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A CRITIQUE or SOME Assumpnous A'P‘PAAEATLII .
UNDERLYING SOClA-L SCIENTIHC ANALYSIS -
WITH PARTICULAR RAFERENCE T0 THE FIELD

' or CRIMIAAI. JusIICE

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MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
WAYNE: B- HANLWTCZ A A
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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

A CRITIQUE OF SOME ASSUMPTIONS APPARENTLY UNDERLYING
SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS, WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO THE FIELD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

by Wayne B. Hanewicz

The relative success of experimental research in the
physical and natural sciences seems to have stimulated
similar methodological endeavor in the social sciences.
That is, there is an attempt to utilize those methods which
have been, and are now being, utilized in the former aca-
demic disciplines. There remain, however, a number of
questions concerning the nature of these methods, which
questions appear to be even more complex within the context
of social phenomenon. Indeed, some relatively recent exper-
imental results appear to lend credence to philosophical
doctrines, both contemporary and non—contemporary, which
suggest that some of these methods may have limited utility
in reaching a thorough understanding of a social reality
apart from the one in which the researcher finds himself.

Closely related to these basic issues, and a major
theme of this thesis, is the question of concept formu-
lation. Generally speaking, it is suggested that concepts
are human constructions which signify a perception of some

aspect of social reality. However, since the theory of

Wayne B. Hanewicz

social reality presented here is that of a totally inter-
related or "wholistic" one, these constructions may be
rather arbitrarily delimited extractions, that is, the
delimitation could have taken place at some other points
within the sphere of social reality. Consequently, although
these concepts may signify certain phenomena, it may be
difficult or impossible to ascertain how accurately they

represent such phenomena.

 

Since the general field of criminal justice is a
relative newcomer to the arena of "scientific" methodology,
it may be productive at this early, malleable stage to re-
examine these methods and the nature of the concepts
involved in their utilization. It may well be that the
very concept of a "field" of "criminal justice" should
undergo significant modification. If, after sufficient
analysis of these issues, one finds that some of these
methods will not lead to an "understanding" of an "event"
or a "reality," then their continued utilization in their
present form may be brought into question. This, in effect,

is what has herein been attempted.

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Approved : '.,A”(lfiflW diagram»

A CRITIQUE OF SOME ASSUMPTIONS APPARENTLY UNDERLYING
SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS, WITH PARTICULAR

REFERENCE TO THE FIELD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
By

Wayne B. Hanewicz

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

A..._-

3 MASTER OF SCIENCE

 

School of Police Administration and Public Safety

1968

DEDICATION

Dedicated to Sitoo and Jidoo, and to Amey D. F. Gamf,
some of whom, in their own way and to varying degree, have
had a more profound effect upon my life than they may
realize.

Wayne B. Hanewicz

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTORY AND BACKGROUND
INFORMATION. . . . . . . . . . I
Introduction . . . . . . . . . l
A Short Review of Comparative Method

in the Social Sciences . . . . . . 2

Trends in the General Field of

Political Science . . . . . . . 7
Statement of the Problem . . . . . 12
Definitions. . . . . . . . . . 17
Literature Review. . . . . . . . 18

Organization of the Remainder of

the Thesis . . . . . . . . . 19

II. A DISCUSSION OF SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF

"SCIENTIFIC" METHOD

22

Science . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Mathematics and Mathematical Systems . 29
"Certainty" and "Laws" . . . . . . 3A

Quantum Physics and "Subjectivism" . . A0

III. A DISCUSSION OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC METHOD. AA
General Introduction. . . . . . . AA

Concept Formulation . . . . . . . A5
Objectivity, Part I . . . . . . . 5A

On Words. . . . . . . . . . . 59

 

CHAPTER PAGE

Objectivity, Part II. . . . . . . 62
Value. . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Fact . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

IV. A DISCUSSION OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC METHOD,

PART II . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Causation . . . . . . . . . . 82
Multiple-Causation . . . . . . . 86
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . 9O
Interdisciplinary I--Culture . . . . 93
Interdisciplinary II. . . . . . . 97
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Models . . . . . . . . . . . 10A
Summary of Chapter . . . . . . . 108
V. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . llO
Implications of a Wholistic Reality. . 110
Developing a Social "Scientific" Method 119
On Goals (Where To?, Why?). . . . . 12A

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

CHAPTER I

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Introduction

 

There is an increasing tendency on the part of both
scholars and practitioners in the field of police adminis-
tration to attempt to undertake "scientific studies" of
phenomena or relationships which appear to fall within the
confines of that field. The necessity for "objective"
analysis in such studies is of overriding concern, and is
equaled only by the demand for "value-free judgments."
Ihn'thenwst part, the general feeling seems to be that
there is "something out there" which can be "discovered"
if the correct methodological guidelines are followed.

The application of a "scientific" method to the
analysis of some phenomenon is a rather complex undertaking;
the use of mathematical and other types of "purely scien-
tific" principles is not without procedural and substantive
problems. The issue is made considerably more complex
when such study is directed toward the analysis of "social"
phenomena, of which "police" phenomena are a part. It
appears as though certain basic assumptions have been made
regarding human thought processes and concept formulation,

both of which provide the framework for any methodological

inquiry, which are subject to considerable question. One
of the major purposes of this thesis is to once again
raise these questions.

Due to a relative lack of "scientific" research in
the field of police administration, it appears that stu-
dents of this academic discipline have not yet been
dramatically confronted with these issues in the same way
that physicists or biologists have. However, with the
trend toward the develOpment of a comparative method, these
questions may again acquire major proportions. Although
comparative method per se is not the major object of this
discussion, nevertheless, because of the relationship
it may have with the questions at issue, a rather short
review of discernible trends in this area may be useful

as a means of clarification.

A Short Review of Comparative

Method in the SociéI Sciences

 

The development of, or, more correctly, the idea to
deveIOp, a comparative method for utilization within the
context of cross-national and/or cross-cultural analysis
of police systems is a most recent phenomenon. Indeed,
with regard to analysis of police systems per se (even in
a very broad sense), one finds oneself in a most virgin
area of academic endeavor. While most students of police
administration are, at least, not unfamiliar with the

term "comparative," the term "methodology" does not appear

to enjoy equal notoriety; and when one combines both terms,
one finds the combination enjoying even less notoriety.
Whether this situation be the result of a lack of interest,
a lack of time due to the pressing domestic problems in
the area of police administration, or, what is more likely,
a combination of both, is not of prime interest to this
writer; the resulting situation itself, however, is
deserving of discussion.

As of this time, there does not appear to be any
"comparative method" to speak of in the area of police
administration, whether it be in regard to inter- or
intra—national and/or cross-cultural studies; notwith-
standing the fact that there appears to be some indication
of a growing interest in the development of a "comparative
method" per se to deal with problems of cross—national and
cross-cultural studies in police administration.l For the
most part, however, comparative studies in the area of
police administration have been descriptive and/or histor-
ical more than conceptual, with the respective authors
undertaking an analysis, sometimes cursory and sometimes
"in-depth," of some particular police system or, more

rarely, of a number of police systems. Among the

 

1See, for example, Raymond T. Galvin, The Study of
Comparative Police Administration, A paper presented at the
American Society of Criminolagy Meeting, Berkeley,
California, December, 1965.

 

 

descriptive works of other police systems, Great Britain
has probably enjoyed the most pOpularity as a tOpic
country. Hewitt's work provides a general description of
police administration within that country, although it
probably could be more useful as a reference book for
certain statistical, and legal and constitutional infor-
mation.2 In addition, of course, some indigenous liter-
ature is also available and can provide descriptive and/or
historical information for a respective police system.3
Robert Foranis book provides an interesting historical
analysis of the Kenya police“ as does Wood's for the

police of Natal.5

Early in this century, Fosdick pre-
sented a kind of comparative analysis of European police

systems,6 but it was not what could be called an example

 

2William H. Hewitt, British Police Administration

(Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 19657.

3See, for example, John Coatman, Police (London:
Oxford University Press, 1959), or, G. T. O'Brien, The
Australian Police Forces (Melbourne: Oxford UniverEIEy
Press, 1960). There are also a number of books which are
available in foreign languages, Germany being fairly
prolific in this area.

 

 

“Robert W. Foran, The Kenya Police 1887-1960
(London: Rovert Hale Lmtd., 1962).

 

5Arthur A. Wood, Natal, Past and Present (Devon,
England: Stockwell, 19627.

 

6Raymond B. Fosdick, EurOpean Police Systems (New
York: The Century 00., 19157.

 

of comparative methodology. Finally, and more recently,
Cramer's work provides a simultaneous description of a
number of police systems throughout the world,7 but,
again, this is not looked upon as a deveIOpment of a com-
parative method.*

If one wishes to View a police system as encompas—
sing more than purely "administrative" concepts, one
expands the literary base from which to draw relevant
material. For example, the area of comparative criminal
law has been, and continues to be, a rather pOpular
subject among legal scholars. Further, this closely
related academic discipline seems to offer more in terms
of a comparative method than the traditional police liter—
ature. That is, there appears to be some progress in
formulating concepts for the purpose of cross—national
and/or cross-cultural study; the very enlightening series

of articles which appeared in the Journal of Criminal Law,

 

7James Cramer, The World's Police (London: Cassel
and Co., Ltd., 196A). Although Cramer does devote a few
of the initial chapters to a discussion of the historical
development of policing in a few different countries, it
does not appear to be an attempt to deveIOp any kind of
method which would allow for further comparative analysis
along the same lines which he follows.

 

*For point of clarification, the comparative method
as used here suggests, among other things, the construction
or formulation of concepts which are sufficiently flexible
to allow for their use, in a productive manner, in cross-
national and/or cross-cultural study.

 

Criminology, and Police Science8 is indicative of this
change in comparative perspective. Anthropology and law
have combined to produce some very productive material

in this respect, although it must be admitted that anthro-
pologists have been developing a comparative method for at
least two decades now. Llewellyn and Hoebel's piece on

9

social control among the Cheyenne must certainly be
viewed as a forerunner to a comparative method. Similarly,

M. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's African Policital Systems10

 

provided firm groundwork for the development of a compara-

tive method, as did Gluckman's Politics, Law, and Ritual

in Tribal Society.ll More recently, Marc Swartz, 33 a1.,

 

 

have developed a new conceptual framework for the compara-

tive analysis of political systems, both "primitive" and

"developed."12

 

8The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and
Police Science, 51:2, July-August, 1960; 512A, November-
December, 1960; 51 fl, May-June, 1961.

 

 

9K. N. Llewellyn and E. A. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way
(Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 19A13.

lOM. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (eds.), African
Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press,
19AOT.

llMax Gluckman, Politics, Law, and Ritual in Tribal
Society (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 19657.

12Marc J. Swartz, gt a1., Political Anthropology
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 19667.

 

 

 

 

Tgends in the General Field
of Political Science

 

 

The developments in anthropology have coincided with,
have indeed influenced, similar methodological deveIOp-
ments in the other social sciences in general and political
science in particular. Because of the obviously close
relationship between political science and public adminis-
tration (of which police administration is viewed as a
part), developments or trends in these fields have had,
or should have in the future, significant repercussions
with respect to similar developments in police adminis-
tration. Consequently, a brief sketch of these develOp-
ments with regard to comparative methodology may lend more
coherence to the later discussion of develOping a compara—
tive method for analysis of police systems.

When one turns to policital science and public
administration (insofar as they can, in fact, be so neatly
separated), one begins to discern the deveIOpment of some
tangible comparative method that appears to have particular
relevance to students of comparative police administration.
There is a great deal of interest on the part of political
scientists and public administrators to develop a compar-
ative method which will provide working concepts that
will produce empirical data for the testing of hypotheses
and discovering of "general principles" of administration.
Indicative of this trend is the following statement made by

Robert Dahl as early as 19A7.

No science of public administration is possible
unless . . . there is a body of comparative
studies from which it may be possible to
discover principles and generalities that
transcend national bqundaries and peculiar his—
torical experience.

Similarly, the need for a comparative method to supplant
the traditional approaches to the study of political and
administrative systems was suggested by Dwight Waldo in
the following statement:

The case against "traditional" study of compar-
ative government is put as follows: that it was
culture-bound, limiting itself for the most part
to countries of Western Europe or to areas affected
by Western political institutions; that it was
legallistic and formalistic, limiting itself to
examination of documents (often of the formal,
static aspect of governmental institutions, unduly
neglecting informal arrangements and indeed the
whole political-social-economic-cultural context
of laws and formal institutions); that it was pre-
ponderantly descriptive rather than problem-
solving, explanatory or analytic; that it failed to
probe far enough to discover functional equivalence

. . ; and that it was not genuinely comparative--
i. e., that its basic descriptive categories were
inadequate and confusing, that most students dealt
with only one country (or at best proceeded country-
by-country), and that there were really no concepts
or techniques for determining either similarity or
difference, especially if study moved beyond a
strict Western orbit. A

 

 

 

As is suggested by the above statement by Waldo,

political scientists and public administrators have long

 

13Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Adminis-
tration," Public Administration Review, Winter, 19A7,
p. 11.

lquight Waldo, Political Science in the United
States of America; A Trend Report (Paris: United Nation's
Edugational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 1956),
p. 3.

 

 

 

recognized the limited usefulness of purely "descriptive"
and/or "historical" studies in supplying those kinds of
data which would provide a firm basis for comparative
studies of the actual goings-on within political and/or
public administrative systems. (It will be recalled at this
point that this is predominantly the type of literature
which is now circulating within the ranks of police admin-
istration students.) This traditional, preponderantly
descriptive, approach ". . . did not lend itself to the
development of theories and the testing of hypotheses and
the compilation of significant data. It was limited to
the description of the forms of government of foreign
political systems."15 The applicability of that criticism
to contemporary methodology in the field of comparative
police administration is all too plain!

The deveIOpment of more flexible and meaningful
concepts for comparative political studies was in evidence

more than a decade ago. Marion J. Levy's The Structure of

 

Societyl6 attempted to uncover certain general character-
istics common to all societies, thereby facilitating con-

ceptual formulation around those characteristics for use

 

15Roy 0. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, Comparative
Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood, 111.: The
Dorsey Press, 196A), p. 3.

16Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952).

 

 

 

10

in comparative analysis. Roy Macridis17 and Gabriel
Almondl8 produced their respective works, both of which are
specifically devoted to the comparative study of political
systems per se. Similarly, the "Industria-Agraria" model
of Fred Riggs19 should not be overlooked in this short
historical, developmental sketch, for his model represents
a significant attempt to formulate working concepts for
comparative political studies. Very obviously the list is
not very complete, nor can it be said to be very represen-
tative, but it does indicate that there has been, as there
now is, a definite trend toward developing suitable methods
for comparative analysis.

It should be emphasized that these developments have
not been as distinct as this, rather obviously imcomplete,
historical sketch may have suggested. "AnthrOpology,"
"political science," "public administration," "social
science," "criminal justice," etc. are terms which repre—
sent some kind of intellectual specialization in the pur-
suit of certain kinds of knowledge; the real phenomena are

not as distinct as their linguistic symbols suggest. On

 

l7Roy C. Macridis, The Study of Comparative Govern-
ment (Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday Short Studies in
Political Science, 1955).

l8Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems,"
Journal of Politics, August, 1956, pp. 391-A09.

19Fred Riggs, "Agraria and Industria: Toward a ,
Typology of Comparative Administration," in William Siffin
(ed.), Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administra-
tion (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1957), pp. 23-116.

 

 

11

the contrary, the assumption of this writer is that there
is a very significant interrelationship among developments
in all of these fields, and between them and similar
developments hithe field of comparative police administra—
tion. In all probability, students of comparative police
administration will draw heavily from experiences in these
disciplines in attempting to construct a workable compar-
ative method; in one sense, this heavy reliance is appar-
ently a necessity, for the development of any truly compar-
ative method has been, and will continue to be, the result
of interdisciplinary c00peration. This apparent necessity,
however, should not diminish the importance of the concom-
itant necessity to critically analyze the material which
will be the object of this interdisciplinary borrowing.

The field of comparative police administration, then,
is in its infancy, and, like its human counterpart, it is
quite malleable. To the extent that students of comparative
police administration draw material from students of other
disciplines concerned with similar academic endeavor, to
that extent, the former students must make an assumption
that the work of the latter is basically valid and capable
of being modified to meet the demands of police adminis-
trative analysis. Generally, this paper will be concerned
with both these and some other basic assumptions that have
been, or appear to be in the process of being, made with

regard to the formulation of concepts and construction of

12

a method for social scientific analysis in general and

police administration in particular.

Statement of the Problem

 

As the preceding discussion should suggest, the
emphasis in the fields of political science and public
administration, insofar as comparative studies are con-
cerned, is on the formulation of concepts and subsequent
develOpment of a method sufficiently flexible to allow for
cross-national and/or cross-cultural analysis. Moreover,
as has also been suggested, developments in these academic
disciplines will necessarily have significant repercussions
for similar attempts in the field of police administration.
In all of these and related fields the key words are
"concepts" and "method." "It is not saying too much that
ours has become the methodological century in the social

20
sciences."

Indeed, the very terms "comparative govern-
ment" and "comparative public administration," being defined

as "lines of approach involving perspective, methodology,
21
H

 

and data . . (emphasis supplied), reflect a character-

istic method which is inherent in their very definition.

 

2OArnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations

of Twentieth—Century Political Thought (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 5.

21

 

 

Macridis, op. cit., pp. A-5.

13

If the development of a suitable method, in general,
is a major objective of comparativists in the social
sciences, particularly in the field of political science
(in the very broad sense), then "scientific" is the pre-
requisite for acceptable participation in such a develOp-
ment. Everywhere the emphasis is on the "scientific
approach" to the problems of comparative analysis in the
social sciences, and if the assumption of a necessarily
close relationship between police administration and
political science is accepted, one can expect to hear
similar appeals for a "scientific method" for comparative
police analysis.

The general assumption seems to be that the social
sciences can utilize those methods for analysis that have.
been developed, and are now being utilized, by biologists,
chemists, mathematicians and physicists. The "scientific"
method, in this sense, is supposed to allow for a thorough
and "objective" analysis of nature. As Holten says, there
is a generally ". . . accepted thema of the unlimited
possibility of doing science, the belief that nature is
inexhaustibly kncwable."22 Apparently, it is felt that if
one follows such a "scientific" methodology, one can
expect the same degree of "success" enjoyed by students of

the "pure" sciences.

 

22Gerald Holten, Science and Culture (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1965), p. xxiv.

 

1A

Although no attempt is made to mimic every detailed
aspect of the method of the "pure" sciences, nevertheless,
it is felt that general principles underlying this method
can be validly used as basic premises for a comparative
method in the social sciences. More specifically, it is
not uncommon to hear one talk about the elimination of
"value judgments" in undertaking comparative analysis in
order that "objectivity" will result; the assumption being,
of course, that "value judgments" can in fact be elimin—
ated.23 Another advantage commonly attached to the use of
"scientific method" in the social sciences is that general
hypotheses can be "empirically" tested and validated or
invalidated, thereby allowing for appropriate modification
of the hypotheses for future testing, and so on until
theory adequately represents reality.2u Symbolically, the
ultimate objective would be to validly state some social

relationship or phenomenon thus:

Given: A = Some social condition

B Some "resulting" social condition
X1 = Variable
X2 = Variable
X3, etc.
Then: A (provided X X etc.) = B.

1’ 2’
The assumption here is, basically, twofold: (1) that social

 

 

23Harold MacIver, The Pursuit of Happiness, A Phil—
osophy for Modern Living (New York: 19557, pp. 157, 170,
and 173.

2A

 

 

Macridis, op. cit., pp. A-5.

15

phenomena are sufficiently distinct to be capable of being
perceived as elements in a cause-effect relationship, and
(2) that all the variables (Xn) involved can be isolated
and measured to determine their significance with regard to
the social phenomenon under study. This thesis will
question these assumptions!

In general, then, there appears to be a tendency on
the part of social scientists to draw heavily from the
methodology of the "pure" sciences in order to develop a
"scientific" method for use by the former academicians.
Efforts in political science and, more specifically, public
administration now reflect this predominant concern with
"scientific" methodology and the formulation of a compar-
ative methodology based upon the experiences in the "pure"
sciences. "If science is essentially a matter of method,
then a major value of comparative administration lies in
its contribution to an increasingly scientific approach."25

What is the supposed objective of comparative method
in general and particularly of utilizing a "scientific"
method for undertaking these studies? Two have already
been touched upon, namely, (1) the introduction of "objec~
tivity" and the elimination, or reduction of the signif-

icance of, "value judgments," and (2) the gathering of

"empirical" data for the testing and retesting of hypotheses.

 

2SSiffin, op. cit., p. 16.

m

16

In addition, however, it might be said another objective
appears to be to facilitate the formulation of general
principles which are applicable "across the board,"
regardless of national and/or cultural variation. In this
respect, of course, comparative studies pose the problem

of generality and the need for obtaining and assimilating

 

data which have often been considered beyond the scope of
traditional political science.26 Generalization is recog-
nized as necessary if for no other reason than the fact
that one cannot experiment on all aspects of reality,27
but there is a question as to how far and in respect to
what kinds of social phenomena one can generalize.

To recapitulate, the basic problems with respect
to the development of a comparative method for utilization
in cross—national and cross-cultural police analysis, and
the ones to which this writer will, directly or indirectly,
devote the proceeding discussion, are these. First, and
this is probably the most basic, to what extent can students
in the social sciences draw fromtme»methodological exper-

ience in the "pure" sciences? To what extent should such

a borrowing take place? Second, to the extent that the

 

26

Ibid., p. l.
27Henri Poincare, "Hypotheses in Physics," in Philip
P. Wiener, Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New
York : Charles Scribnerfs Sons, 195A), p. 33.

 

17

former can draw from the experiences of the latter, what
assumptions must be made regarding the utilization of the
"scientific method" even within the context of "pure"
scientific research? Third, will any of these methods
really supply a thorough or accurate understanding of social
reality? Finally, what are the prospects for developing a
truly useful comparative method for police or any kind of
social analysis?

Generally speaking, discussion will proceed along
these lines, although not necessarily in that general order.
In addition, discussion will not necessarily be directed
specificallyto a given question, although the material
brought out will have rather obvious relevance to all of
them. Finally, the bulk of the thesis will be devoted to
pointing up the interrelationships of a number of impli-
cations of these basic questions. In general, discussion
will be centered around these questions EEEESZ than being

directed at them.

Definitions

 

For reasons which will hOpefully become clearer as the
thesis progresses, with two exceptions, no attempt is made
at "defining" most concepts utilized here. Since "defining"
a given concept requires the utilization of a process of
conceptual extraction (to be eXplained later in the thesis),
which process is the object of a major portion of this

thesis, it would be rather self-defeating to utilize the

 

 

l8

process in formulating "definitions" prior to the discus-
sion. In addition, those concepts which may require clar—
ification, e.g., "conceptual extraction," "system of
reality," etc., are objects of rather extended discussion
within the body of the thesis. Concise definitions at this
point would be more confusing than clafiying.

The two exceptions noted above are "pure sciences"
and "field."

Pure Sciences: Those academic disciplines which may

 

be represented by the terms "chemistry," "physics,"
mathematics," "biology," and other closely related terms
(i.e., "biochemistry," "mathematical physics," etc).
Field; That grouping of phenomena or relationships
which is seen as comprising a distinct area for academic

or practical endeavor.

Literature Review

 

It is noted that there is no attempt to extensively
review the literature of the "field." There are a number
of reasons for this intentional inaction. First, one of
the major issues raised in this thesis deals with the
utility of the perpetuation of a "police field" as such.
In effect, it is suggested that the "field" is confined
by a rather arbitrary means of circumscription, and, in
reality, a great deal of information concerning almost
every aspect of human existence would be a significant

contribution to the understanding of the relationships or

19

events grouped under a given "field." Consequently, if an
intentional attempt is made to review all the literature in
the "field," the thesis immediately becomes subject to the
justifiable criticism of gross self-contradiction.

The second reason for the absence of a literature
review of "the field" follows directly from the first.
Given the writer's general train of thought and belief in
the artificiality of a "field," it becomes difficult to
discern a "field" at which the thesis is directed. Rather,
the thesis is directed at the very concept of "field," and
involves concepts which accrue from, and clarify the nature
of, a number of "fields" Consequently, rather than an
extensive literature review of a "field," relevant material
was drawn from the literature of many, sometimes apparently
"unrelated, fields."

In brief, the anticipated result is £92 a thesis which
only discusses the issues related to the artificiality of
"fields." Rather, an attempt was made to construct a thesis

which both discusses and itself manifesps the major theme of

 

 

the significantly interrelated relevancy of many "fields."

Organization of the Remainder
of the Thesis ‘ '6

 

 

Chapter II will be devoted to a discussion of research
methodology as utilized in what have traditionally been
labeled as the "pure" sciences, i.e., chemistry, physics,

etc. Here the emphasis will be on exploring those aspects

20

of the method that seem to be so attractive to the social
scientists who envisage the many advantages associated with
it. For instance, there will be discussion of such topics
as mathematical systems, the question of "certainty" in
"scientific laws," and the relation of recent experiments
in quantum physics to the possibility of "objectively"
undertaking research.

Chapter III will begin a discussion of Method in
general, and it will be particularly concerned with the
questions of concept formulation, "objectivity," "value
judgments," and with the issue of whether or not there are
such things as "facts." Here, as throughout the thesis,
an attempt will be made to relate the immediate discussion
to the preceding one, for the conclusions will be based on
a thorough understanding of the material already presented.

Continued discussion of isolated aspects of social
scientific methodology is undertaken in Chapter IV.
Emphasis will be placed on a concern for such things as
the general theory of causation and the related theory of
multiple-causation, the development of, and the rationale
for, an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of
social phenomena, and a short discussion of the utility
and problems associated with axause of models. Here again,
attempts will be made to relate the discussion to the

material presented up to that point.

 

21

Chapter V will be the concluding chapter of the
thesis. Here the discussion will involve logical impli-
cations which may accrue from the material and conclusions
presented in the preceding chapters; where productive,
their relationship to the development of a comparative
method will be likewise discussed. No attempt will be
made to formulate such a method, for this would take at
least another thesis. Rather, this chapter, as indeed
the entire thesis, will be a critique of the method in
general, with particular attention to those aspects of
social scientific methodology which appear to raise the
most significant questions with regard to the utilization
of that, or any, method.

It is in this final chapter that the writer will
most obviously put forth personal conclusions which he
feels to be justified in View of the preceding chapters.
It is to be emphasized that conclusions drawn from material
dealing with the kinds of tOpics which are herein dealt
with cannot, for the most part, be "proved" as a mathe—
matical problem might be; indeed, the very concept of
"proof" is indirectly discussed and questioned to some
extent within the context of the thesis. Rather, the

question is one of justification as Opposed to "proof,"

 

and it is toward this end that references from philosophy,

physics, and other "unrelated fields" are cited.

CHAPTER II

A DISCUSSION OF SOME OF THE ELEMENTS

OF "SCIENTIFIC" METHOD

Since there is a general trend among social scientists
to draw from‘mwaexperiences of students of the "pure"
sciences, it would seem appropriate to undertake a discus-
sion of what seems to be implied by the term "science" in
general, and the "scientific method" in particular. In
addition, it is felt that it would be beneficial to dis—
cuss some recent advancements in the "pure" sciences and
relate, at least in a cursory manner, the implications of
these advancements to those elements of the "scientific
method" which seem to be the most heavily relied upon by
the social scientists. It should be noted that each of
the areas to be discussed could easily be the sole topic
of an entire thesis; given spatial and intellectual limi—
tations, however, such an undertaking would be impractical.
Consequently, discussion will center only around those
elements which seem closely related to the general theme of

the thesis.

 

 

23

Science

It would appear apprOpriate, indeed necessary, at this
point to discuss some characteristics of the term "science,"
with particular emphasis on its relation to method. In
fact, it is this writer's opinion, and an attempt will be
made to show, that the term "science" implies the use of
a particular method, although characteristics, goals, and
techniques of this method vary, or ought to vary, from one
particular "science" to another.

The term "science" has been attached to so many
academic disciplines, particularly within the last fifty
years, that one can no more equate it with a particular
discipline as was the case during the nineteenth century
and, to some extent, the twentieth. The traditionally
"pure" (including natural) sciences, i.e., biology,
chemistry, physics, and mathematics, no longer enjoy the
same monopolistic use of the term as was once the case;
for psychology, politics, sociology, law, and public admin-
istration, among others, have made it known that they too
are now "sciences." What has happened within these
disciplines that now makes them "sciences"?

The term "science" appears to imply, among other
things, emu inclination toward the formulation of general
laws which can be used, primarily, for the prediction of
future events. It is felt that if one is able to predict

future events, one can possibly modify a given human

2A

situation to the extent that that situation is related in
some manner to the events liable to prediction.
However we may define the word science in some
philosophical or epistemological system, it is
clear that it begins with the use of previous
observaiion for the prediction of future
events.

Another purpose of these general laws, the ramifi-
cations of which will be gone into in more detail at a
later time, appears to be that of tying together the
various phenomena which have been extracted from their
totality for purposes of analysis.2 That is, they are
supposed to provide some semblance of order to perceived
phenomena in order that rational thought regarding those
phenomena may be facilitated. Actually, these two gen-
eral purposes are closely interrelated, if, indeed, not
sometimes interdependent. For, in most cases, accurate
prediction is best accomplished only after a thorough
understanding of the interrelationships of the events
involved; while in other cases, the process of prediction

does aid in tying together conceptually distinct phenomena.

In general, then, it can be said that:

 

lBronislaw Malinowski, "A Scientific Theory of
Culture," in Philip P. Wiener (ed.), Readings in the
Philosophy of Science (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,

195A), p. 391.

2Albert Einstein, "The Method of Science," in
Edward H. Madden (ed.), The Structure of Scientific
Thought (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 83.

 

 

 

 

25

The function of science, in this sense of the word
(broadest), is to establish general laws covering the
behavior of empirical events or objects with which
the science in question is concerned, and thereby to
enable us to connect together our knowledge of the
separately known events, and to make reliable pre-
diction of events as yet unknown.

At this point, it should be apparent that both the
"pure" sciences and the "social" sciences share a common
denominator in the formulation and utilization of general
laws for predictive purposes and to facilitate comprehen-
sion of the interrelationships of events. There is yet
another characteristic of a "science" which is shared, or
certainly has the possibility of being shared, to some
extent by all the disciplines, namely, experimentation,
and more experimentation. The crucial issue with regard
to experimentation revolves around the question of control,
and notwithstanding the interdisciplinary use of experi-
mentation in general, it is at this point, involving the
question of control, that experimentation in the physical
sciences and experimentation in the social sciences start
to part company; for control suggests variables, and the

social scientists have more than their share of variables.

In the physical sciences, for the most part,* relatively

 

3Richard Bevan Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation:
A Study of the Function of Theory. Probability and Law in
Science (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), p. l.

 

 

*Developments in quantum mechanics suggest that all
the variables may not be subject to control in the senSE.
of being liable to experimental manipulation.

This will be discussed at another point in this
chapter.

 

26

rigid control of variables can be obtained; but it is
another matter with experimentation in the field of human
behavior. In contrasting experiments in the physical
sciences with those in the social sciences, Brecht states:

Yet rarely, if ever, is it possible to concoct

such favorable experimental conditions in the

social sciences. Even when external conditions

can be arranged in line with strict postulates,

many variables enter the experiment because of

the human factor involved.

The social sciences, of course, do not have a
monopoly over this basic problem; the question appears to
be one of degree. The effect of the variable differential
on the relative degree of predictive reliability and amen-
ability to operational manipulation can be seen in the
following set of statements, which may be classified as

"laws," generally speaking, in their respective fields.

Mathematical Statement: The hypotenuse of a right

 

triangle is equal to the square root of the sum of the
squares of the other two sides.

Bio—chemical Statement: If the brain of a human

 

being is deprived of oxygen for 8-10 minutes, other bodily
functions will cease shortly thereafter.

Social Scientific Statement: In times of adminis-

 

trative stress, the organization will tend toward an

authoritarian type of leadership.

 

“Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations
of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 9A.

 

27

It becomes apparent that the mathematical statement ex-
presses a relationship the outcome of which is certain, at
least within the context of that mathematical system. The
bio-chemical statement also expresses a predictible rela-
tionship between events, but there is an interjection of

a small amount of ambiguity. For instance, what are the
"bodily functions"? Although organs and cells may cease

to function, atomic interaction will continue to take place.
This atomic observation is not, of course, particularly
significant; but it 12 significant that the relationships
are not seen as clearly as was the case in the mathematical
statement. The social scientific statement is even more
ambiguous. Although the relationship itself may or may not
be true, there is considerable problem in defining the
terms so as to include all the variables that may affect
the relationship which is being expressed. The variable
issue can truly be seen as being one of degree 229 perspec-
tive.

As mentioned previously, all the sciences have at
least one common denominator in the inclination toward, and
the recognized necessity for, the formulation of general
laws. In addition, experimentation may be another common
denominator, although the problem of control does appear to
create a significantly more complex problem for the social

sciences than is generally the case with the other sciences.

28

In addition to these two general characteristics,
there are some other features of the "pure" scientific
method which, because of social scientific interest in
them, deserve discussion. Reference is specifically made
to the role of mathematics and mathematical systems and
"laws" in scientific method. Although a discussion in
this area may appear at first glance to be unnecessary
or "unrelated," nevertheless, because such techniques
appear to be the objects of some rather rampant social
scientific larceny, some comments would appear to be in
order. No attempt will be made to analyze their present
role in the social sciences, for, in view of the literature

available,5

this would require at least another thesis if
any kind of professional dignity is to be maintained.
Rather, discussion will center around those characteristics
of mathematical systems and laws which, in this writer's

opinion, would appear to have rather significant repercus-

sions for social scientific utilization.

 

5See, for example, Paul F. Lazerfeld, Mathematical
Thinking in the Social Sciences (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free
Press, 195A); or Frank Harary, Robert Z. Norman, and Dorwin
Cartwright, Structural Models: An Introduction to the
Theory of Directed Graphs (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1965); or Roy G. Francis, The Rhetoric of Science:
A Methodological Discussion of the Two-by-Two Table
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

29

Mathematics and Mathematical Systems
As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality,
they are not certain; and as far as they are certain,
they do not refer to reality.

Albert Einstein

As has been suggested, there is a great deal of
interest on the part of social scientists in the possi-

bility of utilizing mathematical techniques in social

 

research. There appear to be, basically, three reasons
for this interest:

1. The apparent success of utilizing mathematical
techniques in natural scientific research
appears to be a lure for many social scientists,

2. The prestige and charm of mathematical work is
a temptation for many social practitioners,

3. There is a felt need for a more precise language
among social sciefitists.6

No attempt is made to directly assess the merits of these
"drawing cards." Discussion is centered around the general
area of mathematics as utilized in the "scientific method"
and the implications that accrue therefrom.

One of the most obvious characteristics of "pure"

scientific methodology is the constant reliance upon mathe-

matics or its basic principles in undertaking almost any

 

6Lazerfeld, op. cit., p. 3.

30

type of experiment. Mathematical systems provide a kind of
logical "absoluteness" within a given system that, generally,
cannot be contradicted as long as the required manipulative
techniques are carried out correctly. It is strictly a
logical process. The terms, devoid of any inherent
meaning, are manipulated according to an accepted "modus
operandi" until the necessary result is obtained. The new
Euclidean postulate in geometry is a good example; If A,
B, and C are points on a straight line 1, and if B lies
between A and C, then B also lies between C and A. This is
simple, logical, and absolutely certain within that system!
There is a conspicuous absence here of empirical
content, the characteristic element with which sciences
other than mathematics must deal. Indeed, "A mathematical
truth is irrefutably certain just because it is devoid of
factual, or empirical content."7 When one introduces any
degree of empirical content into the system by attaching
some meaning to the symbols, the process being referred to
as semantical interpretation, one should not thereby expect
that the mathematical system will "prove" the factual
"truth" of the empirical proposition under analysis, for
this is not a direct function of the mathematical system,
it is a function of empirical observation; ". . .mathematics

deals with symbols--not with the objects which the symbols

 

7Carl G. Hempel, "Geometry and Empirical Science,"
in Wiener, pp. cit., p. A3.

 

31

represent."8 This is true not only of the social sciences,
but of all empirical sciences. Again, and at the risk of
redundancy, empirical interpretation of mathematical
symbols is not subject to mathematically conclusive proof;
only when the factual content is discarded can absolute
"proof" be mathematically shown to exist.

Mathematical symbols are abstractions, they have
empirical meaning only insofar as such meaning is attached
to them by someone, be he sociologist, economist, physi-
cist, or chemist. There is, therefore, a distinctive
difference between the symbol and its attached meaning,
they are not one and the same. The physicist-philosopher,
Pierre Duhem, in_discussing this point with regard to the
physicist, states that,

Between the concrete facts, as the physicist

observes them, and the numerical symbols by which

these facts are represented in the calculations

of the theogists, there is an extremely great

difference.
The point is that the certainty and absoluteness which
characterize a pure mathematical system do not carry over,
in the same respect or to the same extent, into an empir—
ical field, whether it be physics, chemistry, or what have

you. One cannot "prove" that "opportunity + desire =

crime" in the same way one "proves" that 2 + A = 6.

 

8S. S. Stevens, "Psychology and the Science of
Science," in Wiener, pp. cit., p. 175.

9Pierre Duhem, "Mathematical Deduction and
Physical Theory," in Wiener, pp. cit., p. 27.

 

Mathematical induction will not "prove" the "truth" of
an empirical proposition.

What we have called the "truth" of an empir-
ical proposition is something which can never
be absolute. Repeated tests of an objective sen-
tence can add to its probability, but never
clinch ihscertainty. Induction, as Hume pointed
out, is not a watertight method of proving
anything empirical.10

The mathematician Carl G. Hempel discusses this point at
length, and his conclusion is deserving of quotation in
toto.

The most distinctive characteristic which
differentiates mathematics from the various
branches of empirical science, and which
accounts for its fame as the queen of the
-sciences, is no doubt the peculiar certainty

and necessity of its results. No prOposition

in even the most advanced parts of empirical
science can ever attain this status; a hypoth-
esis concerning "matters of empirical fact" can
at best acquire what is loosely called a high
probability or a high degree of confirmation on
the basis of the relevant evidence available;

but however well it may have been confirmed by
careful tests, the possibility can never be
precluded that it will have to be discarded later
in the light of new disconfirming evidence. Thus,
all theories and hypotheses of empirical science
share this provisional character of being estab-
lished "until further notice," whereas a mathe-
matical theorem, oncelproved, is established

once and for all. . .

If one accepts as necessary the less than certain
results which accrue from the interjection of empirical
content into a mathematical system, one must further

become aware of the "degrees of uncertainty," so to speak,

 

10S. 8. Stevens, pp. cit., p. 175.

llCarl G. Hempel, pp. cit., pp. Al-A2.

32

I fun-- a. we}

33
which may result fronltheinterjection of different kinds of
empirical content. For an empirically "contaminated" mathe—
matical system to retain a relatively significant degree
of certainty, ". . . the system of postulates has to be made
so complete that all the required propositions can be de-
duced from.itby purely logical means."12 This suggests
that, within a given set of empirical prOpositions which

are going to be "mathematically proved," account must be

I_
9-

taken of all the possible variables which may influence the
factual outcome. Within the realm of the traditionally
"pure" sciences, there is a good probability that such a
state can be attained or, at least, closely complied with,
quantum physical experimentation being a seemingly notable
exception. On the other hand, there are so many variables
involved in social scientific research, and they are of
such a nature, that such a state seems to be out of reach
for the methods now being utilized by students of that
academic discipline. That is, it appears easier to
identify and control the possible effects of "heat" or
"light" than it is to similarly control "attitudes" or
"thought." Although the "too many variables" argument is
admittedly an old one, unlike other types of aging, time
does not necessarily diminish the virility of arguments.
It appears, at this point, that the kind of cer-

tainty which is so characteristic of pure mathematical

 

12Ibid., p. A2.

 

 

3A

systems cannot be attained in the empirical field, any
empirical field. One of the reasons for this appears to be
the lack of universality with regard to the definition and
meaning of empirical facts which is so necessary for mathe-
matical techniques to be successfully utilized; again, this
problem is common to all the empirical sciences. In addi—
tion to the problem of universality, or, more correctly,
the lack of it, there is the problem of constructing postu~
lational systems which take account of all the variables
which may be influential in the particular phenomenon under
analysis; in this respect, the social sciences seem to be
confronted with more formidable obstacles than is the case
with the "pure" sciences. It appears less complex to
determine a significantly useful relationship between a
virus and the disease of polio than would be the case with
"atmosphere" and "coercion." In any case, this appears to
be an appropriate point to undertake a discussion of the
question of "Certainty" in the pure sciences and its rela-

tionship to "Laws" within those sciences.

"Certainty" and "Laws"

 

A number of students of the social sciences seem to
imply in their writing that somewhere, under the confused
maze of social phenomena, there lurk "scientific laws" which
will supply rather clean-cut and/or absolute-type answers
to various questions concerning these social phenomena. The

general feeling seems to be that if one follows the

35

"objective" methods of the "pure" sciences one will then
uncover social scientific laws of human behavior which
reflect the "certainty" of "purely scientific" laws. With
these propositions, there are a number of problematic impli-
cations, most of which will be discussed in more detail as
the thesis progresses. For example, the assumption that
scientific laws regarding some academic discipline are
discoverable in the sense of existing prior to human formu—
lation is subject to question. At this point it need only
be noted that the general consensus seems to be that "laws"
are formulated in such a way as to conform to the natural
phenomenon under study, and not vice—versa. The implica-
tions of "objectivity" in undertaking certain kinds of
physical experiments is also subject to question, particu—
larly in the light of recent developments in quantum
physics. This point will be discussed later in this
chapter.

The subject of this particular section, however, is
the question of "certainty" and the existence of "absolute
laws" in the physical sciences.

It has been suggested earlier in this chapter that
empirical prOpositions cannot achieve the same kind or
degree of certainty which characterizes pure mathematical
systems. In the empirical realm, mathematical "correla-
tions" are many times more flexible than mathematical

"proof." It has been known for quite some time that

36

empirical phenomena, for the most part, were best explained
by statistical laws of probability as opposed to absolute
laws. Although it is not uncommon to hear of the existence
of universal laws which assert that in all cases without
exception when conditions of a specified kind C are realized
a phenomenon of a certain kind E occurs, it now seems
difficult, if not impossible, to specify exactly all the
conditions involved. For quantum theory now suggests that
it is impossible to accurately specify at least one condi—
tion, the prediction of certain kinds of atomic events, of
which, it may be noted, all other events are composed.

The Hiesenburg "uncertainty principle" involving the
inability of accurately predicting both the position and
momentum of an electron is probably the most notorious
example of quantum theory implications. It is emphasized

that at this level not even statistical laws p: prob -

 

bilipy can pp accuratply ptilized.

 

 

The statistical laws of probability begin to have

 

meaning only as more and more atomic events become involved
in a given phenomenon.

Only in the co-operation in the enormously large
number of atoms do statistical laws begin to
operate and control the behavior of these
assembles with an accuracy increasing as the
number of atoms involved increases. It is in
that way that the events acquire truly orderly
features. All the physical and chemical laws
that are known to play an important part in

the life of organisms are of this statistical
kind; any other kind of lawfulness and order-
liness that one might think of is being perpet—
ually disturbed and made inoperativi by the
unceasing heat motion of the atoms. 3

37

Schrodinger writes further of the /N rule:

The laws of physics and physical chemistry are
inaccurate within a probable relative error of
the order of /N, where N is the number of mole—
cules that co-operate to bring about that law--
to produce its validity within such regions of
space or time (or both) that matter, for some
consideration or some particular experiment.

You see from this again that an organism
must have a comparatively gross structure in
order to enjoy the benefit of fairly accurate
laws, both for its internal life and for its
interplay with the external world. For other-
wise the number of cowOperating particles would
be too small, the "laws" too inaccurate. The
particularly exigent demand is the square root.
For though a million is a reasonably large
number, an accuracy of just one in one thousand
is not overwhelmingly good, if a thing ifiaims
the dignity of being a "Law of Nature."

One reason for this inability to accurately predict
atomic events is that, at this level, the observer himself
is part of the event. The very processes by which he
predicts are themselves part of the event, they cannot be
separated from it. On this point, the noted physicist,
Max Plank, writes:

In consequence the actual impossibility of pre-
dicting even a single occurrence accurately in
classical as well as quantum physics, appears

to be a natural consequence of the circumstance

that man with his sense organs and measuring
instruments is himself a part of nature, subject

 

l3Erwin Schrodinger, "What is Life," in Robert M.
Hutchins and Mortimer J. Adler, The Great Ideas Today
(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1967), p. 381.

lulbid., pp. 38A-385.

38

to its laws and confined within its limits,

whereas the ideal intellect is free of all

such limitations.1
"Certainty," then, is really a matter of degree, it can
even be said to be relative, it ppppppp on the observer's
"threshold of improbability" if you will.

To what extent these individual atomic events
influence the relatively gross phenomena with which social
scientists deal is unknown. However, it should be noted
that at no stage in the conceptual "growth" from atomic
events to gross behavior is "certainty" substituted for
"probability." Indeed, the latter term does not even
begin to have meaning until one leaves the atomic level of
conceptualization. It is obvious that the significance of
these atomic events is closely related to the question of
"probability," a term which itself is not susceptible to
precise universal definition. Lest one be inclined to
disregard the significance of atomic events at the macro-
scopic level, Shrodinger warns that

. . . incredibly small groups of atoms, much too
small to display exact statistical laws, do play

a dominating role in the vegy orderly and-Tawful
events within an organism.1

 

15Max Plank, "The Concept of Causality in Physics,"
in Wiener, pp. pip., p. 87. For the reader's information,
the "ideal intellect" in this case is that which deals
with totally abstract entities or non-empirically observ—
able phenomena, i.e., mathematics.

l6Schrodinger, pp. 333., p. 385.

39

It is interesting to note that the peOple who work
most directly with these concepts and mathematical cal—
culations, the physicists, the chemists, the mathemati-
cians, are ppp, for the most part, the same people who
assert the "certainty" or "absoluteness" of scientific
"laws." On the contrary, these kinds of assertions are
most vociferously put forth by peOple who, for the most
part, have not had the training and experience of working
with these concepts that the student of physics or mathe-
matics may have had. Maybe it is because of this unfamil-
iarity and lack of experience in working with these
concepts that

The non-physicist finds it hard to believe that

really the ordinary laws of physics, which he

regards as the prototype of inviolable pre—

cision, should be based on the statistical

tendency of matter to go over to disorder. 7
There appears to be a constant attempt, almost to the
point of obsession, to "explain" human behavior in terms
of laws which are based on the same kinds of assumptions
which underlie physical 1aWs. Indeed, in many cases the
same basic conceptual framework which is found in the
physical sciences reappears in the form of social or
behavioral "laws." If the physicist is not sure about the

"certainty" of physical laws, how can the social scientist

be so sure about them? Maybe the concept of "physical

 

17Ibid., p. AlA.

A0

laws" is not applicable to social phenomena. With regard
to this point, the physicist, Schrodinger, emphasizes

. . . that from all we have learnt about the struc-

ture of living matter, we must be prepared to find

it working in a manner that cpgnot be reduced to

the ordinary laws of physics.
If only the humility of this physicist could, by some
osmotic process, be passed on to many a social scientist!

Generally speaking, this writer is not in total

disagreement with the prOposition that if one follows, in
a sufficiently similar manner, the methods utilized by
students of the "pure" sciences, one may then expect to
attain the same kind of "certainty" in results, although
not necessarily to the same degree, that is enjoyed by the
pure sciences. However, it is this writer's feeling that
this "certainty" is really not quite as certain as some
social scientists seem to imply. The difference between
mathematical and empirical "certainty" is, as indeed the
differences among the certainties" within the empirical
realm are, rather significant. And it is suggested that

these "certainties" will affect the reliability of both

the methodology utilized and the results obtained.

Quantum Physics and "Supjectivism"

 

The work done, and now being undertaken, in the area

of quantum physics has literally shaken the world of

 

181bid., p. A18.

Al

physical science and philosophy. The implications for
philosophy in particular are relevant to this thesis, and,
consequently, a short discussion will be undertaken with
regard to some particularly relevant aspects of this com-
paratively "new" area of physical science. Basically,
quantum theory appears to modify the rather neat, compact
atomic model which consisted of electrons, protons,
neutrons, etc. (at last count there were 100+ of these
particles) manifesting spatial relationships in a manner
not unlike the solar system. Quantum theory now modifies
this neat picture in such a way that one now has a more
accurate picture of the situation if one views these
particles as bieng, in effect, units (quanta) of energy.
Although the mathematical calculations and detailed analysis
are far beyond the intellectual capacities of this author,
nevertheless, it can be said that this basic conceptual
modification seems to be the most significant general
change in atomic (or, more correctly, quantum) physics.
Whence the relationship between quantum physics and
methodology in the social sciences? The exact relationship
is unknown; but there is one point that is deserving of
discussion. As physicists refined and "re-refined" exper-
iment after eXperiment with regard to quantum phenomena,
they found that there was a point at which the experimenter
ceased to "examine" the "experimentee," so to speak. That

is, at that level of analysis "experimentor" and

A2

"experimentee" really had no meaning in the traditional
sense; there ceased to be a "subject" and an "object." The
instruments, the machines, light, man himself, were inter-
acting with the phenomena being studied, and, consequently,
the experimentor became, in effect, part of that which was
being "observed."

The most significant implication of this effect is
that it appears to be inaccurate to speak of "objectivism"
in the classical sense as being removed from the object of
study; rather, the key word here is "subjectivism." The
"observer" is now an integral part of the "observed," and
is incapable of detachment.19 The implications of such a
situation have been recognized for some time in the field
of philoSOphy,2O although this writer does not portend
through understanding of the relationship, if in fact there
is any, between the position as advanced in the physical
sciences as compared to that advanced in the realm of
social philosophy. Nevertheless, the student of the social
sciences should be aware of these positions and their
possible implications for success (or, more correctly,

failure) in undertaking such "dredging Operations necessary

 

19Richard Schlegel provides a good discussion in his
Completeness in Science (New York: Appleton—Century-Crofts,
1967).

2OPierre Duhem suggests this, as does Willard Van
Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logical
PhiloSOphical Esspys (Cambridge: Harvard Ufiiversity
Press,'l953).

 

A3

to remove obstacles to the development of scientific
objectivity" hinted at by Martindale.2O If the observer is,
in fact, part of the system within which he functions, then
there may be a social application of Go§dels theorem, which
implies the impossibility of a system examining, compre-
hending if you will, itself. If this be true, it may be
that social researchers should restrict research to the

"descriptive" realm, and emphasize the creative aspect of

research rather than the "explanatory."

 

2ODon Martindale (ed.), Fpnctionalism in the Social
Sciences (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and
Social Science, February, 1965), p. viii of the Introduction.

 

CHAPTER III

A DISCUSSION OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC METHOD

General Introduction

 

With this chapter will begin discussion of those ‘
isolated factors with which the social scientist, particu-
larly the comparativist, will be, or should be, most
directly concerned. It must be emphasized at this point
that the division of this chapter into specific, sectional
topical areas, such as "Concept Formulation," "Objectivity,"
and "Truth," was undertaken purely for reasons of chiro-
graphical eXpediency. The divisions, while not without
justification, are, in the last analysis, rather arbitary.

The action is jpstified for the reason that coherence of

 

thought is thereby somewhat simplified, but arbitrary in

 

the sense that this writer is not aware of any "scientific
method" which would "objectively" justify the action taken.
The point is that the subject matter areas should be
viewed as being closely interrelated. Indeed, one will
find that a clear understanding of the concepts introduced

in one section may be dependent upon a grasp of the

 

concepts introduced in another section, and the reader
will find that some concepts have been introduced in earlier

sections in a rather superficial manner with the understanding

A5

that the matter will be taken up later in this chapter or
the thesis. Insofar as coherence of thought seems to
permit, reference to appropriate concepts in other sections
will be made at the time that such referral is deemed
necessary. Although this procedure may result in a certain
amount of repetitiveness and apparent redundancy, never-
theless, it is well worth the price if clearer understanding

will result.

Concept Formulation

 

Above all, the researcher deals with concepts. The
term is rather vague, and a definition will not be attempted
here. Rather, it is hOped that a clearer understanding will
result from examining some stated purposes of "concepts,"
and similarly examining some factors involved in their
formulation. Among other purposes, concepts serve to
provide some sort of order to the myriad phenomena with
which the researcher is confronted, they serve to facilitate
comparison, they provide for productive communication, and,
in general, they provide a basic framework for human under—
standing. Although a detailed discussion of each of these
topics would certainly not be irrelevant to the present
analysis, nevertheless, such an undertaking would be beyond
the proper scope of this thesis. Consequently, the present
discussion will be most directly concerned with the process

of conceptual formulation per se as an attempt to provide

A6

a more manageable picture of interconnected phenomena, and,
secondarily, with the implication that the discussion of the
process may have for the conceptual role in comparative
analysis.

A working assumption of this analysis is that the
universe of phenomena, in their totality, are a totally
interrelated whole, of which the human being, the researcher
if you will, is a part.1 This view is certainly suggested
at the quantum physical level, and, as mentioned in the
last chapter, some philosophers have maintained that a
similar condition obtains on the "macroscopic" level. Since
the human intellect is very probably incapable of compre-
hending every relationship that could exist among the
universe of phenomena, the intellect constructs various
"concepts" or "images" which represent those relationships
which are either the sum of those capable of being grasped
by the "observer" or those which hold some particular
interest for him; "criminal behavior," "enforcement,"
and ""deviancy" are representative examples.

In any case, the "concept" is an extraction from this

totality of phenomena, and this extraction, for whatever

 

1A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New
York: The Free Press, 1925), pp. 161-162.

*The writer will not get involved, at this time, with
the question of whether or not such conceptual extraction
is justified or, indeed, necessary. It may very well be
that such extraction is a necessary part of the functioning
of "mind," although this is a rather complex philosophical
issue.

 

A7

reason, will not be without repercussions for a thorough
understanding of the particular "event" or sum total of
relationships being represented by the concept. The
general proposition being suggested is simply this: The
choosing of the "event" which is represented by the concept,
the process involved, is, in the last analysis, basically
arbitrary in nature. It is arbitrary in the sense that the
particular conceptual extraction could have taken place at
any other point in the universe of phenomena, been involved
with any other event, without contributing any more to the
observer's understanding, to his real knowledge, of the
total phenomenal system of events. The interjection of the
intellect in the form of "concepts" or "meaning" introduces
an artificiality which is obstructive of, as Kant nght
call it, "pure experiencing."2
The following, possibly oversimplified, example may
help to illustrate some of the implications of this
position. Say that line AZ represents the universe of
relationships, the universe as a whole, the line is solid.
Further, say that a researcher is studying some phenomenon
or "event" P whose conceptual symbol or symbols represent

some part CE of AZ. Suppose also that another researcher

is studying a phenomenon Pl whose conceptual symbol or

 

2Kant seems to have suggested this in some of his
material, particularly in the Prolegpmena to Any Future
Metaphysic That May Be Presented As a Science, Academy
Edition.

 

A8

symbols represents some part BD of AZ. Finally suppose
that a third researcher is studying the phenomenon P2 whose

conceptual symbol or symbols represent some part BF of AZ.

A

P
2
The first, rather obvious, observation is that there

are an infinite number of possibilities (Pm) for the con-
ceptual extraction of some phenomenon. Second, since all
the relationships on AZ are interrelated, no one event

can be completely understood without a concomitant under-
standing of (1) all the phenomena, one or both of whose
extreme points on AZ fall within the extreme points of the
phenomenon under analysis, and (2) all phenomena, one or
both of whose extreme points fall "immediately"* outside
the extreme points of the phenomenon under study. These,
of course, will encompass the relationships directly
related to the relationships under study. However, when
one speaks of an analysis of all the relationships directly

related to the ones under analysis, one thereby introduces

 

*On a truly solid line which represents an infinitude
of relationships, it is indeed difficult to conceive of
some point "immediately" outside of another point.

A9

a note of relativity which suggests an infinite number of

direct relationshipp which will be necessary for the

 

thorough understanding of the relationships directly
related to the ones under study. In other words, steps

1 and 2 above must now be undertaken for a complete under-
standing of the relationships directly pp indirectly (for

they will soon become directly) related to the ones under

 

study. Using the illustration above, and again, conse—
quently, at the risk of oversimplification, one might say
that thorough understanding of P requires a thorough under-

standing of P , which requires a thorough understanding of

1
P2, which, in the final analysis, requires a thorough
understanding of Pm. Actually, a sphere would probably
serve the illustrative purpose much better than the fine
AZ, since the real impact of P0° can be more easily grasped
when something more than a two dimensional reference is
utilized.* The application to the "field" of police
administration can be made more obvious by substituting

"law enforcement" for P, "policing" for P1’ and "social

control" for P2.

 

*This, of course, is the way Einstein had envisioned
the universe, that is, as a three dimensional (A dimensional
if one includes Time) geometrical figure. It served very
well for depicting the "closed" nature of the universe, and
it would probably serve very well for depicting the nature
of reality that is envisioned by this writer. Incidentally,
it seems quite possible that the similarity may be more
than structural.

50

The important point to emphasize is that the concepts
with which the researcher works represent events which have
been conceptually extracted from their totality of inter-
relationships. Indeed, the very terms "event" and "inter-
relationships" are really quite inadequate since they may
easily acquire a connotation of finiteness with respect to
the conceptual segments involved. It does indeed seem
justifiable to say that ". . . every single perception dis-
closes on closer examination an infinite number of constit-
uent perceptions which can never be exhaustively expressed

in a judgment."3

The utilization of the term "phenomenon"
or "event" immediately restrains one's View of reality
insofar as interrelationships with other "events" are
concerned. Regarding this problem, Brecht writes:

. . events cannot be neatly separated into units
that follow each other like the units of an alphabet,
distinctly identifiable as separate. Every detail
of what occurs is so inseparably intertwined with
what had occurred before and will occur after, and
even with what occurs simultaneously, that any
lumping together of occurrences into bigger units
called "events" is utterly arbitrary . . . A

If such general and all-inclusive terms as "event"

or "phenomenon" fail to represent the interrelationships
of reality, how much less so would such terms as "policing,"

"legal," or "enforcement"?

 

3Max Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science," in
Wiener, Philip P. (ed), Readings in The Philosophy of Science
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 195A), p. 330.

 

“Arnold Brecht, Political Theory; The Foundations of
Twentieth-Centupy Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1959), p. 97.

 

51

There are a number of questions which present them-
selves at this point if one accepts the basic position
suggested by the previous discussion. If the concepts in
terms of which natural phenomena are comprehended are

"5

indeed "man—made inventions, how does one know how
accurately one's concept represents reality? As Harre
puts it:
We know that our perceptions, are, in part,
the result of the mental ordering and grouping of
our sensations. It is an easy step from this fact
to sceptical doubts about the degree of resemblance
which we are entitled to assume that our perceptions
bear to those things, prOperties, and procegses
which we want to say cause our perceptions.
Further, one is always confronted with the problem that
what one is observing is most probably not some elemental
relationship, but, rather, a conglomeration of relation-
ships; one is never quite sure whether what one is
observing is a number of details which are combined into
larger units, or larger units (wholes) which can be further
subdivided into parts.7 Actually, it seems more likely
that it could be both depending upon one's perspective.
It may very well be that, as Cohen suggests,8 the

formulated concepts are, in fact, reality; that it is more

 

5L. L. Thurstone, "Multiple-Factor Analysis," in
Wiener, (ed.), pp. cit., p. 193.

6R. Harre, Matter and Method (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 196A), p. A.

 

7Brecht, pp. cit., p. 39.

8Morris R. Cohen, "The Place of Logic in the Law,"
Introduction to Law: Selected Essays Reprinted From the
Harvard Law Review (Cambridge: The Harvard Law Review
Association, 1965), p. 188.

 

 

52

realistic to view concepts as themselves being the "reality"
and to end our search for some "reality" apart from the
concepts. Certainly, Mannheim's observation that " . . .
human thought—processes concerned with the same world
produce divergent conceptions of that world" can be viewed
as suggesting a similar conclusion. However, assuming
this position, how does one eXplain the observation that in
many cases scientists, working independently of each other,
often arrive at similar conclusions regarding some aSpect
of "reality"? These issues will be discussed further,
either directly or indirectly, as the thesis progresses.
Although the relevance to comparative method, with
particular reference to criminal justice, can be readily
deduced from the discussion, the implications may be
eXplicated further. The rather general, and very basic,
term "legal behavior" is indicative of the problems fore-
shadowed by the previous discussion. Can behavior really
be so distinctly separated into "legal" and other kinds?
How does one draw the line between "legal" and other types
of social behavior? By separating "legal" behavior from
other types of behavior, has not one thereby "staked out"
one's position on the line AZ, and has not one thereby
raised the issues (Pw) connected with such action? Again,
can the administration of a given organization be truly
understood in vacuo? Of course not, and no contemporary

student of public administration would suggest such a

53

prOposition. However, when one begins to examine those

phenomena most directly related to the administration of

 

a particular organization, one then becomes involved in
the "Pm" problem, and any line that one may draw with

respect to the most directly related phenomena will be,

 

in the last analysis, arbitary.

These are significant questions which need analysis.
If one accepts their implications, then one should question
oneself regarding the conceptual framework from which one
pursues social scientific study. Further, if one accepts
the implications, how does one justify research from the
present conceptual framework? Brecht offers in justifi-
cation for continuing in this manner the fact that the
social sciences need research, ppp, and that the present
framework is all we have to work with in undertaking social

9 Although there is, obviously, wide consensus

analysis.
on the validity of this basic justification, somehow, this
just does not seem to sufficiently meet the problem. As
Brecht himself had earlier written:

Agreement does not necessarily prove the validity

of a theory; human history is to a considerable
extent a history of erroneous agreements.10

 

9

10Ibid., p. 11.

Brecht, pp. cit., p. 79.

5A

Objectivity, Part I

 

"Objectivity" has become an end in itself within the
realm of social research. Its apotheosis has probably
resulted from, among other things, its close association
with eXperimental methodology in the "pure" sciences. Due
to the rather charismatic quality of the term, and due
similarly to the position it now occupies in the hierarchy
of social scientific values, one would be remiss not to
undertake an analysis of the term in any discussion of
social scientific methodology. To facilitate the presen-
tation of material, the following discussion has been
divided into two (2) general questions; (1) Can one
approach a given analysis of some phenomenon in the absence
of any preconceived ideas regarding certain aspects of
that analysis?, and (2) What is meant, indeed, what ppp_be
meant, by the proposition that one must "objectively"
observe certain kinds of phenomena? These two questions,
obviously, are closely related; indeed, their very separ-
ation may appear quite illogical and wanting of adequate
justification. Admittedly, this is a valid criticism, but
this writer could think of no better approach which would
take into account the rather subtle distinction between

general method and particular observation which is suggested

 

 

by the division. HOpefully, the distinction, however
subtle, will become more easily discernible as the discus-
sion progresses, for if, and as, this occurs, the justifi-

cation for the initial division may become self—evident.

It is not uncommon to hear it said that one must
approach a particular research project with an "open mind,"
or "objectively," or without any "preconceived ideas"
that may "distort" the "true" picture. One must be aware
of drawing conclusions before they have been "verified"
by the "facts." With regard to general questions of
method, the fact that the human mind is most likely
incapable of manifesting itself without the use of ideas
is not worthy of discussion; it is simply unrealistic
to speak in terms of a mind without ideas. Proceeding
on this admittedly empirically unverifiable assumption,
it would seem that a more proper question might be, "Do
such preconceived ideas serve any useful purpose in
scientific research?" The answer appears to be in the
affirmative.

To begin with, without the existence of pre-
constructed concepts, field research would be undertaken
rather indiscriminately. There would be no orientation
with regard to the gathering of data, indeed, one could
not tell what the relevant data would be.

Scientific achievements are rarely made by
those who start with an Open mind without any
knowledge or anticipation of nature. In order
to find something we must look for it . . . without
any anticipatory idea . . . we do not know what

facts to look for and cannot recognize what is
relevant to the inquiry.11

 

llPauline v. Young, Scientific Social Surveys and
Research, Ath Ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 109.

 

 

56

Within the present conceptual framework of the social
sciences, the characteristics of eXperimentation necessi-
tate some kind of selective orientation for information
gathering. In addition, pre-experimental thought may give
some indication of where to go to find certain types of
information, and, in some cases, there may be some indi-
cation of what types of information may be expected to
be available.

It is a complete misunderstanding of the require-

ments of scientific research to begin immediately

with indiscriminate field research. Such research

can and should be well prepared by hard thinking

on the basis of available experiences, including

those of the thinker himself. Such preparatory

work may lead us to good guespes of what we can or

cannot eXpect to find . . . 1

Generally, the need for this kind of preparatory work

is accepted by students of the social sciences; precon-
ceived ideas, in that sense of the word, are accepted as
necessary. When one is able to clearly discern and, in
effect, to some degree manipulate these types of precon-
ceptions, the problems do not appear to be particularly
significant. However, there are other kinds of precon-
ceptions which are necessarily involved in this type of
Operation, and which may not be so easily recognizable.

These types of preconceptions provide the basic conceptual

structure by which one's thought processes Operate, and,

 

l2Brecht, pp. cit., p. 392.

57

consequently, these kinds of preconceptions are not readily
identifiable. The problem is made even more complex when
analysis or research of some kind is being undertaken within
the context of a social environment in which this basic
conceptual structure is shared by the other inhabitants.
In the field of comparative analysis, where there is
a rather good probability that one may be studying phenomena
which are manifested in an environment whose inhabitants
share a basic conceptual structure with regard to thought
processes that is different from that of the observer, the
issue becomes at the same time both significantly more '
subtle and subtly more significant. This problem is not
peculiar to the social sciences; it is a potential problem
for all empirical sciences. It is particularly operative
whenever meaning is attached to any symbol. The physicist-
philosopher Henri Poincare states the problem rather
clearly.
It is often said experiments must be made

without a preconceived idea. That is impossible.

Not only would it make all eXperiment barren, but

that would be attempted which could not be done.

Everyone carries in his mind his own conception

of the world, of which he cannot so easily rid

himself. We must, for instance, use language;

and our language is made up only of preconceived

ideas and cannot be otherwise. Only these are

unconscious preconceived ideas, and thpusand
times more dangerous than the others.1

 

l3Henri Poincare, "Hypotheses in Physics," Wiener
(ed.), pp. cit., p. 33.

As more and more "knowledge" is accumulated as a
result of research based upon some one conceptual thought
structure, the more difficult it becomes for one who shares
such a structure to recognize the element of relativity
which pervades it. SO long as one remains unaware of one's
attachment to a basic conceptual thought structure, so long
does one remain so attached to one's way of thinking

. . . that the ways of thinking which are perceived
in other groups are regarded as curiosities, errors,
ambiguities, or-heresies. At this stage one does not
doubt either the correctness of one's own traditions
of thougpfi or the unity and uniformity of thought in
general.

As mentioned previously, the implications of this
position should be carefully weighed by the comparativist,
for there are ramifications for all disciplines of compar—
ative social scientific analysis. In the field of
political science, for instance, our sometimes overly
emotional attachment with basic democratic principles has
frequently hindered real understanding of the role of
elements of other political systems.15 In the field of
police administration, the experience in post-war Japan
presented the problem in a fashion which was all too clear

to the American police administrators who were involved

with "democratizing" the Japanese police system. In the

 

l“Karl Mannheim, "The Sociology of Knowledge,"
Wiener (ed.),pp. cit., p. 352.

15Brecht, pp. cit., p. 32.

58

59

broader field of criminal justice, one's basic conceptions
of "trial," "law-morality,' etc., may prevent one from

fully comprehending systems that deal with similar phenomena
in other cultures. Indeed, the very term "criminal justice"
is a concept which may not have significant meaning within

the context of another culture.

On Words

The discussion has now become so indirectly concerned
with "words" per se, that a short expository departure from
the analysis of "objectivity" at this point seems almost
necessary to maintain coherence of thought. The problem of
the ambiguity and relativity of meaning of words is, or
should be, most familiar to social scientists in the compar—
ative field. Where comparative analysis is undertaken in
a cross-cultural context, the "word problem" or "language
problem" takes on added prOportions. Although it is a
potential problem in almost any academic endeavor with
empirical overtones, word ambiguity is a particularly
sticky issue in the social sciences, where the subject
matter appears to be a little more susceptible to such
problems than is generally the case with the subject matter
of, say, physics or chemistry.

Political scientists and public administrators, due
to their relatively recent interest in comparative analysis

and consequent lack of experience, have found the problem

60

particularly sticky. This fact, added to the burden
created by the nature of the subject matter dealt with,
presents a rather formidable obstacle for the undertaking
of valid comparative analysis. As Brecht states:
Most words (verbal symbols) are ambiguous; they
cover a great variety of facts or values, or of
both. This is especially so in the political
field, where terms such as freedom, equality,
democracy, socialism, patriotism, loyalty, poweri
authority, order, carry many different meanings. 6
The fields of law and legal philosOphy, insofar as one may
wish to distinguish, is notorious with respect to semantical
problems. Felix Frankfurter, in discussing the difficulties
which arise from statutory interpretation even within the
context of one's own culture, feels that:
The problem arises from the very nature of words.
They are symbols of meaning. But unlike mathe-
matical symbols, the phrasing of a document,
especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains
more than approximate precision. If individual
words are inexact symbols, with shifting variables,
their configuration can hardly achieve invariant
meaning or assured definition.l
Similarly, Karl Llewellyn feels that similar problems may
have indirectly affected the effective study of legal
behavior. He emphasized ". . . the limitations of rules,

of precepts, or words, when made the focus, the center p:

 

16Brecht, pp, cit., p. 57. In passing, it might be
noted that Brecht suggests the use of mathematical symbols
to replace such terms.

l7Felix Frankfurter, "Some Reflections On The Reading
of Statutes," Essays On Juripprudence From the Columbia
Law Review (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963),
p. AA.

 

 

61

18

reference, in thinking about law." In critically

 

discussing the traditional approach to the study of legal
phenomena, which has striking similarity with the tradi-
tional approach in political science, public administration,
or police administration, he goes on to say:
The traditional approach is in terms of words;
it centers on words; it has the utmost diffi- A
culty in getting beyond words. If nothing be
said about behavior, the tacit assqution is
that the words do reflect behavior.
The point to emphasize is that the researcher should look

beyond the verbal symbols, the words, in analysis of some

social phenomenon. So much for words.

In summary of this section, it is noted that it is
unrealistic to think in terms of approaching some partic-
ular piece of research in a state of mind which is devoid
of preconceived ideas. In fact, it is difficult to
conceive of "mind" as existing apart from "ideas." Not
only would it be a rather frustrating experience to
attempt to reach such an "ideal" state, but it is ques-
tionable whether such a state would, in fact, be "ideal."
For preconceived ideas are not only helpful in delimiting
the area of study and indicating what the relevant data may
be, but they are, in addition, simply necessary, whether

or not one finds them helpful.

 

l8Karl N. Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence--
The Next Step," Essays On Jurisprudence From the Columbia
Law Review, pp. cit., p. 153.

 

19Ihid., p. 161.

62

Over and above the problem of these rather readily
observable preconceptions, one is faced with the additional
problem posed by the not—so-readily discernible precon-
ceptions, the very basic ones which influence both the
information gathering process and the construction of
other concepts. They are, in effect, basic assumptions of
"the nature of things" with regard to certain aspects of
reality; in the field of physics, "space" and "time" are
examples. To recognize and work with these "preconceptions"
requires a good deal of very hard, but very basic, thinking.
At this stage of development in the social sciences,
consensus has not yet been attained on what these most
basic concepts, in fact, are; and until such consensus has
been attained, one may never know to what extent and in
what respect one is being "non-objective" in approaching

analysis of social phenomena.

Objectivity, Part II

 

As utilized in the social sciences, the proposition
that one should "objectively" study something seems to carry
with it an assumption that the something to be studied is
capable of "being" apart from any human meaning which may
be attached to it; the position is certinaly not dissimilar

to Heinrich Rickert's "Reality" and "Meaning" distinction.2O

 

2OSee Brecht, pp. cit., p. 209 for a short discus-

sion of Rickert's thesis.

63

From the assumption that something can "be" apart from
human meaning, it appears that "objectivity," in the
sense herein used, would refer to a process by which the
human, the researcher, would view the phenomenon from a
state of mind devoid of any preconceived meaning. There
are a number of problems inherent in this position, some
of which were discussed in the preceding section. It is
the purpose of this section to analyze some implications
that may not have been brought out in that section.

Among other things, the above position suggests that
there is a "subject," to wit, the researcher, and an
"object," to wit, the phenomenon to be studied; in short,
the classical "subject-object" distinction is at the base
of the position. At this point one is referred to the
discussion on quantum physics which suggested that at the
quantum level of analysis there could be no "subject" and
"object," both were onezmuithe same. At the quantum level
of observation, the key word is not "objectivism," but,
rather, "subjectivism," although, upon closer analysis,
even that term seems inadequate. The question was also
raised at that point as to what implications the conclusions
reached regarding observation of quantum events might have
for the macrosc0pically oriented social scientific research
activities; and, again, it must be stated that the exact
relation is unknown, or, at least, not generally agreed

upon. However, it was noted that conclusions similar to

6A

those reached regarding quantum analysis have in fact been
reached by some philoSOphers with regard to the "social
universe," if you will. This View is generally put forth
as the "wholistic" View, and, indeed, the P0° problem
discussed previously is based upon this position.

If one accepts the "wholistic" position, there are

“L.

some rather significant implications for social scientific
"objectivity," at least in the sense that the term is being
herein used. Assuming that one is part of the entire
system of events occurring in the universe one calls
"reality," then it would seem that one would be incapable
of completely comprehending the system of which one is a
part, since one could not comprehend the act of one's

comprehension. In this sense, then, one is always both

 

"subject" and "object," and one can realize a "subject-
object" distinction with respect to oneself only to a
degree, specifically, only-to the degree that one is
"willing" to sacrifice full comprehension of the total
system.

This discussion could proceed for some time without
all of the ramifications being fully analyzed; the entire
question is much too complex to be thoroughly analyzed by
this writer and in this thesis. It is mentioned here only
as a stimulus to thought, in the hope that some students of
the social sciences will become aware that one of the basic

premises of certain types of social scientific research,

65

namely, that there is a "subject-object" distinction, is
vulnerable to considerable question.

Regarding the question of "objectivity," there is, in
addition to the assumption of a "subject-object" distinc—
tion, the assumption that the mind is capable of compre-
hending certain phenomena, of receiving certain sense
impressions, in a totally passive manner. That is, in a
manner that will attach no "artificial" meaning or charac-
teristics to the conglomeration of sense impressions
received. This attempt to attain purely descriptive state-
ments of "facts" appears to have the potential for causing
a great deal of frustration among social scientists. This
seems to be particularly true in View of the previous
discussion which centered on preconceived ideas and the
influence of one's basic conceptual structure on thought
processes. It appears that this basic conceptual structure,
these unconscious assumptions, mitigate against purely
descriptive statements.

-. . . contrary to what some empiricist philoso-
phers seem to have held, "observation-description"
are not written on the face of events to be trans—
ferred directly into language, but are already
"interpretations" of events, and the kind of

interpretation depends on the Eiamework of assump—
tions of a language community.

 

21Mary B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), pp. 16-17.

 

66

Observation of some event is not simply passive; the
literature seems to suggest that observation involves a
number of elemental processes, and is influenced by a number
of factors.

Empirical observation of even the simplest
fact is a complicated process. In its course
the mind is not merely a receiving instrument;
it cooperates in various ways, intentionally
singling out the objects and sub-objects of
observation, using many conceptions and eXper-
iences previously piled up in it, and affecting--
sometimes sharpening, sometimes corrupting--
the accuracy of observation through expectations
or through some preconceived shape of config—
uration. 2

There is, then, something more to observation than physio-
logical reaction. "Meaning," although possibly having a
physiological basis, cannot be understood solely in those
terms; "meaning" is not as susceptible to manipulation in
the same way that physiological processes are.

Observing is an eXperience. A retinal
reaction or an olfactory or tactile reaction
is only a physical state-~a photochemical or
pressure-sensitive excitation. Physiologists
have not always distinguished experiences
from physical states. People see, not their
eyes. Cameras and eyeballs are blind.
Attempts to locate within the organs of
sight (or within the neurological reticulum
behind the eyes), some nameable called
"seeing" or "observing" may be summarily
dismissed. There is more to seeing than
meets the eyeball. And there is much more
to scientific observation than merely standing
alert with sense organs "at the ready!

 

22Brecht, pp. cit., p. 32.

23Norwood Russel Hanson, "Observation and Inter-
pretation," Morgenbesser, Sidney, Philos0phy of Science
Today (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1962), p. 91.

 

67

It appears that one cannot escape the effects of
the totality of one's experiences. The processes by which
we observe are significantly influenced by past exper-
iences as well as by physiological states. Both past
experiences (in the broadest sense) and physiological
states are involved in a joint process which may be called
"observation," and the significance of their respective
roles probably varies with the phenomenon being observed.2u
For example, it would seem that in those instances where
touch and smell may be utilized as an aid in observation,
physiological factors would probably play a more signif-
icant role than if one were observing some pure abstraction.
Specifically, physiological processes would probably play
a more direct role for a geologist in analyzing a piece of
rock than they would for a social scientist observing
some type of "legal behavior"; the social scientist does
not "see" legal behavior in the same sense that a geologist
"sees" a piece of rock. This suggests that, however
contrary to "objectivism" it may seem, past experiences,
etc. play a relatively more significant role in "seeing"
social phenomena than would be the case in observing those
types of things with which biologists and chemists, for
instance, work most frequently. However "unobjective" this
position may appear, the conclusion does not seem to be

unjustified.

 

2A
Harre, pp. cit., p. 52.

 

68

However one may try, one cannot escape the influence
that the totality of one's past experiences will have on
one's mode of thought and the process by which one gives
meaning to what is sensually received. Actually, the
phrase "pppp experiences" is not quite adequate unless
taken very strictly, for the social milieu within which one
functions will have similar effects on the relatively
indiscernible assumptions which influence one's thought
process. Within the context of comparative analysis,
particularly where cross—cultural overtones may be evident,
the issue obviously becomes many times more significant.
Karl Popper discusses these problems under the general
heading of "the sociology of knowledge."

The sociology of knowledge argues that
scientific thought, and especially thought on
social and political matters, does not proceed
in a vacuum, but in a socially conditioned
atmosphere. It is influenced largely by
unconscious or subconscious elements. These
elements remain hidden from the thinker's
observing eye because they form, as it were,
the very place which he inhabits, his social
habitat. The social habitat of the thinker
determines a whole system of opinions and
theories which appear to him as unquestion-
ably true or self-evident. They appear to him
as if they were logically and trivially true,
such as, for example, the sentence "all tables
are tables." This is why he is not even aware
of having made any assumptions at all. But
that he has made assumptions can be seen if we
compare him with a thinker who lives in a very
different social habitat; for he too will
proceed from a system of apparently unquestion-
able assumptions, but from a very different one;
and it may be so different that no intellectual
bridge may exist and no compromise be possible
between these two systems.2

 

25Karl Popper, "The Sociology of Knowledge," Wiener
(ed.), pp. cit., p. 358.

-1

69

At this point a short recapitulation is called for.
The above discussion suggests that there can be no true
"objectivity" either in the sense of an absence of precon-
ceived opinions or ideas or in the sense of passive
observation of events with no attachment of meaning. It
appears that there are always preconceived ideas within
the mind of the researcher, and he cannot help but attach
meanings to observable phenomena. In addition, in most
cases the underlying basis from which such meanings
accrue will not be discernible by the observer, for they
will be the result of his totality of experiences from
which he cannot divorce himself for purposes of analysis.
Every meaning, every vieWpoint, is, in a sense, both his
own and not his own. It was probably, basically, for this
reason that Max Weber stated the case, although possibly
a little harshly, when he pointed out that:
There is no absolutely "objective" scientific
analysis of culture-—or put perhaps more narrowly
but certainly not essentially differently for our
purposes--of "social phenomenon" independent of
special and "one-sided" viewpoints according to
which--expressly or tacitly, consciously or
unconsciously--they are selected, analyzed and
organized for expository purposes."2
If pure scientific objectivity seems to be an impos-
sibility, and if all vieWpoints regarding social phenomena

have sometimes rather significant personal connotations,

can there be any "rea1"'phenomena to observe? Does,

 

26Max Weber, pp. cit., p. 325.

 

70

indeed can, "objectivity" have a useful meaning? This
writer is not qualified to answer the first question at this
time. As to the second, at least a statement or two can
be made. If one of the characteristics of any scientific
method is that it allows for confirmation or rejection by
a process of Open and public (not necessarily in the
liberal political sense) re-eXperimentation, then maybe

. . . What we call "scientific objectivity" is

not a product of individual scientists' impar-

tiality (since it has been suggested that this

may be unrealistic to assume) but a product of

the social or public character of scientific

method . . .27
Here one becomes involved in what Brecht calls "inter-
subjectively transmissible knowledge," a concept to be
touched on again later in this chapter. At this point, of
course, one becomes involved with the question of "truth"
and "fact" (again, to be discussed later in this chapter),
for they are rather obviously closely related to the question
of "objectivity." For now, suffice it to say that the
social scientist, particularly the comparativist, should
be prepared to accept a workable definition of "objectivity"
which reflects considerably less absoluteness and purity

than what appears to have been the case in much of the

literature which has been put forth thus far.

 

27Karl Popper, pp. cit., p. 362.

71

raise.

The question of "value" is, of course, closely related
to that of "objectivity," although the former appears even
less susceptible to concise definition than the latter. As
was the case with preconceived ideas, most social scientists
appear to accept the influence of "value" factors as a
necessary, and in some cases useful, condition in the pre-
liminary steps of research. Few contemporary scientists
would maintain, as Martindale suggests, that ". . . it is
the essence of the scientific mode of thought that it
analyze its problems dispassionately in a value-neutral

28
manner."

A great many more social scientists feel
that value judgments are properly utilized in determining
goals, although a number of these may disagree about the
use of such judgments in the determination of means; Young's
position that research must be pursued "objectively" only
after value decisions have been made regarding problem
identification, experimental design, etc., is indicative
of this basic position.29

Social scientists, then, seem to suggest that "value"

judgments differ from judgments which are "objectively"

made; indicative of this is Brecht's statement, "The

 

28Don Martindale (ed.), "Functionalism in The Social
Sciences" (American Academy of Political and Social Sciences:
Philadelphia, February, 1965), p. VIII, Introduction.

29Young, pp. cit., p. 127.

72

judgment that something is true or false is no value

"30 The true scientific method per se, is suppos-

judgment.
edly characterized by "objective" data gathering, and value
judgments are influential only in the penumbra of method-
ology so to speak, or so they say. Indeed, it is main-
tained that the use of "objective scientific methods,"
renders one incapable of proving, in an intersubjectively
transmissible manner, ". . . the validity of ultimate
value judgments beyond the clarifications of their impli- 1
cations and consequences."31 The distinction is that
clear!

Upon closer analysis, however, the distinction does
not appear to be really all that clear. Can "value"
judgments, in fact, be so clearly distinguishable from
other kinds of judgments. Within the context of scientific
method, the attempt at separation, for other than purely
theoretical analysis, appears to be rather self-defeating.
For as John Dewey had pointed out, an attempt toward
"scientific objectivity" presupposes ". . . the sincere aim
to judge.truly," and for this reason any "scientific
judgment" is always, in the last analysis, a value judgment.32

Further, if one accepts the implications of the sociology of

 

3OBrecht, pp. cit., p. 265.

31Ibid., p. 131.

32John Dewey, Problems of Men (New York: Philosoph-
ical Library, 19A6), p. 228.

 

 

73

knowledge doctrine, one should be prepared to recognize the
possibility that "value" judgments, as with other kinds
(insofar as one wishes to clearly distinguish), are an
inherent part of the thought process of the observer, from
which it appears impossible to escape. With this in mind,
the impact of Young's statement is more keenly felt.

In the last analysis it is the eXperimenter who

makes the choices and decisions on what, when, and

how to use the complicated system of measuring

instruments. These decisions are a scientist's

evaluation, and therefore there can be n value-

free research or value-free observation.

Finally, there are some implications that follow
from the position, maintained previously, that "value"
judgments cannot be "objectively" verified by "scientific
method." Those who put so much faith in the scientific
method and point to all that it has been, and most
assuredly will be, able to conquer, must be prepared to
accept the possibility that all or most "value" judgments
are, in fact, quite "objective," since it may only be a
matter of time before an acceptable method will be devised
that could "scientifically" verify their "objectivity."
Even if this were not the case for all such value judg-
ments, still, how could one know which value judgments will

be capable of being "objectively" dealt with in the

future? Or, on the other hand, one should be prepared to

 

33Young, pp. cit., p. 182.

 

7A

accept the possibility that all judgments are, in fact,
"value" judgments, of which some may be further termed
"objective" because of the existence of some method which
complies with some generally accepted rules of procedure.
In short, the distinction between "value" and other types
of judgments does not appear to be as clearcut as is
implied by some social scientists.

Nor does it appear realistic to suppose that
"objective" observations are made in vacuuo without recourse
to some value premise. The data observed must have some
meaning for the observer if the latter is going to utilize
the former in some constructive manner, and meaning, as
previously suggested, implies recourse to some value premise.
It may be quantitatively useful to carry out the arithmatic~
operation 2+2=A without attaching any particularly signif-
icant meaning to 2 or A. But, one cannot manipulate
social scientific symbols in a similar manner without the
attachment of some meaning both prior and subsequent to the
arithmetic Operation. For in the social scientific sphere,
quantitative elements are not as significant as the quali-
tative ones. Scriven's criticism of the ". . . arid
escapism of the so—called 'empirical' school of political
science . . ." with their "pristine but pointless evalua-
tions" appears to be based on the position that meaning is

necessary for extracting "crucial criteria" from the mass

75

3A

of observed data. In other words, empirical data can

take on meaning for the observer only insofar as they are
related to some value premise, and this seems particularly
true with regard to the social sciences. The discussion
by Weber on this point is quoted at length.

The significance of a configuration of cultural
phenomena and the basis of this significance
cannot however be derived and rendered intel-
ligible by a system of analytical laws (Gesetzes—
begriffen), however perfect it may be, since the
significance of cultural events presupposes a
value-orientation toward these events. The
concept of culture is a value—concepp. Empirical
reality becomes "culture" to us because and
insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It
includes those segments and only those segments
of reality which have become significant to us
because of this value-relevance. Only a small
portion of existing concrete reality is colored
by our value conditioned interest and it alone

is significant to us. It is significant because
it reveals relationships which are important to
us due to their connection with our values . . .
We cannot discover, however, what is meaningful
to us by means of a "presuppositionless" inves-
tigation of empirical data. Rather, perception
of its meaningfulness to us is the presuppopition
of its becoming an object of investigation. 5

 

 

 

As mentioned previously, many social scientists seem
to feel that value judgments can and should be reserved for
deciding upon ultimate goals and objectives, but having
done that, the researcher then "objectively" proceeds to

36

gather the data. In addition to the short discussion

 

3“Michael Scriven, "Science, Fact, and Value,"
Morgenbesser (ed.), pp. cit., p. 185.

35

36Harold D. Laswell, "The Policy Orientation," D.
Lerner and H. D. Laswell (eds), The Policy Science, Recent
DevelOpments in Scppe and Method (Stanford University Press,
1951), pp. 9 and 11. Brecht also takes the position
throughout the whole of his book.

Weber, pp, cit., p. 329.

 

76

earlier, there is now one further implication which seems
to be suggested by the preceding analysis of "meaning,"
particularly with respect to Weber's statement. If one
accepts the position that the basic structure of the
research project is the result of value judgments,37 and if
one also accepts Weber's position that data without the
interjection of the observer's value system are meaning- A H
less, then "objectivity" can be easily construed as having ' I
meaning only within the subjectively (in the sense of non- i
objectively, personally, although not necessarily inten-
tionally) constructed system and only to the observer
whose values provided the premise for the construction of
that system. In other words, pure "objectivity," at best,
may have meaning only for the particular observer and only
within the context of the study being undertaken.
The theory, of course, is far from tight, and a
number of questions can be raised regarding it. The only
purpose in expounding it is to raise spme very basic
questions about the nature of "objectivity" and its relation
to "value" judgments. It is hoped that this discussion has
considerably confused the whole issue, for confusion may
stimulate more thought. Heretofore, the issue has been
relatively clear, in some cases too clear, in the minds of

many social scientists, particularly regarding students of

 

37See Footnote 33.

77

comparative political, public, and police organization.

One of the reasons, probably, is that the latter academic
areas are relatively new (infant in the case of comparative
police administration) and much is yet to be learned.
However, in their haste to learn, students of these fields
should not accept without question some of the basic
elements of social methodology, or, for that matter, any

empirical methodology. For the issues are far from clear,

 

and they are very far from resolved.

 

Fact

 

A discussion of "objectivity" or value judgments would
not be complete without a similar discussion regarding the
nature of "facts." For most, if not necessarily all,
proponents of the "objective scientific method" presuppose
the existence of "facts" which one can perceive if one is
"objective" enough. The following quote by Brecht, appar-
ently made in an attempt to justify the use of the term
"fact," is indicative of this position.

So long as we do not abandon the speculative idea
that there is a reality which no human senses have
yet observed or may ever be able to observe--be it
a star whose light has not reached us or has not

been made noticeable and may never become notice-
able, or be it some metaphysical reality--so long
do we need in our vocabulary for this reality a

term that is indppendent of the state of our
knowledge; . . .

 

38Brecht, pp, cit., p. 50.

78

Although such terms as "speculative" and "metaphysical" in
his statement do not tend to thoroughly convince one of it,
actually, Brecht appears quite certain that there are such
things as "facts." In Eppp, one of the criteria for proving
£pppp to be gpppp is the acceptance of the apparently
observed Epppp as actual Eppppl39
Notwithstanding the certainty with which Brecht
approaches the issue, and the frequency with which it is
utilized in the social scientific literature, the term
"fact" seems to be among the most difficult to define.“0
The problem seems to revolve around the condition that
once a phenomenon has been physically received into the
sense organs, it must then be given meaning so that it can
be truly "observed," this distinction between physiological
states and "eXperiencing" being discussed earlier in this
chapter. In addition, the structure of the thought processes
and cultural and social environmental variation contribute
their share to the issue; as Young puts it, "Facts expressed
in words assume different meanings to different people,
depending on their past experience as well as on the many
things with which they associate the facts and the words.”1

Physiological reaction, thought processes, cultural and

 

39Ihid., p. A9.

quoung, pp. cit., p. 10.

ullbid.

79

social environmental variation, and the intangible called
"meaning" all combine to create a problem significantly
more complex than might initially appear to be the case
upon scanning some of the social scientific literature.

In view of these difficulties, one may easily be
tempted to take the extreme position that there is simply
no such thing as a "fact." However, how would one then
account for the observation, mentioned earlier, that in
many cases scientists, working independently (both
physically and culturally) of each other, and on the same
subject matter, arrive at very similar conclusions? One
of the more plausible explanations seems to be that,
although there may be some personal variation as to what
the "facts" really are, intersubjective compatibility or
agreement on certain aspects of the phenomenon concerned
may help to solidify an image of the "fact" which is
capable of consensus with regard to the Observers involved.
Surprisingly, Brecht expounds upon this position at length,
terming it "consubjectivity," and even accepts it as a
basis for his general theory concerning the "intersubjective
transmissibility of knowledge."* The discussion fits so

well with the present analysis, that it is quoted in toto.

 

*Here is an example of the much too common phenomenon
where one accepts a position which has implications that
seemingly undermine the theory that one goes on to espouse,
but one goes on without resolVing, or, in many cases without
attempting to resolve, the contradiction. In this case,
"consubjectivity" certainly does not suggest the absolute-
ness that is necessary to observe "facts as actual facts,"
yet both positions are put forth by Brecht.

 

80

An empirical observation may be limited to
a single situation or be repeated in essentially
similar situations. It may be "extrospective,"
focusing on the outside, or "introspective,"
focusing on the inner self. It is always,-
strictly speaking, observation by one person,
and by one person only. Other persons may make
similar observations, but never identical ones,
because the terms "I" and "Here" refer to
different persons and places in each case.

Even though observations by two or more
persons are never identical the "what" observed
may, of course, be so, if due allowance is made
for the different "angle" or "perspective."
However, to accept identity of the object (the
"what") observed by several persons means to
accept a fundamental presupposition: the truth
of the common-sense assumption that one and the
same thing often cause parallel impressions in
different human beings, and that, therefore,
there is a broad sphere of what is best called
"consubjectivity." 2

 

Similarly, Schrodinger's amusing, but pertinent, example
of viewing a tree is worth quoting.

. . . there is a tree there outside my window,
but I could not really see the tree. By some
cunning device of which only the initial, rela-
tively simple steps are explored, the real tree
throws an image of itself into my consciousness,
and that is what I perceive. If you stand by
my side and look at the same tree, the latter
manages to throw an image into your soul as
well. I see my tree and you seerours
(remarkably like mine), and what the tree itself
is We do not know. 3

The theory of intersubjective verification, "con-

subjectivity" if you will, appears to have considerable

 

u2Brecht, op. cit., p. 33.

u3Erwin Schrodinger, What is Life, Hutchins, Robert
M. and Adler, Mortimer J., The Great Ideas Today (Chicago:
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1967), p. A25.

81

merit. Probably its most valuable asset is that of flex-
ibility. It does not deny the existence of some "factual
world," although it is not difficult to conjure up visions
of being condemned to Plato's cave. On the other hand, it
does not deny the significance of a personal interpretation
of these "facts"; on the contrary, it apparently does allow
for the influence of those factors subsumed under the
theory of the sociology of knowledge in providing for the
utilization of intersubjective verification in consolidating
some image of a "fact." Finally, it does provide some
type of acceptable justification for the apparently radical
theoretical and practical changes which have occurred
over the centuries.
Whatever the merit, it nevertheless appears to be

one of those theories that is incapable of empirical
"proof" in the sense that most other types of theories
appear to be. In the last analysis, one either accepts it
or rejects it on grounds that one cOnsiders to justify one's
decision. It appears, at this stage of methodological and/
or conceptual develOpment, to be not unlike one of those
deep-seated preferences that Holmes had talked about. For
those who appreciate the style of a great legal philosopher,

I love granite rock and barberry bushes, no doubt

because with them were my earliest joys that

reach back through the past eternity of my life.

But while one's own experience thus makes certain

preferences dogmatic for oneself, recognition of

how they came to be so leaves one able to see ,

that others, poor souls, may be equally dogmatic

about something else . . . Deep-seated preferences

cannot be argued about--you cannot argue a man into
liking a glass of beer . . .

CHAPTER IV
A DISCUSSION OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC METHOQ,PART II

Chapter IV will be devoted to a consideration of the A

. "I

concepts of causation and multiple-causation, the notion
of an interdisciplinary perspective, and to some of the
problems of "model—building." Throughout the chapter
emphasis will be placed on the interrelationships of these
tOpics with each other and, in most cases, with many
concepts already discussed in previous chapters. For
instance, the discussion in Chapter III on concept formu-
lation will have obvious relevance to the preceding
sections, as, indeed, will the general theory of reality
around which the entire thesis is oriented. Again, as has
been the case thus far, none of the sections will provide
as thorough a discussion of the particular subject-matter
areas as could logically be undertaken; rather, the main
point is to raise som justifiable questions with regard to
the utility of these concepts and the validity of con-

clusions based upon their use.

Causation

 

As Chapter III may have suggested, there are a number
of very basic concepts which are incorporated into one's

thought processes in such a way that they are not easily

83

discoverable. One of the reasons for them being so diffi-
cult to uncover is that they form the conceptual structure
for some very basic assumptions regarding certain aspects
of reality, the truth of which seem self-evident. To
question the validity of these basic assumptions is to
likewise question the validity of conclusions which were
based upon data gathered from the conceptual framework of
which these assumptions were a part.

In the traditional "purely physical sciences," the
notions of space, time, and matter are some examples of
these kinds of concepts. The physical theory of rela-
tivity certainly had a significant impact on the traditional
notions of space and time, as did the atomic theory on the
traditional notions of matter. The impact that the general
theory of relativity has had, and is continuing to have, on
generally accepted notions of aging, particularly with
regard to the human process, is tumultuous; it is indeed
difficult to conceive of a reversal of the aging process.
Similarly, with regard to the atomic theory, one could
imagine how difficult it must have been for so many people
to so significantly modify their idea of a piece of rock
as being some solid chunk of matter. How difficult it
must have been to conceive of a rock as consisting of
particles which were constantly in motion; how difficult
today to conceive of that same piece of rock as consisting

not of particles, but of waves of energy.

8A

The preceding paragraph of thought is not meant to
be overly rhetorical, rather, it is meant to point out
how difficult it may be to earnestly question some concepts
which have heretofore been assumed to be self-evidently
true. Such questioning seems to strike, directly or
indirectly, at the very foundations of one's eXperience,
at the myriad justifications to which one refers for so
many of one's actions. "Causation" is one of those
concepts. Its grip on thought processes is so tight that
it can be difficult to recognize, and, consequently, it
can pose a serious problem to any student of any empirical
science. This writer will attempt no final definition or
eXplanation in this thesis, as it is highly unlikely that
such an objective could be attained here. Rather, the
sCOpe of this discussion will be limited to clarifying the
concept and its implications only to the extent that a
discussion of multiple-causation can be adequately under-
taken.

Generally speaking, "causation" implies, at minimum,
some kind of relationship between some given events. As
Brecht puts it,

Cause-effect is the conventional name for the
interrelation between two successive events

where the occurrence of the earlier is regarded
as a condition for that of the latter.1

 

lBrecht, pp, cit., p. 7A

85

In other words, if one can validly state that every time

A occurs B will thus obtain, it would probably be acceptable
to state that one has discovered a cause-effect relationship,
at least classically speaking. Actually, it really is not
quite that simple, as one may run into considerable diffi-
culty in attempting to define exactly what A and B both
include or preclude. In reference to this general problem,

Brecht writes of historical causal relations:

 

Limited knowledge of relevant events, plur-
ality of causal factors, limited possibility for
actors in history to forsee the effects, and the
limited ability of the historian to list all the
possible alternatives of action and their poten-
tial effects, plus the immense number of other
variables involved in the analysis of history--
all this makes the causal interpretation of
macro-history a free field for almost unlimited
adventures in speculative thought, while the
possibilities of verification are narrowly
limited.

Although it was made in direct reference to "macro-
history," the basic line of thought in the above statement
is definitely relevant to the "present"; for one need only
ask, "At what point does an event become 'history'?" All
the obstacles in the path of accurate causal interpretations
of macro-history are similarly present in the macroscopic
social sphere of the present. Rather than proceed with I
what would eventually develop into tangential discussion,
suffice it here to convey the very general picture of a

relationship between events which is such that one always

 

2Ibid., p. 91.

86

precedes, or, more correctly, has a high degree of prob-
ability of preceding, the other. This general idea will
suffice to proceed with a discussion of the concept of

"multiple-causation."

Multiple-Causation

 

In view of the earlier discussion regarding the inter—
relationships of events, a "wholistic" reality, and the P00
problem of conceptual extraction, the development of a
theory of multiple-causation seems at least understandable.
The development was probably stimulated by, among other
things,(l) an explicit observation that no one event seems
to cause only one other event, and (2) an implicit recog-
nition of the artificiality of those very "events" as
conceptual extractions. The first Observation was common
to all the empirical sciences. It was not until relatively
recently, however, that the notion of multiple-causation
began to gain ground in those sciences. Almost ironically,
it seems as though the social sciences started to really
develop the idea first. With the increase in field studies,
initially by anthropologists, and later by students of
other social scientific disciplines, it became more and
more obvious that social phenomena could not be understood
as consisting of simple one to one relationships with other
phenomena. This, in turn, seemed to be the result of the

recognition that if "causation" could have any real meaning

 

87

within the context of social scientific research, the
concept would have to be modified in such a way as to
account for the many interrelationships being encountered
by social scientists who were now beginning to View social
phenomena as being part of an overall process.3 Indicative
of this "processual" approach is the following statement

by Young.

__ f 11.1

A certain problematic situation or hit of
behavior owes its origin or process of becoming
not to one factor or set of factors but to a
complex varietypf_factors and sequences . . .
It is easy, but dangerous, to follow a "one
track" explanation which leads to THE cause.

It is imperative to look for a whole battery

of causal factors or syndromes which generally
EIay a sIgnificant—FO1e in bringing about
complex situations.Ll (emphasis supplied)

54- -

 

 

 

 

Hence, "multiple-causation" was incorporated into the working
vocabulary of the social scientist.

Insofar as a general theory of causation is utilized
in the social sciences, it would appear that the species
called "multiple-causation" would be most lucrative at this
stage of develOpment. Given the theory that reality is a
system of interrelatioships incapable of being completely
comprehended by the observer, and given the consequent
proposition that any given "event" is a conceptual extrac-

tion whose interrelationships with all other possibilities

 

3Pauline V. Young, Scientific Social Surveys and
Research, Ath ed. (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1066), p. A7.

A

 

Ibid., p. A85.

88

for conceptual extraction of "events" are infinite, the
appearance of a theory of "multiple-causation" is, as has
been suggested, not without justification. Implying the
need for a theory of "multiple-causation," Mill writes.

Whatever affects, in an appreciable degree, any
one element of the social state affects through
it all the other elements. The mode of production
of all social phenomena is one great case of
intermixture of laws. We can never either under-
stand in theory or command in practice the
condition of a society in any one respect without
taking into consideration its condition in all
other respects. There is no social phenomenon
which is not more or less influenced by every
other part of the condition of the same society
and, therefore, by every cause which is influ-
encing any other of the contemporaneous social
phenomena.

The concept of "multiple-causation" is again implied by
Young.

Man lives in a socioeconomic and political world
W_§pd thrives on its varied relationships. It is
inconceivable that a study of bare and isolated
events on any one aspect of man's life would
yield any meaningful results . . . His past,
present, and future activities, aspirations,
motives, and attitudes influence each other
and form a variegated and closely knit pattern
of behavior.

 

5J. S. Mill, "On the Logic of the Social Sciences," in
Wiener, pp. ppp., p. 258. It might be noted in passing that
Mill feels that one should go on to study some aspect of
reality anyway, because he feels that each one will have its
own immediate or "main" determining causes. In view of the
entire discussion thus far, the problems involved should
be rather apparent. Here again, as was the case with
Brecht, is an example of one who seems hesitant to accept
the logical implications of one's own theory.

6Young, pp. cit., p. 31.

 

89

As has been already suggested, the rise in popularity
of the concepts of "social system" or "process" appears to
have been contemporaneous with, and possibly related in
some other way to, that of "multiple-causation"; indeed,
their rise may have been interdependent. The comparatively
recent appearance of the "functionalist" approach to the
analysis of political behavior are (1) it sensitizes anal-
sis to the complexity of interrelationships among social
and political phenomena, and (2) it draws attention to a
whole social system as a setting for political phenomena.7
Here one sees the implication that the understanding of
"causal" relationships can best be attained in a setting
which takes into account the entire system of "causal"
factors.

In the field of comparative police administration,
the functionalist approach is in its infancy. As pointed
out in Chapter I, most of the literature thus far has been
rather structurally oriented, and, conseuqently, meaningful
data is lacking. If the trend in the other social sciences
is any indication, the "functionalist" approach will
probably take on added significance as more students under-
take research in the field. The question is, Has the

concept of "multiple-causation" (and its relations, i.e.,

 

7William Flannigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Functionalism
in Political Science," in Martindale, pp. cit., pp.

 

9O

"functionalism") really provided for a more thorough under-
standing of social phenomena? Will it do so for students

in the field of comparative police administration?

Summary

In View of the earlier discussion regarding the
interrelationships of events, a "wholistic" reality, and the
P00 problem of conceptual extraction, it becomes apparent
that the notion of "multiple-causation" is of a rather
complex nature. Given the artificial nature of conceptual
extractions, how does one conclude that any number of
events (Al, A2, A3, etc.) "cause" any number of other
events (B1, B2, B3, etc.) without fully comprehending the
nature and role of any of the events concerned? Given a
sphere as representing reality, and given thus the
infinitude of interrelationships which are possible, it
would seem that the closest one could come to taking
into account the causal role of all the possible relation-
ships would be in terms of an approximation of necessarily
uncertain accuracy.

Further, as previously suggested, it would seem
unrealistic to talk in terms of "specializing" in, or in
some way constricting one's view to, some particular
aSpect of reality. For this seems to be a never-ending
process of changing perspective, at least until one has
specialized down to the quantum level of phenomena, and

"causation" at that level of observation does not appear

 

91

to be quite as useful a concept as it may have been at the
macrOSOOpic level. With respect to the proposition that
all social phenomena are a multiplicity of events, and
similarly with respect to the question of perspectual
change, Weber writes:

The absolute infinitude of this multiplicity

is seen to remain undiminished even where one's
attention is focused on a single "object," for
instance, a concrete act of exchange, as soon
as we seriously attempt an exhaustive descrip-
tion of pii the individual components of this
"individual phenomenon," to say nothing of
eXplaining it causally.

In view of the improbability of ever completely under-
standing the events involved in a supposed causal relation-
ship, it would appear rather difficult, at best, to validly
construct such a relationship with regard to those events.
In this respect, Weber again writes:

Even with the widest imagineable knowledge
of "laws," we are helpless in the face of the
question: how is the causal explanation of an
individual fact possible-—since a description
6? even the smallest slice of reality can
never be exhaustive? The number and types of
causes which have influenced any given event
are always infinite and there is nothing in
the things themselves to set some of them
apart as alone meriting attention.9

 

 

 

8Max Weber, "'Objectivity' in Social Science," in
Weiner, pp. cit., p. 326.

91bid., p. 330. For Weber, the factor that sets
them apart as meriting one's attention is their relevance
to one's value system. See Chapter III, section on Value,
for a further discussion of this relationship between
"Objectivity" and "Value."

' 1

 

 

92

Given this general train of thought, the conceptual
extraction of "events" as either "causes" or "effects" will
provide little in the way of an understanding of the system
of interrelationships called "reality." A notion of
"cause-effect" would probably be most useful, although even
inrequite limited, only within the context of a much larger
conceptual extraction, such as "social science," or "police
administration" for example, one can "play the causal
game" rather accurately (relatively speaking) if one
remains eternally alert lest one forget that one is not
playing with accurate representations of real interrelation-
ships; unfortunately, reality does not distinguish between
"police" and "non-police" phenomena. The question is,
does "playing the game" really amount to anything more
than that? If so, What?

There are similar implications for the entire theory
of causation. The notions of "cause" and "effect" are human
concepts that were probably developed to help explain
certain relationships that were already conceptually
extracted in terms of "events," these notions do not appear

10

to be ontological properties of nature. In other words,

 

10John Dewey, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry (New York:
H. Holt and Company, 1938), p. 326. It might also be noted
here that much of Kant's writings suggested a similar
situation. Although this writer is not thoroughly acquainted
with his Critique of Pure Reason, nevertheless, references
to, and extracts from, it appear to sufficiently reinforce
the view presented here that it can be recommended in good
faith to any reader desiring a notably more scholarly pre-
sentation of the philOSOphical basis and implications of
such a view.

 

 

93

the notion of "causation" is, in effect, a heuristic
principle, a signpost ". . . to help us find our bearing
in a bewildering maze of occurrences . . .,"ll but when
utilized in this respect, or possibly at all, its useful-
ness in truly understanding the role of some relationship
involved in the goings-on of nature may be subject to
question. As Brecht states, "Whether causality rules the
universe and what causality really is has remained a

matter for scientific controversy."l2

Interdisciplinary,I—-Culture

 

Given the notion of mlutiple causation, the need for
the utilization of an "interdisciplinary" perspective
logically follows. For along with the notion that some
event was "caused" by a number of other events, comes the
necessity for an understanding of the "causal" events, which
events may transcend traditional disciplinary lines. In
addition to this apparently logical develOpment, the notion
also develOped that the probability of including in one's
perspective all the "causal" events which may be involved
in some phenomenon would be greater if very broad concepts
were utilized as a basis for analysis. Hence, a term such
as "culture" may be viewed as, among other things, an

attempt to provide a working concept which could be

 

llMax Plank, pp. cit., p. 87.

l2Brecht, pp. cit., p. 7A.

 

9A

inclusive of a great many factors thought to be significant
for the understanding of certain kinds of social behavior.
The concept of "culture" is said to be useful in
understanding all kinds of social behavior, be it indi-
vidual, organizational, or what have you. It has even
been said that the work of ppy social scientist must begin
with the investigation of culture, ". . . the ways of life

which are characteristic of particular societies."l3

 

Chase has stated that the individual ". . . is a product of
his culture; he is a living part of his group, and can be

"14 Indic-

understood and appraised only in relation to it.
ative of the general feeling with regard to the utility of
the concept of "culture" is Young's feeling that, "It
would seem that, for practical purposes, the research
student needs chiefly to examine the cultural milieu to
determine what factors actually account for the particular
life patterns under scrutiny."15
"Culture" has also been utilized in analysis of
organizational behavior, both collective and individual.
The relationship between an organization and the cultural

milieu within which it carries on its administration has

been, and will probably continue to be, the focus of much

 

13Linton, quoted by Stuart Chase, The Proper Study of
Mankind (New York:- Harper & Row, 1962), p. 59.

1“Young, pp. cit., p. 62.

15Ibid., p. 253.

95

social scientific research. Indeed, some suggest that the
very existence of organizations has a significant and
integral function with regard to the productive mainte-
nance of any given society. Similarly, it has been said
that government in general, viewed as an organization, is
best understood as a system ". . . linked organically with
social structure, traditions and ideologies, culture and

"l6 In general,

the environment within which it Operates.
then, most students of administration will accept the
proposition that organizational studies are most productive
when undertaken with reference to some concept of "culture."
As useful as the term is supposed to be, "culture" is

not easily definable. It is usually defined in terms of
some other equally vague concepts, which themselves admit
of no unambiguous definition.* It is sometimes suggested
that better understanding would result if one views culture
as a dynamic process or act of becoming, as opposed to
some static structure encompassing a number of social
interrelationships. In this respect, Young writes:

It is necessary to go even further and ascertain

the system of values that determines the various

cultural eXperiences and activities of the group.
This is the same as saying that the research

 

l6Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, Comparative

Politics: Notes and Readingp (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey
Press, 196A), p. A.

 

 

*Here one is reminded of K. Llewellyn's astute
statement, "People are so much used to definitions--
although definitions have not always been of so much use
to people."

96

Observer should be interested in social processes

and the sequence of events which make up a social

system. Unless the observed phenomena are

studied in relation to a social process or a

particular way of life, they are incapable of

explaining reality or of further pocial explan-

ation of the associated elements. 7
Harry Levin has suggested that any attempt at some universal
definition of "culture" may lead to frustration. It is
felt that the term takes on a different meaning with each
new generation of scholars, and may even take on various
‘ meanings within the same generation of scholars who
inhabit, if you will, different cultural milieus.18 The
approach appears to have a good deal of merit, and could
probably find much reinforcement in the material currently
being presented under the heading of "the sociology of
knowledge."

In effect, then, "culture" appears to be just another
example of conceptual extraction, but on a level which is
much more inclusive than is the case with conceptual extrac-
tions which refer to individual kinds of behavior. As
such, its usefulness in truly understanding the role of

certain kinds of social phenomena which it now is supposedly

useful in "understanding" is subject to considerable

 

l7Young, pp. cit., p. 18A.

l8Harry Levin, "Semantics of Culture," in Gerald
Holton, Science and Culture: A Study of Cohesive and
Disjunctive Forces (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965). Levin's
entire article suggests this situation. -

 

 

97

question; this conclusion seems quite logical in view of
the entire discussion thus far. The distinction between
"cultural" and "non-cultural" influences, or, indeed, between
many different "cultures," is felt to be obstructive of the
acquisition of knowledge concerning the nature of social
reality. The problem is recognized by a number of
scholars, and some suggestions have been put forth. One of
the most promising, and one that is certainly in congruence
with the general theme of this thesis, is that of Herbert
Read's, who, in his To Hell With Culture, says:
. . . Culture in a natural society will not

be a separate and distinguishable thing--a body

of learning that can be put into books and museums

and mugged up in your spare time. Just because it

will not exist as a separate entity, it would be

better to stop using the word "culture." We shall

not need it in the future and it will only confuse

the issue. Culture belongs to the past: thp

future will not be conscious of its culture. 9
Interdisciplinary II

Given the development of rather broad concepts,

i.e., "culture," to facilitate the comprehension of social
phenomena, there remains the problem of gaining an under-
standing of the events or relationships that either
comprise "culture" (when viewed as a process) or are

included within its realm. The most recent attempt at

solving the problem, or at least of mitigating the

 

19Herbert Read, To Hell with Culture and Other Essayp
on Art and Sociepy (New York: Schocken Books, 1963),
- ppo 12-130

98

consequences of it, is seen in the develOpment of an
interdisciplinary approach to analysis. This trend is not
peculiar to the social sciences, on the contrary, it is
observable in some of the most "purely scientific" of the
empirical disciplines; witness, for example, the Salk

Institute in California, where, in addition to biologists,

T‘i
‘!

chemists, and physicists, there are also resident phil-
osophers and historians, with immediate plans to add
resident artists and musicians.

Nevertheless,_the discussion is herein concerned
with the rationale for the develOpment of the interdis-
ciplinary method in the social sciences, and with its real
and potential utility. It might be verbally economical in
the long run to quote at the outset a rather comprehensive
statement that is probably most indicative of the general
rationale for the utilization of the interdisciplinary
method in the social sciences; Young provides just such a
statement.

The most fruitful results in research are
achieved not only through an integration of social
scientific techniques and method but also through
a unified approach of the various scientific
disciplines. Since man lives in a world of eco-
nomic, industrial, political, phychological forces
and social attitudes and values, it is self-evident
that his responses to, and roles in, these should
be studied. As a matter of fact, the Social
Science Research Council was organized to promote
and integrate the social sciences to each other
and to the related useful arts of industry,
government, and public welfare; to guard against
overspecialization and isolated efforts which
might result in distorted vision, especially
when a section of man's world is'wrenched loose
from its context in the process of study.

99

As we have already indicated in the
discussion of social scientific laboratories,
one of the most significant considerations in
cooperative research is that it facilitates the
study and analysis of the complex web of social—
psychological-economic forces intricately inter-
woven in modern life. Each collaborator not
only may provide a new orientation as to subject
matter but also may proceed methodologically in
a way which enables him to View certain par-
ticular aspects of the functional inthrelation-
ships of the various social elements.

This rather lengthy statement just about covers,
directly or indirectly, the range of opinion in social
scientific circles with regard to an interdisciplinary
approach to social scientific analysis.* Simply stated,
it comes down to someting like this: No one point of View,
single approach, or scientific discipline can completely
account for total social reality, each is supposed to be a
complement to the others. A relatively systematically
coordinated approach of this kind has been lacking between

many of the disciplines, and in the general field of

 

2OYoung, pp. cit., pp. 119-120.

*So many social scientists espouse this View that it
would simply be impractical to cite all of them. Of the
materials already cited, Brecht's and Chase's respective
texts provide further discussion, as of course does Young's.
In the field of criminology, the interdisciplinary approach
is stressed by, among others, Karl Mannheim. To this end,
Mannheim states:

From the fact that it (understanding of criminal
phenomena) is dependent upon the contributions of
several other disciplines and from the multi-factor
theory of crime causation follows the need for
research in this field often to be planned and
carried out by a team of scholars with widely
differing backgrounds and interests. (From Mannheim's
Comparative Criminology, p. 90.)

 

 

comparative criminal justice it is suggested that such an

approach would be much more productive than those hereto-

21

fore utilized. Similarly, students of comparative public

administration have begun to utilize interdisciplinary

techniques, for there is now the general recognition that

nature just does not manifest itself in the form of

"public administrative" behavior. In this respect,

writes:

But the required data for comparative studies

are not confined to the content of public admin-

istration or even of political science as we
have customarily regarded them. Other disci-
plines are involved. The perspectives, postu-
lates, and techniques of sociology, social
psychology, anthropology, economics, and even

history are to an extent germane to comparative

studies in the realm of government.

Siffin

Discussing this same general point, within the context of

comparative studies, Dahl writes:

It follows that the study of public admin-
istration inevitably must become a much more
broadly based discipline, resting not on a
narrowly defined knowledge of techniques and
processes, but rather extending to the varying
historical, sociological, economic and other
conditioning factors that give public adminis-
tration its peculiar stamp in each country.2

Given the general theory of reality suggested by this

thesis thus far, the trend toward interdisciplinary

 

21Brecht, pp. cit., p. 329.

22

William J. Siffin (ed.), Toward the Comparative

 

Study of Public Administration (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-

versity, Department of Government, 1957), p. 13.

23Rohert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Adminis-

tration," Public Administration Review, Winter, 19A7, p. 11.

 

100

' 'I

101

cooperation seems to be an inevitable stage in methodo-
logical development. The artificial nature of traditional
disciplinary distinctions is becoming more and more obvious
to scholars of these respective disciplines. At a rela-
tively recent conference of the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences (around 1963 or 196A), the members,
. . including scientists, scholars in the

humanities, creative artists, social scientists,

and administrators, found fairly quickly one

area of substantial agreement. It was the feeling

that the relationship between the sciences and the

humanities may Well become considerably more

strained in the immediate future.
It is interesting to note some of the remarks heard during
the conference. Once scientist said, "we may not have seen
anything yet of the row that is really going to develOp."
A social scientist stated,

I think that the develOpment of the in-between

sphere (where both the sciences and the human-

ities have claims) is going to force many, many

fights; they have been develOping rapidly, and

we have seen only the barest beginning of what

is coming.
Another social scientist remarked that such a conflict
may cause "the entire intellectual enterprise to come under
severe attacks in the next years." Finally, a well known
poet and literary critic stated, "There is a mounting sense
of tension; I am quite sure that those who have stressed
it have been quite right. We are at the beginning of

trouble."2u

 

2“Gerald Holton, Science and Culture: A Study of
Cohesive and Disjunctive Forces (Boston: Beacon Press,
1965), pp. XI and XII provide a discussion of this meeting.

I"; 25m

102

It is quite true that we are indeed at the beginning
‘of what may be a tumultuous re—evaluation of the roles,
objectives, and "jurisdiction" of the respective disciplines.
In view of the theory of reality thus far presented, it

could hardly be avoided. The artificiality of traditional
disciplinary distinctions is definitely becoming apparent.
Llewellyn has said that "The social sciences are not

staked out like real estate,"25

and he was certainly
correct, but he did not go far enough. The statement should
not have been limited to the social sciences, for all
empirical sciences are subject to the same qualification,
as are the "events" or particular kinds of behavior with
which the various disciplines are concerned. Referring to
this basic problem, Brecht aptly observes that

The twentieth—century use of the terms "phil—

osophy," "science," and "theory," is not

definitely settled. It could not be, precisely

because the interrelation between philosophy,

science, and theory is one of the fundamental

problems i2 the present crisis of scientific
thinking.2

 

25Karl N. Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence--The
Next Step," Essays On Jurisprudence From the Columbia Law
Review (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963),
p. 183.

26Brecht, pp. p1p., p. 1A. Here again, however,
Brecht goes on to say that there pp a difference between
political science and political philoSOphy. Yet, by the
impliCations of some of Brecht's own statements, this
distinction, however "useful" it may seem at present, will
become increasingly untenable in the not too distant
future.

 

 

103

Summary

As promising as the interdisciplinary approach may
seem to be, still, it is this writer's Opinion that it will
provide little in the way of an ultimate understanding of
reality. For the very term "interdisciplinary" suggests the
existence of "disciplines," and this is the crux of the
problem. In light of the theory of reality suggested here,
this writer can only conclude that the development of
present interdisciplinary techniques is but a stage in a
process which may culminate in the general recognition
that the basic process of conceptual extraction, in what-
ever form, is not conducive to truly effective comprehen-
sion of reality. In the end, the process will only lead
to a discovery of itself. The physicist—mathematician,
Hermann Weyl, suggests this very conclusion in his discus-
sion of a "scientific" analysis of chalk marks on a black—

board.

As scientists, we might be tempted to argue
thus: "As you know, the chalk mark on the
blackboard consists of molecules, these are made
up of charged and uncharged elementary particles,
electrons, neutrons, etc. But when we analyzed
what theoretical physics means by such terms, we
saw that these physical things dissolve into a
symbolism that can be handled according to some
rules. The symbols, however, are in the end
again concrete signs, written with chalk on the 27
blackboard. You notice the ridiculous circle . ."

It may indeed be a ridiculous circle, and the recognition

of it may be a significant contribution to the "field."

 

27Gerald Holton, pp. cit., p. XXVIII of the Introduction.

 

10A

Models
The use of models is widespread in the empirical
sciences. Their construction and utilization for compar-
ative studies has been academically in vogue for some
time now, and it appears as though the frequency with which
they are constructed and utilized will continue to increase.
In the area of the social sciences one can encounter model
societies,28 model governments,29 model bureaucracies,
model administrative systems,31 and models of almost every
conceivable type of phenomenon which is capable of being
conceptualized by the observer. It has been said that the
existence of appropriate models is a necessary prerequisite
32

for theories to be generally predictive. It has even

been categorically stated that ". . . to assert a theory

is to assert a model . . ."33 With regard to the necessity

 

28Marion J. Ley Jr., pp. cit.

. 290ar1 Friedrick and Leonoid Brezinski, Totalitarian
Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

 

30Max Weber is the one that most quickly comes to mind
in this respect; his work on bureaucratic structure is well

known.

31Fred Riggs, "Models in the Comparative Study of
Public Administration," Papers in Comparative Public Admin-
istration, Special Series: Number 1 (Chicago: Comparative
Administration Group, American Society For Public Admin-

istration, 1963).

32Mary B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), p. 6.

33Ihid., p. 28.

105

for models, Young states, "In scientific studies it is neces-
sary to isolate certain elements within the complexities and
reconstruct them on a simpler model before they can be ade-
quately examined."314 This is only to show the ubiquity of
models in the social sciences, and the present discussion is
not intended to be an excursus on them. Rather, it will

be limited to a short critique of those aspects of models
that, in view of the general orientation of this thesis,
raise considerable question with regard to their incorpor-
ation into, and the general use of, models.

Above all, models, of necessity, incorporate the use
of concepts of all kinds for the purpose of categorization.
"They (models) are concepts or systems of concepts (theories)
in terms of which data are collected, classified and other-’
wise analyzed, and conclusions of some sort are formulated."35
Concept formulation, then, is a necessary condition for
model construction, and since the problems posed by the
former process have already been discussed in Chapter III,
it would be of limited value to rediscuss the issues here.
However, it would be useful to undertake a short analysis
of the relationship of concept formulation to categoriza—
tion and information gathering. Simply stated, the propo-

sition is this: Once the concepts have been formulated

 

3“Young, pp. cit., p. 111.

35Siffin, pp. cit., p. 10.

 

106

and incorporated into some model structure, there is a

tendency to (l) exclude certain types of possibly (quite
probably) relevant information, and (2) assume the real
existence of relationships which may only be present in

the artificial model.
The first effect is an indirect result of the nature

of conceptual extraction. The very "selection" of the

 

concepts and models ". . . largely determines, or in any

case limits, the outcome of the study."36 Once the arti-.
ficial concepts have been formulated, there is a natural
tendency to "see" things in a rather dichotomous way;
either the phenomenon falls within the realm of the concept
pp it does not. Such an approach ". . . both excludes and
includes. It makes some matter fall inside the field; it
makes some fall outside. And the exclusion is almost
always arbitrary."37 The dichotomous nature of categor-
ization resulting from conceptual extraction has been, and
will remain, a formidable obstacle for effective comparative
analysis. Dichotomous concepts, either alone or within the
context of models, have created particularly significant
problems for the students of comparative political science
and public administration. With regard to this general

problem, Fesler writes:

 

36Ibid.

 

37Karl N. Llewellyn, Columbia Law Review, pp. cit.,
I)° 1500

107

One of the principle obstacles (to comparative
study) is the assumption that we must choose
between two alternatives. We need not choose
between a strong Federal government and strong
state government, between absolute centraliza-
tion and absolute decentralization, between
bureaucratic regimentation and local self-
government. The vice of such choices is mani-
fold. Despite elaborate and repeated efforts
of social scientists to marShall advantages
and disadvantages of each alternative, the
choice is bound to be only pseudoscientific.
It forces us back on prejudices, the emotional
symbolism of words, and sheer acts of faith.
Once the choice between alternative positions
has been made, there is set up an unscientific
major premise that colors and distorts any
attempt to apply scientific method to the
objective facts of governmental functioning.
Instead, science is muggered to rationalize

a foregone conclusion.

The second danger in the utilization of conceptual

models is that of tacitly assuming the real existence
of certain relationships because such relationships may be
suggested by the model. It has been suggested by Hesse
that, essentially, a model is composed of causal relation-
ships, it is supposed to be an interconnected system of
relationships.

Certain prOperties are necessary or sufficient

conditions for other prOperties, and the net-

work of causal relations thus established will

make the occurrences of one property at least

tend, subject to the presence of other

properties, to promote or inhibit the occur-
rence of another.

 

38James W. Fesler, Area and Administration (University,
Alabama: University of Alabama Press, l9A9), p. 156.

39

 

Hesse, pp. cit., p. 87.

 

108

But the property relations themselves are perceived in terms
of concepts, and the dichotomous nature of so many of the
latter is such that the researcher, in deciding whether or
not the phenomenon under study fits, may tend to uncon-
sciously attach to that phenomenon certain types of rela-
tionships which are part of the conceptual model with which
he is working but which may, in fact, not be real. In this
respect, Llewellyn writes:

The other suggestion of a realistic approach
(to analysis of socio-legal phenomena) rests on the
observation that categories and concepts, once
formulated and once they have entered into thought
processes, tend to take on an appearance of solidity,
and reality and inherent value which has no founda-
tion in experience. More than this : although
originally formulated on the model of at least some
observed data, they tend, once they have entered
into the organization of thinking, both to suggest
the presence of corresponding data when these data
are not in fact present, and to twist any fresh
observations of dafia into conformity with the terms
of the categories. 0

Braithwaite may have been right when he said that "The price

of the employment of models is eternal Vigilance.”l

Summary of Chapter

 

This chapter concludes the critical discussion of
those aspects of "method" that, in this writer's opinion,
deserve what may turn out to be a rather agonizing reap-

praisal. This particular chapter was concerned with the

 

uoLlewellyn, Columbia Law Review, pp. cit., p. 171.

ulBraithwaite, pp. cit., p. 93.

 

109

theory of causation and its related theory of multiple-
causation, with the rise of the interdisciplinary approach
to social analysis, and the use of models. As should be
apparent at this point, and as was suggested early in the
thesis, all of these topics are interrelated, and re-
evaluation of one may well necessitate re-evaluation of all.
The critique thus far has been based on what appears to

be a justified theory of a "wholistic" reality which cannot
be fully comprehended in terms of conceptual extractions
representing isolated parts of it. The final chapter

will assume, for the most part, a rather thorough under-
standing of the material presented thus far and some of
the major implications which may logically accrue there-
from; for the focus of the final chapter will be to inves-
tigate some of the ramifications of these logical impli-

cations.

 

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS

This is the final chapter of the thesis. One of the
major objectives of it will be to summarily review the
major points emphasized in the material thus far, and then
to attempt to draw some logical conclusions from that
material. In addition, an attempt will be made to relate
all of the major points heretofore presented to the general
issue of methodology in the social sciences. In short,
this chapter will be devoted to clarifying issues and
problems with respect to social scientific research
methodology, and with raising apprOpriate questions with

regard to those issues and problems.

Implications of a Wholistic Reality

The entire thesis and its major conclusions have been
based upon what has been called a "wholistic" reality. In
essence, at least for purposes of this thesis, a "wholistic"
reality amounts to this. The observer, any observer, is
part of a system of infinitely interrelated phenomena, from
which he cannot divorce himself for purposes of "Objective"
analysis. Actually, the term "phenomena" is not quite
adequate, since it carries with it a connotation of some

spatial and/or temporal finiteness which can be viewed

 

111

as not conveying an accurate picture of a truly "wholistic"
reality. In View of this, it might be best to say simply
that the system is a totality in its own right, it simply
"is," it exists, period!

Now it must be emphasized at this point that this
writer does not mean to suggest the existence of a thing

(a system) apart from the human observer, some "thing"

 

which other observers can "objectively" analyze from
"outside." On the contrary, the very point is that there
cannot be such a thing apart from the observer, variable
perspective notwithstanding, unless the observer himself
constructs it. He is actually part of it, and it is part
of him; the observer is, in effect, the system. The
discussion on quantum physical observation should have
suggested this very conclusion.

From this theory of reality, one can draw some
logical conclusions which appear to subject a number of
aspects of Contemporary social scientific methodology to
serious question. First, the theory seems to signifi-
cantly limit the real usefulness of terms like "fact,"
"objectivity," "value-free" judgments, etc. The following
quotation from Brecht's book is an example of that type
of statement, those kinds of distinctions, which, in
‘vieW'of a "wholistic" theory such as is presented here,

can pp more be accepted as p priori valid or even useful.

 

. . . the scientist's acceptance of empirical
laws of a factual content is based on factual
observations, while his acceptance of ultimate
value judgments would have to be based on a
generalization, not of factual occurrences,
but of Opinions, and in the typIEal case, of
conflicting Opinions. (emphasis supplied)

 

One should not conjure up an image of some social scientist
running around "objectively" collecting the "facts," and
then interpreting those "facts" in a "value-free" manner

to arrive at the "truth." To the extent that those

social scientists are attempting to attain an understanding
of a "reality" which is, in effect, part of their own
being, to that extent the terms with which they are working
have very little utility.

A second conclusion, which is really an extension of
the first, is that the process of conceptual extraction
which appears to condition one's experience necessitates
"value" (in the sense of non-objective) judgments. For the
process of conceptual extraction takes place only in rela—
tion, and in prOportion, to some value relevancy. In this
respect, all judgments are "value" judgments, and the dis-
tinction between "value" and "objective" ones is ultimately
rather artificial. If somehow one could "experience"
‘without recourse to a process of conceptual extraction, a
rnunber of these problems would be solved, and "objec—

‘tivity," "value," etc. would then be seen as not being all

 

1Brecht, pp. cit., p. 270.

112

. “If

 

113

that useful.2 However, since this does not appear to be
likely at this stage, suffice it here to clarify, at least
to some extent, the relationship between the process of
conceptual extraction and such terms as "value," "objec-
tivity," etc.

One might justifiably ask as this point, Do such
terms really have any menaing in View of the discussion
thus far? Well, certianly they have "meaning," but it does
little to recognize just that. The point is not simply
that they have meaning, but that their meaning varies with
the context within which they are used. In other words,
they would have really useful meaning only within the
context of some larger, more inclusive, conceptual extrac-
tion, and, consequently, variance in meaning might be
proportional to conceptual variance. Only in this sense

could there be a really useful meaning; the terms would

 

2It should be noted here that this suggestion is some-
thing more than pure conjecture. A number of philosophers,
Kant being the first one that comes to mind, pp imply that
a process such as that of conceptual extraction is definitely
obstructive of the ascertainment of "truth." "Pure exper-
iencing," as Kant puts it, is the only "truth."

It might also be noted that some oriental philosophies,
"religions" is you wish (although this is often a misnomer),
not only recognize the relation between "pure eXperiencing"
and "truth," but their entire philosophical training is
directed toward attaining a state of mind that is conducive
to such experiencing. In this respect, Zen Buddhism is
probably becoming the most pOpular, and it has been the
object of a number of Western philosophical inquiries. See,
for example, (1)Ehdch,Fromm, Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis
(New York: Harper & Row, 1960), (2) Daisetz Toitaro Suzuki,
The Essentials of Zen Buddhism (London: Rider, 1963).

 

11A

probably not reflect such utility when used in reference
to observation of some reality apart from a conceptual
extraction.

A logical implication here, and what is in fact being
suggested, is that the final test of these terms, when
used within the context of other conceptual extractions,-
might be one of simple utility, in conjunction with some
kind of intersubjective verification. In other words, such
terms would be utilized only to the extent that their use
serves some purpose for the user. With regard to this
general question of utility, John H. Randall Jr. writes:

Beliefs are in fact, in the actual procedure
of the scientist, judged to be scientifically
"warranted," "verified," or proved to be "true"
when they give a satisfactory solution to the
specific problem to which they have been
proposed as an answer. They are validated only
when they have succeeded in doing what they are
instituted to do. Beliefs, in scientific
inquiry, are always designed to perform some
determinate function. The objective criterion
of their validity is the success of their
functioning in the specific way in which they
were designed to function. The question always
is: Do they actually solve the specific and
determinate problem they were designed to
solve? This functional test is decisive.3

There is, of course, one very significant ramifi-
cation to this conclusion. If a term such as "truth" or
"fact" manifests real utility only within the context of

some conceptually extracted world, then in any given

cl

 

3John Herman Randall, Jr., "History and the Social
Sciences," in Wiener, pp. cit., p. 315.

115

case what is "factual" or "true" might very well depend upon-
a general acceptance or belief by enough of the right kinds
of people. To this end, the physicist, Max Plank, astutely
writes:

A new scientific truth does not triumph by

convincing its opponents and making them see

the light but rather because its Opponents

eventually die, and a new geperation grows

up that is familiar with it.
In other words, whether or not such concepts as "truth" and
"objectivity" have served their purpose in some way could
conceivably turn out to be an intersubjectively arrived at
judgment.

A "wholistic" theory of reality also has some rather
significant ramifications for the notion of "multiple—
causation" and the develOpment of an interdisciplinary
approach to social scientific analysis. With regard to the
notion of multiple-causation, it may be better to modify
it so it reads something like "multiple-influence" or
"multiple-relationships." For it appears that the notion
of causation, however heuristically useful it may have
been previously, will, if used in too strict a fashion,
mitigate against a thorough understanding of the inter-
relationships which may be involved in social phenomena.

It would appear that a more accurate understanding of some

phenomenon would result if one looks for "relationships"

rather than "causes."

 

“Max Plank, Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers
(New York: Gaynor, l9A9), pp. 33-3A.

 

116

The interdisciplinary approach, although enjoying a
great deal of popularity at this time, is not without its
problems, most of which accrue from its reliance upon the
process of conceptual extraction. Nevertheless, within the
context of a larger, conceptually extracted world, such an
approach may have limited utility. For example, if one is
studying "crime" or "criminal behavior," an interdisci—
plinary approach to analysis could be helpful, provided one
realizes the limitations of dealing with concepts which may
or may not accurately represent the interrelationships
involved in some phenomenon. As suggested previously, the
apotheosis of an interdisciplinary approach to empirical
analysis seems to be the result of a tacit recognition of
the artificiality and consequent inadequacy of disciplinary
distinctions. To the extent that an interdisciplinary
approach recognizes such an artificiality, to that extent,
at least, it will be a relatively useful tool to the empir—
ical investigator.

The main point with regard to all of these concepts,
"objectivity," "value," fact," "causation," "social science,"
"philOSOphy," etc., is that one should see them for what
they are, human concepts of necessarily uncertain accuracy.
The final test of their validity is not how accurately
they represent some reality, for one could never know this.
In this respect, Einstein had warned that the scientist

has to understand reality in the same way a man might if

 

117

he had to study a watch without opening it. "He will never
be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism, and
he cannot even imagine the possibility or the meaning of
such a comparison."5
Comparison being an impossibility, the final test
would again be one of utility; how well they serve the
researcher in his conceptually extracted world. In other
words, the concepts would have useful meaning only in
relation to other concepts which make up the conceptual
world of the researcher. The concept of "deviancy," for
instance, will be useful only to the extent that one can
refer to a working concept of "normality." Since "normality"
may vary from culture to culture, and even within cultures
with regard to different kinds of acts and circumstances
and over a period of time, one must expect that "deviancy"
will also be variable. But then, not only will these par-
ticular concepts vary in meaning, but in addition, all
other concepts, adequate definitions of which are somehow
dependent upon the meaning of "deviancy" or "normality,"
will likewise take on variable meaning; to wit, "morality,"
"preservation of peace," etc. And the cycle continues

indefinitely. Again one notices the possibility of a

"ridiculous circle."

 

5Don K. Price, "The Established Dissenters," in
Holton, pp. cit., p. 127.

..-
9

By attaching too much "realness" or "isness" to these
concepts, one runs the risk of committing what Whitehead
called "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness." In this
respect, it might be best to take Brecht's advice with
regard to analysis in the area of political justice.

It is not the nature of things as such, but
the human mind and human emotions reacting to
the nature of things--functioning as an instru-
ment of observation and reasoning, of predicting
consequences, of shaping expectations, and of
devising means to promote or counteract their
realization, or engaging in metaphytical spec-
ulations--which we must egamine, if we Want to
learn more about justice.

These concepts, then, possess no inherent reality,
they are referents to a set or sets of relationships which
have been "selected," for some reason or another, and in
a basically arbitrary manner, to be the object of one's
analysis. One should recognize that the real interrela-
tionships may not be adequately represented by, or amenable
to manipulation with the ease and in the same manner as,
the conceptual extractions with which one deals. The
conceptual world may not necessarily be the same as, and
is more susceptible to problems of perspective than, the
interrelationships which comprise reality.

On this point, William James writes:

What we say about reality thus depends
on the perspective into which we throw it.

Here in the field of sensation, our
minds exert a certain arbitary choice. By our

 

6Brecht, pp. cit., p. 1A6.

ll8

 

inclusion and omissions we trace the extent; by

our emphasis we mark its foreground and its

background; by our order we read it in this

direction or in that. We receive in short the

block 0; marble, but we carve the statue our—

selves.
Developingpa Social "Scientific" Method

What is a "scientific" method? Can the social

scientists utilize that method which is generally utilized
by students of the "pure" sciences? Attention is initially
directed to the first question. It should be apparent that
one would find oneself on less than sturdy grounds in
answering that question in terms of "objectivity," "value-
free" judgments, etc.; for it has been suggested that these
concepts, upon closer analysis, do not possess the clarity
that they need in order to be very meaningful for methodo-
logical study. There must be a somewhat different approach

to definition. Consequently, Bronislaw Malinowski suggests

that, at minimum, a definition of "science" would imply

". . . invariably the existence of general laws, a field for

experiment or observation, and last, but not least, a control

of academic discourse by practical application."8 If the

existence of general laws implies inexactitude, if the

"field" for experiment or observation is not artificially

 

7William James, "Pragmatism," in Robert M. Hutchins
and Mortimer J. Adler, (eds.) The Great Ideas Today
(Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 196A), p. 56A.

8Bronislaw Malinowski, op. cit., p. 391.

 

 

120

circumscribed, and if the control of academic discourse by
practical application is itself regulated by philosOphical
thought, then this writer would not have too many objections
to such a definition, although, in a positive sense, it is
felt that it does not approach the issue in a productive

manner 0

h..-

More than "laws" and "fields," "scientific" seems to

imply the existence and utilization of hypotheses or

 

hypothetical systems and logic. To this end, Braithwaite

says:
A scientific system consists of a set of
hypotheses which form a deductive system;
that is, which is arranged in such a way that
from some of the hypotheses as premises all
the other hypotheses logically follow.9
Similarly, Kaplan states that, "Scientific method is the

same everywhere; it is the method of logical inference from
data provided and tested by experience."10

This approach to a definition of "science" seems more
productive than most others, and it is certainly compatible
with the general orientation of this thesis. Unfortunately,

however, in manifesting such compatibility it becomes suscep-

tible to most of the criticisms heretofore presented. That

 

9Braithwaite, pp. ppp., p. 12. For some reason, this
definition appears as though it could be substituted pp toto
for that of a "model." The very interesting ramifications
of such a relationship are left to the inferential abilities
and interests of the reader!

10Abraham Kaplan, "Sociology Learns Mathematical
Language," in Wiever, pp. cit., p. 399.

121

is, it is seen as a man-made concept of necessarily uncertain
valid utility in terms of the probability of providing some
understanding of the system of reality presented here. In
this respect, Holton writes:

I think that we shall have to get accustomed

to the idea that we must not look upon science
as a "body of knowledge," but rather as a system
of hypotheses; that is to say, as a system of _
guesses or anticipations which in principle E
cannot be justified, but with which we work as
long as they stand up to tests, and of which
we are never justified in saying that we know
that they are "true" or "more or less certain"*
or even "probable.

 

-.'- d. -—

Our justification for these hypotheses is

that they have a hold on our imagination and

that they help us deal with our eXperience.
This last point is particularly penetrating, for it both
justifies the use, and implies the fallibility, of the
"scientific" method in comprehending social reality in its
totality. Young's statement that "Science in any form, is
no panacea. . ." is certainly apprOpriate here. Holmes may
have rather poetically made the point when he said:

And the logical method and form flatter that

longing for certainty and for repose which

is in every human mind. But certainty generally

is ilgusion, and repose is not the destiny of
man.1 '

The second question which was posed at the beginning
of this section was whether or not the social sciences

could utilize the method generally utilized by students in

 

llHolton, pp. cit., p. XXVI of Introduction

120. W. Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law
Review, 10:8 March 25, 1897, p. 62.

122

the "pure" sciences. If scientific method is seen as
consisting of hypotheses or hypothetical systems from which
logical conclusions are inferred or deduced, then such a
method can certainly be utilized in the social sciences.
But there pp a difference between method and technique, and
that difference is crucial.

The confusion of method and technique, and the f-
resultant identification of scientific method T
with the techniques of physics has hindered *
the advance of the social sciences not a little.

For the problems of sociology are different from
those of physics. There are no concepts in social
phenomena comparable in simplicity and fruitfulness
to the space, time, and mass of classical mechanics;
experiments are difficult to perform, and even
harder to control; measurement in sociological
situations presents special problems from which
physics is relatively free.1

 

 

 

All the sciences may utilize a method which implies some
type of logical reasoning, but one cannot expect to produc-
tively use the same techniques for all the sciences or
expect to find the same degree of certitude.

There are, then, a number of techniques of research
which differ from one "science" to another. The appropriate
technique is said to be ". . . determined both by the
subjective requirements for comprehension and by the

d."lLl The

objective nature of the field to be investigate
technique of probability measurement is a good example.

It is now generally accepted, as has been mentioned earlier

 

l3

luWeisheipl,

Kaplan, pp. cit., p. 399.

 

123

in this thesis, that the higher the level of conceptual-
ization (sub-atomic, atomic, molecular, cellular, organismic,
etc.) the greater the significance which is attached to the
role of probability. Hence, it becomes understandable that
many of the "pure" sciences can attain a greater degree of
certitude in eXperimentation than most or all of the

social sciences; in this respect, one sometimes says that

.’r("_. .‘

there are "more variables involved," which amounts to the

 

same thing. Discussing the role of probability in social
scientific experimentation. Lazerfeld writes:

There is a general awareness that probability
does play a dominant role, explicitly or im-
plicitly,.in the study of human behavior.

No one believes that behavioral laws can be

as simple as the laws of the natural sciences.
It is necessary to consider more variables,

to begin with; but even then we can only state
that certain behavioral combinations are more
frequent than others. The predictions of

the social scientist will always be probabil-
istic ones.

Similarly, Brecht writes:

Yet the possibilities of measurement in the
social sciences have remained, and will
continue to remain, limited because of the
great number of variables, all of which
cannot be included in scientific analysis,
and insofar as they can, are not all
measurable.l

Of course, as Hesse states, it is probably true that

". . . observation establishes empirical laws which become

 

15Lazerfeld, pp. cit., p. 9.

l6Brecht, pp. cit., p. A3.

12A

almost as certain as the rational laws, when they are based
upon a sufficient number of observations."17 But what con-
stitutes a "sufficient number of observations" may be more
than the social scientists are capable of accurately
making, the tool of generalization notwithstanding.*

In conclusion, there does not appear to be any reason
why social scientists could not utilize some kind of
"scientific" method, 33 they see that method as consisting
of sets of hypotheses or hypothetical systems and logical
inferences. IE, on the other hand, there is a confusion
between this kind of method and particular kinds of

techniques, there will probably be a resulting frustration

 

which will not be conducive to rational analysis of some

conceptual world.

On Goals (Where To?, Wpy?)
Given the theory of reality which has been prOposed

in this thesis, it is apparent that the process of conceptual

extraction which is utilized in empirical research will not

l7Hesse, pp. cit., p. 93.

*With regard to the question of generalization, Poin—
cnxre accurately states both the main advantage and problem
lJl‘the following succinct statement.

Thus, thanks to generalization, each fact
observed enables us to forsee a great many
(Jthers; only we must not forget that the first
alone is certain; that all others are merely

probable.

See Poincare, pp. cit., p. 33-

‘ 3

125

lead one to an understanding of the system of which one is
a part. For some reason, most empirical scientists,
particularly social scientists, pp ppp accept this position
and its implications; or, as is more often the case, they

explicitly accept it but implicitly reject it. It is often

 

pointed out by the explicit Opponents of this position
that one need only look at the world around oneself to see
tangible evidence that the sciences, both "pure" and
"social," have made tremendous "advancements" toward the
understanding of this reality and its manipulation; the
evidence is everywhere.

The fact is, however, that such a statement is, at
best, of dubious accuracy. For although one may be able
to say that the social sciences have wrought change, that
is not the same as saying that those sciences have wrought

advancement in terms of increased understanding of some

 

reality apart from the one within which they themselves
exist and, in most cases, construct. The "advancement"
about which such scientists speak implies, of course, some
logical progression from X to Y, Y being "better" than X.
The "improvement" of the conditions of social existence
and the "increased" understanding of reality have coin-
cided with, indeed are said to have been attributable to,
a concomitant "improvement" of research methodology. In
this particular case, the "progression" has often been

implied as going from pure philosophy, to empirical

 

126

observation and categorization, to hypothetical and logical
reasoning, to, finally, pure mathematical reasoning.

This writer suggests that the "progression," the
"advancement," and the "increased understanding," amount
only to change, and one cannot be sure (even in a probabil-
istic sense) that it amounts to anything else. As Holton
writes:

In the empirical sciences we are far from
able to prove that we have been approaching an
increasing understanding of the type that char-
acterized the development of say some branches
of mathematics. Our interests and tools change,
but not in a linear and inevitable way. For
example, the historical develOpment from organ-

ismic science to a mechanistic and then to the
mathematical style, could have taken place in

the opposite direction. And the ontological

status of scientific knowledge itself has been

turned completely upside down since the beginning

of the twentieth century. The experimental

detail is now not simply the token of a real

world; on the contrary, it is all that we an

be more or less sure about at the moment.
The very fact that new problems constantly replace old
ones, or indeed are sometimes created by the "solutions" to
other ones, would seem to make this conclusion at least
worthy of serious consideration. If history suggests
anything, it suggests that we have not been approaching an
"increased understanding" of the basic issues involved in
human existence; we have not even been able to agree on
what they are!

It appears as though there are a number of reasons

for this. One of them is that not enough people have

 

l8Holton, pp, cit., pp. XXVI-XXVII of Introduction.

127

stopped to ask Why? Why study social phenomena? Why
develop a method for comparative police analysis? If, as
Macridis suggests with regard to a general comparative
method, such a method will at least "identify uniqueness,"19
then one should recognize that it will identify "unique-
ness" only within the confines of one's conceptual world.
p..

Even with this recogniztion, there is still the question I

of Why?; one cannot escape, although one can hide, from

 

this Why? system of questions. Since the present test of
empirical methodology is its utility in someone's conceptual
world, then one tacitly admits that much of one's thought
and research is devoted to what amounts to "game theory" in
some conceptual world. If this is the case, then it is here
suggested that there needs to be some re-evaluating; for
many, indeed most, social problems will not be "solved,"
or even identified, in this manner, "advancements" not-
withstanding. In this respect, Ackerman writes:

At the root of these problems is the preoccupation

of the twentieth century SCIENTIA with function and

process, and with the nature of observation, which

is a cause as well as a result of the insecurities

of our time. It has brought extraordinary progress

in science, and radical change in the arts, but it

has not sought or provided solutions to the major

dilemna of human existence and behavior, nor even

provided the means of assessing the value of its
own achievements.

 

19Macridis and Brown, pp, cit., pp. A-5.

20James S. Ackerman, "On Scientia," in Holton,
ob. cit., p. 22.

128

On the other hand, if pressed far enough, the social
scientist would probably answer the "Why?" with some state-
ment like, "It will help us understnad social reality (as
opposed to some purely conceptual reality)." There is a
feeling that some "it," apart from the observer, can be
understood by the present social scientific method with its
reliance on the process of conceptual extraction. With
regard to this, Holton writes:

The paths to an understanding of nature may

be infinite . . ., and each of these paths is
eXpected to have difficult but not insurmount-
able barriers. But all the paths have been
vaguely thoughttx>lead to p goal, an under—
standing of one nature, a delimited though

no doubt complex rational corpus which some

day a man's mind would be able to make his own
(as the layman today says, somewhat frightened,
"one great formula" that tells everything there
is to know about nature).

This, however, as has been implied by the entire
thesis, is not possible by the process which is commonly
utilized to comprehend social phenomena. All of the
present social scientific approaches to methodology (be
it comparative or otherwise) are based upon this process
of comprehension, and, therefore, to that extent may not
provide increased understanding of social reality; so
whence the rationale? It is quite possible that at the
innermost chamber of the social maze toward which present

social scientific analysis is directed there will be

nothing. In effect, one may well find oneself facing

21Holton, pp, cit., p. XXIV of the Introduction.

129

one's own "chalk marks on the blackboard," ("notice the
ridiculous circle. . . "); and pppp might well constitute
alltflmereality which one observer can ever really know or
understand. If at any point in the series of "WHY?"
questions a justifiable and logical answer or explanation
cannot be given, that is the point from which analytic
endeavor should proceed and to which it should be directed!
If there is no "it" to discover, then it may be much more
profitable to focus one's intellect on the construction of
a suitable "it" which will be adequate for some small
spatial-temporal coordinate of social reality. Since this
construction is, in fact, what we may have been doing all
the time, a most significant contribution to any "field"

would simply be the recognition of it.

 

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