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OPEN- AND CLOSBDMINDEDNESS
AND THE
ABILITY TODIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN
SOURCE AND MESSAGE

Thesis- fm the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
' Fredric A. Powell.
1961

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SDURCE AND NEJJflGB

By

Fredric A. Powell

A? ABETRACT DF A TFW ”I

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
far the degree of

”ASTER OF I12 T3

Department of General Cor. munication Arts

1951

AF‘FIIC 3"ij :

 

ABSTRACT

been- AND CLossonIHnBLnrss
AhD ens
ABILITY so Dlrerurnexies Barnes:
sensor Ann usual 3

by Fredric A. Foeell

The purpose of this study was to test enyiricelly
the validity of the fundamental distinction between Open
and closed belief—disbelief S‘stems posited by Rokeech
in his discussion of dogmatism. He suggested that Open
and closed individuals are basically differentiated in
their relative ability to distinguish between and eval-
uate independently information about the world and the
information source.

Placing the study in a communication context, it was
hypothesized that the more Open an individuel's belief
system, the greater should be his ability to differentiate
between the substantive content of a message and infor—
mation about ‘he message source end to evaluate each up-
on its intrinsic merits.

Two independent variables were introduced: (a) the
degree of dogmatism~~open~ or closednindedness—-of the
individual, and (b) the reference point employed by the
individual in evaluating the source end mesSuge. The
former variable wee Operationelised as the individual's
degmetisn score on the Rokeech Dogmetism Scale. The
latter depended upon whether the individual employed the

source as a reference point for evaluating the message

2 F. A. Powell
or used the message as a reference point for subsequently
evaluating the source.

The dependent variable was the individual's ability
to differentiate between and evaluate independently the
source and the message. This was Operationalized as the
23 score derived from the individual's judgments of the
source and message utilizing a series of Semantic Dif—
ferential (SD) scales.

Seventy-six reSpondents judged six source-message
pairs on the basis of the SD scales. The sample was
equally divided between open and closed individuals and
each of these groups was further equally divided between
those employing the source as a reference point and those
usin; the message as a reference goint for subsequently
judging the message and the source, respectively.

The statistical analysis of the data involved test-
ing for differences between the variances of the mean 23
values of the Open and closed groups under the two refer-
ence point conditions. The results of the ana ysis pro-
vided empirical evidence that open and closed individuals
differed in their comparative ability to differentiate
between sources and messages and to evaluate them ince-
pendently upon their intrinsic merits. Openminded in-
dividuals were founded to be more able to do this than
were closed individuals. This difference was found to
exist regardless of the reference point used in eval-
uating the sources and messages and regardless of the

substantive content of the messages.

5 P. A. Powell
On the basis of these results, it was concluded that

OpGߢ and closedmindod individuals do differ in their
relative capacity to differentiate between and evaluate
independently information and source of information,
thus providing emp rical support of the validity of wha
Rokeach considered the fundamental distinction between
Open and closed belief-disbelief systems, or between

Openminded and closedminded individuals.

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3?

Fredric A. Powell

m T", w." '-
2“ ‘PiothIb

Submitted to
nichi3an State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

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Department of General Communication A ts

1961

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“retest of Concepts and
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I wish to exyress my appreciation and thanks to my
advisor, Dr. Hideya Kunata; to Dr. Paul J. Deutschmann
and to Dr. Lionel C. Barrow, Jr., who guided me and
assisted me throughout this pregram of research.

I also wish to thank my friends and associates who
"volunteered" to assist me with the collection and coding
of the data for this study.

The greatest debt of gratitude is due my wife and
family, friends and colleagues who served as my severest

critics.

iii

The process of communication always involves at least
three elements~~a source, a message, and a receiver.
Communication research is continually directed at gaining
a more comprehensive and insightful understanding of the
source, message, and receiver variables which may contri-
bute to more efficient and effective communication.

then one undertakes to study the communication pro-
cess and/or its elements, a number of approaches are
available. One might study the process 33,3333, as a_
process. Again, it is possible to concentrate on only
one or more of its isolated elements. In this case,
however, it is impossible to study a sin3le isolated
element, despite primary concern with that one element.
Each of the elements in the process of communication is
interdependent with the other elements in the process
and cannot be congletely isolated from them, even for
purposes of study.

This study is primarily concerned with the receiver
as an element of the communication process and, more
Specifically, with the personality predisposition of dog—
matism as an attribute of the receiver which affects the
efficiency and effectiveness of any communication.

This study, of necessity, also had to consider the
source and the message as elements of the process of com~
munication. The empirical approach to the study required

the holding constant of the source and the message so

iv

that the effect of the receivers’ dogmatism upon their
acceptance and evaluation of both the source and the
message might be observed.

Specifically, it was hypothesized that high dogmatic
and low dogmatic individuals differ in their relative
ability to differentiate between and evaluate the sub~
stantive content of a message and the source of the nes-
sege. If significant differences in this ability are ob~
served between high and low dogmatic individuals, it moy
be concluded that the personality characteristic of eog~
mutism is a useful variable in predicting the use e re~
ceiver will make of judgments about the source and the

message before reaponding to communicative stimuli.

Table

\N

LIST OF TfiBLLS

Page

Distribution of Reagencents' dogma-
q?

,- - (7' - -
tlsm UCGEQSQQQoo90.000000.-000099n0!00¢000000044

Open and Closed Respondents According
to Sex, Age, Income, Education, Party

u,

Preference, and Socio-Jconomic Status......ooo27
Republican urd Democratic Resyondents
according to Sex, Age, Income, Bduca~
tion, and Socio—Lccnomic Status...............23

Mean scores of the Four Groups on
the bl? Source-Message Pairs..................58

Analysis Of VarianceooooaoQOoooooooo-oconaoono42

ILTRUDUCTION

The purpose of this study was to test empirscslly
the fundamental distinction posited by Rakes ch between
Open and closed beliefudisbelief systems, or as the title
of his recent book (60) su 3 3ests, between open and closed
minds. He su33ests that open and closed belief—disbelief

systez-zs ere basicallv differer tinted in "the capacity to
distin3uish information from source of information and
to evaluate each on its own merits" (60, p. 595 .

In The Open and Closed King and in a number of Jour~

 

nal articles (22, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62,
65), Rokesch and his associates preposed several charac-
teristics which dii iere11tiute open and closed belief-
discelief svstems Thm pronosed th t open and closed
systems differ in the extent of isolation and differen-
tiation of beliefs and disbeliefs, in the specific con-
tent of beliefs and disbeliefs, end in the structuring
or or3enizstion of beliefs and disbeliefs. Rokench end
his associates reported a number of stueies testing the
velinity of these differences in which they found that
Open and closed belief~disbelief systems do, in fact,
differ in the extent to which they exhibit these chsrac~
teriotics.

iowever, no attempt seems to have been made to date
to test the validity of what Rokeech considered to be the
fundamental distinction between Open and closed systems.

The differences in fie3ree of isolation, in content, and

1

2
in or3anizstion were seen as variables contributin3 to
the fundamental distinction-~the ability to differentiate
between information and source of information and to eval-
uate each on its intrinsic merits. The purpose of this
study was to empirically test the validity of this eis~
tinction. The intent was to determine whether or not
cpen- and closed minded individuals do, in fact, differ
in their comparative ability to differentiate and eval-
uate source and information.

This fundamental distinction was tested in a more or
less everyday communication situation. Respondents were
3iven the task of differentiating between and evaluating,
information contained in political statements and informs-

tion about the sources of the statements.

313nificcnce

 

The si3nificance of this study was seen as fourfold.
First, the study should provide empirical evidence sup-
porting or failin3 to support the validity of the basic
distinction between Open- and closedminded individuals,
as posited by Rokeach.

Second, should the evidence obtained supgort that
distinction, it may prove useful in exolaining some of
the variability present in the studies of cognitive bel-
snce reported by Heider (25), Eewconb (44), Osgood and
Tannenbeum (so), Festin3er (13), end others. The prin-
ciples of con3ruity-incon3ruity ‘r consondnce-—disson-
ance set forth in these theories of co3nitive balance

and attitude change may hold true to vnryin3 de3rees in

3
the cases of cpenminded and closedminded individuals.

Third, the study may have significa.ce in the area
of source credibility. It may provide some partial er
planation of the results of those source credibility
studies in which tire source' 3 influence, ei- her favorable
or unfavorable, was not as predicted. These studies are
typified by the research efforts of Ewing (11),.Hovland
and weiss (29), Holman and Hovland (58), and others.

Finally, it may be that the distinction su55 ested by
Rokesch has relevance to the study of reference group in-
fluence and usage as represented by the work of Asch (2,
5, 4) and Sherif (66), among others. Individuals exhibit-
in5 Open and closed belief-disbelief systems may differ
in the extent to and the manner in which they make use of
reference groups when they must reconcile new information
with existin5 cognitions or knowledge, and when evaluating
and acting upon new information.

The possible implications of the differential ability
of Open and closed individuals to distin5 uish between and
evaluate independently information and source of informa-
tion for the study of c05nitive behavior, source credibil-
ity, and reference 5roup influence will be discussed in
greater detail in Chapter IV.

Organization

 

The study is reported and discussed in four parts.
Chapter I summarizes the theoretic background of the study,
includin5 a discussion of tle early studies of the rela-

tionship of personality to persua ability or nd a brief

n
summary of Rokeech's conceptualization of the basic dis-
tinction between open and closed belief~disbelicf systems.
Chapter I also includes the theoretic hygothesis and a
rationale for the stu‘“.

The eesign of the stufly, a description of the sample,
a discussion of the questionnaire, and the methods employ-
ed in the study are presented in Chapter II.

Chapter III presents the results of the statistical
analysis of the date and the conclusions derived from the
analysis.

The final chapter, Chapter IV, includes a summary of
the study, e discussion of the results, and son suggested
areas for further study. The latter section discusses in
particular the implications of Open~ end closedminded in-
dividual’s differential ability to distinguish between in-
formation and source of information for the study of coga
nitive balance, source credibility, and reference group

influences.

CHAPTER I

Chapter I presents a discussion of the theoretic
background of this study, the hypothesis that was tested,
and a rationale for the study. In outlining the theoretic
background, some of the early research efforts in the
areas of personality and persuasibility and of rigidity
or dogmatism are discussed, as well as Rokeach's notion
of the basic difference between Open and closed belief-
disbelief systems.

Theoretic Backgroung

It is generally recognized that the effects of a
communication are, among other influences, dependent up-
on the personality characteristics of the communicates.

By taking account of such personality predispositions,
tecether with reference group influences and other pres—
sures upon the communicates, it is possible to predict

the manner in which an individual or a group of individuals
will respond to a communication.

iovland, Janis, and Kelley (26, p. 17#) differentiate
two general classes of personality characteristics which
affect an individual's responsiveness to any communica-
tion, and to persuasive communications in particular.

The first general class is the individual's readiness to
accept or reject a particular point of view with regard
to a specific tepic.

his set of factors has been recognized as a major

determinant of an individual's susceptibility to Opinion

5

6
change. Much research effort has been devoted to studi-
ing the personality factors associated with acceptance or
rejection of various beliefs and attitudes within one
tepic area or another. This togigmbound type of person~
elity predisposition was subdivided by snis and Hovlend

(55. pp. 6-13) into content«bound (including appeal-bound,

 

argument-bound, and style-bound) factors, connonicetor~

 

bound factors, media-bound factors, and situntigg—bound

 

factors.

The studies of authoritarian personalities by Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, end Sanford (1) provided the
major impetus toward understanding the nature of belief
and attitude changes about Specific issues, such as racial
prejudice. The findings of Bettleheim and anowitz (6,

p. 6) beer directly upon the nature of topic~bound predis-
positions. They found, in a study of the effects of anti—
Semitic prepsgnnde, that such propaganda use most readily
approved by individuals who either had already acquired

an intolerance toward the Jewish peeple, or who were tol-
ersnt of them, but whOse personalities were insecure and
hostile. Smith, Bruner, and White (67, p. 7), Hartley (24),
and Sarnoff (65) reported other studies of personality
correlutes contributing to readiness to accept or reject?”
favorable or unfavorable communications about specific
ethnic, national, and political groups.

Other studies of topic-bound predispositions have
dealt with relatively general factors not limited to the

modification of attitudes and beliefs toward only one

type of social group. Weiss and Pine (70, 71) investi-
gated th= personality 5 actor3 wlflic make ior high readiu
mess to accept or reject a communication adVOC3tin3 strict
punitive measures toward social deviates” They found that
individuals witlx ILi3h a3pre sicn drives and strong extra-
punitive tendencies were more prone to accept communica-
tions advocatin; strcr n3 puniLive attitzdcs tSWi; d those
who violate the norms of society.

Janis and P@ vland (35, p3. 9-13) cite a number of
additional 3 33133 deuunstratin; the nature of content-
bound, com3unicator-b0und, media-bound, and situation-
buunfi personulity correlates which were fauna to influence
and indiviiual’s readiness to cce pt or reg ”act a cor-
municaticn advocatin3 a given point of view on a partic-
ular tepic.

The findin33 of these and othe e:r studie3 are us eful
in preaicting the manner in which cifferent infiividuala
may respond to commgni03tions dealing with 3pecific
13 3ue3. However, their usefulness is limited when 3t~
tempting to prefiict an individual's P6830188 to many types
of ccmmunications, cuttin; 3 $033 diverse subject mat—
ters ané covering a wifie spectrum of Q ecilic belic f3
311d attitudes.

The second c 333 of :L33033lity f3ct013 set fart“ by
Hovl3nd, Janis 2’ and K311 3' are those which influence an
indiviuua l‘ 93en3ral susceptibilitsr to various tprs of
'cr3u33 V3 communications and social influence. This

01333 of predisgositians was 3333333 to be relatively

8
independent (topic~frce) of the subject matter of the con-
municetion. As compared to topic-bound personality factors,
they are more general in scope in that they are relatively
independent, not only of the subject matter of the communi~
cation, but also of the communicator, the channel or medium
through which conveyed, and the communication situation.
Although never completely independent of these influences,
they ere, nevertheless, not dependent upon the conclusion
of or the position advocated in the communication.

A number of empirical studies have been conducted in
an effort to isolate those topic-free predispositions which
generally influence the acceptance or rejection of com-
munications. A large number of these investigations were
concerned with individuals' differences in reseonsiveness
to persuasive communications (12; 26. Pp. 177—795 50, 51,
32). The results of these studies indicated that there
may be a general personality rector of susceptibility to
communications-a rector leading to high or low resis-
tance to a wide variety of communications on many diverse
and unrelated topics.

Janis and Field ($5) reported a study of the consis-
tency of these individual differences in susceptibility
to various types of communications. The results of their
study indicated that there may be a general configuration
of a relatively few personality variables which contri-
bute to conm'iication suscegtioility.

tony personality characteristics have been nosited

b

as influencing an individual's general susceptibility to

9

communications. Janis and Field (34), in another study,
found thut the personality characteristics of feelings of
social inferiority, richness of fantasy, interpersonal
aggressiveness, and neurotic defensiveness were positively
correlated with susceptibility to persuasive communications.

Linton and Graham (40) identified a series of vari-
ables related to change of Opinion in response to communi-
vations and describe a fundamental pattern of personality
correlates which predispose an individual to accept or to
reject persuasive communications. Among these variables
was that of authoritarianism. Although they found no sig-
nificant differences between Opinion—changers and nonchang-
ers in their overall authoritarianism, they did find signi-
ficant differences according to the dimensions along which
authoritarisnism was organized. Changers and nonchsngers
differed in authoritarian submission and aggression, unti-
intrnception, power and toughness, destructiveness end
cynicism, and in projectivity. Opinion-changers exhibited
a greater degree of all of these variables, with the ex-
ceptions of cynicism and projectivity, than did nonchnngers.

Other personality characteristics which Linton end
-rehsm (40, pp. 86-101) found to be related to suscepti-
bility to communications were degree of respect for per-
ental authority, attitudes toward social deviates, admire~
tion of power, feelings of inadequacy and inferiority,
assertiveness, and desire for independence.

Cohen (18) found that the degree of an individual’s

self-esteem and estimate of his personal adequacy were

lO
positively correlated with his susceptibility to persuasive
communications.

Janis and Hovland (55, pp. 167-281) and Hovland,
Janis, and Kelley (26, pp. 174-214) cite a large number of
additional studies of a wide variety of tepic-free person-
ality correlates which have been found to effect the accep-
tance or rejection of persuasive communications.

One of the personality factors noted above which has '
been found to be closely related to communication suscepti-
bility is that of the communicatee's degree of authoritar-
ianism. The measures of authoritarianism used by Linton
and Graham in their study were derived from those develop—

ed by Adorno, gt al, and reported in The Authoritarian

 

Personality (1, pp. 57-290).

 

The research efforts of Adorno and his associates
were conducted in the areas of authoritarianism and intol-
erance as functions of dogmatic or rigid thought behavior.
An individual's susceptibility to an ideology, belief, or
idea was seen as a function of the degree to which he ex-
hibits the personality forces of authoritarianism and in-
tolerance. These personality forces were seen, furtherb
more, as influencing his readiness for response to socio-
logical influences or pressures, including communicative
influences.

In their conceptualization, an individual's system
of objective and rational thought was a function of the
fixity or flexibility of his personality. In order to

_understand and predict his reaponse to sociological

ll
influences, it was necessary to determine the kind of per-
sonality organization~~the degree of cognitive rigidity--
that exists within him. An individual's response to influ-
ences, whether the response is one of acceptance of or
resistance to change, was seen as a function of the ego--
that part of the personality structure which appreciates
reality, integrates the parts of reali y, and Operates
with subconscious awareness (1, pp. 1—11).

Thus Adorno and his asseciatcs conceived of the per~
sonality characteristic of cognitive rigidity, overtly
manifested in authoritarianism and intolerance, as a de-
terminant of an individual's resistance to or acceptance
of sociological (and communicative) influences.

Dissatisfied with the earlier efforts to define and
describe rigidity or resistance to change, Rokeach and his
associates conceived of Open and closed belief~disbelief
systems in an effort to overcome what seemed to be some
major inadequacies in the prior conceptualiZations of the
nature of rigidity or dormstism.

Rokeach's major objection to the earlier efforts in
this area was that they failed to produce a satisfactory
generalized descr ption of the nature of rigidity or do;-
matism-~resistance to change. is felt that the previous
efforts were still too content— or tepic~boundg that is,
that these earlier conceptualizations of the nature of
resistance to change remained, despite their attempts to
overcome this inadequacy, applicable only to specific

situations and areas of cognitive activity. They failed

12
to provide a description of resistance to change which
pervaded all areas of belief and cognitive fnnctioninQ.
Initially, RcKOech made a distinction between ri¢id

and dogmatic cognitive behavior. Although both notions

 

referred to resistance to change, Rokeach saw them as
differing in the scepe of their influence. The former,
rigidity, referred, in his formulation, only to the re~
sistance to change of single, specific beliefs whereas
dogmatisn referred to the resistance to change of entire
systems of belief (65, p. 88). Thus the referent of rigid
thinking was a single concept, set, idea, habit, exrectancy,
etc.; the referent of dogmatic thinking, on the other hand,
was the total cognitive configuration of ideas and beliefs
held by the individual. Rigidity involved the overcoming
of single sets of beliefs in solving or learning specific
problems and tasks; dogmatism, the overcoming of a total
system of ideas and beliefs.

As Hokeach conceived of dogmatiss, it was a much more
comprehensive phenomenon than was rigidity, embracing the
total cognitive organization of the individual, rather than
a single, isolated belief or idea.

Second, and closely related to his first objection,
Rokeach took exception to the previous studies of dogmatism
or rigidity which treated authoritarianism and intolerance
or ethnocentrism as independent domains of degnatic thought
(1, 21, 41). In his conceptualization, these phenomena are
not independent; both are manifestations of higher levels

of dogmatism.

15

He also objected to the nature of the authoritarianism
and intolerance focused upon in the earlier studies. In
his view, these studies overemphnsized the riahtist forms
of authoritarianism and intolerance, concentrating only on
the conservative forms of political and ethnic thought such
as Fascism and anti~3emitisn. The earlier studies ignored
left authoritarinnism end intolerance-~the literal or radi-
6n1 forms of political and ideologicnl thought as exclpli-
fied by the Communist doctrine.

seeing a need for the conceptualisation of general
authoritarianism and intolerance, both left and right,
Hokeach, in formulating his notion of dogmatism, sought
to describe the nature of general authoritarianism and in—
tolerance, rather than limit his description to the rightest
forms of those phenomena.

In Rokeach's formulation, dosnatism is a "cognitive
state which mediates objective reality within the person"
(57, p. 194). His construct of dogmatism revolves around
the convergence of three closely interrelated sets of
variables: cognitive systems, intol>rance and author turn
ianism. Dogmatisn, in essence, involves the relationship
of cognitive functioning and socinl attitudes.

In recent yours, Roheech and others (1, pg. 57~250§
41, pg. 401-11) have investigated this relationship, lurge-
ly in the area of ethnic intolerance and its underlying
authoritarianism (SO, 51, 52, 53, 56). In these studies,
it was found that individuals high in ethnic prejudice

and/or authoritarianism were more rigid and concrete in

14
their cognitive functioning, more narrow in their grasp
of an idea or belief, had a greater tendency to premature
closure of perceptual processes and distortions of memory,

and a greater intolerance of ambiguity.

Prior to the writing of The Qgen and glosed Mind, the

 

major research effort to cXploin the relntionship between
beliefs end cogiition was that of Frenkel-Brunswik (16,
17, 18, 19). In her explanation, a close correspondence
existed between the c05nitive spheres of behavior and the
emotional or social spheres. An individual's cognitive
activity was seen as a function of his past social and
emotional experiences.

Rokesch's construct of Open and closed belief~d15*
belief systems was largely derived from the work of
Frenkel-Brunswik. It was a theory tying together the
organization of social end emotional attitudes with that
of cognition, as was the theory of Frenkel~Brunswik.
However, his theory embraced the nature of general nu~
thoritnrienisn end intolerance, whereas that of Frenkel-i
Brunswik concerned itself solely with right authoritur~
isnism and intolerance. In Rokeach's view, beliefs and
COgnition were structurally inseparable, smug es SUCh:
were interrelsted in his conceptualisation of dogmatism.

According to Rokeach's construct, the structure of
belief~disbelief systems varies along a continuum from
42223 (low dogmatism) to closed (high dogmatism). This
Continuum was a Joint function of (s) the degree of

interdependence noon; the parts within the belief system,

15
within the disbelief system, and between the belief and
the disbelief systems; (b) the degree of interdependence
between the central, intermediate, and peripheral regions
of the system; and (c) the organization of the system along
a time perspective dimension (51).

Contentwise, the belief-disbelief system may be dcs~
cribed in terms of the formal content of centrally located
beliefs and disbeliefs.

In The Open and Closed hind, Rokeach reported a nun~
ber of studies testing the validity of his theory of Open
and closed belief-disbelief systems in terms of the co;-
nitive processes (60, pg. 169-284). These studies re-
quired subjects to accomplish a variety of problem-solving
tasks, many of them patterned after the Denny Doodlebug
Problem devised by M. R. Denny in 1945. In general, the
problem and its many variations required the formation of
new beliefs and the alteration of existing systems.
Rokeach hypothesized that “the more closed a person's
belief system, as measured by the Dogmatism Scale, the
more resistance he will put up to forming new belief
systems" (60, p. 161).

The validationel studies provided evidence in sup~
port of Rokeach's construct of general dogmatic thought
as epyosed to rigidity i.e., the hypotheses that rela-
tively closed individuals were more resistant to chanyes
in beliefs, had more difficulty in integrating new infor-
mation and beliefs into their existing beliefadisbelief

system, hgd more difficulty in remembering new information

16
and beliefs, were more dependent upon authority, end ex-
hibited greater isolation of peripheral beliefs. These
and other studies conducted by Hokeech and his associates
all served to support the validity of his conceptualizations
of the nature of belief~disbelief systems and the differen-
tial characteristics of Open and closed systems.

In this study, it was attemnted to test and validate
a portion of Rokeech's theory which has not, to date, been
empirically tested; namely, the fundamental differentiation
he makes in the nature of Open end closed minds—-the abil-
ity to distinguish between and evaluate independently the
substantive content of a message and the source of that
messsse.

In Rokeech's terms

"The more Open one's belief system, the more should
evaluating and acting upon information proceed inc pendent-
13 on its own merits, . ¢ . .

"Conversely, the were closed the belief system, the
more difficult should it be to distinguish between infer»
mstion received about the world and information received
about the source.

"The two aspects of communication are indistinguisha
able to the closed system, but distinguishable to the Open

system" (60. pp. 58~59).

 

vheoretic Hypothesis
he theoretic hypothesis uncerlying this study was:
The more Open an individual's belief-disbelief system, the

greater should be his ability to differentiate between

17
the substentive content of a message and information about
the message source; end the more should evaluation and
action upon the content, and evaluation nn* acceptance of
the source, proceed independently upon the respective
merits of each.

Conversely, the more closed an individual's belief-
disbelief system, the less should be his ability to dif-
ferentiate between informational content of a message and
information about the source with evaluation and action
on each proceeding upon their aggregate and interacting
merits.

The theoretic hypothesis was Operationalised in the
following manner: Given individuals indicating their
personal evaluative Judgments of the substantive content
of a series of statements and of the statement sources,
utilizing a series of Semantic Differential scales (4?);

The average distance (2) between concept points
representing for the individual the connotative meaning
of the substantive content of a statement and of the source
within that individual's semantic space, as determined by
his evaluative Judgments of each and reflected by his res-
ponses to a series of Semantic Differential scales, will
be greater for Openminded individuals than for closedminded
individuals; the extent of Open~ or closedmindedness
being measured by the individual's score on the Rokesch
Degmatism Scale, (1.6. 38).?32).

Rationale

 

In Rokeach's conceptualization, all information re-

ceived by an individual must be processed or coded in such

18
a wey that it may either be rejected or fitted into the
individusl‘s belief-disbelief system. He conceives of
this processing-coding activity as the process of think-
ing and suggests that it is within the Context of beliefs
and disbeliefs that thinking or cognitive activity takes
place (60, pp. 47-49).

Although not certain of how this process proceeds,
he suggested that new information is first screened for
compatibility with existing primitive or basic beliefs.

If not rejected through the process of cosnitive narrowing,
the new information is transmitted from the central re-
gion to the intermediate region of the belief-disbelief
system. If not rejected as incompatible with the individ-
ual's beliefs about the nature of authority, the informe~
tion is subsequently communicated to the peripheral region
where it becomes represented as a nonprinitive belief or
disbelief.

The extent and manner in which new information is
fitted into the belief~disbelief system depends upon the
degree to which the svstem is Open or closed. In Rokesch's
conceptualization;

"it the closed extreme, it is the new information

hat must be tempered with~~by throwing it out, altering
it, or containing it within isolated bounds. In this
way, the belief-disbelief system is left intact. At the
cpen extreme, it is the other way around: how information
is assimilated gs is end, in the hard process of reconciling

it with other beliefs, communicates with other :eripherel

‘

13

33 131133 inLc: ‘33; Lo bol= i3f3, thereby producing ’genuin3
(3:3 Cantrzizistud with '3 Lair-11.413) 63:51:21 '03 in L313 Mingle
belief-313bclief 333 Lem" (SO, p. 30}.

13keacn 3V*133336 th t $33 3:313 cLaracL 3112t13 de-
fining the exti3nt 33 wLich 3n inuiviu3Ll'3 belief—Li"uoLlcf
syatefi’s is 0;: :en 031‘ 3103311 13 "L113 331L331; to 1511131"; the 3231.“-
son can r3ceive, evaluLLQ, 333 act on r lcvan’ inzoLmLtLon
received $333 the 3333ir23 on its own inLrinaic 33riL3, un~
3333333233 by irxelevant factors in the situatiun £333
within the :13333n or fr33 the out2133" (56, p. 5?).

Placing his fundamental distinction in a 333333i33~

Lion context, it 13 the 33?: .t to which an individual can

{7;

H3 in nigh betweer *nLLPLLLion cont 333.3 in a m'w 3:53 and
11331.33133 uaLuL the 33urca of the 3333353 333 QVLlunte
each upon 1L3 own muriLs.

This atufiy was conceived in an atLempt to provide
empirical evidence 3? the validity of that distinction-
The study was 3333313333 in an effort L3 ascertain whether
or not Open and; 033d individuals do, in fact, differ in
their r313tive ability to dilic: ant is :te betx:eon information
and 33u330.

The vaxi3ua aource pi»3ti;3 and creaibility atudies,
and, to some 335333, ‘33 c3gnitive “HLLhce “£3313 re in~
t3r33t33 wnly in the 311ch of u 33L1rce u; on LL1 33“"‘11—

cutca'a uLJLLnt 333 LCL3“Luncc 35 133333, LLLitfu, c; nu

h

C3pt3, etc. In this study, an 3tL33¢L wz3 3333 33 achiave

“-
‘

greater 3333131131131113v of tile rerults by {resting sources

‘ ‘ I. 5.“ _. fl i! a" . ,_ 0 .-‘~ . '1... fl 4, t. .33., .
333 3:3 La_333 33 refer.3;ce r31333 3V31n3L WulCh L33 r3333n-

 

20
dents were to judge new stimuli--sources and statements.
In line with the theoretic hypothesis of this study,

he influence of Open~ or closeomindedness should Ope‘ste
to approximately the some extent and in engroximstely the
some manner regardless of whether the reference point used
in evaluating the sources and statements is the message

or the source.

t was seen that, should the fundamental distinction
between Open and closed systems be supported by this study
(es well as by other similar velidstional studies), this
distinction may be useful in eXpleining and predicting
various effects of communication. It was thought that
these effects, and the phenomena producing them-vsource
credibility, persuasive appeals, reference group influ-
ences, methods and order of presentation, etc.--mey occur
in different manners and to different degrees in the cases

of Open-and closedminded individuals.

CHAPTER II

This chapter describes the design of the study, the
questionnaire, and the sample; and discusses interviewing
procedures and controls.

Design 9£_the_5tudg

 

This study was designed to cenpsre the relative cups-
oility of Open-end closedminded individuals to differen-
tiete between a series of statements end their sources
and to evaluate each on its own merits, independently of
the other.

There were two independent variables in the study.
the first vuriehle was the individuals' QBQPCG of dogma—
tism--0pen~ or closedmindedness. This Variable was Opere-
tionelised, indexed, and munipulated through measurement
of that personality factor on the Rokeech Dogmatism Scale.
The reSpondents were differentiated, on the basis of their
dogsatisn scores, only as being oren~ or closeumindedx
The magnitude or intensity of their Open~ or closeuminded~
ness was not taken into account.

The dogmatism scores of the respondents comprising
the sample ranged from 120 to 197. The mean dogmstism
score was 138.§6 (slightly Openminded) end the standard
deviation of the scores was 19.19. In line with Rokeech's
scoring procedures (60, p. 63), a score of 1L0 was taken
as the cutting point between Open and closed respondents;
Openninded respondents having scores of 159 or less.

Table 1 shows the distribution of the respondents'

21

dogmatism scores.

Distribution of Respondents'

Dogmatism scores

(N egusls 76)

 

 

score ‘ f score f
120 - 124 2 150 - 164 5
25 ~ 129 5 165 - 169 6
130 ~ 154 4 170 - 174 8
135 - 139 5 179 - 179 8
140 ~ 144 6 180 - 184 6
145 - 149 7 185 - 159 4
150 - 194 5 190 - 194 -
135 - 159 6 195 - 1

199

 

The second independent variable was that of the refer-
ence point to be used by the respondents in judging the
statements and the sources. The reference point was oper-
etionalised and manipulated as either Source Primacy or
Message Primacy. That is, the reSpondents in one—half of
the cases used the source as a reference point (judged the
sources first) for subsequently evaluating the statements
of the source and in the other one-half of the cases, they
used the statements as the reference point (judged the
statements first) for evaluating the statement sources.

Under the theoretic hypothesis, the reference point
used by the respondents was not of primary concern; how-
ever, it was manipulated in an attempt to evaluate the
generalizability of the first independent variable‘s effect

upon the dependent variable under both Source Primacy and

23
the Messe; Primacy conditions. The assumption that the
reference point variable would not contaminate the influ-
ence of the dogmatism variable upon the dependent variable
was tested by manipulation of the reference point Variable.

The dependent variable was the relative ability of
Open and closed respondents to differentiate and evaluate
independently the statements and the statement sources.
This variable was Operationalized and measured in terms of
the reSpondents' judgments of the sources and their respecn
tive statements on the Semantic Differential scales pro-
vided to then for making their judgments.

Respondents were asked to indicate on 14 Semantic
Differential scales their feelings toward the two major
political party Presidential cnndidntes in the 1360 elec-
tion: Vice President Hixon and Senator Kennedy. Utilizing
the same 14 adjective pairs of polarized connotative mean»
ing, the respondents were also asked to Judge three state-
ments made by the two candidates in the course of the
election campaign.

The average source-statement difference in Judgment
was obtained for each respondent. This average distance
or difference between source judgments and statement Jud3~
ments was then squared, end this value was taken as the
measure of each respondent' ability to differentiate the
sources from the content of their statements and to evol-
uste them independently. In line with 'he theoretic hypo-
thesis, it was erpoctcd that the distance squared.(Q§)

scores would be greater for the openninded respondents

24
than for the closedminded respondents.

Thus, the index of the dependent veriuble was‘gi as
derived in the equation;

D29 (12,
where‘gi was the distance between the respondents' juic-
ment of the source end the statement on each of the 14
scales used to judge them. The 23 scores are additive and
may be averaged over the open- end closedminded respon-
dents and reference point conditions (47, pp. 76-124).

A pretest was conducted (Appendix A) to determine the
statements to be included in the questionnaire and the
Semantic Differential scales to be provided ‘he reSpon-
dents for judging the statements and the sources in the
study preper. Ten statements, five by each of the two
candidates, were selected from newspapers and news mega—
zines. The subject matter of these statements included
defense, domestic affairs, foreign affairs, and integra-
tion. The statements of the two sources were matched, as
nearly as possible, with regard to subject matter and pur—
pose. In the pretest, the statements were not attributed
to their sources. The respondents in the pretest were
asked to judge the resulting 12 concepts on the basis of
50 Semantic Differential adjective pairs.

They were also asked to reSpond to five items selected
from the Rokesch Dognstisn Scale, and a statement of their
political party preference was obtained.

The respondents' Semantic Differential responses were

submitted to correlation- and item-analysis with the

following results:

1. 'The list of 50 adjective pairs we 3 reduced to 14
pairs. These 14 Semantic Differential Scales were select-
ed for their polarization of the respondents' jud~ments,
their ability to difi'orcn Mi te the resyonses of Republican
and Democratic respondents, the ability to differentiate
between the statements of the two sources, and the average
distance between source and sts en Judgments on each of
the scales.

2. The series of ten statements was reduced to six,
three matching statements by the two candidates. The state-
ments were selected for their greater average distance from
their sources on the Semantic Differential scales and for
the consistency of the responses made to them by Open- and
closedminded respondents. The three remaining pairs of
statements dealt with foreign eff: ire , dm wtic ail airs,

nd integration.

'1‘ 1e {Bennie

 

The pepulation from which the sample of respondents
for the study was taken was composed of Open- and closed~
minded individuals. For the purposes of this study, the
respondents were drawn from the general pepulstion of the
City of Lansing and the surrounding township.

The resnondents were selected by means of a modified
quota sampling procedure. That is, it was predetermined
that one-half of the respondents should be Openminded;
the other one-half, closedninded. For this reason, it

was not nossible to establish an usher limit on the sample
R is

26
size. Interviewing continued until the sample was (a) 50
or more resyondents in size and (b) equally divided between
onen~ end closedninded individuals.

In addition, it was occided that the sample, as nenr~
1y as possible, should be equally distributed in terms of
age, sex, political party preference, and high, middle, or
low socio~economic status. Socio~economic status was in~
dexed on the basis of annual household income and the edu-
cational level attained by the respondent.

The criteria or political party preference and socio—
economic status were manipulated by interviewing respon-
dents residing in areas in and around the City of Lansing
which (videnced these critical characteristics. (”he
offices or the Lansing City Clerk and Treasurer and the
offices of the Lansing Township Clerk and Treasurer pro-
vided assistance in selecting areas which exhibited the
critical voting behavior and socio~econonic status charac-
teristics.)

Thus, the sample was not representative or the gen-
eral population of the City of Lansing and the immediate
area. iowever, the general pepulation is not the pepule-
tion to which it was desired to generalize the results of
this study; rather, the results were to be generalized to
the population of open— and closedninded individuals. It
was felt that the sample was representative of this pOpu-
letion inasmuch as the distribution of open and closed
respondents closely approximated the distribution of dog-

at

metism scores observed by Hokench in severe SpCCifiC

27
populations (60, pp. lleCS).

In terms of the respondents actually contacted and
interviewed, the sample is deecribed in Tables 2 end 3.
Thirty-eight Openminded respondents were interviewed, as
were a like number of closed reepcndente. The other
major breekéqwn, that of party preference, yielded 40
Republicans and 56 Democrats.

Although not or primary interest in this study, the
data collected afforded an Opportunity to examine, on the
basis of this small sample, the relationship of dogmatism
to the demagrephic variables of sex, age, income, education
socio—economic status, and political party preference.
Chi-square tests were employed to determine whether or
not the distribution of Open and closed respondents within
each of the demographic classifications differed from that
which might be eXpected by chance. Only in the case or
party preference did the distribution differ significant~
13 from chance (p<.01). The direction or the difference
suggested that Republicans tended to be more Openminded;
Democrats, more closedminded. This relationship was found
in a relatively small sample and must, therefore, be test-
ed in a larger research effort Specifically designed to
investigate the relationship of dogmatiem and party pre-
ference before any statement may be made to the effect

but Republicens are more or less 0pcn~ or closedminded

than Democrats.

h)
C9

Til BLE 2

Open and Closed Reepondente
According to
Sex, age, Income, Education,
Party Preference, en Socio~hconomic Status

 

 

Item Open Cloned ‘ATotnl
Male 16 20 38
Female 22 18 40

[V‘Q

“*Tkes than 20 4 2 6
20 — 24 l 3 4
25 - :29 4 3 7
50 - 54 6 2 8
55 ~ 59 4 6 10
40 ~ 44 5 8 ll
45 ~ 49 2 7 9
20. - 534 5 2 7
95 ~ 59 3 5 6
60 ~ 64 2 1 3
65 and over 4 l 5

Annual Income

($1,5003'

 

 

Less than 5.0 2 5 5
5.0 "' “-09 7 12 19
70 “ 8.9 6 4 10
11.0 - 12.9 6 6 12
15.0 and over 5 2 7
Education
(leuréj
Less than 8 2 3 5
8 2 6 8
9 2 2 4
10 ~ 4 4
ll - l 1
12 14 12 26
15 - - -
14 - l 1
15 ~ ~ a.
16 16 9 25
More than 16 2 - 2

TnBLE 2 - continued

 

 

 

tem _ open Clo ed Totnl
Part; Prefnronce

KepuSlicnn 2 15 40

Democratic ‘ ll 29 56
S~E Status

Eiah 17 ll 28

Riddle 12 12 24

Low 9 15 24

 

The distribution of cpen and closed reSpondents did
not differ significantly from chance in the cases of the
age (p) .99), sex (p>.50), income (p >.50), education
(p>.20), and cools-economic status (p) .50) variables.
Although no significant differences from chance were ob-
served, the direction of the differences, however small,
suggested that Opennindedness may be associated with
higher education and socio—econonic status, and that
women may be more Openminded than men. There was no sug-
gestion of any association of age or income with dogmatism.
Again, Specific stu‘" of the relationship of these vari-
ables and that of dogmatism is needed before any con-
clusions may be drawn.

Chi-square tests were also used to determine whether
or not the distribution of Republican and Democratic res~
pondents within the sex, age, income, education, and socio-
economic stetus classifications differed from chance. In
addition to the significant difference noted in the case
of Open- versus closednindedness, the only other major and

significant difference from chance was observed in the

50
TABLE 5

erublican and Democratic Respondents
According to
Sex, Age, Income, Education,
and Socio~ficononic Status

 

 

 

 

Item Republican V Democratic Total
fiale 18 18 56
Female 22 13 40
Less than

20 1 5 6
20 - 216- 2 2 4
:23 - 2*) 4 3 7
50 - 334 5 5 3
3)") - 39 7 3 10
4O - 44 6 5 11
45 - 49 6 5 9
50 ~ 54 5 4 7
55 - 59 3 3 6
60 - 64 1 2 5
$5 and

over 2 3 5

Annual Incogg

(51,0e0)
Less than
5-0 2 5 5
£900 "" 609 5 2 5
7.0 - 8.9 4 6 10
9.0 * 10.9 7 2 9
11.0 - 12.9 7 5 12
1/00 "" lite"? 6 5 9
15.0 and
OVcr 5 s 7
Education '
(Yenrsj
Less than 8 1 4 5
8 2 6 8
9 3 l 4
10 1 5 4
11 1 - 1
12 14 12 26
15 - - ~
14 - 1 1
15 - - ~
16 16 9 25
more than
16 2 - 2

\9-1
H

 

 

 

_‘_ Item its uglicsn homoerotic Total
3"44 Status
High 18 10 28
Eiddle 14 1o 24
24

Low 8 16

case of the income variable (p.<.05). The direction of
this difference suggested that individuals with higher
incomes may be partial to the Republican party; those
with lower incomes may tend to be Democrats. This is in
agreement with the findinrs of the nuns; ous investL ;ctions
of the relationship of incoe2e and polit ion 21 p: 2rty prefer»
once or affiliation.

he distribution of Republicz2n and Democratic res-
pondents did not differ significantly from chance in the
cases of the sex (p>580), age (p>.€i0), education (p>.20),
or socio—economic status (p> .10) variables. The direc—
tion of tr e differences in the cases of education and socio-
economic status would suggest, h022rever, that tilere may be
some relations hip between these variables and that of
party preference. Individuals of higher education and
socio~economic status were found, from the direction ofv
the differences in this small sample, to be Republicans,
whereas ti 1038 of loser educc tion and socio-econonic status
tended to be Dem'crsts. There ens no suggestion of any
association of the age and sex Variables with that of
party preference. Lgsin, this is in line with the find-

ings of studiw of the relationship of these variables

32
with political party affiliation.a

The Questionnaire

 

Four versions of the questionnaire were prepared.
Each version contained the names of the two major politi-
cal party -r*sioential candidates and three statements
made by each of them. The candidate's names and the state~
ments were placed at the head of pag‘s containing the 14
Semantic Differential scales to be used in Judging then.

The four versions of the questionnaire were construc~
ted as follows in an effort to minimise order and refer-
ence point effects:

One-half of the questionnaires asked the respondents
to Judge the sources f rat and then to Judge the state~
ments, attributing the statements to their respective
authors (Source Primacy condition). In the other one-
half of the questionnaires, the respondents were asked
to first judge the statements, without attribution, and
then to judge the sources, apprising the respondents as
to which of the preceding statements had been made by
that source (Message Primacy condition). It was felt
that by so alternating the source-statement order, the

strength of any influence of judgments of the source upon

subsequent Judgments of the statements, and vice-verse,

 

aYates' correction, involving subtraction in the numerator
of an absolute value /.§/, was used in computing the chin
Square values. All of the chi-square values were tested
with one degree of freedom with the exception of those
values involving the education and socio-economic status
Variables.

\M

3
might be determined and controlled.

In ad‘1tion, in one~h31£ of hie source Primacy con-
dition cues tionn1iros, the Refl>u lican Pa‘ty ca1ndifiate and
his statements were ;:reser -tcd first for cv1lu1111n, in
‘33 other one-h3lf, the Democratic candidate and his
statementa were presented first. T310 b”3*a o P3133CJ
canaition questiozu 311303 3033 31311::313 diviuca, thus
pro¢ucing £33: versicns cf the quest M01n1irc.

The rue1tio111ire 3130 includcé the 33b33v13ted
(43-ite:1, TommL)I.123311 Dogmatism $0316. ?cn items of
the nature of those in the 303333133 Scale were added in
the first draft of the questionn1irc. These itcm3 u re
intenfied to measure the respundents' abili 13 to diffier»
entiate info 33tion fram source of informaticn. However,
it w13 faund that the item3 did not tapt this ability {1
they were therefore excluaed frmm the final firaft of the
questionnaire.)

The Questionnaires 3130 included questions about 33
re1nou1nt3' a we. sex, 31nu~l h3u3ch1ld 133333, eduC3tional
level attninzd, 331111311 t;rt" preference or affili1tion,
and Fre3idential canéiéute choice. This last 33333103 333
used in conjunction with the (guestion of pz1rfiJ p10f3rence
in order to obtain a more 01 Jectivo 3013313 or the res-
pondents' political 13331333 at the time of the 1910 Presio
denti3l election campaign.

Appenéix B presents 3 313310 of the questionn1ire.

 

23121311121 “ Pm c =9 7111131
A team of interviewers was employed to conduct 'h

interviews in the homes of th 13 ro1i1ondent3. Their

34
responsibility was to explain the nature and purpose of

the study (tn study was presented to the respondents as

a ”survey of political and social attitudes"), explain the
respondent's task to him, and to answer any pertinent
questions prior to the interviewee's beginning to respond

to the questionnaire items.

Once the interviewees had begun to reSpond to the
items, the interviewers were instructed not to interpret
or eXplain any of the items.

When the respondents completed the questionnaire, the
interviewers checked them to ensure that the respondents
had not inadvertently or willfully omitted any item, answer-
ed any questions that the respondents may have asked at
that time, and thanked the respondent for his or her
coogerntion.

Controls

 

Three control measures have been previously mentioned
in passing. In the preparation of the questionnaires, the
source—statement order of presentation was alternated or
rotated so that the influence of judgments of either upon
subsequent Judgments of the other might be controlled and
taken into consideration when evaluating the effect of the
independent variable upon the dependent variable.

The order of presentation of the two candidates and
their statements was similarly rotated for the same purpose.
In addition, since the study was not interested in the
effect of Judging one statement prior to judging another,

the six statements were presented in random orders so as

35
to mininize or average any effect judgments of one stute«
wont night hove hnd uton Judgnents of subsequent state-
ments.

A second control involved the matching, as nearly es
possible, of the statements of the two ennuidetes with
regard to substantive content. By matching the statements,
it was hoped that any differential effects due to the suS*
ject matter of the statements might be controlled so as
not to confound the reletionship of tie inuependcnt and
dependent variables.

nether strenuous controls over the activity of the
interviewers were essential to prevent any possible bias-
in; of the respondents’ answers by the interviewers. The
controls exercised over the interviewers were liscussed

in the preceuing section on interviewing Procedure.

 

The manner in which the reSponuents were selected
constituted some control over the nature of the sample.
Some degree of balancing was achieved by means of quote
sampling. Within each quote group, randomization of res—
pendent selection was sought by utilizing a table of ren-
don numbers to determine which households within the voting
behavior and socio—economic status areas would be selected
for the interviews.

Controls over the interview situation were necessary
to ensure that the resyondents' answers were not biased
by other individuals or uictrecting influences within
the household. For this reason, the interviews were con~

ducted, if at all possible, away from the nucleus of

“if“

90
activity in the home and in private, preferably.
It was necessary to also control the activities of
he coders to ensure their reliability. Each question-
naire was scored by two coders other than the investigator,
and in all cases of coder disagreement the problems were
readily resolved.

The control techniques of elimination, equalization,
ran osizstion, and balancing were not seen es appropriate
for application to the independent end.dependent variables.
Both the incependent variable of Open- or closedmindness
end the responses upon which the aependent variable was
grounded are functions of a great number of extraneous

eriubles; that is, they are functions of the attitudes
and beliefs of the respondents. Insofar as attitudes
and beliefs are determined, at least in part, by the
individual's past experiences, socio~economic environ-
ment, and knowledge, such extraneous and possibly confound-
ing variables which might be associated with the inde~
pencent vuriuble-sex, ego, education, social contacts,
income, etc.--cennot properly be controlled as they are
determinants, in uncle or in part, of the independent

variable of Open- or closedmindedness.

CHiPTER III
The statistical analysis of the data obtainee in the
interviews and the conclusions derived from the analysis
are reported in this chapter.

Empirical Evidence

 

Empirical evidence supgorting or failing to support
the theoretic hypothesis was obtsined by testing the fol-
lowing statistical hypothesis:

The mean 23 scores of Openminded resyoneents do not
differ from the mean 23 scores of the closedminded res~

. 2 2
ponoents, (i.e., D0=Dc).

ienn D2 scores were computed for each of the four

test groups (openminaed, Source Primacy condition; Open-
minded, message Primacy condition; closedminded, Source
Primacy condition; and closed minded, Message Primacy con-
dition) on each of the six source—message pairs. These
scores, upon which the analysis was based, are reported
in Table 4.

”he .05 (two~teiled) level of significance was select~
ed for testing the statistical lvpothesis.

Analysis

The statistical analysis of the data consisted of
testing for differences between the Mean 23_scores of
the four groups. The techniques described by Greenhouse
end Geisser (25) for the analysis of profile data were
employed.

A simple inspection of the data indicated that the

57

38

tonne

covey» ccaaehmouau humane“ “homage“ Hb .pcosousuu eoauaHMopca noxaz neonaz HHH
.pcmsouepe .ucme
manages cwuenou unoccox “nuance” > toosue unwound swacuou coxaz agenda HH
.uceeepwpo .unoe
stamens eaveoeoe humane“ "homecou >H toueuo onaehhm caucosoc sex“: ”can“: H

”mxoaaou as
ceauaucocu one: shame oweewoacoonsom ones

 

 

 

ommm.n~ NmHm.mm mnnc.mm eusmysm smmm.am mamm.w~ memm.mm memos uses
Lemmnmoxtoousom
ooom.m~ Hmsm.o~ ansm.ma smea.sa noa~.sm mmmn.mfl nmmn.na owmmcex
. \eomOHe a
mm-.sa mnofl.efl emms.ofl ~mwm.o~ mmmn.mH memo.ma Nmmm.sfi esteem
. \coeoau o
mammrcs mnflm.fia ~mwm.mm mmmn.:m nsmm.ws oooo.mm amen.ms emammos
\cono m
:mwm.mm mamn.sm auao.cm nmma.oz Hmrm.am muna.am oooo.ma eonsom
\cono 4
acme: H> b >H HHH HH a coconut»:
mucus tandem owoemmxuoonscm \Emuuaswoa Queue

 

madam ummmwmmnooasom xam on» no
museum hack on» no eoaoom mm.ceom

: mamma

39
assumption of homogeneity of variance could not be met.
Bartlett's test of homogeneity was applied, neverthe~
less, and the resultant Q ve‘ue of 172.5d5 (p .001) was
obtained, indicating heterogeneity of the date. (It
should be noted that the Bartlett test of homogeneity is
not ngpropriste for date of this sort. It was used only
as a means of obtaining a crude measure of the hetero-
geneity of the date.)

As a result, a correction factor for heterogeneity
of variance suggested by Greenhouse and Geisser was em-

ployed. ‘heir conservative correction involves reducing

 

the degrees of freedom by a factor l/p - l (where E: in
this instance, equals the number of source-message pairs)
for the 3 tests of the source-message pairs and of the
interaction between the pairs and the independent veri-
ebles in this study (23. p. 102

In addition to testing the null hypothesis of no
difference in the mean inscores of the open and closed
groups, four additional null hypotheses were simultane-
ously tested:

1. The mean 23 scores among the six source-message
pairs are not different, (i.e. D§=D§I.D§II=D§V=D§=D§I).

2. The mean 2E scores under the Source Primacy
conditions are not different from those under the Message

2 ‘3
Primacy conditions, (i.e. DS=D§)°

5. There is no interaction between the variable of
Open- or closednindedness and that of source or message

primacy .

no

4. There is no interaction between the groups and
the source-message pairs.

The results of testing these five hypotheses are
reported in Table 5. The obtained‘g‘s listed in the
table:

1. Permit rejection of the hypothesis of no differ~
ence in the mean 23 scores of the eponninded end closed~
minded groups (p .001);

2. Fail to permit rejection of the hypothesis of
no difference in the seen 32 scores among the six source-

noose e pairs;

J

3. Fail to pernit rejection of the hypothesis of
no difference in the mean §E_scores under the Source
Primacy and message Primacy conditions;

4. Fail to permit rejection of the hypothesis of
no interaction between the variables of Open- or closed-
mindedness and of source or message primacy; and,

5. Fail to permit rejection of the hypothesis of
no interaction between the groups and the source-message
pairs.

Sessississe
From the results of statistical analysis of the

date, it was concluded that there was evinence in sup~

2
i)

port of the theoretic hypothesis. The mean scores

of the Openminded respondents were significantly dif-
ferent from those of the closedminded resooneents. As-
suming that 93 is a reliable and valid index of the de-

pendent variable, it as inferred on the basis of the

41
results of the analysis (a) that Open- and closedninded
individuals differ in their ability to differentiate be~
tween and evaluate the substantive Content and the Source
of a message and (b) that, based on the greeter‘gi scores
of the open respondents, the ability of openminded inn
dividuale to make this differentiation is greater than
that of closedminded individuals.

Each of the other null hypotheses were rejected in
the statistical analysis of the data. The mean 23 scores
did not differ eignificently between the Source Primacy
and Message Primacy conditions, nor did they differ sig-
nificantly among the six source-message pairs. Similnrly,
no interaction was observed between the variables of
degree of dogmatiom and reference point, nor between the
four groups and the source-message puirs.

Rejection of each of these hypotheses contributed
to the generalizability of the applicability of the
theoretic hypothesis. The influence of Openmindednese
or closedmindednees upon the ability to differentiate
and evaluate information and nource of information was
not contaminated by the nature of the communication.

The effect of Open» or close nindedness upon this ability
did not change significantly from one gource-meseege pair
to another, indicating the generaliznbility Of the re-
sults to communications of relatively diverse content and
intent. Similarly, the reference point utilized by the
reopondente in making the evaluations of sources and

statements flid not contaminate the effect of the infie—

42
Analysis of Variance

a
of Mean D“ scorcs of the Four Groups

 

 

Source df §gm of figusres ya D

.. . . b A.
Pairs 5 Q1 2 5122.5276 Fl 3 .7595 n.5.
GrOUps 3 Q2 - 56G91.1990 “2 = 8.9575 .601

Open/ c
Closed‘ (1) a“ a 54978.1780 «q «25.9730 .091

371 a

Source/ (1) Qq2= 1305.?570 Fq a .9010 n.s.

Message “ G

Inter~ .. A a

ACtiOn (l) Q23“ “00950 F25 “ 0091) nos.
InLLiVi"
duals 72 Q5 =152430.3253
Groups
x Pairs 15 Q4 . 3270.9fi55 F3 2 .2V52 n.s.
Indivi-
duals x

Pairs 360 q 2517’92.8520

 

TOTAL 455 $6 #535225¢7900

 

a
Following the procedures of Greenhouse and
Gsisser, the F values were computed and
tested as follows:

F a (72) Q /QV, tested with l and 72
l fif'Sa l 5

F“ a (72) ON/(B) Q”, tested with 5 and
d d a {Q 3
7C. (if 3;) Q

F. a (72 fil /? tested with 1 and 72
61 ‘gl ‘5’
df'ifio
FAQ: (72) Q4 /Q7, tested with l and 72
da df'“ *a2 ‘)
.3.

F“ a (72) Qgfi/Qj’ tested with 1 and 72 df's.

cf.

43
pendent variable upon the dependent vz rL ble. The find»
in5s were tie some re”ulcle:s of whether the source served
as a reference point for qu in; tle statements or the
state .uents we; e employed as a reference point for oval»
untin5 the sources.

Finally, none of the variables was found to be op—
crating in conjunction with another or interacting so as
to confouna the effect of Open- or closednindedneos upon
the ability to differentiate between and evaluate inde~

pendently messe5es and their sources-

 

Fj . (72) r /(5) Q5, tested with 5 end
72 df's

b a
The ce5reos of freedom for F} are 1F; wer

reduced from) F and 350, and rozn 5end 560,
by a factor 1/5 as so ested by Greenhous‘
one Geisser in order to correct ior hot ero~
5eneity of variance.in the data.

cSee Geor5 e w. Snececor, Statistical Nethods

(Ames: Iowa State Colle5e Press, 1396), pp.
254~§6 and 529~§3, for the procedure of sub~
dividing a term into independent or orthogonu
el components for the pum ose of desi5ned

co 1>erisons among the components.

C1 2311 Jul-Iii Iv

Chapter IV presents a summary of the study, dis~
cusses the results of the data analysis in light of the
major hypothesis, and su55es ts some areas for further
study.

Summer:

The present study attempted to obtain cmuiricul
evidence in support of the funéanentel distinction su5u
5ested by Rokeech end his associates between open and
closed belief-disbelief systems namely, the differential
capacity to distinguish between information and source
of information and to evaluate and set Upon each on its
intrinsic merits.

In order to test the validity of this distinction,
a series of source-mess.:5e pairs were preps ared and pre-
sented to resgondents who were asked to jud5e each source
end statement (messs5e) on the basis of 14 Semantic Dif-
ferential scales. One 5ro up of res ooncents used the
source as the reference point for subsequently evaluat-
ing the stater ents; the other group used the statements
of the source as the reference point for Jud5in5 that
source.

The distance (Q) between each respondent's judg-

ment of the source and his st: :tements on the Semantic
Differential scales was te ken as an index of his ability
to differentiate the source and the me: .se5e and to evalu-

ate each independently. In order to compare the distance

44

45
ecox es of the Openminded resriondents with those of the
closedminded respondents, and to compare the distance
scores of the respondents using the sources as reference
points with the scores of those using the statements as
reference points for subsequently jud5in5 the W tc‘ents
or the “euros s, it was nczces ssry to square the distance
scores, obtaining a distance sq nred (QB) score for each
of the res g>ondents on the six source-mes sag 3e pa ire present~
ed in the questionnaire.

Each respondent’s d05metism score-unis degree of
open- or closed.t indedness-- was me ensured by administra—
tion of the Rokench Dogmstism Scale.

0n tile basis of Roimeich's formulation, it was ex-

pected and hypothesized that the D2

scores of the Open-
minded respondents (those with low doin netism scores)
would (a) differ significantly from, and (b) be greater
than, the §E_scores of the closedminded respondents
(those with hi5h do metis m scores as measured by
Rokeech Scale). E ~.piricnl evidence in sup 0: t of this
expectation or h {)othesis wns to be taken as evidence of
the validity of Roieach's fenclnentol distinction be-
tween Open end closed minds«~the relative ability to
differentiate between and evaluate independently informa-
tion and source of information.

It was also exnected that the 93 scores of both
the Open and the closed resgondents who utilised the
sources as reference paints fer judging the statements

. a

O - I) ‘I s 2 V.
would not differ signiiicnntly from the D scores of tne

46
Open and closed respondents, respectively, who employed
the statements as a reference point for subsequently
evaluating the sources.
Inspection of the data indicated that the §3_scores
of the open reopondents were, in fact, greater than those
of the closed respondents. Comparison of the 23 scores

of the Open and closed respondents by means of analysis
2

of variance procedures provided evidence that the
scores of the Open and closed groups were significantly
different.

The 23 scores of the reference point (Source Primacy
versus Message Primacy) groups were not found to be sig-
nificantly different. Similarly, the Q3 scores of all
four groups (Openminded, Source Primacy condition; Open~
minded, Message Primacy condition; closedminded, Source
Primacy condition; and closedminded, message Primacy
condition) did not differ significantly among the six
source-message pairs.

Discussion

 

On the basis of these empirical results, it was
concluded that OpGߢ and closedninded individuals do,
in fact, differ in their relative ability to differenti~
ate between information and source of information and to
evaluate and act upon each independently of the other.
It was further concluded that openninded individuals ex~
hibit the capacity to do so to a greater degree than do
closedminded individuals.

It was also found that this relationship of Open- or

47
clos edninded cness to the abilit ' to differentiate iniorran-
tion and source of information holds re urdles s of the
reference point (source or statement) utilised by the in-
dividuals in evaiuating either the source or the message
and rears rdless of the position advocated by the source
in the message.

In this manner, then, it was felt that empirical
support of the validity of the fundamental distinction
netween open and closed beliefndisbelief syst ens pro-
posed by Rosesch was obtained in a m‘re or less everyday
Communication situation.

It was concluded, on the basis of this v lidntion
of Rokeach's proposition, that the personality predis~
position of dogmatism (in ternzs of the individual's de-
gree of open- or closednindedness) is a useful variable
in predicting the use a receiver will make of Judgments
about a source and a message before responding to the
communication. It was felt that the Opena or closed-
minds uness of the communicates is an in-portant con sidera-
tion when attempting to construct effective and efficient
communications.

Some Areas for Further Study

 

T319 di fferential cap mity of 0; cn— and clos edmind—
ed individuals to distinguish between tile substantive con-
tent and the source of a message, end to evaluate and act
upon each of then on its intrinsic merits, may have some
implications for the study of cognitive balance, source

credibility and reference group influence or pressures

48
particularly as they are related to efficient and effec~
tive communication.
Cognitive Balance

In general, cognitive imbalance or incongruity or
dissonnnce is experienced by on individual whenever he
is confronted with new cognitions, beliefs, and knowledge
which are incompatible with his existing cogniti'ns, in-
formation, etc. The presence of such incongruity hives
rise to pressures within the individual to reuuce that
incongruity. In order to resolve the incompatibility,
these pressures may lead to attempts on the part of the
individual to change the new segnitions, etc., to add
other new cognitions, etc. which tend to reinforce the
existing ones or to decrease the importance to the indivi-
duel of those which are incongruent.

In the communication situation, the receiver may
experience incongruity between his perceptions of the
source and of the mos ago. The source may be favorable
to him while the messnge is unfavorable, or the source
may be unfavorable and the message favorable. The re-
ceiver may also exocrience incongruity between his beliefs
one attituues and those advocated by the source, either
favorable or lfavorsble.

In such an event, the receiver may attempt to resolve
the incongruity by changing his cognitions of the source
or of the message, by seeking eduitionsl new information
which will reinforce his cognition of the source or of

the message content, or by decreasing the importance to

49
him of either the source or the message content.

It is suggested that open and closed individuals
may differ in the degree to which they exyerience such
in~cn5ruity between the source end the message and the
strength of their attempts to resolve the dissonance.
Inasmuch as closed individuals are less able to differ-

entiate between the source end the meson e and to evalu-

3
ate each on its own merits, they may exnerience pressures
to reduce incongruity between the source and a massage

to a greater extent than would Open individuals. Open-
minded individuals, because of their greater ability to
differentiate source and message, may be more tolerant

of any dissonance between their cognitions of the source
and of the messnge content.

Further study is needed in order to determine whether
Openninded receivers are, in fact, more tolerant than
closedminded receivers of incongruity between source and
message, and whether they experience, as a result, less
pressure to resolve the incongruity by changing their
cognitions of he source end/or message, by seeking new
information, or by decreasing the importance to them of
the source and/or the message.

Source Credibility

A great number of studies have undertaken to investi-
gate and explain the influence of source credibility upon
the sequisition and retention of materiel presented in a
message and upon initial and retained Opinion change as

a result of exposure to the message. The results of these

50

studies generally indicated that the greater the prestige,
trustworthiness, and eXpertness attributed to the source
by communicatees, the greater is the amount or the Opinion
chen3e effected by hi is “es s3e Ho si3nificcnt difference
has been found in the amount of information learned end
retained when it is presented by a hi3h credit lity source
or by ulow credibility source.

It is proposed that the influence of source credibil-
ity may Operate differentially nmon3 oyenn and closedninded
individuals. The receiver's dc3ree of opzn- or closed~
minLCQF‘"S should not affect the amount of information
that is acquired and retained from a messa3e; however,
it may be relevant to t? Le ability of both hi3h and low
credibility sources to effect Opinion change.

In the case of closed receivers, it is pos oSible that
the credibility of the Source is lnr3ely influential in
determining whether or not the receiver's Opinions will
be chen3: ed as a result of a per Hue ive cormunicetion.
Unless the messe3 e stron: 31y contradicts th -e existin3
Opinions and attituaes of the receiver (thereby creating
dissonance), a hi3h credibility source mey be hi3hly
effective in chan3in3 the Opinions of the receiver. A
low credibility source, on the other hand, may be unable
to effect such a chnn 3e.

In the case of Openminded receivers, cepeble of eval-
uatiig the source and the mes u3e content independentl),
it is su33ested t1 zet the cref.ibility or the source is not

as influential in effecting Opinion ch n3e as it is in

51
the case of closed receivers. Opinion change in the Open»
minded inuividuals may be dependent largely upon the posi~
tion advocated in the messes and the receivers' evelua~
tion of that position, independent of their evaluation of
the source and his credibility. It is possible that the
credibility of the source will only take on inportance
when the Open receiver is undecided or unable to evelunte
the position advocated by the source. In this event, high
credibility sources should be more effective than low cred-
ibility sources in bringing about opinion changes.

$everal of the source credibility studies report a
sleeoer effect in which the initial opinion change effect~
ed by a high credibility source diminishes over a period
of time and low credibility sources, over time, come to
effect Opinion changes. This has been attributed to, in
both instances, the receiver's forgetting of the Source
more rapidly than his forgetting of the message content.
It is suggested that the éiminishment of Opinion chenge
may occur only in closednirded receivers who have changed
their Opinion in response to 'he appeals of a high credi-
bility source. Here, having forgotten the source more
rapidly than the message, they may come to reject the
position advocated by the source.

In the case of closed receivers who did not change
their opinions in reoyonse to a low credibility source,
they may come to accept the position advocated by such
a source as they forget the source more rapidly than

the content of the message.

t‘

)2

It is also suggested that the sleeper effect may
not Operate at all in the case of Opennindod individuals
in that before changing their Opinion or attitude in row
Spouse to the persuasive epyesls of either a high or a
low credibility source they erduously evaluate both the
source and he position advocated end are not us greatly
dependent upon the credibility of the source in deciding
whether or not to alter their Opinion as advocated by
the source.

As with the relationship of Open- or closedminded-
mess to cognitive imbalance, further research is needed
into the relationship of Open- or closednindedness to
source credibility in the communication situation.

Reference Group Influences

heny studies have been reported which have investi~
gated the effect of reference or membership group influ-
ences and pressures upon attitude and Opinion changes in
individuals. It has been found that some individuals
readily yield to group influences toward Opinion changes
while other individuals rennin independent of the group
'nd fail to change their Opinions in response to influ—
ences from the group.

Some of the many factors which have been found to
be related.to yielding or failing to yield to reference
group influences toward Opinion change are the character
of the stimulus situation, salience and importance Of
the group to the individual, the cohesiveness of the

group, the group's capacity to reward or punish the in-

55
dividual, the magnitude of the group Opposition, the
nature of the decision to change Opinion as a result
of a group decision or that of a power minority, he
necessitv of private versus public commitment to the
new 9 sition, and a variety of individual personality
characteristics.

It is suggested that one of the more important and
influential personality predispositions which might de»
termine whether or not an individual will yield to group
influences toward Opinion or attitude cha 3e is that of
the individual's degree of Open- or closednindedness.

It is preposed that closedninded individuals may be
more responsive to group influences toward Opinion
change then are openminded individuals.

Closedminded individuals may not be as capable of
differentiating between and evaluating the nature and
implications of the desired Opinion change and the
nature and purpose of the reference group exerting pres-
sure toward such a change. If the reference group which
is advocating a change of Opinion is important or very
salient to the individual, it is possible that the indi~
vidual, failing to differentiate between the group and
the desired Opinion change as a function of a closed be—
lief-disbelief system, will more readily yield to group
pressures and exyerience an Opinion change then will an
Openninded individual who is more capable of evaluating
both the group and the desired Opinion change on their

intrinsic merits.

54

The same phenomenon may be expected with increased
cohesiveness end power of the group to reward or punish
the individual for yielding or felling to yield to refer—
ence group influences toward Opinion change.

Empirical studies designed to investigate the differ-
ential effects, if any exist as suggested here, of refer-
ence group influences upon Open- and closcdminded group
members and aspirants are needed.

Should research efforts beer out the relationships
of Open» end closedmindedness to cOgnitive imbeleice,
source credibility, and reference group influences which
were suggested here, Rokeuch‘s fundamental distinction
between Open and closed individuals-the ability to dif-
ferentiate and evaluate independently information and
source of informationu-will be a valuable addition to
the understanding of efficient and effective interpersonal

communication.

1.

3.

4.

7.

8.

9.

10.

ll.

12.

15-.

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Janis, I. L., finxiety indicos related to ausceptibil—
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519 @55'9679

 

Janis, I. L, & I’C3hbach, 8., Personality differences
""oUClutCQ with re:son31vene 2’; to fear-arou3ing com~
2""1..ic,-.tior‘..2 Q J. I) Cir-‘3. ’ 1324' 23. likl‘db.

 

Janis, I. L., & Field, P. 3., A behaviorrl aspess :nent
of ersuasir ility Cons intcncy of inuividual differ—
ences. In I. L. Janis, & C. I. Hovland (3H3.), log-

sonnlit" grd norr'ficlil11+* New H.ven: Yale Univer-
Sity 1.3.81.) 350, 11)“). p o “J“)‘f.

 

Janis, I. L., & Field, P. 3., Sex differences and
person nlity factors relate; to persua. .iuility In
I. L. Jc= nis, 3 C. I. Hoxlazd ( as.),}’er2tn31ity and
p22 mu sibilit;. Ncw H3ven: Ynle UHiVuySity P2222,
1J2). Lit 2w“UQo

 

JfiIliS: In 140' ff HOVlEsz’ Co II) PC 1‘8 “5%. 14;! EULA. 140:".

ounsibilitx. .ow Haven: Yale UnIvC131L} JICSZ, 1,29.

 

Kelley, H. H., ”we functions or reference grQUps.
In Swanf.’ on, G. L., NEJW'CUH‘b’ 4:. Ho, (:6 flarfilcy, E. L.
(Lds. ), nintiguu in 2ociul p532voL Holo . New York:
Holt, 1932. 93). 416—414;”

Kelley, H. Ho, & Volkart, E0 Ho. The reSiStance to
change of ggoup-anchored attitudes. Amer. soc. Rgv.,
1922’ 1?: 455‘465-

Kelruan, H. 0., & Hovlnrxd, C. 1., "Reinstatement" of
the communicator in delay ed measurement of Opinion
change. .i' abnorm. 30c. Psvch01., 1953. 42, $27~535.

 

Lewin, K., Group decision and social change. In
Eleanor E. Maccoby, T. H. Heweo.nb, & E. L. Hartley
(Eds.),;("n1n s in social psvohology. New York:
Holt, 193%“: "'15,??7. I”; -2

#0.

41.

42.

43.

\31

Linton, Harriet, & Grnhtm, Elaine, RorJuJu»it corre-
lotes of rerSHu ibility. In I. L. J:nie, & C. I.
Hovlnnd (1cc.), LE “‘“ lit1 and Jew V’“l ilit1. New
Niven: Y5; le Lni 1.11.3); 11:} 1.1.6.353, 1,3,1), ii). {RJ'LTLIVO

 

 

 

IckSth’ A. He, .11ch iUthOiitflI’iQ n CharaCuer StLUCtUI‘e.
it §C36| 32-;ICC..L:'1. ’ 19%;). 1;), (“31-411.

 

Merton, R. K., Patterns of influence: n study of
interpersonal influence and of comvunicntiJns be~
havior in a local community. In P. L. Lazerefelfi,
& F. N. Stanton (Id8.), Contunicotiong research,
1Q43~1?4?. New York: Har1>e;s, 1349. pp. loO—219.

 

MGl‘tOn, Ra K0, & Kitt, “lice 8;, Contributions to
tl1e t11eory of r91 erence group behavior. In G. E.
Swanson, T. I1. homeomb, and 1:1. L. Hartley (Lida-“1.),
Rc.1in*o in social oeicholofv. He ew York: Holt,
1/22.. E”). “QJU-‘4-‘rir. '

 

Newcomo, T. N., An approach to the. etudy of communi-
cative acts. Psychol. Rev., 10 5}, CO, 53 5-404.

 

Newcomb, T. R., Attitude develooncnt as a function
oi reference groups. In: leanzrr L. InccoLV. T. N.
Newcomo, & E. L. Rurtlev (hng), RC: (in n in "oci l
“P 1. MJ-h-or
n1"crolo_v. rtew Yorn: Holt 1930. pp. 20)-E73.

Osgood, C. 3.. Co n1 itive dynamics in tlxe conauct of
hLman Iaffmj-rS. :31:le C‘i*in. (114:8.rt.’ 191.90, 2’4" /“P'l"/55.

 

'egood, C. 3., Suci, G. J., & Tnnnenbaum, P. H., The
Itu0U“ewPUt of meanina. Urbane: University of I linois
lLCvJL)’ 1.127..-

 

Oegood, C. E., R Tannenboum, P. H., The principle of
contruity in the prediction of attitude chnnge.
Fs"chol. Rev.. 19)5. 62, 42-55.

Pelz, Edith 8., Discussion, decision, commitment and
consensus in "group decision". Human Lelz1t.. 1955,
8 ’ 2jl"274.

 

Rokeach, M.. Genoz elized mental rigidity as a factor
in etk1nocentrisnn‘g. abnorm . eoc. Pwvclzol., 1946,

Ro kc eack1, H., A mtthod for stu: lging individual differ-
ences in "nn ow-Pinocdne‘0". .1. Pers., 1931, 20,

s.CL.C;-’ Ii. ’ 1.3.6 J Lid
111d areifice1:ion of

1351 46, a ~91.

ic e, concretenuss of thinking,
tmm11n 'g. abnorm. eoc. Fnychol.,

 

 

 

54-

\fi
U?
I

59.

60.

61.

62.

59

Rokoach, M., "fiaflrow-ninccnno""" and personality.

£0 F‘GI‘S Q ’ 19')1. (3&1, 25%£.310

Rokcach, M., Toward the scientific evaluation of
social attitudes and ideologies. g, Fsvcholc, 1931,
51’ 97-104.

Rokench, N., DOgmntism and opinionntion of the left
end on the right. 5352. qucnolo ist, 1933, 7,
510*511.

 

Rokeach, H., Attitude as a deters innnt of distor~

tions in Irccall. g, at zorm. soc. Pfijchol., 19)“,

 

Zokeach, M., The nature and meaning of dogmatiom.
“c‘chol. E?cv., 1954, 61,194~;O#.

Rokcnch, N., Political 1d religious dogmatism: An
alternative to the authoritarian personality.
Psychol. fiono;;., 1996, 70:1d.

Rokonch, F., 0n the unity of thought and belief.
J. ‘~.‘.,I€‘1‘ 19J6’ 2), (.24.;250.

Rokench, M., The Opel angc ”lo ed 11nd. New York:
Basic Books, 1990.

 

 

Rokcach, M., & Balash A., A scale for measuring
intellectual conviction. ‘g. soc. Psychol., 1996,
44) 155-1410

 

Rokcach, m., & brucizte1,:.;., A factorial study of
dogmatism and related concepts. g, abno1.u. soc.

PSYChOlQ’ lgjfi, 65’ 556*3QO:

Hokench, M., HoGovnoy, w. 0., & Denny, M. R., A
distinction between dogmatic and rigid thinking.

i. mono m. soc. Psychol.. 1935. 61. 87-95-

Rosenbcrg, M. Jo. A stru.ct urnl theory of attitufie
change. Publ. 9:13, (ugrt M,, 1900 24’ 513-540.

 

Szmnofi', 1., Inclwiiiccation with the 81 ~. run 301‘:

1-1%.4

Some personality corr elatcs oi anti-senitism ans:

35"8- 51- “Perm. 1:391. «:u. 19‘3~21z;3.

Sheiif, H., Group influences Upon the formation of
norzxs and httltufieuo Socio col“, 1957, l, 90~)o.

 

Smith, fl. 3., Brunor, J. 8., & White, a. w., Opinionq

 

and nerv' {Ulitn' New York: Wiley, 1936.

 

Snedocor, G. w., 31 tistical method.3. Amos: Iowa
Sta t8 0011658 lrevu, lJ/U.

 

69.

70.

71-

60

a“

Trueblood, D 3., The 13*1 of b lief. New York:
a . .

Keiss, w., & Fine, B. J., Ofiir ion Chan-e as a function
of some iatrugczsonhl utbri bunes of tie cQflmunicatees.
g... '7‘."31="J.1.'"‘Z. 21TTCol’7S"C?"log 135'): )1: “-143“ ”Lu/’3'.

 

Weiss, u., a Fine, 3. J., :he efject of induced hgfifluv-
sivenez s on Opinion Chan 0. 3g. nbnugy. sac. P;ych:l.,
1'355’ 52, lOJLllr.

Enjonc, R. 3., The conce3ts cf balance, con ruity,
and aissonance. Publ. 01n.fiunrt., 1959, 24,
:1 (30—2 jU o

 

‘ qmv... « -‘. -oq‘ aft 1.: ‘
3‘ , L , ’ , . .2 3 .
.‘n-J & ‘-.$~I*4‘ 21

The Pretest of Concepts

and semantic Differential scales

A protest was conducted for the following puryoses:

1; To select from a list of 30 adjective pairs a
list of ten to fifteen such pairs to be use& in the study,
The adjective pairs or Semantic Differential scales were
to be used by the respondents in evaluating the candidates
and the statements mass by them;

2, To select from a series of statements made by
the two candidates (five by each of them) a lesser number
of statements, perfercbly three by each of the candidates.
The statements selected for use in the study were to be
matched, as nearly as pessible, with respect to subject
matter and source intent,

(In addition to the two Presidential cancidatos and
the ten statements, the two Vice Presidential candidates
and the two major political parties were utilized as con~
cepts in the pretest.)

The 30 adjective pairs retested were:
P

optimistic ~ pessimistic
resgonsible - irresponsible
interesting - boring
strong - weak
meaningful - meaningless
honest « dishonest
impulsive ~ deliberate
near "' far
friendly - unfriendly
relaxed - tense
active - passive
severe - lenient
500d - bud
Valuable ~ worthless
61

complex
potent
plensnnt
fair
emotional
breve
clear
motivated
deep

safe
accurate
difficult
wide
biased
prohioitive

'l I I! I {l I ll 1 I C\
R)

Simple
impotent
unpleasant
unfair
unemotionel
cowardly
has1
aimless
shallow
dangerous
inaccurate
easy
narrow
unbiased
permissive

These Semantic Differential scales were presented to

the respondents, together with instructions for their use.

The concepts to be evaluated, using these scales, were

tyged on cards and presented to the respondents one at a

time.

In addition to the candidates and the political

parties, the concepts evaluated were:

Nixon statements:

 

l.

"Th0 United Stfltds 15’

-nd will under prayer

leadership remain, the strongest nation militarily,

economically and morally in the world."

2. "we hold shove everything else, whether in the

field of foreign policy or domestic policy, the

rights of the individual.“

5. "If the Russians doubt our will to carry OUt

our commitments to resist aggression anywhere in

the

world, and again resort to arms, they are in

for a terrific surprise.“

4.

tile

"we believe in an aggressive action to remove

remaining VQStiQGS of segregation or discrimi-

nation in all areas of national life."

65
5. "This couzltry and ite nllios will not be deflec-
ted by Soviet threats from armind with ballistic mie~
31103 or taking an; 0 her join t d Wf nzoive nr‘ ' es."

. ‘ * - 3 ' . 9 9n
Renate; state. 1:111:53:

 

l. "The choice lies not merely between two men or

two p:1rtioe a, but between public intem at end private

Comfort, between national wetnec a eno no tional den

Cline, between pro, rees and ‘nornnlcy,' between

dedication and mediocrity.

2. "The essential goal of foreign policy is an en-

during peace in whio the univereal values of human

dignity, truth and Ju:stice under law are finally
secured for all men everywhere."

3. "We will use all the will, power, resources and

energy at our conmnnd to re: gist the further encroach-

ment of Communism on frBGGOE-*\a. nether at Berlin,

Formosa, or new points of pressure."

4. "The time has Come to assure equal access for

all Americans to all areas of community living, in~

cluding voting booths, schoolrooms, Jobs, housing
and public facilities."

5. "We must make invulnerable a nuclear retaliatory

force second to none."

These mt tements we re selected from the many state-
ments made by both candida tee and reported in the national
press. In the on so of both candid ates, the first etete-
nent deals wit} domestic policy; tie second with forei;

policy; tge fourth with integration; and tee third and

fifth with defense.

Ten respondents, six Republicans and four Democrats,
Judged the 16 concepts on the 50 Semantic Differential
scales. or the ten, only nine of the respondents' evalu-
ations were usable, as one individual, a Republican, fail~
ed to follow instructions.

Correlation and item analysis of the respondents'
evaluations resulted in be following:

1. The list of 30 adjective pairs was reduced to
14 pairs. The scales were selected for their polarization,
their ability to differentiate between the responses of
Democrats and Republicans, their ability to differentiate
between the Nixon and Kennedy statements, and the average
distance between source and statement on each of the
scales.

The 14 adjective pairs chosen for use in the study
were:

Evaluative dimension

 

 

 

good - bad
clear ~ hazy
responsible ~ irresnonsible
relaxed - tense
fair - unfair
pleasant - unpleasant
Activity dimension
active ~ passive
impulsive - deliberate
emotional - unemotional
motivated - aimless
interesting - uninteresting
Potency dimension
strong ~ weak
severe ~ lenient

65
brave - cowardly

The connotative loadings of each group of scales
is indicated by the dimension beneath which it was placed
above. However, none of these pairs was considered pure;
all have some degree of loading in dimensions other than
that under which they are grouped.

2. The series of ten statements was reduced to six,
three matching statements by the two candidates. The
statements selected for use in the study were those deal-
ing with domestic affairs, foreign affairs, and integra-
tion. They were selected for their greater average dis«
tance from the source in semantic space (as reflected by
the resyonses of the bretest resnondents) and for the
consistency of responses by cpen- end closedminded res-
pondents; that is, Openminded respondents agreed in their
evaluations and closedninded respon ents agreed in their
responses.

In order to make the latter decision, it was necessary
to obtain a crude measure or the pretest respondents' de~
gree of Open- or closedmindedness. Five items were used
from the Rokench Degnstisn Scale for this purpose:

1. "Even though freedom of speech for all groups
is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to
restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

2. "Once I get wound up in a heated discussion, I
just can‘t stop.”

3. "most of the ideas which get printed nowadsys

aren't worth the paper they are printed on."

66

4. ”In this complicated world of cure, the only
way we can know what's going on ie to rely on leaders or
experts who can be trusted."

5. "Unfortunately, a good many peeple with whom I
have discussed important social and moral problems don't
really understand what's going on."

These items were selected from the eO-item form of
the Dogmatiem Scale because they seem to deal primarily
with the communication process or situation.

The pretest also provided eome additional finaings
pertinent to the stud":

1. With this small group of respondents, the basic
hypothesis of the study was borne out in that openminded
)0noente were bott~r able to differentiate between
the source and the stetemoits than were the closedmindod
reepondents.

2. The closedminded reapondents tended to rely more
upon the evaluative scales in making their judgments.
Their judgmente on these scales were more polarized than
on the potency and activity scales. In addition, the
closed respondents revealed a slightly greater tenaoncy
to polarize the entire schedule of scales than did the

openmindcd respondents.

a33uEIX B

(Sample questionnaire. In this velsion of the question-
naire, the res“oncents were required to fire t juu5e the
statements and ethen to jud5e the sour ces, usin5 the
statements 3.? 3 ref e3* once paint for jud5in5 the sources.
In the 0th er version, the respondents fi13t Jud5ed the
sources and subsequently jud5ed the state.r :ents, using
the sources 33 reference points for qu :in5: the st3' te~

meats.)

POLITICAL are 3eCIAL ATTlTUDLS

Ceee Ho:

 

Sex (check): fiale ( )
Female ( )
(interviewer)

67

 

 

This stuey is a survey of your own personal attitudes
and feelin5e about a number of political, em cisl and per-
son =1 issu es. The study is divided into two parts: the
first 13 concerned with your feelin5s about the two presi~
dentisl candidates in the comin5 election, the two me jor
political parties and a series of statements made by the
two candidates ; the second part of the study is concerned
with your thinkin5 about some important sociul and porn
sonel questions.

On the final page of this booklet are a few ques-
tions about yourself, the one we; 3 to these questions
will aid in the evaluation of your responses to the items
in the survey.

At the outset of each of the two ports of the sur~
vey are instructions which outline what you are to do in
each part. If the instructions are not clear to you,
ask any questions about them that you desire. It is
essential that you fully understand what you are to do
in each part of the survey.

Your res pone es to the ite...s in this survey will be
held in the strictest confluence. Your adores s is re-
cordee only so that we may identify the eocio~cultural
environment of resyondents. You will not be asked to
5ive any additional information which will in any way
identify you in the evaluation of your res: onsce.

The instructions for Part I of the survey are on the

RBXt pn5e.

69

Port I Case No:

The purpose of this port of the study is to escer~
thin the Eflfihiflgé to you of a number of statements made
by the presidential candidates of the two major politi-
cal parties. This port is also concerned with your per»
sonnl feelings about the two candidates and the Democratic
and Reyublican parties.

You are to judge each statement, the cundidhtes end
“he pnrties against a series of descriptive scales.
Please make your judgments on the basis of what each
means to. Lu.

On the followinr pages you will find the statements,
the candidates and the parties to be judged. Beneath
each are a set of scales. You ere to rate the statements,
candidates and parties on each of the scales in order.

Zero is how you are to use the scales:

If your feeling about the statement, candidate or
party at the top of the page is very closely related to
one end of the scale, place your check-mark as follows:

fair X z a 8 t x : : unfair

mm M
01‘

fair 2 x s t x a X unfair

M

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

If your feeling about the statement, candidate or
party is Quite closely rclntcd to one or the other end
of the scale (but not extronely releted), place your chece~
merk as follows:

 

 

strong : X s :7 z t a : weak
or
strone : x x z x X z : week
“M M m

 

 

If the statement, candidate or party seems only slight—
l‘ to one end of the scale as cpgosed to the other end
'(%ut is not really neutral), then place your check~msrk as
follows:
active,___: : X ,x t

01'

active : x : 2 X x :» passive

. passive

 

Wm

 

 

 

 

 

Obviously, the direction toward which you place your
checkumark depends upon which of the two ends of the scale
seem to vou most characteristic of the statement, candid-
ate or pttty which you are judging.

 

emu-h All?"

. A?“ 1" '13.]

 

70

Case No:

If you consider the statement, candidate or party to
be neutral on tile scale, both sides of the scale eruell“
ass eecieted with the statement, candidate or part y, or i
the scale is congletely ir elevnnt or unrelated to the

statement, candiénte or perty, place your check-mark in the
middle Space:

 

safe : 2 z X s

z : dangerous
mmmmmmm

IFEI’UginaI-i 'I' t

(l) Plzce your check-marks in tie :niddle of

th
s»nces, not on the boundaries:

(9

 

: X : _: : I :

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(2) Be sure to check every scale for every state-
ment, candidate or party —-Igg not pmit anz scale.

(3) Never put more than one checknmerk on a single
scale.

Sometimes you may feel the t you have had the same
item before on the test. This will not be the case, so
‘gg net look back and ferth through the items. Do not try
to remember flew you checked similar items earlier in the

test. “(re each itc m e separe te and incependent dud wrent.

work at a iairly regid Speeu tnrcu h thi3 part; do not
worry or puzzle over individual items. It is your first
impressicns, the immediate "ieelinrs" about the statements,
candidates and parties, that are sought. On the other

hand, please do not be careless, as your true impressions
r feelings are important.

Now please turn the page and begin marking each scale
on the basis of your prsonul judgment of the candidate,
statement or party.

71

"We hold above everything else, whether in the field

of foreign policy or domestic policy, the rights of the

individual."

emotional
strvng
clear
aimlesa
good
brave
relaxed
unfair
active
pleas-$31.1;
impulsive
severe
responsible

interesting

wmmmmmm

C

unematianal
weak

hazy
motLVated
bad
cowardly
tense

fair
peasive

1111:: 1 e a: .5; an ‘
delibereto
lenient
irreSponsible

uninteresting

72

"The essential goal of foreign policy is

an endur~

ing peace in which the universal values of human dignity,

truth and justice uncer law are finally secured for all

men evonywhcre."

emotional : : : :

 

brave
relaxed : : : z z :
unfair : z :
active f x : t : 3 :
pleasant
impulsive : z : z :
severe

responsible 3

I

interesting

0
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unemotional
weak

hazy
motivated
bad
cowardly
tense

fair
passive
unpleasant
deliberate
lenient
irresponsible

uninteresting

73

"The choice lies not between two men or two parties,

but between the public interest and private comfort, be~

tween national greatness and national decline, between

progress and ’normelcy,‘ between dedication and medio-

crity."

emotional
strong
clear

aimless

pl

0

d

breve
relaxed
unfair
active
pleasant
impulsive
seVere
responsible

interesting

a
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unemotionel
weak

hazy
motivated
bad
cowardly
tense

fair
passive
unpleasant
deliberate
lenient
irresponsible

uninteresting

74

"The United fitntes is, and uneer preger lent rehip
will remain, the strongest nntlon militarily, ecenemicnl-

ly and navally in the world."

emotional : x : z : : amateuionnl

 

D:‘ '. . . ‘l

:3 \-l (J: a 3 3 3 h'evniu
“ .._... __ _ W M W W

clear a : a x : : haxy

aimless 3 z x I x : mo;ivated

gmod : : s _: t : ad

 

brave : I 2 I I : cowardly

. 4‘.
relaxed : : tense
o “v . rt» o o o o 0 7"} ' VA
MnLLlLJ-g o I o a a ”gal-L

”mm-”mm“

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p.

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nevu:e : t z : : : lcnlunt

 

 

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lsepnn.lale : z a : : : irrnnnnnnltle
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in .4; -.

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aimless
500d
brave
relaxed
unfair
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ylensant
impulsive
severe
reaponeibla

interesting

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unenotionnl
weak

hazy
motiVeted
b :10.
Cz'm'nrdly
tense

.f air
passive
ungleasant
fieliberata
lenient
irrengonaible

uninteresting

76

"The time has come to assure equal access for all
Americans to all areas of community life, including voting

booths, schooleroons, jobs, housing nnfi public facilities."

emotional : : ,: z : : unemotional

strong a z : s x 3 weak

clear : 2 t s z : hazy
aimless : x c z a z i motivated

good : x z x z 3 bed

breve : x : z s x cowardly
relaxed to z x a x x tense
unfair : e I 3 a 2 fair

mmmmwmm

active : t : x z 1 passive

mmmmmwm

pleasant unpleasant

mmmmmmm

impulsive deliberate

O
O.
O.

fi

severe : x z a I : lenient

“mmwmwm

responsible : t a a x : irresponsible

mmmmmwm

uninteresting

O.

interesting : x z : :

MMMMMWM

These

77

stetesents were made by Vice President Nixon:

 

 

 

"The United States is, and under proper leadership
will remain, the strongest notion militarily, economically
and morally in the world."

"We hold above everything else, whether in the field
of foreign policy or domestic policy, the rights of the
individual."

"we believe in an aggressive action to remove the
remaining vestiges of segregation or discrimination in
all areas of national life."

Now make your judgment of VICE PRESIDENT RICHARD M.
NIXON on the basis of the scales below:

emotional
strong
clear
aimless
good
breve
relaxed
unfair
active
pleasant
impulsive
severe
responsible

interesting

I
M W M m m m

“mm-“mm”

“mmmmmm

mmm*wmm

*mwww-“m

nemotionsl

week

motivated
bad

cowardly
tense

fair

passive
unpleasant
deliberate
lenient
irresponsible

uninteresting

73

These stntements were made by Senator Kennedy:

 

"The choice lies not between two men or two parties,
but between the public interest and private comfort, be»
tween national greatness and national decline, between
progress and 'normslcy,' between dedication and medio—
crity."

"The essential goal of foreign policy is an enduring
peace in which the universal values of human dignity,
truth and Justice under lsw are finally secured for all
men everywhere."

”The time has come to assure equal access for all
Americans to all areas of community life, including voting
booths, schoolrooms, jobs, housing and public facilities."

Now make your judgment of SENATOR JOHfi F. KEEKLDY
on the basis of the scales below:

emotional : z z z I : unenotionel

“mm-”WWW“

strong 3 z x x : : week

clear 2 s 2 a z : hazy

“MMWWMM

aimless : I z t I a motivated

good 8 x a I a 3 bed
breve : s x z z : cowardly
relaxed : x x s x z tense
unfair : 3 2 s s 3 fair
active : x I t I : passive
pleasant t t s t z : unpleasant

impulsive 2 x x x t a deliberate

severe : t a : z x lenient

“mmwmwm

responsible : z z a a : irresponsible

interesting 8 x x t z : uninteresting

79
Part II Case No:

The statements on the followin“ poi; es are concerned
with how you think and feel about a number of in iporqant
social end personal questions. The best res/ones to each
of the statements is your ovnypers3nnl ooinion. Men; dif~
ferent and Opposing points of view are re3resented in the
statements; you may find yourself agreein5 stron5ly with
some of the statements, disn*roein~ just as stron5ly with
others and perhaps unce tnin about still others. Whether
you s5ree or eisn'ree with any statement, you can to sure
thst In any other people feel the sane we y as you do.

 

You are to mark each statement in the s 3:nce provided
ecoordin; to how much you n5ree or 015””“Ce with it.
Ztleese mark every one of the souteaonus. Write +1, +2,
+5, or -1, -2, «j in the space nrovided, dep ndin5 upon
how you feel amt ut 9: ch stuteno t. Remember, your person~
ngooinion is im3ortsnt.

err

he:

+1: I Au.ln A illlL” ~13 I DIS ;"Ijn A LITTLE

+2: I ..LJRiE UN 'i'xi...’ 1.1101413 ~28 I LLQJtUuJ.«B on 5333.3 #110 '7‘
+5: I AGnEE ViRY HUGH '~3: I LISAGJQE VERY MUCH

Bxannle
If the statement were:

"The principles I have come to believe in
are quite different from those believed in by
most people,"
and you feel that you AGQLs on sun smelt with the
statement, you would mark the statement +2 in the space
provided to the left of it.

INPUfiTnNT: The same cautions 5iven in the preceding
port of the study are applicable in this part. 39 sure to
mark each statement --.93 not omit any,

 

   

711‘. F‘ $13G}? iffefic 3-113, althou h} HIE-13:; feel that
you have luzd tn sane s-nvcicnu earlier0 in tile series.

Try not to rene :ber how you m:m rl2ed eerlie statements.
V72} L: i: ’ ‘ ' - 55hr“ 2'.- '~ ‘1“."V‘ O
sorfi « ' niriy rapid.sp the series Oi
statements; it is your first inoressions that are sou5ht.
On the other hand, work carefully as your true personal
Opinions are important.

    
  

 
   

J

   

Now plea ass turn the page and mark each statement on
the basis of how much you per :zonslly s5ree or disa5ree
with the statement.

Keg Case Ho:
+1: I AGL? 3 A LITTLE ~13 I DISAGREBA LITTL,
+2: I AG' {4.31.} (JET T11}. 96H(;LE "'2' I I)I~)1\‘JLLJJ¢J C.“ 112.1 fillULE
+5: I AGP‘E VERY MUCH ~53 I Dishonor VLRY MUCH

l. The United States and Russia have just about
nothin5 in common.

2. Man on his own is a help (333 and miserable
creature.

5. Once I get wound up in a hosted discussion I
just can't stop.

4. Even thou5h freedom of speech is a worthwhile
5osl, it is unfortunately necesSsry to restrict
the freedom of certain political rou"s.

5. In the history of mankind there have probably been
just a handful of really great thinkers

6. While I don't like to admit this even to myself,
my secret ambition is to become a great man.

7. In times like these, a person must be pretty
selfish if he considers primarily his own
happiness.

8. It is better to be a deed hero than to be a
live coward. -

9. A person who 5ets enthusiastic about too many
csus es is likely to be a pretty "wish~was hy"
sort of person.

10. The present is all too full of unhappiness. It
is only the future that counts.

11. Host of the ideas which get printed nowadays
aren’t worth the paper they are printed on.

12. The worst crime a person could commit is to
attack publicly the people who beleve in the
some thing he does.

15. host peOple just don't know what’s good for
them.

14. There is so much to be done and so little time

t0 do it in.

+1:
+2!
+5:

FfiF4F1

IS A

AG :
3,3 LN lip uhtLE -2:

O

C

JmKI
15 gJLitlfi—l Via-7': .5

..T 1

I; ..mhu A LI$TLE
I J:\ UJ‘ Li- .L’A UN 7:11;... HiiUlJE
T T” VZXZY L.UCH{

1-“ JUNJ'TL‘Cl-II 5¢-J“

HIJTIJ‘. “‘1 I I
I 1
~ 1! I -

rjti/‘II

 

F’
@
O

17.

1.13.

In a discussion I often fine it necessary to
rope t my self seVLrsl times to mane sure I
am being unuerstood.

she noes not believe in
really lived.

A men
not

great Cuuse

QDEQ

ha;

The hiQhE t form of 5overzmont is a der
and the hi5host Iorm of democracy is a
sent run by those who ore most intelli5ent.

nocrscy

.or 1 P ~— 1n
c)\.: {Ti-L.;‘-

It is only unturnl thht a person would have a
much better sequsintnnce with ideas he oelieves
in thun with ioeas he cpgoses.

Host people just don't 5ive a "dawn" for others.

The "lain thil5 in life is for a person to
want to do some thinr important.

then it comes to differences of Opinion in
reli5ion we must be careful not to compromise
with those who believe differently from the way
we do.

There are a number of people I have cone to hate
because of the things they stand for.

To Compromise with our political op onents is
don5erous because it usually lends to betrayal
of our own sine.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly
refuses to admit he's wrong.

In the long run the best way to live is to
pics friends and associates whose tastes and
beliefs are the same as one's own.

It is often desirable to reserve Judgment
about what's going on until one has had a
chance to hour the Opinions of those one
respects.

If a man is to accomplis his mission in life

it is neces sury to 53Uole "ell or nothin5 at all"

Ke‘
+1: I .GRLE A LITTLE —l: I DISAGJLE A LIT'l LE
+2: I AGREE LN Th3 WEOLE ~2: I LIJLGKLE LL 1hn "noLs
+5: I n‘nns VERY HLCH ~52 I DISAGRLE V351 LUCK

“but“..“mm“u“mmamnmmumfi-m-“wmm“wmnm

is. A person who thinls orimxrily of his own hap—
piness is beneath conte pt.

2~. A 5roup wk ich tolert ites too much differs encce of
opinion enon5 its oun members cannot e.w :ist for
long.

30. It is only w on a person devotes himself to an
ideal or czzuse tr at life beco es near in5ful.

51. If 5iven a chance I would do something of 5reet
benefit to the world.

52. In times like these it is often necessary to be
more on 5uord a5ainst ideas put out by people or
5roups in one' s own camp than by those in the
op,osin5 comp.

In a heated discussion I 5enerelly become so
sosorbed in what I an goin5 to say that I f0r~
5get to listen to what the others are sayin5.

\N
\d
O

54. Of all the different ph110503h163 which exist in
this world there is probably only one which is
correct.

55. There are two kinds of people in this world
those who are for truth and those who are
{lgjflinilt the tr Lit-.1.

56. In this complicated world of ours the only we‘
we can know what's going on is to rely on lead-
ers or eXperts who can be trusted.

57. Unfortunately 500d mwxn peo le with whom I
have disCussed iraportsnt socia and moral pro-
blems don't resllv understand what's 5oin5 on.

go. Fund mentally, the world we live in is a pretty
lone:~;one ylnce.

59. It is only noturel for a person to be rather
fearful of the future.

40. I'd like it if I could find someone who w ould
tell me how to solve my personal problems.

83
Part III Case fio:

In order that we nay properly evaluate your resyonses
in the prececing two sections, some iniornetion about {32
is neeued. Please answer the questions below as accurate-
ly as you can.

Age (check aypropriate Lox):
Loos tLon 20 ( ) 45 through 49 E )
20 through 24 ( 3 )0 tHEOUQh 54
25 through 29 2 55 through 99 E
50 through 5% ) 60 through 64
55 ~hrouggh 59 2 g 65 and over ( )
40 through 44

Last year of school completed (circle):
Less than 8 8 9 10 ll 12 l} 14 15 1o over 16
Approiimate annual household income (check):

Less than $5,000 ( g
$5,0ou throu5h 34,999

3),OOO through $6,999

$2,0c0 through te,939

%C,OUO through filo,y}9 ( )
311,000 thrcu;h £12,953 g
$15,00o through 314,999
$15,0LU or more

who did you vote for in the last Presidential election
(check)?

Dwight D. Eisenhower (Republican)
Adlai E. Stevenson (Democrat)

Other

Did not vote (

Who do you think should Qg_the next President of the
United btetes (check)?

 

John F. Kennedy (Democrat) ( ;
Richard M. Nixon (Republican) (
Undecided ( )

Who do you think will 33 our next President (check)?

 

John F. Kennedy (Democrat)
Richard M. fiixon (Regublicen)
Don't know

Thank you for your petiezce and your fine coo? ration.

R0833! USE GEES, ‘

W

.._...q. A nu.‘~\ - .. )‘ W" ._,
" m ’ ‘
MM. \ ‘ .._-

 

"lilllllllflllwill“