

THE LACK OF MARKETING PLANNING IN
FEDERAL PROGRAMS WITH EMPHASIS
ON MODEL CITIES

A Problem Analysis for the Degree of M. B. A.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

WM. MELVIN SMITH

1971

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THE LACK OF MARKETING PLANNING IN
FEDERAL PROGRAMS WITH EMPHASIS
ON MODEL CITIES

By

Wm. Melvin Smith

A PROBLEM ANALYSIS

Submitted to

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"THE MOST UNBELIEVABLE THING"

By

Hans Christian Anderson

A king once offered the hand of his daughter, the princess, to the man who could do the most unbelievable thing in the arts. There was a great competition. At last it was decided that the most unbelievable thing among entries was a combined clock and calendar of ingenious design and surpassing beauty, the product of many years of work. Not only was the time given, the clock showed the ages back and forth into the past and future. And circling the clock were sculptured figures representing the greatest spiritual and cultural minds in the history of human society.

All assembled were agreed that this clock was without question the most unbelievable thing and the hand of the princess must be given to the clock's handsome creator. But as judgment was about to be pronounced, a lowbrow competitor appeared, sledgehammer in hand. With a single blow he destroyed forever the marvelous clock. And everybody said why, to destroy so beautiful a thing, this is surely the most unbelievable thing of all. And that was how the judges had to judge.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I do not believe in the conspiracy theory of history. Nothing happens by accident but by design, however it is clear by evaluation and measurement of data that no better device could have been found to limit the full use of program benefits and thus reduce the cost to the government than the non inclusion of budgetary allocation for marketing strategy.

Nearly 200 cities and counties from all parts of the country applied for first round Model Cities planning grants. These applications, with their profiles of cities and their problems, constitute a rich source of information.

On the basis of experience gained in the first round, certain approaches appeared to be particularly rewarding. In those applications that appeared most promising:

1. Public and private agencies necessary to carry out the program and local residents were deeply involved in the preparation of the application, assuring community understanding and commitment.

However, because of the lack of good preparatory marketing planning the private agencies with their professional talent have become bogged down with red tape and the citizens participation mechanism has become frustrated because of the lack of realistic product (services) priorities.

2. Problem analyses probed deeply, going well beyond a description of symptoms of problems to those forces that created and maintained the problem situations.

This was mainly because of the strong commitment of both private citizens and agencies. You might also say that the politicians during this period had not begun to realize the political power that could be acquired in this infant of a product.

3. Linkages between problems were clearly defined such that a well integrated perspective for the problems of the "Model Neighborhood" and its residents emerged.

This problem solving mechanism brought about a variety of lay marketing experts who because of lack of good marketing principles and foundations fell into the traps of deadlines and excessive over commitments. In order to benefit by the experience of the first round of applications, the guidelines have been revised.

First, the relationships between the preparation of the application for a planning grant and subsequent activities have been clarified.

Second, cities are now asked to file a letter of intent as they begin to organize for the preparation of the application for a planning grant. This is intended to help cities plan for the involvement of the necessary state and local public and private agencies and Model Neighborhood residents and to provide a basis upon which Federal Agencies can keep localities advised of program developments and provide technical assistance, if requested.

Third, cities should not be requested to develop program proposals in second round applications. Rather, greater emphasis is placed upon organizing to involve the necessary groups and individuals in a Model Cities endeavor; the development of a deeper, more probing problem analysis, including analysis of causes of an interrelation among major problems and a preliminary examination of changes needed to solve such problems; the general direction and specification of planning activities to be undertaken; and the organizational structure for carrying out those activities to be undertaken during the planning period.

CHAPTER II

MODEL CITIES-DIVERSIFIED

PLANNING PROCESSES

Each of the eleven cities I have studied initiated its own planning system. Each developed locally relevant definitions of the four components of HUD's prescribed system-structure, process, product and performance. Additionally, each established locally relevant relationships among these components to satisfy HUD's planning requirements. Despite the local character of city's approach to Model Cities, however, five basic marketing planning systems appeared in the eleven cities that have been studied. These were: (1) staff dominance; (2) staff influence; (3) staff/resident parity; (4) resident influence; and (5) resident dominance.

Staff Dominance

Sustained chief executive interest in, and commitment to, city A's Model Cities Program, juxtaposed

with a non-cohesive,¹ non-integrated² resident base, permitted the City Demonstration Agency staff--formally responsible to the mayor--to initially assume and continuously maintain a dominant position in the City's Model Cities Planning System. Citizens Demonstration Agency staff were clearly given the mandate to develop, amend, and implement the planning work program. City Hall, particularly the Major's office, was both the Client³ and the constituency⁴ of the head of the CDA staff throughout the planning year. Residents, consistent with their involvement in planning efforts to Model Cities, functioned primarily to "legitimize" staff-oriented processes and products. Their direct input into either process was minimal. Most agencies were not vitally concerned with Model Cities. Only a few assigned staff to

¹MKGK classified residents groups as cohesive or non-cohesive. Residents groups, interested in Model Cities, which faced many internal problems and divisions were classified as non-cohesive. Each group had many leaders. None seemed to speak for a large constituency in the Model Neighborhood.

²MKGK classified residents members of group as politically integrated or non-integrated. Non-integrated referred to those groups whose members had only minimal experience prior to Model Cities in negotiating with City Hall on planning or resource allocation issues.

³Client in this text refers to any individual or groups receiving services under contract, or within the context of a formal relationship.

⁴Constituency in the text refers to a group or a group of individuals offering support or receiving commitments from professional staff or political leaders. No formal contractual relationship is involved between professional and constituent.

the CDA on a full or part-time basis. Agency or department review and sign-off was a perfunctory activity.

Given City A's relatively non-turbulent environment, the basic ground rules governing the roles assigned to staff, agencies, and residents were easy to define and maintain during the planning period. Their endorsement by the Mayor, and acceptance by other relevant participants, helped the planning system withstand the pressures of potentially threatening non-planned events such as the assassination of Martin Luther King or the firing of a popular resident employee in the Model Neighborhood. This can also be compared with a wild-cat walkout in a plant or a prolonged strike.

Once structural issues, such as the number of residents to be included in advisory groups, and the internal organization of residents groups were resolved, very few additional issues were observed during the planning period. Staff members were rarely confronted by residents or agencies. They could, and indeed did, spend the major portion of their time on substantive planning activities. The processes used to complete the Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) reflected considerable staff efforts to meet what were perceived as HUD criteria concerning order, timing and technique. The diversions which did occur, particularly during the final months of the planning period, reflected the felt pressures of time, budget, and

staff capacity, rather than competing non-planning related agenda items.

City A's final plan met HUD's requirements in form if not always in content. The problem statement was comprehensive in that it covered most functional areas of concern. Analyses of specific problems were quite detailed, and supported by considerable data. The CDA illustrated attempts to define priorities among problems and objectives. As in most cities, however, the discussion of relationships (linkages) between and among problems received only cursory treatment, and the relationship between five-year objectives and cost estimates for the proposed first-year projects in most functional areas were quite brief, suggesting general intent but not precise strategy, program content, or work program. Total budget estimates for first-year action programs, apparently reflecting in part the sustained involvement of only a few agencies with the Model Cities program, minimized the projected use of categorical programs (i.e., housing, social services).

Of the five performance criteria, only coordination was given direct attention. Use of on-loan staff allowed the limited number of agencies providing such staff to be kept informed of planning progress while review groups and policy boards provided opportunities for a small number of other agency participants and public officials to be kept appraised of CDA activities. The

dialogue at board sessions, however, usually focused on procedural rather than substantive matters.

The involvement of the chief executive in the program facilitated CDA use of central direction as a coordinative technique to define and implement the planning work program. That is, the Mayor's articulated support of the program and his commitment to seeing City A submit its documents first, encouraged the staff to concentrate on the planning process and supported their seemingly conscious decisions to request agency review and sign-off responsibilities.

Cities B, C, D, and E illustrated characteristics associated with staff influence systems. The program in these cities, despite the fact that the CDA was formally responsible to City Hall in three cities and to the public agency in the fourth, lacked the continuous interest or the commitment from the chief executive. Indeed, for the most part his involvement was generally limited to the application period and the period just prior to submittal. Tension in the Model Neighborhood in at least three of the four cities clearly made the program a political risk to the chief executive, given what appeared to him to be uncertain federal commitments and alternative local priorities.

Minimal chief executive involvement was accompanied, at the inception of the program at least, by the

presence in the Model Neighborhood area of non-cohesive resident groups whose members were not generally politically integrated. Staff therefore lacked both a client group and/or a constituency. As a result, during the early months of the planning period, they were unable (or unwilling) to initiate planning events, crystalize planning issues, and establish effective relationships with either residents or agencies concerning the development of planning products. They were limited primarily to providing secretarial type services to supposed relevant participants. As one CDA head put it, "We were confined to securing rooms for meetings; recording minutes; and providing agendas."

There were, as implied above, very few ground rules concerning planning assignments at the beginning of the planning period. The development of such ground rules occurred in an ad hoc fashion and resulted in most of the issues occurring in the system. Participants changed roles and responsibilities frequently; some left the system entirely, while others entered, not always to assume the same roles. Ground rules were rarely clear or firm.

The absence of firm ground rules made the system vulnerable to considerable environmental turbulence which existed in three of the four cities throughout the year, and in the fourth during the final months of the year.

This turbulence--competitive resident groups, Martin Luther King's death, competitive agencies, etc.--constantly threatened planning participants, and resulted often in changes in work program objectives and assignments.

Planning efforts when finally underway were subject to numerous shifts in, and amendments to, the work program. Order and technique were frequently left by the wayside. Staff direction of the planning process was at best an intermittent event, and at worst, nonexistent.

As resident or resident dominated groups grew stronger, a few key CDA staff members began to increasingly assume the role of resident advocates. For most, however, periodic intervention of the chief executive (or his surrogate) permitted City Hall to ultimately be viewed as the primary client. This fact, combined with HUD's deadlines, allowed staff to become the major, although not primary, influence in the planning process.

Resident groups in all staff influence cities made their most significant contribution to the planning process during the development of the problem statement. Their input came through direct dialogue with staff and agency personnel in task force and board sessions. CDA staff responsible for writing all drafts, made an effort to accurately reflect resident needs, priorities, and

programs in these drafts. Such conformity would, it was thought, lend sanction to staff prepared products and therefore facilitate their ultimate acceptance by resident or resident dominated review boards.

Agency involvement in staff influence cities was minimal. Where it occurred, it was limited in terms of duration, and usually quite specific in terms of products. The lack of sustained agency commitment was apparently related to the failure of the chief executive in staff influence cities to provide early support to the program. Many agencies, in light of the marginal visible support granted the program by respective major and city managers, apparently questioned the program's worth to them. The cost of their participation seemed high, and the benefits marginal. CDA heads, without chief executive support, could not mandate participation on a continuing basis, or even exercise meaningful persuasive powers.

HUD's products generally took longer in staff influence cities to complete than the initially prescribed planning year. Most met HUD's requirement concerning form, but diverged significantly with respect to content. For example, the analysis of different functional problem areas varied in depth and documentation. Priorities among problem areas were almost always absent. Linkages between and among problem areas were rarely stated in more than a perfunctory fashion.

Critiques of the existing delivery systems were tough in some areas but absent in others. Five-year objectives and costs were difficult to relate precisely to all problem areas. They were certainly neither clear nor precise enough to suggest local strategies or provide a frame of reference for development of first-year projects. Budgets were quite general and relied on supplemental funds to meet the major share of first-year action needs.

Locally relevant definitions of HUD's performance criteria did not come from either conscious direction or substantive planning processes. Rather, they emerged from dialogue between residents and staff, residents and agencies; and were an indirect by-product of the continuous efforts to define and develop roles.

The most visible innovation in all the cities was the apparent citizen participation during the planning period of resident groups able to conduct continuous discussions with City Hall about resource allocation issues. Evidence of significant coordinative approaches, unusual institutional response patterns, or conscious resource concentration and mobilization was rare. Minimal participation of chief executives, combined with a weak resident base, frustrated serious efforts in these areas of HUD concern. Apparently no local mandate existed concerning these performance criteria sufficient to motivate agency response.

Parity

Cities F, G, H, and I were classified as parity cities. Continuous chief executive interest in, and support of, the program was visible in all cities. Similarly, availability of reasonably cohesive Model Neighborhood resident groups whose members were politically integrated was apparent in at least three of the four cities.⁶ Sustained chief executive involvement, a strong resident base and a relatively turbulence-free environment permitted definition of ground rules early in the planning period. These rules allowed staff and residents alike to share responsibility relative to key planning decisions.⁷

CDA staff in three of the cities were formally responsible to the chief executive. In two of these they perceived themselves, and were seen as, resident advocates for select issues; while in the third a "bona-fide" resident advocate, responsible to a resident group, was present and able to work with CDE staff at City Hall. Only in one city was staff formally responsible to a resident dominated group.

⁶City Hall, at the request of CDA staff in City F, supported development of a strong Model Cities resident group. Members were quickly involved in non-Model City related planning issues by many city officials.

⁷Formal administrative responsibility and authority clearly resided with City Hall, however, in at least three of the four cities.

Resident groups in parity cities were able, either at the outset or after a short time, to make real planning contributions. All had developed a visible and supportive constituency; and non-ideological leadership was either present or quickly developed during the initial weeks of planning. Resident groups in at least three of the cities were able to secure "independent" staff.

Direct chief executive or surrogate involvement, combined with comparatively strong resident groups, granted initial ground rules the status of written constitutions. City Hall and residents were able to negotiate their differences and as one chief executive stated, "stick to agreements." Existence of such agreements relative to planning assignments helped maintain or support the planning system in the face of sporadic threatening non-Model Cities related events. Most of the issues which occurred after the ground rules were defined concerned process or products.

Agency involvement was encouraged by the visible support provided the program by respective chief executives. On-loan staff was provided by some agencies for sustained but varying periods of time in all four cities. A number of agencies participated in "active" resident dominated boards in at least three cities, and on less active agency review boards in two cities. Tasks leading to the completion of specific products were completed under contract by individual agencies in at least one city.

Parity cities were not able to perfectly match the planning order suggested by HUD, nor were they able to include all the different "techniques," implicit as well as explicit, in HUD's guidelines. Departures from the requirements, however, generally reflected the conscious choice of staff and residents. Staff prepared documents in all cities.⁸ They were based, to the extent possible, on resident-staff agreements about work program and product priorities.

Products developed in parity cities were generally completed within the initially set one-year planning period, or shortly thereafter. While most contained thorough discussions of problem "linkages," the discussion of underlying causes was often superficial and did not get at basic causes. At least half the documents contained analyses of priorities among problems and objectives and subsequent strategy statements. Critiques of existing institutions were common; indeed, some were presented in great depth. The statement of objectives and fiscal needs, Part II, while often vague, did seem to relate content to both the problem statement and anticipated projects. Parity cities, perhaps reflecting the participation of local agencies, proposed greater reliance on categorical programs as a proportionate share of total first-year budgets than other cities.

⁸In one city, F, the resident group prepared the major portion of the problem statement.

No consistent pattern emerged in the way first-year action projects were described. Some cities provided more information and a clearer picture of proposed first-year action efforts than others. Variations, however, existed even internal to documents from the same city.

By and large, parity cities were able to initiate coordinative approaches based on adjustment⁹ processes rather than central direction. Information sharing and use of on-loan staff, plus sustained resident-staff, dialogue led to development of common strategies concerning planning processes and anticipated products. Continuous resident-City Hall dialogue was seen locally as the primary example of innovation and institutional change. A number of agencies in each city, however, responded to the complaints of Model City related resident groups concerning agency provided services. As a result, urban renewal plans were altered and zoning proposals amended in at least two cities. An obnoxious coal heap was removed in one city after participating Model City residents objected; while a health program was redirected in another city for the same reasons. Evidence of resource allocation and mobilization was generally limited to projections in the plan concerning the use of categorical programs.

⁹Coordination was achieved through discussion, negotiation, bargaining, etc.

Resident Influence

City J initiated a resident influence system. Minimal chief executive interest and involvement in the program, in part related to a high level of turbulence in the local environment, combined with a non-cohesive resident organization, impeded early development and assignment of responsibilities. Staff, at the outset, were without a client or a constituency and had to assume a service role. Their initial functions, as in staff influence cities, were limited to arranging meetings, securing agency attendance, monitoring sessions, etc.

Both residents and staff were constantly threatened by events not directly related to the Model Cities planning process. These threats were constant with respect to residents, and intermittent with respect to staff. They added to the difficulties frustrating development of ground rules pertaining to roles and initiation of substantive planning processes. Sporadic chief executive intervention, resulting from staff pressure, and the results of resident group confrontations with select public agencies over issues related to local services helped establish, after some period of time, roles for relevant participants. A relatively large number of issues related to who would control the planning process were recorded in this system.

Most staff, because of the emergency of an increasingly cohesive and self-directed resident group and the

continued assumption, by and large, of a neutral position by the chief executive concerning Model Cities, became "advocate" planners. The resident group became the major, although not the only, influence on planning. Staff were clearly junior partners. Their primary role was to structure and extend resident-initiated dialogue concerning planning, pose alternatives, and help clarify ideas. Ultimately, they recorded in HUD's format the result of predominantly resident-initiated planning decisions.

A number of agencies participated on resident-dominated boards and task forces, as well as contributed staff, during the planning year. Yet, agency involvement was not generally widespread. Some agencies feared "locking horns" with resident groups. Others saw very few benefits from participating on a sustained basis, and many costs, particularly in terms of staff and postponed agenda items. Absence of continuous chief executive support, particularly early in the planning period, made it difficult to secure participation from hesitant agencies.

One city did not complete its planning documents until well into the second planning year. Order and technique were not primary concerns during most of the planning period. Substantive causal analyses were missing, as were in-depth statements concerning linkages among problem areas. Critiques of the delivery system were presented in most all functional areas, as were initial attempts to define priorities.

Five-year objectives and fiscal needs seemed consistent with the problem statement and anticipated project.¹⁰ Resident desire to control the anticipated program was illustrated in the assignment of sponsors to first-year projects. Project descriptions varied by functional area. Some were quite detailed and clearly reflected a projected implementation strategy and work program; others suggested little more than an idea in the mind of the author.

The resident influence system was able to achieve visible responses from an array of local institutions concerning local non-Model Cities related planning issues (e.g., zoning changes, etc.). Innovation, as in the other systems, was defined primarily in terms of resident involvement. Resident-dominated groups assumed the major role in determining how Model Cities funds would be spent at least until the very end of the planning period. Significant coordinative approaches were not a primary contribution of this system. Where coordinative processes took place, they took the form of adjustment. Many relevant Model Cities agencies resisted involvement in the program because of its rather unstructured quality. Some apparently feared resident confrontation; others resisted involvement because of the tenuous commitment of city officials.

¹⁰Such consistency was difficult to determine precisely, given the lack of concreteness and supportive rationale.

Very little evidence of resource concentration and mobilization was illustrated during the planning period. Supplemental funds composed by far the largest portion of projected first-year action budgets.

Resident Dominance

Although not politically integrated, resident groups in City K were reasonably cohesive. They were able to "negotiate" a set of ground rules with City Hall which granted them a dominant role in the program. These ground rules, allocating planning responsibilities, despite or because of the tense local environment,¹¹ were endorsed by the chief executive, who remained visibly involved and committed to the program.

Despite many threatening non-Model Cities related events, the working relationship between residents and the city stood up well. Both groups were able to withstand outside pressure without much difficulty. CDA staff were used primarily to service resident groups and act as brokers between such groups and public officials.

Since the resident group secured the dominant policy voice in the program, severe strain was put on the ability of the staff to involve agencies. Continued

¹¹City Hall's commitment to the program, unlike most cities where tension was visible, was high. The cohesiveness or strength of Model Neighborhood groups, unlike other cities where turbulence was a factor, was one of the primary reasons leading to this commitment.

support by the chief executive of the program, however, permitted staff to gain some agency participation. Several agencies provided staff for resident groups to participate in their respective planning efforts, apart from Model Cities planning. A few even yielded to resident review of their proposed programs affecting the Model Neighborhood.

The resident group was more concerned with issues of control and involvement than with those related to planning processes and products. Substantive planning was for them a part-time activity. HUD's prescribed planning system had little meaning. Logic, order or priority definition were not prominent agenda items. Outside consultants were brought in ultimately, to translate resident statements of problems, goals, etc., into the required federal format.

City K's submittal, like most, met HUD's requirements relative to form. Differences existed, however, with respect to content. Most problem areas received substantive treatment, and the city, unlike most, made a meaningful effort to distinguish between problems and their causes. Further, the local delivery system was subjected to a general critique.

The plan, however, purposely did not distinguish priorities among problem areas. As one resident put it, "Everything was a priority." Part II of the document,

from most cities, appeared to relate to the problem statement in only the most general way. It did not illustrate in all functional areas a clear relation to anticipated projects. While projects, with some exceptions, were reasonably well developed, budgets, as in many cities, lacked clear rationales or supporting data. Supplemental funds were emphasized in developing the projected pattern of first-year expenditures.

The participants were concerned deeply with neither coordination nor resource mobilization and concentration. The primary coordinative technique used was adjustment. Demands made of agencies by residents were usually arbitrated by the CDA staff and chief executive.

Agency willingness to participate directly, as indicated above, varied considerably over the course of the planning period. Usually it took the form of staff contributions to resident task forces. These staff members were able to transmit pertinent information on the program's progress to their parent agencies.

The resident group was clearly dominant. Staff were utilized chiefly to secure participation among recalcitrant agencies and legitimize resident-defined products through authorship of formal documents. Resident involvement was the system's most visible innovation, and the changes in behavior of some existing institutions was its clearest example of institutional response.

System Determinants

Several related factors appeared to influence if not determine the type of planning systems developed by the eleven cities studied. Some relate to specific components of the pre-Model Cities environment; others to characteristics associated with the role of the chief executive.

Pre-Model Cities Planning Environment

Many characteristics associated with the pre-Model Cities planning environment in each city were defined during the course of this study. They included: (1) population size; (2) racial indices; (3) range and intensity of problems; (4) form of local government; (5) previous experience with federal programs; (6) interest in coordinating local officials; (7) level of turbulence in the environment; and (8) nature of resident participation in public decision-making processes. Only the level of turbulence and the nature of resident participation in each city prior to and at the outset of the Model Cities program appeared to affect the type of planning system carried out by each of the eleven cities studied. That is, only these two factors, of those reviewed, helped explain why certain cities adopted one planning approach, and other cities another approach.

Turbulence.--Intense and sustained tension among groups within the Model Neighborhood and between various

groups and City Hall was a characteristic of the pre-planning environment in all but one of the staff influence cities, and in both the resident dominant and resident influence cities. Only a modest amount of turbulence was observed in parity cities while practically no turbulence was illustrated in the staff dominant city.

Intensive turbulence clearly suggested to most chief executives that they should "think twice" about their role during the planning period. The program's uncertain dimensions and cloudy future, when combined with a tense local environment, made the risks of visible and sustained City Hall participation seem to many local officials to be quite high. Conversely, the program's well advertised promise made the risks of complete nonparticipation also significant.

Most executives in cities where turbulence was a factor opted to "play" it down the middle. Where the residents related to Model Cities were not well organized nor able to speak for a large number of residents they would elect in most instances to maintain only a peripheral interest and involvement in the program (e.g. D, E, B, C, J). Their role when juxtaposed with a relatively weak resident base would lead to the development of a staff or resident influence system.

If the resident or resident-dominated Model Cities group (or groups) was strong and reflected obvious

Parity				Resident Influence	Resident Dominance
F	G	H	I	J	K
493,887	71,860	108,000	98,777	312,000	262,332
75,000	19,460	16,000	7,947	36,000	42,343
7.1%	20.2%	7%	4.8%	7.9%	21.8%
I: 1 37.8%	53.7%	NR	13%	33.1%	89.5%
II: 1%					
NR	7%	-	NR	13%	-
I: 1 30.9%	8.1%	-	2.7%	NR	-
II: 19.7%					
\$6,361	NR	\$5,923	\$5,453	\$6,361	\$6,099
NR	NR	NR	Min. \$3,000	NR	\$3,167
4%	Wht 8%	4.1%	5.9%	5.4%	5.8%
	Blk 16%				
8.1%	Wht 19%	5.7%	8.9%	14%	10.5%
	Blk 23%				
12.4%	11%	19.7%	14.4%	19.1%	14.4%
28.2%	25%	27.2%	27%	38.9%	28.5%
28.2/1000	(County)	3%	2.1%	16.2/1000	26.8/1000
	2.2%				
NR	(Orig. MMA)	4.4%	NR	18.1/1000	45.7/1000
	3%				
12.9%	18%	15.6%	32%	41%	20.1%
27.5%	32%	27.2%	44.9%	73%	33.7%
Strong Mayor Council	City Manager	City Manager	Commission	City Manager	City Manager
Strong	Strong	Strong	Strong	Weak	Strong
Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Negative	Positive

³This study rated cities as having a positive climate prior to the inception of Model Cities program if the chief executive in the city had articulated publicly and constantly a desire to establish "a coordinated planning framework, one involving agencies and residents, and one including environmental, social, and economic issues." Further, in order to be ranked as having a positive climate, the chief executive would have had to state publicly his commitment to and strong support of the new Model Cities program.

TABLE 1.--Non-System Determinants--Planning Process

Characteristics		Staff Dominance	Staff Influence			
		A	B	C	D	E
<u>Demographic</u>						
Population	City	499,000	587,700	604,332	178,000	1,670,444
	MNA	47,640	114,000	75,745	20,500	169,833
Per Cent Nonwhite	City	45%	7%	16.8%	38.9%	29.0%
	MNA	68.2%	4.2%	52.4%	99.1%	52.7%
Per Cent Spanish Surname	City	-	41.7%	-	-	-
	MNA	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Economic</u>						
Median Income	City	\$5,056	\$4,691	\$5,605	\$6,004	\$4,069
	MNA	\$3,564	\$4,691	\$4,000	NR	\$3,873
Per Cent Unemployed	City	3.4%	5.3%	8.1%	3%	10.2%
	MNA	15%	(Orig. MNA)	12.9%	6%	19.6%
<u>Physical</u>						
Substandard Housing	City	30.2%	22.1%	31.0%	19%	6.4%
	MNA	71.8%	(Orig. MNA) 39.8%	43.8%	26%	26%
<u>Social</u>						
Infant Mortality	City	NR	2.6%	28/1000	3%	2.9%
	MNA	42/1000	(Orig. MNA)	63/1000	3%	4.3%
Education	City	9%	51.1%	NR	22%	24%
	MNA	10.6%	23.2%	NR	41%	38%
<u>Institutional</u>						
Form of Government		Weak Mayor Council	City Manager	Weak Mayor Council	Strong Mayor Council	Strong Mayor Council
<u>Citizen Participation</u>						
Involvement of Residents Pre-Model Cities ²		Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak	Weak
<u>Pre-Model Cities Climate</u>						
Movement towards Model Cities Objectives ³		Positive	Negative	Negative	Positive	Positive

¹City F has two Model Neighborhoods.²This study rated resident involvement prior to Model Cities as "strong" if there were visible resident groups in the Model Neighborhood Area, concerned with planning issues, which were cohesive and/or integrated.

community support, the chief executive would, given local tensions, understandably acquiesce to a major if not dominant role for this group during the planning period. Such acquiescence would not limit the direct involvement of the chief executive; his involvement, however, would be defined in brokerage terms. That is, the chief executive would act primarily to maintain communication linkages between residents and public agencies.

Resident Involvement

There were in at least four of the eleven cities studied resident or resident-dominated organizations in the Model Neighborhood prior to the inception of its program, which were internally strong and which reflected widespread community support. In effect, they were cohesive organizations; their members shared many common objectives relative to the program, thus permitting them an ability to "speak with one voice." Their support in the Model Neighborhood permitted them to act without constant fear of attack from other organizations in the Model Neighborhood.

Presence of a cohesive organization allowed residents to negotiate with City Hall from a position of relative strength. Demands which required a response could be and were made by residents. Because resident

cohesion generally occurred¹³ in those cities where chief executives were involved from the outset on a sustained basis in the program, it was possible to discuss and agree on ground rules concerning HUD's planning criteria early in the planning period. Continued resident cohesion permitted these ground rules to be maintained until submittal of the plan to HUD.

A cohesive resident base led to development of either a parity or resident dominant planning system. If resident members of Model City related organizations were, or became, politically integrated, the city would achieve a parity planning system. Conversely, if residents were not politically integrated prior to Model Cities and did not become so during the early months of the program, the city would establish a resident dominant system.

Where participating residents did not, either prior to or during the Model Cities program, have easy access to City Hall on issues related to or apart from

¹³ Generally those chief executives who assumed an active posture with respect to Model Cities were seen locally as "activists" with respect to programs apart from Model Cities. There appeared to be a coincidence in some cities between such activism and the strength of resident groups. That is, in several of the cities where chief executives were characterized as activists, resident groups were considered to be internally strong. Evidence exists to at least speculate that chief executive activism was a necessary but not sufficient condition for resident cohesion to exist in certain cities. As one resident suggested, "Before the Mayor was elected we had no one at City Hall to talk to. Now we can negotiate with City Hall, . . . our organization can do something. . . ."

Model Cities, neither their experiences nor those of involved public officials lent support for parity ground rules. Residents in these cities sought primacy in Model Cities decision-making. City Hall granted their demands because of their visible strength (cohesiveness) and the turbulence of the environment.

Political integration of residents involved in Model Cities encouraged City Hall to look upon the sharing of decision-making in Model Cities as only an extension and not a major departure from pre-Model City decision-making processes. "After all," reported one chief executive, "residents were involved in select planning issues before Model Cities. . . . Our Model Cities organization is not really that new." By the same token, political integration made it easier for residents to trust City Hall, and to see the value of their involvement as partners in the program. Discussions with City Hall were reasonably free of abrasive rhetoric and quite direct. It was not an uncommon phenomenon to find that some public officials were residents of the Model Neighborhood.

While residents didn't "get all they wanted," in discussions with City Hall on non-Model City related issues, many at least felt that some of their requests met with a positive response. They apparently welcomed access to City Hall. "We needed," as one resident reported, "to keep City Hall in . . . so we can get needed funds. We have done it before, we can do it again. . . ."

A number of resident groups illustrated very little cohesion; and their members exhibited very little political integration. Staff or resident influence systems resulted when these two characteristics were coupled with minor or negligible chief executive interest in Model Cities. Planning ground rules concerning role assignments were difficult to develop since neither City Hall nor residents were able or willing to set, or negotiate, them at the outset. If the residents became stronger and more assertive (characteristics associated with cohesion) faster than the chief executive became visibly involved and committed to the program, a resident influence system developed in the city. Staff, in these instances, served primarily to sanction resident articulated views concerning planning products. If the chief executive became involved earlier than residents became cohesive, or if neither resident cohesion nor chief executive involvement became a fact, then a staff influence system resulted in the city. Residents, in these instances, were primarily used to lend sanction to staff efforts.

A staff dominant system resulted when the resident group was not cohesive and the participating residents were not politically integrated. Sustained chief executive involvement, given the characteristics of the resident base, led to the creation and maintenance of ground

rules providing staff with the major decision-making role. Residents were primarily used to legitimize decisions made by staff.

TABLE 2.--Systems and Their Determinants

Planning Systems	Degree Turbulence	Chief Executive Involvement	Resident Characteristics
Staff Dominance	Low	Sustained	Non-cohesive Non-integrated
Staff Influence	High	Minimal	Non-cohesive ¹ Non-integrated
Parity	Low	Sustained	Cohesive Integrated
Resident Influence	High	Minimal	Non-cohesive ² Non-integrated
Resident Dominance	High	Sustained	Cohesive

¹Chief executive involvement prior to resident cohesion.

²Resident cohesion prior to chief executive involvement.

Role of Chief Executive

The role assumed by the chief executive¹⁴ and/or his surrogate¹⁵ was, as indicated above, related to the level of turbulence and the pre-Model City nature of resident participation. In turn, his role was a key system

¹⁴The term as used in this report refers to the chief political or administrative officer in the city.

¹⁵A senior aide to the chief executive who in effect is able to speak for the executive.

determinant. It, perhaps more so than any other factor, helped define the basic character of the planning process, the roles of staff, residents and agencies.

Table 3 suggests that the level of chief executive involvement varied over the course of the planning period in many cities. Only in staff dominant, resident dominant, and parity cities was there evidence of sustained chief executive participation in the program throughout the planning period. Mayors and/or managers in staff and resident influence cities became involved in the program only during select "crises," and specific time periods, or not at all. For example, in Cities D and E, both staff influence cities, the Mayors while obviously sympathetic to the program, were only visibly involved when resident-staff relationships became particularly sensitive; when internal problems associated with the resident group appeared to threaten the program; or when apparent HUD deadlines with respect to the final submittal were in danger of falling by the wayside. Similarly, in City J the city manager played a very marginal role in the program. He became involved only when staff directly sought his intervention during a crisis period and near the very end of the planning period prior to submittal of the plan to HUD. In City C there is no record that the chief executive (mayor or manager) was involved at all during the planning period.

TABLE 3.--Involvement of Chief Executive in Planning Process

Planning Period	Staff Dominance			Staff Influence			Parity			Resident Influence		Resident Dominance	
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K		
Application	O	O	O	●	O	Δ	O	Δ	O	O	O	O	
Revision	O	O	●	●	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	
Initial Organization Period	O	●	●	●	O	O	O	O	Δ	O	Δ	Δ	
Part I	O	●	●	●	●	O	O	O	O	●	●	O	
Part II	O	●	●	●	●	●	●	O	O	●	●	O	
Part III	O	●	●	O	O	O	O	O	Δ	Δ	Δ	O	

Key: ● Passive O Intermittant Δ Sustained

Note: This table illustrates the intensity of the chief executive's (or surrogate's) involvement in the program. Classification is based on the number of events illustrating executive involvement in meeting various HUD planning requirements. A "passive" classification means minimal or no involvement; "intermittant" suggests episodic but frequent involvement; "sustained" portrays rather continuous involvement.

There were also substantial differences in the nature of the roles assumed by chief executives. For example, in staff dominant cities, chief executives periodically directed CDA staff to act on issues related to Model City planning processes and products. Such executive orders were an uncommon occurrence in all other systems. It was much more common, particularly in resident and staff influence cities, for the chief executive to serve as an arbitrator. Only near the end of the planning period did he become a partisan on issues related to process or product. The chief executive in the resident dominant system chose to act primarily as a broker linking residents and city agencies. He was able to reduce the potential for friction between residents and City Hall inherent in this system. Chief executives in parity cities were, perhaps more than in any other system, direct and frequent participants in the planning process.

The chief executives of parity, resident dominant, and staff dominant systems were able to provide visible public support to the program immediately upon initiation of the planning period. They helped to validate early CDA activities--to in effect grant the new organization status at City Hall and in the community. Further, their continuous interest and participation in the program facilitated the establishment and maintenance of ground rules with respect to different planning roles assigned

to residents, staff, and agencies. In parity cities, rules and subsequent roles, as indicated earlier, assured the residents of equality with respect to decision-making; in resident dominant cities they allowed residents to assume the major planning voice; and in staff dominant cities, they provided staff with the primary planning role.

Mayors and city managers did not in staff and resident influence systems lend the program the mantle of official respectability. Absence of a firm and willing client at City Hall limited the ability of the staff to define relevant relationships with agencies and residents. Subsequently, ground rules concerning roles of CDA staff, agency personnel, and residents were at best open-ended, and at worst non-existent during most of the planning period. Efforts to develop and implement a planning work program were viewed as residual activities by most participants. Negotiations concerning roles continuously took precedence over substantive planning efforts.

CHAPTER III

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

It is obvious that there are many different structures in the cities that I have visited. However, these structures are not in line with meeting the needs of Urban Life. Staudt and Taylor in their book A Managerial Introduction to Marketing deal with organizational structure and the grouping of similar functions together. Often, various departments will not give up their autonomy even if it means duplication of effort. This leads to misallocation of funds and non-inclusion of fiscal marketing restraints. This results, by design, in a dysfunctional organization. There is no marketing plan model set forth by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Therefore the recipients of Model Cities funds have not concerned themselves with the proper groupings necessary to meet the broad guidelines of HUD through organizational structure. An example of this is the jobs that Model Cities has created. How many of these jobs fit the needs of the local area? I will leave this question to the reader who will make up his own mind.

Since there are no monetary incentives in government programs, the organizational criteria rely heavily on structure. With proper structure the following are included:

- a. Coordination of activities,
- b. Good decision-making by managers,
- c. Effective planning.

Dr. W. J. E. Crissy, Professor of Marketing at Michigan State University, has stated criteria of a sound organization that are indeed applicable:

1. The organization must facilitate speedy and accurate information to the external publics.
From the system determinents alone this has not been the case in federal programs, especially Model Cities.
2. Business tempo doesn't allow for long red tape decision making. Neither do federal programs, especially the way the present fiscal restraints are interpreted. If the money that is allocated by the federal government for a particular year is not spent by the end of the twelve-month period, there is a chance of losing it back to the government. However, some cities have gotten around this by extending the execution year. This extension leads to all sorts of problems that I will not

elaborate on. For example, I wonder what would happen if one of the big three auto companies were to extend the fiscal year of one of their divisions just because that particular division had not spent all the money allotted to it.

3. Try to decentralize plans and strategies close to the market place. The Model Cities guidelines have, in broad terms, made this one of the objectives through a mandatory citizen participation requirement. However, decentralizing anything means giving up some power by the central source, and politicians as a whole are reluctant to carry out this approach.
4. High degree of specialization within the organization as well as dealing outside the organization. Since the product is relatively in the beginning stages and funds are only projected on a five-year basis, I am not sure whether this criteria will ever be met.

Using Dr. Crissy's concept of organization, his criteria reveal the following:

- a. That because of a lack of application of strong organizational concepts the problems are prevalent.

- b. Without a sound organization, even if a marketing plan exists, it cannot be implemented.

In general the program creates new chiefs everyday but very few indians. There are very few lean organizations in the Model Cities program. However, again Dr. Crissy has proposed a model that might solve the problem by matching the man with the job through analytical compromise on man qualities (Figure 1).

Long-Term Planning

The Talent/Task Analysis Model deals with common groupings of duties to be performed and the human qualities needed. The horizontal axis starts with entry management positions (EMP) and concludes with the chief executive office (CEO) of the mayor. The vertical axis considers common duties such as knowledge, skills, and personal and social qualities. These common duties cover the whole range of individual job descriptions and the type of man needed to carry out the assignment. The cells in Figure 1 are specific, explanatory statements about the job as it relates to the present and the future. What does the Crissy, Kaplan, Grossman Talent/Task Analysis Model give the government planner? When all cells are completed, the city administration has a panoramic view of the functions to be performed and the type

COMMON ELEMENTS: *		EMP	2	3.....CEO
DUTIES:	a			
	b			
	c			
	.			
	.			
KNOWLEDGE:	d			
	e			
	f			
	.			
	.			
SKILLS:	g			
	h			
	i			
	.			
	.			
PERSONAL AND SOCIAL:	j			
	k			
	l			
	.			
	.			

FIGURE 1.--Talent-Task Composition of the Enterprise Levels of Management

*William J. E. Crissy, Robert M. Kaplan, and Louis H. Grossman, Matrix Models for Planning, Executive Development, Michigan State University Business Topics (Spring 1965).

of man needed to carry out the assignment. We now have set up the beginning of the identification process of weak management areas of concern. This model also gives us the ground rules for an all inclusive long-term management strategy for the selection of qualified candidates in relation to the goals of the organization. If this model were used, one would not find a man with a Master's Degree in Theology in charge of evaluation and monitoring.

Many cities throughout the country have employed people without thinking about the Talent/Task Analysis (Model) which would eliminate some of the lack of competence on the local level in federally funded programs. There has to be some linkage that matches personnel qualifications with job duties.

Organizational Theory

Many problems that encompass the lack of a marketing plan are shown in the failure of top management to disseminate information to subordinates in the Model Cities program. HUD guidelines are constantly changing and these changes are incorporated in what are called CDA letters. These letters make up policy (e.g., CDA-3 is concerned with citizen participation). There are also transmittal notices that explain the CDA policy letters.

Organizational theory states that management, in making changes to improve and strengthen the organization, needs to let those affected know why such changes are

being made and how the city (organization) will benefit, even if some individuals seem to suffer. More often the case is to make the decision and explain it to the people later. This explanation only comes in most instances when citizens question the integrity of politicians and the role of the organization. In such cases the chief executive must be firm but if he has previously been fair, these actions are more easily accepted by all concerned.¹⁶ Actually, a large number of the problems in management relations arise from inadequate marketing plans, ill-defined organization shot through with problems concerning responsibility and authority, centralization line, and functional responsibility, etc.¹⁷ The effects of such problems on all levels are considerable. If members of each individual department are insecure because of lack of identification with the problems of the organization, if department heads are scrapping among themselves and mistrust one another, if incompetent men are put into key positions, if major errors in policy are made because decisions are made on a crisis basis, then the manager who looks to the organization chart for leadership cannot

¹⁶Gurly A. Price, "Organization to Coordinate People's Effort," Management Record, XVI, No. 2 (1953), p. 50.

¹⁷Garret L. Bergen, Fashions, Fallacies, and Fundamentals (New York: American Management Association, Personnel Services, 1950), p. 34.

be expected to do his best of feel secure in what he is doing.¹⁸

A description of top management's responsibility in organizing that would be all inclusive and provide the answer for all to follow is not possible. However, the following grouping of elements is a useful tool for a partial description:

1. To define and set forth the purposes, aims, objectives, or ends of the organization;
2. To lay down the marketing plan for the structuring of the organization;
3. To recruit and organize the program staff as defined in the plan;
4. To provide a clear delegation and allocation of authority and responsibility;
5. To direct and oversee the general execution of the activities as delegated;
6. To assume that a sufficient definition and standardization of all positions have taken place so that quantity and quality of performance are specifically established and are assuredly being maintained;
7. To make provisions for the necessary committees and conferences, and for their conduct

¹⁸Charles R. Hook, Profit and People (New York: American Management Association, Personnel Services, No. 132, 1950), p. 3.

in order to achieve good coordination between top and middle management;

8. To assure stimulation and the necessary energizing of all concerned; and
9. To provide an accurate evaluation of the total outcome in relation to established purposes.

Even when these elements are followed, since an organization is a living organism, it is constantly adapting to new external pressures and requiring constant adjustment to these external needs. The organization is dynamic. All of the factors listed above have to be under continuous review, for these are the daily functions of management.

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNICATIONS--AN INDICATOR OF
A GOOD MARKETING PLAN

There are many publics involved in the communications network in the Model Cities program. They can be classified in two areas:

1. external publics
2. internal publics

The external publics are as follows:

- a. Citizens Governing Boards (advisory policy board)
- b. Non-Profit Corporations--Board of Directors
- c. Planning Task Forces
- d. Operating Agencies
- e. Third Party Contract Agencies
- f. Model Neighborhood Block Clubs, etc.

The internal publics are as follows:

- a. City's Planning Department
- b. Police Department
- c. Housing
- d. Planning
- e. Urban Renewal

- f. Personnel Department
- g. Corporation Counsel's Office
- h. Other related areas that are tied into the program description.

Communication lines must flow to and from the inside of the organization as well as to and from within the external public. A problem that the marketing plan has to address itself to is that of what mechanism will interlock this 4-way network.

External Public

Internal Public




FIGURE 2.--4-Way Network

Both internal and external publics must know how each of the others is affected. Therefore it is very important that a feedback mechanism be clearly defined and implemented. What format will the interlocking feedback mechanism take? The communication that takes place is a critical aspect of any organization.

In an effort to answer the question of what type of mechanism is needed for good communication both

internally and externally, the following model (Figure 3) was taken as an example of poor communication.

Community Communication
Implementation Team

Scope of services:

1. Develop contracts for the projects in the original HUD submittal and the revised "Plan for Progress."
2. Lend assistance to and check the performance of contractual agencies.
3. Provide necessary report including press release.
4. Collect and catalogue Model Neighborhood information.
5. Make studies as requested by the Community Communication Committee and MNA in order to develop second-year plans.
6. Recommend new programs or changes in the component as it develops and such other tasks as the Committee and MNA may feel are necessary to coordinate the program and insure its smooth and effective operation.

It is quite obvious from this model that it will not fulfill the requirements of our interlocking mechanism. Nevertheless, this is one model that is currently being used. One of the most important things that has been left




FIGURE 3.--Tentative Chart Showing Relations of the
Communications Component

out of the plan for communication is a time table. Communication timetables lend themselves to good, sound marketing planning. They keep the organization from perceiving false indications from both the internal and external publics. Communication timetables also force the planner to avoid overcommitting himself with regard to what he can and cannot do. The mechanism that will work for effective communication will include the following:

1. Monthly Reporting Procedures
2. Components Timetable
3. Provide analysis or interpretation of the meaning of reports from both external and internal public
4. Preview of the above before it is put in the mass media network.

The following information will solidify the preceding remarks.

In conducting my survey I assumed that there was a lack of communication between publics and the organization (city). What I found was a minute system of communication that was mainly verbal in nature and concentrated among those who were employed in the program. Both the Model Neighborhood Agency, which is a department of the city, and the Citizens Participation Group, which is subsidized completely by HUD funds, are failing to communicate

W. Melvin Smith, Jr.
3800 Woodward Avenue
Suite 604
Detroit, Mich. 48201

January 10, 1971

Dear Resident:

May I solicit your support by answering the attached questionnaire. I am a student in the Graduate School of Business Administration in the Advanced Management Program (AMP) at Michigan State University.

I hope that you will fill out the enclosed questionnaire and mail it in the self addressed envelope attached as quickly as possible. If you are interested in the results sign your name and address and I will forward you a copy of the data analyses.

Sincerely yours,

Wm. Melvin Smith
Student

Attachment:

Circle the Correct Response

QUESTIONS

- | | | | |
|-----|------------|----|---|
| Yes | No | 1. | Do you live in the Model Neighborhood? |
| Yes | No | 2. | Are you involved either by employment |
| () | Employment | | or in a sponsored citizen participation |
| () | Other | | group connected with Model Cities? |
| () | Both | | |
| Yes | No | 3. | Do you feel that the citizens that |
| | | | represent you on an advisory, board, |
| | | | group, or commission are keeping you |
| | | | informed of the progress made in the |
| | | | program? |
| Yes | No | 4. | Do you feel that the Model Neighborhood |
| | | | Agency is doing enough to keep you |
| | | | informed of what services are available |
| | | | to you? |

Percentages of Responses*

Question 1.-----100% Yes

Question 2.-----30% Yes--70% No

15% Employment

10% Both

5% Other

Question 3.-----Of the 70% who
answered No to
Question 2, 62%
said No to
Question 3.

Question 4.-----60% No--40% Yes

*Sample of 200 people

with the community. This is evident not only from my small sampling but from the concept of turbulence that I described earlier in my presentation. Therefore, it would have to be assumed that the external agencies that have contractual agreements with Model Neighborhood Agencies would fall into the same pattern of responses as the residents. Another example of an ineffective communication model is the organization's inability to deal with rumors. Non-profit organizations within federal programs always appear to have controversy written all over their incorporation papers. Most of the controversy seems to be a by-product of the ineffective communication among both participants and the employees of the particular program. Effective communication does have a

degree of discipline interwoven in its fabric. Many corporations in the profit-making world have used communication as a discipline technique for taking their famous "trip to Washington."

Question number 4 of my survey is directly related to Figure 3. The communication component does not show the to and from relationships of the internal administration. The question that might be posed here is: Is there any mechanism designed internally for effective communication? If the agency does not effectively communicate in-house, how can one expect good communication externally with other publics?

Another aspect of the problem is the citizens group representing the Model Neighborhood residents. The response to question 3 of the survey reveals that this group also is having difficulty in keeping residents informed of its progress. So the appropriate feedback mechanism in both cases is inadequate.

I have considered the problem of communication effectiveness from the practical level.

Dr. Staudt in his book A Managerial Introduction to Marketing talks about several factors related to the sources that influence communication effectiveness. They are: (1) thought and language competence, (2) attitudes, (3) knowledge levels, and (4) cultural class. There is a great need for research in the use of this practical

application for federal programs. I think that if more city planners would apply this theory in communications in their five-year plans, there would be greater communication throughout the country from the citizen participation standpoint.

The factors that Dr. Staudt refers to are all inclusive and very important. However, there are many variables.

Thought and Language Competence

This competence factor can be categorized in two broad publics: (1) internal (within the organization), and (2) external (Citizen's Advisory Board, community groups and individual residents). Because of this concept and the physical environment of the Model Neighborhood area, thought and language competence vary from family to family and person to person. There is a direct relationship between thought and language competence and educational background or median number of school years completed. For persons 25 years and older Table 4 shows a range from 8.2 to 9.0; this average is equivalent to a grade school education.

The data in Table 4 is a variable that influences communication effectiveness in developing a strong marketing plan.

TABLE 4.--Education, 25 Years and Older (1968)

Education	Service Area		A		B		C		D ^o		D ⁿ	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Completed Grade School or Less	31955	48	9217	43	8751	55	10143	52	3395	50	359	15
Completed 9-11 Years	16643	19	5573	26	4137	26	4681	24	1765	26	167	7
Completed High School	12649	19	4501	21	2387	15	4096	21	1358	20	311	13
Higher Education	5326	8	2143	10	636	4	585	3	272	4	1557	65
Totals	66573	100	21436	100	15910	100	19506	100	6790	100	2396	100
Median Number of School Years Completed (1960)	8.8		9.6		8.2		8.4		9.0		---	

Informational Notes: Basic data sources for tables and other data included in this section are listed below.

1. "Cross-Section Sample Survey of the Model Neighborhood," Community Renewal Program, City of Detroit, 1968.
2. "Geographic and Demographic Characteristics of the Detroit Model Neighborhood," Detroit Model Neighborhood Agency, 1969.
3. "A Profile of Southeastern Michigan--TALUS Study Data," Detroit Regional Transportation and Land Use Study, Detroit, 1965.
4. United States Census, 1960.

Attitudinal Factor

There has been no research done on the attitudinal factor and how it would affect our communication model but the following data represent variables that affect attitudes in many spheres of influence: The high crime rate, high density neighborhood and the psychological evaluation of children in the school system all have relationship to attitudes. This again points out the need for a highly developed communication network that should take top priority in the development of a sound marketing plan.

Crime Statistics

The homicide rate for the Model Neighborhood area has consistently been much higher than the overall rate of city E, and in recent years has been more than double city E's rate. Homicide has been singled out from other crime statistics in Table 5 because of the emotional problems which are generally indicated in persons committing homicides.

TABLE 5.--Homicides (per 100,000 population)

Area	1967	1968
Detroit	20.1	27.1
Area "A"	39.1	54.9
Area "K"	50.1	59.4

The Model Neighborhood, like most low-income, high-density, rapidly changing neighborhoods, is a high crime area. The 1965 TALUS study correlated the crime rate by police precinct with several other social variables to draw a sketch of consistent characteristics of high and low crime rate areas. In 1965 the four precincts covering the Model Neighborhood reported a crime rate for the rest of the city. These four precincts had the lowest levels of family income, with 38 per cent of all families earning an average of less than \$3,000 per year, while the rest of the precincts showed an average of 19 per cent of their families living at this level. The same four precincts scored among the seven lowest precincts in educational attainment, and among the five lowest precincts in single-family dwellings. These four precincts scored among the top five in number of households with a female head, and had the four lowest employment rates anywhere in the city.

This same study gave comparative data for the Model Neighborhood and city E on other police data for 1965, which show that crime rates and police contacts are both higher in the Model Neighborhood--more than double the overall city rates. Certain areas of the Model Neighborhood show higher crime rates than others. High crime areas include the Central Business District and

the skid row districts along Cass and Woodward Avenues. Also, because of greater population density, crime rates are higher in the two public housing projects in the Model Neighborhood.

TABLE 6.--Police Data, 1965 (per 100,000 population)

	Model City	Balance of City	Total City
Crime Rate	112.5	43.2	48.8
Youth Bureau Contacts	40.9	15.3	17.0
Women's Division Contacts	7.0	2.9	3.2

TABLE 7.--Housing Data

	Detroit		Service Area	
	#	%	#	%
Total Blocks	13,300	100.0	1,082	8.1
Vacant Lots	8,412	100.0	1,414	16.8
Total Dwelling Units	501,047		41,037	
Total Housing Structures	348,892	100.0	14,697	100.0
Good Condition	245,970	70.5	3,136	21.3
Fair Condition	100,414	28.7	10,845	73.1
Poor Condition	2,508	0.7	716	5.6

TABLE 8.--Rental Data

Area	# Renting	% Renting	\$ Median Rent
Service Area Households	37,624	77	58
A	16,510	90	65
B	11,117	86	53
C	6,618	58	51
D ^o	1,955	57	49
D ⁿ	2,047	73	159

The school system's psychological counseling service received a total of 418 Model Neighborhood children for psychological evaluation during the last school year. A breakdown of reasons for evaluation is given in Table 9.

Children's attitudes were heavily influenced by the family and environment. School social workers handled 426 student cases in the Model Neighborhood during the last school year for reasons also given in Table 9.

Knowledge Levels

We have dealt with knowledge levels in the factor in "Thought and Language Competence," and I would argue with Dr. Staudt that there appears to be a thin line between "Knowledge Levels" and "Thought and Language Competence." The data given in Table 4 does not appear to show this interrelationship.

TABLE 9.--Psychological Evaluation

Reason	Number	Percentage
<u>Psychological Counseling Service Cases</u>		
Attendance Adjustment	24	5.0
Attendance--suspension	40	10.0
Attendance--census	1	0.5
Possible Special Ed. Placement	288	69.0
Possible E.D. Class	2	0.5
Change of Recommendation	63	15.0
Total	418	100.0
<u>School Social Worker Cases</u>		
School Adjustment	314	43.0
Home Factors	126	17.0
Social Adjustment	105	14.0
Personal Adjustment	116	16.0
Physical Factors	26	4.0
Mental Handicaps	43	6.0
Total*	730	100.0

*Problems sum to more than the total number of cases as some cases comprise more than one problem.

Cultural Class

Federal programs are used generally in low economic areas. Therefore, communication effectiveness depends on developing a model that will reach a multi-tudinal cross-section of the population. Large families, low income, and type of welfare assistance received give the magnitude of the problem. Cultural class is constantly shifting in the Model Neighborhood. Internal and external publics appear to be dealing with more than one

class. Therefore, it is necessary to design a multi-functional communication component to meet the objectives of our plan.

TABLE 10.--Income of Families

Area	Median Income per Household per Year	Per Capita Income	Per Cent Households with under \$3,000 Annual Income
Detroit	6,348		22
Service Area	3,309	1,324	47
A	3,309	1,575	51
B	2,426	1,055	55
C	4,563	1,426	38
D ^o	4,133	1,090	38
D ⁿ	12,614	10,406	15

TABLE 11.--Income by Source

Source	Service Area %	A %	B %	C %	D ^o %	D ⁿ %
Wages and Salaries	60	65	50	63	51	79
Business and Professional Profits	4	6	1	3	2	24
Rents and Investments	8	6	7	7	9	33
Alimony and Child Support	2	4	2	1	2	--
Unemployment Compensation	2	3	2	2	1	--
Disability Payments	9	6	15	9	5	3
Social Security	26	22	30	26	27	23
Veteran's Payments	3	5	2	2	2	--
Pension, Insurance Annuities	9	11	7	6	13	14
Welfare	11	10	16	9	18	--

TABLE 12.--Occupation of Adults

Occupation	Service Area		A		B		C		D ^o		D ⁿ	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Professional, Technical, Managerial	5766	11	2025	12	751	6	927	6	214	4	1207	64
Clerical & Sales	5751	11	2700	16	1022	8	1075	7	321	6	359	9
Skilled/Semi-Skilled	20966	40	6076	36	4634	37	8447	55	2459	46	226	2
Service	13630	26	4219	25	4630	37	2918	19	1497	28	56	3
Unskilled	2620	5	843	5	751	6	267	5	267	5	37	2
No Occupation	3670	7	1012	6	742	6	1228	8	588	11	---	--
Totals	47413	100	16875	100	12530	100	14862	100	5346	100	1885	100

TABLE 13.--Labor Force Status of Adults

Status	Service Area		A		B		C		D ^o		D ⁿ	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Employed	25160	48	8101	48	5386	43	7833	51	2299	43	1227	65
Unemployed	3669	7	1519	9	1002	8	768	5	374	7	--	--
Retired	6290	12	1857	11	1754	14	1689	11	--	--	283	15
Housewives	13104	25	3882	23	3257	26	4146	27	1710	32	302	16
Students	1048	2	671	4	125	1	---	--	--	--	75	4
Disabled/Other	3144	6	844	5	1002	8	961	6	374	7	--	--
Totals	42416	100	16878	100	12527	100	15358	100	5346	100	1887	100

TABLE 14.--Family Composition

Household	Metropolitan Detroit	Service Area		
		%	Households #	Individuals #
One-Person				
Households:	15.1	49.0	23,980	23,980
Under 45 Yrs.	(2.9)	(14.9)		
Over 45 Yrs.	(12.2)	(34.1)		
Head & Wife Only				
Households:	24.6	18.8	9,200	18,400
Under 45 Yrs.	(5.9)	(4.8)		
Over 45 Yrs.	(18.7)	(14.0)		
Households with Children and				
Head & Wife	53.8	20.0	9,788	74,219
Head Only	6.5	12.2	5,970	
Totals	100.0	100.0	48,940	116,599

TABLE 15.--Type of Welfare Assistance Received (percentages)

Type	Service Area	A	B	C	D ^o	D ⁿ
Old Age Assistance	11	11	18	4	7	--
Aid to Disabled & Aid to Blind	14	21	12	11	5	--
Medical Assistance	9	13	12	3	6	--
ADC	25	30	22	25	23	--
ADC - U	10	5	8	15	20	--
General Assistance	35	35	32	39	35	--

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

It has been attempted here to broadly outline the need for federally funded programs to be designed around a sound marketing plan. While any such plan should be cautiously implemented, the facts indicate the need for such an approach.

Experiences in various federally funded programs run the entire route from elementary to advanced approaches in their implementation techniques. There have been far too few success stories in programming concepts from the federal government. The application of business marketing tools, while not the complete answer, does give the social planner some realistic approaches to problem solving. Even from the standpoint of identifying high cost centers in program areas, marketing plans can be used to evaluate how services are received, although I have not attempted to design a model to meet the many needs of federally funded programs. I have attempted to show the many discrepancies of the current system from a business approach. Of all federally sponsored programs the Model Cities program seems to provide the type of climate most suitable for the ready use of sound marketing principles.

The economic conditions of our urban centers demand fresh ideas from our business professionals. Given the sound educational program of good communication between both internal and external publics, the question of economic feasibility remains the only obstacle to the development of an all purpose marketing plan in federally funded programs.

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