


TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF METROPOLITAN AREAS

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ABSTRACT

TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF METROPOLITAN AREAS

By

Patrick James Ashton

The purpose of this paper is to develop a political economy of metropolitan areas as a context for studying suburbs. The historical treatment of suburbs by social scientists is examined and criticized on two grounds: (1) The predominant focus on suburbs as independent units of analysis has obscured important interrelationships among communities in the metropolis; and (2) The overly narrow, single-discipline character of this research has resulted in an artificial division of labor and a subsequent lack of comprehensive analysis. Political economy is suggested as a more systematic and comprehensive method of understanding the meaning of the metropolis for those who reside in it.

Thus the metropolitan economy is the starting point for systematic analysis. It is seen as divided into three distinct sectors: monopoly, competitive and state. Each of these sectors is differentiated along four key dimensions: (1) the technical conditions of production, (2) the social relations of production, (3) the quality of living conditions of the work force, and (4) the social composition of the labor force. Politically independent suburban municipalities are viewed as the means by which certain class and status groups

attempt to protect and expand privileges which accrue to them because of their location in the metropolitan economy. The origin, development and perpetuation of suburbs for this purpose are examined, along with the conflicts and contradictions produced by this process.

The characteristics of the residents of forty-three suburban municipalities in the Detroit metropolitan area are examined to determine if the spatial distribution of privilege can be observed from census data. The discovery of some significant variations among communities leads to a strengthened conviction that metropolitan political economy provides the best context for understanding the meaning of suburbs for the lives of their residents.

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By

Patrick James Ashton

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To My Parents
who, in their own way,
made this possible

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE SUBURBAN PHENOMENON

One of the most striking and significant social phenomena of the twentieth century United States has been the growth and proliferation of the suburbs--small to moderate size municipalities outside the corporate limits of the large central cities, politically independent but economically and culturally dependent on them. Although suburbs existed to some extent in the nineteenth century, it was only in this century that they developed into significant social phenomena. As far back as the Civil War, the populations of large Northeastern cities like Boston, New York and Philadelphia were spilling over the cities' corporate boundaries. But spatial expansion was limited by the relatively undeveloped modes of transportation. With the advent of railroads, suburban communities began to spring up along the spokes of the major routes leading from the hub of the city.

However, it was really the development of the automobile as a relatively cheap and universal mode of transportation at the beginning of this century which made the large-scale development of suburbs possible. In 1900, only 10.7 percent of the U.S. population lived in suburbs (see Table 1, page 2). In 1920, when Americans owned nine million autos, suburban growth exceeded that of central cities for the first time and suburbs accounted for almost 15 percent of the total national population. By 1930, when 26.5 million automobiles were in

Table 1.--Metropolitan Distribution of the U.S. Population, 1900-1970.

Year	Percentages			
	Central cities	Change by decade	Suburbs	Change by decade
1900	21.0	----	10.7	----
1910	25.0	19.1	12.7	19.0
1920	28.9	15.6	14.8	16.5
1930	31.8	10.1	18.0	21.6
1940	31.6	-0.6	19.5	8.3
1950	32.3	2.2	23.8	22.1
1960	32.6	0.9	30.7	24.9
1970	31.4	-3.7	37.6	22.5

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Adapted from Masotti and Hadden (1974:7).

circulation, the growth rate of suburbs was more than double that of central cities. Although the central cities lost population in the depressed thirties, suburbs actually gained 8.3 percent.

After World War II, the stored-up demand for housing, the easy availability of FHA and VA insured mortgages and the growing decentralization of commerce and industry combined to initiate a frenzy of suburban growth. By 1950, the suburban growth rate was more than ten times that of the central cities and nearly one in four Americans was a suburbanite. Eighty-four percent of the nation's twenty-eight million person population increase in the next decade took place in metropolitan areas, with suburbs alone accounting for 64 Percent (Sobin, 1971:24). Urban insurrections and fear of street

crime contributed to a precipitous decline in central city population in the 1960s and further increased migration to the suburbs. In 1970, seventy-six million Americans lived in suburbs--almost 57 percent of the total metropolitan population (Masotti and Hadden, 1974:5-6). The 1970 census confirmed that, for the first time in American history, more people lived in suburbs (37.6 percent) than in either central cities (31.4 percent) or rural areas (31.0 percent).¹

The explosive growth of suburbs since 1900 can also be documented by the expanding volume of social commentary, novels, short stories, and both popular and social scientific research concerning suburbs. A trickle of books and magazine articles in the first few decades of this century turned into a veritable deluge of material after 1950. Not surprisingly, the stated aims and conclusions of these studies varied over time. Given the limitations of time and space, I must necessarily confine myself to those popular and social scientific studies which have made major contributions to the research and debate concerning suburbs.²

The first sociological study of the automobile-induced suburbs was The Suburban Trend by Harlan Paul Douglass which appeared in 1925. In this seminal work Douglass called the suburb "a footnote to urban civilization affecting the nearby countryside It is the city trying to escape the consequences of being a city while still remaining a city. It is urban society trying to eat its cake and keep it, too" (1925:3-4). Ignoring his own dire assessment momentarily, he went on to characterize suburbs as

the most promising aspect of urban civilization Formed out of the dust of cities, they wait to have breathed into them

the breath of community sentiment, of neighborly fraternity and peace. They reflect the unspoiled and youthful aspect of urban civilization, the adolescent and not yet disillusioned part of the city, where, if at all, happiness and worthy living may be achieved, as well as material well-being (1925:36-7).

Douglass' contradictory assertions stood essentially untested for over twenty-five years. It was not until after World War II, when suburban migration became a stampede, that a social scientific literature concerning suburbs began to accumulate and social critics sat up and took notice. The first studies were invariably explorations of specific suburban communities. The findings from one particular community were then assumed to be generalizable to the entire suburban phenomenon. (Sometimes this assumption was made by the writer, sometimes by the writer's audience, often by both.) Thus was born what came to be called "the Myth of Suburbia."³

Thirty years after Harlan Douglass examined the movement out of cities, Auguste Spector sky studied those who moved out the greatest distances--the exurbanites. These people, he found, were artists, editors and successful businessmen who wished to escape the "rat-race" of the city for the tranquility of the countryside. Thus they moved to farms a good distance removed from the city, their place of employment. But they had escaped from one rat-race only to find themselves enmeshed in another. Spector sky noted a high degree of insecurity, compulsive socializing, clique-forming and competition among these people. The exurbanite, he said, has a personal equation in which there is "one constant, his insecurity; one steadily growing value, his obligations; one steadily diminishing factor, time" (1955:269).

If Sectorsky's book laid the basis for a "Myth of Suburbia," William H. Whyte did the most to popularize it through his study of The Organization Man (1956). Whyte devoted the seventh chapter of his book to the residence and lifestyle of The Organization Man. He looked at Park Forest, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago which was predominantly populated by young junior executives on the way up. Whyte criticized the intense competition, superficial social relationships and dulling conformity which he found there. "Social adjustment and togetherness" were the primary values of the community and Whyte showed how they manifested themselves in the lives of the Organization Men, their wives and children. Because Whyte's book achieved such a wide circulation, many Americans assumed that he had accurately summed up the entire phenomenon known as suburbia. Indeed, more than a decade later Scott Donaldson characterized Whyte's account as "the single most influential statement in the attack on the American suburb" (Donaldson, 1969:2).

Another popular study of suburbia which enjoyed a wide circulation in the 1950s was John Keats' The Crack in the Picture Window (1956). In it he examined the housing and the residents of suburbia and found them both uniformly dull and boring. Another book on suburbia which appeared in the same year as those of Keats and Whyte was Crestwood Heights (Seeley, Sim and Loosley, 1956). Although its circulation was far more limited than that of the aforementioned volumes, it is nonetheless extremely important because many social scientists regard it as the first complete study of suburban social life. The authors examined an upper middle class suburb

outside Toronto, Canada populated primarily by business and professional people. They attempted to probe all aspects of suburban life, with a special emphasis on child-rearing practices. They noted that the rigorous and rigid pace of the business world deeply penetrated the social life of the residents. Children were taught the value of the constant acquisition of new objects and that the appearance of success was more important than the reality of it. While the authors attempted to conduct their research with appropriate scientific objectivity, the fact that they considered many of the attitudes, norms, and values which they found in Crestwood Heights almost pathological inevitably fueled the Myth of Suburbia.

In 1958, Robert Wood published Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics. Although ultimately critical of suburbs, this work marked a break with the traditional attack on suburbia. In a sophisticated analysis of the meaning and function of local suburban governments, Wood recognized that the maintenance of these seemingly inefficient local political units represented the desire of suburbanites for local identity in the best tradition of Jeffersonian small-scale direct democracy. Ultimately, however, Wood noted that political fragmentation would greatly hinder the solution of basic suburban problems.

Bennett Berger's 1960 study, Working Class Suburb, struck a major blow at the "Myth of Suburbia." First of all, it contradicted the popular notion that all suburbanites were middle class white collar workers. Secondly, Berger showed that urban residents bring their values and life styles with them to suburbia and transplant them there, rather than automatically acquiring new values and behavioral

patterns. This work did a great deal to spread the notion that suburbia was a much more complex social phenomenon than had previously been indicated.

The 1960s produced a number of studies which were explicitly critical of the "Myth of Suburbia." While the authors of these works admitted the existence of problems in suburbia, they saw these problems as no more serious or extensive than those of the large cities. William Dobriner was one of these people. "Suburbs certainly possess a structural reality and a distinct ecological position within the metropolitan area," he noted in 1963, "but it is questionable whether they have developed a way of life critically different from the urban pattern" (Dobriner, 1963:25-6). Dobriner prefers to see each suburb as a specialized subsystem of the metropolitan area. Individual suburbs can vary a great deal and it is important to make distinctions based on social class composition (the most critical variable), employment patterns, and type and age of housing. Writers and social critics who fell for the Myth did so because they overlooked these variables, Dobriner concludes (1963:25-8).

Another important critique of the "Myth of Suburbia" was the work of Herbert Gans. He studied the new suburb of Levittown, New Jersey from its inception onward through participant observation and questionnaire techniques. Gans published his findings in 1967 in The Levittowners. What he found was that people's basic lifestyles were not changed by the move to suburbia, and the small changes which did take place were planned before the move. Gans said he saw no evidence of compulsive socializing, excessive conformity or intense

competition among the Levittowners. Reflecting Dobriner somewhat, Gans concluded that new communities were essentially shaped by their population mix.

Perhaps the most virulent critic of the "Myth of Suburbia" has been Scott Donaldson. He unequivocally states that the "largely nonsensical" onslaught against the suburbs "contains little that is intelligent or constructive; for the most part, it is composed of whopping irrelevancies, galloping overstatements, and poorly concealed animosities" (Donaldson, 1969:1). He worries that in the end the suburbs may succumb to this unfair attack out of demoralization and despair. Donaldson's work is both an attempt to dispel the myth and raise the spirits and pride of suburbanites.

The urban insurrections in the 1960s did much to rekindle interest in the flagging study of urban sociology. And studies of the large metropolitan cities could hardly fail to analyze the expanding suburbs. In addition, when the 1970 census confirmed the fact that a plurality of Americans had become suburbanites, increasing numbers of social scientists and social commentators were drawn to investigating this phenomenon. Drawing fruitfully on the debate of the fifties and sixties, these newer analyses tended to be broader in scope. They viewed the problems of suburbia as complex and interdependent and thus were usually more realistic.

Dennis Sobin's The Future of the American Suburbs is one such work. Sobin wonders if suburbs can continue to exist in their present form, both because of their internal difficulties and the larger interdependent problems of the metropolis. "The ills fostered

by the suburbs extend beyond suburbia," he writes.

In large measure many of the problems of the cities can be directly attributed to the suburbs, for suburbia has helped to bring about the economic crisis, the jobless situation, the deterioration of public services and the perpetration of ghettos in cities. It has helped to do this by drawing the affluent from the city, by discriminating against black people, and by diverting federal and state funds from the city (1971:93).

Several readers have appeared recently which deal with the question of policy for the suburbs. One such collection is Cities and Suburbs, edited by Bryan Downes (1971). Another is The End of Innocence, edited by Charles M. Haar, who served as chairman of President Johnson's Task Force on Suburban Problems (Haar, 1972). For Haar, the important questions which must be answered include:

What are the implications for American society of what is taking place in suburbia? What are the portents of the coming wave of suburban growth? Can we guide, direct, or exhort the coming growth so that it will accord with our vision; and if we can, are we willing to accept the responsibility and undertake the task?" (1972:ii).

The responsibility of planning, Haar says, requires a "loss of innocence" in order to completely recognize the fully interdependent nature of the metropolis and the nation. Whether he does so consciously or not, Haar revises Harlan Douglass' characterization of the suburbs of half a century ago as "the unspoiled and youthful aspect of urban civilization, the adolescent and not yet disillusioned part of the city," by stating that "Our infancy and childhood are over: neither nature, nor the frontier, nor the unfettered pursuit of individual interests will sufficiently protect us from ourselves" (Haar, 1972:185).

If one recurrent theme could be said to run through this varied literature on suburbia, it would be this: Each author, whether

critic, defender or disinterested researcher, has attempted to come to grips with the meaning of suburbs for the lives of their residents. They have tried, with varying degrees of success, to understand the attitudes, values, lifestyles and lifechances of these Americans who live in suburbs. The uneven quality of the insights gained is a result of a fundamental methodological difficulty: While suburbs are part of an interdependent metropolitan system, they have most often been studied as relatively independent units of analysis. Research has focused on individual suburbs or groups of suburbs without examining how the lives of these particular residents are directly and indirectly tied to those of all the other residents of the metropolis. Nor is this the sole fault of suburban research. Studies of cities and urban problems have consistently overlooked the suburbs and their interconnections with the problems studied.⁴

Focus on suburbs as relatively independent units of analysis has introduced an additional methodological failing. The assumption is made that if enough microsocial studies of independent units are done, they will somehow add up to a coherent and comprehensive picture of the whole phenomenon. Examining the possibilities for future research, Maurice Stein epitomizes this position when he states: "The whole effort at developing a sociological interpretation of suburbia will rest upon the accumulation during the years to come of a series of studies of different kinds of suburbs" (Stein, 1960: 199). While it is true that social science research is cumulative, it must be research which examines the full microsocial range of a

phenomenon, which takes into account as many fine details and distinctions as possible while remaining comprehensive.

If studies of cities and suburbs are limited because of their narrow scope, one would expect the literature on metropolitan areas to remedy this difficulty. However, most metropolitan research goes too far in the other direction. That is, in an attempt to achieve a broad scope of analysis, the authors of these studies have overlooked important distinctions between and among suburbs and cities. For example, Masotti and Hadden have written extensively about the complexities of suburbia. Yet, when they choose the metropolis as the context for their research, they fail to establish the meaning of these complexities in the larger whole (Hadden, Masotti, and Larsen, 1967). Similarly, Blake McKelvey's analysis of the growth and development of metropolitan America fails completely to take the suburban phenomenon into account (McKelvey, 1968). Even a very comprehensive and excellent comparative and historical analysis like that of Hans Blumenfeld neglects the subtle differences between city and suburbs (Blumenfeld, 1967). A metropolitan study which does touch on conflicts between and among cities and suburbs is John Bollens' examination of St. Louis (Bollens, 1961). Unfortunately, he does not analyze these differences in a sufficiently systematic manner.

Social science research on suburbs and their place in the metropolitan context is further impaired by the artificial division of labor among the social sciences. Sociologists and social psychologists have studied attitudes, values and lifestyles of suburbanites but, as noted earlier, they have failed to examine the

full complexities of the metropolis. Economists have traditionally had a metropolitan focus to their research but, on the whole, they too have neglected the dynamics of conflict among competing interests.⁵ Political scientists have been the group most likely to take account of the conflicts arising out of the growth and development of suburbs.⁶ They have analyzed how the divergent needs and goals of cities and suburbs clash and compete in the metropolitan arena. However what is often missing from their analysis is a thorough examination of the bases for divergent interests, the origin of competing needs and goals. This is due to their omission or superficial treatment of the economic element.

In order to comprehensively analyze the meaning of suburbs for the lives of their residents, then, we need a methodology which will take into account social, political and economic factors and which will view suburbs not as independent units of analysis, but as interdependent parts of a comprehensive whole. More importantly, it must be a mode of analysis which has as its starting point the most fundamental of human activities: the way in which people satisfy their basic human needs. No research purporting to analyze people's lives and life chances can overlook this fundamental activity. For here are rooted the origins of power and control (and thus conflict) in society. The methodology of which I speak is that of political economy. Very simply, political economy is "the study of the social laws governing the production and distribution of material means of satisfying human needs" (Lange, 1963:1). Political economy begins with the most fundamental human activity and then seeks to explain

the relationships of individuals and groups of individuals to one another. It roots the origin and dynamics of conflict among various interests in a society in the bedrock of production relations. Thus, it attempts to reveal the laws of motion of society (Eaton, 1949: 1-4).⁷

The methodology of political economy, then, is indispensable to a truly fundamental and comprehensive analysis of the meaning of suburbs for the lives of their residents. But the methodology impels us to look beyond suburbs themselves, to consider the entire metropolitan context. What is needed is a political economy of metropolitan areas. Unfortunately, relevant research in political economy is currently rather scattered and uneven. The present paper is an attempt to bring together and synthesize those works which, because of their political economic methodology, can bring insight and clarification to metropolitan analysis. O'Connor (1973) is the most important of these endeavors and is relied on heavily throughout the remainder of this paper. Although he does not deal specifically with metropolitan areas to a great extent, O'Connor's work is crucial for comprehending the nature of advanced capitalism in the United States, and the conflicts generated within it. Working independently, Bluestone (1968, 1972) has reached several parallel and ancillary conclusions. Harvey (1972) and Sinclair (1972) clearly demonstrate how spatial relationships are generated by economic ones, although neither of them talk specifically about suburbs. Williams (1967) shows how suburbs protect the privileges of certain groups in the

metropolis and Gordon (1971) shows that fundamental urban problems are rooted in the metropolitan economy.

Thus this paper attempts to develop a political economy of metropolitan areas as a context in which to study suburbs--their growth and development and their implications for the lives of the people who live in them. No theory will be conclusively proved or disproved here, nor will sophisticated techniques of data manipulation be employed. Rather an attempt will be made to illustrate the utility of political economy for understanding both the dynamics and human meanings of suburbs in metropolitan areas. Rather than a conclusion, I hope that this is a beginning.

CHAPTER II

THE CONTEXT OF SUBURBIA

The Metropolitan Economy

When we speak of a metropolitan economy, we are essentially considering the national economy as a whole, for the U.S. economy is a metropolitan economy. Over two-thirds of the nation's population and labor force reside in the metropolis. The headquarters of almost all the large corporate organizations are there, as well as a vast majority of all financial institutions and wholesale and retail establishments (Bollens and Schmandt, 1965:109).

Following O'Connor (1973:13), I would observe that economic activities in the metropolis are divided into two broad groups: industries organized by private capital and those organized by the state. Production and distribution in the private sector are further divided into industries organized along competitive and monopolistic lines.⁸ Richard Hill (1973:16) has pointed out that each of these sectors--competitive, monopoly and state--can be differentiated along four key dimensions: (1) the technical conditions of production; (2) the social relations of production; (3) the quality of living conditions of the work force; (4) the social composition of the labor force. Since the state sector tends to have features of both the monopoly and competitive sectors, it is my intention to first

differentiate the latter two sectors along these dimensions, then return to an analysis of the state sector.

Technical Conditions of Production

The most striking difference between the monopoly and competitive sectors is the degree of concentration inherent in each. Monopoly sector industries are dominated by a handful of firms⁹ and characterized by high cost of entry while competitive sector firms face a great deal of competition and relative ease of firm entry. The reasons for this difference flow directly from two differing conditions of production. Monopoly sector industries are highly capital intensive and ordinarily very large in order to take advantage of economies of scale. Increases in an already high rate of productivity are tied more to capital investment and technological progress than to growth of employment. Furthermore, markets for monopoly sector goods are generally national and international in scope. Thus the desire to protect huge capital investments and the flexibility introduced by large markets, coupled with large size and difficulty of entry give monopoly industries both the motivation and the ability to control price competition in their sector.

The situation of competitive sector industries is the opposite: low capital-to-labor ratios allow for ease of entry and thus lead to overcrowding and fierce competition. Increases in productivity are achieved in small increments and are generally tied to an expansion of the labor force. The market for competitive sector commodities is often local or regional. Frequently demand is highly unstable

and/or seasonal. The difficulty in achieving economies of scale, ease of firm entry and unstable markets thus conspire to prevent competitive sector firms from achieving any significant degree of control over their respective industries.

Profitability also varies in the competitive and monopoly sectors. Monopoly sector firms tend to have both higher absolute profit levels and higher rates of profit. For example, in 1969 the one hundred largest industrial corporations in the United States accounted for over 58 percent of all after-tax profits (Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf, 1972:154). Moreover, Table 2 shows that the more capital intensive a firm, the higher its relative profit rate. A major explanation for both higher absolute and relative profits lies in the differing structure of monopoly and competitive industries. By their very nature, industries in the monopoly sector have a great deal of control over their market and are thus not strictly subject to the laws of supply and demand. Increased costs can be passed on to the consumer in the form of higher prices and declining demand will not necessarily lower the price of monopoly sector commodities. In fact it usually leads to an increase in prices in order to maintain projected profit margins.¹⁰

In the competitive sector, on the other hand, profits are much less stable because they are subject to market forces. Increased costs often must be absorbed by the firm in order to maintain a competitive position, thereby reducing profits. In addition, decreasing demand in an industry must often be met by reduction in prices by the

Table 2.--Profit Rates of All U.S. Corporations by Asset Size.*

Asset class (lower limit)	Year		
	1937	1949	1961
\$0	-8.2	-3.4	-4.9
\$50,000	1.8	7.4	6.4
\$100,000	3.9	10.5	8.2
\$250,000	4.9	12.9	8.1
\$500,000	5.3	13.5	9.4
\$1,000,000	6.0	14.3	9.8
\$5,000,000	6.0	13.9	10.2
\$10,000,000	6.9	14.6	10.6
\$50,000,000	5.4	13.9	11.2

*Total profits or losses before taxes were divided by equity to obtain the profit rate, which is expressed as a percentage.

Source: U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service.
Adapted from Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf(1972:154).

individual firms in order to retain their competitive shares of the market.

The higher absolute and relative profitability of the monopoly sector, along with its greater stability of profits, begets an ever-increasing share of capital investment. For, according to the "law of uneven development," capital is reinvested in those areas which have proven to be most profitable in the past. This investment tends to change the quality of the factor in a way that makes further investment even more profitable. Rich firms are made richer by this process and poor firms are left to fend for themselves. Thus the gap between the monopoly and competitive sectors increases secularly (Bluestone, 1972:65-6).

Social Relations of Production

The social relations of the monopoly and competitive sectors are based on their respective technical conditions of production. An important set of social relations is found in the division of labor in the two sectors. In the monopoly sector, sophisticated and complex production processes require a large number of trained technical and supervisory employees. Huge organizational bureaucracies are created as monopoly sector firms expand in both size and scope. Moreover, high profitability and the ability of these firms to pass the increased costs of bureaucracy on to the consumer encourage this development. By way of contrast, competitive sector firms (1) have less need for large organizational bureaucracies because of their generally smaller size and scope; and (2) are financially unable to support such bureaucracies because of their very competitive position--

costs must always be kept to a minimum. Competitive sector entrepreneurs and employers simply cannot afford the luxury of finely differentiated work roles which accrues to their monopoly sector counterparts.

The wage contract represents a very important social relation between capital and labor. But its conditions differ enormously between the monopoly and competitive sectors. Capital intensity, high labor productivity, stability produced by concentration and high profit levels, and high public visibility create the structural conditions impelling and enabling monopoly sector firms to pay significantly higher wages than those in the competitive sector.¹¹ High labor intensity, low productivity and profit margins, and competition in the market on the other hand constrain competitive sector firms from paying high wages. In addition, low public visibility lessens the pressure on them to do so. In 1968, O'Connor notes, ten million workers in the United States earned less than \$1.60 per hour, including 3.5 million who were paid less than \$1.00 per hour. Two-thirds of these workers were employed in retail trade and services--both highly competitive industries (O'Connor, 1973:14-5). Similarly, Bluestone (1972:68) has found that the wage differential between "high-wage" and "low-wage" industries has increased secularly. In 1947, in the set of industries with the lowest wages, the average hourly rates were 75 percent of the average in high wage industries. In 1966, the ratio had fallen to 60 percent. Furthermore, the low wage industries granted smaller wage increases (in both percentage and absolute terms) in all but four years of the period.

However, the technical conditions of production are necessary but not sufficient conditions for higher wages in the monopoly sector. Ultimately, higher wages are strongly correlated with the level of unionization. Of course the extent to which workers can organize and successfully bargain for better circumstances is also determined to a certain extent by the technical conditions of production. Physical and geographic concentration of production facilities, the relatively inelastic demand for labor and high productivity per worker combine to create a climate conducive to unionization in the monopoly sector. On the whole, blue collar workers in this sector have exploited these conditions advantageously and are now almost completely unionized. Recently, white collar workers in monopoly sector industries have begun to organize also.

The need for monopoly firms to create a stable labor force in order to rationalize the planning process and their ability to pass on increased wage costs to the consumer allows these employers to accept union movements. On the other hand, workers in the competitive sector are faced with this dilemma: their wages tend to be low and do not keep up with the cost of living. However, if they attempt to raise their wages through collective bargaining, they may price their employer out of the competitive market and thus lose their jobs when the company folds. For this reason and others mentioned above, unionization and wages tend to be low in the competitive sector.

Quality of Living Conditions
of the Work Force

The quality of life for workers in the monopoly and competitive sectors of the metropolitan economy can be analyzed in terms of two categories: (1) job security and advancement, and (2) social and working conditions. Both of these dimensions are rooted in the technical conditions and social relations of production. Two features of the monopoly sector--its huge capital investment and its relatively inelastic demand for labor--contribute a great deal toward maintaining a relatively stable workforce. Unions prevent arbitrary layoffs and provide benefits (or get the firm to provide benefits) when they do occur. Seniority and tenure systems protect jobs and provide opportunities for advancement. In contrast, employment in the competitive sector is often temporary or seasonal, and the demand for labor is highly elastic. Coupled with the low level of unionization, these conditions contribute to a highly unstable employment picture for workers in this sector. Hiring, firing and advancement are often done on very particularistic criteria and workers have little recourse unless overt racial or sexual discrimination can be proved.

In addition, structural conditions in the competitive sector contribute to a great deal of underemployment. According to government usage, the underemployed include: those unemployed, those working full time at very low wages, those who want to work full time but can find only part time work, and those who want to work but have dropped out of the labor force. David Gordon (1971:58) notes three defining characteristics of underemployed workers: low wages, low skill levels, and random, frequently unpredictable patterns of work.

Each characteristic reinforces the other to create a self-perpetuating cycle of underemployment. These workers, because of their own personal and social characteristics or the structure of the industries in which they find employment, become locked in a cycle of deprivation at the same time that other workers find security and advancement in monopoly sector jobs.

Because of greater public visibility and a higher level of unionization, jobs in the monopoly sector tend to be safer and less subject to arbitrary discipline than those in the competitive sector. Strict work rules provide for workbreaks, sickleave and paid vacations for monopoly industry workers. Very few competitive sector workers have all of these benefits. Recently, monopoly sector unions have put increasing emphasis on health care and pension provisions in their collective bargaining agreements. Most workers in competitive industries are not likely to have extensive medical and dental insurance, and until very recently saw pension plans completely wiped out when companies went out of business. Although recent government legislation will protect a majority of pension plans for workers with seniority, the benefits gap between monopoly and competitive sector workers is not likely to close.

Social Composition of the Labor Force

An examination of the labor force employed by monopoly and competitive sector industries shows that significant distinctions can be made by sector. The monopoly sector labor force is relatively homogeneous; it is disproportionately composed of white male workers.

This is logical when we consider three points: (1) jobs in the monopoly sector invariably carry the greatest status, highest wages and most benefits; (2) white Anglo-Saxon males have traditionally been the most privileged group in the U.S. labor force; (3) the stability of employment inherent in the structure of monopoly sector industries and the job tenure and protection from labor market competition afforded by strong unions serve as effective weapons in the service of the status quo.

Workers in the competitive sector, on the other hand, are disproportionately black, chicano, female and at either extreme of the age continuum of the labor force. Part of the heterogeneity of this work force is explained by the nature of employment in the competitive sector. Its frequently seasonal and temporary nature has obvious appeal to students, working mothers with children, older people supplementing social security and/or pension income and moonlighters. Nevertheless, minorities are concentrated in the competitive sector to an extent great enough to cause us to look for a structural mechanism by way of explanation.

The operation of dual labor markets is just such an explanation. Michael Piore (1970:90-4), who has done extensive analysis of manpower allocation and labor markets, argues that

the role of employment and the disposition of manpower in the perpetuation of poverty is best understood in terms of a dual labor market. One sector of that market, . . . the primary market, offers jobs which possess several of the following traits: high wages, good working conditions, employment stability and job security, equity and due process in the administration of work rules, and chances for advancement [i.e. jobs in the monopoly sector]. The other, or secondary sector, has jobs which, relative to those in the primary sector, are decidedly less

attractive. They tend to involve low wages, poor working conditions, considerable variability in employment, harsh and often arbitrary discipline and little opportunity to advance [i.e. jobs in the competitive sector] (Piore, 1970:91).

Minority workers tend to be trapped in secondary, or competitive sector jobs for two self-fulfilling reasons. First, their entrance into the work force at the level of competitive sector employment tends to develop behavioral traits which are not conducive to upward movement into the primary sector. For example, punctuality and a high degree of on-the-job discipline are often not essential in competitive sector industries. Association with others who do not possess these traits, especially through ghettoization, tends to reinforce and perpetuate alternate behavioral patterns which make these people unacceptable to monopoly sector employers.¹²

Secondly, minority workers who do possess the behavioral traits necessary to work in the monopoly sector are kept out of the primary labor market because they possess the superficial physical or social characteristics of secondary workers. Piore calls this phenomenon statistical discrimination. Secondary workers are thus confined by "gatekeeping" institutions like employment agencies and labor service pools to employment in the competitive sector while the status of white males is protected through their privileged access to primary labor markets.

According to O'Connor (1973:17-8), there are two major subdivisions in the state sector of the economy: production of goods and services organized by the state (e.g. education, health and welfare) and production organized by industries under state contract (e.g. highway construction, military and aeronautical equipment).

State-organized production tends to have the structural features of the competitive sector. It is labor intensive; expansion of production depends upon expansion of employment. State-contracted production is organized along monopoly sector lines. It is capital intensive and highly concentrated. High profits are guaranteed through cost-plus contracts. Productivity, however, tends to be low because the unique nature of many of the products militates against economies of mass production and the lack of incentive in the guaranteed profit plan.

Wage levels in both subgroups of the state sector tend to be high. This is due partly to the high level of unionization at the Federal level and increasing unionization at the state and local level. But more importantly, wage levels reflect the political process. Workers in state-contract production are already members of monopoly sector unions and workers in state-organized production have successfully extended monopoly sector pattern bargaining to their own union contracts, in spite of their low productivity. Job security and opportunity for advancement in state-contract industries resembles that of the monopoly sector. Workers in state-organized production have achieved these benefits through the civil service system.

Because of political pressure for equal opportunity and the resultant government regulations, minorities are employed by the state in significantly greater numbers than in the monopoly sector. High public visibility of both state-organized and state-contract industries results in a movement of some blacks, women and other minorities into positions of power. However, it is still possible to see

the operation of the dual labor market in the state sector. Blacks, women, chicanos, students, etc., are funneled through the secondary labor market into the menial blue collar and low-status clerical jobs in this sector. To the extent that the civil service system can be circumvented (and often in the course of its normal operation), white males are channeled through the primary labor market into high-paying decision-making positions. Since wages in the state sector are significantly higher than in the competitive sector, access of minorities to state jobs represents an absolute gain. However, since they tend to be concentrated in the lower-status occupations within the sector, relative inequality is perpetuated.

The structure of the metropolitan economy which I have just described is crucial for an understanding of the lives of the people who live and work in the metropolis. For the nature of the production and distribution relations into which these people enter in the process of earning a living provides a framework for the development of a system of stratification. It is a system based on both class and status distinctions.¹³ White collar workers in the monopoly sector have different access to high-paying and rewarding jobs than do their counterparts in the competitive and state sectors. A small businessman in a competitive industry has a very different range of investment and production decisions than does the president of a huge monopoly corporation. While the nature of clerical work may be similar, it is rewarded in a different fashion in the state and competitive sectors. And so on. The inequalities manifest in the metropolis have their origins in the organization and dynamics of production relations.

Furthermore, this class and status stratification has a spatial dimension. For the geographic organization of space in the metropolis "is the result of human activity as it unfolds in a particular cultural, social, economic, political and technological setting," says David Harvey (1972:1). The material base of this activity, as we have seen, is located in the structure of the metropolitan economy. The various claims on space in the metropolis and the uses to which it is put reflect the different locations of classes and status groups in that economy. It shall be the purpose of the remainder of this paper to examine the location of these groups and to show how their economic position brings them into conflict with one another.

The Spatial Distribution of Privilege

The basic thesis of this paper is that political fragmentation in the metropolis, evidenced by the proliferation of relatively small, independent municipalities at the fringes of large cities, is not an irrational, unplanned and uncontrolled development. Rather it is the result of very rational, self-serving attempts on the part of certain class and status groups to protect and maintain a certain degree of privilege. While it is quite true that many urban neighborhoods have easily identifiable class and status characteristics, the important difference in suburbia is political independence. Suburban municipalities are sufficiently small and manageable enough that a class or status conscious group of residents can use their governmental power to defend, and often to expand their privilege.

There are two basic incentives for the protection of space in the metropolis. First, strategic locations can be appropriated by

various groups in order to protect or improve their competitive position in production and/or consumption. But once these areas are acquired, they must be safeguarded, notes Oliver Williams, "for the curse of urbanism is the instability of site advantages. A variety of social institutions, of which the municipality is one, help to protect the place of advantage for its constituents and to slow down the forces of change" (Williams, 1967:302). Secondly, class and status groups can stake out relatively vacant territory outside the city and erect the walls of political independence to keep out those people sufficiently different from themselves so as to challenge their cherished values.

Those lifestyle values which depend upon location for their realization [e.g. education, recreation] are the major sources of metropolitan politics The more nearly the suburb specializes [i.e. attains a homogeneous population] the easier it is, politically, to maintain the primacy of the values prized by the dominant type of sociospatial unit (Williams, 1967:303).

Political conflict in the metropolis is thus rooted in the competing interests of various spatially arranged class and status groups, and location in space therefore has extensive ramifications for the lives of metropolitan residents.

Before analyzing the roots of the spatial distribution of privilege in the metropolis and some of its present contradictions, a brief word is necessary about how the approach of this paper differs from other related work in this area. First of all, I have shown in the Introduction why I believe that analysis of metropolitan areas must take place within the framework of political economy--an avenue which only a few studies have taken in the past. Secondly, I view the process of suburbanization as a conscious, rational attempt on

the part of some groups in society to protect and/or expand their resources. This process is inevitably accompanied by political conflict and coercion. A number of social scientists, especially from the Human Ecology school, have tended to reify the process of suburban growth. By describing it as a logical outcome of a relatively constant natural process and by their use of concepts like invasion and succession, they tend to overlook the very real political conflicts which often accompany spatial changes. This perspective was stated in perhaps its most extreme form by pioneer suburbanologist Harlan Douglass.

The suburb is a natural process of sifting and of the more or less efficient disposal of the specific elements of urban life in separate places. It is a series of areas devoted to partial and limited segments of the broad interests and activities necessary to civilization. It is a set of specializations with a geographical basis (Douglass, 1925:121).

Finally, research on class and status in suburbs has been almost entirely in terms of how "suburbs" or "the suburban ring" differ from the central city (e.g. Schnore, 1965; Dobriner, 1963).

The Roots of Modern Suburbs

As noted in the Introduction, suburbs existed around large cities as far back as the middle of the nineteenth century. Because of the limited nature of the transportation system, though, only the rich could afford the time and transport costs involved in living "in the country." The growth of urban rail systems allowed middle class urbanites to move out into "streetcar suburbs." But the real impetus for suburban migration came at the end of the nineteenth century with the growth of industrialization in urban centers and

the great waves of immigrants arriving in the cities from Eastern and Southern Europe. Out of these two processes arose the motivation for the accelerated suburban migration of both the upper and middle classes. O'Connor (1973:125-6) describes it this way:

By the last half of the [nineteenth] century immigration and industrialization had decreed the central political fact in the growing urban centers: the elementary division of classes under capitalism--capitalists and workers. But men of property were relatively few in number and divided among themselves. Scandalized by rampant corruption and unable to control their environment, the upper classes sought refuge in the villages on the periphery of the city, where market forces were pushing out the farmers For the great majority in the middle classes--commercial property owners and businessmen, independent professionals, and the new corporate retinue--the city became a wasteland which they could not control and therefore could not enjoy. Hence they became suburbanites--to control their environment (in particular to get more space), acquire political autonomy and escape from big-city politics.

Thus, according to O'Connor, class conflict was put on a metropolitan basis.

The great numbers of immigrants arriving in the cities in the late nineteenth century were bound to generate some degree of tension and hostility in the native residents. But this conflict was exacerbated by changes which the great waves of immigration precipitated in productive technology and the supply of labor. As Sennett and Cobb (1972:12-3)¹⁴ point out, labor was in short supply before the great waves of immigration. Machines were developed to perform relatively unskilled jobs, freeing the somewhat scarce workers to do the more complex skilled tasks. The influx of destitute immigrants in the late nineteenth century created a huge pool of unskilled laborers. Since these foreigners were desperate for work at any wage, it became cheaper for the industrialists to employ these

laborers to do unskilled tasks than it was to utilize current machinery. Under these conditions, machinery was developed to replace skilled labor. Middle class urban residents thus had two specific sources of hostility toward the immigrants: (1) they contributed, even if indirectly, to the elimination of skilled jobs; and (2) the skilled craftsmen among them increased the competition for better jobs. Faced with cultural conflict, competition for housing and jobs and the loss of political control, the native urban middle class began to seek out greener pastures. The suburb, with its opportunity for political independence and control, was an appealing solution. Gregory Singleton (1973:45) sums it up like this:

Residential segregation, industrialization, and the challenge of ethnic and labor groups to middle-class control of the city created a class consciousness which was expressed in many ways, including the 'flight' to the suburbs. By the end of the nineteenth century, the middle-class suburb, in spite of the fact that other kinds of suburbs existed, became a social category.

The twentieth century began with some extremely important and deeprooted changes in the U.S. economy which gave further impetus to suburban migration. Essentially, the metropolitan economy began to take the shape which I have described in the previous section. Huge corporations emerged through mergers to dominate particular industries. A new group of class-conscious managers took over from the old independent capitalists. The union movement was born amidst tremendous conflict. The state was enlisted in rationalizing decision making and protecting profits in the emerging monopoly sector.¹⁵ The state sector itself began to grow, literally exploding in size and importance in the post-Depression Roosevelt years.

The meaning of the developing metropolitan economy for the growth of suburbia is this: Differentiation and growing complexity in the structure of production and distribution was accompanied by differentiation of labor markets and further stratification of the labor force. Technical skill alone was no longer sufficient to ensure access to greater economic rewards. Increasingly it came to matter who a worker was employed by, the industry in which this employer was located, and the place of this industry in the larger economic structure. Workers with access to the primary labor market and thus to more rewarding jobs sought ways to protect this privilege. Migration to the suburbs provided one answer. Here they could consolidate their gains and reproduce themselves in ways which reinforced and expanded their privilege, effectively protected by the walls of political independence. Life chances, already distributed unequally, then became more systematic in their unequal distribution.

Two key features of my argument should be emphasized here. First of all, I am not arguing that all communities on the fringes of large cities are the result of conscious decisions on the part of specific groups to incorporate and protect some degree of privilege. Rather I am saying that the ability to achieve a measure of control over the environment, which was impossible to obtain in the central city, has been and is now an important causal factor in the movement to the suburbs and the growth of political incorporation.¹⁶ Secondly, I am not arguing that all or even some suburban communities are completely homogeneous by class, sector or occupation. With Oliver Williams I note that

any municipality can absorb a certain degree of internal diversity and still maintain a dominant style. In fact, a certain degree of internal diversity is often required for the maintenance of daily activities. However, a scanning of the range of mean values describing any municipal characteristic in a metropolitan area will quickly establish that real diversity (specialization) exists (Williams, 1967:307).

Furthermore, there is evidence that as the structure of production and distribution in the metropolis becomes progressively more complex and labor markets more intricately stratified, the spatial distribution of privilege becomes increasingly manifest. In a 1965 study of the Philadelphia metropolitan area, Williams and his colleagues found that differentiation by social class was increasing more rapidly among suburbs than among towns and townships in the area. They indicate that this was due to the more recent establishment of middle and lower-middle class suburbs alongside of the older elite communities (Williams et al., 1965:49-53). Similarly, in a study of governmental inequality in U.S. metropolitan areas based on 1960 census data, Hill (1974:19-24) discovered that the degree of fiscal inequality among municipalities in a given metropolitan area covaried with:

1. the age, size and population density of the metropolitan area
2. the degree of inequality in the distribution of income among families in the metropolis
3. the degree of segregation by social class in the metropolis
4. the extent of segregation of housing by quality in the metropolitan area
5. the number of municipal governments in the metropolitan community.

The division of the metropolitan economy into monopoly, competitive and state sectors, along with the changing nature of work under advanced capitalism, constitutes a further impetus to the growth of incorporated municipalities as protectors of privilege. According

to David Gordon (1971:63-6), traditional class distinctions have been blurred by the increasing complexity of the economy. The need of the capitalist class for stability and legitimation and the need of certain workers to consolidate and protect privileged access to the more rewarding sectors of the economy has led both of these groups to seek new mechanisms of stratification by status.

What specific changes have occurred to render class distinctions less meaningful? First of all, Gordon says, the growth of competitive sector service industries has eroded the distinction between owners and workers in this sector, since they often perform the same kind of work. Secondly, the growth of bureaucratic methods of production has undermined a number of traditional distinctions. For example, the formerly clear relationship among wages, productivity and manifest labor skill has become hazy. Worker productivity is increasingly based not on measurable, "objective" skills, but on length of job tenure and grasp of complex organizational nuances. In this situation legitimation of unequal rewards becomes increasingly problematic. Thus managers are led to create a complex system of relatively meaningless job classifications in order to foster an illusion of mobility and differentiation. The use of non-monetary incentives and fringe benefits has placed further emphasis on arbitrary status distinctions. Finally, the increasing reliance on educational requirements as hiring standards has intensified stratification by status in the labor force.

The important implication of these changes is that as status distinctions become more significant in the economy, workers

possessing privileged characteristics will move to consolidate, protect and reproduce these distinctions over time. The move to the suburbs--not just any suburb, but one whose residents possess appropriate status characteristics--is a way of doing this. In their chosen suburb, status groups can engage in the types of lifestyles and consumption patterns which reinforce their status. And they can use the educational system to ensure that their own particular attributes are reproduced in their children.

Probably the strongest and most significant factor propelling suburban growth in the twentieth century has been the decentralization of the means of production and distribution in the metropolis. Two interrelated forces were at the heart of this process: the automobile and the assembly line. The flexibility introduced by the use of trucks as a major means of transport meant that manufacturing and wholesaling concerns no longer had to locate along major rail lines or waterways. They could move out from the central city in order to be nearer their sources of supply and/or areas of distribution. At the same time, the new assembly line technique of manufacturing, developed to its fullest extent by Henry Ford, was not well adapted for use in the multistory industrial plants which then existed in the center of the city. The assembly line was most efficient in a sprawling, one story building. Since there were few vacant parcels of land of any great size within the city, industrialists naturally turned their attention to the open spaces beyond the fringes of the residential areas. And the concurrent development of truck technology

made it feasible and efficient to expand industrial production in this way.¹⁷

The continuing decentralization of production and distribution facilities has obviously meant a continuing dispersal of employment opportunities. And the growth of private automobile ownership has permitted selected groups of workers to follow these jobs. A number of people who have studied suburbs, including many of those discussed in Chapter I of this paper, have tended to see the automobile as a causal factor in the development of suburbs, or at least a semi-independent variable. While it is true that upper and working class people did and still do move to the suburbs for all the reasons discussed previously, there can be no doubt that the major spur toward suburbanization of the population was the decentralization of production and distribution. The automobile was a facilitating factor, not a causal one. After careful investigation, John Kain (1968:17) informs us that "the locational decisions of most manufacturing firms are largely unaffected by the distribution of metropolitan population. Manufacturing determines the locational process of urban households, not vice-versa." Furthermore, he presents data, which I have reproduced here in Table 3, to show that in fact employment has decentralized more rapidly than population.

Initially, metropolitan decentralization took place primarily in terms of durable goods manufacturers in the monopoly sector. The automobile industry was the early leader. After the sluggish Thirties, decentralization picked up again. While World War II had a stimulating effect on the entire economy, nowhere was its influence

Table 3.--Estimated Mean Annual Percentage Changes^a in Population and Employment for the Central Cities and Suburban Rings of 40 Large SMSA's (1950 central city boundaries).

Item	Central City			Suburban Ring		
	1948- 1954	1954- 1958	1958- 1963	1948- 1954	1954- 1958	1958- 1963
Employment						
Manufacturing ^b	1.9	-1.7	-0.4	13.2	6.9	6.0
Wholesaling ^c	0.8	0.2	-0.2	24.9	16.6	15.1
Retailing	-0.6	0.1	-2.0	11.3	13.5	13.4
Services	1.6	3.9	0.9	18.0	16.6	13.5
Population ^d	0.2	0.1	-0.5	8.7	6.4	5.5

^aSimple, unweighted averages of individual city percentage changes.

^bData pertain to 1947-1954.

^cWholesaling data available for 39 SMSA's only.

^dObtained by interpolation and extrapolation of 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1965 data.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Cited in Kain (1968:13).

more heavily felt than in the durable goods industries. In the eight years 1938-46, the government built on the average over two and one-half billion dollars worth of industrial buildings per year (Kain, 1968:7). This figure was over 2,000 percent higher than the government average for the previous eight year period and over twice the average of private industry. Lacking space in the cities, most of these plants were built on their outer rims. Because there were restrictions on construction during the war years, workers who would ordinarily move into the area and erect protective municipalities could not do so. When the war ended, the government sold its industrial facilities back to private industry. Many of these production facilities continued in the state sector under state contract work. A number of them also returned to the private sector. The important point is that they were an attractive lure to certain groups of workers. And when residential building controls were lifted, a stampede to inhabit these areas was created. This interpretation helps explain the relatively high mean annual percentage increase in manufacturing and wholesaling employment and population growth in the suburban ring in the postwar period (see Table 3).¹⁸

Even if one accepts the fact that, for the most part, industry decentralized into outlying areas and then workers followed, the conventional wisdom holds that retail outlets were the last to decentralize. There is without a doubt a great deal of truth to this view. The first residents of suburban areas, while they might live very close to their jobs, nevertheless often had to travel great distances to shop. Also, the changing location of ethnic group oriented

retail outlets can be traced, following their clientele across the metropolitan area. However, with the growth of huge retailing outlets, and particularly with the development of the shopping center in the late 1950s, this situation changed somewhat. These huge, multimillion dollar investments require a great deal of land, capital and advance planning. Increasingly, these centers are being built in relatively sparsely populated areas, with full confidence that (1) the surrounding area will be appropriately settled by some future date, and (2) that the huge centers with their built-in competitive advantages (malls, entertainment, exhibits, tremendous variety, etc.) and economies of scale can draw customers out from presently existing retail outlets.¹⁹

Although a rather large literature on metropolitan decentralization exists, most of it is phrased in terms of differences between central cities and suburban rings (e.g. Vernon, 1959; Schnore, 1965; Birch, 1970). The concern of the present paper is with the selectivity of metropolitan decentralization. I am interested in the particular locations to which urban manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing plants move. It is important to understand how this becomes both a cause and a result of stratification in the metropolis. Certain groups of workers gather around particular production and distribution facilities and erect a wall of political independence--the suburban municipality--around themselves. Other groups, seeking to reinforce or expand privilege already gained through incorporation, selectively entice various industries to locate within their boundaries in order to increase the tax base. The next section will examine the mechanisms used for protecting special privilege in suburbs and a

final section will discuss conflicts and contradictions which arise as these policies are pursued.

Mechanisms for the Protection of Privilege

Economic decentralization, increasing differentiation of distinct industrial sectors and labor markets, and changes in the nature of work have produced a variety of status differences among workers. Those groups in the labor force which possess characteristics that give them privileged access to the most rewarding jobs have sought to consolidate and expand their prerogatives. Three major mechanisms have been employed to accomplish this purpose. They are: (1) single-class developments; (2) zoning, land and building codes, and (3) racial discrimination. Each of these mechanisms will be dealt with in turn.

A very large proportion of suburban growth has taken the form of tract developments. In the first two decades of this century, for example, Henry Ford developed several new communities in the Detroit area as dormitories for his workers. Single-class tract developments in the years following World War II were the basis for the Myth of Suburbia. Today, with an increasing emphasis on leisure and recreational activities, many suburban developments are taking the form of elaborate townhouse, apartment or single family condominium subdivisions. Not only are the prices of the units aimed at a particular class of worker, but the amenities which are provided are designed to appeal to the specific tastes of various status groups. Thus some developments have golf courses and private lakes, while others have bowling alleys and outdoor swimming pools. Some clubhouses are

designed for cocktail parties, while others are more amenable to beer blasts. Thus class and status are important in these new suburban developments.

In examining the metropolis it should be clear that there is not a direct one-to-one correspondence between class interest and its spatial expression. This is so because production relations are translated spatially through real estate, land development and banking interests. And these groups have their own unique and overriding motivation--profitability. However, it happens that it is highly profitable to construct upper and middle single-class developments and to maintain the class character of older neighborhoods. As a result there is generally a good fit between class interest and its spatial distribution in the metropolis.

Once particular status groups move to an area and incorporate, there are a number of legal methods they can use to keep poorer and lower status groups out. First, they can raise the cost of building by specifying minimal quality standards for construction materials and techniques which are far above the industry minimum. Or they can control development through selective municipal expenditure on roads, sewers, drains, educational facilities, etc. The biggest weapon in the arsenal of those who wish to protect the "character" of their municipality is the ability to zone. Large-lot zoning effectively raises the cost of both land and housing. Setting up minimum or maximum dwelling sizes excludes certain other groups. The number and type of multiple dwellings can be closely regulated. Furthermore, the ability to zone is a two-edged sword. Not only can various

groups be excluded from a municipality, but industry can be lured by the prospect of special developments and services (e.g. industrial parks) and property tax breaks. Even with tax breaks, industry provides important revenue to suburban municipalities. If enough industry can be recruited, individual property taxes can remain relatively low while assuring residents that the quality of schools will be such as to reproduce privilege over time.

The third method for maintaining privilege for particular groups of workers is racism. By excluding about one quarter of the labor force on the basis of skin color, certain groups of privileged white workers maintain their competitive position. And while the more blatant forms of discrimination have been outlawed by the courts or legislature, sophisticated practices such as redlining by banks and mortgage companies and covert agreements by realtors not to show houses in particular areas to blacks continue. Thus racism, along with single-class developments and discriminatory zoning and code regulations, remains a viable basis for maintaining equality within a community and therefore privilege in relation to other communities.

Conflict and Contradiction in the Metropolis

The spatial distribution of privilege through the institution of the politically independent municipality represents a continuing source of conflict in the metropolis. This political fragmentation is a source of conflict precisely because it has serious implications for the lives of metropolitan residents. Hill (1974:27) finds that inequality among governments in the metropolis is rooted in income

inequality among families. And family income inequality, he observes, "is translated through the dual mechanisms of residential segregation and political incorporation into inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among municipal governments in the metropolis."

Fiscal inequality means that municipalities with greater tax resources can provide those services which will insure a reproduction of their privilege over time. Education is the most crucial service in this regard. As noted earlier, employers in monopoly and state sector industries are demanding higher levels of educational attainment as a criteria for hiring. Those municipalities which possess higher tax resources have a head start in ensuring that their residents will obtain these credentials. A de facto recognition of this reality can be seen in the fiery opposition to cross-district busing on the part of suburban residents.

Even if, by some chance, access to quality education was distributed equally among metropolitan residents, the spatial distribution of privilege would remain. For equality of training for employment does not mean equality of access to employment. First of all, labor market institutions--employment agencies, labor pools, etc.--are dispersed throughout the metropolis in a way which tends to maintain the distinction between primary and secondary labor markets. Secondly, employment itself is unequally distributed in the metropolis. Most suburbs are constantly competing for decentralizing capital in order to alleviate their property tax burdens.²⁰ But municipalities with better-than-average tax bases are in much better position to give industries the property tax breaks which they have come to expect.

At the same time, higher status suburbs attempt to prevent the employees of these industries from moving into the community. Thus, not only do many workers fail to benefit from the property taxes which their employers pay, but they often cannot live in the community where they work.²¹

Those suburbs which are successful in attracting a large amount of capital investment impose a further burden on those communities which fail to do so. For example, residents of the latter are forced to live with the noise and pollution of a nearby industrial park in the former, even though they receive no property tax benefits from it. Similarly, when one municipality succeeds in attracting a massive retail development, its neighbors are forced to expand their municipal services (road construction and maintenance, police protection, etc.) and preside over a decline in their own retail facilities (and thus their tax base) while receiving no property tax benefits. Thus while individual residents of neighboring suburbs might benefit from new employment opportunities, the community as a whole suffers a setback.

Besides the class divisions among suburban municipalities, lifestyle divisions are also present. As I noted earlier, some communities are developed in such a way that their recreational and leisure facilities appeal to particular status groups. In addition, the differentiation of the metropolitan economy tends to promote and reinforce various lifestyle differences in the labor force. The frequently odd hours, the temporary or seasonal nature of the work, and the general instability of competitive sector employment makes

long term credit purchases extremely difficult for this group of workers. Unable to consume leisure and recreational goods at the same rate and in the same style as workers employed in the state and monopoly sectors, they often find life intolerable in some communities.

In order to overcome many of the conflicts and contradictions inherent in the political fragmentation of the metropolis, many urban planners and monopoly sector industrialists have argued that metropolitan government is more rational and efficient. But as I have shown, political fragmentation serves an important function in maintaining privilege for certain groups in the metropolis. Analysts of the metropolitan reform movement have pointed out that it has consistently failed because the privileges it would destroy are vitally important to those who possess them (see Greer, 1963; Williams et al., 1965; Donaldson, 1966). Undaunted by their failure to gather local support, the advocates of metropolitan reform have turned to state legislatures and the federal government to impose it from above. But their chances of getting any legislation passed to this effect are dim and growing dimmer. Given proportional representation, suburbs have been gaining control over state legislatures as their populations increased. At the federal level, suburban congressmen formed a plurality for the first time in the ninety-third Congress.²²

Thus it appears that political fragmentation will continue to be a prominent feature of metropolitan areas in the United States. This is so because it continues to represent an effort by certain groups in the metropolis to protect and maintain privileges which accrue to them because of the nature of the metropolitan economy.

Because other groups are less privileged, and because of the contradictions inherent in this fragmentation, conflict will also continue to be an important feature of the metropolitan political economy.

CHAPTER III

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION: THE CASE OF DETROIT

What I have tried to show in the previous section is that suburbs are a spatial expression of the attempt by certain groups in the metropolis to protect and expand privileges which they possess based on their relationship to the metropolitan economy. I have attempted to illustrate the mechanisms by which privilege is protected, and some of the conflicts arising out of this situation. If the analysis which I have developed seems to be logically and intuitively correct, then the next question is: can the spatial distribution of privilege be discovered empirically? The first step is to operationalize the meaning of privilege. Obviously, social class--the ownership or nonownership of means of production--is one important distinction. Another important one is that between manual and non-manual labor. And, since the most fundamental and penetrating characteristic of the metropolitan economy is its division into monopoly, competitive and state sectors, a third important dimension would be sector location.

There are two basic approaches to an investigation of the empirical distribution of privilege. One way would be to focus on the residents of the various municipalities. What is their location in the metropolitan economy? What are their incomes, ages, educational levels? Where do they stand in relation to the other residents of the

metropolis? To what extent is their municipality homogeneous? The second empirical approach to the differential distribution of privilege would be to focus on the municipality itself. What are the physical resources that exist within it? That is, the nature and size of industrial developments, age, size and quality of the housing, extent of retail development, opportunities and limitations for expansion, amount and quality of municipal services, size of tax base and rate structure. These represent some of the questions which have to be addressed by each of these approaches.

The method of study undertaken in this paper is essentially the first approach. I intend to focus on the characteristics of suburban residents, and to define their municipalities in terms of these characteristics. Since I am basically concerned with the meaning of suburbs for the lives of the people who reside in them, I feel that this is an altogether appropriate way to begin the analysis. Thus I intend to answer three questions in the present research: (1) Based on the characteristics of their residents, can municipalities be classified by class or status and sector? (2) How would municipalities so classified differ from one another? (3) What is the meaning of these differences for the lives of the people studied? I must emphasize, however, that no absolutely conclusive answers to these questions will be produced. The present study is a tentative exploration of a relatively uncharted area. I say uncharted because, to my knowledge, no other work approaches the subject in the manner set forth here. And yet, as I have argued in the previous two sections, I believe that the political economic

approach to the suburban phenomenon is the one most likely to bear substantive fruit. Thus I intend this research to serve as a beacon for those who would refine the analysis of metropolitan political economy and hopefully produce more substantive results.

Why Detroit?

The focus of my research is on suburbs in the Detroit metropolitan area. This area was selected for several important reasons. First of all, Detroit is the industrial metropolis par excellence. It has a greater concentration of employment in one single economic activity than any other major metropolis in the nation. About 40 percent of the Detroit metropolitan labor force is engaged in manufacturing. And within manufacturing, only Pittsburgh has a greater concentration of employment in a single industry branch (Sinclair, 1972:15-6). But Detroit has been at the heart of the two most important suburb-facilitating factors in this century: the automobile and the assembly line. The world headquarters of the three major automobile manufacturers are located in the Detroit metropolitan area, as well as most of their research and engineering facilities and a good portion of their fabricating and assembly plants. Detroit's position at the center of the automobile industry is illustrated by the fact that over 90 percent of the automotive employment of the United States and Canada is located within a one-shift truck drive of downtown Detroit (Sinclair, 1972:28-9).

Like the auto, the assembly line also got its start in Detroit. In 1914, Henry Ford introduced the world's first continuous moving assembly line in his newly-built Highland Park plant. This

development was to revolutionize production the world over. As we have seen, it was also to lead to the decentralization of industry and the growth of suburbs. Nowhere was this process clearer than in the Detroit metropolitan area. Indeed, Highland Park itself was a suburb of Detroit when Ford built his original plant there. Although still an independent municipality, it is completely surrounded by the City of Detroit today.

A second reason for focusing on Detroit is that it is a relatively modern industrial phenomenon. Although it is the oldest metropolis in the Midwest, Detroit did not really develop until the beginning of this century with the birth of the auto industry. Thus the connection between the economy and the growth and differentiation of suburbs in the metropolitan area is perhaps clearer in Detroit than anywhere else in the country. In addition, because of its domination by a single industry and its relatively recent development, the Detroit metropolitan area has a tendency to magnify the basic conflicts and contradictions of all U.S. metropolitan areas. Robert Sinclair puts it this way:

Detroit is distinctive and dominating in the role which it plays in the world. It also tends to be overwhelming in its failures and disasters. To a large degree, the city has epitomized the achievements and disappointments of American urban society, perhaps more so than the central, national and international metropolitan centers which present a more attractive physical image. Today Detroit is symbolic and representative of the ills which beset American society in the 1970s (Sinclair, 1972:14).

A third reason for selecting the Detroit metropolitan area as the focus of analysis is the relatively permissive Michigan state policy on fringe incorporation. It is quite easy in this state for a group to incorporate their territory, whereas annexation of one

area by another is a very difficult process. Thus the growth and dynamics of politically independent municipalities should be magnified in Detroit, the largest metropolis in the state.

A fourth reason for choosing Detroit as the context for this research was the author's familiarity with the region. Born and raised in Detroit, I think I have a strong feeling for the underlying dynamics of conflict and cooperation in the metropolitan area. Since the present research is exploratory in nature, sensitivity to fine nuances of meaning and an intuitive grasp of the data are as important (and perhaps more important) than empirical sophistication. My personal knowledge of a great deal of the Detroit metropolitan area was thus a strong asset in this research.

In sum, then, the Detroit metropolitan area was chosen as the focus of this research because it was expected that the spatial distribution of privilege would be more extensive and fully developed here. Thus, it was hoped, the underlying conflicts and contradictions would be readily apparent. But presumably the difference between Detroit and other metropolitan areas in the United States would only be one of degree. The basic structure of the metropolitan economy as laid out previously in this paper is presumed to be relatively constant from metropolis to metropolis. The actual extent to which the situation in other metropolitan areas differs from that in the Detroit region, however, remains an empirical question.²³

The Classification Scheme

This study focuses on forty-three suburban municipalities in the Detroit SMSA with populations greater than ten-thousand. Only

four municipalities of this size are excluded from the study. Obviously, Detroit is omitted because it is the central city of the metropolis. Pontiac was excluded because it also is a central city. While much smaller than Detroit (1970 population--85,364), Pontiac is an old city which exhibits most of the characteristics of Detroit-- industrial base primarily in the auto industry, central business district ringed by deteriorating slums, large black population, and suburbs of its own. The third community excluded was Drayton Plains, the largest of Pontiac's suburbs. It is also beyond effective commuting distance from Detroit. Since my intent was to examine class and status differences arising from and interacting with the economy of Detroit, I limited the scope of analysis to municipalities within commuting distance of it. The final community excluded from this study was Mt. Clemens. Lying beyond effective commuting distance, this city is a financial and industrial center in its own right.

In spite of the fact that two large and populous central cities have necessarily been excluded from the actual analysis, Table 4 indicates that this study still embraces over 43 percent of the total population, total number of families, total labor force and total employed persons over sixteen years old, and over 90 percent of the municipalities over 10,000 in population in the Detroit SMSA. Figure 1 shows the geographical relationship of the forty-three municipalities in this study.

The analysis was limited to incorporated municipalities with populations greater than ten-thousand because the census data was too sparse for smaller communities. On the basis of data from the




Fig. 1.--Map of the Forty-three Municipalities in the Present Study Plus the City of Detroit.

Note: Unlabeled areas on this and subsequent maps are communities too small in population to be included in this study.

Table 4.--Statistical Scope of the Present Study.

Item	Total SMSA	Percentages			Total
		Study Area	Excluded Areas		
			Detroit & Pontiac	Remainder of SMSA	
Population	4,199,931	43.5	38.0	18.5	100.0
Families	1,043,897	44.0	37.6	18.4	100.0
Labor Force	1,669,730	43.8	38.2	18.0	100.0
Employed persons, 16 years +	1,570,953	44.5	37.5	18.0	100.0
Municipalities over 10,000 pop.	47	91.4	4.3	4.3	100.0

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: PC(1)-C24
General Social and Economic Characteristics--Michigan, 1970.

1970 census, then, an attempt was made to classify each of the forty-three municipalities by the class and sector of employment of their residents. It was quickly observed that no formal definition of class could be operationalized from the census data. Thus I decided to use a measure of occupational status as the best equivalent to social class. Percentage of employed persons over sixteen years old working in white collar occupations was selected as the measure by which to determine the occupational status of each municipality. This measure was chosen because it had the highest standard deviation, and thus the greatest range of variability, of all occupational measures.

After examining the distribution of municipalities on this variable (Table 5), I decided to establish two arbitrary breakpoints

Table 5.--Distribution of Municipalities by Percentage of White Collar Employment.

Beverly Hills	84.9	Riverview	47.0
Grosse Pointe Farms	82.1	Warren	46.7
Grosse Pointe Woods	80.3	Madison Heights	46.3
Birmingham	80.1	Westland	45.8
Grosse Pointe Park	73.8	Center Line	44.8
Southfield	73.4	East Detroit	44.3
Oak Park	72.8	Southgate	42.7
Farmington	70.5	Roseville	41.8
Troy	64.5	Garden City	41.3
Royal Oak	62.3	Highland Park	40.6
Harper Woods	60.6	Lincoln Park	40.3
Livonia	60.1	Wayne	40.3
Dearborn	56.9	Melvindale	38.7
Plymouth	55.6	Wyandotte	37.7
Allen Park	53.7	Taylor	37.6
Trenton	53.3	Inkster	36.8
Berkley	52.5	Hamtramck	35.4
St. Clair Shores	52.5	Hazel Park	34.5
Sterling Heights	51.6	River Rouge	29.8
Clawson	51.1	Ecorse	26.3
Dearborn Heights	50.6		
Fraser	49.0		
Ferndale	48.0		

Mean = 52.1

Standard Deviation = 14.7

in order to divide the communities into those of upper, middle and lower status. Upper status communities were defined as those having more than 70 percent of their employed persons in white collar jobs. Lower status municipalities were those whose white collar residents were less than 40 percent of the community's employed persons. Each of these breaks was at, or very close to, one standard deviation unit from the mean. Furthermore the divisions came at natural gaps in the distribution and made good intuitive sense based on my knowledge of the Detroit metropolitan area. Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution of these status groups.

The next step was to see if the forty-three municipalities could be differentiated on the basis of the industries in which their residents were employed. A community with a high percentage of employment in monopoly sector industries might then be classified as a monopoly sector suburb. Similarly, a suburb with predominantly competitive sector employment would be designated a competitive sector suburb, and so forth. Absolutely clear differences were not anticipated. Indeed, as Oliver Williams (1967:307) has pointed out, in most cases "municipal boundaries do not operate as sharp demographic breakpoints. Any municipality can absorb a certain degree of internal diversity and still maintain a dominant style." Thus, it is the relative differences between communities that are important. If a majority of residents of a particular suburb are employed in the monopoly sector, for example, they are likely to possess certain privileges which they will utilize the municipality to protect, according to my analysis.

Fig. 2.--Spatial Distribution of Municipalities by Occupational Status.

The question, then, was how to distinguish monopoly, competitive and state sector industries. Based on the Census Bureau classifications, two state sector industries were immediately noted: public administration and educational services.²⁴ Differentiation of the competitive and monopoly sectors was somewhat more difficult, however. Since the census figures are reported only in terms of industries, not individual corporations, a measure was sought which would distinguish the sectors on the basis of the industries which compose them.²⁵ Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the monopoly and competitive sectors, from which their names are derived, is that industries in the monopoly sector tend to be dominated by a few large producers, whereas competitive sector industries are characterized by a relatively large number of producers and a fair amount of competition. Concentration ratios--the share of assets, sales and/or profits controlled by the top few corporations--were thus deemed to be a useful way to distinguish between monopoly and competitive sector industries. Although they have some drawbacks,²⁶ I made the assumption that these ratios would in fact delineate crucial differences between the sectors.

Table 6 provides the concentration ratios for nineteen industries related to the Detroit metropolitan economy. There are two important facts to note about these figures. First, these are national figures, and therefore potentially misleading in some cases in relation to Detroit. A classification scheme based on these ratios must be tempered by the realities of the local metropolitan economy. Secondly, the Bureau of the Census does not report

Table 6.--Percentage of Sales, Assets and After-Tax Profits Accounted for by the Four Largest Firms in Each Industry for 19 Selected Industries, 1962.

Industry	Sales	Total Assets	Profits
Motor vehicles	80.8	79.7	89.1
Petroleum refining	50.3	50.1	54.3
Dairy products	42.9	48.8	73.9
Basic industrial chemicals	42.0	45.5	64.6
Alcoholic beverages	41.4	47.2	58.3
Primary iron and steel	40.2	48.0	44.3
Electrical machinery	34.4	35.6	44.4
Bakery products	33.6	39.6	52.8
Drugs and medicines	31.0	29.2	32.6
Other transportation equipment	30.3	44.2	51.6
Primary nonferrous metals	27.3	41.1	37.1
Lumber and wood products	21.2	31.0	48.6
Other machinery	20.6	24.3	39.6
Miscellaneous manufacturing	16.3	33.1	25.2
Other fabricated metal products	14.7	19.9	17.7
Metalworking machinery	14.5	16.3	19.1
Other food products	12.5	13.2	20.1
Furniture and fixtures	5.2	8.4	5.3
Apparel	4.9	7.7	7.4

Source: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission. Adapted from Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf (1972:155).

industrial employment in identical categories. Thus some manipulation is necessary in order to develop a classification system.²⁷

The variables comprising each sector of the metropolitan economy are listed in Table 7. The most obvious fact here is the lack of variables to define the state sector. There is no way to glean state-contract industry employment from census data. (These workers would tend to show up under the monopoly sector classification.) Except for educational services, no service industries can be identified within the state sector using census data. Furthermore the two lone variables which can be identified with the state sector are heavily biased toward white collar workers. Blue collar state workers and almost all state service workers would fall into the competitive sector, based on my classification scheme. It is safe to conclude, I think, that the state sector cannot really be discovered through census data. Thus it will be excluded from the rest of my analysis. Since state-contract workers would fall into the monopoly sector classification and state organized workers would fall into the competitive sector, I am assuming that their effects tend to cancel each other and that the distinction between monopoly and competitive sectors is still worthwhile.

In general, the manufacturing industries classified in the monopoly sector have concentration ratios greater than 25 percent--Blair's minimum standard of concentration (1972:11-2)--and those in the competitive sector have ratios lower than 25 percent. There is one major exception in each case. First, in the monopoly sector, various divisions of the machinery industry appear to have somewhat

Table 7.--Composition of Sectors by Industry.

Competitive Sector	Monopoly Sector	State Sector
Competitive manufacturing	Monopoly manufacturing	Public administration
Furniture, lumber and wood products	Transportation equipment	Educational services
Food and kindred products	Metal industries	
Textiles and fabricated textile products	Chemicals and allied products	
Printing, publishing and allied industries	Electrical machinery	
Other durable goods	Machinery	
Other nondurable goods		
Trade, wholesale and retail	Communications	
Construction	Utilities and sanitary services	
Finance		
Banking and credit agencies		
Insurance, real estate		
Services		
Trucking service and warehousing		
Other transportation		
Business and repair services		
Entertainment and recreation services		
Hospital and health services		
Legal, engineering and miscellaneous professional services		
Private households and personal services		

low concentration ratios nationally (Table 6). However, I have classified the metropolitan Detroit residents who are employed in these industries as monopoly sector workers because of the peculiar nature of this industry in Detroit. A very high proportion of the metalworking machinery produced in this area is produced for the auto industry. Some of the production facilities are owned by the Big Three, but most of the firms operate under contract to the auto producers. Because of these close ties, the technical conditions and social relations of production, the social composition of its labor force and the quality of life of the workers in these two industries are very similar. Thus I perceive the machinery industry in metropolitan Detroit to be in the monopoly sector.

In the competitive sector, three food manufacturing industries--dairy, bakery and alcoholic beverages--have relatively high concentration ratios. While a few corporations may dominate these areas of food production nationally, my understanding of the Detroit market is that it is relatively competitive. Nationally-known products face a good deal of competition from a large group of local producers. And except for the alcoholic beverage industry, the technical and social conditions of production and the social composition of the labor force resemble that of the competitive sector. Thus I feel reasonably justified in classifying food manufacturing in the competitive sector.

The remaining components of the competitive sector are pretty straightforward. Trade, especially retailing, is labor intensive and nearly always highly competitive on a local level. Many forms

of construction work are characterized by ease of firm entry and this industry is usually quite competitive in each locality. While banking and insurance are quite concentrated on a national level, there is a great deal of competition on the local level. In addition, these industries are labor intensive--as are services, the final component of the competitive sector.

In the monopoly sector, the communications industry is dominated by workers employed by the telephone company--the monopoly par excellence. Likewise utilities usually enjoy spatial monopolies. It may be noted that sanitary services, which belong in the competitive sector, are lumped together with utilities. Since the Bureau of the Census reports its figures this way, there was nothing I could do about it. Because I deemed utilities the more important variable, and because I assumed it to have the greater proportion of employees, the entire category was placed in the monopoly sector.

Based on the conceptual scheme just described, I calculated the percentage of persons in each municipality employed in the monopoly and competitive sectors. The results appear in Table 8. Note that in only one case--Ecorse--does the percent of residents employed in the monopoly sector exceed the percent of residents employed in the competitive sector. On the one hand, this result might have been anticipated from the greater number of measures of the competitive sector in Table 7. On the other hand, the fact that competitive sector employment nearly always exceeds monopoly sector employment has two possible meanings: (1) that competitive sector industries in fact employ a greater percentage of the labor force

Table 8.--Distribution of Municipalities by Percent Employed in
Monopoly and Competitive Sectors.

Municipality	Competitive Sector	Monopoly Sector	Competitive/ Monopoly Ratio
Ecorse	43.2	45.5	0.95
Sterling Heights	44.9	42.2	1.06
Wyandotte	46.9	43.2	1.09
Riverview	45.4	40.8	1.11
Warren	46.9	42.0	1.12
Center Line	46.2	40.0	1.16
Southgate	49.8	40.0	1.25
Hazel Park	51.0	40.1	1.27
Trenton	48.5	37.4	1.30
Taylor	51.6	38.9	1.33
Dearborn Heights	51.6	38.1	1.35
Lincoln Park	52.2	38.6	1.35
Madison Heights	53.3	37.6	1.42
Roseville	52.6	37.1	1.42
Inkster	52.4	36.3	1.44
Wayne	51.0	35.5	1.44
Garden City	53.6	37.0	1.45
Westland	52.9	36.4	1.45
Allen Park	52.1	35.7	1.46
Hamtramck	52.6	35.9	1.47
River Rouge	53.6	35.7	1.50
Melvindale	53.7	34.8	1.54
Dearborn	51.4	33.0	1.56
Clawson	54.7	34.2	1.60
Plymouth	50.9	31.8	1.60
Fraser	54.6	33.7	1.62
East Detroit	55.8	34.2	1.63
Livonia	54.5	32.8	1.66
Troy	53.7	31.0	1.73
Berkley	56.2	31.6	1.78
St. Clair Shores	56.6	31.6	1.79
Ferndale	56.2	31.3	1.80
Royal Oak	56.6	29.0	1.95
Highland Park	57.1	27.9	2.05
Beverly Hills	61.1	28.0	2.18
Farmington	56.7	25.5	2.22
Harper Woods	60.3	27.1	2.23
Grosse Pointe Woods	60.3	22.7	2.66
Birmingham	61.0	22.5	2.71
Southfield	67.2	19.6	3.43
Grosse Pointe Park	66.8	17.9	3.73

Table 8.--Continued.

Municipality	Competitive Sector	Monopoly Sector	Competitive/ Monopoly Ratio
Grosse Pointe Farms	66.9	17.8	3.76
Oak Park	71.8	14.2	5.06
Mean:	54.3	33.2	1.81
Standard Deviation:	6.1	7.2	0.82

than those in the monopoly sector, or (2) that the classification system I have worked out is not an accurate reflection of reality.

The truth probably lies somewhere in between. Since competitive sector industries are labor intensive, it is logical that they would employ a larger proportion of workers than capital intensive monopoly sector industries. However, the predominance of the auto industry--a monopoly sector employer--in the metropolitan Detroit economy might lead one to question the empirical finding of greater competitive sector employment in its suburbs. Also, I have already pointed out that not all workers in the state sector have been captured by my inadequate measures of that sector. The fact that the extent to which these workers are partialled out into the monopoly and competitive sectors is unclear casts a modicum of doubt on the findings. Nevertheless, since this study is exploratory in nature, intended to discover if the origins of conflict in the metropolis can be analyzed in this way, I feel justified in assuming that, all things considered, there is a sufficient degree of validity in these classifications.

Since competitive sector employment in each municipality is nearly always larger than monopoly sector employment, a ratio was employed to distinguish them. The distribution of monopoly sector employment by municipality was used as a base because it had a larger standard deviation than the distribution of competitive sector employment, and therefore greater variance. Monopoly sector municipalities were determined to be those suburbs with more than 35 percent of their residents employed in monopoly sector industries

and a competitive-to-monopoly sector employment ratio of less than 1.5. Conversely, competitive sector municipalities were those with less than 35 percent employment in the monopoly sector and a competitive-to-monopoly sector ratio of greater than 1.5. Since River Rouge fell exactly in the middle, it was too difficult to classify and thus I left it out of the subsequent analysis. Of the remaining forty-two municipalities, twenty are classified in the monopoly sector and twenty-two are classified in the competitive sector. Figure 3 illustrates this geographically.

Table 9 presents the forty-two municipalities in this study classified according to occupational status and sector. The scheme is unbalanced in that there are no upper status monopoly sector municipalities and only one lower status competitive sector municipality. Perhaps this reflects a deficiency in the type and source of data used to build this classification scheme. Census data by municipality is not refined enough to trace certain classes of workers. That is, it has a built-in lower status monopoly and upper status competitive sector bias. This is especially true in a metropolis like Detroit where a single monopoly sector industry employs a large amount of manual workers. Blue collar competitive sector workers are potentially "lost" in the reporting classification. Similarly, monopoly sector managers and clerical workers are probably numerically smaller than the white collar employees of the thousands of small businesses and industries in the metropolitan economy. Furthermore, the structural features of Detroit's economy may




Fig. 3.--Spatial Distribution of Municipalities by Sector.

Table 9.--Classification of Municipalities by Occupational Status and Sector.

Occupational Status	Sector	
	Monopoly	Competitive
Upper	N = 0	N = 8
		Beverly Hills Birmingham Grosse Pointe Farms Grosse Pointe Park Grosse Pointe Woods Farmington Oak Park Southfield
Middle	N = 14	N = 13
		Berkley Clawson Dearborn East Detroit Ferndale Fraser Harper Woods Highland Park Livonia Plymouth Royal Oak St. Clair Shores Troy
Lower	N = 6	N = 1
		Melvindale

militate against large-scale employment in certain monopoly sector categories like communications.

My classification scheme has, however, produced a relatively balanced distribution of middle status monopoly and competitive sector suburbs. There are a sufficient number of municipalities in each classification to provide a basis for the emergence of significant differences. Thus the final part of this analysis will concentrate on these twenty-seven middle status communities, illustrated spatially in Figure 4. The eight upper status competitive sector suburbs and the six lower status monopoly sector communities will be included for purposes of comparison, along with the city of Detroit.²⁸

The Dependent Variables

I have consistently argued throughout this paper that suburbs primarily represent the attempt by some workers to protect privileges which accrue to them through their location in the metropolitan economy. I have tried to trace the sources of these privileges, the mechanisms by which they are protected, and some of the conflicts arising from this process. If suburban municipalities can indeed be classified on the basis of status and sector (and I think I have shown that, to some extent, they can), on what dimensions would we expect those classes of communities to vary? What critical differences would emerge which would have important implications for the lives of the residents of these two distinctive types of communities?




Fig. 4.--Spatial Distribution of Middle Status Municipalities by Sector.

There are two important areas in which we would expect monopoly and competitive sector suburbs to differ.²⁹ The first area of difference is their social composition. This variation is rooted in the differentiation of the metropolitan economy and the operation of dual labor markets and is reinforced through the privilege-maintaining mechanisms discussed in Chapter II. Because the competitive sector labor force tends to be disproportionately black, female, very young and old, we would expect suburbs with large competitive sector populations to reflect this fact. In addition, because the residents of monopoly sector suburbs are able to utilize exclusionary mechanisms in order to protect their privileges, we would expect a greater concentration of the aged, the poor, and the blacks in competitive sector suburbs.

The second area of difference between the residents of monopoly and competitive sector suburbs lies in their access to rewards. Analytically, this includes both monetary and nonmonetary rewards. Realistically, however, the census data limits us to an investigation of monetary rewards alone. Since occupational status is being held constant, overall income ordinarily would not be expected to vary significantly between the two classes of municipalities. However, because the technical conditions and social relations of production differ in the monopoly and competitive sectors, income was expected to vary within occupations by sector. Thus the managers, craftsmen, etc., who reside in the monopoly sector suburbs are expected to be more well-off monetarily than their counterparts in competitive sector communities.

Results and Analysis

Table 10 graphically illustrates the differing social composition of monopoly and competitive sector suburbs. Controlling for sex, the labor force of competitive sector communities, on the average, is composed of a higher proportion of very young and old workers than the labor force of monopoly sector suburbs, whether or not status is held constant.^{30, 31} The percentage of females over sixteen in the labor force is very similar in each group of communities, although it is slightly higher in the middle status competitive sector suburbs, as was expected. Surprisingly, the average unemployment rates for middle status monopoly and competitive sector communities are identical. The reasons for this are not clear. It might be due to the systematic undercounting of the very categories of workers who predominate in the competitive sector--blacks, women, teenagers and the aged. Certainly it overlooks the chronic underemployment which is characteristic of competitive sector workers. Not so surprising is the fact that unemployment rates are inversely related to status and that the central city of Detroit has the highest unemployment rate of all.

The second half of Table 10 indicates that the general characteristics of those who reside in monopoly and competitive sector suburbs are indeed different. Holding status constant, race seems to emerge as a significant difference. However, this measure is somewhat unreliable because of the fact that nearly all of the black population of middle status competitive sector suburbs is concentrated in one community--Highland Park. If this city were eliminated,

Table 10.--Mean Social Composition of Municipalities by Status and Sector.

Variable	Percentages by Municipality					City of Detroit
	Lower Status ¹		Middle Status		Upper Status ²	
	Monopoly Sector Mean		Monopoly Sector Mean	Competitive Sector Mean	Competitive Sector Mean	
Labor force characteristics						
Self-employed	2.8		3.0	4.4	27.0	3.4
Males, 14 and 15 years old	13.7		16.5	19.6	21.6	14.5
Females, 14 and 15 years old	5.5		4.2	6.0	7.4	5.8
Males, 65 years and older	14.6		19.0	24.4	36.3	18.8
Females, 65 years and older	6.1		7.5	8.6	10.3	8.5
Females, 16 years and older	39.0		40.6	41.0	39.2	41.7
Unemployed	6.0		4.3	4.3	3.3	7.2
Population characteristics						
Black	15.8		0.2	4.3	0.1	43.7
65 years and older	7.9		4.3	7.8	9.8	11.5
Persons with social security income	19.0		12.7	17.2	19.7	23.8
Families below \$10,000 annual income	43.1		25.8	28.9	16.7	49.7
Families below poverty level	7.3		3.1	3.7	2.1	11.3
Persons with public assistance or public welfare income	5.2		1.8	2.6	1.0	8.3

¹Lower status competitive sector n = 1 and thus it was not computed.²Upper status monopoly sector n = 0.

the average percentage of blacks in middle status competitive sector suburbs would actually be lower than that of middle status monopoly sector communities. Also, lower status monopoly sector suburbs emerge here with a relatively large black population. This is undoubtedly due to the influence of the auto industry, a monopoly sector industry which does employ significant numbers of blacks, albeit in low-level positions.

Age is a much more reliable measure here, and it shows that middle status monopoly sector suburbs have the lowest average percentage of persons 65 and over. And these communities, on the average, also have fewer economically deprived residents--i.e. fewer families with annual income below \$10,000,³² fewer families below the poverty level and on welfare or social security. The implications of this particular distribution of the population are clear. Each of these categories is composed of individuals who are the least productive and require the most services. Competitive sector municipalities, in which they are predominantly located when status is held constant, thus suffer a double burden: income and property values are not as high and do not collectively increase as rapidly as those in monopoly sector suburbs, and the fiscal resources of communities in the competitive sector are disproportionately channeled into social services. Thus monopoly sector suburbs are not only likely to have lower tax rates, but they are able to channel more funds into such things as education, which tends to reproduce their privilege over time.³³

Table 11 illustrates the differences in income of residents of monopoly and competitive sector suburbs. Controlling for status, median family income and mean wage and salary income are found to be nearly equal for the two classes of municipalities, contrary to my expectations. Perhaps the high incomes of some competitive sector entrepreneurs help bring the income figures for their home suburbs into parity with those of the monopoly sector suburbs. Then again, these income figures may be deceiving in that they do not take into account the monetary and nonmonetary fringe benefits which accrue unequally to monopoly sector workers, especially at the white collar level. In any case, more refined methods for the measurement of income are needed in order to adequately probe this difference.

It is when income is examined by occupation that real differences, and thus evidence of privilege, begin to appear. Managers and professionals who are residents of middle status competitive sector suburbs, on the average, have higher incomes than their counterparts in monopoly sector suburbs. Self-employed professionals like doctors and lawyers are probably responsible for this higher figure. While it is true that top-level monopoly sector managers make astronomical salaries (by middle class standards), middle level managers in this sector, while receiving excellent incomes, have neither the flexibility nor the opportunity to earn as much as the self-employed professionals. Anyway, at this level, residents of competitive sector suburbs are better off.

As we move down the occupational ladder, however, residents of monopoly sector suburbs exhibit an increasing degree of privilege.

Table 11.---Mean Income Differences by Status and Sector.

Variable	Lower Status ¹		Middle Status		Upper Status ²		City of Detroit
	Monopoly Sector Mean		Monopoly Sector Mean	Competitive Sector Mean	Competitive Sector Mean		
Median family income	\$10,810		\$13,122	\$13,085	\$18,505		\$10,045
Mean wage and salary income	11,229		13,221	13,270	18,512		10,862
Median earnings by occupation							
Managers and professionals	10,503		12,468	12,752	18,015		10,740
Craftsmen	10,495		11,899	11,402	12,482		9,445
Operatives	8,503		9,378	9,052	7,329		7,896
Laborers	7,027		6,519	4,863	2,930		6,419
Median earnings, females over 16 years old with income							
	4,322		4,335	4,337	4,376		4,333
Clerical and kindred Operatives							
	4,802		4,763	4,861	4,479		4,891
	5,064		5,307	4,758	5,051		4,700

¹Lower status competitive sector n = 1 and thus it was not computed.

²Upper status monopoly sector n = 0.

Among middle status communities, residents of monopoly sector suburbs who are craftsmen average four-hundred dollars more in yearly income than craftsmen in competitive sector municipalities, while monopoly sector operatives average three-hundred fifty dollars more. But the difference between residents of middle status monopoly sector suburbs and those in similar competitive sector communities is most glaring at the level of laborers. Here the mean income differential is more than sixteen-hundred dollars! Surely this reflects the higher level of unionization and superior technical conditions of production in monopoly sector industries. And this difference has two important implications for the lives of the residents of the two types of suburbs. First, it is not likely under these conditions that the competitive sector worker will be able to achieve the same level of consumption and acquire the same lifestyle as his or her counterpart in the monopoly sector who averages sixteen hundred dollars more yearly in the same occupation. Thus important status differences are reinforced. Secondly, competitive sector laborers are less likely than their counterparts in the monopoly sector to be able to afford the kind of education or training which would qualify their children for upward mobility. Thus not only are status distinctions maintained, but access to more rewarding jobs is limited in general to monopoly sector workers and specifically to residents of monopoly sector suburbs.

No overall income disparity seems to exist between women workers who reside in monopoly sector suburbs and those who live in competitive sector municipalities, owing perhaps to a rather

universal discrimination against women workers. However, female clerical workers in the competitive sector suburbs are slightly better off, on the average, than those in monopoly sector communities. From the limited nature of the data available, I can offer no sound explanation for this.

A greater refinement of this variable would be necessary in order to fully understand the process at work here. With regard to female operatives, however, the process is relatively clear. The highly unionized nature of the industries to which females from middle status monopoly sector communities have access produces an average five-hundred and fifty dollar disparity between their average annual income and that of their opposite numbers in the competitive sector.

Taken together, these variables show, albeit rather tentatively, a pattern of privilege in the metropolitan community. It is a privilege which accrues to certain groups of workers because of the structure and social relations of the industries in which they earn their living. And it is a privilege which is given a spatial dimension through the institution of the politically independent municipality. Hopefully this study has hinted at how the lifechances of various metropolitan residents are inextricably bound up with the distribution and limits of these municipalities. A more systematic understanding of the mechanisms which maintain this privilege, and the dynamics of conflict which arise over it, awaits further study.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF SUBURBS

This paper represents an attempt to develop a political economy of metropolitan areas as a context for studying suburbs. To the extent that it has succeeded, a new path has been opened for those who want to discover the meaning of suburbs for the lives of their residents. To the extent that it has failed, this study demonstrates the need for further research which is both more comprehensive and more refined. In either case, we might fruitfully reflect on the directions further inquiries could take.

Essentially I see four broad and overlapping areas of investigation. First of all, suburbs need to be studied as independent political units in an interdependent metropolitan economy. The historical process of annexation and incorporation should be empirically investigated in the context of a specific metropolis. When did annexation/incorporation take place? How was it accomplished? What were the sources of support and opposition? What were the long term results? These are some of the questions which must be answered in order to understand the historical origin of suburbs as independent municipalities. The economic assets and liabilities of each suburban community is another important research topic. What is the tax base of the suburb? How does it compare with that of other municipalities? In relative terms, is it appreciating or declining? What is the tax

rate structure and how does it compare with others? How does the municipality allocate its resources? What are the origins and dynamics of conflict over this allocation? What is the nature and extent of municipal services? Finally, it would be necessary to place all of these factors in the context of the metropolitan economy.

A second focus for future research would be on the residents of each suburb. Where did they come from? How long have they been there? What are their demographic characteristics and how are they related to the position of the residents in the metropolitan political economy? What are the connections between the places where these people work and the places where they live? Similarly, where do these suburbanites shop and play and what are the implications of this? These are some of the questions which must be answered in order to understand the social dynamics arising out of the metropolitan political economy.

A third area of investigation would involve a comparative study of metropolitan areas. Hopefully this would give us a broader perspective and a more systematic understanding of both the most intransigent and the most ephemeral features of the metropolis. It would also give us a better clue to the key dimensions along which metropolitan economies vary.³⁴ Robert Sinclair, for instance, suggests that other metropolitan areas may show greater disparity in income than Detroit because of greater diversification in their local economies (1972:20). This suggestion, like the others mentioned above, is open to empirical investigation.

A final focus for analysis would be to investigate the patterns of conflict and movement and change in the metropolis. What are the fundamental bones of contention in the metropolitan political arena? What groups support and oppose these issues and where are they located in the metropolitan political economy? What are the forces preserving the status quo? What are the origin and dynamics of the forces of change? These are some of the fundamental questions which must be answered in order to come to grips with the future of the metropolis in general and suburbs in particular.

What, in fact, will be the future of suburbs in our metropolitan areas? Wilbur Thompson (1973:423-5) presents a particularly upbeat view. "The rich will get poorer and the poor will get richer . . . when the suburbs come filtering down." That is, as suburban housing ages and deteriorates, the lower classes will move into it. The central city will be recycled as the rich move back into it. The net effect of these changes will be the convergence of median family incomes and the achievement of a "more normal distribution" of income and resources in the metropolis. A fundamentally contrasting view of what the "Great Society" can become was put forth by President Johnson's Commission on Crimes of Violence:

If present trends are not positively redirected by creative new action, we can expect further social fragmentation of the urban environment, formation of excessively parochial communities, greater segregation of different racial groups and economic classes. . . and the establishment of the "defensive city," the modern counterpart of the fortified medieval city, consisting of an economically declining central business district in the inner city protected by people shopping or working in buildings during daylight hours and "sealed off" by police during nighttime hours. Highrise apartment buildings and residential "compounds" will be fortified "cells" for upper-, middle-, and high-income populations living at prime locations in the inner city.

Suburban neighborhoods, geographically removed from the central city, will be "safe areas," protected mainly by racial and economic homogeneity and by distance from population groups with the highest propensities to commit crime. Many parts of central cities will witness frequent and widespread crime, perhaps out of police control (Masotti and Hadden, 1973:452-3).

Regardless of whether either of these two visions ever comes to pass, those who wish to comprehend the dynamics impelling the destruction of suburbs and the impulses supporting their survival, and the meaning of this clash of forces for the lives of suburban residents, will do so in the context of a metropolitan political economy.

FOOTNOTES

¹The causes and consequences of suburban growth are discussed more extensively later in this paper. For more comprehensive documentation and explanation of the origins and dynamics of suburban growth see Schnore (1965:77-168), Wood (1958:54-87), Singleton (1973:29-50), and Glenn (1973:51-78).

²A useful anthology of literary works and both popular and social scientific studies regarding suburbs may be found in Sobin (1971:5-9 and 27-39). An excellent anthology of fictional works about suburbia may be found in Donaldson (1969:184-208). This work also includes a relatively comprehensive annotated bibliography (pp. 241-67).

³Two excellent analyses of the bases for this myth are: Dennis Wrong, "Suburbs and the Myth of Suburbia" (Wrong, 1967) and Bennett Berger, "The Myth of Suburbia" (Berger, 1961). Wrong sees the political quiescence of the Eisenhower years as setting the conditions for a search on the part of social critics for new critical outlets. Setting their sights on the rapidly growing suburbs, they thoroughly emphasized any negative aspect that could be found, often doing so out of context. The political unrest and social movements of the Sixties provided new outlets for social criticism, however, and the castigation of the suburbs subsided. Berger believes the myth was created when social critiques of specific suburbs, most notably Whyte's study of Park Forest, Illinois, achieved widespread circulation--not only in academic circles, but in the popular press as well. Although perhaps true of some specific communities, these descriptions became vastly overgeneralized through mass circulation. It was left to people like Berger to refute these images with more refined research in the 60s.

⁴Often of course it is the stated intention of urban researchers to confine the scope of their analyses to the circumscribed limits of a particular city or range of cities. With some research problems, this is altogether fitting and proper. My critique here is of those analyses which purport to deal with issues and variables which are inherently part of a larger metropolitan complex, complete with suburban nuances. Examples of urban studies which fail to formally recognize the unique characteristics of suburbs are: Schmandt and Bloomberg (1969), Weaver (1960), and Loewenstein (1971). An example of urban research which does take some account of the suburbs is Glazer (1960).

⁵For example, Jane Jacobs (1969) is imprecise in her use of the terms city, suburb and metropolitan area and her analysis is consequently diminished. Dick Netzer (1970) suffers from the same problem. Henderson and Ledebur (1972) begin their book with the sentence, "The majority of our population now lives in cities." If by cities they mean metropolitan areas, then this is quite true. Nevertheless, it represents a consistent neglect of the subtleties of the metropolis.

⁶This is particularly true with regard to analysis of the metropolitan reform movement. Greer (1963) is a good analysis of the sources of support and opposition to this movement. Williams (1965) is an empirical investigation of the forces for independence among suburbs. Other worthwhile studies include: Danielson (1966) and Sweeney (1958) in which various methodological approaches to the study of the metropolis are discussed.

⁷Perhaps the best statement on the overall scope and task of political economy is contained in Marx's famous Preface to his Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy:

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society--the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness (Marx, 1904:11-12).

⁸Barry Bluestone has also observed this development. "An economic system based on private investment decisions," he states, "tends to produce a dual economy both in the structure of industries and in the structure of the labor force" (Bluestone, 1972:70). The reason for this process lies in the "law of uneven development." This law dictates that capital tends to be reinvested over time in those particular product lines, machinery, geographical areas and workers which promise the highest profits. Concentration of capital tends to beget more concentration of capital and the gap between the haves and have-nots grows over time (Bluestone, 1972:65-6).

⁹Technically, the correct term for this phenomenon is oligopoly--control and domination of a market by a number of producers and suppliers. However, since the U.S. government generally addresses this matter under the heading of "monopoly" and since oligopoly is a cumbersome word, I shall follow O'Connor and use monopoly to designate the sector and the situation within an industry where a few firms exercise control.

¹⁰The automobile industry is a prime example of both of these features. In arguments with the Environmental Protection Agency over the implementation of safety and pollution standards, automotive executives have consistently argued that a major drawback of installing the devices necessary to meet the standards would be the increased cost to the consumer. And recently, when new car sales have slumped because of the stagnating economy, spokesmen for the industry have predicted further price increases to protect falling profit margins.

¹¹A more comprehensive discussion of these factors may be found in Bluestone (1968:292-301).

¹²For an excellent qualitative discussion of this situation, see Elliot Liebow's brilliant study, Tally's Corner (1967), especially Chapter Two.

¹³The variable "class" is used here in its marxian sense. That is, it is used to define an individual or group relation to the means of production. But more than strict ownership or nonownership is involved here. For the managers of the huge monopoly sector corporations, while not owners in the narrowest sense, are almost invariably among the largest stockholders in the corporation and are regularly and highly rewarded for corporate profitability. Thus they engage in decisionmaking which is entirely congruent with that of the old "captains of industry." It is appropriate, then, to consider the highest level corporate managers as members of the capitalist class.

"Status" is used here to designate social positions which are accompanied primarily by particular styles of life and secondarily by varying levels of prestige.

¹⁴Sennett and Cobb's book is an interesting and sometimes very moving account of the psychic trauma of ethnic workers who have thoroughly internalized the American Dream of mobility based on ability and yet are doomed to failure by the structure of the economic system. In an effort to resolve this dissonance they blame themselves for their failures. The book is based on a series of first-hand interviews in the Boston area.

¹⁵For a fascinating and insightful discussion of the partnership between big business and government forged in the Progressive Era, see Kolko (1963) and Weinstein (1968). Both of these works are part of the so-called "revisionist" history which seeks to dispel popular myths about our past through radical reinterpretation.

¹⁶The other side of this argument and the one that follows may be found in Muth (1967). Muth finds that the distribution of the population between the central city and its suburbs is "to an important extent, though not solely, explainable by the same forces that affect the spread of population within the city" (p. 296). He

also argues that the distribution of income and resources in the metropolitan area is largely what it would be if there were no political fragmentation.

¹⁷A parallel development is taking place in the second half of the Twentieth Century. Advances in data processing technology have made large, single-story or modular office buildings a more efficient method of bureaucratic organization. And developments in communication technology have made it feasible to decentralize this particular type of production activity.

¹⁸A good illustration of this entire process is the case of Willow Run. About twenty miles west of the city of Detroit, Willow Run served as the major airport for Detroit prior to World War II. During the war, the federal government built a huge bomber plant at the airport, which was at that time surrounded by farms. Since workers could not move out near the new plant on account of residential building restrictions, the government was forced to finance a high-speed freeway from the west side of Detroit to the plant (one of the first such highways in the country). After the war, the bomber plant was sold to an automobile company and today fabricates automobiles and automobile parts. The old industrial freeway has been a major factor in the continuing residential sprawl west from Detroit.

¹⁹Although this particular type of retail decentralization has usually occurred in terms of huge multistore shopping centers and malls, there is a recent trend toward primary retail decentralization on the part of a single firm. A recent newspaper article told of the grand opening of a new "Meijer's Thrifty Acres" super discount store in a relatively sparsely settled area thirty miles west of Detroit. Modeled on the European "hypermarkets," this store is the largest single-story retail outlet in the United States, with over five acres of floor space. Even though the projected population for the area has not yet materialized, the firm is confident that it can be a factor in inducing this development.

²⁰However, not all suburbs are competing for industry. The residents of certain upper class residential suburbs, for example, militantly oppose the introduction of industry into their municipality. This opposition has essentially two motivations: (1) a desire to keep local service costs down, and (2) a desire to increase the property value of the already highly-valued large-lot single-family dwellings. Both of these drives have the effect of keeping the tax rate low in these municipalities. In addition, even if a suburb is interested in attracting industry, the type of industry it can successfully capture varies by class and status. Nearly every municipality desires "clean" industries like office parks, commercial developments and light assembly and manufacturing, but inevitably these industries wind up in "clean" (i.e. white, middle-to-upper-class) suburbs, while the lower status communities get to fight over the decentralizing "dirty" industries.

²¹David Harvey (1972:21-2) quotes the following analysis of this problem from the Wall Street Journal (11-27-70):

As housing costs have risen and as suburbs have become more stringent in their zoning requirements, many suburban concerns have found it increasingly difficult to find production workers nearby Ford Motor Co., which has a giant assembly plant in the northern New Jersey town of Mahwah, attributes some of its 20% annual turnover in production employees to a shortage of nearby housing for workers. Many of its 5,000 employees travel to work from Newark, 30 miles away; New York City, 40 miles distant, and Jersey City, 45 miles away One large industrial concern in the East with comparable problems has begun to exert pressure on town councils, Chambers of Commerce, and zoning boards to get more inexpensive housing suited for production workers. So far they've had little luck. Says one company official, "Town officials want the plant but they don't want the hourly worker. They want the executive who will live on two acres of land in an \$80,000 home." Such corporate pressure will probably increase, in large part because of suburban greed. Eager to get more taxable assets, the towns are encouraging business to settle there. In the fast-growing 400 square mile area around Princeton, N.J., 20 local governments have zoned enough undeveloped land for industrial parks and research centers to support 1.2 million jobs. At the same time, the undeveloped residential land in the area is zoned for such low densities that it could house only 144,000 of the working population.

²²The numbers look like this: Of the 435 Representatives, 131 represent districts that are more than half suburban, 130 represent rural districts, 102 represent urban districts and 72 districts are too mixed to classify. By way of comparison, only 96 districts could be classified as suburban in 1966.

²³Though the particular mix of industries in any given metropolitan area would vary, I believe that the basic relationships described in this paper would hold true. This is, of course, an empirical question.

²⁴Educational services is a subdivision of the service industry category. The majority of people employed in this field are teachers, administrators and service workers hired by state and local governments. Thus it made sense to view it as a state sector category. However, because the Census Bureau made no attempt to separate out those people employed in private education, this measure is somewhat open to question.

²⁵If data were available by corporation, my task would be greatly simplified. The structure of each corporation and its relationship to others in its industry could be examined according to criteria which I have laid out earlier in this paper. Data on

employment by sector would be more more exact. An attempt to cull this data from corporate reports would be a worthy research project for the future.

²⁶In an informative discussion of concentration ratios, Blair (1972:7-11) observes that they are:

Overstated when there is great substitutability of products from other industries;
Understated at the industry level because of specialization by individual companies;
Understated in terms of control over local and regional markets;
Overstated in that exports from foreign corporations are excluded.

Overall, Blair concludes that concentration ratios are relatively accurate reflections of monopoly power.

²⁷Following the Standard Industrial Classification system (SIC), the Bureau of the Census reports industrial employment by two-digit Major Industry Groups (e.g. manufacturing) and three-digit Industry Groups (e.g. transportation equipment). Concentration ratios are developed in terms of more specific four-digit Industries (e.g. motor vehicles). For further explanation of the SIC, see Blair (1972:7-9).

²⁸The city of Detroit is included for purposes of comparison with a large central city. According to the classification scheme which I have proposed, Detroit would emerge as a middle status competitive sector community.

²⁹The differences between monopoly and competitive sector suburbs were operationalized by calculating the mean score of the group of municipalities falling into each category and then comparing means for each variable. The number of variables on which the sectors are compared and the relative sophistication of the variables was limited by the nature and form of census data. Every effort was made to use every possible variable, or combination of variables, which was conceptually relevant to the monopoly/competitive sector distinction.

³⁰The self-employment variable was used as a check on the classification scheme. Since nearly all monopoly sector firms are incorporated, self-employment is almost entirely a characteristic of the competitive sector. If my classification scheme has in fact captured the reality of monopoly and competitive sector municipalities, self-employment should be significantly higher, on the average, in competitive sector suburbs, particularly the upper status ones. Table 10 shows that this is precisely the case.

³¹The city of Detroit is consistent with the findings for middle status competitive sector communities, except in the case of young males in the labor force, where it actually has a lower

percentage than the average monopoly sector suburb of equal status. This is quite possibly due to a very high unemployment rate in the city among young males (especially young black males) which would tend to discourage them from even looking for work.

³²Ten thousand dollars in annual family income was selected as a measure of deprivation because the Bureau of Labor Statistics Moderate But Adequate budget for an urban family of four was set at slightly over ten thousand dollars in 1970.

³³This appears to vary by class and status, however. A number of lower status monopoly sector suburbs in the Detroit area have very large tax bases and low tax rates, due to the presence of a great deal of monopoly sector physical plant facilities. Nevertheless, the achievement scores of pupils from these districts are consistently among the lowest in the state. Obviously there are intervening factors here like race, class and perhaps ethnicity which require further study.

³⁴The study by Hill (1974) is a step in this direction.

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