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THESIS

IVERS

Illliill’ilill‘ull

 

Illlui'nlllll

3 1293 01409 6071

This is to certify that the

dissertation entitled

Market Trader Activism in the Context of

Global Restructuring Processes:

A Ghanaian Case Study

presented by

Emmanuel Baffuor Awuah

has been accepted towards fulfillment

of the requirements for

Ph.D .

degree in Sociology

 

 

WXW

' \,

Major professor

Date ’,%a/VL [Ill/17f

MS U i: an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

0-12771

 

 

  

 

LlBRARY

Michigan State

University

 
  

PLACE ll RETURN BOXto romavothb Mutton your record.
TO AVOID FINES return on or before date duo.

DATE DUE      

DATE DUE

DATE DUE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARKET TRADER ACTIVISM IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL

RESTRUCTURING PROCESSES: A GHANAIAN CASE STUDY

By

Emmanuel Baffuor Awuah

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to

- Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology and Urban Affairs Programs

1995

ABSTRACT

MARKET TRADER ACTIVISII IN THE com

OF GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING PROCESSES :

A GHANAIAN CASE STUDY

By

Emanuel Baffuor Awuah

This study investigated how market traders, as human-

social

agents,

mobilized to articulate

their collective

interests regarding the policies of state/local government

institutions in the Kumasi Metropolis. It was placed within

the context of global restructuring and its implications for

Ghana.

The research questions that guided this investigation

were

(a)

how did

global

economic

restructuring

affect

central/local state restructuring in Ghana?;

(b) what

institutional and structural factors engendered conflicts

between market traders and the local state?;

(c) how did

market

traders

mobilize .to

articulate

their

collective

interests? (d) what is the relevance of market trader activism

for the democratic processes in Ghana?

Data for the study were gathered through fieldwork which

was conducted between January and June,

1992. The author

utilized. several methods including interviews, survey,

archival and documentary sources, and personal observations.

sud

The framework of the study relates to the argument that

central/local state restructuring should.be understooduwithin

a broader context of global economic restructuring, which

redefines capital-labor relationships, and the role of the

state in national development. It was argued that since Ghana

implemented a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1983,

state restructuring has led to further dependence of local

state institutions on their communities. Consequently, local

state institutions have adopted fiscal measures including

increased

tax

revenues,

and

retrenchment

of

community

services.

The study demonstrated that market trader activism in the

Kumasi Metropolis following after the implementation of the

Structural Adjustment Program, was aimed at influencing

the fiscal policies of the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority,

while at

the same time demanding the provision of new

services, and maintenance of existing physical and social

infrastructure, to enhance their business activities in the

marketplace. The study concluded that the demands market

traders made were part of the larger I'demecratization"

process that is going on from the ''bottom up" in Ghana.

Capyright by

EMMANUEL BAFFUOR AWUAH

1995

«a

 

DEDICATION

TO MAAME AMA OSAAH, WHO CARED FOR ME,

TO MY MOTHER, ELIZABETH BAIDEN:

WHO DID NOT LIVE TO SEE THE MIRACLE,

AND TO MY DEAR WIFE, AGATHA, AND THE

CHILDREN, WHO MADE IT POSSIBLE.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Pursuing graduate studies has been a life-long

investment for me. Along the way, I have become indebted to

many people, all of whom I cannot mention in this short

space.

First, I would like to express my heart-felt gratitude

to my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, who provided me the

opportunity to pursue graduate studies in the united States.

He is the source of my strength, wisdom and protection.

The members of my Guidance Committee, Professors Ruth

Simmm Hamilton, Christopher Vanderpool, Richard Hill, and

John Herrick, were quite helpful throughout my stay at

Michigan State university. They challenged me to think

critically about social realities. The chairperson of the

Guidance Committee, Professor Ruth Hamilton, want an extra

mile to guide my research. She helped me to see Ghana in new

and refreshing ways. She gave me more than my fair share of

her rich academic and research experiencesl.

An initial research assistantship from the Urban

Affairs Programs (UAP) made it possible for me to accept my

admdssion for doctoral studies. The research opportunities

HAP provided me, first under Dr. Bill Cross, and later with

Professor Ruth Simms Hamilton, the Director of the African

Diaspora Research Project, helped.me to acquire more

research skills, and enabled.me to apply them to emergent

problems in the American society.

I am.also grateful to the Department of Sociology

for the teaching assistantships, which not only provided

financial support for my studies, but also created

opportunities for me to work with faculty in the classroom,

and taught my own classes. I thank the department for the

trust it reposed in me; but I should admit that those rare

and challenging opportunities have renewed my interest in

teaching.

The fieldwork in Ghana would not have been possible

without timely research funds from the Mid4West

universities Consortium for International Activities

(MUCIA). I thank the Center for International Programs for

its assistance in securing the MUCIA research funds.

Numerous research assistants in Ghana, particularly Mac

Obiri-Mainoo, served as "foot soldiers" in the process of

collecting data, and I am grateful for their service. Also,

the cooperation of market traders, and officers of the

Kumasi Metropolitan Authority made my research possible.

The family of Professors Jack and Margaret Jones

(College of Human Medicine) provided invaluable spiritual,

emotional, and financial support for me and my family. Their

labor of love enabled my famdly'to endure the pain and

hardships of living in a foreign land.

Finally, but not the least, my most gratitude goes

to my wife Agatha, and my children, Eunice and Yaw. They

were always there for me, sharing in my joys and

frustrations. I really appreciate their love, patience, and

forgiveness.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

1.

INTRODUCTION ....................................... 1

Statement of the Problem ........................... 9

Significance of the Study............. ...... . ..... 13

Organization of the Study.........................16

m

2.

THE SETTING FOR THE STUDY

IntrwuctionOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO. OOOOOOOOOOOOOO 00.17

“:0 ..... 0.0... ....... 0.0.0.0....00.00.000.000017

KmsiOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.0....0.0.0.000000000037

Markets and.Marketplaces..........................51

Gender Division of Labor in the Market ........ ....58

The Kumasi Central Market.........................62

Demographic Characteristics of Market Traders.....67

Market Associations.................. .......... ...78

Administration of the Central Market..............86

Su-ary of the Chapter. .. ........... . ............. 92

M

4.

PUTTING TEE GHANAIAN -ERIENCE IN A BROADER

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT

Introduction......................................93

The Informal Bconomy..............................93

Previous Research on Market Traders Versus the

State............................................110

Human Social Agency and Collective Action........115

Market Trader Associational Aotivity.............118

Framework for understanding Market Trader

Aotivism.in Ghana‘Mithin the Context of Global

Restructuring....................................125

working Propositions ...................... . ...... 134

 

Chapter

5 .

RESUME OF RESEARCH PROCEDURES

IntrmctimOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0136

Members and Leaders of Market Associations.......137

State/Local Government Officials.................142

Limitations of the Study......... ................ 145

Conclusion........................... ......... ...147

Qantas

6.

GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND THE STATE AGAINST

NATION DILEMMA IN GHANA

Introduction.....................................l49

Context of State Restructuring...................149

Fiscal Crisis of the State.......................161

State Policy Responses...........................163

Central-Local Government Relationship............177

Local Government in the Kumasi Metropolis........181

Local Government Restructuring in the Kunasi

Metropolis...............................186

Financing of Local Government in the Humasi

Metropolis...............................190

Bone of Contention: Central Market Traders versus

the Kumasi Metropolitan.Authority........197

Analysis of Major Issues in Traders' Petitions...209

Gleaner

7 . mam TRADER normsx m nmcmnza-rron

PROCESSES IN'GHANA

Introduction.....................................229

Rehabilitation of the Kumasi Central Market......231

Security in the Kumasi Central Market............238

rment of Indigenous Business Associations..241

Civil Society and Democratic Processes in Ghana..244

Chapter

8.

SUMMARI'AMD CGMCLUSIGMS

IntrmctimOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.00254

8m Of angBOOOOOCIOOOOOOOOOOIOOOOOOOOO0.0255

conc1uaion8000000.000000000000000000.00.000.000.0258

APPENDIX .A: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE..................260

APPENDIX B: PETITIONS OE MARKET TRADERS.............325

WSOOOOOOOOOOOO0.......0.COO-OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO00.335

BIBLIMOCOO0....0000OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0......342

LIST or TABLES

The Political and Economic Profile of Ghana,

1957-1993................. ..... ..22

Structure of Ghana Exports.. ............ ... ...... .26

Structure of Ghana Imports ........................ 27

2.4

Balance of Payments of Ghana ...................... 29

2.5

Average Exchange Rates, 1980-1992 ................. 31

2.6

Age and Gender Structure in Ghana ............... ..32

2.7

Enrollments in Ghanaian Schools..... ....... .......34

2.8

Literacy Rates in Ghana...... ............... . ..... 35

2.9

Population Profile of Kumasi.......... ........... .42

2.10

Age and Gender Characteristics in Kumasi. ...... ...43

2.11

Educational Attainments in Kumasi.................45

2.12

Occupations OF Employed Persons in Kumasi.. ..... ..47

3.1

Educational Attainments of Market Traders ........ .68

3.2

Sources of Capital of Market Traders .............. 70

3.3

Marital Status of Central Market Traders .......... 73

3.4

Family Size of Central Market Traders . .......... 74

6.1

Total External Debt of Ghana......... ........... .162

6.2

Total External Debt Ratios of Ghana .............. 164

Central Government Revenue and Grants, Ghana ..... 166

Central Government Expenditure and Net Lending,

Ghana.. ....... 167

Profile of Local Government Development in

Kummei ............................... . ...... 183

Major Sources of Kumasi Metropolitan Authority's

Revenues... ......... ....... ..... ... ......... 191

Kumasi Metropolitan Authority Rents for Central

market Stalls/Stores, 1984-1991. e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e a 0193

Sources of Conflict Between Market Traders and the

Kumasi Metropolitan Authority ............ . ...... 199

LIST OF FIGURES

Map of Ghana ..................................... 18

Map of Kumasi .................................... 40

Distribution of Markets in Ghana....... ........ ..52

Relationship Between Rural and Urban Markets ..... 54

Interchanges Between Sectors of the Ghanaian

Economy and the Global Economy....... ........... .56

Organizational Structure of the Kumasi Metropolitan

Authority... ................. . ................... 87

Characteristics of the Formal and Informal

sectorsOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO......OOOOOOOOOOO ........ 96

A Framework for Understanding Market Trader

Activism in Ghana Within the Context of Global

Restructuring Processes.................. ..... ..135

People's Defence Committees and worker's Defence

conittees' 1983........OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO. ..... 151

PNDC Ghana(1984): Political Structure...........152

Organizational Structure of the Kumasi Metropolitan

Aaamly.OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.00.00.00.0000000188

 

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1

BACKGROUND

My study focused on market trader mobilization and

articulation of their collective interests within the context

of global/state restructuring processes and their impact on

Ghanaians.

Ghana has a long history of mobilization among informal

economy workers, particularly market traders, in defence of

their individual and collective interests vis-a-vis the state.

According to Clark (1990), marketplace trade in present-day

Ghana has historically had.a highly charged relationship with

a range of states:

from small chiefships to centralized

confederacies, to colonial empires, and nationalist would-be

states, to contemporary electoral and military states.

Controversies over the acceptable and actual role of traders

were prominent among justifications for changes of government.

All these types of authority structures generally more than

once, intervened energetically in trading relations, at the

same

time

that

traders'

own

actions,

individual

and

collective, shaped important aspects of the economies and

political formations of these state systems.

Market traders, particularly market women, were quite

active in the anti-colonial struggle for Ghana's political

independence from the British colonialists. They formed

alliances with proto-nationalist movements in putting

pressures on the colonial state, until eventually Ghana gained

its independence in 1957. Since then, Ghanaian market traders

have

been

among

the

first

social

groups

to

mobilize

collectively

to

protest/challenge/resist

seemingly

unpopular policies of state/local government authorities,

through

overt and covert activities.

Every state system in Ghana has had to deal with workers

in the informal economy, particularly market traders. Market

traders relate to

state institutions in Ghana at two levels:

the central government and local government authority levels.

The central government initiates commercial policies

which affect the operations of businessmen and women in the

country, regarding the allocation of import licenses, and

which goods are subject to state price controls. The issue of

state price controls of imported goods into Ghana was the bone

of contention between market traders and central government

officials until it was repealed in 1983. Price control of

goods was a regulatory instrument which involved government

stipulation of prices for

imported commodities into Ghana.

According to Clark (1990), price controls were pioneered by

colonial governments as a means to guarantee low-cost food

supplies for barracks and prisons. In addition, the colonial

state had to control food.prices for workers in foreign-owned

mines, to cheapen the cost of production, and thereby maximize

Their profits from the labor power of the workers. However,

traders and farmers effectively refused to sell at the

controlled prices.

In the First Republic under Kwame Nkrumah (1957-1966)1

the "price control“ system was used as an instrument to

regulate business enterprises. The 196; Control of Prices Act

 

was designed with the goal of ‘bringing down the prices of

commodities

needed by

the masses

within

the

reach

of

everybody, so that it would ensure that the people are not

deprived of decent and inexpensive living by any privileged

class'. The price list promulgated under the 1962 Control of

Prices Act was largely confined to imported consumer goods and

locally' manufactured consumer goods ‘with

a

high.

import

content. The price control mechanism was used as an instrument

of social policy, intended totprotect consumers by preventing

importers and local manufacturers from.earning:monopoly rents

arising from import restrictions.

But as Rillick (1973) points out, the real test of the

price control policy was its effectiveness as an egalitarian

device. Generally, the price control list was not confined to

items mostly purchased by lowbincome consumers. Relatively

lowbincome people could hardly afford to purchase imported

commodities, and locally manufactured import-substitutes. In

fact, as Killick (1973) argues, it was the middle and upper

classes in the Ghanaian society (especially the expatriate

community and political elites, and their families), who took

advantage of the price controls, as they spent a greater

-proportion of their incomes/wealth on these goods. Thus, the

disparities in real consumption standards increased rather

than diminished.

Interestingly, the extent of price control evasion was

considerably higher in local informal markets than in state

and private supermarkets. Generally, while government trading

enterprises such as the Ghana National Trading Corporation

(GNTC), and multinational commercial enterprises such as the

United Trading Company (UTC), and G.B. Ollivant, were too

conspicuous to break the price controls with impunity,:market

traders were not inhibited in the same way. In fact, market

women who served as petty traders within the commodity

distribution

system

were

too

numerous

to

regulate

as

thoroughly as the others.

The Abraham.Commission (1968) which was appointed after

the fall of the N‘krumah government in 1966 to investigate

trade malpractice in the Ghanaian economy, reported that the

operations of market women contributed to shortages and

escalating

prices

of

locally-manufactured

and

imported

commodities. The Commission's report provided the mass media

a weapon against women which they used with relish, calling

for steps to rid the markets of recalcitrant and I'unpatriotic"

middlewomen. Thus, women traders were castigated for hoarding,

profiteering,

and

smuggling.

These

attitudes

persisted,

particularly as prices skyrocketed in urban markets. The

dominant view remained that commodity price increases in the

internal economy were due mostly to market trader

machinations and detenmination to undermine state commercial

policies.

The 1972-1979 period also witnessed the imposition of

price controls, and state repression/regulation, as well as

violence against market traders. The mdlitary state under

Acheampong introduced several policy'measures to regulate the

activities of:market traders. The Price Control Decree of 1972

stipulated that ' any person.who speculates or deals in any of

the commodities specified in the decree with the purpose of

making excessive or unlawful profit, shall be guilty of an

offence, and liable on summary conviction to imprisonment not

less than three months, and not exceeding ten years without

the option of a fine". In addition, the decree included the

forfeiture of market stalls/stores, and ban from trade in a

market for a period of up to twelve months, for those who

violated the provisions of the decree. These price controls

and regulations were extended to locally-produced foods as

well. They were enforced by police and.military personnel,

students and workers, who were sympathetic to the military

junta. These state actions worsened the already precarious

shortages of imported.and.locally-manufactured.commodities in

the country. In the process,

market traders hoarded their

comodities, and withdrew them from sight. One newspaper

report recounted some of these occurrences:

Several market stalls in various markets in Accra

remained bare as many traders failed to display their

commodities following the insistence by students and

workers to buy at controlled prices. Others who owned

supermarkets and shops, however, displayed few items of

provisions with a view to selling them quickly before

the arrival of the "revolutionary“ students and workers

(The Ghanaian Times,November, 1977:1).

The hoarded commodities were available only to those who

could connect to the "underground" network for the sale and

distribution of commodities,

but at prices about ten times

the price controls. For instance, milk was supposed to be sold

at 45 pesewas, but was sold at C4.50, that is, ten times the

stipulated price in 1976. The withdrawal of commodities, and

the creation of the “underground“ market,

frustrated the

capacity of state officials to control/regulate activities of

market traders.

In the end, some, state officials joined the

market trader “underground" market, and supplied them with

commodities, with the sole purpose of also benefitting from

their

illegal

activities.

Thus,

market

traders had the

capacity to pull corrupt state officials into their camp, and

‘were successful in sabotaging and.defeating the price control

policy.

Similarly,

Rawlings'. military

state

(from

June

to

September,

1979,

and from December 1981 to April 1983) ,

reintroduced

the

price

control

idea

in

the

Ghanaian

marketplace to regulate the activities of market traders. The

police, the military and other state agencies stormed public

markets, and enforced price controls. In the process, they

”a

 

7

seized commodities from traders, and sold them.at prices way

below their actual official prices. I remember joining a queue

to buy a screwbdriver even though I did not need it at that

time, because it was being sold by a military personnel for

only 25 pesewas, about one-tenth of its official price. Some

police and. military personnel

also

took

some

of

these

commodities away as booties, as if they were their prizes for

engaging in such exercises. The Pioneer reported:

A survey of Kumasi Markets has revealed that some

policemen and women and soldiers in Kumasi have turned

the markets and shops into GOLDMINES where they extort

huge sums of money from frightened traders. The survey

also showed that these service personnel go round and

buy goods at very ridiculous low prices and later sell

them at high prices. Some of the traders interviewed

were unanimous that some of the police and military

personnel go round with old, pro-budget price-lists,

arrest traders, threaten them with the Public Tribunal,

and.exhort.monies ranging from.Cl,OOO to C10,1000 from

them.before dropping the case

(The Pioneer, July 1, 1983:1).

Some market traders, mostly women, were caned in public

(often naked, which was a grievous traditional insult to

African/Ghanaian'women) for selling above the price controls.

In fact,

in Kumasi,

a woman cloth trader was shot for

profiteering (her baby was removed from her back before she

‘was

killed)

[Fraker

and. Harrell-Bond,

1979:2182).

State

repression of market traders also took an ugly turn when the

military personnel used dynamite and razed the Makola Number

2 Market. This market was believed to be the center of trade

in Ghana, the chief wholesale and retail market in Accra. What

made it a target was that it was generally portrayed as the

8

center of trade malpractice, and the hub around which the

“underground economy” was organized in Ghana (The Ghanaian

Iippp, August 20, 1979:1-2). The space previously occupied.by

Makola Number Two was later used for the construction of a

parking lot for Accra elite shoppers.

However, recent attempts at portraying market traders as

victims of state oppression, unorganized, and.powerless, does

not

fully capture

the

long history of market

traders'

mobilization and struggle in dealing with powerful/large

structures such as the state and its institutions of control.

 

For example, Robertson (1983)

states that as a result of

various pressures created by the degree of competition between

traders in the market, and build-up of substantial political

opposition to their presumed power over prices and supply,

market traders/women have not been able to organize to

represent their own interests. She states that:

In spite of the noise to the contrary, the bulk of the

market traders, like the majority of the population, is

politically powerless. Their voluntary associations are

mainly for mutual help and are politically inactive....

The basic powerlessness of the market women, large and

small, is shown by their defenselessness in the face

of arbitrary acts of the government (1983:476).

As already indicated, what was significant about this

period.

‘was

:market

traders'

capacity

for

collective

mobilization, and resistance/sabotage of the price control

policy. Withdrawal of commodities from the markets in Ghana

was one of the key strategies of traders to register their

protest against the price control and state violence against

9

them. Market traders survived through I'underground'I networks,

which controlled the supply and distribution of commodities in

the marketplace. In fact, it is not unreasonable to argue that

the capacity for mobilization among Ghanaian market traders

enabled them to sabotage the price control mechanism and

regulation of their activities, and eventually contributed

immensely to compel Rawlings' military state to embark on a

program of economic reforms, including trade liberalization

and elimination of price controls in April 1983. The cessation

of the price control policy was a testament to the success of

market traders' collective struggle to resist state

interferences in their economic activities in the marketplace.

James C. Scott (1987:421) has aptly argued that "such everyday

forms of resistance are effective, widespread, durable, and

highly coordinated".

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Given the preceding recent historical context, the point

of departure for my study was how market traders mobilized to

articulate

their

collective

interests

vis-a-vis

local

government institutions in their communities, within the

larger context of global/state restructuring processes. The

study sought to investigate how the human-social agency of

market

traders

relate

to

their

external

environment,

particularly local government institutions.

So far, very little documentation on how market traders

 

10

mobilize to deal with powerful/large structures, such as

state/local government institutions exist in Ghana.

Past

research on market trader associational activities focused on

their

recruitment

strategies,

and

their

socio-economic

functions,

but failed to examine their mobilization and

articulation of their collective interests vis-a-vis their

external environment. However, research on the relationship

between market traders and state/ local government institutions

is quite important since it would provide us information to

understand what aspects of the policy environment affect

market trader activities, and what strategies they utilize to

influence

the

policy

environment,

to

survive

in

the

marketplace.

How market traders empower themselves to deal with

powerful bureaucracies, surprisingly has not been the

fascination of social scientists who do research on collective

action and social movements in Africa, Ghana in particular.

The reasons for such an oversight/neglect are not far-fetched:

they pose more conceptual/ theoretical and methodological

challenges to the researcher than studies of workers in the

formal sector, such as labor unions in private and public

institutions. Here, there is an apparent ease with data

collection from official primary and secondary sources of

data.

Realizing the gaps in our understanding of market trader

activism, I sought to study a market trader collective in the

11

Kumasi Metropolitan Area in Ghana, to examine the sources of

conflict

between

its

members

and

the

local

government

institution, and how it mobilized its members to articulate

their collective concerns. Thus, my research was a case study

of an exploratory nature, which examined the relationship

between traders in the Kumasi Central Market and the Kumasi

Metropolitan Authority.

The study was approached from a global perspective. The

contention of the author is that in order to have a better

understanding of market trader activism in the 1983-1992

period, it is necessary to appreciate the changes taking place

both within the global political economy, as well as their

impact on state and local government institutions. It was

contended that crisis within the global capitalist economy in

the 1970s initiated restructuring of the global economy itself

in terms of capital, role of the state, and markets.

Peripheral countries,

particularly Ghana, which had been

dependent on primary commodities in the global economy,

inherited huge balance of payment problems, debts, and debt-

service problems. Here, the role of international capitalist

institutions such as the World Bank and the International

Monetary Fund have become quite critical in helping peripheral

capitalist states to adjust to the crisis in the global

system. Subsequently, both organizations have been relatively

successful in convincing peripheral states, like Ghana, to

embark upon Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). The goal is

 

12

to redress what they call “distortions in the economy".

However,

SAP

has

also

set

into motion

state/local

government restructuring processes. State restructuring has

involved austere measures which have been designed to increase

state revenues while at the same time contracting state/public

services, as well as emphasizing disciplined state

expenditure. These measures, arguably, have become necessary

as a result of increasing burden on the part of peripheral

states

to

devote

greater

proportions

of

their

foreign

earnings, if any, to service accumulated debts from

international financial institutions, such as the World Bank

and the International Monetary Fund.

Local government institutions which used to depend

upon the central government have had to shoulder greater

responsibilities by providing services to their communities.

However, the catch is that they have to rely on their local

communities for tax revenues, while at the same time reducing

the quantity and quality of services they provide for their

communities.

Market

traders have

come

to

feature

quite

prominently as a major source of tax revenues for local

governments, and hence have become key players in the

urban

political economy in Ghana.

Thus, one of the objectives of the study was to

examine the extent to which the global/state/local government

restructuring

processes

had

impacted

market

traders'

activities. Second,

it investigated the institutional and

 

13

structural factors which engendered conflict between market

traders and state/ local government institutions. Finally, the

study analyzed market trader mobilization, and modus pperandi

for articulating their collective interest/concerns.

1.3 SIMPICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study provides some insights into the capacity of

informal economy workers, particularly market traders,

to

mobilize to influence their external environment. Past social

science research on collective action in the workplace focused

mainly on organized labor in the formal sector, and to a large

extent, overlooked the urban informal economy in Ghana. The

present investigation seeks to fill some of these gaps by

providing a window into the internal structure, and modus

operandi of market trader mobilization and collective action

vis-a-vis local government institutions. More importantly, the

study seeks to investigate the human-social agency of market

traders, especially their capacity for mobilizing to influence

powerful/large bureaucratic structures, whose policies affect

their survival in the marketplace.

The study will also contribute generally to theoretical

and policy discussions

on

the

urban

informal

economy,

particularly market traders,

in the political economy of

developing countries. The relevance of these activities for

development in the Third World, and Ghana in particular, has

been questioned by some scholars (Ninsin, 1991) . On the other

14

hand, some scholars (Desoto, 1989) have projected them as _s_i_:;e_

qpa non for development in the Third World. However, it is

interesting to observe that those who advocate support for the

informal economy to enhance their role in Third World economy,

often ignore issues regarding their mobilization, especially

associations they form to defend and articulate their

collective interests in the marketplace.

International development agencies and Non-Governmental

Organizations (NGOs) stand to benefit from this research. It

will demonstrate that while material provisions such as

financial assistance and credits, as well as training are

essential for improving the activities of workers in the

informal economy,

especially market traders,

it

is also

important to stress factors (both.internal and.external) which

affect the mobilization of these workers to articulate their

collective interests in the marketplace.

Most importantly, the study also seeks to make a

contribution to theoretical discussions on grassroots

movements,

particularly

in

the

Third World,

and

their

interconnections with the global system. The study illustrates

that grassroots mobilization is deeply affected by the

international transformations of the global economic base, and

its mediation through national/local political contexts, and

people's everyday actions and activism. Hence, the search for

a comprehensive understanding of grassroots mobilization in

the fringes of the periphery of the global system, must

15

incorporate structuralist (macro-level analysis),

national/local political processes (mezzo-level analysis),

as well as human agency (micro-level analysis), that is, how

people resist/challenge domination in society.2

1.4 DEFINITIONS OF KEY CONCEPTS

Market Trader: A person who either produces, or

distributes, or retails goods and services in a marketplace.

Activism; The act of opposing something one is against,

or acting in behalf of those things one supports. These

involve both overt (open) and/or covert (clandestine and

underground) activities.

Th2 Statg:

The roles, institutions, and individual

office occupants having particular drives, compulsions and

aims of their own related to decisions binding upon all

segments of society in a certain territory.3

Central Government:

A political organization with a

centralized administration, from which devolves authority to

governments in regional and local communities.

Local Government:

A political organization which has

legal and political jurisdiction over a relatively smaller

community in a state.

16

1.4

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

Chapter Two presents the setting for the study. It

provides a background discussion on the history, politics and

economy of Ghana, but with special emphasis on the Kumasi

Metropolis.

Chapter Three discusses markets, and market trader

phenomena in Ghana, but Kumasi in particular.

Chapter Four puts the Ghanaian experience of market

trader-state relationship in a broader conceptual and research

context.

Chapter Five provides a resume of the research procedures

for the collection and analysis of data for the study.

Chapter Six examines global restructuring processes and

their impact on state versus civil society dilemma in Ghana.

It also discusses market traders as social-human agency, and

their collective mobilization to resist/challenge domination

in society.

Chapter Seven assesses market trader activism within the

larger context of the l'democratization" processes that are

emerging from the 'bottom.up' in Ghana.

‘

Chapter Eight provides the summary and conclusions of

the study.

CHAPTER TWO

THE SETTING FOR THE STUDY: GHANA

Introduction

This chapter presents background discussion on the

history, economy, politics, and demography of Ghana, and the

Kumasi Metropolis.

Qppgpaphical Backggound

Ghana is situated on the West Coast of Africa, north of

the Gulf of Guinea. Her neighbors are the Ivory Coast to the

West, on the northdwest and north is Burkina Farso, and on

the east is the Republic of Togo (see Figure 2.1). From

south to north, it extends from about latitude 4o 2' N to

about latitude 1f’ 10' SN, a distance of about 420 miles.

From west to east, it extends from 3° 15' 3W to

1° 12' 0E.

The country has an area of approximately 92,100 square miles

which is roughly equal in area to the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and about the size of the State of Oregon1

P

ati

The results of the March 1984 census showed a total

population of 12.2 million, giving an average annual growth

rate of 2.6 percent since 1970, and an average population

density of 50 per square kilometer. The highest densities

are in the urban areas, which accounted for 31 percent of

the total population in 1984. In 1991, the United Nations

17

Ghana

18

 

0 km

100

200

w

Ffi——w-—-—-H

0 miles

50

too

150

NI

OER

 

—— Main toads

-+-v-v- Main runways

IURKINA

-— International boundaries

-------- Internal DOUMIHOS

 
  

Main airport

 
 

  
  

Source: Economic Intelligence, Country Profile, 1994 :1

 

19

estimated that the population of Ghana had risen to 15.0

million, implying an acceleration in the growth rate to an

average of 3.5 percent per year over 1984-1990 period. At

the time of the 1984 census, the most populous region by far

was Ashanti with 2.09 million (17 percent of the total), and

the least populous Upper West with 438,008 (3.6 per cent).

Other important regions were Eastern with 1.68 million (13.8

percent), and Greater Accra with 1.4 million

(11.5 percent).2

Historical Backgpound

Long before formal colonization by the British at the

end of the nineteenth century, the territory called modern

Ghana, was inhabited by about one hundred ethnic groups, who

were organized under native traditional structures and

institutions such as families, clans, tribes, villages,

towns, and kingdoms. Some of these ethnic groups had become

so powerful that they had established dominance over other

ethnic groups. The Ashanti Kingdom, for example, covered

almost fifty percent of present-day Ghana. Its boundaries

extended far into the northern, western and southern

sections of Ghana. Ashanti people, therefore, gained control

of the

precolonial economy of Ghana, particularly in the

hinterland.3

The first contact between Europe and the Gold Coast

occurred in the late fifteenth century when a party of

Portuguese landed and subsequently established a small

20

trading base on the southern coast. During the next three

centuries the English, Danes, Dutch, Germans, and Portuguese

established control over various segments of the coastal

region. A number of these groups used the small footholds to

facilitate their participation in the lucrative West African

slave trade.

Ultimately, only Great Britain came to exercise control

over any major portion of the area. British rule was

confined to a few coastal settlements until the middle of

the nineteenth century, when Great Britain began to expand

its control into the interior. This ambitious venture

brought them.into a long series of conflicts with the most

powerful of the inland kingdoms, the Ashanti. In 1901, the

British succeeded in gaining formal control over the Ashanti

and in turning the Northern Territories into a protectorate.

Colonial rule ended on March 6, 1957 after the people of

the Gold Coast voiced their demands for change, and were

successful in gaining political independence from the

British. The country's name was changed from the Gold Coast

to that of the ancient sub-Saharan empire of Ghana, which

flourished during the Middle Ages.‘

Political Backgpound

Between 1957 and 1993, Ghana had a turbulent political

history. So far, Ghana has experienced nine governments

alternating between civilian and military rule. In fact, the

military defacto regimes have ruled Ghana longer than

21

civilian regimes [see Table 2.1 showing civilian and

military regimes in Ghana from 1957-1993].

The first civilian regime under Kwame Nkrumah was

toppled by the military junta, led by senior officers of the

army. In explaining why they toppled Nkrumah's government,

the principal architects of the coup "emphasized their

resentment at Nkrumah's interference with the army, his

mismanagement of the Ghanaian economy, his repressive

politics, and widespread corruption, intrigue and sycophancy

of the Convention People's Party functionaries" (McCaskie,

1986:480).

The first military regime, the National Liberation

Council (NLC) ruled by decrees and projected itself as a

typical guardian regime. It adopted austerity economic

measures, culminating in the halting of several projects

began under the Nkrumah government, the retirement of a

number of workers considered to be redundant or a threat to

the smooth running of the military regime. The NLC existed

for only three years and ushered in the Second Republic

under Dr. Kofi Busia, a distinguished sociologist, and a

leader of the Progress Party (PP) and one-time rival of

Nkrumah, was installed as the Prime Minister, under a new

constitution, with Edward Akuffo as the non-executive

(ceremonial) president (Pinkney, 1972).

However, the Second Republic was short-lived. On

January 13, 1972, another military coup d'etat led by

Colonel Kutu Acheampong brought the demise of the Busia

22

Table

2.1

Date: W M:

W

1957-1966

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah

Civilian

State Socialism

(Convention Peoples

Party)

 

1966-1969

General Emmanuel

Military

Market-oriented

Kotoka

(National Liberation

Council)

 

1969-1972 Dr. K.A. Busia

Civilian

Market-Oriented;

(Progress

Party)

 

1972-1978

Gen. I.K.

Acheampong

Military

Self-Reliant

Development I

(National Redemption

Council, Supreme

Military Council I)

 

1978-1979

Gen. F.W.K.

Military

Self-Reliant

Akuffo

(Supreme Military

Council II)

Development II

 

1979

June-September

Flt. Lt.

J.J. Rawlings

Military

Tightened Economic

(Armed Forces

Revolutionary

Council)

Controls

 

1979-1981 Dr. Hilla Limann

Civilian

No Real Change

(People's

National Party)

 

1981-1992

Flt. Lt.

Rawlings II

Military

Structural Adjustment

(PNDC)

Program I

 

1993-

Flt. Lt.

Structural Adjustment

Rawlings

(National

Democratic Party) Civilian

Program II

 

Source: Alan Roe and Hartmut Schneider, 1992

W p-40-

23

government. The following poignant account on Busia's short

rule in Ghana illuminates some of the reasons underlying his

overthrow by the military:

Busia' brief record of twenty-seven months in power

was not a happy one: it largely confirmed the view

that Kofi Busia was a cleverer academic than he was

a politician. By a series of sweeping measures he

continually tried to clear his path f obstacles to

the kind of liberal democracy he professed, only to

find his difficulties increasing and having to fall

back on some of the illiberal and undemocratic

practice of which he accused ex-President Nkrumah.

What made matters worse for Busia was that he

presided over notoriously divided team of

well-educated Ministers and he was unable either to

sack the critics within his Cabinet or to assert his

effective authority (Africa Contemporary Rgcord,

1992:552).

The National Redemption Council (NRC), following the

1972 coup, was established to rule Ghana. The regime under

Acheampong, sought a policy of national self-reliance, and

pressed for increased food and agricultural raw'material

production in the country. In October 1975, a seven-man

Supreme Military Council (SMC) was set up as the highest

legislative and administrative organ of Ghana. But an

internal or "palace—coup” forced Acheampong to step down in

1978. The SMC was reconstituted under General Fred Akuffo,

Acheampong's deputy.

On June 4, 1979 a coup d'etat by junior officers of the

Ghana Armed Forces, toppled Akuffo's regime. An Armed Forces

Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was set up. The main goal of

the AFRC was to rid Ghana of corruption before handling over

power to the civilian. Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings

emerged as the leader of the AFRC military regime. The AFRC

24

“v.

ruled Ghana for about four months, and handed power over to

the People's National Party (PNP), and Dr. Hilla Limann

served as the President in September, 1979.

The Third Republic under Limann was short-lived. On

December 31, 1981, Rawlings and the military seized power

again through a coup d'etat. Rawlings cited corruption and

economic maladministration as the reasons for his "second

coming" (McCaskie, 1986: 485-488).

The Provisional National

Defence Council (PNDC) headed by Rawlings was established to

run Ghana. Between December 31, 1981 and December 1992, the

PNDC survived more than six known counter-coups.

The need

for a stable political climate was long overdue.

However, a

combination of political and economic developments in Ghana

(discussed in detail in chapters 4 and 6) have led to

democratic reforms. Even here, the general and presidential

elections that were conducted in November and December,

1992, respectively, were boycotted by political parties

opposed to the PNDC, on the grounds of election

irregularities and fraud by PNDC-appointed election

officials. The PNDC-sponsored party, the New Democratic

Congress, won the elections, and Rawlings became the

President for the Fourth Republic, beginning January 4,

1993.

Thus, the political climate in Ghana since independence

has been one characterized by disarray, chaos, and

confusion. Hence, abrupt changes in government, and the

political turmoil have affected Ghana's economic

 

25

development. As McCaskie points out:

"the quest for political stability is intimately

bound up with the state of the Ghanaian economy. As

was the case with previous governments of Ghana, the

economy was, and remains, the biggest single problem

confronting the ruling PNDC regime" (1986:486).

Economic Backgpoundi

Essentially, Ghana is an economically dependent

country: its economy is dependent on primary agricultural

commodities, and imports. Cocoa, the mainstay of the

Ghanaian economy, covers about 50 percent of the land under

cultivation, and accounts for 60 percent of the export

earnings. Food crops and livestock, as well as other

important exports of Ghana include timber, gold, diamond,

bauxite, and manganese, account for 40 percent of export

earnings [see Table 2.2 showing the structure of exports

from Ghana]. What is troubling about dependence on primary

products is that it makes the economy vulnerable to

vicissitudes of commodity prices at the world market,

determined largely by the performances of economies of

core

countries in Europe, North America, and Asia.

Ghana is also heavily dependent on commodity imports

from core countries of the global system,

It imports

agricultural raw materials (foods), fuel, machinery and

transport equipment, and other manufactured goods [Table 2.3

shows the structure of Ghanaian imports from 1980-1991.].

The irony is that Ghana has no control over the prices of

these imports, and pays for them.through its exports whose

26

TABLE 2.2

STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS

[percentages]

Primary

Commodities

Manufactures

Other

 

1980

83.9

15.1

1.0

1985

72.4

22.4

5.2

1990

60.6

10.2

29.2

1991

60.6

10.2

. 29.2

 

Source:

United Nations, AfricanfiSocio—oconomic

Indicators, 1991,

Economic Commission for Africa; p. 55.

27

TIBLB 13

STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS

[Percentages]

Food

Fuel

Machinery

other

other

Items

and Equip-eat Manufactured

Goods

 

1980

7.8

26.7

29.7

29.9

5.9

1985

4.0

29.2

26.4

33.6

6.8

1990

9.9

35.6

20.8

26.5 .

7.2

1991

9.9

35.6

20.8

26.6

7.1

 

Source:

United Nations. “Waters.

1991,

Economic Connission for Africa; p. 60.

28

prices are determined by external forces.

Since the 19708, the story of Ghana's economy has been

one of stagnation and deterioration. The performance of the

economy has been characterized by declining output of key

sectors, persistently high rate of inflation (116 percent on

the average in the 1970-1983 period), balance of payments

difficulties, large government budgeting deficits and excess

liquidity. The rising cost of living and depreciation of the

value of the Ghanaian currency

sharply reduced the standard

of living of the average Ghanaian.‘ The overall GDP declined

at an average annual rate of 1.3 percent. There was a sharp

decline in per capita income--averaging 3.8 percent during

the some period. External debt reached $2 billion and debt

service ratio amounted to 35.9 percent in 1984. However, the

net resource flow rose from -$90.5 mdllion to +$566.3

million in 1984 (can, 1986:118).

The poor performance of Ghana's economy during the

1970-1983 period has been attributed to both internal and

external factors. The WOrld Bank and the International

Monetary Fund, for example, have put the blame on internal

factors, particularly the excessive role of the public/state

sector of the economy, as well as poor economic planning and

management. Others have attributed the poor showing of the

economy on adverse weather (droughts), bushfires during

1978-1983) which seriously reduced agricultural output, and

created major food shortages. From.my own vantage point,

Western analysts often fail to get to the root of the

29

fiNflEILA

Balance of Payments

1984

1986

1988

1990

 

[In Millions of U.S. Dollars]

Exports

566.7

749.4

881.0

896.9

Cocoa Beans

381.7

503.3

462.0

360.6

Gold

Timber

Other

103.3

106.4

168.5

201.7

21.2

60.5

44.1

106.2

118.0

95.6

144.2

216.6

Imports

616.0

733.5

990.9

1,233.7

Oil

161.0

122.6

142.9

199.9

Non-oil

455.0

610.9

848.0

1,033.8

 

Trade Balance

-49.3

15.9

-109.8

-336.8

 

Source:

International Monetary Fund, 1991.

Ghana 3 Adjustment and Growth, p.8.

30

problem: that is, the external orientation of the Ghanaian

economy, and its dependence on the global system” These

circumstances often create a lot of headaches for the

Ghanaian economy. For example, the sharp increases in

petroleum prices, followed by world recession and declining

export prices, usually create a major deterioration in

Ghana's terms of trade, and burden it with negative balance

of payments [see Table 2.4

showing balance of payments of

Ghana for the 1970-1982 period].

Currency

The unit of currency is the cedi (C), which is divided

into one hundred (100) pesewas. Fifteen months after the

PNDC came to power, in April 1983, a system of surcharges on

imports and bonuses on exports was introduced. This was

effectively a devaluation of the cedi, since surcharges on

imports amounted to 750% of the amount being spent, and the

discounts on exports amounted to 990%; but the real

devaluation was avoided for fear of political

repercussions.’ Since October 1983, the exchange rate of the

cedi to the US$ has increased at alarming proportions.

[Table 2.5 shows the average exchange rate of the Ghanaian

cedi from 1980-1992).

31

Table 2.5

Ayera e Exc

a Rate

Cedis

er U.S.

1980 1983 1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

 

2.7

3.4

54.0

89.2

153.7 202.4

270.0

326.3

367.8 437.1

 

Saute: EbammfioinuelLufimoelhfii, (inma:(kuanarnfile,Sinial.

Dgggggaghic Characteristics

Age ggd Gender Structure of the Population

In 1980, 1985, and 1989, females maintained a steady

representation of 50.4 percent of the total population in

Ghana. In terms of age groups, the data show that Ghana has

a heavy dependent population, with about half of the total

population (45.2 percent in 1989) under 15 years of age.

Those in the 15-60 age bracket represented 52.4 percent of

the total population [see Table 2.6 showing age and gender

structure of the population].

Education and Literagz Legels

By comparison, Ghana has one of the best and highest

levels of educational attainment in Sub-Saharan Africa.

However, a closer examination of the data shows that males

have more access to formal education than females in the

Ghanaian society. Initially, there seems to be parity in the

proportion of males and females in primary schools. However,

32

TABLE 2.6

AGE AND GENDER STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION

 

Females as Percentage of Total Population

 

 

1980

1985

1989

 

50.4

50.4

50.4

Age Groups as Percentage of Total Population

[Percentages]

1980

1985

1989

 

0-14

15-64

65+

0-14

15-64

65+

0-14

15-64

65+

 

44.9

52.4

2.8

'44.?

52.4

3.0

45.2

51.8

2.9

 

Source:

United Nations,

African Socio-economic Indicator; 1990,

Economic Commission for Africa,

p.315.

33

as one moves up

the educational system, females gradually

fade from the picture in large proportions. At the secondary

(high) school level, males are almost twice as many as

females. At the tertiary (post-secondary) level, it is

disappointing to realize that in 1990, males outnumbered

females by a ratio of 4 to 1 [see Table 2.7 showing

enrollment in Ghanaian schools].

In 1990, 60.3 percent of the total population 15 years

and over was literate. However, there were differences

between males and females. While 70 percent of males were

literate, only 51 percent of females were literate [see

Table 2.8 showing the literacy rates in Ghana]. The

differential educational attainment and literacy levels for

men and women in Ghana, have consequences for their

participation in the occupational structure of Ghana.

Qgggpgtional Structurg

About 70 percent of the population in Ghana live in

rural areas, and engage in agricultural activities such as

farming, fishing, and hunting, to mention but a few; These

farmers and their families produce the cocoa for export, and

also food for local consumption. It is within the urban

areas that one could see diversity of occupations in the

formal and informal sectors of the Ghanaian economy.

Overall, about 48 percent of females work in the

agricultural sector. About 18 percent of the females are

found in the industrial sector, while 34 percent of them are

34

TABLE 2.7

ENROLLMENT IN GHANAIAN SCHOOLS

[Percentages]

 

1970

1980

1985

1987

1988

1989

1990

 

MALES

PRIMARY

57.0

55.6

56.0

55.0

55.0

55.0

55.0

SECONDARY

72.3

62.0

61.0

61.0

61.0

61.0

62.0

HIGHER

85.7

82.6

83.0

83.0

82.0

78.0

80.0

EDUCATION

FEMALES

PRIMARY

43.0

44.4

45.0

45.0

45.0

45.0

45.0

SECONDARY

27.7

38.0

39.0

39.0

39.0

39.0

38.0

HIGHER

EDUCATION

14.3

20.4

17.0

17.0

18.0

22.0

20.0

 

Sources: United Nations,MW

Atrial 1986-

Uorld Bank.W. 1980.1990

United Nation. W. 1993-

35

TABLE 2.8

mm POPULATION 15 YEARS or ass AND osz a!

sxx

[PERCENTAGBS]

1981

1985

1990

 

Total

Male Female

Total

Male

Female

Total

Male

Female

46.3

56.3

35.0

53.2

64.1

42.8

60.3

70.0

51.0

 

Source: United Nations,W.

‘

1991, Economic Commission for Africa: p. 19.

36

engaged in the service sector. For males, about 55 percent

of them.are found in the agricultural sector, 20 percent in

industry, and 25 percent in the service sector. These data

show that for both males and females, agricultural

activities are the most important sources of occupation. The

major difference is in the area of services, particularly

commercial activities. There are absolutely more women in

commerce than men. In 1970, there were 368,900 women

employed in the commercial sector compared to only 67,000

men in the same sector. Simdlarly, the women in trading

accounted for 84.6 percent of total employment in the

commercial sector. WOmen's participation in the industrial

sector should not be overlooked; women play a recognizable

role in the manufacturing sector, especially in the

manufacture of bakery products, miscellaneous food

preparation, and the manufacture of wearing apparels.

This section has painted a picture of Ghana, and has

provided socio-historical and demographic characteristics of

the population. It has been shown that Ghana is a country

which has been struggling for a place under the sun. Its

economy and politics have suffered several setbacks since

independence, and have produced ups and downs in its

development process. Education is major asset of Ghanaians.

but women in Ghanaian consume less of the quantity and

quality of education in the society. women are not only

over-represented in commercial activities in the society,

but also provide the labor for the production,

37

transportation, and distribution of food, and other

agricultural commodities.

KUMASI

Kumasi is generally called "The Garden City of West

Africa“ because of its beautiful landscape, and trees along

its streets. It is the administrative capital of the Ashanti

region, which is the region with the largest population in

Ghana. The development of Kumasi as a city is directly

linked to the political, cultural, and economic history of

Ghana, in general, but the Ashanti people in particular.8

Pre-Cglonial Kumasi

According to Ashanti royal traditions, Kumasi was

established by Oti-Akenten, the predecessor of Osei Tutu who

founded the Asante nation, in the seventeenth century.

Later, Kumasi came to serve as the administrative,

commercial, and religio-cultural center of the Asante Empire

in the nineteenth century.

Kumasi served as the administrative capital of the

Asante Empire. This function focused on the King of Asante's

palace, and on the dwabrgim, the national meeting place of

the Asante people. The palace in Kumasi served not only as

the local residence of the Asante king, but also as the

national treasury, and the meeting place of the Asante

councilors, and the highest court of the Asante people.

Kumasi, therefore, became the focus of power in Ashanti. The

38

concentration of power was accompanied by a concentration in

‘wealth. The wealth of the courts came from diverse sources

including tributes, poll taxes, death duties, court fees,

state enterprises, and official monopolies or prerogatives

in trade. This wealth went into the royal treasury, from

which it was dispersed to support the court.

The second function of Kumasi was as a religio-cultural

center of the Asante people. The assumption of this role

resulted from its position as a political capital, and thus

the location of the Asante King, and the Golden Stggl, which

is traditionally believed to be the symbolic spiritual

embodiment of the Asante state. The Asante King who resided

in Kumasi, had the responsibility for prescribed acts of

veneration and rituals to honor dead kings of Asante.

Kumasi's role as a commercial center was due largely to

its central geographical location. On the North-South axis,

it was strategically located between European trade on the

coast, and the Muslimrdominated trading entrepot of the

savannah to the North. Thus, Kumasi's central location,

access routes, wealth, royal monopolies and control of

trade, all contributed to the emergence of Kumasi as a

commercial center. In addition to local agricultural

produce, items of trade included dried fish from the coast,

and European goods such as rum, and textiles/clothing.

39

Kumasi In the Colonial Period

In the early part of the twentieth century when the

British captured and occupied Kumasi, the latter's

commercial functions assumed a clear predominance over its

administrative functions. It became the railhead for the

only rail transportation between the Asante and the coast.

This opened the Asante region in the forest belt to the

export-import economy, since the railway afforded relatively

cheaper movement and transportation of agricultural produce

(such as cocoa, rubber, and timber) from the forest regions

to the coast. It also enabled European and indigenous

bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes to locate in Kumasi to

establish commercial enterprises.

The presence of Europeans in thecity in the colonial

period also opened the city to additional functions, as an

educational and mission center. These developments ensured

that the greatest concentrations of Europeans and educated

Africans would be in Kumasi, and provided still greater

demand for European imports, which reinforced Kumasi's

commercial pre-eminence.

Eumasi As A.Modern,Metrgleis

In present-day Ghana, Kumasi continues to serve as a

pre-eminent commercial center. It is still the political and

administrative capital of the Asante. It is cosmopolitan,

with different ethnic migrant groups, and immigrants from

Africa, and other continents.

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41

Dggggggphic Characteristics

Table 2.9 shows the estimated population of Kumasi from

1901 to 1990. At the turn of the century, it was estimated

that there were only 3,000 inhabitants in Kumasi. By the

middle of the century (1948), Kumasi's population had

reached 71,436. In 1990, Kumasi had developed into a

metropolis with a population of 600,000 people, and had

spread its sphere of influence to the outlying towns and

villages. Thus between 1948 and 1990, Kumasi experience a

population growth of about 740 percent. Much of this growth

came from in-migration from within the Ashanti region, other

regions in Ghana, and those who were born outside Ghana.

In fact, in-migration accounted for 57 percent of the total

population in Kumasi in 1970 (Republic of Ghana, 1978).

Table

2.10 shows a breakdown of the age and gender

characteristics of the Kumasi Metropolis. It shows that

there is

a heavy dependency ratio, with over 40 percent of

the city's population under fifteen years of age. 47 percent

of the population were aged between 15-44 years. Only 8

percent of the city's population were over 45 years. These

data demonstrate that majority of the city's population are

relatively young. However, there were no significant

differences in the composition of men and women, apart from

the observation that there were more older men and women in

the city.

42

THEIR 1L9

POPULATION PROFILE OF KUMASI, 1901-1990

 

YEAR

POPULATION

 

1990

1984

1970

1960

1948

1944

1931

1921

1911

1901

600,000

488,991

345,117

218,175

71,436

45,133

35,829

23,694

18,859

3,000

 

Sources 3

1. Census of Population (Ghana, 1948, 1960, 1970, 1984)

2. Fry and Drew's Development Plan Report (1944)

3. Abloh, (1972)

4. Tetteh (1967)

43

TABLE

2.10

AGE AND GENDER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE KUMASI METROPOLIS, 1970

 

AGE snoop

MALE

FEMALE

Total

8

 

Below 1 year

5592

5681

11273

3.3

1—4 Years

23840

24449

48289

14.0

5—9 Years

24481

27921

52402

15.3

10-14 Years

19358

24859

42717

12.5»

15-24 Years

38482

37420

75902

22.0

25-44 years

47282

39277

86559

25.1

45-64 Years

12579

8734

21313

6.3

65 and Over

2660

2502

5162

1.5

 

All ages

174274

170843

345117

100.0

 

Source: 1970 Population Census of Ghana: Special Report "D”:

Statistics of Localities and Enumeration, page 508-509.

44

Table 2.11 shows educational attainment of residents

(aged six years and over by sex, age, and type of school) in

the Ashanti Region. The data indicate that overall, males

and females made up 54.5 percent, and 45.5 percent of

individuals who had been to all types of schools. In fact,

at the primary school level, women made up a greater

proportion (61.7 percent). However, as one moves up the

higher levels of the school system, women's representation,

like the national trends, decreases accordingly. At the

secondary/high school level, women are less than one-third

of the total enrollment. At the commercial and technical

levels, men's proportion to women is almost 2:1. The most

significant differences between men and women are found at

the university/college level. women represent only 10.5

percent of total enrollment. These differences in

educational attainment

have significant consequences on

types of occupations men and women in the Ghanaian society,

in particular in the Kumasi Metropolis, would pursue. With

such low educational attainment, women would be found less

in administrative and managerial positions, professions, and

technical fields. Realistically, most women who are found in

towns and cities in the Ashanti region, particularly Rumasi,

are found in retail/trading activities, and self-employment

in relatively small-scale businesses.

45

TABLE 2. 11

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINNENT 0F RESIDENTS (AGED 6 YEARS AND OLDER)

IN THE ASHANTI REGION (BY SEX, AGE AND TYPE), 1984

 

TYPE OF SCHOOL AND

ALL 6 YEARS AND OVER

GRADE ATTAINED

TOTAL

HALE

FEMALE

 

ALL TYPES OF SCHOOLS

582,120

317,373

264,747

2818181
ALL GRADES

mm ‘
ALL GRADES

31mm
ALL GRADES

108,379

41,493

' 66,886

408,011

229,958

178,053

37,239

26,968

10,271

ALL GRADES

12,955

8,010

4,945

IEAQIEELIBAININQ
mm
mm

 

ALL GRADES

11,105

7,053

4,052

W
W

480

358

122

mm

ALL YEARS

3,951

3,533

418

 

Source:

1984 Population Census of Ghana, Demographic and Economic

Characteristics, Ashanti (Statistical Service, Accra, Ghana)

   

46

Economic Activities

Kumasi lies in the forest belt, and in the Ashanti

region which is the largest producer of agricultural

commodities including foodstuffs, timber, and cocoa, the

chief export of Ghana. Its strategic position in the

transportation system in Ghana, both road and rail, makes

Rumasi a very good candidate for commercial activities.

Traders have direct access to agricultural commodities,

locally-manufactured commodities, as well as imported

commodities.

Table

2.12

shows selected occupations of employed

persons 15 years and over in the Rumasi Metropolis. It

demonstrates that more than two-thirds (70 percent) of

Kumasi workers are engaged in commercial activities (sales,

wholesale, and retail). Wholesale trade involves the selling

of commodities in relatively large quantities, to be

retailed by others. Retail trade involves selling

commodities in small quantities. Generally, male traders in

the commercial sector of the urban economy dominate the

wholesale trade. Women, however, are over-represented in

retail trade. They made up 78.5 percent of persons employed

in retail trade. Wholesale trade generally involves large

investments of capital for purchases, and storage

facilities. One explanation for the apparent gender

stratification in the commercial sector is the unequal

access to capital markets. Generally, men have more access

to capital markets than women. In fact, it is a common

47

TABLE

2.12

OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED PERSONS 15 YEARS AND OVER

BY GENDER IN THE EUMASI METROPOLIS, 1984

Total

Kumasi

Ashanti Region

Metropolis

 

All Occupations

922,762

207,568

Sales Workers

119,955

74,131

Men

Women

20,536

99,419

15,430

58,701

Iholesale

and Retail Trade

116,896

71,777

Men

Women

18,392

98,504

13,793

57,984

 

Source: 1984 Population Census of Ghana, Demographic and

Economic Characteristics, Ashanti Region, Statistical

Service, Accra, Ghana, pages 125-131.

48

practice for most formal banks in Ghana to require women who

apply for loans, to get the signatures/approvals of their

husbands.

Retail traders are dependent on wholesale traders. The

former make arrangements with the latter to supply them

commodities, in most cases on credit, which they sell in

small quantities, and later pay back to the wholesalers.

Others arrange with indigenous and multinational firms for

supplies, and sell on ‘commission' basis. ‘Commission' is

the ‘wage' retailers earn from the sales they make for

commercial firms. Finally, other women, although the

minority, operate in both worlds, serving as both

wholesalers and retailers.

Ethnicity and Suburbination

Ethnic groups tend to be concentrated in different

suburbs of the city. This may be attributed to the

historical development of the city, rather than intentional

ethno-class discrimination. The local Asante people are

concentrated in the “old“ sections of the city:

Bantama,

Asante New Town, Manhyia (Manshia), and Mbrom to the north,

and Asafo and Amakom to the west of the city.

Fantis who migrated from the Central Region along the

coast, settled in Kumasi in numbers after the opening of the

railway between Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi. They were

attracted by the prospects of work in rebuilding Kumasi and

for Europeans traders (Tetteh, 1967). The Fantis in Kumasi

49

are concentrated in Fanti New Town, which is sandwiched

between Asafo and Ashanti New Town. A second in-migrant

group, the Ewes from.south-eastern Ghana and Togo, came to

Rumasi after the opening of the railway to Accra in 1928.

The Ewes are concentrated in Oforikrom and Anloga, in the

south-western section of the city.

Ethnic groups from.the Nbrthern and Upper regions of

Ghana are found in Kumasi in large numbers. Historically,

the 'northerners" performed services for the Asante Ring,

serving as scribes, and keeping accounts and records in

Arabic (Schildrout, 1978). The Nertherners in Kumasi are

found in large numbers to the north of the city, where they

have created a 'Zongo" community.

It should be pointed out, however, that although areas

like Anloga and Fanti New Town are known as Ewe and Fanti

areas, respectively, they are not ethnically homogeneous.

There are Asantes and other Akans who live in Zongos, while

some Fantes live in Ashanti New Town. While in Kumasi for

the fieldwork, I observed that new suburban communities that

were being established included people from different ethnic

groups. Here,

social class was becoming more significant

than ethnicity in determining people's places of residence.

Thus the new residential developments in Danyame, Asukwa,

Ahinsan, Atonsu, and Chirapatre, did not seem to exhibit a

concentration of any one ethnic group. These areas had the

most expensive real estate properties, and attracted

residents and homeowners from across the spectrum of ethnic

groups in the city.

50

In this section, I have attempted to provide a

historical as well as demographic and socio-economic

characteristics of the Kumasi Metropolis. I have

demonstrated that Kumasi is a city in transition. As a

precolonial town, it served as a significant administrative,

political and commercial center. Colonialism which was

directly connected to commercial activities in Ghana,

heightened the commercial preeminence of Kumasi within the

global economy. In modern Ghana, Kumasi continues to grow as

a strategic commercial, political, and educational center.

With Ghana's further integration into the global economy,

and dependence on imports and primary commodities, Kumasi

has come to serve as the connecting rod in the nexus of

rural-urban interchanges, and a gateway to the hinterland of

Ghana. In the process, commercial activities have become the

pre-eminent sources of employment for the city's population,

particularly women. The next chapter will discuss the

commercial sector of the Ghanaian economy, particularly

market trader retailing activities in the Kumasi Metropolis.

CHAPTER THREE

IN'PARTICULAR

IN'GHANA, EUMASI

Markets and.Marketplaces

There are several definitions of the term.‘market' or

‘marketplace', but one of the clearest and most concise is

that proposed by B.W. Hodder (1965:57): "...an authorized

public gathering of buyers and sellers of commodities

meeting at an appointed place at regular intervals".

Similarly, Polly Hill (1966:295), defined a marketplace as

”an authorized concourse of buyers and sellers of

commodities, meeting at a place more or less strictly

limited or defined, at an appointed time”. In my analysis,

the two concepts, ‘market' and ‘marketplace' are used

interchangeably.

Generally, there are two main classes of markets in

Ghana;

"rural" and “urban" markets, depending on the

location of the market. About eighty-eight percent of

markets in Ghana are rural, and their economic functions are

basically the collection, bulking, and distribution of local

farm.produce. A subsidiary function of the these markets is

to act as a distribution center for imported commodities.

These functions link gggg; markets to gppgg markets. The

urban markets are usually found in the major towns and

cities, and serve as centers for the distribution and

retailing of farm produce as well as imported commodities.

Markets can also be classified according to the level

 

51

52

FIGURE 3.1

 

 
 

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.

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omsr

LEGEND

has!“ mm Yacht-e-

41

. ‘“

 

 

.

..

I

“‘

Ameyaw (1990:20)

GHANA DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETS

 

53

of organization, and frequency of meetings. In the case of

Ghana, there are “periodic" and "daily" markets. Periodic

markets are usually coterminous with rural markets. They are

held at specific time intervals: thus, there are definitive

days on which the level of activity is conspicuously high,

and hence have come to define those days as "market days“.

So far, there are six periodicity types: 3-day, 4-day, and

six day, or one, two or three fixed days on a calendar week

(Apeldoorn, 1977). The ggily markets are continuous, and the

level of organizations are equally active on all days except

on a day earmarked for religious or social festivities

(especially Fridays, and Sundays), when the volume of the

market activities go down.

Daily markets may be held in the

day, morning or night. However, the Rumasi Central Market

which I studied is a day market: it opens as early as 6

O'clock in the morning and operates for twelve hours and

closes at 6 O'clock in the evening. In fact, local

government bye-laws stipulate that all traders and customers

are expected to be out of the market at the specified time

or else they would be prosecuted.

The linkages between rural and urban markets correspond

with the nature of the Ghanaian economy. Rural economic

activities are mainly agricultural, hence agricultural

products, particularly farm.produce find their way to the

urban centers. Similarly, imported commodities from the

neighboring countries, as well as overseas find their way to

the rural areas mainly through the urban markets. Thus, the

54

FIGURE 3.2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL MARKETS IN GHANA

Rm]

Market

District "P‘ Nation-l

UrbanDaily

Manner

Pundit

Market

<—-w

 

 

 

‘—

 

 

 

 

 

WenchLN‘huransah.

Techiman

Kunusi.Accn.Tamale

Kintarupo

Sunyani

'31:”

.l

.

41:14me -selltprodweinbu1k

ouanspunpruducehom

.mmm monsoon:

mordprwveproduce omgeuanspun

pencdncmrkctcenw

-pmcesandsellto

'FW. grading

-payfmners

'Wsm -produca's-aelleo

-wholelalc

.

mbanemsumen

«seam-sells «harm

qualms .

(«mutating

vilhgeshup.

hawker:

Jam-gene's

-insututiaulbuyer

-

:32

to

huyingpost

hukorwholesale

disuibutionmtail

mental!

centres

 

W. W Wholesalers.

Cm

 

 

 

 

 

retailers

retailer's

 

Somme:

Stephen Ameyaw, 1990,.‘TheJDYnamics of Female Entrepreneurship in
Indigenous Food Markets: A Case Study of Techiman, Ghana, p.23

 

 

 

55

dependent nature of the Ghanaian economy, creates some

rural-urban interchanges of locally-produced and imported

commodities.

Figure 3.2

shows the relationship between rural and

urban markets, periodic and daily markets in the food

marketing structure in Ghana. The starting point of the food

marketing structure is the rural market, where some farmers

who are producer-sellers sell their commodities directly to

wholesalers in the food business. These wholesalers are sort

of "food contractors" who buy in bulk and transport them to

district markets, such as wenchi, Nkoransah, and Kintampo in

the Brong Ahafo Region. The district markets are the next

levels of food marketing. Here, wholesalers purchase food in

bulk, store them for some days while they arrange to

transport them to the next level of marketing, at the

national periodic markets.

District markets and national

periodic markets feed into each other; market traders

commute from one market to the other to sell and purchase

food and non-food commodities. Urban daily markets serve as

centers for the distribution of locally-produced

commodities, including food items, as well as imported

commodities from neighboring countries and overseas. Urban

markets are relatively larger in size and have higher

volumes of activities than rural periodic markets, with the

exception of a few national periodic markets which attract

large numbers of traders on market days.

Figure 3.3 presents a model of the interchanges between

56

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57

various sectors of the Ghanaian economy and the global

economy. Ghanaian markets and market traders are major

players in these interchanges. It demonstrates that the

local Ghanaian economy and the global economy are

integrated. This is made possible with the presence of an

intercalary commercial activity both in the rural and urban

sectors of the economy. An enclave economy emerges which

serves as a

conduit completing the incorporation of the

periphery into the world trade system. The dominant economic

functions of the enclave economy, therefore, are to

intermediate between potential consumers and the producers.

The enclave economy in the urban setting is dominated by

women, particularly those that can be referred to

euphemistically as the ”commercial proletariat“. In essence,

therefore, women control this enclave sector within the

urban setting (Nypan, 1960; McCall, 1962; Little, 1965;

Sanjek and Sanjek, 1976). Within the urban enclave economy,

the retail subsector is critical for the bulking and

distribution of commodities. More significantly, it is

mainly one to two-person economic enterprise which serves as

a major source of employment for many women (Simms and

Dumor, 1977). In the Ghanaian context, market traders

perform a variety of functions for the urban, national and

global economy. Mintz (1971:248-249) has summarized these

functions:

58

a. they convey badly needed produce from the

agricultural and craft producers, as well as import

houses, to the consumer;

b. the both bulk produce and break that bulk into small

quantities which facilitate exchange at costs

appropriate to the scale of production and buying

capabilities of the customers;

c. they process goods, like prepared foods, cosmetics,

and condiments, as well as grinding or winnowing

grains;

d. they assume credit risks for customers regarded as

bad risks by lending institutions because they have

no collateral;

e. they provide a market for the produce of widely

scattered and accessible producers, even in the face

of great transportation difficulties;

f. they arrange and assume the costs of shipping,

storage, and market fees and taxes;

g. they substitute labor for capital at every

opportunity, providing employment for many

illiterates whose other avenues are strictly

limited;

h. they are the chief recycling agency for all sorts of

waste materials like beer cans, newspapers, bottles,

and even old homework papers, which are sold to

other market women for wrapping produce;

1. they provide entrepreneurial training for young

people, an alternative for those who cannot or do

not want formal education.

Gender Divisign of Lghor

women constitute over eighty percent of participants in

the commercial sector of the Ghanaian economy (Ewusi, 1985).

women's dominance in the commercial sector could be

explained from historical as well as structural

perspectives.

Prior to the establishment of the colonial economy,

women in Ghana, were involved in food production,

distribution, and marketing. But within the colonial

context, women's status in agricultural production was

reduced. Boserup states that I'European settlers, colonial

59

administrators, and technical advisors are largely

responsible for the deterioration in the status of women in

the agricultural sectors. It was they who neglected female

agricultural labor force when they helped to introduce

commercial agriculture to the overseas world and promoted

the productivity of male labor" (1970:53-54).

With decline in their status in agricultural

production, women in Ghana tended to look to other

alternatives. Historical evidence suggests that trade in

small luxury items and food was probably carried out by

women long before contact with Europeans (Robertson,

1974:212).

But by the seventh century, when products sold

in local markets became diversified to include imported

agricultural commodities, provisions, textiles, and so

forth, it was natural for women who were already involved

with food distribution to enlarge their stocks to include

the foreign items brought in by European firms (Sai,

1971:3). By the middle of the nineteenth century, women were

said to be trading in all kinds of items in the urban

centers, as well as in the remote villages (Simms and Dumor,

1977:47). 'In this way these women performed a valuable

function for the European firms on the coast by retailing

imported goods to even the smallest villages at no overhead

cost to the firms" (Robertson, 1974:226).

Thus colonialism.changed structural sectors of the

Ghanaian economy, with the result that women came to

concentrate in the commercial sector of the economy.

60

According to Clark (1982:12), withdrawal of men from.market

trading intensified with Africanization of the government

and business sectors after WOrld war Two. Some women moved

into the lower levels of white-collar work at this time,

creating even more room in the market. Thus social change in

the form.of formal education and modern sector employment,

also intensified the gender division of labor, as men left

the marketplace for better jobs in the civil service, and

commercial houses, while women replaced men at the lower

levels of the distributive sector.

However, the gender division of labor still remains in

present-day Ghana. In the market, women are concentrated in

food-related retail businesses, which are generally

perceived as "women's work". Men constitute a smaller

proportion of traders in local markets, although they own

relatively larger commercial businesses outside the market.

In local markets, men engage in the retail of locally-

manufactured and imported commodities. These include

textiles, provisions (imported foods), furniture, and

gold/silver smith products. Others are cloth designers

(tailors), tinkers, and second-hand cloth retailers.

The major factor which accounts for the concentration

of women in retail trade in particular, but informal

economic activities in general, is their low levels of

educational attainment. Women's education has always lacked

behind that of men in the Ghanaian society. Some

explanations that have been given thus far stress cultural

61

practices and expectations. In a traditional society, a

major role for a woman is to ensure the continuity of the

lineage, and she was expected to marry soon after puberty.

In addition, a woman was expected to be provided for by her

husband, and since education became a means for entering

highly-paid jobs in the formal sector, it was considered

more important for men to have formal education, since they

*were to be the breadwinners in the family. Even women who

start

school, a higher proportion of them.than men, dropout

due to pregnancies, poverty, and family preference to invest

in the education of men more than women (Dolphyne, 1991).

For those with lower educational qualifications,

retailing of commodities became a viable option for earning

a living, since there is a higher correlation between

educational attainment and participation in formal sector

jobs. Retailing of commodities, however, does not require

technical skills acquired from formal educational

institutions. women traders, particularly food retailers,

tend to commercialize their trading skills they acquire as

part of their socialization (Greenstreet, 1976).

Education was still important for traders in the

market. Market traders who were literate (at least with a

high school diploma) could trade quite well in imported and

, manufactured commodities, and maintain well-kept records of

their business activities. However, what determined higher

returns and profits among market traders was the size of

capital investment in the business, rather than educational

attainment (Clark, 1984).

62

The Eumasi Central Market1

The Kumasi Central Market is the largest single market

in Ghana, as well as the whole of West Africa. Historically,

it used to be called the “Great Market of Kumasi' during the

peak of the Ashanti empire in the 17th and 18th centuries,

when travellers from Northern and Southern Ghana and

neighboring kingdoms of Denkyira, came to trade in Kumasi.

However, the Kumasi Central Market in its present form, was

constructed in 1928 by the British colonialists to promote

commercial activities in the region. Since Kumasi was

situated in the hinterland, the Central Market was supposed

to be a major center for the exchange_of both local and

imported commodities.

‘Within the city, the Central Market is located in the

Central Business District. Its strategic position in the

center of the city provides the Central Market several

advantages over other markets in the city. Within the

Central Business District, it is directly linked to an array

of retail activities. Retail sales of local and imported

commodities, for instance, are conducted in state-owned

supermarkets (like the Ghana National Trading Corporation)

and multinational supermarkets, such as the United Trading

Company (U.T.C.), and the United African Company

(U.A.C.). These supermarkets have direct access to import

licenses from the Ghanaian state, which enable them to

63

connect to the larger global market for manufactured

commodities from core countries of the global system, such

as the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, to mention,

but a few of the countries Ghana is dependent on for

imports. Traders in the Central Market rely on these

supermarkets for manufactured goods for sale in the market.

Some of the manufactured goods I found in the Central

Market, and which originated from the supermarkets included

cement, textiles, tobacco, soap, and sugar. However, it must

be stressed that the Central Market and the other markets in

the city, complement the activities of the retail shops by

offering a variety of commodities, particularly local farm

produce, which are brought to the city from the Ashanti

region, and its hinterland, which supply the city with

commodities.

The Central Market, is open air. This is understandable

given the fact that Ghana is located in a warm/humid

temperature zone, with an average temperature of about 70

degrees Fahrenheit throughout the year. The market is

circular in shape, and walled, with ten gates around it. An

imposing two-story building which houses the sub-offices of

the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority sits in front of the

market. One could have a panoramic view of the whole market

from the second floor of the story building. The market is

bordered by streets, and other urban use areas on all sides,

leaving the market no room for further expansion.

The space within the market is divided into stalls and

64

stores. A 5551; is basically a space between two separate

walls where traders carry out businesses. The stalls are

built of wood and roofed with corrugated iron sheets. Some

traders have enclosed their open stalls for the sake of

security. According to data supplied by the Kumasi

Metropolitan Authority officials, there were 3,000 stalls in

the market. I observed that the stalls were of different

sizes. The maximum size was fifteen feet wide, eighteen feet

long, and twelve feet high (15 by 18 by 12 feet). One could

contrast this with some of the stalls which.measured only

six feet wide, eight feet long, and ten feet high (6 by 8 by

10 feet).

On the other hand, stores (storerooms) are built of

cement, enclosed, and roofed with corrugated iron sheets. In

all, there were 1,000 stores in the Central Market. The

stores seemed more secure for traders because in most cases

they could be locked at the end of the day's businesses,

compared with the open stalls, where traders had to arrange

to transport their commodities home and bring them back the

next day. The stores were of different sizes. The largest

store measured twenty feet long, fifteen feet wide, and

thirty feet high. The smallest store measured ten feet long,

eight feet wide, and twelve feet high.

Traders who need a stall or store are requested to

apply to the Treasury department of the Rumasi Metropolitan

Authority, which officially owns the market. The latter

allocates stalls/stores to applicants whenever they became

65

available. My interviews with the market traders revealed

that only a few of them originally applied for

stalls/stores. In fact, only forty five percent of those I

interviewed applied for their stalls/stores. The rest (55

percent) “inherited" the stalls/stores from relatives who

had traded in the market in the past. Relatives of dead

occupants of market stalls/stores are supposed to report to

the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority about the vacancy.

However, they often do not do so. They pass on the

stall/store to another member of the deceased occupant's

family. It became quite clear to me why they behaved this

way, upon further enquiry. They intimated to me that it was

always difficult to get a store/stall when one applied for

one. For those who applied originally for the stall/stores,

they indicated that they had to wait up to twelve months on

the average, before their applications were approved, and

were eventually allocated stalls/stores. There were others

who had to wait for more than twelve months, and still

others who did not receive any response from the Kumasi

Metropolitan Authority.

The inadequacy of stalls/stores for market traders

accounts for a higher number of traders who sell in the open

spaces in the market. Squatters squeeze themselves in the

narrow aisles of the market. They displayed their

commodities in the open to attract more customers. However,

these squatters were always at the mercy of the weather. I

saw some squatters who stood in the scorching sun for hours

66

on end to sell their commodities. I also saw some traders

who struggled to deal with their commodities when it rained

because they did not have any place to keep their

commodities, apart from leaving the market for home. Some

squatters also conducted their business outside the market

structure, into the streets in front, and behind the market.

The Kumasi Metropolitan Authority often attempts to get rid

of these squatters because their activities around the

market, and in the streets are perceived to be causing

overcrowding in the streets and traffic jams. In fact, one

city official confided that these activities are an eye-sore

to the beauty of the city. However, these squatters return

to the same spots, or move to another section of the streets

around the market, whenever they have been raided by KMA

officials or the police. The squatters' popular spot was the

entrance to the market, where they could deal directly with

incoming customers to the market.

‘Within the market, there was an area specialization of

commodities whereby similar commodity sellers tend to sit

together. The layout of the market make this possible. The

food sections occupy the largest space in the market. Each

food produce has its own section. Thus, there is a section

for vegetables, including pepper, tomatoes, okra, onion, and

garden eggs. There are sections respectively for plantain,

cassava, yam and cocoyam sellers. There are also sections

for imported commodities such as cement, corrugated iron

sheets, tobacco, textiles, and second-hand clothing. Market

67

traders and customers alike benefit from such an

arrangement: for it aids the traders to control prices and

supply, and makes it possible for customers to compare the

goods regarding the quality, quantity, as well as the cost

of the commodities, in order hopefully, to make a good

choice. However, it has its negative side; market traders

often compete with one another for the attention of

potential customers.

Dgggggaphic Characteristics of Central Market Traders

a. Educational Attainment

The educational attainment of traders in the market was

generally low. Table 3.1

provides data on the educational

attainment of traders in the Central Market. 46.5 percent of

the traders had primary education, while 44.5 percent of

them had no formal education. Only 9 percent had high school

education. The relatively lower educational attainment of

market traders is consistent with the educational

characteristics of participants in other sectors of the

urban informal economy as a whole. I have already argued

that the lower the level of one's educational attainment,

the greater the chances of participating in the informal

economy. It leaves people with no possibility of being

employed in the formal sector to become self-employed, often

operating at the periphery of the urban economy.

68

TAHUS

3.1

LEYEL_QE_EDDQATIQN.

HUNGER:

BERGENTAQE

PRIMARY

SECONDARY

VOCATIONAL/TECHNICAL

COLLEGE

93

13

4

1

46.5

6.5

2.0

0.5

NO FORMAL EDUCATION

89

44.5

 

 

200

100.0%

Source: Data Compiled from Field Research, 1992.

Satple=200.

 

69

b. Sources of Capital

There are several sources of capital formulation in the

market. Table 3.2 provides data on the sources of capital

for traders in the Central Market. The data show that the

main source of capital for these market traders is personal

savings, which accounted for the source of capital for about

three-quarters of the traders in the sample. Upon further

enquiry, traders indicated that they usually started their

business life trading in small quantities of commodities.

Others engaged in the processing and distribution of

foodstuffs, and made some profits. Normally, traders move a

step further to enlarge their businesses by depositing a

seed capital with relatively larger commercial enterprises

for supplies of commodities, and are credited with

commodities over and above the initial capital. Others

depended on esusu groups (pot banks) which provide ease of

access. In Ghana, for example, designated collectors make

daily tours of markets, accepting deposits from.market

traders in the workplace. These esusu collectors charge a

small fee for keeping the money over a period of time, and

when the money had matured into larger sums, traders could

collect the large sum from the money collectors.

Family members are also an important source of capital.

Twenty-three percent of the respondents indicated family

members provided them capital. Financial support for family

members to set up businesses is a strong value in the

Ghanaian society. A family member may provide the initial

70

TABLE

3 . 2

SQEBQB

NUMBER

EEBQENIAQE

PERSONAL SAVINGS

148

FAMILY MEMBERS

46

GOVERNMENT GRANT

MONEY LENDERS

BANK CREDIT

OTHER

l

3

1

1

74.0

23.0

0.5

1.5

0.5

0.5

 

 

200

100.0%

Source: Data Compiled from Field Research, 1992.

Sarp1e=2oo

 

71

capital for a trader to obtain supplies from.wholesale

commercial houses.

A few traders obtained capital from.money lenders.

MOney lenders are indigenous credit-granting financial

institutions. They usually charge higher interests for money

they lend for fixed periods. In.most cases the interest rate

is 100 percent of the amount of loan taken from them. Only

1.5 percent of the traders in my sample took loans from

money lenders.

Interestingly, the least sources of capital for market

traders are formal banking institutions, and state

development agencies. Less than two percent of traders

received any support from these sources. The problem traders

have with these formal sources of capital formation has to

do with direct and indirect institutional discrimination:

preferences for large-scale business because they are

perceived to be relatively risk-averse, compared with small-

scale businesses. Secondly, they emphasize

l'collateral'I for

loans, which.most small-scale business entrepreneurs,

especially market women could hardly afford. But more

importantly, because of kinship and femily relations, land

titles, the commonest form of collateral, were not always

clear, so banks did not wish to risk-losing money. Moreover,

there was no governmont credit agency available to meet the

valid economic needs of the people. As already demonstrated,

these situations set the stage for alternative means of

obtaining credit through esusu groups, as well as special

72

arrangements with commercial firms and support from.family

members to establish credit.

The foregoing section has argued that market traders

depend on various informal credit institutions to generate

capital for their businesses, supported by local values and

traditions. It demonstrates that market women are quite

resourceful, and ingenuous in overcoming the institutional

discrimination against them in gaining access to capital.

c. Family Characteristics

It was interesting to observe that market traders were

not different from the rest of the adult population: most of

them were married and had children.

Table 3.3

provides data on the marital status of

traders in the Central Market. Seventy percent of the

traders indicated they were married, while thirty percent of

them were ‘single' individuals. Of the latter group, 16.5

percent were divorcees/separatees, one percent was widowed,

and 12.5 percent had never married before.

Table 3.4 presents data on family size of market

traders. Twenty percent of the traders had more than six

children per family. thirteen percent of them had five

children per family. Fourteen percent of them had no

children. Overall, the traders had an average of three

children per family. One would have expected a higher

average family size given the relatively low level of their

education among traders. However, it seemed that the factor

73

TABLE

3 . 3

MARITAL_$IBIQ§

NUMBER

EEBQENTAQE

SINGLE (NEVER MARRIED)

25

12.5

SINGLE (DIVORCED/SEPARATED)

33

16.5

SINGLE (WIDOWED)

MARRIED

2

140

1.0

70.0

 

 

200

100.0%

Source: Data Compiled from Field Survey Research, 1992.

Saqfle==200.

 

74

TABLE 3 . 4

1 CHILD

2 CHILDREN

3 CHILDREN

4 CHILDREN

5 CHILDREN

25

32

28

21

26

6 CHILDREN AND OVER

40

NO CHILD

28

12.5

16.0

14.0

10.5

13.0

20.0

14.0

 

 

200

100.0%

Source: Data Compiled from Field Research, 1992.

Saqfle==200.

 

75

of urbanization mediated the effect of educational

attainment on number of children per family among these

traders, since generally urban women have relatively smaller

family size than those in rural areas (Ewusi, 1984).

d. Mode of Market StallLStore Acquisition

How did you acquire your stall/store in the Central

Market?

When this question was put to traders, it became

clear that most of them.(55 percent) acquired their

stalls/stores directly from

family members, and not from

the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority, which owns and operates

the Central Market. The practice was that they "inherited“

these facilities from family members who previously rented

them from the KMA. The rest (45 percent) indicated that they

acquired them through direct applications to the KMA.

Generally, the former method of stall/store acquisition is

easier than the latter approach. Since there is a high

demand for market stalls/stores, applicants wait for more

than twelve months to get their applications approved, if

they apply directly to the KMA. Those who do not get

stalls/stores in the market could still operate their

businesses on tables in the aisles within the market, at an

approved fee of C 50 per day. The only disadvantage is that

those who operate in the aisles of the market have no

shelters, and they have to cart their commodities to their

homes at the end of the day's activities.

Q

76

e. Reasons for En a

in Tradi

Activities

I also enquired about the reasons why the traders set

up their own businesses in the market. The most popular

response was the need to raise sufficient money to cater for

their family needs. In particular, the women explained that

their husbands' salaries from formal sector employment were

inadequate. In fact, one woman narrated why she got into

retail activities from home and gradually moved into the

market. The husband's income was barely enough to pay for

rent, much less able to feed the entire family of five

people for thirty days. She was, therefore, forced to sell

charcoal and processed foods in her neighborhood, until she

was able to raise some money to venture into a relatively

larger business in the market selling second-hand clothing.

These stories could be repeated over and over, with

variations on details and contexts. Most of the women were

more concerned about the education of their children, and

therefore their immediate purpose for engaging in retail

trade was to generate revenues

to pay their children's

school fees, and provide stationery, and other resources to

facilitate their children's learning at school and at home.

Other traders admitted that the only means by which

they could obtain any property of their own was through

their business activities. In the Ghanaian context, women

traders who are well off undertake real estate projects

either in the city, or in their hometowns in the

countryside. One woman intimated that she was engaged in

77

trading to raise capital for large-scale agricultural

projects, such as cocoa farming and animal husbandry, in her

hometown in the Ashanti region.

Realistically, I discovered from.my interviews that the

reasons why women and women engaged in trading activities

were not different from those who worked in other

workplaces: workers in both groups had a responsibility to

provide for their personal material needs, as well as cater

for the needs of their families, and hopefully raise enough

money to undertake projects which could meet their immediate

and future needs.

In summation, this section has demonstrated that market

traders, particularly market women, have relatively lower

levels of formal education. But this was not the only reason

why they engage in retail activities at the lower levels of

the distributive system in Ghana. Institutional

discrimination towards small-scale businesses bars these

women from generating large capitals to expand their

businesses. The traders have adapted to these hindrances by

organizing grassroots institutions which provide them access

to seed capital formation, as well as networks for supplies

of commodities from.wholesale commercial houses. Their

relationship to farmers and food contractors from the

countryside is based on mutual trust which ensures the flows

of commodities from the hinterland to the urban centers, of

which traders in the Central Market, play a critical role as

78

distributors

and

intermediaries

between

producers

and

consumers.

Market Associations

‘

In the Central Market, traders within each commodity

sector are organized into informal associations. Formation of

such associations is predicated upon the famous Ghanaian adage

which states that "dodo so a mien [literary it means that

when many people carry the load, it becomes lighter'] . Titles

given to the leaders of these associations follow after titles

given to leaders in Ashanti political system. For example, the

title for a women leader of a commodity association is ohma

or 'queenmother". She is normally chosen as the woman who has

been on the market the longest and commands a degree of

generalized adjudicative authority. She is expected to settle

disputes among members. These disputes often center around

competition

for

customers.

Retail

trading

is

a

very

competitive business, since no single trader can monopolize

the commodities traders engage in. Quarrels often arise as

traders compete for traders who visit the sector of the market

where the commodities are sold. Traders vie to catch the

attention of potential

customers.

They shout,

and even

sometimes persuade customers to purchase their commodities. I

once visited the vegetable section of the market and observed

this cometition. I observed that several market traders

rushed on potential customers aggressively, to the extent of

drawing them away from other competitive traders. Generally,

traders have an understanding about the rules of the game,

but if any trader felt that there was a foul play by other

traders, she could report the matter to the 'queenmother',

whose responsibility it is to settle the dispute. Thus, she

is expected to maintain orderly commercial relationships

among members by ensuring that they compete fairly in the

marketplace (Clark, 1984).

The ohemma or 'queenmother' also has control over the

supply of commodities in the market. This is quite common

among food traders. The ”queenmother' of a particular food

sector negotiates

the prices of food supplied in bulk by

food contractors from the hinterland. In fact, it is the

'queenmother' who controls the prices of these foods, and

her skills for such negotiations are critical for her

selection as a leader. Unfortunately, she is often blamed

for higher prices of food at the market when supplies are

few (Dumor, 1982; Lawson, 1967).

Ordinarily, these associations are a subset of the

"voluntary associations" that have been observed in West

African settings. Such voluntary organizations have been

formed as common interest groups among members of the same

ethnic, religious, and occupational orientations. They have

been viewed as providing common security and welfare

functions for members. Beyond providing emotional support,

these organizations also assume economic and welfare

functions in so far as they assist bereaved members, and

contribute to funerals of deceased members, and act as

80

savings and credit associations).

The commodity associations in the Central Market are

very political, since their activities are tied to the

overall urban political economy. They influence the extent

to which the state can ensure affordable food prices for

urban residents. When the prices of their commodities are

prohibitive, they influence workers to persuade state

authorities to demand lower prices in the market through

price controls. Since market traders lose profits when they

are forced to sell at controlled prices, they often do not

adhere strictly to price controls. State authorities,

however, enforce price controls with brutal force, and

seizure of market trader commodities. For instance, when

soldiers imposed price controls on foodstuffs in Ghanaian

markets in 1979, 'queenmothers" of food commodity

associations in the Central Market, made representations at

the Ashanti Regional Administration offices. Under the

sponsorship of the Regional Commissioner, they negotiated

with representatives of consumer groups, government buyers,

and the military on price controls for different sizes of

foodstuffs (Clark, 1988).

Apart from the informal commodity associations in the

Central Market, traders had also formed a ggllgggizg of

commodity associations. The purpose was to strengthen their

capacity to deal with the external environment which

influences their business activities in the market,

particularly the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority, which is the

81

landlord of the market. The General Traders Association

(GTA) was the collective at the Central Market which

articulated the collective interests of market traders.

The General Traders Association (GTA) was formed in

1979 in response to the repressive military regime of the

Armed Forces revolutionary Council (AFRC). As already

explained elsewhere, the AFRO took some measures that were

detrimental to the survival of market traders. The AFRC sent

military and police personnel to the Central Market to seize

market traders' commodities, particularly imported

commodities, such as milk, sugar, flour, building materials,

among several others.

During this period, market traders intimated that it

was impossible to deal with the military and police

personnel as individual commodity associations. They needed

a concerted effort to articulate their collective interests

to pressure the state authorities to stop the harassment of

traders in the marketplace.

Although the price control

policy had been abandoned in pursuant of economic reforms in

the regime of Structural Adjustment in 1983, the commodity

associations stuck together, and their collective was alive

and well. They revealed that the local government, the

Kumasi Metropolitan Authority, was 'a thorn in their flesh“,

as landlord, and enforcer of state policies pertaining to

business activities in the market.

82

Organizational Structure of the General Traders

Association

Each of the commodity associations had representation

in the General Traders Association. Usually, it was the

aha-la ('queenmothers“, for female-dominated businesses.)

and ahggg ('chiefs", for the male-dominated businesses) who

represented their members. However, the queenmothers/chiefs

could ask members of their associations to deputize for

them, whenever necessary. In all, there were thirty

commodity associations that were represented in the General

Traders Association. All the representatives formed a

General Council of the GTA. The main

functions of the

General Council were to formulate policies pertaining to the

conduct of business in the market, and also to assess the

impact of state (central and local government) policies on

market traders' activities in the Central Market.

The General Council was also charged with the

responsibility to establish an Executive Committee, whose

membership was chosen from.among representatives in the

General Council. The Executive Committee was made up of the

Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer, and eleven other members.

The function of the Executive Committee was to implement the

decisions of the General Council. In 1992, when I undertook

my study, the Chairperson and the Secretary, were members of

the Provision Sellers Association. The provision sellers

were retailers of imported food commodities. Their sources

of supply of commodities included Multinational Supermarkets

 

83

(such as the United Trading Company, and the United African

Company), as well as state supermarkets (such as the

National Trading Corporation). Others also travelled outside

Ghana (including Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Togo) to purchase

their commodities, but there were few traders who could

afford the large capital involved in these ventures.

Other members of the Executive Committee included the

following associations:

1. Enamel Retailers Association: These traders sold

enamels (buckets) that were made from aluminum.and plastic.

They received their supplies from.the Aluminum.Products

Factory in Accra, and the Chinese Plastic Factory in

Takoradi in the western Region.

2.

Textile Retailers Association: These traders sold

textiles manufactured in Ghana and overseas. The sources of

supply included multinational supermarkets, while others

received theirs from indigenous Ghanaian entrepreneurs and

textile dealers. There were a few'who travelled to countries

in the West African sub-region, particularly Togo and the

Ivory coast. However, the bulk of the supply of textiles

were from.made-in Ghana textiles. These factories were

located in Tema and Akosombo.

3.

Route Retailers Association: Kente is the

traditional clothing worn by Ghanaians. particularly the

Akan people, of which the Asante are the majority. The Kente

factory is at Bonwire, which is about twenty kilometers from

Kumasi. Retailers of Kente receive all their suppliers from

the Bonwire area.

4. Cosmetic Retailers Association:

‘Women specialize in

the

retail of cosmetic products. Most of their products are

imported. These products include powder, pomade and skin-

breaching creams.

They receive supplies from supermarkets

in Rumasi. They usually buy in bulk quantities, and retail

them.in small quantities to customers.

5. Toffee Sellers.Association: Toffee retailers receive

supplies from supermarkets in the city, and rebag them in

small quantities, before selling them to customers.

6. Scarfs Retailers.Association:

Scarfs are used by

adult women to cover their hair in the Ghanaian society.

Scarfs are imported into Ghana by the government, indigenous

Ghanaian wholesalers, and multinational trading

corporations. The traders retailed the scarfs apiece to

customers.

7. Ear-gigg Sellers Association: These women sold

imported and locally-manufactured earrings. The latter were

manufactured by gold/silver smiths in the Ashanti Region,

which is known for quality earring products.

8. Sgall Fish Rgtailerg Association: Fish retailing was

a female-dominated activity. These women received supplies

from the coastal regions of Ghana (including Central,

Greater Accra, Volta, and Western regions).

9. Tailorg.Asgociation: Tailoring is a male-dominated

activity. Tailors designed men's clothing, and sold them.

They also undertook alterations of old clothing.

85

10. Shoe-Makers Association: Shoe-making and repairs is

a male-dominated activity. These men design and produce

shoes for the local market. However, the materials they used

including leather, the machines, and other accessories were

all imported. In addition, the shoe-makers repaired worn-out

shoes for a fee, depending on the nature of the problem.

The day-to-day affairs of the General Traders

Association was run by the Chairperson, Secretary, and the

Treasurer. There was a monthly meeting of the Executive

Committee every second Sunday of the month, and preceded by

the General Meeting of the Association on the last Sunday of

the month. Press releases of the GTA's activities were

usually made by the Secretary. Petitions were expected to be

signed by other members of the Executive Committee, upon

consultation with the General Council. However, the

petitions I examined did not always have all the signatures

of the members of the Executive Committee.

So far, this section has demonstrated that market

traders organize themselves for the purposes of enhancing

their business activities. At the commodity sector level,

market traders have organized themselves, and the leadership

is charged with maintaining orderly commercial relationships

among members. Taking the market as a whole, the General

Traders Association, as a ggllgggigg, articulates the

collective interests of market traders in dealing with their

external environment, particularly the Kumasi Metropolitan

Authority (KMA).

86

6. Administration of the Central Market

In pre—colonial Ghana, local traditional authorities

(chiefs) had a "natural“ mandate to control and regulate

markets. The traditional authorities set out the rules

governing the terms and conditions for the operations of

markets. In return, market traders paid fees in the form of

foodstuffs and commodities they were engaged in. Traders who

deviated from the established norms were usually tried by

chiefs in traditional courts, and whenever they were found

guilty, they were sanctioned in the form of fines and/or

banishment from.market trade in the locality. Disputes among

traders were settled by representatives of chiefs and market

traders.2

However, with colonization came control of local

markets by colonial institutions. City, town, and village

markets came under the control and regulation of state

officials in the localities. Markets became formal sources

of tax revenues for colonial authorities. Ghanaian

governments, in the post-independence era, have also

continued the practice of taxing market traders, as a source

of revenues for local governments.

The administration of the Kumasi Central Market falls

under the jurisdiction of the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority

(EMA). The

KMA has responsibility for planning, building

and providing essential physical facilities in the market

for the convenience of traders and customers. The KMA is

87

FIGURE 3.4

Organizational structure of the Runasi

Metropolitan Authority

 

 [1...]- ...;1

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l Departmental Headel

 

 

 
  nunxh Ixemnnq'o

Iagu

cal

 

 

t?

 

Imanui ——IEEEF‘—Emfiafiar_—EEEEEEF’

 

 

1mghunrhg'lmgflunnUg Alhurs smut

 

 

‘

,

[’

 

amenabonmmorommnurj

 

  
Lynne
mmnma l

mun:

 

.

l

Source:

Compiled from field data, 1992.

 

88

also expected to provide places of convenience (washrooms),

drainage, water supply, clinic, and day-care centers, within

the market. The EMA has a responsibility to initiate and

enforce regulations pertaining to activities in the market.

For instance, the KMA is supposed to open and close the

market each day. Market traders and buyers were expected to

operate between the hours of 6 am and 6 pm. Also, market

traders and customers with communicable diaeases were not

expected to enter the market during its hours of operation.

The KMA is expected to arrest violators of its bye-laws and

prosecute them at the City Court (Local Government Bulletin,

1988).

KMA directly administers the Kumasi Central Market

through the

offices of the Chief Engineer, Treasury, and

the Medical Officer of Health.

The Chief Engineer's department is responsible for the

construction of market stalls/stores, as well as their

maintenance. However, in the Central Market, they do not

construct additional stalls/stores due to lack of space.

Only old ones that are destroyed by fire are replaced. For

instance, when fire destroyed 120 stalls/sores in the market

in 1987, the Chief Engineer's department replaced them'with

new ones, and the refurbished stalls/stores were reallocated

to the affected occupants (zhg_gigggg;, Movember 24,

1987:8). The department was also expected to repair the

roofs of the stalls/stores that leaked. Failure to do so

means the roofs would leak when it rained, and cause damage

89

to the traders' commodities. Other services the department

was responsible for were the construction and maintenance of

the drainage system, and to provide outlets for rain water

to flow out of the market. Without an effective drainage

system, the market would be flooded when it rained.

Moreover, the Chief Engineer's department was expected to

provide pipe-borne water in the market. Pipes/taps are

supposed to be placed in all sections of the market, so that

both traders and customers would have access to water when

they were in the market.

On the other hand, the Medical Officer of Health's

(MOH) department was responsible for general sanitation in

the market. This included arranging for its workers to sweep

the market on a daily basis. The workers were expected to

sweep the market at the end of the day's activities, so that

by the following day, it would be ready for business

activities. Market traders were expected to clean their own

stalls/stores, and deposit the garbage in designated spots

in the sections of the market. Conservancy laborers of MOH's

department were supposed to clean the spaces within the

market and collect all the garbage dumped in the designated

spots. The workers were also responsible for cleaning the

drainage system, or else it would be choked by garbage which

may have been dumped by traders. According to the MOH's

department, twenty conservancy workers were assigned on

daily basis to clean a market which has a size of 9.6

hectares, and the largest in the country.

90

Any casual visitor to the Central Market would observe

that workers from the Treasury Department were the most

visible elements in the market. They are responsible for

collecting fees from squatters and hawkers who operate in

the aisles, and outside of the market. The KMA provides each

revenue collector tickets to be sold to the squatters and

hawkers for each day. Revenue collectors are assigned to

different sections of the market where squatters and hawkers

carry out their businesses. They begin their work as soon as

the market gates open at 6 am, and end at 4pm, to enable

them to file reports of their activities at the Treasury

Department before it closed at 5 pm.

Revenue collectors were expected to hand out tickets to

squatters and hawkers within their zones, and demand fees

from them, unless they showed receipts to the effect that

they had already bought tickets, which cost C 100 per day.

Revenue collectors worked in pairs; one collected the fees

for the tickets while the other was expected to seize the

commodities of any squatter/hawker who failed to pay for a

ticket. The commodities of default traders were taken to the

Treasury Department, and released when the affected trader

paid the fees, plus the cost of transporting the seized

commodities. Perishable commodities, such as foodstuffs were

usually destroyed by the end of the day if they were not

claimed early in the day. Squatters and hawkers I

interviewed complained that the problem they had with the

91

revenue collectors was that the latter usually came to them

too early in the morning, when they had scarcely made enough

sales to be able to pay for the market fees. However, I

found out that the more experienced squatters and hawkers

paid market fees with money from the previous day's sales,

to avoid trouble with the revenue collectors.

A.Market Superintendent is charged with the

responsibility to supervise day-to-day operations of the

market. All KMA workers who are assigned to work in the

Central Market have to report to the offices of the Market

Superintendent. Also, traders and customers who had any

problems in the market were supposed to report them to the

Market Superintendent. The Superintendent in turn had to

file reports at the City Manager's office regarding

problems and complaints he/she received, as well as

observations of daily activities in the market.

The Market

Superintendent's offices also broadcast public announcements

to traders, as well as customers, through a new public

address system the KMA had purchased.

In sum, the Kumasi Central Market is administered and

regulated by the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority. The latter

is responsible for providing and maintaining the physical

and social infrastructure in the market to facilitate

business activities between traders and their customers.

92

Summary

This chapter attempted to achieve three objectives.

First, it has provided background information on Ghana, as

well as the Kumasi Metropolitan Area. Second, it has

demonstrated that the commercial sector in Ghana is well and

alive due to the dependent nature of the Ghanaian economy.

It has also shown that women predominate the commercial

sector due to a combination of historical and socio-economic

factors, particularly their low levels of education, and

structural barriers to better opportunities in the Ghanaian

society. The chapter has also demonstrated that "markets“

are important institutions in the economic and social life

of Ghanaians.‘Within markets, it has been revealed that

traders, particularly women, play a key role in the

transportation, distribution, and retailing of commodities,

activities which invariably connects them to the local

Ghanaian economy as well as the global economy.

Associations which market traders have formed are

important institutions for the maintenance of an orderly

organization of each commodity sector. But more importantly,

it has been shown that the collective which represents all

market traders, is critical for mobilizing the collective

interests of market traders.

The next chapter will place Ghana's experience of

market trader-state relationship within a broader

conceptual/theoretical and research contexts.

CHAPTER FOUR

PUTTING THE GHANAIAN EMPERIENCE INUA BROADER THEORETICAL

AND RESEARCH CONTEXT

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to review literature

pertaining to the relationship between market traders and

state/local government institutions. First, it evaluates the

relevance of conceptual and theoretical approaches to the

phenomenon of the informal economy for my study. Second,

past research on market traders and their relationship to

state/local government institutions will be reviewed. Third,

it presents the conceptual and theoretical framework for

understanding market trader mobilization and articulation of

their collective interests within the context of

global/state restructuring processes.

.A. The Informal Ecgpggy

The phenomenon of market traders is often discussed

under the general rubric of the “informal economy". However,

the informal economy is one of the most elusive and

controversial concepts in the social science literature.

Since its inception, scholars have debated over its

origins, meaning and scope. It is, therefore, not surprising

that there is no one definition for the concept. However,

researchers on the informal economy phenomenon seem.to agree

93

94

that one's definition and application of the concept is

relative: that is, the form it takes and the various reasons

why people engage in these activities vary from country to

country. In the literature, such apparent omnibus

application of the concept is illustrated by different

names that have come to be associated with the informal

economy: "black market", "informal sector", “second

economy", “parallel economy", “underground economy“, and

“the hidden sector", among several others. Thus, it would

seem that the words and meanings one chooses to describe the

informal economy should correspond to the problem of concern

(Tripp, 1990). In this study, the problem is about the

relationship between market traders and the state in Ghana.

1.

Modernization/Dual Economy Perspectives

It was Keith (1973) who first used the concept

“informal sector“ in his study of the urban poor in Ghana.

The thrust of his study was that new entrants to the urban

labor market were compelled to undertake self-employment due

to inadequate opportunities in the formal sector on the one

hand, and their lack of skills and training, on the other.

He went on to label individuals dependent on informal income

opportunities as the “urban proletariat". Since the earnings

received by this group of people were usually below the

legal minimum.wage they were also considered underemployed.

The study of informal income opportunities in Ghana raised

questions about the role such activities might play, not

95

only in individuals' survival, but also in economic

development. Hart (1973:61) phrased it this way:

Does the "reserve army of urban unemployed and

underemployed' really constitute a passive exploited

majority in cities like Accra, or do their informal

economic activities possess some autonomous capacity

for generating growth in the incomes of the urban

poor?

The International Labor Organization (ILO) popularized

the informal economy concept in the 1970s. In its 1972

Kenyan report, the ILO identified an employment problem

which it traced to both imbalance between the growth of the

labor force, urban population growth and education, and the

overall growth of the economy, as well as an imbalance

between people's aspirations for work, and the structure of

income and opportunities available.

The ILO conceptualized the urban economy of developing

countries in a dualistic framework: "formal“ and “informal"

sectors. It defined the informal sector activities in terms

of some distinguishing characteristics:

a)

b)

e)

d)

e)

f)

9)

ease of entry;

reliance on indigenous resources;

famdly ownership of enterprises;

small-scale operation;

labor-intensive and adopted technology;

skills acquired outside the formal school

system;

unregulated and competitive markets (1972:3).

96

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97

On the other hand, the features of the formal sector were

conceptualized as the obverse of the foregoing

characteristics:

a) entry by new enterprises is difficult;

b) enterprises rely frequently on overseas

resources;

c) corporately owned;

d) large-scale operation;

e) capital-intensive and often imported

technology;

_

f) skills acquired from the formal school system;

g) regulated and protected.markets (through

tariffs, quotas and trade licenses)

[ILO, 1972:3].

'
I
_
'
_
_

In fact, Sethuraman (1981:17) defined the informal

sector as:

small-scale units engaged in the production and

distribution of goods and services with the

primary objective of generating employment and

incomes to their participants notwithstanding the

constraints on capital, both physical and human,

and knowhow.

Due to the complex nature of these criteria for

purposes of operationalization, Sethuramam.(l976:15) gave

the following as conditions for membership of the informal

sector:

a) employment of no more than ten people;

b) nonapplication of legal and administrative

regulations;

c) employment of family members;

d) no fixed hours or days;

e) no institutional loans;

f) production intended for the final consumer;

9) less than six years of schooling;

h) and for some activities, no use of mechanical

and electrical energy;

1) the semi-permanent character of the activity.

98

Essentially, the ILO model of the informal economy

attempted to draw a theoretical connection between rural-

urban migration and informal income-opportunities in the

urban centers of developing countries. Their argument was

that new entrants to Third Werld cities create excessive

demand on the urban labor market, and since “formal" sector

employment is limited, rural-urban migrants cannot wait but

rather create their own jobs as well as generate their own

incomes through “self-employment". The ILO saw income-

generating activities outside the "formal“ sector as

important for labor absorption, and poverty alleviation

among urban migrants in developing countries.

ILO's conceptualization of the informal economy as an

urban migrant phenomenon does not fully reflect the Ghanaian

urban experience, since traditional residents of urban .

communities have been involved in the so-called informal

sector for a long time (Simms and Dumor, 1976). Second,

these studies lacked analytical rigor since they only

focused on the income-generating activities, without

analyzing the larger economic, political, and social

contexts within which they emerge. Furthermore, these

studies had theoretical and conceptual problems. As Effron

(1980) quizzed: Is it not possible to identify some firms

that have most, but not all, of the given characteristics,

but which clearly belong to the "informal" sector? A

researcher has the problem of identifying which of these

99

characteristics are necessary and sufficient for the purpose

of identifying the "informal" sector.

2.

§§atist Perspectives

A growing number of scholars have tended to place the

distinctions between the "formal“ and "informal" economic

activities within the context of state institutional

framework governing participation in the economy. Within

this school of thought, one can distinguish between those

who emphasize the intended/unintended consequences of policy

makers' preferences for large enterprises (Remy and Weeks,

1973), and those of the 'legalist' tradition, whose focus is

largely on bureaucratic/administrative barriers that

obstruct the creation and operation of self-employed

enterprises (Desoto, 1989).

Remy and Weeks (1973) maintain that it is the

relationship of enterprises to the state that defines

formal/informal enterprises, and argue further that the

organizational and economic characteristics identified by

Hart (1973) and the ILO (1972), respectively, are a

consequence of this relationship:

.
t
I

"
.

 

100

The formal sector is encouraged, nurtured, subsidized,

and fostered by the state....it enjoys tariff and

quota protection; competition in the market is

frequently restricted administratively; it has

privileged access to foreign exchange and is aided by

low interest rates in the banking system, As a

consequence, the formal sector is large-scale, uses

imported capital-intensive techniques, and earns high

profits.

On the contrary, they revealed that:

The informal sector....is largely ignored by

government. It is a competitive world of small-scale

enterprises where entry into the market is relatively

easy and the techniques of production must be adapted

to local conditions in the absence of state measures

to alter relative factor prices

(1973:295).

According to this model, enterprises in the informal

sector are defined by their relationship to the state, and

by what they are not: they do not receive government

attention, privileges, benefits, and recognition.

The ‘legalist' perspective, while not underscoring the

presmmed privileged position of formal enterprises, focuses

on regulatory and legal barriers that obstruct the creation

and operation of small-scale enterprises. According to this

interpretation, the informal economy has shown and continues

to show strong signs of adaptability, innovation, and

resourcefulness, filling many of the economic niches left

vacant by relatively larger enterprises, as well as

providing employment opportunities, and on-the-job training

and entrepreneurial skills. However, they argue that the

productive potential and growth of the informal economy are

101

constrained and stunted by excessive and redundant state

policies and regulations including licensing, taxation,

location of businesses, labor recruitment, access to credit

and training, and technology transfer (DeSoto, 1989).

Azarya and Chazan (1987) have conceptualized the

informal economy as a form of disengagement from the state.

They define disengagement as “the tendency to withdraw from

the state and keep at a distance from its channels as a‘

hedge against its instability and dwindling resource base

and declining performance." As Third World economies

deteriorate, they argue that citizens adopt coping

 

strategies in the face of declining resources. In the case

of Ghana, they identified four major coping responses

including “suffer-manage“, "escape“, “self-enclosure“, and

'beat-the-system' strategies.‘ For the purposes of my study,

I will elaborate on the “beat-the system" coping response.

They define 'beat-the-system' strategy as alternative

outlets for needs that remain unfulfilled by official

channels, which help to reduce dependence on these channels.

A parallel economy to the formal one is constructed, but

feeds on the formal sector, and diverts its resources to the

informal economy, and sets to manipulate the state in order

to serve the needs of diverse groups of persons within its

boundaries. This scheme has come to be known in Ghana as

kalabule or malpractice of various sorts involving attempts

to skirt existing controls or to knowingly defraud in order

to maximize one's own gains.

102

In the context of disengagement, the informal economy

enables people to withdraw from the state and still meet

their basic needs. State reactions to disengagement also

vary widely, ranging from.encouragement to policy

adjustments, repression and even reconciliation to a

palpable decline in state control over society. For example,

state clamping down on ‘black markets' in an attempt to

forestall such disengagement may lead to increased smuggling

out of the country or reduced production altogether. If the

state imposes production quotas and punishes producers for

reducing their marketed produce, it might force them to

emigrate. State-society relations are thus interlinked in a

dynamic network of action and reaction which, in some

instances, exacerbates existing tendencies and pushes them

into more radical forms.

Regarding disengagement, Azarya and Chazan (1987)

explain that as it further undermines the state's ability to

control resources and to exert authority, the state may use

all means necessary, including coercive force, to combat

such tendencies. The state may attempt to extend its

grassroots control; regulate more aspects of the citizen's

life, and outlaw many of the disengagement devices and

impose stiff punishments on transgressors. However, the

coercive reaction to disengagement is also very costly and

depletes the state's meager resources.

103

Finally, they argue that the state may also react to

disengagement in a constructive way, by introducing reforms

that would increase its efficiency, enhance its penetrative

capacity and re-create the attractiveness of its channels.

Implicit in the refomm strategy is the desire to create

conditions that would make existing forms of disengagement

unnecessary and obsolete. But the opposite result is

obtained when the government, in order to implement its

reform.programs makes increasing use of force and lets the

coercive aspects of reform.implementation overshadow the

reform per se. Reform programs often ignore and compete with

ongoing survival strategies, and the state is mostly

preoccupied with imposing restrictions, breaking opposition

and punishing transgressors who standin the way of its

reforms. The paradox that emerges is that on the one hand,

the reforms try to resuscitate state-society relations,

while on the other, daily activities focus on quashing

strikes and repressing opposition. By overlooking actual

survival strategies in the society, the reform programs

could ironically detach the state itself from society, and

demonstrate little understanding of ongoing processes in the

society, and have poor chances of success (Azarya and

Chazan, 1987; Azarya, 1988).

104

3.

Global System/Dependency Perspectives

a) Petty Commodity Production

Marxist and Neo-Marxist scholars have been critical of

the dualist/modernization models of development and their

conceptualization of the informal economy. They argue that

at any one time, there is only one economy, determined by

the dominant mode of production. Within a capitalist

Isociety, there may exist pre-capitalist and/or petty

commodity modes of production, but in the Marxist framework,

these do not indicate duality because they are effectively

dominated by capitalism. In petty commodity production, the

producer owns the means of production, and.may work alone,

with apprentices, or side by side with hired laborers.

Because of the incomplete separation of capital and labor,

there can be no firm line demarcating an informal sector.

Rather, there is a continuum of productive activities

ranging from the simplest artisan-producer to large

capitalist enterprises (Bose, 1984; Lewin, 1985).

However, Marxists envision that petty commodity

production will inevitably disappear as the dominant

capitalist system.expands (Lenin [1917] 1966:27-28), but

Lenin's generalization that large-scale industry will

completely squeeze out small enterprises is increasingly

being called into question (Lewin, 1985: 130-131). In fact,

small-scale/petty commodity production, even if it is

105

destined for eventual disappearance, will continue to be

part of the Third WOrld economic reality for some time to

come because of their structural dependence on the global

system (McCormick, 1988).

b) Global Economic Crises and Restructuring

Other scholars have conceptualized the informal economy

by locating it within the context of the restructuring

processes associated with the general impact of the global

economic crises. Portes and walton (1989:87) defined the

informal sector as including “all income-producing

activities outside of the formal sector wages and social

security payment".

The objective of Portes and his associates has been to

explore the extent to which informal labor processes

function to subsidize capital accumulation in both the

periphery and the core countries of the global-system

(Portes and Sassen-Koob, 1987; Castells and Portes, 1989;

Benton, 1986).

Basically, Portes et al. view informalization as a

process:

The informal economy is not an individual condition

but as a process of income-generation characterized

by one central feature: it is unregulated by the

institutions of society in a legal and social

environment in which similar activities are regulated

(1989:12)

106

Portes et a1. argue that the source of the differences

between the wages of core capitalism and peripheral

capitalism.could be traced to the structure of peripheral

economies which invariably facilitates profit maximization

by keeping labor costs at a minimum, The informal sector is

supposed to facilitate this process at two levels. First, it

subsidizes part of the costs of capitalist enterprises in

peripheral countries, enabling them to enforce comparatively

low wages on its own labor. The basic needs of formal sector

workers are partially met by goods and services produced and

distributed more cheaply using unpaid and paid informal

labor. Moreover, parallelling the mechanism.of subsistence-

transfer, but in a far more diversified and complex.manner,

capitalists are able to exploit not only the work-energy of

the worker, but that of his/her kin, neighbors, and friends

as well (Portes, 1989).

In fact, within the core of the world-system,

especially in the United States, studies have shown how

capitalists have resorted to informal production strategies

to cut down costs of

production, in order to meet the

challenges of the global economic crisis, as well as

maximize capital accumulation. Sassen-Koob (1989:60) has

demonstrated that in the city of New York, for example, a

large portion of the construction, apparel, electronic and

furniture industries are carried out on an informal basis,

and heavily dependent on immigrant labor.

107

c) Dependent/Uneven Development and the Enclave Economy

Critical to my analysis is an understanding of foreign

capital penetration in the political economies of peripheral

countries. According to the dependent/uneven development

perspectives, the economy of Ghana, other African and Third

world nations have been historically conditioned by their

relationship to other more powerful and dominant economies.

Thus the interdependence of such economies assumes

contrasting forms of dominance and dependency, to the extent

that dependent nations develop as mere reflection of the

expansion of dominant nations, and become underdeveloped as

a consequence of their subjective relationships (Santos,

1970).

Historically, uneven development assumes a relationship

among nations of the world based on exploitation and unequal

development. In this respect, it starts with the assumption

that development and underdevelopment are integral parts of

a global system. The global economy itself is seen as a

total system of which Third Werld nations are ipgo facto,

subsystems. Modern economies, from the 15th century onwards

have developed within a global economy following the laws of

peripheral capitalist development. According to Booth

(1975:15), relationships of dependency are essentially

asymmetric because:

108

development of parts of the system occurs at the

expense of other parts:....it is the combination of

inequalities plus the transfer of resources from

underdeveloped to developed countries which explains

inequality, deepens it, and transforms it into a

necessary and structural element of the world economy.

Simms and Dumor's (1976) ”enclave economy” phenomenon

provided an excellent insight into the structural position

of market traders within the context of Ghana's dependent

status in the global economy. They defined the ‘enclave

economy' as "an economy which is a direct response to the

economic penetration of peripheral nations by industrial

countries in search of raw'materials, as well as a market

for finished products from these countries." According to

the enclave economy model, at one end of the economic

spectrum are modern/formal enterprises, including

multinational investments, and local capitalist ventures. At

another end are potential consumers. Therefore, what the

enclave economy does is not only to link the two sectors of

the economy, but also intermediate between the potential

producers and consumers.

Sanjek and Sanjek (1976) have categorized market

traders in the enclave economy into four analytically

distinct groups for the purposes of analysis. They

identified:

a) working-class traders who act in their capacity as

petty commodity producers involved in food preparation and

processing, along with other similar activities;

109

:

1

‘

b) small traders who are relatively stationary, selling

commodities at fixed locations;

c) middle-class traders who have higher levels of

capital and own larger stocks of commodities;

d) business-owners who have relatively larger capital,

employ labor, lend out money to other businesses, and also

invest in other income-generating ventures.

So far, I have attempted to demonstrate that there are

varied conceptual and theoretical explanations of the

phenomenon of the informal economy in the development

literature. Although some aspects of market trade such as

size of enterprise, ease of entry, and acquisition of skills

outside formal institutions,

correspond with the informal

sector characteristics as articulated by the

modernization/dualistic framework, market trade also has

formal sector characteristics. These include obtaining

license for operation, as well as operating within a built

environment defined by state regulations. Also, market

traders have linkages to large-scale enterprises in the

formal sector, as commission-sellers and sometimes as

competitors. Thus, the modernization/dualistic framework

needs to be modified to capture the complexities and

dynamics of market trade activities in developing countries,

particularly Ghana.

The statist and global/dependency perspectives serve as

backdrop for my analysis of the relationship between the

110

state and market traders in Ghana. The statist perspective

demonstrates the policy and regulatory environment within

which market traders operate, as well as its concomitant

effects on market traders.

Clearly, the global-dependency perspectives throw more

light on the historical and structural factors which affect

peripheral economies, and the strategic position of market

traders within the enclave economy. As intermediaries of

indigenous and foreign producers and local censumers, market

traders are major players in the political economy of

peripheral countries. Hence, the relationship between the

state and market traders in Ghana, should be understood

within the larger context of Ghana's dependence on the

global economy, and its ramifications for state

control/regulation of the domestic economy, especially

market trader activities.

B.

Previous Research on.Market Traders versus the

£122

Previous research indicate that the relationship

between market traders and the state in Africa, and other

Third world societies, is generally marked by conflict.

One of the most celebrated accounts of the conflict

relationship between market traders and the state in the

West African sub-region was the “Aba Riots" or Ibo "Women's

war“ of 1929 in Nigeria. A British colonial administrator's

111

decision to count women and their property sparked fears

among women that they would be taxed. Word spread quickly

through trading networks, and tens of thousands of women

protested. Once they had won written assurance that they

would not, in fact, be taxed, they continued mass marches,

and local “disturbances" against regional colonial

administrators, for failing to recognize women's political

organizations. eventually, the police and army turned on the

protesters, killing fifty, and wounding fifty more (Ifeka-

Moller, 1975; Van Allen, 1976; Johnson, 1978; Sacks, 1982;

Wipper, 1982). Market queens in Southern Nigeria continued

to lead women anti-colonial activities through the 1940s

(Johnson, 1982).

Gracia Clark's (1988) Market Traders and the State

documents instances of hostility and tension between

specific sets of traders and government functionaries in

several countries across four continents. In the case of

Ghana, Clark discussed

the conflict between market traders

and the Rawlings' state when the latter imposed price

controls for local foodstuffs in Kumasi, (Ghana) in the

1980s. In the process, market traders who rebelled against

the new policy were harassed in the form.of public

humiliation and physical assault by the police and military

personnel.

In Tanzania, two studies have revealed the

tension/conflict between the state and traders (particularly

112

in the informal economy or magendo). First, Kerner (1988)

has shown that during the crisis of the 1980s, the Tanzanian

state launched two concurrent campaigns aimed at

restructuring commodity distribution in the society. The

“war Against Economic Sabotage" which was initiated in 1983

was a state crackdown on large-scale black market racketeers

trading in luxury imported items, foreign currency, and

locally-produced commodities. The second program.'Human

Resources Deployment Act (October, 1983), entailed the

detention, registration, and resettlement of thousands of

urban jobless persons along with traders, vendors, workers,

and housewives, on state plantations in rural areas. The

root of the problem seemed to have been state conception of

“hard work" which was ideologically defined as "activities

that were directly related to food production in the rural

areas". Consequently, state legislations were designed to

convert the urban unemployed, the underemployed, and traders

into rural casual laborers.

113

Tripp's (1990) The Urban Informal Economy and the State

in Tanzania, documents the struggles of ordinary Tanzanian

citizens to overcome state control of formal economic

activities. She argued that the more the state tried to

adopt interventionist posture, the less it was able to

affect change in the direction it intended. She saw the

noncompliance of Tanzanians in the form.of private small-

scale economic activities, contrary to state policy, as a

testament to the capacity of Tanzanians to resist policies

that infringed on their ability to carry out informal

income-generating activities. In conclusion, Tripp argued

that the informal economy may have played a critical role as

an internal factor that allowed Tanzania to embark on a

program of economic refonms and austerity measures.

Babb (1988) studied the repression and harassment of

marketers in Peru in the 1980s when the country was

experiencing severe economic crisis. Two related and

pressing problems faced the Peruvian state: rising food

prices and a proliferation of urban marketers and street

vendors. The state, in an attempt to provide affordable food

to the middle class, and the masses of the people for

political reasons, scape-goated food retailers who seemed to

be at the lowest end, and the weakest in the chain of

distribution of commodities in the society. Regulation of

petty traders took several forms including increased taxes.

health/medical certification, and relocation from street

114

trade. She indicates that ambulantees marched in peaceful

protests against government initiatives to relocate them to

undesirable and even dangerous locations. However, they were

met violently by the National Guard, who showed very little

regard for women and their children. The most important

revelation of the study was that the Peruvian state and its

functionaries failed to appreciate the broader international

context of the Peruvian economic crises in the 1980s, and

its implication for Peru's food prices. Peru, like other

Third world nations are dependent on the global economy,

hence the availability of commodities and their distribution

within peripheral societies are contingent upon the "health“

of the national and global economies, and not petty traders,

who contribute to the production and reproduction of labor

within the global system.

Freidberg's (1991) Market women and Sgage Viglgnce in

west Africa, analyzes the tension between market women

traders and the state from a feminist perspective. She

states:

state violence toward market women is clearly not

arbitrary. It is a manifestation of a struggle for

control over women's income, labor, food, and sex—-

a struggle, in other words, over the basic means of

production and reproduction (1991:2).

She argues that since the state apparatus is dominated

primarily by men, state violence against women, in

particular market women, is an attempt to deny women the

right to economic autonomy, with the aim of pushing them

115

back to depend on men in society. She points out that

African states have staked a great deal of legitimacy on

cheap urban food provided primarily by cheap female labor,

both on the farm, and in the market (Guyer, 1987a, 1987b).

When this legitimacy is threatened, men, she argues, in the

State simply cannot afford to mind their own business, and

let market women mind theirs.

The review in this section has shown that the conflict

relationships between market traders and states in

peripheral countries stem from.numerous sources including

conditions induced by the dependent positions of peripheral

states within the global capitalist system, as well as

internal dynamics such as class and gender inequality.

C.

Human-Social Agent! and Collective Action

Agency is the means of exerting power and influence to

bring about change whether at the level of the individual,

the household or larger collectivities, like networks, and

groups. Agency, therefore, has to do with sources of‘

influence and directions of power (Strathem, 1987:23). Thus,

the basic questions that need to be asked are: What

mechanisms do people have at their disposal in influencing

others, and in shaping the contours of the everyday world

around them?

What are their capabilities to affect their

world and the actions of others?

Much of the contemporary research on agency and

116

activism.

has often been associated with the Marxist

tradition. After all, Marx himself was concerned with

working-class

consciousness, mobilization and social

change. Marxists have for a long time established a

connection between class interests and collective action.

They argue that individuals who share the same "life

situation", by sharing the same relations of production,

have a similar stake in “contemporary bourgeois society.“

They are also affected similarly by events that enhance,

sustain, or erode this material stake. Those who are

similarly situated and affected, constitute a collectivity,

known as a “class“. Members of the same class situation have

a common set of economic and political interests.

Individuals who make up a class are "objectively" related to

one another because of the interests they share. The

incumbents of class positions have a predisposition to act

collectively and conflictually, a process which is "given

and conditioned“ by the structural position itself (Davis,

1991: 20).

While the classical Marxist model of collective

action based on class identification is profoundly

illuminating, it focuses on collective action occurring

inside the workplace, and therefore it is not easily

applicable to collective action occurring outside the place

of work. It conceptualizes 'class' in terms of productive

property. It is the common position that people occupy in

relationship to the means of production--owning or not

117

owning productive property; controlling or not controlling

the labor process--that determines their common interests

and their common orientation to political action. Class

formation and class conflict are both engendered by

relations of production.

What is problematic about this for my study is the

observed fact that groups in the enclave economy,

particularly market traders, often form.and fight along

lines that have little to do with productive property. These

groups are not “classes" in the Marxist sense, since they

are engendered by relations of distribution and consumption,

not by relations of production.

Neo-Marxist interpretations of collective action have

tended to focus on urban-based social movements. Castells

(1978; 1983; 1987) has attempted to integrate the ideas of

class, ideology and disposition, as he relates them to the

processes of urbanization, uneven development, and urban

social movements. His unique contribution has been his

ability to have conceptually and empirically linked

constituency movements to class structures through the

notion of urban space ts medium, Space, he reminds us, is as

much a material dimension of production as are land, labor

and capital, for the ways in which space itself is

appropriated to produce them» Castells further explains that

it is how people experience the gggtttttgt and ggtttg;_that

flow from the spatial form associated with the city that

118

leads to urban-based social movements. In such cases, these

need not be class-based, since they are more likely to

emerge from what a group sharing a common residential area

perceives as a threat to its cultural identity and/or

neighborhood autonomy. The form these non-class movements

take in response to pressures from the class structure, he

argues, are contingent rather than determined. What is

crucial, he stresses, is that whatever the value or interest

or goal at the base of a non-class movement, it has been

precipitated by the workings of a particular mode of

production on the shapes of people' lives (Kling and Posner,

1991).

Overall, Castells is moderate in his conclusions. Urban

movements are not the new historical actors creating social

change, nor the pivotal source of alternative social forms

(1983:319). Secondly, he saw urban movements not as agents

of structural social change, but symptoms of resistance to

the social domination, which in the process may have major

effects on cities and societies (1983:329).

D.

Market Trader Aggociational Activity

Market traders generally form.associations, which have

been conceptualized as voluntary associations.

Earlier

studies on voluntary associations in West Africa

conceptualized them as mechanisms for helping migrants to

adjust to urban life. They were seen as surrogate familiar

119

institutions in the rapid urbanization processes (Llyod,

1959; Little, 1965, 1973; wallerstein, 1966).

Simms and Dumor (1976) studied associational activity

among women in the urban enclave economy of Ghana. They

highlighted the economic, and social significance of

associational activity for the survival of market traders.

They revealed that market women's associations enabled them

to create institutions of mutual support such as credit,

networking, and general welfare of their members. This study

was quite important in that unlike earlier studies which

associated voluntary associations with urban migrants, they

saw them as mechanisms devised by market traders, especially

market women, to survive in the marketplace, within the

context of lack of resources and support from state/local

government institutions.

Simms Hamilton's (1967) Urban Social Differentiation

and Membership Recruitment among Selected Voluntaty

Assgciations in Accra, Ghana revealed some interesting facts

which are pertinent to the present study. She demonstrated

that voluntary associations are ggt substitutive of familial

institutions but rather additive. That is, the functions

they perform within urban structures are not meant to

compete with, or replace the functions of social

institutions such as the family. Instead, they supplement

the functions of familial institutions within the context of

the urban environment.

120

These associations provide economic and social benefits

for their members. They may provide economic support in the

form of providing capital for members to start their

business, or to enlarge the trade they are already engaged

in, by providing the necessary capital. A typical form of

economic support is the provision of working capital. This

is done by holding meetings once a week, at which a

collection is taken. All the traders present hand over as

much money as they can afford, and their contributions are

recorded in the book supplied to each member for this

purpose. The officials receiving this money also have a list

of the associations's members, in order of seniority,

depending on the date on which they have joined. When the

collection is finished, all the money is given to the member

whose name has the first place on the list; the following

week, it is given to the second, and the third, until every

member of the group has received a contribution. This system

provides a useful alternative to negotiating a private loan

from.money-lenders, or from the public and private banks

(Little, 1973:52).

Members of market associations may also buy in bulk,

which would help them to obtain produce and commodities at

relatively cheaper prices, by saving the overheads of

buyers. Others may take steps to ensure direct access to

supplies of commodities in which their members trade.

The social functions of these market associations are

121

also quite significant. They provide welfare for their

members and their families, when they are bereaved or sick.

They may also contribute to the funeral expenses of a

deceased member.

The market associations may also regulate trading

practices of their members, in an effort to prevent under-

cutting by shrewd members. Any member found under-cutting

may be brought before the officials of the association, and

disciplined, which could result in the expulsion of the

member from the association. These informal social control

mechanisms are designed to ensure healthy competition among

members who trade in the same commodities.

While these economic and social functions of market

trader associations are critical for their members survival

in the marketplace, the focus of my study is the

relationship between these associations and their external

environment, particularly state/local government

institutions.

Activism of market traders may be attributed to their

commonality of interest and identity, as well as their

perceived threat (real or imagined) of the policy/regulatory

environment on their survivability in the marketplace. The

policy and regulatory environment refers to “central/local

government policies and regulations spelling out rules

regarding licensing, labor hiring practices, location,

taxation, and general operations of public markets.“

Self-

122

employed workers with similar business interests may

mobilize to deal with regulations and micro-policies that

affect their businesses. The effects of the regulatory and

policy environment have been the basis for mobilizing trade

groups (Harrod, 1987).

Market traders also constitute a community of tenants.

In fact, local market structures are under the jurisdiction

and supervision of state/local government institutions.

Thus, market traders who occupy public markets engage in a

landlord—tenant relationship. Much as tenants in urban

neighborhoods may mobilize to demand better utilities and

services from their landlords, as well as articulate other

concerns pertaining to their occupancy, so could market

traders organize to express their concerns regarding

increases in their rents, and lack of relevant facilities

that could enhance their business operations in the public

markets such as safety and security, clinics, day-care

centers, and public places of conveniences.

In some cases, the commonality of interest may be

spontaneous, based on characteristics which provide a sense

of collective economic and/or social identity (Portes and

Borcos, 1988). In others, the commonality may come into

being in response to a situation which adversely affects the

interests of a wide range of self-employed workers. For

example, self-employed workers in various trades formed

themselves into a single organization to oppose their

eviction from an area which the city authorities (in

123

Chandigarh, India) wanted to use for other purposes. (Sarin,

1979). Similarly, in Ahmedabad, India, petty traders and

street vendors in the central business district (CBD) got

together to fight police harassment and won a major

concession: that they could not be barred from selling on

the streets in that area unless the local authorities

provided an equally attractive alternative location

(Sebstad, 1982).

Lessinger's (1985) Nobody Is Here to Ygll At Me:

Political Activism Among Petty Retail Traders In An Indian

Qtty provides some of the conditions which pave the way for

political mobilization among market traders:

1. In cities, petty retail trade is comparatively secure in

terms of income and steady employment. This security, in

comparison to other types of jobs, makes trading an

attractive occupation, drawing in workers from.other

occupations, and swelling the number of traders and market

places. Such security, he argues makes trading an occupation

worth defending through political means, and the ability to

organize becomes an important component of job security;

2.

The ability of traders to monopolize the sale of

particular kinds of goods such as fresh foodstuffs because

their sale is too risky and labor-intensive to involve the

formal sector. This kind of monopoly gives traders a potent

political'weapon if they should decide to strike;

3. Relations of production and social relations surrounding

marketing which create a physical concentration of traders

124

and impose on them.a high degree of cooperation. Unlike many

other informal sector workers, traders are often

concentrated, cheek by jowl, in congested market places.

This concentration often demands a high degree of

cooperation among market traders;

4. Conflicts between traders and state/local authorities

which can be perceived clearly by participants as instances

of class conflict. Disputes over the right to sell on vacant

r public land are particularly clear examples, but official

complaints that markets are dirty, unhealthy or unsightly

can also be seen as aspects of class conflict. Disputes

which threaten to eradicate traders' livelihood in marketing

are most likely to mobilize traders;

5. The existence of a political culture which legitimates

popular protests and offers some avenues for conflict

resolution. As Portes and Walton (1976), Gutkind (1973) and

Sandbrook (1977), all point out, the political potential of

workers has to be judged against the background of the local

political culture. Does that culture offer ideological

justification for purposes of protest from below?

Gender is also an important unifying factor for

mobilization among market traders. women in most Third Werld

societies, particularly Ghana, predominate commercial and

distribution sector activities. Market trader grassroots

mobilization is often conceptualized as a strategy by women

to protect and defend their collective interests in response

to attempts by state/local government institutions to

125

regulate and control their lives and businesses.

(Ewusi,

1987:14; Greenstreet, 1981; Date-Baah, 1986; Parpart and

Staudt, 1989). Pare women in Tanzania rioted to protest the

levying of a graduated income tax in the 1940s. The women

organized a 25-mile march to the district headquarters and,

once there, stoned colonial officials, demanded settlement

of the matter, and created so much trouble that a compromise

had to be settled (O'Barr, 1976). In the case of Ghana,

Accra Market women withdrew their services until state

officials reinstated their control over pricing and the

market in 1982. Thus, gender is a critical factor for

mobilizing African, as well as Ghanaian market women in

negotiating state institutions, and serves as a basis for

political solidarity among market women. However, in

situations where men participate in local markets as well,

they provide support to the cause of market traders because

of their identification collectively as traders vis-a-vis

state/local government institutions.

E. FRAIENORE FOR.UNDERSTANDINGIMAREET TRADER.ACTIVISI IN

GHANA EITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALZSTATE RESTRQQQQQ

PROCE SE

The premise of the present investigation is that

market traders mobilize to articulate their collective

interests. Their ultimate goal is survival in the

marketplace. It is the contention of the author that market

trader activism in the period under study (1983-1992) should

126

be situated within a broader context of the effects of

global restructuring on peripheral countries, particularly

Ghana.

Global Restructuring2

Global restructuring is defined as ”attempts to reform

capitalist structures/institutions in response to crises

within the global/world system". According to Castells and

Henderson (1987:l), the world economy is undergoing a

process of global restructuring that redefines capital-labor

relationships, and the role of the state, while furthering

the asymmetrical interdependency of economic functions

across national boundaries.

The process manifests itself

differently in different contexts, thus triggering diverse

social and political conflicts upon which its outcome will

ultimately depend. For the purposes of my study, I‘will

focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Ghana.

Sub-Saharan Africa experienced substantial debt crises

in the early part of the 1970s, but it was until the 1980s

that they became major issues in international relations.

Total Sub-Saharan debt was about US$156bn at the end of 1989.

However, most of these countries are highly dependent on

imports and manufactured goods, oils, services, food, and

capital goods. They purchase imports with foreign exchange

from two main sources: exports of a narrow range of

commodities with volatile world market prices; and foreign

grants, loans, and investment. In 1980-1989, their commodity

127

export prices fell by 18 percent compared with import

prices, and export volume fell by 15 percent. Net capital

transfers--disbursements minus repayments--also declined in

real terms (allowing for inflation) after 1981. Higher aid

failed to compensate for lower transfer from the IMF, export

credit agencies, banks, import suppliers, and foreign

investors. Though rising in the period 1986-1989, real net

transfers in 1989 were 20 percent below the 1980-83 annual

average. These development reduced annual imports by 32

percent of their US$ value during the 1980-1989 period.

On a real per capita basis, imports in 1989 were at or below

the levels of 1985 (IMF Survey, June 1988; UN, 1988; WGrld

Bank, 1989).

Since the early part of the 1980s, Ghana's debt crises,

and crises with debt service payments culminated in the

imposition of Structural Adjustment Program by the WOrld

Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, under the general

rubric of state restructuring, with the aim.of redressing

distortions in the Ghanaian economy.

State RegtructuriAgf

State restructuring is defined as "adjustments/changes

in the structures/functions of state institutions in

response to fiscal crisis emanating from the global

economic restructuring processes'.

The emphasis on state

restructuring under Structural Adjustment was predicated on

the fact that the source of Ghana's economic malaise was a

128

direct result of state-led development planning and

management of the economy. This observation was in sharp

contrast to Post-war development theorizing in the 19503

and 1960s, which stressed that state apparatus could be used

to foster development and change in developing economies.

The role of the Ghanaian state, for example, was to

accelerate industrialization, to modernize agriculture, and

provide the infrastructure necessary for modernization.

In addition, since the private sector was small and

relatively weak, the state became the major employer of many

qualified personnel in the public sector. By the early

1960s, there were more than one hundred state parastatals in

Ghana. They increased to a total of 235, of which the state

had majority holding in 181, which provided employment for

approximately fifty percent of labor force in

Ghana (Ada,

1989:305). Furthermore, the Ghanaian state had substantial

role in economic development. It initiated development plans

and mobilized resources to provide the basic infrastructure

for national development. The major weakness of this

strategy, however, was that development projects were

dependent on the country's major exports: cocoa, timber,

and minerals, which‘were often affected by expansion and

contraction in the core economies in Western Europe,

North America, and the Pacific Rim”

State restructuring in Ghana has been based on three

principles: reducing the role of the state relative to the

private sector, "getting the prices right", and opening the

129

economy to foreign trade and investment (Wbodward, 1992).

For the purposes of this investigation, I will focus on the

first one, pertaining to attempts to "roll back" the state.

Reduction of the role of the state under economic

restructuring has taken three main forms: restricting the

level of state expenditure as a share of national income,

shifting production and provision of services from the

public to the private sector; and relaxing regulations

affecting transactions in private markets.

State expenditure cuts are deliberate shifts away from

the concept of the state as an economic agent and social

provider, and towards more minimalist view of its role in

society. The irony is that at a critical time when most

people, especially the poor, need social protection under

Structural Adjustment, the state attempts to divest itself

of responsibility for economic developments affecting the

welfare of the population. This implies an erosion in the

accountability of the state for the consequences of

adjustment policies. This approach leads to contraction of

public sector expenditures on welfare, education, and

health. It has been estimated that women and children, who

are the major consumers of welfare and public sector

services, suffer most when state services become contracted

(Afsher and Dennis, 1992).

As if expenditure cuts were not enough, the state also

responds to fiscal deterioration by resorting to the tax

base to generate increased revenues. These include increased

130

individual and

corporate direct taxes, as well as taxes on

domestic goods and services. This is understandable giving

the fact that, under the regime of adjustment, the fiscal

crisis of the state is exacerbated by the fact that a

greater proportion of revenues from.exports is used to

service debts accrued from international and bilateral

institutions.

Local Government Restructurtgg

State restructuring processes have also affected local

government institutions. Local governments have been

reconstituted and restructured in a move to make them.more

responsible to their local communities. It is a strategy

on the part of the central government to reduce state

expenditures for public services. Accordingly,

decentralization of local government administration has been

accompanied by increased roles and functions for local

communities. In the pre-Adjustment period local government

institutions tended to depend on central government

transfers to promote community development. However, the

fiscal constraints imposed on the state by the Structural

Adjustment Program.has placed a greater burden on local

governments to generate revenues from the local community.

Local governments, it is argued would tend to use the

strategies of the central government to generate incomes

from their local communities: expenditure cuts, and

restoration of the tax base to generate revenues. However,

131

expenditure cuts often lead to reduced community/public

services, as well as the maintenance of existing physical

and social infrastructure in the local community.

GlobalZStateZLocal Government Restructuring and Market

Trgder Activism

Market traders are affected by global/state/local

government restructuring processes:

First, market traders

are dependent on the global market for sources of commodities

for their businesses. Trade liberalization and removal of

price controls create opportunities for traders to obtain

imported commodities, as well as sell them at prices

determined by the market, as opposed to the dictates of

state officials. However, policies associated‘with state

restructuring such as retrenchment of

workers in the formal

sector increases mass poverty, unemployment, and

underemployment. As a result, the supply of labor in the

informal sector increases, and thus reduces real informal

sector incomes, including incomes from retail activities

in the market.

Market traders, most of whom are women, and consumers

of welfare and public sector services, are affected by

expenditure cuts and contraction in public welfare services.

In addition, SAP policies such as liberalization of

prices, devaluation, and removal of government subsidies

from commodity prices, contribute to higher cost of living.

Market traders, like other Ghanaians. are impacted by the

132

higher cost of living as they have to pay for higher schools

fees, cost of food, health care, transportation, and energy.

State/local government policies designed to generate

incomes through increased taxes also affect Ghanaians in

general, but market traders in particular. These include

increased income taxes, rents for market occupancy,

licenses, and basic rates. Local government expenditure cuts

and contraction in public services would affect the

provision of, and maintenance of infrastructure, including

market facilities in the local community.

Under these conditions, it is argued that market

traders, as human-social agents will mobilize to articulate

their collective interests vis-a-vis state/local government

institutions, to survive in the marketplace. Their

collective interests would center around control of their

incomes: to resist state/local government income-generating

strategies, to demand accountability for activities of the

local government officials, as well as to seek improvements

in the physical and social infrastructure in the market, to

enhance their business activities.

The State Agtinst Natigg Dilemma‘

The foregoing framework taps into the theoretical

discussion of the state against the nation dilemma in the

periphery of the world system.

One of the classical contributions to the dialectical

relationship between the state and the nation/civil society

133

is Antonio Gramsci (1971:210-276). In Gramsci's view, the

state encapsulates ”political society" and represents the

moment of force and coercion, while "civil society“ is the

complex network of educational and ideological institutions

in which leadership is more important than force. Most of

the institutions that exert direct domination are controlled

by the state, whereas civil society encompasses the bodies

and solidarities usually termed "internal and private"

(Macciocchi, 1974). Gramsci (1971:209) wrote that “between

the economic structure and the state with its legislation

and coercion stands civil society".

In the periphery, however, the state as a phenomenon

is not an independent variable. State forms are constantly

created, reproduced, maintained, and modified. These

processes of reproduction and change are intertwined with

the historical evolution of the particular society and

culture within which the state functions (Trouillot,

1990:19).

Peripheral states are subjected to many inherent

tensions, and historically, instability is inherent in the

social structure of peripheral capitalism (Alavi, 1982).

It stems from the very dependency that characterizes these

societies (Amin, 1980:17). Peripheral societies are

characterized by a permanent tension between the centripetal

forces of the state, and the centrifugal forces inherent in

dependency (Trouillot, 1990:23). In the case of Ghana, the

disjuncture between the state and the civil society has been

exacerbated by global restructuring processes, particularly

134

the Structural Adjustment Program, The Structural Adjustment

Program tends to pit the state against the civil society,

and the dialectics lead to change in state structure, and

the (re)emergence of a meaningful civil society.

mums PROPOS ITIONS

Based on the foregoing framework, the working

propositions for the study were:

1. It is expected that global restructuring processes

‘will redefine the structure, functions, and sources of

revenue of state and local government institutions.

Consequently, state/local government institutions will adopt

fiscal policies for increasing revenue—generation from their

communities, particularly market traders, as well as adopt

austere measures to conserve financial resources to the

detriment of community service needs;

2. It is expected that conflict between local

communities, particularly market traders, and

state/local

government institutions will be engendered by the latter's

fiscal policies for revenue-generation, lack of

accountability for local government officials, as well as

declining conditions of physical and social infrastructure

in the community, especially in the marketplace;

3. It is expected that market traders, as human-social

agents, will mobilize to articulate their collective

interests/concerns vis-a-vis state/local government

135

restructuring processes that affect their activities.

Thus, market trader activism.would be aimed at protesting

and resisting state/local government fiscal policies,

holding local government officials accountable, s well as

demanding the maintenance of the physical and social

infrastructure in the marketplace, to enhance their business

activities.

FIGURE 4.2

RELATIONSHIP BETHEEN GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND COMMUNITY ACTIVISM

 

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CHAPTERFIVE

RESUME OF RESEARCH PROCEDURES

This chapter contains a resume of the manner in which

the field research was conducted, as well as a concise

explanation of the methods and techniques employed in the

collection and analysis of data for the study.

The methods I used to gather data for the

study

included, interviews, documentary/archival research, survey,

and personal observations. The research was conducted from

January to June 1992. I was assisted in my fieldwork by five

Ghanaians, made up of three women and two men. Each of these

assistants had a high school diploma, and was teaching in

local public schools in Kumasi. The criteria for the

selection of these assistants were familiarity with the

city's people, fluency in the local Asante Twi language, and

another Ghanaian ethnic language, as well as research

experience.

I was personally raised in Kumasi, and so I was

familiar with the urban informal economy, particularly petty

trading, from a personal experience: my family was involved

in informal income-generating activities. My mother, in

particular, began her work life as a seamstress, and later

through friendship networks acquired a 'passbook' to sell

textiles on commission basis with the United African Company

(UAC), a British multinational company. Later, she landed a

job as a bottle-collecting subcontractor for the Kumasi

136

137

Brewery, which was owned and operated by the United African

Company. She also rented a stall at the Kumasi Central

Market for selling second-hand clothing. My parents have

lived in the city for more than forty years, and I had lived

in Kumasi for twenty years. I was fortunate to draw on these

experiences in carrying out my fieldwork.,

The target groups for my research were members and

leaders of the General Traders Association, and officials of

the local government institution, the Kumasi Metropolitan

Authority.

1. Members and Leaders of Market Associations

The major challenge I faced when I arrived in Kumasi in

January 1992 was how to get in touch with members and

leaders of market trader associations in the city. I went to

the District Office of the Department of Cooperatives for

names of market associations in Rumasi. Unfortunately, the

records at this office did not contain names of market

associations. Fortunately, after reading the local

newspaper, the Pioneer, I came across an article on a

petition submitted to the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority

(EMA) by members of the General Traders Association (GTA) in

the Kumasi Central Market. The petition was signed by the

leaders of the GTA.

I wrote down the name of the secretary of the

association and followed up on him at the Central Market. I

introduced myself to him, and made him.aware that I was

138

interested in researching into the problems they had with

the EMA. Initially he was taken aback, and later, after I

had developed a rapport with him, he revealed

that,

actually he was quite apprehensive of my motives in

conducting the research. He thought I was a "secret" agent

of the state. He revealed on my first encounter with him

that apart from.the petition I followed up, he had copies of

other petitions the association had previously submitted to

the EMA regarding several issues the market traders were

concerned about. These revelations gave me hints that I

could begin my research from.there, and gradually broaden my

network to other traders in the market.

On the second encounter, the secretary of the GTA

introduced me to other leaders of the association, and

explained to them my interest in studying the association,

and its relationship to the EMA. This step was quite

important, in the sense that it ensured the cooperation of

the leaders, who later introduced me to members of the

association. For the uninitiated to the nuances of Ghanaian,

particularly Akan culture, just bumping into people in the

public place, and asking them questions about their personal

and business lives, could breed suspicion and non-

cooperation, as well as contempt for the intruder.

From the records of the GTA, I realized that the

association was the largest single ggttggttygitttgt of

market associations in the Central Market, as well as in the

city. The GTA was the mouthpiece of the traders in the

139

Eumasi Central Market. It had an active membership of about

20,000 traders. Eighty percent of the members of GTA were

women, while the rest (20%) were men. After examining the

files of the association, I had a pretty good sense of its

goals/objectives, as well as the rules/norms governing its

day-to-day operations. These were spelt out in the

association's constitution.

I was formally introduced to members of the association

at their first monthly meeting in January 1992, at the Ghana

National Culture Center in Eumasi, which had enough room for

members, since meeting in the Central Market is virtually

impossible due to the small sizes of the market

stalls/stores. The meeting was preceded by a prayer, and the

president cf the association introduced the agenda for the

meeting. Among the items on the agenda was an introduction

of the researcher. Since I had already been introduced to

him.by the secretary previously, he knew my mission and made

sure the members understood what I was doing, and therefore,

appealed to them to cooperate with.my research. I was given

the opportunity to speak to the group briefly. I expressed

my gratitude for the opportunity to meet them, and their

‘willingness to cooperate with me in the research. However, I

took the opportunity to outline the pertinent aspects of my

research, and gave them assurance that the information they

provide would be used only for academic purposes, and would

be kept confidential.

By the time the second monthly meeting arrived in

140

February 1992, I had successfully selected my fieldwork

assistants, and had provided them.some background

training/orientation to the research processes. I took them

to the meeting, and by permission of the president, I

introduced them to the members of the association who were

at the meeting. This step was important because the

assistants were younger persons who were later going to be

sent out to gather information from relatively older people.

In the Ghanaian culture, respect for relatively older people

is a social value and highly regarded, hence younger persons

could not just go to people older than themselves to ask

them questions pertaining to their personal and business

lives. By introducing them to the group, it provided

"legitimate“ basis for the association's members to

cooperate with them.when they saw them around.

I prepared a survey questionnaire which included

questions on demographic and socio-economic background

characteristics of members of the General Traders

Association. These included questions on age, marital

status, and educational attainment. Questions were also

asked about the history of their businesses, and probed into

traders' assessment of physical and social conditions in the

Central Market, EMA's rent increment policies, and security

and safety in the market. Most important of all, I probed

into their participation in associational activities and

actions vis-a-vis the EMA.

With the help of the five field assistants, I pretested

141

the questionnaire through a random sample of twenty-five

members of the GTA in the Central Market. The intent of this

pretest exercise was to assess the appropriateness and

suitability of the questions. This procedure enabled me to

test the accuracy of the interpretation of the survey

questions from English to the local Asante Twi language.

After the pretest, some of the questions which seemed

inappropriate were dropped, and.meanings of some apparently

difficult concepts were sharpened and clarified.

The assistants also had the opportunity to share their

experiences and observations, as they tried out the pretest

questionnaire. Through these exchanges, I was able to

provide some guidance regarding the next phase of data

collection.

The final version of the survey questionnaire was

administered to a random sample of 200 members of the

General Traders Association. The sample was drawn from

members who attended the monthly meetings, as well as those

in the Central Market. Few of the members of the association

were capable of completing the questionnaire themselves, so

I and the assistants interpreted the questions to them and

wrote down their responses.

The next step of data collection from the GTA.was

interviews with leaders of the association. For these

leaders, I deemed it appropriate to interview them privately

in their stores/stalls at prearranged times in the market.

In order to facilitate free flow of information and

142

exchanges, I tape-recorded the "conversations" I had with

them, with their informed consent. Later, in my own privacy,

I reviewed these conversations and extracted the relevant

information for my present study. The conversations centered

on the leaders' assessment of EMA policies to raise rents

and fees, and the physical and social conditions in the

Central Market, including safety and security. Others

included specific actions taken by the association in the

past (1983-1992) toward the policies of the EMA, and in

response to physical and social conditions in the Central

Market. I interviewed the president, secretary, and

treasurer of the General Traders Association. They were

quite candid with their responses. These leaders cooperated

quite well with the sessions I had with them.

2. State/Local Government Officials

I gathered data from officials of the Eumasi

Metropolitan Authority, who were involved in the design and

implementation of policies that affected market trader

activities in the Central Market. Other officers I targeted

were those in charge of providing physical and social

infrastructure in the market. At the EMA, I interviewed the

Metropolitan Secretary, the City Attorney, and heads of the

health and treasury departments, and the Manager of the

Central Market. The interviews centered on a) EMA's

relationship to the central government; b) the effect of the

Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) on the operations of the

143

EMA; c) administration of the Central Market; d) their

assessment of conditions in the Central Market; e)

facilities EMA provided in the Central Market in the 1984-

1992 period; f) EMA's rent increases, fees for late payment

of rents, fees for tables traders set up inside and outside

their stalls/stores; and g) werld Bank Funds for Central

Market rehabilitation. The next section of the interviews

focused on the relationship between the EMA and the market

associations in the Central Market, particularly the General

Traders Association. I was interested in what the EMA did or

did not do with actions of the market traders to

resist/protest the farmer's policies, such as petitions,

demonstrations, and appeals through highly respected

personalities in the city.

Documentary/Archival Data Gathering

I also used documentary and archival sources to gather

data on the present study.

First, the University of Science and Technology Library

in Eumasi was invaluable to my research. Established since

1960, the library had pertinent books, magazines,

newspapers, and research papers on the subject I was

investigating. These resources were

essential, since the

local press house, the Pioneer, had lost much of its

previous editions in its archives for the 1981-1992 period

due to "search and destroy" tactics of the military

government. I was highly impressed with the up-to-date

144

collection

of local, national, and international newspapers

and magazines in the University Library including the

following:

1) State-owned newspapers:

The Pegple's Daily Graphic,

The Ghanaian Times; The weekly Spectator, and The Mirror.

2) Local private newspapers (for example, The Pioneer),

which covers the Eumasi Metropolis, and 3) The‘West Africa

Magazine, which covers news items from the West African sub-

region.

3) In addition to these documentary sources, I had

access to the relevant records of the Eumasi Metropolitan

Authority for the period of my study (1984-1992). Another

major source of information was the Local Government

Bulletin which is published.monthly by the Ministry of Local

Government. The General Traders Association at the Central

Market also made available to me the few files they had,

which contained information on their activities/actions vis-

a-vis the EMA.

Leaders of the GTA provided historical data on the

association, membership characteristics, structure, and

organizational procedures of the association. The activities

and actions of the association vis-a-vis state/local

government policies, and conditions in the Central Market

were analyzed from a historical perspective; detailing the

issues, and activities of the members of the trader

association in the Central Market.

Simdlarly, the data from the EMA were analyzed from a

145

l

historical perspective, paying particular attention to the

state restructuring processes, and their effect on the

relationship between the EMA and the central government,

EMA's restructuring, and strategies it had adopted to

survive financially in the period of state restructuring.

EMA's relationship with market traders were analyzed with

the help of the historical/archival data, as well as the

information obtained from interviews with officials of the

EMA.

Limitations of the Study

A case study approach was adopted for this present

study. This approach was done on purpose. Previous attempts

to study informal economic activitieshave often used a

cross-sectional approach, a survey of people engaged in the

manufacturing,

distribution, and retailing of goods and

services through self-employment, and outside the sphere of

influence of the state/local government regulations. I

realized this approach, much as it covers a variety of

activities, often led to nowhere in terms of policies to

either promote or limit these activities.

After all, no one policy could deal with all spheres of

informal economy activities. My conviction was that a

focused study of a particular sector of the urban informal

sector, was a better way to provide detailed information on

its activities, and relationship to state/local government

institutions.

146

However, the researcher is aware that such a strategy

limits comparison of market associational activities with

other sectors of the informal economy. Second, by limiting

the study to the Central Market, it does not allow for

comparison with activities of market associations in other

markets in the city, in relationship to the EMA. Similarly,

others may question the applicability and extension of

conclusions of this focused research to other market

associational actions/activities in other Ghanaian cities.

Much as these questions are legitimate, the researcher

had to deal with practical realities of time and resources.

The researcher would make recommendations at the end of the

study for further research into questions that were not

addressed in this research, but which could be quite useful

for comparative purposes. For instance, what is the

relationship of market associations in the Central Market to

market associations in other markets in the city?

How are

the Central Market associational activities/actions

different from associational activities in other markets, or

associations representing other sectors of the urban

informal economy?

Although the findings of this study, and

its conclusions may be useful for comparison with other

traders, they do not reflect on, nor are they meant to

represent all traders in Eumasi, nor all cities in Ghana.

The second limitation was record keeping at both the

EMA and the General Traders Association. Although the EMA is

147

a bureaucratic institution which was expected to have well-

kept records, what I observed was below expectation. Some of

the data, particularly petitions they received from the

market association were missing. I had to rely on

recollections of officers who were in charge of responding

to these petitions. Similarly, record-keeping in the GTA was

quite poor, given the relatively low-level literacy and

educational attainments of the traders. In most cases, I

made follow-up enquiries of the few items I found in the

records, and the leaders had to recollect the information

from.memory, which was not always easy to verify.

Conclusion

I was generally impressed with the outcomes of the

interviews and responses to the survey questionnaire. The

initial contacts I made with the leaders of the General

Traders Association were quite helpful, and abated any

suspicions of my motives and intentions in carrying out this

research. In all instances, I explained to traders the

purpose of study, and assured them of anonymity and

confidentiality. I believe my familiarity with the Eumasi

Metropolis was an asset in undertaking the fieldwork. While

my gender as a male could have hampered my study of market

traders, most of whom were women, my selection of three

women assistants helped to diffuse any negative responses.

Moreover, my knowledge of the cultural, political, and

148

social contexts within which these market traders operated,

provided unique insights which could have escaped a foreign

researcher.

Finally, the data gathered from the foregoing methods

and techniques are used throughout the dissertation; they

are used for the discussion and analysis of the research

questions for the study. Overall, it was a rewarding

fieldwork experience.

CHAPTER SIX

GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND THE STATE VERSUS NATION

DILEMMA IN GHANA

Introduction

This chapter discusses the state versus the nation

dilemma in Ghana within the context of global restructuring.

It argues that the conflict between the state and the civil

society in Ghana cannot be divorced from Ghana's historical

experience(s) as a dependent, peripheral state within the

global system. First, it demonstrates that global

restructuring processes have redefined the structure,

functions, and sources of revenue of state and local

government institutions. Second, it is argued that these

processes have engendered a bone of contention between the

state and the civil society, as exemplified by the conflict

between state/local government institutions and market

traders in Ghana.

The Context of State Restructuring

In April 1983, the Provisional National Defence Council

(PNDC) formally launched its Economic Recovery Program

(ERP), which contained the Structural Adjustment Program

(SAP). Although the policies and programs contained in the

SAP package were presented as a novel idea of the PNDC, it

149

150

was an open secret that they were prepared with the

expertise, and moral and political suasion from the

International Monetary Fund and the WOrld Bank.

The fact

that the PNDC adopted the Economic Recovery Program itself

testifies to the vulnerable and precarious position of

peripheral African states in the global system.

The PNDC came to office through a military coup led by

Flight Lieutenant Rawlings on December 31, 1981. It launched

a "revolution" which was interpreted to mean a radical

change and restructuring of the political, economic, and

social institutions in Ghana.

Politically, the PNDC provided a unique experiment in

'people's power' and a level of spontaneous mass

mobilization not seen since the early days of the

independence struggle. In fact, the aims and tone of the

revolutionary tasks were aptly summarized in the last

paragraph of the PNDC's policy preamble:

The policies projected under the December 31st

Revolution should bear the characteristics of a

genuine National Democratic Revolution. They must

be anti-imperialist, anti-neo-colonialist, and must

aim.at instituting a popular democracy. These policies

must at all times ensure that the national interest is

supreme

[PNDC, Preamble, 1982:81

The political restructuring involved the formation of

grassroots organizations. These were of two types; People's

Defence Committees (PDCs), and.Wbrkers' Defence Committees

(WDCs). PDCs were organized by the community, and WDCs were

formed at the workplace, whether it was part of the Ministry

of Agriculture, a school, a factory, or a unit of the Army,

151

FIGURE 6 . l

People's Defence Committees (PDCs) and

Workers‘ Defence Committees (WDCs). I983

 

Chairman's

National

Defence

 

J.J. Rawlings

 

Chairman

PNDC

 

 

 

Committee

 
  

 

I

National Defence Committee (NDCI

I

 

l NDC inter-departmental Committee

(head: of the six dmrtmcntsl

 

 

  NDC Secretariat

l Regional PDC Secretariat I

 

I

District POC Secretariat

 

l Zonal PDC Secretariat

  

 

Neighbourhood PDC

 

Block POC

Unit PDC

 

WDC s

   

 

 

Source: Donald Ray (1986:67)

 

 

  

152

FIGURE 6 . 2

PNDC Ghana (1 984): Political Structure

=0 PNDC political control

—-l>

Civil Service administrative control

PN DC

(Provisional National Defence Council)

\

/

Chairman     

 

(JJ. Rawlings)

Hsead of

  

  

W

 

”2 mmm’

 

cm.

   

Defence Staff

  

National

Defence

     
  

Committee

 

  

PNDC Special Advisor on

Security and Foreign Affairs

 

 

 

  

National Commission

on Democracy

  

   

(Cabinet)

’

PNDC Coordinating Secretary

 

 

flooioml

 
  

0"“ m PNDC

 

in“

    

PNDC

“0‘0““

Secretaries

       

Secretaries

whim”,

 

L ii

I

Sewflty I

 

 

 

V

II

'

Ministries

  

   

Administrations

 

 

Regional

  
 
   

(I'LQJ

District

Defence

puoc

District

‘-
 

Tribunals

Judieiaryj

 

I 1

 

fl

 
   

 

 

Paoplo‘g

Defence

I Cmmmm I

 

 

  
   

Wm”.

Defence

Committaea

 
  

 

I

District Administrations

I

 

‘

Source:

Donald Ray(1986:67)

 

 

153

Navy or Airforce. In theory, there was a hierarchy of

defence committees that extended from the local unit of the

PDCs with between forty and a hundred members, up to the

National Defence Committee, chaired by the PNDC chairman

(that is, Rawlings), which operated in a democratic

centralist manner. At the lowest level, three to five unit

PDCs composed one Block PDC; three to five of these

constituted one Neighborhood PDC; and three to five of these

made up the Area PDC, which was the effective membership

level.

Three to five Area PDCs were contained in the Zonal PDC

Secretariat which actually organized community projects and

monitored prices of commodities in the locality. Several of

these were formed under the District PDC Secretariat which

corresponded to the administrative districts and provided

the political back-up to the PNDC-appointed political head

of the district administration, the District Secretary. The

District PDC Secretariats in each region were grouped under

their Regional PDC Secretariat, which.was the body in charge.

of the region's political strategy, political education, and

cadre training. The National Defence Committee (NDC)

Secretariat coordinated the administration of the Regional

Secretariats, in particular through the NDC departments: (1)

Education and Research; (2) Information and Press;

(3) Monitoring and Coordination; (4) Administration;

(5) Complaints and Investigation; (6) Projects and Programs.

The Standing Committee of the NDC, consisting of a maximum

153a

of nine members, was the central executive committee of the

structure of PDCs and WDCs. The NDC chaired by the PNDC

Chairman, also acted as a source of policy and political

advance to the PNDC.

Thus, the PDCs and the WDCs were

designed as the primary units by which the December 31st

revolution would promote itself. The PDCs and the WDCs were

to be instruments of popular participation, political

education, channels of communication to and from the

leadership, and political control (Ray, 1986:65-67).

The economic restructuring process as articulated by

the PNDC when it came to power was not clear. In

retrospective, one could argue that, the PNDC had none. In

his radio speeches, Rawlings promised a "merciless struggle“

against such social ills as corruption, fraud, profiteering,

and smuggling. First, the bank accounts of ministers, and

their deputies were frozen by PNDC decree. Each day, new

lists of persons charged with crimes against the state and

the people were published for public consumption. The PNDC

also launched a campaign to eradicate profiteering, which

flourished in the previous regime. Lists of price controls,

violation of which could entail criminal liability, were

published periodically, and prices were monitored by PDCs

and WDCs. New rent legislation, another measure contrary to

free-market economic, was adopted by the PNDC in the

beginning of March, 1982. According to the PNDC, this move

was to protect the interests of the poorest sectors of the

population. Rents were reduced by half of what they were on

154

December Blst, 1981. Breach of the rent law by landlords

became a criminal offence. Landlords could not evict tenants

if the latter paid rent on time (PNDC Laws, 1982, Number 5).

As a result, landlords tried by all means to withhold rental

property, thus creating a housing crisis (Petchenkine,

1993). The rhetoric of populism which had provided the PNDC

room to maneuver in the initial fifteen months was not

enough to overcome the harsh realities of the Ghanaian

economy, which had reached a state of decline and paralysis.

As a matter of fact, as a player in the global system,

the PNDC had limited options in transforming/restructuring

the Ghanaian economy through moral persuasion and populism,

The PNDC inherited an underdeveloped economy which was

almost beyond repair. Between 1975 and 1981, the Ghanaian

economy entered a period of profound crises. To an extent

this reflected sudden adverse developments outside the

immediate control of Ghanaian governments. Rain failures and

drought affected agricultural production at a time of

substantial government commitment to, and investment in food

production. The rise in petroleum.import costs badly

affected overall import capacity: petroleum imports rose in

value from 6.7 percent of total export earnings in 1973 to

almost fifty (50) percent of export earnings in 1981. In

addition to this, generalized inflation on the world market

led to severe import compressions. On the other hand, the

international climate for Ghana's main exports were on the

whole much more favorable than in any period since the early

155

19503. Yet this coincided with a precipitous and continuing

decline in Ghana's entire export structure. Cocoa exports

fell from 397,000 metric tons in 1975 to 246,5000 metric

tons in 1981. Ghana's share of total world production

dropped correspondingly from 24.4 percent in 1974-1975 to

15.4 percent in 1980-81. Also, there were similar declines

of between thirty and sixty percent for mineral and timber

exports. Current account deficits increased from C (cedi) 70

million in 1976 to C419 million in 1981, due at least partly

to higher energy import costs (Hutchful, 1989).

The directions taken by state finances were also

alarming. Total public expenditures rose by 615 percent in

current termm between fiscal years 1975-1976, and 1981-82,

while revenues appreciated by only 56 percent. The total

deficit rose by 690 percent. These state deficits were

covered by heavy borrowing from the Central bank, with the

result that money supply expanded by 933 percent.

The PNDC's Program for Reconstruction and Development

(PRD), introduced in December 1982, was the first statement

of an economic recovery program by the government. On the

face of it, the PRD was the initial phase in a nationalist

and anti-imperialistic strategy of reconstruction. In this

program, 1983 was designated as a period of preparation for

launching a three-year recovery program.(1984-1986) which

would lay the foundations for a 'self—reliant and integrated

national economy'. In the first year, there was to be

restructuring of the basic institutions of the economy, in

156

areas such as import-export trade, internal distribution,

tax and budgetary reform, banking and insurance, and the

establishment of a ‘sound.macro-economic framework' which

would cover fiscal and monetary policy, prices and incomes,

with the objective of rationalizing productive incentives. A

state monopoly was to be instituted in the import/export

trade, and internal distribution of essential commodities

(basic household needs such as soap, milk, sugar, and milk)

was to be taken over by I'People's Shops" under the control

of PDCs. These measures were meant to eradicate trading

malpractice, and attack the economic base of the foreign and

indigenous factions. Thus, the basic tenet of the PRD was

that the economic recovery in Ghana was not intended to be

monetarist; that is, it required the restructuring of

production relations, and sound financial management

(Hutchful, 1989:102).

However, elements within the PNDC and other

‘revolutionary forces‘ failed to obtain aid from the Eastern

bloc, and anti-West sources, such as the Soviet Onion, Cuba,

and Libya. Hence, they had to swallow their pride and seek

aid from.alternative sources such as the WOrld Bank, and the

International Monetary Fund (IMF). This shift in policy, one

would argue, derailed the PNDC's initial economic

‘revolution', as it succumbed to rightewing, neo-liberal

economic policies under the general term, Structural

Adjustment Program (SAP).

157

The Structural Adjustment Prgggam (SAP)

The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) is a neo-

classical economic approach ostensibly designed to solving

the problems of underdevelopment in peripheral countries. It

is championed by the core countries, particularly in the

West, and financed through the WOrld Bank and the

International Monetary Fund. Essentially, the SAP is

predicated upon the ideology of the supremacy of “free“

market, and the elimination of centralized state economic

planning.

According to this school of thought, the root causes of

economic crises in the periphery, Ghana in particular lay in

state control of the economy, and very little, if any role

for markets, prices, and the private sector. In other words,

the problem.of economic development in the periphery is one

of faulty monetary policies, characterized by strong role of

peripheral states in the economy. The prescription that

follows such prognosis advocates greater reliance on “free"

markets, and minimum.state intervention in the economy. It

involves reduced government spending, currency devaluation,

reduction of imports and escalation of exports, and the

primacy of the private sector. The WOrld Bank's own

conceptualization of the economic crises in Ghana was as

follows:

158

Ghana's economy has suffered tremendously for over a

decade. This long neglect has brought the economy to a

stage where instantaneous or quick remedies cannot be

expected to work. A carefully phased program of

adjustment has to be initiated with short, medium, and

long term goals and supporting policy actions and

institutional changes. While the needs of the economy

are enormous, available resources and economic

management capacity are limited. The external

environment, especially the outlook for the country's

major export commodity, cocoa, is extremely poor.

At the same time, the chronic political instability of

the past has generated deeply-ingrained attitudes of

skepticism.and indifference among the main economic

agents. Outside the country, other developing nations

compete for the limited amount of concessional

external assistance. One of the criteria for

allocating external assistance is past economic

performance and management, because of its track

record, the perception of Ghana among bilateral donors

and multilateral agencies has unfortunately not been

very positive. Any acceleration in the flow of

external assistance is likely to be gradual and will

be based on Ghana's ability to demonstrate measurable

progress in economic performance

[Wbrld Bank,

1984:34].

In addition, the WOrld Bank identified the objective of

the adjustment program as:

to reverse the trend of declining per capita incomes

through better overall economic management leading

Ghana's economy to a stage from.where it can sustain

more rapid economic growth.

The process of adjusomont will entail three different

phases (a) stabilization phase, (b) rehabilitation

phase, and (c) liberalization and growth phase. While

the stabilization phase will primarily attempt to

restore macro balances, it will still contain elements

of liberalization in so far as it affects relative

prices. The emphasis in the rehabilitation phase would

be on improved utilization and greater efficiency in

the use of existing resources while in the

liberalization and growth phases new investment would

form.the basis.

It is expected that the first phase should result in

reduction in price distortions, the second in

improving the capacity utilization of existing capital

assets, and the third in trade liberalization and

minimizing Government intervention

[Wbrld Bank,

1984:34].

159

The foregoing statements from the WOrld Bank regarding

the diagnosis of the Ghanaian economic crises, and

prescriptions to solve the problems, clearly contradicted

the PNDC's own diagnosis and prescription for solving the

economic problems of Ghana. How and why the PNDC accepted

the perspectives of the WOrld Bank attests to the dilemma of

peripheral states in the global system, The PNDC's economic

pragmatism, fortuitously combined with rhetoric of populist

assertion, had to strike a balance between domestic

aspirations and international objectives to allow for a new

initiative to achieve national economic recovery. Thomas

Callaghy points out how critical this reconciliation is for

 

peripheral states:

The ability of Third WOrld governments to engage in

sustained economic adjustment----caught as they are

between strong and often contradictory internal and

external pressures and economic and political logics

--depends in large part on the technocratic and

bureaucratic capabilities of the state apparatus and

the ability of leaders to use these capabilities

effectively. This means coping with the complex

two-level negotiating 'games”---—economic and political

games played simultaneously at domestic and

international levels [Callaghy, 1989:20].

In the case of Ghana, there are three phases of the

Economic Recovery Program (ERP) or SAP. The goals of the ERP

I (1984-86,) were stated by the government:

a) to arrest and reverse the decline in production,

especially in agriculture; b) to control inflation; c) to

stimulate exports and curb the consumption of luxury

imports; d) rehabilitate the ruined productive and social

160

infrastructure; and mobilize both domestic and foreign

resources to restore the living standards of Ghanaians

(Government of Ghana, 1987:3).

The goals of ERP II (1987-1989) were stated as:

a) to ensure substantial economic growth at around 5

percent per annum; b) to stimulate substantial increases in

the levels of saving and investment; c) to place the balance

of payments on a sounder footing; and improve public sector

management. The ultimate goal was to create a "growth-

oriented, competitive, efficient, and integrated economy"

(Government of Ghana, 1987: p.i.).

The goals of ERP III (1989-1993) were focused on

liberalization and economic growth. It aimed at reducing

inflation, generating balance-of—payments surplus, promoting

private investment, and promoting growth in the agricultural

sector (Development GAP, 1992).

Since its inception, the ERP/SAP in Ghana has been "the

realignment of the price and incentive system in the economy

in favor of the productive, particularly export, sectors"

(Government of Ghana, 1989:2). The first phase of the

Program (1983-1986) concentrated on halting the decline in

industrial production and commodity export. The second phase

(1987-1989) focused on economic development. The ERP/SAP has

also emphasized efforts to restore fiscal and monetary

discipline, to encourage both savings and investments, as

'well as to lessen the overhang of domestic and international

imbalances. To implement this, the state and its

161

institutions were to be reorganized and, where necessary,

reduced in size and function. In place of an over-concern

with regulating every aspect of economic relations

(something that was bound to prove ineffective under the

conditions of weak state capacity prevailing in the country

at that time), the bureaucracy, it was hoped, would

concentrate on

rehabilitating Ghana's productive and social

infrastructure (Government of Ghana, 1988:11).

Fiscal Crisis of the State1

One of the consequences of the ERP/SAP in Ghana has

been a debt crisis of the Ghanaian state. In its quest for

economic recovery, Ghana has drawn upon every funding

mechanism available at the World Bank, and the International

Monetary Fund. By the end of 1990 the government had

contracted over US$1.75 billion in Bank loans and credits.

In fact, by 1988 Ghana was the third largest recipient in

the world of credit from the International Development

Association (IDA), the Bank's soft-loan window. Only India

and China, with a combined population of two billion,

received more than Ghana, whose population is only 15

million. IMP funding under the ERP has totalled over US$1.35

billion, and total financial resources from bilateral and

multilateral sources amounted to US$8 billion over the first

seven years of the program, making Ghana one of the most

favored aid recipients in the developing world (Development

GAP, 1991:22).

162

TABLE

6.1

TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT OF GHANA

[03$ MILLION, UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED]

 

1970

1980

1985

1987

1990

1991

1992

Total

-

1,407

2,226

3,262

3,296

4,209

4,275

Long-Term

521

1,171

1,337

2,276

2,705

2,992

3,131

Debt

Use of IMF

Credit

46

105

701

867

745

834

740

Short-Term

-

131

189

119

312

384

404

Debt

 

Source:

The World Bank. 1994. W.

p. 171.

163

Table 6.1 shows the debt status of Ghana from 1970 to

1992. It shows that in 1992, Ghana's external debt reached

US$4.2 billion.

Between 1980 and 1992, there was 203

percent increase in Ghana's external debt. Long-term debt

accounted for the largest proportion of Ghana's external

debt (73%), followed by IMF credit facilities (17%). Short-

term debt accounted for 10% of Ghana's external debt in

1992. The data indicate that since the ERP and Structural

Adjustment Programs were initiated in 1983, Ghana's

indebtedness to the international community has worsened.

However, external indebtedness under the ERP and SAP

regime has had some consequences for Ghana. Essentially, it

created a corresponding debt service burden for the Ghanaian

government. Table 6.2

shows the total external debt ratios

for Ghana. In 1980, the net value of total external debt was

236.2 percent of total exports. This remained the same for

1992. The net value of the external debt was 41. 2 percent

of the Gross National Product, but declined in 1992 to 39.1

percent.

State Policy Responses

In the face of debt and debt service burden, Ghanaian

officials have undertaken policy measures to correct the

fiscal imbalances through restoration of the tax base to

generate increased revenues, as well as intensify austerity

measures such as reduced spending for social/community

services.

164

TABLE (L2

TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT RATIOS OF GHANA

 

Net present value of external debt as % of

 

Exports

GNP

 

 

1930

1992

1980

1992

 

236.2

236.0

41.2

39.1

 

Source: The world Bank, 1994 Eorld_ne!elonnent_ncncrti

P. 206.

164

165

Increased Tax Revenues

Since 1983, tax revenue has risen as a proportion of

Gross Domestic Product(GDP), reaching a peak of 12.7 percent

in 1987, before declining to 11.6 percent in 1990 [Table

6.3

shows Central Government Revenue and Grants]. This

increase reflected the combined effects of tax policy

changes, improvements in tax administration and enforcement.

The composition of tax revenue has changed significantly

over the period of the economic recovery program; individual

income taxation and export taxes now generate a

significantly smaller share of revenue than in 1983, while

corporate income tax and indirect taxes on imports and

domestic commodities accounted for a larger proportion of

revenue. The share of corporate tax revenue doubled, from

just under 9 percent of total revenue in 1983 to 18 percent

in 1988 (IMF, 1991).

Reduced Expenditures

One of the priorities of the economic recovery program

was to restore discipline in government finances. To this

end, in 1983, the first year of implementation of the

adjustment strategy, the budget deficit was reduced from 6.3

percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1982 to 2.7

percent of GDP, primarily through a contraction in

government spending from 10.2 percent of GDP to 8.0 percent.

This lower spending level was significantly below the

budgeted level of 9.5 percent of GDP and was necessitated by

166

TABLE

6 . 3

Central Government Revenue and Grants. I975-9I

 

I975

I980

I983

I984

I985

I986

I987

I988

I989

I990

I99I

Budget

Tax revenue

Direct taxes

Individual

Corporate

Other

Taxes on domestic goods and

(In percem of total revenue and grants)

89.8

90.6

82.6

79.2

80.7

84.5

85.5

84.0

8L4

82.2

84.4

20.6

26.0

l8.0

l8.2

l9.2

l9.2

2|.7

26.3

2L4

20.6

8.5

ll.8

I l.3

I4.2

0.8

0.!

8.6

8.8

0.6

7.3

7.6

7.2

7.4

7.2

5.7

6.5

l0.6

I0.8

I l.3

I3.0

l8.0

I4.6

I2.7

0.3

0.7

0.7

L4

LI

[.0

L4

l6.9

5.2

l0.8

l.0

services

l6.7

47.3

I5.9

24.6

22.3

26.6

23.6

25.2

24.3

26.8

36.9

General sales

5.7

6.7

2.3

L9

2.9

4.3

7.5

Excise except petroleum

I0.S

4| .l

I3.6

22.6

l7.9

l3.4

ll.5

Petroleum

—

—

-

—

l.5

9.0

4 5

8.0

9.7

7.4

8.3

8.9

7.0

8.8

8.6

9.5

Taxes on international trade and

»

transactions

52.5

I 7. I

48.7

36.4

39.3

38.7

40.2

32.5

35.7

34.7

Import duties

Export duties

Non-tax revenue

Grants

Tax reveme

Direct taxes

Taxes on domestic goods

”.2

l6.3

I9.3

(4.0

l6.3

l9.3

l6.0

I6.6

2|.0

24.6

35.3

l0.l

0. I

l3.8

3 2

0.8

8.0

L4

7.4

2|

28.6

22.0

22.8

l9.3

24.2

l5.9

I4.6

I0.2

I6.9

l6.8

l5.3

l0.3

0.6

4.0

4.0

5.3

9.|

5.4

8.5

7.5

8.7

9.9

7.4

NA

(In percem of GDP)

4.6

l.0

6.6

l.5

9.5

2.3

I2.2

I2.7

l2.3

I2.3

I L6

2.8

3.2

3.9

3.2

2.9

.

7.3

7.9

2|.7

30.6

20.2

I0.3

6.8

8.7

l3.8

2 8

and services

2.6

3.8 .

0.9

2.I

2.6

3.8

3.5

3.7

3.7

3.8

6.0

Taxes on international trade and

transactions

Non-tax revenue

Grants

Total reverue and grants

Memorandum items

Total revenue and grants (broad)

Grants (broad)

8.I

L6

—

l5.4

—

—

L4

0.6

0.I

8.I

-

—

2.7

0.9

-

5.6

5.6

—

3.0

L4

0.3

8.4

8.8

0.7

4.6

l.8

0.5

5.6

l.5

0.8

6.0

L4

0.8

4.8

L2

H

5.4

L3

(.5

4.9

I.0

LS

5.0

|.I

I.4

I I.7

l4.4

l4.9

I4.6

l5.l

I4.I

l6.3

I2.4

l5.9

l6.7

l6.I

I6.8.

I5.8

‘

I8. I

I. l

2.2

2.6

2.5

3.2

3.2

3.2

 

chu:DanprovidedbytheGMuianamnues;sttafleathntes.

Source: Internatiaalmtaty Fund.

19913 20-

167

TABLE 614"

Central Government Expenditure and Net Lending. I975-9|

 

 

I975

I980

I983

I984

I985

I986

I987

I988

I989

I990

I99I

Budget

Total expenditure

94.6

96.7

97.2

97. I

95.6

96.4

95.5

96.0

96.2

96.4

96.9

Current expenditure

75.I

82.2

89.4

84.9

80.3

83.0

75.3

74.I

72.8

75.I _

74.7

Economic Classification

(In percent of total expenditure and net lending)

Goods and services

50.2

48.4

47.9

56.9

57.4

57.5

56.5

56.7

54.8

54.5

Wages and salaries

30.I

28.5

24.7

I9.2

30.3

35.7

33.6

33.0

30.8

3 I .2

Other goods and services

20.I

l9.9

23.2

37.7

27.0

2|.7

22.9

23.7

24.0

23.4

Interest payments

6.I

I2.8

l4.5

|2.5

|0.6

I5.5

Subsidies and transfers

I3.7

2| .0

27.0

|5.S

I2.3

|0.0

9.9

9.0

8.0

9.4

9.2

8.8

|0.3

l0.2

Capital expenditure

|9.S

I4.4

7.9

I2.3

|5.2

|3.4

l7.3

l9.9

I8.7

I8.3

Special efficiency

Net lending

—

5.4

-

3.3

Total expenditure

2| .7

|9.|

Current expenditure

I7.2

l6.3

Capital expenditure

4.5

2.9

Total expenditure and net lending

22.9

20.0

—

2.8

8.0

7.4

0.6

8.2

—

2.9

9.9

8.6

L2

—

4.4

—

3.6

2.8

4.5

2.0

4.0

4.7

3.8

3.0

3.6

(In percent of GDP)

|3.3

l3.8

I3.7

I3.7

I3.9

l3.5

I |.2

”.9

I08

|0.6

I0.5

|0.5

2.I

L9

2.5

2.8

2.7

2.5

I0.2

|4.0

I4.3

I4.3

I4.3

I4.4

l4.0

Memorandum items

Capital expenditure (broad)

Total expenditure (broad)

—

-

—

—

0.6

8.2

L9

3.3

5.0

5.4

5.8

5.|

5.0

I H

l5.4

I9.2

l9.|

l8.9

l8.9

|8.I

General public services

25.8

2|.0

26.4

24.9

2|.3

20.8

l9.3

22.0

l9.3

Functional Classification

(In percent or total central government upmdimre)

Defense

Education

Health

Social security and welfare

Housing and community ameni-

ties

Other community and social

7.8

6.3

4.6

6.0

7.5

6.5

6.5

3.2

3.I

20.6

I7.I

' 20.4 .

20.2

l8.0

23.9

23.9

25.7

24.3

8.3

| LG

—

6.4

7.2

—

4.4

4.3

|.7

8.6

4.2

2.I

9.8

5.0

2.0

8.3

5.3

L9

8.3

6.4

L9

9.0

l0.l

6.9

3.5

7.3

2.6

services

3.9

3.I

L8

2.2

I.5

L7

L7

I.5

2.0

Economic servicesa

|6.2

22.7

2|.6

l8.9

23.8

|5.4

I8.6

|7.9

l6.9

Interest on public debt

6.5

l3.2

I4.9

I2.8

I |.I

l6.I

I0.4

Special efficiency

-

_.

—

-

2.9

8.3

2.I

9.5

4.9

54.2

30.4

23.8

I0.7

9.8

I9.0

3.2

3.I

|4.0

l0.8

2.8

l4.5

5.9

l9.3

 

Sources: Data provided by the Ghanaian authorities; and MF staff urinates

'Data for I975 and I980 are on a fiscal year base (year ending Harem; from I983 onward the fiscal year coincides with the calender year.

"MW services for agriculture. forestry and fish-rug. mg. manufacturing and construction. roads. and other tramport and commutation.

Soiree: International mtary fund, 1991:21

168

a shortfall in government revenue (IMF, 1991:30). Table 6.4

shows Central Government Expenditure and Net Lending, 1975-

1991. Total expenditure as a percentage of the Gross

Domestic Product was 21.7 in 1975. In 1983, when the SAP was

introduced, it was reduced to only 8.0 percent of the GDP.

However, in the 1991 budget, it was projected to be around

14.0 percent of the GDP.

Apart from the increased tax revenues and discipline in

expenditures, state restructuring has also involved

privatization of state enterprises, retrenchment of workers

in civil and public services. and local government

restructuring.

Privatization of State Enterprises

Privatization of state enterprises is based on the fact

that many of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had been

created for political purposes, and therefore they performed

poorly as commercial enterprises. For instance, between 1980

and 1982, the deficits of Ghanaian public enterprises were

around 0.2-3.3 percent of Gross National Product (Swanson

and WOlde-Semait, 1989:31). In 1982 alone, SOEs received

approximately thirteen percent of total government

expenditure in the form.of subsidies, equity contributions,

and capital grants, and by 1984 this figure had almost

doubled to twenty-five percent of total expenditures (Ada,

1989:307).

169

Thus, state enterprise restructuring had two principal

objectives. First, it was aimed at reducing state

involvement in the productive sector, and also ease the

state of financial and managerial burden. Second, for those

enterprises in which the state continued to participate, the

goal was to improve their efficiency, profitability, and

managerial accountability.

Since 1983, more than thirty SOEs have been lined up

for divestiture wholly or partly. These include the State

Fishing Corporation, Food Production Corporation, State

Farms Corporation, and forty-two Cocoa Board coffee and

cocoa plantations. The response to the divestiture program

in Ghana has not been encouraging. The absence of a dynamic

entrepreneurial class in the private sector, as well as

harassment of private indigenous investors by past

mdlitary/civilian governments, has created a credibility

problem.for potential indigenous and international

investors, and therefore, the privatization process has not

been as successful as expected.

Privatization and Rationalization of Social Services

State provision of essential social services for the

public from the taxes the former collected from the latter

had been a traditional practice for a long time.

For instance, free and compulsory public education was

one of the hallmarks of the first President, Dr. Kwame

Nkrumah. Through this practice, many Ghanaians from poor

170

families had the opportunity to receive good education from

the primary to the university level. However, as the

economic crises of the 19703 and 1980s caught up with all

state institutions, education was not spared. By 1980,

education was taking around twenty percent of government's

total recurrent expenditure. However, under the regime of

adjustment, SAP required external funding, and donors were

not likely to provide additional resources for the

educational sector without refomms within the educational

sector. Consequently, the structure and financing of

education underwent some changes.

First, the structure of the national educational system

was changed from seventeen years of preuniversity schooling,

that is six years of primary, four years of middle, and five

years of junior secondary, and two years of senior secondary

school education before entering the university. The new

structure required twelve years, that is six years of

primary, three years of junior secondary, and three years of

senior education (Dei, 1993). According to the WOrld Bank

and Ghanaian education officials, the rationale was to

release more resources to improve both access to, and

quality of education, especially at the basic level.

Second, the reforms also introduced user fees for

primary school services, equipment, and laboratories (for

example, health services fees, sports and recreational fees,

textbook and stationery fees), parent-teacher association

fees, and room and board charges for institutions of higher

171

learning. The state was to cut down on recurrent

expenditures on staff, staff training, and textbooks. The

latter action was based on WOrld Bank conceptualization of

the educational problems in Ghana as largely due to

administrative inefficiency, and the increased involvement

of the state in running the educational system, As Dei

(1993) points out, no adequate attention was given to the

fact that deplorable national economic conditions and

poverty of many people accounted in large measure for many

of the educational problems.

Through these measures, the state sought to remove the

traditional responsibility of financing education from the

collective whole (that is, the state) to the individual. The

state has committed itself to privatization of the

educational system, particularly the post-secondary levels,

by making parents contribute more toward their children's

education. Given the increasing impoverishment of ordinary

Ghanaians in the 1980s (Hooper, 1990; Anyinam, 1989; Dei,

1992), such measures have consequences for educational

equity and accessibility. These measures took place at a

time when the SAP recommendations included "getting the

prices right" and aligning domestic prices with

international price structures. The costs of textbooks and

stationery for students, teachers, and researchers are

beyond the reach of the average Ghanaian salaried worker or

farmer or trader. Not only have salaries/wages of workers

fallen, but also they do not reflect actual purchasing

172

power. For example, on my visit to Ghana in 1992, a basic

science textbook in the senior secondary school cost between

C10,000-C20,000 (about $50-$100), while the daily minimum

wage was C200 ($1.00). This was complicated by the fact that

there was massive retrenchment in the job market.

The state has also restructured the financing of health

care in Ghana, and invariably privatized it. Prior to the

SAP, Ghanaians enjoyed free medical care. Although there was

a two-tier system.of health care, the private and public

systems, most Ghanaians in cities and towns, could utilize

the latter within their localities. Under the regime of

adjustment, however, and for the first time in Ghana's

history, health care provision was privatized. In 1985, the

PNDC government introduced a range of fees for hospitals and

clinic consultations and laboratory tests. The basic fee for

an adult to consult with a doctor was from two-thirds to a

full day's minimum.wage (C50-C75 in 1985, excluding a

minimum.of 56 percent additional in allowances).

Although

the clearly destitute supposedly do not have to pay fees,

fee collection efforts are insistent. Initial consultation

fees by 1987 were C200, almost two days of minimmmuwage. An

inpatient is required to make a Cl,500 initial deposit

against costs, about ten days of a minimum wage worker's

earnings. As one scholar has reported, some patients

sometimes abscond to avoid payments of hospital fees (Kraus,

1991).

i

To add insult to injury, the privatization of education

173

and health services occurred at the same time that the

state, with the recommendation of the WOrld Bank,

retrenched workers in the civil/public sector of the state

bureaucracy.

Retrenchment of Civil and.Public Service‘florkers

As part of the downsizing of state institutions, over

300,000 workers in civil and public services as well as

State-Owned Enterprise (SOEs) have lost their jobs.

According to state officials, the rationale for the

retrenchment was to remove redundant workers, necessitated

by the twin problems of low productivity and low incomes on

the one hand, and the size of public expenditure, on the

other. The exercise was executed according to guidelines

issued from the Office of the Head of the Civil Service

(DECS) I namely 3

a) eliminate officers whose work and conduct have been

persistently negative;

b) save officers whose work and conduct have been

persistently positive and cannot be dispensed with

without serious detriment;

c) dispense with officers handicapped by physical

infirmity;

.

d) eliminate officers engaged over and above approved

establishment schedules;

e) include officers who are willing to retire

voluntarily;

f) consider officers who are on secondment elsewhere

who can be dispensed with;

g) use the "last come, first go“ strategy, if it comes

to the crunch, that is, if above figures do not

produce target figures;

174

h) include officers whose qualifications were proven

to be false (as quoted in Jonah, 1992:142-143).

State downsizing in the form.of retrenchment has had

far-reaching consequences for the survival of the affected

workers. One reaction bears witness to its toll on

individual‘workers:

The 12,000 employees of Ghana Cocoa Board

(Cocobod) who are to be made redundant are not

happy with the way in which the government is

trying to rush through the exercise. The

Secretary-General of the Trades union Congress

(TUC) told the Ghana News.Agenoy that the

affected.workers had.begun receiving their

redundancy letters even though negotiations on

their entitlements were still going on.

'How on earth can the government drive these

workers out of employment into the streets

'without paying them.anything to sustain them.in

the harsh conditions that prevail today?, he

asked (Nest Africa, 2-8 August, 1983: 1356).

The reaction of urban workers was generally hostile to

the retrenchment policy. While some of the redundancies may

have been necessary in the context of reducing public

sector expenditure, workers demanded that the PNDC should

not make employees redundant without the existence of

realistic programs to redeploy them” For example, in 1986,

the explosive nature of this question was demonstrated by an

accident at the Hall of the Trade Unions in Accra. Following

the arrest of several union leaders because of their vocal

opposition to the redundancy program, an estimated 1,000

armed police personnel surrounded the TUC Hall to control a

crowd of workers which had gathered to express their

displeasure (Africa Events, 1986:15). Eventually, the

175

leaders were released, but the government went ahead with

the retrenchment policy, anyway.

In 1987, the PNDC established a "Program of Action to

Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment" (PAMSCAD)

ostensibly to help redeployed and retrenched workers, as

well as the poor, rural and urban centers in Ghana. Four

main categories of projects were designed for implementation

under the PAMSCAD, namely; (a) Community Initiative Projects

that were intended to enable communities to design and

implement projects that would help to rehabilitate their

social and economic infrastructure; (b) Mt,

Generation Projects, mostly food for work and public works

projects to provide employment for the urban and rural

unemployed; (c) Basic needs related projects at the

grassroots level in such areas as housing, water, sanitation

health, and nutrition; (d) §pecial Projects fgr Reggplgzed

workers. These were projects that were meant to update the

skills of workers to conform.to the needs of the Civil and

Public Services. These included literacy training, computer

workshops, and group projects (ILO, 1989). The world Bank

and the IMF pledged US$84 million to cover the cost of the

program,

Although the PAMSCAD

is often cited as if it is

already addressing the social costs of adjustment, the ILO

(1989) found out that the Projects had hardly taken off, and

had a

number of problems. Donors were slow in converting

their pledges to funds for disbursement, partly because of

176

the complicated requirements by Donors, and partly because

some of the preparatory work prior to funding had not been

done. The reality then was that only very few programs were

actually being delivered, and only a small proportion of the

needed aid funds were available. The ILO concluded:

Accordingly, the plight of the poor and the vulnerable

remained unattended to. It is a matter for regret that

with such large external funds being released for the

economic program, it has not been possible for both

Government and donors to streamline aid disbursement

procedures so that the relatively "small funds“ needed

to address the social dimension of adjustment could be

available (1989:24).

Generally, preliminary investigations indicate that

while some twenty percent of retrenched workers left for the

countryside to engage in agricultural activities, majority

of them entered the urban informal economy as either micro-

business

entrepreneurs or laborers. By the mid—1980s, it

was estimated that the burgeoning informal economy accounted

for about eighty-five percent of employment in Ghana, up

from sixty percent in 1980s, and fifty percent in the 19703,

respectively (Jonah, 1989:15).

The foregoing has outlined some of the effects of state

restructuring processes in Ghana since the SAP was

implemented. It demonstrates that the initial impact of the

SAP has been quite drastic for many a Ghanaian; devaluation

of the Ghanaian currency, retrenchment within public sector

employment, and general economic hardship in the society

have been quite stressful for both workers and the poor. The

next section addresses how the SAP has redefined central-

177

local government relationships, and its implications for the

civil society.

Central-Locgl Government Relationship

Central-local government relationship has also been

affected by the restructuring processes in Ghana. In the

pre-SAP period, local governments depended quite heavily on

central government transfers and subventions. For instance,

between 1950 and 1960, government transfers accounted for

about forty percent of the total revenue of local

governments. In fact, until 1985, the Central government was

fully responsible not only for local government employees'

salaries, but also provided funds for community development

at the local level.

But effective July 1985, local governments were

required to take over fifty percent of the salaries of their

employees. The PNDC Budget Statement and Economic Policy for

1985 stated:

Government has decided to restore the traditional

system of self-reliance in financial management by

local bodies. These bodies used to meet their expenses

on schools, labor, maintenance and salaries of local

staff out of their own revenues. The transfer of

responsibility back to them will be phased to ease

adjustment. Local authorities will start paying

overtime expenses from April 1, 1985, fifty percent

of the salary expenses from July 1, 1985, and assume

full responsibility later in 1985 (Budget Statement,

1985:22).

However, the official rhetoric/explanation for this

change in the central-local government fiscal relationship

was that it would encourage local governments to be more

178

responsible toward their local communities. However, it

could be interpreted as a strategy on the part of the

central government to reduce state expenditures for public

services, as well as oblige local authorities to seek

alternative sources of revenue to provide services to their

communities.

How have local government institutions responded to

this new challenge within the context of state restructuring

in Ghana?

Local Government Response

Local governments were originally set up to fulfill

several functions, but they generally fall into three major

categories: environmental, protective, and personal

services. ‘Environmental Services' are designed to secure

g and improve the residents' surroundings, including public

health services, such as prevention of diseases, and water

pollution. ‘Protective services' relate to local authority

police force. They are expected to safeguard public order,

and safety of persons and property within their

administrative areas. ‘Personal services' which local

governments provide are meant to promote the general well-

being of residents.

Local authorities need money to pay for services which

they are legally required to provide, and for services which

they themselves plan. However, the fundamental problem.which

faces local governments is how to provide this money to meet

179

the cost of these services without imposing too high a

burden on their

residents, and without becoming too

dependent upon grants from the central government, and

thereby losing much of their freedom of choice in the

planning of their budgets, and in the way they execute their

plans. In the period preceding the SAP, the main sources of

revenue of local authorities in Ghana were:

a) licenses, permits, dues, charges, and fees specified by

the local authority's by-laws;

b) land revenue and rents derived from letting and leasing

of any building or land owned by the local authority;

c) proceeds of annual levies imposed on all persons above

the age of eighteen years who reside within the jurisdiction

of local authority;

d) interests from invested funds of the local authority;

a) all fees, fines, penalties, amounts and costs in respect

of offences committed within the jurisdictions of the local

authorities; f) loans; and central government subventions

(grants-in-aid).

The contradiction in the restructuring process was that

while the central government was "rolling back" its

responsibilities to society, it increased the role of local

governments in community development, but without the level

of financial support it used to provide the latter to

fulfill their functions. For instance, the 1988 Local

Government Law empowered local governments to assume wide-

ranging functions. They were charged with providing

180

infrastructure for community development such as schools,

roads, and markets.

The 1988 Local Government Law empowered local

authorities to generate revenues for their operations mainly

from their communities, as a means to reduce their

dependence on the central government. It provided a broad-

range of sources of revenues from the local community:

1.

Income Tax (Registration of Trade, Business, Profession

and Vocation);

2.

Fee-related revenues from.activities such as market

trade, and local restaurants;

3.

License-related sources of revenue such as hawkers,

local distillers, herbalists, and self-employed artisans

(Local Government Law, 1988:56-58).

The responsibility for the assessment and enforcement of

fees and licenses were left to the discretion of local

authorities, with prior approval by the Ministry of Local

Government.

In addition to new revenue-generating strategies, local

governments have retrenched some of their workers in keeping

with central government policy to reduce the size of the

labor force in public institutions. Realistically, it is a

strategy to reduce the financial burdens of local

governments within the context of state restructuring and

limited financial resources. Retrenchment of local

government workforce will tend to have an effect on their

capacity to provide adequate services for their local

181

communities. In particular, the retrenchment exercise will

affect the extent to which local governments will be able to

provide adequate maintenance for local markets.

Local Government in the RumasiiMetropolis

In 1924, the colonial administrators established the

Kumasi Sanitary Board (KSB) as its first formal local

government institution in the region. Hitherto, a Sanitary

Committee had been set up to concern itself with improving

'the environment by improving street drainage and drinking

water, and constructing incinerators and latrines

(washrooms) [Adubofour, 1977; Tordoff, 1965]. The Kumasi

Sanitary Board continued the work of the Sanitary Committee:

it was aimed at improving the urban environment. especially

in terms of public health and welfare. It appointed educated

Ghanaians as public health officers who visited schools, and

homes to educate people about personal hygiene and waste

disposal. The services provided by the KSB were financed by

the colonial government. The reason was quite simple: the

EurOpeans were as much concerned with outbreaks of plague

and yellow fever emanating from “native housing areas" as to

increase the welfare of the indigenous population.

Similarly, early housing policies tended to be based on

sanitation requirements rather than on space and occupancy

standards. This "Sanitation Syndrome" (Swanson, 1976) made

the European administrators pay for health and environment

services from central government coffers.

182

The Eumasi Sanitary Board was replaced in 1925 by the

Kumasi Public Health Board (KPHB). It comprised of four

official members who were appointed by the Chief

Commissioner for Ashanti Region, and five African unofficial

members. The latter were nominated by both the Chief

Commissioner for Ashanti and the Eumasi Divisional Council,

which represented the local Ashanti chiefs. The KPHB had

more wide-ranging powers to initiate, and implement

policies/regulations on public health. It was responsible

for public parks, cemeteries, slaughter houses, and general

sanitation in schools and homes.

The Eumasi Town Council (KTC) replaced the Kumasi

Public Health Board in 1943. For the first time, the

principle of elected members was introduced. The KTC was

made up of six elected members (each representing one of the

six wards into which Eumasi was divided), three official

members nominated by the Chief Commissioner for the Ashanti

Region, two members from the Chamber of Commerce. For the

first time, the local government institution was charged

with more responsibilities beyond public health and

sanitation. It was charged with the responsibility to levy

taxes from people in the community, and license professions

and business, as well as control buildings through zoning

policies. It promoted community development, and was

instrumental in the construction of public schools and

markets, roads, cemeteries, and slaughter houses. The

presence of a representative the Chamber of Commerce on the

183

TABLE

6.5

PROFILE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT IN KUMRSI

l. COLONIAL PERIOD

1924-1925

The Kumasi Sanitary Board

1925-1943

The Kumasi Public Health Board

1943-1953

The Kumasi Town Council

2. POST-COLONIAL PERIOD

1953-1962

The Kumasi Municipal Council

1962—1989

The Eumasi City council

1989

Thelnmesilunznpokunn.memhly

 

Sources:

Government of Ghana, Ghana Enguiryiinto the Affairs

of the Kumasi City Council, 1970.

Government of Ghana, Local Government Bulletin, 1988.

184

Council was indicative of the influence of the indigenous

and European bourgeois class in the city.

The Eumasi Municipal Council (KMC) replaced the Eumasi

Town Council in 1953. The Municipal Council Ordinance of

1953 broadened the membership of local governments, and

emphasized the elective principle. In all, twenty-four

members were selected from the wards of the city, which was

a broader representation of the residents of the city

compared with the previous local government institution, the

Kumasi Town Council. The KMC assumed.both

legislative and

executive powers; it passed bye-laws and enforced and

implemented them through its office outlets in Kumasi. These

bye-laws invariably affected all aspects of the residents'

lives, including birth registration, sanitation, education,

lorry parks, noise, security, business, death registration,

and cemeteries.

The Kumasi Municipal Council was succeeded by the

Kumasi City Council (KCC) in 1962. The composition,

functions, and powers of the KCC were all determined by

dynamics of national politics in Ghana. This accounts for

changes that took place within the ICC from 1965 to 1988, a

period during which the KCC went through patterns of

elections, suspensions, and interimimanagement committees.

For instance, the KCC was suspended by the Nkrumah state in

March 1965, and its functions were transferred to an Interbm

Management Committee. A new council was elected in October,

1965, and operated until February 24, 1966, when the first

185

military coup ended its operations.

From.1966-l969, the military government appointed

military personnel to head the Interim Management Committee

of the Kumasi City Council. The return to civilian rule in

the 1969-1972 period brought back the elective principle

regarding membership into the KCC. The KCC was

reconstituted, as the electorate had the opportunity to

elect their own twenty-four representatives to the Council.

But this did not last long when it was disbanded by the

Acheampong military regime that overthrew the civilian

regime in 1972.

From 1972-1979, the Interim.Management Committees of

the KCC were headed by military personnel appointed by the

National Redemption Council, a military institution. The

Eumasi City Council constructed schools, public markets,

roads, and recreational/leisure facilities. It also

continued to enforce health and sanitation standards in the

city. It carried out this function by appointing health

inspectors who were dispatched to suburbs of the city to

enforce its bye-laws pertaining to health and environmental

sanitation. They visited households, and business sites, to

ensure residents and business people maintained some minimum.

level of hygienic conditions which did not pose a health

hazard to residents. They summoned residents who were in

default to appear before the City Court; and those who were

found guilty were fined.2

186

Local Government Restructuring in Eumasi (1987-1992)

In 1987, the Provisional National Defence Council

(PNDC) embarked upon a major local government restructuring

process. It involved decentralization of political and

administrative authorities, with elected representatives of

the people.

In pursuance of the policy of decentralization, the

PNDC established 110 District Assemblies. Each District

Assembly consisted of "a) The District Secretary; b) Two-

thirds of the members represented the electoral units

directly elected by the electorate; c) One-third of the

members comprised of traditional authorities or their

representative and other persons from the district, to be

appointed by the Central Government from the District, in

consultation with the traditional authorities and other

organized associations of productive economic groupings in

the district" (Ghana, 1987:2).

The Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly was established in

1989. It comprised of ninety-one persons who were made up

of:

a) The Provisional National Defence Council Secretary

responsible for the Eumasi Metropolis;

b) Sixty persons who represented the electoral areas

into which Metropolis was divided;

c) Thirty persons who represented traditional

authorities, and other persons ordinarily resident in the

Metropolis, who were appointed by the Council in

187

consultation with the traditional authorities and organized

productive economic groupings in the Metropolis (Local

Government Instrument, 1989:1).

The Eumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) assumed a long

list of functions [Local Government, (Eumasi Metropolitan

Assembly) Establishment Instrument, 1989:61-67]. I would

focus on some of its functions related to markets and market

traders. The KMA was charged with the responsibility to

build, equip, open, close, and maintain markets in the

Metropolis. Furthermore, the KMA was supposed to prohibit

the erection of stalls in places other than markets, and

prevent the sale and purchase of goods near established

markets. More importantly, it was expected to regulate and

control markets including fixing andcollection of rents and

fees from traders. Thus the KMA, like other local government

institutions, was not only the basic political authority,

but also the statutory deliberative, legislative and

consultative body, concerned with the determination of broad

policy objectives and the critical assessment of development

programs. The Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly was also charged

with

the responsibility for the maintenance of security and

public safety in the metropolis. It carried out this task

with the support of national and local security agencies,

such as the police and the mdlitary institutions.

The Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly established other

institutions to assist it to carry out its functions. These

included the a) Eumasi Metropolitan Authority, b) The

188

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE KUMASI METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY

FIGURE 6.3

 

KUMASI METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY

 

 

 

 

METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY

 

 

 

 

 

 

  
    

 

METROPOLITAN

OF

BOARD

TECHNICAL

PLANNING

MINISTRATION~ OF MUNICIPAL

 

INFRASTRUCTURE

COMMISSION

 
   

SERVICES

 

’

 

I

presume,

error a

  

   

SOCIAL

SUB-COMMITTEES

i . Waste

Management

11'. Metro

PROGRAMMING

ECRETARIAT

SERVICES

Engineering

SUB-COMMITTEE

iii . Estates

 

 

&BUDGET

(Legal Dept)

 

SUB-COMMI

 

i.

Economic

Planning

Department

—
.
.
.
.
.

ii .

 
  

Budget

De

t

  

i.Education Dept.

iiJlin. of Health

  

Dept.

 

 

 

FINANCE

& ADMIN.

1. Trees

ii. Administration

iii. Internal Audit

 
  

 

 

 

 

 

isUB-METRO DISTRICT COUNCILS

 

  

 

 

 

SUBIN

- mu}. mm

EOKWA

 —‘

DatacmpfledfrunthereoordsofthenetropolitanAssatbly.

 

189

Metropolitan Planning Commission, c) The Board of Municipal

Services; and d) The Board of Administration.

The Eumasi Metropolitan Authority serves as the

Executive Committee of the Assembly. The thirty members who

comprise the

Metropolitan Authority are elected by members

of the Assembly themselves. However, the Provisional

National Defence Council Secretary responsible for the

Kumasi Metropolis presides over the meetings of the

Authority. The Metropolitan Authority performs the executive

functions of the Metropolitan Assembly. Hence, it implements

the resolutions of the Metropolitan Assembly, as well as

overseas the day-to-day administration of the Assembly.

The Metropolitan Planning Commission integrates,

monitors, and evaluates development planning and management

of the Eumasi Metropolis. It also integrates the functions

of the sub-committees of the Metropolitan Authority, and

proposals that come from such committees, and advises the

Authority on such matters. The Board of Municipal Services

is responsible for the efficient integration of the

municipal services, which include construction of public

facilities such as roads and bridges, schools, and markets,

as well as the provision of health and welfare services.

On the other hand, the Board of Administration organizes and

manages the general administration of the Authority and the

Assembly. In addition, it supervises the Treasury, justice,

security, and estate management of the Assembly.

190

Financing of Local Government in the Eumasi Metropolis

The major change that has occurred in local government

restructuring in Ghana has been their revenue sources.

Essentially, local governments have come to depend more on

taxes from the community under their jurisdiction. For

instance, Section 57(3) of the Local Government Law (1988)

stated that certain revenue sources, like entertainment

duty, casino revenue tax, betting tax, gambling tax and

income tax (registration of trade, business, profession or

vocation), which had been previously tapped by both central

government (through the Internal Revenue Secretariat), and

local government units, were now to be taxed exclusively by

the district assemblies. The law, however, allowed for other

agencies to collect the ceded revenue on behalf of the

district assemblies. In practice, the Ministry of Local

Government arranged with the Internal Revenue Secretariat

for the latter to collect the money and pay into a special

Ministry of Local Government Account on behalf of the

district assemblies. What became obvious was that the

central government ceased paying fifty percent of the

salaries/wages of district assembly employees. Instead,

district assemblies assumed greater responsibilities, as

well as challenges to mobilize resources for its

administration and projects. In fact, the Wbrld Bank

committed $US 7.5 million to help the Ministry of Local

Government towards fiscal decentralization. Under the Urban

 

I Projec , the Werld Bank funded programs designed to

191

TABLE

6.6

 

(PERCENTAGES)

 

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1. Markets

25.8

34.1

33.6

26.6

40.0

38.1

2 . property

Rates

20.7

21.8

13.5

14.0

13.9

10.8

3. License

18.2

11.4

16.6

16.9

17.3

13.7

4. Reimbursement

(Government

Share of

50% of

Salary)

2.8

11.9

13.9

15.1

13.1

12.4

5. Fees

7.6

2.0

2.2

4.4

4.4

6.5

6. Lorry Park ___

2.8

6.0

5.1

3.2

4.9

 

Source: Treasury Department, Eumasi Metropolitan Authority, 1992.

 

 

192

strengthen the management capacity and revenue mobilization

of district assemblies. However, The Eumasi Metropolitan

Assembly benefitted from the Urban II Projegg, when its

staff participated in the project to enhance their

management and mobilization capacities.

Table 6.6 shows the major sources of revenues for the

Eumasi Metropolitan Authority for the 1987-1993 period. It

demonstrates that markets, property rates, license, central

government reimbursement for local government employees'

salaries, and fees were the major sources of revenues for

the EMA. Throughout the period, revenues generated from

markets in the city accounted for an average of thirty-five

percent of the total revenues the EMA received. The average

contributions of licenses, property rates, government share

of employee salaries, and fees to total revenues of the EMA

were 15.1, 14.7, 11.5, and 5.0 percent, respectively.

In general, market traders bore a greater burden of the

finances of the EMA in the form.of higher increases in

rents, license fees, income taxes, as well as new strategies

of the EMA to demand fees from traders for every table they

set up both inside and outside their stalls/stores.

Table 6.7 shows the rents for stalls/stores in the

Central Market. ngn Spells are spaces designed for traders

to display their commodities, but have no locks attached to

them. The biggest increase for rents for Open stalls was

since in the 1984-1985 period. It jumped from C 60 to C 400,

an increase of 566 percent. However, the rents for the open

193

TABLE 6.7

KUMASI METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY

RENTS FOR CENTRAL MARKET STALLS/STORES, 1984-1991

 

(Amount in cedis)

% Change

1984 1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1984-1991

 

Open

Stalls

60

400

400

400

600

600

800

1,600

2,550

Lock-up

120

300

400

400

800

800

1,500 3,000

2,400

Stores

Super

Lock-Up

200

500

500

500

1,000

1,000 3,000 5,000

2,400

Stores

 

Source: Data compiled from the Ghana Local Government Bulletin,

1984-1991 editions.

194

stalls stabilized at C400 for the 1985-1987 period. In 1988,

the rents increased by fifty percent, from C 400 to C 600.

In 1989, the rents remained at C 600 without any increase.

However, the rents increased by fifty percent in 1990, from

C 600 to C 800. The rents doubled in 1991, from C 800 to C

1,600. Overall, open stalls experienced increases in the

1984-1991 period to the tune of 2,550 percent.

The lock-up stores were spaces in the market which had

locks attached to them, and were relatively more secured

than open stalls. Market traders who owned them could lock

up their commodities at the end of the day, instead of

carrying them home, and carting them back for the next day's

business activities. In the 1984-1985 period, rents for the

lock-up stores increased by more than 150 percent, from C

120 to C 300. Also, rents for the lock-up stores doubled in

the 1987-1988 period, from C 400 to C 800. Another major

change in rents was in the 1990-1991 period, when rents

doubled again, from C 1,500 to C 3,000. Overall, the

percentage increase in rents for the 1984-1991 period was

2,400. The super lpck-up stores were relatively larger than

the lock-up stores. In the 1984-1985 period, rents for the

super lock-up stores jumped from C 200 to C 500, an increase

of 150 percent. The rents remained stable at C 500 for both

1986 and 1987. However, the rent for the super lock-up

stores doubled

in the 1987-1988 period, from C 500 to C

1,000. The biggest increase in the rents took place in 1990

when the previous year's rent tripled, from C 1,000 to

195

C 3,000.

To increase its revenues derived from.market traders,

the EMA also introduced a new policy to charge market

traders special fees for using tables inside and infront of

their stalls/stores

in 1985. Originally, occupants of

stalls/stores were required to pay monthly rents for the

stalls/stores allotted to them. Traders were expected to

display their commodities inside the stalls/stores. However,

customers had to enter the store to catch a glimpse of the

varieties of commodities being displayed for sale. To

increase sales, market traders set up tables infront of

their stalls/stores to display their commodities. The EMA

interpreted the practice of displaying commodities in front

of stores/stalls as a strategy by the traders to increase

sales, and therefore, should be taxed for extra sales they

made. Specifically, for each table that a market stall/store

occupant set up, he/she was expected to pay a fee of C 5

daily. However, this tax increased to C 50 in 1992.

Another source of EMA's tax revenues derived from

market traders were fees for late payment of rents. This

policy was introduced in 1985. The penalty was set at C 500

for late payment of rents. EMA officials indicated that this

policy was intended to deter traders from defaulting rent

payment. The penalty was set at C 500 for late payment of

monthly rentals. However, market traders felt that late fees

were attempts by the EMA to generate extra revenues from

theme They argued that it was not always possible to pay

196

monthly rents in person on time due to unforeseen

circumstances. Market traders cited illness, and

participation in some social and cultural events, such as

funerals in their hometowns. However, the EMA did not accept

traders' alibi, and went ahead with the implementation of

fees for late payment of fees.

Apart from generating tax revenues from the local

community, the EMA also retrenched some of its workers to

reduce expenditures. The EMA carried out two phases of

retrenchment between 1985 and 1992. The first phase in the

1985-1988 period involved retrenchment of 1,500 employees.

Most of these were casual laborers who worked for the

Sanitary Department of the EMA. They used to clean the

streets, markets, and washrooms in the city. The second

phase of the retrenchment exercise (1989-1992),

affected

all departments of the EMA. The Treasury Department reported

that the retrenchment exercise affected 161 revenue

collectors, which they argued throw their collection of

revenue estimates out of gear. The targets they set could

not be achieved. Overall, by 1992, the EMA's labor force had

been considerably reduced by 74%. According to EMA's annual

report, "the retrenchment was carried out to ensure prompt

payment of salaries, and also to purchase tools and

materials for maintenance and development" [EMA, 1992].

197

Summary

In the foregoing section, I have demonstrated that the

restructuring processes have redefined the relationship

between central and local government institutions in Ghana.

It has been argued that local government institutions have

assumed more responsibilities towards their localities.

However, local government institutions have come to depend

on their communities for tax revenues to support their

bureaucratic institutions, at the same tbme their capacity

to respond to local service needs has been weakened by their

fiscal crises. The next section of the chapter analyzes

these contradictions, and the conflicts they have engendered

between the local state and market traders.

BONE OP CONTENTIGN: LOCAL STATE VERSUS CIVIL SOCIETY

It is argued that contradictions in state restructuring

processes have engendered conflict between the local state

and workers in the community. The conflict hinges on the

former's fiscal policies which are designed to control and

exploit the incomes of the latter through increased

taxation, while at the same time not having the

institutional capacity for providing the social service

needs of the local community, and the struggles of the

latter for empowerment. These contradictions became quite

clear in the struggles of the market traders in the Eumasi

Central Market vis-a-vis the Eumasi Metropolitan Authority.

First, the petitions of the market traders will be presented

198

to illustrate the major issues of their struggle. Second,

these issues will be categorized and analyzed to demonstrate

their centrality to the restructuring processes, and their

effects on market trader activities.

Market Trader Reactions

Between 1985 and 1992, the General Traders Asociation

(GTA) in the Central Market subitted six petitions which

articulated their collective concerns and interests

regarding the policies of the local state.

First, I will

present the petitions to illustrate the major issues of

 

their struggle. Second, these issues will be catgeorized and

analyzed to demonstrate their cemntrality to the

restructuring processes, and their effects on market trader

activities.

Each of the petitions originated from the monthly

meetings of the GTA. At these meetings, members discuss

important issues facing them, and at the end of the meeting

pass resolutions for action. These issues are further

reviewed by the General Council of the association, and

final recommendations are made to the executive committee of

GTA. It is only the executive committee that writes the

final resolution in the form.of a petition. Among the

executive members I interviewed, I observed that it was only

the secretary who had obtained a High School education. He

drafted the petition, and sought the help of a local typist

199

TABLE 6.8

SUMMARY OF SOURCES OF CONFLICTS/CONTENTION BETWEEN THE

KUHASI METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY AND MARKET TRADERS

 

YEAR

1985

1989

1991

1992

 

SOURCE OF CONFLICT

 

1 . Poor Infrastructure

2:

2. State Taxation of Workers

at

and Traders

3. Accountability for World

Bank Funds

4 . Gender/Hork-related

facilities

3:

x

x

x

x

2:

x

x

x

x

x

x

 

Source: Compiled and formulated from fieldwork data, 1992.

 

200

(Commissioner of Oath/thary Public"), for a typed copy. The

secretary read the final copy to the members of the

executive committee, and each of them either signed their

names or thumbprinted. These procedures made the document

official, for and on behalf of the GTA.

After preparing the petition, market traders' next step

was a strategy for presenting it to influence public opinion

on the policies of the local state. They usually had a two-

prone approach: first, to organize a demonstration

throughout the principal streets of the city on their way to

presenting the petition to the offices of the local state

(the Eumasi Metropolitan Authority); and second, by

presenting copies to the press houses in the city. Such

strategies provided them photo opportunities to get their

 

message out to the public. However, among the press houses,

it was the Pioneer which generally covered the activities of

the market traders. It was the only newspaper in the country

which was privately-owned, and historically aligned itself

with groups that were opposed to state policies. Although

the public-owned newspapers received copies of the

petitions, a content analysis of the Qaily Graphic and The

Ghanaian Times revealed that they occasionally covered such

stories, and even when they did reported on them, they

castigated them in negative tones. Ironically, they were

sycophantic and sympathetic of the state policies the market

traders complained about. Thus, through its control of the

press, the state also diffused attention from the popular

201

struggles of ordinary Ghanaian workers, especially market

traders, to seek redress to their problems.

The 1985 Petition

In a letter dated May 14, 1985, the General Traders

Association sent a petition to the Executive Chairman of the

Eumasi City Council (now the Eumasi Metropolitan Authority).

1. Sanitation at the Eumasi Central Market is very poor as

the Council laborers are not sweeping the market regularly.

This often produces unhealthy atmosphere, and we the traders

often have to do the sweeping and clearing of refuse all by

ourselves. We, therefore, humbly appeal to you for

consideration to effect transfer of some laborers to work

permanently at the Central Market:

2. There are no fire-fighting implements at the Eumasi

Central Market to fight any possible outbreak of fire. As a

result of which some goods and stores have often been burnt

to ashes. we are, therefore, appealing to you to consider

providing us with the necessary firerfighting implements to

fight all future outbreak;

3. We are also entreating you to give the necessary

directives for the replacement of broken down Iron Bars or

Iron Gates from the mouth of the Subin stream entering the

market at two points opposite Dr. Mensah's Hospital and

Ghana railway Corporation, respectively. Thieves often jump

into the streams and pass through the two points and find

their way into the market either to steal or hide themselves

when being chased by the people;

4. 500 Association members were ejected from.Eejetia,

and that the Regional Secretary has granted permission for

resettlement of the traders at the “French Line" where

dumped refuse were removed. we are, therefore, appealing to

you to consider giving your assent for its implementation as

it will raise revenue for the Council;

5. Our monthly rates have been increased from C 45 to

C 200 per store, and from C 20 to C 100 per stall, and we

still have to pay additional C 5 a day for any small table

put infront of the stall or store, and therefore, appeal to

you, and beg you for reduction of the rate;

6. The market gates were usually closed at 6 p.m.

everyday to avoid possible entry of thieves into the market

at night. This method worked considerably as market thefts

were greatly reduced. Unfortunately, this order has been

reversed, and people have to remain at the gate as late as 8

p.mm Thieves have, therefore, been raiding the market. We

are, therefore, entreating you to consider reversing the

 

202

closing time to 6 p.m. to clear away all thieves and to

enable the watchmen to go about their normal duties to

arrest all suspected thieves after 6 p.mm

[Emphasis mine]

From the records of the Eumasi Metropolitan Authority

(EMA). I gathered that this petition was received by the

Executive Chairman, and subsequently referred it to the

Market Committee of the EMA for consideration. However, it

literally died through EMA's bureaucratic maze, and no

further action was taken on it. I also discovered that the

EMA did not have the courtesy to acknowledge receipt of the

petition. Nevertheless, the market traders were not deterred

by EMA's reaction, and sent them another petition in 1989.

 

The 1989 Petition

The petition submitted to the EMA on January 17, 1989,

was more poignant, questioning the lack of action on the

rehabilitation of the Central Market:

“It will be recalled that the former City Council

Chairman Lt. Col. Opuni Mensah, assured the association that

the werld Bank had voted some money for the rehabilitation

of the Central Market, particularly construction of drains

and culverts to retrain the entry of water into stalls and

kiosks;

That when the Chairman was relieving his post as the

Executive Chairman, he further told us that the commencement

of the work will begin in June, 1988. That to our surprise,

the June 1988 has lapsed and nothing has been heard from the

Council about the rehabilitation of the market. we by this

letter want to know from the Council the date or time the

said project will take place;

That prior to this assurance, the Council increased

rates on the grounds that they will construct EVIP toilet,

urinal rooms, etc. which the market has been denied;

That because of this development which the Council

assured us, we accepted the increase of rates with the hope

that the Council will actually undertake the assured

projects at the market, but to our dismay, the Council did

203

not fulfil its promise to the traders at the market, and

where the Council's revenue is received;

That we traders sweep the market and convey the refuse

to the dumping places with our own resources instead of the

Council's own responsibility;

We are further by this letter requesting the Council to

disclose to us the rates collected from January 1988 to

December 1988, and the development made at the Central

Market to enable us to advise ourselves accordingly".

This petition had a more confrontational approach

indicating the frustrations and seemingly powerlessness the

traders felt in trying to get the attention of the local

state to deal with problems they faced, and which affected

their operations. It seemed quite logical when they appealed

to other state authorities in the state bureaucratic

structure, including the Ashanti Regional Administration,

and the Offices of the Head of State in the capital city,

 

Accra .

1991 Petitions

In 1991, the General Traders Association submitted two

petitions; one to the Ashanti Regional Investigating

Committee, and the Head of State, Flight Lieutenant Jerry

John Rawlings.

Petition to the Ashanti Regional Investigating

Committee (ARIC)

The Ashanti Regional Investigating Committee (ARIC) was

a local branch of the National Investigating Committee (that

was established by PNDC Law No. 2, 1992). It investigated

corruption in public office; and the office of the Special

Prosecutor was responsible for prosecutions arising from

204

these investigations. under a rather unusual provision,

those being investigated by the National Investigations

Committee (NIC) had the right to confess and offer

'reparation' to the state in atonement for their crimes. In

the first twenty-two months of their operations, the PNDC

reported that the NIC collected over C 5 million in

reparations (Ray, 1986).

The petition to the Ashanti

Regional Investigating Committee was designed to request

investigation into alleged corruption and misappropriation

of world Bank funds for the rehabilitation of the Central

Market, as well as to demand accountability for the monies

collected from the traders. The petition addressed these

issues:

1. That the former Executive Chairman of the Eumasi City

Council, Lieutenant Colonel Opuni-Mensah once said to us

that after his transfer, we must question any new Executive

Chairman if within six months of his office he fails to

develop the Central Market because the world Bank earmarked

an amount of money for the development of the Central

Market;

2. That, when the present Metropolitan Secretary,

Commander Yaw Mensah came to office, we consulted him for

the development of the market, but he did not mind us since

then;

3. That due to the failure to develop the market, we

suffer rain floods resulting in the destruction of our goods

in our stores and stalls in the market;

4. That, our store rent has been raised from C 600 a

month to C 1,200 and then from C 1,500 to C 3,000, and then

from C 3,000 to C 6,000;

5. That, despite these huge increases in rents, we also

pay C 50 for the goods inside the stores, and also C 50 for

the goods displayed in front of the stores daily;

6. That, despite such huge rents and rates collected by

the EMA from.the traders in the market, they failed to

develop the market to save our goods from floods;

7. That, we undertake repairs and renovations of our

stores and also employ our own laborers to sweep the market

with our own resources, despite the huge amount of money

collected from us by the EMA;

205

8. That, we do not benefit from the huge amount

collected by the EMA but they make use of the money

collected from us for nothing;

9. That, we ask the Committee to investigate into these

our cases for justice to be done. We also appeal to the

Committee to reduce our high rents for us.“

My investigation revealed that the NIC did not

investigate the EMA as requested by the traders. Initially,

when the NIC was established at the beginning of the

Rawlings' "revolution“, the target was public servants who

were associated with the previous civilian administration

(Limann's government, from October 1979, to December 31,

1981), and not the political functionaries of the PNDC. In

 

addition, both the NIC and the EMA were chaired by military

officers. I suspected that the comradeship among the

mdlitary officers made the NIC overlook the traders'

allegations of corruption within the EMA, for the purposes

of political expediency.

Petition to the Head of State

On October 8, 1991, the General Traders Association

sent a petition to the Head of State which specified basic

problems their members faced in the market:

We have learnt with dismay, the publication in the

Pioneer, 13th September, 1991, whereby the EMA had voted

C4.3 million solely to provide public address system to

provide music and other information to the traders at the

Central Market. And we wish to state that we object to such

a project for the following reasons:

1. That, the said amount could be utilized to provide

fire extinguishers at vantage positions in the market;

2. To provide day-care center since there is no such

facility in the market and urinals;

206

3. To desilt the choked gutters in the market to avoid

floods during rainy season, and also to avoid any epidemic;

4. To repair all the broken down telephone system in

the market. The repair will enable EMA to communicate any

information to traders and the staff of the Authority;

5. That EMA should liaise with the Ghana Railway

Authority to resettle traders squatting near the railway

lines. There is every possibility that in the event of

derailment, there will definitely be heavy casualty of human

lives among the squatters;

6. That we appeal to the EMA to allow the traders to

renovate their stores without exhorting any money from them

which goes into private pockets;

In respect of the nwmerous rates paid by the traders,

it is high time that EMA reviews them, We appeal to the PNDC

to ensure that EMA initiates discussions on the reduction of

rates to forestall any possible public demonstration by the

traders. The rates of each stall or store have been

arbitrarily increased to over 150 percent;

Since the appointment of Metropolitan Secretary to

Eumasi we have observed that, as a result of his poor

leadership, no development has taken place in the market. We

experience seasonal floods, the market is dirty, the gutters

have been choked, and he is not tolerant to discuss the

basic problems facing traders. At the moment, there are no

keys to most of the gates leading to the market;

As traders and citizens of Ghana, we can no longer

accept him as our Secretary in Eumasi, and we fervently

appeal to the PNDC to relieve him of his post. we want to

finally inform you that the presence of the Metropolitan

Secretary in the person of Naval Captain Yaw Mensah is

retarding progress and hampering trading business of

individuals in Eumasi. The earlier he is transferred from

Eumasi the better, so that the PNDC could get a competent

person to organize to support the good cause and assist the

people who live in peaceful and honest atmosphere in

Eumasi."

The highest appeal any person or group could make in

Ghana is to the Head of State. I did not know how the

traders figured this out. On the part of the traders, this

was an extra effort, since the offices of the Head of State

is in the capital city, Accra, about one hundred and eighty

miles from Eumasi. The traders sent a delegation to Accra to

present this petition.

 

207

According to the traders, the Head of State assured

them that he would look into the matters presented in the

petition. However, nine months after the traders presented

their petition, the Metropolitan Secretary, Naval Captain

Yaw Mensah, was dismissed, and replaced by a non-military

native from the Ashanti Region, Nana Akwasi Agyeman. Thus,

state power was directly and indirectly used to appease an

irritant group, a move which was calculated to further

consolidate PNDC's legitimacy both in the Ashanti region,

but Eumasi Metropolis in particular.

 

1992 Petition to the Ashanti Regional Secretary

The GTA also sent a petition to the Ashanti Regional

Secretary regarding EMA's tax revenues on January 15, 1992:

“That, we have learnt with dismay the unprecedented

yearly increase of market stores/stores monthly rentals

‘without considering matters affecting our welfare;

That, we also appeal against the act of collecting

daily rate of C 50 in the stores, and another C 50 for goods

displayed just infront of the same store by the same

storekeeper, while the same storekeeper pays a monthly

rental as well. A tenant is obliged to pay for his/her

monthly rental but does not pay additional money for /her

personal belongings in the room to the landlord. Therefore,

the daily collection of fees in the stores must be avoided

by the EMA to give way to the monthly rentals only;

That, on July, 29, 1991, our Executive members had a

meeting with the EMA. At the meeting, we resolved that the

EMA should avoid the daily collection of tickets inside the

store, and stick to the monthly rentals only. The EMA agreed

and promised to convene a meeting to resolve this matter,

but never fulfilled this promise;

That, a penalty for C500 for late payment of monthly

rentals must be avoided in view of the fact that a trader

could easily fall sick, and be admitted to a hospital, or be

involved in funerals, etc. which does not need punishment;

That, all our appeals to EMA to improve the drainage

system at the Central Market have been to no avail, and this

gives rise to a flooded market during the rainfall which

destroys many of our wares;

208

That, many of the stores/stalls roofing were rotten and

leaked profusely to soak our stock of goods in the

stores/stalls but our appeals to the EMA for renovation

proved futile. we therefore renovated the stores/stalls

ourselves. and raised the level of the floors a bit against

the flood with our scarce resources with approval and

authority from EMA.

Surprisingly, the EMA instead of

refunding all our expenses involved has chosen to raise the

monthly rentals of all the renovated stores/stalls from

C1,600 to C 3,000, without considering hoW'much we spent on

the renovation works. We therefore vehemently appeal against

this uncalled for, and arbitrary increases which seriously

affect our welfare and trading activities;

That, of all these collections by EMA, there are no

amenities like places of convenience for traders inside the

market while the drainage system is still worse;

We, therefore, humbly appeal to the PNDC regional

Secretary for Ashanti to intervene on our behalf for a

redress of these anomalies and predicament:

a) Revoking the daily collection of C50 and stick to

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monthly rentals of C1,6000 for traders in stores and stalls;

b) Daily C50 collection to affect only traders using

tables on the open space;

c) Revoking the new'monthly rental of C3,000 on the

renovated stores/stalls to the normal rental of C1,600;

We, therefore, conclude by appealing to the PNDC

Regional Secretary to take immediate steps to remedy the

situation to avoid any possible confrontation between us and

EMA.

After exhausting all possible avenues to seek redress

to their problems, Central Market traders mobilized other

traders in the city, and resorted to direct confrontations

and violence means to achieve their ends:

Angry response from traders in Eumasi's Central

Market

and Asafo Market has forced the Eumasi Metropolitan

Authority to suspend the across-the-board increases of more

than a hundred percent in the rent it charges for market

stalls and shops. Following the announcements of the

increases, the traders marched to protest through the

principal streets to the offices of the EMA to present a

petition against the increase. The demonstrators who carried

placards, some of which read -we are fed up with

dictatorship", "Why cheat, National Democratic Congress?',

hooted and threw stones at the Chief Executive, Nana Akwasi

Agyeman, when he attempted to address them, The EMA called

in the police who dispersed the traders with teargas and

warning shots. When he

announced the EMA's decision to

suspend the increase, Mr. Agyeman said the move was to allow

209

the matter to be discussed with the traders. He said that

the decision to suspend the increases was the result of

appeals from the Ashanti regional branch of the National

Democratic Congress (NDC), traders, prominent personalities,

and organizations in the region"

(west.Africa, 15-21 February, 1993:254).

So far, the foregoing petitions have provided ample

illustration of problems market traders faced in the context

of global/state restructuring. It has also been demonstrated

that their attempts to appeal directly to different levels

of the state bureaucracy for redress, yielded very limited

success. The next section provides an analysis of the major

issues in the traders' petitions.

 

Analysis of Mejor Issues in the Traders' Petitions

Table 6.8 provides a summary of the issues over which

market traders petitioned the state bureaucracy in the 1985-

1993 period. The major issues that stood out consistently

throughout the period were poor infrastructure, state

taxation of urban workers/traders, accountability for werld

Bank funds for market rehabilitation, and ‘engendering' of

the workplace.

1.

Poor Infrastructure

Market traders were displeased with the conditions of

the physical and social infrastructure in the Central

Market. Specifically, these included the drainage system,

sanitation, provision of water, roof leakage, absence of

washrooms, day-care, and health care facilities, and

security in the market.

2H)

a. The Drainage System

The drainage system involved provision of outlets for

rain water to flow out of the market. The drainage system

was not well maintained. The drains had been choked with

wastes from the activities of market traders, as well as

sand which had been washed into the drainage system,

resulting in offensive odors. The drains were blocked, and

hence water could not flow easily out of the market. The

market traders complained about the damage caused to their

commodities whenever it rained, and the market became

flooded. Whenever the market became flooded, water would

enter their stalls/stores, and soak the commodities packed

in boxes. They filed reports with the Market Manager about

the drainage problem they faced. However, the EMA did

nothing about their drainage problems. In order to forestall

.further damage, some of the market traders used their own

money to hire workers to clear the choked drainage in front

of their stalls/stores. They blamed the EMA for not clearing

the drainage system on a daily basis.

When I discussed the drainage problem with officials of

the EMA, especially the Chief Engineers office, they

acknowledged that they had received complaints from the

market traders, but they interpreted the problem from a

different perspective. They in turn blamed the market

traders for the poor state of the drainage system, They felt

211

market traders deposited some waste in the drainage system

which caused the drains to be choked. Consequently, the EMA

had not taken the drainage problem seriously since the

market traders were the source of the problem, Apparently,

both the market traders and the EMA did not see eye to eye

on the issue of the poor drainage system in the Central

Market.

b. Sanitation

Apart from the drainage system, another problem.in the

market was sanitation. The nature of operations

undertaken

in the market makes it imperative to seek effective ways for

maintaining acceptable levels of sanitation in the market

environment by controlling the disposal of wastes of all

kinds. wastes in the market were produced by both traders

and customers. They included materials such as leaves and

papers for wrapping commodities on sale, peels from fruits,

and leftover food. The high humidity experienced in the city

promotes rapid decay when garbage piled up in the market,

thus creating unwholesome conditions for business

activities.

To ensure effective sanitation in the market, the EMA

bye-laws stipulate that: "Every occupier of a stall/store

during his/her occupation thereof shall keep the same in a

clean state, and shall brush, sweep or otherwise clean all

dirt and rubbish before leaving, at the end of the day's

selling" (1988 Local Government Bulletin, Appendix A). In

 

212

addition to market traders cleaning and sweeping the

immediate area of their business activities, EMA conservancy

workers were, however, responsible for the collection of the

garbage deposited in designated spots in the market. In the

market I observed that huge deposits of garbage sat in

designated spots inside the market but had not been removed

for days.

I discussed the problem of sanitation in the market

with officials of the Medical Officer of Health's (MOH)

department in the EMA. They acknowledge the general

sanitation problem in the market. They. however, explained

their inability to maintain effective sanitation,

particularly clearing the huge deposits of garbage inside

the market was due to lack of conservancy laborers, and

inadequate tools.

V

The Supervisor of the conservancy laborers in the MOH's

office revealed that in the 1985-1988 period, the labor

force in his department was cut down from thirty workers to

fifteen workers, a reduction of fifty percent, although the

use of the market, and the volume of activities in a market

which covered an area of 9.6 hectares, remained the some. In

addition to the retrenchment of conservancy workers, the

supervisor identified lack of adequate tools to clean the

market. workers needed equipment such as 'wheelbarrows',

'pushcarts", and brooms, but budget cuts in the MOH's

department, had made it virtually impossible to replace worn

out equipment workers needed to achieve satisfactory

 

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sanitation in the market.

213

c. Provision of water in the Market

The City Engineer's department was responsible for

providing water for traders and customers in the Central

Market. Each section was supposed to have at least one

standing pipe to provide water for those who needed it.

However, most of the public pipes in the market had broken

down. Out of the twenty pipes in the market, only eight,

that is forty percent of them, were in good condition. My

survey of market traders revealed that forty-one percent

obtained water from the public pipes in the market, while

 

forty-six percent purchased water from‘water vendors.

The

rest, (thirteen percent) brought water from home, or

purchased water from traders who had erected their own

private stand pipes. The traders felt the EMA had to repair

the old pipes, as well as increase the number of pipes in

the market to serve them.and their customers. However, the

EMA did not invest any money in the provision of pipe-borne

water in the market for the period under study.

d. Leakage in Roofs of Stalls/stores

The roofs of the market stall/stores were supposed to

be maintained by the Chief Engineer's Office of the EMA.

Some of the roofs had become worn out and leaked. Thirty

percent of traders I interviewed indicated that they had

leaked roofs in the past. They demonstrated that leaked

214

roofs caused damage to their commodities whenever it rained,

as water dripped into their stalls/stores. When I inquired

about what they did with the leakage problem, they indicated

that they reported it to the Market Superintendent. The

Market Superintendent acknowledged that in all he received

eighty reports from.market traders in the period under

study. However, the EMA could fix only twenty percent of the

reported cases. The traders whose roofs were not repaired by

the EMA hired private companies to fix them at their own

expense. The EMA refused to pay refunds for these repairs

which on the average amounted to C 20,000 per store/stall.

e. washrooms

The Central Market lacked places of convenience. There

were no washrooms inside a market which attract more than

20,000 people on a daily basis. There was only one toilet

facility outside the market, but due to incessant and

frequent usage, it was always full, and not well maintained;

the tanks were full and overflowing. Traders complained that

even when it was cleaned, they had to wait in long queues to

gain access to the washroom, I observed that in the absence

of adequate toilet facilities, both traders and customers to

the market used a stream.which passed through a section of

the market as a place of convenience. However, the EMA

disapproved the use of the stream as a place of convenience,

because of the environmental hazards it posed for other

users of the market.

215

f.

Market Security and Safety

The market faced three security problems. The first was

the lack of equipment for emergency fire outbreaks. Fire

outbreaks in the past had claimed the property of some

market traders. The major outbreak they remembered most

occurred in 1987. Fire engulfed 120 stores in two sections

of the market. The fire started late in the night, when

market activities had ended.

By the time the fire service

personnel arrived, the fire had engulfed store/stalls in two

sections of the market. Market traders lost their

commodities, but had no insurance to cover the loss.

Insurance premiums were unknown among the market traders

and, therefore, they could not recover their losses.

However, they blamed the EMA for not providing fire-fighting

equipments for such emergencies, as well as the lack of

telephone facilities in the market. The EMA renovated the

burnt stores, and reallocated them to the affected

store/stall occupants. However, the EMA refused to pay for

any losses the affected market women incurred.

The second security problem was related to broken down

market gates. Six of the market gates had broken down, but

had neither been repaired nor replaced by the EMA. Thieves

took advantage of the damaged gates and made away with

traders commodities in the night. For instance, on July 8,

1985, thieves broke into the stores of two traders, namely,

Mr Yaw Apan, and Mrs Comfort Tosu. The thieves made away

‘with approximately C 104,000 worth of commodities, and were

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never apprehended (The Pioneer, July 9, l985:l). The EMA

neither compensated these traders for the losses, nor

replaced the gates immediately. In fact, it took the EMA

more than twelve months to repair three of the damaged

gates.

Finally, the EMA had failed to enforce bye-laws

regarding the operating hours of the market. The market was

supposed to be closed at 6 pm, and all traders and customers

alike were expected to leave at that time. However, some

traders remained at the market far into the night. In fact,

some were reported to have done their cooking and washing in

the market past 6 pm.

Market traders complained that those

who remained in the market after the posted hours posed a

security risk to other traders. They were suspected to have

been accomplices of criminal activities in the market. The

market traders demanded that the EMA enforce the operating

hours of the market to reduce the potential for thieves to

use traders who overstayed as a coverup to steal traders'

commodities in the night.

Thus, one of the sources of contention between market

traders and the EMA was poor conditions of the physical and

social infrastructure in the Central Market. The roofs

leaked, the drainage system had collapsed, and the

sanitation was generally appalling. The market also lacked

day-care centers for the children of the traders. In

addition, security in the market was less than desirable: it

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217

lacked fire-fighting equipment to control fire out-breaks in

emergencies, and its gates were broken, and provided

opportunities for thieves to steal market traders'

commodities. Traders who lost their commodities through

floods, roof leakage, and theft or fire, did not receive any

compensation for their losses, since insurance for small-

businesses in the market and the Ghanaian society, is not

common. The critical question that has to be addressed here

is why the conditions of the physical and social

3 

infrastructure in the market had deteriorated. Definitely,

even before the local government fiscal restructuring,

market conditions were not in good shape. In the

1970-1980

period when Ghana experienced one of its worst economic

crises, conditions in the market also declined. However, the

SAP, and its attendant effect on local state restructuring,

exacerbated the deplorable market conditions with its

emphasis on manpower retrenchment, austere fiscal measures,

and benign neglect. The revenues it generated were used to

finance the state bureaucracy.

2. State Taxation of workerslTraderg

State control of workers' incomes and earnings also

became a bone of contention. under periods of economic

crisis, and regimes of adjustment, the state.uses all

possible means to extract revenues from the society,

particularly through taxation.

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As a landlord, the EMA maintains a monopoly over all

decisions pertaining to public markets. In fact, it is not

supposed to consult with market traders before initiating

any increases in its rents for market stalls/stores.

Decisions and policies affecting market rents are fixed by

resolution of the EMA, on behalf of the Ministry of Local

Government. In the 1984-1991 period, the EMA introduced

substantial increases in rents for market stalls/stores in

all public markets under its jurisdiction. As discussed in

an earlier section of this chapter,

rent increases for the

Central Market were quite high and unprecedented in the

history of market trading.

The issue of taxing market traders for expanding the

space in their stalls/stores began in 1985, and at that time

generated

controversy between market traders and the EMA.

It seemed to me that the traders had a point in challenging

the intentions of the EMA. In crafting such a policy, the

EMA assumed that the addition of a table infront or inside a

store/stall would necessarily increase sales for traders. In

fact, for the first time in the history of the market, the

EMA decided to implement such a policy. Apart from using it

as a means to generate extra tax revenues, it seemed quite

unfathomable why the city government should draft such a

policy. After all, these stalls/stores were relatively

smaller, and had not been expanded since they were first

constructed more than half a century ago. Thus, the extra

219

fees the EMA charged were unwarranted, and mere excuse to

extract more revenues from the traders. It goes to show that

the state uses every means possible to exact revenues from

the people.

The controversy over fees for late payment of monthly

rents was a more difficult one. Market traders gave several

excuses why they could not pay rents on time, on certain

occasions.

Unlike the united States where people could pay

their debts in cash, check/money order/bank draft, credit

card, and other means, the only means to pay one's debt,

 

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particularly rent, was in person, and cash.

Whether it was

an alibi or for fact, traders explained that sometimes they

could not pay their rents on time due to their commitment to

Ghanaian traditional customary practices such as attending

funerals, and visiting sick family members in their hometown

and other parts of the country. In Ghana, funeral

celebrations sometimes extend over a fortnight, and family

members are expected to stay as long as the grieving period

can take. In fact, a family member who deviates from these

norms could be sanctioned severely. The main challenge is

that when these traditional practices come face to face with

the ethos of modern and urban society, with emphasis on

individuality and conformity to bureaucratic virtues, some

Ghanaians are caught in the middle, and this was the dilemma

some market traders had to deal with. Thus, the EMA took

advantage of this situation to further exploit the market

220

traders by imposing penalties for late payments of rents.

From the foregoing analysis, it has been shown that the

state, both at the national and local levels, utilized all

possible means to exploit the “nation“, especially poor

working urbanites to support the state apparatus. For market

traders, it has been shown that the state intruded their

private and public lives with too many taxes. These included

basic rates (locally called 'lampoo', a tax for every adult

fifteen years and over), rent increases, licenses, tax for

enlarging one's stall/store space, and tax for late payment

of rents.

In addition to the tall order of taxes, market traders

were affected by other fiscal policies of the state.

Privatization of social services, such as education and

health care meant that market traders, like other workers in

the society, had to pay more for their children's education

and health care. Liberalization of prices, and removal of

state subsidies for imported food commodities and energy had

increased the cost of living in Ghana. On the average, A

Ghanaian household spent over fifty percent of its income on

food. Energy costs also increased remarkably, to the tune of

eighty percent. Rates for water were also raised by between

150 and 1,150 percent (werld Bank, 1987).

Historically, state exploitation of the "nation"

through taxation and other strategies of revenue-generation

to support state apparatus and the “hypertrophy of the

 

221

service sector" is well documented. The colonial state used

it even in more sophisticated and complex form through its

linkages to the metropolis-satellite nexus (Kay, 1972;

Frank, 1967). In post—colonial Ghana, especially under the

PNDC, contrary to the rhetoric of state officials that the

state apparatus was being downsized, it actually became

bigger. In particular, the PNDC created so-called

"revolutionary" institutions and structures that duplicated

the work of existing public institutions and bureaucracies.

For instance, apart from the traditional courts in Ghana,

new legal institutions, such as “public tribunals“ were

established under the guise of ensuring "swift justice" in

the country. At the district levels, apart from the head of

the civil service in the locality, the PNDC also appointed

its own District Secretaries. Institutions such as the

National Investigation Committee (not mentioning its

regional offices), Citizens Vetting Committees, which

investigated persons whose lifestyles and expenditures

exceeded their known or declared incomes (PNDC Law No. 1,

Section 4), and the National, and Regional, District,

Town/Village Defence Committees, to mention but a few, all

enlarged the cost of managing the affairs of the country,

and made existing structures virtually redundant. Of course,

this expansion of state apparatus was designed to give state

officials control and influence over every facet of the

civil society. In addition, through these processes, the

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PNDC rewarded its political functionaries at the national,

regional, district, and town/village levels. The irony was

that these new structures were established through

”proclamations and decrees' of the PNDC, without any

discussion by the public. However, in the end, the state had

to tax the “nation" to sustain its huge bureaucracy which

continued to grow, although its officials believed they were

actually downsizing it.

In addition to maintaining the state bureaucracy, the

 

state was constrained under a dire necessity to fulfill its

commitment to International Financial Institutions (IFIs),

such as the werld Bank and the IMF. As discussed earlier in

this chapter, Ghana's debts and debt service had increased

sharply in the period of the SAP; from 26 percent in 1983 to

53 percent in 1987. In 1990, the figure rose to 65 percent

(Frimpong-Ansah, 1992:152). This meant that for every dollar

earned from exports, Ghana paid sixty-five cents to IFIs to

service its debt. One therefore wonders how the state could

finance a huge bureaucracy, and pay a substantial portion of

its foreign earnings to service its debts, and still afford

to provide adequate infrastructure and services for the

"nation“.

Consequently, the deterioration of physical and

social infrastructure in Ghana, including those raised in

the petitions of the Central Market traders, should be seen

in a larger context of development crises, and

contradictions within the state itself, exacerbated by both

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internal and external forces .

Accountability for world Bank Funds

The market traders also questioned the EMA to account

for world Bank Funds for rehabilitating the Central Market.

Apparently, they felt the EMA had something to hide in the

deal between the Ghana government and the werld Bank for

refurbishing the Central Market.

Infrastructural Development in the Eumasi Central

Market was part of the urban Two Prggpmm designed to

“enhance the economic and social prosperity of the Eumasi

Central area to improve the quality of the environment“.

under the SAP agreement, the WOrld Bank was supposed to

provide funding for this project, and other projects in the

country, to ensure efficient returns to the investments and

commitments the Bank was making in the country. According to

the traders, they had a wind of the project in the

newspapers, and it was later confirmed by the Metropolitan

Secretary in 1987, who assured them that the project would

commence in June, 1988. In fact, the final report on the

Central Market Project was completed in March, 1993, and it

is still subject to the approval of both the Ghana

government and the world Bank. However, it was not explained

to them that the project would have to go through several

phases before final approval. It is not uncommon in Africa

and other countries, for politicians to use projects as

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political weapons, although these projects are paid for with

public funds. Unfortunately, market traders who faced £25;

problems regarding infrastructure in the market needed a

quick fix to their problems, rather than depend on the empty

“ promises and rhetoric of politicians.

The critical questions that arise from the experience

of the Central Market project are, to what extent did the

state involve the market traders in its negotiations with

the werld Bank? How'much will it cost to rehabilitate the

Central Market?

When will the project actually begin?

Where will the market traders do business when the project

takes off?

I did not get specific answers to these

questions from both the EMA, and world Bank officials. The

main source of market traders' frustration was that they

were left out of the picture, and were therefore left to ask

only questions. This is a problem of the African state,

particularly in Ghana. The state tends to alienate the

people in decision making that affects their lives and day-

to-day existence. It is an institution that takes its people

for granted, and therefore, does not seek input from them.

The fact that the market traders questioned the intentions

of the local state regarding the market rehabilitation

project, and demanded accountability, demonstrates an

increasing awareness and consciousness, and the

(re)emergence of civil society in Ghana.

225

Gendeerbrk-Related Facilities

Finally, the traders made demands for the provision of

day-care facilities in the Central Market. The idea of day-

care centers is a good one. If market traders could send

their children to a day-care center, they could have more

time to concentrate on their business activities. Young

children need a lot of attention, and their presence in the

market distracted their parents' attention.

In the market, I observed that some women brought their

pre-school children along with them to do business. They

were tied to the backs of their mothers, in the traditional

African fashion of carrying babies. These women stood in the

scorching sun with the children for several hours, while

they sold their commodities. Those.who were fortunate to

have stalls/stores had a place to lay these children when

they slept. Sometimes the former arranged with the latter

for space to put their children to sleep, while they

competed with other traders in the open spaces in the market

for customers. When asked why they sent their children to

the market, there were different responses. Some indicated

that they could not afford to pay for the private day-care

centers in the city. Others mentioned that they preferred to

have their children with them, since they could give them

better care than the day-care centers.

Others preferred to

have a family member to take care of their pre-school

children at home, but they had none in the city, and

 

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226

therefore, had to carry their children to work.

I realized that some older children took care of their

younger siblings in the market after school hours in the

afternoon,

while their parents did business, and others

sold some commodities. It gave them a hands-on experience in

the art of trading, a real ‘job-training' and a headstart,

which they needed for their own businesses in the future.

It is interesting to note that the demand for day-care

facilities is a work/gender-related issue, which women in

Ghana, and other African countries, and even in the united

States, have had to deal with. In the case of Ghana,

although there is a need for more day-care facilities, it

has not become a major public issue compared to the united

States. Majority of Ghanaian women (seventy percent) live in

the rural areas, and receive a lot of support from extended

family members. However, for urban women, there have been

some changes in the society which have affected their access

to extended family members or maids to help them in child-

care. Market women I interviewed.mmntioned that extended

family members they brought from.the village to help them,

had opted to go to school, and were, therefore, not at home

at the time they had to go to the market to do business.

Second, since they were self-employed, they did not have the

option of negotiating with their employers for some

allowance to send their children to private day-care

centers. In fact, women in the civil service and private

227

sector employees, still do not have any allowance to pay for

day-care for their children. So for the urban Ghanaian

woman, like other women in modern societies, the dual role

of caring for children, and pursing a career, is still a

dilemma and a challenge.

Thus, the traders' demand for day-care facilities in

the Central Market was not only a service they felt the

state should provide for mainly women workers through the

taxes the former collects from them, but also demonstrates

the increasing significance of a problem.which needed a

national, rather than a local solution.

In this chapter, two major arguments have been

advanced. First, I articulated the view that global

restructuring processes have redefined the structure,

functions, and sources of revenue of state and local

government institutions. Second, it has been argued that

these processes have engendered a bone of contention between

the state and civil society, as demonstrated by the conflict

between market traders and central/local state institutions

in Ghana.

V

What stood out in these processes was that inspite of

their limitations, market traders mobilized their members

and challenged large and powerful state bureaucracies, and

sought redress for their problems, as well as demanded

accountability for taxes extracted from theme This

demonstrated a (re)emergence of civil society; an important

 

228

element of the larger I'democratization" process that is

going on from the "bottom.up" in Ghana.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

MARKET TRADER.ACTIVISHIAND DEIDCRATIZATIGN PROCESSES

IN'GEKNA

INTRODUCTION

This chapter has two objectives. First, it assesses

outcomes of market trader collective mobilization and action

vis-a-vis the local state. Second, it argues that market

trader demands including accountability of public/state

officials, participation/involvement in decision making that

affects their day-to-day lives, physical/social

infrastructure that would enhance their businesses, and

reduced taxes, should be understood within the context of

the larger “democratization" processes that are going on

from the I'bottom.up" in Ghana.

It must be pointed out that market trader activism.and

relationship with the different levels of the state

bureaucratic structure should be distinguished from

I'revolutions" and I'national revolts“. Regarding social

revolutions, Skocpol's formulation is the most recent and

compelling:

social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of

a society's state and class structures; and they are

accompanied and in part carried through by class-based

revolts from.below. Social revolutions are set apart

from other sorts of conflict and transformative

processes above all by the combination of two

coincidences; the coincidence of societal structural

change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of the

political'with social transformation

(Skocpol, 1979z4).

229

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Here, Skocpol's conceptualization of revolutions,

focuses on outcomes: sustained and cataclysmic changes in

the social structure. However, Walton's (1984) critique of

this classical conception of 'revolutions' based on violent

structural change is in order. While not denouncing the

appropriateness of the criteria used by Skocpol, he argues

for a broader conceptualization of a "revolution", as a

continuum.whose outcomes may be a matter of degree.

Consequently, walton's (1984) “national revolts“ idea seems

to convey another level of collective action which has

substantial outcomes, but short of a complete revolution. He

defines "national revolts" as

protracted, intermittently violent, non-local struggles

involving large-scale mobilization of classes and

status groups that become recognized claimants of rival

sovereignty and engage the state in responses with the

effect of transforming social or state power in the

development process ( walton, 1984z6).

unlike “national revolts", market trader collective

mobilization and action is local, sometimes violent, but

limited in the scale of its effect on the social structure.

It is not intended to overthrow the state structure, nor to

displace the powers there be. It is a local protest movement

which seeks changes in harsh and harmful state policies,

actions, and inactions. Although their immediate goal was to

pursue their collective interests, as articulated in their

petitions, one must look beyond that. A meaningful

assessment of the outcomes of

market traders' activism

should be based on the extent to which they could get the

state “off their backs“, and exercised greater self-

de1

231

determination in the marketplace.

REHABILITATION OF THE KDlmSI CENTRAL MARKET

As revealed in chapter Six, market traders consistently

complained and petitioned the local state regarding the poor

state of existing conditions in the Central Market.

So far, some plans are in the works to rehabilitate the

Central Market. What was not clear to me in my research was

whether the initiative to rehabilitate the Central Market

was a direct result of market trader activism, or an idea

which was part of the Structural Adjustment Program.

Definitely, one could argue that the PNDC did not initially

plan on rehabilitating the markets in Ghana; on the

contrary, the PNDC took actions which actually led to the

demolition of some market buildings in Ghana.

For instance, as already demonstrated in chapter One,

the state under both Rawlings I (June-September, 1979) and

Rawlings II (December 31, 1981 until trade liberalization

was introduced in 1983), was quite hostile to market

traders. Market traders, mostly women, were caned in public

(often naked) for selling above the price controls. Some

traders were shot point blank for alleged acts of

profiteering practices. The most devastating and glaring

incident which symbolized state-market trader hostility was

the demolition of the Makola Number Two Market in the

capital city, Accra. The market space was developed into a

parking lot for Accra elite shoppers. The Kumasi Central

   

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and z

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233

Market, was a target for demolition, but thanks to the

intervention of the King of the Ashanti, Nana Otumfuor Opoku

ware II, it was spared. Thus, from its own pronouncements

and actions, the Rawlings State, had no plans/intention to

undertake major market rebuilding projects.

The first indication of any intentions of the PNDC

state to rehabilitate urban markets was in tandem with the

urban Two Program, which I discussed in Chapter Seven. It is

still not clear whether this Program was designed initially

as part of the SAP, or it evolved in response to market

trader activism, The whole SAP was not subject to public

debate, and one could not tell the contents of the original

SAP package between the PNDC and International Financial

Institutions (IFIs). However, according to the available

records, the Urban Two Program.was a community development

project designed by the Ghana Government, and funded by the

world Bank/IMP. Its objective was to renovate old roads, and

provide new ones in urban areas, as well as rehabilitate

other urban facilities, such as schools and market

buildings. Specifically, for the Kumasi Metropolis, it was

“to maintain and enhance the economic and social prosperity

of the Kumasi central Area, and to improve the quality of

the environment“ (Integrated Development Consultants,

1993:1).

Given the poor state of urban infrastructure in Ghana

due to the economic crisis in the 19703 and early 19803, the

Urban Two Program.was long overdue. Improvements in rural

 

 

and ur]

succes:

effect,

very W1

were d.

rehabi

and ur?

SAP se

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in thi

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Ghana

the I:

Scien.

study

Cent-r;

study

marke.

234

and urban infrastructure were critical for the SAP to be

successful. In my estimation, before the SAP came into

effect, the world Bank and the IMF were in Ghana, and knew

very well that the roads were dangerous, and the markets

were dilapidated, and yet nothing was done about them. The

rehabilitation of roads was necessary to reconnect the rural

and urban areas of Ghana to the larger global economy. The

SAP seeks to intensify the production of exportable

agricultural products such as cocoa, timber, and rubber. On

the other hand, the rehabilitation of the roads was to

increase the volume of trade between cities, and also

between the cities and the rural hinterland, when trade was

liberalized, and allowed foreign goods to be dumped on the

Ghanaian market. Urban markets have come to play a key role

in this nexus, as the brokers between the producers (located

in the rural hinterlands, and overseas) and consumers in

Ghana and abroad.

The Ghanaian Ministry of works and Housing contracted

the Integrated Development Consultants at the University of

Science and Technology in Kumasi to undertake feasibility

study of the Infrastructural Development of the Kumasi

Central Market in 1990. The final report of the feasibility

study (1993) revealed interesting facts, which confirmed

market traders' complaints:

 

 

Cent:

(301181:

the p

for c

compl

Sanit

Devel.

235

a) The existing infrastructure in the market is obsolete

and poor. Water and electricity connections are

usually unauthorized and illegal, while telephones

and hydrants for fire fighting are virtually non-

existent.

b) The few toilets in and around the market are all

poorly managed, and refuse management is also poor.

c) Disposal of surface water runoff after rains is poor

due to inadequate drainage system and the silting of

the few existing channels. Frequent flooding of the

market is a common phenomenon during rains.

d) paved surfaces in the market have deteriorated so

badly that the market is suffering from severe

erosion at some areas and sediment deposition in

other areas.

e) Most of the stalls are temporary structures, and are

in very poor condition (Integrated Development

Consultants, (Integrated Development Consultants,

1993z3).

Consequently, the report recommended that the Kumasi

Central Market should be redeveloped including the

construction of two-storey and three-storey buildings, and

the provision of other facilities such as day-care center

for children of market traders, bank and post office

complexes, health post, police post, fire service post,

sanitary and relaxation areas, among others (Integrated

Development Consultants, 1993:17).

In addition, the study report recommended that a

company be floated to manage the Central Market, and all the

remaining urban and suburban markets in Kumasi. Such a

company, they suggested, may be called the Kumasi Markets

Development Corporation (KMDC). The company would appraise

the viability of individual markets and formulate proposals

for their improvements.

However, the feasibility study had some weaknesses.

First, there was no indication in the report that market

re

an

tr

Co:

the

236

traders were consulted, and whether their input was sought

or not. What was quite clear was that the consultants held

preliminary discussions with statutory institutions whose

activities related closely to the planning, development,

management, and maintenance of the Kumasi Central Area,

including the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority, the Survey

Department, the Ghana Highway Authority, the Market Manager,

and the Town and Country Planning Department in Kumasi.

In my estimation, market trader input was critical to

the rehabilitation of the Central Market. Why should the

consultants be concerned about environmental impact of the

project, and therefore undertook an environmental impact

assessment, and not a social impact assessment? A

sociologicallanthropological study of the impact of the

rehabilitation of the market could have been

quite helpful.

Markets reflect the culture, values, and beliefs of a

people.

What happens when a market structure is changed by

new architectural designs cannot be ignored. For instance,

when the Kaneshie Market (Accra) was built based on‘Western

architectural designs of enclosed (dome-like) structures,

and storey-buildings, it affected market trader-customer

relationship. Those whose stalls/stores were closer to the

entrance of the Kaneshie Market outperformed their fellow

traders. Eventually, most traders refused to sell their

commodities inside the market (particularly those who had

their stores/stalls on the upper floors), and.moved to do

business outside the market. While in Ghana, I saw that the

 

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237

Accra City Council had a problem controlling/regulating

these traders, and I found that City Council officials

chased recalcitrant traders to go inside the market. I

wondered what social impact assessment was done before the

Kaneshie Market was constructed in 1970. This should have

provided lessons for the architectural designers and

financiers of the Central Market rehabilitation project.

In addition, one must make a distinction between what

is proposed and what may actually happen. It should be borne

in mind that the proposed project is contingent upon the

flow of funds from the WOrld Bank/IMF to the Ghana

Government, and the continuity of the SAP in Ghana. Also,

the continuity of the project, once it begins, will be

dependent on political stability in the country. Given the

fact that the Ghanaian political scene has been

characterized by instability since independence, no one can

guarantee completion of the proposed project, even if it

takes off. Market traders who were

interviewed were

enthusiastic about the possibility of seeing their dreams

come true, but they were concerned with how the

rehabilitation process will affect their business

activities, and where they would be relocated.

 

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238

SECURITY IN'THE CENTRAL MARKET

Poor security was one of the issues market traders

petitioned the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority. According to

the report of the Schedule Officer for Security in the Legal

Department of the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority (attached),

there were twenty-four night watchmen (security guards) for

the twenty-four gates of the Central Market in 1984.

However, in 1985, during the local government downsizing,

thirteen of the watchmen were declared redundant, and were

laid-off. By 1992, only four watchmen were retained by the

KMA, and were only charged with opening and locking the

twenty-four gates at the Central Market. The poor security

problem led to several reports of theft in the Central

market, which was discussed in Chapter Six. The irony was

that market traders whose commodities were stolen had no

recourse to seek redress and compensation.

In 1990, the traders became wary of the incessant

thefts of commodities in the Central Market, and petitioned

the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly for consideration. The

Metropolitan Assembly resolved to provide better security at

the Central at its own expense. They contracted the services

of the Civil Defence Organization (CDC), to beef up security

at the market. The CD0 was one of the civil organizations

that was formed when the 'PNDC' revolution began. It was

armed by the state to defend the PNDC against any counter

insurrection from those who were opposed to the

'revolution'. It was the belief of the Metropolitan Assembly

 

that 1

the DE

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1991, '

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239

that they could do a better job of providing security for

the market.

However, when the CD0 took charge of security, the

break-ins, and theft of commodities continued. The market

traders suspected the CDO itself for conniving with others

to steal commodities in the market in the night; for they

could not comprehend how the armed CDO could be overpowered

by another group, and break into their stalls/stores. In

1991, three traders lost their commodities (mostly imported

textiles), which amounted to over two million cedis (C 2

million). They petitioned the Metropolitan Authority for

compensation, since the theft took place while the CDO_was

supposed to have provided security for the market. At its

meeting held on June 17, 1991, the Metropolitan Assembly

decided to pay for the total cost of the stolen commodities.

Consequently, the metropolitan Assembly paid the three

traders C 2,0005,000.00. The Metropolitan Assembly blamed

the theft on the negligence of CD0 personnel, and therefore

took steps to redeem the money from the allowances and

entitlements for the CD0 personnel (see attached

memorandum). It also withdrew the CD0 from the market in

1992, and advised the market traders to seek their own

private security guards.

Groups of traders whose stores were adjacent to each

other teamed up and hired private security guards. According

to the traders, this arrangement worked better for them;

since the watchmen actually kept guard of the stalls/stores

 

3882

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240

assigned to them, instead of keeping watch over the entire

market. The catch was that with this new arrangement, the

KMA could not be held accountable for the theft of traders'

commodities. In addition, the stores/stalls of market

traders who could not afford to hire private watchmen became

targets of thieves, as the KMA had only four security guards

to watch the twenty-four gates of the Central Market.

First, what is the obligation (in this case, security)

of the state to private business?

According to the traders,

so far as they were tenants of the local state, and were

charged rents and paid numerous taxes to the state as

discussed in Chapter Six, the state was obliged to provide

security for their commodities. But given the financial

constraints of the local state during the period of state

restructuring, and the attendant retrenchment of security

guards, there was a breakdown of security in the market.

Privatization of security at least gave the market traders a

greater control of who would protect their commodities, and

who should be held accountable for any losses they make when

their goods are stolen in the future.

Second, it also

raises questions as to why the market, in the first place,

should be owned by the state, and not controlled completely

by the traders whose daily survival is linked to the market

as an institution. The idea of privatizing the'ownership of

the market would give market traders a better leeway to

negotiate for better services and security, since state

bureaucracies in Africa, particularly in Ghana, have proven

 

ac

di

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Ma

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38!

Die

241

to be inefficient and self-serving.

EMPOWERMENT OP INDIGENOUS BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

It is heartening to note that indigenous business

associations, including market traders, have mobilized at

district, regional and national levels to empower themselves

to influence the political process in Ghana. Indigenous

business associations are defined generally as associations

that represent men and women who participate in what is

generally considered the "informal” economy. Their

activities are based on a localized production and

distribution system, with skills and knowledge gained

through apprenticeship, and expressed in the local language

(ILO, 1972; Warren, 1981, 1986; Amoyaw, 1990).

The General Traders Association in the Kumasi Central

Market is affiliated with the Federation of Market Traders

Associations (FEMATA), which has its headquarters in the

capital city, Accra. The FEMATA coordinates market trader

associations throughout Ghana, and serves as their mouth-

piece at the national level. In 1990, the FEMATA represented

market traders, for the first time, at the Constituent

Assembly, which deliberated on the modalities for the

transition of political power from military rule to civilian

rule in Ghana. A major outcome of the Constituent Assembly

was a new Ghanaian Constitution in 1992, which among other

things, recommended the establishment of the Council for

    

Indige

up of

baker

with t 

and as

activi

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S

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242

Indigenous Business Associations (CIBA). The CIBA was made

up of representatives of market traders, auto-repairers,

bakers, artisans, among several other groups. It is charged

with the coordination of member associations' activities,

and assesses how state economic policies affect the

activities of its members, and makes recommendations to the

state.

So far, the CIBA has been successful in negotiating for

a different approach/arrangement for collecting state tax

revenues (income taxes) from its member associations; an

arrangement which gives them a greater self-determination in

how they organize their business activities, and in

relationship to the state and its agencies. Prior to the new

arrangement, collection of state tax revenues (income tax)

from indigenous business men and women was done at the

convenience of the state agents. First, state agents accused

indigenous business men and women of evading taxes in the

past. Thus, when the PNDC established the Citizens Vetting

Committee in 1982, one of its purposes was to go after

businesspeople, especially market traders, who were

suspected to have evaded the payment of taxes under the

previous regimes.

The harassment and brutal tactics that

were used to collect taxes from.businesspeople left much to

be desired. Ray (1986) reported:

   

in

10.

Co]

the

and

Sta

One

bqu

243

Between its establishment in February 1982 and

November 1993, the Citizens Vetting Committee directly

resulted in the collection of 166.3 million cedis, out

of an assessed 306 million Cedis. The increase of

almost 500 percent in taxes paid by the self-employed

between 1980 and 1982 has been attributed to the fear

on the part of the self-employed of being caught by

the Citizens Vetting Committee

(Ray, 1986:59).

Although the exaction of taxes from businesspeople has

not ceased, the harassment and brutal tactics have become a

thing of the past. The CIBA has arranged with the Internal

Revenue Services (the former Citizens Vetting Committee) to

t
-

’
!

exercise control over tax collection from its member

associations. For instance, the CIBA presents the names and

activities of its members to the Internal Revenue Services,

and the latter assesses how much tax CIBA members should pay

overall. The bulk sum is then divided up among the CIBA

member associations. Unlike the previous practice where

businesspeople were expected to pay their annual taxes in

bulk, the new arrangement allows them to pay their taxes in

installments, spread over a twelve-month period, to their

local business associations.

It appears that the state bureaucracy benefits from the

collection of taxes by the local business associations from

their members. Definitely, under a regime of retrenchment

and austere measures, such an arrangement could help the

state bureaucracy to cut down some overhead costs. However,

one must also recognize that for the indigenous

businesspeople, including the traders, this was a major step

 

Ur

bu

81:

Li

de:

De]

th

0f

244

forward in their relationship with the Rawlings' state; a

change from complete hostility, suspicion, and harassment,

to formal recognition, and self determination of the

processes for collecting taxes from their members. Thus,

when one looks at these changes from a broader perspective,

market traders were able to get the state relatively ‘off

their backs'.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND DENOCRATIZATIGN PROCESSES IN GHANA

The struggle of market traders to seek a more

participatory and responsive state system, is not unique.

Rather, it illustrates the struggles of Ghanaians as a

people for a state which derives its authority to rule from

the people, and subject to their control. Groups and

associations including the National Union of Ghanaian

Students (NUGS)‘, The Trades Union Congress (TUCV, the

Ghana Bar Association (GBAYfi the Ghana Medical Association

(GMA)‘, the Ghana Nurses Association (GNA)‘, and the

University Teachers Association of Ghana (UTAG)‘, to mention

but a few, have wrestled with both civilian and military

states in Ghana in their search for democratic reforms.

Like other countries in Africa, Ghana faces a crisis of

democracy.

The crisis of democracy has become more crucial in the

period of Structural Adjustment Program in Ghana. Outsiders

who are unfamiliar with the political history and political

of Ghana often associate democracy with the Structural

 

th'

We

Gh

C8

ti

ta

245

Adjustment Program. It goes like this: the world Bank and

the International Monetary Fund as well as the states in the

West which support the Structural Adjustment Program in

Ghana initiated the on-going democratic processes (in this

case, the return to rule) as one of their conditionalities.

The logic of this argument is that without the Structural

Adjustment Program, countries such as Ghana, which have

taken some steps towards democratic rule, would not have

taken that course. This interpretation of what has happened

in Ghana is not only erroneous, but also discredits the

struggles of Ghanaians for a democratic state system; a

struggle which began in the colonial period, and continues

unabated.

First, when the World Bank and the IMF pushed for

economic reforms in the 1970s and the 19808, these

institutions said very little about political reforms to

match the economic reforms which were being advocated. After

much criticism on this issue, the World Bank, in particular,

attempted, though inadequately, to address the issue of

democracy in its latest study, Sub-Saharan Africa: From

Crisis to Sustainable Growth (1989).

Second, as Nyang'oro

(1992:22) argues, the inadequate attempt by the WOrld Bank

to address the issue of political reforms did not really

matter after 1989. As the so-called “democratic movements'I

swept through Eastern Europe, cries for democracy were heard

throughout Africa. In virtually every African country, there

were demands for the creation of multi-party systems where

C:

re

Gh

re

246

single party systems once existed. There were also demands

for civilian rule in countries under military rule.7

Third, dialectics of authoritarian rule and the harsh

conditions associated with the SAP also advanced the cause

of democratic systems. Based on dialectics, the emergence of

authoritarianism in Africa naturally created its own forms

of various types of opposition. In Ghana, for example, there

has always been political opposition, both overt and covert,

reflecting contradictions in the society. In fact, at any

one time, Ghanaian immigrants in Europe and the United

States, form.opposition groups, and provide ideological and

financial support for the covert and overt opposition groups

inside the country.

The Structural Adjustment Program itself intensified

these conflicts in African societies. The world Bank and the

IMF identified with authoritarian systems in Africa for the

implementation of austere measures including devaluation of

currencies, retrenchment of workers, higher taxes,

privatization of public institutions, among others, which

were discussed in Chapter Six. The implementation of these

measures could only be done in societies where there were no

public debates on the issues. Throughout Africa, including

Ghana, Nigeria“, and Zaire’, the SAP was introduced in

countries which were under “strong“ one party or one-man

regimes, or under military regimes. Civilian regimes in

Ghana which experimented with any economic policies which

relatively were not as harsh as the SAP, never succeeded; in

f8CtI th

the Busi

1981) "’.  

dialecti

'revolut

conditio

process,

as the K

Movement

abandone

Rawlings

neo-colo

Raw

dafined

P0pulous

Should a

the Powe

Principl

evolutic

insightf

(DECEmbe

247

fact, they were overthrown by the military. One could cite

the Busia (1969-1972) regime, and the Limann regime (1979-

1981)”.

Rawlings himmelf has had to deal with the

dialectics of the SAP by abandoning his own initial

“revolutionary" principles and ideology, and yielded to the

conditionalities of the world Bank and the IMF. In the

process, radical groups with Marxist-Leninist leanings, such

as the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guard and the June Fourth

Movement, which began the "revolution“ with Rawlings have

abandoned ship, and have joined the opposition against

Rawlings. They have opposed the SAP, which they saw as a

neo-colonial tool for further exploitation of Ghana.

Rawlings has not consistently articulated a well-

defined notion of democracy in Ghana. For while he espoused

populous views of what form.of democratic system Ghana

should adopt, in many instances, the Rawlings state, using

the power at its disposal, acted contrary to "democratic"

principles. Chazan's (1989:341-345) tracking of the

evolution of democratic ideas of the Rawlings state is quite

insightful. For instance, she identified three distinct

phases of these processes. The first, populous phase

(December 31, 1981-April 1983) was the most radical:

government policy sought to bring about democratization by

incorporating the I'people" into politics both as guardians

against elite rule, and contributors to the construction of

a “new“ Ghana. To facilitate its goals, the PNDC created a

morass of organizations (which I discussed in chapter 6)

primaril

us'enen. 

repress '

beating

as the "

generall

religiou 

entrepre'

persecut

instance

includin

overseas

the PNDC

BuPPOrte

Ghana .

248

primarily to carry out its campaign against what it defined

as "enemies of the revolution". Their techniques were quite

repressive: indiscriminate killings, incarcerations, and

beatings of citizens. Civil rights were flagrantly violated

as the "authority of the gun ensure that rules were

generally obeyed" (Fellow, 1983:16). Professionals,

religious leaders, university lecturers, lawyers,

entrepreneurs, and ex-politicians, among others, were

persecuted and ridiculed. The chain reaction to these

instances of abuse of power was mass exodus of Ghanaians,

including intellectuals, to other African states, and

overseas. Those who remained could not directly challenge

the PNDC, and therefore, engaged in covert activities,

supported by the opposition that had been built outside

Ghana.

The second phase of PNDC rule (1983-1986) sought to

redirect democratization efforts to the rehabilitation of

the economy, and exploring alternative avenues to democratic

politics. The PNDC restructured the original defence

committees, and redirected their efforts towards local

economic development projects. Rawlings replaced all the

original members of the PNDC, except himself. This step was

necessary in order to purge the PNDC of the “old stock', and

replaced them with new ones who were moderates. The new PNDC

accepted the conditionalities imposed by the world Bank and

the IMF. Politically, the most significant step taken

towards democratization was the creation of the National

 

 

 

8e

8t

it

Di

249

Commission on Democracy in 1986, which was charged with the

responsibility to study and collate views on new democratic

political institutions based on the traditions, history, and

culture of Ghana. Although the intentions of these political

steps were commendable, most Ghanaians were suspicious that

these acts were designed to prolong the PNDC's stay in

power. Student groups opposed the SAP, particularly the fact

that government allowances for university students were

discontinued, and in its place, they were required to take

loans guaranteed by their working parents or relatives. The

labor unions also opposed the SAP because it led to the

retrenchment of workers, and higher cost of living.

The third phase of democratic implementation by the

PNDC involved participation in formal political

institutions. The National Commission on Democracy

recommended District Assembly elections as a first step

towards encouraging greater popular participation. The

District Assembly elections were depicted as the culmination

of efforts ‘to democratize state power and advance

participatory democracy and collective decision making at

the grassroots' (Republic of Ghana, 1987:1). The District

Assemblies have been established in Ghana as local

government institutions, and charged with the provision of

services to their localities. The irony was that the PNDC

still had some influence on these local government bodies:

it appointed the District Secretary, who was a member of the

District Assembly.

 

T1

prepare

country

establi

Distric

unions,

deliber

They re

electio

were wa

was the

constit'

functiOJ

abuse 0:

Th!

extent 1

activit;

faced we

PNDC. t]

”we! t<

“tees“

Was the;

politice

The

C°u3titu

250

The second half of the third phase was characterized by

preparations for national elections aimed at returning the

country to a civilian rule. A Constituent Assembly was

established in 1990. It had representatives from the

District Assemblies, professional associations, labor

unions, and civic organizations. The Constituent Assembly

deliberated on the contents of a new constitution for Ghana.

They recommended a multi-party democratic system, and

elections based on popular vote. While these popular ideas

were warmly received by the public, the bone of contention

was the recommendation for an indemnity clause in the

constitution providing reprieve for the PNDC and its

functionaries regarding their atrocities, harassments, and

abuse of power, during their stay in office.

The critical question that Ghanaians faced was the

extent to which the PNDC could be held accountable for its

activities between 1981 and 1992. The dilemma Ghanaians

faced was that if they insisted on accountability from the

PNDC, there was no guarantee that the latter would yield

power to the masses. On the other hand, if they were

successful in removing the PNDC from office, what guarantee

was there that Rawlings and his cronies would not take over

political power for the third time?

The Trangitional Provisions“ enshrined in the

Constitution stated:

 

W3

fi

Co:

CO]

90‘

an;

C0!

0011

bef

the

it.

199;

251

No member of the Provisional National Defence Council,

Provisional National Defence Council Secretary, or other

appointees of the Provisional National Defence

Council shall be held liable either jointly or

severally, for any act or omission during the

administration of the Provisional National Defence

Council..........For the avoidance of doubt, it is

declared that no executive, legislative or judicial

action taken or purported to have been taken by the

Provisional National Defence Council or the Armed Forces

Revolutionary Council12 or a member of the Provisional

National or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or by

any person appointed by the Provisional National Defence

Council or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in the

name of the Provisional National Defence Revolutionary

Council or the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council shall

be questioned in any proceedings whatsoever and,

accordingly, it shall not be lawful for any court or

other tribunal to make any order or grant any remedy or

relief in respect of any such act (Constitution of

Ghana, 1992:201-202).

The constitution, including the Transitional Provisions,

was put to a referendum in March, 1992, while I was doing my

fieldwork. Most of the people voted for the proposed

Constitution for varied reasons, but two were quite obvious.

On the one hand, those opposed to the PNDC voted for the

constitution because it would usher in a new democratic

government, and the PNDC would go away. On the other hand,

supporters of the PNDC also voted for the provisional

constitution because it would grant reprieve to their

compatriots. Ironically, the PNDC was not required to resign

before the referendum.was conducted. In fact, it supervised

the referendum, through institutions it created to organize

it.

When the ban on party politics was lifted in August,

1992, the PNDC sponsored its own parties, albeit stealthily.

 

These 92

the Eagi

resourc'

cities a

PNDC-fill

Kumasi,

Ghanaia:

candida

other p

The

and Nov

Patriot

irregul

Behedul

V011 the

Purpose

1993, w

Flight

Th

t0 Civi

for mil

heinOus

in °the

Zairels’

with th

they di

w0uld n

252

These groups included the National Democratic Congress, and

the Eagle Party. It allowed these parties to use state

resources such as vehicles and personnel, to campaign in the

cities and the rural areas. The major party that opposed the

PNDC-funded parties was the New Patriotic Party based in

Kumasi, and led by Professor Adu Boahen. Rawlings surprised

Ghanaians when he declared himself as the presidential

candidate for the New Democratic Congress, and absorbed

other political parties and civic organizations.

The General and Presidential elections held in October

and November respectively, were boycotted by the New

Patriotic Party because of alleged election

irregularities”. Nevertheless, the elections‘were held as

scheduled, and needless to say, the Now Democratic Congress,

won the elections overwhelmingly. Thus, for all intents and

purposes, the rule of the PNDC came to an end on January 4,

1993, when the Fourth Republic was ushered into office, with

Flight Lieutenant Rawlings as the new president of Ghana.

The problem Ghana faced in the transition from.military

to civilian regime, especially the need to provide reprieve

for military officers and their cronies who participated in

heinous crimes against persons and property, is not uncommon

in other African societies. For example, in Nigeria“ and

Zaire”, the military governments have had to come to terms

with the dilemma others have faced in the past: how should

they disengage, and do it in such a way that their past acts

would not continue to haunt them?.

253

So far, I have argued that the activism of market

traders in the Kumasi Metropolis has been fruitful. The

Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly, the Ghana Government and the

World Bank have proposed building a new market structure for

traders in the Central Market. In addition, the Kumasi

Metropolitan Assembly has streamlined payment of

compensation for traders who lost their property in the

market. However, the traders still have other problems to

overcome. First, they have not been able to stop or mitigate

the incessant taxes that have resulted from the fiscal

crisis of the state in Ghana. The involvement of the traders

in the collection of taxes, however, has tremendously abated

the harassment of the traders.

It has also been argued that the struggles of the

market traders in Ghana for a just/democratic society are

akin to the struggles of other groups in the society for

democratic reforms and justice. Although Ghana has returned

to a civilian regime, the struggle continues unabated“.

Democracy must be conceptualized, as Diamond (1992) has

argued, as more than simply a system or the process of

choosing leaders through free political competition, but a

way of life, a culture, a set of values based on human

dignity. The major challenge Ghana faces is how to harness

the democratic ethos that is (re)emerging to providing the

material resources for individuals to realize their full

human potential in the society. Aluta Continua!

39

IE

04

 

 

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study investigated how market traders, as human

agents, mobilized to articulate their collective interests

regarding the policies of central/local state institutions

in the Kumasi Metropolis. It was placed within the context

of global restructuring and its implications for Ghana.

A schema based on the linkages between global

restructuring, dependency, central/local state restructuring

and community activism, provided the analytical framework

for the study.

The working propositions for the study were:

1. global restructuring processes redefine the structure,

functions, and sources of revenue for state and local

government institutions. Consequently, local government

institutions become dependent on their communities to

generate revenues for their sustenance;

2. conflict between the local government institutions and

communities was engendered by the latter's strategies for

generating revenues from their communities, as well as their

austere measures which led to poor quality of physical and

social infrastructure in the community;

3. community activism.was aimed at resisting/protesting

state/local government attempts to control their incomes

254

 

throx

phys:

Cent:

incl‘

and

stud

gloi

poli

195'

Intc

the

the

bel

Pov

enc

and

ins

Com

res

Gen

Gen

0f

255

through increased taxes, and demanding improvements in

physical and social infrastructure in the local community.

The focus of the study was market traders in the Kumasi

Central Market, in Ghana, West Africa. The research design

included survey, interviews, documentary/archival methods,

and observations.

For the purposes of this study, the case

study approach was used.

SUMMARY

1. StatelLocal Government Restructuring

The study revealed that Ghana's dependency on the

global system.contributed immensely to the economic and

political problems it has faced since its independence in

1957. Ghana is now the third largest debtor nation to the

International Financial Institutions (IFIs), particularly

the IMF and the World Bank. The situation has worsened with

the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Program, which is

believed to be the means for reversing decades of misery,

poverty, and underdevelopment. State restructuring has

encompassed retrenchment of workers in public institutions,

and increases in state taxes and the creation of new

institutions to collect them, and austerity measures which

commercialized public services. But more importantly, state

restructuring has redefined the relationship between the

central and local government. Whereas, previously the

central government paid hundred percent of the salary/wages

of local government employees, and provided grant-in-aid,

256

the fiscal crisis of the state has led to systematic cut-

backs of central government support to local governments.

Since the Structural Adjustment Program was introduced, the

central government has reduced its financial support to

local governments by fifty percent.

The local state has also undergone some changes. It has

assumed more responsibilities for community development, at

a time when its resource base has diminished. Strategies the

local state has adopted have included increased taxes, and

privatization of public services. The contradictions

inherent in local state operations became quite apparent in

the Central Market. While the KMA increased taxes, rents for

market stalls and stores, the physical and social

infrastructure in the market deteriorated. Thus, while the

local state institutions had become dependent on communities

for their revenues, they have become less responsible

towards them.

2.

State Versus the Civil Society

The strategies of the local government in Kumasi to

generate revenues from the community, particularly market

traders, have generated some conflict between the two

groups. Market traders have been saddled'with too many

taxes: basic rates, property rates, increased rents for

stalls/stores, table fees, late payment fees, and increased

income tax, not to mention the austere measures of the

central state including privatization of social services,

257

and high cost of living. In addition, due to the poor

security in the market, they lost some of their commodities

through theft and armed robbery, without any compensation

from state/local government institutions. While the KMA was

only interested in raising revenues from the operations of

the traders, the latter were more concerned with the

deterioration of physical, and social infrastructure in the

market, and in the community. Thus, within the period of the

Structural Adjustment Program, both the central/local states

imposed a legion of taxes on market traders and other

Ghanaians, and yet the revenues were not used to service the

people, but were used to create new institutions which

duplicated the work of existing ones.

3.

Market Trader Activism.and Democratization

There were two major objectives of market trader

activism.within the context of state/local government

restructuring processes. First, it was designed to

resist/challenge attempts by the local government to control

their incomes through increased taxes. Second, it was meant

to influence the local government to improve the physical

and social infrastructure in the market to enhance the

traders's business activities.

From.1983-1993, market traders presented petitions to

different levels of the central and local state. An analysis

of the petitions revealed that they addressed issues such as

market conditions, increased rents, special fees for use of

258

market fees, and fees for late payment of rents. They

questioned the integrity of city officials, and demanded

accountability from them,

An assessment of the activities of the market traders

revealed that they have had some effect on the state system.

The Kumasi Central Market is scheduled to be rehabilitated,

and facilities market traders have struggled for in the past

may be provided. The local state also paid compensation for

traders who lost their commodities through the negligence of

security agents. However, the local state has privatized the

security of the market, so that traders could use private

security to protect their commodities.

CONCLUSIONS

First, the study has shown that there is a linkage

between global economic processes and community politics in

Ghana. Such linkages are often neglected in the analysis of

the political economy of Third world countries. Second, the

study also demonstrates that studies of grassroots movements

in Third world countries should not only focus on labor

movements, but also the activities of ordinary men and

women, especially market traders, who on daily basis

mobilize to articulate their collective interests vis-a-vis

the local state. They are a force to reckon with, and

therefore, theoretical discussions on the political economy

of Third World societies, particularly in Africa, should

take into serious consideration the role of grassroots

community groups in effecting change.

259

Thirdly, the findings of this research show that local

communities have come to bear the blunt of global/state

restructuring processes in the Third world, especially

Ghana. While state structures have adopted austere measures

to be lean and mean, in response to external and internal

pressures, they are still dependent upon their citizenry to

generate revenues for their operations. This study has shown

that organized communities are capable of resisting

attempts by state/local governments to have it both ways.

Finally, it has been demonstrated that the search for a

comprehensive understanding of grassroots mobilization in

the periphery of the global system.must be based on a

synthesis of structural factors (macro-level), national and

local politics (mezzo-level), and human agency (micro-

level), that is, people's resistance to domination in

society.

APPENDIX A

   

strictes

only. Yo

  

Name of

Organi z a
    

 

 

260

Membership Questionnaire

This questionnaire is designed to study the social

backgrounds of individuals participating in market

associations in Kumasi. The information will be kept in

strictest confidence and will be used for academic purposes

only. Your cooperation is greatly needed and appreciated.

None of

Organization

 

l. SEX

male

 

female

 

1

2

2. How long have you been a member of this group?

3. Why did you join the group?

4. How did you find out about the group?

5. Did y'

were acc«

 

6. What 1

you held

etc) .

7- How di

B'whdta

10. In th

group? I f

261

5. Did you have to meet special qualifications before you

were accepted as a member? (Explain)

6. What position(s) do you hold in the group? How long have

you held it?

(i.e, office, group leader, committee member,

etc).

7. How did you come to hold this position?

8. What are your duties?

9. Are you paid for the work you do for the organization?

10. In the past years, have you held other positions in the

group? If YES, state position(s) and length of time held?

 

11. What;

group?

QCLN

11.

Wha

the mark

 

262

11. What do you enjoy most about being a member of this

group?

CONDITIONS IN THE MARKET

11.

What is your assessment of the following services in

the market:

1.

Sanitation:

2.

Drainage:

3.

Roofing:

4 .

Water:

263

5.

Toilets:

6.

Security:

Please describe some personal problems you have had

with the above-mentioned services( for example, fires,

leaked roofs, thefts, etc).

12.

SELECTED FACILITIES REQUIRED BY TRADERS

Please indicate which of the following facilities you would

want the KMA to provide in the market:

_____rl"ac111t

11W _9______'l'
be Provided

a)

water

b)

Toilets

c)

Clinics

d)

Crgdit

e)

Trans

rt

f)

Storage

  

   

  

  

  

  

g)

Day-Care Centers

  

h)

Drainage

1)

Security

  

  

 

13.

108'

a) How

b) For

C) How

9) What

13111:?

e) What

8tall/8t

i)

too

ii)

hig 

264

13.

NIRRET STALLSZSTORES

a) How did you acquire your stall/store?

b) For how long have you owned your stall/store?

c) How much do you pay for rent now?

d) What proportion of your profits is used to pay for

rent?

e) What do you think of the rent charged for your

stall/store?

i)

too high

 

ii)

high

iii) fair

 

 

f)?“

stall

 

14.

!
R
P

a)

Wha

tables

b) HOW c

°f stall

265

f) What is your assessment of rent increases for your

stall/store since you owned it?

i)

too high

 

ii) high

iii) fair

 

 

g) How do rent increases affect your business?

14.

FEES FOR TABLES USED INSIDE AND OUTSIDE MARKET STALLS

a)

What do you think of the policy to charge fees for

tables set up inside and infront of stalls/stores?

b) How does payment of fees for tables inside and infront

of stalls/stores affect your business?

 

15.

a)

lat'

b)

busi

e)

Pena.

16.

a)D

imPro

266

15.

FEES FOR LATE PAYMENT OF RENTS

a)

What do you think of the policy to charge fees for

late payment of rents?

b)

How does penalty for late payment of rents affect your

business?

c)

Under what circumstances should a trader not be

penalized for late payment of rents?

16.

WORLD BANK FUNDS FOR CENTRAL MARKET IMPROVEMENTS

a)

Do you know of the World Bank funds for Central Market

improvements?

Yes

No

  

If Yes, what do you know about the funds?

b)Wb

thew

PART

17.

 

18.

W

have y

a. Pet.

b: Dem:

c. Boyc

d. 0the

 

267

b) What is your assessment of the way the KMA has handled

the World Bank funds?

PARTICIPATION IN'ASSOCIATIONAL ACTIVITIES

17.

I attend meetings:

a. all the time

 

b. most of the time

 

c. on few occasions

 

d. I do not attend meetings

 

18.

Which of the following past associational activities

have you participated in?

Petitions to state/local government institutions

b.

Demonstrations to protest government policies

 

Boycotts to protest government policies

 

Others

 

 

 

19. I

 

Other.

21.

22.

268

19. I pay my dues:

a. all the time

 

b. most of the time

 

c. on few occasions

 

d.

Other

 

20. From which tribe are you?

 

Where were you born?

Place of birth

 

Region of Ghana

 

Another country

21. How old are you?

22. How long have you lived in Kumasi?

269

23. Which of the religious groups do you belong to?

a. Christian

 

b. Muslim

 

c. Traditional

 

d. Other

 

OCCUPATION

24. What kind of work do you do now?

(Be specific)

25. What other work have you done before?

26. What was the source of capital for your current

occupation?

a. personal savings(esusu)

 

b . family members

 

c. loans

 

i) money lenders

 

ii) bank

 

iii) special government program

d. Other

 

28.1

29,

Or ‘

tack

270

EDU TION

27. Have you been to school?

YES

No

 

 

28. How far

did you go?

(a)

(b)

(a)

(d)

Primary

Middle

Secondary

University

1.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

1.

2.

3.

4.

S.

6.

 

 

1.

 

 

2.

3.

 

 

 

 

4.

 

 

 

 

6.

29. Have you had special training in any vocation

or field

or work? (Explain)

(i.e. teacher's training, commercial,

technical, etc.)

30.

(Plea:

31.

E
.

271

30.

Are you

married

 

single

 

‘widowed

 

divorced

 

Comments:

(Please get information on kind of marriage, if possible)

31. How'many children have you?

 

What are their ages?

Boys

Age

Girlg

?

ge

Additional Comments:

TEENK YOU'VERYINUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION!

  

1

t
t
‘
a

c

4.3

5' B;

If

organ

272

INFORMATION ON MARKET ASSOCIATIONS IN KUMASI

These questions represent an attempt to study problems

traders face in the Central Market, and how they organize

themselves to deal with these problems.

This information

*will be kept in strictest confidence, and will be used for

academic purposes only. I, therefore, solicit your maximum

cooperation. Thank you.

Name of

Organization

 

 

I .

BACKGROUND

1. When was the association founded?

2. By whom?

3. How did the organization get started?

4. How'many founding members?

5. Has the organization always had the same name? (specify)

a) Yes

 

b) No

 

If Yes, please specify the different names the

organization

has used in the past:

 

Na

a)

e)

b)

II.

IKE

6. What

III. ST

a)

How

b)

Tit

1)

ii)

iii)

iV)

273

Name

Year

 

a)

c)

b)

II.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

6. What is the purpose of the organization?

III . STRUCTURE

a)

How'many officers do you have?

 

b)

Titles and Functions:

Title

Function;

i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

 

c)

If

 

_
E
I

.a)

b)

H:

274

c)

If there is an executive committee, please give its

composition:

Qogposition of executive committees

Functions of executive members

8. a)

Are officers

1.

elected

 

2.

appointed

 

b)

What is the criteria for selection?

9.

How often are elections held?

1.

yearly

 

2.

other

 

10.

Is

with an

If

 

organize 

Wh:

11.

 
 

27S

10.

Is the organization independent?

(Do you have ties

with another or larger group?)

1.

Yes

2.

No

 

 

If yes, please explain the ties you have.

11.

Which trade groups are represented in your

organization?

12.

Does the organization have a constitution or set of

formal

rules?

1. Yes

2. No

 

 

13.

Does the organization keep records of its activities?

1. Yes

2. No

 

 

If Yes, who keeps the records?

-

.
w

'
L
‘

 .

-
'

‘

14.

1

 

15.

3

:
g
M
a
H
S

n
o
w

m
m

r
r

.
H

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

276

If No, please explain.

14.

Is there an office for your organization?

1. Yes

 

2. No

 

If Yes, do you have a paid staff to work for you?

1. Yes

2. No

 

 

IV}

MHHBERSHIP

15.

How many members:

Year

Number of members

Men

women

Active

Inactive

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

16. How

17 . Is

recruit

l

2

18. Are

19. Do

!
A

20- Wha

21) Wha

277

16. How are members recruited (How does one join the group)?

17. Is there a special time at which new'members are

recruited?

1. Yes

2. No

 

 

18. Are qualifications for membership the same for all?

1. Yes

2. No

 

 

19. Do members leave the group?

1. Yes

2. No

 

 

Why do they leave?

20. What will cause a member to be dimmissed?

21) What kinds of benefits does the organization provide its

members?

23. Whal

24- Wha

25, a,

 

278

NATURE OF MEETINGS

22.

a) How often does your organization meet?

1. weekly

 

[Day(s)1

2. Bi-monthly

 

[Day(s)]

3. Monthly

[Day(s)1

 

4. other (specify)

 

[Day(s)]

b)

Where do you meet?

Specific place:

c)

How long are the meetings?

[Time meetings are held]

23. What is the order of business (what do you do?)

24. What rituals are performed at the meeting?

25. a) Who participates?

b) Who presides?

279

26.

What is the attendance?

Please give estimates of proportions of members who

attended meetings for the following period.

Year

Prgportion of Members who Attended Meeti_ngs

 

 

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

27.

What language(s) do you use at your meetings?

280

28.

What are the major issues you discuss at your meetings?

‘VI.

ETHNICITYZTRIHAL AFFILIATION

29.

What are the ethnic backgrounds (tribal affiliation) of

your members?

Ethnic Backggounleribal.Affiliation

Number

Asante

Fante

Ga

Hausa

Nzima

Ewe

Other (please specify)

281

‘VII. DUES AND CONTRIBUTIONS

30) a)

Are there regular dues?

1. Yes

2. No

 

 

b)

how much?

c)

how often do members pay dues:

1.‘week1y

 

2. bi-monthly

 

3. monthly

 

4. quarterly

 

5. yearly

 

31). a)

Do members pay special contributions?

1. Yes

2. No

 

 

b) how much?

c) what are the special contributions used for?

282

VIII.

CONDITIONS IN THE MARKET

32)

What is your assessment of conditions in the market?

a) Drainage:

b) Roofing:

c) Sanitation:

283

d) Provision of water:

e) Toilets and Places of Convenience:

f) Medical facilities (for example, clinics):

9) Security and Safety (for example, fire-

extinguishers, watchmen, telephones, etc. Please mention

specific incidents in the market. If you have records please

attach).

284

33)

SELECTED FACILITIES REQUIRED BY ASSOCIATION

Please indicate which of the following facilities your

association would want the KMA to provide in the market:

Facility

Needs I_mprovement

Should Be Provided

a)

Water

b)

Toilets

c)

Clinics

d)

Credit

e)

Tran

rt

f)

Storage

   

   

   

   

   

   

9)

Da - are

enter

   

h)

Drainage

i)

Security

   

   

34) What actions have been taken by your organization to

improve the market conditions described above?

285

‘VIII.

RENTS FOR.MRRKET STALLSZSTORES

35)

a) What does the organization think of the rents

charged for market stalls/stores?

i)

too high

 

ii)

high

 

iii)

fair

 

iv)

other

 

b) What is your assessment of rent increases for

market stalls/stores?

i)

too high

 

ii)

high

 

iii)

fair

 

iv)

other

 

c) How do rent increases affect members' businesses?

36)

FEES FOR TABLES USED INSIDE AND QUTSIDE MARKET

STALLS STORES

a)

What does your organization think of KMA policy

to charge fees for tables set up inside and infront of

stalls/stores?

b) How does payment of fees for tables inside and

infront of stalls/stores affect your members' businesses?

286

3'7)

FEES FOR LATE PAYMENT OF RENTS

a)

What does your organization think of the policy to

charge fees for late payment of rents?

b)

How does penalty for late payment of rents affect

‘your members' businesses?

c) Under what circumstances should a trader not be

penalized for late payment of fees?

38)

WORLD BANK FUNDS FOR CENTRAL MARKET IMPRQ!§!§!I§

a)

Does your organization know of the world Bank

funds for

Central Market improvements?

Yes

 

No

 

If Yes, what does your organization know about the

funds?

287

b)

What is your assessment of the way the KMA has

handled the world Bank funds?

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KUMASI METROPOLITAN

AUTHORITYZASSEMBLY

39)

How'would you describe the relationship between your

organization and the EMA?

a) very cordial

 

b) cordial

c) tense

 

 

d) very tense

 

40.

What problems does the organization have with the KMA?

288

41.

Please describe how your association organized its

petitions to the Rumasi Metropolitan Authority in the

following period:

19 84 PETITION

1) Why was it sent?

ii) Who prepared it?

iii) How many people were involved when the petition was

presented?

iv) Where was the petition sent?

v) Did the press cover the event?

vi) Which Newspapers covered the event?

vii) What was the content of the petition?

289

viii) What specifically was done by the group members

when the petition was presented? (For instance,

Demonstrations, Marches, etc.)

ix) What did the EMA do with the 1984 petition?

x) Did the petition achieve its objectives?

1. Yes

2. No

 

 

Please explain:

290

42 .

1985

PETITION

i) Why was it submitted?

ii) Who prepared the petition?

iii) How many people were involved when the petition was

submitted?

iv)

Where was the petition sent?

v)

Did the press cover the event?

vi)

Which newspapers cover the event?

vii)

What was the content of the petition?

291

viii)

What specifically was done by the group members

‘when the petition was presented?

[For instance,

Demonstrations , Marches , etc . 1

ix)

What did the RNA do with the 1985 petition?

x)

Did the petition achieve its objectives?

 

2. NO

 

Please explain:

292

44.

1986 PETITION

i) Why was it sent?

ii) Who prepared it?

iii) How many people were involved when the petition

presented?

iv) Where was the petition sent?

v)

Did the press cover the event?

vi)

Which newspapers covered the event?

vii)

What was the content of the petition?

293

'viii) What specifically was done by the group when the

petition was presented? [For instance, demonstrations,

clash'with the police, fights, etc.]

ix)

What did the KMA do with the 1986 petition?

x) Did the 1986 petition achieve its objectives?

1. YES

2.NO

 

 

Please explain:

294

45 .

19 87 PETITION

i) Why was it sent?

ii) Who prepared it?

iii) How many people were involved when the petition was

submitted?

iv) Where was the petition sent?

v) Did the press cover the event?

vi) Which newspapers covered the event?

vii) What was the content of the petition?

 

295

viii) What specifically was done by the group members

when the petition.was submitted? [For instance,

demonstration, marches, clashwwith the police, fights, etc]

ix)

What did on do with the 1987 petition?

f 

x) Did the 1987 petition achieve its objective?

1. n8

2. NO

 

 

Please explain:

296

46.

1988 PETITION

i) Why was it sent?

ii) Who prepared it?

iii) How many people were involved when the petition was

presented?

 

iv) Where was it sent?

v) Did the press cover the event?

vi) Which newspapers covered the event?

vii) What was the content of the petition?

viii) What specifically was done by the group members

when the petition was submitted? [For instance,

demonstrations, marches, police clashes, fights]

297

ix) What did the EMA do with the 1988 petition?

x)

Did the 1988 petition achieve its objectives?

1. YES

 

2. m

 

Please explain :

47.

1989 PETITION

1) Why was it sent?

ii) Who prepared it?

iii) How many people were involved when the petition was

submitted?

 

298

iv) Where was the 1989 petition sent?

v) Did the press cover the event?

vi) Which newspapers cover the event?

vii) What was the content of the petition?

viii) What specifically was done by the group members when

the petition was submitted? [For instance, demonstration,

marches, police clashes, fights, etc.]

299

ix)

What did the EMA do with the 1989 petition?

x)

Did the 1989 petition achieve its objectives?

1. YES

2. NO

 

 

Please explain :

48.

1990 PETITION

i) Why was the petition sent?

ii) Who prepared it?

 

300

iii) How many people were involved when the 1990

petition was presented?

iv)

Where was the petition sent?

v)

Did the press cover the event?

vi)

Which newspapers covered the event?

vii)

What was the content of the petition?

viii) What specifically was done by the group members

when the petition was submitted? [For instance,

demonstration, marches, clash with the police, fights, etc.]

301

ix)

What did the EMA do'with the 1990 petition?

x) Did the 1990 petition achieve its objectives?

1. YES

2. NO

 

 

Please explain:

49.

1991 PETITION

i)

Why was it submitted?

ii) Who prepared it?

302

iii) How many people were involved when the 1991

petition was presented?

iv) Where was the petition submitted?

v) Did the press cover the event?

vii) Which newspapers covered the event?

—
2
.
.
"
1

 

viii) What specifically was done by the group members

when the petition was submitted? [For instance,

demonstrations, clash with the police, fights, etc.]

ix) What did the KMA do with the 1991 petition?

303

x) Did the 1991 petition achieve its objectives?

1. YES

2. NO

 

 

Please explain:

50 .

1992 PETITION

i) Why was the petition submitted?

ii) Who prepared the petition?

iii) How many people were involved when the petition was

submitted?

iv)

Where was the petition sul-itted?

304

v)

Did the press cover the event?

vi)

Which newspapers covered the event?

vii)

What was the content of the petition?

viii)

What specifically was done by the grow) members

when the petition was submitted? [For instance,

demonstration, marches, clashes with the police, fights,

etc.]

ix) What did the KMA do with the 1992 petition?

305

x) Did the 1992 petition achieve its objectives?

1. n8

 

2.NO

 

Please explain :

51.

If the association has used boycotts in the past,

please answer the following questions:

1)

When was the boycott organized?

ii)

Why was boycott organized?

iii) Who organized the boycott?

iv) How many members of your group were involved in the

boycott?

306

vii) What specifically happened when the boycott was

organized? [For instance, demonstrations, marches, vacation

of trading posts, clashes with the police, fights, etc.]

viii)

What did the m or government agency do about

the boycott?

ix)

Did the boycott achieve its objective (s)?

1. Yes

2. No

 

 

Please explain:

307

53. a) Which important personalities in the community has

the organized used to act on its behalf in dealing*with the

III?

b) How did these important personalities help your

organization to deal with its problems with the III?

54) Please describe other strategies your organization used

in the past to influence the KIA to change its policies or

to ilprove conditions in the market.

308

55)

How are your organization's activities financed?

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS:

_

I
J
I
H
-
fi

. 

TEKNK‘YOU FOR YOUR @ENEROUS TIME AND INFORMATION}

IIAILING'ADDRBSS OP ORGANIZATION:

 

 

 

Interviewer:

 

Place:

Tine:

Date:

 

 

 

309

INFORMATION ON THE KUNASIINETROPOLITAN'ADTEORITY

These questions represent an attempt to study the

relationship between the Kumasi Metropolitan Authority and

market associations in Kumasi, particularly the General

Traders Association in the Central Market. This information

will be kept in strictest confidence, and will be used for

academic purposes only. Your cooperation in this exercise

will be very much appreciated.

Thank you.

RELATIONSHIP TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

1.

What is the relationship between the KMA and the Central

Government?

2.

What financial support did the Central Government

provide the KMA before the Structural Adjustment Program?

3.

How has the Structural Adjustment Program affected

Central Government financial support of the KMA?

310

ADMINISTRATION OF THE CENTRAL MARKET

2. a) What departments of the KMA are directly involved in

the administration of the Central Market?

b) What is the specific role of each of the departments

involved in the administration of the Central Market?

c) What are the responsibilities of the Market Manager in

the Central Market?

311

ASSE

OR CONDITIONS IN THE CENTRAL MARKET

1984-92

3. Please comment on the conditions of the following

infrastructure and services in the Central Market.

a)

Drainage:

 

b)

Sanitation:

312

c)

Roofing:

d)

WaterlPipes

e)

oilet Plac

of

onvenience:

313

f) Security and Safety in the Market: (Including watchmen,

fire-extinguisher, thefts, etc.)

FACILITIES EMA PROVID- IN CENTRAL MARKET IN THE 1984-1992

PERIOD

4. What facilities did the KMA provide in the Central Market

in the 1984-1992 period?

W
W
W

 

 

314

THE CENTRAL MARKET

S. a)

When was the Central Market constructed?

b)

How many stalls?

Types of stalls?

What are the measurements?

c)

How'many stores?

Types of stores?

What are the measurements?

315

d)

What are the rents for the different sizes of

stalls?

e)

What are the rents for the different sizes of

stores?

6.

Who determines rent increases in the Central Market?

7.

Are market traders involved in decision-making

affecting rent increases?

YES

 

NO

 

If Yes, what role do they play in the decision-making?

If No, please explain.

316

What factors influence rent increases by KMA?

Does the KMA charge traders fees for late payment of

rents?

YES

NO

 

If YES, when did this begin?

How'much?

If NO, please explain

Why does the KMA charge traders fees for late payment

of rents?

If No, please explain.

317

FEES FOR TABLES SET UP INSIDE AND OUTSIDE MARKET STALLS

10.

When did the KMA decide to charge fees for tables set

up inside and outside stalls/stores in the market?

‘How'much?

Why does it charge these fees for the tables?

MORLD gag; FUNDS FOR CENTRAL MARKET IMPROVEMENTS

9.

What support has the KMA received from the Wbrld Bank

for market rehabilitation/improvements?

a) Financial Support:

Year

 

Amount

318

b) Technical Support:

Year

 

Support

10.

What did the KMA do with the financial and technical

support from the world Bank for market rehabilitation?

11.

RELATIONSHIP TOIMARKET TRADERS

a

How does the KMA communicate its policies to market

traders?

319

b) Has KMA received petitions from Market Traders in the

past?

YES

NO

 

 

What did the KMA dO‘With the petitions?

12) What did the KMA dO‘With petitions from the General

Traders

Association?

a)

1984 PETITION

b)

1985 PETITION

320

c)

1986 PETITION

d) 1987 PETITION

e) 1988 PETITION

321

f)

1989 PETITION

g) 1990 PETITION

h) 1991 PETITION

322

i)

1992 PETITION

13. How did the petitions from the market traders influence

KMA's policies?

a)

Did these petitions influence the KMA to provide the

services

requested by the traders?

YES

NO

Please explain:

323

b)

Did the petitions delay the KMA from.implementing its

policies?

YES

NO,

 

 

Please explain:

c)

Did the petitions stgp the KMA from implementing its

policies?

YES

NO

 

 

Please explain:

15. Have market traders reacted to KMA policies in any other

ways apart from.petitions?

YES

NO

 

 

324

a) What were the reactions of the market traders?

b) How did these reactions influence KMA's policies

affecting traders in the Central Market?

APPENDIX B

 

I325

ASHANTI RETAIL TRADERS ASSOCIATION

KUMASI omen. MARKET,
0/0 9.0. BOX 3412,
x u M A s I.

Iu/S/BS.

ms smou'rrvs, campus,
runner CITY couscn,

P.0. Box 1916,
runsx.

“a! at,

'

IMPORTANT PQINTS FOR DISCUSSION

_ ye have the honour,to present-the under-speeified~

importdnt points for diécussion and implementation.

'(I) Sanitation at the Kumasi Central Market is very poor

as the COuncil labourers are not sweeping the market

regularly. This often produces unhealthy atmosphere

and we the traders often have to do the sweeping and

clearing of refuse all by ourselves. we therefore humbly

appeal to you for consideration to effect transfer of

some labourers to work permanently at the Central Market

(2) There are no fire fighting implementatbtnthe Kumasi

Central Iarket to fight any possible out-break of fire,
As a result of which some goods and stores have often
been burnt to ashes. Is are therefore appealing to you
to consider providing us with the necessary Fire fighti-
ng implements to fight all future out-break.

(3)‘Vb are also entrseting you to give the necessary

directives for the replacement of broken down Iron
bars or iron fl‘t" from the south of the Sabin Stream
entering the

arket'at the two points opposite rrsflensah

Hospital and Ghana Railway Corporation respectively.
'lhieves often Jump into the stress and pass througi
the two points and find their way into the market
either to steel or to hide themselves when being
chased by people.

  

(4) some traders have wron g1

tables all over the st
  
market and thus disr
  
goods into Our sto

   

placed some unregestered

to or pavements inside the

ting the smooth carting.of

spend stalls. We are therefore

:gpealing to you

.e necessary

unwanted tab

s.

0 use your good offices to give
actives for the removal of these

(5) 500 Association member

were ejected from the Reds-

tia (18th) and that
  
permission for re; ettlement of the traders at the Fren-
chline where dum

e Regional Secretary’hes granted

d refuse were removed. “a are there-

fore appealing
it; impldme

c

.

I

0 you to consider giving your assent fpr
‘ion as itwwill raise revenue for the Conn

.

-.’;

'

-.

I

"‘

a

‘-

.

\I

'_

O

a

(6) Our monthly rates have also
to ¢200.00 per store and ¢2
and we still have to pay additional ¢5.00 a day for
any small table put infsent of the stall or Store and
th:refore appeal to you and beg for reduction of the

to $100.00 per stall,

an increased from ¢h5.00-

r. .e

'-

v

(7) The Market gates were usually closed at 6.p.m. everyday

to avoid possible'entry 6f thieves into the market at
night. This method worked considerably as market thefts
were greatly reduced. unfortunately, this order has
been reversed and peeple have to remain
as late as 8.p.m. Thieves hareth°r010r0 $033 tgiSEPS

t the

ket

(P.T.O.)

 

326

the market. we are therefore entraating you to consider

reversing the closing time to 6.p.m. to clear away all

thieves and to enable the 'htchmen so about their normal

duties to arrest all suspected thieves after 6.p.m.

We welcome you warmly into our fold and entreat you to

assist us achieve our objective.

Yours obediently,

W _

327

GENERAL TRADERS ASSOCIATION

( Motto: HONEST LABOUR)

' ‘ELEP

E:

——

REGIONAL SECRETARIAT

P. 0. BOX 1662

““3” °"
l

HON

: 8

'al Beaurit Bank

’ W xuuwx-msmn

Our ....

n at

 Y our Ref:
_

1 7 th {game—#1939

"Ono " Si

.

r

"

uaauser

FOR.hEflnBILITATION or

onumL MARKET, RL'IJASI

_

 

It would

be recalled

that

the runner

Ci ty Council

Chairman Lt. Col.

Opuni

Hensah, assured

the above -nsmed

 

Association
for the rehabilitation of the Central Market partiCulsriy
construction

of drains

culverts

restrain

and

the

that

the

to

world Bank

has voted

money

entry

of

water

into stall

and

kiosks.

That

Upon

the receipt

of this

assurance,

the members

were

happy

about

the unexpected

news

like

this

and we

did

thank the Chairman

for

his able

leadership.

That

when

the Chainusn

was

reIIeVinn

his post

as

an Executive

Chairman,

he

further

told

us that

the

commencement of the work

will

he

begin

in June, 1988.

That

to our

surprise,

the June

1988

has lapsed

and

nothing

is

hoard

from

the Council

about

the

rehabilitation of the market.

We

are by this letter

want.

to know

from the Council

the date

or time

the said project will take place

That

the entire

Association members

wil

not hesitate

to summits

give

helping hands

to

the Councils project

at

the Market if

it begins.

That

prior

to

this

assurance

,

the council

increased rates

on the

ground

that

they

will construct

LVIP

toilet,

Urinal

rooms etc. which the market has denied.

That

because

of this develo mont ‘which

tho

semlred

us,

we

accented

the igcrense

of

ranésc°giiil

the bone

that

the council

will actually

undertake

the

nrruranco

nrodeots

at

the market

but

to our. dismay

the

Council

did

not

fulfil its

promises

to the tnadgrs

Wk!!! 8 13
received.

th

a market

and "here

m

the council a

!

revenue 13

That

we traders

sweep in *h

. e

m

rk

refuse

to the dumping

places

withea

our own resources

et

and convey

the

instead

of

the Council's

own responsibility.

‘n

We

are

further

by

this letter

.

r

eflu

til

Council

to disclose to us

the rates

Jaanry 1088

to December, long

and

collecgzd lgrcmhe

the develcpmant made

at
accordingly, 5

the Centr l

'

Lnrket

~
to enable

us

to advise

ourselves

We hone

in the principles of Natur l J

.

u ti

'

aggnffir

play

which

the Council

is

dZdicazedceIozquth

a

1‘

.0

will

not

hesitate

a nested

‘1

.

for

to us ,

as

the

accountability

to 01801038

what

we

is

hav

coungerned

 

 

Ah

328

Yours

faithfully,

_“’fl_fl,,.

r— """'

1-,

0

THE

P.R.D.C. DISTRICT

SECRETARI’

ILUiiASI DISTRICT

1. COUNCIL,

KUMASI,

Copies

to:

 

‘he P. N.D.C.Begional Secretary,

Regional Administration,

Yumasi/Ashenti.

2,

The

City Treasurer,

Eumaei

Diet. N. Council,

Kumasi.

3.

The Market Mannmer,

Kumasi City Council,

Kumasi.

In.

Th9 Chairman,

.

Central racket ”0V. Committee,

Kumnsi.

5.

.The Dist.0rg.Asst,

CoDeRo ’

Kumeei.

329

GENERAL TRADERS ASSOCIATION

(Motto: HONEST LABOUR)

l‘EflPHONE:

REGIONAL sscumuun

i’. 0. BOX 1052

mamas: socm Scourily Bank W xuMASI . Asnm'rl

hat 3;!

I our Ref:

4%" mu.

.493L

aggoturlgl

The former Executivt choirwm of the 3.0.5. now kl). Ik- col.

, Oplni Innh‘lnvr‘w"35‘dfi|t, lifter his trnnefor. I. lust qus-tion

any new ’Xflifllvo chair-uh it within 6 oonths of his ofl'ios to

fnil- to develop the oontrnl Inrkst trons-o th 'orld Bank snrmrko'd

an uncut of lousy (c the develop-sot of the control purist.

rInt, who the present lotropolitnn Secretory, conned» You “enroll

onls to oft‘ioo, we have consulted his fu- the denim-mat of the

market but ho did not Iind up sinus thou.

'

J.

Tint, duo to the fnilu-o of th LIA. to develop tb onrkot, wo

suffer rain floods resulting to the dostrmtion of our goods in our

storos nod stalls in tho mrkot.

2but, our vta-o rent ‘hnT- boon rni-od tro- “(p.00 n month to 11,200.00

on! tho l‘rou 11.500 to 13,000.00 and tho n-as FJ.000.00 to 76,000.00.

1'tut, doqito those huge increases in route. us also pay 750.00 for

the goods inside the stores nu] nlpo $150.00 for the goods displayed

in front of tin stores dolly.

‘ltut, despite such hung. rents mil rntoo collected by the LIA. fro!

the traders in the Ins-hot, thy toiled to dovelq) tin Inrkot to onto

our pods tro- tloods.

.

'

That, Io mdortnks rqnirs and rouomtions of our stores not! also

«ploy our on: labourers to swoop the market witlnut own rosou-oss

despite the huge (noun or lousy oollsotso tro- us by tho LILA.

That, we do not benefit from the huge noount collected by tho LLA.

but they Inks use of the money collected tron us for. nothing.

'9.

rInt, we therefore wsloonv the committee to probe the KJLA. financial
Inttors whole henrtsdlg, and with the chutes every swoon.

10.

ll.

rhut, we appeal to tip coIIIIittc-e to inventions into those our onses
ru- Justios to to dons. Vs nluo appeal to the conittoo to rodoos our
high I'm" fC‘ “Io

'

'o thsrsta-s welcome the “mam for their seating.

.

s

-

.-oo ‘

'COO'

-

‘.

.

,.

n.-

rm cm.

asnmu none“. DIVISIIGA‘HNG noun-ran,

(ARE )9

'
0/0. REGIGML mum ISNTION.

KU!Ԥ1.

 

 

 

330

GENERAL TRADERS ASSOCIATION

( Motto: HONEST lABOUR)

TWHONK:——————

330' ORAL SECNKT'ARI A1

”tum: 80¢“! Writ] Bank

1’. 0. ”OK I“:

(Nf'h'

 

25i;;;'

XUIuwl-ABHANTI

Your 3:3:

 

_§S.D_9_§9I?£r4__..19_93

The mu .3! .J . lawl inns .

antle.

Thro FIDO Regional Secretary,

we.

bear Gentlemen of the Preas,

PETITIOH TO READ 2? STATE

‘Ie have the honour to present to you on behalf of the

GIIIRAL TRADBRB ASSOCIATION in.xumasi our petition on some of

the basic problems facing traders in Kumasi.

The aain objective of the conference is to highlight once

again the basic problems facing traders in the Central larket

since every effort made to reason with the PNDC Iotropolitan

Secretary and the Aeaeably has fallen on deaf ears.

lo have learn with.dismay, the publication in the Pioneer.

13th September

1991 whereby the [IA has voted h.) million oedia

solely to provide public address system to provide music and

other intonaation to the traders at the Central Iarhet. And we

wish to state that we object to such a project for the following

reasons:-

1.

That the acid amount could be utilised to provide fire extin-

guishers at vantage positione in the Iarhet.

'

2.

To provide day care entre since there is no such facility
in the market and urinals.

3.

T0 desiltrtha choked gutters in the market to avoid floods

during.rainy season and also to avoid any epidemic.

h.

.To repair all the broken dosn telephone syctea in the market.

The repair will enable KIA to_coamunicatc any information

to the traders and the ataff of the Authority. Gentlemen of
the preoa, we wirh to draw the attention of PNDC Secretary
to IVA about the congeetion in the central market. The congea-
tion has made the market so dirty and movement unpleaaant.
Effort then ehould be made to reduce it and we have the plea-
sure to suggest the following:-

1.

2.

3.

That KIA should endeavour to develop and expand lorry parka
at Bantama. New Tafo, Asafo larhet, etc. so that vehiclee
coming from the approaching roads to Kumasi central could
be accommodated in the new lorry parks.

That KIA should liaiee with the Ghana Railways Authority to
relettle traderc squatting near the railway lines. There is
every possibility that in the event of derailment, there will
definately be heavy casualty of huaan liveo anong the
equatters.

That we appeal to the KIA to allow the traders to renovate
their stores without extortion any money from them which go
into private pocket.

 

331

In reapect of the numerous rates paid by the traders, it is high

time that FHA reviews them. We appeal to PNDC to ensure that EMA

initiates descussions on the reduction of rates to forestall any

possible public demonstration by the traders. The rates of each stall

or store have arbitrarily been increased to over 1501.

Since the appointment of HetrOpolitnn Secretary to Fumasi we

have observed that, as a result of his poor leadership, no develop-

ment has taken place in the market. We eXperience seasonal floods,

the market is dirty, the gutters have been choked, and he is not

torerant to discuss the basic problems facing traders. At the moment

there are no keys to most of the gates leading to the market.

As traders and citizens of Ghana, we can no longer accept him

as our Secretary in Humasi and we fervently appeal to PNDC to relieve

him of his post. His transfer from Kumasi will enable confidence

people have in PNDC restored.

'

The General Traders Association have since 1981 played a meaning-

ful role in the communal projects, collection rates political educa-

tion and other activities organise by the Authority or CDR.

But

during the last celebration of CDR day in Kumasi, the Metropolitan

Secretary stepped the traders to attend the Day without any tangible

reasons. he were shocked of this behaviour.

We want to finally inform you that the presence of the MetrOpo-

litan Secretary in the person of Navy Captain Yaw Mensch is retarding

progress and hampering trading business of individuals in Kumasi.

The earlier he is transferred from Kumasi the better for PNDC

to get competent person to organise to support the good cause and

assist the peeple to live in peaceful and honest atmosphere in

Kumasi.

Thank you,

Yours faithfully,

CO:

The Secretary,

Ministry of Local Government, Accra

The Press,

332

GENERAL TR‘ADERS ASSOCIATION

( Noam HONEST LABOUR)

BEGIORAL SECRETABI A'l

'

r. o. nox ms

nu MASl . ASHANTI

15th January

 

—-

-

29.2.2

lflflfiONfl:——————

saunas: Social Security Bank

an: 3:!

 

"$'

Your Ref:

.

Till iG,P, N, D, 0, H3010 ML stoma“,
imam Imam slflllltflhi‘lbl,
no.3): 33,

M

bar at,

PrrI'rIos AGAINST r,u,s.

Maw

11th groat roapsct, Is petition against KJLA.

on Rates Collection as follows:-

I

(

at we hsvs learnt with di-ay tho nnprsosdsntsd

) gal: increase of market storss/stslls monthly

rentals without considering Isttsrs affecting our
wslforo.

 

’2

at we also

sal s ainst the act of collecting

) filly rats stigmoo gfi fty asdis) in the stores

and another 950.00 (fi fty sodisz’ for goods di ml and
Just infront of the sons stars
walls the salsa
A tenant is obligsd to pay against hi s/hsr monthly

y the seas storaksspsr,

star-ksspsr pays -a monthly rental as wall.

rental but does not pay any additional money for his/her

psrsonal belongings in the room to the Landlord.

Therefore the daily coll action in the stores must be

avoided by Lil. A. to mi'vs"say to 'th‘s monthly rentals

onl’s

(3) “that on 29th of July. I991, our txsoutivs mombsrs

had a seating with Km. A. and none. tho sttlndancs
wore (a) Naval captain A. Tulane-uh 4’. mac. Istropolitan
Bsorstnry, Kumssi (b) Rana Ksasi i yamsng (c) MrJull.
deso Assafo (d) Mersdwo Gyamfi
It the nesting, ws resolved that tho K.I.A. should avoid
the daily collection of ticksts insids the atoros and
and
stick to tho monthly rentals only. LI. A. agreed
promised to convsn's a meeting to

rosolvo this matter.

s) Mrdwudu Gariba.

it nsvsr fulfillsd this proniss.

'4) M"!

(fivs hundred csdis) for

. 's rp'symsnt, o

aonthly rsntals snot also bs avoidsd

ma view of tho fact that a tradsr could easily fall

sick and schittsd at a hospital or to involvsd in

funerals etc. which has not need punidimant.

(5) Ithat all our sppssls to LII. A. to improve the drainsas

system at tho control Iarkst have bssn to no avail and

this gvss rise to a flooded nsrkst during the rainfall

shioh dostrovs 95:37 of our paras.

(6) That may of the stores/stalls roofing wars rot-tan and

lssksd profusslp to soak our stock of goods in tho storss/

atolls but: all our appeals to tho rm. A. for renovation

provsd futile. Is thoroforo renovated ths stores/stalls

ourselves and raised the lsvsl of ths floor a bit against

flood with our scarcs resources with approval and author-

 

 

 

333

tro- !.l.l. savanna the Ll. A. .Lntud at rotunda;
.11 our oxymo- 1m1vdd lug chapel ”gt-Lu tho nonthly
sent-1- .: .11 he uncut“ noun/inn. tnn n.soo.oo
(on. thou-aid, It: hand

a can.) ito $009.00 (turn thou-and

can). cum-t could" as M! nah u '31: on the «gov-non

Inn. In undone van-om, IP’Oul as h‘ an. uncalled to:

and arutruy tau-nod “on «floaty-uncut pa: "It." and

tuna; «nun...

’

67) flat at .11 than .911 cotton. to SQ}; than no no

auntie. mo 1.” or convent-Mi on own cum: tund-

h: indu- t

do the aux-t an. tho nun." ult- 1-

mp 9:90.

2

.

. .-~--—.-¢_-2l

‘

In thozotou tux-bl: appeal to the Elia. haunt-1 ”but",

to: Adam h tut-non. on on: huh-1: a: a udnu 01 than

omdlu and ”dies-cat:-

(I) Invoking t o 4.11: can cotton 0! 150.00 Ind me: to

nonthly natal. of fl.GOO.m to: than 13 noun/stalls.

(b) 3.11: oso;oo (an: 0041-) «noctu- to nttoot only

tinder. “has tabla In the open "nu.

'

(a) Invoking the no- nonm: and. or ”.000.00 (flu-u

than“ 0061-) on the ”muted tutu/ltd].- to the

land unto]. o! n.600.00 (no manual. ‘3 “Mad

cells).

I thuohxo coma“ by qpodtu to the P. 3: t6- futon-1

 

”it...” to ink. mod-to a:
nu ”cull. nun-touch man u. and {.Ifh

a to u.“ 2t 03-“: no: t

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o m“

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334

 

NOTES

NOTES

Chapter 1

1. The Nkrumah state was guided by a socialist ideology, which

sought to restructure the Ghanaian society through state-led

development

strategies.

In

addition,

the

Nkrumah

state

ostensibly attempted to promote

egalitarianism through the

I'price--control" mechanism. For detailed discussion of the

Nkrumah state and its economic policies, see Tony Killick,

Develoment Economics in Action. New York: St. Martin's Press,

1978.

2. For one of the most recent works on the linkages of these

three levels of analysis see Robert Fisher and Joseph Kling,

(eds.) Mobilizing the Community: Local Politics in the Era of

the Global City. Urban Affairs Annual Review 41, Newbury Park:

Sage Publications, 1993.

3. See also Max Weber, Economy and Socifl, translated by

Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich.

Berkeley:

University of

California Press, 1978:40-41. He defines the state as “the

organization that controls the use of force in an entire

society".

Chapter 2

1.

For more detailed treatment of the geography of Ghana,

see E. A. Boateng A Geography of Ghana, Cambridge (England),

University Press, 1967; and

Kwabina B. Dickson A Historical

Geography of Ghana, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

2.

See

the Economic Intelligence Unit,

Ghana: County

Profile. London: The Unit, serial (1993).

335

336

3.

For detailed treatment of the Ashanti see Ivor Wilks,

Forests of Gold: Essays on thg Akin and the Kingdom of the

Asante, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1993; Jean Marie

Allman, The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism In An

Energent Ghana, Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin

Press, 1993; Thomas J. Lewin, Asante BeforLthe Britifish: Th;

Pre_n_rpean Year . 1875-1900. Lawrence, Kansas: Regents Press of

Kansas., 1978; Ivor Wilks, Asante in the Nineteen Centug: The

Structure and Evolution of Political Order. London, New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1975.

4.

For detailed analysis of the history of Ghana, see W.E.F.

Ward, A Histopy of the Gold Coast. London: George Allen and

Unwin, 1948; and Adu Boahen, Ghana: Evolution and Change in

the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. London: Longman, 1975.

5.

Two fine reports on Ghana's economic decline are Naomi

Chazan, Ghana: Coping With Uncertainty. Boulder, Colorado:

Westview Press,

1986;

and Douglas Rimmer,

Staying Poor:

Ghana's Political Econoyl 1950-1990. New York:

Pergamon

Press, 1992.

6.

see

Enid

Schildrout,

People

of

the

Zongo:

the

Transformation of Ethnic Identities in Ghana .

Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1978.

7. Data reported in Intelligence Unit: Ghana Country Profile,

1993:3.

8.

Robert Sutherland Rattray's Religion and Art in Ashanti

Accra: Presbyterian Book Depot, 1945, provides some historical

background of Kumasi.

Chapter 3

1.

For detailed history of the Kumasi Market and its relative

role in Ashanti and its hinterland, and colonial Ghana, see

Kwame Arhin, West African Traders in Ghana in the 19th and

20th Centurigg. London: Longman, 1979.

2.

Two major studies provide in-depth analysis of market

systems: Willy Frohlich, The African Market System. Translated

by Charles M. Good. Vancouver, Canada: Tantalus

Research, 1982; and Smart Plattner, Markets and Marketing.

Monographs in Economic Anthropology, Number 4, 1985.

337

Chapter 4

1. Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, "Disengagement from the

State in Africa: Reflections on the Experience of Ghana and

Guinea“

Copparative Studies in Society, 19, 1987.

2.

There are several significant studies on the global

restructuring

phenomenon:

Henk

Overbeek,

Restructuring

Hegemony in

the

Global

Politicaly Econogy:

The Rigg of

Transnational yNgo-Liberaliam

in

they

1980p.

New

York:

Routledge; 1993; Doreen B. Massey, Global Restructuring,

Local Responses. WOrcester, Mass.: Graduate School of

Geography, Clark University, 1988.

‘

3. Edmund Preteceille, State Restructuring and Local Power:

A.ngparative Perspective. New“York: Pinter Publishers, 1991.

4. The state versus the civil society dilemma in developing

countries has been explored in-depth in Michel-Rolph, Haiti:

State Against Nation: the Origins and Legacy of Duverialism,

New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990; Larry Diamond (ed.) , The

Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in

the Developing World. New York: Freedom House;

Naomi Chazan, Civil Society and the State in.Africa. Boulder,

Colo.: L. Reinner, 1994.

Chapter 6

1. For a North American comparison, see James O'Connor,

The Figcal Crisis of the Stgpg. New'York: St. Martin's Press,

1973; Sidney Plotkin and Will E. Scheuerman, Private Interest,

Public Spending: Balanced Budget Conservatism and the Fiscal

Crisis. Boston, MA.: South-End Press, 1994;

John P. Blair and David Nachmias, Fiscal Retrenchment and

Urban Policy. Beverley Hills, California: Sage Publications,

1979.

2.

The Kumasi City Court is inside the Kumasi Town Hall. Its

purpose is to prosecute and fine city residents who violate

the city's health bye-laws.

 

338

Chapter 7

1. National Union of Ghanaian Students

(NUGS)

represents

students in institutions of higher learning, including the

three universities,

and the polytechnics in Ghana.

They

protested

against

the

Structural

Adjustment

program.

especially the aspects which required them to borrow money for

their studies. Subsequently,

the universities were closed

several times between 1983 and 1992.

2.

The

labor

unions

initially

supported

the

Rawlings'

revolution when it began in 1981. But they became disenchanted

when the Structural Adjustment Program was implemented in

1993, especially when the state began the retrenchment of

workers in the public and civil services. They have also

protested against the high cost of living in the country on

several occasions.

3.

The Ghana Bar Association has had tense moments with the

PNDC. This became critical when three High Court judges and

one

retired military

officer were

abducted

and

killed

allegedly with the connivance of the PNDC in 1983. The lawyers

protested against these heinous crimes. Subsequently, the case

was investigated, and surprisingly a member of the PNDC,

Amartey Quaye, was implicated, as having masterminded the

brutal massacres of the judges and the army officer. He was

executed for the crime. The lawyers also criticized the PNDC

for the lack of rule of law, and dictatorial acts, as the PNDC

served as both the legislature and the executive body.

Finally, they called attention to the need to return the

country from military rule to democratic rule.

4. The Ghana Medical Association encouraged its members to go

on strike several times between 1983-1992. The physicians

refused provide medical care on these occasions, and patients

died in the hospitals. The protests were over work conditions

and salaries, as the Structural Adjustment Program brought

prohibitive inflation rates that made the physician salaries

worthless.

5.

The Ghana Nurses Association also used strikes, just as

the physicians did, and refused to provide services in the

hospitals. They used these strategies to seek better working

conditions, and salaries during the period of the Structural

Adjustment Programs

n
x
fi
_
fi

 

339

6. The University Teachers Association of Ghana (UTAG)

is

quite vocal in university and national politics. It has been

at odds with the PNDC since the latter came to office in 1982.

They petitioned the PNDC for better working conditions and

salaries. The professors boycotted classes as a leverage to

bargain with the military government. The most recent incident

occurred in October-November, 1994, when the professors went

on strike and closed down the universities. The newly-elected

civilian government under Rawlings invited representatives of

the UTAG to the Castle, and promised them a twenty percent

increase in their salaries in November, 1994.

7. . For an excellent analysis of why these new movements

emerged in the global system as a whole, see Samir Amin (et.

a1.) Transforming the Rgvolution: Social Movements and the

World System. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990.

8.

In Nigeria,

the Structural Adjustment Program was not

popular. When Babaginda introduced it, it was opposed by the

"democratic movements". He tried to inmlement it piecemeal

through the advice of the World Bank and the International

Monetary Fund, but it still backfired. The crises Nigeria

faced under Babaginda may have been exacerbated by the

forceful implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program.

9. General Mobutu Sese-Seko has ruled Zaire with iron hands

for over a decade now, and not without the blessing of the

Western powers, especially the United States. The World Bank

has implemented a Structural Adjustment Program in Zaire to

help the country to get out of its fiscal mess, created by the

General Mobutu state. Theoretically, one could argue that the

fiscal crises in Zaire may be partly due to its peripheral

status in the global system. However, it is well known that

the Mobutu has used graft, authoritarian rule, and oppression

of the masses, to make a fortune for himself and his cronies

in foreign banks.

10.

Both Busia and Limann regimes attempted to use the

Structural Adjustment Program to deal with the structural

economic problems Ghana faced,

although their respective

packages were not as ambitious as the one introduced by the

Rawlings State.

11. The Trangipional Prpvisions issue was not new in Ghana. In

1979 the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council under Rawlings

demanded reprieve in the Constitution for the Third Republic.

There was a public outcry for the reprieve that was finally

approved by the Constituent Assembly.

 

340

12. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council took over power

forcefully on June 4, 1979. After reigning for four months, it

was forced to hand over power to the democratically elected

government under Dr. Hilla Limann, which ushered in the Third

Republic in Ghana.

13. The National Electoral Commission was established by the

Provisional National Defence Council to prepare the country

for elections as stipulated in the Constitution for the Fourth

}
a

Republic. The controversy, however, was over the preparation

of the Voter Register, which the parties claimed was ill-

prepared, and had to be re-opened for registration of eligible

voters. The PNDC refused to yield to the foul cry, and went

ahead with the impending elections in 1992.

14. In Nigeria, the military has ruled the country longer than

democratically elected governments since it became independent

in 1960. The last election which was organized by Babangida in

1993, was won by Abiola, but was annulled

by the same Babangida State.

15. The case of Zaire is also an interesting one. Mobutu Sese-

Seko has firm grip of power, and has trashed all opposition

groups inside the country. It is the speculation of the author

that he would only hand over power when it becomes apparent

that the civilian government that would succeed him.will pep

haunt him down with his past crimes and atrocities. For

further analysis of the political situation in Zaire, see for

example, Crawford Young, "Zaire: Is There A State", Canadian

Journal of African Studies, 18

(1), 1984:80-82; Nzongola-NTALAJA, "Bureaucracy, Elite, New

Class: Who Serves Whom and Why in Mobutu's Zaire?

Canadian Journal of African Studies 18 (1), 1984:99-102;

Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Crisis in Zaire: Myths and Realities.

Trenton, New Jersey: Africa WOrld Press, 1986; Kelly Sean,

America's Tyrant: the CIA.and.Mobutu of Zaire: How the United

States Put Mobptu in Power. Protected Him from His Enemies,

Helped Him Become One of the Richest Men in the World. and

Lived to Regret It. Washington, D.C.: American University

Press, 1993.

16. The struggle for a just society in Ghana did not end with

the 1992 elections. Poverty still abounds: the World Bank and

the International Monetary Fund have indicated that the real

effects of the Structural Adjustment Program will be felt in

about fifty years time, when the average Ghanaian will be out

of the poverty picture. The private press continues to be at

loggerheads with the Rawlings government, over questions of

341

objective reporting. Issues about who should have access to

the airwaves in Ghana is still being debated after the 1994

incident in which the "Radio Eye'l was shut off the air by

state security agencies,

apparently for not securing the

appropriate

license

fromthe

state.

The

future

of

the

Structural Adjustment Program itself is yet to be discussed

fully regarding its impact on Ghanaians, and the attendant

problem of the fiscal crisis of the state.

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