

THE SETTLEMENT OF THE TRIESTE DISPUTE:
A CASE STUDY OF THE CHANGING
CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Sergio Talacchi

1956

THESIS



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by

Sergio Talacchi

AN ABSTRACT


Submitted to the College of Business and Public Service of
Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied
Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science and Public Administration

1956

Approved

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ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with the national and international interest of several European world powers, and with the diplomacy and other tactics utilized by them in the realization of these interests. More particularly, the thesis focuses on the interest which, in the judgment of the author, must be considered of crucial importance for any political-territorial organization: the interest of national security.

As a case study in the international behavior involved in the implementation of national security goals, the thesis focuses on the problem of the Giulian Region, a region which has raised crucial questions for international diplomacy in two diverse periods of major importance in the history of the Western World: the Conference of Versailles and the Conference of Paris.

Both of these periods represent fundamental modifications in international relations and diplomacy. At the Conference of Versailles the national interests which tended to create a balance of spheres of influence possessed a highly individualistic character. At the Conference of Paris, on the other hand, the creation of balanced spheres of influence took on a collective or institutional character, as evidenced by such organizations as EDC, NATO, the Balkan Pact, the Arab League, and so on.

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Thus, while at Versailles the Giulian Question represented one link out of the chain of control of the Mediterranean sought by one or more single world powers, at Paris the same Giulian Question represented one link in the chain of control of the Mediterranean sought by the East and by the West.

In regard to this change in the nature of the independent variable (Giulian Question) as it affects the dependent variable (national interest), this study will evolve.

The author realizes that history shows no examples in which realization of national interest by a single power acquired an absolute and highly individualistic character. Every nation acts in an international society, or better in a multi-nation world. In the context and dynamic of international relations, national action is always, with more or less formality, influenced by and involved with the national action and interest of other powers. Bipolarism exists now, international coalitions existed before. The former is the continuation of the latter. The characteristic which differentiates bipolarism from coalitions of the past is the fact that within the former have been developed certain degree of formalization of international symbols and institutions which were absent in

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SERGIO TALACCHI

ABSTRACT

the coalitions. Thus the novelty of bipolarism lies only in a concept of intensity: an increase in formalization; and in a concept of quality: new international institutions and symbols.

The previous clarification has been mentioned in order to make the reader realize that the clear cut distinction contained in the conceptual framework of this study and related to the change which the perception and realization of individual national interest underwent between the first and second world wars, is in reality only a question of degree or "nuances." The author wanted purposely and figuratively to increase the contrast between the national individualism of World War I and national collectivism of World War II (played by single powers in the realizations of their national interest), in order to give the reader a clearer perception of the dynamics of the change.

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INTRODUCTION

On Assumptions and Method

Since the end of World War I, it seems that the international order has undergone a significant realignment. Changes have occurred in international structure and politics. Bipolarism, accompanied by a new system of international relationships, has resulted in a new balance of power fostering a new social international order. The two basic factors pertaining to international politics and behavior, i.e., power and its elements--militarism, economics and propaganda--and morality and its elements--international law, judicial settlement of international disputes and sanctity of treaties--have also undergone change.

We will begin first by considering changes occurring in the power elements because they have most obviously altered the structure of international environment affecting, in turn, the balance of power system. The reduction in number of big powers, the role and position of minor and middle powers, their capacity for participation in the decision-making process affecting their own future and the degree of independence and participation in alliances are all factors which can be of significant aid in evaluating the changes in the international order from the eighteenth century to the present.

For our purpose we may take into consideration some institutions which would best define the pattern of international behavior during the period mentioned. In the light of this consideration, the author has chosen for purposes of analysis of international behavior during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, three main peace conferences,--the Conference of Vienna (1815), that of Paris (1856), and that of Berlin (1876),--and their related alliances,--the Holy, the Quadruple and the Triple Alliances. As the last level of approach the author has selected the pattern of behavior followed by individual powers before the declaration of war, i.e., Austria in the war against Prussia, and Prussia in the war against France. In the next pages we will compare these conferences and alliances with those existing in the twentieth century.

These three loci and channels of behavior--peace conferences, alliances and individual patterns of behavior before the declaration of war--have the advantage of being characteristic of international behavior of any age, including ours, and thus offer a common background for our analysis of international changes. This means that past and present international behavior will be evaluated in the light of these three different approaches.

Peace conferences are the loci where national interests, decision-making processes, membership and par-

ticipation can provide us with an idea of the accepted system of international behavior in terms of power, diplomacy and morality. While a conference analysis gives a locus approach to the problem of international behavior, the study of alliances seems to be more suitable in our case because it offers a mobility approach to international behavior. The elasticity of the alliances, the mobility of their members, the facility for withdrawal for the member nations, their time duration and the degree of impaired balance caused by the participation or non-participation of the given nations provide us with adequate categories necessary to evaluate international behavior with a different approach. In this sense, the studies of alliances gives us an indication of international pattern of adjustment in terms of power, national interests, and security, all of which directly affect and are affected by the balance of power system.

The last category of our analysis could be defined as the pre-requisite for war. In this sense it is significant for our analysis to determine the behavior followed by single powers previous to their entering into war with other single nations.

We can now translate into historical perspective the previous theoretical "three-level" approach to the study of international behavior. This approach will pro-

vide us with some of the basic assumptions which will give support, in terms of significance, to the present paper and will also help the reader to better locate and understand the material developed in the present dissertation.

For the purpose of a general introduction to our study we can figuratively establish a scale upon which effective individual participation in the international decision-making process can be placed.¹ If we now apply to this scale the major peace conferences involving European and world territorial and political realignments which occurred during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we would see that the Vienna (1812), Paris (1856), Berlin (1878), and Versailles Conferences (1915) connote high effective participation by all participating members, while, on the contrary, the Paris Peace Conference (1946) would show low results on the scale.² As historical validation of these relations we can mention the behavior of Italy, a minor power, in the Paris conference in 1871, in the Versailles conference, and in the Paris Peace Treaty

¹Effective participation in our case can be measured on the basis of the following criteria: how many committees of nations are created within the conference, how many nations are allowed to be in the top council, the nature of procedures and how they affect the voting power within the conference.

²Archibald C. Collidge, Three Peace Congresses (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919), pp. 3-68. See also: H. Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna (New York: Harcourt-Brace and Co., 1946), pp. 134-167.

Conference in 1946 and how it affected the final results of the conference decision-making in regard to her national interests; the Giùlian and the Trentine questions. In the two former conferences, Italy assumed a decisive role in the decision process by influencing it to an extensive degree.³ Instead, however, in the last conference, Italy, although exerting much pressure on the conference decision-making process, had almost no influence in it.⁴ Even considering that Italy was in a different situation in these three conferences--allied and an enemy--the degree of her different participation which was permitted in the last case, if related to previous conferences is an outstanding example of the trend of national participation in a conference environment.

Thus the widely different degrees of effective participation offered to the minor powers in the decision-making process of international conferences is conducive to a tentative general assumption: The capacity and frequency for minor powers to originate action and affect the decision-making process in international Conferences has undergone sensible reduction from the 19th to the 20th century, or we can say that: Big powers have increasingly

³See Chapter II, *infra*.

⁴See Chapter III, *infra*.

limited the effective participation in the decision-making process to themselves alone.⁵

Now a consideration of the modifications which occurred in the organizational structure of alliances from the early nineteenth century to the present is necessary. This consideration involves an analysis of how elasticity, membership, period of life, the individual nation's participation upon the strength of the alliance, and the nature of formal obligations among the nation members have been affected by the dynamics of international change.

To effect the transference of these criteria into historical data, use will be made of several significant alliances which occurred during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as: the Holy, the Quadruple, and Triple alliances, and the East-West alliances of the World War II period. A correlation between the Holy, Quadruple, Triple alliances and the East-West alliances gives low results of similarity on the basis of the following criteria. In the first three Alliances we note that there is a relatively high degree of elasticity, when elasticity is defined in terms of the existing external compulsion for individual nations to participate in the alliance and the capacity of individual nations to withdraw from it. We also note in

⁵See Chapt. V, *infra*.

these three Alliances that membership is limited to few nations. The period of life of these alliances ranges between one and five years. Another important element to be considered is the improbable survival of the alliance if any of the state members withdraw from it. The nature of the formal obligations existing among members is preeminently legal.⁶

An analysis of the East-West alliances would give almost opposite results to those previously indicated. Elasticity as previously defined is almost non-existent and is now replaced by rigidity. Membership is worldwide. The life of the alliance is prolonged in time and has become independent from the withdrawal of the state members. There is an increased use of economic-ideological ties among members, replacing in part the legal obligations which have assumed mainly a function of formality. From what has been said the assumption can now be formulated that the trend in organizational structure of alliances has shown increased formalization, longevity, increased independence from state members, wide membership and increased use of power as a tool for attracting and maintaining membership. Recent developments in the international order

⁶Archibald C. Coolidge, The Origins of the Triple Alliance (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917), pp. 143, 218. See also H. Nicolson, op. cit., pp. 240-255.

tending towards regionalistic alliances might require a modification of this general assumption.

The last category chosen by the author to delineate the developmental construct is the behavior followed by a single power before the declaration of war. An example of national behavior in this specific circumstance during the nineteenth century is the Austrian declaration of war against Prussia, and the Prussian declaration of war against France. In these two circumstances the initiating nations felt the necessity, customary at that time, for a very careful planning of treaties or alliances. This again shows how the existing balance of power affected the international patterns of behavior. At that time the participation or non-participation by every individual nation in international conflicts could have had serious impact upon the success or failure of a war. That is because the distribution of power among nations had a wider spread and a more even allocation. The initiation of war in the present time is not only effectively limited to a smaller number of nations, but also would exonerate the initiators from a careful planning of alliances. From this we can assume that the trend has been towards an increasing reduction in the number of effective powers in the international environment, thus limiting the restraining function exercised by a multi-nation system of balance of power, as that existing in the nineteenth century.

All of the three previous assumptions regarding trends in decision-making in international organizations--conferences, pattern of national behavior in alliances, and degree of interaction among nations in originating war--are conducive to the formulation of one general assumption concerning power as a motivating factor in the international pattern of adjustment; that is, this trend shows that power and its elements--militarism, economics and propaganda--has been moving from an almost even allocation among several nations towards an increasing concentration in fewer nations, thus affecting the elasticity and the intrinsic functions of the balance of power system existing during the nineteenth century.

At this point the author considers as necessary an analysis of the second factor assumed as basic in international patterns of adjustment; that is the value system or morality of international politics.⁷ Power and morality are so highly interdependent that even a separate study of them for analytical purposes proves to be artificial. Morality in the international environment determines the how and how much military, economic and propaganda power

⁷I would like to give recognition to the theoretical formulation given by E. H. Carr in Twenty-Year Crisis 1919-1939 (London: McMillan, 1949), from which was extracted his conception of international morality for this thesis.

can be utilized, and therefore morality has always framed international conduct by providing it with a system of normative patterns of behavior.

During the nineteenth century the search for a morality as a matter of rationalization for behavior was fostered at a maximum degree. At that time the effort to rationalize international behavior had as a base the conciliatory attitude. Thus the Darwinian doctrine became popular because it identifies the good of the whole with the good of the fittest and contemplates without repugnance the elimination of the unfit, and the doctrine of a natural harmony of interests which became the tool of vested interests projected into a bulwark of extreme and artificial conservatism: the status quo, the right of those in possession. This doctrine, which identifies international morality with security, had its major advocator in Wilson and his principles of self-determination. These accepted principles of status quo-ism, national equalitarianism, and self-determination, natural harmony of interests, and negation of the conflict by considering it as an evil of temporary nature, provided the more suitable ground for the flourishing of the nineteenth century nationalism.⁸

⁸E. C. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 (London, MacMillan Co., 1949), pp. 208-223.

What happened to these normative assumptions? Did they hold themselves and survive after the World War I, when power began to follow a pattern of increased concentration and the international order began adjusting in such a way as to impose more realistic interpretations of international behavior?

With the changes of the power system the morality system prevailing in the nineteenth century international order became unattainable as the basis of actual international behavior. The trend now seems to follow an opposite pattern to the previous one, i.e., from an Utopian morality to an extremely realistic one. The ethical problem involved today is how to reconcile the good of the nation with the good of the world community. The new allocation of power and the new balance system combined with other national and international changes has made unfunctional the ethical arrangement existing in the nineteenth century. The real international crisis of the modern world is the final and irrevocable breakdown of the conditions which made the nineteenth century order possible. The old order cannot be restored and a drastic change in outlook is unavoidable.⁹

⁹Palme Dott, World Politics 1919-1936 (New York: International Publishers, 1936), pp. 11-14.

Where can we look for a revival of international morality which could frame the new international order? At this point we provide the synthesis of the analysis developed in the present chapter. For the problem must be considered from the standpoint of both of power and morality and it involves questions of the following nature:

- 1) will the nation survive as the unit of power? 2) what will be the significance of sovereignty? 3) what will be the role of power in the new international order? and
- 4) what will be the role of morality in it?

Several solutions have been suggested for these problems including imperialism, federalism and regionalism, which all consider to a variable extent the trend in allocation of power in the new international order. However, the recently developed trend in international behavior toward increased decentralization of power (atomic power) allows the author to formulate certain assumptions which will be more fully and extensively treated later:

1. The nation as a unit of power: in spite of the trend toward centralization in the actual international order, group units in some form will certainly survive as repositories of political power, whatever form these units may take.
2. Power in international order: the new international order can be built only on a unit of

power sufficiently coherent and sufficiently strong to maintain its ascendancy without being itself compelled to take sides in the rivalries of lesser units.

3. Morality and the international order: the present morality seems to rely on the recognition of the reality of conflict, the rejection of the easy hypothesis of natural harmony of interests, and the continuance of the acceptance that what is morally desirable is economically advantageous.

On Method

After having formulated the general assumptions underlying the material considered in this dissertation, the author has been compelled to find a theoretical system which would adequately validate these assumptions. The problem lies in selecting a system of analysis which would limit the variables on hand without impairing the significance of the system's relationship to the relative assumptions.

In the light of these considerations the author has used as a case study the Trieste question. The Trieste question will constitute the independent variable in the following analysis. The choice of the Trieste question

has been determined by its adaptability to our analysis. As a matter of fact the Trieste problem, being one of the important international issues discussed in several peace Conferences, will provide us with a constant variable against which we will be able to evaluate international and national behavior within Peace Conferences in a trend perspective. In addition to this behavioristic analysis within a Conference "locus," the Trieste problem will further offer us the opportunity to approach international behavior from a different level: alliances.

The analysis made possible by these two different approaches will illustrate the impact of power and morality upon national patterns of behavior. This in turn will allow us to study the international order in the light of the dynamics and changes assumed by the balance of powers. The study of the trend of these forces--power, morality and their product, the balance of powers--will constitute the background of the present dissertation. Their composite impact on future international behavior will be the object of the last part of the paper, where from a stage of analysis we will pass to a stage of synthesis. There problems related to nationality, sovereignty, imperialism, federalism and regionalism will be considered; all are directly related to the changes of the elements of international politics: power and morality.

The time span covered by the present project will run from 1915 to the present. The choice of this period is significant for our study, because, as will be shown later, World War I constitutes a definite breaking point between the old and new international order. This factor is of considerable importance and helps to formulate criteria for behavioristic analysis, where the extent and nature of "changes" are the object of study.

In analyzing trends of international behavior within conferences and Alliances, the author will make use of the operational categories previously mentioned.

The tools used in the realization of national interest by individual powers (diplomacy), the decision-making process, membership and participation, will constitute valuable criteria of analysis as far as behavior within conferences is concerned.

CHAPTER I

THE LONDON PACT AND THE RAPALLO TREATY

This chapter describes the nature and the realization of the national interest of Italy and Yugoslavia focused on the Giulian Question within the framework of international interests during and after World War I.

The chapter contains an analysis of the first part of the study's general hypothesis: that "in the period preceding and ending with the Versailles Conference the realization of single powers' national interest possessed a highly individualistic character." The following pages show how the political and diplomatic actions of Italy and Yugoslavia, both aiming at possessing the Giulian Region for national security, have a wider range of freedom under the influence exercised by the coalition of the Allied powers. The expression "wider range of freedom" has relevance only in terms of the range of freedom shown by the political and diplomatic actions of Italy and Yugoslavia during the later bipolarism at the time of the Paris Peace Conference.

Returning to our general conceptual framework, we can say that the World War I coalitions, Allied v. Austro-Germanic, had:

- a) a low degree of formalization of international symbols and institutions (quantitative concept) and
- b) a different nature and kind of international symbols (qualitative concept)

in contrast with those possessed by the bipolaristic coalitions of World War II. In order to illustrate better the national and international behavior of the single interested powers, Italy and Yugoslavia, the author has chosen as a descriptive base a succession of international acts formally negotiated. The content of these acts and the national actions preceding their stipulations will be a valid index to the ends of the research.

It should be stressed that the first part of the general hypothesis contained in this chapter, which considers the part that national individualism played in the realization of national interest, will be without significant value if unrelated to the second part of the same general hypothesis. The second part discusses the role that national collectivism played in the realization of national interest and is considered in Chapters II, III, IV *infra*. Due to the interrelationship existing between the two parts of the hypothesis, it is advisable for the reader to read Chapters I, II, III, and IV as an integrated whole. Chapters V and VI have the function of analyzing and interpreting the factual material described in the case study.

A. The Italian and Slavic National Interest in the
Adriatic Area Within the Framework of the International
Interest of the Allied Powers: the Reconstitution of
the Equilibrium of Spheres of Influence After the
Breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Empire

During World War I, the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire became one of the issues that had not been present at the beginning of the war. Italians and Slavs¹ found themselves free from the oppression of the Hapsburg Empire. The Italians had contributed a great deal to the war, including thousands of lives, and they naturally sought satisfactory results at the end of the conflict. Since the Slavs had also sacrificed their share of blood to the cause, was it not also just and fair to respect their principle of nationality?

Due to the particular ethnical position of Istria, only a compromise born out of understanding and good will on the part of Italy and Yugoslavia could have brought about a peaceful relationship between the two countries. However, after Italy entered the war, these possibilities vanished, because Italy's entrance was determined by the

¹Slavs: include the Serbians, Croats, and Slovenes. Serbia was an independent state, while Croatia and Slovenia were principates under the Austro-Hungarian rule.

London Pact, which was signed in the absence of Yugoslavia seven days before the denunciation of the Triple Alliance by Italy. The secret negotiations of the London Pact provoked the Slavs and laid the foundation for the irreducible Italo-Slav conflict. This conflict, officially latent during the war, reappeared at the end of World War I and gave impetus to friction which eventually matured during twenty years of fascism--a friction which the Italians have tasted and have been tasting uninterruptedly since the end of World War II.

The London Pact, the instrument which determined the intervention of Italy, was signed on April 26, 1915, by Grey for England, Imperiali for Italy, Benckendorff for Russia and Paul Cambon for France. It established that:

1. (Art. 4) Under the Treaty of Peace, Italy shall obtain the Trentino, Cysalpine Tyrol with its geographical and natural frontier (the Brenner frontier), as well as Trieste,² the counties of Gorizia and Gradisca, all Istria as far as the Quarnero and including Volosca and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, as well as the neighbouring islands.
2. (Art. 5) Italy shall also be given the province of Dalmatia within its present administrative boundaries, including to the north, Lisarica and Tri-bania; to the south as far as a line starting from Cape Planka on the coast and following eastward the crests of the heights forming the watershed, in

²Emphasis on this page is mine; it notes the key outlets for the control of the Adriatic area, and therefore the realization of the Italian national interest on the Adriatic.

such a way as to leave within Italian territory all the valleys and streams flowing toward Sebenico.

To be neutralized:³

- a. the entire coast from cape Planka on the north to the southern base of the peninsula of Sabinello in the south, so as to include the whole of that peninsula;
- b. the portion of coast which begins in the north at a point situated 10 kilometres south of the headland of Ragusa Vecchia extending southward as far as the river Voiussa, in such a way as to include the gulf and ports of Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno, Durazzo.
- c. Finally all the islands not given to Italy.

Note to the Art. 5--The following Adriatic territory shall be assigned by the Four Allied powers to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro: in the Upper Adriatic, the whole coast from the bay of Volosca on the borders of Istria as far as the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the coast which is at present Hungarian, and all the coast of Croatia, with the port of Fiume and the small ports of Novi and Carlopelago, as well as the island of Veglia, Pervicchio, Gregorio, Govi and Arbe. And in the Lower Adriatic (in the region interesting Serbia and Montenegro) the whole coast from cape Planka as far as the river Drin, with the important harbours of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari and the near-by islands. The port of Durazzo to be assigned to the Independent Moslem State of Albania.

3. (Art. 6) Italy shall receive full sovereignty over Valona,⁴ the island of Saseno and the surrounding territory of sufficient extent to assure defense of these points.

³The neutralization of practically all of the Yugoslavian coast not assigned to Italy must be seen as another step toward major control on the Adriatic area by Italy.

⁴The emphasis on this page is mine; it notes certain key Mediterranean outlets through which Italy will be able to exert her share of Mediterranean control, thus realizing her national interest in that area.

4. (Art. 7) Should Italy obtain the Trentino and Istria in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, together with Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands within the limits specified in Article 5, and the bay of Valona (Art. 6), and if the central portion of Albania is reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neutralized state, Italy shall not oppose the division of northern and southern Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece, should France, Great Britain and Russia so desire. The coast from the southern boundary of the Italian territory of Valona up to cape Sylos shall be neutralized.

Italy shall be charged with the representation of the State of Albania in its relations with foreign powers.

5. (Art. 8) Italy shall receive entire sovereignty over the Dodecanneso islands which she is at present occupying.
6. (Art. 9) Generally speaking, France, Great Britain and Russia recognize that Italy is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean and that, in the event of total or partial partition of Turkey in Asia, she sought to obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia, where Italy has already acquired rights and interests which formed the subject of an Italo-British convention. The interests of Italy shall be taken into consideration in the event of the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire being maintained and of alterations being made in the zones of interests of the powers. If France, Great Britain and Russia occupy any territories in Turkey in Asia during the course of the war, the Mediterranean region bordering the Province of Adalia within the limits indicated above shall be reserved to Italy, who shall be entitled to occupy it.
7. (Art. 16) The present arrangement shall be held secret.

In this pact, Italy renounced Fiume, which, similarly to Trieste after the second World War, constituted the center of discord at the time of peace negotiations.

The real basis of the London Pact must be seen as an application of the doctrine of the balance of powers. In 1915 the total dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empire was an ultimate possibility, but hardly an immediate prospect. The Pact, therefore, did not attempt to go beyond a division of spoils on the basis of a new balance. Austria-Hungary was to retain an outlet on the Adriatic and Serbia was to become the Greater Serbia favored by Russia. To compensate for this modification of the Balkan balance--the presumable increase of Russian influence through the aggrandizement of Serbia--Italy was to have secure control of the Adriatic through the possession of Pola, Valona, and northern Dalmatia. As an application of the theory of balance of power, such an arrangement does not seem unreasonable. One may rather wonder, in fact, at the vagueness of the terminology through which Italy sought to safeguard her further Mediterranean interests. If the Allies wanted Italy, they must pay her price; Italy, on her side, certainly was under no obligation to assist the Entente. It was a clear case of interest on both sides.

The London Pact did not satisfy Serbia for two reasons: first, the signatory allied powers did not respect her nationality principle,⁵ and second, her lack of knowl-

⁵Principle of nationality: Serbia requested as price of her participation in the war the unification of the Slavic people in a new and united nation. The London

edge concerning the clauses of the London Pact, secretly stipulated ~~between~~ France, Great Britain and Russia on one side and Italy on the other, gave her the feeling that she had ~~been~~ abandoned by the Allies in favor of the Italian interests.

Those "faults of the Pact from the Slav point of view" cannot be denied. The principle of nationality, itself at the root of the war, certainly was ignored. It had fallen to Russia--not for any unselfish devotion to that principle on her part--to take up its defense in the Adriatic, with the result that the Pact contained the ambiguous phraseology, "the following Adriatic territory shall be assigned by the Four allied power to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro" (see note to Art. 5, p. 20), opening the door to future dissensions. Even without the events of the following three years, the London Pact contained the potential seeds of discord between Italy and her new Allies, between the Slavs and the Allies, between Italy and the Slavs.

Thus the London Pact caused a complete change in the attitude of the Serbian government of Nish. The Serbian government had at the beginning of World War I made

Pact, by assigning to Italy some territories which Serbia considered as being part of her territories inhabited by Slavic people, did not respect Serbian principle of nationality.

claims more moderate than those advanced by the Slav exiles. As a matter of fact, in August 1914, early in the war, Pasic, the head of the Serbian government, wrote to Spalaikovic, minister to Pietrograd from Serbia,

if the territorial grants to Italy are discussed, Dalmatia wants to be reunited with Serbia because it will be the solution most advantageous to her national interest. Italy will be satisfied if it obtains Trieste, Trento, Istria and Pola.⁶ If Italy demands more, this will provoke a reaction that will prove to be profitable for Austria-Hungary. Ask the Imperial government not to make promises to Italy that will be detrimental to the Slavs since Italy intends not to take part in the actual war, and plans rather to obtain Slavic territories without sacrifices.⁷

But later, after the London Pact, the Serbian government of Nish, fearing that the allies favored the Italian interest at the expense of its own, accepted and made the claims advanced by the Slav exiles its own. Thus from the complete agreement on policy between the Serbian political leaders and Slavic refugees evolved a common proposition, the "Declaration of Corfu" of July 20, 1917. That document, signed by Nicola Pasic, President of the Serbian Committee of Slav exiles in London, asserted that the

⁶Emphasis is mine.

⁷Mario Toscano, La Serbia e l'intervento in guerra dell'Italia (Milano: A Giuffre, 1939), p. 7. The Slavic exiles were those among whom the movement for the unification of the Slavic people was most strongly felt. They created organizations in Europe and in the United States. The most representative among them was Supilo. The memorandum containing the Slavic claims which later constituted the declaration of Corfu and the Yugoslav claims at the Paris Peace Conference received his name. See also page 75.

Serbs, Croats and the Slovenes would constitute nothing but one uniform nation and that a feeling of unity was alive among these peoples. In addition it stated that

The Nation of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenians will include all the territory in which these three named populations live in compact masses and without discontinuity.⁸ Our newly unified Nation does not claim to want that which belongs to another. We want freedom and unity and this cannot be entrusted to foreign powers without our consent.⁹

Thus, while the revolutionary ideas of Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, shook the world, nationality and "self-determination" marked the new order.

The principle of nationality and self-determination inspired the Pact of Rome negotiated in 1914 under the influence of Mazzini's ideology of redemption of the Slavic people and the Italian initiative. This pact established the cooperation of Italy and Yugoslavia for the defense of the Adriatic, as well as the obligation of the two countries to solve their controversies in a friendly manner and to respect the moral and material interests of the national minorities of either state.¹⁰ But unfortunately

⁸ Emphasis is mine.

⁹ Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, La Question Adriatique (Paris: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1900), pp. 19-23.

¹⁰ Ministero degli Esteri, Documenti sulla questione Adriatica: dal Patto di Londra all'armistizio di Villa Giusti (Roma: Ministero degli Esteri, 1915), Documento 32.

the Pact of Rome was the end of the true friendship and collaboration between Italians and Slavs; on both sides the nationalistic trend, characteristic of new states early in their formation, soon became a force of greater importance.

In 1915 the Austro-Hungarian Empire was defeated. The peace Conference at Versailles followed shortly after. According to the Slavic claims, the territory where the population was composed of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and where these populations lived in "a compact mass and with almost complete absence of other races" included Serbia, and Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina, Dalmatia with its archipelago, Fiume, the zone of the Drava, southern Hungary and the old Serbian Vojodina, Istria with its islands and Trieste, Carnia and Gorizia, southern Carinzia and southern Stiria.¹¹

The Italians, on the other hand, reasserted their rights as stated in the London Pact; at the same time they demanded the annexation of Fiume to Italy, even if this city had been granted to Croatia, future component of Yugoslavia, in the Pact of London.¹² The Italian diplomats,

¹¹Gabriele Paresce, Italia e Yugoslavia (Firenze: Bemporad, 1935), p. 15. See also Toscano, op. cit., pp. 56-70.

¹²Ministero degli Esteri, op. cit., documento 8.

in order to justify this illogical policy of claiming Fiume, used for its support the Wilsonian principles of nationality and self-determination, which they believed likely to succeed if applied to the urban center of Fiume. The Italian representatives did not foresee that the Fiume request was bound to be unsuccessful for many reasons. Even if the new Wilsonian principles per se could have had general value, in their application they would always be subordinated to the general international interests. In this way the Wilsonian plan concerning the Italo-Yugoslav boundary and attributing to Fiume an international status, was born out of the general interest for Europe, safeguarding a peaceful relationship between the Italians and the Yugoslavs on the eastern Adriatic. It certainly cannot be assumed that a border, drawn up according to the Wilsonian plan, fully satisfied the strategic and security exigencies of Italy--and for this reason the Navy and the Italian Supreme Command claimed the Dalmatian islands and with them the Dalmatian hinterlands as being the only acceptable Italian defensive border. However, Italian generals Badoglio and Diaz, more realistic, considered the so-called "natural border," which stretched along the Nevoso mountain, an excellent and strong territorial border (both the proposed borders included territories which the Wilsonian plan attributed to Yugoslavia). The American government believed that Italy had no reason to complain about

the lack of security at her eastern borders, because the young Yugoslavia was in no position to menace anyone.

The second reason why the Fiume request by Italian representatives was bound to be unsuccessful was that the influence Italy enjoyed during the war had decreased at the time of the Versailles Conference because of two events: the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the end of Czarist Russia. Thus, the allies' reasons for the London Pact no longer existed. As far as the Adriatic security and Italy's function in it were concerned, France and Great Britain could now serenely shield themselves behind the United States. Even better, they could now avail themselves of Wilson's intransigence as a shield. In this manner Clemenceau and Lord George professed friendship towards Italy, ascribing their inability to apply the London Pact to the difficulties caused by Wilson--who, as a matter of fact, did not recognize as valid the previously secretly stipulated pacts such as the London Pact. But in reality Wilson's rigidity was an easy excuse for France and England, because the **absolute** control of the Adriatic by Italy could not have pleased Great Britain, while on the other hand Italian friendship might reassure France along the Alpine border.

But regardless of the limitations imposed by the new international situation (fall of the Austro-Hungary

Empire and Czarist Russia), and regardless of Wilson's desire for an internationalized Fiume,¹³ the Italian delegation in Paris, headed by the Italian premier Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, adhered strongly to the policy of obtaining Fiume at any cost. Only later, because of Allied pressure, did the Italian delegation withdraw this policy.

Thus, while Italian public opinion, already stimulated by the firm position taken by the Italian representatives in Versailles, demanded the annexation of Fiume to Italy, the activity of the Italian delegation lessened. The delegation began to accept, as a basis for discussion, several plans of compromise, such as the Miller, Tardieu projects;¹⁴ thus it was unable to save what perhaps could have been saved at the beginning of the Peace Conference through faster and more resolute action. In this circumstance it was not possible to avoid the severe criticism raised by Italian public opinion and leveled against the later development of the Italian policy at Versailles--a policy that after a false resistance turned out to be complete capitulation. The fall of the Orlando Cabinet followed shortly after.

¹³Ibid., Vol. II, Documento 20.

¹⁴Ibid., Vol. II, Introduzione.

Nitti, successor to Orlando, gained the confidence of the Allies by following a clear Italian policy. At the same time the Italian delegation's desire to settle the Italo-Yugoslav border coincided with the desires of Great Britain and France to conclude the peace negotiations in Versailles quickly. The Tittoni plan and the Nitti Compromise were proposed, and rejected by the Slavs and Wilson.¹⁵ This constituted the first step towards the international and political isolationism of the Slavs, which later was to be completely abandoned by France and Great Britain. The Slavic international isolationism was completed later, when Wilson, their heroic supporter, was defeated in the American elections. Giolitti, successor to Nitti in the presidency of the Italian Council of Ministers, took advantage of the Slavic isolationism in settling the question of the Italo-Yugoslav borders.

B. The Rapallo Treaty: Formal Seal of the Italian Aspirations in the Adriatic. The Rapallo Treaty Gave to Italy Less than What Was Assigned to Her in the London Pact. Disintegration of the Allies' Coalition.

When the Treaty of Versailles came into force in January 1920, the Peace Conference proper formally came to

¹⁵The Nitti compromise provided for the abolition of the Free State of Fiume with the annexation of the city to Italy and of Sussak to Yugoslavia.

an end. The numerous questions which called for frequent consultations between the various governments were dealt with in a series of conferences. However, these successive conferences in 1920 did not attempt to deal with the Adriatic issue, which was now supposed to be the subject of direct negotiations between the two principal parties.¹⁶ In this way contact was maintained between the Italians and the Yugoslavs; in this case, between Sforza and Trumbic, the respective foreign ministers.¹⁷

It is important to bear in mind that throughout this period, June to November 1920: Versailles and Rapallo treaties respectively, there took place a steady disintegration of the Franco-British alliance, which continued to exist only in name. Relations with Germany and the Near Eastern settlements were the main points of difference, and the two countries pursued diametrically opposite policies. A semblance of unity was maintained toward Germany, but in the case of Turkey, the different policies could not be reconciled. As a result, France made a separate treaty with Turkey. Italy followed with a policy

¹⁶Direct negotiations type of behavior between Italy and Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference will be obstructed by both bipolar coalitions. Besides, the Adriatic issue will be considered and treated as a matter of more interest for the coalitions than for the individual interested powers, Italy and Yugoslavia.

¹⁷Yugoslavia, national Slavic State, was formed in 1918.

akin to, though more open than the French, and the resulting Franco-Italian rapprochement, largely in opposition to British policy, was reflected in the markedly pro-Italian attitude of the French Foreign Office toward the Adriatic issue, as compared with a relatively neutral British position. The Yugoslavs were naturally anxious, on their part, to make a settlement. They could no longer count on further assistance from London and Paris; with the passing of time, it also became increasingly clear that their mainstay in Washington would, in all probability, be definitely swept from the scene. The Yugoslav readiness to come to a final understanding with Italy was further enhanced by the events of October 1920, which were without immediate connection, but not without influence on their decision. It was during October that the plebiscite in the Klagenfurt area was held, and, much to the chagrin of the Yugoslavs, the voting favored union with Austria. The reaction of the Yugoslavs to this disappointment--the ethnic majority in the zone where the plebiscite had been held was admittedly Slovene--was to occupy the district with their troops. This gesture only brought them a sharp joint ultimatum from Great Britain, France and Italy, giving them forty-eight hours in which to withdraw. Close to this fact came the equally disheartening results of the American presidential election at the beginning of November: complete

defeat of their great champion at the Peace Conference. After these events, the Yugoslavs could not but feel isolated.

The political program of Giolitti and of Count Carlo Sforza, the new Italian foreign minister, attempted in view of Yugoslavia's international situation a more firm solution of the eastern Italian frontier with the following claims: the new eastern Italian boundary was to be approximately that of the London Pact, assuring Italy's possession of Mount Nevoso; Italy would renounce Fiume, which would be internationalized, but would demand Cherso and Lussin islands. Dalmatia, excluding Zara, would be given to Yugoslavia. The Italian diplomats convened at Rapallo with this program to meet the Yugoslav representatives.

The principal provisions of the Treaty negotiated in this occasion by Italy and Yugoslavia were:

Istrian frontier (Art. 1)--The frontier was to run from the point (Mt. Pec) where Italy, Austria, and Yugoslavia came together, in a general southeasterly direction to Mount Nevoso, and thence to the sea, which it was to join just south of Castua. This town was left in Yugoslav territory. This line was practically identical with the line of the London Pact, save for a slight shift eastward of that line between Idria and Castua.

Zara (Art. 2)--The commune of Zara and portions of some neighboring communes, amounting roughly to a radius of seven kilometres around the city, "are recognized as forming part of the kingdom of Italy."

Islands (Art. 3)--Cherso and Lussin with adjacent islets were to form part of Italy. Likewise Pelagosa and Lagosta.

Fiume (Art. 4-5)--Italy and Yugoslavia recognized and undertook to respect in perpetuity the full liberty and independence of the State of Fiume.¹⁸

The Treaty of Rapallo was ratified by Yugoslavia on the 22nd of September 1920 and by Italy on the second of February, 1920. Yugoslavia, however, considered the Versailles Peace and the Rapallo Treaty as treason, while Italy sadly pondered the abandonment of Fiume.

Nevertheless, the new frontier assured Italian access to the mercury mines of Idria, a railroad from Trieste to Fiume, and, with inclusion of Mt. Nevoso, control of the Lubiana road and an excellent defense line. But, was it a wise policy to absorb large Slavic minorities in the Italian territory, in an historic period which the events of 1918 demonstrated to be the second general wave

¹⁸Rene Albrecht Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 304.

of the nationalistic insurrection? Probably a non-fascist Italy would have appeased the separatistic claims of the Slavic minorities, and a good administration would have strongly tied these minorities to Italy. In effect, an attempt toward peaceful collaboration between Italy and Yugoslavia was made in 1937 with the "Friendship Pact." But unfortunately Fascism, following its rigid nationalism, increasingly antagonized the Slavs, with the result that later the nationalistic claims of these people were mainly directed against Italy.

World War II came, and with it guerrilla action between Tito's troops and the Italian troops of occupation. The result of the war reversed the political and psychological position between the two countries. Like the Italy of Vittorio Veneto in World War I the Yugoslavia of 1945 could not conceive of being defrauded out of her "natural borders." The Isonzo river was her Rhine.

CHAPTER II

THE RISE OF BIPOLARISM AND ITS DIFFERENCES FROM THE COALITIONS OF WORLD WAR I

A. Allocation of Power in the World National Structure Following World War II

The novel feature of the postwar international situation is bipolarism. The wide disparity of strength between the power of the United States and Russia contrasted to that of the small states must be taken into consideration. At the present time, the ground between them is rather narrow. The failure of the middle powers to achieve strength as independent powers has resulted in the world's being divided into two great spheres of influence.

As the tension grew between the United States and the Soviet Union, the question of power, and of the role of the middle powers, increased proportionately. With sufficient strength, nations in the middle class would be able to serve as mediators between the two giant powers, or, if lacking adequate power, these potential pivotal nations could declare themselves extraneous to any trouble between the two spheres, and rely on their own respective solidarity and strength to command deference. Seeking this role of mediator were Great Britain and France. In

1945 the British political trend was one of attempting to bridge the gap between the United States and Russia. Britain's attempt to assert herself as a mediator in international diplomacy was unsuccessful. It was impossible for Britain, because of her weaknesses, to play an independent role on the world stage. At the end of World War II, Great Britain emerged as a prime example of extreme national insolvency. Britain was no longer able to maintain her position as a super-power with world-wide commitments; neither was recovery from the devastating effects of the war within her own boundaries possible. Consequently, Great Britain was compelled to relinquish the power she had hitherto possessed. India, Ceylon and Burma were liberated from the British Empire. In the Near East, the decision was reached that Palestine could no longer be held intact from the clamors of both Jews and Arabs. However, the most dramatic and important announcement was that Britain could no longer support with military power the small but shaky Greek government against the Communist National Liberal Front. For the United States, 1947 was the year of decision since Great Britain obviously was no longer one of the greater powers of the world. If the United States was going to successfully

combat communism, the only recourse available was to control the vulnerable and strategic world areas herself.¹

The role of mediator in the postwar world was also pursued by France. If the political program of the French postwar governments could have been fully realized, it would probably have led France to a position of effective foreign and domestic opposition to communism, and also would have included a program for increasing the independence of France from America. While many Frenchmen were not in full agreement with the policies of De Gaulle, the majority did agree that the dependence of France upon the United States was a necessary evil; but an evil that should be done away with as soon as possible. France was no longer an important military power. The former power of the French military force had evaporated under the unopposed onslaught of Hitler into the Rhineland a decade earlier.

A fact often forgotten in the year of victory (1946) was the internal feeling which existed among Frenchmen. It was an intrinsic condition which frustrated all attempts by both political and economic institutions to revive any semblance of the former greatness of France. The assumption that the Fourth Republic of France would be able to

¹Percy Corbett, Britain Partner for Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1946), pp. 3-16, 69-72.

solve the problems which had caused the downfall of the Third soon proved to be incorrect.²

Among the most significant of these problems caused by the French political and social instability appeared to be the multiplicity of the parties, as well as numerous political alignments. These led to general instability in the government which, while serious, was only a surface manifestation of the deeper problems of social, economic and ideological conflict. The many French governments which existed, between the two wars, to take moves of economic, social and financial reforms necessary to continue political health, were a reflection of a lack of common identification with a stable and standard set of political and economic institutions. This lack of identification together with basic weaknesses and uncertainty were responsible for the defeat of France. Time after time the people of France voted for reforms; and time after time the various French cabinets moved more and more to a conservative political program.³ Some questions might have been asked regarding the future of Britain on the world scene, but there was no question as to the position of France. The democracy of France depended on outside help;

²Carter, Ranney and Hartz, Major Foreign Powers (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1952), pp. 265-270.

³Ibid., pp. 279 ff.

she could not vacillate between the giants of the East and West but instead was forced to rely on the United States for her national recovery and continued well-being.

Another factor of the most important contribution to the dynamic rise of bipolaristic coalitions was the post-war face-to-face position of the two super powers: USSR and USA. The salient implications resulting from the Russian-American relationship, which acted as a factor contributing to the dynamic rise of bipolarism, must not be underestimated. These two powers will be the leaders and the centers of the future coalitions. An analysis of the discernible causes of the postwar poisoning of American-Soviet relations will furnish us some of the explanations and justifications of the existence and nature of the respective coalitions.

Several points in summary should be mentioned here to clarify the situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves in the postwar period. First, the negotiations undertaken and made during the war resulted in agreements and statements so vague and ambiguous that more was concealed than revealed. Neither the East nor West knew for certain what had been agreed to; thus a perfect stage for future disputes was set. The intention of Russia to extend its influence as far west as possible became clear after the Teheran Conference, when

the Russian policy of infiltration and eventual control could be clearly observed in regard to Poland and the Balkans.⁴ In both areas Soviet policy was soon shown to be at variance with the milder form of influence which the West expected of the Soviet Union and to which it thought its Eastern allies committed.

Secondly, the stalemate over Germany was also caused by a similar failure of the East and the West to evaluate each other's objectives. To the Soviet way of thinking, the proposed American plan for German recovery looked like suspicious tactics, particularly when the United States neither accepted nor rejected the Russian reparation claims on Germany. Further the United States did not act upon the reconstruction loan desired by the Russians as a substitute for, or as a possible addition to, the reparation claim.⁵ Since there was no agreement in the United States on what the German policy should be, evasions came quite easily. America had established a policy of not discussing in detail any possible future arrangements for Europe, and of making sure that her allies also followed this line of thinking.⁶ A policy of "no

⁴James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 33 and pp. 54-56.

⁵William Carleton, The Revolution of American Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), pp. 48-53.

⁶Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951), p. 188.

policy" prevailed. The factors compelling the United States to have this type of policy stemmed from a number of sources: foremost was the definite lack of leadership which was parallel to a fear that any detailed arrangements might produce dissatisfaction among the American people. Not to be overlooked was the inadequacy of the State Department in caliber as well as in number of personnel and the apparent distaste felt by the State Department to undertake the necessary steps to establish a policy. No one knew, and if they knew, did not care to speak out exactly what the American policy in Europe was to be after the defeat of Hitler. With this uncertainty as a basis the results were not surprising. A series of piecemeal negotiations were made on a variety of subjects of separate yet related issues. The trouble with this was that the issues were not viewed in the proper perspective of being interconnected as one major problem. It is not hard to see how this confused the Russians.

To say that the United States was solely to blame for this situation would not be wise; yet to say that the United States was not entirely certain of what their objectives were and how they intended to accomplish these objectives would be closer to the truth.⁷ It was Russia at

⁷James McCamy, Formulation of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1952), pp. 135-157.

this point that first noticed and realized the incompatibility of Russian and American objectives.

The manner in which both Great Powers saw themselves as an increasing threat to their own national security was probably the reason for their respectively assumed rigidity in international behavior. Anglo-Russian tension was augmented by the Russian violation of the Yalta Declaration.⁸ Russia went beyond the powers of self-determination, previously agreed upon in the Yalta agreement, by a concentration and an extension of power in Eastern Europe beyond the limits desired by Great Britain and the United States.

As a first move, the Russians located power positions in Eastern Europe. By 1947 the situation was obvious to all who cared to see. The presumption that a self-operating system of European stability would function was false. Not wanting to withdraw from Europe but, on the contrary, willing to retain her influence there and concentrate on domestic reconstruction, the Soviet was building and concentrating behind the Iron Curtain. If there had been any type of self-sufficient middle powers in

⁸Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 319-325. See also William Williams, American-Russian Relations (New York: Rinehart, and Co., 1952), pp. 270-278.

Western Europe, some sort of balance could have been met. But there was none. Russia was stronger than anyone believed possible, and the main powers of Western Europe--Great Britain and France--were far weaker than anyone had imagined. Both France and Great Britain were not far from a complete collapse.

B. The Forces Contributing to the Rise of Bipolar Coalitions and the Attempts to Give Them a Formal and Cohesive Structure by Using Ideological and Institutional Values. Case Study: the Western Coalition

Due to the steady deterioration of the Soviet-American relations, the United States was forced to counteract a constantly increasing pressure and expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence and to find an effective policy to combat international communism.⁹ Western Europe was the primary target in regard to areas where American policy was to effect the pursuit of her national security. This paramount strategic position was also to be gained because the United States, still limited in the capacity and quality of her foreign policy, could operate with better results and to a greater advantage in this area than

⁹William Carleton, op. cit., pp. 11-26, 45-54, 55-58.

in the Asiatic world. This recognized relationship between the security of the United States and that of Western Europe can be considered as the first step toward establishing a necessary coalition. The words of integration and unification of Europe became the magic words of United States proclamations.¹⁰ This had important implications upon the goal which the United States had set. It was necessary for the United States to take a far more positive stand than had been previously planned to make any progress toward attainment of this goal. The rigid barrier constituted by the European national rights which had been guarded for hundreds of years were to be overcome, and there would have to be sustained participation on the part of American officials in many aspects of European state policy unequalled in modern times, completely reversing the relationship that prevailed during the nineteenth century. Supported by her power, the United States took over more and more responsibilities and assumed world leadership. The United States, in order to accomplish her goal of a western international unification (coalition) and in order to institutionalize it with a more formal structure, utilized four main policies which later constituted the underlying institutional and value structure of the World

¹⁰W. Brown and R. Opie, American Foreign Assistance (Washington: Brookling Institution, 1953), p. 147.

War II coalition. The policies were: economic, ideological, security and institutional.¹¹

The reasons underlying the implementation of economic measures by the United States as a first step in her aim for security and for the creation of a western coalition were based upon multi- and evolutive reasoning. The ~~first~~ and foremost reason was the the United States saw that continued freedom of those areas not yet controlled by Russia depended upon their economic strength and stability. This idea of economic aid was also believed to be the one that would receive the least opposition and the most favorable acceptance by the individual nations concerned, and therefore was considered as the best way to approach them. It stimulated the United States to instigate and maintain close cooperation between the many European states. Parallel to this "crescendo" of goals, the last one being the formation of an anti-communist European coalition, the United States developed her economic policy in overlapping and evolutive stages. The United States, starting with limited commitment, moved to the point of unlimited commitment.

¹¹Hajo Holborn, op. cit., pp. 157-193. See also: James Burnham, Containment or Liberation? (New York: John Day Co., 1952), pp. 77-79.

The highpoints in this transitional movement by the United States to unlimited commitment may be identified in the evolutive policies of multi-national relief (UNRRA), reciprocal economic assistance (Lend-Lease Act), and leadership in multilateral economic cooperation (ERP and ECA). At this stage we recognize the evolution and the first appearance of the formal existence of the Western coalition (OECE) which later became more formalized as a result of multilateral military cooperation under American leadership (NATO).¹² The basic reliance upon traditional techniques of World War I (traditional approach instead of collective approach in international relations) is seen in the early development of American postwar foreign policy. A subsequent shift to cooperative measures with economic reasons as the foundation was followed later by a shift to military policies at an international cooperative level. Parallel to this evolutive pattern of American economic policy directed toward objectives of greater cooperation and integration of the Western European block, a change also took place in the methods used to express the foreign policy of the United States. The term of "internationalization" came into use after World War II. In essence, the techniques of economic policy tended to become increasing-

¹²Brown and Opie, op. cit., pp. 543-555.

ly internationalized, whereas the tendency in earlier economic relationships had been unilateral and bilateral. Organizations like the International Trade Council, the United Nations Economic and Social Council, and the International Monetary Fund were created and increasing "internationalization" was the reason given for the creation of these and other organizations. By creating a Western European coalition, the United States was stressing the idea of integration and unification to the highest possible degree.¹³ Later we will notice how this idea or policy is supported by the creation of an increasing number of international institutions. The concept of unification as well as the related concept of cohesiveness were partially diluted because of traditionally rigid national rights. Attempts to attain specific objectives on an international scale (cohesiveness of the Western European alliance) in an international environment still practicing the traditional concept of sovereignty was difficult. The United States eventually attempted to develop policies involving intrusions which were resented by America's allies, such as the first approved and then abandoned plan of the Euro-

¹³Ibid., p. 271. See also: Barbara Ward, The West at Bay (New York: W. Norton Co., 1948), pp. 201-216, and The President's Committee on Foreign Aid, European Recovery and American Aid (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1947), pp. 17-20.

pean Cooperation Administration which would dictated financial policies and production techniques to the Western European countries (seen in American pressure in Italy to begin an intense program for public works). It must be noted, however, that conditions change. The record of the ECA shows that many of the activities conducted by the ECA would have been welcomed at a later date, but could only be applied with duress in the early days following the war. That many countries had stopped arguing over the definition of intervention suggests that the related concept of sovereignty had lost some of its traditional clarity and order and a redefinition in the light of the new international situation was demanded.

The United States was forced to counteract the propaganda of the Soviet Union¹⁴ with propaganda of their own if their goal of attaining a successful policy of creating a Western, non-communist alliance was to be reached. The object of this propaganda was dual in purpose. First, it was necessary to combat Soviet propaganda; and secondly, it had to create a basis of common thinking for the Western alliance.¹⁵ By its enforced leadership of the non-

¹⁴James Burnham, op. cit., pp. 75-89.

¹⁵Edward Barrett, Truth Is Our Weapon (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1953), pp. 35 ff.

communist countries of the world, the United States believed the job of this gigantic propaganda program fell on her shoulders. The ideas of national independence and individual freedom were stressed in the American ideological appeals to the people of the world. In this action of national self-determination, the United States found and tapped a current far greater than communism. Strong nationalism was the by-word for people since the beginning of the nation-state system. It has held its own against all competition. The planned approach of the United States and their method of propaganda was to demonstrate that while each state retained its own national identity, it was possible to cooperate in vital and intimate problems for the benefit of all concerned. The United States propaganda program attempted to show the relationships of states to one another, and how the goals and values of each were basically the same. That this policy was partially successful can be seen in the increased effort of European states to initiate and accept ideas that developed not through the compulsive efforts of the United States but, instead, by the European states themselves. The idea of individual freedom, carefully integrated with social and economic meaning, as well as with political connotations, was the basis of appeal used in the American technique of persuasion. In the light of this ideology the thoughts

and thinking behind the Mutual Security and Technical Assistance program may be easily seen and followed.

The Soviet Union offers a target that is hard to bypass in its case of individual freedom. The communist way of life as presented by the Soviet Union offers economic freedom and general betterment of the individual in return for the complete and absolute control of the individual by the State.

Thus, it is easily seen that the bipolar world structure has as a close ally a bipolar ideological structure. Both coalitions have made the value system of their leaders their own. It is in this ideological conflict, which became also an integrating part of the coalitions, that we have one of the differentiating aspects between the coalitions of World War I and World War II.

The United States took another positive step in their thesis that her security could only be maintained if Western Europe did not fall under Soviet control. This step was taken less than a year after the signing of the European Recovery Program. While it was a fact that economic assistance could bolster the national governments in their fight against an internal threat of communism, something had to be done to combat and counterattack the Soviet expansion of military strength. The Americans would be

compelled to strengthen military power in Western Europe. After a long series of negotiations which had begun in Washington in 1948, twelve countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. The basis of the Treaty is Article Five, which states,

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of United Nations will assist the Party so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.¹⁶

With the North Atlantic Treaty the Western European Alliance assumed an increasingly higher degree of formality and cohesiveness. The European nations seemed willing to cooperate in an undertaking that would be a collective responsibility.

As the basis of what has been said up to now on the dynamic rise of bipolarism, we have seen aspects which have led to actual differentiations between the coalitions present in the World War I and those prior to World War II. Traditional concepts of coalitions must be redefined in the light of present-day, world-wide coalitions. International

¹⁶The Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Atlantic Alliance, NATO's Role in a Free World (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 47. (Emphasis supplied.)

economics, political and military institutions on both sides, and the ideological structures of both the East and the West require a recognition of the new qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the modern alliance. It has been demonstrated in previous pages that a major degree of formality has been assumed in the new type of coalitions. The reasons for such increased formalization can be attributed to the increased world threat brought about either by the discovery of new technological weapons (atomic bomb) or by a highly concentrated power allocation in fewer nations or by both. However, to be able actually to see and understand the real nature and motives for the multi-national participation in these bipolar and formal coalitions is of great importance in order to answer another very significant question: is the world really directed toward increasing unification?

In dealing with the development of western coalitions, we had to assume the presence of certain dynamic forces: the leadership of the United States, the worldwide security problem, and the economic ideological institutional and militaristic factors which were first used by the United States as tools in creating the Western coalition in the first place. Afterwards these factors became partially integrated elements of the coalition itself.

CHAPTER III

POWER POLITICS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

At this point of the present dissertation the author considers an analysis of the Adriatic and Mediterranean power politics necessary to give a more thorough understanding of the change in the role of Trieste and the pertinent international environment which occurred between World War I and World War II, and to illustrate the position of Trieste in the East's and West's balance of power. An analysis of these two coalitions' interests in the Mediterranean, and consequently in Trieste, will show why the Julian and Trieste problem, once left to the formal and direct negotiations of the two interested powers--Italy and Yugoslavia under the Rapallo Treaty--had now become an issue exclusively negotiated between the two coalitions--the East and West.

The Trieste problem must be conceived as the cornerstone in the struggle between Soviet expansion and Anglo-American attempts to contain this expansion. There is a time factor which is conducive to the explanation of the rigid stand taken by the West on the Trieste issue. After the war the Soviet Union, taking advantage of English weaknesses and inability to maintain influence and

control over the Mediterranean and of the postwar American uncertainty, consolidated and expanded her position in the Mediterranean and in Europe. The second stage saw the awakening of Anglo-American nations with their subsequent reaction to the expanding Soviet political and territorial infiltration. Trieste represents the place and time where these two opposing forces met and clashed. Thus Trieste was in Europe what Korea was to become in Asia. To better understand the role of Trieste in this light, the increasing postwar Soviet pressure for expansion, the slow withdrawal of the English from the Mediterranean area, and the increasing American intervention will be described within the dynamic framework of power politics in the Mediterranean region.

This analysis will start with the Teheran Conference. It was in Teheran that the super-powers--Russia, the United States and Great Britain--attempted the first formal definition of the future sphere of influence in the Mediterranean area. Later historical and political events will illustrate the fallacy of formalizing in an agreement the national interests born in a competitive political arena. Thus, the policies of competitive adjustment agreed to or not agreed to by the Anglo-American and Russian powers from the time of the Teheran Conference until 1946 will be considered. The focus of analysis will be

limited to the four nations which constituted and still constitute the cornerstone for the sphere of influence supremacy in the Mediterranean. These are: Iran, Greece, Yugoslavia and Italy.

Iran is important because the cross currents of British, Russian and American influence first were expressed here when the three Great Allies took the first steps towards the post-war machinery which we call by a variety of names, such as "the sphere of influence policy," "power politics," and so forth. Greece is important because the events that took place in this country were a direct result of the policy of competitive adjustment agreed to, or tacitly agreed to by lack of agreement, at Teheran. The importance of Greece was heightened by its strategical geographical location. Of interest to all three powers was the Mediterranean, through which pass the routes from France to her colonies, from Britain to India, the access to and the exit from the [Soviet] Black Sea and the routes to the vital oil fields of the Near East; Greece's peninsular position in the Mediterranean allows potential control of these crossroads. Further, the links between Europe-Asia and Europe-Africa, as well as the entrance to the Dardenelles and to the Adriatic, are controlled by Greece. According to the sphere of influence

policy that took shape after the Teheran Conference, Greece was to be in the British sphere.

Under the same agreement, Yugoslavia was absorbed into the Russian sphere. Yugoslavia is important because here we are able to examine most clearly the tactics and effects of the Russian policy outside the borders of Soviet Russia. The Teheran Conference did not envisage any area of Europe under direct American influence, but subsequent events decreed otherwise. For a variety of reasons, which we are going to explain, America has had to help in the direction of European affairs with increased urgency and responsibility.

Iran

We can now appraise the status of the Anglo-American and Russian policies in Iran in 1944 and then trace an outline of the general trend perceived for the immediate future. The idea of postwar cooperation between America, Britain and Russia had its first trial in Iran. The three war leaders--Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill--realized that a military occupation of this strategic area would eventually result in serious economic and political problems later to be duplicated in the Far East and Europe. Postponement of any solution until the conclusion

of World War II by the British and Americans gave the Russians ample time to effectively outmaneuver them.¹

Later, when Russia displayed her expansionistic aims forcing America and Britain to combine in order to solve the situation mutually, the stage was set for the old game of power politics with Iran as the political football. Once again, Russia handled herself so that she defeated this combination, thus preventing the entry of America into the Middle East field.² Here again, the stage was set for future European and Far Eastern activities. Power politics rather than concurrence were to be the rule, with Russian attempts to drive a wedge into cordial Anglo-American relations or to instigate American withdrawal from the Near East.

At first, the position of the United States in Iran was relatively insignificant. Later, when the new imperialistic designs of Russia toward Iran were manifest, Roosevelt and Churchill became intensely concerned about it, but proposed as the sole solution a return to the status quo ante bellum to be attained by the eventual evac-

¹Sir Readard Bullard, Britain and the Middle East (New York: Hutchinson's University Press, 1952), pp. 141-143. See also Survey of International Affairs 1941-46 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 574-575.

²H. Roberts and P. Wilson, Britain and the United States (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 4-6, 188-190.

uation of the country--which had been stipulated in the Three Powers' Declaration on Iran at the Teheran Conference. Yet Roosevelt and Churchill were aware that this would be ignored by Russia and so they attempted to establish some sort of an Anglo-American partnership to be effective after the war. Again, by speeding up the withdrawal of her troops during the Russian-instigated revolt in Azerbaijan at the end of the year, America demonstrated that she was not yet ready, nor willing, to take any direct issue with the Soviet.³

Although the British position in Iran was probably stronger than that of the United States, it was based on a tottering foundation. The fall of the Churchill government was followed by the rise to power of the left-wing movement in Britain, whose members were determined to follow a policy of friendship with Russia. Therefore, much as the Labor Cabinet could agree with Churchill on the dangers inherent in the Iran situation, the Cabinet's opinions on the necessity of retaining British military occupation of the south of the country were weakened by this public attitude of friendship with Russia.

The Conservative wish to have Iran remain as a political and strategic void between Britain and Russia had

³George Kirk, The Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 56 ff.

as an adjunct a deliberate British decision to refrain from controlling the internal affairs of Iran.

The Russians genially signed the Declaration of Iran. The Soviets, by this Declaration, were compelled to evacuate their zone after the war; Russia agreed because she knew that enough time would be available to arrange matters in Azerbaijan in such a way that the region could be evacuated but still remain under complete domination from Moscow. The "independence" of Iran was stipulated in the resolution, but Russian interpretation of words apparently differs from that of the Western Powers. As far as Russia is concerned, the "puppet" regimes of Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are democratic and independent. Provisional plans for Azerbaijan had already been made in any case. The Tudeh, a pro-communist party, had been formed long before the Teheran Conference. The northern zone, the boundaries of which established an impassable demarcation line, had already been closed off from the rest of the country. Consequently the creation and evolution of an autonomous movement went on unhampered. The Russians' only fear was the growing power and prestige of America and her possible entry into the Middle East. North of Iran, Russia was, however, the undisputed master; in the rest of the country Russia was feared as well as respect-

ed.⁴ The trend of the immediate future was not difficult to foresee because the struggle for influence in Iran has far wider implications than the spheres of influence in Iran itself. The fact is that the demarcation line between Soviet and Western spheres of interest in the Middle East was no longer the Caucasus but was moving south toward the Persian Gulf, and west towards the Mediterranean. We can conclude that there has been a resumption of power politics in the Middle East in which Soviet Russia is on the offensive and Britain on the defensive, with America trying to get into the game.

Greece

Greece was another significant locus of trouble. Nothing had been resolved by the civil war. The dispute for the country continued between Greek communists (ELAS-EAM), the anti-communists (EDES, the Greek democratic National League), and between the Greek government and the Slavic governments of the Balkans. Greece also became an issue between Great Britain and the Soviet Union at the international level. A critical and shaky stability was maintained by Britain in the face of the declining authority of the Greek government and the increasing poverty and impoverishment of the Greek people. No groundwork for

⁴John B. Kieffer, Realities of World Powers (New York: David McKay Company, 1952), pp. 268-272.

permanent recovery and improvement could be laid. The policy of the Greek government fluctuated between ineffective suppression of the disturbing factors and grasping for outside aid. The British policy was to build up a stable and self-reliant Greek government in the hope that this would be attained before the withdrawal of their troops was compelled. However, Greece did not become more independent; instead, increased reliance was placed by the Greeks upon outside aid.

The conclusion of the European war saw a change in the Soviet attitude toward Greece, which according to the Teheran Conference now fell under the control and influence of the British.⁵ The Russians, considering themselves freed of all Allied commitments at the end of the European war, were preparing for action in Greece. At the end of the war Moscow propaganda became increasingly outspoken about the reactionary tendencies of the Churchill government. The Bulgarians and Yugoslavians, both of whose governments were under Russian control, were used to exert pressure upon the Greek frontier. The leaders of the Greek communist party who had fled to Yugoslavia were employed to form the nucleus of an organization which de-

⁵Ibid., pp. 248-249. See also Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1947-48 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 177-183.

manded an autonomous Macedonia; this implied that territory from northern Greece would be taken. This, of course, was done in the name of democracy and attacks against the Churchill administration continued until Belgrade radio was referring to the British as "neo-Fascists." The Russian attitude towards the Greek governments was also one of uncompromising hostility. Russian postwar aggressive and expansionistic policy in Greece can be understood if it is considered in respect to the traditional national interest of the Soviet Union. Russia was not satisfied to possess all of the Balkans, except Greece, nor with dominating the Black Sea, nor with maintaining access to the oil fields of the Middle East. The Soviet Union also wanted to expand into the Mediterranean. Greece was desired as an outlet to the Mediterranean and hence to the Atlantic.

Great Britain, in the uncoveted position of being required to support and maintain any Greek government in order to prevent a national collapse, was relying completely on her ability to execute effectively the political and financial responsibilities she had assumed in Greece.⁶ Britain was counting on capturing the support of all the moderate left-wing parties as well as on retaining the

⁶Arnold Toynbee, The Realignment of Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 403-406.

support of those republicans who feared the rise of communism and consequently turned to the extreme right, as well as obtaining the support of the royalists; this combination of support would be used to form a blockade against the EAM (National Liberation Movement). The British were hoping for the restoration of social stability on a broad but simple basis of food, clothing and personal security in Greece. This was the salient preliminary to economic and political recovery. Until this was accomplished the Greek government revolved in a vicious circle: instability among the masses provided a favorable field for communism; the spread of communism increased the stubborn tendencies of the political rightists; rising political tension reduced popular confidence and made economic revival impossible; and finally delay in revitalizing and reorganizing the national economy increased the instability of the masses. There was no time to try to push the pendulum back the other way. Yet Great Britain could not relinquish her foothold, as weak as it was, in Greece. Withdrawal would result in civil agitation; and civil war could only lead, if there was no outside intervention, to an expansion of communist authority. Moscow was aware of the probable trend; hence increased Soviet influence and pressure was directed toward Greece.

The United States supported Great Britain during this critical period. Full compliance between the two embassies within Greece existed by 1945; cooperation which had not been forthcoming only the year before. However, by the end of 1945, the two governments were so closely allied that their actions and reactions in Greece could be predicted to be similar. This rapid change in the Anglo-American relationship was due directly to events which had taken place in the Balkans; consequently, the development of complementary British and American attitudes had evolved or did evolve in respect to Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria. Russian activity in this area presented a picture of local communist parties' utilization of propaganda, economic pressure and terrorism to confuse and frighten the electorate. The Communist members of coalition governments disintegrated opposition parties and discredited their leaders by means of frustration and threats. The Soviet Union, with its own interpretation of the armistice terms, was purposely splintering the economic order of Rumania and Bulgaria and shifting the control of nuclear activities to Russian hands. Since this picture implied the slow but steady and certain expansion and concentration of Soviet influence and authority, its result was to reaffirm the antagonistic elements in American policy. It became obvious by the end of 1945 that many seg-

ments of the American government were prepared to change policy measures with respect to the Soviet Union. It is in this period and in this area that the United States began to consider a policy of preventing the Soviet Union from establishing positions within the Mediterranean basin, with the implication that full intervention in the Mediterranean area⁷ was potentially available.

Yugoslavia

The most important element of Russo-Yugoslav relations is the use of Yugoslavia as a spearhead to forge and advance Russian interests in Southeast Europe. The first few months after the war gave Russia and her satellites a very convenient and expedient opportunity to consolidate and expand their positions in Europe, and Yugoslavia was in the most favorable strategical location to be used by the Russians to exploit these ambitions. At three places along her frontier there exist areas whose possession is important to any power wishing to extend its sphere of interest into the heart of Europe.⁸

In the south, Greece under foreign control would deny the eastern Mediterranean to the British. The Ital-

⁷Roberts and Wilson, op. cit., pp. 43-52. See also William McNeill, America, Britain and Russia 1941-46 (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 753-757.

⁸Arnold Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 364-370.

ian port of Trieste, in the northwest, is the largest port of the Adriatic, whose eastern coastline is Yugoslavian territory. Consequently, Yugoslavian proprietorship of Trieste would reduce the Adriatic to a Yugoslavian lake. To the north there is the Austrian province of Carinthia. Yugoslav possession of Carinthia would not only emasculate postwar Austria but would undermine and make ineffective Anglo-American attempts to rebuild Austria as an independent state. When the Western Allies withdrew their occupation forces from Austria, this ripe state would be ready to be absorbed by the Red Army, already occupying the eastern sector of the country.

There appeared to be no reason that would stop Yugoslavia from attaining complete control of all three areas as long as Tito used the correct strategy. In essence, tactics as the sudden seizure of Trieste at the appropriate moment to be followed immediately by numerous assertions of good intentions would be apropos moves by Tito to achieve his objective. At one time, acquisition of Greece seemed to be certain. America and Britain supported EAM during the latter part of the war; in fact, British support amounted to almost complete renunciation of other Greek movements. EAM was closely allied with Tito's National Liberation Movement; in fact, it had sent delegates to its conferences.

It was true that at Teheran, Stalin had promised Roosevelt and Churchill that Greece should and would be within the British sphere of interest, and consequently there would be no open appropriation of the country. Yet the Russians, in essence, really selected the best method for grabbing Greece from under the influence of Britain by adopting as their own, the Anglo-American idea of a post-war federation of Balkan nations. If the communists could control the so-called "all party fronts" in each country, they could certainly control a combination of fronts in one Balkan group.

But the collapse of ELAS, the Greek Communist Party, during the civil war and the consequent fragmentation and deterioration of EAM, the **National Liberation Movement** in Greece, as an "all-party" Greek front took this "appropriated" platform from under Tito's feet. Tito, an instrument of Russian imperialism, wanted only a specific type of Balkan federation. For obvious reasons, he desired a federation composed of nations with communist governments rather than a federation composed of partially communist and partially non-communist nations.

The Trieste crisis occurred in the last few weeks of the war. America and Britain were aware of Tito's intention to pounce upon Trieste and the Istrian peninsula of Italy and were equally determined that its future

should not be decided by a fait accompli. With this in mind, Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, flew to Belgrade and agreed with Tito that the Allied and Partisan offensive should be coordinated. According to this agreement Trieste would be captured by the Allies who then would meet the Partisans on the old Yugoslav frontier. But Tito broke this agreement. When German resistance was broken in Italy, the Yugoslav Partisan offensive on Trieste was opened. The Partisans acquired Trieste before the Allies, and as their next objective they intended to present Trieste to the world as a truly Yugoslavian city. The usual "spontaneous" demonstrations were organized, but even this time Tito failed because of the strong position of the British. So Tito changed his tactics in respect to the future of Trieste; the status of Trieste would be left until the peace conference, he said; and stated as a demand a fact to which he had been compelled to agree. This incident closed with the establishment of the Morgan line. In this case, with specific reference to Venezia Giulia, a conclusion was drawn to the effect that the Allies, especially the United States, had specified a definite interest in the Mediterranean. It was also assumed that this interest was closely related to British strategic interests; this definition

of Allied interest in the area was believed to have been forced because of the actions of the Soviet Union.

Italy

The history of power politics as they affected the positions of the three large powers in Italy can be organized into different stages.

There was the first period, during which both America and Britain were under the impression that an agreement had been reached regarding the spheres of influence in the Balkans and so consequently they paid little attention to the future of Italy other than acting solely as her military guardians until the peace. The second period can be dated from the time when America and Britain became aware of Russia's intentions to extend her influence and authority beyond her sphere; intentions which, in fact, were already being resolved into reality. Because of the type of earlier British and American concessions to the Russians, this expansion could not be halted short of the Italian frontier. As a result, Italy became the front line of resistance in the game of power politics.

Previous British policy in Italy had, however, nullified any volta face. In addition, Great Britain was bankrupt financially at a crucial time when British policy desperately needed realignment; further, Churchill lost the election. Therefore, as the senior partner, the

United States took over the burden of shaping the new policy of building up Italy as a bulwark of democracy.⁹

Russia was successful in penetrating up to Trieste; however, further infiltration was impossible without offending her intended victims, as well as her two allies. Tactically, Russia then withdrew from Italy as rapidly as possible, and made the task of Italian reconstruction more difficult for America. The Russians based this action on the theory that economic disintegration would accomplish what "their" infiltration had failed to achieve. As a reciprocal action, American policy was established to grant and provide Italy with necessary and relevant economic aid.

Of all the countries in Europe, Italy was destined to become the special protégé of the United States. The burden of developing the new Allied policy regarding Italy was placed upon the United States. If Italy was to exist without the "aid" of Soviet influence and infiltration, she could only do so if sufficient economic help were forthcoming to enable the Italian defenders of democracy to stave off the forces of decay until the Italian people themselves could take over the administration of their economic and political life. Britain could not carry out

⁹Ibid., pp. 439 ff.

this type of policy because she was financially bankrupt. Besides, Churchill's defeat and the consequent rise of the English Labor government forced a reversal in British foreign policy. The new government believed that putting Britain's own financial house in order was its first duty rather than to throw good money abroad for political reasons.

There was no further question of basic differences between the American and British governments with respect to Italy: both now agreed on the fundamental purpose for which Italy was being revived. They found a common line with respect to Greece; and although the official responsibility remained British, America gave its constant support.

By 1945 the Mediterranean scene presented a wide variety of situations and problems that demanded Anglo-American collaboration. In the course of eight months every potential "trouble-spot," from Azerbaijan to Gibraltar, became active. At each point, a traditional British interest met an intangible, rigid and uncompromising Soviet pressure. The United States already had heavy investments in international principles and local commitments, but lacked a defined and comprehensive policy for the Mediterranean. America discovered unforeseen interests at every turn and so became familiar with the interwoven nature of even the simplest issues.

Thus the Mediterranean became an area where an alternative to the policy of "tripartite agreement" first appeared as a possible diplomatic action. This alternative, which can be roughly described as one that prevented the Soviet Union from establishing positions within the Mediterranean basin, was supported by many strategic, economic and political considerations. In fact, it was almost impossible to carry out the responsibilities that had been assumed in Italy or to protect the interests that had developed in the Middle East without partially accepting this alternative as valid.

There were some common factors in all of the situations that have been described here. The Soviet Union was an interested party in every instance. Each situation brought forth the question as to the possible extension of Soviet influence into the Mediterranean region. Though widely separated geographically, all four areas were of direct consequence to the British or to the Anglo-American position in the Mediterranean. Finally, the American and British reactions to these situations were co-ordinated and consistent.

By the end of 1945, the regular recurrence of these factors led to a loosely consolidated Anglo-American front in the Mediterranean, the stated purpose of which was to maintain the stability of that region until an effective

international security organization was established. However, the activities of this front appeared to resemble attempts to preserve a conventional status quo [see Trieste_7 and to defend established interests.

This Anglo-American front underwent changes in 1945-46. In the past ten years an increasing shift of responsibility from Great Britain to the United States has taken place in respect to Greece, Turkey and Iran.¹⁰ Consequently, American action in the Mediterranean has become partially unilateral, in part an underwriting of the price of maintaining a British system, partially a replacement of Great Britain by the United States in agreed sectors, and in part an integration and parallelization of common interests. The situation was clear at two points: American power had been purposely imposed upon Greece, Turkey and Iran between the Soviet Union and British authority in the Middle East. In respect to Italy, American influence was aided by loans which eventually became a key factor in the later development of Italy.

The problem of Trieste, thus, must be considered within this framework of power politics and as a point of balance between the spheres of influence of the East and

¹⁰William McNeill, op. cit., pp. 754-757.

West. It represents not only a strategic locus but also a symbolic point in our frame of reference.

The geographical midpoint between these two powers, competing in terms of economics, political systems and diplomatic strategy, is the Adriatic city of Trieste. Trieste alone, under normal circumstances, was not as significant or important as it was to become during the post-war period.

A tentative line may be drawn from the Baltic Sea, down to Trieste, on the Adriatic, which separates and divides two distinct types of thought lying on opposite sides of this hypothetical barrier. East of this line, the average Westerner perceives a totalitarian type of social organization and west of this line, the Easterner conceives of capitalistic exploiters abusing a reactionary social system.

However, the Baltic was not a critical area to either the East or the West. Trieste was crucially important to both coalitions because of its strategic location on the Adriatic which, in turn, provides access to the important communication lanes of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean is of interest to the Soviet Union because it is the gateway to the Atlantic for a nation perpetually geographically landlocked. However, the threat to Russia of Britain's interest in this area was negli-

gible compared to the threat presented by an increasing United States interest and action in this area. The interest of the United States in this area is obvious. The supply of oil located at the eastern end of the Mediterranean is vital to the United States for strategic reasons: that is, to deny the USSR the possession of such natural resources; American commerce to the east passes along this sea-route, and finally it represents an extremely important strategical line for defense which must be maintained by the United States if its position as a world power is to be retained.

The Russian interest in Trieste stems primarily from economic reasons. Trieste represented a keystone of the Danubian economy and of the commercial advantages of Austria and Czechoslovakia--all of which Moscow was attempting to absorb into its own economic orbit. Besides, Moscow has promised Belgrade that all attempts would be made to secure Trieste so that the political and economic activity of this city would eventually be controlled by Yugoslavia.

However, the Western Powers took an opposing stand. Trieste was considered as an outpost of the Western sphere--loss by the West of the control of Trieste might virtually lead to an Adriatic controlled by the Soviet. An ob-

vious potential threat was thus present against Western European security.

Trieste was selected by both sides as a test case. However, instead of remaining solely a Peace Conference issue, Trieste has also been a point of junction and an area to be utilized by both sides to test the potential effects of any future expansion of their interests in the Mediterranean.

CHAPTER IV

DIPLOMACY AS AN APPROACH TO POWER POLITICS

A. Paris Peace Treaty: Diplomatic and Political Challenge of East and West. Treaties and Spheres.

Throughout 1946 the pattern for future Anglo-American action in the Mediterranean was being established. The successful consolidation of the Communist party in the Balkans tended to solidify British policy in Greece; [and] the aims of the Anglo-American policy in Italy were narrowed because of the nature of the prevailing American relations with Yugoslavia. A trend towards a reorganization of fragmented nationalisms was discernible all over the Mediterranean basin; a regrouping which occurred because of the magnetic drawing power of the Soviet Union and the United States. To the Soviet Union were drawn the Balkans, Allied and satellite alike--except for Greece--in the interest of Slavic unity to be achieved by combination and communist ideology. An equally compelling force drew the Arab states to the side of Great Britain, although in an admittedly less direct manner. It was clear that in the eastern Mediterranean, the opposing interests had come tightly together and that the least movement in one sphere

directly affected the other. There was no tolerated buffer zone to soften their contacts.

The balance between these two powers seemed to be so vulnerable that it might have been reasonably assumed that abandonment of any cantilevered power position by the United States could have completely undermined their entire position in that area. Equally plausible was the argument raised that the pressures being exerted by the Soviets could not be withdrawn or reduced without endangering the position reached by the Soviet Union in Europe as a consequence of her victory in World War II. Consequently, the slightest touch to the scales in this balance might have conceivably led to basic alterations in the structures of the international power system not only in Europe but throughout the world. The friction generated by such a situation heated every issue and inevitably carried over into the Conference that met to consider peace treaties for Italy and the satellite states.¹

B. Long Term Problems at Paris

The Conference at Paris was not a peace conference in every sense of the word. The victorious nations were attempting to arrive at some sort of an agreement, the

¹James E. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), p. 92.

terms of which would then be imposed on the Axis powers. In actuality, the treaties had far greater importance as a test of the nature of the relations existing among the Allies. If the Conference had soothed the tensions which had tightened to the breaking point between the Soviet Union and the West, and between the Great Powers and the small nations, it would have justified itself regardless of the decisions reached regarding boundary lines in Venezia Giulia or Bulgarian reparations. It was more important that Russia and the United States should agree about Trieste than that Yugoslavia or Italy should keep or lose it. And the same held true for all the terms laid down in all the draft treaties under negotiation.²

It would be incorrect to say that the terms had no intrinsic significance. The stipulations were important because of their direct effect upon the countries concerned, and because they expressed the interests, aims, and fears of the Great Powers that framed them. Thus, the treaties served as the thread which tied the ex-enemy countries into the political network being woven by the Big Four. The problem of Trieste was a good example of this type of action. The Trieste question could have best been met by the establishment of a free territory under some form of

²Ibid., p. 137.

international control. However, the solution did not revolve around a scrutiny of ethnic maps nor by consulting the popular will. The solution of Trieste was, in effect, the only possible compromise available which would satisfy the demands of the Eastern and Western coalitions in respect to access to the Adriatic. The Western powers wanted to keep the Soviet Union away from the Adriatic and Russia was equally determined that this Western wish would not be fulfilled. The final arrangement favored the Soviet Union with a somewhat modified and qualified victory. So far, the best one can say about the treaties as a whole, about the organization of the conference and its procedure, about the area of participation reserved for the smaller nations, is that they were the results of bargains among the Big Four.³

The treaties represented the lowest common denominators of agreement among the powers whose mutual interests had been overshadowed by their differences.

The despondent outlook in Paris was actually indicative of the fact that the war as a whole was not over. Any attempts to make peace when a war is still under way will be, obviously, futile. The Conference table was, in

³"Paris soundings," The Spectator (August 16, 1946), 159.

essence, another battlefield in the neverending political war.⁴

For the sake of convenience Russia could be placed in the role of a totalitarian threat. Britain, America and the lesser Western powers were thrown in the opposite role as the defenders of democracy--an admittedly oversimplified alignment,⁵ but this political war had nebulous boundaries. Besides being a war between dictatorial versus democratic political systems, it was also a fight between capitalism and revolutionary socialism in one form or another.

The attempts by Russia to extend and expand her sphere of influence and control were in themselves composed of power politics and revolutionary zeal. Consequently, this Soviet drive buffets against an equally determined British and American policy of "containing Russia" as well as against the Anglo-American desire to maintain political, economic and individual freedom..

An impression that there are two rigidly delineated camps was not exactly correct. Although America was the leader of what could be called the Western coalition, the

⁴Arthur Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 297.

⁵"The Three and the Four," The Spectator (December 19, 1947), 757.

American diplomats at Paris realized that they had to carry on their political counter-offensive without forcing an open break with or driving Moscow to extremes of suspicion and fear which would have ended all chances for peaceful settlements. Nor could they afford to injudiciously incite a showdown in terms which might have frightened or antagonized the allies of American democracy. Consequently their actions were a cautious mixture of toughness and conciliation.⁶

Contrary to the desires of the United States, the smaller countries, especially those in Western Europe, were divided internally because the political war was a national struggle as well as a (social) revolution. The Communist party was powerful in most of these nations; and the Socialist party was powerful in all of them. Several, Britain included, had socialist governments. So they were only partially in the American camp. Although the prevailing hope was for a Europe where political democracy maintained its rule, even this was not taken for granted by all nations concerned because many powerful, politically democratic factions sincerely believed that the only chance to maintain political freedom was by moving rapidly toward a socialist economy.

⁶Arthur Vandenberg, op. cit., p. 297.

Thus the long term issues at Paris contemplated problems of a manifold nature. The peace treaties had direct connection with the establishment of a bipolar system of spheres of influence which was to be supported by an analogous system of coalitions. The United States and Russia, leaders of the respective coalitions, thus found themselves compelled to legitimize their efforts and projected goals on the basis of full acceptance by the smaller national members of the respective alliances. It was this difficult task of realizing the opposing interests of the two major actors in a conciliatory fashion with the interests of their prospective allies, that gave the shape and determined the nature both of the Peace Conference and of its related results.

C. Short Term Issues at Paris: A Balance of
Mediterranean against Danubian Interests

The Big Four foreign ministers had two issues at stake at the Paris Peace Conference. The first was that the Allied powers had to write peace treaties for all of the Axis powers which would, in turn, rescue a large portion of the population of Europe and the Mediterranean area from an anomalous political and economic position, where a de facto peace was assumed, but a de jure war existed; and secondly, secretaries Byrnes, Molotov, Bevin

and Bidault had to establish a scheme whereby the powers would not impinge upon one another's principles and interests. In other words, the pieces of an individual-geographical puzzle had to be worked together and each completed section fitted into a harmonious global picture, to be represented later by the United Nations.

There were two schools of diplomatic thought present at this meeting. Secretary of State Byrnes and Foreign Minister Bevin, usually supported to a secondary degree by Foreign Minister Bidault, represented the Western coalition. Foreign Minister Molotov and Vice-Prime Minister Andrei Vishinsky spoke for the Eastern coalition. Between them an agreement had to be arranged that would compromise the points of view on several broad as well as many specific questions, but which would, at the same time, not compromise the concepts of principle supported by each side.

The trend toward rival coalitions based upon political, economic and ideological difference would continue if the snags (compromising) producing discords among the Allies were not resolved. The big issues where compromise was needed most involved treaties with Italy in the first instance and Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria in the second--

these issues could best be described as Mediterranean versus Danubian interests.⁷

Russia was interested in Danubia for both strategic and economic reasons and to an admittedly far greater degree than the Western group. The Danubian states are a keystone in the Soviet's western security picture and the Danubian economy is closely geared to that of the Black Sea and the Ukraine.⁸

The Western group was vitally interested in the Mediterranean. Italy is the dividing line between Eastern and Western Europe. The sea itself is a lane to the British Eastern Empire and to American oil concessions in Arabia.

Eastern attitudes on the Mediterranean could best be seen when Russia had staked out certain claims that intruded upon this region; one claim was for a single trusteeship of Tripolitania.⁹ Moscow also appeared to support Marshall Tito's claims to Trieste which the Western group wanted Italy to retain. The Russians opposed their demilitarization of the Dodecanese which led to suspicions on

⁷"Soviet Policy at Paris," New Republic (May 20, 1946), 722.

⁸"Along the Danube," Yale Review (Autumn 1947), 449 ff.

⁹James E. Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 96-101. See also A. Vandenberg, op. cit., p. 267.

the part of the West that Russia eventually intended to establish bases there. Furthermore, the Russian demand for larger reparations from Italy was considered as damaging to Italy's chances of economic recovery by the Western coalition.¹⁰

In retrospect the demands of the United States, that the treaties must stipulate free navigation on the Danube, including open commercial and trading privileges for the West with Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, and that properties owned by Westerners in these areas had to be restored, can be seen as appearing to the Russians as Western impingement upon her interests.

It was in this context that negotiations were the most difficult. Simple exchange, where the United States would say, in effect, that the Bulgarian government would be recognized if Russian claims to Tripolitania were withdrawn, was impossible. Actually, the process was one of give and take and where the concepts of principles and interests were closely interwoven.

If the Paris Conference was to be successful, modifications of the Soviet attitude toward Tripolitania, Trieste, the Dodecannese and Italian reparations had to be

¹⁰Arthur Vandenberg, op. cit., p. 264.

made.¹¹ Further, some sort of satisfaction had to be given to the Russians regarding Danubia so that agreement to draft all treaties could be made.

Both sides were determined not to waver from certain strong ideals and principles. The major question was whether or not the gaps between the interpretation of these ideals could be bridged.

D. Italy and the United States: The Meaning of the
Italian Peace Treaty in Respect to American Policy
in the Mediterranean

The main issues in the Italian treaty were extremely difficult to settle because they involved the greater and more important question of the total Mediterranean settlement. The aim of the Soviet Union was obviously to obtain access into the Mediterranean area and then to obtain control of the eastern half of it. Consequently, if this purpose was attained, Great Britain would be severed from the Middle East, Africa and southern Asia. The Soviet Union thus upheld Tito's demands on Trieste as the means towards achieving this long-desired control of the upper Adriatic and access to the Mediterranean as well as allowing the Soviet potential domination of the northern

¹¹James E. Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 127-133.

Italian plain. To attain this end, Russia exerted internal and external pressure upon Greece and Turkey; the two nations which constituted a barrier between Russia and the Mediterranean. To insure the success of the total project, the Russians finally demanded a trusteeship in Tripolitania.

This was the rough plan of the Soviets to settle the Mediterranean problem--by taking possession of the Mediterranean. Opposing this Soviet expansion were the Anglo-Americans. The British and Americans held Trieste and the most important part of Venezia Giulia. The British had a foothold in Greece and in Tripoli; the United States, committed by its own vital interest, had, along with Britain, the military power to support its commitments.

However, the British and Americans had to plan beyond their present policy which was one of absolute refusal to grant any concession to the Russians. Continued aid to Greece and Turkey and an undefined status for Trieste were not means toward establishing any kind of enduring peace settlement. This was to be a temporary emergency policy; one which would break down if the Anglo-Americans relaxed or if hostilities arose between the factions.

To attain a more lasting agreement, the Anglo-Americans were forced to consider the Mediterranean as a

region in which the conflict was one of power politics.¹² In these terms the situation in the Mediterranean was one of extreme instability because the relation of Britain's commitments to her real power was not in balance.¹³ Thus the only possible alternative for the Americans in underwriting the British position in the Mediterranean was to restore there a balance of power.¹⁴

Britain if reinforced by the United States, could for a while contain the Russians, but the consequence was that there would be no peace. The only apparent solution seemed to be the multiplication of the number of powers which had a direct stake in the Mediterranean. To this end the American proposal for the establishment of Italy as the trustee of Tripoli was a step in the direction towards ensuring that the Mediterranean would not necessarily be made a British lake in order to exclude the Soviet attempts to turn it into a Russian lake. However, restoring Italy as a Mediterranean power--and supporting the recovery of France--was not enough. The United States **was** compelled to become a Mediterranean power as well.

¹²Council on Foreign Relations, United States in World Affairs, 1947-48 (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), pp. 7-15.

¹³Royal Institute of International Affairs, America, Britain and Russia 1941-46 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 753-757.

¹⁴James E. Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 298 ff.

E. Paris Peace Conference

The meetings of the Foreign Ministers and their deputies in London in September 1945, in Moscow in December 1945, in Paris in April-July 1946, and the Peace Conference in Paris from July-October 1946 revealed the undercurrents that were at work in American-Soviet relations.¹⁵ The draft treaties, completed by the Foreign Ministers and turned over to the Peace Conference, had two groups of clauses upon which agreement could not be reached: one involved economic issues, the other strategic issues.¹⁶ Both, however, were directly connected with the power relations existent in the Mediterranean.

The sides thus taken at the earlier meetings of the Foreign Ministers carried over to the full Peace Conference. Mr. Molotov, speaking to the Peace Conference, made it clear that the Soviet Union would oppose any interference from the other powers in the economic affairs of the satellite nations concerned. Byrnes insisted upon an "open door" economic policy, because this was the only way to prevent the evolution or **creation**:

¹⁵Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit., pp. 111 ff.

¹⁶Department of State, Paris Peace Conference 1946, selected documents (U. S. Government printing office, Washington, 1946), pp. 649-833, 1011 ff.

. . . of an economic system which would merely substitute for Germany some other country upon which they (the satellite states) would be almost entirely dependent for supplies and markets.¹⁷

Both sides were then fully aware of the opposition facing them and the arguments proceeded through extensive irrelevancies of detailed claims. Finally agreement was reached on a standard clause inserted into all the treaties which assured equality of treatment in commercial affairs to all members of the United Nations for a period of eighteen months following the date of ratification of the treaty. Thus, the appearance of the issue was compromised but not the substance. The problem regarding the free use of the Danube raised similar arguments and was resolved in much the same way as the economic clauses concerning the satellites.

Trieste was the primary issue as far as strategic aims were concerned.¹⁸ At previous meetings, the Foreign Ministers had exhausted all possible changes on the subject and reluctantly accepted the idea of a free Territory.¹⁹

¹⁷James E. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 134.

¹⁸Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Realignment of Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 463 ff.

¹⁹James E. Byrnes, op. cit., p. 134.

At the full conference, however, Yugoslavia vigorously opposed this agreement, but the United States and Great Britain were against making any modifications. Molotov advocated a fresh approach because he feared that the Yugoslav claims could not be conscientiously defended and the United States was chiefly interested in ensuring continued Anglo-American control over Trieste. The United States was firm in the face of violent lobbying and of proposals to reduce the Italian navy and to admit the Balkan states as co-administrators, and remained equally undisturbed when Yugoslavia withdrew from the Conference.

Finally, the original agreement was accepted, but it was recognized as a superficial compromise in that it did no more than temporarily neutralize an issue that could not be solved. The most that even Byrnes could say for it was:

. . . Italy had been disarmed so that aggressive action cannot be supported, and Yugoslavia, despite its militant nationalism, will hesitate, I believe, to challenge the authority of the Security Council in this area.²⁰

The Conference at last returned amended drafts to the Foreign Ministers for their final agreement. All the Great Powers confessed that they were dissatisfied with the stipulations in these tentative drafts. The Soviet

²⁰Ibid., p. 155.

Union stated that the United States and Great Britain had been more interested in defending and expanding the aims of capitalistic imperialism than in achieving a truly democratic and peaceful world. The United States expressed the belief that the Soviet Union was more concerned in maintaining the Red Army in Europe than in achieving agreement on the outstanding issues.

Yet, the results were not completely unsatisfactory for the Soviet Union. Its position in southeastern Europe was not changed and the influence and power of the Anglo-Americans in Italy had been partially compromised. The Anglo-American position in the Mediterranean remained solid but a weakening of human loyalties 'felt' toward the West produced a less solid foundation for the continuation of this position. While the Soviet Union and her satellites had achieved political cohesiveness, the opinion of the smaller states, upon which the United States and Britain relied for support, fluctuated and was diversified, a fact which caused them to be viewed as suspicious by these two great Western powers.

It was inevitable that settlements would be made in respect to policy and method in the Mediterranean by the Peace Conference. The United States policy was one of maintaining the status quo principle simultaneously with

containment of the Soviet infiltrations by counteracting any type of aggression.

In an attempt to implement this American policy in the Mediterranean, the United States utilized the power position which had been so casually acquired in that area during World War II as the fulcrum to support this policy. The adjustment of American aims to this conception of Soviet intentions obviously demanded that all positions from which power and influence could effectively be made be zealously guarded and retained. In summary, the staggering amount of loans made to Greece and Italy, the rigidification of attitudes toward all issues, an increasing concern with the shifting political tensions of the Mediterranean were all revealed in the failure of the Peace Conference.

The Soviet Union adjusted to this situation by increasing the variety and extent of its pressures on the circumference of the Mediterranean basin. These pressures were supplemented with propaganda designed to advocate every ~~dis~~integrating force that could be discovered or created in the particular region under "attack."

The Mediterranean region was accordingly viewed as an area in which antagonistic aims and principles come into recognized and obvious conflict. The expansion of American power and its partial integration with the historical

British position was one factor by which the conflict can be defined. Conversely, the opposing factor to Western policy was the extension of Russian land power into Western Europe and Soviet penetration to the Adriatic--via Yugoslavia. Ignoring for the moment pertinent economic and political questions, the above factors were connotative of an extremely fragile balance of force in Europe, because of the simultaneous appearance of the United States and Russia as external elements in this balance. In effect, the picture of this conflict in Europe was one of an extension of the land power of one coalition being reciprocally counter-challenged by the sea and air projection of the other.

Thus, it was to be expected that the Soviet Union would make a most open effort at adjustment in connection with negotiations with Turkey (~~revision~~ of Montreux Treaty) and **debates** regarding the control of the Straits (Dardanelles) and that the United States ~~and~~ Great Britain would be equally and openly decisive in direct denial of any of these specific Russian claims.

The significant features of the alteration in the Anglo-American attitude which, at Yalta and Potsdam, was favorable to a revision of the Montreux convention, were the frankness with which Russia stated the basic strategic

interests involved, and the promptness with which the United States accepted the issue as a test case.

By this time, it was apparent that the United States had interests commensurate with her commitments in the Mediterranean--in actuality, the United States was increasingly becoming a Mediterranean power.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT BETWEEN WORLD WAR I AND WORLD WAR II

We have seen in the previous chapters evidence of a trend in the international situation from quasi-individualistic to collective formalized national behavior. In the present and following chapters we will attempt to give an interpretation of this change and its possible future trend.

Most of the changes in the international environment between World War I and World War II require a re-definition of several manifestations of the nation-state in respect to such terms as nationalism, sovereignty, alliance and national interest. It is significant to point out here that this evolution and alteration in the previous expressions of national and international behavior has not been radical. The traditional conceptions of the intrinsic nature of nationalism, sovereignty, alliance and national interest seem at present, to be left intact. The modifications of these concepts have been only marginal.

The future development of international intercourse will show whether or not these modifications, viewed in this last postwar period, are permanent and meaningful

manifestations of a new international order or if they only are the temporary result of contingencies.

Thus, for the sake of a precise study and interpretation of the actual international situation and relationships it will be wise to distinguish between those new factors recently appeared; those which are likely to demonstrate a resistance to the test of time and those which are not; those factors which may have significance in a true eventual alteration of international orientation and those which may not. In order to be more specific about the limits of this analysis, we will try to consider it in a propositional framework--i.e., from what to what?--by taking into consideration the hypothesis recently formulated and stated in the concept "nationalism versus internationalism." By internationalism is meant the rise of a world state or any other kind of super-national state with the consequent liquidation of national-state. The time focus --from when to when--of this analysis cannot be limited solely to the time period between the two world wars. It will be necessary to consider nationalism as it has been conceived and accepted in the classical period of the nation-state and as it may be related to its connotation in this postwar situation. If we translate these terms into historical dates we may say: nationalism from the time of the conclusion of the religious wars in 1600 until

World War I and from World War I to World War II, including the postwar period.

To answer our previously stated proposition--if future nationalism will yield to new international or super-natural institutions and if the world will be ruled under the authority of one system, three major steps will be taken. First we will illustrate certain significant changes and trends which appeared in the postwar international order. It is the author's intention, in this first step of the analysis, to illustrate the changes in the national interests of the major and minor powers as focused upon the Mediterranean area during the period between the world wars. This will be indicative of international changes when related to our general analysis. As a second step we will then analyze and evaluate the factors present in these changes in order to measure their role as an eventual fulcrum to this definite trend of international events. Finally, some conclusions may be derived as to the dynamic content of these factors and their impact upon and significance to the future of nationalism and internationalism.

The de facto situation in the Mediterranean is highly significant in our analysis of the trend in the international order, because the Mediterranean area is highly geared into the world political scene. Thus our case

study of the Mediterranean and Trieste spheres of influence will aid in understanding the "why" and "how" of the actual power political situation as seen in bipolarism, one of the new elements generally conceived as favorable to internationalism.

A. The Changing Structure of Power Politics: Major and Minor Powers--Focus on Spheres of Interest from World War I to World War II in the Mediterranean

The interaction of power interests in the Mediterranean has been very complex. However, the only factor which has been continually present has been the existence of Great Britain and Russia as the **two-power** loci in the Eastern Mediterranean. Because of the relevant importance of the Balkans to the Near East, Great Britain and Russia attempted to prevent any stabilization there because they feared that such stabilization might work to the advantage of the other.

The longstanding yet precarious balance had been altered in favor of Great Britain by World War I. The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and a Russia drained by revolution caused British influence to be pushed closer to the body of Russia proper. The enforced enervation of the Soviet Union prevented the initiation of effective countermeasures against the advances of the Brit-

ish and permitted subordinate interests (the interests of the Mediterranean minor powers) to develop. As a direct consequence of this unbalance in the Anglo-Russian spheres of influence in the Mediterranean, enough time was available for effective maneuvering by Italy and France, and, at the same time, nationalism in the Arab world became a political force. Among all of the secondary interests released, the main threat to the British position in the Mediterranean was constituted by those of Italy. In fact the Italian aspirations, by opposing the interests considered by the British as vital, provided one of the major false leads of the period between the wars.

The defeat of Italy in World War II temporarily appeared to restore the British position as it had been in 1919; yet in actuality it only cleared the ground for the revival of the basic conflict between Russia and Great Britain.

It soon became clear, as World War II approached, that continued American security depended almost exclusively upon rapid stabilization in Europe. Consequently, the maintenance of the Anglo-American position in the Mediterranean had priority over any other of their national political actions. The result of this alignment was recognized increased intervention by the United States and the

slow withdrawal of Great Britain from Mediterranean affairs.

The traditional strategic and political British interests in the Mediterranean, as that of the elevation of the Mediterranean to a global position, and of retaining power in this area to be used to exert a direct influence in Europe or of exerting the maximum authority over the direction of political developments in the Mediterranean with the minimum commitments of actual power, had been profoundly affected by the last war.¹

It may be certain, however, that the traditional imperialistic interest was no longer the core around which present British diplomacy revolved. The long range result of this last war was that the Labour and Conservative Parties in Great Britain were forced to re-formulate policy stands in respect to actions to be taken in this area. Earlier concepts used to substantiate the British interest there as the "life-line" and shortcut to imperial possessions had to be modified as well as the idea that British sea power in the Mediterranean would influence European affairs because the "influence channels" were now blocked. The Balkans could no longer be utilized as a channel

¹Council on Foreign Relations, The Foreign Policy of the Powers (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935), pp. 54 ff.

through which British influence could move and Italy, as a channel, though not blocked, was more susceptible to American influence than British. However, the British strategic interest still prevailed with a local and a general aspect. The local element may be understood as dealing with the the defense of oil resources in Iran, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and with the defense of refinery, pipe line, and port facilities in Syria and Palestine. The general aspect was concerned with preventing the formation of a vacuum in the Middle East as long as there was a possibility that the void would be filled by an unfriendly power.² The assumption was that the Soviet Union directly, or the satellites under Russian pressure and influence, would hasten to fill this vacuum if the opportunity presented itself.

The political interests of Great Britain in the Mediterranean became unified with the increasing interest and pressure of Russia in this area. Formerly these had been diversified and detailed, since the internal stability of the Mediterranean depended on Britain's proper handling of the different and specific situations. A full range of influence was used to forward these Mediterranean-British interests which had by now been reduced to two: one

²John Kieffer, Realities of World Power (New York: David McKay Co., 1952), pp. 261-73.

of preventing a Communist-Russian influence from establishing itself, and one of converting a system of semi-colonial control over the Arab states into a system of friendly co-operation with a regional group of sovereign Arab states.

The primary political interest of Great Britain in the Mediterranean was thus one of attempting to establish this system of friendly co-operation with the Arab states.³

The final general interest was of a commercial and financial nature which gave additional emphasis to the English interest in the Mediterranean. The greatest of these interests, and the most vital, was the oil of the Middle East. Here England, although losing the role of official guardian of natural resources (Iran), was still a powerful actor in the vested interest of stockholder. Until the Mediterranean becomes a region of stable and co-operative governments, Great Britain cannot pursue a path of action implying the potential risk of being shut-out of the eastern Mediterranean, as both she and the United States had been closed out of southeastern Europe. However, one course of action which was available to the British, pressed by the necessity of partial withdrawal from the Mediterranean affairs while still containing the

³Royal Institute of International Affairs, America, Britain and Russia, pp. 753-57.

Russian sphere of influence, was to encourage the development of American interests and the growth of American power in the Mediterranean.⁴

In comparison with the rich history of British relations in the Mediterranean, those of the Soviet Union are of a more simple nature.⁵ The sole Soviet economic interest which may be noted is a need resulting from the rundown conditions of the productive facilities in the Russian oil fields; the Russian interest in the oil of the Middle East was and still is a negative one which rests on the strategic value of denying it to other powers rather than on the vital need to acquire it for her own use. However, it must be noted in respect to the interests of the Soviet Union that her strategic interests are precisely defined and vigorously pursued. Some of these interests have a long history: the control of the Straits,⁶ an expansionistic shift toward India, and the establishment of a subordinated center of Slavic power in the Balkans.⁷

⁴Kieffer, op. cit., p. 269.

⁵Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Atlantic Alliance (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 24-28.

⁶Kieffer, op. cit., pp. 246-60.

⁷Ibid., pp. 222-37.

Russian interests have been fulfilled in Southeastern Europe but denied in Turkey and Iran. On the other hand, if the Soviet's interests in Tangier, Italy and the Italian colonies are interpreted as expansionistic, their efforts to penetrate into the Mediterranean were effectively resisted by the combined efforts of the United States and Great Britain.

The political purposes of the Soviet Union are difficult to define. However, the inter-connection of strategic and political aims and control in Italy, Greece, Turkey and Iran have made the Russian political goal to control the activities in these nations an obvious fact.

In contrast to the coercive tactics used by the Soviet in the Balkans, their diplomatic efforts to intervene in the Mediterranean lacked this element of coercive force. Russian diplomacy in this realm can be considered as having no other purpose than to disrupt British and American influence at all points and to test the tolerance of the Anglo-American policy.

Although the United States was compelled to protect her oil interests in the Near East, it was clear that the other interests of the United States were basically different from those attributed to Russia and Great Britain. The substantial and vital point of difference was that the United States was not until recently a Mediterranean power.

Compared to Great Britain's defensive interest or the Soviet Union's interest in an increasing expansion by the disruption of Anglo-American influence in this area, the interests of the United States were of an indirect nature. In essence, the United States is concerned mainly with the external purposes which can be served by maintaining a position of power and influence within the Mediterranean region, and by keeping the Soviet Union and Soviet influence out of the region. Yet a strong feeling that a very significant American interest did exist in the Middle East was felt by many because this area afforded immediate contact with the Soviet orbit which resulted in acute strategic issues and the development of a vigorous economic interest.

Consequently, it may appear that the aims pursued by the United States in respect to the Mediterranean were motivated by political and economic strategical interests. Because of the coalescent nature of the relationship between Russian nationalism and international communism, these American aims can be relatively enlarged to a world scale or reduced to a European scale.

The interests of certain secondary powers can now be considered. These subordinate Mediterranean interests are: the interests of France, of the Arab League, of Italy and of the Balkan states.

Except for Greece, the Balkan states at the end of World War II were not inevitably Mediterranean powers. They form an area which can be either a Mediterranean hinterland or an outpost of central Europe and Russia.

Before 1948, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, in spite of their insistent nationalistic demands for interests in the Adriatic and the Aegean Seas, were at the fringes of Soviet influence. In fact, Yugoslavian and Bulgarian interests in the Mediterranean had strength only when these interests were in fact duplicated as spearheads used to advance the aims of the Soviet Union. However, recently with the Balkan Pact, Yugoslavia **assumed** a more direct and independent position in Mediterranean affairs. With the creation of the Balkan Pact and after the Yugoslavian separation from the Soviet Union, an increasingly important alternative has become available, although still on a small scale, to the bipolaristic world situation: this alternative is the creation of regionalistic associations. The consequence and the meaning of this and parallel institutions will be more extensively analyzed in the latter part of this chapter.

Italian claims pursued during the Fascist and World War II periods were expanded far beyond her power to support them. Italy, until very recently, was a problem area to be resolved by her complete reconstruction rather than

by a set of competing interests. Until recently, this was a problem that could only be dealt with by American aid; and it has been considered under the general heading of factors affecting the internal stability in the Mediterranean in this paper. Recent events, however, such as Italian participation in NATO⁸ and strong Italian interest in the Balkan Pact, have shown that Italy is becoming more and more concerned, in an independent fashion, with her security position in the Mediterranean and consequently is becoming interested in increasing her power through the only possible means available--coalitions.

French interests in the Mediterranean have been consolidated by using the region to counterbalance the weakening position of France as a world power. A formula was derived from this which viewed the empire in Africa as a reserve of manpower and means of defense. The French do not feel that their interests in the Mediterranean have changed but only have become more difficult to support. French prestige is very low in the Arab world and French authority over the heterogeneous Arab populations in North Africa and in Morocco is more important now than previously because it provokes antagonistic Arab opinion and in-

⁸Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Atlantic Alliance, pp. 24-28.

terferes with the development of favorable attitudes toward the West.

Arab interests must be thought of in terms of the objectives of the Arab League rather than in terms of the local concerns of the various Arab nations. The purpose of the League is to consolidate--racially, religiously and nationalistically--the Arab-Moslem populations so that they might become a self-contained and self-supporting community extending from Morocco to Iran. In reality, the League does not have the necessary means to carry out such a policy. Its power resources are insufficient to coercively bring about any of the issues involved. Under these conditions the League's future can be seen to be conditioned by the effort of realizing its interest. This, very probably, will imply an Arab policy of "pendulum," between the Eastern and Western powers, a policy which has been so common in this post-war period to under-developed areas. In this light, the Arab world, divided by nationalism and driven by hatred of foreigners, is able to select even a destructive course of action. For the time, it is a source of political instability along the entire southern coast of the Mediterranean.

B. Change in World Politics

From the end of the Middle Ages to the first World War, the modern nation-state system was held together by the legal and moral traditions of the Western world. Because of this tradition, moral and legal limitations existed upon and channeled the struggle for power on the international scene. Further the balance of power was a tool which maintained a certain measure of order in the international community while simultaneously securing the independence of the individual members. It seems today that part of this heritage has been changed. The "if," "what," and "why" of these changes are the topics of the next pages. It is important to keep in mind that we will analyze the changes in terms of the present situation, and only later will their future meaning be evaluated.

Nationalistic imperialism

Nationalism of the mid-twentieth century differs basically from the traditional concepts of nationalism. The nationalistic movements of the nineteenth century pursued as a goal the liberation of the nation from foreign control and the attainment of a status as a state in its own. This was the aim considered to be a rightful one for all nations. Thus the nationalism of the nineteenth century had two elements of international conflict: 1. the

conflicts between a nationality and an alien master, as the conflicts seen in the Balkans and Turkey, the Slavic nations and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; and 2. the controversies between different ethnic nationalities over the delineation of their deserved spheres of dominion as seen in the German, Polish and French nationalistic movements. The sources of these conflicts can be attributed to differing interpretations of the national principle or else the refusal to accept it at all. Thirty years ago it was hoped that after the aspirations of all states to **exist** as individual nation-states were fulfilled, this group of satisfied nations would then achieve the necessary means for its preservation within the legal and moral principles of national self-determination.

The nationalism of today is actually a nationalistic imperialism and has only one denominator common to the nationalism of the nineteenth century. This common factor is the focusing of all political loyalty and actions upon the nation. The similarity ends here. Nineteenth century nationalism had as an ultimate goal the attainment of national sovereignty for all or several nations. In essence, the nation is the primary focus for political action. However, for the nationalistic imperialism of the mid-twentieth century the nation is but the starting point of a universal mission **whose** ultimate goal reaches to the

confines of the political world. While nationalism wants one nation in one state, the nationalistic imperialism of our age claims for one nation and one state the right to impose its own valuations and standards of action upon all other nations.⁹ The result of these rival claims to universal dominion by different nations is the absolute deterioration of the social system of international intercourse within which, for almost four centuries, nations were living together in constant rivalry, yet under the common roof of shared values and universal standards of action. The failure of this common system grants to the most powerful nations opportunities to attempt to rebuild the world as a system of their own devising and in their own image.

The new balance of power--re-definition of alliance¹⁰

The dissolution of the international consensus which had lasted for three hundred years was accompanied by basic changes in the system of balance of powers.¹¹ The most obvious change was the decrease in number of par-

⁹Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953), pp. 192-93.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 138-40; see also Robert Strautz Hupe, The Balance of Tomorrow (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1946), pp. 17-38; 256-76.

¹¹E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (London, McMillan, 1949), pp. 224 ff; s35-38.

ticipating members. By 1914 Japan and the United States were two of eight major powers and were, for the first time, strong powers existing outside of Europe. The remaining great powers at the outbreak of World War I were Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Russia. By the end of the war Austria was permanently removed from the nucleus of powerful nations; Germany and Russia temporarily lost status as members of the Great Powers, but they regained their involuntarily relinquished position twenty years later.

By 1945, the conclusion of World War II saw only three great powers remaining, Britain was viewed as a major power but she lost her strength during the postwar period. Consequently the only powerful nations existing de facto were and are the United States and Russia. The trend toward a numerical reduction of powerful states in the international scene is obvious when the number and nature of the multi-state system of the seventeenth and eighteenth century is compared to the international situation of today.

The balance of power system has, as a result, lost most of its inflexibility and uncertainty and thus its restraining effect upon the nations involved in a struggle for power on the international scene also has been lost.

Formerly the balance of power operated by means of coalitions among a number of nations which, while differing in power, were still of the same order of magnitude.

From 1870 to 1914 the game of power politics was played by eight nations. Consequently, no nation could go very far in his aspirations for power without relying upon the support of at least one of his co-players, and no country could absolutely certain of that enduring support. It is fairly certain that in 1914 Austria went as far as she did with Serbia because Germany imposed no limitations on Austrian activities in this area.

The more active players there are, the larger is the number of potential combinations. Thus, the vagueness of possible future national alignments created uncertainty which increased as the number of participating nations increased. As a result, whenever coalitions of nations comparable in power confronted each other, calculations of power nature would of necessity be close, since the defection of one prospective member or the addition of an unexpected one could not fail to affect the balance of power considerably.

An example of this occurred during World War I when the question of whether or not Italy should remain neutral had great importance for the final outcome of the war.

But this feature of the balance of power has been drastically altered in recent years. Whether or not Italy, Spain or Turkey joined or did not join one side or the other had no relevance in changing a victory into a defeat or vice versa. The withdrawal or addition of a prospective member was not significant because of the wide gap between the power of the first rank nations and the remaining nations.

This situation, first apparent in World War II, has been intensified in the bipolarity between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result the balance of power system became rigid and its restraining influence upon the power aspirations of the major conflicting nations has disappeared. Neither can neutral nations mitigate international disputes or erect effective barriers to unlimited aspirations for power by other nations. Thus the changed structure of the balance of power has made the hostile opposition of the two gigantic power blocks possible.

Reasons for the Change in the meaning of balance of power:
the new actors

The reasons for the drastic historical changes in the function and meaning of balance of power must be found in the independent variable of the system, i.e., power. The allocation of power in the world structure affects and

sometimes distorts what we call "balance." Since World War I a substitution occurred in the holder of the fulcrum of the balance. Apparently the shift has moved in a centripetal direction. The fulcrum of power has moved from Europe, particularly France and Great Britain, toward and in favor of the United States and Russia. We have been facing the practical results of this clear-cut world allocation of power during the last postwar period. But an historical analysis of political, economic and sociological factors evolving in the three continents--Russia, Europe, United States--would have made evident in the early decades of this century what we now are so concerned with, i.e., bipolarism. Long range historical forces were at work from 1900. The conditions which directly or indirectly permitted and encouraged new ideologies and totalitarianism, the steady increase of government intervention in economic life in all countries, and the revolt against the concepts and institutions of liberal democracy and laissez faire capitalism were symptomatic of the collapsing European economy and political stability of the later nineteenth century. The increasing anomie persistent in Europe and characterized by political and social unrest, e.g., France of today, together with a rising maturity and formalization of two new different civilizations, is at the very base of the world revolution

of our times. Two new players entered in the game of power politics and brought with them their own backlog of potentials, affecting thus the "old" European rules, function and meaning of the balance of power system. The new players sharpened and developed their most inherent capacities which seemed not commonly found in Europe. New techniques, such as productivity and consequent technological advances, more stable and integrated political behavior and substantial manpower and natural resources, have provided the new players with the tools and capacity of ruling and limiting the game to them alone. The only alternative left for Europe was that of assuming an adaptive pattern of behavior. Only after having completed, if possible, the adaptive process will Europe be able to participate in the game as an influencing partner.

Thus, the presence in the game of two new powerful actors has changed the rules of the game. Furthermore, not only the function but also the meaning of "balance of power" has been altered. There is no reason to think of the balance of power system as being a system with its own peculiar ethical and operational standards. These standards are set by the actors--in this case, Russia and the United States. Thus, as the allocation of power changes, so does the meaning and the nature of the balance of power. In present circumstances the balance of power system has

lost most of the ethical and operational structure characteristic of it, during the eighteenth century, and has acquired a new structure and meaning imposed by the new actors in a new international surrounding.

C. The Decline of the National State?

One of the greatest dilemmas at the present time seems to be the conflict between the still powerful and newly inflamed nationalistic movements and the political, economic and military realities which seem to have made the national sovereign state an anachronism.¹²

Superficially, nationalism appears to have become stronger while becoming greatly intensified. In India nationalism has been the principal force in dividing the country into two new States. It has led the creation of a new state in Palestine. The partial dissolution of the British Empire was for the most part due to strong nationalistic forces. Vigorous nationalistic movements combined with campaigns for liberation from the political and economic domination of Europe were present in the Middle East, South Africa, India and the Far East. There are already indications of similar movements gathering force in the

¹²E. H. Carr, op. cit., pp. 226-32. See also Emery Rives, The Anatomy of Peace (New York: Harper's Bros., 1946), pp. 126-44.

West Indies and Northern Africa led by intellectuals schooled in Western ideas and strategy.

Yet it would be wrong to assume that the nation-state is going through a second childhood or that it has attained its full maturity. The resumption of nationalism is quite genuine and easily explained. In Europe the nationalistic movement is largely a reaction to the brutality of the Nazi Regime which deliberately tried to extinguish the old established nations of Europe, especially those of Slavic nationalities who, consequently, have vigorously reasserted their national identity. Thus nationalism is simply a natural reaction to suppression and exploitation.

But the main symbol of the nation-state has been its legal and political sovereignty; that is, the absence of any control by a higher international authority; or, putting it in political terms, the power to wage war as the supreme means to settle international differences. Only as long as this sovereignty is an expression of basic political, economic and military actualities, can it endure. History shows that there have always been big states and small, powerful states and weak, but not until the present time has such a wide disparity existed between military and economic powers, nor have so many states been unable to control their own affairs in real, as compared

to nominal, independence. World War II adequately illustrated the difficulties faced by the small states in attempting to remain neutral. World War II overwhelmed the smaller states and only a few small countries, like Switzerland, Sweden and Ireland, remained neutral, but it was a highly vulnerable neutrality. The postwar period has shown even more clearly the hollowness of national sovereignty. In fact, those same states which most loudly declared national independence are now forced to pursue wider international alignments. Behind the vigorous declarations of national sovereignty by the Communist southeastern European states stood their defense treaties with the Soviet and the powerful super-national Cominform which regulated the foreign policies of the participating members. The Western states were also forced to relinquish national isolation for the protection of the United States of America. This weathering of actual national sovereignty is expressed economically in the Marshall Plan Program, which combined with the Economic Administration, coordinated American aid with the joint economic planning of the states receiving American aid. The political and military expression of the reduction of national power elements necessary to maintain a real sovereignty is the Atlantic Pact, which coordinates the political and military activities of the member states. If America did not assume a

major supporting role, these states would be as fatally weakened as would be the Eastern European bloc without the participation of Russia. The actual situation behind these developments is that although there are 50 or 60 supposedly sovereign states which make up the world political map, there are only two super-states--the United States and Russia (or closely integrated coalitions)--which actually enjoy the privileges and attributes and potentials of real sovereignty.

National sovereignty is endangered in a world where wars of conquest and suppression are still the greatest dangers to independence and freedom, and where the disparity of power between states is so great. The disparity of manpower, and most importantly of industrial and technological resources, has, in the age of air warfare and long distance technical weapons, intensified the inequality between great and small powers. A hundred years ago states like Holland, Belgium or Spain still had chances of defending themselves successfully against a foreign invasion. But at present these opportunities no longer exist. Belgium and Holland were conquered in a few days in the last war; future conquests may be decided in a matter of hours. National sovereignty means, in the last analysis, war potential. The inequalities of space, manpower and

productive resources have, at present, reduced it for all but a very few nations.

D. Evaluation of the Dynamic Content of the Factors
Causing the Actual International Situation

Summarizing the picture of the present international situation as outlined in the previous pages, we note the presence in it of bipolarism, international insecurity and threat of total war, allocation of power, specially in terms of technological weapons and resources disproportionately monopolized by the Soviet Union and United States, consequent weakening of war potentials and effective maintenance of sovereignty by small powers, and the recent rise of regionalistic associations within the bipolaristic system.

If we look for a common denominator in all these situations we might note that the factor "power" (military and economic) seems to be the only one to which such a nature can best be referred to. But in these situations power is more than a common denominator; it can be considered, in a causal frame of reference, as one of the causes of the dynamic and evolution of the international structure as a consequence of the present international system. (we do not take into consideration other elements, such as ideologies and ideological trends which can also be consid-

ered at the very root of the forces contributing to international changes). But power, as we have considered it, is not a constant element. By its very nature and definition it carries as a consequence the very possible quantitative and qualitative variability of its ingredients. The consequence of this is that power, as a national prerogative, is subjected to changes, nor can it be monopolized indefinitely in a specific locus.

In the light of these explanations we can now better understand and evaluate the meaning of the present international situation and its impact on the future of nationalism and internationalism. We have seen how the survival of sovereignty in the Second World War has been threatened, and we have mentioned a nationalistic imperialistic trend arising in this postwar period. Now to assume from these two international situations, which are at the very base of our hypothesis defined under the concept of nationalism versus internationalism, that the world in the future is inevitably directed toward internationalism with the subsequent demise of the national state and attendant sovereignty, it seems to go too far. Historical events which occurred between the end of the Second World War and the present time seem already to prove that any dogmatic assertion on the end of national sovereignty is invalid. The rise of regionalistic associations,, such as

NATO and the Balkan pact and the insertion into the NATO of a Germany in a position of almost full industrial capacity, are factors which are very much indicative that sovereignty is always present. These regionalistic associations seem to represent the only available way at present for the European nations for completion of their political and economic rehabilitation, thus strengthening the tools for effective maintenance of their sovereignty. Much in this sense has already been done. The decentralization of atomic production from the United States to the lesser European powers (Greece, England) is a step toward increasing national war potential, that is, the establishment of a more significant maintenance of a national sovereignty. It is noteworthy here to mention that the American policy of decentralized allocation of atomic control is an expression of her attempt to reestablish an efficient European balance of power system (American "organic" approach opposed to the "functional" approach used by the Soviet union). In this sense the rise of regionalism, as it has recently developed, may not be considered as a significant manifestation of the termination of the nation-state, but rather might offer adequate support for the contrary: that is, it can be considered as a way by which state-members attempt to maintain their national sovereignty. This could carry as a possible consequence that in the

future we will see the end of these coalitions, born out of contingent necessities, and the eventual rise of new hegemonic powers, i.e., Germany.

Taking into consideration this evaluation of the factors present in the international environment and their probable impact on it, we will attempt now an analysis and critique of the alternatives to nationalism lately considered by different schools of thought as possible of realization. Finally, we will derive several conclusions from this evaluation.

CHAPTER VI

NATIONALISM VERSUS INTERNATIONALISM

In the previous chapters we have described what would eventually be the composite impact of power and morality upon the future of the "state" as a member of the international group. More precisely, questions related to the future of the nation as a unit of power and sovereignty were considered. The step remaining after attempting to foresee the future of the state, the nation, as a unit in the international structure, is the study of how these conceived assumptions will best fit a new international order. From an analysis of the parts we pass now to the analysis of the whole.

We have seen that the international order has clearly marked a trend towards integration and the formation of increasingly larger political and economic units. This trend set in the early part of the twentieth century, appears to have been closely connected with the growth of large-scale capitalism and industrialism, as well as with the improvement of the means of communication and of the technical instruments of power. The First World War threw this development into conspicuous relief.

On the other hand there is evidence that, while technical industrial, economic developments within the

last fifty years has dictated a progressive increase in the size of effective political units; there may be a size which cannot be exceeded without provoking a recrudescence of disintegrating tendencies.

Integration of ever larger political units combined with the concentration of power in fewer nations are the trend-factors taken into consideration by those who assert imperialism and federalism; that is internationalism as the only possible alternative for the future of the international order.

More recent developments, however, have shown an increasing decentralized tendency of power combined with a readjustment in the integration of political units. These recent phenomena have dictated the basis for assuming that the international structure is reassuming its traditional order based on sovereignty and the nation-state; so no radical change has yet really occurred within the system of international relations.

If regionalism must be considered as a transitional stage from nationalism to internationalism, or as a stage of transit from internationalism to increasing nationalism, it is a question that **only** the future could fully qualify. Our **assumption** has been that the pattern followed up to now by the decentralization of power, atomic power, toward separate individual nations seems to foster the

strengthening of the national unit within the traditional boundaries of sovereignty, thus rendering almost impossible the growth of supernational integrated political unit.

It is noteworthy at this point to consider and evaluate, within a power and morality frame of reference, some of contemplated alternatives recognized as applicable to national sovereignty.¹ This analysis, by establishing the merits and pitfalls of the different appraisals of the future of the international system in the light of the changes occurred in power and related balances, will provide us with a framework of analysis which will have the benefits of synthesis and continuity with the material developed in the previous pages.

Imperialism

International conquest by a single power followed by the establishment of a world wide international order under the control of that conquering power is the first alternative. Western Europe and the Mediterranean area felt the impact of this type of action under the expansion of the Roman Empire. In more recent times the establishment of universal rule by conquest has been attempted again, first by France under the leadership of Napoleon

¹Clyde Eagleton, International Government (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1948), pp. 23-28. See also Werner Levi, Fundamentals of World Organization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1950), pp. 3-43.

Bonaparte, and more recently by the Axis powers. But in the final analysis these efforts only intensified the forces of national resistance rather than exterminating them.

In modern times imperial conquest is usually the result of a distortion of nationalism. Most nations, after achieving superior political and physical strength compared to their neighbors, which correspondingly increases the chances of successful conquest, then turn from genuine nationalism to imperialism. Today it seems that history, in a sense, is repeating itself under different semblances. We argue that because the imperialism of today is a distortion of nationalism it does not yet constitute an accepted system of relationships. This means that imperialism has not yet gained a formal or rigid structure in the international system. The situation is still very fluid. One equilibrium will be reestablished and expansive nationalism constrained, which is obtainable through a new realignment or redistribution of power (atomic power); imperialism as a form of world government will cease to be.

Besides, the imperialism of today offers wide deviations from the traditional conception of imperialism traditionally held. The trend today is for recognition of sovereignty. This credit and emphasis might per se plant the seeds for future disintegration and complete rehabilita-

tion of national independence. Let us analyze the operations of outstanding cases of the present imperialism.

The Soviet Union's pattern of conquest is rather subtle. The ends of its imperialism are, contrary to traditional imperialism, to maintain in fact the concept of national sovereignty. Thus the means used to achieve Russia's expansion differ from the more traditional ones. The experience of the nations in Eastern Europe since the war clearly show that association with the Soviet Empire means maintenance of formal sovereignty even though genuine political and economic sovereignty are subject to some limitations. We must realize that the actions of the Soviet Union are less destructive of genuine nationalism than are the previous imperialistic regimes, such as the Nazi regime, in two respects. First, the Soviet Union has no policy or philosophy of discrimination between races and nations. Soviet policy encourages national groupings on the condition that they keep away from the political and economic field. Secondly, the Soviet regime has powerful groups of ideological followers in most countries, and is therefore able to administer a Communist form of government through the nationals of the different countries. In other words, the Soviet system means the maintenance of the national sovereign state contrary to the Nazi regime,

thus leaving more scope to cultural and ideological nationalism.

The United States is, at present, the only other power capable of achieving world rule. The position of America in the international scene and United States' expansion has however a different policy basis than the Russian one. The American trend has been toward regionalism. The willingness on the part of the United States to develop and foster a regionalistic movement is perhaps the main factor affecting the future of internationalism or nationalism. The intention of the United States to reestablish a new balance of power by placing more effective members in it, seen in reinforcement of middle powers, appears to lead the trend further away from supernational unities. At present it seems that the United States is handling the delegation of atomic power in such a way as to foster unity or alliances at regional level, in which the "have-nots" will assemble around the "haves." But how long will this kind of American control endure? What will happen if the atomic element of power will be widely distributed among the individual powers? All of these questions, directly arising from the actual situation, are focused upon the individual nations as they have traditionally existed; none of them, however, consider the eventuality of growth of supernational entities.

The chances are few that either the United States or the Soviet Union could attain world rule without a gigantic and destructive war with the other. If this battle did occur, and if at its conclusion man was still capable of organizing society, the most likely course would be to set up a universal law. This would insure that the world would be free for the introduction of one political system, one economic plan and one social philosophy. This, however, could not be achieved except by a war of unprecedented violence and magnitude, and by the eventual elimination of other national and personal liberties. The possibilities of war in the light of the deadly consequences involved seem to be very few. The threat of total destruction implicit in the use of new technological weapons, is by its nature endangering to the principles of national survival of the United States and Russia. Thus, deducing from these considerations and the present trend toward redistribution of power to individual nations, it seems likely in the future that the international order will be dealt with by the traditional system of power politics with a multi-nation state world.

Federalism²

The idea of federal unions between groups of nations was considered by those concerned with the improve-

²Arthur Salter, The United States of Europe (London: George Allen Ltd., 1933), pp. 83-122.

ment of international relations during the late 1930's. The realistic experiences of recent years have helped to put the problem of a federal union in its proper perspective. Federalism is a form of organization resting upon a constitutional foundation which, in a number of cases, has successfully united groups of states while their separate identities and self-governments have remained intact. The common type of federation has been initiated with the transfer to the federal government of certain powers of national concern, i.e., defense, foreign affairs, customs, and a varying number of legislative powers. Overwhelming common interests and traditions--geographical, racial, economic or military--have solidified the existing federations (Switzerland, United States, Canada, Australia, etc.). Without such a minimum of common interests and traditions, federal government cannot operate successfully.

We need not waste any words on plans for a world federation: the idea of unification into a Federal Union of states as Argentina, France, India, Spain, the Soviet Union and the United States, with all of their differences in political systems, economic standards and policies and social achievements, cannot really be seriously considered. The plan to tie more closely related associations, as a Western European union, into a Federal system has al-

ready shown how difficult it would be to put it into practice.

A federation of Western European nations would be forced to function against dozens of varying national traditions and systems of government, as well as against vast differences in social beliefs. Under these circumstances, a federal constitution might eventually be accepted by all concerned, but the proper approach to this type of political organization would involve and require complete and habitual cooperation in the vital areas of military and economic planning, and common discussion of politically controversial matters, all of which seems very hard to attain.

In addition to these socio-political factors which at present make impossible a complete international integration required by a federalistic arrangement, we have to mention the present trend which seems to oppose forms of supernational governments such as Federalism: we speak of regionalism. Differences and contrasts between regionalism and federalism lie mainly in degree; specifically, the why and the how of interaction among nation members. The alternatives between the two might be determined from how much the existing balance of power would stimulate and enforce the different kinds of international integration.

We have spoken of federalism as a system requiring not only cooperation between the state members, but also as requiring almost complete integration among them. A system, in other words, where the component parts, in the long run, would be almost completely assimilated in the whole. To pretend to reach such a degree of consent among the actual nations would be nonsense. Moreover, consent alone is not enough to create federalism; it is also necessary that the members relinquish some of their already formalized structure and renounce part of their actual national sovereignty. Such a sacrifice would be considered improbable, at present, even in a situation where the possibility of survival would be extremely limited.

But, apart from considerations of the possibility and impossibility of such an integration as that imposed by the intrinsic nature of a federation, it would be more functional to see how the existing balance of power--or international threat--would further advocate the kind of national adjustment required by an international federation.

Such an approach will provide us with a more realistic appraisal of the probability that federalism will prevail in the future international order.

Until today the balance of power system was dominated exclusively by bipolarism. Recently, however, the trend

has been for decentralization of power toward minor nations. This policy, originated and perpetuated by the United States, offers the possibility for minor nations to seek survival in limited national associations; some of these members have been provided with recently developed technical techniques of power (atomic power). The way these regional associations (such as NATO, Schuman Plan, OEEC, etc.) have been set up gives the nation-members ample liberty of action, while fully maintaining their sovereign independence. As a matter of fact the obligations existing among members are related to cooperation rather than integration.

Under such circumstances the alternative between Federalism or integration and Regionalism or cooperation seems, at least for the immediate future, non-realistic. It appears almost obvious that the nation-states will accept the regionalist association offered them. Thus, they can enjoy a degree of security and yet retain almost complete independence. Federalism is out of place and out of time.

Regionalism³

Another alternative to national sovereignty is the establishment of several small and compact regional groups

³J. Goormaghligh, "European Integration," International Conciliation (No. 463, October 1953). See also A. Loveday, "The European Movement," International Organi-

of nations which would constitute, by their mutual relations, a balance of power situation similar to that shaky balance maintained by the larger nations in the past. This appears to be the direction toward which the most significant international developments are heading. Regionalism forcefully illustrates the trend toward several worlds instead of toward one world. The association of Communist nations is dominated by the Soviet Union which maintains tight political control over the governments of these nations which take their directions from the Kremlin. The United States is the leading and dominant member of a group of nations pledged by the Atlantic treaty, to mutual assistance against aggression. Compact regional associations might be set up within the two major groups to be headed by the United States and the Soviet Union. A significant example is the Benelux Union. A wider group of the Western European nations was associated in the Council of Europe;⁴ the Balkan Pact and the Atlantic Pact are two recent examples of nations linked together as regional associations.

zation (Vol. 3, November 1947), and Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on Regional Organizations outside Europe (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950).

⁴F. L. Schuman, "The Council of Europe," American Political Science Review (Vol. 45, September 1951); see also J. A. McKesson, "The Schuman Plan," Political Science Quarterly (Vol. 67, March 1952).

Confronting these regional associations is the same problem of instability which made the former balance of power system so precarious. This element of instability in the balance is likely to allow relatively small events to become of major importance. A change of government in any of the States concerned, or the invention of a superior weapon by one side can disturb the balance overnight.

Political and economic factors are closely interwoven in the movement toward more closely knit and mutually exclusive associations of nations.⁵ The Soviet bloc has a political origin; but in order to cement it into the economic system of the nations forming part of it, a common and exclusive plan must be developed. The nations within the regional associations are encouraged to conduct trade relations within the group, but trade agreements between the group and outside nations are viewed either as a necessary evil or as a means of political pressure.

Outside the Soviet world the ideology of free and nonpolitical trade theoretically persists. In practice, however, the dollar crisis which threatens the majority of nations and the differences of national policies work in

⁵Indian Council of World Affairs, Regionalism and Security (New Dehly: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 44-56.

favor of close regional groupings and other discriminating associations and against open international exchange.

The future of Nationalism

In conclusion, what is the future of nationalism likely to be? In all probability, the foreseeable future will not see the establishment of a world state or a world federation in which the existing nationalities will be erased and combined. It seems highly uncertain that the diversities of national tradition and culture will be eliminated primarily because this is the heritage upon which the very foundation of the existence and perpetuation of Western civilization rests. The most probable course of events will see a blending of national and super-national alliances. Those alliances taking shape in the Eastern and Western associations will take somewhat different forms. The differences will be manifest in the Soviet maintenance of control over the multi-national organization of the Communist bloc with a possible extension of influence and control to other nations. This means that existing national groups will retain their identity and obtain administrative and cultural autonomy. Their national traditions and languages will remain intact and, to some extent, the different legal systems will be retained. Economic and political control in the Soviet pattern of multi-national states is firmly anchored at the

center, and the monopolistic power of the Communist party insures that movements for independence will not be carried too far.

The primary problem for the associations of Western democracies will be the determination of methods to be used to maintain the national diversities of the members without utilizing the iron regulation of a one-party system and a totalitarian type of political control. The Western approach most likely will be "functional" rather than "organic." Super-national loyalties may develop around a joint military organization or around a joint economic council whose task must be the gradual integration of the production of the participating nations.

Concrete achievements such as the pooling of Western European coal and steel resources under a joint, super-national authority--the Schuman plan, OECE, NATO and the recent Balkan Pact--show the reality of the trend toward increased cooperation of nations within regionalistic associations. It might be that the rise of this regionalistic trend is conditioned by the external pressures of the United States and the Soviet threat or by the internal weaknesses and incapacity for the single nation-states to preserve their security. If this is the case, the future will eventually show that with the gradual change of the present international pressures and with increased rehabil-

itation of the individual powers, a correspondent loosening of these alliances will occur. Problems in this area have already arisen.⁶ The Western pool of steel and coal has already been threatened. Yet, on the other hand, we can say that the future success of NATO lies very much in the development of Russo-American relationships. With this as a frame of reference, much will depend on the future role and attitude of Germany. A sensible increase in the production potential of Germany and its uncertain future in respect to her domestic political situation has already raised the suspicions of France and Great Britain. As we previously mentioned, the European balance is very precarious, and this does not appear favorable to the most conducive status for the development of the right environment in which to build serene and longstanding international cooperation and real integration of the member states.

The situation is still very fluid; however, we can be certain that nationalism and the sovereign state are still present in the international environment and very probably they will continue to form the foundation of the future dynamic changes in the international system.

⁶P. Seabury, "The League of Arab States, Debacle of a Regional Arrangement," International Organization (Vol. 3, November 1949).

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