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0N MODEL CARES ‘

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MSU I: An Affirmative WM Oppommlly Inflation
7 7 mun-m

THE LACK OF MARKETING PLANNING IN
FEDERAL PROGRAMS WITH EMPHASIS

ON MODEL CITIES

BY

Wm. Melvin Smith

A PROBLEM ANALYSIS

Submitted to

Michigan State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Master of Business Administration

Advance Management Program (Detroit)

1971

Approved %

(Paéulty AdAEEBr I

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer is most grateful to the following
people: Edward Adkins, John Kendall, Lowell Perry for
their moral support during the early stages of the
Advance Management Program.

To William Randolph, whose career counseling
gave me the inspiration to continue my efforts in the
business school until completion, and to Milton H.
Watson, who gave me many resources that were unavailable
to me on my own, and, finally, to Dr. W. G. E. Crissy

for his understanding and advice in preparing this

Problem Analysis; may God bless all of you.

ii

"THE MOST UNBELIEVABLE THING"

BY

Hans Christian Anderson

A king once offered the hand of his daughter, the princess,
to the man who could do the most unbelievable thing in the
arts. There was a great competition. At last it was
decided that the most unbelievable thing among entries was
a combined clock and calendar of ingenious design and sur-
passing beauty, the product of many years of work. Not
only was the time given, the clock showed the ages back and
forth into the past and future. And circling the clock
were sculptured figures representing the greatest spiritual
and cultural minds in the history of human society.

All assembled were agreed that this clock was without ques-
tion the most unbelievable thing and the hand of the
princess must be given to the clock's handsome creator.

But as judgment was about to be pronounced, a lowbrow com-
petitor appeared, Sledgehammer in hand. With a single blow
he destroyed forever the marvelous clock. And everybody
said why, to destroy so beautiful a thing, this is surely
the most unbelievable thing of all. And that was how the
judges had to judge.

iii

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. MODEL CITIES-DIVERSIFIED PLANNING

PROCESSES . O O O O O O O O O O 4

Staff Dominance. . . . . . . . . 4

Parity O O O O O O O O O O O O 13

Resident Influence. . . . . . . . 17

Resident Dominance. . . . . . . . 20

System Determinants . . . . . . . 23

Pre-Model Cities Planning

Environment . . . . . . . . . 23

Resident Involvement . . . . . . 27

Role of Chief Executive . . . . . 31

III. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION. . . . . . . . 36

Long-Term Planning. . . . . . . . 39

Organizational Theory. . . . . . . 41

IV. COMMUNICATIONS--AN INDICATOR OF A GOOD
MARKETING PLAN . . . . . . . . . 45

Community Communication Implementation

Team 0 O O O O O O I O O I O 47

Thought and Language Competence . . . 54
Attitudinal Factor. . . . . . . . 56

Crime Statistics . . . . . . .

Knowledge Levels . . . . . . . . 59

Cultural Class . . . . . . . . . 60

V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . 65
BIBLIOGMPHY 0 O 0 O O O O O O O O O O 6 7
PWHLETS O O I I O O O O O O O O O O 6 8

iv

 

LIST OF TABLES

Page
Non-System Determinants--Planning Process . 25
Systems and Their Determinants. . . . . 31
Involvement of Chief Executive in Planning
Process . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Education, 25 Years and Older (1968). . . 55
Homicides (per 100,000 population) . . . 56
Police Data, 1965 (per 100,000 population). 58
Housing Data. . . . . . . . . . . 58
Rental Data . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Psychological Evaluation. . . . . . . 60
Income of Families. . . . . . . . . 61
Income by Source . . . . . . . . . 61
Occupation of Adults . . . . . . . . 62
Labor Force Status of Adults . . . . . 63
Family Composition. . . . . . . . . 64
Type of Welfare Assistance Received . . . 64

 

LI ST OF FIGURES

 

Figure Page
1. Talent-Task Composition of the Enterprise
Levels of Management . . . . . . . . 40
2. 4-Way Network . . . . . . . . . . 46
3. Tentative Chart Showing Relations of the
Communications Component. . . . . . . 48
vi

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I do not believe in the conspiracy theory of
history. Nothing happens by accident but by design,
however it is clear by evaluation and measurement of data
that no better device could have been found to limit the
full use of program benefits and thus reduce the cost to
the government than the non inclusion of budgetary alloca-
tion for marketing strategy.

Nearly 200 cities and counties from all parts of
the country applied for first round Model Cities planning
grants. These applications, with their profiles of cities
and their problems, constitute a rich source of informa-
tion.

On the basis of experience gained in the first
round, certain approaches appeared to be particularly
rewarding. In those applications that appeared most
promising:

1. Public and private agencies necessary to
carry out the program and local residents were deeply
involved in the preparation of the application, assuring

community understanding and commitment.

 

However, because of the lack of good preparatory
marketing planning the private agencies with their pro-
fessional talent have become bogged down with red tape
and the citizens participation mechanism has become frus-
trated because of the lack of realistic product (services)
priorities.

2. Problem analyses probed deeply, going well
beyond a description of symptoms of problems to those
forces that created and maintained the problem situations.

This was mainly because of the strong commitment
of both private citizens and agencies. You might also say
that the politicians during this period had not begun to
realize the political power that could be acquired in this
infant of a product.

3. Linkages between problems were clearly defined
such that a well integrated perspective for the problems
of the "Model Neighborhood" and its residents emerged.

This problem solving mechanism brought about a
variety of lay marketing experts who because of lack of
good marketing principles and foundations fell into the
traps of deadlines and excessive over commitments. In
order to benefit by the experience of the first round of
applications, the guidelines have been revised.

First, the relationships between the preparation
of the application for a planning grant and subsequent

activities have been clarified.

Second, cities are now asked to file a letter of
intent as they begin to organize for the preparation of
the application for a planning grant. This is intended
to help cities plan for the involvement of the necessary
state and local public and private agencies and Model
Neighborhood residents and to provide a basis upon which
Federal Agencies can keep localities advised of program
developments and provide technical assistance, if
requested.

Third, cities should not be requested to develop
program proposals in second round applications. Rather,
greater emphasis is placed upon organizing to involve the
necessary groups and individuals in a Model Cities
endeavor; the development of a deeper, more probing prob-
lem analysis, including analysis of causes of an inter-

relation among major problems and a preliminary examina-

tion of changes needed to solve such problems; the general

direction and specification of planning activities to be
undertaken; and the organizational structure for carrying
out those activities to be undertaken during the planning

period.

CHAPTER II

MODEL CITIES-DIVERSIFIED

PLANNING PROCESSES

Each of the eleven cities I have studied initi-
ated its own planning system. Each developed locally
relevant definitions of the four components of HUD's
prescribed system-structure, process, product and per-
formance. Additionally, each established locally rele-
vant relationships among these components to satisfy
HUD's planning requirements. Despite the local character
of city's approach to Model Cities, however, five basic
marketing planning systems appeared in the eleven cities
that have been studied. These were: (1) staff dominance;
(2) staff influence; (3) staff/resident parity; (4) resi-

dent influence; and (5) resident dominance.

Staff Dominance

 

Sustained chief executive interest in, and com-

mitment to, city A's Model Cities Program, juxtaposed

AL ash“- .l

with a non-cohesive,l non-integrated2 resident base, per-
mitted the City Demonstration Agency staff-~formally
responsible to the mayor--to initially assume and con-
tinuously maintain a dominant position in the City's
Model Cities Planning System. Citizens Demonstration
Agency staff were clearly given the mandate to develOp,
amend, and implement the planning work program. City
Hall, particularly the Major's office, was both the

3 and the constituency4 of the head of the CDA staff

Client
throughout the planning year. Residents, consistent with
their involvement in planning efforts to Model Cities,
functioned primarily to "legitimize" staff-oriented pro-
cesses and products. Their direct input into either

process was minimal. Most agencies were not vitally con-

cerned with Model Cities. Only a few assigned staff to

 

lMKGK classified residents groups as cohesive or
non-cohesible. Residents groups, interested in Model
Cities, which faced many internal problems and divisions
were classified as non-cohesive. Each group had many
leaders. None seemed to speak for a large constituency
in the Model Neighborhood.

2MKGK classified residents members of group as
politically integrated or non-integrated. Non-integrated
referred to those groups whose members had only minimal
experience prior to Model Cities in negotiating with City
Hall on planning or resource allocation issues.

3Client in this text refers to any individual or
groups receiving services under contract, or within the
context of a formal relationship.

4Constituency in the text refers to a group or a
group of individuals offering support or receiving com-
mitments from professional staff or political leaders.
No formal contractual relationship is involved between
professional and constituent.

 

the CDA on a full or part-time basis. Agency or depart-
ment review and sign-off was a perfunctory activity.

Given City A's relatively non-turbulent environ-
ment, the basic ground rules governing the roles assigned
to staff, agencies, and residents were easy to define and
maintain during the planning period. Their endorsement
by the Mayor, and acceptance by other relevant participants,
helped the planning system withstand the pressures of
potentially threatening non-planned events such as the
assassination of Martin Luther King or the firing of a
popular resident employee in the Model Neighborhood. This
can also be compared with a wild-cat walkout in a plant or
a prolonged strike.

Once structural issues, such as the number of
residents to be included in advisory groups, and the inter-
nal organization of residents groups were resolved, very
few additional issues were observed during the planning
period. Staff members were rarely confronted by residents
or agencies. They could, and indeed did, spend the major
portion of their time on substantive planning activities.
The processes used to complete the Comprehensive Develop-
ment Plan (CDP) reflected considerable staff efforts to
meet what were perceived as HUD criteria concerning order,
timing and technique. The diversions which did occur,
particularly during the final months of the planning

period, reflected the felt pressures of time, budget, and

 

staff capacity, rather than competing non-planning related
agenda items.

City A's final plan met HUD's requirements in form
if not always in content. The problem statement was com-
prehensive in that it covered most functional areas of
concern. Analyses of specific problems were quite detailed,
and supported by considerable data. The CDA illustrated
attempts to define priorities among problems and objectives.
As in most cities, however, the discussion of relationships
(linkages) between and among problems received only cursory
treatment, and the relationship between five-year objec-
tives and cost estimates for the proposed first-year pro-
jects in most functional areas were quite brief, suggest-
ing general intent but not precise strategy, program
content, or work program. Total budget estimates for
first-year action programs, apparently reflecting in part
the sustained involvement of only a few agencies with the
Model Cities program, minimized the projected use of
categorical programs (i.e., housing, social services).

Of the five performance criteria, only coordina-
tion was given direct attention. Use of on-loan staff
allowed the limited number of agencies providing such
staff to be kept informed of planning progress while
review groups and policy boards provided opportunities
for a small number of other agency participants and public

officials to be kept appraised of CDA activities. The

I.

dialogue at board sessions, however, usually focused on
procedural rather than substantive matters.

The involvement of the chief executive in the
program facilitated CDA use of central direction as a
coordinative technique to define and implement the plan-
ning work program. That is, the Mayor's articulated
support of the program and his commitment to seeing City
A submit its documents first, encouraged the staff to
concentrate on the planning process and supported their
seemingly conscious decisions to request agency review
and sign—off responsibilities.

Cities B, C, D, and E illustrated characteristics
associated with staff influence systems. The program in
these cities, despite the fact that the CDA was formally
responsible to City Hall in three cities and to the pub-
lic agency in the fourth, lacked the continuous interest
or the commitment from the chief executive. Indeed, for
the most part his involvement was generally limited to
the application period and the period just prior to sub-
mittal. Tension in the Model Neighborhood in at least
three of the four cities clearly made the program a
political risk to the chief executive, given what appeared
to him to be uncertain federal commitments and alternative
local priorities.

Minimal chief executive involvement was accompa-

nied, at the inception of the program at least, by the

 

presence in the Model Neighborhood area of non-cohesive
resident groups whose members were not generally politi-
cally integrated. Staff therefore lacked both a client
group and/or a constituency. As a result, during the
early months of the planning period, they were unable
(or unwilling) to initiate planning events, crystalize
planning issues, and establish effective relationships
with either residents or agencies concerning the develop-
ment of planning products. They were limited primarily
to providing secretarial type services to supposed rele-
vant participants. As one CDA head put it, "We were
confined to securing rooms for meetings; recording
minutes; and providing agendas."

There were, as implied above, very few ground
rules concerning planning assignments at the beginning
of the planning period. The development of such ground
rules occurred in an §§.E22 fashion and resulted in most
of the issues occurring in the system. Participants
changed roles and responsibilities frequently; some left
the system entirely, while others entered, not always
to assume the same roles. Ground rules were rarely clear
or firm.

The absence of firm ground rules made the system
vulnerable to considerable environmental turbulence which
existed in three of the four cities throughout the year,

and in the fourth during the final months of the year.

10

This turbulence--competitive resident groups, Martin
Luther King's death, competitive agencies, etc.--con-
stantly threatened planning participants, and resulted
often in changes in work program objectives and assign-
ments.

Planning efforts when finally underway were sub-
ject to numerous shifts in, and amendments to, the work
program. Order and technique were frequently left by
the wayside. Staff direction of the planning process
was at best an intermittent event, and at worst, non-
existent.

As resident or resident dominated groups grew
stronger, a few key CDA staff members began to increas-
ingly assume the role of resident advocates. For most,
however, periodic intervention of the chief executive
(or his surrogate) permitted City Hall to ultimately be
viewed as the primary client. This fact, combined with
HUD's deadlines, allowed staff to become the major,
although not primary, influence in the planning process.

Resident groups in all staff influence cities
made their most significant contribution to the planning
process during the development of the problem statement.
Their input came through direct dialogue with staff and
agency personnel in task force and board sessions. CDA
staff responsible for writing all drafts, made an effort

to accurately reflect resident needs, priorities, and

11

programs in these drafts. Such conformity would, it was
thought, lend sanction to staff prepared products and
therefore facilitate their ultimate acceptance by resi—
dent or resident dominated review boards.

Agency involvement in staff influence cities was
minimal. Where it occurred, it was limited in terms of
duration, and usually quite specific in terms of products.
The lack of sustained agency commitment was apparently
related to the failure of the chief executive in staff
influence cities to provide early support to the program.
Many agencies, in light of the marginal visible support
granted the program by respective major and city managers,
apparently questioned the program's worth to them. The
cost of their participation seemed high, and the benefits
marginal. CDA heads, without chief executive support,
could not mandate participation on a continuing basis,
or even exercise meaningful persuasive powers.

HUD's products generally took longer in staff
influence cities to complete than the initially pre-
scribed planning year. Most met HUD's requirement con-
cerning form, but diverged significantly with respect
to content. For example, the analysis of different
functional problem areas varied in depth and documenta-
tion. Priorities among problem areas were almost always
absent. Linkages between and among problem areas were

rarely stated in more than a perfunctory fashion.

12

Critiques of the existing delivery systems were tough in
some areas but absent in others. Five—year objectives

and costs were difficult to relate precisely to all prob-
lem areas. They were certainly neither clear nor precise
enough to suggest local strategies or provide a frame of
reference for development of first—year projects. Budgets
were quite general and relied on supplemental funds to
meet the major share of first-year action needs.

Locally relevant definitions of HUD's performance

criteria did not come from either conscious direction or
substantive planning processes. Rather, they emerged from
dialogue between residents and staff, residents and
agencies; and were an indirect by-product of the contin-
uous efforts to define and develop roles.

The most visible innovation in all the cities was
the apparent citizen participation during the planning
period of resident groups able to conduct continuous dis-
cussions with City Hall about resource allocation issues.
Evidence of significant coordinative approaches, unusual
institutional response patterns, or conscious resource
concentration and mobilization was rare. Minimal parti-
cipation of chief executives, combined with a weak resi-
dent base, frustrated serious efforts in these areas of
HUD concern. Apparently no local mandate existed con-
cerning these performance criteria sufficient to motivate

agency response.

l3

Parity

Cities F, G, H, and I were classified as parity
cities. Continuous chief executive interest in, and
support of, the program was visible in all cities. Simi-
larly, availability of reasonably cohesive Model Neighbor-
hood resident groups whose members were politically
integrated was apparent in at least three of the four I.

O I 6 O l O 0
Cities. Sustained chief executive involvement, a strong

I“

resident base and a relatively turbulence-free environment
permitted definition of ground rules early in the planning
period. These rules allowed staff and residents alike to
share responsibility relative to key planning decisions.
CDA staff in three of the cities were formally
responsible to the chief executive. In two of these they
perceived themselves, and were seen as, resident advocates
for select issues; while in the third a "bona-fide" resi-
dent advocate, responsible to a resident group, was
present and able to work with CDE staff at City Hall.
Only in one city was staff formally responsible to a

resident dominated group.

 

6City Hall, at the request of CDA staff in City F,
supported development of a strong Model Cities resident
group. Members were quickly involved in non-Model City
related planning issues by many city officials.

7Formal administrative responsibility and
authority clearly resided with City Hall, however, in at
least three of the four cities.

 

14

Resident groups in parity cities were able, either
at the outset or after a short time, to make real planning
contributions. All had developed a visible and supportive
constituency; and non-ideological leadership was either
present or quickly developed during the initial weeks of
planning. Resident groups in at least three of the cities
were able to secure "independent" staff.

Direct chief executive or surrogate involvement, .
combined with comparatively strong resident groups, granted

initial ground rules the status of written constitutions.

 

City Hall and residents were able to negotiate their dif-
ferences and as one chief executive stated, "stick to
agreements." Existence of such agreements relative to
planning assignments helped maintain or support the plan-
ning system in the face of sporadic threatening non-Model
Cities related events. Most of the issues which occurred
after the ground rules were defined concerned process or
products.

Agency involvement was encouraged by the visible
support provided the program by respective chief executives.
On-loan staff was provided by some agencies for sustained
but varying periods of time in all four cities. A number
of agencies participated in "active" resident dominated
boards in at least three cities, and on less active agency
review boards in two cities. Tasks leading to the comple-
tion of specific products were completed under contract

by individual agencies in at least one city.

15

Parity cities were not able to perfectly match the
planning order suggested by HUD, nor were they able to
include all the different "techniques," implicit as well
as explicit, in HUD's guidelines. Departures from the
requirements, however, generally reflected the conscious
choice of staff and residents. Staff prepared documents
in all cities.8 They were based, to the extent possible,
on resident-staff agreements about work program and pro-
duct priorities.

Products developed in parity cities were generally
completed within the initially set one-year planning
period, or shortly thereafter. While most contained
thorough discussions of problem "linkages," the discussion
of underlying causes was often superficial and did not
get at basic causes. At least half the documents con-
tained analyses of priorities among problems and objec-
tives and subsequent strategy statements. Critiques of
existing institutions were common; indeed, some were pre-
sented in great depth. The statement of objectives and
fiscal needs, Part II, while often vague, did seem to
relate content to both the problem statement and antici-
pated projects. Parity cities, perhaps reflecting the
participation of local agencies, proposed greater reliance
on categorical programs as a proportionate share of total

first~year budgets than other cities.

 

8In one city, F, the resident group prepared the
major portion of the problem statement.

16

No consistent pattern emerged in the way first-
year action projects were described. Some cities provided
more information and a clearer picture of proposed first-
year action efforts than others. Variations, however,
existed even internal to documents from the same city.

By and large, parity cities were able to initiate
coordinative approaches based on adjustment9 processes
rather than central direction. Information sharing and
use of on—loan staff, plus sustained resident-staff, dia-

logue led to development of common strategies concerning

 

planning processes and anticipated products. Continuous
resident-City Hall dialogue was seen locally as the pri-
mary example of innovation and institutional change. A
number of agencies in each city, however, responded to
the complaints of Model City related resident groups con-
cerning agency provided services. As a result, urban
renewal plans were altered and zoning proposals amended
in at least two cities. An obnoxious coal heap was
removed in one city after participating Model City resi-
dents objected; while a health program was redirected in
another city for the same reasons. Evidence of resource
allocation and mobilization was generally limited to pro-
jections in the plan concerning the use of categorical

programs.

 

9Coordination was achieved through discussion,
negotiation, bargaining, etc.

 

17

Resident Influence

 

City J initiated a resident influence system.
Minimal chief executive interest and involvement in the
program, in part related to a high level of turbulence in
the local environment, combined with a non—cohesive resi—
dent organization, impeded early development and assign-
ment of responsibilities. Staff, at the outset, were
without a client or a constituency and had to assume a
service role. Their initial functions, as in staff influ-
ence cities, were limited to arranging meetings, securing
agency attendance, monitoring sessions, etc.

Both residents and staff were constantly threat-
ened by events not directly related to the Model Cities
planning process. These threats were constant with
respect to residents, and intermittent with respect to
staff. They added to the difficulties frustrating devel-
Opment of ground rules pertaining to roles and initiation
of substantive planning processes. Sporadic chief execu-
tive intervention, resulting from staff pressure, and the
results of resident group confrontations with select pub-
lic agencies over issues related to local services helped
establish, after some period of time, roles for relevant
participants. A relatively large number of issues related
to who would control the planning process were recorded
in this system.

Most staff, because of the emergency of an increas-

ingly cohesive and self—directed resident group and the

18

continued assumption, by and large, of a neutral position
by the chief executive concerning Model Cities, became
"advocate" planners. The resident group became the major,
although not the only, influence on planning. Staff were
clearly junior partners. Their primary role was to struc-
ture and extend resident-initiated dialogue concerning
planning, pose alternatives, and help clarify ideas.
Ultimately, they recorded in HUD's format the result of
predominantly resident-initiated planning decisions.

A number of agencies participated on resident-
dominated boards and task forces, as well as contributed'
staff, during the planning year. Yet, agency involvement
was not generally widespread. Some agencies feared "lock-
ing horns” with resident groups. Others saw very few
benefits from participating on a sustained basis, and
many costs, particularly in terms of staff and postponed
agenda items. Absence of continuous chief executive sup-
port, particularly early in the planning period, made it
difficult to secure participation from hesitant agencies.

One city did not complete its planning documents
until well into the second planning year. Order and
technique were not primary concerns during most of the
planning period. Substantive causal analyses were miss-
ing, as were in-depth statements concerning linkages
among problem areas. Critiques of the delivery system
were presented in most all functional areas, as were

initial attempts to define priorities.

19

Five-year objectives and fiscal needs seemed con—
sistent with the problem statement and anticipated pro-

10 Resident desire to control the anticipated pro-

ject.
gram was illustrated in the assignment of sponsors to
first-year projects. Project descriptions varied by
functional area. Some were quite detailed and clearly
reflected a projected implementation strategy and work
program; others suggested little more than an idea in

the mind of the author.

The resident influence system was able to achieve
visible responses from an array of local institutions con-
cerning local non-Model Cities related planning issues
(e.g., zoning changes, etc.). Innovation, as in the
other systems, was defined primarily in terms of resident
involvement. Resident-dominated groups assumed the major
role in determining how Model Cities funds would be spent
at least until the very end of the planning period. Sig-
nificant coordinative approaches were not a primary con-
tribution of this system. Where coordinative processes
took place, they took the form of adjustment. Many rele-
vant Model Cities agencies resisted involvement in the
program because of its rather unstructured quality. Some
apparently feared resident confrontation; others resisted

involvement because of the tenuous commitment of city

officials.

 

10Such consistency was difficult to determine pre-
cisely, given the lack of concreteness and supportive
rationale.

20

Very little evidence of resource concentration
and mobilization was illustrated during the planning
period. Supplemental funds composed by far the largest

portion of projected first-year action budgets.

Resident Dominance

 

Although not politically integrated, resident
groups in City K were reasonably cohesive. They were able
to "negotiate" a set of ground rules with City Hall which
granted them a dominant role in the program. These ground
rules, allocating planning responsibilities, despite or
because of the tense local environment,11 were endorsed by
the chief executive, who remained visibly involved and
committed to the program.

Despite many threatening non—Model Cities related
events, the working relationship between residents and
the city stood up well. Both groups were able to with-
stand outside pressure without much difficulty. CDA staff
.were used primarily to service resident groups and act as
brokers between such groups and public officials.

Since the resident group secured the dominant
policy voice in the program, severe strain was put on the

ability of the staff to involve agencies. Continued

 

llCity Hall's commitment to the program, unlike
most cities where tension was visible, was high. The
cohesiveness or strength of Model Neighborhood groups,
unlike other cities where turbulence was a factor, was
one of the primary reasons leading to this commitment.

21

support by the chief executive of the program, however,
permitted staff to gain some agency participation.
Several agencies provided staff for resident groups to
participate in their respective planning efforts, apart
from Model Cities planning. A few even yielded to resi-
dent review of their proposed programs affecting the 5]
Model Neighborhood.

The resident group was more concerned with issues

 

of control and involvement than with those related to _ a
planning processes and products. Substantive planning was E
for them a part-time activity. HUD's prescribed planning
system had little meaning. Logic, order or priority
definition were not prominent agenda items. Outside con-
sultants were brought in ultimately, to translate resident
statements of problems, goals, etc., into the required
federal format.
City K's submittal, like most, met HUD's require-
ments relative to form. Differences existed, however,
with respect to content. Most problem areas received
substantive treatment, and the city, unlike most, made a
meaningful effort to distinguish between problems and
their causes. Further, the local delivery system.was
subjected to a general critique.
The plan, however, purposely did not distinguish
priorities among problem areas. As one resident put it,

"Everything was a priority." Part II of the document,

22

from most cities, appeared to relate to the problem state-
ment in only the most general way. It did not illustrate
in all functional areas a clear relation to anticipated
projects. While projects, with some exceptions, were
reasonably well developed, budgets, as in many cities,
lacked clear rationales or supporting data. Supplemental '
funds were emphasized in developing the projected pattern
of first-year expenditures.

The participants were concerned deeply with neither :

 

coordination nor resource mobilization and concentration.
The primary coordinative technique used was adjustment.
Demands made of agencies by residents were usually arbi-
trated by the CDA staff and chief executive.

Agency willingness to participate directly, as
indicated above, varied considerably over the course of
the planning period. Usually it took the form of staff
contributions to resident task forces. These staff mem-
bers were able to transmit pertinent information on the
program's progress to their parent agencies.

The resident group was clearly dominant. Staff
were utilized chiefly to secure participation among recal—
citrant agencies and legitimize resident-defined products
through authorship of formal documents. Resident involve—
ment was the system's most visible innovation, and the
changes in behavior of some existing institutions was its

clearest example of institutional response.

23

System Determinants

 

Several related factors appeared to influence if
not determine the type of planning systems developed by
the eleven cities studied. Some relate to specific com-
ponents of the pre-Model Cities environment; others to
characteristics associated with the role of the chief

executive.

Pre-Model Cities Planninngnvironment

 

Many characteristics associated with the pre-

 

Model Cities planning environment in each city were
defined during the course of this study. They included:
(1) population size; (2) racial indices; (3) range and
intensity of problems; (4) form of local government;
(5) previous experience with federal programs; (6) inter-
est in coordinating local officials; (7) level of tur-
bulence in the environment; and (8) nature of resident
participation in public decision-making processes. Only
the level of turbulence and the nature of resident par-
ticipation in each city prior to and at the outset of
the Model Cities program appeared to affect the type of
planning system carried out by each of the eleven cities
studied. That is, only these two factors, of those
reviewed, helped explain why certain cities adopted one
planning approach, and other cities another approach.
Turbulence.--Intense and sustained tension among

groups within the Model Neighborhood and between various

24

groups and City Hall was a characteristic of the pre-
planning environment in all but one of the staff influence
cities, and in both the resident dominant and resident
influence cities. Only a modest amount of turbulence was
observed in parity cities while practically no turbulence
was illustrated in the staff dominant city.

Intensive turbulence clearly suggested to most
chief executives that they should "think twice" about
their role during the planning period. The program's
uncertain dimensions and cloudy future, when combined with
a tense local environment, made the risks of visible and
sustained City Hall participation seem to many local offi-
cials to be quite high. Conversely, the program's well
advertised promise made the risks of complete nonpartici-
pation also significant.

Most executives in cities where turbulence was a
factor opted to "play" it down the middle. Where the
residents related to Model Cities were not well organized

nor able to speak for a large number of residents they

would elect in most instances to maintain only a peripheral

interest and involvement in the program (e.g. D, E, B, C,
J). Their role when juxtaposed with a relatively weak
residentbase would lead to the development of a staff or
resident influence system.

If the resident or resident-dominated Model Cities

group (or groups) was strong and reflected obvious

 

25

 

Resident

 

Resident

 

Parity Influence Dominance
F G H I J K
493,887 71,860 108,000 98,777 312,000 262,332
75,000 19,460 16,000 7,947 36,000 42,343
7.1% 20.2% 7% 4.8% 7.9% 21.8%
1:1 37.8% 53.7% up. 13% 33.1% 89.5%
II: 1%
[JR 7? - IJR 13-1 '-
Izl 30.9% 8.1". — 2.72. m». -
II: 19.7%
$6,361 HR $5,923 $5,453 $6,361 $6,099
:39. NP. 2J9. Min . $3 ,000 {CR 53, 167
4% Hht 8% 4.1% 5.98 5.4% 5.8%
81k 161
8.1% Wht 19% 5.7% 8.91 14% 10.5%
Blk 23%

12.4% 111 19.7% 14.4% 19.1% 14.4%
28.2% 25? 27.2% 27? 38.9% 28.5%
28.2/1000 (County) 3% 2.1% 16.2/1000 26.8/1000

2.2%
NR (Orig. MHA) 4.4% HP 18.1/1000 45.7/1000
3%
12.9% 18% 15.6% 32% 418 20.1%
27.5% 32% 27.2% 44.9% 73% 33.7%
Strong Mayor City City Commission City City
Council Manager Manager Manager Manager
Strong Strong Strong Strong Weak Strong
Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative Positive

I'_1~_

 

 

3This study rated cities as having a positive climate
prior to the inception of Model Cities program if the chief
executive in the city had articulated publicly and constantly
a desire to establish "a coordinated planning framework, one
involving agencies and residents, and one including environ-
Further, in order to
be ranked as having a positive climate, the chief executive
would have had to state publicly his commitment to and strong
support of the new Model Cities program.

mental, social,

and economic issues."

26

TABLE l.--N0n‘SyStem Determinants-—Planning Process

 

Staff

Staff Influence

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dominance i
Characteristics
A B C D E
Demographic
Population
City 499,000 587,700 604,332 178,000 1,670,444
MNA 47,640 114,000 75,745 20,500 169,833
Per Cent Nonwhite
Citv 45% 78 16.8% 38.9% 29.0%
HHA 68.2% 4.2% 52.4! 99.1% 52.7%
Per Cent Spanish
Surname Cit» — 41.72 - — - .
HhA — — - - —
Economic
Median Income
City 53,13, $4,691 $5,605 $6,004 $4,069
HXA $3,564 $4,691 $4,000 hR $3,873
Per Cent Unemployed
City 3 4q 5.33 8.18 3? 10.2%
H.“ 13% (Orig N‘A) 12.9% 68 19.6%
Physical
Substandard Housing
Cit 30.29 22.1% 31.0z 19? 6.4%
(Orig. qu)
M.A 71.8% 39.8L 43.8% 26% 26%
Seeial
Infant Mortality
City I.£{ 2.6r 28/1000 3“. 2.9;!
nun 42/1000 (“rig ..;) 63/1000 33 4.3%
Education
City 97 51.1% YR 22? 24“
XML 10 {i 83 2? SP 413 38%
Institutional
Form of Weak Mayor City Weak Mayor Strong Mayor Strong Mayor
Government Council Manager Council Council Council
Citizen Participation
Involvement of Residents . . . . .
. . ' L ‘v'. A L ‘: 1" t :‘c k 1'? 1 k
Pre-Model Cltlesz seak ear eak x'1 (a
Pre—Model Cities Climate
Movement towards Model Positive Negative Negative Positive Positive

Cities Objectives3

 

1

City F has two Model Neighborhoods.

2 . . . .
' ' This study rated reSident involvement prior to Model
Cities as "strong" if there were visible resident groups in
the Model Neighborhood Area, concerned with planning issues, which

were cohesive and/or integrated.

27

community support, the chief executive would, given local
tensions, understandably acquiesce to a major if not
dominant role for this group during the planning period.
Such acquiescence would not limit the direct involvement
of the chief executive; his involvement, however, would
be defined in brokerage terms. That is, the chief execu-
tive would act primarily to maintain communication link-

ages between residents and public agencies.

Resident Involvement

 

 

There were in at least four of the eleven cities
studied resident or resident-dominated organizations in
the Model Neighborhood prior to the inception of its pro-
gram, which were internally strong and which reflected
widespread community support. In effect, they were
cohesive organizations; their members shared many common
objectives relative to the program, thus permitting them
an ability to "speak with one voice." Their support in
the Model Neighborhood permitted them to act without
constant fear of attack from other organizations in the '
Model Neighborhood.

Presence of a cohesive organization allowed
residents to negotiate with City Hall from a position of
relative strength. Demands which required a response

could be and were made by residents. Because resident

28

cohesion generally occurred13 in those cities where chief
executives were involved from the outset on a sustained
basis in the program, it was possible to discuss and
agree on ground rules concerning HUD's planning criteria
early in the planning period. Continued resident cohe-
sion permitted these ground rules to be maintained until
submittal of the plan to HUD.

A cohesive resident base led to development of
either a parity or resident dominant planning system. If
resident members of Model City related organizations were,
or became, politically integrated, the city would achieve
a parity planning system. Conversely, if residents were
not politically integrated prior to Model Cities and did
not become so during the early months of the program, the
city would establish a resident dominant system.

Where participating residents did not, either
prior to or during the Model Cities program, have easy

access to City Hall on issues related to or apart from

 

l3Generally those chief executives who assumed an
active posture with respect to Model Cities were seen
locally as "activists" with respect to programs apart
from Model Cities. There appeared to be a coincidence in
some cities between such activism and the strength of
resident groups. That is, in several of the cities where
chief executives were characterized as activists, resident
groups were considered to be internally strong. Evidence
exists to at least speculate that chief executive activism
was a necessary but not sufficient condition for resident
cohesion to exist in certain cities. As one resident sug-
gested, "Before the Mayor was elected we had no one at
City Hall to talk to. Now we can negotiate with City Hall,
. . . our organization can do something. . . ."

 

29

Model Cities, neither their experiences nor those of
involved public officials lent support for parity ground
rules. Residents in these cities sought primacy in Model
Cities decision-making. City Hall granted their demands
because of their visible strength (cohesiveness) and the
turbulence of the environment.

Political integration of residents involved in
Model Cities encouraged City Hall to look upon the sharing

of decision-making in Model Cities as only an extension

 

and not a major departure from pre-Model City decision-
making processes. "After all," reported one chief execu-
tive, "residents were involved in select planning issues
before Model Cities. . . . Our Model Cities organization
is not really that new." By the same token, political
integration made it easier for residents to trust City
Hall, and to see the value of their involvement as part-
ners in the program. Discussions with City Hall were
reasonably free of abrasive rhetoric and quite direct.
It was not an uncommon phenomenon to find that some pub-
lic officials were residents of the Model Neighborhood.
While residents didn't "get all they wanted," in
discussions with City Hall on non-Model City related
issues, many at least felt that some of their requests met
with a positive response. They apparently welcomed
access to City Hall. "We needed," as one resident reported,
"to keep City Hall in . . . so we can get needed funds. We

have done it before, we can do it again. . .

30

A number of resident groups illustrated very
little cohesion; and their members exhibited very little
political integration. Staff or resident influence
systems resulted when these two characteristics were
coupled with minor or negligible chief executive interest
in Model Cities. Planning ground rules concerning role
assignments were difficult to develop since neither City

Hall nor residents were able or willing to set, or nego-

 

tiate, them at the outset. If the residents became
stronger and more assertive (characteristics associated ’
with cohesion) faster than the chief executive became
visibly involved and committed to the program, a resident
influence system developed in the city. Staff, in these
instances, served primarily to sanction resident articu—
lated views concerning planning products. If the chief
executive became involved earlier than residents became
cohesive, or if neither resident cohesion nor chief execu-
tive involvement became a fact, then a staff influence
system resulted in the city. Residents, in these
instances, were primarily used to lend sanction to staff
efforts.
A staff dominant system resulted when the resident
group was not cohesive and the participating residents
were not politically integrated. Sustained chief execu-
tive involvement, given the characteristics of the resi-

dent base, led to the creation and maintenance of ground

31

rules providing staff with the major decision-making role.
Residents were primarily used to legitimize decisions

made by staff.

TABLE 2.--Systems and Their Determinants

 

 

 

Planning Degree Chief Resident
Systems Turbulence Executive Characteristics
Involvement
. . Non-cohesive
Staff Dominance Low Sustained Non-integrated
. . . Non-cohesivel
Staff Influence High Minimal Non-integrated
, . Cohesive
Parity Low Sustained Integrated
. . .. - '2
ReSident Influence High Minimal Non coheSive
Non-integrated
Resident Dominance High Sustained Cohesive
1

Chief executive involvement prior to resident
cohesion.

2 o o I o o o
ReSident coheSion prior to chief executive involve-
ment.

Role of Chief Executive

14 and/or

The role assumed by the chief executive
his surrogate15 was, as indicated above, related to the
level of turbulence and the pre-Model City nature of resi-

dent participation. In turn, his role was a key system

 

14The term as used in this report refers to the
chief political or administrative officer in the city.

15A senior aide to the chief executive who in
effect is able to speak for the executive.

32

determinant. It, perhaps more so than any other factor,
helped define the basic character of the planning process,
the roles of staff, residents and agencies.

Table 3 suggests that the level of chief executive
involvement varied over the course of the planning period
in many cities. Only in staff dominant, resident dominant,
and parity cities was there evidence of sustained chief 2
executive participation in the program throughout the
planning period. Mayors and/or managers in staff and
resident influence cities became involved in the program
only during select "crises," and specific time periods,
or not at all. For example, in Cities D and E, both
staff influence cities, the Mayors while obviously sympa-
thetic to the program, were only visibly involved when
resident-staff relationships became particularly sensitive;
when internal problems associated with the resident group
appeared to threaten the program; or when apparent HUD
deadlines with respect to the final submittal were in
danger of falling by the wayside. Similarly, in City J
the city manager played a very marginal role in the pro-
gram. He became involved only when staff directly sought
his intervention during a crisis period and near the very
end of the planning period prior to submittal of the plan
to HUD. In City C there is no record that the chief
executive (mayor or manager) was involved at all during

the planning period.

 

33

 

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mamnpnom =omsflmumom= uucmfio>ao>cfl ucmsqmnm use 0fl©0mflmm mummmmsm =usmupefi

unease: uucoao>ao>ce o: no HmEHGHE mamma soflpMOHmwmmmao =m>Hmmmm= m .mucma

Imuesqmu mcflcsmam com msoflnm> mcwuome CH ucmEm>Ho>cH m>wpsowxm maeumuumsaafl

muco>w mo Hogans one so comma we soflHMOHMflmmmau .Emumoum may :H pcmEm>Ho>sfl
Am.oumm0HH5m HOV m.m>flusomxo moflso ecu mo muflmcoucfl may mopmuumsaafl dandy mesa "muoz

 

 

oocflMpmsm < namepfleumucH o m>flmmmm O ”Nam
O < < O O O O O O O O HHH uhmm
O O O O O O O O O O 0 HH “Ham
0 O O O O O O O O O O H #Hmm

poehmm cowumN

 

 

 

 

 

a o a o o o o o o o o nacmmno HmauacH
o o o o o o o o o o o coflmfl>mm
o o o a o a o o o o o coaumoaadda
m e H m o m m a o m «
mOCMQHEOQ GOGQDHHGH huflhwm GOSTDHMCH GUCMGHEOQ UOHHQA UGHGGMHQ
ucmeammm unmeflmmm mmmum emmnm

 

mmooonm mcflccwam CH 0>Husomxm mowsu mo usmso>ao>cHll.m mnmde

34

There were also substantial differences in the
nature of the roles assumed by chief executives. For
example, in staff dominant cities, chief executives
periodically directed CDA staff to act on issues related
to Model City planning processes and products. Such
executive orders were an uncommon occurrence in all other
systems. It was much more common, particularly in resi-
dent and staff influence cities, for the chief executive
to serve as an arbitrator. Only near the end of the
planning period did he become a partisan on issues related
to process or product. The chief executive in the resi-
dent dominant system chose to act primarily as a broker
linking residents and city agencies. He was able to
reduce the potential for friction between residents and
City Hall inherent in this system. Chief executives in
parity cities were, perhaps more than in any other system,
direct and frequent participants in the planning process.

The chief executives of parity, resident dominant,
and staff dominant systems were able to provide visible
public support to the program immediately upon initiation
of the planning period. They helped to validate early
CDA activities--to in effect grant the new organization
status at City Hall and in the community. Further, their
continuous interest and participation in the program
facilitated the establishment and maintenance of ground

rules with respect to different planning roles assigned

35

to residents, staff, and agencies. In parity cities,
rules and subsequent roles, as indicated earlier, assured
the residents of equality with respect to decision-making;
in resident dominant cities they allowed residents to
assume the major planning voice; and in staff dominant
cities, they provided staff with the primary planning
role.

Mayors and city managers did not in staff and
resident influence systems lend the program the mantle
of official respectability. Absence of a firm and will—
ing client at City Hall limited the ability of the staff
to define relevant relationships with agencies and resi-
dents. Subsequently, ground rules concerning roles of
CDA staff, agency personnel, and residents were at best
open-ended, and at worst non-existent during most of the
planning period. Efforts to develop and implement a
planning work program were viewed as residual activities
by most participants. Negotiations concerning roles
continuously took precedence over substantive planning

efforts.

 

CHAPTER III

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

It is obvious that there are many different struc-
tures in the cities that I have visited. However, these
structures are not in line with meeting the needs of
Urban Life. Staudt and Taylor in their book A Managerial
Introduction to Marketing deal with organizational structure
and the grouping of similar functions together. Often,
various departments will not give up their autonomy even
if it means duplication of effort. This leads to misallo-
cation of funds and non-inclusion of fiscal marketing
restraints. This results, by design, in a dysfunctional
organization. There is no marketing plan model set forth
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Therefore the recipients of Model Cities funds have not
concerned themselves with the proper groupings necessary
to meet the broad guidelines of HUD through organizational
structure. An example of this is the jobs that Model
Cities has created. How many of these jobs fit the needs
of the local area? I will leave this question to the

reader who will make up his own mind.

36

 

37

Since there are no monetary incentives in govern-

ment programs, the organizational criteria rely heavily

on structure. With proper structure the following are

included:
a.
b.

C.

Coordination of activities,
Good decision-making by managers,

Effective planning.

Dr. W. J. E. Crissy, Professor of Marketing at Michigan

State University, has stated criteria of a sound organiza-

tion that are indeed applicable:

1.

The organization must facilitate speedy and

 

accurate information to the external publics.

 

From the system determinents alone this has
not been the case in federal programs, espe-
cially Model Cities.

Business tempo does't allow for long red tape

decision making. Neither do federal programs,

 

especially the way the present fiscal
restraints are interpreted. If the money that
is allocated by the federal government for a
particular year is not spent by the end of the
twelve-month period, there is a chance of
losing it back to the government. However,
some cities have gotten around this by extend-
ing the execution year. This extension leads

to all sorts of problems that I will not

 

38

elaborate on. For example, I wonder what
would happen if one of the big three auto com—
panies were to extend the fiscal year of one

of their divisions just because that particular
division had not spent all the money allotted
to it.

Try to decentralize plans and strategies close

to the market place. The Model Cities guide—

 

lines have, in broad terms, made this one of
the objectives through a mandatory citizen
participation requirement. However, decen-
tralizing anything means giving up some power
by the central source, and politicians as a
whole are reluctant to carry out this approach.
High degree of specialization within the
organization as well as dealing outside the

ogganization. Since the product is relatively

 

in the beginning stages and funds are only

projected on a five-year basis, I am not sure

whether this criteria will ever be met.

Using Dr. Crissy's concept of organization,

his criteria reveal the following:

a. That because of a lack of application of
strong organizational concepts the prob-

lems are prevalent.

39

b. Without a sound organization, even if a
marketing plan exists, it cannot be imple-
mented.

In general the program creates new chiefs every-
day but very few indians. There are very few lean organ-
izations in the Model Cities program. However, again
Dr. Crissy has proposed a model that might solve the

problem by matching the man with the job through analy-

 

tical compromise on man qualities (Figure l).

Long-Term Planning

 

The Talent/Task Analysis Model deals with common
groupings of duties to be performed and the human quali-
ties needed. The horizontal axis starts with entry
management positions (EMP) and concludes with the chief
executive office (CEO) of the mayor. The vertical axis
considers common duties such as knowledge, skills, and
personal and social qualities. These common duties cover
the whole range of individual job descriptions and the
type of man needed to carry out the assignment. The
cells in Figure l are specific, explanatory statements
about the job as it relates to the present and the future.
What does the Crissy, Kaplan, Grossman Talent/Task
Analysis Model give the government planner? When all
cells are completed, the city administration has a pan-

oramic View of the functions to be performed and the type

 

4O

 

 

 

 

 

COMMON
ELEMENTS:* EMP 2 3..........CEO
DUTIES: a
b
C

 

 

 

 

 

KNOWLEDGE: d

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

e 1
...;_
f
SKILLS: g
h
i
PERSONAL .
AND SOCIAL: 3
k
1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FIGURE l.--Talent-Task Composition of the Enterprise Levels
of Management

*William J. E. Crissy, Robert M. Kaplan, and
Louis H. Grossman, Matrix Models for Planning, Executive
Development, Michigan State University Business Topics
(Spring 1965).

 

 

4l

of man needed to carry out the assignment. We now have
set up the beginning of the identification process of
weak management areas of concern. This model also gives
us the ground rules for an all inclusive long-term manage-
ment strategy for the selection of qualified candidates
in relation to the goals of the organization. If this
model were used, one would not find a man with a Master's
Degree in Theology in charge of evaluation and monitoring.
Many cities throughout the country have employed
people without thinking about the Talent/Task Analysis
(Model) which would eliminate some of the lack of compe-
tence on the local level in federally funded programs.
There has to be some linkage that matches personnel quali-

fications with job duties.

Organizational Theory

 

Many problems that encompass the lack of a mar-
keting plan are shown in the failure of tOp management
to disseminate information to subordinates in the Model
Cities program. HUD guidelines are constantly changing
and these changes are incorporated in what are called
CDA letters. These letters make up policy (e.g., CDA-3
is concerned with citizen participation). There are also
transmittal notices that explain the CDA policy letters.
Organizational theory states that management, in
making changes to improve and strengthen the organization,

needs to let those affected know why such changes are

 

42

being made and how the city (organization) will benefit,
even if some individuals seem to suffer. More often the
case is to make the decision and explain it to the people
later. This explanation only comes in most instances when
citizens question the integrity of politicians and the
role of the organization. In such cases the chief execu-
tive must be firm but if he has previously been fair,
these actions are more easily accepted by all concerned.16
Actually, a large number of the problems in management
relations arise from inadequate marketing plans, ill-
defined organization shot through with problems concern-
ing responsibility and authority, centralization line,

and functional responsibility, etc.17 The effects of

such problems on all levels are considerable. If members
if each individual department are insecure because of

lack of identification with the problems of the organiza-
tion, if department heads are scrapping among themselves
and mistrust one another, if incompetent men are put into
key positions, if major errors in policy are made because

decisions are made on a crisis basis, then the manager

who looks to the organization chart for leadership cannot

 

16Gurly A. Price, "Organization to Coordinate
People's Effort," Management Record, XVI, No. 2 (1953),
p. 50.

l7Garret L. Bergen, Fashions, Fallacies, and
Fundamentals (New York: American Management Association,
Personnel Services, 1950), p. 34.

 

 

43

be expected to do his best of feel secure in what he is
doing.18

A description of top management's responsibility

in organizing that would be all inclusive and provide the
answer for all to follow is not possible. However, the
following grouping of elements is a useful tool for

a partial description:

1. To define and set forth the purposes, aims,
objectives, or ends of the organization;

2. To lay down the marketing plan for the
structuring of the organization;

3. To recruit and organize the program staff as
defined in the plan;

4. To provide a clear delegation and allocation
of authority and responsibility;

5. To direct and oversee the general execution
of the activities as delegated;

6. To assume that a sufficient definition and
standardization of all positions have taken
place so that quantity and quality of per-
formance are specifically established and are
assuredly being maintained;

7. To make provisions for the necessary commit-

tees and conferences, and for their conduct

 

18Charles R. Hook, Profit and People (New York:
American Management Association, Personnel Services, No.
132, 1950), p. 3.

44

in order to achieve good coordination between
top and middle management;
8. To assure stimulation and the necessary ener-
gizing of all concerned; and
9. To provide an accurate evaluation of the total
outcome in relation to established purposes.
Even when these elements are followed, since an
organization is a living organism, it is constantly adapt-
ing to new external pressures and requiring constant
adjustment to these external needs. The organization is
dynamic. All of the factors listed above have to be under
continuous review, for these are the daily functions of

management.

There
tions network

classified in

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNICATIONS--AN INDICATOR OF

A GOOD MARKETING PLAN

are many publics involved in the communica-
in the Model Cities program. They can be

two areas:

1. external publics

2. internal publics

The external publics are as follows:

a.

Citizens Governing Boards (advisory policy
board)

Non-Profit Corporations--Board of Directors
Planning Task Forces

Operating Agencies

Third Party Contract Agencies

Model Neighborhood Block Clubs, etc.

The internal publics are as follows:

City's Planning Department
Police Department

Housing

Planning

Urban Renewal

45

 

46

f. Personnel Department

9. Corporation Counsel's Office

h. Other related areas that are tied into
the program description.

Communication lines must flow to and from the
inside of the organization as well as to and from within
the external public. A problem that the marketing plan
has to address itself to is that of what mechanism will

interlock this 4-way network.

 

 

 

External Public Internal Public
A 0(TO) A
z a a
o o Interlocking DeVice 0 §
5* m Pi m
EI-c EH
(FROM)
V V

FIGURE 2.--4-Way Network

Both internal and external publics must know how
each of the others is affected. Therefore it is very
important that a feedback mechanism be clearly defined
and implemented. What format will the interlocking feed-
back mechanism take? The communication that takes place
is a critical aspect of any organization.

In an effort to answer the question of what type

of mechanism is needed for good communication both

47

internally and externally, the following model (Figure 3)

was taken as an example of poor communication.

Community Communication
Implementation Team

 

 

Scope of services:

1. Develop contracts for the projects in the
original HUD submittal and the revised "Plan
for Progress."

2. Lend assistance to and check the performance
of contractual agencies.

3. Provide necessary report including press
release.

4. Collect and catalogue Model Neighborhood
information.

5. Make studies as requested by the Community
Communication Committee and MNA in order to
develop second-year plans.

6. Recommend new programs or changes in the
component as it develops and such other tasks
as the Committee and MNA may feel are neces-
sary to coordinate the program and insure
its smooth and effective operation.

It is quite obVious from this model that it will

not fulfill the requirements of our interlocking mechanism.
Nevertheless, this is one model that is currently being

used. One of the most important things that has been left

48

 

 

MNA

 

 

 

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

 

XXXXX

 

CGB

 

 

 

MCHRD

 

CENTERS

 

 

 

 

 

OTHER PROGRAMS

 

 

 

 

 

OTHER PROGRAMS

 

 

 

 

?

 

CITIZEN
ACCOUNTABILITY

 

 

 

 

 

COMMUNICATIONS

STANDING

COMMITTEE

 

 

 

 

 

 

COMMUNICATIONS

IMPLEMENTATION

TEAMS

 

 

 

/ KEY:

MCHRD--MAYOR'S COMMITTEE
ON HUMAN RESOURCES
& DEVELOPMENT

CGB----CITIZENS GOVERN-
ING BOARD

MNA----MODEL NEIGHBOR-
HOOD AGENCY

XXXXXXXCONTRACTUAL
RELATION

ADMINISTRATIVE
RELATION

------- WORKING RELATION

 

NO HHILIWWOD DNIIVNIGHOOO

SWVHI NOILVINHWHTdWI

 

 

 

 

 

FIGURE 3.--Tentative Chart Showing Relations of the
Communications Component

 

49

out of the plan for communication is a time table. Commu-
nication timetables lend themselves to good, sound mar—
keting planning. They keep the organization from per—
ceiving false indications from both the internal and
external publics. Communication timetables also force
the planner to avoid overcommitting himself with regard
to what he can and cannot do. The mechanism that will
work for effective communication will include the
following: > 1_
1. Monthly Reporting Procedures
2. Components Timetable
3. Provide analysis or interpretation of the
meaning of reports from both external and
internal public
4. Preview of the above before it is put in the
mass media network.
The following information will solidify the pre-
ceding remarks.
In conducting my survey I assumed that there was
a lack of communication between publics and the organiza-
tion (city). What I found was a minute system of commu-
nication that was mainly verbal in nature and concentrated
among those who were employed in the program. Both the
Model Neighborhood Agency, which is a department of the
city, and the Citizens Participation Group, which is sub-

sidized completely by HUD funds, are failing to communicate

 

50

W. Melvin Smith, Jr.
3800 Woodward Avenue
Suite 604

Detroit, Mich. 48201

January 10, 1971

Dear Resident:

May I solicit your support by answering the
attached questionnaire. I am a student in the Graduate
School of Business Administration in the Advanced Manage-
ment Program (AMP) at Michigan State University.

I hope that you will fill out the enclosed
questionnaire and mail it in the self addressed envelope
attached as quickly as possible. If you are interested
in the results sign your name and address and I will
forward you a copy of the data analyses.

Sincerely yours,

Wm. Melvin Smith
Student

Attachment:

Yes No

Yes No

( ) Employment
( ) Other

( ) Both

Yes No

Yes No

51

Circle the Correct Response

QUESTIONS

Do you live in the Model Neighborhood?
Are you involved either by employment
or in a sponsored citizen participation
group connected with Model Cities?

Do you feel that the citizens that
represent you on an advisory, board,
group, or commission are keeping you
informed of the progress made in the
program?

Do you feel that the Model Neighborhood
Agency is doing enough to keep you
informed of what services are available

to you?

52

Percentages of Responses*

 

Question 1. ----------------------- 100% Yes
Question 2. ----------------------- 30% Yes--70% No

15% Employment

10% Both
5% Other
Question 3. ----------------------- Of the 70% who F

answered No to
Question 2, 62%
said No to
Question 3.
Question 4. ----------------------- 60% No--40% Yes

*Sample of 200 people

with the community. This is evident not only from my
small sampling but from the concept of turbulence that I
described earlier in my presentation. Therefore, it
would have to be assumed that the external agencies that
have contractual agreements with Model Neighborhood
Agencies would fall into the same pattern of responses as
the residents. Another example of an ineffective commu-
nication model is the organization's inability to deal
with rumors. Non-profit organizations within federal
programs always appear to have controversy written all

over their incorporation papers. Most of the controversy

 

seems to be a by-product of the ineffective communica-
tion among both participants and the employees of the

particular program. Effective communication does have a

53

degree of discipline interwoven in its fabric. Many cor—
porations in the profit-making world have used communica-
tion as a discipline technique for taking their famous
"trip to Washington."

Question number 4 of my survey is directly
related to Figure 3. The communication component does
not show the to and from relationships of the internal
administration. The question that might be posed here is:
Is there any mechanism designed internally for effective
communication? If the agency does not effectively commu-
nicate in-house, how can one expect good communication
externally with other publics?

Another aspect of the problem is the citizens
group representing the Model Neighborhood residents. The
response to question 3 of the survey reveals that this
group also is having difficulty in keeping residents
informed of its progress. So the appropriate feedback
mechanism in both cases is inadequate.

I have considered the problem of communication
effectiveness from the practical level.

Dr. Staudt in his book A Managerial Introduction
to Marketing talks about several factors related to the
sources that influence communication effectiveness. They
are: (l) thought and language competence, (2) attitudes,
(3) knowledge levels, and (4) cultural class. There is a

great need for research in the use of this practical

54

application for federal programs. I think that if more
city planners would apply this theory in communications
in their five-year plans, there would be greater communi-
cation throughout the country from the citizen participa-
tion standpoint.

The factors that Dr. Staudt refers to are all
inclusive and very important. However, there are many

variables.

Thought and Language Competence

 

This competence factor can be categorized in two
broad publics: (1) internal (within the organization),
and (2) external (Citizen's Advisory Board, community
groups and individual residents). Because of this concept
and the physical environment of the Model Neighborhood
area, thought and language competence vary from family to
family and person to person. There is a direct relation-
ship between thought and language competence and educa-
tional background or median number of school years com-
pleted. For persons 25 years and older Table 4 shows a
range from 8.2 to 9.0; this average is equivalent to a
grade school education.

The data in Table 4 is a variable that influences
communication effectiveness in developing a strong market—

ing plan.

55

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56

Attitudinal Factor

There has been no research done on the attitudenal
factor and how it would affect our communication model but
the following data represent variables that affect atti-
tudes in many spheres of influence: The high crime rate,
high density neighborhood and the psychological evaluation
of children in the school system all have relationship to m“
attitudes. This again points out the need for a highly
developed communication network that should take top In

priority in the development of a sound marketing plan.

Crime Statistics

The homicide rate for the Model Neighborhood area
has consistently been much higher than the overall rate
of city E, and in recent years has been more than double
city E's rate. Homicide has been singled out from other
crime statistics in Table 5 because of the emotional
problems which are generally indicated in persons commit-

ting homicides.

TABLE 5.--Homicides (per 100,000 population)

 

 

Area 1967 1968
Detroit 20.1 27.1 ‘
Area "A" 39.1 54.9

Area "K" 50.1 59.4

 

 

57

The Model Neighborhood, like most low-income,
high-density, rapidly changing neighborhoods, is a high
crime area. The 1965 TALUS study correlated the crime
rate by police precinct with several other social vari-
ables to draw a sketch of consistent characteristics of
high and low crime rate areas. In 1965 the four precincts
covering the Model Neighborhood reported a crime rate for
the rest of the city. These four precincts had the lowest
levels of family income, with 38 per cent of all families ,
earning an average of less than $3,000 per year, while the
rest of the precincts showed an average of 19 per cent of
their families living at this level. The same four pre-
cincts scored among the seven lowest precincts in educa-
tional attainment, and among the five lowest precincts in
single-family dwellings. These four precincts scored
among the top five in number of households with a female
head, and had the four lowest employment rates anywhere
in the city.

This same study gave comparative data for the
Model Neighborhood and city E on other police data for
1965, which show that crime rates and police contacts are
both higher in the Model Neighborhood-~more than double
the overall city rates. Certain areas of the Model
Neighborhood show higher crime rates than others. High

crime areas include the Central Business District and

 

58

the skid row districts along Cass and Woodward Avenues.
Also, because of greater population density, crime rates
are higher in the two public housing projects in the

Model Neighborhood.

TABLE 6.--Police Data, 1965 (per 100,000 population)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. Balance .
Model City of City Total City
Crime Rate 112.5 43.2 48.8 a
Youth Bureau Contacts 40.9 15.3 17.0
WOmen's Division Contacts 7.0 2.9 3.2
TABLE 7.--Housing Data
Detroit Service Area
# % # %
Total Blocks 13,300 100.0 1,082 8.1
Vacant Lots 8,412 100.0 1,414 16.8
Total Dwelling Units 501,047 41,037
Total Housing Structures 348,892 100.0 14,697 100.0
Good Condition 245,970 70.5 3,136 21.3
Fair Condition 100,414 28.7 10,845 73.1
Poor Condition 2,508 0.7 716 5.6

 

59

TABLE 8.--Rental Data

# % $

Area Renting Renting Median Rent

 

Service Area

Households 37'624 77 58
A 16,510 90 65
B 11,117 86 53
C 6,618 58 51
D° 1,955 57 49
Dn 2,047 73 159

 

The school system's psychological counseling ser—
vice received a total of 418 Model Neighborhood children
for psychological evaluation during the last school year.
A breakdown of reasons for evaluation is given in Table 9.

Children's attitudes were heavily influenced by
the family and environment. School social workers handled
426 student cases in the Model Neighborhood during the

last school year for reasons also given in Table 9.

Knowledge Levels
We have dealt with knoWledge levels in the factor
in "Thought and Language Competence," and I would argue
with Dr. Staudt that there appears to be a thin line
between "Knowledge Levels" and "Thought and Language
Competence." The data given in Table 4 does not appear

to show this interrelationship.

 

60

TABLE 9.--Psychological Evaluation

 

Reason Number Percentage

 

Psychological Counseligg Service Cases

 

 

Attendance Adjustment 24 5.0
Attendance--suspension 40 10.0
Attendance--census l 0.5
Possible Special Ed. Placement 288 69.0
Possible E.D. Class 2 0.5
Change of Recommendation 63 15.0

Total 418 100.0

School Social Worker Cases

School Adjustment 314 43.0
Home Factors 126 17.0
Social Adjustment 105 14.0
Personal Adjustment 116 16.0
Physical Factors 26 4.0
Mental Handicaps 43 6.0

Total* 730 100.0

 

*Problems sum to more than the total number of
cases as some cases comprise more than one problem.

Cultural Class

Federal programs are used generally in low
economic areas. Therefore, communication effectiveness
depends on developing a model that will reach a multi-
tudinal cross—section of the population. Large families,
low income, and type of welfare assistance received give
the magnitude of the problem. Cultural class is con-
stantly shifting in the Model Neighborhood. Internal and

external publics appear to be dealing with more than one

 

 

61

class. Therefore, it is necessary to design a multi—

functional communication component to meet the objectives

of our plan.

TABLE lO.--Income of Families

 

 

 

 

 

Median Income Per Per Cent Households
Area per Household Capita with under $3,000
per Year Income Annual Income
Detroit 6,348 22
Service Area 3,309 1,324 47
A 3,309 1,575 51
B 2,426 1,055 55
C 4,563 1,426 38
D° 4,133 1,090 38
Dn 12,614 10,406 15
TABLE ll.--Income by Source
Service 0 n
Source Area
% % % % % %
Wages and Salaries 60 65 50 63 51 79
Bugiggiisand Professional 4 6 1 3 2 24
Rents and Investments 8 6 7 7 9 33
Alimony and Child Support 2 4 2 l 2 --
Unemployment Compensation 2 3 2 l --
Disability Payments 9 6 15 9 5 3
Social Security 26 22 3O 26 27 23
Veteran's Payments . 3 5 2 2 --
Pension, Insurance Annuities 9 11 7 13 14
welfare ' 11 10 16 18 --

 

62

 

 

 

 

 

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63

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64

TABLE l4.--Family Composition

 

Service Area

 

 

Metropolitan
Household DetrOIt Households Individuals
% % # #
One—Person
Households: 15.1 49.0 23,980 23,980
Under 45 Yrs. ( 2.9) (14.9)
Over 45 Yrs. (12.2) (34.1)
Head & Wife Only
Households: 24.6 18.8 9,200' 18,400
Under 45 Yrs. ( 5.9) ( 4.8)
Over 45 Yrs. (18.7) (14.0)

Households with
Children and

Head & Wife 53.8 20.0 9,788 74,219
Head Only 6.5 12.2 5,970
Totals 100.0 100.0 48,940 116,599

 

TABLE 15.--Type of Welfare Assistance Received (percentages)

 

 

Service 0 n
Type Area A B C D D

Old Age Assistance ll 11 18 4 7 --
Aid to Disabled & __
Ait to Blind 14 21 12 11 5
Medical Assistance 9 13 12 3 6 --
ADC 25 30 22 25 23 --
ADC - U 10 5 8 15 20 --

General Assistance 35 35 32 39 35 --

 

 

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

It has been attempted here to broadly outline the
need for federally funded programs to be designed around
a sound marketing plan. While any such plan should be
cautiously implemented, the facts indicate the need for
such an approach.

Experiences in various federally funded programs
run the entire route from elementary to advanced approaches
in their implementation techniques. There have been far
too few success stories in programming concepts from the
federal government. The application of business marketing
tools, while not the complete answer, does give the social
planner some realistic approaches to problem solving.

Even from the standpoint of identifying high cost centers
in program areas, marketing plans can be used to evaluate
how services are received, although I have not attempted
to design a model to meet the many needs of federally
funded programs. I have attempted to show the many dis-
crepancies of the current system from a business approach.
Of all federally sponsored programs the Model Cities pro-
gram seems to provide the type of climate most suitable

for the ready use of sound marketing principles.

65

"‘II.

 

66

The economic conditions of our urban centers
demand fresh ideas from our business professionals. Given
the sound educational program of good communication between
both internal and external publics, the question of eco-
nomic feasibility remains the only obstacle to the develop-
ment of an all purpose marketing plan in federally funded

programs.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bergen, Garret L. Fashions, Fallacies and Fundamen—
tals. American Management Association, 1953.

Benett, C. L. Defining the Manager's Job. New York:
_American Management Association, 1958.

Haire, Mason. Organizational Theory in Industrial
Practice. New York, 1962.

Lazer, William, and Kelley, Eugene J. Mana erial
Marketing. 3rd revised ed. Homewood, IIIinois,
1967. -

Leavitt, Harold J. Management Psychology, Chicago,
1958.

Shortle, Carroll. Executive_Perform§nce and Leader-
ship. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1956.

Staudt, Thomas A., and Taylor, Donald A. A Mana-

gerial Introduction to Marketing. Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, 1965.

67

 

PAMPHLETS

Bergen, Garret L. Fashions, Fallacies! and Fundamen—

tals. American Management Association, 1963.

Hook, Charles R. Profit and People. American Manage-

Price,

United

 

ment Association, Personnel Services No. 132. A
New York, 1950. r

Gurly A. Organization to COordinate Peoples
Effort. Manggement Record, XVI, No. 2. New
York, 1953, p. 50.

States Conferences of Mayors, Model Cities
Service Cente£_Bulletin. Volume 11, No. 1
(September 1970).

. Model Cities Service Center Bulletin.
Volume 11, No. 2 (OCtOber 1970).

. Model Cities Service Centgr Bulletin.
Volume 11, No. 3 (November 1970)._

68

 

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