This is to certify that the

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Laszlo J. Hetenyi

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OUTLINE OF A PHILOSOPHIC POSITION AND ITS APPLICATION TO AN

INTRODUCTORY MUSIC PROGRAM IN GENERAL EDUCATION

By

Laszlo Joseph Hetenyi

A THESIS

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OUTLINE OF A PHILOSOPHIC POSITION AND ITS APPLICATION TO AN

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This study presents a philosophic position which regards the
sentient individual as the creator of both knowledge and reality. The
pragmatic criterion, operating in relation to the individual's experi-
ence, determines what is real no less than what is true. Objective
existence is employed only as an operational concept, devoid of special
ontological position, meaningful only as it operates to promote the
purposes of the sentient being.

In consequence, a value system is evolved which maintains that
conduct promoting an individual's capacity to deal with his experience
(notably through a growth in his capacity to anticipate consequences)
is ethically positive, while the converse is ethically negative. At
present, maximum growth is seen as occurring in a social context, hence
social value is regarded as the most acceptable criterion for evaluating
human conduct.

The aesthetic experience is analyzed as a need-satisfaction oc-
curring in the appreciator--the need arising from repeated frustration
in daily life of man's tendency toward organized (formally complete)
perception. In this process the aesthetic object is granted existential

status only as it participates in the experience of the beholder.

In relation to education, this position implies a concentration on the experience of the individual learner, while demanding adequate allowance for the apparent reality of his surroundings in both the cognitive and the valuative areas. As a part of the latter, preoccupation with the aesthetic emphasizes the promotion of skills and attitudes leading to increased development of formal completeness in the student's personal experience.

An introductory music course in general education based on this position must contain a minimum of seven basic objectives. The program must (1) address itself to the development of the individual. It must (2) produce certain social attitudes to (3) extend and (4) intensify the musical experience. It must (5) restructure this experience in terms of musical form and (6) bring about the requisite dynamic conditions through a modification of existing attitudes. Finally, it must (7) provide a foundation for integrating musical growth with the totality of the experiential field.

In realizing these objectives it is necessary to determine the developmental status of students at the outset and to organize the program with sufficient flexibility to allow for individual differences. Content and methodology are selected with due regard for the environment of the clientele, but provisions must be made to permit subsequent expansion of experience beyond this setting. Perception of stimuli presented through the four musical elements (rhythm, melody, harmony, tone color), also retention in memory of such stimulation, must be fostered. Presenta-

tion of these elements must occur in a structurally organized setting (i.e. through examples having formal integrity) and provision must be made to advance from this level to a perception of musical design. Some procedure must be devised to coordinate the resultant musical growth with development in other areas of experience.

An extensive sample program illustrating concrete application of this approach completes the study.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study proposes to outline a philosophic position of pragmatic orientation, and to derive from it principles on which to base a music program for general education. This over-all purpose determined not only the material included in the study but equally dictated an organizational pattern responsible for certain exclusions. Thus the objectives and topic organization of the music sequence (Chapters VII and VIII) are based deductively on some implications for education (Chapter VI) contained in the philosophic foundations of the study (Chapters II, III, IV, and V). Similarly, the sample program illustrating the application of the program's objectives (Chapters IX, X, and XI) is supported primarily by a deductive linkage with the general principles in question and not by inductive evidence gathered from controlled experimentation. To be sure, a limited amount of inductive evidence (obtained first hand and from the experience of educators in the field) has been adduced, but such evidence is of a preliminary nature, suitable for the formulation of hypotheses but not for the drawing of firm conclusions.

The purpose and plan of this study, therefore, is essentially systematic, rather than experimental. It is intended to function as a logically coherent plan of operation on which subsequent experimental explorations may rest. This limitation of purpose provides the basis for possible future undertakings which can then establish experimentally-- through a process of validation, modification, or refutation--the degree of reliability of the suggestions herein presented. A further area for

later studies is the expansion of recommendations derived from the philosophic position of this study to educational areas beyond an introductory general education music course. Such an expansion may include subsequent music sequences and/or any other activities needed in completing a rounded general education program on the college level. Eventually it may even be possible to outline a comprehensive educational system (from primary to graduate levels) conceived as a consistent application of this position. In this way the entire plan of the present study, it is hoped, exemplifies the fundamental ethical proposition developed in Chapter V--to wit that any ethically positive act must involve potentialities for a constantly expanding field.

An ethical conviction also accounts for the fact that in this study the discussion of a concrete educational problem is preceded by a fairly lengthy development of a philosophic framework. This organization was the inescapable outcome of the belief that any conscious attempt to guide, modify, or in any way control the growth of another human being is an act subject to ethical judgment; that, in other words, "deliberate education is never morally neutral."[1] Such a belief assumes particular significance when a society assigns a considerable part of education to a formally structured institutional setting. In these instances (and, hence, in the modern Western world)

    . . . the moral factor enters whenever and wherever significant

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[1]John L. Childs, Education and Morals An Experimentalist Philosophy of Education (New York: Appleton -- Century -- Crofts, Inc., 1950), p. 17.

decisions have to be made about either the organization, the
administration, or the instructional program of the school.
All of these decisions . . . exert an influence on the at-
titudes and the behaviors of the young.[1]

Any moral enterprise, however, presents a problem in consistency--
particularly when the undertaking is as elaborate as formal education has
become in contemporary culture. Various parts of the curriculum, extra-
curricular activities, school-community relations, family and sub-cultural
influences interact in the total educative process. The school, to be sure,
cannot--and perhaps should not--assume controlling power over every force
acting on the young. On the other hand, even in those areas assigned to
the school by common consent of the community, major inconsistencies can
arise. Yet "a school is ineffective as an educational agency whenever
the emphases of certain aspects or departments of its work are denied or
negated by other parts of its program."[2] Such negation, in turn, becomes
possible, nay probable, in the absence of an explicit and consistent
philosophical foundation from which the various activities of the school
can be planned and integrated. Thus education, as a moral activity, de-
mands a consistent ethical framework; such a framework, in turn, depends
on a fundamental commitment to some source or sources of moral values.

> 'Supernaturalists' believe that this . . . source is to be
> had in the declarations of revealed religion as authoritatively
> interpreted by the leaders of the Church; 'classicists' hold
> that it is available in the teachings of the great books--
> books that have endured because they contain the insights of
> intellectual and moral leaders who have succeeded in going be-
> neath the local and the transcient to the deeper and more
> ultimate meanings of human existence; 'essentialists' affirm

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[1]Ibid., p. 19.

[2]Ibid., p. 17.

that a more dependable source of educational values is given
ready-made in the intellectual and moral findings of the
'common sense' of mankind; still another group insists that
this more stable source is provided by the original nature
of biological man--a nature considered more fixed and funda-
mental than is exhibited in the varied patterns of living
that men acquire as a result of their experience in different
human societies.[1]

Each of these sources of morality implies a commitment to some

theory of truth, knowledge, and reality. If, therefore, this study is

to offer an adequate ethical basis for a proposed plan of education, it

becomes necessary to evolve a philosophic position in which the axiologi-

cal--ethical and aesthetic--propositions rest on a firm epistemological

and metaphysical foundation. In other words, before statements about

value, morality, and the aesthetic experience can become meaningful it

is necessary to arrive at a consistent view of truth, knowledge, and re-

ality. It is this necessity which forced the presentation of a rather

elaborate outline of a philosophic system in the early part of this study.

Such an undertaking, however, has to deal with issues which have

been central to the philosophic speculations of humanity throughout re-

corded history. It would be, therefore, a sign of boundless arrogance if

this study were to pretend to have found the answers to what Schiller has

termed "the riddles of the Sphinx."[2]   Certainly no such claim is ad-

vanced in these pages. On the contrary, far from offering the views

expressed as <u>definitive solutions</u> to the besetting problems of man, they

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[1] Ibid., p. 41.

[2] F. C. S. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx A Study in the Philosophy
of Humanism (third edition; London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co. Ltd., 1910),
p. 7.

are merely presented as a possible orientation consistently developed from certain postulates. Should these postulates be rejected, the validity of the entire system becomes questionable and the acceptability of any proposition therein purely fortuitous.

Thus the educational implications generally, and the proposed music program specifically, are offered not as universal, ideal, and perennial verities, but merely as logical consequents of a particular human, and hence fallible, viewpoint. Any other interpretation, besides being presumptuous, would also be hopelessly inconsistent with the position developed in the next four chapters.

CHAPTER II

TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE

In developing a theory of truth and knowledge, preoccupation
with the many controversial aspects of the problem frequently obscures
what is, perhaps, the central issue in any truth theory: that truth is
not an independently existing entity, but rather "a property of certain
of our ideas."[1] Whether one accepts the coherence theory of one of the
rationalists, such as the one so elaborately developed by Spinoza,[2]
whether one subscribes to some form of correspondence theory, as, sur-
prisingly, William James did,[3] or whether one wishes to construct some
entirely different system, truth remains a property, characteristic,
attribute, not of an object, but of a belief. One may say that water
is a compound consisting of oxygen and hydrogen and the truth problem
revolves around the statement, not around water or the gases in question.
Similarly, in the more abstract sphere of mathematics, should one wish to
assert something about the truth, or, in this case, falsity of the state-
ment that two times two equals seven, the negative verdict rendered
would not refer to the concepts "two" and "seven," nor yet to the con-
cept "times" (indicative of the multiplication process), but rather to
the statement as a whole. The total statement, on the other hand, is an

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[1]William James, Pragmatism A New Name for Some Old Ways of Think-
ing (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909), p. 198.

[2]Benedict de Spinoza, The Ethics (R. H. M. Elwes, translator, The
Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, London: George Bell and Sons, 1884),
II, 82-127.

[3]William James, The Meaning of Truth A Sequel to "Pragmatism"
(New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910), pp. 136-161.

expression of a belief, an opinion about a relationship and not the relationship itself. This distinction, frequently overlooked in non-technical discussions, pinpoints the real location of the controversial issues in relation to truth theories. Since truth is a quality of belief (for purposes of this study of human belief), its direct connection is with the problems of knowledge, hence it falls within the sphere of epistemological investigation. The connection with the nature of reality and existence, with metaphysics and ontology, though vital, is less direct.

In attempting to construct a theory of knowledge, the critical word is necessarily "how." Since a process is being investigated, the problem of operation is inescapably the central one. Though "what" we know is of greatest importance, questions relating to it are essentially metaphysical, "how" remains the primary consideration of epistemology. How is it that some beliefs are accepted and others rejected? How does a human being acquire information? How is it that the knowing process takes place at all? And, to return to the truth question once again, how is it that some beliefs are classed "true" and others "false"? It is to such questions that a defensible epistemology must furnish answers.

Leaving aside, for the moment, various controversies regarding the nature of knowing, an attempt will be made to find an area of agreement among all theories of knowledge hitherto proposed. There seems to be no question that knowing implies the existence--real or imaginary--of a knower. Similarly, knowing implies some form of activity on the part of the knower. This activity, to eliminate controversy, might be classed as purely receptive or exclusively creative, but, whatever its nature,

it must be in some relation to the knower. As an initial step in moving toward a more distinctive (hence more controversial) interpretation of the knowing process, it may be hypothesized that knowing is experiential in nature.

Experience, as a concept, is far from unequivocal. Writers on the subject have been trying for centuries to arrive at some uniformity of understanding even of its basic characteristics. What might be considered the most elemental part of experience, sense impression, was to Plato merely a shadow, hence of little significance.[1] To Locke, at the opposite extreme, sense impressions became the foundation on which all else had to be built.[2] In either case, however, man as an experiencer was cast in a predominantly passive role. Experience as a process, pleasant, painful, or neutral, was regarded as something that happened to man. Such a passive interpretation of experience, however, fails to take into account the dynamic quality of human existence. More precisely, it narrows the definition of experience to a point where it no longer serves as an adequate tool for human thought and action. A considerably broader meaning, implying both active and passive human participation, will be attached to this term in subsequent pages. This meaning possesses the great advantage of placing man as an organism within his environment, accounting thereby for interaction between the inner and outer spheres (i.e., between stimuli and responses, between seemingly

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[1] Plato, Republic (A. D. Lindsay, translator, New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 253-260.

[2] John Locke, On Human Understanding (The Works of John Locke. A New Edition, Corrected, London: Printed for Thomas Tegg; et al., 1823), I, 82-83.

objective reality and subjective human knowledge thereof), and eliminat-

ing the troublesome dichotomous analysis of knowledge based on the separa-

tion of the individual from his physical and social setting. This defi-

nition, therefore, permits a philosophical approach in accord with Lewin's

field-theoretical principles.[1] The definition was originally offered by

John Dewey in the following words:

> The organism acts in accordance with its own structure . . .
> upon its surroundings. As a consequence the changes produced
> in the environment react upon the organism and its activities.
> The living creature undergoes . . . the consequences of its
> own behavior. This close connection between doing and . . .
> undergoing forms what we call experience. Disconnected doing
> and disconnected suffering are neither of them experiences.[2]

The full significance of this definition becomes apparent when one con-

templates its impact on various conventionally accepted notions. By this

definition the foundation of much theological knowledge is flatly denied

experiential character. Man as a mere passive receiver of divine will,

or even as a purely determined saint or sinner, is not assigned experi-

ential status. Similarly, a rigorous application of this definition must

deny experiential character to human knowledge if such knowledge is con-

ceived as no more than the passive reception of stimuli.

In terms of this definition of experience, one is forced to reject

both the purely receptive and the purely creative conceptions of the know-

ing act--though the latter analysis may be re-established with certain

modifications. This is particularly significant in light of the customary

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[1] Kurt Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality (Donald K. Adams and
Karl E. Zener, translators, New York: McGraw - Hill Book Company Inc.,
1935), p. 41.

[2] John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: The New
American Library, 1950), p. 83.

common-sense view of knowledge which relegates the knower to a role of exclusive receptivity in the cognitive process. From an experiential point of view, knowledge cannot be accepted as "revelation" in the creation of which the knower had no part. Some form of activity must have been involved if knowledge is indeed an experience. This is the import of C. I. Lewis' statement in which he excludes the possibility of purely receptive knowledge:

> A mind for which, whatever happened, nothing could be done about it, could possess no knowledge either of generalizations or of objects. . . .
>
> For the merely receptive and passive mind, there would be no objects and no world.[1]

Even where Lewis carefully avoids any touches of subjective idealism, where, therefore, he takes special pains to retain contact with empirical realism, he still finds it necessary to re-emphasize the significance of the knower's active part in the cognitive experience. Speaking of the qualia involved in the knowing process, he stresses both the subjectivity of the experience and the impossibility of conceiving of it except as the participating agent is actively engaged in it.

> The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective. The property of an object is objective: the ascription of it is a judgement which may be mistaken; and what the predication of it asserts is something which transcends what could be given in a single experience.[2]

That this presentation of qualia, the intuition, reception of the given, is not all of the knowing process, that, therefore, the active part is a

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[1]Clarence Irving Lewis, _Mind and the World Order_ (Boston: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), pp. 136-137.

[2]_Ibid._, p. 121.

necessary aspect of knowledge, Lewis asserts most specifically. He states that "there is no knowledge merely by acquaintance . . . knowledge always [italics in the original] transcends the immediately given."[1]

The cognitive process is, however, but incompletely defined by its presentation as an experiential, hence two-way, process. One might, for example, view knowing as an undergoing of stimuli upon which some organizing function is undertaken by the knower. Both the reception and the organization are conceived as necessary to the complete knowing act. If one were to add that the organizing process arises from the operation of innate, a priori categories, one would, in effect, arrive at the essential features of Kant's epistemology of pure reason. On the other hand, though perhaps less directly, one might suggest that the initial phase of knowing is the active one, that the individual, or some part of him (mind) creates the first stimulus, that this stimulus, in turn, is received by all or part of the organism (the passive stage), and that, as a result of this stimulation, interpretations or conceptualizations are formed by the mind. By the partial definition of the term knowledge (i.e., knowledge being experiential) this still could be classed as an experience, yet would result in a solipsistic epistemology--quite probably with idealistic metaphysical components. Finally, as a third alternative, it may be reasoned that external stimuli are actively transformed by the knower in the cognitive act and that the outcome of this process of transformation (rather than a priori categories) would then form the basis for the interpretation of future experiences. It is essentially this type of epistemology which is

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[1]Ibid., p. 118.

involved in the thinking of such empirical realists as William James.[1]
With so many divergent theories equally reconcilable to an experiential
definition of knowing, additional limiting factors must be introduced
into the definition.

If the concept of knowledge is to be operationally useful, it
must not only be inclusive, but exclusive as well. But the criteria for
both inclusion and exclusion are in themselves items of knowledge, hence
there is danger of a circular argument. The classical dictum of Peirce,
though possibly cumbersome, may offer a way out of this difficulty. As
he put it:

> Consider what effects, that might conceivably have
> practical bearings, we conceive the object of our con-
> ception to have. Then our conception of these effects
> is the whole of our conception of the object.[2]

Applying this principle to the problem of knowledge, the object
becomes the concept "knowledge," the effects, in turn, are those outcomes
which accrue from a particular interpretation of this concept. In terms
of the Peircean maxim, "knowledge" is no more than the totality of these
outcomes. Hence, the appropriate questions arising from an attempted
definition of the term must be those that are directed toward the results
springing from a given interpretation, particularly as these results (con-
sequences) differ from the results attributable to an alternative defini-
tion of the concept.

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[1] William James, The Meaning of Truth, pp. xv-xvii.

[2] Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, editors, Collected Papers of
Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1931-35), V, 1.

According to Lewis again, "the significance of all knowledge is for possible action."[1] It may be necessary, in this context, to emphasize the word possible. The experience termed "knowledge" is not restricted to action, nor is it restricted to events which de facto lead to action. Merely the potential for action is specified. Yet even the potentiality requirement results in a helpful delimitation of the term. Many experiences, though action is involved in the experience itself, hold no significance for further action. Automatic response to a stimulus, such as the reflex kick, must be classed as an experience--involving, as it does, connected doing and undergoing--but without further elaboration it leads to no possible further action. As such, it is not classifiable as knowledge. The difference between experiencing generally and the particular experience classed as knowledge can be seen more clearly in the continuation of this illustration. Though the reflex kick itself is not knowledge (though experiential), a person's awareness of the connection between the tap stimulus and the kick response certainly is. Once aware of the relationship, this awareness makes possible future actions--if no more, at least a decision whether or not this experience is worth repeating--so that the experience "tap-kick-awareness-of-connection" becomes knowledge.

Potentiality of action involves the necessary presence of alternatives. Though this need not, it may be interpreted in favor of voluntarism; it merely means that a possibility carries within it, as a bare minimum of alternatives, the eventuality of fulfillment or non-fulfillment.

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[1]Clarence Irving Lewis, op. cit., p. 90.

Schiller, viewing reasoning, and therefore cognition, as "a weapon in the struggle for existence and a means of achieving adaptation,"[1] sees this option as part of the evolutionary process and, therefore, feels "that the purposive character of mental life must influence and pervade also our most remotely cognitive acts."[2] With the theory of evolution being one of the scientific hypotheses which, at present, are assigned considerable warrant, Schiller's assignment of purpose to the cognitive act may also be considered a warranted hypothesis.

So far, then, it may be stated that knowledge is a purposive experience, directed toward a goal. This yet fails to offer criteria for distinguishing true knowledge from illusion, error, even hallucination. Thus the consideration of truth, as a possible attribute of knowledge, must be resumed once more.

Perhaps paradoxically, a most fruitful consideration of truth is begun by investigating the nature of error. The question Schiller asks is the following: "How does [one] discriminate between propositions which claim to be true, but are not, and claims to truth which are good, and may be shown to be valid?"[3] In attempting to answer this question, purely deductive logic breaks down completely. In terms of pure deduction, _validity_, rather than truth, becomes the central preoccupation. By being entirely dependent on the truth of the assumed premises, the

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[1]F. C. S. Schiller, _Humanism_ (London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1903), p. 7.

[2]_Ibid._, p. 8.

[3]F. C. S. Schiller, _Studies in Humanism_ (second edition; London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1912), p. 3.

conclusions (derived through the canons of deduction) offer no guarantee regarding the reliability of the ideas they express. A single illustration is sufficient to demonstrate the limitations of pure deduction. In the following two syllogisms (both valid) deductive procedures fail to distinguish between the truth or falsity of the two conclusions.

> The first commander of the Continental Armies was the first president of the United States.
>
> George Washington was the first commander of the Continental Armies.
>
> ──────────────────────────────────────
>
> Hence, George Washington was the first president of the United States.

Compared with:

> The first commander of the Continental Armies was the first president of the United States.
>
> Julius Caesar was the first commander of the Continental Armies.
>
> ──────────────────────────────────────
>
> Hence, Julius Caesar was the first president of the United States.

In terms of deduction alone, both conclusions commend themselves equally. Checked by the canons of categorical analysis, confirmed by means of the topological Euler diagrams, both arguments are of equal excellence. Yet one argument is patently unreliable when accepted as the basis for human conduct. This demonstration brings to light the obvious conclusion that no deduction is any more reliable than its starting premises. No serious rationalist ever questioned this fact. Descartes tried to circumvent the difficulty by starting only from premises as he felt impossible to doubt. Spinoza offered a series of postulates and definitions, acceptance of which was made prerequisite for the establishment of his propositions.

But just as soon as one of these additional, though inescapable, steps was taken, an unexpressed element, the element of human commitment, entered the seemingly air-tight system. In a sense this constituted a case of _petitio principii_, since it merely pushed back, but failed to answer the original query. One is no longer asked to distinguish the truth or falseness of conclusions by commitment (faith) alone--that much has been gained--but the premises must still be accepted without proof demonstrations of any kind. The _position_ of the question in the chain of reasoning has been shifted, but no new answer or criterion for an answer has been provided. Schiller suggests, therefore, that an entirely different approach--one which has been used from time immemorial _de facto_, but not accepted _de jure_--becomes necessary. This approach, referring back to the experiential nature of knowledge, is simply another expression of the pragmatic maxim; _i.e._, "when an assertion claims truth, _its consequences are always used to test its claim_."[1]

This particular formulation of the pragmatic maxim merits some attention since its rather modest wording may well reduce some of the objections levelled against the Peirce formulation. Schiller does not, _at this time_, claim that a concept _is_ no more than its consequences, although subsequently he does make this claim. Here he merely points to the _method of verifying_ truth claims, leaving, for the moment, the _nature_ of such claims open to question. In this form his statement does not attempt to answer questions about the characteristics of truth and error, yet it provides a means by which various answers to these questions may be tested. In a

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 5.

broad sense, the entire truth theory of Schiller's "Humanism" boils down
to an application of this testing principle to various claims regarding
the nature of truth, a rejection of those claims which appear to be
worthless or harmful in terms of this test, and an acceptance of those
which promise aid in the organizing of human experience:

> Human interest, then, is vital to the existence of truth:
> to say that a truth has consequences and that what has none
> is meaningless, means that it has bearing on some human
> interest. Its 'consequences' must be consequences to some
> one engaged on some problem for some purpose.[1]

> . . . if an assertion is to be valuable, and therefore
> 'true', its consequences must be 'good'. They can only
> test the truth it claims by forwarding or baffling the
> interest, by satisfying or thwarting the purpose, which
> led to the making of the assertion. If they do the one
> the assertion is 'good' and pro tanto 'true'; if they do
> the other, it is 'bad' and 'false'. For whatever arouses
> an interest or forwards an end is judged to be (so far)
> 'good', whatever baffles or thwarts is judged to be 'bad'.[2]

It may be of value to point out that no detailed criteria of ethi-
cal judgment are proposed in the foregoing. Schiller has made no attempt
to establish a hierarchy of the various "goods." The definition is simply
a limited, operational one, to be used in evaluating specific truth claims.
Schiller's "so far" functions as the Jamesian "in so far forth" to exclude
implications exceeding the intent of the statement. This caution on
Schiller's part makes it possible to employ his formulation rather ex-
tensively, since the limited nature of his statement excludes hierarchic
organization of an axiological nature. Failure to do so might well have
rendered an ethics based on his truth theory circular, hence logically

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[1] Loc. cit.

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

suspect. By merely establishing the accomplishment or frustration of purpose in a particular situation as criteria for good and bad in the situation, Schiller leaves open the systematically higher classifications of good and bad, avoids the postulation of any standards of comparison between different situations, thereby making it possible to arrive at truth characterizations without anticipating some preconceived ethical system.

Proceeding with the discussion of truth theory along Schiller's lines (i.e. by investigating the nature of error), it becomes possible to eliminate some truth interpretations which fail to satisfy the operational requirements of Schiller's dictum. In terms of his pragmatic test, both idealism and sensory realism pose problems which cast serious doubt on their acceptability as adequate explanations of the distinction between truth and error. In this respect absolute idealism is particularly vulnerable.

Absolute idealism derives the truth claim of beliefs from their approach to immutable, eternal verities. It may grant the inability of the human mind to encompass these verities in their entirety, in fact it emphasizes that the very nature of these truths transcends the possibility of human experience. Nevertheless, it stresses the interpretation that human contact with truth depends on the closeness with which human thought can approximate universal comprehension. The idealistic aspects of Spinoza's epistemology offer an explicit illustration of this approach.[1] But such an analysis exacts a number of substantial concessions. On the one hand, it means that there will remain a substantial residue of truth

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[1] Benedict de Spinoza, op. cit., pp. 82-127.

(residue might even be too modest a term, since it is to be anticipated that what is left unknowable exceeds that which can be known by limited human minds) inaccessible to man, since he is partial and the idea is total. On the other hand, the postulation of an unknowable, no matter how small, raises the problem of relations between it and the knowable. In fact, the mere existence of an unknowable might vitiate all human knowledge. Either of these considerations would suffice to render idealist truth theory questionable in terms of the pragmatic test, since both difficulties tend to place human truths into a category so far removed from the postulated absolute as to rob them of reliability for the purposes of man.

A third consideration may make idealist truth theories even less acceptable in terms of the pragmatic test. Experience of man, as far as the sentient individual is concerned, always deals with the particular. As such, time and change are hallmarks of his knowledge. So that

> . . . if you insist on having a system of eternal and immutable truth you can get it only by abstracting from those characteristics of Reality, which we try to express by the terms individuality, time, and change. But you must pay the price for a formula that will enable you to make assertions that hold good far beyond the limits of your experience. And part of the price is that you will in the end be unable to give a rational explanation of those very characteristics, which had been dismissed at the outset as irrelevant to a rational explanation.[1]

Thus, in a rigorous application of idealist epistemology, man is left with no explanation regarding his knowledge of the very aspects of reality which he can and does experience. Merely to dismiss such knowledge

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[1] F. C. S. Schiller, Humanism, p. 99.

as being an incomplete, confused form of true ideas, as Spinoza does,[1] still offers no explanation on how such "confusion" occurs, or what characterizes the "confusion." In other words, it still fails to account for the nature of the kind of knowledge an individual human may obtain. Whatever other standards such a system may meet, it does not help man distinguish truth in his own limited experience.

Examining some form of realistic truth theory, the analysis becomes considerably more involved. For one thing, one cannot lightly dismiss the apparent reality of the external world as reported by human senses. Not only would an outright dismissal apparently violate the very definition of experience (the "undergoing" part of the experiential process appears to demand a recognition of the external world), but many types of human conduct seem to yield most satisfactory consequences when the reality of objective environment is assumed. It is, therefore, not surprising that many pragmatists, notably James, but also Dewey, found it necessary to adopt some realistic components in the most fundamental propositions of their truth theories. Notwithstanding the obvious merits of realistic epistemology, there seems to be some question about its ability to function successfully in all settings. James' own formulation offers as good an illustration as can be found, since the author was anything but hostile to pragmatism, yet was so bound by realistic conceptions in his metaphysics and epistemology as to jeopardize the consistency of his philosophical position as a whole.

In the opening chapter of his Meaning of Truth, James delves directly into the problem of cognition as it occurs in man's experience. He

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[1] Benedict de Spinoza, op. cit., pp. 105-110.

presents cognition as an act of consciousness[1] and identifies its minimal

content as feeling.[2] These two points are significant since, taken joint-

ly, they firmly anchor the original, minimal aspects of cognition in the

knower rather than the known. As far as these two basic considerations

are concerned, there is nothing in James' theory that could not be

developed along idealistic or even solipsistic lines.

In subsequent differentiation of cognitive feelings from those that

are not, James then takes an approach which rules out solipsism and, to

all practical purposes, idealism as well. Starting from an illustration

(the experiencing of fragrance), then abstracting for greater detachment

and more convenient generalization, he introduces the concept of resem-

blance as the distinctive quality which a feeling must possess in order

to be classed as cognitive:

> . . . all qualities of feeling [are cognitive] so long as
> there is anything outside of them which they resemble. . . .

> The point of the vindication of the cognitive function of
> the . . . feeling lies . . . in the discovery that a q[quality]
> does exist elsewhere than in it. In case this discovery were
> not made, we could not be sure the feeling was cognitive; and in
> case there were nothing outside to be discovered, we should have
> to call the feeling a dream.[3]

The criterion of cognition is explicitly placed in the resemblance

between the quality of a feeling and the quality which exists somewhere

outside the consciousness of the knower. Truth, therefore, would be a

matter of positive resemblance, falseness negative resemblance, and dream

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[1] William James, The Meaning of Truth, p. 1.

[2] Ibid., p. 2.

[3] Ibid., pp. 15-16.

(or illusion) a form of negative resemblance, resulting from an inability to find anything in external reality to which the quality of feeling could be related. Should the feeling "resemble without operating, it is a dream; if it operates without resembling, it is an error."[1]

This concept of resemblance fails to stand up under close scrutiny-- and once it has been destroyed the central part of James' realistic epistemology has been brought into doubt. Let it be assumed, for the moment, that some external quality which a feeling may resemble does indeed exist (and James himself said he must treat this as an assumption and speaks of it in terms of faith[2]), experientially its qualities can only be known, as James has just demonstrated, through the feelings of the knower. The implication of this is a theory wherein cognition becomes a function of human consciousness, validated by a resemblance to some external quality, which quality, however, even if its existence is postulated, can be verified only by further recourse to human feeling. Depending on the particular standpoint from which such an argument is viewed, it must either be classed as circular, or as infinitely regressive, in spite of an axiomatic acceptance of external reality. Without such an axiom, for which the sole warrant is faith, even the circular argument breaks down. It seems, therefore, that a realistic epistemology along lines of a correspondence theory (which is the import of the concept of resemblance) involves, even with a gratuitous assumption, circularity of reasoning. This should certainly make it logically questionable.

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[1] Ibid., p. 28.

[2] Ibid., p. 7.

Is, however, the logical problem sufficient to reject this theory in its entirety, particularly in view of the fact that on many levels of application it yields desirable consequences? Does the logical problem suffice to rule it out in terms of the pragmatic maxim which has been employed as a criterion of judgment? There appears to be a way out through Schiller's formulation of the maxim. His inclusion of the phrase "so far" provides the solution.

So far as a realistic approach to the knowing process yields operationally "good" consequences, i.e. to the extent that it makes possible behavior which promotes human purposes, its findings must be classed as true. But, again in terms of the maxim, so far as the truth theory thwarts, impedes, human purposes, the consequences (by definition) are "bad," hence to that extent the theory must be judged false. There can be little argument but that realistic truth theory yields eminently workable results in certain situations: a man tries to walk straight ahead, finds his progress impeded by an obstacle which his senses report to be solid, his resultant feeling interprets the sensations as a wall, and subsequent feelings sustain this interpretation. As a result, he classes his feeling as truly cognitive (positive resemblance to a quality existing outside the consciousness), goes around or over the wall and fulfills the purposes which prompted his actions. On this level of experience, a realistic epistemology, based on a theory of correspondence, yields desirable consequences and is, therefore, true.

On a different level, however, the situation is reversed. Should one wish to find a principle of cognition broad enough to satisfy requirements of a systematic nature, i.e. result in a system of thought

which **as a whole** leads to desirable consequences, the total situation is substantially changed. The circularity of reasoning involved in a correspondence theory introduces a condition which makes the philosophical system unreliable. This unreliability stems from the following considerations: If in so fundamental a part of a philosophy as its epistemology circularity can be permited to exist, then certainly such reasoning cannot be excluded categorically from any other phase of the system. It would have to be entertained, at least as a possible mode of reasoning, in metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. But once this is granted, there is literally no stopping, since with circular reasoning (as from inconsistent premises) any conclusion can be derived and no conclusion is logically in a preferable position. This can only lead to complete frustration of all attempts to evolve a system of ideas, constructs, or conceptions which could be used for the purpose of guiding decisions. Since, however, the evolving of such ideas, constructs, and conceptions is the basic purpose of philosophic inquiry, the foiling of intent, by the pragmatic maxim, must render the decision "bad," hence the belief leading to this decision (viz. that circularity of thought is acceptable in a systematic truth theory) must be judged false. This judgment, in turn, poses the apparent dilemma of a truth theory which itself is true in one field of human endeavor, but false in a different field.

Paradoxical situations of this nature have been common in situations where conceptions had to meet the challenge of new conditions. Newtonian physics and Euclidian geometry involved man in the same sort of paradox when their laws were extended to the macrocosmos and the microcosmos. The straight line as the shortest distance between two points became meaningless when applied on a global scale, though it

worked well in the confines of a man's farm. The distinction between matter and energy had to be maintained when calculating a family's need for winter fuel, yet that same distinction yielded unworkable results in nuclear and astronomical physics. Speaking in terms of function, what is true in one context may well be false in another. Since, furthermore, functioning still remains the criterion of judgment for truth (so long as the pragmatic maxim is being employed), such changes in truth and falsity must continue to be expected.

In the physical sciences this difficulty was overcome when a more embracing theory, the theory of relativity, was introduced. Should it be possible to evolve an epistemology in which the truth or falseness of a belief need not remain constant but could be relative to its realm of application, then the apparent dilemma could be broken. Furthermore, should it be possible to organize this epistemological position in such a way as to guarantee not only the relativity of truth, but also show how one truth theory (sense realism, where applicable) can be subsumed under the broader approach, then the parallel to recent developments in scientific thought would be complete.

In deriving a truth theory of the desired flexibility, certain requirements must be listed as essentials to avoid the pitfalls of the more absolute forms of idealism and sense realism. First of all, the theory must provide allowances for the apparent success of realism on numerous levels of existence. There must be some feature within the theory permitting the use of such realism in situations to which it is appropriate. Secondly, the theory must furnish a workable analysis of truth problems in context of a larger philosophic system without producing either inconsistency or circularity. Thirdly, such a theory must account for the

possibility of communicating knowledge--at least to the extent that such communication can be said to exist. Fourthly, it must avoid the postulation of an unknowable, hence refrain from creating an unbridgeable chasm between such an unknowable and the realm of human knowledge. Fifthly, so long as the pragmatic maxim is used to test truth _theories_, provision must be made in the theory for the testing of specific truth _claims_ in a consequential manner. Sixth and finally, opportunity must be provided by the theory to carry the pragmatic testing of claims through all levels of applicability, thus avoiding a chain of infinite regression. These six requirements constitute a necessary minimum of criteria a truth theory must fulfill if it is to avoid frustration of human attempts at comprehension. Such frustration being the proposed criterion of "bad" consequences, no theory of truth may be deemed acceptable in the present context unless it avoids this outcome.

A truth theory meeting the requirements outlined above must start from the recognition that truth is not an attribute of "facts," but rather a characteristic of beliefs. This much has been pointed out before. The requirement of testing in terms of consequences further implies that the beliefs in question must be human (not super-human) beliefs, since only in human experience is there a testing ground for man. Such beliefs are advanced first as mere claims to truth, then as claims which have received some form of validation. The _process_ of validation is what changes a mere claim into a claim whose truth has now gained acceptance. In this transformation a belief "becomes true," made so by the operation of the process itself. This process, then, is both descriptive and causal in its relation to true knowledge; _i.e._ it is this process which is meant when the

term true knowledge is used and it is this process which "makes true" a

given belief. Schiller describes the operation in the following words:

> Let us proceed . . . to consider . . . how, in short,
> truth is made. . . . [We] observe, in the first place,
> that in every science the effective truth or falsity of
> an answer depends on its relevance to the questions raised
> in that science. . . . We observe, secondly, that every sci-
> ence has a definitely circumscribed subject-matter, a defi-
> nite method of treating it, and a definitely articulated
> body of interpretations.[1]

> But inasmuch as every science is concerned with some as-
> pect of our total experience, and no science deals with that
> whole under every aspect, it is clear that sciences arise by
> the limitation of subjects, the selection of standpoints, and
> the specialization of methods. All the operations, however,
> are artificial, and in a sense arbitrary, and none of them can
> be conceived except by the action of a purposing intelligence.
> It follows that the nature of the purpose which is pursued in
> a science will determine the questions we put and their bear-
> ing on the questions we put will determine the standing of
> the answers we attain. If we can take the answers as relevant
> to our questions and conducive to our ends, they will yield
> 'truth'; if we can not, 'falsity.'[2]

> Truth, then, being a valuation, has reference to a purpose.
> What precisely that reference is will depend on the purpose,
> which may extend over the whole range of human interest. . . .
> Society [however] exercises almost as severe a control over
> the intellectual as over the moral excentricities and non-
> conformities of its members; indeed it often so organizes
> itself as to render the recognition of new truth nearly im-
> possible. Whatever, therefore, individuals may recognize
> and value as 'true', the 'truths' which de facto prevail and
> are recognized as objective will only be a selection from
> those we are subjectively tempted to propound.[3]

> The ordinary 'truths' we predicate have but little concern
> with ultimate [i.e. long-range and inclusive] ends and realities.
> They are true (at least pro tem.) if they serve their immedi-
> ate purpose. If any one hereafter chooses to question them he
> is at liberty to do so, and if he can make out his case, to

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[1] F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism, pp. 150-151.

[2] Ibid., pp. 151-152.

[3] Ibid., pp. 152-153.

reject them for their inadequacy for his ulterior purposes. But even when the venue and context of the question have thus been changed, and so its meaning, the truth of the original answer is not thereby abolished. It may have been degraded and reduced to a methodological status, but this is merely to affirm that what is true and serviceable for one purpose is not necessarily so for another.[1]

> If therefore we realize that we are concerned with human 'truth' alone, and that truth is ambiguous, there is no paradox in affirmatively answering [the] . . . question . . . as to whether 'the truth of a newly discovered theorem is created . . . by the fact of its discovery.' . . . If . . . we grant . . . that the Pythagorean, Ptolemaic and Copernican systems represent stages in the progress of a successful calculation of certain celestial motions, it is clear that each of them was valued as 'true' while it seemed adequate, and re-valued as 'false' when it was improved on. . . . So the whole distinction remains within the human evaluation of truth, and affords no occasion for attributing to 'truth' any real independence of our procedure; it is a mere error of abstraction to think that because 'truth' may be judged 'independent' after human manipulation, it is so per se, irrespective of the procedure to which it owes its 'independent' existence.[2]

The truth theory proposed in the foregoing quotations is, as yet, merely another hypothesis claiming acceptance. Before it can be granted any warrant beyond that of a mere claim it will have to withstand examination in terms of the six points listed as minimum requirements for an epistemological position deemed acceptable in terms of the pragmatic maxim.

The first point (allowing for the apparent success of sense realism in certain lines of endeavor) is met in the following way. By emphasizing that truth and falsity depend on the particular purposes for which a belief is to be used and by emphatically declaring that these purposes must determine both the questions and the relevancy of the answers, Schiller

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[1] Ibid., p. 156.

[2] Ibid., p. 157.

stresses the need for tailoring truth expectations and truth claims to
their intended sphere of action. To the extent that a given truth claim
must operate in the context of direct sense impressions, it must afford
a basis for action in that area of human endeavor. By emphasizing
further that the applicability of truth claims may in no way be con-
sidered transcendent of their intended sphere of operation, he guards
against the eventuality of having to reject a realistic orientation in
its proper place simply because of the inadequacy of such orientation
in some other conceptual field.

This restriction of truth claims to their projected areas of opera-
tion (i.e. the relativization of truth claims) also helps meet the re-
quirement for the avoidance of circularity. In making this restriction,
Schiller establishes the legitimacy of the claims of logic (including the
demand for an avoidance of petitio principii) in the field of philosophic
inquiry. Since in such inquiry circularity of reasoning frustrates the
intended purposes, no further justification is needed to demand that in
a philosophic system truth theories avoid circularity. His own theory,
furthermore, meets this demand, since the introduction of different
levels of truth functionings is not postulated axiomatically, but ad-
vanced hypothetically on empirical grounds. As a working hypothesis,
it is subject to the verification process and is not claimed as proven
except to the extent as it is operationally useful. By leaving this mat-
ter (the relativism of his epistemology) in hypothetical form, Schiller
leaves it subject to proof, hence does not treat it as an assumption.
Since, finally, the point to be proven is, by definition, assumed in a
circular fallacy, Schiller's relativism is free from this logical flaw.

An explanation of the sharing of truth experiences (the third requirement of an epistemology) is integrated so closely in Schiller's truth theory that it easily escapes detection as a treatment of the communication problem. He emphasizes that objective truth, i.e. truth held in common by several people, is a matter of selection from a larger body of truth with only individual, subjective validity. In doing so he explicitly acknowledges that not all truth is shared. Only those truths are shared which at a given time happen to satisfy the value requirements of more than one individual. Since general sharing has not been made a necessary criterion of truth, it becomes possible to account for the existence of purely individual truths--which are incommunicable at that moment--and also for the presence of general truths--communicable because they are of use to more than one individual. C. I. Lewis elaborates this point by showing the mechanism involved in this process:

> My concepts [including truth concepts] are from the outside view which you have, revealed as modes of behavior, including speech. . . . It is necessary that we should act alike. . . if we are to have a possible basis for understanding one another.[1]

Truths are shared as, and only as, they satisfy needs, offer values for more than one person, with the revelation of this sharing being reflected by substantially identical actions on the part of the persons concerned. Speech, being a form of action is, of course, a most frequent means of revealing the achievement of communication, but speech is not communication of truth concepts. Common value attachment constitutes actual communication.

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[1] Charles Irving Lewis, op. cit., p. 102.

Schiller postulates no unknowable of any kind, hence the question raised by the fourth requirement (the problem of accounting for the connection between knowable and unknowable) is met by showing the inapplicability of the question. The fifth requirement (amenity to pragmatic testing of truth claims advanced) is clearly observed. Testing by the pragmatic method has been declared the basic process by which truth claims are validated in Schiller's epistemology, so that any particular formulation of details is of necessity advanced hypothetically. Such claims are never granted any warrant beyond mere claim status until subjected to consequential verification. This hypothetical approach, with truth claims granted only as much recognition as results from their consequences, guarantees a flexibility of approach concordant with the pragmatic requirement.

The final point (avoidance of infinite regression) is met by analyzing each situation as it arises and treating it as a unique problem situation. Schiller's illustration regarding the development of astronomical theories is a case in point. Idealism would trace the increasingly refined theories to an ascent along the path of truth leading to some pre-existing, unchanging, ideational reality existing, perhaps, in a universal mind. Regress would stop only when the human mind comprehended the entirety of reality. The nature of such reality, however, precludes encompassing by human minds, hence both an infinitely closer approximation (infinite regress) and an ultimately unbridgeable chasm (unknowable) remain. Somewhat similarly, absolutistic forms of realism involve the regress of infinite approximations plus the eventual separation of knower and object--with the latter becoming unknowable to man. By relating the

truth claim only to the specific situation in which the inquiry arises, Schiller's theory precludes regression. Each truth claim is grounded in the specific situation and in it alone. The earlier "truth" is merely another factor in the present gestalt of the conceptual field. Thus not only is there no regression, but a specific function is assigned to superceded truth. This function, furthermore, is active, productive of growth, by making older truth, even if negatively, a producing agent of the new. In this process older truths function in two significant ways. First, the very inadequacy of existing beliefs (truths) is of significance in the dynamics of the situation. Were it not that existing ideas prove inadequate in coping with the present field, the individual would find himself in no need situation, hence would lack the psychological force for restructuring the field through the creation of new truths. Second, the constellation of old truths is of decisive importance in determining what new ideas the individual will class as true. The preference will be for those which least disturb existing beliefs, which, therefore, require the least radical restructuring of the field. This is essentially the same point made by James (in somewhat different language) when he stated that the individual, in developing new ideas,

> . . . tries to change first this opinion, and then that. . .
> until at last some new idea comes up [i.e. is created] which
> he can graft on the ancient stock with a minimum disturbance
> of the latter, some idea that mediates between the stock and
> the new experience and runs them into one another most
> felicitously and expediently.

This new idea is then adopted as the true one.[1]

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[1]William James, Pragmatism, p. 60.

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Further clarification of this epistemological position may be obtained through an examination of its relation to Dewey's analysis of the pattern of inquiry. Close harmony, but different emphases, emerge from such a comparison.

Dewey defines inquiry as

> . . . the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.[1]

In this process the movement is from an indeterminate situation preceding inquiry to a determinate one as a result of inquiry. Origin of inquiry, therefore, lies in a situation which is "uncertain, unsettled, disturbed."[2] The next step is constituted by the recognition of the problematic nature of the situation. "To see that a situation requires inquiry is the initial step in inquiry."[3] This, in turn, is followed by an ascertainment of the components of the situation by means of "observation."[4] This is followed by the suggestion of a "possible relevant solution"[5] which "presents itself as an idea."[6]

> An idea is first of all an anticipation of something that may happen; it marks a possibility. . . . Because inquiry is a progressive determination of a problem and its

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[1]John Dewey, _Logic   The Theory of Inquiry_ (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938), p. 105.

[2]_Loc. cit._

[3]_Ibid._, p. 107.

[4]_Ibid._, p. 109.

[5]_Loc. cit._

[6]_Loc. cit._

possible solution, ideas differ in grade according to the stage of inquiry reached. . . . Every idea originates as a suggestion, but not every suggestion is an idea. The suggestion becomes an idea when it is examined with its reference to its functional fitness; its capacity as a means of resolving the given situation.[1]

This process, operating with symbols (constituting propositions) is reasoning in the sense of ratiocination or rational discourse.[2]

Ideas are operational in that they instigate and direct further operations of observation. . . . [Facts] are selected and described . . . for a purpose, namely the statement of the problem involved, in such a way that its material both indicates a meaning relevant to resolution of the difficulty and serves to test its worth and validity.[3]

These brief excerpts indicate that the purposive character of knowing and the active part of the knower, stressed by Schiller, are central also to Dewey's description of the process of inquiry. The truth of a proposition, furthermore, is tied in both descriptions to the idea's action in resolving a situation, i.e. meeting a human purpose. The nature of the process involves, in both instances, a manipulation, rather than a passive acceptance, of the given, so that the resultant truth or falsity of that which is known depends on the knower. The precise nature of this "given" is not properly the subject of an epistemological discourse, but a matter for subsequent metaphysical and ontological discussion, but Dewey's frequent use of such terms as "facts," "observations," and the stress he places on the environmental aspects of the situation, shows him to be rather sympathetic to a position of empirical realism. Though

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[1] Ibid., pp. 109-110.

[2] Ibid., p. 111.

[3] Ibid., pp. 112-113.

Schiller appears to lean less plainly in that direction, a distinct realistic undertone remains in his system of thought.

These considerations have been raised at this time to emphasize that the subsequent employment of Schiller's epistemology and Dewey's theory of inquiry will occur in a context at variance with the one proposed by these authors. Specifically, it is necessary to emphasize that the connotation of realistic metaphysics suggested by the terms "fact" and "given" is not an inescapable concomitant of this theory of knowledge.

CHAPTER III

REALITY AND EXISTENCE

In attempting to gain an understanding of the nature of reality,
and with it of the "given" involved in the knowing process, there is
great temptation to turn to some form of realism for an explanation. As
has been shown earlier, even such a pragmatist as James embraces realism
when confronted with this issue. Dewey and Schiller, though perhaps less
absolutely, show strong leanings in this direction. Yet it was Dewey
who stated that nature "is an environment only as it is involved in an
interaction with an organism, or self, or whatever name be used."[1] And
it was Schiller who wrote: "It must be admitted that without a process
of selection by us, there are no real facts for us."[2] It is the purpose
of this chapter to carry the implications of these two remarks to their
ultimate conclusion. Such a development, however, must be treated with
great caution if the relativists' old pitfall (i.e. that the statement
"all things are relative" is in itself an absolute statement) is to be
avoided. Perhaps the constant caveat of this section ought to be Schil-
ler's own statement from the preface of the 1910 edition of Riddles of
the Sphinx: "As for metaphysics, I now wholly disbelieve in the possi-
bility of framing a system that can . . . lay claim to absolute truth
and certainty."[3] Thus, the subsequent metaphysical position is most

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[1]John Dewey, Logic the Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1938), p. 106.

[2]F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism (second edition; London:
Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1912), p. 188.

[3]F. C. S. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx A Study in the Philo-
sophy of Humanism (third edition; London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co. Ltd.,
1910), p. vii.

emphatically <u>not</u> presented as absolute truth, but as an hypothesis supported by evidence evaluated in terms of the pragmatic test. Being hypothetical it is subject to revision by changed circumstances; being measured by the pragmatic maxim it appeals for verification only to operational efficacy. In conformity to the truth theory on which it relies, its claim to truth is maintained only so long as and to the extent that it promotes human purposes.

The "given" referred to in the preceding chapter, the first, raw component in the knowing process, ought to lead an analyst to the very core of the problem posed by the nature of reality. Unless an investigation be conducted in terms of some superhuman, possibly divine, being, it must be emphasized that the nature of reality under consideration is the nature of such reality as enters man's experience. At least at its earliest phase of appearance, in the first moment of consciousness, prior to examination, comparison, evaluation, "<u>all</u> immediate experience is real."[1] As far as the unexamined event is concerned, the whole question of appearance and reality is previous. Distinctions are meaningless, since the very process of distinguishing takes the experience beyond the step here discussed.

> In a wider sense everything is 'fact' <u>qua</u> experienced, including imaginings, illusions, errors, hallucinations. 'Fact' in this sense is anterior to the distinction of 'appearance' and 'reality' and covers both.[2]

In one sense it is hard to overestimate the significance of this initial phase of experience. "For it is the starting-point, and final

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[1]F. C. S. Schiller, <u>Humanism</u> (London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1903), p. 192.

[2]F. C. S. Schiller, <u>Studies in Humanism</u>, pp. 186-187.

touchstone, of all our theories about reality, which have for their aim its transformation."[1] Being, or seeming to be, primary in the development of experience, it might well be considered the fertile source from which human experience develops the more complex conceptions of reality. Yet, as Dewey pointed out in the passages relating to inquiry, as Schiller and James demonstrated in their epistemologies, this primary fact "as immediately experienced is a meaningless chaos, merely the raw material of a cosmos, the stuff out of which real fact is made."[2] The fundamental distinction between the real and the illusory, between "'appearance and reality' is not one which transcends our experience, but one which arises in it."[3] This drawing of the basic distinction proves itself to be a distinctly human function. Even if the "given" were entirely outside of man, the recognition of this "given," the classing of components into "given" and "made," is not.

With this fact established, the development of reality beyond its primary stage merely continues as a function of human activity:

> If . . . immediate experience would suffice; it would be
> the sole and complete reality. Appearances would be the
> reality and reality would truly appear. In heaven, no doubt,
> such would be the case. But . . . our experience is woe-
> fully discordant and inadequate. In other words, our experi-
> ence is not that of a perfect world. We are neither disposed,
> therefore, nor able to accept it as it appears to be. Its
> surface-value will not enable us to meet our obligations: we
> are compelled therefore to discount our immediate experience,
> to treat it as an appearance of something ulterior which will
> supplement its deficiency. We move on, therefore, from our

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[1] Ibid., p. 187.

[2] Loc. cit.

[3] F. C. S. Schiller, Humanism, p. 192.

starting-point, taking our immediate experience as the symbol
which transmits to us the glad tidings of a higher reality,
whereof it partly manifests its nature.

The 'realities' of ordinary life and science are all of
this secondary order: they rest upon inferences from our
immediate experience which have been found to work. And the
process of reaching them is everywhere the same: we ex-
periment with notions which are suggested to our intelligence
by our immediate experience, until we hit upon one which
seems to be serviceable for some purpose which engrosses us.
And then we declare real the conception which serves our
purpose. . . .[1]

If Schiller's analysis of this process is accurate, then the pur-

posing human is as much the cause of reality--as yet excluding primary

reality--as he was of truth. If the conversion of primary reality is in-

deed in terms of human needs and desires, then, on this level, man is not

the discoverer but the maker of reality. To seek, therefore, this type

of reality without reference to human needs becomes meaningless. The ra-

tionalists' goal, a reality divorced from human purposing, would seem an

impossibility.

The common notion, therefore, that 'fact' is something
independent of our recognition, needs radical revision in
the only sense of 'fact' which is worth disputing. It must
be admitted that without a process of selection by us, there
are no real facts for us, and that this selecting is im-
mensely arbitrary.[2]

This, however, does not yet account for the nature of the primary

experience, the "given" from which the selective process is to take its

start. Such an interpretation, in fact, presents a seemingly insurmount-

able obstacle. If primary reality is external to man, but reality on the

level just discussed is made by man, then the fundamentally different--nay,

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[1]Ibid., p. 193.

[2]F. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 188.

contradictory--nature of the two creates a schism as deep as the one

between the "unknowable" and the "knowable" in certain epistemologies.

The schism is not only equally deep, it is also of the same basic

character. A stubbornly separate species of reality, the "objective

fact," remains terra incognita to man and forms the "unknowable." It

is for this reason that Schiller's theories fall short in the analysis

of reality. It would seem that his cavalier statement accepting such ex-

ternal reality and his subsequent dismissal of the problem is something

less than adequate in the formulation of a philosophic system.

Referring to the "given" Schiller wrote: "It may, certainly, in

a sense be called 'independent' of us, if that comforts any one. For it

is not 'made' by us, but 'found.'"[1] But how it is found, why it is

found, and, if found, how it is known, he does not explain. The reason

for this dismissal is not hard to understand. Schiller devoted most of

a book[2] to the exposition of the difficulties encountered by philosophic

analyses which separate reality into knowable and unknowable classes. In

that work he carefully traced the successive steps leading from agnosti-

cism, to scepticism, to pessimism and eventually declared that one should

regard "a reduction to pessimism as a sort of provisional reductio ad

absurdum, and consider ourselves justified in rejecting any doctrine

which ultimately leads to pessimism."[3] Such a rejection is based on

pessimism's complete negation of human life and purpose in which "Chaos

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[1]Ibid., p. 187.

[2]F. C. S. Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx.

[3]Ibid., p. 130.

once more swallows up the Cosmos."[1] With such convictions Schiller
could not very well elaborate the one aspect of his own position which
would start the chain of reasoning toward an outcome he so earnestly
sought to avoid.

Using Schiller's own truth theory as a guide and applying it to
the metaphysical problem under consideration, it becomes possible to re-
ject the independence of the "given." Such a rejection follows from the
definition of truth in terms of its value to a specific endeavor. If in-
deed "good" means "furthering a purpose" and "bad" the frustration of
same, if, furthermore, truth is a species of good and falsity a species
of evil, then any particular phase of a theory which frustrates the pur-
pose of the enterprise as a whole must be classed false (cf. Chapter II).
In this instance the goal of the total enterprise is the development of
a theory of reality which as a whole contributes to the understanding of
life and government of conduct, hence any part which frustrates that pur-
pose (by opening the way for a reduction to pessimism) must be judged
false. Thus the independence of primary reality and the resultant schism
between different levels of reality must be rejected. Positively, it
must be affirmed that reality is essentially a unity which, for the sake
of analytical convenience, may be divided up in the process of verbaliza-
tion and description, but which constitutes a single whole in actual ex-
perience--the nature of this whole being determined by the active func-
tioning of the human organism.

This concept is in itself nothing new. David Hume found it neces-

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[1]Ibid., p. 14.

sary to come to terms with the same problem and arrive at similar con-

clusions. It was he who said

> . . . our reason neither does, nor is it possible it ever
> should, upon any supposition, give us any assurance of
> the continu'd existence of body. That opinion must be
> entirely owing to the IMAGINATION. . . .[1]

In these words the first step of an independent existence, i.e. the

independent existence of man's own body, is treated as a function of man's

consciousness. It is not too much to say that this statement already con-

tains the essence of a position which finds the source of all reality in

the experiencing human. But Hume goes further in offering support to

such an interpretation.

In investigating causal relations, he finds insurmountable logical

difficulties when trying to connect independent objects with man's com-

prehension of them. The essential part of his argument is contained in

the following:

> The only conclusion we can draw from a thing to . . .
> another, is by means of the relation of cause and effect,
> which shews, that there is a connexion betwixt them, and
> that the existence of one is dependent on that of the other.
> The idea of this relation is deriv'd from past experience,
> by which we find, that two beings are constantly conjoined
> together, and are always present at once to the mind. But
> as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions;
> it follows that we may observe a conjunction or a relation
> of cause and effect between different perceptions, but
> never observe it between perceptions and objects. 'Tis
> impossible, therefore, that from the existence or any of
> the qualities of the former, we can ever form any conclu-
> sions concerning the existence of the latter. . . .[2]

Once again, therefore, the gulf between an independent object and man's

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[1] David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (T. H. Green and T. H.
Grose editors, London: Longman's Green and Co., 1874), p. 483.

[2] Ibid., pp. 499-500.

knowledge thereof is presented as unbridgeable. This whole problem
disappears once the need of accounting for independent objects is re-
moved. If perceptions are the farthest point outward to which inquiry
is to be pursued, no such systematic difficulties occur. For this reason
it appeared necessary to reject a conception of reality in which any
component remained entirely external to man.

Such a rejection, however, poses difficulties to replace those it
has solved. By rejecting the independence of elementary reality, the
successful functioning of common sense realism on many levels of experi-
ence becomes as grave a problem in metaphysics as it had been in episte-
mology. Thus, theories rejecting the independent element of reality seem
to be trading one frustration of purpose for another. No matter how in-
tricate the analysis of the subjective element becomes after the existence
of external stimulation has been granted, there remains that first com-
ponent of experience, be it called the "given," "primary reality," or
"stimulus," which apparently defies any attempted explanation in terms of
subjective functioning of the human organism.

A solution to this problem may be found in a more penetrating ex-
amination of the way in which the "given" enters into the knowing process.
As mentioned before, both Dewey and Schiller deny the possibility of the
given occurring in total isolation. It appears (to man) only as a com-
ponent part of the knowing experience, hence only as a contributing part
in a gestalt, the other components of which have been contributed by the
knower's activity. Divorced from these components, taken out of the
total field, the "given" does not exist so far as man's experience is
concerned. On this basis alone it might be possible to deny it

existential status. This, however, still fails to explain why this component comes into existence as the "given" precisely at the moment when it enters into conjunction with the man-made features of reality. Such an analysis would seem to demand the granting of another "unknowable" among the components of reality.

There appears to be, however, an approach which offers a solution to the elimination of this persistent residue. Research in the field of human psychology has pushed deeper and deeper the levels on which the perceiver is seen to function actively in the process of perception. Much of what had been considered purely "given" is now no longer assigned to the external world. The concept of the "life space," for example, (as used by Lewin[1]) involves more significant man-made components in human experience than did such older theories as associationism. Similarly, the various psycho-analytical schools show numerous internal (i.e. subjective) forces in operation where hitherto external influences were postulated. Thus man appears to be more involved in the making of his world than had been believed possible even in relatively recent psychological studies. If this trend is indeed a fruitful one, it may be questioned whether the "given" (as now seen) is really external and unknowable, or whether it is a further, as yet unknown, human component. Should the latter be the case, the systematic difficulties would disappear. An "unknown" does not raise any of the difficulties resulting from an "unknowable." On the contrary, there is ample evidence in legend, myth, religion, philosophy, and science that a customary reaction to any facet of

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[1] Kurt Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality (Donald K. Adams and Karl E. Zener, translators, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1935), p. 12.

experience not yet understood is its attribution to some realm outside

of human control and segregated from all that man can possibly comprehend.

To the primitive, thunder and lightning were supernatural and "unknowable"

in their essence; to the 19th century realist they were manifestations

of external physical reality; today there is reason to suppose that the

phenomena designated by the concepts "thunder" and "lightning" are, to

a large extent at least, constructed by the action of the perceiver.

What has not yet been explained is, perhaps from psychological necessity,

lumped under the heading of primary reality--in this case visual and/or

aural stimuli. The exact limits of those elements which might be placed

in the class of stimuli is considerably narrower when interpreted by

Lewinian theories than by directly mechanistic approaches. It is, there-

fore, questionable how adequately the term "stimulus" designates something

fixed, specific, and unchanging. But if even a stimulus is something

subject to change in terms of human interpretations and the changing

states of human knowledge, then where lies the fixity of external reality?

Where is there any existence so independent of human experience to be ac-

cepted as the "given"?

These considerations strongly suggest the conclusion that the

"given" is no more than a designator for that residue in experience which

is not known or, at any rate, not yet known, i.e. is not the description

of some independent existence, permanently, unknowably, outside the ex-

periencing human. As such, it is reduced to an operational concept to

which man resorts whenever a phase of his experience is, at that time and

in that cultural setting, beyond his comprehension. In so far as such a

concept helps him achieve his goals, it is (pragmatically speaking) true.

Thus he can act upon it. But beyond this, there appears to be no compelling reason forcing the acceptance of the "given" as being possessed of reality. This, in turn, makes it unnecessary to postulate for the "given" any special status outside of human experience. Operationally speaking, the conception of some element of external reality serves to harmonize the interpretation of human experience when, in a particular state of knowledge, man's insight has reached its limits. This independent element is pushed back each time the understanding of a total process progresses a step. Since in no field of endeavor can man lay claim to complete understanding, there remains in each experience some persistent residue which he labels external, hence "given."

The warranted assertion underlying this whole chain of reasoning is simply the belief that man has analytically not yet penetrated to their fullest _any_ of his experiences. He may well have reached an intensive comprehension of some component part of an experience, but once that experience appears in context, the connections to other experiences which give it reality involve so much that even the most trivial incident in human life escapes comprehension in its totality. Until and unless such complete knowledge becomes humanly possible, some form of the "given" will play a tremendous and legitimate part in human consciousness and will have reality in so far forth.

The issue of communication, as much a problem in a subjective metaphysics as it is in subjective epistemology, actually supports rather than contradicts such an interpretation of reality. To the extent that man governs his actions in terms of his conscious understanding of their nature, communication is relatively reliable. Since man thinks and communicates in terms of symbols, his symbolization is adequate to the

extent to which he has managed to bring a given process to full conscious-
ness. But just as soon as he wishes to communicate with a person not
possessed of the same degree of clarity of symbols, communication becomes
equivocal. To communicate to an Australian bushman Western theories of
nuclear structure is impossible, so long as the bushman has not the re-
quisite preliminary foundations of abstraction and representation. In
turn, these foundations can hardly be established until the person at-
tempting such communication is able to stand on the same level of con-
sciousness as does the bushman. Only when such a meeting has taken place
(and its genuineness remains in doubt until tested by the outcome of the
attempted communication) can the bushman traverse the road which will
bring him to an understanding of the theory. Such a process, by showing
the difficulty and tenuousness of communication, emphasizes the degree to
which subjective factors enter the knowing process. It also shows that
the reality involved in such cognition depends to a great degree on the
subjective functioning of both parties in a communicative situation.
That communication exists is, therefore, hardly a disproof of a subjective
theory of reality. That so much of communication is equivocal and, in
certain areas apparently impossible, lends support to a subjective view
of reality. Perhaps the most striking illustration of the limited degree
to which communication is possible is found in the fundamental inability
of male and female to convey to each other matters fundamentally connected
with sex differences. A specifically male experience appears to be incom-
municable to a female (has no reality for her) and, conversely, a specifi-
cally female experience seems to be beyond the comprehension of the male.
Yet the experience is of uncontestable reality to the one undergoing it.
It would seem that these and other problems of communication actually

tend to prove that reality is subjective to an extent which only gradually is becoming apparent.

It has been emphasized that, in spite of a subjective analysis of reality, some operational concept corresponding to the "given" is, as yet, of utmost importance in the organization of human comprehension. Possibly the most striking illustration of its significance comes from a writer who places himself in categorical opposition to pragmatic truth theory,[1] yet operates in a framework which can only be termed pragmatic:

> It is the purpose of the organic function of thought
> to change and elaborate the perceptual material into those
> ideas, associations of ideas and conceptual constructs
> which, while consistent and coherent among themselves are,
> as the phrase goes . . . 'clothed in objectivity.'[2]
>
> Since, however, we do not know the objective reality . . .
> but only infer it . . . we must . . . say that thought
> has fulfilled its purpose when it has elaborated the given
> sensation-complexes into valid concepts . . . and has pro-
> duced such a world that the objective happenings can be
> calculated and our behavior successfully carried out. . . .[3]

Though it had been found necessary to deny the reality of the independent "given," its usefulness, hence existence as an instrumentality of thought, had to be granted. A non-pragmatist like Vaihinger describes the process in the following way:

> . . . many thought-processes and thought-constructs ap-
> pear to be consciously false assumptions, which . . .
> are intentionally . . . formed in order to overcome dif-
> ficulties of thought by this artificial deviation and

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[1]Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of "As If" A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind (C. K. Ogden, translator, second edition; New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1935), p. viii.

[2]Ibid., p. 3.

[3]Loc. cit.

reach the goal of thought by roundabout ways and bypaths.[1]

> The 'As if' world, which is formed in this manner . . .
> is just as important as the world of the so-called real or
> actual (in the ordinary sense of the word); indeed it is
> far more important for ethics and aesthetics.[2]

Vaihinger's position amounts to an endorsement of the systematic
use of concepts for which there exists need in human conduct, but which
are questionable as to their theoretical acceptability. In pragmatic
terms, this constitutes an endorsement of concepts which are true in
certain contexts even though their truth changes to falsity with a change
in context. The "given" illustrates exactly this type of concept.

This limited use of an independent reality does not impose the
restrictions of an absolutely independent "given." Above all, it leaves
open the possibilities of experiential change to an extent which would be
incompatible with the notion of a permanently fixed component of reality.
Thus the "given" is classed with all other working concepts and denied
any higher ontological status. In this way the requirements of the prag-
matic maxim are fully satisfied and the cogency of the Protagorean dictum
is once again demonstrated.

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. xlvi-xlvii.

[2] *Ibid*., p. xlvii.

CHAPTER IV

VALUE AND MORALITY

A value theory can show internal consistency only if it takes

into account pertinent conceptions of knowledge and reality. Analysis

of the valuation process can not be regarded as satisfactory unless it

harmonizes with a philosophy's epistemological and metaphysical commit-

ments. Unless inconsistency be accepted as a legitimate feature of sys-

tematic thought (a procedure which has nothing to recommend it), some

points have already been established which a related value theory must

take into account. Experience, human comprehension and participation,

rejection of absolutes have characterized the metaphysical and episte-

mological views that have been developed. These considerations are indi-

cative of the direction a value theory must take if a consistent system

of thought is to be attained.

From such considerations it becomes apparent that the most profit-

able approach to the development of a value theory begins with an investi-

gation of those situations in which value judgments take place. Dynami-

cally speaking, motivation for all action (including the valuative one)

springs from some felt need. As Dewey puts it:

> Moral goods and ends exist only when something has to be
> done. The fact that something has to be done proves that
> there are deficiencies, evils in the existent situation. . . .[1]
>
> Because valuations in the sense of prizing and caring for
> occur only when it is necessary to bring something into

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[1] John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: The New
American Library, 1950), p. 136.

existence which is lacking, or to conserve in existence something which is menaced by outside conditions, valuation _involves_ desiring.[1]

When we inquire into the actual emergence of desire and its object and the value-property ascribed to the latter . . . it is plain as anything can be that desires arise only when 'there is something the matter,' when there is some 'trouble' in an existing situation. When analyzed, this 'something the matter' is found to spring from the fact that there is something lacking, wanting, in the existing situation as it stands, an absence which produces conflict in the elements which do exist.[2]

Obstruction of the immediate execution of an impulse converts it into a desire.[3]

These brief quotations introduce a value theory which attributes the origin of the valuative process to the dynamic state of a specific human in a specific situation. Dewey goes so far as to say that "every moral situation is a unique situation having its own irreplaceable good. . . ."[4] Such a position is so thoroughly consistent with the metaphysics and epistemology developed in the preceding pages that a considerable portion, though not all, of Dewey's theory of values has been adopted.

With the location of the starting point, an ethical situation is, however, far from completely defined. Funding the moral act in the desires and needs of the individual is no more than a rather vague beginning. It excludes much material, but it fails to clarify that which remains included.

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[1]John Dewey, _Theory of Valuation_ (Otto Neurath, editor-in-chief, _International Encyclopedia of Unified Science_, Vol. II, No. 1. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 15.

[2]_Ibid._, p. 33.

[3]John Dewey, _Experience and Education_ (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 78.

[4]John Dewey, _Reconstruction in Philosophy_, p. 132.

It is indeterminate in its bearing upon the theory of
valuation until the nature of interest and desire has
been analyzed, and until a method has been established
for determining the constituents of desires on their con-
crete particular occurrence.[1]

Desire may be considered the partially developed form of any im-

pulse (rooted most likely in some biological source) motivating an indi-

vidual. It must be noted, however, that

. . . impulses are doubtless sine qua non for the existence
of desires and interests. But the latter include foreseen
consequences along with ideas in the form of measures . . .
required to bring the ends into existence.[2]

Desire, according to this definition, is more than mere impulse. At least

certain elementary, preliminary manipulations of the impulse have already

taken place. This distinction between impulse and desire furnishes the

basis for the eventual exclusion of purely impulsive behavior from the

moral situation. Failure to do so would make every act a moral act and,

in the process, destroy the distinctiveness of the concept, thereby mak-

ing it operationally useless.

The concept of desire describes a dynamic entity in the analysis

of the moral situation. Being dynamic, it is in the nature of a psycho-

logical force and so, of necessity, vectorial in character.[3] Like all

vectors, desire is characterized by intensity and direction and it is this

matter of direction which has produced numerous controversies. Perhaps

the most popular position, that of the hedonists, formulates the direc-

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[1]John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, pp. 17-18.

[2]Ibid., p. 18.

[3]Kurt Lewin, The Conceptual Representation and Measurement of Psy-
chological Forces (Donald K. Adams and Helge Lundholm, editors, Contri-
butions to Psychological Theory, Vol. I, No. 4. Durham, North Carolina:
Duke University Press, 1938), p. 17.

tional element in terms of pleasure and pain. This, however, is likely

to prove a misleading indication, unless the working hypotheses of con-

temporary biological sciences are proven wrong. Because

> . . . instincts and appetites exist not for the sake of
> furnishing pleasure, but as activities needed to maintain
> life--the life of the individual and the species. Their
> adequate fulfillment is attended with pleasure.[1]

> The object of desire is not pleasure, but some object is
> deemed pleasurable because it is the congenial terminus of
> desire.[2]

Thus, the direction of desire as a psychological force is seen to exist

toward some _specific_ act or condition, not toward some generalized state

(pleasure) of which the specific situation is merely one manifestation.

A similar point must be made in relation to happiness--whether or not

happiness is hedonistically equated with pleasure.

> To say that the desire of man is for happiness is only
> to say that happiness comes in the fulfillment of desire,
> the desires arising on their own account as expressions
> of a state of lack or incompletion in which the person
> finds himself.[3]

So far it can only be said that the moral situation originates in

some human impulse which, through frustration, becomes a desire. The

direction of such desire is toward some specific object or condition, the

attainment of which (other factors remaining constant) gives rise to a

feeling of pleasure. In so far as the terms "good" and "bad" are con-

sidered only in an isolated situation as designators of the accomplish-

ment of some end, the satisfaction of desire is invariably and necessarily

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[1] John Dewey and James H. Tufts, _Ethics_ (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1908), p. 270.

[2] _Loc. cit._

[3] John Dewey and James H. Tufts, _Ethics_, p. 272.

"good." In actuality, however, it must be realized that desires and

> . . . interests occur in definite existential contexts
> and not at large in a void, and since these contexts are
> situations within the life-activity of a person or group,
> interests are so linked with one another that the valuation-
> capacity of any one is a function of the set to which it
> belongs.[1]

In this more complex context it becomes apparent that the problem

of moral judgment arises when conflicting interests and desires are

present; when a "good" (the satisfaction of one desire) becomes ques-

tionable in light of a concomitant "bad" (the frustration of a different

desire). Such a conflict necessitates a dynamic concept of a higher

order than desire. It involves a comparison of the outcomes (anticipated

outcomes) of different desires, thereby entailing the formulation of ideas

relative to the consequences of potentially diverse modes of action. As

this process takes place, desire is replaced by something more developed,

more complex which is designated as a purpose.

> A purpose is an end-view. That is, it involves the
> foresight of the consequences which will result from act-
> ing on impulse. Foresight involves the operation of in-
> telligence.[2]

Operation of intelligence in the formulation of purpose and the role of

purpose in organizing conflicting desires makes it possible to arrive at

a further delimitation of the moral situation. The moral situation must

involve an

> . . . activity called forth and directed by ideas of
> values or worth, where the values concerned are so mutu-
> ally incompatible as to require consideration and

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[1] John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 19.

[2] John Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 78.

<u>selection before an overt act is entered upon.</u>[1]

This selection implies an element of choice between conflicting need satisfactions. The choice, furthermore, may be either discretionary with the acting agent or forced by some set of circumstances. In a moral situation the choice "involves a voluntary factor."[2]

A man overpowered by superior force might be physically compelled by some ingenious device to shoot a gun at another, knowing what he is doing, but his act would not be voluntary since he had no choice in the matter. . . .[3]

The element of freedom, it must be noted, is in no way dependent on a voluntaristic philosophical position. Vaihinger shows rather conclusively the logical difficulties of genuine voluntarism, yet demonstrates the necessity of retaining the "fiction" of freedom for the regulation of human conduct.[4] As has been shown earlier (<u>cf.</u> Chapter III), Vaihinger's "fiction" and the pragmatists' "truth in so far forth" are functionally identical, so that his argument on behalf of freedom as a necessary concept in a moral situation is equally cogent in a pragmatic setting. Neither the pragmatist, nor the advocate of the "As If" school need concern himself with the problem of absolute voluntarism. For both, genuine choice, <u>as interpreted by the individual</u>, is a necessity in a moral situation. There is general acceptance that the

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[1]
John Dewey and James H. Tufts, <u>Ethics</u>, p. 209.

[2]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 202.

[3]<u>Loc. cit.</u>

[4]Hans Vaihinger, <u>The Philosophy of "As If" A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind</u> (C. K. Ogden, translator, second edition; New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1935), p. 43.

. . . agent must know what he is doing; he must not be a
somnambulist or an imbecile, or insane, or an infant so
immature as to have no idea of what he is doing. He must
also have some wish, some desire, some preference in the
matter.[1]

The voluntary nature of the moral situation raises the problem of

acts motivated by habit. Many situations are so completely routine as a

result of habituation that no conscious decision seems to occur. The is-

sues involved, on the other hand, may be of such nature as to suggest

strongly the presence of a moral factor. On the basis of habit, a person

might decide matters of conduct purely from the standpoint of their ease

of execution. Regardless of consequences, the habit may be so strong as

to render conscious decisions practically non-existent. Yet similar acts,

or even the selfsame situation viewed in retrospect, may arise subsequently

as subjects for moral judgment. The person, in other words, may reconsider

his acts in a setting where habit does not become dominant.

He then considers them morally, approving or disap-
proving. . . . There is then no fixed line between the
morally indifferent and the morally significant. Every
act is potential subject-matter of moral judgment, for
it strengthens or weakens some habit which influences
whole classes of judgments.[2]

A specific act, when resulting from pure habit, must be classed as amoral

at the time of its occurrence, but its relation to the strengthening or

weakening of that same habit and the nature of the habit itself become

legitimate subjects for moral judgment. In similar fashion, the purely

impulsive act is also devoid of conscious control, hence amoral, but it

also may be subject to moral considerations on subsequent re-examination.

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[1] John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics, p. 202.

[2] Ibid., p. 211.

The difficulty in drawing a line between morally significant and morally neutral situations is compounded by the dual criteria of intent and consequence. Evidently the intent of an act, when consciously perceived, is one aspect of a moral situation--hence the amoral character of habitual and impulsive acts at the moment of their performance. Conversely, the consequence of an act, once such consequence is apparent, determines another aspect of the moral situation--hence the moral quality of a single act in relation to the development of habit. For example, the fact that a person may consciously and reflectively select a course of action leading to his own aggrandizement at the expense of his fellow men is definitely of moral character. His intent--regardless of his success or failure in putting it into practice--makes his decision subject to moral considerations. Another person may adopt a similar point of view on the basis of early habituation; thus the intent element is absent from the situation. The second person's decision--again without regard for any actual physical acts--will strengthen the habit of deciding issues on the basis of self-interest. In a future instance he will be that much more likely to arrive at the same decision in a similar case. Hence judgment must be rendered in terms of the consequences which his habitual act produces in future settings. From a standpoint of morality, the consequences of one action appear to be instrumental in producing the intent of the next analogous case. This linking of present consequences and future intent suggests the inadvisability of rigidly separating the two and declaring one or the other as the absolute determinant of the moral act. The unification within the agent of both intent and consequences, or at least his conscious anticipation of consequences, may be the only way in which a

full evaluation of an act becomes possible. Once again, in ethics as in

epistemology and metaphysics, the nature of the individual (man as the

acting agent) appears to hold the key to an explanation of his conduct.

This is the import of Dewey's statement that the

> . . . first quality which is the object of judgment pri-
> marily resides . . . in intention; in the consequences
> which are foreseen and desired. Ultimately it resides in
> that disposition or characteristics of a person which are
> responsible for his foreseeing and desiring just such con-
> sequences rather than others.[1]

The limitations inherent in habit arise, therefore, from the cir-

cumscribing, the hemming in, of the ability to foresee consequences. Habit

functions somewhat as an unconscious form of "special pleading," as it is

sometimes called, where a person appears to see only a rather small part

of potential consequences. The particular part of the total consequence

field which a person sees (when acting habitually) is the segment most

nearly coinciding with predilections fostered by his habit. Nor is this

a general condemnation of habit in the broadest sense. It is, after all,

conceivable to cultivate a habit directed to a maximal viewing of conse-

quences--though this appears to stretch the meaning of the term "habit"

rather far. Practically speaking, acts of habit tend to reduce the sphere

of anticipated consequences.

Human knowledge being limited, "there is no act so intelligent that

its consequences do not run beyond its foreseen ones, and thus necessitate

a subsequent revision of intention."[2] What is more, the cumulative effect

by which actual consequences outrun anticipated ones mounts so rapidly

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[1]Ibid., p. 261.

[2]Loc. cit.

(due to the variety of interactions created by each new situation) that
only a constant process of change and revision promises any narrowing of
the gap between anticipated and actual consequences. Unless, therefore,
each decision includes successively more anticipated consequences, the
net result will be a reduction of the capacity of an agent for moral ac-
tion. In this context, a person who remains unchanged, without growth,
actually retrogresses. Hence the "great need of the moral agent is . . .
a character which will make him as open, as accessible as possible, to
the recognition of the consequences of his behavior."[1]

To summarize the analysis up to this point: It has been shown that
a moral act arises only when an inadequacy in the existing situation gives
rise to a desire; furthermore, such situations become moral only if de-
sires and interests conflict and the decision between different courses
of action is open to choice. The voluntary nature of the moral situation,
in turn, makes it necessary to insist upon the need for maximizing the
individual's insight into future outcomes of his behavior--since only an
increase in the ability to anticipate prevents the decline of voluntary
behavior, with a corresponding increase of habitual responses in determin-
ing decisions. In line with the theory of knowledge to which this ethical
view is related, maximizing of insight depends on the activities of the
individual agent. These activities, in turn, result from the character
of the individual involved. Thus it appears that only a development of
character along expanding lines promises maintenance of or increase in
the proportion of moral acts. What remains to be investigated is the

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[1] Ibid., p. 262.

process by which such an increase takes place and the nature of the individual character which is to be evaluated positively from an ethical standpoint.

The clarification of these problems requires a return to the basic dynamic factors in the moral situation. It has been shown that the satisfaction of some desire, the removal of some difficulty, is the motivating force in ethical experiences. Since the outcome of such action can be termed "happiness," there seems to be no question that happiness "is what men _ought_ to desire."[1] A character, therefore, must be so formed as to keep this goal foremost. Unfortunately not "all anticipations when realized are what they were expected to be."[2] The problem mentioned before-- actual consequences exceeding anticipated ones--frequently results in situations where the expected happiness fails to materialize. "Hence the demand for some standard good or happiness by which the individual may regulate the formation of his desires and purposes. . . ."[3] It is true that our

> . . . present happiness or distaste . . . defines for us
> the value of future consequences. . . . This, however,
> applies to any end as it happens to arise, not to the end
> as we ought to form it: we are still without a standard.[4]

The question remains: What kind of character will assign value to those activities which will result in happiness in retrospect (fulfillment) as well as in anticipation?

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[1] _Ibid._, p. 274.

[2] _Loc. cit._

[3] _Ibid._, p. 274.

[4] _Ibid._, pp. 278-279.

> Can there be found ends of action, desirable in them-
> selves, which reënforce and expand not only the motives
> from which they directly spring, but also other tendencies
> and attitudes which are the source of happiness? Can there
> be found powers whose exercise confirms ends which are
> stable and weakens and removes objects which occasion only
> restless, peevish, or transitory satisfaction, and ul-
> timately thwart and stunt the growth of happiness?[1]

In other words: Is there a way in which character can be so developed as

to distinguish illusory (transitory, short-term) from true (more perma-

nent, long-term) happiness?

The direction of this answer is indicated by the suggestion that

the more lasting forms of happiness (parallel to moral judgments) involve

activities of a constantly broadening nature. It has been stated repeat-

edly that, just to remain in the same relative moral position, a person's

consciousness must embrace an ever-increasing field of anticipated conse-

quences. This condition draws attention to the fact that, as a minimum

distinction between true and illusory good, the former must show this same

expansiveness. "In form, the true good is thus an inclusive or expanding

end."[2] Whatever a morally good character might have to be, it must find

its positive values in some process or processes that are not static but

flexible. Such flexibility, furthermore, must "move outward," be increas-

ingly encompassing, rather than exclusive, contracting in nature. A man's

character, therefore, must be considered "good" when increasing possibili-

ties of interaction are striven for. Interaction, in this sense, involves

interaction among a man's own capacities, sensations, emotions on the one

hand, and interaction with his environment (including the human environment)

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[1] Ibid., p. 284.

[2] Ibid., p. 286.

on the other. Though the environment may be merely one aspect of his own functioning (cf.Chapter III), as yet, man must regard it "as if" it possessed independent reality. What is more, this increased interaction may not be restricted to the unconscious, or else the lack of conscious-ness would once again render the resulting situations amoral. Thus, as a second attribute, "good" moral character involves increased sensiti-vity to possible interactions brought to a level of conscious awareness. But conscious awareness of the implications of an act demands the ability to anticipate and the ability to make comparisons between anticipations.

> This factor of forethought and of preference after comparison for some one of the ends considered, is the factor of intelligence involved in every voluntary act.[1]

> In short, a truly moral (or right) act is one which is intelligent in an emphatic and peculiar sense; it is a reasonable act. It is not merely one which is thought of, and thought of as good, at the moment of action, but one which will continue to be thought of as "good" in the most alert and persistent reflection.[2]

Knowledge of the good, therefore, is not a species of knowledge mystically removed to an inspirational sphere and involving some special "moral faculty," but rather a form of knowledge like any other--hence part of the cognitive process described earlier (cf. Chapter II).

Nevertheless, to avoid circularity, it must be emphasized that, though knowledge of the good is a form of knowledge, the "good" itself is not. On the contrary, knowledge (i.e. true knowledge) is a form of the "good," namely that which is good in the way of belief--the ethical term is the more inclusive of the two. "True" moral knowledge might be

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[1] Ibid., p. 306.

[2] Ibid., p. 307.

described as that which it is good to believe about the "good."

This "true" knowledge about the "good" involves the use of intelligence in its genesis and shows constant expansion as a vital attribute. Based on the concept of needs, such a notion of the "good" stems from and also implies the warranted assertion that maximum growth of a person is the fundamental moral criterion of all acts. It is imperative that this statement be regarded merely as an assertion for which adequate warrant exists. Only at the cost of complete inconsistency can it be made absolute. Once any ethical rule becomes absolute in the present context, knowledge of it conflicts with the epistemology (and its nature with the metaphysics) on which it is based—thereby creating the paradox of an absolute resulting from a system of thought which denies the existence of such absolutes. Of necessity, furthermore, there would come into being a series of fixed ethical rules which would by their very fixity set limits to the expansive attribute of moral character. Thus a second paradox would result. If nothing else, the principle of parsimony would place any such conclusion in grave doubt.

It is precisely this paradox (arising from the introduction of absolutes into a system of thought hostile to them) which makes it necessary to emphasize the dangers inherent in assigning any mode of conduct permanent supremacy in the moral sphere. For this reason it becomes necessary to reject in form, though not in intent, Dewey's claim that

> . . . the true and final happiness of the individual,
> the happiness which is not at the mercy of circumstance
> and change of circumstance, lies not in the objective
> achievement of results, but in a supremacy within char-
> acter of an alert, sincere, and persistent interest in

those habits and institutions which forward common ends
among men.[1]

It must be repeated that this objection relates to form, not to intent.
Had some qualifying remark been appended to the formulation, no such ob-
jection would be indicated. In fact, once qualified to allow for the
possibility of revision, the statement may well be considered the cul-
mination of the theory which has been developed. The reasons for this
position may be summarized in the following.

If maximal expansion of sensitivity, response, interaction--and
maximal consciousness of these processes--appears to be a warranted des-
cription of the "good," then only such orientations as would bring about
these attributes can be classed as morally satisfactory. Furthermore,
maximal response, maximal interaction (and consciousness of both) depends
on a maximum of potential connections being established between the recep-
tive and active functionings of the organism (i.e. on experience being
maximized). This latter condition, in turn, becomes possible only when
no areas of experience are restricted or excluded from deliberate ex-
pansion. Present knowledge, finally, suggests that maximal development
of all these factors requires a social (rather than isolated) setting,
hence the emphasis on social consequences as the optimal moral criterion
must be considered warranted.

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the reason for the ac-
ceptance of this conclusion lies in two premises: (a) the "good" is the
greatest expansion of man's (i.e. the sentient unit's, the individual's)

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[1]Ibid., p. 301.

development in terms of the characteristics described; and (b) maximal growth becomes possible only in the social interactions of man. Both of these propositions being merely warranted assertions, subject to revision should their context ever change, the conclusion--that social consciousness is the legitimate standard of moral judgment--is necessarily hypothetical. As the hypothesis with maximal warrant under present circumstances, it falls logically within the ideational framework of the position here presented--leaving open the possibility of testing, revision, even rejection in light of future consequences.

CHAPTER V

THE AESTHETIC AND ART

It has been shown previously (cf. Chapter IV) that all experiences

valued by man spring from some situation of need. Every need, further-

more

> . . . is a lack that denotes at least temporary absence
> of adequate adjustment with surroundings. But it is
> also a demand, a reaching out into the environment to
> make good the lack and to restore adjustment by build-
> ing at least a temporary equilibrium.[1]

Such equilibrium is an extremely delicate matter, differing from all

earlier balances "by the state of disparity and resistance through which

[the organism] has passed."[2] The term equilibrium, therefore, designates

diverse states of balances in which previous imbalances become constitu-

ents of an integrated whole. Characteristic of such states is the inter-

action and counterposition of component forces, producing a situation in

which the momentary resultant of forces is zero. Mere random arrangement

of forces could hardly be expected to result in such equilibrium. The

successful adjustment of the organism is, therefore, a sign that form,

organized structuring of the situation, has been achieved. As Dewey puts

it:

> Form is arrived at whenever a stable, though moving
> equilibrium is reached. Changes interlock and sustain
> one another. Wherever there is coherence there is en-
> durance. Order is not imposed from without, but is made
> out of the relations of harmonious interactions that

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[1] John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1934), p. 14.

[2] Loc. cit.

energies bear to one another. Because it is active . . .
order itself develops. It comes to include within its
balanced movement a variety of changes.[1]

The requirement of form sets apart an experience from mere ex-

periencing. In much of life, things

> . . . happen but they are neither definitely included
> nor decisively excluded; we drift. . . . There are be-
> ginnings and cessations, but no genuine initiations and
> concludings. . . . There is experience, but not an ex-
> perience.[2]

The distinction between mere experiencing and an experience depends on

the union of components, the organization through form which, in the lat-

ter, permeates the entire process.

> Because of continuous merging, there are no holes,
> mechanical junctions, and dead centers when we have an
> experience. . . . An experience has a unity that gives
> it its name, that meal, that storm, that rupture of
> friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted
> by a single quality that pervades the entire experience
> in spite of the variation of its constituent parts. This
> unity is neither emotional, practical, nor intellectual,
> for these terms name distinctions that reflection can
> make within it. In discourse about an experience, we must
> make use of these adjectives. . . . Yet the experience was
> not a sum of these different characters; they were lost in
> it as distinctive traits.[3]

Dewey designates the quality which "rounds out an experience,"[4] makes of

it something unified and whole, as the aesthetic quality. He states that

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> . . . object is peculiarly and dominantly esthetic,
> yielding the enjoyment characteristic of esthetic

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[1]Loc. cit.

[2]Ibid., p. 41.

[3]Ibid., pp. 36-37.

[4]Ibid., p. 41.

perception [i.e. the aesthetic experience], when the
factors that determine anything which can be called an
experience are lifted high above the threshold of per-
ception and are made manifest for their own sake.[1]

Dewey's conception of the aesthetic experience, as the foregoing

quotations show, results in an extremely broad area which bears the name

aesthetic. Consequently, there arises the danger of failing to dis-

tinguish between experiences of rather markedly different character.

The inclusiveness of the term necessarily destroys some of its ability

to discriminate. Hence a somewhat narrower conception of the term

"aesthetic" will be developed for subsequent use. In order to clarify

this interpretation an illustration may be of some assistance.

The situation to be investigated deals with the experience of a

spectator at Shakespeare's Othello. Let it be postulated that the spec-

tator is conversant with the language of the performance; let it also be

postulated that he is reasonably sensitive to sights and sounds; that he

is capable of perceiving relationships between ideas and able to gain

stimulation from viewing simulated actions. These assumptions are

reasonable in terms of the usual play-goer. Such a spectator would

undoubtedly be experiencing. He would be doing and undergoing, would be

receiving stimuli (as this process has been interpreted in Chapters II

and III), and would be interacting cognitively, emotionally, and in other

ways with these stimuli. In terms of Dewey's analysis, the pertinent

question would now be whether or not this experiencing is organized,

whether it results in states of equilibrium, whether it has certain domi-

nant characteristics unifying it into an experience. These factors,

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[1] Ibid., p. 57.

potentially innumerable, would include responses to the purely sensory aspects of the experience. The colors of the scenery, the timbre of the actors' voices, the spatial arrangements on stage, plus numerous other factors would have to be included in this category. In addition certain cognitions are likely to be included in the experience. Information about various characters and incidents, also abstract concepts like fidelity, love, rage, punishment would become elements of the total experience. More remote, but equally intense components, including associations with personal marital difficulties, past misfortunes at the hands of scheming friends, memories of hastily conceived and brutally undertaken actions, may also occur. Ethical factors relating to the spectator's own life may become part of the experience through their recollection in association with incidents of the drama. Emotional responses like pity, compassion, shock may also be included. All these components do not yet guarantee an experience, hence also leave questions about the presence of an aesthetic experience. But if all these (and other possible) components merge into a single whole then an experience has taken place. Furthermore, if the experience takes place not for some ulterior purpose but for its own sake, if the component factors are the ends as well as the means of the experience, then Dewey would class the experience as aesthetic.

This broad interpretation of the aesthetic experience, however, leaves room for certain objections. It includes, of necessity, a great number of factors which cannot be expected to occur in cases where the stimulating object is changed. What if instead of attending a play the audience listened to a fugue by an unknown composer and performed by an

unknown artist? Unless the audience is presumed to include only techni-
cally trained musicians, to whom chords, sequences, patterns convey
specific musical concepts (tonic, seventh chord, exposition, etc.),
there certainly is little cognition which can take place. Again, unless
one were to assume associations through contiguity, it is questionable
whether ethical considerations would enter the listeners' experience.
Similarly, inter-personal emotions like pity, affection, and compassion
are not likely to be aroused. By its nature, the experience is more re-
stricted, though potentially no less intense or rewarding, than the one
gained while viewing the play. There still exists a certain satisfac-
tion and it still is achieved in an experience divorced from the desire
for overt action. Thus the same distinguishing trait is shared by both
illustrations. It is this shared trait--and no more--which will be
termed aesthetic.

The narrower interpretation of the concept "aesthetic" includes
only such characteristics as are shared by all aesthetic experiences.
If some trait is to be termed aesthetic it will have to occur in every
aesthetic experience regardless of medium; conversely, regardless of
this stimulating object, an experience will be termed aesthetic if it
contains these traits. This interpretation of the term means all ex-
periences Dewey would term aesthetic will be so considered, but that ad-
ditional ones will also be included. Contrary wise, it also means that
components which Dewey would include as part of the aesthetic experience,
hence as potentially aesthetic qualities, will not be so classified. The
term "aesthetic experience" is thereby narrowed to include, under normal
circumstances, only part of an entire experience. Recognizing, however,

the value of a single concept designating the entirety of such experiences, the designation "total experience" will be employed. This latter may be defined as the equivalent of Dewey's "aesthetic experience"--a complete experience, including, but not restricted to, aesthetic components.

To complete the clarification of terms, explanation of the concepts "aesthetic object" and "art object" seems indicated. An aesthetic object is any object or grouping of objects, including human figures, sounds, even optical illusions, which operates in the capacity of stimulating an aesthetic experience. Its distinctive quality is the actual stimulation of such an experience, not merely its potential to do so. An art object (work of art) is an aesthetic object created by man, possibly, though not necessarily, for aesthetic purposes. The distinction between the aesthetic object and the art object is a crucial one, with the former requiring merely a beholder, but the latter implying a beholder and also a creator. That under certain circumstances creator and beholder may actually be a single person does not alter this distinction, since in those cases the person involved assumes at various distinct, though possibly minute, time intervals different functions vis-a-vis the object in question.

The distinction between art object and aesthetic object draws attention to the fact that in discussing the aesthetic experience the experience in question is viewed from the standpoing of the appreciator.

> The word 'aesthetic' refers . . . to experience as appreciative, perceiving, enjoying. It denotes the consumer's rather than the producer's standpoint. It is Gusto, taste; and, as with cooking, . . . taste is on the side of the consumer. . . .[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 47.

It is, therefore, from the perceiver's, the appreciator's, functioning in the aesthetic parts of a total experience that the characteristics of the aesthetic experience must be drawn.

The restricted use of the term "aesthetic experience," can best be examined in a situation where fewest non-aesthetic components are joined to it; where, therefore, the total experience consists most nearly, though probably not totally, of aesthetic components alone. Such a situation comes about most readily when the stimulating object is abstract, _i.e._ when the stimuli do not function as signs and symbols, but are perceived for their own sake. Music, non-objective paintings, poetry in a language strange to the hearer constitute objects of this type.

Such an abstract aesthetic object is devoid of most functions commonly regarded as communicative of concepts, except, perhaps, of concepts relating to the sensuous medium itself. It is, furthermore, highly questionable to what extent, if any, these technical medium-concepts contribute to the aesthetic experience even of those capable of recognizing them. To the non-technician--the appreciators at large--the medium alone, without the aid of concepts, carries the entire burden of aesthetic stimulation. The abstract arts, therefore, show most directly that the

> . . . experience of art contains . . . the sensations which
> are the media of expression. In painting there are colors
> and lines; in a musical composition, tones; in a poem word-
> sounds. To this material . . . there are attached vague
> feelings. It is characteristic of aesthetic expression . . .
> that their sensuous media, quite apart from anything which
> they may mean or represent, are expressive of moods.[1]

It may be somewhat more accurate, in the present context, to change the

[1] DeWitt H. Parker, The Principles of Aesthetics (second edition; New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1946), p. 43.

word "expressive" in the foregoing quotation. The word as it is used by Mr. Parker strongly suggests communication between the creator and the appreciator. But it must be emphasized again that the present analysis approaches the aesthetic experience entirely from the standpoint of the appreciator, i.e. as a function of his interaction with the aesthetic object. The history of that object (including the intentions of its human creator, if any) is a matter which may be involved in the total experience but in no way has been established as part of the aesthetic experience. Hence, at this time, it would be more accurate to speak of the sensations as "stimulating" rather than "expressing" moods. With this reservation it becomes evident that

> . . . sensation is the door through which we enter
> aesthetic experience . . . it is the foundation on which
> the whole structure rests. Without feeling for possible
> sensation men may be sympathetic and intelligent, but
> they cannot be lovers of the beautiful.[1]

The full import of this statement is brought to light in the reactions of men congenitally deprived of one set of functioning sense organs. The totally blind have no way of appreciating visual stimuli; the deaf are excluded from aesthetic experiences involving music. Even partial impairments, such as the varying degrees of tone deafness, present handicaps which frequently influence preferences in favor of other media. In turn, some physiological advantages, such as exceptional color sensitivity, may well explain ready inclination and greater responsiveness toward some particular medium.

Sensitivity to medium and the mere sensations, however, are not

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[1] Ibid., p. 44.

sufficient to explain the aesthetic experience. Were this the case,
then all sensations would have to be classed as aesthetic, since "mood
and sensations are indissoluble."[1] Every color, every line, every sound
can arouse at least limited feelings. The nature and intensity of feel-
ings is, of course, within the perceiver; it is merely a convention of
speech which, through an attribution of mood to its producing stimulus,
brings about the "objectification of feeling."[2] Though common speech
says otherwise, sensations and their stimuli do not have, but create
(more precisely, become the occasion for the creation of) moods--mood be-
ing synonymous with "vague feeling."[3] Even with this clarification, the
equating of sensation-stimulated moods with the aesthetic experience
would still leave the latter very broadly defined. The special dis-
tinguishing mark of the aesthetic experience is the unity, the form,
which these sensations possess. Random sensation, though arousing mood,
having feeling-tones, is too diffuse to be considered aesthetic, just
as mere experiencing does not constitute an experience. What makes
aesthetic analysis so difficult is that this "unity itself is very in-
tricate and depends upon many co-operating factors."[4]

The central quality of the aesthetic object being a special type
of unity, the aesthetic experience is a process which involves the per-
ception or recognition of organic "wholeness." The quality in the object
and the nature of the process can be summarized in the following brief

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[1] Ibid., p. 50.

[2] Loc. cit.

[3] Loc. cit.

[4] Ibid., p. 67.

sentence: Aesthetic organization takes place when component parts of an experience are grasped as cohering into a connected whole--the resultant gestalt clarifying both whole and constituents. The condition leading to such organization, as well as the organization itself, hereafter will be referred to as the principle of perspicuity. When an organization accords with this principle, the stimuli were so selected by the artist (if the aesthetic object is an art object) as to concentrate the response of the appreciator. Should the aesthetic object be natural, the same limitation (through coincidence or through the unconscious elimination of extraneous stimuli) takes place. "Too great a multitude of elements, elements that are not assorted into groups cannot be grasped."[1] As the composition of areas and lines does not necessarily correspond to the landscape which it resembles, so the "division of a novel into chapters . . . although it may answer in some measure the objective division of the life-story related, corresponds much more closely . . . [to] the subjective need for comprehension."[2] Thus one aspect of the principle of perspicuity is negative, exclusive; it involves a holding down of components, a temporary elimination of vast areas of stimulation by conscious human act, unconscious selection, or fortuitous accident.

The other aspect of the principle is positive, inclusive in function. The discovery that apparently unrelated components actually do relate affords the satisfaction of perceiving order where hitherto existed only the insecurity of disorganization. Geometric shapes, lines

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[1] Ibid., p. 68.

[2] Ibid., p. 69.

which at first glance appear jumbled, yield satisfaction when unexpected subtle relationships among them are discovered. In a poem or novel, a writer may show "latent emotional harmonies among the most widely sundered things."[1] In a musical composition seemingly unrelated sounds may be brought into congruity, dissonance resolved into consonance, thereby bringing to light unsuspected relationships. With the principle of perspicuity in command, the aesthetic experience is a process of clarification, of completion; it is a discovery of order and attendant emotional satisfaction.

Since the claim of emotional satisfaction in an aesthetic experience hardly needs substantiation, the question of proof must arise in connection with the assertion that the principle of perspicuity explains the process through which this satisfaction comes about. Since satisfaction clearly implies a need and need involves the frustration of some tendency, the matter of proof resolves itself into an affirmative answer to this question: Does man strive for (what he conceives to be) order? Does he, consequently, wish to avoid disorder? Should it be possible to demonstrate that such a preference in favor of organization actually exists, its frustration, by definition, would constitute a need. Furthermore, "whenever a psychological need exists, a system in a state of tension exists within the individual."[2] Through a series of derivations

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[1] Ibid., p. 68.

[2] Kurt Lewin, The Conceptual Representation and the Measurement of Psychological Forces (Donald K. Adams and Helge Lundholm, editors, Contributions to Psychological Theory, Vol. I, No. 4, Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1938), p. 97.

Lewin demonstrated[1] that the individual may cope with these tensions by moving out of the situation (locomotion), but that he may equally seek to release them through "the structural change in the environment."[2] The aesthetic experience is precisely such a structural change; hence its conscious seeking is an attempt at restructuring the environment in order to resolve a tension state produced through frustration of some desire. If, therefore, it should be possible to establish a tendency toward intelligibility and demonstrate its frequent frustration, the dynamic foundations for the existence of the aesthetic experience would be established.

Research into the psychology of perception has, in recent decades, evolved a conception which, to the extent that it is experimentally verified, constitutes a strong endorsement of the claim that intelligibility of organization is a basic tendency among humans. Known as the law of prägnanz, this theory "can briefly be formulated like this: psychological organization will always be as 'good' as the prevailing conditions allow."[3] In this formulation the word "good" is left undefined, but intensive experimentation has established characteristics which give it operational meaning. It does not appear desirable to detail here the experiments through which the conception of good form has been defined; only the findings will be reported. For experimental evidence attention

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[1]Ibid., p. 107.

[2]Ibid., p. 109.

[3]K[urt] Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935), p. 110.

is directed to works by Koffka,[1] Köhler,[2] and Hartmann.[3]

From the standpoint of aesthetics, probably the single most important characteristic of good form is the quality of closure. Closure

> . . . may be formulated thus: Where A, B, C, D, are present and A B / C D yield two enclosed or completed processes and A C / B D open and unclosed ones, then A B / C D is preferred in the perceptual response. . . .[4]

This preference for the closed figure carries over with equal force into situations where choice between two shapes is not involved, but where a single incomplete shape is completed in the act of perception. This tendency can become so strong that major effort has to be expended to become aware of an existing incompleteness. Hence, closure becomes one of the features of good organization.

Another characteristic of good organization is referred to as "good continuation."[5] This simply means that, other factors remaining equal, perception is organized so as to suggest repetition of recognized attributes. Thus, "a straight line will continue as a straight line. . . . [A] circle as a circle, an ellipse as an ellipse, and so forth."[6] This may be regarded as a feature closely related to closure, since it also constitutes a fulfillment of expectations aroused by impressions gained

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[1]K. Koffka, op. cit.

[2]Wolfgang Köhler, Gestalt Psychology, An Introduction to New Concepts in Modern Psychology (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1947).

[3]George W. Hartmanm, Gestalt Psychology A Survey of Facts and Principles (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1935).

[4]George W. Hartmann, op. cit., p. 98.

[5]K. Koffka, op. cit., p. 153.

[6]Loc. cit.

from the original configuration.

Good organization is also frequently produced by the relationship of equality. Though the degree of equality varies and its limits have not been definitely established experimentally, at least the obverse has been conclusively demonstrated: "no equality, no grouping"[1]-- except as the result of alternative forces of good organization. It must also be noted that distance, in a relative sense, is also a contributing factor. Given equality of parts, "those among them which are in greater proximity will be organized into a higher unit."[2] Experimental evidence shows this distance to be highly variable and significant mainly relative to proxi- mities existing between the remaining parts.

One final characteristic of good form (which is of particular significance by suggesting possible standards of aesthetic value judg- ments) relates the law of _prägnanz_ to conditions of maximum and minimum simplicity. The principle of simplicity suggests that the form of per- ception will take place along lines which make it easiest for the per- ceiver to establish connections between components of the total _gestalt_. Experimentation suggests that "minimum simplicity will be the simplicity of uniformity, a maximum simplicity that of perfect articulation."[3] Stability, a determinant of good form, will come about through minimum simplicity when the resultant organization involves greatest similari- ties, with little differentiation, few organized sub-wholes, numerous indistinct outlines. The stable shape will, on the other hand, be more

[1]_Ibid._, p. 166.

[2]_Ibid._, pp. 164-165.

[3]_Ibid._, p. 171.

complex, more contrasting, more sharply outlined, more clearly differenti-
ated in those cases where maximum simplicity is attained. Koffka indi-
cates[1] that the relative energy status of the organism determines actu-
alization of a particular gestalt from various potential organizations.
Maximum simplicity states tend to occur in situations of high available
energy, minimum states where such energy is low. Thus, for example, it is
to be expected that an organism will tend to perceive in terms of minimum
simplicity when fatigued, but will move toward greater articulation as
its vitality increases.

The evidence of these studies strongly supports the contention
that, in perception at least, there is a definite tendency toward organi-
zation into comprehensible, intelligible shapes. The law of prägnanz
(including "unity, uniformity, good continuation, simple shape, and
closure"[2] and developing "maximum-minimum principles"[3] as indicative of
specific organization) appears to demand that stimuli in an experience
be susceptible to organization if perception is to exceed random stimu-
lation; i.e. if experiencing is to result in an experience. The strong
tendency toward closure and good continuation, particularly, suggests
that such organization is actually striven for by the human perceiver;
that, therefore, the frustration of such organization results in a need.
In light of this evidence warrant appears to exist for the assertion that
man desires to avoid disorganization and strives for orderly structure.
It is for this reason that an "experience . . . has a satisfying emotional

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[1]Ibid., pp. 172-174.

[2]Ibid., p. 171.

[3]Loc. cit.

quality because it possesses internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement."[1] The absence of this quality is responsible for the restless, meaningless quality of mere experiencing.

The life of man is filled with experiencing in this loose form, but is not nearly as rich in processes meriting description as an experience. Random visual stimulations abound during the course of a day; indistinctly grasped snatches of conversation assail human ears with disturbing frequency; unrelated, even mutually exclusive, concepts are presented almost every hour of the day; human interactions take place in large numbers, but only a small fraction of them develops any degree of completeness. Finally, as a culmination, there stands ever before man the specter of final cessation in meaningless death--a death without relation to the life that has been led, with no completion which would integrate the end to the preceeding process of living. This lack of completeness which prevails in the daily life of mankind constitutes the field in which the tendency toward organization is frustrated. This is the field man seeks to restructure into more satisfying experiences and it is the resultant resolution of tension (when he succeeds) which gives value to the aesthetic experience. Hence it is reasonable to speak of an aesthetic experience whether or not the stimulating object is in one of the "fine arts," or for that matter, whether or not the situation contains an art object. For the experiencer the fact that restructuring along these lines takes place (that organization into completeness occurs) the experience becomes aesthetic, regardless of whether the

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[1] John Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 38.

object was created for this purpose or even had a human creator. This explains why, from a consumer's point of view, the creator of an object-- though historically interesting and, therefore, part of the total experience--is in no way involved in the aesthetic experience.

In investigating the elements and structure of the aesthetic experience, the same psychological studies which established the need-foundation of the experience also offer hints regarding its composition. The aesthetic object must possess features which will produce unity, uniformity, good continuation, simple shape, and closure and it must possess them in different ways, depending on whether the experience is to come about in maximum or minimum conditions of available energy. What is more, just as the perception of figure-ground relationships depends on relative interpretations[1] (where the figure emerges only in relation to the ground and ground is perceived only with reference to figure), so the various components of the aesthetic object function in experience only as they constitute relationships. Though unity be an essential quality of the aesthetic object, that unity is conceivable only in the context of variety. Hence in the aesthetic object and experience the "unity is a unity of variety and the variety a differentiation of the unity. The variety is of equal importance with the unity, for unity can assert itself only through a multiplicity of elements."[2] It is this unity-in-variety which is the aesthetic aspect of both object and experience. Often designated as "organic unity,"[3] its components, acting

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[1]K. Koffka, op. cit., pp. 177-210.

[2]DeWitt H. Parker, op. cit., p. 70.

[3]Loc. cit.

in mutual interdependence, constitute the aesthetic part in a total experience.

Organic unity, hence the aesthetic quality, involves the organization of various processes singly or in combination. These processes or characteristics (the latter, if the object rather than the experience is the focus of attention) may be designated as

> . . . the harmony or union of co-operating elements;
> the balance of contrasting or conflicting elements; the
> development or evolution of a process towards an end or
> climax. The first two are predominantly static or spatial;
> the last dynamic and temporal.[1]

To these three should be added the concepts of "dominance . . . and equilibrium."[2] These five components, interacting in almost any combination, produce organic unity, which, in turn, is responsible for the aesthetic experience. The close interweaving of components makes their separation for analytical examination rather artificial and can, in fact, give rise to spurious claims to autonomy on behalf of any one of the constituents. The subsequent analysis is, therefore, in no way a claim that in isolation _any_ of these factors is likely to produce an aesthetic experience. As in case of other complex phenomena, their isolation is merely a device for demonstrating their qualities, not a claim for their independent existence.

The first of these components, harmony or union, "exists whenever some identical quality or form or purpose is embodied in various elements of the whole."[3] This condition comes into being only when

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[1]_Ibid._, p. 71.

[2]_Ibid._, p. 70.

[3]_Ibid._, p. 71.

similarities exist in the object <u>as perceived by the appreciator</u>. Any such similarities are non-existent to him who does not perceive them, but constitute equality and good continuation for him whose experience they enter. The repetition of some shape in painting, the recurrence of a musical figure, the use of a single color in different areas of a bit of pottery illustrate union in its simplest form. Somewhat more sophisticated manifestations of union come from the repetition of intensities and recurring relationships. Achievement, after contrast, of earlier dynamic levels in music, similarity of color intensities (though possibly of different hues) in the visual arts, repeated juxtaposition of shape combinations in buildings illustrate harmony of this type. A still more sophisticated form of union results from the repetition of identical (or closely analogous) emotional states--with appropriately selected stimuli constituting their equivalents in the aesthetic object. Identical emotions like pity, hate, or anger, though stimulated by different characters and situations in a play, and parallel plots reaching similar emotional climaxes in novels may function in this way. The specific illustrations could be multiplied without end, but all share one common feature: repetition. Repetition is the prime device of union, no less so because <u>what</u> is repeated might be well-nigh intangible.

The second feature of organic unity has been designated as balance. Parker defines it as "the unity between elements which, while they oppose or conflict with one another, nevertheless need or supplement each other."[1]

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[1] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 72.

It must be emphasized that mere dissimilarity is no guarantee of balance, since the complementary, closure-producing quality may not be present. Contrasts which produce balance tend to cohere by being opposite extremes, or at similar distance from the center, of a single continuum. The complementary colors, certain musical chord sequences, extreme personal traits of fictional characters can create balance. Probably the classical illustration of this can be seen in some dramas of Sophocles where the entire structure rests on the protagonist-antagonist relationship of characters. Creon and Antigone in Antigone are typical in this respect. In contrast to union, balance makes greater demands on the sophistication of the perceiver; hence it is more characteristic of experiences in high energy states. Though union, particularly in the temporal arts, can become most complex (with subtle similarities recurring after long intervals of time), balance, involving, as it does, differences which yet complement each other, is more readily elaborated beyong the point where low energy levels of simplicity (organization) can encompass it. In such states it is likely to be replaced by symmetry, which is no more than a particular form of union-through-repetition. The psychology of perception would lead to an anticipation of symmetry or simple forms of balance in aesthetic experiences where the involvement of energies is small. Conversely, more complex balance situations are to be expected where the experience draws on larger stores of energy. Preferences in the arts appear well in line with these anticipations.

The third feature of organic unity, evolution, "appears in any process or sequence in which all the elements, one after another, contribute towards the bringing about of some end result. It is a

characteristic of all teleologically related facts."[1] By its very

nature this type of unity is most frequently found in temporal media,

but it also contributes significantly to the effect in case of large

works of visual media where the dimensions involved tend to force loco-

motion on the appreciator. The movement in the evolutionary process may

be smooth, with "each element harmoniously related to the last;"[2] or it

may be "difficult and dramatic, proceeding through the resolution of

oppositions among the elements."[3] This latter case is illustrated with

textbook-like clarity in certain musical forms. The reconcilication of

opposition in an evolving, climax-producing fashion marks episode-re-

entry relations in a fugue; culminative evolution, as distinct from more

geometric classical balances, typifies the Beethoven sonata-form (sonata

allegro). There is, in fact, an increasing tendency in the construction

of musical forms, particularly the larger ones, to resort to this type of

organic unity. In the literary field also such an approach is quite com-

mon. Narrative structure is hardly possible in either prose or poetry

without resorting to it extensively; even in the visual fields, though

less preponderant, evolution may make significant contributions. Except

from aerial views, it is almost impossible to gain a sense of over-all

unity in the presence of a large work of architecture. To be sure, repe-

tition of lines and shapes, colors and masses act as devices of union

(harmony), but without a sense of functioning toward some purpose,

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[1]Ibid., p. 73.

[2]Loc. cit.

[3]Loc. cit.

without perceiving a cumulative effect in the process of the experience, it is questionable how great an aesthetic impact could be obtained.

This impact is further dependent on the perception of certain co-ordinations and subordinations among the components of the aesthetic object--resulting in a parallel organization of the experience. A hierarchy exists in which some components occupy positions of greater significance than others. This arrangement is the essence of the principle of aesthetic dominance.

> In an aesthetic whole the elements are seldom on a level; some are superior, others subordinate. The unity is mediated through one or more accented elements, through which the whole comes to emphatic expression. The attention is not evenly distributed among the parts, but proceeds from certain ones which are focal and commanding to others which are of lesser interest.[1]

In every play some characters are more significant than others, in every composition some themes stand out above the rest. Most paintings have certain accentuated shapes and others to which less attention is drawn. The latitude of means in accomplishing this is enormous. "Anything which distinguishes and makes representative of the whole serves to make dominant."[2] The specific devices differ from medium to medium, but certain features, unless counteracted, will tend to favor dominance in almost any setting. Size alone usually produces dominance, so does intensity (be it of color or volume), particularly when "the effectiveness of intensity is enhanced by contrast."[3] Certain locations, both physical

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[1] Ibid., p. 79.

[2] Loc. cit.

[3] Ibid., p. 78.

and temporal, promote dominance. "In space-forms the center and the edges are natural places of pre-eminence."[1] On stage, as on canvass or in the circus, central position tends to endow with dominance whatever occupies it. Such positional advantage, however, is not sufficient to elevate into dominance components whose other contributions to the whole are but minor. The case is similar in temporal processes. Though beginning, middle (not mathematical, but psychological middle "which is usually nearer the end, because impetus of action and purpose carry forward and beyond"[2]), and end are the preferential positions in a flow of time, material which has little else to sustain it gains little dominance through position alone. In fact, positional dominance may tend to weaken the organic unity of a work if the positionally dominant elements are too noticeably subordinate in other respects. This is particularly true in the temporal arts where unification is largely a matter of memory, where, therefore, the effect of recency is of some importance. Musical figures, for example, which are not otherwise distinguished are generally poor choices for closing moments of a composition. On the other hand, the re-iteration of a major theme (i.e. one which has been made dominant by other means as well) tends to produce satisfaction in conclusions. This is true even when the passage is extremely brief and has gained signifi- cance by its employment rather than its sub-structure in earlier parts of the composition (cf. cadential chord sequences or other cadence for- mulae). The principle of dominance, furthermore, is in no way restricted

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[1] Ibid., p. 77.

[2] Loc. cit.

to single elements, but can be involved in the treatment of numerous components. "In this case there must be either subordination among them, a hierarchical arrangement; or else reciprocity or balance . . . otherwise they will pull the whole apart."[1] The former is well illustrated by the thematic material (first and second subject) in the first movement of Beethoven's Third Symphony, the latter in the characters of Iago and Othello in Shakespeare's Othello. In all these instances dominance operates as a distinguishing characteristic. In specific cases it can relate to any feature of perceptually "good" organization; generally speaking, however, it pertains most directly to the figure-ground relationship. What is dominant will usually be perceived as figure while, at the moment, the less dominant will tend to become ground.

The counterpoise to dominance is the principle of equilibrium.

> It demands, despite the subordination among elements, that none be neglected. Each, no matter how minor its part in the whole, must have some unique value of its own, must be an end as well as a means. Dominance is the aristocratic principle, the rule of the best; this is the democratic principle, the demand for freedom and significance for all.[2]

Violation of this principle frequently mars aesthetic objects by making the appreciator aware of components which have value only as technical devices. Invention of the term "filler material"--frequently found in musical criticism--indicates the frequency with which aesthetic objects fall short in this respect. Numerous coincidences, employed to make possible some twist in the story line of a fictional work, introduction

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[1] Ibid., p. 78.

[2] Ibid., pp. 78-79.

of characters merely as backdrops for leading personages, "straight men" with no other function but to provide opportunities for the delivery of key lines are further violations of this principle. "There should be no mere figure-heads or machinery."[1]

Needless to say, this principle is meaningful only <u>as it applies to the perceiver's experience</u>. An object may be filled with artificial details to the point where it actually ceases to be an aesthetic object for one beholder. If some other person responds to it differently, if he does not notice these crudities, <u>then to him they do not exist</u> and the object continues to function aesthetically. This holds true equally of the other principles of organic unity. None of them have any meaning except in the context of experience though in figurative speech they are frequently transferred to the object itself. It must be emphasized that none of these five principles (union, balance, evolution, dominance, equilibrium) are absolute, none inhere in the object itself. Only as the object <u>functions</u> aesthetically, only as it becomes a component in a specific human's experience, do the principles acquire reality. They are principles of aesthetic perception, not objective qualities of the stimulating device. Since an aesthetic object, by definition, is such only when actually stimulating an aesthetic experience, so these principles refer to processes that exist only in context of experience.

The formal elements described above constitute the relationships which make up the aesthetic part of experience. In so far, and only in so far, as they are to be found in an experience does the emotional satisfaction associated with the aesthetic take place. Being by nature

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[1] <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 79.

relationships, they cannot exist without some components through which the relations are established. The feature of repetition, characteristic of union, to take one example, must be a repetition of something. Though the epistemological and metaphysical position developed in previous chapters brings into question the existential reality of "facts," it nevertheless emphasizes the necessity of dealing with stimulations as real to the extent that they, at present, cannot be traced to subjective processes. Thus it is logically not only permissible but mandatory to investigate the stimuli which enter into these relationships.

As has been stated previously, there is, first of all, the realm of sensations and, correspondingly, the sensuous medium in the aesthetic object, which must be taken into account. There can hardly be any doubt about the fact that to a given appreciator the sounds, colors, textures, etc. of the object must convey some sense of completeness (i.e. form) if the experience is to be in any way aesthetic. In many cases the medium alone most make all, or most, of this contribution. It is hard to see how a non-objective painting by Mondrian or a keyboard sonata by Mozart can have aesthetic qualities apart from the sensuous medium. On this basis attempts have been made to declare certain particular medium features permanently associated with specific feelings. Plato's selective acceptance of certain musical modes[1] is among the more famous instances of this procedure. Such absolutism in the establishment of stimulus-feeling relationships is, however, defensible neither on a historical nor on the present systematic basis. Accepting an unalterable connec-

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[1] Plato, Republic (A. D. Lindsay, translator, New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 100-103.

tion between specific medium features and feelings makes the explanation of changing taste just about impossible. Even in a single civilization, over a rather limited number of years, substantial changes of response have been frequent. In Greece, for example, the ideal proportions of the human figure--as represented by sculptors--underwent several changes. The "ideal ratios" of the Periclean and Hellenistic periods differ considerably. Even in a single age, such as the present, the color and line combinations which stir pleasant sensations in one spectator give rise to violent aversions in another. Within the limits of human sense organs, it seems questionable whether any particular stimulus can be universally correlated to any given feeling in the aesthetic experience. The criterion of judgment, in final analysis, remains the experiencing individual. If to him the aggregate of some features produces a sense of completeness, then in that situation, those features have specific feeling tones. A change in the situation (which may, but need not, involve a different perceiver) can so completely alter the connection between medium and feelings as to produce entirely different, possibly non-aesthetic, consequences. In either case, whether or not the experience be aesthetic, some moods will be connected with the stimulation--unless one were to postulate a perceiver capable of purely intellectualized sensation. There appears to be no warrant for such a postulate.

Once the analysis of the aesthetic experience advances into situations involving non-abstract objects, the identification of aesthetic components becomes somewhat more complicated. Mention has been made earlier of a hypothetical spectator viewing a play and the great variety of components contained in his experience. It now becomes possible to

narrow down somewhat the parts that need be considered aesthetic, but even the residue, to which the term aesthetic may be applied in its more limited scope, remains extended beyond the sensuous medium. To the extent that fortuitous associations (cognitive, ethical, emotional) remain outside the framework provided by the relationships of organic unity, they need no longer be considered. They retain their significance in the total experience, but cannot be aesthetic in the restricted sense of the term. Even with this limitation what remains to be analyzed involves something more than the color, shape, and sound sensations (and the emotions appertaining to them) which are stimulated from the stage. The spectator translates these sounds and sights into meanings and the emotions aroused by the stimuli are complemented by feelings associated with these meanings. In other words, the spectator conceptualizes in his interaction with the aesthetic object. It is in the interpretation of this conceptualization process that it becomes necessary to depart from Parker's theories if consistency is to be maintained.

Parker states, referring to specific examples, that "certain ideas (concepts)--of trees and clouds in the painting, of men and their deeds in the poem--are associated to the sensuous factors and constitute their meanings."[1] Next he specifies that the function of ideas is "substitutive of objects. The idea enables us to experience imaginatively what we do not or cannot experience directly."[2] Moreover, since he considers that "the communication of ideas is the important thing,"[3] the connective

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[1] DeWitt H. Parker, op. cit., p. 44.

[2] Ibid., p. 56.

[3] Ibid., p. 57.

function of art, the linking of creator and appreciator, must be stressed at all times by a stimulation of conceptualization. This communication, considered fundamental by many aestheticians (cf. the writings of John Dewey[1]), relies heavily on the process of signification and symbolization. Langer devoted most of a book[2] to the symbolic functions involved in this process, and Parker assigned it sufficient importance to show that he deemed the aesthetic experience basically a means of communication--with most of the communicative function provided by the appreciator's appropriate conceptualization.

Such an interpretation of the aesthetic experience is totally inconsistent with more fundamental considerations raised in the course of this analysis. As has been stated, only such components of an experience were to be considered aesthetic as could be found in all aesthetic experiences. But communication of concepts is patently impossible where the aesthetic object is not an art object (i.e. not man-made), or where the medium is abstract, hence concepts, as instruments of cognition, are necessarily barred from the aesthetic experience. This in no way deprecates their significance in the total experience of the appreciator which, as has been emphasized before, necessarily includes non-aesthetic components in all cases where the stimulating object is other than abstract. It does mean that a "pure" aesthetic experience (in a descriptive, not a valuative sense) is theoretically possible only in the presence of abstract aesthetic objects and practically questionable even then.

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[1]John Dewey, Art as Experience, pp. 104-105.

[2]Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951).

Having rejected communication as the function of concepts in the aesthetic experience, there remains to be clarified the part, if any, they do play in context of the aesthetic. Through the elimination of the communicative part, the individual cognitions represented by concepts, the only way in which concepts might operate is through the <u>relationships</u> of the feelings associated with them. These relationships appear to be totally consistent with the principles applying to the formal medium. It is not only in the medium, but also among concepts that union, balance, evolution, dominance, and equilibrium can be discerned. A haphazard sequence of ideas is no more aesthetic than a random arrangement of colors and sounds and, conversely, a formally structured pattern of ideas yields the same satisfaction of good <u>gestalt</u> as an organized group of sense stimuli.

> Hence <u>an</u> experience of thinking has its own aesthetic quality. It differs from those experiences that are acknowledged to be esthetic, but only in its materials. . . . Nevertheless, the experience has a satisfying emotional quality because it possesses internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement. This artistic structure may be immediately felt. In so far, it is esthetic.[1]

This interpretation is particularly cogent in light of the epistemological and metaphysical considerations raised in previous chapters. If indeed external stimuli are merely conceptions man uses because he has not yet been able to identify all components of his own internal functioning, then it need hardly be surprising to find that other functionings, already interpreted as subjective, should follow analogous patterns of development.

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[1] John Dewey, <u>Art as Experience</u>, p. 60.

It is, therefore, well in line with systematic expectations that concepts should function aesthetically in formally satisfying interaction, even though in isolated cognitive contexts their function is non-aesthetic. This interaction of feeling tones, as distinct from the information-carrying aspects, of concepts is designated by the term conceptual form.

Conceptual form, therefore, is in the relationship among feelings associated with concepts but not in individual cognitions. It coordinates with form in the sensuous medium and is subject to analysis in similar fashion. Whether it operate on the level of surface meanings or depth meanings (i.e. "ideas of more universal scope lying behind concrete ideas and images"[1]), it is the means by which concepts contribute to an aesthetic experience. Being analogous in nature, conceptual form can, on all levels of meaning, coordinate readily with form in the sensuous medium. In fact, should such coordination be lacking, the resulting incompleteness constitutes a flaw in the experience as a whole. But when concepts on all levels interact in a satisfying way, when, furthermore, conceptual form and medium form blend satisfactorily, the entire experience acquires satisfying organization, becomes an experience, hence aesthetic. In these cases, as also in aesthetic experiences involving no concepts, the "aesthetic fact is, therefore, form and nothing but form."[2]

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[1] DeWitt H. Parker, op. cit., p. 41.

[2] Benedetto Croce, Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic (Douglas Ainslie, translator, London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1909), p. 26.

CHAPTER VI

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

The philosophic position outlined in the foregoing chapters has definite implications for educational theory and practice. These implications arise directly from the epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and aesthetic positions which have been developed. To show consistency with the philosophic position here advocated, a proposed plan of education will have to accord with the following formulations.

I. Central to the system of thought is the significance of the individual. Assignment of this primary position is based neither on a doctrine of theological nor natural rights, but on an epistemology which attributes all knowledge to the active functioning of the living, sentient unit. Though hardly identical with the Cartesian _cogito ergo sum_, it represents a point of view which defines knowledge solely in terms of the individual's active experience. In the broadest sense, this means that man's knowledge is knowledge only of himself and that the attribution of knowledge to external influences reflects a present (and possibly future) incompleteness in man's awareness of his own vital processes. Educators, therefore, must remember that any attempt to _convey_ knowledge externally, without the _creation_ of that knowledge by the learner, is indefensible in terms of this system.

II. Conversely, it has been emphasized that in every specific instance, at present, understanding of human processes is far from complete, that in every area there are residues in the analysis of cognition which must be attributed to external factors if the resultant

behavior is to yield satisfactory consequences. The seeming dualism of such a position is pragmatically defensible and imposes on educators the obligation to deal with knowledge "as if" some of its parts were external to man.

Under the circumstances it may be questioned whether such a distinction is either useful or necessary in the philosophic foundations of education. Specifically, it may be questioned whether any advantage accrues from denying the existence of a genuinely external component in cognitions when, in practice, every area of knowledge must--at this time--hypothesize it. The answer to such an objection, as also to analogous objections in corresponding criticisms of the metaphysics, is two-fold. Systematically, the elimination of an external component dispenses with the "unknowable" and all the attendant epistemological difficulties (i.e. the integration of the "knowable" and the "unknowable" in the cognitive process), as well as with the vexing problems of a correspondence theory of truth. Operationally, the elimination of a fixed, independent-of-man element in knowledge yields flexibility of action (without the need for revising the analysis of the knowing process) each time a different subjective factor is brought to consciousness. At the same time, the instrumental use of such concepts as stimulus, primary experience, raw fact permits systematization and intelligent action in those areas of knowledge where the human creative operation is not yet known. Though indefensible in a context of absolutes, this view is perfectly compatible with a relativistic philosophy of education.

III. Paralleling the considerations raised in relation to the knowing process, a theory of existence must take as its starting point

the central reality of the sentient individual. It is <u>his</u> functioning
which constitutes knowing, <u>his</u> purposing which produces the criteria of
value in terms of which truth and falsity are judged. On the educator
this imposes the obligation to consider the individual student the only
reality <u>for</u> and <u>to</u> whom all processes must be directed.

IV. Continuing the parallel with the knowing process, here too
the converse must be kept in mind. As one may not operationally dis-
pense with objective knowledge components, so ideas relating to objec-
tive reality remain a continued necessity in humanity's present state of
development. The educator must, therefore, consider, evaluate, and re-
gard as real such factors of the environment as he cannot comprehend as
functions of the human organism. To this extent the achievements and
methodology of empiricism retain their validity in the educational
process.

V. As in the case of knowledge and reality, so, most definitely,
in the field of values the fundamental unit is the living individual.
Needs stem from imbalances existing within the sentient organism and
values are funded exclusively in need-satisfying activities. Moral acts
are moral only to the extent that they involve values, hence the criteria
of morality must have constant reference to the sentient entity--the
individual human.

VI. But moral individualism is not synonymous with moral atomism.
It has been shown that maximal achievement of need satisfaction is, at
present, possible only under conditions of social interaction. It has
also been demonstrated that the requirement of free choice in moral situ-
ations depends on a constant expansion of anticipated consequences.

Finally, it has been shown that such expansion can take place only when individual interaction with the group is consciously acknowledged. Thus--again speaking for the present--criteria for the evaluation of conduct have greatest warrant when based on standards of the social good. Yet the external standard is acceptable only in terms of what it produces for and in the experiencing human. The retention of social value as the fundamental moral criterion is, therefore, not absolute, but relative to existing conditions. To the educator this continues to place social criteria in hierarchically dominant positions in all cases where decisions are to be made and ethical influencing of the learner is to be attempted. It also means that the educator may not regard any particular set of social values, or social values as a class, as absolute, since their justification springs, eventually, from individual needs. He must be prepared to accept one or many new criteria should warrant for such appear. This warrant rests, ultimately, not in the group, of which the individual is a fraction, but in the individual whose needs make meaningful his relation to the group. Thus, making social criteria for the "good" into absolutes is theoretically indefensible in this context, but acceptance of the social good, though relative, becomes morally binding in the present frame of reference.

VII. The analysis of the aesthetic experience rests directly on the foregoing. Here, too, the experiencing individual becomes the creator of both process and value. Not the stimulating object, nor the historical originator of the art work, but the appreciating perceiver determines the nature of the experience. Such experience is deemed aesthetic when to that perceiver the experience results in a satisfaction

of his need for completion. This need, in turn, arises out of the individual's tendency to organize his perceptions and the frustration of this tendency by the inadequate organization of daily life. In this sense the value of the aesthetic process arises from frustration, without which there could be no need, and no experience. Since life without this frustration is patently beyond foreseeable human attainment, the fullest meeting of needs necessarily includes concern with the aesthetic. Whether the schools are to be assigned this task is subject to debate, but an educational task it certainly is--unless some need areas be removed arbitrarily from the obligations of education. Such removal is not defensible in terms of the philosophic position presented in this study.

VIII. If the aesthetic experience results from human needs, then identification of a frustrated tendency becomes basic to a comprehension of the experience as a whole. Here again a constant change and probable growth of human understanding must be anticipated. As indicated above, present findings of psychologists suggest that the perception of optimal organization is a basic tendency, frustration of which produces a state of need. Satisfaction of this need is brought about through experiences involving organic unity (form) in the experience itself and in the situations through which the experience is brought about. To the extent that awareness of form (i.e. creation of form within the consciousness of the appreciator) may be fostered by education, the educator is confronted with the necessity of providing situations through which such awareness may be increased. Justification for such practices springs neither from an absolute value inherent in the object,

nor from immutable formal laws, but from the need which these processes satisfy. Should the human need either disappear, or become modified in any significant particular, the fostering of any particular response pattern would lose the support of this philosophic position.

The foregoing eight points constitute the foundations on which educational efforts must rest if they are to implement the system of thought developed in the preceding chapters. Since all eight points tie directly to the systematic exposition of the philosophic point of view, it will be considered sufficient to link subsequent educational recommendations to the foregoing summarizations. Once such linkage has been accomplished, effective connection with the philosophic foundation will be considered established.

CHAPTER VII

OBJECTIVES OF A MUSIC PROGRAM

In attempting to develop a program of music within the framework
of general education, it is, of course, necessary to view it within the
context of general education as a whole. On the other hand, it would
be far beyond the scope of this study to evolve an entire course of
general education based on the philosophic position propounded in the
opening chapters. This, seemingly, vitiates in advance any attempt to
outline a course of musical studies which appears as part of an inte-
grated educational endeavor. In a certain sense such a conclusion must
be permitted to stand. The subsequent presentation in no sense consti-
tutes a specific plan which could be put into operation as a complete
course in any institutional situation. The very limitation of the ob-
jectives presented in this chapter ought to make this clear. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to discern certain minimum requirements which a
proposed course of musical studies must meet if it is to become part
of a general education program consistent with the point of view estab-
lished previously. In this light, the objectives of the music program
(also the more detailed recommendations) must be regarded as minimal
and foundational in character. Before translating these suggestions
into practice, additional objectives, with corresponding activities,
must be developed in terms of the specific general education program
into which the music unit is to be incorporated. The objectives presented
in these pages are offered in the anticipation that any music program
based on the philosophic position of this study would have to include

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them; that, therefore, they constitute a firm base on which the varying special applications must be erected.

It has been demonstrated that justification for any educational procedure must eventually be found in the proposed activity's contribution to the individual student. Thus the music part of a general education sequence can claim validity only if it accomplishes some positive value for the individual participating in it (cf. Chapter VI, Point V). This directly identifies the raison d'être of the program as a whole and any subsidiary activity therein. It also implies the converse, namely that any experience which fails to provide positive values for the individual, or which actually results in negative values, has no place in the music program. Hence the planner's and instructor's attention must focus on the participating student--what he does, how he reacts, what he accomplishes--with content and methodology achieving significance only in relation to the development of the student.

The implications of this deceptively simple statement are so significant that it appears desirable to elaborate them somewhat further. The orientation demanded by this approach excludes from the program any composition, skill, or corollary information, justification for which resides in the object alone. No composition may be included simply because it has acquired the reputation of a "classic"; similarly, no composition may be excluded merely on the grounds that it fails to exhibit certain pre-defined objective characteristics. This neither precludes the inclusion of works traditionally in high repute, nor does it ban skills or information long associated with musical excellence. It does mean, however, that inclusion or exclusion of a given work will have to

be made on the basis of its effect on the individual and that its evaluation must proceed on the basis of the results which accrue as the student interacts with it.

In evaluating the contribution of any given work or skill it is, needless to say, mandatory to view it functionally. The development of the individual has been set up as the basic criterion of value, but it has also been shown that, at present, optimal development of the individual occurs in a social setting--that, therefore, social criteria are constantly to be kept in mind (cf. Chapter VI, Point VI). This requirement acquires particular pertinence in considering general education. Individuals in the United States at this particular time receive the greatest part of their formal education in an institutional setting. Thus it becomes apparent that the development of individuals in the field of music, as here discussed, must be viewed as a development within a group situation. From this it follows that the organization and administration of the music program must be directed toward objectives consonant with the social (i.e. group) nature of the enterprise. A specific illustration may help clarify this point. It is theoretically possible to envision cases in which apparent optimal progress of a student is seen to demand purely individual instruction, with all materials, methods, and instructors selected to suit each single student. This may well be considered the music educational equivalent of the "one-student-and-one-professor-sitting-on-a-log" ideal advocated by some as the ultimate in higher education. Such a situation is socially undesirable as well as impractically expensive. Moreover, it is hardly justifiable in terms of the musical attitudes and tastes which

the individual is likely to acquire.

Unless the student be both composer and performer, his experiencing of music necessarily involves (in some form) the activities of others. To remain completely consistent, it is more accurate to state that at this time he can gain musical experiences only when acting "as if" such outside reality were responsible for some part of his musical experience (cf. Chapter VI, Point IV). This being true during his period of formal education and also in subsequent years, restrictions of his individual experiences are inescapable parts of those experiences. Thus instruction which links appreciation with rigorously individualized conditions is likely to produce attitudes (including tastes) which eventually result in a severe limitation of actual musical experiences. Even in the days of personalized and mechanized musical reproduction, some person (other than the listener) must compose the music, must bring it to performance, must make it available in published or recorded form before the listener can experience it. What is more, it is open to question how much music can be available to a person in opposition to the preferences of all other humans. Hence some form of group instruction appears to be so fundamental for this aspect of education that it transcends mere methodology and becomes a fundamental objective.

The same considerations which made it necessary that the individual acknowledge the "as if" reality of objective factors in relation to his social setting (cf. Chapter VI, Point IV) also determine the necessity of accepting a similar reality for stimuli, interaction with which produces the musical experience. Operationally, the sound stimuli provided by a piece of music must be regarded as "real" in any attempt to understand the processes involved in a musical experience. As a conse-

quence, it is inconceivable to envision a program of music education

which fails to treat the actual works of music "as if" possessed of real

existence. Conversely, however, it must also be kept in mind that this

conditional reality is meaningful only in terms of the listener's ex-

perience. It has been shown (cf. Chapter III) that any communication

demands a "creation" of reality by both parties to such communication

and that absence of the creative act defeats the communicative process.

Hence if something is to be communicated to the student he must bring

into existence the object of such communication. This object--be it

ideational or quasi-physical--must be essentially similar to the one

created by his instructor if the communicative process is to be meaning-

ful. This would mean that a teacher to whom a composition exists as a

group of orderly, organized sounds can have nothing significant to say

about it to students to whom that same composition appears merely as a

random collection of noises. This raises to a vitally important posi-

tion the objective of changing the student's experience vis-a-vis the

work of music in all cases where such experience appears inadequate from

some significant point of view. This objective (the reconstruction of

experiences involving works of music) stands at the center of a music

program in general education. What the educator attempts to do is to

create favorable situations for such a transformation, what the student

must do is to perform the pertinent reconstruction. Whether or not the

result is ethically positive depends on the direction of the reconstruc-

tion. As shown in Chapter IV, a reconstruction which would tend to

limit further experiences of the student would have to be classed as

negative, while failure to achieve any reconstruction would constitute

a form of retrogression (<u>i.e.</u> in terms of the expanded consequences) and would be equally undesirable. Essentially, therefore, the embracing objective of a general education course in music involves the restructuring of the individual student's experience in his interaction with musical compositions, such restructuring moving in an expanding direction and occurring in a social context. This fundamental objective encompasses the more specific points discussed below; these, in turn, underlie (as functional foundations) any additional goals which may be set for the music program by other aspects of a general education curriculum.

It appears to be superfluous to include among the objectives of a music program a specific statement to the effect that music has some contribution to make to the life of man. Any educational program which includes some concern for musical experiences accepts, explicitly or by implication, the contention that music has a place in human life. There is, however, some need to clarify the nature of music and some of the obligations produced by its inclusion in general education. The material of music has been described as "the conscious counterparts of periodic, longitudinal vibrations of the air."[1] Such a description, however, fails to take into account that all perceived sounds are associated with the same general type of external stimuli; hence an adequate definition of music must be so restricted as to circumscribe a particular group of aural stimuli. Specifically, some provision must be made to exclude sounds of a random nature (<u>i.e.</u> noise) and also sounds the primary purpose of which involves their signifying or symbolic character (<u>i.e.</u>

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[1]DeWitt H. Parker, <u>The Principles of Aesthetics</u> (second edition; New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1946), p. 127.

speech, conventional signals, etc.). One major restriction is effected
when music is defined as "an ordered sequence of sound, forming a de-
sign,"[1] but this still leaves the definition excessively broad by fail-
ing to eliminate the area of sound-signs and symbols. For purposes of
this study, therefore, music is defined as: an ordered sequence of
sounds, forming a design, without primary signifying or symbolizing
functions. The word "primary" is included to guard against an overly
narrow definition, one which, for example, would exclude program music
from the musical realm entirely.

The definition of music which has been proposed focuses attention
on the fact that structure is centrally involved in a musical experience.
Furthermore, the exclusion of signifying functions further emphasizes the
similarity between this definition and the one offered for the aesthetic
experience in Chapter V. The aesthetic experience having been identi-
fied with the experience of the consumer, it appears reasonable to at-
tack the musical experience from the same standpoint by evolving a
general education program in music based on the experience of the lis-
tener.

Proceeding from these considerations, the program in music here
proposed forms part of a wider program directed toward the area of the
aesthetic experience. That concern with the aesthetic cannot be eli-
minated from the province of educational obligations has been indicated
earlier (cf. Chapter VI, Point VII). It has also been shown that the
educator discharges this obligation by creating conditions in which the

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[1]Oscar Thompson, How to Understand Music (New York: The Dial
Press, 1936), p. 5.

student's awareness of form (as the crux of the aesthetic experience) is increased (Chapter VI, Point VIII). Applied to music, this means that within the scope of general education some place must be found where an awareness of musical form becomes the primary preoccupation of teacher and student. This objective is, however, so readily open to misinterpretation that some explicit warnings need be presented.

It must be kept in mind that the aesthetic experience--in music as in other media--is an experience of form, not the experiencing of a particular form or group of forms. Thus the program or instructor may not prescribe some specific formal patterns as the unalterable requirements of aesthetic experience. Selection of particular forms on pedagogical or sociological grounds (forms, for example, which the student already knows, or can readily encounter in future years) may well be desirable, but all such selections must then receive their distinctive justification on methodological or other non-aesthetic grounds.

A second misinterpretation also needs to be avoided. Emphasis on form may easily be distorted into a preoccupation with intellectualized techniques. Techniques have a definite part to play in the instructional process, but they must remain in a suitably subordinate position and not be elevated into a basic objective of the music program. In this respect Lewin's analysis of the relation between means and ends offers valuable guidance:

> One can probably say that the more the unity of the path
> as a whole increases, the more the single steps take on the
> character of merely a 'means' to an 'end.'[1]

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[1]Kurt Lewin, The Conceptual Representation and Measurement of Psychological Forces (Donald K. Adams and Helge Lundholm, editors, Contributions to Psychological Theory, Vol. I, No. 4. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1938), p. 30.

The eventual goal being the development of a situation in which the aural experience becomes an experience (without which it could not be aesthetic, hence musical), it is necessary that recognition of partial factors, among which techniques must be counted, eventually recede into a subordinate position. This makes it important that, in organizing the music program, each technique to which the student is consciously exposed be evaluated in terms of its anticipated contribution to the total musical experience.

The nature of the aesthetic experience, as analyzed previously, suggests the direction in which the student's musical development should proceed. In discussing the aesthetic experience (cf. Chapter V), it has been shown that the need satisfied stems from the human tendency toward formally optimal perceptual organization and from the frustration of this tendency during the course of everyday life. There is no reason to suppose that this condition is less true in the context of aural experiences than it is in any other setting. Hence it is only to be expected that almost every person finds some satisfaction in some form of music. During the past two years, for example, close to 4000 freshmen and sophomore students at the University of Florida have been questioned on this subject and the overwhelming majority answered affirmatively to the question: "Do you enjoy listening to some kinds of music?" The situation in which the question was presented[1] hardly warrants any detailed analysis of the data since both the method of soliciting answers and the method of tabulation was anything but precise, but even an error of

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[1] Question asked by lecturer in large (300-500) lecture sections, results tabulated by counting a show of hands.

major proportions would leave a comfortable margin favoring musical ex-
periences of some sort. Almost any random survey is likely to turn up
figures of a similar kind. A music program, therefore, deals with an
area of experience which has already elicited some action by a great
majority of students. This recognized and existing activity on the part
of students imposes the obligation on planners of musical studies to
take into account the level on which the students' musical experiences
take place at the time that the instructional effort starts. If the
program is to be justifiable on ethical grounds, it must aim for some
positive changes in the musical experiences of students. These changes,
in order to be positive, can necessarily move in only two directions:
they can involve an intensification of experience in already existing
areas and they can involve an extension of the number and variety of
areas of musical experience.

Intensification of an aesthetic (hence also musical) experience
relates to the increase of energies available for use in the experience.
It has been shown[1] that there is reason to believe in a connection be-
tween perceptual organization and the energy states of the organism--with
organization into more complex forms being associated with higher energy
states. If by intensification one means organization into a hierarchi-
cally higher, structurally more complex perceptual pattern--the most
meaningful interpretation of this term in a musical context--then it is
apparent that to the extent that a music program aims for such intensi-
fication, it must find ways of making available larger energy states

[1]K[urt] Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (New York: Har-
court, Brace and Company, 1935), pp. 172-174.

within the musical experience. Practically this may mean no more than bringing about a positional change in a musical experience within the listener's life space. A concentration of energies available at that moment onto the musical experience itself would necessarily result in an increase whenever the musical part of a total experience is moved from the background to a central position in the momentary field. On the other hand, intensification may mean a far more fundamental restructuring of the field, particularly in respect to the increase of acuity in aural perception, so that energies not previously used in the total experience (of which the musical experience is part) can be brought into play. The former process involves no change in the energy total of the moment, merely changes the distribution, the latter constitutes an increase in the energy total, both leading to intensifications of the musical experience. Hence both positional and sensitivity changes constitute valid objectives for a general education music program.

The second positive development, extension of the number and variety of musical experiences, involves a realignment of the valences motivating a student's behavior. According to the analysis of field theoretical psychology, locomotion, or restructuring of the field, depends on the existence of psychological forces (more precisely, their resultants) in each concrete situation. These forces, in turn, are directly, though not exclusively, related to the valences possessed by various areas of the life space.[1] If, therefore, a student's musical experiences are to be increased in quantity and variety, it becomes necessary to produce situ-

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[1] Kurt Lewin, op. cit., pp. 88-90.

ations in which more (and more varied) musical experiences acquire positive valences. This involves attitudinal changes which the music program must accept as one of its goals.

It must be pointed out that all the objectives so far proposed apply to any general education music program based on the philosophic orientation of this study. Though other parts of the educational program may bear on the practices employed in the realization of these objectives, the objectives themselves are fundamental to any positive growth of the students' musical experience. It is more than likely that the integrative aspects will produce additional objectives for a music program, but these objectives will have to be outgrowths of the entire general education course and cannot be presented prior to or independently of the overall objectives of the full sequence. Thus the chapters which follow represent a certain minimum prescription, to which the integrative aspects remain to be added. Integration, however, demands that the thing to be integrated genuinely exist. Thus, musical experiences as such must become genuine experiences before they can make a significant contribution to an educational enterprise. This orientation is based on the conviction that an individual's musical experience "begins with the music itself--whatever the perspective in which it may be viewed by reason of a broader or narrower cultural outlook. . . ."[1] Such a commitment means neither that music exists independently from a perceiver, nor that the integrative function is in any way less significant than the directly experimential one but it does reflect the belief that unless and

[1] Edwin J. Stringham, Listening to Music Creatively (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943), p. 4.

and until the interaction between hearer and musical stimulus exists on a level of some significance, any attempt to utilize music for other educational objectives is likely to be futile.

The foregoing discussion can be summed up in a group of seven brief statements which, in effect, constitute the objectives of a general education music program:

1) The program must aim at the improvement of the individual's experience.

2) It must produce the necessary social adjustments required to maximize the individual's experience.

3) It must provide for intensification of the student's musical experience.

4) It must provide for the extension of the student's musical experience.

5) It must bring about a restructuring of the field so that the aesthetic (formal) component is increased in the student's musical experience. This involves both intensification and extension of the experience.

6) It must produce attitudinal changes to provide the necessary dynamic conditions for the restructuring process.

7) It must provide a foundation which readily lends itself to the integrative functions required by the totality of the general education program.

The realization of these seven broad objectives involves a series of specific, practical goals. These goals constitute the concrete

problems of the program. Though in actual practice these problems occur conjointly and their separation is not always pedagogically defensible, systematic clarity can best be achieved by presenting them seriatim as the logical topic organization of the program.

CHAPTER VIII

TOPIC ORGANIZATION OF A MUSIC PROGRAM

The objectives proposed for a music program in the previous chapter all involve changes in the individual student's musical experiences. In order to provide a starting point of some concreteness from which such changes are to originate, it appears to be necessary that the nature of each student's existing experience be ascertained at the time he first enters this program. Hence the first topic (or problem) to be faced in a course in music, such as is here projected, is an exploration of the clientele. This exploration, furthermore, can hardly be general, statistical, in nature, since the usual classroom situation involves numbers far too small (20-30) for meaningful statistical prognoses. On the contrary, the investigation of existing student abilities, attitudes, preferences, and practices has to be conducted in terms of the individual small groups with which each instructor expects to deal. Since, however, a rather large student population will have to be reached eventually (assuming that this program is conducted in an institution comparable in size to most state universities), the total student population is likely to be substantial. This combination of circumstances indicates the desirability of employing measures which, in terms of facilities, equipment, and staff, can be applied to large numbers of students but which can be administered and interpreted in groups of limited size. Ideally, this would mean that the measures employed should not call for staff, materials, or equipment which would lose its usefulness after the exploratory process, but would involve only such measures as can be used

subsequently during the course of instruction. Since, furthermore, such exploration should take place at the outset of the program, it is of considerable importance that both the plan and the execution of this phase of the program be designed and administered so as to erect no barriers between instructor and students or between students and the musical experience, thus making the valences as positive as possible in the crucial early contacts with the participating group.

To accomplish this process of exploration, consideration may be given to some of the numerous tests devised for the measurement of musical aptitudes and achievements. Possibly the best known of these instruments are the Seashore Measures of Musical Talent.[1] This battery consists of six sections, each purporting to measure some component deemed essential in the evaluation of musical giftedness. Though frequently criticized as excessively atomistic,[2] and also because of the rather mechanical sounds employed, it, nevertheless, remains the most thoroughly explored instrument of its kind. One of the more vigorous opponents of the Seashore battery, H. D. Wing, produced a test to accomplish somewhat similar measurements, but with means which appeared to him to be more properly musical in nature. This group of tests, the Wing Standardized Tests of Musical Intelligence,[3] employs brief piano selections in place of the

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[1]Carl E. Seashore, Don Lewis, and Joseph G. Saetveit, Seashore Measures of Musical Talent (revised edition; New York: Psychological Corporation, 1939).

[2]James L. Mursell, "The Seashore Measures of Musical Talent" (Oscar Krisen Buros, editor, The Third Mental Measurements Yearbook, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1949), p. 264.

[3]Herbert D. Wing, Cecilia Wing, Wing Standardized Tests of Musical Intelligence; A Test of Musical Ability on 10 Records (Sheffield, England: Sheffield City Training College, 1948).

neutral sounds of the Seashore records, but, according to one writer at least,[1] fails to measure anything significantly different from the Seashore tests. The observation that experimental subjects found this test rather fatiguing also must be considered disadvantageous. Since tests of this nature tend to be quite time-consuming and usually arouse something less than glowing enthusiasm among students, it is open to question whether their employment in the initial phases of the course can be justified. To be sure, their diagnostic value may well outweigh their shortcomings in special problem situations--where more informal instruments indicate the need for further exploration--but for most students simpler measures should suffice. In view of the fact that pitch discrimination refined below the semi-tone interval is of negligible significance in relation to music presented in an introductory course, it would seem superfluous to subject most students to more than some informal testing which any competent instructor can perform on the piano. Analogously, degrees of rhythmic discrimination, tonal memory, dynamic discrimination, etc. can all be ascertained by such means in a minimum of time. What may be of even greater significance, students generally show decided aversion to anything which resembles formal tests or conjures up visions of examinations, hence the valences of activities commonly associated with "examinations-for-grades" might be considered sufficiently negative to discourage the general administration of formalized aptitude tests in courses of this nature. In their place it seems advisable to confine

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[1] John McLeish, "The Wing Tests of Musical Intelligence" (Oscar Krisen Buros, editor, The Fourth Mental Measurements Yearbook, Highland Park, New Jersey: The Gryphon Press, 1953), pp. 230-231.

this phase of exploration to brief, informal, personalized aural examples (performed by the instructor) to which the student is asked to respond verbally.

A somewhat similar situation exists with regard to devices aimed at ascertaining the student's knowledge of and preference for various types of music. Once again, there are a number of printed tests available. One of the more frequently used ones is the Kwalwasser-Dykema Music Test,[1] which, for all its age, still has some strong adherents. The Keston Music Preference Test and the Keston Music Recognition Test[2] are less known, but considerably more recent devices in this general area. The badly dated Kwalwasser Test of Musical Information and Appreciation,[3] along with a long list of other devices constructed along similar lines, might also be considered for this purpose. Generally speaking, however, these devices are once again too lengthy to be particularly appropriate in a general education situation. Attention must be drawn to the statement made earlier, namely, that it is of decisive importance to keep valences positive early in an introductory general education course and that any testing program which would introduce even the approximation of a barrier situation must be dismissed on this basis alone. If, as is the case, most of the tests are open to question on other grounds as well,

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[1]Jacob Kwalwasser and Peter Dykema, The Kwalwasser-Dykema Music Tests (New York: Carl Fischer, Inc., 1930).

[2]Morton J. Keston, "An Experimental Evaluation of the Efficacy of Two Methods of Teaching Music Appreciation," Journal of Experimental Education, 22:215-226, March, 1954.

[3]Jacob Kwalwasser, Kwalwasser Test of Musical Information and Appreciation (Iowa City, Iowa: Bureau of Educational Research and Service, State University of Iowa, 1927).

their employment on a broad scale is anything but desirable. Thus on the achievement and informational level, no less than on the aptitude level, a conversational survey by the instructor, along with the playing of <u>a</u> <u>few</u> selections representing different idioms of musical expression, may be considered preferable to a more rigorously structured testing situation. The by-product of such an approach is also of some value: the tenor of the student-instructor relationship is set early in the course in a form which emphasizes <u>discussion</u> and <u>listening</u> (to music) and minimizes <u>lectures</u> and <u>examinations</u>. Thus the exploratory process becomes a pedagogical device as well.

It has been stated earlier that the "exploration" is designed to familiarize instructors with the musical development of their students. The information gathered is likely to reveal that, in a student body of a thousand or more, the range of aptitudes, interests, and past preparation covers a substantial area. It is, however, far less likely that in an individual section of the course the range will be anywhere near that large. The tacit assumption behind this statement is, of course, that classes will be kept to sizes where genuine discussion is still possible. This would mean that, except by accident, no section is likely to show statistically normal characteristics, since the numbers involved are entirely too small. Should any class turn out to be excessively heterogeneous, a few judicious transfers could usually be arranged. That such transfers are desirable follows from the experience that, in music at least, optimal progress is not achieved by groups of students whose background is excessively varied. Seashore, basing his findings on some experimentation conducted in Rochester, N. Y., puts it this way:

Contrary to ideas that many have had on the subject,
it has been demonstrated that there is more incentive
for the majority of students to work at their highest
level when they are in a homogeneous group. It is a
mistake to place the less talented student in classes
with the more musical students. Instead of the highly
gifted student acting as an inspiration to the less
talented ones, it tends to discourage them. . . . There-
fore, children of like musical capacities are placed in
the same classes where their schedules will permit.[1]

A grouping of students with some homogeneity according to back-
ground and ability, however, becomes little more than a meaningless ges-
ture, if it is not accompanied by a corresponding flexibility of program
content. The basic objectives of the music program (as outlined in Chap-
ter VII) all refer to a process of growth, a change in the student's ex-
perience; nowhere do these objectives call for the attainment of identical
levels of accomplishment, or the interaction with identical musical com-
positions. It is in this respect that a program based on the philosophic
position of this study will have to differ most substantially from general
education music courses now in operation. A glance at a few typical
examples, such as the ones found at the University of Chicago,[2] Univer-
sity of Florida,[3] or the University of North Carolina,[4] shows that stu-
dents, regardless of differing abilities and previous training, are ex-
pected to master identical material by the time their general education
music experience (or a prescribed part thereof) has been completed.

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[1] Carl E. Seashore, Psychology of Music (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1938), p. 324.

[2] Humanities 1.

[3] The Humanities (C-51 & 52).

[4] Music 41.

Even more strangely, this identity of experience is supposed to take

place in the same length of instruction. Such procedures run counter

to the position of this study.

It is, needless to say, entirely possible to devise a program

geared to the needs of the least talented and experienced students, with

a concomitant lack of stimulation for the remainder of the group; simi-

larly, it is possible to address the program to those students possess-

ing the greatest aptitude and preparation for musical studies; finally,

and most frequently, it is possible to aim for some mean or median of

student ability and background, but in each instance students outside

the specific group for which the program was designed are likely to suf-

fer. Thus the second task confronting each instructor is a selection of

content and methodology best suited to the needs of his particular group

of students. No master plan devised for the total course population is

likely to satisfy the varying needs of many different sections. Similar-

ly, no program leading in a prescribed length of time to a single out-

come can be thought desirable in this context. The superficially plaus-

ible objection, that the variances introduced by such a proposal defeat

the purpose of general education, can only be sustained if general edu-

cation is defined as the accomplishment of identical specifics (as cer-

tain educators indeed demand[1]). But this again would be logically in-

defensible from the standpoint explored by this study. Hence, it must

be repeated, establishment of concrete course content and methodology

for each section (based on the results of the exploratory process) is

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[1]Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1936), p. 66.

the second logical step in organizing the program.

There appears to be some danger that the partial individualization inherent in the approach just presented might defeat attempts to speak of the music program as a whole. This danger is, however, more apparent than real. To be sure, the actual works presented, the level of difficulty on which analysis is conducted, even the language used in class discussions all have to vary from section to section. On the other hand, the principle of approach, the orientation taken toward the musical experience, even the structure of analysis flow from the aesthetic nature of the experience and from the "as if" reality of the medium--and these remain the same for all sections. In fact, this was one reason why, in pragmatic terms, the definition of the aesthetic experience had to be drawn within the narrow limits developed in Chapter V. The formal nature of the aesthetic experience makes it necessary that (though varying in difficulty and complexity) identical considerations guide the students' experiences, namely, considerations for the expansion of perceptions of form. The "as if" autonomy of the medium demands that attention be directed toward identical types of musical stimuli, though, again, student differences will make the specific examples vary. So long, therefore, as it is possible to find some basic processes of experiential organization and certain common requirements of medium, the nature of topics throughout the program will remain the same, no matter how widely their application may differ from section to section.

One of the more immediately apparent unifying forces in the program grows from the social considerations involved in the musical experience. It has been stated as a cardinal objective of the course (cf.

Chapter VII) that situations be created which will promote the indivi-

dual's growth along musical lines most likely to integrate his own need-

satisfactions with the social context of his world. This, in turn,

imposes on the program the requirement to select the objects of study

(musical compositions) from an area of musical expression generally

available in the contemporary scene. It further makes it necessary to

emphasize those skills most apposite to the experiencing of musical

performances available in the present and foreseeable future. This

means that, except in highly atypical situations, emphasis must be

placed on works and musical idioms now contained--or reasonably antici-

pated--in the repertory of the various musical agencies (orchestras,

opera houses, phonograph records, etc.) the student is likely to en-

counter. In skill-development this also means that the _primary_ (though

not exclusive) emphasis must tend toward hearing-skills required in the

interaction with works composed in a tonal and metric idiom. Lest these

statements be misinterpreted, it must be emphasized that the restric-

tions imposed are neither inflexible, nor as limiting as they might

sound.

First of all, nothing stated in the foregoing excludes the possi-

bility of reaching beyond the existing repertory, provided that such ac-

tion is not taken at the cost of ignoring or slighting materials and

skills pertaining to that repertory. Secondly, whenever the exploratory

studies show the student to be atypical in background, modifications of

the program content can always be provided. Thirdly, and this is a point

of particular importance at the time of writing, the availability of re-

markably wide repertories on phonograph records, plus the fact that (un-

desirable though this may be from some points of view) much of a student's

future musical experience is likely to be by way of the phonograph, the
area of selection is amazingly broad. Thus restrictions imposed by the
repertory are actually limitations within the most generous of confines.
Finally, the objection that preoccupation with existing repertories
produces audiences of extremely conservative tastes, whose refusal to
patronize anything new will lead to a stagnation and decay of musical
expression, is totally unrealistic in terms of the orientation this
program must take.

In terms of the conceptions of reality and communication developed
in the earlier sections of this study, music so far removed from a po-
tential listener as to be outside any common ground he might find with
it is unequivocally also outside his sphere of experience. He cannot
bring it into existence as a genuine experience (cf. Chapter III), nor
can any educational system be devised which could possibly alter this
situation. Hence a postulated requirement for the music program which
would produce in its students abilities of reaching music that far re-
moved from them is systematically absurd. On the other hand, and
pragmatically this second alternative is the only meaningful one, expan-
sion of the student's taste will take place whenever the educational
effort is a successful one. This follows from the conception of educa-
tion (and positive value formation) as the providing of dynamic situa-
tions which contain a constantly expanding characteristic (cf. Chapters
III and VI). Musical education so conceived enables the student to con-
tinue the enlargement of his musical experiences beyond the period of
formal education. Consequently, the specific goal under discussion
(i.e. the provision of foundations for musical experiences emphasizing

existing or readily anticipated musical idioms) may only be interpreted in a way which permits subsequent expansion of the student's taste to include musical works and idioms that, quite possibly, are far removed from the examples included in his instructional period. When so understood, serious emphasis on the available repertory becomes a legitimate guide in formulating the content and methodology of the course of instruction.

Beyond the considerations of idiom (as dictated by the available repertory) there are other factors which will tend to provide common features among the different sections in which the program is to be offered. These factors stem from the contention that the characteristically musical part of a person's total experience (when listening to music) is essentially aesthetic and that the aesthetic experience is characterized by its formal aspects (cf. Chapters V and VII). Whatever the specific works, activities, emphases of the program in any given section might be, all will have to share the formal orientation adopted toward musical experience. This formal orientation, however, must be genuine in terms of student experience, and the experience can be genuine only as it involves the student in the aural, the listening, process. It has been said that "the essence of every musical experience is listening and until this ability is established it is futile to undertake the study of music appreciation."[1] Or even more categorically: in the case of music, "appreciation is . . . primarily a problem of hearing. After we

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[1] Sister M. Alodia, "Music Appreciation Can Be Taught," Catholic School Journal, 52:38-40, February, 1952.

have learned to hear we can then begin to understand."[1] This "hearing" is, however, a rather complex experience, since it involves interaction with both the totality and the parts of a musical composition. Since, furthermore, it is necessary to accept the "as if" reality of the stimulating object, the entire problem of the nature of that object is raised. Thus it appears that the formal nature of the musical experience relates intimately to the formal structure of the musical composition (as perceived by the hearer). This further suggests that improved perception of the formal qualities of a given musical composition is central in any attempted intensification of a given musical experience--and that an enlargement of the number and types of compositions in which such perception takes place is necessary in the extension of musical experiences. Both of these having been listed as objectives of the program (cf. Chapter VII), all sections will have to show some progress in these directions. The formal qualities of a musical composition being inherent in the medium itself (on an "as if" basis), this obligation resolves itself into a requirement of dealing with the medium-characteristics of a musical composition. The medium, finally, being essentially identical for all works of music, the problem becomes nothing more nor less than a coping with the four basic elements of music: rhythm, melody, harmony, and tone color (timbre). That certain works, commonly classed as musical, such as songs, operas, programmatic compositions, involve additional factors as well, does not alter their nature as far as the purely musical features are concerned. It appears, therefore,

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[1]Howard Hanson, "Music in the Liberal Arts College," Journal of General Education, 1:156-159, January, 1947.

that "in music this basic problem is concerned not with history, nor

even aesthetics, but with the sensitizing of the ear to an awareness

of the elements which go together to make music."[1]

This seems to reduce the major portion of the proposed program to

a remarkably simple problem. Such, however, is not the case. As Howard

Hanson puts it:

> Aural concentration . . . is an exceedingly taxing type
> of attention. That this is true is evidenced by the fact
> that education is experimenting so extensively in the de-
> vising of visual aids to concentration whenever the aural
> approach is involved. . . . [It] is my belief that the
> number of individuals fully equipped to grasp a piece of
> music of any complexity at first hearing is so small as to
> be startling. It may be that music is a universal language,
> but, if so, I am sure that the type of music universally
> understood is limited to that of the greatest possible
> simplicity. It would hardly include art music of any
> degree of complexity.[2]

To increase the difficulty even further, it must be kept in mind that the

manner in which these elements are used at any given moment in a musical

composition is so varied, the problem of overcoming the obstacles posed

by a composition's movement in time is so great, that the systematically

simple obligation of the course (_i.e._ to deal with the four elements of

music) becomes a practical undertaking of considerable proportions.

The intricacy of this process results directly from the fact

that music is an art of time, not space. The two-fold implications of

this circumstance manifest themselves as problems of perceptual sensi-

tivity and aural memory. At a given moment, or, more accurately, over

a _brief_ span of time, the four elements of music may be intercombined

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[1]_Loc. cit._

[2]_Loc. cit._

in an almost infinite variety of ways. Each of these sound stimuli has a definite structural function in providing some aspect of the aesthetic components of form. Failure to perceive one or more of these stimuli is bound to leave a gap and make formal organization of the listener's experience problematic. That even a fully trained musician may accomplish such perception on levels which are not wholly conscious, does not in any way reduce the damage caused by an absence of some pertinent perception. Speaking metaphorically, when such gaps occur, some essential building block needed for the construction of form in the hearer's experience has simply not been supplied through the senses. Thus, the improvement of musical perception, particularly in works where such elements are presented in complex patterns during individual brief spans of time, becomes one of the essential features of the learning process. But the second consideration, posed by the difficulties of retention, is, if anything, even more critical.

A musical composition may take anywhere from a few minutes to several hours to perform. So long as the composition is heard as a work (a "whole"), there is a constant, irreversible progress through time-- with the total formal experience completed only at the end of the composition. In this process, however, there is not a single moment when the entire work of art exists as a unified organism as far as the stimulating object is concerned. Only the memory of the listener can make it cohere into a single experience. This statement applies as much to the various sub-wholes which form the component parts, as it does to the composition in its entirety. A specific illustration may help to clarify this point. At no time can one hear all of Beethoven's Eroica. As stimuli, the

sounds are merely momentary occurrences, aligned over a period of time which covers the better part of an hour. Each of the four movements, in turn, is, as far as the actual sounds are concerned, merely a collection of momentary stimulations, stretched over a correspondingly smaller expanse of time. Even individual melodies, qua melodies, come into existence only when the memory of the listener synthesizes them from single notes. In a very real sense, therefore, the Eroica as an entity exists for the hearer only as he is capable of assembling the component sounds into a gestalt through his own retentive ability. Such an act of memory, however, is not easy where the stimuli are lacking the usual symbolic or signifying associations. That is why, generally speaking, so many people fail to derive aesthetically satisfying experiences from compositions of extended duration. The lack of large stores of available energies directed toward the organizing aspects of perception makes it impossible for them to organize sound stimuli of this abstract nature into the kind of complex, substantial units which most art-music demands. That is why a change in this state of available energies was discussed at some length in connection with the objectives of the music program (cf. Chapter VII). A change in this situation was deemed essential if the student's musical experience were to be extended. Thus a further problem area of the music program becomes apparent. Along with greater sensitivity in perceiving musical stimulation offered in terms of the four elements, there must be a growth in the ability to retain the stimuli received so as to permit their organization into more significant wholes and sub-wholes.

Finally, and still as a direct outgrowth of the nature of musical works, some methods or principles must be provided by which the perceived and retained stimuli can be changed from mere potentials for organization

into actual structures in the life space of the listener. This statement is not to be interpreted as an atomistic approach to the aural experience. De facto, in accord with the psychological studies cited in Chapter V, all perception takes place in terms of various wholes. The question here revolves around the size and differentiation of the wholes each listener perceives. The learning situation involves first the increasing of available energies--thereby promoting more elaborated structures in perception--and secondly the creation of some ideational framework through which conscious interpretation of perceptions becomes possible. Since both of these factors are rarely present to any great extent in the life space of the average student (with available energy states low, and suitable ideational patterns practically non-existent) the achievement of positive changes in this respect applies quite generally to the music program under discussion. Differences among sections become, once again, divergencies of application and variations of pedagogical approach.

Both the increase in available energy states and the creation of suitable ideational frameworks involve increased concentration on the actual sound-stimuli provided in the musical experience. This much is hardly ever disputed. There is, however, some question as to the most effective method by which this end is to be achieved. The procedure here advocated is based on the generally accepted educational maxim that optimal learning proceeds from the known to the unknown and its corollary, that, whenever possible, multiple unknowns not be attacked simultaneously. As applied to the listening experience, this means that the original works chosen should be in idioms familiar to the student and that the various elements and techniques receive intensive treatment seriatim

during the course of study. To guard against the danger of atomism it must be stressed that, regardless of the momentary emphasis, the presentation always takes place through a musical experience containing a totality of the elements. When, for example, rhythm is to be examined, it is not to be presented as an abstract concept, produced by mechanical means, but rather as an element of music shown in context of an actual composition. The seeming isolation is purely a pedagogical device designed to permit the student's concentration on some concrete musical feature thereby, possibly for the first time, directing his energies toward the perception of sound-stimuli without any signifying functions. Aaron Copland shows keen awareness of the objections mentioned and also of the desirability of the procedure:

> From the standpoint of the lay listener they [the four elements] have only limited value, for he is seldom conscious of hearing any of them separately. It is their combined effect--the seemingly inextricable web of sound they form--with which listeners are concerned for the most part.

> Still, the layman will find it is well-nigh impossible to have a fuller conception of the musical content [i.e. obtain a fuller musical experience] without in some degree delving into the intricacies of rhythm, melody, harmony, and tone color.[1]

An educator with long experience in this area of music education, states the case even more strongly:

> The statement has often been made . . . that if one studies any of the fundamentals and attempts to listen to and for it alone in musical experiences he will miss the greater enjoyment of the complete composition. In contradiction of this point of view it has worked out in

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[1]Aaron Copland, What to Listen for in Music (New York: The New American Library, 1939), p. 25.

> thousands of instances that if a student gives his atten-
> tion judiciously and actively to each of the fundamentals
> until he can follow them with little difficulty, he will
> ultimately be able to hear the composition with each of
> the . . . fundamentals adding to his enjoyment in a way
> proportionate to its importance in the composition
> itself.[1]

It hardly needs to be said that Fishburn's statement about "enjoyment"

applies with equal force to the aesthetic experiencing of music since,

presumably, the enjoyment referred to results directly from the need-

satisfaction contained in the aesthetic experience.

There is, furthermore, an entirely different way of analyzing the

experience which also tends to support initial preoccupation with the

elements of music. It must be recognized that in the context of music

the elements themselves occur as organized structures and not as dis-

creet, random incidents. Thus the study of the elements, undertaken

musically, necessarily involves the study of wholes or, at least, sub-

wholes, and not a pre-occupation with unitary components. Each of the

four elements appears in music in a formally structured way; hence, so

long as the study is of a musical appearance of these elements (as dis-

tinct from noises), the listener is necessarily concerned with the type

of formal experience earlier described as aesthetic. If, in addition,

pedagogical results are of the nature indicated by Fishburn, there ap-

pear to be neither theoretical nor practical objections to this pro-

cedure. For these reasons, intensive preoccupation with the improvement

of the aural experiencing of musical elements becomes one of the key topic

areas of the proposed music program.

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[1]Hummel Fishburn, Fundamentals of Music Appreciation (New York:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), p. 12.

In the foregoing pages it has been stated that the temporal nature of musical experiences imposes particularly severe tasks on the organizing activity of the listener. It has also been shown that interactions with the individual elements, though already in the nature of formal experiences, take place in context of a larger formal structure (the total composition), and that, therefore, these element-forms are in effect substructures in relation to the musical experience as a whole. If positive changes in the listening process were to terminate without conscious effort being made to take the hierarchically next higher step (i.e. the meaningful combination of subordinate gestalts), the music program would fall significantly short of providing a completed cycle of improvement. The achievement of this additional step again involves formal organization though, this time, on a still more complex level. Now the wholes into which the elements were seen to be organized need to be perceived as constituents of a still larger structure—and this means an application of the aesthetic principles discussed in Chapter V to the composition as a single organism. These principles have been designated as union, balance, evolution, dominance, and equilibrium and have been seen to result in what Parker termed "organic unity."[1] Though often designated as "form,"[2] this organic unity, when occurring in music, shall, hereafter, be named "design," thereby providing a term consistently restricted to musical experiences alone. This designation will make it necessary to resort, at times, to rather cumbersome verbalizations since

[1]DeWitt H. Parker, The Principles of Aesthetics (second edition; New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1946), p. 70.

[2]Hummel Fishburn, op. cit., p. 127.

accepted musical terminology, more often than not, speaks of "forms"
when, in line with the practice herein proposed, the word "design" is
called for. The procedure adopted differentiates discussions of or-
ganic unity as a general aesthetic phenomenon ("form") from its special
application to music ("design"). The resultant clarity of meaning ap-
pears well worth the price of occasionally inelegant verbal expression.
Hence, for example, it will become necessary to speak of "song-form"
design, "sonata-form" design, etc., but it will also be possible to
indicate by the choice of wording that entire musical structures, not
merely aesthetically organized components, are the subjects of discus-
sion.

With this explanation, it is hoped, the highest purely musical
level of organization can now be specified. So long as the program
operates in the musical realm alone, design constitutes the top level of
organization. It involves the structuring of a musical experience on the
plane where all factors directly attributable to a listener's interaction
with the musical stimulus are integrated. From the experiential stand-
point, it demands the perception of a composition as an entity, involv-
ing abilities of hearing, retention, and organization of sound stimuli
presented in terms of all four elements. From the standpoint of peda-
gogy, it requires activities devised for the attainment of such percep-
tions in a constantly expanding field of applications. Thus, only with
the attainment of growth in the experiencing of design can even the
purely musical phase of the general education music program be considered
complete. As such, it becomes the final problem in the topic organiza-
tion of the music program--as far as the autonomous musical experience
is concerned.

Once this level has been reached, however, attention must again be directed to an issue which has been held in abeyance for some time, namely, that the music sequence is merely one part in a larger educational endeavour, that, therefore (cf. Chapter VII), it must lend itself to integration with the broader purposes of the general education program. Even now, however, the concrete nature of this integration cannot be determined within the confines of this study since, as has been stated, this would necessitate the outlining of a total general education program. Nevertheless, the existence of a need for integration demands that one of the most vital items to be included in the topic organization of a concrete course be the provision of some functioning integrative procedures. As such, systematic completeness requires the acknowledgement of this obligation, even though it is impossible to discharge it within the limitations of this study. In lieu of describing, therefore, the integrative aspects of a concrete program, a few remarks will be offered to indicate several possible directions in which such integration may profitably be sought.

The aesthetic (formal) point of view adopted toward the autonomously musical aspects of the experience indicates one avenue of approach which, depending on the over-all program, may yield gratifying results. Either in parallel offerings, or in the class sections dealing with the musical experience itself, analogous instruction in other media of aesthetic expression may be attempted. In this case it probably would be feasible to demonstrate the existence of elements, structural principles, and methods of approach (applicable to such fields as painting, sculpture, poetry, fiction, drama) which yield aesthetic experiences in

other media, just as their counterparts in music result in aesthetic musical experiences. The unifying principle here is the aesthetic experience itself. There are, however, certain dangers in such a procedure. First, it may happen that the process of integration becomes one of verbalization only, lacking genuine experiential (hence aesthetic) content. This danger has clearly been recognized by the planners of the humanities program at Stevens College. Though their statement starts almost facetiously, it points to a real risk present in such an undertaking:

> There appears to be a curious trait in human nature that makes us turn from the art object itself to the explanation of it. . . . When there is a poem or a selection of poetry on a page, accompanied by an explanation, the student will almost always read the explanation, but skip the poetry.[1]

In other words, similarities, analogies, connections may be drawn and become central in a total program, while at the same time the aesthetic experiences, on which these verbalizations are supposed to rest, fail to occur in the life of the students. The second pitfall pertains to the equally great danger that analogies may be forced where none actually exist; where, therefore, the student is asked to create an experience, provide a unity, which simply is beyond his powers to create. The result is not only liable to destroy any aimed-for integration, but it also is apt to interfere with the creation of an experience (aesthetic or otherwise), thereby reducing the situation to mere "experiencing"--with all its attendant frustrations (cf. Chapter V). Given adequate safeguards,

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[1]Louise Dudley, "A Basic Course in the Humanities," (Roy Ivan Johnson, general editor, Explorations in General Education The Experiences of Stevens College, New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), p. 71.

however, integration with other aspects of the program on the basis of the formal foundations of the aesthetic experience becomes eminently feasible.

Another possible principle of integration may be evolved on a less direct basis. Edwin J. Stringham attempts something of this nature in several chapters of his book on music appreciation.[1] Here integration is proposed by treating musical experiences in context of larger experiential units, in which music constitutes some, but not all, of the total experience. This procedure, illustrated by such headings as "Music and the Dance,"[2] "Music and Ceremony,"[3] "Music and Religion,"[4] has the great advantage of providing an extensive connective area between the musical phase of the program and such other fields as the visual and literary arts, social sciences, and, possibly, even the physical sciences. There is, however, a threat to genuine experiencing of music whenever the musical experience is treated primarily as part of a more inclusive situation. In such cases it is easy to reduce music to an insignificant background against which other aspects of the experience are analyzed, thereby failing to achieve, in fact running counter to, the objective of mobilizing greater available energies in the musical experience proper. Here again great care must be taken lest in the process of integration the "object" of integration—the aesthetic experience in music—once again be sacrificed.

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[1] Edwin J. Stringham, Listening to Music Creatively (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943), pp. 1-38.

[2] Ibid., p. 1

[3] Ibid., p. 10.

[4] Ibid., p. 17.

A third method of integration is somewhat more difficult to describe, yet offers considerable promise if adequately developed. This approach establishes connections between musical experiences and other human activities on the basis of certain emotional and ideational kinships. It is possible, for example, to discover in musical experiences great intensities of emotional states. These can form the basis of connection between music and other aesthetic experiences of similar character, and also connect music to philosophic orientations assigning the emotional aspects of man a high position in the hierarchy of values. Certainly the obverse types will also suggest relationships. The greatest difficulty in integrating a program along these lines must be attributed to the fact that relatively few realms of genuine coordination have been discovered. In developing just a single semester's work (in which music played only a subordinate part), one institution found itself in the position of forcing connections far exceeding those sincerely believed to exist.[1] Grave doubts now have arisen in the minds of those responsible for this program whether or not the connections so forced do not, in fact, grossly distort all experiences involved in the attempted integration.

Finally, the most commonly employed integrative device is, of course, the one of historicity. In its least meaningful form it becomes a coordination on the basis of some crude chronology--crude, because an exact chronology inescapably produces stylistic and pedagogical problems too great to surmount. Historical coordination as a principle is not nearly as unpromising as many unimaginative applications have made it appear. Obviously, if a course were to adopt a chronological sequence, and

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[1] University of Florida, The Humanities, C-51.

start, say, with ancient Greece, progress in a continuous sequence--
attempt, therefore, to base an introductory course on the approach taken
by Paul Henry Lang[1] in a book not intended (and usually not used) for
such a program--the results would, most likely, be disastrous. But if
chronological progress were not used as the chief principle of histori-
city, if, for example, a particular social and geographic milieu were
chosen and in it the various human activities explored, their inter-con-
nection demonstrated, if, next, some ideationally and stylistically con-
trasting setting were chosen, if, finally, the number of choices were
sufficiently restricted so that adequate experiences (as distinct from
verbalizations) could be provided, then the specific content of the
music offering might well be so devised as to accomplish both the desired
objectives relating to the musical experience and also provide a function-
ing component in the larger organism of a general education program. Such
restraint in coverage, however, runs severely counter to the tradition
of historical and survey courses. It is, therefore, hardly surprising
that quite a few institutions have chosen not to incur the risks in-
volved. Again Dudley provides an articulate statement on the subject:

> [The] members of the humanities division at Stephens
> College felt, and have continued to feel, that the par-
> ticular advantages of the analytical method far out-
> weighed those of the historical. Historical courses,
> therefore, have been reserved until the student has been
> introduced to the principles of art as given in The
> Humanities.[2]

It may be worth while to point out that the value of a historical approach

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[1] Paul Henry Lang, Music in Western Civilization (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1941).

[2] Louise Dudley, op. cit., p. 73.

has by no means been rejected by the spokesman just quoted, merely postponed to a later phase of the educational program. It may be argued quite plausibly that the integrative aspects of general education might best be served if not only historicity, but also other principles of integration were incorporated formally into the program only after the foundations of skills and experiences have been provided. In such cases much informal integration could still take place from the earliest moments on, but the advantages of firm experiential grounding would be available for later synthesizing activities. But, as has been said before, the actual process adopted will depend to such a large extent on considerations transcending the music program, that this study will not be able to offer a particular method of integration among the problems constituting the topic organization of the music program.

This topic organization may now be summarized in nine brief points:

1) The program must begin by ascertaining the abilities, background, preferences, and interests of the students.

2) It must provide adequate flexibility of content and methodology to accommodate--if need be in different sections--the varying groups found in a student population of any considerable size.

3) It must involve content and skills of such nature as to be of maximum value to students in their concrete historical and geographical environment--including such modifications as reasonably anticipated changes in the environment may suggest.

4) It must provide the basis for continued growth, including the extension of a student's musical experience beyond the

limits of the program content.

5) It must provide for growth in the perception of stimuli presented through the aural interaction with the four elements of music.

6) It must provide for growth in the ability to retain perceptions gained through interaction with the musical elements.

7) It must accomplish the presentation of elements in terms of a musical configuration.

8) It must provide the necessary principles and conditions to move from the perception of form in the elements (as sub-wholes) to the aural comprehension of musical design (as an entity of a higher order).

9. It must either become part of an integrated unit of general education or must offer adequate foundations for subsequent integrative experiences.

Subsequent chapters of this study will be devoted to the presentation of a program which, within certain limitations, follows the nine-point topic organization presented above. There are, however, a few matters which need to be mentioned before such a presentation can become meaningful.

Immediately apparent is the fact that this topic organization is logical, rather than pedagogical, that it provides separate headings for activities best conducted on a joint basis, that it fails to indicate necessary repetitions, etc. Obviously the program to be outlined will not, therefore, follow the topic organization in structural sequence—just as it has never been suggested that any program should be logical

rather than pedagogical in concrete application. The logic lies in the plan of the program, it applies to the principles to be followed, not the order in which the activities are to be carried out.

A second point to be considered springs from the nature of this study. Since it is restricted to the music program alone, it will be necessary to confine the presentation to a situation in which the absence of integrative considerations is likely to exert the least possible handicap. Thus the description of the music sequence which follows is conceived as occurring in a framework where primary concern with integration has been assigned to a subsequent period of study. This does not negate the possibility of using much of the content and many of the procedures herein described in a program where immediate integration is desired-- and periodic points where such integration may occur will be suggested-- nor does it exclude all references which transcend purely musical considerations. What it does make possible is the description of a program which can be presented as a functioning course, even though information about its total setting is necessarily unavailable. In this connection it must also be stated that certain additional, admittedly artibrary, assumptions had to be made in reference to the abilities and achievements of the students involved.

In consequence of the foregoing, the exploratory phase of the program has, of necessity,been omitted. It will be assumed that, on the low end of the scale, all deaf and functionally tone-deaf students have been eliminated from the course and that, on the upper end, students with a record of theoretical training (as distinct from routine childhood "lessons" in music) or an indication of extensive voluntary musical experi-

ences as concert patrons or record collectors have also been excluded.

Actual selections, particularly in the earlier phases of the course,

might still have to be modified in each concrete application, but with

these exceptions the program can be considered representative of the

general type of offering suggested for college freshmen and sophomores

by the philosophical orientation forming the basis of this study.

CHAPTER IX

A SAMPLE PROGRAM -- THE ELEMENTS OF MUSIC

As stated in the previous chapter, the beginning of the program here presented takes place after a process of exploration. Thus it may be permissible to dispense with the preliminaries which are customarily offered to establish initial rapport. This makes it possible to turn directly to the first activity designed to contribute to the musical growth of students.

In line with the emphasis placed on the elements of music in the process of intensifying and extending musical experiences (cf. Chapter VIII), it seems advisable to concentrate immediately on these vital components. Here, however, the teacher is faced with a pedagogical problem. He is aware of the necessity of dealing with the elements, whereas his students, more than likely, are completely unaware of it. Should he, at this time, arbitrarily propose to them procedures for which they see no good reason, it is at least questionable whether desirable results will accrue. The situation is one which the practicing teacher faces constantly; he must find some way of having his students bring to conscious awareness a need which they possess, but which is, to them, by no means explicit. The method herein proposed is one which has been tried (with encouraging results) at the University of Florida.[1]

At the start of the meeting the following statement, referring to

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[1] The Humanities (C-51).

the earlier period of exploration, is made:[1]

> Everybody here has said that he or she likes some types
>
> of music, that he or she gets a kick out of hearing some
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> compositions. At the same time most of you also said that
>
> certain compositions leave you cold, or even arouse active
>
> dislike. Let us try to find out what it is that makes you
>
> like some of these pieces. I am going to play a series of
>
> selections, each of which has been listed as a favorite by
>
> some member of the class. Try to listen carefully to all of
>
> them and see if you can pin down just what it is you like
>
> about them. Pay particularly close attention to the one you
>
> yourself picked as a favorite and try to tell us just what
>
> it was that made you select it in the first place.

Following this statement brief excerpts from compositions chosen

as favorites by members of the class are presented on the phonograph. In

line with the desideratum of treating all listening experiences in a gen-

uinely musical context (cf. Chapter VIII), some care must be exercised

that each selection have some integrity of form. For example, should the

group include a number of popular songs, one complete chorus or stanza

might be a suitable unit. Similarly, the complete principal song of a

minuet-and-trio design or the entire theme in a theme-and-variation de-

sign might be considered appropriate units. The exact numbers will

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[1]Occasionally it appeared desirable to include some statements
indicating the style, as well as the content, of remarks made to students.
These statements have been taken from lecture notes, notes taken by at-
tending faculty members, and, in a few instances, from tape recordings
of actual class meetings. They are identified in this study by being
presented in indented form, but double spaced for easier reading and
clear differentiation from long quotations.

depend on the preferences of the group, but should, if at all possible,

show some variety of tempo, idiom, and medium. It may be possible, at

this time, to venture a guess as to the nature of these selections. Al-

though some opinions to the contrary have been expressed,[1] the preponder-

ance of compositions is apt to be of the "popular" or "hillbilly" type.

In addition, there is likely to be some demand for the genre exemplified

by the waltzes of Johann Strauss; quite possibly some illustrations may

call for excerpts from the romantic period of the standard orchestral

repertory, and, perhaps surprisingly, in most cases at least a few re-

quests for a Beethoven or Mozart composition will also be included.

After the selections have been played, students can then be asked

to offer their suggestions as to the particular features which made them

select their favorite among the selections. From the standpoint of

maintaining positive valences toward music and class experiences, this

phase can become crucial. To fully comprehend the situation, it may be

of some value to analyze the process taking place at this time.

The individual student, possibly for the first time in his life,

has consciously tried to concentrate his energies in a musical experi-

ence. More than likely, the analytical assignment (i.e. to bring into

consciousness some factors which inclined him favorably toward a specific

piece of music) is even less familiar to him. It is, therefore, reason-

able to anticipate considerable uncertainty, insecurity, in his psychic

state. Under the circumstances he is likely to be timid, even fearful

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[1] Paul J. Faye and Warren C. Middleton, "Relationship Between Musi-
cal Talent and Preferences for Different Types of Music," Journal of Edu-
cational Psychology, 32:573-583, November, 1941.

in voicing his findings. That outwardly his behavior may be actually rather aggressive is frequently a sign of that very insecurity--and an anticipation of negative judgments from the instructor. The student has undoubtedly heard disparaging comments about "popular" music and has, in many instances, formed a stereotype of faculty members, which leads him to suspect that any such preference is likely to meet with ridicule. It is, therefore, of greatest significance that the instructor's response to student statements do everything possible to dispell these impressions. At the same time, it would be equally disadvantageous in relation to those selecting less "popular" compositions, if the instructor were to make overt or implied value judgments seeming to favor the "popular" idiom. The foremost requirement, therefore, is the maintenance of maximum detachment as far as the musical selections are concerned. Similarly, the perceptiveness of student comments is likely to vary considerably and the skill of expression might range from near-perfect lucidity to total incomprehensibility. Once again it is incumbent on the instructor to exercise self-restraint if unfavorable reactions are to be avoided. Simultaneously, however, there exists an apparently contradictory requirement, namely that the instructor display genuine enthusiasm for the task at hand and in regard to the participation of his students. Thus the first attempt at discussing a musical experience in its own terms is a particularly trying and challenging one for teachers in general education.

It may be thought that excessive space has been allotted to such a brief moment in a program which, after all, will have to be of several months' duration. Nevertheless, the attitudes formed in the earliest

phase of the course are so significant in the formation of valences that it is hard to overestimate the care and thought which must be expended in conducting these initial contacts. The same tact is required in guiding the process of selection which next becomes necessary.

Of the many comments which students offer, some are more fruitful than others in pinpointing the pertinent features of music. These must now be brought into focus without offending members of the class whose remarks are not further explored. Usually it is possible to do this by showing that most of the comments tend to form groups describing identical features. For example, several students are likely to have said something about the "tune" or "tunefulness" of their favorite selection, others probably brought up "bounce" or "rhythm" as the outstanding feature of their choice. In such cases it becomes possible to collect the pertinent remarks under the heading of one of the elements and show how, in each case, diverse terms actually describe identical features. In most classes such discussions will eventually result in a collection of remarks which, when grouped, identify the four elements of music: rhythm, melody, harmony, and tone color.

The next step involves the creation of a situation in which, ideally, each student becomes aware of the need for improving his ability to hear these four elements. One of the ways this has been attempted--and one which frequently yields hilarious results--is to select some adventurous volunteer, ask him to play his particular favorite on the phonograph, and call attention to the features of the music responsible for his choice. If the candidate's preferences are pretty nearly in agreement with those of the class as a whole, it will soon become apparent

that most single individuals hear no more than a fraction of the music. Furthermore, since members of the class collectively can be expected to find far more items of note than did the individual who chose the music, any lingering resentment at the "favored" position of the demonstrator generally disappears.

By this time, active participation in the activities of the group tends to be widespread and, in most classes, intensive. A recognition that more can be heard in a piece of music than is usually experienced characterizes the comments volunteered by students. If this atmosphere can be maintained, students may express so much interest and ask so many questions that transition to a demonstration, more formal definition, and more specific illustration of the musical elements follows quite easily. In preparing for this transition and in guiding the discussion, precautions need be adopted to avoid turning the process into empty verbalization. Thus, whenever a student makes a point, whether it be eventually accepted or rejected, it should always be tied to the aural experience. This usually involves playing passages on the piano or phonograph (depending on the nature of the comment) and asking the student whether his statement was accurately reflected by the music. The specific purpose of this procedure is twofold. On the one hand, it tends to clarify the student's meaning to the class (or forces him to reword his statement until class and instructor grasp what, in terms of musical sound, he wished to convey); on the other, it constitutes valuable exercise for the group in concentrating on music qua music. If carefully guided, this phase ought in itself to be a good exercise in the most elementary type of "ear training"--quite aside from furnishing a logical and peda-

gogically convenient transition to more formal consideration of the musical elements.

Specific discussion of the elements can, of course, start with any of the four. The best choice will depend on the direction student comments have taken. Howard Hanson feels that the most profitable approach "should begin with the study of rhythm. . . ."[1] In practice this will often be the case, but the advantages gained are not sufficient to force such a beginning if student sentiment indicates some other direction. As an illustration in a sample program, however, starting with rhythm offers the distinct convenience of a logical development which also appears promising from a pedagogical point of view. Unfortunately, starting with the element of rhythm poses the difficult problem of finding an adequate definition. Willi Apel goes so far as to state that it

> . . . would be a hopeless task to search for a definition of rhythm which would prove acceptable even to a small minority of musicians and writers on music.[2]

Contrariwise, Hummel Fishburn offers an extremely narrow and specific definition, stating "that rhythm is the regular recurrence of accented and unaccented beats."[3] Aaron Copland, in turn, avoids the issue altogether, devoting several pages to this element without ever evolving a

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[1]Howard Hanson, "Music in the Liberal Arts College," Journal of General Education, 1:158, January, 1947.

[2]Willi Apel, Harvard Dictionary of Music (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1944), p. 639.

[3]Hummel Fishburn, Fundamentals of Music Appreciation (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), p. 96.

definition.[1] Theodore M. Finney[2] and Gomer Ll. Jones[3] adopt what might

be termed compromise positions, by offering broad, inclusive definitions

which are then elaborated in terms of specific illustrations. Each pro-

cedure has its merits and disadvantages. Fishburn's definition has the

great virtue of being concrete, readily demonstrable, and easily grasped

by students. It has the shortcoming of excluding (by its very specifi-

city) many aspects of music which by logic and practical experience are

best analyzed as components of rhythm. Copland's avoidance of a defini-

tion frees student and instructor from the necessity of arriving at a

formulation which may, in light of subsequent experiences, become dis-

turbingly restrictive. On the other hand, it leads to the continued use

of a term for which no "referent"[4] has been specified. Hence it would

seem advisable to follow Finney's and Jones' example and provide a defi-

nition of considerable generality which can, with constant reference to

aural experiences, be restricted in its application to specific works of

music.

A second, more narrowly methodological, problem centers around

the manner in which this definition is to be introduced. It is, of

course, entirely possible to present it as an accomplished fact, ex

[1]Aaron Copland, What to Listen for in Music (New York: The New
American Library, 1939), pp. 25-32.

[2]Theodore M. Finney, Hearing Music The Art of Active Listening
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), p. 32.

[3]Gomer Ll. Jones, "Rhythm, Tonality, and Form in Music," An Intro-
duction to Literature and the Fine Arts (John F. A. Taylor, editor: East
Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State College Press, 1950), p. 381.

[4]Max Black, "Referent," The Dictionary of Philosophy (Dagobert D.
Runes, editor; New York: Philosophical Library, [n.d.]), p. 267.

cathedra, as it were, and, where time is of the essence, the accruing
disadvantages may well be a small price to pay for the efficiency of this
procedure. It is, however, possible to retain student participation with-
out endangering the eventual evolution of a suitable definition. One
method which may be tried involves questions regarding the dimension in
which music takes place. These might be raised in the following context:

Painters frequently express a feeling of awe at the sight

of a clean, newly stretched canvas. "How am I going to fill

all this space with something worth looking at? How am I go-

ing to lead the spectator's eye from border to border without

losing his interest along the way?" Questions of this nature

have direct counterparts for artists in other media as well.

What form would they take for the architect? And how would

they apply to the composer?

The ensuing discussion discloses that the painter's two dimensional
problems are matched by similar difficulties in three dimensional space
for the architect, and by challenges in the single "fourth dimension" in
case of the composer. Such comments as "A piece of music must somehow
get from three p.m. to ten minutes after three," or "The audience has to
go along with the music for the half hour it takes to play the piece"
are typical student contributions. Usually someone will make the state-
ment that a period of time is the composer's framework in which he must
operate. Either a student or the instructor can then add a remark about
music being "a kind of flow through time" to which the listener responds.
During the course of discussion it is generally helpful to present several
musical examples of widely different rhythmic character and ask students
to try to identify some of the ways in which the composer accomplished

this "movement through time."

Attention must be called here to the fact that the term "rhythm" has not yet been defined, but the direction in which such a definition is to be sought has already been established. The listening process, as far as the selections are concerned, has been focused on the listener's temporal experience while interacting with the music. When the illustrations have been completed (some "popular" music, a march, a waltz, a brief non-metric example, and a theme from a symphonic slow movement might be suitable selections), there usually is no shortage of suggestions as to the ways in which the composer achieved his temporal movement. The instructor's chief function in the discussion becomes one of emphasizing the need to keep comments sufficiently general to remain applicable to all the music presented. From this discussion it then becomes possible to proceed to a formulation of the definition of rhythm. The exact wording will differ from class to class (since it is pedagogically advantageous to employ as many of the students' own phrases as possible), but in essence the definition can be stated in the following:

Rhythm is the continuous flow of music (sound and silence) from the first to the last moment of a composition. It is characterized by tensions and relaxations which focus the listener's attention on the irreversible progress through time.

This definition is sufficiently broad to apply to any musical style or idiom, yet clearly isolates temporal motion as the characteristic feature of rhythm. The very generality of the definition makes it

necessary to study and re-study it in application to different types of music. This opens the way to discussions of tempo, meter, duration, dynamics, harmony (as harmonic rhythm), provides a convenient approach to subsequent analyses of design, and also permits--should this be desired--early insights into period, national, and individual styles. As an immediate tool for "ear training" its value is obvious.

The definition of melody is, relatively, a much simpler task. A few selections played on the phonograph, sung by the class, and performed on the piano will probably produce some comment approximating Apel's skeletal definition, i.e. that melody is "a succession of musical tones. . . ."[1] To expand this basic definition through student contributions, the instructor can perform some material on the piano which meets the words of the definition, while still not satisfying students as to its melodic nature. The statement can be shown as incomplete by simply repeating a series of identical tones. Almost without fail the next suggestion will be that these tones, in order to form a melody, must be at different pitch levels. The shortcomings of this definition are then made apparent by playing a number of notes bearing no discernible relation to one another. At this point it may not be easy to progress further in clarifying the meaning of melody, but the difficulty is one of verbalization only. Students sense that some tone-series impress them as melodies, while others do not, without being able to verbalize the characteristics required to unite isolated tones into a melodic line. The delay can be turned to good use by concentrating on individual changes and

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[1] Willi Apel, op. cit., p. 435.

affecting modifications in the music played one characteristic at a time. This process can be continued until range, interval relationship, the inter-dependence of melody and rhythm, possibly even the formal characteristic of repetition all have been touched upon. Eventually a definition may be formulated in these terms:

Melody is a succession of tones, generally at different
pitch levels, which produces a continuous line of rising
and falling inflections.

Depending on the elaborateness with which the search for a definition has been conducted, statements about range, tone relations, melodic rhythm, etc., can be added as descriptive characteristics of a continuous line. Attention can also be drawn, preferably through further musical illustrations, to the fact that cohesion of tones into a melody depends on the functioning of the listener, that, therefore, his past experiences, geographic, historical and personal background will determine whether a particular sequence of tones is to him melodic in nature. Activities for expanding students' abilities to encompass a variety of idioms through consideration of melodic features are varied and extensive. Class listening, listening assignments, laboratory periods can all be built around this portion of the course.

In moving from melody to harmony, the approach will depend largely on the musical idioms listed among student preferences during the exploratory meetings of the group. The probability is high that the preferred types of music are homophonic, but it is by no means impossible that (due, perhaps, to an interest in improvisatory jazz) polyphony has enough adherents to make it the natural starting point. In this sample program, the approach taken assumes the more common situation, i.e. that

most students listed essentially homophonic selections among their favorites.

The discussions should again start with an aural experience. If among student preferences some single work of easily discernible harmonic structure was listed prominently, the natural choice is that composition. In the absence of a single choice, several examples, corresponding to the most frequently mentioned idioms, should be selected. These examples might include one or two "popular" songs (preferably slow in tempo, simple in harmonic devices, but containing both consonances and dissonances), a conventionally harmonized hymn tune, possibly that same hymn as harmonized in a Bach chorale. None of these selections needs to be played in its entirety, though as much of each as is performed ought to be a self-contained gestalt. Questions raised by students will depend on their success in concentrating attention away from the melodic part and either on the total texture, or on the supporting harmonies. It may, therefore, be advisable to precede the playing of these selections by a performance of their melodic lines on the piano--first unaccompanied, then with different harmonizations. In a few cases it may even be possible to draw members of the class into this performance (if amateur "barbershop" harmonizers are present), thereby reducing the need for phonographic demonstration.

Though students can be expected to raise pertinent questions without much prompting, a few judicious remarks can expedite the process. As before, these remarks should be quite informal and should raise some variant of this question: "What makes the sound of these pieces of music different, in spite of their melodies remaining unchanged?" In practice, the responses will invariably produce comments from which gradually a defini-

tion of harmony can emerge.

In case of this element, possibly more so than with melody, there is likely to arise some controversy in the elaboration of a definition. Some of the problems to be expected are indicated by Apel's statement:

> Harmony. In general, any simultaneous combination of sound, hence synonymous with chord. The narrower use of the term in the meaning of 'agreeable chord' conforms to some extent with earlier practice, but has been rendered pointless by the recent development of music. . . .
> Harmony, the vertical aspect of music, came to be appreciated considerably later than counterpoint, the horizontal aspect.[1]

This quotation emphasizes, first of all, the inadvisability of retaining the older--and, in a non-technical sense, still current--connotation of the term, i.e. that harmony is something pleasant, relaxing, and does not include tension-producing sound combinations. It also draws attention to the distinction frequently made by technicians which assigns to separate headings harmonic effects achieved through contrapuntal means. The former is likely to be one of the restrictions urged by students, the latter a distinction which can result in a definition unnecessarily complicated for beginners. The fact that students so frequently wish to equate harmony with "relaxed, pleasant, agreeable" sound combinations, raises the question whether or not it is wise to evolve a definition prior to the introduction of the concepts of consonance and dissonance. For the sake of clarity, this study proposes to define harmony first, following it with some discussion of consonance and dissonance, without suggesting that this sequence is necessarily the soundest in all situations. Certainly in some classes it has developed in this order, in others the

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[1]Willi Apel, op. cit., p. 322.

sequence had to be reversed. With these reservations it is now possible to state that:

Harmony is the simultaneous sounding of two or more different tones.

This definition includes two tones in octave relationship, but excludes the unison as a type of harmony. Furthermore, it defines harmony without reference to texture, thereby making it possible to employ the term without re-definition in both homophonic and polyphonic music.

In spite of the danger of multiplying definitions, the concepts of consonance and dissonance are so vital in any discussion of harmony that their introduction becomes well-nigh mandatory at this time. Usually these terms will already have been mentioned during the discussions leading to a definition of harmony. Should this not be the case, a simple, if perhaps undignified, demonstration will start a lively conversation on the subject. The instructor plays a few triads on the piano and inquires whether or not they illustrate harmony. After an affirmative answer he simply sits on the keyboard and then inquires whether the last demonstration produced harmony. Opinions tend to be quite divided among students about granting such cacophonous sounds the status of harmony. As before, the instructor needs to curb his inclination to supply a ready-made answer. To do so--if only by pointing to the wording of the definition--may well impair the gradual development of tolerances for a wide variety of sound combinations. Should he decree on his own authority that, as the definition states, all simultaneous sounding of tones must be accepted as harmony, subsequent illustrations would lose much of their force. These consist of a series of excerpts chosen

from a wide variety of harmonic idioms. They should range from con-
ventional harmonizations of well-known songs, to some of the most com-
plex chordal structures in Western music. A certain amount of caution
must be exercised in selecting the items lest they depart so far from
the students' level of experience that the sounds are no longer perceived
as music at all, but purely on the basis of chordal complexities a sur-
prisingly wide range remains available. Students favorably disposed to-
ward some of the more sophisticated aspects of "popular" music (such as
the so-called "progressive jazz" of Stan Kenton), will usually be will-
ing to listen attentively even to sections of the "Sacrificial Dance"
from Stravinsky's Rite of Spring. Listening to music of such harmonic
latitude, students can readily experience, rather than merely being told,
the involvement of both dissonance and consonance in the element of har-
mony.

After these activities, consonance can be defined as a harmony,
or series of harmonies, of a relaxed, relatively static nature, while
dissonance is assigned the converse meaning. For optimal progress an
attempt should be made to show that it is not the combination of tones,
but the listener's experience while interacting with them, which is ac-
tive or static, tense or relaxed. If this is once grasped by the group,
an almost limitless choice of activities emerges in connection with the
harmonic element. Different period and national styles can be intro-
duced, with students making comparisons and expressing judgments about
the harmonic qualifies of each; integrative comparisons with other arts,
notably the color harmonies in painting, become possible; a start can
be made toward a historical process of integration, based on harmonic

style differences between artistic periods, cultural epochs, or even major divisions of civilizations; above all, a ready opportunity presents itself to involve students in numerous concrete listening experiences with compositions of widely different character. What is probably most productive relative to the purely musical aspects of the course, is the examination and discussion of specific aural experiences. These discussions, by furnishing incentives to aural concentration, tend to build up the students' habit of intensive listening, thereby making a major contribution toward realizing the basic objectives of the course (<u>cf</u>. Chapter VII).

Possibly even more telling results can be obtained from the examination of the fourth musical element, tone color. Here the opportunity arises to expand students' experiences beyond the confines of their class room. Considerable interest and variety of procedure can be introduced by working out a cooperative enterprise with the college or university symphony orchestra. The amount of advance class preparation needed will depend on the familiarity and sympathy of the orchestra's conductor with general education--also on the time and effort his organization is willing to devote to this work. When possible, there is some merit in beginning directly with live performances, since the discussion of material can then proceed on the basis of a vivid personal experience. This, however, demands considerable exertion--the equivalent of several class sessions--from the performing group. It also requires some skill on the part of the conductor in dealing with a non-technical class. Should both of these conditions be met, the gain in experiencing directly the color element in music suggests this as the preferential sequence.

The execution of this plan may take the following form. After students have been made comfortable in the rehearsal hall—and in this process the relaxed atmosphere of the class room should be duplicated as nearly as possible—the conductor will probably wish to say a few words about his organization. These remarks should lead to a short description of the three elements of music (discussed previously) as they relate to actual performance. The point should be made again that these elements have no meaning except as they exist in the musical sounds perceived by the listener, and, consequently, music divorced from a source of sound and a receptive hearer does not exist.[1] Next, a demonstration in which different instruments, singly and in groups, play the same melody (for example, a folk song played in the same key and range by flute, oboe, and violin), will prepare the way for defining tone color. The definition should be formulated in terms of the musical experience and not in terms of the physics of sound—although subsequent meetings need not exclude considerations of this topic, should student interest demand it.

Tone color (timbre), therefore, may be defined as "the quality or 'color' of a tone, i.e. the difference between tones of the same pitch if produced on different instruments. . . ."[2] Though often included, it probably is best to omit on this occasion that "timbre of a given tone is determined by its harmonics. . . ."[3]

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[1]In line with the considerations presented in Chapter III and applied to music in Chapter VII, the "as if" reality of the musical sound stimulus is taken for granted and need not be made a subject for discussion in an introductory course.

[2]Willi Apel, op. cit., p. 747.

[3]Loc. cit.

Having suggested a definition of this nature, the aural explora-
tion of various timbres becomes the subject of the major part of this
undertaking. The exact sequence of introducing the numerous instrumental
colors provided by the orchestra is not particularly significant. Some
directors might choose to start with the full orchestra (if so, it might
be suggested that several full orchestral colors be shown); others may
prefer to feature individual instruments first. In either case the ex-
amples should be kept short. Emphasis on brevity is necessary, since,
as yet, students hardly have had much time to improve their ability to
retain sound impressions in memory, thus making it unlikely that longer
selections would cohere into unified experiences.

Irrespective of the order of their appearance, the following
colors should be presented during these meetings:

1) Full orchestra. This to include the relatively small
   "classical" orchestra; the large "romantic" orchestra
   (possibly in several variants ranging from late Beethoven
   to Brahms and Wagner, or even Richard Strauss); some illus-
   trations from impressionist and contemporary composers, up
   to, and including one or two radical "experimentalists."

2) String choir. This to include the choir as a whole, violins,
   violas, 'cellos, string basses, and harp, both singly and in
   groups. A string quartet demonstration may be part of this
   sequence.

3) Woodwind choir. This to include the choir as a whole, the
   various subdivisions (no-reed, single-, and double-reed
   colors), as well as individual instruments (flute, piccolo,
   clarinet, bass-clarinet, oboe, English horn, bassoon, contra-

bassoon).

4) <u>Brass choir</u>. This to include the choir as a whole, as well
   as French horn, trumpet, trombone, and tuba, playing singly
   and in groups.

5) <u>Percussion choir</u>. This demonstration should probably be kept
   brief, since most instruments are unsuited to the playing of
   complete musical structures. As a minimum it should include
   tympany, bass- and snare-drums, cymbals, triangle, and a few
   "special effect" instruments (bells, chimes, xylophone, etc.).

It is desirable that all demonstrations be kept visually close to
students. In case of individual instruments an opportunity should be pro-
vided to observe the instrument and the actions of the performer and, if
at all feasible, an atmosphere should be created in which students feel
free to raise questions about what they see and hear. These questions
might be encouraged if students are permitted to examine one or more ex-
amples of each instrument, while the performer offers a description of
it. At no time should the demonstration be hastened excessively, or it
will not only discourage student participation, but also hinder the
formation of vivid perceptions of the tone colors involved. Hence, as
much as two or three weeks may be devoted to this part of the course.

The time element shows that this procedure, desirable though it
may be, will frequently be impractical in institutional situations. If
there are many sections in the general education music program, the bur-
den placed on the music department becomes onerous beyond anything they
might reasonably be expected to assume. It seems, therefore, wise to
suggest several alternative ways of accomplishing this end. One way of
approaching this problem--and in some classes it may even be preferable--

would be to ask class members to bring along any instruments they play

and demonstrate the colors in question. Judiciously supplementing these

demonstrations with recorded music, and either climaxing or introducing

the entire sequence by a visit to a single orchestral demonstration con-

stitutes a plausible alternative procedure. Another approach, parti-

cularly suited to institutions located in large urban centers, may be to

distribute the imposition on the time of performers by visiting dif-

ferent groups during the exploration of various tone colors. Yet a

fourth way might be to take advantage of ordinary rehearsals of a sym-

phony orchestra (professional or amateur), but reserve all the explana-

tion and discussion to class periods prior to or in between rehearsals,

relying, therefore, on the time spent with the orchestra merely for the

stimulation of "live" performances. Finally, if all else be unavailable,

recorded demonstrations, possibly with supplementary visual aids, can

provide at least some aural familiarity with tone color. This last al-

ternative, however, is distinctly inferior to the preceding ones, since

even the finest sound equipment fails to reproduce the range of timbres

experienced in an orchestral performance, and few, if any, visual aids

prove as stimulating to students as watching a live performer demonstrate

his instrument.[1]

Once the last of the musical elements has been introduced,

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[1]Vocal colors have been omitted intentionally from this dis-
cussion, since the facilities of most institutions usually do not include
representative samples of voices--at any rate, solo voices--of major
caliber and it appeared ill-advised to mix "live" and phonographic demon-
strations in a way which totally excluded one color group from "live"
demonstrations. Should the entire color unit be treated by means of the
phonograph, this objection would not prevail and vocal colors might well
be included in the course offerings.

the course enters a particularly sensitive phase. It is here that an attempt has to be made to provide students with further experiences to intensify their perception in terms of the musical elements. Although the initial exploration of the elements also had intensification of perception as its goal, among the various activities only the study of tone color lent itself to reasonably prolonged work in listening intensification. It is, after all, rather difficult for listeners just at the threshold of analytical listening to concentrate for prolonged periods of time on something as general as melody or rhythm, unless some specific guide-posts are available to them. Contrariwise, the provision of such guide-posts involves a certain amount of technical knowledge and terminology, introduction of which often produces negative valences. Thus the challenge of the next unit lies in the development of situations which make available the necessary technical material, without the students losing interest and developing hostile attitudes toward music and the class activities. If, however, an atmosphere of trust and cooperation has been built up over the preceding period, then the instructor can now face his class with some confidence that his attempts at guidance will be accepted willingly until such time that students themselves can see the results of their efforts.

In this context it must again be emphasized that the instructor has to move carefully into the technical discussions the class now faces. As has been shown in Chapter III, students must, through their own actions, create the reality of their experience. The instructor's attempts at communication will fail if he can not proceed jointly from some common ground with members of his class. Thus it is of crucial

important that he sense every mood of the group, choose every word with the utmost care. He can neither afford failure in communication, nor switch suddenly to authoritarian methods of instruction unless he is to risk serious impairment of further progress in the course. This means, among other things, that he dare not lose the students' confidence by being caught in anything they might class as deception. Hence a truthful presentation of the difficulties ahead is inescapably part of his obligation. This obligation may be discharged, in part, by a statement similar to the one below:

Up to this time we have been working with the four elements of music in a general way. Some of you have mentioned that, of the entire sequence so far, our studies in tone color seemed to afford the greatest satisfaction. You said that they "were something concrete; something one could get one's teeth into." This was a singularly perceptive observation, since it called attention to the major difficulty which besets most of us when we first try to listen to music with some care. The trouble is, we are just plain unaccustomed to concentrating on sounds, unless they have some immediate, direct meaning for us. It is not the sound of words, but the meaning behind them which generally makes us pay attention; it is not the melody and rhythm of the bugle we listen to, but the fact that it stands for chow call. So now when we first try to listen to music just as sound, it is pretty hard to get our bearings. That is why listening specifically to tone color has been so helpful. When you tried to identify the performing instruments you could concentrate on just one of the many things that were

going on in the music--and this gave a certain focus to the

business of fastening attention to sounds alone. Surely you

were hearing all the other elements as well--how could you

hear the instrument without hearing the tune it was playing?--

but the fact that there was some single, specific, identifiable

feature for which to listen, made it easier not to be side-

tracked from giving full attention to the music. This focus-

ing, this concentration, and the resultant actual "hearing"

makes the difference between productive and unproductive listen-

ing. It is the difference between hearing music or hearing,

more or less pleasant, sounds. The satisfaction many of you

have expressed comes from the fact that you actually have heard

more music than, perhaps, ever before. What we now must do is

find some other things, just as concrete as tone color, just as

clearly identifiable (in some works at least), to further ex-

pand this new-found ability to "hear." In that process a cer-

tain amount of technical terminology will be inevitable. With-

out it we will not be able to talk to each other meaningfully,

and without adequate communication many of you might find it

difficult to discover further specific things on which to anchor

your listening. But please, whatever else may happen, don't

forget the "why" behind all this technical talk. It, in and of

itself, is of no value except for people who want to "show off"

their erudition at a formal tea-party. The fancy words, how-

ever, can become further tools in sharpening your ability to

hear music--just as the names of the instruments helped you in

listening--and this, after all, is the goal of our meetings in this class.

The statement cited above can take many forms. This sample has been suggested to indicate the two features which are of major signifi-cance. First, the instructor's remarks should frankly admit that some of the matters to be treated are technical. Such frankness can do much to eliminate potential antagonism aroused by attempts to disguise the true nature of the material. Students may be expected to respond more favorably in a class room where they feel the instructor deals with them honestly, than where they suspect that some deception is practiced on them. Deception is likely to create a schism between student and instruc-tor, arousing hostility and creating a barrier in the field of the stu-dent's perception. Secondly, the remarks proposed serve the purpose of re-emphasizing the goal of the process to be undertaken by indicating that technical information, and even aural recognition of specific tech-niques, are but subordinate means to the end of effective listening.

Lewin's analysis of the dynamic conditions prevailing in "segmen-ted paths"[1] applies explicitly in this situation. The aim, of course, is to increase the "degree of unity of a path"[2]--the path being the progress through time involved in the listening experience. But Lewin specifically states that the "degree of unity of the path need not be

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[1]Kurt Lewin, The Conceptual Representation and the Measurement of Psychological Forces (Donald K. Adams and Helge Lundholm, editors, Con-tributions to Psychological Theory, Vol. I, No. 4. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1938), pp. 30-34.

[2]Ibid., p. 30.

constant during the whole locomotion"[1] and that "the more the unity of the path increases, the more the single steps take on the character of merely 'means' to an 'end'."[2] In the case of the techniques now to be considered, the goal implies their eventual elimination as separate dynamic entities, hence the eventual unification of the path in which the components (these techniques) become reduced to a status of "means." Some indication of this process, though without an overt expression of the psychological theory behind it, is the second purpose of the state-ment in question.

In order to make up for any possible adverse effect of the lengthy statement, and also to continue the program along lines of maximum stu-dent participation, it would seem advisable that aural identification of all features discussed be provided by the students themselves. To be sure, some definitions and terminology will probably have to be provided by the instructor, but care needs to be taken to ascertain that these ver-balizations have living "referents" to the students. As before, the in-structor's job is one of producing situations in which students may, through suitable aural experiences, create their own "referents."

The first of these situations involves the metric aspects of music. To avoid puzzling the group, it is desirable that the music selected con-tain meter which is constant, sharply accentuated, and free from signifi-cant counteraction by other rhythmic devices. Depending on the works known to each section, some "popular" dance (in duple time), a march (such

[1]Loc.cit.

[2]Loc. cit.

as Sousa's Stars and Stripes Forever), and, possibly, the opening section
of the last movement from Beethoven's Symphony No. VII may be chosen. Be-
fore playing these selections, students should be invited to register
overtly their response to the music:

> You are about to hear several pieces of music. Try to
> relax and get the "feel" of these excerpts. When you think
> you have sensed the effect, then clap, tap the table, or stamp
> your feet to show what you feel. If you prefer, snap your
> fingers or bang the table with a book, but express in some way
> whatever it is the music is trying to make you do.

It is important that the class feel at ease, confident of not be-
ing ridiculed, if this activity is to be successful. Under those condi-
tions and with the music properly selected, there is every likelihood of
lively cooperation. Furthermore, experiments with over ten thousand stu-
dents[1] indicate that, almost without exception, students will be able to
hear and reproduce the beat. It may be necessary to suggest that the
group continue to listen carefully and clap only what it hears, because
it frequently develops that a class, having once picked up the beat, will
gradually increase the tempo without regard for the music. This, however,
is not necessarily a disadvantage, since it affords an opportunity of
demonstrating the need to concentrate on the sounds heard, if the experi-
ence is to retain relevance to the music.

Once the group of selections in duple meter has been played, a
second group, in triple time, is chosen. Here again a "popular" melody
of the day can furnish the starting point. This may be followed by one

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[1] University of Florida, The Humanities (C-51).

of the waltzes of Johann Strauss (in a recording not using the "concert

version"--to avoid the confusion of abrupt tempo changes), and a minuet

from a classical symphony (for example Haydn's Symphony in G Major ["Sur-

prise"]). Here students may pick up the beat a bit less readily, often

showing a tendency to clap only the accented beat. This too can be turned

to advantage by alternating selections in duple and triple meter and ask-

ing students whether any differences can be heard. In most classes there

will be near-unanimity about the existence of some difference, and once

the presence of this difference is acknowledged, its nature is likely to

be revealed by a perceptible change in the clapping. Increasingly, stu-

dents will tend to clap more loudly for accented beats and soften their

response to the unaccented ones. Having once achieved this distinction,

the metric patterns can then be pictured on the blackboard. Figures 1a

and 1b suggest possible symbolizations of these two basic meters.

Having become aware of the phenomenon of meter in experience, a

definition may now be advanced. Slightly paraphrasing Newman,[1] meter can

be defined as a regularly recurring pattern of accented and unaccented

beats. A beat, in turn, is taken to mean the "temporal unit of a compo-

sition, as is indicated by the (real or imaginary) up-and-down movements

of a conductor's hand."[2] In spite of plausible objections to a definition

as prosaic as the one suggested for "beat," Apel's formulation was selected

on the basis of its reference to man's physical response to strongly marked

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[1] William S. Newman, Understanding Music A New Introduction to Music's Elements, Styles, and Forms--for Both the Layman and the Practitioner (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1952), p. 47.

[2] Willi Apel, op. cit., p. 81.

Or

Or

FIGURE 1a

Duple Meter

FIGURE 1b

Triple Meter

beats. Since this ties in directly with activities the students have just performed, any loss in formal accuracy is outweighed by the definition's direct relevance to student experience.

Having heard, depicted, and defined meter in its simplest forms, the terms duple and triple meter can be introduced without the need for formal definition. Once this minimum terminology has become available, it becomes possible to illustrate various functions of meter. Dance music of contemporary and older times, marches, work songs, and many other examples can show the powerful connection between meter and certain forms of rhythmic motion. Expansion of metric samples to include other common meters (6/8; 4/4 etc.) may be undertaken, though the degree of such expansion may be subject to debate. As a general rule it would seem advisable not to complicate matters unduly, to furnish more and more listening experiences in a limited number of meters, and to leave the expansion toward different varieties to student initiative.

In the process of providing further listening experiences featuring the metric idiom, a great number of increasingly difficult aural stimuli should be made available. Tempo changes (such as in the "concert version" of most Johann Strauss waltzes), syncopation, durational counteraction of meter (as in the final section of Wagner's Overture to Tannhäuser ["Dresden Version"]), and other rhythmic devices for artistically balancing the uniformity of meter can be shown. The purpose of all these activities is directed toward sensitizing students to rhythmic effects generally, while at the same time retaining the aid of listening for a concrete device. In some classes it may be possible to advance to some polyrhythmic illustrations, or even to music not involving meter at all, once the group's alertness to the element of rhythm has been sharpened.

Though the extent and variety of these studies is potentially very great, the degree to which an instructor can take advantage of them will have to be limited by the exigencies of time and (possibly) the diminishing of student interest.

Throughout the studies of meter it may be suggested that the other elements not be ignored in the process of listening. Such changes in attention not only help to furnish variety to students but also counteract excessive preoccupation with a single feature at the expense of the total musical experience. Thus, with the observation of a few simple precautions, meter can make major contributions to intensification of the listening experience. Since, however, meter is primarily suited to listening intensification in the rhythmic sphere alone, different, though analogous, procedures will have to be employed to improve the hearing of melody and harmony. The avenue of approach which immediately suggests itself is an exploration of musical texture.

Texture involves both melody and harmony; it is, furthermore, relatively easy to bring to the attention of beginning listeners. In addition, texture lends itself readily to a series of listening experiences of increasing difficulty, thereby facilitating the learning process. Finally, through texture an approach can be made to stylistic analysis, which can then lead toward several types of historical integration procedures.

The term texture is susceptible to various definitions. Hummel Fishburn offers a rather descriptive definition, stating that "texture in music, like the texture of cloth, refers to the way in which the

component parts are woven together."[1] The specificity of this defini-
tion may be increased by emphasizing that the particular elements most
directly involved are melody and harmony. Thus the term texture, as
employed in this study, stands for the particular way in which melody
and harmony are used to form the sound-fabric of music. It must be
emphasized that a piece of music need not be composed in terms of a
single texture, that, on the contrary, variations in texture are among
the features adding interest to a composition. Such remarks, however,
as well as the definition itself, are best presented in the context of
textural explorations—not in a prefatory statement. In line with the
principles governing the course, the aural experience should occur
first.

A major part of these initial experiences can be contributed by
student activities. One way to initiate this is to request a demonstra-
tion of students' prowess at singing or whistling in the bath tub. Com-
ments on the demonstration usually point up the absence of harmony in
this type of music. Should this also produce some adverse value judg-
ments (by unfavorable remarks about the simplicity of this texture), the
opportunity may be utilized to demonstrate various examples of monophony
in its more sophisticated versions. Gregorian or Hebrew chants, passages
not involving double stops from solo violin music, and Don Jose's first
aria from the second act of Bizet's Carmen are suitable illustrations.
References taken from folk music or possibly some passages from improvi-
satory jazz can also be used to demonstrate monophony, both as the tex-

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[1]Hummel Fishburn, op. cit., p. 124.

ture of an entire composition, or as a variant texture in an otherwise different work. Demonstration of the values of monophony is, however, a different matter from stating them. As before, it seems advisable for the instructor to refrain from expressing his own value judgments, leaving it to members of the class to draw their own conclusions on the basis of the experiences available to them. The formation of value judgment, the development of taste, is likely to be better served if students have a chance to evolve their own standards, based on their own experiences, uninfluenced by direct dogmatic statements of the instructor.

In passing, it may be mentioned that from the discussion of monophony various lines of integration may be originated. Comparison with line drawings readily suggests analogies to the visual arts; more extended preoccupation with folk songs can lead to the drawing of cultural and historical conclusions; a more elaborate illustration of religious chants may be used to integrate the music unit with some aspects of cultural history. Such efforts at integration appear to be of considerable value, even where no formal or extensive unification of the general education course is contemplated at this time. By opening the subject in a casual way, the instructor can do much to place the musical experience in a broader context. Such expansion of context may also be helpful in moving to a consideration of more complex textures.

In terms of familiarity--unless integrative considerations suggest a different course--the second texture to be examined should usually be homophony. Here active participation by students may be somewhat harder to achieve. Should some of the class have facility in extemporaneously harmonizing such tunes as Down by the Old Mill Stream, or some "popular"

song, the instructor can draw them into the initial demonstrations. Lacking this assistance, phonograph and piano examples will have to be employed. Starting with the most elementary chordal harmonizations (avoiding, particularly, any rhythmic independence in the harmonic parts), the complexity of illustrations can be increased to any desired degree the class can still follow. By moving gradually to homophonic works with increasingly active harmonic parts (which assume quasi-melodic character), it becomes possible to range over a considerable segment of music literature. Bach's chorale harmonizations, excerpts from Haydn's and Mozart's keyboard sonatas, can be contrasted with homophonic examples of the contemporary idiom. On a different level (without value judgments by the instructor!) sections of a Brahms symphony can be juxtaposed to the homophonic idiom of a commercial "popular" tune. Should time permit and students show interest, an exploitation of homophony in such a work as Debussy's Festivals (notably the middle section) may be compared to a superficially similar treatment of some motion picture "background music." Value judgments may well be expected to occur but, so long as these judgments are made by members of the class, their attack and defense can become occasions for profitable extension of listening experiences. Since it is this subjectively motivated intensification of listening which is the aim of the entire set of activities, such discussions are valuable adjuncts to the exploration of texture.

For similar reasons, arguments arising out of a presentation of polyphonic texture should also be welcomed. Here, from the very beginning, active class participation can occur. Dividing the group into three or four parts, some well-known round (Row, Row, Row, Your Boat, or Three Blind Mice, for example) can be performed by the class. It might

be helpful if the rounds were performed several times, cuing parts in different sequence, so that each group will have the opportunity of listening to various voice combinations before being preoccupied with singing its own part.

After students have become thoroughly familiar with simple imitative polyphony, the question of distinguishing this texture from homophony arises. In the course of free discussion it would be quite surprising if a definition would not emerge which, erroneously, tried to restrict polyphony to imitative types. This brings about the expansion of experiences to include free polyphony without the necessity of introducing the concept extraneously. As a popular illustration the group may be divided into two parts, one singing Way Down Upon the Suwannee River, the other Dvorak's Humoresque. That initial attempts at this combination generally result in desperately confused results not only furnishes much appreciated comic relief but can be made into an occasion for interesting discussions of rhythmic and harmonic challenges involved in polyphonic texture. Further illustrations, using "Dixieland," as well as more conventional examples (such as Bach and Handel fugues, fugatos from Beethoven's Symphony No. III and V for imitation; the "Dies Irae" section of Berlioz' Fantastic Symphony, part of the ninth variation from the last movement of Beethoven's Symphony No. IX, the final section of Wagner's Prelude to Die Meistersinger, for free polyphony), can furnish extensive experience in hearing this type of texture. In presenting illustrations it may, at first, be helpful to preface the performance of each selection with a playing of its major themes on the piano, but after some familiarity with the texture, students will achieve a sense of accomplishment upon being able to isolate the different themes without help from the instructor.

Definition of these textures is often facilitated by inviting students to devise some visual aids. These should picture the characteristic qualities of each texture, clearly differentiating it from all others. Figure 2 shows one possible way of accomplishing this. The formulation of definitions may be expedited by the instructor offering assistance in providing verbalizations reasonably in conformity with accepted musical practice. The significance of these definitions is, however, distinctly subordinate to the aural experiences necessary to their formulation and also to the intensification of perception resulting from continued exercises in texture identification, undertaken in class, laboratory sessions, and listening assignments.

Should it be desired, homophony and polyphony, no less than monophony, can become bases for integrative undertakings. It is, perhaps, somewhat more dangerous to attempt direct comparisons between these textures and techniques in the visual arts, so that close cooperation with staff members trained in other fields of art could well be helpful. Similarly, members of the general education faculty specializing in literary studies, may help to show similarities of literary devices to musical textures. Historical coordination can also be advanced through texture studies, but discretion must be used not to exceed the limits of students' musical perception.

In order to provide yet another guide-post to aid intensive listening, some attention may be given to various modes (scales) of music and a composition's progress among them. This activity demands somewhat greater skill on the part of students than the ones hitherto discussed and may, for this reason, not be as generally applicable as

Monophony

Homophony

Imitative Polyphony

Free Polyphony

FIGURE 2

Textures

the studies of meter and texture. It is also quite easy to become ex-
cessively technical in expatiating on the subject of modality, tonality,
and modulation. Given, however, reasonable ability on the part of stu-
dents (semi-tone discrimination) and equally reasonable restraint on the
part of the instructor, exploration of this area can prove of such value
in subsequent analysis of designs (as well as increasing acuity of per-
ception) that in many classes the treatment of musical elements can best
be concluded by some attention to this topic.

As an initial aural experience, the class may well start with the
playing of a familiar song (for example, America) and a transposition of
the melody into the minor mode. A question can now be raised about the
difference in effect created by these two renditions. If harmonization
has been kept to a bare minimum, or even omitted altogether, students will
tend to have little trouble in identifying the changed effect with a
change in the melodic quality. They can be expected to make some remarks
about the tune sounding "sad," or "strange." In spite of the fact that
equating the minor mode with lugubriousness may offend the instructor,
the identification of a change in mood is the point at issue. Subse-
quent illustration of both major and minor modes, providing for different
tempi and rhythmic vitality in each, can readily counteract the initial
identification of the minor with sadness. Continuing with the playing of
examples (which need not be long, but should constitute complete struc-
tures), students may then be asked to group the pieces of music in terms
of generic similarities of melodic effect. The original grouping may not
turn out as satisfactorily as clear identification of modes would demand.
In such cases repetition of the problematic illustrations, underlining

their mode through fuller harmonization, can be counted upon to improve student discrimination. Throughout this process discussion should be stimulated in an attempt to ascertain the reason for the differences in perceived sound. Without prompting, students can generally be relied on to recognize eventually that the relationship between notes in the melodies differs, depending which of the two groups they exemplify. This observation can further be sharpened by repeatedly switching melodies into the opposite mode. Once the differences have been firmly established in aural perception, it becomes possible to identify major and minor modes by name and to proceed to an investigation of the different interval relationships in each.

Though theoretical purity may suffer, demonstration and explanation of major and minor is most practically accomplished by means of the conventionally tuned (evenly tempered) piano. If the group is small enough, students can gather around the instrument, maybe even experiment with playing, while the component intervals of major and minor are demonstrated. In the absence of such intimacy, pictures of the keyboard, with identifying marks on the keys played, can be shown as the intervals are sounded. As a further concession to simplicity, the instructor may choose to slight the upper tetrachord of the minor (merely mentioning that there, too, differences exist) and concentrate on the difference resulting from the lowered third step.

Proceeding in this fashion, it becomes a simple matter to introduce the term "semi-tone" (or "half-tone"), identify it as the basic unit of both modes in question--as also of the piano keyboard--and derive the interval organization of the major mode. Contrasting the lower tetra-

chord of this mode with the minor, the characteristic difference in
sound can be shown to result from the changed interval relationship.
A striking, and often loudly appreciated, demonstration of this dif-
ference can be used to clinch the argument. After performing the do-
re-mi-re-do sequence (in the appropriate rhythm) it is next shifted to
the minor--with immediately apparent results.

The extent to which technical terminology is to be used will have
to depend on the interest shown by each group. The concepts of interval,
mode, major, minor, and, at least, octave are probably as few as will
still provide a vocabulary capable of expressing pertinent ideas. If
possible, expansion of musical experience would be profited by the in-
clusion of a few other modal types. Among these the chromatic, penta-
tonic, and whole-tone modes ought to be given first choice in terms of
frequency of use. But should interest diminish during the process,
restriction of discussion to the minimum suggested still permits signi-
ficant contributions to be made.

A further expansion of the conceptual framework and, with it, the
mastering of additional means for intensified listening, occurs when modal
patterns are exemplified in a variety of keys. This matter need not be
made forbiddingly technical at all. One writer puts it this way:

> To prevent monotony, and because certain tonalities
> fit certain instruments and voices better than others,
> all music does not start on the same pitch, nor is it
> within the same confines.[1]

Ample opportunity for listening can then be provided to show that scales
of the same mode sound substantially identical, regardless of their start-
ing point. At the same time, the concept of modulation can be made real

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[1]Ibid., p. 117.

by tying it to readily perceivable illustrations. These illustrations ought not to aim at subtlety of modulating devices; rather abrupt modulations into distant keys furnish the most easily distinguishable initial experiences.

The comment may be made that it is of questionable value to burden students with technical information of this nature in a general education course. This objection is well taken, particularly in terms of the philosophic approach of this study, if the material is introduced as an end in itself and in face of hostile, or indifferent, reactions by students. Should it not be possible to arouse genuine interest on their part, then indeed the total educational enterprise would profit by omitting the segment dealing with modes and scales. If, conversely, these studies are presented in a way which constantly stresses their experiential aspect and which persistently relates them to the goal of perceiving music in its entirety, then their inclusion can be justified on the grounds that they expand and deepen the musical experience. As Dewey has pointed out, a crucial phase of education is

> . . . the progressive development of what is already experienced into a fuller and richer and also more organized form, a form that gradually approximates that in which the subject-matter is presented to the skilled, mature person.[1]

Awareness, if only unconscious awareness, of the mode of a musical passage, of--at least daring--modulations, of achievement of tonal and model contrasts, of returns to a "home key" is part of a skilled person's musical experience. Its attainment is, therefore, a legitimate goal of a program aimed at making the students' awareness more nearly into that of a mature

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[1] John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 87.

and skilled person. The only valid objection would have to be made in terms of the interest and ability of a given group of students. In this respect, as in many others, the instructor's sensitivity to student response will have to provide the final decision. Here, therefore, is yet another reason why a music program based on the philosophic position of this study must provide for free variations among sections and could not, under any foreseeable set of circumstances, demand uniformity from all its students.

In order to assess more clearly the contributions to be made by the unit of the course outlined in this chapter, there may be some value in examining the proposed activities in terms of the nine points delineating the topic organization of the music program (cf. Chapter VIII). The experiences suggested thus far relate most specifically to points two, three, four, five, and seven. To a lesser extent they also pertain to points six, eight, and nine.

Point two called for flexibility of content and methodology to accommodate varying student abilities and backgrounds. Throughout this unit emphasis has been placed on proceeding from existing experiences of students. This necessarily implies that activities will vary in nature, difficulty, intensity, and specific application, depending on the composition of a given group. It also means that evaluation of progress will have to be made in terms of the individual student and the particular group in which he works. This, certainly, is in line with the flexibility specified for the program.

Point three stated the need to work in terms of the geographical and historical environment of students. The concentration on metric and

tonal idiom, the particular selection of textures to be emphasized, the choice of specific illustrations, the orchestral tone colors discussed all were determined by this consideration.

Point four specified that students be furnished a basis from which they can, in the future, expand their experiences beyond the content of the program. In this respect the activities discussed function in a two-fold manner. First, they all deal with basic skills, applicable to musical experiences of every conceivable type; thus the student acquires a foundation which is directly and immediately pertinent to compositions far beyond the scope of those encountered in the program. In this respect the first unit is primarily one of skill training, the skills being those needed for the attainment of musical experiences generally. Secondly, it has been suggested that in conjunction with each activity some attempt be made to transcend the confines of the more limited repertory. Thus, for example, it has been suggested that other modes besides major and minor, other textures beside the homophonic, be given attention. Such suggestions are deliberately designed toward future broadening of student experience.

Point five made the demand that growth in perceiving stimuli, presented in terms of the four musical elements, be achieved. This, as a matter of fact, has been the primary point attacked in this unit. Every single activity was chosen for and treated in light of an intensification of the student's ability to experience the elements of music.

Point seven stressed the need to present the elements in terms of a musical gestalt. Throughout this section attention has been called to the requirement of selecting examples which, in addition to demonstrating

some particular feature, constitute formal entities of reasonable integrity. Thus fragmentation, hence the destruction of structure (and through it the musicality of an illustration) was avoided in the selection of examples.

Points six, eight, and nine, the points less directly involved in planning this unit, dealt with growth in retaining perceptions, movement toward an awareness of formal qualities on the level of design, and integration with the total general education program. In this unit improvement of memory was largely incidental, although, in practice, identification of meter and tone color and, particularly, the differentiation among textures, seem inconceivable without some improvement in retaining perceptions. Similarly, movement towards aural comprehension of design has not been attacked directly. Here, however, the perception of form in the components of design (i.e. the elements and their organization) constitutes a necessary preliminary, and, in that sense, must be classed as progress towards the goal. Finally, although the plan for this study specifically excludes formal attempts at integration (cf. Chapters VII and VIII), many activities were shown to offer reasonable foundations for integrative efforts (cf. tone color, monophony, polyphony, etc.).

On the basis of the analysis just presented, it can be stated that, broadly speaking, the unit dealing with the elements of music received its primary justification from the improvements in perception which students can be expected to gain. Relatively little has been done to provide growth in those aspects of experience directly concerned with the retaining of perceptions and, hence, advancing perceptual organization to the level of experiencing musical design. This, therefore, will have to become the major preoccupation of the next sequence of activities in the course.

CHAPTER X

A SAMPLE PROGRAM -- PERCEPTION OF FORM AND MUSICAL DESIGN

In the preceding chapter an attempt has been made to outline in
some detail a sequence of activities designed to improve the students'
ability to perceive aural stimuli presented through the four elements
of music. The present chapter centers around activities aimed at im-
proving the students' ability to retain in memory the stimuli thus per-
ceived, thereby making possible the experiencing of musical design.

This phase of the program depends heavily on work accomplished in
the preceding unit and on the atmosphere established in the classroom dur-
ing the preceding weeks. Depending on the number of meetings per week,
the group will have been working together for a period of somewhere be-
tween three and six weeks. If, during this time the class has developed
a healthy work relationship, then there is reason to believe that sugges-
tions by the instructor no longer appear to students as dictates of a
higher authority or, worse still, as impositions from an external, hostile
force. Under these circumstances, it should be possible for the instruc-
tor to exercise leadership without fear of arousing immediate hostile re-
actions.

Such leadership is necessary to further growth at this stage of
student development, since it is unlikely that students will have much
awareness of the activities required to improve their listening ability
in the direction of perceiving formal organization in a musical experi-
ence. Since this means that, in a sense, the instructor is taking over
the formulation of purposes in the group, the question might be asked
whether such a decision is consonant with the point of view adopted in

this study. This question, it would appear, must be answered in the affirmative.

It has already been pointed out (cf. Chapters V, VI, and VIII) that the students' own needs in the realm of music demand a perception of form, culminating in an experiencing of musical design. It has also been pointed out (cf. Chapter IV) that an activity to be classed as ethically positive must involve a constantly expanding characteristic. Thus there is no doubt that increasing the ability to perceive form is, in character, a justifiable enterprise for this course. In this respect the situation closely resembles the one which prevailed at the outset of the course as a whole (i.e. the presence of a need is genuine, but its conscious perception by students is considerably less in evidence). Thus it is only in a superficial sense that the instructor formulates the purposes of the group. In point of fact the purposes still stem from student needs and it is only in the identification, in the "bringing to consciousness," that the instructor assumes the initiative.

Even granting the assumption of this need situation there is, however, a possible objection to a program which seeks to attack directly the perception of form. It may be suggested that a more oblique, indirect, approach would be more profitable. This objection is somewhat more difficult to answer in the present context. Since this study is not experimental in nature, the only inductive evidence which can be suggested in favor of attacking the perception of form directly must be sought in the opinions of music educators who have, over a period of years, found this procedure a profitable means of accomplishing the underlying purpose.

In this respect there exists near unanimity among writers on the
subject. At some point in an introductory course they all recommend
specific preoccupation with formal factors, and eventually designs, for
introductory courses in music literature (appreciation). Among writers
on this subject Martin Bernstein,[1] Aaron Copland,[2] Theodore Finney,[3]
Hummel Fishburn,[4] William Newman,[5] and Edwin Stringham[6] may be considered
representative. All of these educators devote considerable attention to
activities devoted directly to the perception of formal devices and
specific musical designs. In fact, the attention devoted to design in
these works is frequently far greater than the citation of pages would
suggest, since, notably in the case of Stringham, formal analysis is in-
volved quite directly in many chapters primarily concerned with individual
works, styles, and media. It would, therefore, be reasonable to suggest
that direct preoccupation with formal factors has the sanction of con-
siderable practical experience. Since, furthermore, a number of these
works have been used again and again as bases for general education
music programs, it would seem that this approach has been found profitable

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[1]Martin Bernstein, An Introduction to Music (second edition; New
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), pp. 63-71.

[2]Aaron Copland, What to Listen for in Music (New York: The New
American Library, 1939), pp. 66-121 and pp. 140-150.

[3]Theodore M. Finney, Hearing Music The Art of Active Listening
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), pp. 106-150.

[4]Hummel Fishburn, Fundamentals of Music Appreciation (New York:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), pp. 127-154.

[5]William S. Newman, Understanding Music A New Introduction to
Music's Elements, Styles, and Forms--for Both the Layman and the Practi-
tioner (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1952), pp. 124-164.

[6]Edwin J. Stringham, Listening to Music Creatively (New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1943), pp. 44-50.

in a significant number of cases. This does not mean that the value of a direct analytical approach has been experimentally verified, but it does suggest the presence of adequate empirical foundations to adopt it as a working hypothesis (subject to verification) in the sample program herein proposed.

In making this decision, however, a word of caution seems indicated. To remain consistent with the viewpoint adopted for this course, musical analysis must take place in terms of aural experiences, abstraction of principles of organization and concrete designs can take place only as a result of adequate funding in experience, and the instructional techniques employed need to be consonant with student participation. Since, finally, student participation involves genuine activity (involvment in the experience), student attitudes remain decisive factors in the conduct of the class. This implies that the instructor must be willing to forego technical details, even maximum theoretical accuracy, where their attainment would impair student growth. Thus the amount and detail of analysis must be determined not by music-theoretical considerations, but by the consequences of such analysis in the students' listening experience. To do otherwise, to elevate the demands of the subject matter into a hierarchically dominant position, would clearly be inconsistent with the interpretation of reality proposed in Chapter III.

Activities of this unit may be begun in a variety of ways. One method (tried successfully with over four thousand students)[1] begins the learning process with a simplified melodic analysis of an orchestral work. A suitable starting selection might be the final movement from Haydn's

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[1]University of Florida, The Humanities (C-51).

Symphony in G Major (No. 88) which should be presented with no advance

indication of its formal pattern. Before playing the work, the instruc-

tor can facilitate the process by performing the characteristic opening

period of the main theme. Students are then invited to listen to the

movement, signifying in some way each reappearance of this melody.

It may be of interest to report that differences in wording this

request, particularly in larger groups, substantially affected student

participation. An invitation to raise one hand whenever the music in

question returned elicited only slight response, with many students re-

maining apathetical and substantially uninvolved. Conversely, the state-

ment cited below evoked nearly total student participation:[1]

When you hear this tune reappear show somehow that you

have recognized it. Raise your hand, shout, whistle, bang

the table, or hit your neighbor over the head; but whatever

you do show that you hear its return.

This statement resulted in unusually close attention to the music and

eager response by the students. A certain amount of pandemonium was only

to be expected, but the attitudinal change in the group was so marked, and

the subsequent expansion of thematic listening experiences so gratifying,

that only one plausible hypothesis suggested itself. Apparently the in-

formality of the invitation (unusual in this large lecture group) and the

chance it offered to engage in some ebullient conduct created a field in

which students assigned high positive valences to careful listening to

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[1]Observation made by lecturer and subsequently substantiated by
four members of the faculty located in various areas of the lecture hall.

and identification of a musical theme. As has been suggested earlier (cf. Chapter IX), initial contacts with a novel listening situation have substantial influence on the attitudes students eventually adopt toward the activity; thus any procedure which can assist in positive valence formation has consequences far beyond that single incident. It is, therefore, of major importance that throughout the program the instructor remain alert to changes in student response attributable to modifications in the methods of presentation. To be sure, the particular phrasing reported above may not be applicable to the more intimate surroundings envisioned for this sample program and to the student population a given section may serve. This, however, does not change the purport of these remarks, namely that the instructor needs to exercise considerable care in analyzing student responses. Frequently an activity (deemed advisable in terms of the total program) can be retained in spite of apparent negative student reaction if the method of presentation creates a new total field for the participating student.

This change in the total field can be utilized to initiate discussion of the features which made students recognize as familiar the recurrences of the melody in question. In the process, skills acquired in the previous unit are brought into play. The rhythmic features, linear character, harmonic support, textural nature of the material are specific characteristics which help define the theme. Repeated playing of the selection can also open for discussion some of the musical means which the composer employs to deviate from the basic musical idea. Provided the gains in the direction of intensive listening can be sustained, students may be encouraged to comment on the whole problem of unification

and variety in music. Eventually they, or, if need be, the instructor,
can call attention to the fact that in this composition unity was achieved
by means of repetition, whereas variety came about through digression.
Once this point is reached, it becomes possible to turn to a more inten-
sive examination of the unity-variety feature in music. Thus the basic
formal principle of musical design (unity-through-repetition, variety-
through-digression) can be elaborated from a direct aural experience.

In pursuing this subject further it must be kept in mind that stu-
dents have not yet had much experience in retaining musical material in
memory. The melodic analysis of the symphonic movement just undertaken
was, after all, simplified to a point where it could barely be called
analysis at all. It is, therefore, advisable to proceed slowly, con-
centrating first on small designs which do not demand a protracted reten-
tion of thematic material and which, by their simplicity of construction,
do not offer numerous contrasting thematic stimulation. In this respect
the unity-variety principle is most easily identified in a simple three-
part arrangement. Study of this pattern has the further advantage of
opening up a quantitatively impressive area of music for immediate ex-
perience, while the expansions springing from this design prepare the
way for even the most intricate musical forms. For this reason educators
have consistently favored devoting attention to the simple ternary form.
They particularly stress the broad applicability of this pattern. Bern-
stein speaks of its having "been employed more frequently than any other."[1]
Finney states that the "ternary (ABA) principle in music has almost

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[1] Martin Bernstein, op. cit., p. 70.

universal application. . . ."[1] Newman finds the pattern in this design

so "highly stable and self-sufficient . . . [as to] be found to some ex-

tent in nearly all areas and categories of music."[2] Thus there is every

reason, from the standpoint of subject matter, to turn to this structure

as the initial design for discussion. Fortunately pedagogical reasons

also support this decision.

Hitherto it has been considered advisable to start from a discus-

sion of musical compositions which already were familiar to (and liked

by) a large group in the class. In the customary situation it has also

been assumed that the majority of students enter the program with a

preference toward the "popular" or "hillbilly" idiom. Both of these idi-

oms lean heavily on the ternary as the preferred design. Thus a dis-

cussion of the ternary employs aural stimuli which many students already

have accepted on favorable terms. In practice, therefore, the class

could proceed to an analysis of a "popular" tune of the day.

In a sample program, however, it appears advisable to depart from

this procedure. As Fishburn puts it: "If we were to use the current hit-

parade variety of any given year, it is probable that the suggested titles

would be completely unknown several years later."[3] In actual fact the

case is even stronger. Though "popular" tunes may be known for as long

as a few years, their popularity, hence their favorable valence status,

is usually of shorter duration. Hence it would be inadvisable to suggest

any particular tune for analysis. Instead, the illustrations chosen are

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[1] Theodore M. Finney, op. cit., p. 114.

[2] William S. Newman, op. cit., p. 164.

[3] Hummel Fishburn, op. cit., p. 128.

works of music likely to remain familiar for some time to come. This
means that the particular songs here discussed are merely prototypes, as
it were, demonstrating the process of analysis, while actual selections
in a program would have to be picked by the instructor from the songs
popular at that time.

Having made his choice, the instructor can now invite the class
to sing the number in question, stopping whenever they feel that a signi-
ficant unit has come to a close. In a familiar piece of moderate tempo
and clear sectionalization, students will usually identify the major sec-
tions of the form. Each of these sections can then be pictured on the
blackboard. The process can then be repeated, this time asking students
to sing only those parts in which the same melody occurs. Relating this
second singing to the diagram on the board, it now becomes possible to
indicate the repetitive and the contrasting sections--designating them by
suitable symbols of the alphabet. Figure 3 suggests one such way of di-
agramming a ternary.

Having once performed this analysis, the group can now gain further
experience by engaging in similar analysis of ternaries in a variety of
idioms. Constant discussion of the melodic features of these samples
will soon elicit the observation that the initial thematic idea (A)
dominates all the design. This, in turn, can be related to the first
example in this unit (the Haydn selection) and a lively discussion
started on the psychological effects of intensive repetition. Students
will readily perceive that excessive repetition results in monotony, but
that repetition not carried to this extent produces a sense of security,
a feeling of completeness in the listener. The instructor may even point

FIGURE 3

Ternary Form

out that the initial repetition of "A" serves much the same purpose as his own repeated playing of the first melody in the Haydn selection: fixing the main idea in the listener's mind so as to make its reappearance more meaningful.

The question now can be raised as to how a unit terminates so as to stand out as a structurally complete segment of the composition. Here again student participation is needed to make the process meaningful. The class is given a chance to sing one of the familiar examples already discussed and is asked to stop each time when--in their opinion--a structural unit has been completed. Next they are asked why they stopped at the points they did. Answers are likely to be subjective but unanimous in substance. "It just felt right," or "It seemed as if something made me stop," or "Well, that's where I felt something ending" are typical comments. The instructor can then play the parts in question on the piano, underlining the critical points through suitable harmonization. From this the group will readily perceive that something akin to punctuation is taking place in music. There only remains to identify this "musical punctuation" by the term "cadence," and one of the important concepts needed in further analysis will have been derived.

There is no general agreement on the degree to which the concept of cadence should be discussed technically. Jones[1] and Newman[2] go so far as to indicate the chordal sequences involved (with Newman even demonstrat-

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[1] Gomer Ll. Jones, "Rhythm, Tonality, and Form in Music," An Introduction to Literature and the Fine Arts (John F. A. Taylor, editor; East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State College Press, 1950), p. 338.

[2] William S. Newman, op. cit., p. 81.

ing the function of the inverted tonic)[1] but it is doubtful whether

introduction of this much technical detail can be justified in a general

education course. From a functional point of view it seems more appro-

priate to identify the more common cadences (authentic, semi, and decep-

tive) in terms of the listener's response, illustrate each of them copi-

ously, but leave to student initiative a more systematic study of their

structure. This decision follows from the purpose of the activities

undertaken at this time. This purpose is the accomplishment of growth

in retaining musical stimuli, increase in awareness of formal organiza-

tion, and, eventually, aural sensitivity to musical design. In this con-

text the _sound_ and _concept_ of cadences have a legitimate part to play--

the former in facilitating the aural perception of structural units, the

latter in assisting in the formation of an ideational framework of or-

ganization--but it is questionable whether familiarity with the _means_

through which cadential effects are achieved offers any tangible rewards.

Even the brief and admittedly superficial discussion of cadences

will, however, make it possible to expand the discussion of musical de-

signs with a somewhat greater degree of assurance. Once students become

aware of the functioning of cadences--particularly the authentic cadence--

it is a great deal less difficult to discuss the binary design. This

structure lacks the repetitive element provided by the return of "A" in

the ternary and is, therefore, less easily analyzed by students. It is

for this reason that a discussion of cadence was suggested between the

treatment of ternary and binary patterns. Once cadences are strongly

perceived by the group, the separation of the two parts in this design

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[1] _Loc. cit._

will cause considerably less difficulty.

Probably the most familiar illustration of binary design can be found in the song America. Since students have learned to identify the authentic cadence as the clearest and strongest closing device of musical punctuation, they can be asked to sing this song, pausing each time that an authentic cadence is reached. Marking the sections as before, this design can now be pictured on the blackboard. Figure 4 illustrates the pattern.

Once the basic distinction between binaries and ternaries has become audible to students, it becomes possible to extend class discussion somewhat further. In this process it must be kept in mind that the objectives of the course are primarily directed toward the creation of musical (aural) experiences, that, therefore, theoretical comments not reflected in such aural experiences are of dubious value. This means that refinements not aurally perceptible to students are not accomplishing anything the course aims to do and that continuation of formal analysis of these designs beyond the point where significant improvement of listening skills takes place wastes time--and may be harmful. During these discussions there are, however, activities which, suitably presented, can make distinctly positive contributions either through sharpening perceptive or improving retentive skills. Finally, there are a few structural features which can be made clear at this stage because of their great usefulness in analyzing larger designs. Generally speaking the following activities may be suggested: recognition of sectional repetitions and repetitive elements common to both binaries and ternaries, examination of melodic, rhythmic, harmonic (possibly including modulatory) features

FIGURE 4

Binary Form

of musical materials, and some attention devoted to a few basic formal

concepts, such as "introduction," "transition," and "coda." The amount

and intensity of such studies varies with the time allotted; this, in

turn, depends on the over-all organization of the course. Certainly,

more extensive treatment is possible if it is given protracted atten-

tion in connection with integrative activities, than if it is studied

from a musical standpoint alone.

Integration on the basis of small song-forms is possible in a num-

ber of ways. Stringham,[1] for example, expands the study of folk songs

(easily undertaken in terms of binaries and ternaries) to discuss cul-

tural differences among peoples of different nations. Integration with

geographical and cultural studies may well be carried far beyond the be-

ginnings he suggests by the use of musical illustrations in binary and

ternary design. Alternatively, by selecting illustrations from Protestant

chorales, and contrasting these with simple song patterns of other reli-

gions, integration with theological or cultural studies may be undertaken.

Still other lines of integration can originate from the discussion of

melodic and rhythmic features of these forms. Through the choice of suit-

able examples, national or regional style characteristics can be shown,

these then coordinating with similar features demonstrated in the other

arts. Finally, the formal principles observed are analogous to various

patterns in the visual and literary arts, thereby establishing a basis

for integration along aesthetic lines. Each of these activities involves

intensive listening, with students given the opportunity to report on

their aural experiences. It is this listening which, regardless of other

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[1]Edwin J. Stringham, op. cit., pp. 28-38.

values, constitutes the major musical contribution of the unit.

After an examination of short song-forms the next logical step is an expansion of listening experiences to include patterns which utilize these forms as components of a larger design.[1] Among these the easiest to perceive is the simple episodic design. The initial object of study should be marked by a clear contrast between principal song and episode (trio) and should, for the sake of easy identification, contain an unmodified return of the principal song. These requirements are admirably fulfilled by the structure of most classical minuets. Thus it is proposed that the next work to be examined to be the third movement from a Mozart or Haydn symphony. A suitable illustration would be the minuet from Mozart's Symphony in G Minor.

Generally speaking, the analytical study of this work involves three major phases. In the first phase activities are analogous to those undertaken in the unit described in the previous chapter. The function of these activities is the improvement in perceiving stimuli presented in terms of the four musical elements. This process involves the aural study of (a) rhythmic features, notably meter; (b) melody and harmony, including mode and salient modulations; (c) texture; and (d) tone color. It is to be hoped that, in addition to the primary purpose, these activities

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[1]In actual class situations this logical progress may not always be justified. It has been emphasized (cf. Chapter VI) that development of students, not the presentation of subject matter, must be the guiding principle of such a program. It may, therefore, be necessary to abandon the logical order herein pursued in student groups where interest threatens to decline through prolonged preoccupation with fundamentally similar activities. In such cases it may be advisable to interrupt the present sequence by turning to some of the integrative activities mentioned above, or by interchanging the proposed discussion of homophonic episodic patterns with the examination of the fugue.

will also help to familiarize students, if only unconsciously, with the thematic content so that partial improvement of retention is accomplished. In fact, it would not be surprising if each phase of this study were to melt almost imperceptibly into the following one, thereby creating a sense of continuity in the examination of the composition.

The second phase can, under the favorable conditions just mentioned, emerge directly from the previous one. It is not unlikely that in the process of examining the various elements, students will offer some comment relating to formal organization. The anticipated reaction would tend to deal with the larger units of the design--in spite of the longer time-span involved. The reason for this is twofold. First, the contrast is sharper between principal song and episode than between the subordinate parts of each. Second, there is the rather striking return of the principal song which students can be expected to recognize after this much listening experience. Should, however, such spontaneous recognition fail to occur, the instructor can help his class by playing in rapid juxtaposition thematic material from principal song and episode. In any case, it is likely to prove helpful if students are encouraged to represent visually the pattern perceived. One possible diagrammatic representation is shown in Figure 5a. This pattern can now be compared with the analogous picture of the ternary design (cf. Figure 3) and questions raised about the similarities and differences between the two.

Allowing adequate discussion, punctuated by constant musical illustration, is of some importance. During this time students are likely to offer comments on the similarity brought about through the repetition of a major unit after an intervening digressive section. Such remarks help to emphasize the broad applicability of unification-through-repeti-

(a) Preliminary Analysis

(b) Final Analysis

FIGURE 5

Simple Episodic Form

tion and variety-through-digression which have been mentioned earlier as the basic principles of formal organization in music. It is also to be anticipated that some mention will be made of the increased degree of contrast found in the simple episodic design. These statements, in turn, can furnish a transition to the third phase of analysis. The instructor, for example, can use remarks by students to show the difference in magnitude of contrast between sections "A" and "B" of the minuet in comparison to the slighter contrasts encountered in some of the instrumental ternaries studied previously.

From this, the third phase of analysis can be entered by calling attention to the internal structure of each major unit. In this minuet it is to be expected that quite a number of listenings (with ample free discussion) will be necessary to bring into consciousness the structure of the subordinate parts. Eventually the pattern should become sufficiently clear so that even the limited contrasts between statement and digression (in both the principal song and episode) are perceived by the group. This process may be aided in the analysis of the aurally more difficult principal song by calling attention to the shift in mode which takes place at the end of the first statement.

One formal device employed in this movement may be worthy of special attention. In the discussion of binary and ternary forms there probably has been some mention made of a <u>coda</u> as a device for rounding out the design. The occurrence of a similar device at the end of the principal song suggests the introduction of the term <u>codetta</u>. This concept may well facilitate the aural analysis of the movement, since students frequently recognize the presence of extra material without being

able to account for it in terms of their existing knowledge. This illustration, by the way, demonstrates the approach suggested to musical terminology for introductory music courses in general education. Presentation of technical concepts should be determined by functional considerations based on the experience of the listener. If introducing a new term is likely to facilitate the organization of the students' musical experience, then the use of the term has positive value in the program; if no such result is anticipated, then the term (no matter how common among specialists) had better be omitted. In this case the concepts coda and codetta are conceived as facilitating the grouping of stimuli (promoting the perception of design), hence their introduction appeared justified.

Once the three phases of analysis have been completed, students may be invited to superimpose their findings on the broad pattern derived earlier. Figure 5b shows the resulting diagram. This visual aid helps to demonstrate the virtues and shortcomings of the kind of analysis performed during the process. The pertinent questions may be phrased in the following way:

We now have a picture of this movement before us. It shows visually some of the things we have discovered during the time we have worked with the music. Now just how much of what we have actually heard is represented by the diagram?

And what, if anything, does it fail to tell us?

It is hoped that the discussion of the question will eventually clarify that the pattern reflects merely the arrangement of musical material without suggesting anything about its nature. It is in this context

that the term "minuet" may be introduced to describe the rhythmic and
melodic content of the design. Additional illustrations (for example,
third movements from Haydn symphonies and the Symphony No. VIII by
Beethoven) help to show the range of mood and style possible even with-
in the limits of a single dance type. The distinction between formal
arrangement and total musical design can, furthermore, be sharpened by
increasing the number of applications of the simple episodic pattern.
Military marches, a scherzo, a true da capo aria may be used to show
the varied uses of this structure.

The precise choice of works will vary, depending on the integra-
tive requirements of the general education program, but the method of
presentation is clearly indicated. Improvement in the students' ability
to retain musical material (and hence growth in the musical experience)
demands that something more than the simple playing of selections be under-
taken. The compositions can be assigned to listening periods--with stu-
dents asked to prepare analyses similar to the ones made of the Mozart
minuet--and reports on them can include discussion of melodic, harmonic,
rhythmic, textural, and structural features. These reports, furthermore,
can be arranged in a way which will give individual students, or small
groups, a chance to conduct class meetings based on their findings.
From these reports, if desired, a large selection of integrative acti-
vities can be initiated.

These integrative activities embrace a variety of approaches.
There is, first of all, the possibility of integration along formal
(aesthetic) lines--since a structure containing an embracing tri-partite
pattern, with reasonably "closed" subordinate parts, is paralleled in

both literature and the visual arts. On the other hand, it may be argued that the exactness of repetition which characterizes the simple episodic design is rarely found in other media, thus making the connection somewhat artificial. Should this objection be considered sufficiently strong, alternative methods of integration may be employed. Thus an aesthetic analysis, though formal, need not be in terms of pattern alone, since form (the aesthetic determinant) includes considerably more than spatial or temporal arrangement (cf. Chapter V). Or, if the over-all program contains historical orientations, stylistic discussions may lead to historical and cultural considerations which expand some of the similar activities undertaken in connection with the smaller song-forms. Specifically, should the general education program deal at some length with the 17th and 18th centuries (notably the rococo) the contributions of the music unit could include simple episodic selections from suites, symphonies, divertissements, and operas. These being both numerous and artistically of great significance in the period, a rather substantial unit could be built around this design.

Advancing from the simple episodic design, it is possible to turn to other episodic patterns of homophonic music. Since, however, these forms (the rondos) involve listening activities closely similar to the ones just discussed, it may be wise to dispense with them until such time as they occur in context of a major work selected for later study. There is, however, an episodic structure demanding somewhat different listening skills which, therefore, belongs into the unit of the course dealing primarily with skill training. This structure is the fugue.

It may be argued that discussion of fugues has little place in a

general education program, since the fugue is idiomatically far removed from most students' realm of experience and is, furthermore, technically one of the more difficult patterns to perceive. Both of these objections have some merit, but neither can be accepted in toto. As far as the first objection is concerned it must be pointed out that fugues (or at least fugal sections) occur quite frequently in the generally available repertory (particularly if phonograph records are kept in mind), that, therefore, students are likely to encounter musical experiences which would be severely impaired if the fugue were to remain totally strange to them. Similarly, it has been pointed out (cf. Chapter VIII) that subsequent expansion of students' responses demands the inclusion of activities in the music program which are not limited by considerations of the narrowest interpretation of an existing repertory. As to the second objection, it must be admitted that any treatment of fugues which would involve detailed attention to all the intricacies of contrapuntal technique is not justified in this context. If, however, the instructor keeps in mind that the primary purpose of this unit demands improvement in perception and retention of musical material; if, therefore, the study of the fugue is restricted to an analysis of the design in terms of a polyphonic episodic structure (i.e. without elaborate attention to the developmental devices); if, finally, the fugue selected is based on a readily identifiable, melodically appealing subject, there appears to be no reason to anticipate undue difficulties. In the absence of such difficulties the favorable considerations suggest the advisability of including this design in the music program.

The work suggested as a suitable object of study is one of the shorter fugues by J. S. Bach. This composition, the G Minor Fugue

("Little"), has been chosen for a number of reasons. It is relatively uncomplicated in structure; it contains the full four voices best illustrating the expositional pattern; it has a readily identifiable, easily singable subject; and, finally, it contains an episode in the exposition which occasions a valuable demonstration of the listening process.

In studying this work students benefit most substantially if they thoroughly familiarize themselves with the subject. This is best accomplished by having the entire group sing the subject as the instructor plays it on the piano. Often it may be necessary to play the subject very slowly, one figure at a time, returning to the beginning before moving on to the next figure. It is particularly important that the final figure (the ascending scale passage) be given close attention. There may be a tendency on the part of students not to associate this final passage with the subject, thereby creating difficulties in the subsequent analysis of the exposition.

Once the group has become familiar with the subject, the instructor proceeds to play the entire exposition--though without, as yet, assigning a name to this section. Having presumably already discussed the melodic and rhythmic nature of the subject, he asks about the texture of the larger unit; the group will generally identify this as being polyphonic and imitative. Some of the more observant students may even mention the fact that along with imitation there appears to be a certain amount of free polyphony involved. During this discussion it may be helpful to introduce (and illustrate) the term "counter-subject." Though it is not likely that students will learn to sing so instrumental a theme, a number

of conclusions can be drawn from its examination. Students can be asked what functions a counter-subject seems to perform and what considerations the composer will, therefore, have to keep in mind while composing it. Since it should be apparent that a counter-subject must offer a good continuation and also a good polyphonic "accompaniment" in relation to the subject, students can focus their listening on both melodic and harmonic features. This dual concentration (first, probably, alternatively-- later simultaneously) is, of course, the most essential feature required in listening to polyphonic compositions. Thus it may be worth some effort to accomplish it in context of brief examples (such as this subject and counter-subject) where it is uncomplicated by the requirement of retaining long passages in memory.

Once the subject and counter-subject have been examined, attention may be directed to the handling of each voice after it has completed both themes. If there are students present who play the piano (even with one hand), they can be invited to the instrument and each be asked to play a single voice. Combining their efforts into the total texture, it can be heard that considerable free polyphony occurs during the course of the exposition. After such a performance the instructor can show that the composer has introduced his major thematic material (subject and counter-subject) and also established the number of voices he is to use; that he has, therefore, exposed to view the basic resources to be employed in the composition. Such a unit can then be identified as the exposition of a fugue. The remainder of the analysis should be sufficiently simple that students are able to perform it. They are only asked to identify all sections in which the subject occurs (these may, but need not, be labelled

by the term "re-entry"), and all those in which different material is
heard. Since the term is already a familiar one, such new material can
be designated as forming episodes, thereby establishing the fugue as an
episodic design.

To what extent the nature of episodic material is discussed, also
the degree to which various contrapuntal techniques are explained, will
depend on the interest of the group. Generally speaking, a conservative
estimate of interest is most profitable since, after all, acquaintance
with details of the design is subordinate to the improvement in hearing
and retaining musical material accruing through simple aural analysis.
In connection with aural experiencing this fugue can, however, illustrate
quite dramatically the value of improved hearing. This has been demon-
strated in at least two teaching situations:[1] After completing the aural
analysis of the entire fugue, the instructor returns again to the exposi-
tion. He then invites the class to indicate when they feel each entry of
the subject should occur--regardless whether it actually appears. Since
in this composition (as so often in his works) Bach has introduced a
short episode in the exposition, most students will call for the third
appearance of the subject well in advance of its actual presentation.
Their subsequent remarks usually reflect the tensions produced by the
delay and the increased gratification caused by the eventual entrance
of the subject. It may be expected that many students will for the first
time become conscious of the change that increased perception and improved
ability to retain perceptions has wrought in their listening experience.

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[1]University of Florida (The Humanities) and Michigan State College
[now Michigan State University] (Literature and the Fine Arts).

The analysis of the Fugue in G Minor will probably be facilitated if each structural discovery is pictured on the blackboard. Such a process will assist students to retain in memory the aural experience and will also expedite references during the discussion. To be sure, this means that at various stages the diagram on the board will be incorrect, since it is not to be expected that every student remark will contribute to an accurate analysis of the work. This, however, is not a disadvantage. The function of the diagram is simply one of aiding the listening process. This is best accomplished when it accurately represents what students hear--or think they hear--at a given time. Any errors will actually be helpful by indicating to the instructor where and in what way the listening skills of his students are still in need of improvement, while the modifications brought about through the eventual rectification of errors help to demonstrate to students the changes taking place in their own listening experience. Not until the class has genuinely heard the composition will this diagram coincide with one prepared on the basis of a formal analysis of the score. Thus Figure 6 represents only the final version of such a picture.

Up to this time the activities dealing with formal analysis have employed compositions in essentially episodic forms. To be sure, the fugue illustrated a certain amount of thematic development, but the analysis stressed those aspects of design which emphasized thematic digression (for variety) and thematic repetition (for unity). Yet one of the most common organizing techniques in music involves the evolutionary treatment of material--a formal principle, therefore, in which unity still is the function of thematic repetition, but variety is achieved not by new thematic content but through changed treatment of the theme itself. Thus

FIGURE 6

Bach's Fugue in G Minor ["Little"]

the next step in the growth process of students involves the extension of
their listening ability to structures where they must aurally experience
differences in spite of thematic similarities and unifying similarities
in spite of changed contexts. Coupled with this improvement in hearing
there exists the need to provide conceptual frameworks for musical de-
signs not based on episodic patterns. Both of these requirements can be
met by an examination of the variation-form design.[1]

This design, consisting of a single theme and its variations,
can be introduced through a number of musically and pedagogically at-
tractive works. Moore and McGeoch[2] start their discussion with Handel's
Air and Variations ("The Harmonious Blacksmith"), Bernstein[3] with the
second movement from Haydn's Symphony in G Major ("Surprise"), while
Newman[4] presents various methods of variation, illustrating each with a
different example. Copland[5] does not tie his discussion to a master-
piece of musical literature, but to a set of variations he composed on
the opening measures of the song Ach Du Lieber Augustin.[6] There are at
least five reasons recommending Copland's procedure in a course such as
is outlined in this study. There is, first, a great deal to be said in

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[1]Cf. Chapter VIII for an explanation of this terminology.

[2]Earl V. Moore and Glenn McGeoch, Syllabus of Outlines and Materi-
als for Introduction to Musical Literature (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1946), pp. 5-7.

[3]Martin Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 144-145.

[4]William S. Newman, op. cit., pp. 175-191.

[5]Aaron Copland, op. cit., pp. 92-94.

[6]Ibid., pp. 140-144.

favor of tying explanations of a new formal pattern to a composition so completely removed from pretentiousness. Secondly, a considerable saving in time and student energy can be realized by selecting a variation-form in which the theme is already familiar to the class. Thirdly, Copland's variations clearly demonstrate the most common devices of variation, without encumbering them with complicating (though aesthetically valuable) distractions. Fourthly, the composition in question is short, making, therefore, only modest demands on the students' gradually developing ability to retain thematic material in memory. Finally, this work constitutes a departure from the rather serious atmosphere of the works studied just previously, thereby furnishing a welcome change in the class atmosphere. Such a series of advantages makes the work an almost ideal object of study in situations where the student population is made up largely of musical unsophisticates.

Nevertheless, it is desirable to approach this composition in a fashion which does not treat the listening process lightly. A serious preoccupation with the musical features, however, is not to be confused with an inappropriate sententiousness. It simply means that in examining the component parts of the aural experience just as much care is needed as if a less humorous selection had been selected. As a start, the customary investigation of the theme must be undertaken. This involves some concentration on melodic (including modal), metric, textural, and structural features. By now students should have advanced far enough in their studies to discover these qualities with a minimum of help from the instructor. It may even be suggested that the class, rather than the instructor, select the features to be examined. A statement by the instructor may set this process in motion:

We have been listening to all kinds of music during our previous meetings. Sooner or later it has always been necessary to put into words the important characteristics of a musical selection. I am now going to play the theme of this composition. Sing along with me, then describe the music in terms you think will do most to show its important features.

It is to be expected that this process will yield, along with subjective comments, the information that the theme is singable, of limited range, in the major mode, and concluded by an authentic cadence. It will also be described as being in triple meter, of homophonic texture, and, though not in any of the patterns studied, quite repetitive in structure. The results of this discussion can be pictured on the blackboard in some fashion similar to Figure 7a.

Once the theme has been described, the instructor can play both the theme and the full set of variations on the piano. Student comments on the work are likely to identify at least some of the salient features of the music. There will probably be quite widespread recognition of the fact that the selection is dominated by a single theme (though some students may mistake the third and fourth variations for an episode) and that the major means of producing variety is something other than the introduction of new material. There may be some question about the number of changes the theme has undergone, in which case the work must be repeated until a fair degree of unanimity is achieved.

Once the group recognizes the number of changes it becomes possible to discuss the nature of each variation. This process can be facilitated by playing the composition one variation at a time. Generally

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                      THEME                        .   │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                       │
│     Meter:         Triple.                            │
│     Mode:          Major.                             │
│     Range:         Limited.                           │
│     Structure:     Repetitive.                        │
│     Termination:   Authentic cadence                  │
│     Character:     Singable melody.                   │
│                                                       │
│                                                       │
│                                                       │
│                                                       │
│                                                       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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FIGURE 7a

Theme of Variation Form

speaking, little difficulty need be anticipated with the first variation. Though no change in the type of texture has taken place, students tend to hear rather readily the fuller harmonies provided. The second variation may be mistaken by some as a change to full polyphonic texture. Should this be the case, earlier studies in texture can be reinforced by illustrating the potentialities of enriched homophony, where, however, the dominance of a single melodic line still prevents a shift to polyphony. The third variation, by eliminating the melodic line, concentrates attention on the harmonic skeleton. Students may, as a result, deny the presence of the theme. Should this be the case, it can be made the occasion for further sharpening of musical perception. By repeating the theme and gradually (instead of abruptly, as Copland has done) abstracting the harmonic content, this variation can be used to enrich the students' insight into the melody-harmony relationship. Having once clarified the relationship of melody and harmony, the fourth variation can be identified with ease as consisting of a change in harmonization. The fifth, sixth, and seventh variations, being melodic, are easy to hear. They are, respectively, constructed by increasing, then decreasing floridity, and finally shifting the melodic line to the bass part (positional change). The eighth variation shows the possibilities of rhythmic (including metric) change, while the ninth variation employs textural changes. This last variation can be elaborated to any degree desired to provide a suitable ending for the work.

The analysis can be summarized in a diagram similar to the one shown in Figure 7b. On inspecting this representation it becomes evident that every element, with the exception of tone color, has been used

Theme. <u>Ach Du Lieber Augustin</u>.
<u>Variation I</u>. Continued homophony, but changed harmonization.
<u>Variation II</u>. Continued homophony, but enriched by more linear accompaniment.
<u>Variation III</u>. Elimination of melodic line, emphasis on harmonic skeleton.
<u>Variation IV</u>. Change in the chord structure.
<u>Variation V</u>. Changes in melody, line now more florid.
<u>Variation VI</u>. Changes in melody, line now less florid.
<u>Variation VII</u>. Change in melodic position, melody now in bass.
<u>Variation VIII</u>. Changes in rhythm, meter now duple.
<u>Variation IX</u>. Change in Texture to polyphony, including both free and imitative features.

FIGURE 7b

Complete Variation Form

to produce variety, while unification was provided primarily by reten-
tion of the single theme. This principle, totally at variance with the
methods of organization discussed previously, can next be illustrated
by a series of compositions. Fishburn[1] suggests a number of suitable
examples which may be discussed in class and assigned to individual
students (or small groups) for analysis and report. From these reports
integrative activities, similar to the ones suggested in connection with
the episodic design, may be initiated. As there, so here, the direction
and extent of integration depends on the over-all organization of the
general education program.

In assessing the contributions of this second unit of the sug-
gested sample program, it is clear that the major effort has been directed
to the achievement of growth in retaining musical stimuli. This means
that the points receiving only incidental attention in the previous unit
(points six and eight in Chapter VIII) determined the greater part of
the activities in this section of the course. Considerable emphasis has,
however, been placed on the necessity of continuing to improve students'
ability to perceive stimuli presented in terms of the four musical ele-
ments (point five), so that this unit may also be viewed as a further
development of activities instituted previously. Similarly, attention
has remained centered on the experiences of students, thereby retaining
the emphasis on the learner, as distinct from a postulated abstract de-
mand inherent in the subject matter (point two). The choice of selec-
tions represented the dual requirement of proceeding in terms of a
repertory available to students in their historical and geographical

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[1] Hummel Fishburn, op. cit., pp. 142-143.

setting, while also opening the way for growth toward less commonly encountered idioms (points three and four). Point seven (requiring that stimulation be offered in terms of musical gestalt) was necessarily observed, since the activities could not otherwise be undertaken, while point nine (referring to integration) has been touched upon rather extensively in connection with activities arising from the study of various designs.

In retrospect, therefore, it seems clear that of the nine points constituting the topic organization of a music sequence (cf. Chapter VIII) all but two (points one and nine) have received intensive attention in one or both units of the sample program. It has also been stated (cf. Chapter VIII) that of these two the first (dealing with exploratory activities) would necessarily fall outside the scope of this study, since no experimental projects were envisioned as part of this undertaking (cf. Chapter I). Similarly, it has been shown (cf. Chapters VII and VIII) that no single basis for integration could be suggested in the confines of this study, since this would involve the outlining of the full general education program. The alternative proposal, of suggesting various possible lines of integration, has been accomplished in both of the units presented above.

Thus it would seem that all points involved in a music program have been explored in the two units of the sample course to the extent compatible with the restrictions imposed previously. Nevertheless, a program containing no more than what has been outlined thus far would fail to meet the basic objectives in one serious respect. Up to this time only a limited improvement (in terms of intensification and expansion) of the students' listening experience has taken place. Although

a beginning has been made in every direction proposed, it is questionable how far this beginning could be exploited by students without further classroom assistance. In other words, the program must be regarded as incomplete so long as sufficient activities have not taken place to establish more firmly the gains made in the first two units. This is particularly evident when the relative paucity of designs thus far discussed is kept in mind. Possibly the most fruitful musical structure of the past two centuries (the sonata-form) has not yet received attention; vocal music, notably opera, has appeared, if at all, only incidentally; and compositions covering a substantial time-span have generally been avoided. It is, therefore, to a remedying of these deficiencies that the third, and final, unit of the sample program must turn.

CHAPTER XI

A SAMPLE PROGRAM -- EXTENDED APPLICATION OF LISTENING SKILLS

After completing the two units outlined in Chapters IX and X, the
course will have lasted (depending on the number of meetings per week)
something between six and twelve weeks. In most situations, therefore,
there remains only a limited amount of time during the semester (or
quarter) in which to cement the gains made in the students' listening
experience. Since this sample program is presented without time being
reserved for formal integration, it is to be expected that the class can
continue to operate together for about twenty more meetings before the
first music course will have to be terminated.

The availability of this time is both an opportunity and a handi-
cap. As an opportunity it means that at least some further reinforcement
of the skills and habits acquired can still be undertaken; conversely,
the brevity of the time remaining imposes limitations on the nature and
amount of musical works which can be presented. It is hardly possible
to include all the forms, styles, and idioms which even the generally
available repertory has to offer; it is quite impossible to present a
program which transcends this repertory to any significant degree.
Finally, when the general education program is viewed as a whole, includ-
ing all the contributions music can make to the understanding and ap-
preciation of man's cultural and historical development, it appears that
the time remaining is totally inadequate to make ambitious plans for the
exploitation of these possibilities.

These considerations seem to indicate that the introductory music
sequence must be followed by additional musical offerings. These are to

encompass activities made possible by the gains achieved in the initial
music course, but which demand a period of instruction well in excess of
the time remaining in a single semester or quarter. Thus the final unit
of the present program may be regarded as final only in the sense that
it concludes a period of instruction customarily assigned to a college
course. Actually it is a phase of transition to further educational
enterprises in which music has a major part to play. This, however,
makes the selection of any particular group of compositions for the third
unit of the sample program highly tentative. Without knowing the nature
and extent of subsequent music offerings, it is hardly possible to estab-
lish the direction in which this transition is to move. Furthermore, the
literature of music is so rich that, even if the direction of development
were known, there would remain dozens, even hundreds of compositions
which could function as stimuli for desired musical experiences. Thus
the limited number of works which can be presented in the time remaining
must always constitute a more or less arbitrary choice from the wealth
of material available.

The considerations which governed the process of selecting objects
of study for the remainder of this sample course were the following:

> . . . first . . . that music, although shopworn to the
> average musician [is] new to these listeners. Even the
> old war horses [can be] a new listening thrill. . . .
> Second, they must be favorites of the teacher. This may
> seem to be a strange requirement . . . but teacher en-
> thusiasm . . . [is] a great factor in class response.
> . . . Third, the music should be an obvious illustration
> of the point under discussion. Fourth, in view of the
> limited capacities of some of the students too great a
> progress . . . [should] not be expected. . . . Fifth,
> the selections used for listening must have variety.

Sixth, for best results they should not be arranged chronologically. Thus Wagner often rubs elbows with Prokofieff and Schubert.[1]

Having once selected the compositions, there remains the problem of presenting them in a fashion conducive to maximum student growth. This study has stressed repeatedly (cf. Chapters VI, VII, and VIII), and demonstrated specifically (cf. Chapters IX and X), the need to introduce material in a way promising the most favorable valence development of the student group. It appears, therefore, that this requirement can now be taken for granted. Thus, for the sake of brevity and clarity, analysis of these compositions will be shown largely through illustrative diagrams, with textural comments on the conducting of classes kept to a minimum. Thereby, it is hoped, it will be possible to focus attention on the function to be served by each musical selection, without the distraction of having to outline the steps to be taken in accomplishing this purpose. Where some departure from procedures described earlier becomes necessary, or where some pedagogical device of particular helpfulness may be used, the suggested method of presentation will, of course, be indicated.

The first composition to be included in this unit is Benjamin Britten's Young Person's Guide to the Orchestra. The choice of this work was determined by seven considerations. First, it requires students to concentrate their attention over a substantially longer time-span than any of the selections discussed thus far. Second, it facilitates this concentration by a structural pattern (variation-form) with which the

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[1] Marion Loveless, "The Liberal Arts College Music Appreciation Course," Education, 69:438-444, March, 1949.

group has already become familiar. Third, it offers further assistance
to concentration through the clear color differentiation of the subsidi-
ary units (thereby utilizing a listening skill intensively cultivated in
the first unit). Fourth, it presents additional experience in listening
to the only polyphonic design hitherto discussed (the fugue). Fifth, it
constitutes a musical experience in the contemporary idiom without, how-
ever, involving the more difficult, less directly appealing, aspects of
that idiom. Sixth, it is a composition, study of which combines familiar
activities with the difficulties of an increased time-span. Seventh, it
is a composition which may be regarded as sufficiently significant musi-
cally to serve as stimulus for an aesthetic experience.

The final point may, perhaps, demand some clarification. It would
be unprofitable to engage in a critical dispute about the artistic merits
of the various compositions included in the sample program. Probably not
a single illustration could be chosen which could not be attacked by
some critic as either aesthetically worthless or of such little worth as
to make other pieces of music preferable for programs operating under
severe limitations of time. No piece of music is herein advanced as
being of such surpassing aesthetic value that its place in the program
can be justified on grounds of ultimate superiority over alternative
choices. In fact, the philosophic orientation of this study forbids any
such claim. On the other hand, certain requirements have been stated (in
Chapter V) which an experience must meet in order to be classed as aesthe-
tic. At that time it was stressed that any work (natural or man-made),
interaction with which resulted in an aesthetic experience, would be
termed an aesthetic object. It also was emphasized that the aesthetic

experience is the experience of the participator, the recipient, not an experience determined by pre-existing, abstract rules of organization. Thus the requirements amounted to analyses of a living human being's processes while interacting with the object and not to prescriptions based on fixed rules determined by a group of experts. To be sure, in one respect education constitutes an attempt to change a person's experience so as to make it more akin to that "of the skilled, mature person,"[1] but it cannot be claimed that this aim is also the description of a learner's state at a given moment in the educational process. Therefore, in appraising the aesthetic nature of a particular composition, judgment must always be made in terms of the person whose experience is under investigation--in this case the general education student. Since the very reason for a student's presence in this phase of the program is his lack of musical development it must be presumed that compositions which, perhaps, to the sophisticates are--through familiarity or simplicity--no longer preferred aesthetic objects, may for those very reasons be singularly appropriate stimuli for his aesthetic experience. All a more skilled person can do is formulate hypotheses about the probability of a work producing an aesthetic experience in interaction with a particular person (or group). Thus the judgment about Britten's composition--as about all items in this program--has to be interpreted in terms of the student population envisioned for the program and not taken as a value judgment sub specie aeternitatis. With this understanding, there appears ample reason to claim aesthetic value for the selection

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[1] John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), p. 87.

under discussion.

The analysis of Britten's <u>Young Person's Guide to the Orchestra</u> is shown in Figure 8. In deriving this analysis it is, as before, suggested that students be encouraged to develop the pattern from their own aural experience. Having had considerable practice in listening to tone color and also the variation-form design, they should have a fairly easy time in perceiving the structure. There are, however, three items which may require special attention.

First, some difficulty often arises in establishing a suitable conceptualization of the first section. As the diagram shows, Britten first introduces the Purcell theme in the full orchestra, then performs it (with very slight changes) in settings for each of the orchestral choirs, and finally returns it in a fully orchestrated version. It is possible to treat each of these appearances (barring the initial one) as a variation, thereby retaining the "purity" of the variation-form pattern. This, however, seems little justified by the musical effect achieved. Individual class members may vary in their opinion whether the color changes (with so few other differences in treatment, except, perhaps, in the percussion version of the theme) should really be termed variations. The instructor can assist in the discussion by pointing out that the final authorities on the structural analysis of any work are the composer and the listener. The former can, and frequently does, depart from the text-book pattern for reasons which seem to him musically justified. The latter, by creating his own reference points, can structure his experience in an aesthetically satisfying way without conforming to an abstract theoretical plan. So long as the resultant structure,

Theme. Full Orchestra Solemn, yet lively, melody by Purcell.	Variation V. Violins; brass, bassoon, and drum acc. Polish dance.
Theme repeated. Woodwind choir; upper instruments have melody.	Variation VI. Violas; horns, trombones, tuba acc. Dark, slow, somber.
Theme repeated. Brass choir; horns and trumpets have melody.	Variation VII. Cellos; violas, clarinet, harp accompaniment. Lyrical, rich quality.
Theme repeated. String choir; violins and violas, then cellos have melody.	Variation VIII. String basses; woodwinds and tambourine acc. Gay caricature of theme.
Theme repeated. Percussion choir; tympany have fragment of melody.	Variation IX. Harp; strings, brass, cymbal, gong acc. Ornate.
Theme repeated. Full orchestra.	Variation X. French horns; harp, strings, tympany acc. Chordal interlude effect.
Variation I. Flutes and piccolo; strings, triangle and harp acc.	Variation XI. Trumpets; side drum and strings acc. Fast, fragmentary.
Variation II. Oboes; accompanied by strings. Plaintive dialogue.	Variation XII. Trombones and tuba; woodwinds, string bass, trumpet, acc.
Variation III. Clarinets; accompanied by plucked strings. Playful, gay	Variation XIII. Percussion; large sample of percussion and "special effects" group.
Variation IV. Bassoons; accompanied by side drums, strings. Jocular march mood.	Variation XIV. Fugue for full orch.; instruments in previous order. Theme returns in brass.

FIGURE 8

Benjamin Britten: Young Person's Guide to the Orchestra

besides being aesthetically satisfying, is also consonant with the totality of his aural experience, the divergence from a traditional pattern is, to him, of no significance. In this instance it may be preferable to combine the entire first section into a single unit, treating it as the statement of the theme with repetitions, rather than breaking it down into a thematic statement with five variations. Should, however, the class experience the section otherwise, there appears no good reason to insist on this analysis.

Second, there may be some confusion about the thematic material in some of the variations (Variation IV, for example), where, as a result of melodic changes, students tend to lose track of the theme--thereupon classing such units as episodes. Should this be the case, it is suggested that the instructor play the theme on the piano and, progressing gradually, demonstrate the relationship between the theme and its modified versions. This occasion can be used to stimulate discussion about the various ways in which thematic changes (development) can take place. The ensuing gains not only contribute to a clearer conception of the composition at hand, but also prepare the way for the subsequent introduction of the sonata-form.

Third, some groups may find it hard to account for the structure of the final variation. By now, most students should recognize the presence of imitative polyphony and, similarly, should have little doubt about the fugal nature of the variation. The introduction (in the brass) of the original theme, however, can cause some comment. Here the flexibility of the fugal structure can be emphasized by calling attention to the effects attained through the introduction of a major theme different from the subject. Furthermore, the reappearance of the Purcell theme makes it pos-

sible to speak of the unification achieved by this variation in relation to the entire composition--the triumphant entry of the original theme functioning akin to the re-statement of a ternary (or _da capo_ of a simple episodic) pattern. Discussion of this feature also helps to direct attention to the over-all formal unity of the work and to the many ways in which composers can employ the unity-through-repetition principle.

Some comments on individual variations not only promote the aural experiencing of this composition, but can also assist in the formation of some tentative hypotheses about the nature of the contemporary musical idiom (or, at any rate, one branch of it). Humor, notably in the form of caricaturing earlier styles, so typical of certain contemporary composers (such as Prokofieff), can be shown in connection with variation XIII; melodic and harmonic deviations from earlier models emerge tellingly in Variation I; while the contrast between the contemporary and the baroque idiom becomes striking indeed when placing the final variation in juxta-position with the fugue studied previously (_cf_. Chapter X). Should it be desired, integration with various other media in the arts can occur al-most spontaneously. Painting, architecture, literature all offer fruit-ful parallels for discussion. From the arts, in turn, integrative acti-vities reaching into the social sciences can be originated. The very ec-lecticism of this composition makes it easy to establish justifiable con-nections between it and human expressions of the most varied sort.

The next object of study, Tschaikowsky's _Romeo and Juliet_, was selected initially for its suitability in leading to the study of the sonata-form. In addition, this composition has a number of other fea-tures to recommend it. It is written in an idiom which, in spite of the lamentations of critics, continues to attract beginning listeners more

readily than some of the more subtle styles. It represents an additional step in perceiving, retaining, and organizing aural stimuli--since a time-span about equal to that of the Britten work must be traversed without the aid of the clear sectionalization found in the variation-form. Romeo and Juliet also constitutes an introduction to a field of music (program music) not previously included in the course. Finally, this work makes possible particularly fruitful integrative activities in connection with the emotional orientation of its style.

At first it may seem surprising that Romeo and Juliet should be the recommended introduction to the sonata-form. The pattern is, after all, less clear in this romantic composition than in almost any classical symphony. Similarly, the program content, if mentioned, may be thought to obscure structural features of the design. It also could be argued that the intense emotionality of the work militates against the kind of aural concentration needed to grasp a new musical pattern.

These objections, though logical of the subject matter, are not applicable to the teaching situation as it exists in the projected general education music course. Here the governing consideration must continue to be the anticipated response of students. Thus, the fact that the idiom (and the work itself) leads one to anticipate strongly favorable valences is in itself almost sufficient to select this work as the initial composition exemplifying the design. Of equal significance is the fact that the program content makes it possible to arrive at an analysis without introducing new terminology. Thus it becomes possible to separate into successive phases the two new elements involved in presenting the sonata-form (i.e. the new aural experience and the new conceptual framework). As a result, a situation in which students are con-

fronted simultaneously with multiple unknowns can be avoided. Thus the logic of the learning process suggests that the sonata-form be approached through a composition of this type.

This procedure is reflected by the analysis shown in Figure 9. The pattern resembles an enlarged ternary (or simple episodic) structure, in which the digressive section contains modifications of old material. It also shows two optional sections (introduction and <u>coda</u>) already familiar to students. The customary terminology of the sonata-form, therefore, has not yet been introduced, while the aural experiencing of the design has already occurred. This will make it possible to evolve later the pattern for sonata-form from two familiar concepts—the simple episodic form and the programatic analysis of <u>Romeo and Juliet</u>.

It is desirable that, concurrently with the analysis of structure, intensification of perception be emphasized. The nature of thematic material (notably the features which create the contrasts between the two "Love" themes, "Romeo" and "Juliet," and the "Feud" theme), the changes affected in themes during the course of the composition, certain modulations, tone color, harmonic effects (particularly the handling of consonance and dissonance) all can be useful "ear training" activities. At the same time, the analytical process itself demands constant sharpening of the students' ability to retain a considerable variety of material. Aurally speaking, this is probably the most significant new factor in the experience, since in this composition more themes, with a greater variety of contrasts, have to be kept in mind over a more protracted period of time than in any work so far presented. The purely aural part of the experience is, therefore, challenging enough without increasing the

Introduction
"Friar Lawrence" theme. Slow, hymn-like, dominated by low instruments. Builds to climax, then subsides.

A

| "Feud" theme stated first in woodwinds, strings and horns, then treated by various other instruments. Series of climaxes, then calm. | "Romeo" and "Juliet" themes. Former in Eng. horn and viola, latter in strings. Numerous interchanges and modified repetitions. |

B
Does not contain new material, but modified treatment of "Friar Lawrence" theme and "Feud" theme, with the latter dominating. Builds to great intensity. Frequently only the rhythm of the "Feud" theme is heard, but even so great tension is felt.

A

| "Feud" theme dominates. | "Romeo" and "Juliet" themes, but in reversed order, also other elements of variety |

Coda
Based mainly on "Romeo" and "Juliet" themes at first, then "Feud" and "Friar Lawrence" themes. End balances mood of introduction.

FIGURE 9

P. I. Tschaikowsky: Romeo and Juliet

difficulty through new terminology.

It is to be anticipated that, even in courses where formal integration is postponed to a later date, a good deal of incidental integration will occur during the discussion of this composition. Immediately apparent are the comments necessitated by the program content. Some mention will have to be made of the literary source, as well as the differences in expression between the verbal and the musical art. In this connection it may be advisable to raise questions about the differences between program music and (so-called) absolute music--though not necessarily introducing these terms. Students should be encouraged to examine their listening experience to determine whether, without oral or written communication, the work would have conveyed any non-musical concepts. It may well be desirable to furnish additional illustrations to demonstrate the issues involved. Similar incidental integration is likely to arise while examining the themes in Romeo and Juliet. Contrasting the material with that of works in the previous unit (examining, for example, the dynamic and color balances employed by Tschaikowsky in comparison with those in the Mozart minuet) will almost certainly yield stylistic conclusions which have application well beyond the field of music. From these beginnings more elaborate formal integration can then be undertaken. Should it be desired, stylistic, hence historical, and also aesthetic approaches appear particularly promising. The latter, furthermore, (through the implied value judgments of aesthetic orientations) can be expanded into integration along broad philosophic lines.

Should these integrative efforts not move too far afield, the course can continue with a further development of student listening

experiences in relation to the sonata-form. The work suggested for this

purpose is the first movement of Mozart's Symphony No. 39 in E Flat

Major. Here again a great number of alternative choices could be made;

there are, however, a number of features which make this work, though

not an exclusive, nevertheless a preferred choice.

Probably the strongest factor favoring this selection is its

thematic content. The two subjects are clearly differentiated, the

transitional material, by and large, is sufficiently unlike the sub-

jects to be readily distinguishable, cadential devices are emphatic

(thereby facilitating the recognition of structure), and the develop-

ment section is rather brief and uncomplicated. A further advantage,

after having just studied Romeo and Juliet, is the fact that this move-

ment contains both an introduction and a coda, thereby facilitating the

recognition of structural similarities between the two compositions.

The contrast in themes, orchestration, and emotional atmosphere between

the Mozart work and Tschaikowsky's provides, furthermore, desirable

variety in the course and also makes it possible to branch out (if

desired) into a discussion of period styles. Should time permit, it

is also possible to include the remaining movements in the program (there-

by providing the experience of listening to an entire symphony) without

introducing any new designs. Finally, the composition is of a musical

caliber few critics could attack, while at the same time remaining emi-

nently accessible to the beginning student.

It is suggested that study of this work be started with an aural

analysis of its structure--based entirely on the thematic content. It

is only to be expected that several playings of the movement will be

necessary for even an approximation of the pattern to emerge, but these repetitions should eventually result in an analysis which resembles Figure 10a. This diagram, though still quite far removed from the structure of the sonata-form, identifies, in embryonic form, the tripartite organization of the design, while also indicating that the main unit is preceded by a contrasting, slower introductory section.

The next step in analysis is designed to increase the differentiation of the large areas. In this connection it may be wise to concentrate first on the exposition alone. If sufficient discussion is encouraged, students should be able to develop the pattern of two distinct subject areas, connected by transitional material. During this activity it may not be too sanguine to hope that, in addition to an improvement of perceptive and retentive skills, students will begin to perceive the distinction between thematic and connective material. This process can be sharpened by emphasizing (if need be on the piano) the cadential and scale sequences associated with transitional material. This, in turn, also helps to distinguish the codetta at the end of the second subject, where the use of cadence formulae gives clear indication of the function served by the unit. Thus the next step in analysis may be pictured in a diagram similar to Figure 10b.

Having once progressed this far, it becomes possible to compare the exposition with the recapitulation (which, at this stage, still includes the coda). Probably the first thing mentioned by students will be the fact that the recapitulation appears to contain an extra part at the end. This part is similar in nature to the codetta, in that it also induces a feeling of completion. It would be surprising indeed if some

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    Introduction                       │
│ Slow, dignified section, using full (if relatively    │
│ small) orchestra. Extensive use of scale passages.    │
│ Anticipation built at end to lead to movement         │
│ proper.                                               │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         A                             │
│ A rather substantial section containing material      │
│ sufficiently differentiated to suggest the presence   │
│ of several themes, or even groups of themes.          │
│                                                       │
│                                                       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         B                             │
│ No new material, but definitely modified use of       │
│ themes heard previously.                              │
│                                                       │
│                                                       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         A                             │
│ Largely repetition of the original version of this    │
│ material. Appears to be somewhat extended near the    │
│ end.                                                  │
│                                                       │
│                                                       │
│                                                       │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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FIGURE 10a

W. A. Mozart: Symphony No. 39 in E Flat Major
          Preliminary Analysis of First Movement

First Subject	Transition	Second Subject
Starts in lilting waltz-like fashion. Appears to be more nearly a group or area of themes, rather than a single melody. Leads to a climax of modest proportions.	Largely scale passages and similar connecting material. Near end a series of figures stress cadence. The entire section seems to stress motion towards some destination.	Another group of musical ideas contrasting rather lyrical material with more tense, dramatic unit
		Codetta Scale passages and similar material lead to sharply accented cadences.

FIGURE 10b

W. A. Mozart: Symphony No. 39 in E Flat Major
Exposition of First Movement

student, after the experiences provided in the previous unit (cf. Chapter

X), did not suggest that the section in question provides a conclusion to

the whole movement, just as the codetta concludes the exposition and the

recapitulation. Now the analysis may be refined by splitting off the

coda into a separate part.

Next it is advisable to return to an examination of the composi-

tion as a whole. The aural discoveries made in connection with this move-

ment facilitate a comparison with Romeo and Juliet. Both show a struc-

ture similar to a large ternary (or simple episodic) organization, con-

taining, however, changed forms of already presented material in place

of the central episode. Both, furthermore, show "appendages" in form of

an introduction and a coda. It may be questionable whether a breaking

down of the subject areas into individual themes and the derivation of

the developmental units from their thematic sources is appropriate in an

introductory course. Yet it would not be surprising if some classes

would have already accomplished much of this without special effort--

simply as an outgrowth of previous analytical activities. In these

cases the students concerned may be encouraged to continue the process

in listening assignments, reporting their findings in class (if enough

students have participated), or in conferences or papers (if only a

minority of the group is involved). Thus in most sections of the course

the final diagram would resemble Figure 10c, while in more adept groups

it more nearly would duplicate Figure 10d.

Though this more detailed analysis may apply only to a limited

number of students, there is one more aural activity which can be sug-

gested for the group as a whole. Admittedly, this is likely to tax

Introduction
Slow, dignified. Uses scale passages and builds
up anticipation near the end.

Exposition

First Subject	Transition	Second Subject
Waltz-like beginning, builds to modest climax while using new material.	Scale passages, cadence formulae.	Lyrical material, then more dramatic effect all on new key level. then: Codetta

Development
Utilizes modified versions of material heard in
second subject, also some transition figures.
Ends with section similar to end of introduction.

Recapitulation

First Subject	Transition	Second Subject
No substantial change.	Does not modulate.	Same material, this time in same key as first subject. Codetta

Coda
Scale passages from introduction and cadence
formulae from end of transition dominate this
section.

FIGURE 10c

W. A. Mozart: Symphony No. 39 in E Flat Major
Simplified Analysis of First Movement

Introduction
Same as in Figure 10c.

Exposition		
First Subject Theme 1. Waltz-like lilting melody. Theme 2. Bolder theme with broad interval leaps.	Transition Modulates, stresses cadence	Second Subject Theme I. Lyrical. Theme II. Dramatic. Codetta. Cadential.

Development
Uses material from I, transition, codetta, II, in order named. Comes to stop on two accented chords, then uses material from end of introduction to lead to recapitulation.

Recapitulation		
First Subject Theme 1. No change. Theme II. Slight change at end.	Transition	Second Subject Theme II. Home key. Codetta. Changed to lead to coda.

| Coda |
|---|
| Same as in Figure 10c. |

FIGURE 10d

W. A. Mozart: Symphony No. 39 in E Flat Major
Slightly Advanced Analysis of First Movement

rather heavily the ability of some students (and if the class is made up predominantly of individuals in this category, the activity had best be omitted), but the experiencing of sonata-form design and the enrichment of the conceptual framework is so greatly enhanced by this undertaking, that it seems highly desirable in all cases where pedagogical considerations do not forbid it outright. The reference here is to an aural recognition of the modulatory function of the transition in the exposition and the absence of such modulation in the recapitulation. More precisely, the experience involves the awareness of a contrast in tonality between first and second subjects in the exposition and the unity of tonality in the recapitulation. It is suggested that, in most instances, students are not likely to be aware of this difference unless exposition and recapitulation, or even just the central section of these units (including the end of the first subject, the transition, and the beginning of the second subject) are played in close juxtaposition. On the other hand, once such recognition has taken place, it should be readily discernible on subsequent hearings of the movement. The reason for emphasizing this single feature so strongly is two-fold. First, there is the psychological effect of the design. The exposition may be viewed as an establishment of tensions (particularly in the hand of later composers), which are subsequently exploited in the development. The recapitulation, then, represents a resolution of conflict, underscoring the diminishing of tensions by the uniformity of tonality. Newman speaks of the sonata-form as "a field of battle"[1] (in at least some of its uses), in which the

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[1]William S. Newman, Understanding Music A New Introduction to Music's Elements, Styles, and Forms--for the Layman and the Practitioner (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1952), p. 220.

recapitulation represents the peace settlement. It may seem ludicrously

hyperbolic to speak of this Mozart movement as a "field of battle," and

certainly no such suggestion is here intended, but relaxation of tension,

through the transposition into the tonic of all thematic material, is a

distinct feature of the sonata-form--provided the aural experience is of

sufficient intensity. How significant this unifying effect can become

is illustrated by a second consideration. Frequently composers, even

in the classical period, will introduce variety into the recapitulation

by new coloration, elaboration, or even partial omission, of themes, re-

lying on the power of tonality to provide much of the unifying effect

(cf. first movement of Haydn's Symphony in D Major ["Clock"]). In fact,

the psychological response to a single tonal center is considered sig-

nificant enough that a majority of composers (in the sonata-form) shift

all or part of the second subject from the relative to the tonic major in

compositions where the "home" key is minor (cf. first movement of Mozart's

Symphony No. 40 in G Minor). Thus it would seem that aural recognition of

this feature is of sufficient significance to attempt its achievement

where the course aims for an intensified musical experience.

In discussing the various organizational features of designs,

students are, however, in constant danger of gaining the impression that

certain patterns are in some mysterious fashion compulsory, inflexible,

models which composers are required to follow. This erroneous conception

needs to be counteracted at every possible opportunity. Some mention has

been made earlier in this chapter (cf. the discussion of Britten's Young

Person's Guide to the Orchestra) of the analytical pattern's dependence

on the actual music. It has been stressed that the pattern depends on

the music and not <u>vice versa</u>. From a listener's point of view a the-
oretical framework is merely an aid to listening, a means by which the
total experience can be intensified so as to increase the aesthetic com-
ponent (<u>cf</u>. Chapters V, VI, and VII), hence an attitude which would
erect barriers to the listening process dare not be fostered. At this
time, when the most complex design of the course is under discussion,
the instructor must, therefore, be particularly alert to counteract any
tendency which would channel energies toward verbalizations and abstrac-
tions, thereby reducing the energies available in the listening experi-
ence. Precautionary measures may involve the presentation of additional
musical illustrations in which the basic pattern is clear enough to es-
tablish them as sonata-forms in student perception, but where the de-
partures from a "pure" version of the form are sufficiently striking to
destroy any notion of a dominant, pre-existing, permanently binding model.
If for no other reason, though many could be cited, compositions showing
this formal characteristic should be performed in class, or assigned for
outside listening. Some of Beethoven's overtures (<u>Coriolanus</u> or <u>Egmont</u>,
for example) would serve this purpose admirably.

Expanding illustrations beyond the single work discussed can also
facilitate integrative activities in connection with the sonata-form de-
sign. Comparing the Mozart and Tschaikowsky compositions already studied,
adding a Beethoven selection, maybe a short Brahms illustration, or, per-
haps, Weber's <u>Overture to Der Freischütz</u>, can lead to discussions of
classical and romantic characteristics which correlate readily with
historical and stylistic considerations raised in the context of other
media. It is even possible (though this may involve some risk) to examine

literary parallels to the sonata-form. The one great danger against which guard must be kept is pseudo-integration on the basis of empty verbalizations.

In organizing the remaining portion of the introductory music program, the primary limitation is the shortage of time. If even a few of the suggested avenues of integration have been explored, the number of class hours in the customary three semester-credit course has already been exhausted. But even if the program has consistently postponed integrative activities to a later date, only about six to eight class meetings remain--and this figure depends heavily on reasonably rapid progress of the group involved. Thus it is clear that only a minute fraction of the many desirable activities not yet undertaken can be planned for the course. The question is one of selecting, from among the large list of possibilities, that work (or those works, if they be short) which best bring to conclusion this part of the students' educational experience.

One of the more plausible choices would be the examination of a single major instrumental composition utilizing all, or most, of the designs discussed. This would offer the advantage of consolidating the gains made in the students' aural experience, while at the same time extending the retentive requirements over a period far in excess of anything hitherto attempted. If the composition chosen were also to present a style or idiom not yet treated, it would have the further advantage of providing extension, as well as intensification, of the experience. If, finally, the selection were to appeal strongly to students, the course would end with a positive valence area, promising highly favorable condi-

tions for further growth in subsequent courses or independent activities. Thus it might be suggested that the final work in this program be one of the more directly appealing symphonies by Beethoven (No. III, No. V, No. VI, or No. VII), a Tschaikowsky symphony (No. IV, No. V, or No. VI)-- though here the idiom would not be new--or, perhaps, the First Symphony by Brahms. Any one of these compositions would probably constitute a successful closing work for the introductory music course. Nevertheless, this sample program suggests a different approach.

Up to this time, in spite of the precautions taken, some students may well have become excessively preoccupied with a conscious analysis of their musical experience--thereby failing to bring about the "unity of a path"[1] suggested as the desired outcome of their development (cf. Chapter IX). It may actually be too soon to hope that intensification of the listening experience has become sufficiently great to permit the perception of design (hence achievement of the aesthetic experience) without preparatory conscious analysis. On the other hand, should this have been accomplished (so that subsequent music offerings could be devoted primarily to extension of this accomplishment plus integrative efforts) the course could hardly be concluded more satisfactorily than by offering students an opportunity for this experience. In doing so, it would make it possible for the group to leave the course with the assurance that musical performances in the future could be meaningful experiences even without the help and guidance available in the class room. Thus it is

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[1] Kurt Lewis, The Conceptual Representation and the Measurement of Psychological Forces (Donald K. Adams and Helge Lundholm, editors, Contributions to Psychological Theory, Vol. I, No. 4., Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1938), p. 30.

proposed that the final work studied be one which by its nature lends itself to a presentation at variance with the procedures hitherto pursued, while, at the same time, making a distinct contribution to the total musical growth of the group. Whether, in point of fact, the inclusion of this activity in the introductory program is justified, or whether it should be postponed to a subsequent music unit, can only be established through controlled experiments. In this study it is suggested as a possible way of concluding the course.

With these reservations, it is suggested that the introductory program be brought to a close with a presentation of Verdi's opera Rigoletto. This work, as also the same composer's La Traviata, or Puccini's La Boheme (which would be suitable alternates), has the great advantage of being composed in an idiom easily accessible to and widely appreciated by audiences of limited musical background. It has been, and continues to be, one of the most popular repertory pieces of every opera house in the world. Selections from the opera, notably La Donna E Mobile and Bella Figlia del' Amore, are known and liked even by musically unsophisticated listeners, while the setting and plot provide sufficient color and excitement to capture the interest of those unfamiliar with the operatic medium. Thus it is probable that student reaction will be generally favorable. Popularity, in this case, is, furthermore, by no means antithetical to musical excellence. Grout, for example, classes "the famous quartet one of the finest ensembles in all opera."[1] And of the opera as a whole Francis Toye has this to say:

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[1] Donald Jay Grout, A Short History of Opera (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), I, 340.

> As a work of art Rigoletto remains even today among the finest manifestations of Verdi's genius. In unity of dramatic conception, in delineation of character, this music excels not only all [Verdi's] operas that preceded, but most of the operas that succeeded it.[1]

It need not be feared, therefore, that pedagogical considerations prompted the placement of an aesthetically inferior work in this concluding position in the course. From the point of view of this introductory program, two additional advantages accrue by discussing Rigoletto at this time. First, the gap left by the omission of major examples in a vocal idiom is filled. Second, the attempt to advance musical growth through an activity where awareness of design is not approached through conscious analysis takes place in a setting where the students' life outside the class room (i.e. the focusing of attention through dramatic, hence verbal, devices) can be of direct assistance in accomplishing the musical experience.

There is, however, a major psychological obstacle to be overcome in the presentation of this work. Many students may find it difficult to view without embarrassment the intense emotionality of the libretto. Accustomed as they are to realistic (or rather, pseudo-realistic) plot and language components from the popular screen, they may express the tensions resulting from such embarrassment by sarcastic, or otherwise hostile, responses. Similarly, the lack of realism involved in the singing of dramatic material may arouse antagonism in a considerable portion of the group.

In order to forestall these developments, the instructor should

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[1] Francis Toye, Giuseppe Verdi His Life and Works (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 1946), p. 267.

stimulate discussion of the nature and value of experiences gained

through participation (as members of the audience) in a dramatic per-

formance. In the course of such discussion it will soon emerge that

strict realism is antithetical to all drama, particularly when (as in

the case of most students) the medium is that of the cinema. A consider-

able number of conventional devices, totally at variance with "reality,"

are always accepted without impairment of the illusion. Most motion pic-

tures, furthermore, show the same schematisation, over-simplification, of

character, the same concentration on none but crucial incidents, the same

heightening of emotional components which characterize opera. The audi-

ence in a movie theater, therefore, engages in a "willing suspension of

disbelief" which is no different in kind from the attitude required when

witnessing an operatic performance. Fairy tales, fantasy, the currently

popular science fiction, offer illustrations of extreme departures from

"reality" which mankind readily accepts for the sake of values obtained

in a literary experience.

This approach also suggests a way of dealing with the problem

posed by the frequent repetitions of text (as well as the replacement of

speech with singing) involved in the operatic medium. Since the value of

the total experience lies not in the information, the cognitions, con-

veyed through the medium of dramatic representation, but in the aestheti-

cally satisfying, emotionally intensified participation in the experience,

the contributions of music demand that its melodic, rhythmic, and repeti-

tive features be accomodated. The necessity of producing aesthetic and

emotional situations requires a temporal expansion of those moments in

which music is to intensify the experience. Thus the apparent illogi-

cality, the jarring, disruptive effect produced by singing and repetition,

disappears as soon as the perspective is changed from preconceived no-
tions of realism. It is this shift in perspective which must be accom-
plished through discussion before the opera is presented.

Some practical difficulties also arise from the circumstance that
the customary teaching situation does not permit the presentation of
opera as a visual, as well as an aural, work of art. This is further
complicated by the general unavailability of good English versions of
operatic recordings. Neither of these handicaps can be overcome com-
pletely, but some amelioration can be achieved in a number of ways.
Large reproductions of the stage settings for each scene can be placed
before the class, with the instructor offering some explanation about
the movement of characters on the stage. The plot of the opera can be
made familiar in advance of class meetings by asking students to read
such summaries as are contained in the books of Newman,[1] Toye,[2] or The
International Cyclopedia of Music and Musicians.[3] Finally, students can
be given a complete libretto (with as idiomatic a translation as can be
found) and/or the libretto can be projected on a screen during the per-
formance. An added advantage of projecting the libretto rests in the
instructor's ability to change slides (or pages) so that students can
keep abreast of progress through the work. This avoids the danger of
some students getting lost (particularly in ensemble passages) and being

[1]Ernest Newman, The Stories of Great Operas and Their Composers
(Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company, 1928), pp. 609-620.

[2]Francis Toye, op. cit., pp. 263-266.

· [3]Oscar Thompson, editor, The International Cyclopedia of Music
and Musicians (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1939), pp. 2196-2197.

diverted from the listening process while trying to regain their place.
It might be added that, for the sake of clarity, the instructor should
edit those pages of the libretto in which the text of ensembles is given.
It is frequently the case that the published version presents successive-
ly material which is, actually, performed simultaneously. Students are
far more likely to follow the opera successfully, if such passages are
arranged in parallel columns.

Some comment may be desirable about the extent to which technical
discussions should be offered in connection with this work. It is, after
all, entirely possible to perform a detailed analysis of each section (as
Finney has done with the aria La Donna E Mobile),[1] or to expatiate on
the major technical devices of operatic design (aria, recitative, ensemble,
etc.), or to discuss vocal tone colors (as Fishburn has done),[2] but it is
doubtful that the special purpose which prompted the inclusion of
Rigoletto in this program would be advanced by any of these procedures.

This does not mean that student questions should go unanswered.
Since the work is to be presented, as nearly as possible in a class room,
in a manner approximating that of an actual performance, it is assumed
that intermissions will be provided. During intermissions in the opera
house perceptive students, accompanying a person more familiar than they
with the operatic medium, would, without a doubt, ask many questions
about the background of the work and about the various things they see

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[1] Theodore M. Finney, Hearing Music The Art of Active Listening
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1941), pp. 42-44.

[2] Hummel Fishburn, Fundamentals of Music Appreciation (New York:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), pp. 22-30.

and hear in the performance. Information provided under such circumstances is apt to have a vitality unmatched by anything a formal lecture could provide. To the extent that a similar situation arises in the class room, the instructor can, and should, function in this capacity.

With the presentation of Rigoletto, in the manner outlined above, the final unit of the sample program comes to a close. Except for this concluding activity, nothing has been suggested which is different in nature from the undertakings described in the previous two units. Thus the two points in the program outline (cf. Chapter VIII) which have not been put into direct operation before (i.e. exploration of student abilities and interests and a single consistent plan of integration) have again been omitted. Reasons for this omission have already been stated (cf. Chapters VII and VIII) and need not be repeated here. The primary function of this unit, the consolidation and partial extension of gains accomplished in the previous two units, has, it is hoped, been accomplished. It is hardly likely, however, that the activities in this unit (or in the sample program as a whole) have sufficiently extended and intensified the musical experiences of students to permit the ignoring of music in subsequent courses in the general education program. Thus it must again be emphasized that the course outlined in Chapters IX, X, and XI is introductory in nature; that it is not, and does not pretend to be, adequate to discharge the total musical obligations of general education—unless the general education sequence aims at only the most limited impetus for further growth. To be sure, no general education program can do more than cover one phase of growth; in fact, a program

aimed at completing, terminating, growth would be totally inconsistent with the philosophic orientation of this study. On the other hand, a program which fails to strive for growth in the total field of student experiences (whether in the context of formal courses or otherwise) exercises an arbitrariness of selection, a limitation of the life process, which can hardly be condoned. Consequently, a general education program developed along lines of this study is a fairly elaborate and lengthy undertaking. In such an endeavor the sample program herein suggested is envisioned as a foundational, elementary part.

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