

THE PHILIPPINE ANNEXATION DEBATE:  
AS CONTAINED IN FOUR SELECTED SPEECHES

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.  
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY  
Mary Alice Gilchrist  
1958

STAC

STAC

STAC



PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.  
TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due.

DATE DUE	DATE DUE	DATE DUE
<del>5 JUN 14 2005</del>	_____	_____
AUG 27 2005 <del>5 JUN 14 2005</del>	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

MSU is An Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution  
c:\crl\datesdue.pm3-p.1

THE PHILIPPINE ANNEXATION DEBATE:  
AS CONTAINED IN FOUR SELECTED SPEECHES

By

Mary Alice Gilchrist

A THESIS

Submitted to the College of Communication Arts  
Michigan State University of Agriculture and  
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Speech

1958



#### ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to express her sincere appreciation for the guidance, encouragement, and assistance given by the director of this study, Dr. Donald H. Ecroyd; for the instruction and criticism provided by Dr. David C. Ralph, and for the advice concerning research materials offered by Dr. Huber W. Ellingsworth.

The writer also wishes to express gratitude to her undergraduate professor, Dr. Paul W. Keller, who, by his example, individual help, and encouragement, inspired the desire to enter graduate study.

\*\*\*\*\*

THE PHILIPPINE ANNEXATION DEBATE:  
AS CONTAINED IN FOUR SELECTED SPEECHES

By

Mary Alice Gilchrist

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the College of Communication Arts  
Michigan State University of Agriculture and  
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Speech

Year 1958

Approved

Donald H. Ensey

## ABSTRACT

In his book, History of American Oratory, Warren Choate Shaw makes this observation about four speeches given on the Philippine annexation question:

On February 15, 1899, Beveridge gave . . . "The Republic That Never Retreats." This address Bryan answered in Washington for the anti-imperialists on February 22, 1899, with a discourse entitled "America's Mission." Bryan's talk, in turn, was answered by Roosevelt in Chicago on April 10, 1899, when Roosevelt spoke on the subject, "The Strenuous Life." And Roosevelt was answered on October 17, in the same city, by Carl Schurz, in behalf of the anti-imperialists.<sup>1</sup>

Such a description would lead one to picture these speeches as constituting a kind of debate.

Prompted by this assertion that the speakers were debating one another, this study was made for the purpose of describing, analyzing, interpreting, and evaluating the four speeches to find answers to the following questions:

1. What were the issues brought out in these speeches?
2. What lines of argument were used?
3. What types of proof were used?
4. What plans and/or counterplans were presented?
5. What evidence of refutation is found?

As a result of analyzing the speeches in light of these debate principles, certain evaluative considerations were possible:

---

<sup>1</sup>Warren Choate Shaw, History of American Oratory (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928), p. 560.



1. Can these four speeches be considered a debate?
2. If they do constitute a debate, which side won?
3. What is the relative effectiveness of these speakers as debaters?

Because this period in American history, and specifically the event of annexation of the Philippines, marked a departure from previous American tradition, it is an important and significant period. These four speeches, given by four outstanding men in a time of national crisis, are an example of the intellectual combat called forth by such times.

This study is organized into six chapters: Chapter I gives the introduction; Chapter II establishes the historical setting; Chapter III describes the men and the occasions of the speeches; Chapter IV analyzes the general debate of which these four speeches were a part; Chapter V analyzes the four speeches; and Chapter VI gives evaluations and conclusions.

The conclusion was reached that the speeches of Beveridge, Bryan, Roosevelt and Schurz can be considered a persuasive debate. History awarded the decision to the affirmative as winners of the debate, but according to debate criteria, the negative side did the better job of debating. The second negative speaker, Carl Schurz, was, according to debate criteria, the most effective speaker. William Jennings Bryan, first negative speaker, was second most effective speaker, with Theodore Roosevelt and Albert J. Beveridge, second and first affirmative speakers respectively, rating third and fourth.





## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	Page
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Statement of the Problem.....	1
Limitations Imposed.....	3
Justification.....	6
Organization.....	6
II. HISTORICAL SETTING.....	7
Under Spanish Rule.....	7
The Americans Come to the Philippines.....	9
Events in the Philippines.....	17
Aguinaldo—exiled and returned.....	17
Was independence promised the Philippines?.....	18
Did the Filipino insurgents cooperate, as an ally, with the United States' forces?.....	20
Who started the war between America and the Philippines?.....	21
Did the United States destroy a republic in the Philippines?.....	24
Conclusion.....	25
III. THE MEN AND THE OCCASIONS.....	27
Albert J. Beveridge.....	27
William J. Bryan.....	31
Theodore Roosevelt.....	35
Carl Schurz.....	38
Conclusion.....	43
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL DEBATE.....	45
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECHES.....	57
What Were the Issues Brought Out in These Speeches?...	59
What Lines of Argument Were Used?.....	62
What Types of Proof Were Used?.....	75

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Continued

CHAPTER	Page
What Plans and/or Counterplans Were Presented?.....	86
What Evidence of Refutation is Found?.....	87
Summary.....	94
VI. EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.....	96
Can These Four Speeches Be Considered a Debate?.....	96
Which Side Won?.....	99
What is the Relative Effectiveness of the Speakers as Debaters?.....	103
Conclusions.....	104
Suggestions for further study.....	105
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	106
APPENDIX.....	109

---

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

\*\*\*\*\*

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### Statement of the Problem

In his book, History of American Oratory, Warren Choate Shaw makes this observation:

On February 15, 1899, Beveridge gave . . . "The Republic That Never Retreats." This address, Bryan answered in Washington for the anti-imperialists on February 22, 1899, with a discourse entitled "America's Mission." Bryan's talk, in turn, was answered by Roosevelt in Chicago on April 10, 1899, when, Roosevelt spoke on the subject, "The Strenuous Life." And Roosevelt was answered on October 17, in the same city, by Carl Schurz, in behalf of the anti-imperialists.<sup>1</sup>

Such a description would lead one to picture these four speeches as constituting a kind of debate.

The word debate needs some clarification. Nichols and Baccus define debate in two ways: as a "persuasive debate," and as an "academic debate." The definition of a "persuasive debate" would seem to apply in the case of these speeches:

. . . a species of persuasion conducted as an oral contest with or without definitely established rules and techniques, the purpose being to influence others to act upon a belief or proposal of policy.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Warren Choate Shaw, History of American Oratory (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928), p. 560.

<sup>2</sup>Egbert R. Nichols and Joseph H. Baccus, Modern Debating (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1936), p. 21.

These speakers, as Nichols and Baccus' definition suggests, presented arguments pro and con in an alternating fashion for the consideration of a judge--the American people--in an attempt to persuade them to support their proposed policies.

These speeches would not, however, constitute an "academic debate" as Nichols and Baccus define it:

. . . a species of argumentation conducted as an oral contest with definitely established rules and techniques, the purpose being to establish the balance of proof in favor on one side or the other of a formal proposition.<sup>3</sup>

These speeches were given over a period of time from February 15 to October 17, 1899, and their order was in no way the result of an over-all plan. The participants did not consider themselves colleagues in the sense of a formal debate situation; they did not plan together the material of their speeches.

On the basis of these considerations, the word debate in this study will be used in the sense of a "persuasive debate," as it was defined by Nichols and Baccus.

Prompted by Warren Choate Shaw's assertion that these four speakers were debating one another, this study is made for the purpose of describing, analyzing, interpreting, and evaluating these four speeches to find answers to such questions as the following:

1. What were the issues brought out in these speeches?
2. What lines of argument were used?
3. What types of proof were used?
4. What plans and/or counterplans were presented?
5. What evidence of refutation is found?

---

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.





As a result of these critical analyses, certain evaluative considerations become possible:

1. Can these four speeches be considered a debate?
2. If they do constitute a debate, which side won?
3. What is the relative effectiveness of these speakers as debaters?

#### Limitations Imposed

Only these four speeches, of the many given on Philippine annexation, have been selected for consideration because of the circumstances that give them the appearance of a debate. Since the purpose of this study is to consider these speeches as a debate, only the principles of debate will be applied in analyzing them. In other words, no consideration will be made of delivery, immediate audience response, and the like.

It was discovered that unabridged texts of these speeches are not readily found in anthologies of speeches. The speeches by Beveridge, Roosevelt, and, less frequently, the speech of Bryan could be found in anthologies, but they were abridged. Schurz's speech was not found in an anthology. With the exception of the Beveridge speech, texts were available, however, in the standard collections of the works of Bryan, Schurz, and Roosevelt.

To obtain a complete copy of Beveridge's speech, it was necessary to write to the Indiana State Library and have photostatic copies made of the text that appeared in the Indianapolis News, February 16, 1899. This reference was the one given in the Ross dissertation on



Beveridge.<sup>4</sup> The reference to this speech of Beveridge's found in the Brigance History and Criticism of American Public Address<sup>5</sup> incorrectly lists the issue as February 14, 1899. Perhaps this error was caused by the fact that Beveridge was to have spoken on the thirteenth, but was unable to get to Philadelphia on time, thus actually speaking two days later.

Bryan's speech was obtained from Mary Baird Bryan's book: Life and Speeches of the Honorable William Jennings Bryan.<sup>6</sup> This reference was obtained from the Brigance, History and Criticism of American Public Address.<sup>7</sup>

Roosevelt's speech was finally taken from his book, The Strenuous Life.<sup>8</sup> A comparison of texts was necessary before this choice was made as there was an important discrepancy between the published texts available. In addition to the text in Roosevelt's book, other texts were found in Peterson's, A Treasury of the World's Great Speeches,<sup>9</sup> and The Chicago Tribune.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Herold Thuslow Ross, "The Oratorical Career of Albert Jeremiah Beveridge" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1932), Appendix I, p. 160.

<sup>5</sup>William Norwood Brigance (ed.), A History and Criticism of American Public Address, II (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1943), p. 941.

<sup>6</sup>Baltimore: R. H. Woodward Co., 1900.

<sup>7</sup>Brigance, op. cit., p. 918.

<sup>8</sup>Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life (New York: The Century Co., 1904), pp. 1-21.

<sup>9</sup>Houston Peterson (ed.), A Treasury of the World's Great Speeches (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 655-660.

<sup>10</sup>Tuesday, April 11, 1899, pp. 1 and 3.



In both the Peterson anthology and The Chicago Tribune,

Roosevelt is reported to have said:

As for those in our own country who encourage the foe, we can afford contemptuously to disregard them; but it must be remembered that their utterances are saved from being treasonable merely from the fact that they are despicable.

In Roosevelt's book the sentence reads:

As for those in our own country who encourage the foe, we can afford contemptuously to disregard them; but it must be remembered that their utterances are not saved from being treasonable merely from the fact that they are despicable.

The word "not" in the sentence changes the whole meaning and it had to be decided which text should be used. The text from Roosevelt's book was chosen for two reasons. First, the book was written by Roosevelt and he would have the manuscript from which he spoke. Second, Roosevelt was an outspoken man and would not hesitate to use strong language. The sentence, as Roosevelt includes it, is obviously much stronger in its language than is the sentence in either of the other texts--calling the opposition traitors, for example.

The text of Schurz's speech was taken from Bancroft's Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz.<sup>11</sup> This is the reference given in Mahaffey's dissertation on Carl Schurz.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup>Frederic Bancroft, Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz, VI (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913), pp. 77-120.

<sup>12</sup>Joseph H. Mahaffey, "The Speaking and Speeches of Carl Schurz" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1951).



### Justification

Because this period in American history, and specifically the event of annexation of the Philippines, marked a departure from previous American tradition, it is an important and significant period. In periods of importance, a nation's outstanding men and speakers rise to debate the issues. These four speeches, given by four outstanding men in a time of national crisis, are an example of the intellectual combat called forth by such times.

Rhetorical studies have been made of these four men and their speaking, but no one has studied these four speeches in the unifying setting of a debate. In this respect, this study does not duplicate but is different from previous studies of these men.

### Organization

This study is organized into six chapters: Chapter I, Introduction; Chapter II, Historical Setting; Chapter III, The Men and the Occasions; Chapter IV, Analysis of the General Debate; Chapter V, Analysis of the Four Speeches; and Chapter VI, Evaluations and Conclusions.

## CHAPTER II

### HISTORICAL SETTING

It has been said many times that a speech is not given in a vacuum: that it is caught up in the political, economic, social and psychological tenor of the times. If we admit this to be true, then we must admit that it is necessary to review the historical setting in which the four speeches under analysis occurred. Only as we understand the times that gave rise to these speeches can we hope to grasp their significance.

It is with this viewpoint in mind that the following historical setting is given.

#### Under Spanish Rule

The Philippine Islands were first known to the Europeans through Ferdinand Magellan, who came across them on his voyage around the world. Spain sent out further expeditions, and Don Miguel de Legaspi established the first permanent Spanish settlement on Cebu in 1565. With the early Spanish expeditions came the Catholic religious orders: Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinians, and Recollects. Though successful in establishing Christianity and other aspects of European culture, the Spanish were not so successful in establishing contentment with Spanish rule. By 1600 Luzon and the Visayan Islands were under Spanish control, but

the southern part of the archipelago was more resistant and Spain never came to control these islands effectively.

Spain had governed the Philippines with her customary ineptitude. Underpaid officials had been dishonest officials, and to the exactions of officialdom had been added those of the Catholic religious orders. . . . the orders had not endeared themselves to the natives. As owners of great landed estates, they were reputed to be harsh landlords. They virtually monopolized education and exercised innumerable minor governmental functions. Important posts in both state and church were reserved for Spaniards. The Filipinos . . . were consistently treated as inferiors. Misgovernment and racial discrimination bred sporadic local rebellions over the years. . . .<sup>1</sup>

The nineteenth century doctrines of liberalism and nationalism were brought to the islands. Many Filipinos studied in Europe and came back with the idea of a better life for their people. Increased trade with non-Spanish traders served to increase contacts with the revolutionary changes in the world. Finally in 1872, some 200 native soldiers in Cavite province revolted, killed their officers and called for independence. This insurrection was quickly suppressed.

On August 26, 1896, insurrection again broke out, but this time the aim was reform rather than independence. Cavite was once more the heart of the revolt, and it was at this time that Emilio Aguinaldo first came into prominence. A campaign of fifty-two days brought defeat to the insurgents. However, upon the execution of Jose Rizal y Mercado--one of the leading advocates of reform for the Philippines--the insurrection broke out again, spreading to other provinces. This insurrection was terminated in December of 1897 by the treaty of

---

<sup>1</sup>Julius W. Pratt, America's Colonial Experiment (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950), p. 193.

Biac-na-bato, in which the leaders of the insurrection agreed to surrender their arms and leave the islands in exchange for amnesty and a sum of money—800,000 dollars. Captain-General of the Philippines, Primo de Rivera, agreed to recommend reform to Spain. When the reforms were not carried out by Spain, there was a revival of hostilities in February and March of 1898.

Emilio Aguinaldo, a young man of twenty-seven, was one of the chief leaders who went into exile. In just five months he was to return, on an American ship, and resume leadership in the Filipino insurrection against Spain.

#### The Americans Come to The Philippines

As early as 1873, F. Jagor in his book, Reisen in den Philippinen,<sup>2</sup> predicted that the United States was destined to become the territorial successor of Spain in the Philippines. Another such prediction was expressed in 1891 by Jose Rizal y Mercado in his article "The Philippines Within a Hundred Years."<sup>3</sup>

In other words, the possibility of the United States annexing the Philippines was not a new idea in 1898. This idea would not, however,

. . . if known to the American people, have excited anything but ridicule from them, absorbed as they were in the

---

<sup>2</sup>F. Jagor, Reisen in den Philippinen (Berlin: 1873), p. 188.

<sup>3</sup>Jose Rizal y Mercado, "The Philippines Within a Hundred Years," La Solidaridad, September 30, 1891.

development in their own continent; no notion was more remote from their minds than that of holding colonies.<sup>4</sup>

What events, then, were to put the American people into a situation where annexation of colonies, and specifically of the Philippine Islands, was not just an idea, but a reality?

As the nineteenth century neared its close, the American people were revealing unmistakable evidences of a desire for a larger stage. . . . The United States had had no real war since 1865, no foreign war since 1848. A younger generation was coming on--a generation wearied with hearing about the deeds of its sires and uninitiated to the horrors of Mars. By 1897, the American people were definitely recovering from the panic of 1893 and from the effects of the Venezuela scare, and prosperity was going to their heads. Expand or explode is a fundamental law--and America, bursting with power, was prepared to follow its dictates. Cuba proved to be the spark that set off the American powder magazine.<sup>5</sup>

Cuba had been in a state of rebellion since February of 1895. The "yellow press" especially and the press in general kept the situation constantly before the public. On February 15, 1898, the Maine blew up in the harbor of Havana and on April 11, McKinley asked Congress for a declaration of war. On April 19, 1898, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to employ the armed forces of the United States to secure Cuban independence. Attached to this resolution was the Teller Amendment which disavowed any intention on the part of the United States to claim jurisdiction over Cuba once the Spaniards had been expelled.

<sup>4</sup>James A. Leroy, The Americans in the Philippines, Vol. I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), pp. 147-148.

<sup>5</sup>Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), p. 494.

One event of this war is of significance to the eventual annexation of the Philippines and it is therefore necessary to deal with it in a little more detail.

It is no less puzzling to understand from the surface facts how a war to liberate the Cubans from Spanish imperialism could have been turned into an instrument for American imperialism in the Far East. The crucial connecting link, of course, was Admiral Dewey's defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila.<sup>6</sup>

Admiral George Dewey had been assigned as commander of the American Asiatic squadron through the influence of Theodore Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy. It was Roosevelt who cabled orders to Dewey to hold himself in instant readiness to attack the Spanish fleet in the Philippines. As soon as war was declared, Dewey sailed straightway for Manila Bay and, on May 1, 1898, ". . . blew out of the water the collection of marine antiquities that passed for the Spanish fleet."<sup>7</sup>

With the destruction of the Spanish Fleet, the strategic function of preventing any Spanish naval raids on our West Coast had been achieved. But Dewey was not ordered to withdraw. Instead, on May 19 McKinley ordered naval reinforcements for Dewey to protect against a possible attack by a fleet from Spain. He also ordered the sending of an army to complete the destruction of the Spanish power in the Philippines.

While Dewey was waiting for these forces, the American ships were joined by five men-of-war belonging to Germany, two of the British

---

<sup>6</sup>Theodore Green (ed.). American Imperialism in 1898. Boston: D. C. Heath, 1955.

<sup>7</sup>Bailey, op. cit., p. 514.





and one each of the French and the Japanese. They were there for the avowed reason of protecting their nationals.

The Germans proved a nuisance to Dewey, violating the American blockade in several ways.

This unusual situation aroused grave suspicions in the United States that the German warships were there to support the Kaiser's designs on the Philippines. The documents now available reveal that this surmise was correct.<sup>8</sup>

After American troops arrived and occupied the city of Manila, however, the German fleet left quietly one night. In contrast to the Germans, the British at Manila were conspicuously friendly. American-Anglo relations were harmonious at this time. Japan also was interested in the Philippines, but had no intention of risking a quarrel with the United States. The Japanese warship offered no trouble for Dewey.

The interest manifested by these countries undoubtedly influenced the McKinley administration's decision to take the Philippines. It was believed that if left alone, the Islands would be "grabbed up" by one or another of these other nations.

Before Dewey's victory,

the average American citizen could not have told you whether Filipinos were Far Eastern aborigines or a species of tropical nuts. . . . At the time of Dewey's victory, President McKinley himself had to look them up on the globe.<sup>9</sup>

But Dewey's victory at Manila turned America's eyes outward to the Pacific. She was electrified by this impressive naval victory.

---

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

By July, 1898, Spain had had enough. On July 18, she undertook bringing a halt to the war by approaching President McKinley through the French Government. The French ambassador, M. Cambon, presented the Spanish communication to McKinley on July 26. The note indicated that Spain was ready to part with Cuba and, in hopes of saving Puerto Rico and the Philippines, stated that since Spain had not started the war, she understood "that the conqueror should not be arbiter of territories foreign to Cuba which have been attacked by the United States."<sup>10</sup> By this time, however, it had already been decided by the United States that we would keep Puerto Rico.

What to do with the Philippines, on the other hand, was a problem yet unsolved. The possible alternatives in the Philippine problem were: 1) to give them their independence, 2) to let them revert to Spain, 3) to take a coaling station, 4) to take Luzon, or some part of the islands, 5) or to take all of the archipelago.

McKinley at first seemed to be thinking of a coaling station. The draft of a reply to Spain's request for peace terms that was first presented to McKinley and the Cabinet called for only this much, the rest of the archipelago going back to Spain.

The actual reply to the Spanish note, however, sent through Ambassador Cambon on July 30, required that Spain

. . . consent that the United States occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty

---

<sup>10</sup>Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1936), pp. 328-329.

of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.<sup>11</sup>

The protocol, as signed on August 12, 1898, contained the above mentioned terms. McKinley immediately issued a proclamation ending hostilities, but because of a broken communication cable, the news did not reach Manila until August 16. In this interval, on August 14, the city of Manila was surrendered to the American army under General Merritt.

The peace commission met in Paris on October 1, 1898. McKinley's initial instructions to our commission concerning the Philippines stated that the United States could not accept less than Luzon, which was the largest island of the group and on which Manila, the principal seaport, was located.

In the interval between these initial instructions and the final instructions to the peace commission, the administration gathered information on the Philippines--their resources, population, harbor facilities, naval and commercial advantages, political situation, etc.

McKinley also tested American public opinion. In mid-October, he made a trip to the Trans-Mississippi Exposition in Omaha. "Enroute he took occasion to sound out American opinion on the Philippines and found that the Middle West was strongly expansionist."<sup>12</sup>

Finally, McKinley arrived at the decision that the islands were potentially rich in resources, that the Filipinos were incapable of

---

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 330.

<sup>12</sup>Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951), p. 32.

self-government, and that the United States had to annex the whole archipelago.

An ultimatum was therefore handed the Spanish ministers on November 21. It demanded cession of the Philippine archipelago and authorized payment of \$20,000,000 to Spain and admission, for ten years, of Spanish ships to the ports of the Philippines upon the same terms as American ships. On November 28, Spain accepted the American ultimatum and on December 10, 1898, the treaty of peace was signed.

On December 21, 1898, McKinley proclaimed sovereignty over the Philippines and ordered the United States Military Government at Manila city and bay extended over the entire archipelago.

The treaty went to the Senate on January 4, 1899. Debate on the Philippine question began in the Senate a month before it received the treaty and continued for some time after the treaty was ratified. The treaty met decided opposition to the Senate.

Few Senators opposed annexation of tiny Guam or Puerto Rico, but the Philippines was a greater break with American tradition--their distance, polyglot population, differing culture and resistance made these islands seem a dangerous violation of time-honored principles.<sup>13</sup>

The vote on the treaty was set for February 6, 1899. On February 4, 1899, the Filipinos revolted against United States rule. On the 6th, the treaty was passed 57 to 27. "Bryan's influence apparently turned the tide." William J. Bryan, Democratic Party leader, had come to Washington to urge his followers to vote for the treaty and end the war,

---

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.



"take over the Philippines, and then grant the Filipinos independence.

. . . It was one of the bitterest and closest fights on record, the nays failing by two votes to block ratification."<sup>14</sup>

But the action of the Senate was not a fair test of sentiment in that body or throughout the country as to the Philippines. In order to reject the Philippines, it was necessary to reject the treaty. This would have resulted in repudiating the President, unsettling business, and adding to the international uncertainties. On the clear-cut issue of retaining the archipelago the imperialists would almost certainly have failed to obtain a two-third majority.<sup>15</sup>

Before the final vote on ratification, the Senate rejected a resolution which promised ultimate independence to the Philippines. The resolution met defeat by the vote of the Vice-President who voted to break the tie.

While the Senate was debating, McKinley, on January 20, 1899, appointed the First Philippine Commission. Its purpose was to make a full investigation of the situation in Manila, report upon the situation and recommend what action should be taken for the civil administration of the Philippines.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, the Commission issued a proclamation stating the purpose of their visit. The statement declared that the

. . . aim and object of the American Government, apart from the fulfillment of the solemn obligation which it has assumed toward the family of nations by the acceptance of sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, is the well-being, the prosperity

<sup>14</sup>Bailey, op. cit., p. 523.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 523-524.

and the happiness of the Philippine people and their elevation and advancement to a position among the most civilized peoples of the world. . . . The supremacy of the United States must and will be enforced throughout every part of the archipelago, and those who resist it can accomplish no other end but their own ruin.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, in 1899, the United States found itself in possession of the Philippine Islands and several other dependencies. She had become an imperial power.

Looking back over the course of these events, one cannot fail to be impressed with the slight extent to which this great movement has been consciously planned or directed by those having charge of the destinies of this nation; how largely, indeed, it has practically been beyond their power to control. The United States, thus, though it has never deliberately or consciously pursued an imperialistic policy, yet today finds itself in fact possessed of a territory truly imperial in its extent, in the variety of the people or races occupying it, and in the wide difference of the conditions that have to be met in its government and administration.<sup>17</sup>

### Events in The Philippines

#### Aguinaldo--Exiled and Returned

As has been shown, after the treaty of Biac-na-bato, Aguinaldo and certain other leaders took up residence in Hong Kong and Spain paid them \$800,000. In February and March of 1898, hostilities in the Philippines were renewed. The Philippines were thus actually in revolt several weeks before Dewey's naval victory on May 1.

---

<sup>16</sup>Clifford H. Beem, "A Study of the Persuasive and Logical Elements in the Beveridge-Hoar Debates on the Philippine Question" (unpublished M. A. thesis, State University of Iowa, 1931), p. 29.

<sup>17</sup>William F. Willoughby, Territories and Dependencies of the United States (New York: The Century Company, 1905), p. 4.





Aguinaldo had gone to Singapore on April 21, 1898, the day upon which the United States declared war against Spain. He met with the Consul-General of the United States in Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt on the night of April 22, 1898.

After this meeting Pratt telegraphed Commodore Dewey that Aguinaldo would come to Hong Kong to arrange for cooperation between the United States forces and the Filipino insurgents. Dewey cabled back telling him to come as soon as possible. On Tuesday, the 26th, Aguinaldo, his aide-de-camp and private secretary left for Hong Kong.

Aguinaldo arrived in Hong Kong to find that Dewey had left for the Philippines. Aguinaldo then had an interview with Consul-General Wildman. On May 4, the Hong Kong junta met and voted that Aguinaldo should go to the Philippines. He sailed on the United States' ship McCulloch, Dewey's dispatch boat, which left May 17 and arrived in the waters of Cavite on May 19. He went the same day to the Olympia for a meeting with Dewey.

After this meeting, Aguinaldo went ashore at insurgent-held Cavite to command the insurgents in their operations against the Spanish. In the debate to follow, certain questions of fact kept recurring which history has never precisely settled. Some of these are relevant to the four speeches under consideration and are therefore taken up below.

#### Was Independence promised the Philippines?

It has been declared by both Filipino insurgents and American sympathizers that Aguinaldo was promised independence for the Philippine Islands by Consuls Pratt and Wildman, and Commodore Dewey.

There is no conclusive evidence that independence was promised to the Philippines, certainly not officially. Consul Wildman and Pratt, and Commodore Dewey all deny that they promised independence for the Philippines. A language barrier necessitated the use of interpreters and thus the possibility that a breakdown in communication might have occurred cannot be overlooked.

The minutes of the Philippine junta meeting mention no such promise, however, and it seems unlikely that Aguinaldo would not have mentioned this promise to them. In addition the minutes contain a plan to secure arms from the Americans which would be used against those very people if the need arose. This does not sound as if independence had been promised.

At the same time, we must recognize the influences at work which might have led the Filipinos to believe, by inference, that the United States had no designs on the Islands and if they were successful in ousting the Spaniards, they would achieve independence. In the first place, the United States went to war to achieve Cuban independence; in the second place, the United States had proclaimed, in the Teller Amendment, that she was after no territorial gain by this war; in the third place, the United States had no definite Philippine policy to proclaim until the decision was made to annex the entire archipelago on October 26, 1898. Thus, until this time, there was room for much speculation as to what the eventual policy of the United States would be.

Whether or not independence was promised, it must be recognized that it was never specifically not promised.

Did the Filipino Insurgents Cooperate, as an Ally, with the United States' Forces?

Dewey states that he had not wanted Aguinaldo's help, that he did not consider that the Filipinos would do anything, but that he gave in to the pressure of Pratt and Wildman and agreed to accept help from Aguinaldo and the insurgents.

Dewey also said:

Then he (Aguinaldo) began operations toward Manila, and he did wonderfully well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle. . . . I knew what he was doing--driving the Spaniards in (to the walled city of Manila)--was saving our own troops, because our own men perhaps would have had to do that same thing.<sup>18</sup>

Aguinaldo in other words, was successful in fighting the Spanish in the provinces, but he was unable to take Manila without Dewey's firepower. Dewey never showed any thought of cooperating with Aguinaldo in capturing Manila--he was waiting for the American forces to arrive. When the Americans arrived, tensions between Americans and Filipinos became open.

To a group of insurgents fighting for and desiring independence, the arrival of fighting forces from another country, who landed and took over positions they had fought and died for, was naturally nothing to rejoice at. In the operation against Manila, the Filipinos were excluded from American plans and were asked not to enter the city. They did not act in accord with the Americans, but

. . . carried out their own attack on the city without regard to the plans or the requests of the Americans. They secretly

---

<sup>18</sup>Dean C. Worcester. The Philippines Past and Present. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930.

treated with the Spaniards in the endeavor to secure the surrender of the city to themselves.<sup>19</sup>

When the city was in the hands of the Americans, Aguinaldo's request for joint occupation was denied.

We see, then, that Aguinaldo was very helpful to the American marine forces. In fact, they were mutually helpful to one another. But when the American troops landed and requested the withdrawal of the Filipinos, the interests of the two different forces clashed and compliance to American wishes on the part of the Filipinos was from then on reluctant or nonexistent.

Thus, it seems that the United States never really considered the Filipinos as allies. Although the Filipinos may not have thought so at the time, at most, the United States had decided to cooperate with them against a common enemy.

#### Who Started the War Between America and the Filipinos?

Worcester, after examining insurgent records, concludes that these records "leave no escape from the conclusion that the outbreak of hostilities which occurred on February 4, 1899, had been carefully prepared for and was deliberately precipitated by the Filipinos themselves."<sup>20</sup>

As was mentioned above, the minutes of the junta meeting in Hong Kong held before Aguinaldo returned to the Philippines, showed

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 127.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 161.

a plan for obtaining arms from the Americans to use against them if necessary. On August 8, Fernando Acevedo wrote to General Pio del Pilar recommending that he attack and annihilate the Americans: on August 10, del Pilar suggested to Aguinaldo that the Americans be attacked; on August 17, Aguinaldo stated: "The conflict is coming sooner or later."<sup>21</sup>

On January 4, 1899, the following telegram was sent to all local chiefs of each town:

Hasten the preparation of all the towns in order to oppose the American invasion. See that all the inhabitants prepare their bolos and daggers; also that in each street and barro national militia is organized.<sup>22</sup>

Aguinaldo and his men were preparing for the conflict all the time and they intended to pick the time of its beginning. On January 21, Aguinaldo was evidently not quite ready and ordered:

Tell the Filipino soldiers in the walled city affiliated to our cause that they must keep on good terms with the Americans, in order to deceive them, since the hoped-for moment (underlining is my work) has not yet arrived.<sup>23</sup>

Of the circumstances surrounding the actual outbreak of hostilities, Taylor says:

On February 2, General MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of the Eighth Army Corps, wrote to the commanding general of the Filipino troops in the Third zone in front of him that--"An armed party from your command now occupies the village in front of blockhouse No. 7, at a point considerably more than a hundred yards on my side of the line, and is very active in exhibiting hostile intentions. This party must be withdrawn to your side of the line at once. From this date if the line is crossed by your

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 149.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 154.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 158.



men with arms in their hands, they must be regarded as subject to such action as I may deem necessary." At about half past 8 on the night of February 4, a small insurgent patrol entered the territory within the American lines at blockhouse No. 7 and advanced to the little village of Santol in front of an outpost of the Nebraska regiment. This was the same point from which the insurgents had been compelled to retire on February 2. An American outpost challenged, and then as the insurgent patrol continued to advance the sentinel fired, whereupon the insurgent patrol retired to blockhouse No. 7 from which fire was immediately opened upon the Americans. This fire spread rapidly down the American and insurgent lines and both forces at once sprang to arms.<sup>24</sup>

This account does not remove from the Americans responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities. It must be remembered that the Filipinos had desired their freedom for many years and under Spanish rule sporadic insurrections were the rule rather than the exception. For a brief while hope had been held out to them that independence was near at hand. Whether by promise or inference, Aguinaldo let his followers believe that independence had been promised to him by the United States. Further hope was no doubt provided by the traditional policy of the United States against embroilment in international affairs and by the Teller Amendment. It could very well have been thought by the insurgent leaders and people that the United States would not annex the islands. When it was announced that the military government of the United States was to be extended over the archipelago, the United States became to many of the insurgents just another oppressor to be fought. So the very presence of troops in the Philippines did something to help precipitate the war.

---

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 158-160.



Did the United States Destroy a Republic in the Philippines?

On May 24, Aguinaldo declared himself dictator of the Philippines, and on June 12, 1898, he proclaimed Philippine independence. On June 18, 1898, he issued a decree providing for the creation and administration of municipalities.

On June 23, Aguinaldo proclaimed the establishment of a revolutionary government, of which he was to be the President. Four secretaries and a congress were provided, the delegates to congress being elected by the methods decreed on June 18 and 20. In case a province was not able to elect representatives, they would be appointed by the government.

Of this revolutionary government, in which the power lay in the hands of Aguinaldo and the people that he surrounded himself with, Worcester says:

The people of the provinces obeyed the men who had arms in their hands. It is not probable that many of them had any conviction concerning the form of government which would be best for the Philippines. There were no signs of a spontaneous desire for a republic. Orders came from the group about Aguinaldo, and the people accepted a dictator and a republic as they accepted a president and a republic, without knowing, and probably without caring very much, what it all meant, except that they hoped that taxes would cease with the departure of the friars. A determined and well-organized minority had succeeded in imposing its will upon an unorganized, heterogeneous, and leaderless majority.<sup>25</sup>

It would appear, then, that a minority group took it upon themselves to rule the mass of ignorant and heterogeneous natives. The constitution drawn up and never put in effect was not necessarily

---

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 197.

indicative of the ability of the people to maintain a republic; it was the work of this minority group.

### Conclusion

The Philippine Islands, under Spanish rule since the 1600's, had long agitated for their independence. The Filipino insurgents were used by Dewey to fight the Spanish on the islands before the American troops arrived. The Filipinos hoped for independence and took steps to set up a government. When the United States took steps to bring the islands under their control, the Filipinos revolted.

The assertion that Aguinaldo was promised independence by Pratt, Wildman or Dewey is not proved conclusively and insurgent records throw doubt on such an assertion. The insurgent leaders, from the beginning, were aware of the possibility that America might replace the Spanish as their rulers and took steps to fight them. The antagonism aroused by the proximity of the American and Filipino forces and the clash of interests of the two groups led inevitably to hostilities.

America has been accused of destroying a republic in the Philippines. A government was in existence, but it was rule by the minority. A true republic could not be expected in a country made up predominately of uneducated natives who did not understand what a republic was.

America entered the Spanish-American War with no intention of annexing the Philippine Islands. Her eyes were turned to these islands

only when Dewey's victory at Manila Bay electrified the country. Despite many influences favoring annexation, the treaty passed the Senate by the barest possible margin and had the issue been annexation alone, it possibly would not have passed. The war that started as a crusade to free Cuba brought America a colonial empire, largely through force of circumstances rather than through any planned action.

All of these facts, of course, played a major role in determining the content and persuasive approach of the four speakers in the speeches being studied. It could also probably be argued that by their speaking they may have, in some ways, affected these events, developing public opinion as well as reflecting it. With this complex of history in mind, let us next consider who our four speakers were at the time they spoke, and what were some of the details of the occasion in each case.

## CHAPTER III

### THE MEN AND THE OCCASIONS

The four speakers involved in this study were all politicians in the sense that they ran for and held public office. In the year 1899 they were at relatively different stages in their careers, however. These brief sketches, therefore, are presented for the purpose of giving the reader some perspective for his consideration of their individual roles in that particular year--the year in which the debate under study was begun.

#### Albert J. Beveridge

Albert Jeremiah Beveridge was born near the border of Highland and Adams counties, Ohio, October 7, 1862, while his father and four half-brothers were away with the Union Army. Three years later the family moved to Sullivan, Illinois, where Beveridge was graduated from the Sullivan High School in 1881. He then entered De Pauw University. Having achieved success as an orator, Beveridge was enlisted in 1884, while yet a student, to campaign for James G. Blaine in Indiana. After his graduation from De Pauw in 1885, he entered the law office of Senator McDonald in Indianapolis and remained there until January of 1899 when he was elected to the Senate.

Why did Beveridge support Philippine annexation? In some ways it was a natural result of the intense American nationalism which he began to develop early in life. His father and brothers had served under McClellan and brought home a stout loyalty and devotion to the Union. Periodically, the "bloody shirt" speakers came to Moultrie County, Illinois, and these speeches were attended by the Beveridge family. His college career was spent in surroundings of mid-western Republicanism. De Pauw ". . . was located in a section of the country filled with an intense political feeling based upon Civil War fractionalism."<sup>1</sup>

At the beginning of his political career, while still a student, his attention was focused on the national level rather than at the State and local level. His interest and research as a lawyer centered in the Constitution and the powers and duties of the Federal Government. "It was the fundamental law of the United States rather than local statutes and interpretations that held his attention."<sup>2</sup>

Although Midwestern influences had not led Beveridge to imperialism, certainly, they had prepared him to wish to see the United States grow ever stronger and greater. With the coming of the Spanish-American War and the accompanying surge of patriotism and nationalism in the country, there also came an opportunity for the United States to become a colony-holding world power. It was an easy step from strong nationalism to imperialism when the opportunity was at hand and the passions of patriotism were already inflamed by warfare.

---

<sup>1</sup>Herald Thuslow Ross, "The Oratorical Career of Albert J. Beveridge," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1932) p. 107.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 109.

Thus, in 1899, we find Beveridge, at the age of thirty-seven, a newly elected Senator from Indiana. He was just beginning his political career and had yet to make his mark on the American political scene. He had achieved some reputation as a speaker, especially in the Mid-West States, but had yet to achieve his ultimate fame. An intense nationalist, he felt a deep sense of pride in being elected to the Senate and was anxious to carry out his new duties with the ability and dignity he thought due his position. In his doctoral study of Beveridge and his speaking, Ross says:

As Mr. Beveridge looked forward to his years in the Senate of the United States, he realized that he must now take a place beside men who were skilled in Statecraft and experienced in politics and government. Most of them were older than he; many of them had been national figures for years. What place would he occupy in such company? Earnestly he desired to be a leader; he could never happily follow. But how could he assume leadership in the Senate: Mr. Beveridge throughout his life had known only one way to succeed in the achievement of his ambitions. He had always found it necessary to prepare himself thoroughly, laboring with systematic, painstaking care. With characteristic determination he resolved, therefore, to prepare himself once more, this time for senatorial leadership.<sup>3</sup>

Elected in January of 1899, he would not take office till December, and he was determined to use the intervening time to prepare himself for leadership. What should be the specific nature of this preparation? What was to be the important issue facing the Senate?

To political observers in 1899, it became increasingly evident that the most absorbing topic for Congressional deliberation in the coming session would be the future disposition of the Philippine Islands, acquired under the peace treaty with Spain. The treaty had been ratified in the Senate only after Mr. Bryan had persuaded certain Democratic members to vote for it, but

---

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., Appendix I, p. 160.

Mr. Bryan's subsequent activity gave rise to the suspicion that the move had been entirely political--an attempt to create an issue for the election of 1900. Senator George F. Hoar, of Massachusetts, Carl Schurz and others were busy organizing a league against the "imperialistic" policies toward which the administration seemed to be tending. . . . In all this discussion, Mr. Beveridge saw his opportunity. With the forces of the administration and of the opposition in a quandary, he realized that a senator amply prepared and exceptionally well qualified to speak upon the Philippine situation could seize leadership and exert influence upon legislation.<sup>4</sup>

Beveridge was already an expansionist so there was no question of which side he would uphold. He quickly took his stand with those who favored keeping the Philippines as a possession of the United States.

To become "amply prepared" and "exceptionally well qualified," he decided to take a trip to the Philippines and the Orient. This way he would obtain first-hand information. But Beveridge was faced with a problem by taking this trip. He would be away from the United States for several months and in this period he could be forgotten. To meet this problem he ". . . decided to make so impressive an announcement of his views that he could not be forgotten. . . ." <sup>5</sup>

The opportunity presented itself for the making of this "impressive announcement" when the Union League Club of Philadelphia invited him to speak at their annual Lincoln Day Banquet. A storm prevented him from attending this banquet, however. He became snowbound in a train about forty miles west of Philadelphia.

Since he had been unable to attend the Lincoln Day Banquet, a special luncheon was given for him by the Secretary of the Union League

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 160-161.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 163.

Club, Mr. J. Levering Jones on February 15, 1899. It was attended by approximately one hundred prominent Philadelphians. Several brief addresses were given before Mr. Beveridge spoke.

The Indianapolis Journal reported that Beveridge

. . . was received with impressive hospitality, and his address on the policy of expansion provoked uncommon enthusiasm.

At the conclusion of his address Mr. Beveridge was given three hearty cheers and the assembly rushed forward to congratulate the speaker.<sup>6</sup>

That speech was the first of the four under consideration, and one of Beveridge's most famous, "The Republic that Never Retreats."

#### William J. Bryan

William Jennings Bryan was born on March 19, 1860, in Salem, Illinois. His father was from Virginia--a Jefferson and Jackson Democrat; a lawyer and a judge, a member of the State Senate, and an unsuccessful candidate for Congress. The elder Bryan sent his son to Jacksonville, Illinois, to stay at the Whipple Academy and then to Illinois College where he was graduated with the B. A., highest honors and as valedictorian in 1881. In 1883 he received the LL. B. from the Union College of Law. He was admitted to the Illinois bar in the same year and practiced law in Jacksonville, Illinois from 1883 to 1887. In 1884, Bryan married Mary Baird and in the autumn of 1887, they moved to Lincoln, Nebraska. In 1890, at the age of 30, Bryan became a

---

<sup>6</sup>The Indianapolis Journal, Thursday Morning, February 16, 1899, pp. 1-2.



Democratic candidate for Congress. He was elected and then re-elected in 1892. In 1894 he was an unsuccessful candidate for the Senate. Bryan then turned to journalism and became editor-in-chief of the Omaha World-Herald. He also became a lecturer for the Chautauqua. At the Democratic Convention in 1896, he wrote the silver plank in the platform, made the famous "Cross of Gold" speech, and was nominated for the presidency. He was only thirty-six years of age. He was defeated by McKinley, but remained the leader of the Democratic party despite this defeat and his youth. He lectured on bimetallism in 1897 and 1898. When the Spanish-American War came, he raised the Third Regiment Nebraska Volunteer Infantry and was made a colonel. He did not serve outside the United States, however, and resigned the day the treaty with Spain was signed. When the annexation of the Philippines became an issue, he applied himself to opposing such a step and gave many speeches, one of which was "America's Mission."

Bryan, while still a very young man, was caught up in the Western agrarian discontent of the 1880's and 1890's. Throughout his life he was to be the spokesman of the common people. Coming from a family background of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy, he was a natural advocate of the movement to take government out of the hands of business and put it back into the hands of the people.

As contrasted with Beveridge, Bryan's loyalties were predominately with a geographical section and a particular segment of the people, not with the Union, per se. A government for the benefit of the people, not a government of world power, was his vision. His America was an

America at peace with the World, respecting time-honored principles of non-embroilment in international affairs.

A serious student of the Bible, steeped in its principles by his parents, Bryan was a fundamentalist. The way of the peaceful man, not the way of the militarist, was his ideal.

Bryan found the policy of imperialism incompatible with Democracy and Christianity. In his eyes annexation of the Philippines was in violation of our democratic tradition and the Bible.

We find Bryan at the pinnacle of his fame in 1899, both as a speaker and as a politician.

On the occasion of George Washington's birthday, February 22, 1899, the Virginia Democratic Association of Washington, D. C., held a Washington Day Banquet. Bryan was guest of honor and principal speaker. Thus, as did Beveridge, he faced a friendly audience.

Looking to the election year of 1900, the Democrats were sorely in need of an issue. Bryan had urged the passing of the treaty with Spain, although this meant our taking possession of the Philippines. This he was known to oppose. Bryan declared that it was necessary to end the war and that we could give the Philippines their independence later. After the treaty was passed and Bryan began to assail the Administration's policy on the Philippine question, he was accused of having the treaty passed, with Democratic help, in order to create an issue for the coming campaign. This may have been true, but in all probability, Bryan would have opposed annexation of the Philippines had there been no question of party politics. He was not an expansionist.



Speaking only eight days after Beveridge's rousing expansionist address to the Union League Club of Philadelphia, Bryan seemingly answered him, if not directly, at least in essence.

The banquet was held at the National Rifles' armory in Washington, D. C. The New York Times and other newspapers describe the banquet hall ". . . beautifully decorated for the occasion with flags, bunting and flowers."<sup>7</sup> The Enquirer of Cincinnati further says of the decorations: "In the center of the stage to the rear of the hall was an immense floral design presented to Mr. Bryan by his admirers."<sup>8</sup>

Newspaper accounts claim that the banquet was "largely attended." Present were Democratic Representatives and Senators and members of the Virginia Democratic Association.

The program included speeches and music. The Enquirer gives us an account of the program:

Patriotic speeches were made and songs sung, while the band played a medley of popular airs. . . . Robert N. Harper, the President of the Association welcomed the guests and introduced the speakers. Senator Daniel, of Virginia, was the first speaker, responding to the toast, "George Washington: we celebrate his birthday anniversary for his worth as a warrior, statesman and patriot." "Democracy's Mission" was responded to by Representative Bailey, of Texas. . . . Hon. Elliot Danforth of New York, responded to the toast, "The State of New York." Hon. D. A. De Armond responded to the toast, "The Democratic Party: It cannot die while the Republic lives."<sup>9</sup>

Bryan was the next and last speaker. He responded to the toast, "America's Mission." By the time he rose, several speeches, interspersed

<sup>7</sup>The New York Times, Thursday, February 23, 1899, p. 2.

<sup>8</sup>The Enquirer, Cincinnati, Thursday, February 23, 1899, p. 2.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.



with music, had already been given, all of which helped to put his audience in a receptive frame of mind. The speech was entitled "America's Mission," and while not one of his most famous public addresses, was a worthy effort.

### Theodore Roosevelt

Theodore Roosevelt was born in New York City on October 27, 1858. His father was a prosperous merchant and a Lincoln Republican. Young Roosevelt was a sickly and delicate boy who suffered with asthma. He organized his own gymnasium and rebuilt his body by hard work and determination. After being tutored in the United States and Europe, Roosevelt entered Harvard in the fall of 1876. He graduated in 1880, Phi Beta Kappa, and this same year, married Alice Lee. From 1882 to 1884 he served in the New York State Assembly, going as delegate-at-large to the Chicago Republican National Convention in 1884. This same year his wife, Alice, died. He spent the next two years, 1884 to 1886, as a rancher in the Badlands of South Dakota, returning to politics in the fall of 1886 when he ran against Abram S. Hewitt and Henry George for mayor of New York. Hewitt was elected, and even Henry George received more votes--a fact which some biographers seem to feel had strong influence upon his later social and political views.

Roosevelt then went to London and here, on December 2, 1886, he married Edith Kermit Carow. In 1888 he supported Harrison for president and was in return appointed to the civil-service commission, in which capacity he served from 1889 to 1895. In 1895 he assumed the duties of

the president of the board of police commissioners in New York City. In 1897 he became Assistant Secretary of the Navy. This position he resigned on May 6, 1898 to become lieutenant-colonel of the First United States Volunteer Cavalry (the Rough Riders) in the Spanish-American War. He was later promoted to colonel. He came home from the war a public hero and, at last, was capable of winning elective office. In November of 1898, he was elected governor of New York and served one term in this capacity.

Roosevelt was an intense nationalist. "I am an American from the crown of my head to the soles of my feet,"<sup>10</sup> he once said. A strong United States, occupying a place of prestige, he desired to see. Raised in a family belonging to the "old aristocracy," he was in some cases snobbish, firmly believing in the concept of "higher races." As a strong nationalist and believing in the concept of "higher races," it was an easy step to acceptance of imperialism.

In 1899 Theodore Roosevelt was governor of New York, and a popular hero of the Spanish-American War, but he had yet to achieve the pinnacle of his fame when he was invited to Chicago as guest-of-honor for the Appomattox Day Banquet, held by the Hamilton Club on April 10.

Roosevelt arrived in Chicago about 4:00 p.m. on April 9, 1899 and was accorded an enthusiastic welcome.

The train which brought the New York Governor to Chicago was met at the suburban station of Englewood by an enthusiastic crowd. The Governor was forced to come to the platform of his car and

---

<sup>10</sup>Hermann Hagedorn (ed.), The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. XIV (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), p. 74.

say a few words. From the moment Governor Roosevelt left his car at the Lake Shore station, where he was met by an escort of eight Rough Riders, to the doors of his hotel, he was surrounded and followed by crowds who cheered him every time he moved.<sup>11</sup>

Theodore Roosevelt, . . . rode at the head of a triumphal parade of mounted Rough Riders, members of the Hamilton Club, and between 3,000 and 4,000 other citizens of Chicago, from the Lakeshore Railway Station to the Auditorium Annex yesterday afternoon.<sup>12</sup>

That evening he was the guest of Stephen Demmon at a dinner given in the Union League Club, which was attended by ten prominent men of Chicago. He gave a speech which ". . . gave hard knocks to the men who get up 'reform' political parties and help to elect rogues."<sup>13</sup>

On the morning of the tenth, Roosevelt visited the University of Chicago and gave an informal address to the students. At noon he lunched with the Harvard Club.

That evening the banquet was held in the Auditorium Theatre. The New York Tribune cites the number present around the banquet tables as 600 and adds:

The boxes of the Auditorium, as well as the seats in the hall back of the banquet floor were filled.<sup>14</sup>

The Chicago Tribune sets the number present at 3,000 with 1,000 around the banquet tables.

<sup>11</sup>The New York Times, Monday, April 10, 1899, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup>Chicago Tribune, Monday, April 10, 1899, p. 1.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.



Governor Roosevelt was the third speaker in a program of four speeches.<sup>15</sup> General John C. Black of Chicago spoke on "Grant" and "Lee." When Roosevelt rose to give his speech, he was greeted enthusiastically.

The hall was a mass of waving handkerchiefs and napkins, and the cheers that greeted him as he arose prevented the speaker for many minutes from beginning his speech.<sup>16</sup>

As in the situation of Bryan's speech, Roosevelt was present at a patriotic occasion, and he also faced an audience made more receptive by previous patriotic speeches. Like both Bryan and Beveridge, Roosevelt faced a friendly audience. The Hamilton Club was composed of well-to-do men like himself and was a patriotic organization.

Roosevelt and his speech were warmly accepted. In the words of the Chicago Tribune:

Governor Roosevelt's practical patriotism voiced in his speech, brought applause again and again. . . . Frequently he was forced to stop, while the 3,000 men and women rose and cheered his sentences till the golden arches of the Auditorium shook.<sup>17</sup>

The speech is one of his most famous, and is frequently included in anthologies--"The Strenuous Life."

#### Carl Schurz

Carl Schurz was born in the little town of Liblar on the Rhine, near Cologne, Germany, on March 2, 1829. He attended the village

<sup>15</sup>Charles Emory Smith of Philadelphia closed the evening's program with an address on "The Union."

<sup>16</sup>The Springfield Daily Republican, Tuesday, April 11, 1899, p. 7.

<sup>17</sup>Chicago Tribune, Tuesday, April 11, 1899, p. 1.

elementary school, and, at the age of 10, was placed in the gymnasium in Cologne to prepare for the university. He spent the years 1839 to 1846 at the gymnasium becoming a candidate for the doctorate at the University of Bonn in 1847. His chosen career was a professorship of history, but in 1849, one year short of his doctorate, the German revolutionary movement intervened. Participating in an abortive revolutionary movement upon Siegburg on May 11, 1849, he went on to become a lieutenant and staff officer of the revolutionary army. When the fortress of Rastatt, where he was serving, surrendered, he escaped through an unused sewer, and, with two companions, went to France. Schurz then joined a colony of German refugees in Switzerland. He returned to Germany and effected, on the night of November 6-7, 1850, the escape of his former professor, Gottfried Kinkel, who had been sentenced to life-imprisonment for his part in the revolution. Schurz then went to Paris, but in the summer of 1851, he was expelled by the police as a dangerous foreigner. He then went to England and here, on July 6, 1852, he married Margarethe Meyer. In August they set sail for the United States.

They lived in Philadelphia until 1855 and then, in 1856, bought a small farm near Watertown, Wisconsin. Espousing the anti-slavery cause, he was soon drawn into Republican politics. He campaigned for Frémont in 1856; he was sent as a delegate to the Republican State convention in 1857; and he was nominated for lieutenant-governor in 1857 although he was not yet even a citizen. Although he was defeated, he spent the next year, 1858, campaigning for Lincoln in Illinois. Schurz was next put forward for governor of Wisconsin; but was defeated



again. He was then admitted to the bar and entered into practice. However, politics, continued to dominate his time. He was chairman of the Wisconsin delegation to the Chicago Republican convention of 1860 and was one of the committee which notified Lincoln of his nomination. He campaigned vigorously for Lincoln and Lincoln appointed him minister to Spain. He resigned this post in April, 1862 and was appointed brigadier-general on June 10. He was promoted to major-general on March 14, 1863. The end of the war found him chief of staff to major-general Slocum in Sherman's army. He resigned immediately after Lee's surrender. From July to September, 1865, he traveled in the Southern states, upon the request of President Johnson, and wrote a report on the conditions existing there. With this task finished, he became the Washington correspondent for the New York Tribune. Resigning this post in 1866, he became editor-in-chief of the Detroit Post. He remained at this job one year and then became joint editor with Emil Preetorius, of the St. Louis Westliche Post. He remained in this post only a short time.

He was temporary chairman of the Republican convention in 1868, and made the keynote address. This same year he was elected Senator from Missouri. In 1875, he failed to obtain re-election from a Democratic State legislature. Disgusted with Grant, he was one of the leaders that promoted the Liberal Republican movement. He was the permanent president of the Cincinnati convention of 1872 that organized the new party and nominated Horace Greeley. In 1876, he returned to the Republican fold and supported Hayes, who appointed Schurz

Secretary of the Interior. On leaving this position in 1881, he again turned to journalism. He became head of a triumvirate of editors for the New York Evening Post and the Nation. In 1892 he succeeded George William Curtis as contributor of the leading editorials to Harper's Weekly. In 1898 he severed this connection as he opposed war with Spain while Harper's Weekly favored it. He also opposed annexation of the Philippines, an issue arising out of the war, and was instrumental in the organizing and promulgating of the Anti-Imperialist League.

Schurz's ideal America was a republic, free from all entangling foreign alliances, at peace with the world. Caught up early in the German revolutionary movement, he transferred his ideals to the United States and was loathe to have her adopt any of the old world autocratic, colonial policies. He once wrote that foreign-born citizens were "more jealously patriotic Americans than many natives are," since they watch the progress of the Republic "with triumphant joy at every success of our democratic institutions, and with the keenest sensitiveness to every failure, having the standing of this country before the world constantly in mind."<sup>18</sup> Holding the above views, Schurz was bound to oppose Philippine annexation.

In 1899, Carl Schurz was seventy years of age and past his period of prime influence in politics. He was looked upon as a veteran statesman.

---

<sup>18</sup>Carl Schurz, The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz, Vol. II (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1917), pp. 119-120.



On October 17 and 18, 1899, an anti-imperialist conference was held in Chicago. The meeting was an attempt to consolidate the widely scattered and independent organizations which opposed the McKinley administration's policy regarding the Philippines. About one hundred and sixty delegates from thirteen states and the District of Columbia attended. These men were the leading anti-imperialists in the nation.

The morning and afternoon of the seventeenth were devoted to business sessions which were held in Apollo Hall on the fifth floor of Central Music Hall. The morning session was opened with a speech by Edwin B. Smith who proclaimed the purpose of the conference:

We hope that this conference will result in a systematic effort throughout the country to organize anti-imperialistic leagues and committees of correspondence.<sup>19</sup>

That evening a public meeting was held in Central Music Hall. While the Springfield Republican states that the audience "taxed" Central Music Hall, the Chicago Daily Tribune sets the audience at 1,500 and adds that "the hall was far from filled."<sup>20</sup> The Cincinnati Enquirer also states that the hall was not full and says that "The managers attribute it to the belief of the public that admission was only by ticket."<sup>21</sup> The Chicago Daily Tribune, on the other hand, attributes the failure to fill the hall to the Chicagoans' weariness of anti-imperialistic talk.

<sup>19</sup>The New York Times, Wednesday, October 18, 1899, p. 5.

<sup>20</sup>Chicago Daily Tribune, Wednesday, October 18, 1899, p. 9.

<sup>21</sup>Cincinnati Enquirer, Wednesday, October 18, 1899, p. 1.





J. Sterling Morton presided at the evening meeting and made the opening address. Carl Schurz was the principal speaker of the evening and, according to the Enquirer, was accorded a "spontaneous, enthusiastic and demonstrative"<sup>22</sup> welcome. Throughout the speech, cheers and demonstrations are reported to have checked the speaker in his progress.

The Enquirer calls the speech ". . . the greatest contribution to the anti-imperialistic literature, the strongest presentation of the opposition that began with the adoption of the Paris treaty."<sup>23</sup> Its title was, "The Policy of Imperialism."

#### Conclusion

These then were the speakers. Beveridge, Bryan and Roosevelt were relatively young men, thirty-seven, thirty-nine, and forty-one years of age respectively. Schurz was seventy, the elder statesman.

All had become known in the political arena, and, except for Beveridge, who had yet to take his seat in the Senate, had held public office. Beveridge and Roosevelt had yet to reach their prime in politics; Bryan had already achieved his prime; Schurz was past it.

All had achieved at least some degree of distinction as speakers. Bryan had already delivered his famous "Cross of Gold" speech and stumped the country in the 1896 presidential campaign. He was nationally recognized as a noted speaker. Beveridge was just becoming known outside

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

the Mid-West. Roosevelt had spoken oftener and more widely than Beveridge, but was not at the height of his popularity as a speaker. Schurz was a veteran of long standing on the public platform.

Beveridge and Roosevelt, intense nationalists, desired world prestige and power for the United States; Bryan and Schurz desired an America at peace with the world. Beveridge and Roosevelt advocated annexation of the Philippines; Bryan and Schurz opposed it.

Bryan and Roosevelt gave their speeches at patriotic occasions. Beveridge prepared his speech for a patriotic celebration, but had to give it at a special luncheon when his train was delayed because of snow. Thus, three of the four speeches were prepared with a patriotic occasion in mind. Schurz gave his speech at the Anti-Imperialist Convention in Chicago and it was a presentation of the anti-imperialist stand. In Schurz's case, the logical arguments and evidence were importantly necessary. In the other three speeches the ideas had to be more clearly vitalized and motivated, making logical proof subordinate to the necessity of achieving an immediate, favorable reaction. To use another terminology, Schurz's speech is essentially to convince (to secure belief by appeals to logic), the others' to persuade (to secure action by appeals to emotions).

## CHAPTER IV

### AN ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

The four speakers of this study were not the only ones speaking on this question. The United States as a whole was debating Philippine annexation. The nation was divided for many reasons and on many points concerning annexation, not all of which figure in the four speeches studied. It is, therefore, only proper to consider these four speeches in the context of the debate as a whole.

The over-all point of controversy was: Should the United States annex the Philippine Islands? After ratification of the treaty with Spain, the United States had been ceded the Philippines Islands by Spain and the interpretation of this question changed somewhat. Since we had the Philippines, the question came to revolve primarily about two principle alternatives: Should we hold the islands as territory of the United States for some indefinite period, or should we grant them their independence immediately?

The several subsidiary issues were:

#### A. Issues of policy

1. Does the United States eventually intend to make the Philippine Islands a state of the Union?
2. Does the United States intend to confer citizenship on the people of the Philippines?

#### B. Issues of legality

1. Did the United States have the right to demand the Philippine Islands from Spain, and conversely, did Spain have the right to cede the islands to us?
2. Is the United States given the right by the Constitution and Declaration of Independence to annex the Philippine Islands and govern them for some indefinite period of time as a territory?

#### C. Issue of Economic Advantage

1. Would it be to the economic advantage of the United States to annex the Philippine Islands?

#### D. Issues of principle and/or duty

1. Is the United States honor-bound by the Teller Amendment<sup>1</sup> not to acquire any land by the Spanish-American War?
2. Did we by promise or by implication assure independence to the Filipinos, thus binding us morally to such a policy?
3. Is it the duty of the United States to "take up the white man's burden" and advance the "superior Anglo-Saxon civilization."?
4. Is it our duty to see that our flag is not "hailed down" from territory over which it has once floated?
5. Is not the annexation of the Philippines a part of our "destiny"?
6. Is it not our duty to "spread Christianity" to the "pagan" Filipinos?

#### E. Issue of tradition

1. Would we be breaking with the American tradition embodied in the Monroe Doctrine--non-embroilment in the affairs of the Old World?

#### F. Issue of practicability

1. Will our democratic institutions take root in the Philippine Islands?

The position of each of the two sides on these issues and the background or rationale of these positions are as follows.

---

<sup>1</sup>Supra, Chapter II, p. 10.

## A. Issues of Policy

1. Does the United States eventually intend to make the Philippine Islands a state of the Union?

Annexationists: They believed that this was neither possible nor desirable. They held that the United States was obligated in no way to make them a state in the Union, ever.

Anti-Annexationists: They also believed that this was neither possible nor desirable. But, they believed that under the terms of our Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, we had no right to hold territory for an indefinite period without making it a state.

2. Does the United States intend to confer citizenship on the people of the Philippines?

Annexationists: No. We are under no obligation to do so.

Anti-Annexationists: This would not be desirable. However, under the terms of our Constitution, the children born in our dependency become citizens. Legally then, the next generations of Filipinos will be American citizens with all the privileges of other citizens.

## B. Issues of legality

1. Did the United States have the right to demand the Philippine Islands from Spain, and conversely, did Spain have the right to cede the Islands to us?

Annexationists: Yes. We had legally purchased the Islands from Spain, their former owner. Spain was in possession of the Islands when the United States went to war with her. It was also argued that

our right to demand the Philippines is based on the right of the victor nation to demand indemnity, in the form of territory, if necessary.

Anti-Annexationists: No. You could not purchase something from Spain that she did not have. The Filipino insurgents had taken control over the archipelago and had established a government. Spain could no longer be considered in possession of the Islands. Further, the United States had no right on which to base their demand for the Islands; since, at the time of the signing of the peace protocol, the United States was not in possession of any territory in the Islands that had not been taken from Spain by the Filipinos and surrendered to us as a friendly gesture from an ally.

2. Is the United States given the right by the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence to annex the Philippine Islands and govern them for an indefinite period of time as territory?

Annexationists: Yes. The right to acquire territory is a sovereign right belonging to the United States by virtue of its national sovereignty. Our previous acquisitions are precedents. As to the fact of governing the islands indefinitely as a territory with no intention of incorporating them as a state, the right to acquire a territory embraces the right to govern the territory in any way the condition of the territory requires. The power and legal right to do this are conferred upon Congress in the clause which says: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to

the United States; . . ." <sup>2</sup> The Declaration of Independence does not forbid our annexation of the Philippines. The "consent of the governed" statement does not mean that all government must have the consent of the governed. In all of our previous acquisitions we did not bother to obtain the consent of the governed. The Declaration was not written in opposition to the colonial system but in opposition to the abuses of it.

Anti-Annexationists: The Philippine Islands cannot be compared to our previous acquisitions, which were made with the intent of incorporating the territory into the Union as states. Our previous acquisitions were thinly populated territories which our people could settle, bringing with them the American democratic institutions; or such small areas that they were of little concern to govern. Previous acquisitions were contiguous or relatively close. The Philippines, on the other hand, are thousands of miles away, thickly populated with a polyglot population and unfamiliar with American institutions. Our people could not and would not settle there. The islands could not hope to be successfully incorporated as states. Therefore, since the Constitution confers no power to acquire territory to be governed permanently as such, we do not have the Constitutional right to annex the Philippines. There is a limitation on the power of the government to acquire territory, namely, that the territory have fitness for, and be intended for, ultimate statehood. The power of Congress to govern territories has a limitation also.

---

<sup>2</sup>Constitution of The United States, Article IV, Section 3, Paragraph 2.

The laws enacted for their government must conform to those certain provisions of the Constitution intended to have general application and to embrace all Territories of the United States wherever situated and whatever the form of government enjoyed by them. Those laws must not trench upon the guaranties in favor of the individual security of the citizen contained in that instrument, nor upon those provisions designed to secure, in all the possessions of the United States, uniformity in taxes, duties, imposts and excises, nor upon those provisions intended to fix everywhere the status of citizens of the Republic.<sup>3</sup>

This limitation makes it impossible legally, to govern any territory, as such, indefinitely. Further, the Declaration of Independence, stating that governments derive their power from the consent of the governed, will be violated if we annex the Philippines with the intent to govern them indefinitely as territory.

#### C. Issue of Economic Advantage

1. Would it be to the economic advantage of the United States to annex the Philippine Islands?

Annexationists: Yes. The islands are valuable in themselves as a potential market and resource area. Our future markets are in the Orient, especially China. Our possession of the Philippines will put us in a favorable position to command our share of the trade of the Orient. Since the European countries are in the process of carving China into "spheres of influence," we need this favorable position from which to protect our interests.

---

<sup>3</sup>Senator George Turner (Washington), U. S., Congressional Record, 56th Congress, Vol. 33, Part 2, January 23, 1900, p. 1055.



Anti-Annexationists: No. The cost of subjugating the Filipinos, maintaining a standing army and a governing administration in the Islands would negate any economic profit from the islands. Our trade with the Philippines is negligible, and the only way we can build it up is either to exploit the people or discriminate against their products while forcing our products on them. Trade does not follow the flag; trade follows the best markets. The colonial system is proven of little economic benefit from the example of England, who has practically no trade with the inhabitants of her tropical colonies, except the trade that comes from supplying her officeholders and her army. The United States has more trade with some of England's colonies than she does. Only a few in England have profited from her colonies; the majority own nothing.

#### D. Issues of principle and/or duty

1. Is the United States honor-bound by the Teller Amendment not to acquire any land by the Spanish-American War?

Annexationists: Yes. The Teller Amendment was applicable to the other Spanish islands no less than to Cuba. Had the resolution been broadened to include them all, it would have had unanimous consent in Congress. But the resolution could not be applied unconditionally. For the present we could do nothing but assume the government of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

Anti-Annexationists: Yes. Although the Teller Resolution had not specifically mentioned the Philippines, this resolution announced to the world that we were not seeking territorial gain from our war

with Spain--that it was a humanitarian venture. By violating this pronouncement, we were degrading ourselves and our word in the eyes of the world.

2. Did we, by promise or implication, assure independence to the Filipinos, thus binding us morally to such a policy?

Annexationists: No. It was firmly denied by Consuls Pratt and Wildman and Commodore Dewey that in their dealings with Aguinaldo and the Filipinos, they had made no promise of independence. Thus, we had no moral obstacles in our way on this count. We never recognized the Filipino insurrection and never treated Aguinaldo and his insurgents as allies.

Anti-Annexationists: Yes. Our promise was given either directly or by implication. In any case, whatever may have been said as to an actual promise of independence, it was an indisputable fact that we sought and accepted the assistance of the Filipinos, knowing that they were fighting for independence. Now that they had almost won it, we, their professed friend and ally, were to step into the shoes of Spain and deny them their independence.

3. Is it the duty of the United States to "take up the white man's burden" and advance the "superior Anglo-Saxon civilization?"

Annexationists: Yes. The Filipinos are incapable of self-government. Left to themselves, there would be anarchy or worse. As the beneficiaries of a superior civilization, it is our sacred duty to advance that civilization to the less fortunate peoples. It is our duty to give these less fortunate peoples peace, order, and training

for self-government, which can be granted when and if they are able to stand alone. The United States has the wisdom, self-restraint, and ability to do this job. No one wishes to oppress the Filipinos, and anyone with faith in the United States and her love of freedom and justice would not fear for the Filipino under our government. If they are left to themselves, they are also prey to other nations who would not hesitate to oppress them. Revert them to Spain, and they will continue under the same inept government.

Anti-Annexationists: No. There are many testimonies of the ability of the Filipinos for self-government. Aguinaldo and his associates have established a government that corresponds favorably to that of any of the South American countries. This fact proves the capability of the Filipinos for founding a government. Further, you cannot give a people a better government than that which they can maintain for themselves. Any nation of people is capable of maintaining as good a government as they are entitled to have, and when they can maintain a better government, they will evolve it. People that aspire to liberty deserve it. The nation that struggles for self-government and gives the lives of its patriotic men in the endeavor to achieve it is neither too inexperienced to establish, nor too weak to defend, a republic. And why is it thought we must abandon the Philippines, annex them, or turn them back to Spain, with no other possible solution? Are we doing that with Cuba? No, we are serving as a friend and would protect it against foreign invasion. We are treating Cuba, not as a slave nation, but as a self-governing country. We can do the same with the Philippines.

4. Is it our duty to see that our flag is not "hailed down" from territory over which it has once floated?

Annexationists: Yes. Our flag has been fired on, our sovereignty challenged. Will we meekly withdraw and expose ourselves as weak and cowardly? We must keep the stain of dishonor from our flag; we must crush this rebellion against the sovereignty of the United States. Our flag has never halted on its forward march. Who would halt it now?

Anti-Annexationists: "Those who seek to raise the American flag above the crushed liberties of another people have already begun to haul it down from the Capitol of their own country."<sup>4</sup> We are doing more to dishonor our flag by raising it above a people whom we deprived of self-government than we would do by "hauling it down." By opposing that very institution which we stand for, we are beginning to destroy it in our own country. We would not be called coward, but would be an example of justice and respect for democracy, which would aid in the march of democracy in the world.

5. Is not the annexation of the Philippine Islands a part of our "destiny?"

Annexationists: Yes. Without any desire or design on our part the Philippines have been placed in our care. This duty came to us because as a nation and a race we are superior and thus equipped to advance civilization. We can only follow where our destiny leads for our destiny is determined by divine command.

---

<sup>4</sup>Senator James H. Berry, (Arkansas), U. S., Congressional Record, 56th Congress, Vol. 33, Part 1, January 15, 1900, p. 805.

Anti-Annexationists: No. The cry of destiny is a convenient scapegoat being used by the imperialists to advance their own desires. A nation's destiny is determined by its people and its purpose and the purpose of the United States is not consistent with imperialism.

6. Is it not our duty to "spread Christianity" to the "pagan" Filipinos?

Annexationists: Yes. Our easy victory over Spain was divine approval of our crusade to free Cuba. God has now put the Philippine Islands within our care and has given us the task of taking to them the blessings of Christianity.

Anti-Annexationists: The Gospel cannot and should not be advanced by force. What example of the blessings of Christianity will be given by our subjugating these people? Further, with respect to the need of taking to the Filipinos the blessing of Christianity, it should be remembered that the Catholic orders have been in the Philippine Islands since the sixteenth century.

#### E. Issue of tradition

1. Would we be breaking with the American tradition embodied in the Monroe Doctrine--non-embroilment in the affairs of the Old World?

Annexationists: The United States must break with its tradition of isolationism and build a strong navy. Only then will we take our rightful place as a strong world power. Building a strong navy requires colonies and/or coaling stations.

Anti-Annexationists: Yes. Our forefathers laid down a policy under which our nation has grown in population and in strength. That

policy was non-embroilment in the affairs of the Old World. If we abandon this policy and become established in the Far East, we are bound to become embroiled in the wars of Europe with detriment to ourselves. We should abide by the Monroe Doctrine and stay out of the Old World.

#### F. Issue of Practicability

1. Will our democratic institutions take root in the Philippines?

Annexationists: There were people in this group who were on both sides of the issue. Some felt that we could teach the Filipinos democracy; others felt that we could not and would have to govern them indefinitely.

Anti-Annexationists: There were people in this group that were on both sides of the issue, also. They agreed only that the United States should not annex the islands: one group because it felt that democratic institutions could not flourish there, the other group because it felt that the Filipinos were already capable of establishing and maintaining a republic.

## CHAPTER V

### ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECHES

A debate has certain technical components. First of all there must be a proposition: that is, there must be a statement which sets forth a proposed course of action or a matter of controversial fact or opinion. The debate upon the proposition will center around certain specific issues. Issues are points of contention between affirmative and negative—statements or questions to which the affirmative will answer yes, the negative no. It is necessary for each speaker to prove his position on these issues if he is to win the debate. In order to establish the affirmative or negative position on each of the issues, identifiable lines of argument must be used and these lines of argument must be supported by logical, ethical, and psychological modes of proof. The arguments and proof make up the debate case.

These three modes of proof were first described by Aristotle.

Of the means of persuasion supplied by the speech itself there are three kinds. The first kind reside in the character of the speaker; the second consist in producing a certain attitude in the hearer; the third appertain to the argument proper, in so far as it actually or seemingly demonstrates.

The character of the speaker is a cause of persuasion when the speech is so uttered as to make him worthy of belief; . . .

Secondly, persuasion is effected through the audience, when they are brought by the speech into a state of emotion; . . .





Thirdly, persuasion is effected by the arguments, when we demonstrate the truth, real or apparent, by such means as inhere in particular cases.<sup>1</sup>

These three are known respectively as ethical, pathetic, and logical proof. The modern concept of psychological proof includes the inciting to emotion as well as the motivating appeal and thus, the Aristotelian pathetic appeal is generally considered today as a type of psychological proof. The broader term, psychological proof, therefore, will be used in this study rather than the term pathetic appeal.

Affirmative speakers usually present a plan whereby they give specific proposals which would bring their theories into practice. Sometimes negative speakers present a counterplan, setting forth specific proposals as to the course of action they propose. In a debate, however, it is not enough to just present the case. Whether or not the speaker's position is accepted will depend also upon his success in destroying his opponent's arguments. This process of destroying one's opponent's arguments is refutation and should be an integral part of a debate.

If it is to be determined whether or not these four speeches constitute a debate, the speeches must be analyzed in light of such components of a debate. It is necessary, therefore, to find answers to the following questions:

1. What were the issues brought out in these speeches?
2. What lines of argument were used?
3. What types of proof were used?

---

<sup>1</sup>Lane Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932), pp. 8-9.

4. What plans and/or counterplans were presented?
5. What evidence of refutation was found?

The period of debate on Philippine annexation began in the United States on December 10, 1899. If a debate proposition had been worded at that time, it would have read: Resolved: that the United States should annex the Philippine Islands. With the ratification of the peace treaty, on February 6, 1899, however, the United States had in fact officially annexed the islands. The debate, which continued long after this date of ratification, then had a new proposition: Resolved: that the United States should keep the Philippines as territory of the United States. It was to this proposition that Beveridge, Bryan, Roosevelt, and Schurz addressed themselves.

#### What Were the Issues Brought Out in These Speeches?

It will be remembered that these four speakers spoke in the following order: Beveridge, Bryan, Roosevelt and Schurz. Beveridge and Roosevelt spoke in the affirmative on the proposition; Bryan and Schurz spoke on the negative.<sup>2</sup>

The predominant issue dealt with by Beveridge was that the annexation of the Philippines was a part of our destiny. His speech, in other words, could, in one sense, be classified as a one-point speech. The other issues were discussed as sub-points.

---

<sup>2</sup>Because of the difficulty in obtaining complete texts of the speeches by Beveridge and Bryan, these two speeches are included in the Appendix.

I. The annexation of the Philippines is a part of our destiny.

- A. The annexation of the Philippines is a part of our duty to advance civilization.
- B. The annexation of the Philippines is a part of our duty to spread Christianity.
- C. It is our duty to see that the rebellion against our flag is crushed.
- D. The United States does not intend to confer citizenship on the Filipinos.
- E. The annexation of the Philippines would be to our economic advantage.
- F. The United States has the right, under the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, to annex the Philippines.

Bryan's speech was a tightly knit, hortatory attack on the issue that annexation of the Philippines was a part of our destiny. He approached this attack from two directions.

I. The annexation of the Philippines is not a part of our nation's destiny.

- A. America's true destiny depends upon our nation's purpose.
- B. Our nation's true destiny should not be sacrificed to the false destiny of imperialism.

Like Beveridge and Bryan, Roosevelt had one main issue: the strenuous life is the life to be desired. From this main point he drew an analogy between the individual and the nation. After establishing that the man admired is not the one of "timid peace," but the one who "embodies victorious effort," he argued that the same is true with the nation. The great nation is not bound by "unwarlike and isolated ease," but accepts its world responsibilities. Part of these responsibilities, he said, was in the Philippines. After making this analogy and applying it to the Philippine annexation question, he brought in other issues as sub-points.

I. The strenuous life is the life to be desired.

- A. The annexation of the Philippines would be to our economic advantage.
- B. The United States has a duty in the Philippines that international honor demands we meet.
- C. The United States has the right, under the Constitution and Declaration of Independence, to annex the Philippines.
- D. The annexation of the Philippines is a part of our duty to advance civilization.
- E. It is our duty to see that the supremacy of our flag is established.

The thesis of Schurz's speech was: With the existing situation in the Philippines, what is the best policy we can adopt? He developed twelve issues in arriving at the answer that we should help the Filipinos establish an independent government.

I. With the existing situation in the Philippines, what is the best policy we can adopt?

- A. Is the United States honor-bound by the Teller Amendment and President McKinley's pronouncement not to acquire any land by the Spanish-American War?
- B. Did the United States, by promise or by implication, assure independence to the Filipinos, thus binding us morally to such a policy?
- C. Are the Filipinos able to maintain an independent government?
- D. Did the United States have the right to demand the Philippine Islands from Spain, and conversely, did Spain have the right to cede the islands to us?
- E. Who started the war between America and the Filipinos?
- F. Does the United States have an international obligation in the Philippines?
- G. Would it be cowardly and unpatriotic to surrender to Aguinaldo?
- H. If we do not take the Philippines, will some other power grab them?
- I. Would the annexation of the Philippines be to our economic advantage?
- J. If we give the Philippines their independence, should we keep Manila?

- K. Is the annexation of the Philippines a part of our destiny?
- L. Is it our duty to protect the honor of the flag by putting down the rebellion?

Seventeen issues were introduced in all by these four speakers. Six of these seventeen were used by more than one speaker. Beveridge had seven issues; five were dealt with by at least one other speaker. Bryan's one issue was dealt with by two other speakers. Roosevelt had six issues; five were dealt with by at least one other speaker. Schurz presented twelve issues; four were dealt with by other speakers. Schurz added eight new issues and as he was the last speaker, there was no opportunity for any of the other speakers to deal with them.

In this series of speeches there were, then, some issues that could be called "bones of contention," points dealt with by the speakers of each position. The following table shows the interrelation of the six issues that were dealt with by more than one speaker, and which speakers discussed them. Four issues were discussed by both affirmative and negative speakers; two issues were brought up by both affirmative speakers.

#### What Lines of Argument Were Used?

As has already been shown, Beveridge's main issue was that the annexation of the Philippines is a part of our destiny. The line of argument favoring this issue ran as follows: The American Republic cannot retreat, it must proceed, for it is part of a race movement and race movements are not to be stayed by the hand of man. Beveridge went

TABLE I  
COMPARISON OF ISSUES

Beveridge	Bryan	Roosevelt	Schurz
The annexation of the Philippines is a part of our destiny.	The annexation of the Philippines is a part of our destiny.	The annexation of the Philippines is a part of our destiny.	The annexation of the Philippines is a part of our destiny.
It is our duty to see that the rebellion against our flag is put down.		It is our duty to see that the supremacy of our flag is established.	It is our duty to protect the honor of our flag by putting down the rebellion.
Annexation of the Philippines would be to our economic advantage.		Annexation of the Philippines would be to our economic advantage.	Annexation of the Philippines would not be to our economic advantage.
The annexation of the Philippines is a part of our duty to advance civilization.		The annexation of the Philippines is a part of our duty to advance civilization.	
The United States has the right, under the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, to annex the Philippines.		The United States has the right, under the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, to annex the Philippines.	
		The United States has a duty in the Philippines that international honor demands we meet.	The United States does not have an international obligation in the Philippines.



on to show that the highest laws of a race are its inherent tendencies, and that the inherent tendencies of our race are organization and government. Because organization and government are inherent tendencies of our race, he said, the annexation of the Philippines is a part of our duty to advance civilization. Beveridge here maintained that God did not make the American people "the mightiest human force of all time simply to feed and die." He made us "the lords of civilization that we may administer civilization." From now on the dominant notes in our life, he felt, would be world improvement.

Becoming more specific concerning this "world improvement," Beveridge asserted that the annexation of the Philippines is a part of our duty to spread Christianity. Before we can carry out our destiny, we must first put down the rebellion against our authority and establish the supremacy of our flag.

Beveridge then turned to answering arguments against Philippine annexation. Does the United States intend to confer citizenship on the Filipinos? Beveridge said that "it is not proposed to make them citizens." Would the annexation of the Philippines be to our economic advantage? Beveridge argued that America had never counted the "cause of righteousness," but the Philippines, providing new markets, enterprises, resources, and vitalization of our industries would repay us our expense. Does the United States have the right, under the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, to annex the Philippines? Beveridge said that there have always been those who called progress unconstitutional because they did not understand the Constitution.



They should study the history of our Constitution and then they would learn the meaning of "implied powers," they would learn that "the Constitution is a people's ordinance of national life capable of growth as great as the people's growth," they would learn that "the Constitution was made for the American people; not the American people for the Constitution." The power is given to govern territory acquired by the Constitutional clause: "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States." Nowhere does the Constitution deny this power. It is a power that inheres in and is a part of government itself. As for the Declaration of Independence, it applies only to peoples capable of self-government.

Bryan also had as his one main point the issue of destiny. His position on this issue was that annexation of the Philippines is not part of the destiny of the United States. His line of argument began with the stand that the advocates of Philippine annexation, unable to defend their policy with any other argument, fall back in despair upon the destiny argument. Such prophecies about destiny, he said, are "merely guesses, colored by our hopes and our surroundings." Our destiny, he continued, will be revealed when the American people speak, which they have not done so far, for destiny is a matter of choice and not chance.

The true destiny of our nation will be determined by its purpose. We are now being tempted to depart from our great purpose, but Bryan

felt that the American people will reject this temptation and aspire to a grander destiny than any other people.

Roosevelt takes a somewhat different approach to the topic. His main point is that the strenuous life is the life to be desired, and he develops this in some length before touching on the subject of Philippine annexation at all. As was already shown, to establish his point that the strenuous life is the life to be desired, Roosevelt drew an analogy between the individual and the nation. He asked that "what every self-respecting American demands for himself and from his sons shall be demanded of the American nation as a whole."<sup>3</sup> He then appealed to the audience to establish that the man admired is not the one of "timid peace," but the one who "embodies victorious effort," for we get nothing save by effort. Then, Roosevelt argued, the same is true with the nation. The nation trained to "a career of unwarlike and isolated ease is bound, in the end, to go down before other nations."<sup>4</sup> If we are a great people we will play a great part in world affairs. Such a role demands that we accept our responsibilities. A part of these responsibilities is in the Philippines.

As he turned to answer those who opposed Philippine annexation, Roosevelt touched on the issue: "would annexation of the Philippines be to our economic advantage?" After saying that a country cannot "long endure if its foundations are not laid deep in material prosperity,"<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup>Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life (New York: The Century Co., 1904), p. 1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

he then maintained that material prosperity is only one of the elements making up national greatness and no nation was truly great by relying upon material prosperity alone.

A strong argument for accepting our responsibilities in the Philippines, Roosevelt maintained, is that the United States has a duty in the Philippines that international honor demands we meet. Our forces drove out the "medieval tyranny," Spain, but if we did this only to make room for savage anarchy, which would surely follow if the Filipinos were left alone, we had better left things alone. It is our duty to complete the work in the Philippines. If we do not, a more manly power will have to step in and do it.

To those who argue that we do not have the right, under the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, to annex the islands, Roosevelt said that he has "scant patience with those who make a pretense of humanitarianism to hide and cover their timidity, and who cant about 'liberty' and the 'consent of the governed' in order to excuse themselves for their unwillingness to play the part of men."<sup>6</sup> He declared that the doctrines of these people would leave the Apaches to take care of themselves and condemn our forefathers for settling the United States.

The annexation of the Philippines is a part of our duty to advance civilization, and if we do our duty in the Philippines, "we will

---

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

play our part in uplifting mankind."<sup>7</sup> But before we can do anything in the Philippines, we must establish the supremacy of our flag.

Schurz developed twelve points in order to establish his position that the best thing we can do now is to help the Filipinos set up an independent government. The first point he made was that the United States is honor-bound by the Teller Amendment and President McKinley's pronouncement not to acquire any land by the Spanish-American War. Schurz maintained that if Congress or the President had proclaimed that the Cuban people were of right entitled to independence, but that the rest of the Spanish colonies were not, the people of the United States would have protested and we would have been the object of contempt in the eyes of the rest of the world.

The second point Schurz sought to establish was that the United States, if not by promise then by implication, assured independence to the Filipinos. He said that the facts speak for themselves. These facts are: 1) Aguinaldo was invited by officers of the United States to cooperate with our forces; 2) the Filipino Junta in Hong Kong called upon their people to receive the Americans as their redeemers who placed independence within their grasp; 3) Aguinaldo proclaimed and organized his government under Dewey's eyes. No one can plead ignorance of the Filipinos' intentions to be independent; 4) the Filipinos and our land forces cooperated pleasantly until the capture of Manila. Whether or not there was a formal compact, it is a fact that the Filipinos were

---

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 19.



our effective allies; 5) at no time during this period did we inform the Filipinos that we did not intend for them to be independent although our Secretary of State so informed our consul-general in Singapore. We let them believe that independence was imminent, for they would not even suspect we had other intentions. They believed in our proclamation that this was not a war of conquest.

As for the question of whether the Filipinos are able to maintain an independent government, Schurz took the position that they were. He did not believe they should be called the equals of our Revolutionary leaders, but, by the testimony of various authorities, they are, he said, the equals or superiors of the Cubans and the Mexicans.

Schurz then made the point that the United States did not have the right to demand the Philippines from Spain, and conversely, that Spain did not have the right to cede the islands to us. He first established that the United States' forces occupied only Cavite and the harbor and city of Manila. Then he showed that Spain's authority had practically ceased to exist; she held only a "few isolated and helpless little garrisons." Schurz then discussed what was controlled by the Filipinos. The bulk of the country was in the hands of the Filipinos, he maintained. A government had been established at Malolos which was better than Cuba's and compared favorably with Japan's. This government was recognized and supported by an immeasurably larger part of the people than either Spain or the United States controlled. Schurz concluded this point by asserting that we bought from Spain a sovereignty she no longer possessed on the basis of a conquest that

brought only a very small fraction of the islands under our control.

Schurz then attempted to settle the question of who started the war between the Americans and the Filipinos. He argued that we declared war on the Filipinos by the making of the peace treaty with Spain, and that President McKinley declared war on the Filipinos by his "benevolent assimilation" order. Having fought for their freedom from Spain, and believing that independence would be theirs, the Filipinos refused to submit to another foreign rule. As for the specific incident that began the war, some Filipino soldiers entered the American lines and were shot at by the Americans. This was not premeditated by the Filipino government and when Aguinaldo attempted to bring a halt to this fighting, he was told that the fighting must go on to the grim end. This incident shows that it was the United States that really wanted the war.

With regard to the issue of whether the United States had an international obligation in the Philippines, Schurz asked if we obtained an international obligation in the Philippines by driving out the Spanish, why had we not obtained the same obligation in Cuba, or in Mexico fifty years ago. This argument of international obligation, he maintained, was a dodge. As for the obligation to prepare the Filipinos for self-government, which is asserted by annexationists, Schurz said that we are then killing them for demanding what we ultimately intend to give them. Further, he maintained, no people were ever made fit for self-government by being kept in "leading-strings"

of a foreign power; one learns by doing. Their government should be adapted to their own conditions and notions, not designed for them by another people.

To those who argued that it would be cowardly and unpatriotic to surrender to Aguinaldo, Schurz said that we would be surrendering only to our own conscience. Our prestige would rise, rather than fall, for the world, knowing our strength, would see that we granted the Philippines independence for the noblest of reasons. As for patriotism, the true patriots are not those who drag the Republic down from its high moral position by this treacherous act, but those who strive to restore it to that proud position.

If we do not take the Philippines, will not some other power grab them? Schurz replied that American diplomacy should set about to secure the consent of the Powers to an agreement to make the Philippines neutral territory, like Belgium and Switzerland. Even if this was not obtained, we could say "Hands Off!" and no Power would lightly risk a serious quarrel with the United States.

Would the annexation of the Philippines be to our economic advantage? Schurz replied in the negative. He stated that he was in favor of the greatest possible expansion of our trade, but not at the price of national honor and ideals. Anyway, he continued, the Philippines will not be economically advantageous to the working people; it could only be advantageous to some rich men. Schurz went on to say that one does not build up a profitable trade by ruining his customer



in a war; trade with the islands can never amount to the cost of conquest of the islands. To those who wanted the Philippines as a foothold for the expansion of trade on the Asiatic continent, Schurz asked, what do we need for such a foothold? He answered: coaling stations, docks for our fleet, and facilities for the establishment of commercial houses and depots. If, he maintained, we had favored Philippine independence, we could have had these things for the asking. Now, if we subjugate the Filipinos, we will have no more than we need, but we will have made bitter and revengeful enemies who will rise up again should they be helped by a competitor of ours for the Asiatic trade. He further developed this point by asserting that it is useless to say that they will be our friends if we give them good government. The people of our race are too little inclined to respect the rights of what we regard as inferior races, especially those of darker skin. Also, what assurance do we have that they will be given good government? The Philippines, like India, could become a "pasture" for spoils politicians.

There were those who favored giving the Philippines their independence, but who maintained that we should keep Manila. Schurz took the position that since Manila is the traditional capital, its loss will only rankle the Filipinos and give us trouble in the future.

Schurz maintained that the cry of "destiny" was put forward by those who wanted us to do a wicked thing and shift the responsibility.

He says that "the destiny of a free people lies in its intelligent will and its moral strength."<sup>8</sup>

Finally, Schurz dealt with the point that it is our duty to protect the honor of the flag by putting down the rebellion. He argued that our flag needs protection, but from those who advocate carrying on the war and not from those who are trying to stop it. Those who would carry on the war are making our flag an emblem of hypocrisy, greed, lust of war and conquest, and imperialistic ambitions.

The best thing that the United States can do now, Schurz concluded, is to give the Philippine Islands their independence and help them establish it.

Analyzing these speeches for complexity of structure, Bryan's speech is seen as the least complex. As was previously shown, Bryan's speech is a one-point speech, in the sense that he is dealing with one issue. He states his point and then gives evidence to support it. This deductive arrangement is very clear-cut.

The most complex structures are used by Roosevelt and Schurz. They are complex in two different senses. Roosevelt's complexity lies in the analogy with which he begins the speech. He has to establish this analogy and then apply the conclusions he draws from the analogy to the Philippine question. Several pages are used before the Philippines are ever mentioned; the analogy and its conclusions had to be established before issues of the Philippine question could be dealt

---

<sup>8</sup>Frederic Bancroft, Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz, VI (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918), pp. 77-120.

with, as the analogy was used as proof for Roosevelt's position on these issues.

Schurz's speech is complex in another sense. Like Bryan, he states his point and then gives evidence to support it. This deductive arrangement is also very clear-cut. The complexity lies in the number of examples, quotations, illustrations, and other modes of proof that Schurz used to establish his points and the number of points that he used to establish his conclusion.

The more complex of these two--Roosevelt and Schurz--is Roosevelt. Where Schurz has an easily followed deductive sequence, Roosevelt is not as clear. For example, Roosevelt uses the army and navy as an example on a point dealing with Philippine annexation. Because of the length and detail with which he develops this example, it requires several pages. The point being dealt with could easily be forgotten and the example thus could seem to be a major point in the speech. Schurz does not lose sight of his point in this way.

The Beveridge speech is more complex than Bryan's but less complex than the speeches of either Roosevelt or Schurz. Beveridge has one main point also and uses the deductive pattern, stating his point, then offering proof. His use of this pattern, however, is not as clean-cut as is the use of it by either Bryan or Schurz in their speeches. Beveridge presented a great many statements, one after another, that were mere assertions. Often the connection between these assertions and the point being made is not clear. It seems they belong with a point previously made or one that is yet to be made. Beveridge, however,

does not use such a large number of points or modes of proof as does Schurz and is in this way less complex.

The speeches of Bryan and Schurz, having a basically deductive arrangement, are much clearer structurally than the speeches of Roosevelt or Beveridge. It is possible to become confused in Beveridge's assertions. The Roosevelt speech is less clear than the speeches of the other three because of the complex structure he employs in applying the analogy to the Philippine question.

#### What Types of Proof Were Used?

Beveridge relied more on psychological, and ethical appeals than on logical proof to establish his contentions. For example, Beveridge attempted to put his audience in a confident state of mind. This confidence he attempted to inspire by reminding the audience of our nation's and our race's ability and past successes and by showing that we have divine help. At the same time he minimized his opponent's arguments.

Evident throughout Beveridge's speech is the psychological appeal to racism, pride in our race as the superior race.

The Republic could not retreat if it would. Whatever its destiny it must proceed. For the American Republic is a part of the movement of a race—and race movements are not to be stayed by the hand of man. They are mighty answers to Divine commands.

God did not make the American people the mightiest human force of all time simply to feed and die. He did not give our race the grain of organization and heart of domination to no purpose and no end. No. He has appointed for us a destiny equal to our

endowments. He has made us the lords of civilization that we may administer civilization.

The psychological appeal to patriotism is tied closely to this appeal to racism. The examples just cited illustrate this appeal to patriotism as well as the appeal to racism. Frequent reference is made to the "great Republic," "the greater Republic," and "American Republic," the flag, our history, and our accomplishments.

We follow the flag at Trenton and Valley Forge, at Saratoga and upon the crimson seas, at Buena Vista and Chapultepec, at Gettysburg and Mission Ridge, at Santiago and Manila, and everywhere and always it means the blessings of the greater republic and so God leads, we follow the flag and the Republic never retreats.

As was previously shown, Beveridge made this speech with the intent of making such a strong impression that he would not be forgotten during the months he was to be out of the country. It seems evident then that he would attempt to reveal his own personality in a favorable light through this speech. And indeed, certain ethical appeals are readily apparent. By speaking to this timely topic, he attempted to show an interest in and knowledge of the affairs of the day. By his development of the topic, he hoped to show his wisdom. Beveridge also attempted by linking the cause he espoused with what was generally considered virtuous or elevated, to link himself with these desirable attributes. Conversely, he attempted to link his opponent's cause with what is not virtuous or elevated.

Imperialism is not the word for our vast work. Imperialism as used by the opposers of national greatness means oppression, and we oppress not. Imperialism as used by the opposers of national



destiny means monarchy, and the days of monarchy are spent. Imperialism as used by the opposers of national progress is a word to frighten the faint of heart, and so is powerless with the fearless American people.

The example just cited also clearly shows Beveridge attempting to minimize or reduce the unfavorable aspects of Philippine annexation as proclaimed by his opponents.

As for the use of logical proof, Beveridge relied mainly on an analogy between Great Britain and the United States. His examples were drawn mainly from Great Britain's history as a colonial power, although he also used Holland and Germany.

If it be said that, at home, tasks as large as our strength await us--that politics are to be purified, want relieved, municipal government perfected, the relations of capital and labor better adjusted, I answer: Has England's discharge of her duty to the world corrupted her politics? Are not her cities like Birmingham the municipal models upon which we build our reforms? Is her labor question more perplexed than ours? Considering the newness of our country, is it as bad as ours? And is not the like true of Holland--even of Germany?

Beveridge used specific names and indicated specific examples, but mainly his use of logical proof is very generalized. The specific names and examples he used are, as a rule, only mentioned and not developed in any depth. The one point in exception is his discussion of the constitutionality of Philippine annexation. Here he cited historical examples to show that there have always been those who declared progress unconstitutional. The examples he cited--adoption of the Constitution itself, creation of the national bank, internal improvements, issuance of greenbacks, making gold the standard--are things that were or today are in effect and accepted by at least the

majority of people. Beveridge then showed how Philippine annexation is known to be constitutional. Here he referred to Hamilton and "implied powers," Chief Justice Marshall, and a clause in the Constitution. He cited the example of Alaska and all of our Territories--the experience of a century. Beveridge concluded that the Constitution does not deny us this power "to administer civilization where interest and duty call," and since it is a power that inheres in the very nature of government, who can deny it?

Beveridge's modes of proof can then be summarized as being mainly psychological and ethical. His use of logical proof except in the constitutionality argument, is very general.

As was previously mentioned, Bryan's speech is a tightly knit, deductively arranged speech. The most predominant mode of proof is logical, and the most predominant type of logical proof is reasoning from example. Psychological and ethical appeals are readily apparent also, however.

Bryan uses examples to explain and support his points.

History is replete with predictions which once wore the hue of destiny, but which failed of fulfillment because those who uttered them saw too small an arc of the circle of events. When Pharaoh pursued the fleeing Israelites to the edge of the Red Sea he was confident that their bondage would be renewed and that they would again make bricks without straw, but destiny was not revealed until Moses and his followers reached the farther shore dry shod and the waves rolled over the horses and chariots of the Egyptians.

The types of examples used by Bryan include both factual and hypothetical. For the factual ones he drew mainly from the Bible and from history.



Bryan's frequent use of Biblical examples is an index to the character of the man giving the speech. A reliance on the Bible as a source of proof could be called a trademark of Bryan. He used it consistently in his speaking. Familiarity with the Bible was seen as something virtuous, particularly in Bryan's day, and thus the speaker is associated with what is virtuous. This mode of proof can be classified as ethical. This attempt to associate his cause and himself with what is virtuous and elevated and to associate his opponents' cause with what is not virtuous or elevated is evident in Bryan's speech, but not predominately so.

Bryan used psychological appeals also. He appealed to the audience's patriotism:

The forcible annexation of the Philippine Islands is not necessary to make the United States a world power. For over ten decades our nation has been a world power. During its brief existence it has exerted upon the human race an influence more potent for good than all the other nations combined, and it has exerted that influence without the use of sword or Gatling gun.

Bryan appealed to racism:

The union of the Angle and the Saxon formed a new and valuable type, but . . . a still later type has appeared which is superior to any which has existed heretofore; . . . Great has been the Greek, the Latin, the Slav, the Celt, the Teuton and the Anglo-Saxon, but greater than any of these is the American, in whom are blended the virtues of all.

Bryan's use of logical proof is quite general. He relied mainly on the appeals to patriotism and racism to gain acceptance of his contentions. For instance:

The forcible annexation of the Philippine Islands is not necessary to make the United States a world power. For over ten decades our nation has been a world power. During its brief

existence it has exerted upon the human race an influence more potent for good than all the other nations combined, and it has exerted that influence without the use of sword or Gatling gun. Mexico and the republics of Central and South America testify to the benign influence of our institutions. Europe and Asia give evidence of the working of the leaven of self-government.

As this example shows, there is little in the way of specific evidence in his support of the contention that America has been a world power for ten decades. Mexico, republics of Central and South America, Europe, and Asia are cited as examples of our influence, but the statement is in itself a broad assertion. The appeal to patriotism, however, is strong.

The predominant mode of proof used by Roosevelt is ethical appeal. He uses more logical proof and less psychological appeal than the two previous speakers.

Roosevelt spent a considerable amount of time establishing the strenuous life of toil and strife as being desirable for the individual. This point is the thesis of his speech and could well be called a verbalization of the man himself. A strong ethical appeal is made throughout the speech by the reliance on this point. Roosevelt, the man, was a rugged individual. This had been established by his war experiences. (It will be remembered that at this time he was a popular hero of the Spanish American War.) Roosevelt's life was seen to be one of effort rather than of placid existence. This previous reputation would lend credibility to what he advocated in his speech.

Roosevelt used an ethical appeal associating what is desirable with his cause and what is undesirable with his opponent's cause.

The timid man, the lazy man, the man who distrusts his country, the overcivilized man, who has lost the great fighting, masterful virtues, the ignorant man, and the man of dull mind whose soul is incapable of feeling the mighty lift that thrills "stern men with empires in their brains"--all these, of course, shrink from seeing the nation undertake its new duties; . . .<sup>9</sup>

In this example Roosevelt obviously attempted to identify the opposition's cause with what is undesirable, and, by inference, to identify his cause with what is desirable.

After establishing his point that the strenuous life is desirable for the individual he drew an analogy between the individual and the nation. From this analogy he concluded that the United States must "dare mighty things" and face its tasks if the nation was to lead a desirable kind of existence. This conclusion he then used throughout the speech as proof for accepting Philippine annexation.

Besides this basic analogy which he drew between the individual and the nation, Roosevelt also drew an analogy between Great Britain and the United States. He then used Great Britain as an example.

Frequent use of the example is found in Roosevelt's speech. He drew heavily from history, and one example, a long and detailed one concerning the army and navy, was no doubt drawn from his experience as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and as a Rough Rider in the Spanish-American War.

Roosevelt is more specific in his use of logical reasoning than either of the two previous speakers. He developed his examples and

---

<sup>9</sup>Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 7.

analogies to a greater extent and used a greater amount of factual material.

As did the other two speakers, Roosevelt used the psychological appeal to patriotism. For example, in his conclusion he stated:

. . . it is only through strife, through hard and dangerous endeavor that we shall ultimately win the goal of true national greatness.<sup>10</sup>

In summary then, Roosevelt's predominant mode of proof is ethical. He used logical proof to a greater extent than Bryan or Beveridge and psychological appeals are used less than by the two previous speakers.

In Schurz's speech the predominant mode of proof is logical. Such specific evidence as fact, quotation from official documents, authoritative comment and testimony is in abundance. Ethical and psychological appeals are strong modes of proof also, however.

The following is an example, which is typical of the speech as a whole, demonstrating the use of specific evidence.

There is some dispute as to certain agreements, including a promise of Philippine independence, said to have been made between Aguinaldo and our Consul-General at Singapore before Aguinaldo proceeded to cooperate with Dewey. But I lay no stress upon this point. I will let only the record of facts speak. Of these facts the first, of highest importance, is that Aguinaldo was "desired," that is, invited, by officers of the United States to cooperate with our forces. [This he had previously established, quoting from the telegram sent by Dewey to our Consul-General at Singapore telling Aguinaldo to come to Hong Kong where Dewey was.] The second is that the Filipino Junta in Hong Kong immediately after these conferences appealed to their countrymen to receive the

---

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

American fleet, about to sail for Manila, as friends, by a proclamation which had these words: "Compatriots, divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach. The Americans, not from any mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity, have considered it opportune to extend their protecting mantle to our beloved country. Where you see the American flag flying, assemble in mass. They are our redeemers." With this faith his followers gave Aguinaldo a rapturous greeting upon his arrival at Cavite, where he proclaimed his government and organized his army under Dewey's eyes. The arrival of our land forces did not at first change these relations. Brigadier-General Thomas M. Anderson, commanding, wrote to Aguinaldo, July 4th, as follows: "General, I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have your people cooperate with us in military operations against the Spanish forces, etc."<sup>11</sup>

Schurz continued in a similar vein, weaving the factual material into a meaningful sequence with his interpretative narration.

Schurz used analogy and hypothetical examples in which he made the Filipinos' fight for independence analogous to our fight for independence; he then gave hypothetical examples showing that he felt our founding fathers would have done the same things as the Filipinos were doing. Use is also made of historical examples.

Schurz, the elder statesman of great experience, focused attention on his sagacity and good character. In his introduction he said, for example:

After long silence, during which I have carefully reviewed my own opinions, as well as those of others in the light of the best information I could obtain, I shall now approach the same subject from another point of view.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup>Bancroft, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 78.

Here Schurz is showing that he has sincerely undertaken to become as well acquainted with this timely topic as was possible and to give the audience the benefit of his careful preparation. As he developed his speech, using a preponderance of evidence, he was proving, in a sense, that he had carefully studied and prepared on this subject. He further pointed up his sincerity in trying to give the audience the best information he could by saying:

I have recited these things in studiously sober and dry matter-of-fact language without ornament or appeal.<sup>13</sup>

At another place he stated:

I am not here as a partisan, but as an American citizen anxious for the future of the Republic.<sup>14</sup>

He was, in effect, saying that he had no personal reasons for giving this speech, but that he was concerned for the American Republic.

In his conclusion he pointed out his long service to freedom and his continuing concern for it: ". . . as one of those who have grown gray in the struggle for free and honest government, I would never be ashamed to plead for the cause of freedom and independence even when its banner is carried by dusky and feeble hands."<sup>15</sup>

In spite of such statements, however, Schurz made some strong pathetic appeals, especially in his recitation of our treatment of the Filipinos. Here he attempted to make the audience ashamed of our nation's conduct.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 103.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 119.

We go to war with Spain in behalf of an oppressed colony of her. We solemnly proclaim this to be a war--not of conquest--God forbid!--but of liberation and humanity. We invade the Spanish colony of the Philippines, destroy the Spanish fleet, and invite the cooperation of the Filipino insurgents against Spain. We accept their effective aid as allies, all the while permitting them to believe that, in case of victory, they will be free and independent. By active fighting they get control of a large part of the interior country, from which Spain is virtually ousted. When we have captured Manila and have no further use for our Filipino allies, our President directs that, behind their backs, a treaty be made with Spain transferring their country to us; and even before that treaty is ratified, he tells them that in place of the Spaniards, they must accept us as their masters, and that if they do not, they will be compelled by force of arms. They refuse, and we shoot them down; and, as President McKinley said at Pittsburgh, we shall continue to shoot them down "without useless parley."<sup>16</sup>

At the same time, Schurz was attempting to make his audience indignant and angry. This shameful state of affairs, he maintained has been brought about by the McKinley administration which has not consulted the popular will upon this question.

Schurz, as do the other speakers, used the psychological appeal to patriotism, identifying his cause with what was patriotic and the opposition's cause with what was injurious to the country.

I am pleading for the cause of American honor and self-respect, American interest, American democracy--aye, for the cause of the American people against an administration of our public affairs which has wantonly plunged this country into an iniquitous war; which has disgraced the Republic by a scandalous breach of faith to a people struggling for their freedom. . . .<sup>17</sup>

Logical, ethical and psychological modes of proof are all effectively used by Schurz. The logical proof, however, is most predominant.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 91-92.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 119.

### What Plans and/or Counterplans Were Presented?

In a sense it might be argued that Beveridge and Roosevelt were in agreement as to a plan of action to be followed by the United States, and that Bryan and Schurz disagreed with this plan, with Schurz offering a counterplan.

The plan presented by Beveridge stated first of all that the Philippines were ours forever. The first task was to halt the rebellion against our authority and establish order. The second task was to organize, administer and maintain civilization.

The second speaker on the affirmative side, Roosevelt, made no statement concerning the period of time that we should hold the Philippines. He left it indefinite. As did Beveridge, Roosevelt set the first task as halting the rebellion against our authority. The next step was to administer the islands.

The first negative speaker, Bryan, offered no counterplan in his speech. It seems to be straight negative--that is, he attacked the affirmative contentions but did not propose a specific plan.

Schurz, the second negative speaker, presented a counterplan in his speech. First, he said, there must be an armistice between our forces and the Filipinos. At the same time we should tell the Filipinos that the United States will favor their establishment of an independent government and that we will aid them in this task as far as it is necessary. To carry out this program we should send a statesman "of large mind and genuine sympathy" to the Philippines. It should first



be determined whether the majority of the population favors Aguinaldo's government, and while this program is being carried out, we should protect the Philippines against interference from other powers.

#### What Evidence of Refutation Is Found?

As the second speaker in the debate, the first negative speaker has the first opportunity to attack the arguments of the opponent. Of these four speakers, then, Bryan is the first with the opportunity of refutation.

The whole speech by Bryan is devoted to an attack on the point that annexation of the Philippines is part of our destiny. It will be remembered that the issue of destiny was the main point of Beveridge's speech--"The Republic could not retreat if it would. Whatever its destiny it must proceed." In his introduction, Bryan stated the point to be refuted.

When the advocates of imperialism find it impossible to reconcile a colonial policy with the principles of our Government or with the canons of morality; when they are unable to defend it upon the ground of religious duty or pecuniary profit, they fall back in helpless despair upon the assertion that it is destiny.

Bryan then stated what he felt to be wrong with this argument: "We can all prophesy, but our prophecies are merely guesses, colored by our hopes and our surroundings," and "He is the best prophet who . . . comprehends most clearly the great forces which are working out the progress, not of one party, not of one nation, but of the human race." Bryan went on to say that destiny is a matter of choice and that the



nation's purpose determines its destiny. The American people would therefore choose their destiny.

In Beveridges speech, the appeal to racism is very strong-- "For the American Republic is a part of the movement of a race--and race movements are not to be stayed by the hand of man." Although Beveridge never used the words "Anglo-Saxon race," it is clear this is what he means. In another place he said, "Under the flag of England our race builds an empire out of the ends of earth." Bryan dealt with this issue also: "Much has been said of late about Anglo-Saxon civilization," he says. His position on the issue is:

Far be it from me to detract from the service rendered to the world by the sturdy race whose language we speak. The union of the Angle and the Saxon formed a new and valuable type, but the process of race evolution was not completed when the Angle and the Saxon met. A still later type has appeared which is superior to any which has existed heretofore; and with this new type will come a higher civilization than any which has preceded it. . . . greater than any of these is the American, in whom are blended the virtues of them all.

Bryan then went on to show how the American race will surpass the Anglo-Saxon race. For example: "Anglo-Saxon civilization has taught the individual to protect his own rights; American civilization will teach him to respect the rights of others."

Beveridge maintained in his speech that we have been given the task in the Philippines of advancing civilization. Bryan touched briefly on this point. He maintained that if it can be written of the United States that she resisted the temptations of greed and helped a struggling people attain independence, it "will do more to extend the areas of self-government and civilization than could be done by all the wars of conquest that we could wage in a generation."



Bryan gave refutation on three points advanced by Beveridge-- that annexation of the Philippines is a part of our destiny; that the Anglo-Saxon race is the mightiest human force; that the United States must annex the Philippines to advance civilization.

Roosevelt, as the second speaker for the affirmative, should then react to Bryan's reaction to Beveridge's speech. Evidence of such a reaction are found in Roosevelt's speech.

Bryan made a statement that, up to this point, the young men of our country "have been taught the arts of peace rather than the science of war." In the statement of his thesis, Roosevelt said that he wished "to preach that highest form of success which comes, not to the man who desires mere easy peace, but to the man who does not shrink from danger, from hardship, or from bitter toil, and who out of these wins the splendid triumph."<sup>18</sup> He then identified the man of "timid peace" and the nation committed to peace with what is undesirable.

Twice, although very briefly, Bryan alluded to the cost of the Philippines to the United States. Roosevelt gave an answer to those who object to Philippine annexation on economic grounds. He maintained that while no country can endure without material prosperity, it is only one of the many elements that go to make up national greatness and no state was truly great by relying on it alone.

Bryan mentioned "the burden and menace of a large military establishment." Roosevelt spent considerable time in espousing the

---

<sup>18</sup>Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 1.



need for maintaining a strong navy and reorganizing and building up the army. He firmly denied that a strong army and navy would be a menace.

Roosevelt presented refutation on three points touched upon in Bryan's speech--we should continue to teach our young men the arts of peace; the cost to the United States of Philippine subjugation and annexation would be burdensome; a large military establishment would be a burden and a menace.

Schurz, as the last speaker, was in a position to present refutation on the whole affirmative case, and evidence of such refutation can be seen on several points.

Both Beveridge and Roosevelt argued that if the United States did not administer the Philippine Islands, there would be savage anarchy. Beveridge said, "Law and justice must rule where savagery, tyranny and caprice have rioted." Roosevelt contended "If we drove out a medieval tyranny only to make room for savage anarchy, we had better not have begun the task at all."<sup>19</sup>

Schurz took issue with this contention. He said:

Indeed, the mendacious stories spread by our imperialists, which represent those people as barbarians, their doings as mere "savagery" and their chiefs as no better than "cut-throats" have been refuted by such a mass of authoritative testimony, coming in part from men who are themselves imperialists, that their authors should hide their heads in shame; . . .<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>20</sup>Bancroft, op. cit., p. 81.

After citing official documents and quoting testimony, Schurz concluded that the Filipinos were the equals of the Mexicans or the Cubans.

In his speech Beveridge asserted that to deliver the islands to Aguinaldo would be to "establish an autocracy of barbarism," for Aguinaldo, one of the Tagal tribe of two million people, has only an intermittent authority over less than fifty thousand of these.

Schurz saw this in a somewhat different light.

An equally helpless plea is it that the President could not treat with Aguinaldo, and his followers because they did not represent the whole population of the islands. But having an established government and an army of some 25,000 to 30,000 men, and in that army men from various tribes, they represented at least something. They represented at least a large part of the population and a strong nucleus of a national organization and, as we have to confess that in the Philippines there is no active opposition to the Filipino government except that which we ourselves manage to excite, it may be assumed that they represent the sympathy of practically the whole people.<sup>21</sup>

Roosevelt and Beveridge both made the point that to retreat from our duty in the Philippines would prove us to be cowards and weaklings and a stronger, "manlier" power would step in to do the job. To this Schurz replied that we would only be surrendering to our own conscience and that far from being ridiculed as cowards by the world, our prestige would rise.

The world knows how strong we are. It knows full well that if the American people chose to put forth their strength, they could quickly overcome a foe infinitely more powerful than the Filipinos, and that, if we, possessing the strength of a giant, do not use the giant's strength against the feeble foe, it is from the noblest of motives. . . .<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 94.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 108.



As regards the possibility of another power taking the Philippines, Schurz made three arguments: that we've heard this cry before, just recently in the case of Hawaii, and it has never happened; that American diplomacy could secure an agreement making the Philippines neutral territory; that no power would risk a quarrel with us if we put a "hands off!" sign on the Philippines.

Roosevelt contended:

From the standpoint of international honor the argument is even stronger. The guns that thundered off Manila and Santiago left us . . . a legacy of duty.<sup>23</sup>

To this contention Schurz replied:

Did not the destruction of Cervera's fleet and the taking of Santiago devolve the same obligations upon us with regard to Cuba? And who has ever asserted that therefore Cuba must be put under our sovereignty? And did ever anybody pretend that our victories in Mexico fifty years ago imposed upon us international or other obligations which compelled us to assume sovereignty over the Mexican Republic after we had conquered it much more than we have conquered the Philippines? Does not, in the light of history, this obligation dodge appear as a hollow mockery?<sup>24</sup>

Beveridge supported the point that the Philippines "will pay back a thousandfold all the government spends in discharging the highest duty to which the Republic can be called." Schurz, after declaring that he was not in sympathy with anyone who would sacrifice national honor and ideals for money, asserted that the Philippines will not pay us back the money spent in subjugating and administering these islands.

<sup>23</sup>Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>24</sup>Bancroft, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

Beveridge had as the main point of his speech that Philippine annexation is a part of America's destiny. Schurz's reply to the destiny argument was very similar to the one Bryan gave. "The destiny of a free people lies in its intelligent will and its moral strength."<sup>25</sup> This is very similar to saying that it depends on choice, not chance, and will be determined by a nation's purpose.

Beveridge and Roosevelt both maintained that the first task of the United States was to put down the rebellion against our flag. Schurz's position on this issue was that the flag does need protection, but the protection it needs is against those who would, by subjugating the Filipinos, make it an emblem of "hypocrisy," "greed," "lust of war and conquest," and "imperialistic ambition."

Schurz, then, presented refutation on seven points that can be found in the speeches of Beveridge and/or Roosevelt:--if the United States does not administer the Philippine Islands, there will be savage anarchy; we could not turn the islands over to Aguinaldo as he does not represent the people; to retreat from our duty in the Philippines would prove us to be cowards and weakling, and another power would step into the Philippines; we obtained an international obligation in the Philippines by driving out the Spanish; the Philippines will be economically profitable; annexation of the Philippines is a part of our destiny; it is our duty to put down the rebellion against our flag.

---

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 115.

### Summary

Seventeen issues in all were introduced by these four speakers, with six of these seventeen being used by at least two speakers. Of the six issues that were dealt with by more than one speaker, four were discussed by both the affirmative and the negative and two were used by both affirmative speakers.

An analysis of the lines of argument that were developed by these four speakers shows that the speeches of Bryan and Schurz, having a basically deductive arrangement, are much clearer structurally than the speeches of Roosevelt or Beveridge.

The speakers employ all three modes of proof--logical, psychological, and ethical. Beveridge's predominant modes of proof are psychological and ethical. Bryan uses mainly logical proof; Roosevelt's proof is predominantly ethical; Schurz uses all three modes effectively, but the logical proof is most evident.

Beveridge and Roosevelt, in a sense, agreed on a plan of action for the United States with regards to the Philippines. Bryan and Schurz disagreed with this plan and Schurz offered a counterplan.

There is evidence of direct refutation of one speaker by another. The entire speech by Bryan is devoted to an attack on an issue which was the main point of Beveridge's speech. Bryan also gives refutation on two other points advanced by Beveridge.

Roosevelt, following Bryan in speaking order gives refutation on three points found in Bryan's speech, one of which is an uncommon

issue, not dealt with by Beveridge or Schurz and not found as a main point in the general debate itself.

Schurz presents refutation on seven points found in the speeches of Beveridge and/or Roosevelt.

## CHAPTER VI

### EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

It will be remembered that this study was prompted by a quotation from Warren Choate Shaw suggesting that these four speeches constituted a kind of debate. The first evaluation to be made, therefore, is: Does the analysis of the internal content of these speeches show that the speakers were aware of each other? In other words, is Shaw justified in saying that Bryan "answered" Beveridge, that Roosevelt "answered" Bryan, that Schurz "answered" Roosevelt--thereby leaving the impression that they were debating each other. If this question can be answered affirmatively, it will then be possible to evaluate who won the debate and how effective each of the speakers was as a debater.

Thus, the three questions to be answered in this chapter are:

1. Can these four speeches be considered a debate?
2. If they do constitute a debate, which side won?
3. What is the relative effectiveness of the speakers as debaters?

#### Can These Speeches be Considered a Debate?

Certain aspects of the four speeches being considered suggest that these men were aware of their opposition to one another and that they were therefore "debating" on this proposition. For one thing evidence of direct refutation of one speaker by another is present.

Beveridge, in the first speech, had as his main point that Philippine annexation is part of America's destiny. Only seven days later, Bryan devoted his entire speech to the refutation of the idea that Philippine annexation was part of America's destiny. Beveridge is found to rely heavily on the psychological appeal to racism as a mode of proof. Bryan spent considerable time in attempting to counteract this particular appeal. On the point that "it is our duty to advance civilization in the Philippines," Bryan also presented refutation to an argument found in Beveridge's speech.

In Roosevelt's speech refutation is presented on three points that can be found in Bryan's speech. One point they discuss is particularly noticeable, mainly because it is not touched upon by either of the other two speakers, but also because it was not a main issue in the general debate itself. That was the issue of the "strenuous life." Bryan had said that up to this point in our history our young men had "been taught the arts of peace." Roosevelt, in the first paragraph of his speech, equated the man who desires "mere easy peace" with what is undesirable, and continued to develop this point in some length.

Schurz presented refutation on seven points found in the Beveridge and/or Roosevelt speeches: four points touched by Roosevelt and six by Beveridge.

In addition to the evidence of refutation found in these speeches, another aspect suggests an awareness of each other on the part of the speakers. This second aspect is the similarity of plans presented by



the two speakers on the affirmative, Beveridge and Roosevelt. Both present a two-step plan: 1) establish our authority by putting down the rebellion; 2) administer the islands. Looking to Bryan and Schurz it is possible to find a negative reaction to both proposals. Schurz presents a counterplan that would have us voluntarily give the Filipinos their independence and help them achieve it. This counterplan is in direct opposition to the plan advocated by the affirmative.

An analysis of the refutation and the plans and counterplan, then, shows favorable evidence in support of the idea that these men were debating each other. Other aspects, however, are not as favorable.

In the first place no personal reference to any of the other speakers is made in any of the speeches. It must be remembered that these men were not speaking in a vacuum. Other people were speaking on this proposition; articles and editorials were being written. Around these four men a general debate involving the whole of the United States was being carried on.

In the second place, it must be remembered that there are eleven issues introduced by these speakers which are only dealt with by one speaker. Schurz brings up eight issues not dealt with by any of the previous speakers, and yet, he speaks to these issues as arguments brought up by "the opposition." This would suggest that he looked on his opposition as being composed of more than just Beveridge and Roosevelt.

Important as each was in this day, these four speakers were aware of each other--not to the exclusion of anyone else as should be true in an academic debate, but still aware of each other.





Bryan and Roosevelt were both well-known men. Their ethical appeal, to certain groups, was high. What they had to say, and they were speaking rather frequently on this topic, would be quite widely read. Thus, they were important figures throughout the period of general debate in the United States.

Beveridge was less well-known, but his reputation as a speaker was rising and this was one of his most famous speeches. It is, however, the closeness in time and the identical main issue in their speeches that makes it seem that Bryan was aware of Beveridge's speech.

Schurz was one of the leading anti-imperialists. He helped to bring the anti-Imperialist League into existence. He would be fully conscious of all the speeches given on this question by such men as Bryan, Beveridge, and Roosevelt, and, in turn, others would be fully conscious of what he had to say. He was a well-liked elder-statesman and his ethical appeal was high.

Using the definition of persuasive debate as given by Nichols and Baccus, and allowing for the fact that a general public debate was going on which made it inevitable that these four speakers would be aware of other speakers and writers as well as of each other, we can conclude that these speeches constitute a debate.

#### Which Side Won?

There are two methods by which an answer to this question can be found. The Philippine question has historical perspective, and by examining history we can discover what policy was adopted by the

United States. It is possible, also, to judge this debate according to the content and award a decision on a basis similar to the basis of judging an academic debate.

Historically the plan carried out by the United States has been the two-step proposal submitted by both Beveridge and Roosevelt, except that annexation did not remain permanent as Beveridge had predicted. Despite the granting of Philippine independence in 1946 by the United States government, however, there can be little question that history awards its decision to the affirmative. The course of action adopted by the United States was the course of action proposed by the affirmative. The negative received in 1946 a belated admission of the essential correctness of its position, but by then conditions were so different from what they had been at the time of the debate proper that this change can hardly be viewed as a decision for the negative. It must also be remembered that the negative proposed immediate independence. Some forty-seven years were required for the Filipinos to gain their independence from the United States.

The decision in an academic debate would be based upon specific criteria. These criteria would be skill in: 1) analysis; 2) reasoning; 3) evidence; 4) refutation and rebuttal; 5) delivery. For the purposes of this paper, delivery and rebuttal have not been considered and are therefore dropped from the list of criteria to be used for this evaluation.

Using the criteria just set up, the negative is awarded the decision in their debate. The first criterion was skill in analysis;

that is, skill in analyzing the proposition for the basic issues to be debated. The scale is tipped in favor of the negative on this criterion by the keen analysis done by Schurz. He very carefully analyzes the history of the question and sets forth the important issues found in this analysis; he examines the arguments of the opposition to discover the motivating forces behind their proposals; he gives consideration to the results that would accrue if these affirmative proposals were adopted. This kind of careful, detailed analysis is not to be found in the speeches of Bryan, Beveridge or Roosevelt.

Bryan shows careful analysis of one issue, but that one issue is the only one dealt with in his speech. In all fairness, however, it must be remembered that this one issue was the main point dealt with by Beveridge. Beveridge discusses points of controversy that are basic in the proposition, but the content of his speech does not reveal the careful and thorough analysis that is so evident in Schurz. Roosevelt also discusses basic points of contention, but he brings them in as sub-points to an issue that is not basic to the proposition--the issue of the "strenuous life."

The second criterion was skill in reasoning; that is, the development of sound lines of argument to support contentions. Here, as was true in the case of the first criterion, the negative wins the point. Again, it is the weight of Schurz's speech that makes the negative clearly superior on this point. Schurz has chosen his arguments carefully; arguments that he is able to develop and defend with such authority that one is impressed with the careful thinking evidenced.

The use of reasoning from sign and cause-to-effect reasoning are predominant and effective.

The line of argument in Bryan's speech has a tightly-knit deductive arrangement with generalization and cause-to-effect reasoning being predominant. There is some hasty generalization in Bryan's speech, but mainly his reasoning is sound. Beveridge's reasoning is essentially cause-to-effect, but analogy is used also. This cause-to-effect reasoning is not as careful as it could be, and, at several points, it could definitely be said: "This cause-to-effect relationship is debatable." In Roosevelt's speech, reasoning from analogy is the basic type of reasoning done. Upon the establishment of his analogy between the individual and the nation depends the rest of his argument. Throughout the rest of his speech, Roosevelt uses cause-to-effect and reasoning from generalization. The weak point of this speech is the dependence of his arguments on Philippine annexation upon the acceptance of this analogy between the individual and the nation. If there is disagreement in the minds of the audience as to the validity of the analogy and the conclusions he draws from it, then there will not be agreement with the arguments on Philippine annexation.

The third criterion was skill in the use of evidence. Once again the negative is judged the better and again the balance is tipped to them by Schurz. His speech abounds in fact, quotation of official papers, testimony, etc.; all having the stamp of reliability. Indeed, Schurz quotes annexationists to prove his points. Beveridge, Bryan and Roosevelt do not have the weight of evidence to be found in Schurz.

For proof they rely more on ethical and psychological appeals than they do on evidence.

The fourth criterion is refutation, and on this point the distinction between affirmative and negative is not as sharp. There is effective refutation on both sides. The negative is awarded the point, however, because of Bryan's effective job of refuting the main point of Beveridge's speech. This point is not re-established for the affirmative in Roosevelt's speech, thus negating the bulk of the first affirmative speech. The negative team has the advantage on this point of refutation. Schurz, for the negative, is the last speaker and the effective refutation he makes stands with no rebuttal by the affirmative.

#### What is the Relative Effectiveness of the Speakers as Debaters?

Using the criteria set up for the judging of a debate--skill in analysis, reasoning, use of evidence, and refutation--the best debater was Carl Schurz. William Jennings Bryan rated second in effectiveness as a debater, with Theodore Roosevelt third and Albert J. Beveridge fourth.

In anthologies of public speeches, however, one will be more likely to find the speeches of Roosevelt and Beveridge than those of Schurz and Bryan. Even so, the premise that Schurz and Bryan were the best debaters is not refuted by the literary preference usually given to the Roosevelt and Beveridge speeches. As was mentioned in the chapter on Historical Setting, the anti-expansionists were faced with

a harder task than the imperialists by the very nature of their cause. They were asking the people of the United States to deny themselves the "spoils of war" and were championing a foreign people who were fighting and killing our soldiers. The expansionists had the appeals of patriotism, racism, and duty on their side. Roosevelt and Beveridge made "orations" with all the reliance upon rhetorical skill and emotional appeal involved in such speeches, and the very nature of what they were proposing lent itself to such an approach. Bryan and Schurz, with more reasoned, forensic type speeches, could not as effectively appeal to the emotions. Thus, the speeches of Bryan and Schurz were less "timeless" than the speeches of Beveridge and Roosevelt, less colorful, less dramatic, and less literary. For these reasons, anthologies are much more likely to include the speeches of Beveridge and Roosevelt.

### Conclusions

By analysis and evaluation, the conclusion has been reached that these four speeches, by Beveridge, Bryan, Roosevelt and Schurz, can be considered a debate. History awarded the decision to the affirmative as winners of the debate, but according to debate criteria, the negative side did the better job of debating. The second negative speaker, Carl Schurz, was, according to debate criteria, the most effective debater. William Jennings Bryan, first negative speaker, was second most effective speaker, with Theodore Roosevelt and

Albert J. Beveridge, second and first affirmative speakers respectively, rating third and fourth.

Suggestions for further study:

This study, concentrating on the content of the speeches, is, therefore, unable conclusively to prove that these four speeches constitute a debate. To prove conclusively such a statement, a complete rhetorical analysis, drawing from manuscripts, diaries, letters, and other primary sources, would have to be made. An examination of primary sources might reveal whether or not these four men wrote their speeches with the intention of "answering" one another. Such a study might also bring to light the interplay of effect-response that these particular public speeches set in motion during the nation-wide debate carried on over the Philippine annexation question.

An area for study that should prove highly interesting also is the speaking of the anti-imperialists. This movement attracted prominent men of many areas. Had they succeeded in making their sentiments prevail, history would read much differently than it now does. One question to be answered in such a study might be: "Did the speaking of this group contribute to the group's failure to achieve its end, or did the group fail in spite of effective public speaking?"

Another possible study is of the speaking of President William McKinley on Philippine annexation. The purpose of such a study could well be to show, by his speaking, the gradual evolution of his decision to annex the entire archipelago.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books

- Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People.  
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955.
- Bancroft, Frederic. Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz, VI. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913.
- Bemis, Samuel Flagg. A Diplomatic History of the United States.  
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1936.
- Brigance, William Norwood (ed.). A History and Criticism of American Public Address, II. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1943.
- Bryan, Mary Baird. Life and Speeches of the Honorable William Jennings Bryan. Baltimore: R. H. Woodward Co., 1900.
- Cooper, Lane. The Rhetoric of Aristotle. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932.
- Green, Theodore P. (ed.). American Imperialism in 1898. Boston:  
D. C. Heath, 1955.
- Grunder, Garel A. and William E. Livezey. The Philippines and the United States. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951.
- Hagedorn, Hermann (ed.). The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. XIV.  
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926.
- Jagor, F. Reisen in den Philippinen. Berlin: 1873.
- Leroy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines, 2 Vols. Boston:  
Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1914.
- Miller, Marion Mills. Great Debates in American History, Vol. III.  
New York: Current Literature Publishing Company, 1913.
- Nichols, Egbert R. and Joseph H. Baccus. Modern Debating. New York:  
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1936.



- Peterson, Houston (ed.). A Treasury of the World's Great Speeches. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954.
- Potter, David (ed.). Argumentation and Debate. New York: The Dryden Press, 1954.
- Pratt, Julius W. America's Colonial Experiment. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950.
- Pratt, Julius W. Expansionists of 1898. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1936.
- Roosevelt, Theodore. The Strenuous Life. New York: The Century Co., 1904.
- Schurz, Carl. The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz. New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1917.
- Shaw, Warren Choate. History of American Oratory, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1928.
- Thonssen, Lester and A. Craig Baird. Speech Criticism. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948.
- Willoughby, William I. Territories and Dependencies of the United States. New York: The Century Company, 1905.
- Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1903.

#### Articles and Periodicals

- Harrington, F. H. "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States: 1898-1901." Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII, September, 1923.
- Lanzar, Maria C. "The Anti-Imperialist Leagues." The Philippine Social Science Review, Vol. III, 1931.
- Mercado, Jose Rizal y. "The Philippines Within a Hundred Years." La Solidaridad. September 30, 1891.
- The Chicago Tribune. April-October, 1899.
- The Enquirer. April-October, 1899.



The Indianapolis Journal. April-October, 1899.

The New York Times. April-October, 1899.

The Springfield Daily Republican. April-October, 1899.

#### Unpublished Materials

Beem, Clifford H. "A Study of the Persuasive and Logical Elements in the Beveridge-Hoar Debates on the Philippine Question." Unpublished M. A. Thesis, State University of Iowa. 1932.

Mahaffey, Joseph H. "The Speaking and Speeches of Carl Schurz." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1951.

Ross, Herold Thuslow. "The Oratorical Career of Albert Jeremiah Beveridge." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1932.

#### Documents

Constitution of the United States.

United States Congressional Record, 56th Congress, Vol. 33, Part 2, 1900.

**APPENDIX: SPEECHES**

"THE REPUBLIC THAT NEVER RETREATS"<sup>1</sup>

By

Albert J. Beveridge

The Republic never retreats. Why should it retreat? The Republic is the highest form of civilization, and civilization must advance. The Republic's young men are the most virile and unwasted of the world, and they pant for enterprise worthy of their power. The Republic's preparation has been the self-discipline of a century, and that preparedness has found its task. The Republic's opportunity is as noble as its strength, and that opportunity is here. The Republic's duty is as sacred as its opportunity is real, and Americans never desert their duty.

The Republic could not retreat if it would. Whatever its destiny it must proceed. For the American Republic is a part of the movement of a race--the most masterful race of history--and race movements are not to be stayed by the hand of men. They are mighty answers to Divine commands. Their leaders are not only statesmen of peoples--they are prophets of God. The inherent tendencies of a race are its highest law. They precede and survive all statutes, all constitutions. The first question real statesmanship asks is: "What are the abiding characteristics of my people?" From that basis all reasoning may be natural and true. From any other basis all reasoning must be artificial and false.

---

<sup>1</sup>This edition of Beveridge's speech is taken from the Indianapolis News, February 16, 1899.

The sovereign tendencies of our race are organization and government. We govern so well that we govern ourselves. We organize by instinct. Under the flag of England our race builds an empire out of the ends of earth. In Australia it is to-day erecting a nation out of fragments. In America it wove, out of segregated settlements, that complex and wonderful organization called the American Republic. Everywhere it builds. Everywhere it governs. Everywhere it administers order and law. Everywhere it is the spirit of regulated liberty. Everywhere it obeys that Voice not to be denied which bids us strive and rest not, makes of us our brother's keeper and appoints us steward, under God, of the civilization of the world. Organization means growth. Government means administration. When Washington pleaded with the States to organize into a consolidated people, he was the advocate of perpetual growth. When Abraham Lincoln argued for the indivisibility of the Republic he became the prophet of the Greater Republic. And when they did both they were but the interpreters of the tendencies of the race. That is what made them Washington and Lincoln. Had they been separatists and contractionists they would not have been Washington and Lincoln—they would have been Davis and Calhoun. They are the great Americans because they were the supreme constructors and conservators of organized government among the American people. And today William McKinley, as divinely guided as they, is carrying to its conclusion the tremendous syllogism of which their work was the premise..



God did not make the American people the mightiest human force of all time simply to feed and die. He did not give our race the grain of organization and heart of domination to no purpose and no end. No. He has given us a task equal to our talents. He has appointed for us a destiny equal to our endowments. He has made us the lords of civilization that we may administer civilization. Such administration is needed in Cuba. Such administration is needed in the Philippines. And Cuba and the Philippines are in our hands.

If it be said that, at home, tasks as large as our strength await us--that politics are to be purified, want relieved, municipal government perfected, the relations of capital and labor better adjusted, I answer: Has England's discharge of her duty to the world corrupted her politics? Are not her cities like Birmingham the municipal models upon which we build our reforms? Is her labor question more perplexed than ours? Considering the newness of our country, is it as bad as ours? And is not the like true of Holland--even of Germany?

And what of England? England's immortal glory is not Angincourt or Waterloo. It is not her merchandise or commerce. It is Australia, New Zealand and Africa reclaimed. It is India redeemed. It is Egypt, mummy of the nations, touched into modern life. England's imperishable renown is in English science throttling the plague on Calcutta, English law administering order in Bombay, English energy planning an industrial civilization from Cairo to the cape, and English discipline creating soldiers, men, and finally citizens, perhaps, even out of the fellaheen of the dead land of the Pharaohs. And yet the liberties of Englishmen



were never so secure as now. And that which is England's undying fame has also been her infinite profit, so sure is duty golden in the end.

And what of America? With the twentieth century the real task and true life of the Republic begins. And we are prepared. We have learned restraint from a hundred years of self-control. We are instructed by the experience of others. We are advised and inspired by present example. And our work awaits us.

The dominant notes in American history have thus far been self-government and internal improvement. But these were not ends; they were means. They were modes of preparation. The dominant notes in American life henceforth will be administration and world improvement. It is the arduous but splendid mission of our race. It is ours to govern in the name of civilized liberty. It is ours to administer order and law in the name of human progress. It is ours to chasten that we may be kind. It is ours to cleanse that we may save. It is ours to build that free institutions may finally enter and abide. It is ours to bear the torch of Christianity where midnight has reigned for a thousand years. It is ours to reinforce that thin rod line which constitutes the outposts of civilization all around the world.

If it be said that this is vague talk of an indefinite future we answer that it is the specific programme of the present hour. Civil government is to be perfected in Porto Rico. The future of Cuba is to be worked out by the wisdom of events. Ultimately annexation is as certain as that island's existence. Even if Cubans are capable of self-government, every interest points to union. We and they may blunder

forward and timidly try devices of doubt. But, in the end, Jefferson's desire will be fulfilled and Cuba will be a part of the great Republic. But, whatever befalls, definite and immediate work awaits us. Harbors are to be dredged, sanitation established, highways built, railroads constructed, postal service organized, common schools opened, all by or under the government of the American Republic.

The Philippines are ours forever. Let faint hearts annoint their fears with the thought that some day American administration and American duty there may end. But they never will end. England's occupation of Egypt was to be temporary; but events, which are the commands of God, are making it permanent. And now God has given us this Pacific empire for civilization. The first office of administration is order. Order must be established throughout the archipelago. The spoiled child, Aguinaldo, may not stay the march of civilization. Rebellion against the authority of the flag must be crushed without delay, for hesitation encourages revolt, and without anger, for the turbulent children know not what they do. And then civilization must be organized, administered and maintained. Law and justice must rule where savagery, tyranny and caprice have rioted. The people must be taught the art of orderly and continuous industry. A hundred wildernesses are to be subdued. Unpenetrated regions must be explored. Unviolated valleys must be tilled. Unmastered forests must be felled. Unriven mountains must be torn asunder and their riches of gold and iron and ores of price must be delivered to the world. We are to do in the Philippines what Holland does in Java, or England in New Zealand or the cape, or else

work out new methods and new results of our own nobler than any the world has seen. All this is not indefinite; it is the very specification of duty.

The frail of faith declare that those peoples are not fitted for citizenship. It is not proposed to make them citizens. Those who see disaster in every forward step of the Republic prophesy that Philippine labor will overrun our country and starve our workingmen. But the Javanese have not so overrun Holland. New Zealand's Malays, Australia's bushmen, Africa's Kaffirs, Zulus and Hottentots and India's millions of surplus labor have not so overrun England. Whips of scorpions could not lash the Filipinos to this land of fervid enterprise, sleepless industry and rigid order.

Those who measure duty by dollars cry out at the expense. When did America ever count the cost of righteousness? And besides, this Republic must have a mighty navy in any event. And new markets secured, new enterprises opened, new resources in timber, mines and products of the tropics acquired and the vitalization of all our industries which will follow will pay back a thousandfold all the government spends in discharging the highest duty to which the Republic can be called.

Those who mutter words and call it wisdom deny the constitutional power of the Republic to govern Porto Rico, Cuba, the Philippines, for if we have the power in Porto Rico we have the power in the Philippines. The Constitution is not interpreted by degrees of latitude or longitude. It is a hoary objection. There have always been those who have proclaimed the unconstitutionality of progress. The first to deny the

power of the Republic's government were those who opposed the adoption of the Constitution itself, and they and their successors have denied its vitality and intelligence to this day. They denied the Republic's government the power to create a national bank; to make internal improvements; to issue greenbacks; to make gold the standard of value; to preserve property and life in States where treasonable Governors refused to call for aid. Let them read Hamilton and understand the meaning of implied powers. Let them read Marshall and learn that the Constitution is a people's ordinance of national life capable of growth as great as the people's growth. Let them learn the **golden** rule of constitutional interpretation; the Constitution was made for the American people; not the American people for the Constitution. Let them study the history, purposes and instincts of our race and then read again the Constitution, which is but an expression of the development of that race. Power to govern territory acquired! What else does the Constitution mean when it says: "Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States? But, aside from these express words of the American Constitution, the Republic has power to govern in the Pacific, the Caribbean or in any other portion of the globe where Providence commands. Aside from the example of Alaska and all our Territories, and the experience of a century, the Republic has the power to administer civilization wherever interest and duty call. It is the power which inheres in and is a part of government itself. And the Constitution does not deny the government this inherent power

residing in the very nature of all government. Who, then, can deny it? Those who do write a new Constitution of their own and interpret that. Those who do dispute history. Those who do are alien to the insincts (sic) of our race.

All protests against the greater republic are tolerable except this constitutional objection. But they who resist the Republic's career in the name of the Constitution are not to be endured. They are jugglers of words. Their counsel is the wisdom of veebiage. They deal not with realities, neither give heed to vital things. The most magnificent fact in history is the mighty movement and mission of our race; and the most splendid phrase of that world-redeeming movement is the entrance of the American people as the greatest force in all the earth, to do their part in administering civilization among mankind. And they are not to be halted by a ruck of words called constitutional arguments. Pretenders to legal learning have always denounced all virile interpretations of the Constitution. The so-called constitutional lawyers in Marshall's day said that he did not understand the Constitution, because he looked, not at its single syllables, but surveyed the whole instrument and beheld, in its profound meaning and infinite scope, the sublime human precoeszes of which it is an expression. The Constitution is not a prohibition on our progress. It is not an interdict to our destiny. It is not a treatise on geography. Let the flag advance; the word "retreat" is not in the Constitution. Let the republic govern as conditions demand; the Constitution does not benumb its brain nor palsy its hand.

The Declaration of Independence applies only to peoples capable of self-government. Otherwise how dared we administer the affairs of the Indians? How dare we continue to govern them to-day? Precedent does not impair natural and inalienable rights. And how is the world to be prepared for self-government? Savagery can not prepare itself. Barbarism must be assisted toward the light. Assuming that these people can be made capable of self-government, shall we have no part in this sacred and glorious cause?

And if self-government is not possible for them, shall we leave them to themselves? Shall tribal wars scourge them, disease waste them? Savagery brutalize them more and more? Shall their fields lie fallow, their forests rot, their mines remain sealed, and all the purposes and possibilities of nature be nullified? If not, who shall govern them, rather than the kindest and most merciful of the world's great race of administrators, the people of the American Republic? Who lifted from us the judgment which makes men of our blood our brother's keepers?

We do not deny them liberty. The administration of orderly government is not denial of liberty. The administration of equal justice is not the denial of liberty. Teaching the habits of industry is not denial of liberty. Development of the wealth of the land is not denial of liberty. If they are, then civilization itself is denial of liberty. Denial of liberty to whom? There are twelve million people in the Philippines, divided into thirty tribes. Aguinaldo is of the Tagal



tribe of two million souls, and he has an intermittent authority over less than fifty thousand of those. To deliver these islands to him and his crew would be to establish an autocracy of barbarism. It would be to license spoilation. It would be to plant the republic of piracy, for such a government could not prevent that crime in piracy's natural home. It would be to make war certain among the powers of earth, who would dispute, with arms, each other's possession of a Pacific empire from which that ocean can be ruled. The blood already shed is but a drop to that which would flow if America would desert its post in the Pacific. And the blood already spilled was poured out upon the altar of the world's regeneration. Manila is as noble as Omdurman, and both are holier than Jericho. Retreat from the Philippines on any pretext would be the master cowardice of history. It would be the betrayal of a trust as sacred as humanity. It would be a crime against Christian civilization and would mark the beginning of the decadence of our race. And so, thank God, the Republic never retreats.

The fervent moral resolve throughout the Republic is not "a fever of expansion." It is a tremendous awakening of the people like that of Elizabethan England. It is no fever, but the hot blood of the most magnificent young manhood of all time--a manhood begotten while yet the splendid moral passion of the war for national life filled the thought of all the land with ideals worth dying for and charged its very atmosphere with noble purposes and a courage which dared put destiny to the touch; a manhood which contains a million Roosevelts, Woods,

Hobsons and Duboces, who grieve that they, too, may not so conspicuously serve their country, civilization and mankind. Indeed, these heroes are great because they are typical. American manhood today contains the master administrators of the world. And they go forth for the healing of the nations. They go forth in the cause of civilization. They go forth for the betterment of men. They go forth and the word on their lips is Christ and His peace, not conquest and its pillage. They go forth to prepare the people through decades and may be centuries of patient effort for the great gift of American institutions. They go forth not for imperialism, but for the greater republic.

Imperialism is not the word for our vast work. Imperialism as used by the opposers of national greatness means oppression, and we oppress not. Imperialism as used by the opposers of national destiny means monarchy, and the days of monarchy are spent. Imperialism as used by the opposers of national progress is a word to frighten the faint of heart, and so is powerless with the fearless American people. Who honestly believes that the liberties of 80,000,000 Americans will be destroyed because the Republic administers civilization in the Philippines? Who honestly believes that free institutions are stricken unto death because the Republic, under God, takes its place as the first power of the world? Who honestly believes that we plunge to our doom when we march forward in the path of duty prepared by a higher wisdom than our own? Those who so believe have lost their faith in the immortality of liberty. Those who so believe deny the vitality of the American people. Those who so believe are infidels to the providence

of God. Those who so believe have lost the reckoning of events and think it sunset when it is in truth only the breaking of another day--the day of the greater republic dawning as dawns the twentieth century.

The Republic never retreats. Its flag is the only flag that has never known defeat. Where that flag leads we follow, for we know that the hand that bears it onward is the unseen hand of God. We follow the flag and independence is ours. We follow the flag and nationality is ours. We follow the flag and oceans are ruled. We follow the flag and in Occident and Orient tyranny falls and barbarism is subdued. We follow the flag at Trenton and Valley Forge, at Saratoga and upon the crimson seas, at Buena Vista and Chapultepec, at Gettysburg and Mission Ridge, at Santiago and Manila, and everywhere and always it means larger liberty, nobler opportunity and greater human happiness, for everywhere and always it means the blessings of the greater republic. And so God leads, we follow the flag and the Republic never retreats.

"AMERICA'S MISSION"<sup>1</sup>

By

William Jennings Bryan

Mr. Chairman:--When the advocates of imperialism find it impossible to reconcile a colonial policy with the principles of our Government or with the canons of morality; when they are unable to defend it upon the ground of religious duty or pecuniary profit, they fall back in helpless despair upon the assertion that it is destiny. "Suppose it does violate the Constitution," they say; "suppose it does break all the Commandments, suppose it does entail upon the nation an incalculable expenditure of blood and money; it is destiny and we must submit."

The people have not voted for imperialism; no national convention has declared for it; no Congress has passed upon it. To whom, then, has the future been revealed? Whence this voice of authority? We can all prophesy, but our prophecies are merely guesses, colored by our hopes and our surroundings. Man's opinion of what is to be is half wish and half environment. Avarice paints destiny with a dollar mark before it; militarism equips it with a sword.

He is the best prophet who, recognizing the omnipotence of truth, comprehends most clearly the great forces which are working

---

<sup>1</sup>This edition of Bryan's speech is taken from Mary Baird Bryan's Life and Speeches of the Honorable William Jennings Bryan, Baltimore: R. H. Woodward Co., 1900.

out the progress, not of one party, not of one nation, but of the human race.

History is replete with predictions which once wore the hue of destiny, but which failed of fulfillment because those who uttered them saw too small an arc of the circle of events. When Pharaoh pursued the fleeing Israelites to the edge of the Red Sea he was confident that their bondage would be renewed and that they would again make bricks without straw, but destiny was not revealed until Moses and his followers reached the farther shore dry shod and the waves rolled over the horses and chariots of the Egyptians. When Belshazzar, on the last night of his reign, led his thousand lords into the Babylonian banquet hall and sat down to a table glittering with vessels of silver and gold, he felt sure of his kingdom for many years to come, but destiny was not revealed until the hand wrote upon the wall those awe-inspiring words, "Mene, Mene, Tekel Upharsin." When Abderrahman swept northward with his conquering hosts his imagination saw the Crescent triumphant throughout the world, but destiny was not revealed until Charles Martel raised the cross above the battlefield of Tours and saved Europe from the sword of Mohammedanism. When Napoleon emerged victorious from Marengo, from Ulm and from Austerlitz, he thought himself the child of destiny, but destiny was not revealed until Blucher's forces joined the army of Wellington and the vanquished Corsican began his melancholy march toward St. Helena. When the redcoats of George the Third routed the New Englanders at Lexington and Bunker Hill there arose before the British sovereign visions of colonies taxes without representation and



drained of their wealth by foreign-made laws, but destiny was not revealed until the surrender of Cornwallis completed the work begun at Independence Hall and ushered into existence a government deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed.

We have reached another crisis. The ancient doctrine of imperialism, banished from our land more than a century ago, has recrossed the Atlantic and challenged democracy to mortal combat upon American soil.

Whether the Spanish War shall be known in history as a war for liberty or as a war of conquest; whether the principles of self-government shall be strengthened or abandoned; whether this nation shall remain a homogeneous republic or become a heterogeneous empire--these questions must be answered by the American people--when they speak, and not until then, will destiny be revealed.

Destiny is not a matter of chance; it is a matter of choice; it is not a thing to be waited for, it is a thing to be achieved.

No one can see the end from the beginning, but every one can make his course an honorable one from beginning to end, by adhering to the right under all circumstances. Whether a man steals much or little may depend upon his opportunities, but whether he steals at all depends upon his own volition.

So with our nation. If we embark upon a career of conquest no one can tell how many islands we may be able to seize or how many races we may be able to subjugate; neither can any one estimate the cost, immediate and remote, to the Nation's purse and to the Nation's





character, but whether we shall enter upon such a career is a question which the people have a right to decide for themselves. Unexpected events may retard or advance the Nation's growth, but the Nation's purpose determines its destiny.

What is the nation's purpose?

The main purpose of the founders of our Government was to secure for themselves and for posterity the blessings of liberty, and that purpose has been faithfully followed up to this time. Our statesmen have opposed each other upon economic questions, but they have agreed in defending self-government as the controlling national idea. They have quarreled among themselves over tariff and finance, but they have been united in their opposition to an entangling alliance with any European power.

Under this policy our nation has grown in numbers and in strength. Under this policy its beneficent influence has encircled the globe. Under this policy the taxpayers have been spared the burden and the menace of a large military establishment and the young men have been taught the arts of peace rather than the science of war. On each returning Fourth of July our people have met to celebrate the signing of the Declaration of Independence; their hearts have renewed their vows to free institutions and their voices have praised the forefathers whose wisdom and courage and patriotism made it possible for each succeeding generation to repeat the words:--

My country, 'tis of thee,  
Sweet land of Liberty,  
Of thee I sing.

This sentiment was well-nigh universal until a year ago. It was to this sentiment that the Cuban insurgents appealed; it was this sentiment that impelled our people to enter into the war with Spain. Have the people so changed within a few short months that they are now willing to apologize for the War of the Revolution and force upon the Filipinos the same system of government against which the colonists protested with fire and sword?

The hour of temptation has come, but temptations do not destroy, they merely test the strength of individuals and nations; they are stumbling-blocks or stepping-stones; they lead to infamy or fame, according to the use made of them.

Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen served together in the Continental army and both were offered British gold. Arnold yielded to the temptation and made his name a synonym for treason; Allen resisted and lives in the affections of his countrymen.

Our nation is tempted to depart from its "standard of morality" and adopt a policy of "criminal aggression." But, will it yield?

If I mistake not the sentiment of the American people they will spurn the bribe of imperialism, and, by resisting temptation, win such a victory as has not been won since the battle of Yorktown. Let it be written of the United States: Behold a republic that took up arms to aid a neighboring people, struggling to be free; a republic that, in the progress of the war, helped distant races whose wrongs were not in contemplation when hostilities began; a republic that, when peace was restored, turned a deaf ear to the clamorous voice of greed and to

those borne down by the weight of a foreign yoke spoke the welcome words, Stand up; be free--let this be the record made on history's page and the silent example of this republic, true to its principles in the hour of trial, will do more to extend the area of self-government and civilization than could be done by all the wars of conquest that we could wage in a generation.

The forcible annexation of the Philippine Islands is not necessary to make the United States a world power. For over ten decades our nation has been a world power. During its brief existence it has exerted upon the human race an influence more potent for good than all the other nations of the earth combined, and it has exerted that influence without the use of sword or Gatling gun. Mexico and the republics of Central and South America testify to the benign influence of our institutions, while Europe and Asia give evidence of the working of the leaven of self-government. In the growth of democracy we observe the triumphant march of an idea--an idea that would be weighted down rather than aided by the armor and weapons proffered by imperialism.

Much has been said of late about Anglo-Saxon civilization. Far be it from me to detract from the service rendered to the world by the sturdy race whose language we speak. The union of the Angle and the Saxon formed a new and valuable type, but the process of race evolution was not completed when the Angle and the Saxon met. A still later type has appeared which is superior to any which has existed heretofore; and with this new type will come a higher civilization than any which has preceded it. Great has been the Greek, the Latin, the Slav, the

Celt, the Teuton and the Anglo-Saxon, but greater than any of these is the American, in whom are blended the virtues of them all.

Civil and religious liberty, universal education and the right to participate, directly or through representatives chosen by himself, in all the affairs of government--these give to the American citizen an opportunity and an inspiration which can be found nowhere else.

**Standing** upon the vantage ground already gained the American people can aspire to a **grander** destiny than has opened before any other race.

Anglo-Saxon civilization has taught the individual to protect his own rights; American civilization will teach him to respect the rights of others.

Anglo-Saxon civilization has taught the individual to take care of himself; American civilization, proclaiming the equality of all before the law, will teach him that his own highest good requires the observance of the commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

Anglo-Saxon civilization has, by force of arms, applied the art of government to other races for the benefit of Anglo-Saxons; American civilization will, by the influence of example, excite in other races a desire for self-government and a determination to secure it.

Anglo-Saxon civilization has carried its flag to every clime and defended it with forts and garrisons; American civilization will imprint its flag upon the hearts of all who long for freedom.

"To American civilization, all hail!  
"Time's noblest offspring is the last!"

ROOM USE ONLY

ROOM USE ONLY

Circulation dept.

6 Apr 59

APR 1 1960

NOV 17 1960

JAN 6 1961

MAR 12 1961

30

APR 18 1961

ret April 20, 61

61

~~MAY 27 1962~~

~~MAR 5 1964~~

~~MAR 18 1967~~

~~APR 11 1968~~

~~MAY 10 1969~~ 103