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plus-9.1

PHILIP SELZNICK: ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIST

BY

David Michael Betz

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

1964

q u‘ ‘ a who

*2: HQIG‘I-

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Charles
P. Loomis, my chairman, for his stimulation and assistance
in writing this thesis. His broad reading and understanding
of sociological theory were very helpful. My gratitude
also goes to Drs. Form and MbKee whose open doors were a
constant source of encouragement.

An especial note of thanks goes to the students
in Sociology and Anthropology with whom discussions have
been most instrumental in helping me to formulate and
evaluate a set of sociological tools which have become
more than a semantic comfort.

Finally, I should like to thank Phyllis, my wife to
be, for her corrections, encouragements, and confidence
all of which contributed greatly to the accomplishment of

this project.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter
I 0 INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

Purpose
Importance
Organization

II. THEORY AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . .

Academic Interest
Publications
Types of Large Scale Organizations

III. THE PROCESSUALLY ARTICULATED STRUCTURAL
MODEL 0 O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O O O

.Knowledge--Selznick‘s Contribution

Cognitive Mapping and validation of
Selznick

Knowing

Feeling

Achieving

Norming, Standardizing, Patterning

Dividing the Functions

Ranking

Controlling

Sanctioning

Facilitating

Comprehensive or Master Processes

Conditions of Social Action

IV. SOCIAL CHANGE AND INTERNAL-EXTERNAL ACTIVITY

Internal-External Logic of Interpretation
Conclusions

BIBLIOGRAPHY O O O O O O O O O O O O C O O O O O O 0

iii

Page

m mww

LDOOW

l4
l4

17
22
27
32
39
45
47
50
57
59
61
81

87

91
98

102

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The nature of sociological theory draws varied and
widely differing accounts as to the content of an integrated
and unified disciplinary theory. This lack of order or
consensus can be attributed to several factors. Certainly
the infant stage of growth of sociology as a formal disci-
pline is a crucial condition to consider. But another
factor is the matter of needless semantic confusion.
Theorists sometimes use different terms to describe the
same process or phenomenon. Others use the same term to
describe different processes and phenomena. ‘This is what
Merton has called the ”terminological confusion" in present
sociological theory. The proglem is to eliminate the use
of idiosyncratic terms; the findings should be consoli-
dated and standardized.

One of the objectives of any science, whether it
be natural, physical, or social, is to standardize.
systematize, and make intelligible the materials that
are defined as relevant. This material can and should
be orderly and accessable. There should be a compilation
and synthesis of empirical findings. Order must come out

of the confusion.

In his book, Social Systems--Essays on Their Per—

 

sistence and Change. Professor Loomis seeks to bring
together and classify the concepts that are recurrent in
the literature of system analysts. The objective of the
book was to draw-out and synthesize those elements, con—
ditions, and processes of social action into a compact
systematic model. It represents an attempt to construct
a more useful tool for analyzing a level of social pheno-
mena. This compact theory can be used as a directive in
the field of research. Loomis calls it the Processually
Articulated Structural Model, hereafter denoted as the
PAS Mbdel.

The basic assumption upon which the model is built
is that the elements and processes treated are requisite
to orderly interaction and the functioning of a social
system. The theorist analyzing this level of organized human
behavior must be cognizant of at least the phenomena which
these basic elements and processes seek to describe,
whatever hegmay call them. "Whatever system one is viewing,
whether it be the master system society or any of its
component sub-systems (community, family, etc.). the
elements that constitute it as a social system and the

processes that articulate it remain the same."1

 

1Charles P. Loomis. Social Systems: Essays on
Their Persistence and Change (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van
Nostrand, Inc., 1960), p. 5.

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze in depth
and the large-scale formal organizational theory of
Professor Phillip Selznick. This writer has chosen to
use the PAS Model to facilitate and achieve that objective.
It is felt that this will facilitate a systematic point-
by—point comparison with other large—scale organization
theorists. This standardizing procedure allows a compari—
son with other analysts of social systems of varying
sizes. Thus a depth analysis and comparison can be made

with any theory that can be placed in the PAS Model.

Importance

The PAS Model as a taxonomic scheme reduces diver-
gencies, aids in the organization of thought, and empha-
sizes the importance of clear conceptualization of thought.
Its use in sociological theory has been demonstrated at
two levels: as a theory in and of itself,2 and as a tool
for theoretical comparison between different theorists.3
The PAS Model has been used as a vehicle for a set of
logically interrelated sets of propositions in the
research situation. The model has further been used to

help clarify the unintegrated terminology used by so many

 

2Ibid.. and Loomis and Beagle, Rural Sociology:
the Strategy of Change (N.J.: Prentice—Hall, Inc., 1957).

3Charles P. Loomis and Zona K. Loomis, Modern Social
Theories (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 1961).

contemporary theorists. The scheme aids in the classify-
ing and ordering of variables in human behavior. Thus.
the model facilitates the organization and comparison of
many theoretical conceptualizations through a point-by-
point comparison.

The classifying and ordering of elements in sociology
can be compared with the classification of elements in
chemistry. The work in chemistry has advanced to the
point where a chart of atomic weights and structure
presents a whole history of integrated research effort.
The discoverer, the research materials, and the original
site of discovery is left out of the chart for the chart is
a composite of research findings from several centuries.
The attempt in sociology is also to construct a chart of
fundamental elements that are basic building blocks in
human behavior. Consolidation of concepts that describe
recurrent processes in human behavior can lead to a model
that can explain and predict the structure and outcome of
elements in interaction.

This thesis is an attempt to take a step in the
direction of constructing a chart of elements to help
combine research efforts and to help develop a vehicle
of research to study large—scale organization by juxta-

posing Selznick's theory on the PAS Model.

Organization

To carry out the above purpose, this thesis will
be devided into three parts. The first section will deal
with the methodological and theoretical orientation of
Professor Selznick and the intellectual background out
of which he has arisen.

The second section will deal with the juxtaposing
of Selznick's organizational theory on the PAS Mbdel. The
content of this section will result in codification for the
Model is designed to deal with this type of procedure.
The purpose is not to describe the TVA or the Communist
operations as organizations. To deal with the total
empirical description and development of bodks such as
TVA at the Grass Roots and The Organizational Weapon,
without paraphrasing and abstracting the total contents
would be an injustice to the author. The purpose is to
find and abstract a general theory of organization out
of his research works and writings. The organization of
this thesis will reflect and be in accord with that
purpose.

The third section will be a treatment of social
change and a few observed parallels that exist between
Parsons' treatment of internal-external pattern differenti-
ation and Selznick's internal-external logic of interpre—
tation. Both of these considerations are based upon and
forged out of a methodological approach and theoretical

orientation.

CHAPTER II
THEORY AND BACKGROUND

"Among the practical aims, the theoretical puzzles
of modern social sciences is the assessment of human
institutions. . . . We wish to know what goals or
objectives can be attributed to it, what capabilities it
has, what strategies it lives by, and what its probable
line of evolution may be. This analysis must take account
of the internal features of how it works as well as how
it fits in a larger context. maintaining itself. This is
done to diagnose the organization's own troubles and how
it relates to other institutions and the community at
large."4

The above statement succinctly summarizes most
clearly the academic concern of Professor Phillip Selznick.
He has focused most of his academic interests on large-
scale formal organizations. His publications include:
two theoretical articles in the American Sociological

Review ("An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy” in 1943

and "Foundations of the Theory of Organization" in 1948);

 

4Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A
Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (Glencoe, Ill.:
The Free Press, 1960), p. v.

a book on government agencies in TVA At the Grass Roots,
a second book on the strategy of the communist party in
The Organizational Weapon, and a third book on large-
scale organizations in Leadershipyin Administration.

More recently he has demonstrated an interest in law by
writing an article on the sociology of law in Merton's
Sociology Today. While at the Center of Advanced Studies
for the Behavioral Sciences in 1961, he wrote "Sociology

and Natural Law" which can be found in the Natural Law

 

.E2£EE- He collaborated with Leonard Broom in 1955 in
writing one of the most popular introductory textbooks in
sociology. They have revised the text more recently to
produce two more editions in 1958 and 1963, respectively.
Professor Selznick graduated from Columbia
University in 1947 under the tutelage of Robert K. Merton.
This academic background under Merton greatly influenced
Selznick's interests and method of analysis. It is re-
flected in his concern with the psychological aspects of
organization and the role of the informal structures in
understanding organizational changes and leadership policy.
Merton's use of latent functions is clearly used in
Selznick's concern with latent structures, latent commit-
ments, and latent functions in organizational analysis.
The emphasis is placed on the internal patterns of activity,
emergent informal groups, and their modifying and under-

mining formal policy and action.

It is interesting that Selznick gives reference to
Parsons for the idea and method of structural-functional
approach, even though Merton was the student under Parsons
earlier. The method of utilizing latent models of function,
commitment, and structure is a conspicuous example of
Mertai's influence on Selznick. There are references
and footnotes given to Merton on unanticipated consequences,
practical action and the resistance of the social structure
and the possible dangers in positing a set of "needs" for
an organization. Selznick acknowledges an intellectual
correspondence and a continual reference with his teacher.

An intellectual debt in Selznick's theory can be
traced beyond just the formal academic training or inter-
action. He draws explicitly from Max Weber, Chester I.
Barnard, Barbert Simon, Robert Michels, Daniel BelLHWaller
and Henderson, and Roethlesberger and Dickson. But he
maintains his own identity by concerning himself with the
sources and forms of rational as well as the nonrational
aspects of behavior in the large-scale organization.
By focusing on both the formal role demands as well as
personalities as a whole, he is able to cast new light on
the role of leadership and the effect of informal relations
within the formal system. Clearly, it can be seen that

he departs from the rational, hierarchical structure with

its strict subordination which Weber conceivedit to

be.

Selznick's perspective converges amazingly close

to several other theorists in sociology. Perhaps the most
clear examples are Hbmans and Parsons. With Homans,
Selznick shares an internal-external distinction in his
theory which becomes crucial when analyzing patterns of
activity which function to maintain and guard the system
from external danger and attack. Selznick's use of external-
internal logic is so close to Parsons' pattern variables
that their influence on Selznick is very probable. With
Parsons, he shares a pronounced psychoanalytic perspective.
Both use much the same orientation to the analysis of a
social system: it is viewed as a relatively autonomous
system within an environment.5 But this calls for an over-
view of Selznick's consideration of the types of large

scale organizations.

Types of Large-Scale Organizations

Selznick has addressed himself to what he would
term formal organizations, bureaucracies, and institutions.
Hewever, all three can be considered purposive organizations

under the generic term associations. He defines associations

 

5Gouldner argues that Selznick and Parsons utilize
a ”natural system? approach as opposed to the ”rational

system" approach characterized by Weber‘s model. However,
it is this writer's feeling that this analytical distinction

is somewhat artificial even though some analytical clarifi-
cation might be made. The subject can be found in Robert K.
Merton, et al., Sociology Today (New York: Basic Books,
1959): p. 400.

10

as "special purpose organizations, such as trade-unions,
corporations, and political parties. . . . Associations
are usually based on limited, utilitarian interests. . . .
In general the more specific and practical an association‘s
objectives, the more impersonal and narrow will be the
individual's relation to the group."6 Thus, formal organi-
zations, bureaucracies, and institutions are all considered
as particular types of associations.

This paper will deal with the concepts formal and
informal organization. All associations have a formal
structure which Selznick feels consists of: a division of
labor, delegation of authority, channeled communication,
and co-ordination.7 The formal structure represents the
expression of a system of rules and objectives defining the
tasks, powers. and procedures of participants according
to some officially approved pattern. This formal structure
is an arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplish—
ment of some purpose through the allocation of functions
and responsibilities. It may be viewed as a tool or
instrument, subject to calculable manipulation. The
existence of rational, calculable action is not denied,
but Selznick goes on to say that the administration "never

succeeds in conquering the non-rational dimensions of

 

6Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, Sociology:
A Text with Adapted Readings (New York: Harper and Row,
1963)! p. 32.

7Ibid.. pp. 220-21.

11

organizational behavior. The latter remains at once
indispensable to the continued existence of the system of
coordination and at the same time the source of friction,
dilemma, doubt, and ruin."8

The other important concept which Selznick stresses
is the informal structure. "It is used to denote those
patterns that emerge from the spontaneous interaction of
personalities and groups within the organization. . . .
An organization's informal structure is made up of the
patterns that develop when the participants face persistent
problems that are not provided for by the formal system."9
The participants tend to interpret and restructure the
role demands placed upon them by the organization. Even
though they are assigned a prescribed segmentary role,
guided by the ideals of discipline and rationality, they
tend to participate as whole persons, i.e., not functionally
specific or in an affectively neutral way. They tend to
resist depersonalization.

Selznick views the organizational system from the
analytical standpoints of an economy and an adaptive
social structure. Empirically, however, they cannot be
separated for they represent an empirical whole. The

conception of an adaptive social structure is useful and is

 

8Philip Selznick, ”Foundations of the Theory of
Organization,” ASR, Vbl. 13 (1948). P. 29.

9Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 227.

12

employed with great facility with the structural—functional
model or method of analysis. But Selznick modifies his
position on considering the organization as being an
economy, in that an economy is viewed as a rational,

purely instrumental consideration of scarce resources.

But in fact the scarce goods and resources are not always
used rationally and instrumentally in the actual working
action system. The appointed leadership is given access

to these scarce goods and resources but it does not act

in purely rational and technical ways as prescribed.
Leadership tends to make concessions, make commitments,

and seek support for its actions. Control and consent
become inseparable and indivisible in a stable organization.10
The actual action system is made up of leaders who tend

to act as wholes. The emergent informal structure.becomes
part of the action system as they modify and manipulate
the formal structure. And so the economy with its formal,
technical approach to scarce resources is replaced analyti-
cally with the conception of a cooperative system of
action. "The winning of consent and support is conceived
to be a basic function of leadership. . . . The indivisi-
bility of control and consent makes it necessary to view

formal organizations as cooperative systems, widening the

 

10A somewhat related concern is that of Lipset's
in effectiveness and legitimacy of a government system. He
argues that any system of government must be both effective
and perceived as legitimate over time for a stable relation-
ship between the leadership and the governed to result. This
point can be found in Seymour Lipset, Political Man (New
York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 81.

13

frame of reference of those concerned with the manipula-

tion of organizational resources,’ i.e., the economy.11
Because the informal structure seeks to manage tension
through the organization of power centers by modifying

and manipulating the formal structure, the organization is
viewed as a cooperative system.

To summarize this overview of Selznick's general
theoretical framework, the following major ideas can be
given:

1. Organizations are viewed as cooperative systems
and adaptive social structures, made up of inter—
acting individuals, sub-groups, and informal plus
formal relationships.
2. Relate variable aspects of organization (such as
goals) to stable needs and self-defensive mechanisms.
3. There is a quality of recalcitrance in the tools

of social action, involving a break in the continuum

of adjustment and defining an environment of con—
straint, commitment, and tensions.12

This theoretical orientation will now be analyzed

in terms of the PAS Model.

 

llSelznick, "Foundations of the Theory of
Organization," op. cit., p. 26.

lzIbid., p. 33.

CHAPTER III
THE PROCESSUALLY ARTICULATED STRUCTURAL MODEL

Knowledge--Selznick's Contribution

Many have criticized Selznick for reifying the
system. These commentors find ample evidence for such
conclusions. Perhaps the existence of such factors as an
organizational identity or character becomes so real to the
researcher after working so closely with large-scale
activities that he reifies the existence of them. The
purpose of this thesis is not to criticize Selznick's
formulation of the organization, but it is this writer's
feeling that reification only becomes a real problem when
it hinders the formulation of questions and clear con-
ceptualization.

Selznick's contribution to sociological knowledge
as theorist, writer, and researcher in the field is
evidenced by his writings and the reference other writers
give to these works. The latter is a way of acknowledging
the importance and contribution he has made to the field

of large-scale organization. Some of his concepts and
methods of approach have become part of the language,

part of the tools for understanding and structuring research

problems in the field of sociological operations.

14

15

The professional sociologist perhaps knows
Professor Selznick best by his book The Organizational
weapon. Here he analyzes the Communist movement through
the bolshevik strategy and tactics; specifically, it is a
study of organizational practices and strategies. He is
concerned with analytically constructing a working model
of the combat party. The focus is on the construction of
a model which describes the special capacity and nature of
the system. It is not a full historical account of the
Communist Party.

Selznick's first bodk TVA at the Grass Roots, is his
most well known work outside of the field. He makes a very
strong case for the process of systemic linkage and how
it can be used to maintain stability and to channel the
sentiments of the people for democratic development of a
whole region. The concept which describes this process
is "cooptation." He defines it as "the process of absorb-
ing new elements into the leadership or policy determining
structure of an organization as a means of averting threats
to its stability or existence.“l3 Cooptation has received
wide circulation and acceptance in fields outside of
sociology.

Anyone interested in the field of large-scale

formal organizations or bureaucracy sooner or later becomes

 

l3Philip Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949),
p.13.

16

acquainted with the writings of Professor Selznick for they
appear and are quoted in much of the work done in this area.
His article, "An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy"
appears under the section of bureaucracy in Coser and
Rosenberg's book, Sociological Theory. The article,
"Foundations of the Theory of Organization” can be found

in Etzione's book Complex Organizations, and again in
Merton et al.'s book, A Reader in Buregucracy. Blau and
other contributors to Blau's book make numerous references
to Selznick‘s book on TVA in Formal Organizations.

The special contribution of Professor Selznick is
in the understanding of organizational practices and actual
operations. In his formulations, the elements of belief
and sentiment provide the foundation and cement around
which the organization may exist; socialization of new
members and open communication channels play the critical
role in maintaining the system as an on-going system of
actors. The leadership must educate the membership and
set the ultimate goals of the system; he must fill the
organizational forms with content, i.e., infuse the
system with a set of beliefs and values around which the
membership can work and identify. In socializing the
membership to view the system as a source of meaning and
pride, the membership becomes an integrated unit with morale

and power.

l7

Cognitive Mapping and Validation of Selznick

Selznick argues that a "logic of approach" must

be developed for the analysis of human institutions. He
points to the depth and dynamic analySis of a personality
system and feels this can be a very usable type of model
in analyzing social systems. Psychoanalysts, particularly
ego psychologists, View the personality system as a
relatively autonomous system, conceptually isolated,
with strivings, conflicts, and defensive patterns that
can be studied and accounted for in terms of inner needs.

The suggestion is that the logic or mode of

analysis associated with dynamic psychology may

be similar in essential ways to the analytical

logic of sociology, at least when coherent,

adaptive social organisms are being studied. . . .

The essence of this interpretive process is the

drawing of conclusions, from the study of

observable 9indicators" that some underlying

pattern of configuration exists.14

His "logic of interpretation" calls for the con—

struction of a simplified model which can be isolated from
its envinanment. The problem is one of isolating a crucial
set of interdependent variables that depict the essential
features of the system; an effort is made to identify the
uniqueness of the organization by determining its central
goal or objective and then relating this objective to

certain inferred needs. These needs will help define and

help describe unique tensions which that system will

 

Selznick, The Organizational Weapon, op. cit.,
pp. vii, viii.

18

experience under certain conditions.

The first step then is to discover the uniqueness
or distinctive organizational characteristics of the
system in question. These sets of characteristics, whether
they be in performing a role, realizing particular objectives
or goals, or whatever else, are then related to "needs"
which they are felt to fulfill. ,These "needs" of the
system whether they be organizational or normative
commitments are assumed to help prescribe determinable
choices and directions of action. Thus, the distinct or
unique identity of the organization is related to the
function it plays in the maintenance of the structure.

The study of inherent tensions is a crucial

phase of interpretive analysis because this
procedure helps to identify the system at

hand. Systems may be located empirically by
specifying their special characteristic inner
conflicts. . . . There is an important dif—
ference between disturbances created in a

system by environing forces and those inherent
tensions which arise from the system itself. . . .
Inherent tensions are rather such as are generated
by the very aCt of delegation, which creates

new centers of interest and power, yet is an
indispensable phase of organizational experience.

Thus stress must be placed on the qualifier
inherent.15

The method is to relate a function with an inferred
set of needs; this is the structural-functional approach.
This type of analysis seeks to relate contemporary and

variable behavior to a presumptively stable system of

 

15Ibid., pp. x—xi.

19

needs and mechanisms. The structure of relationships,
rewards, and decision-making is assumed to function effective—
ly to satisfy the "needs" of the organization over time.
The system as noted earlier, is adaptive or develops means
of self-defense through its leadership to maintain itself
over time. i

"It is a postulate of the structural—functional
approach that the basic need of all empirical systems is
the maintenance of the integrity and continuity of the

system itself."16

The maintenance of the formal system
as a generic need may be denoted in terms of the following
imperatives. They are the need to keep:

1. The security of the organization as a whole in
relation to social forces in its environment. (It
maintains its boundary against the outside.)

2. The stability of the lines of authority and
communication. (This includes power, decision
making and initiation of activity and communication,
communication of sentiment and tension management.)

3. The stability of informal relations within the
organization. (This includes the communication of
sentiment and tension management.)

4. The continuity of policy and of the sources of its
determination. (This includes power, decision

making and initiation of activity as both are modi-

fied by the informal or sub-sets of power.)

16Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization,"
op. cit., p. 29.

 

20

5. A homogeneity of outlook with respect to the
meaning and role of the organization.17 (This
includes the institutionalization of a set of
beliefs about the organization and its character
and identity with the respective goals and norms
that guide it.)

The crucial assumption and organizational "need"
is that there be integration and continuity within the
formal organization. This basic assumption is inherent
within the structural—functional approach. Selznick
couples this method with the logic, the type of analysis
which is associated with the psychoanalytical approach.

This type of consideration certainly places an
emphasis on the condition of time but there is no attempt
to reconstruct a history of the system under study. The
method becomes one of selecting and drawing out those
aspects which are most useful for an understanding of
the system. Almost all of the publications of Selznick's
are based on secondary materials and documentary sources.
But he does precaution the use of materials which are
restricted to that which is publicly acknowledged and known
for this may not reveal the true nature of the system.
This should be supplemented with interviews and observations

of actual practice. Internal memoranda and working papers

will help reveal the special insights and internal nature

 

l7Ibid., p. 33.

21

of the system.

If the use of personal interviews, gossip channels,
working papers and participation opens the way for
error, it remains, however, the only way in which
this type of sociological research can be carried
on. . . . An empirical analysis of a particular
organization, of its doctrine, of'a phase of
policy in action, of its interaction with other
structures, was our objective. But in order to
trace the dynamics of these events, it has been
necessary to attempt a reconstruction, which is

to say, a theory, of the conditions and forces
which appear to have shaped the behavior of

key participants.

Special attention is given to the latent structure
of the organization to help determine the latent function
or emerging purpose of the formal system. Latent refers
to that which is in the process of becoming. This function
may be the actual intended function or a concomitant latent
function. "The basic idea is that sociological interpre-
tation should be viewed as the search for models of latent

19 The focus is put on latent commitments,

structures."
latent structures, and latent functions of the system for
special insights.

Selznick's prevailing interest and accent has been
on the internal activity as it modifies the external
activity of organizations. His gathering of material has
followed this emphasis.

An understanding of the system can be gained when

an internal situation charged with conflict qualifies
and informs actions ostensibly determined by formal

 

18Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 250.

19Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit.,

p. xi.

22

relations and objectives. A proper understanding
of the organizational process must make it possible
to interpret changes in the formal system—-new
appointments or rules or reorganizations--in

their relation to the informal and unavowed ties

of friendship, class loyalty, power cliques, or
external commitments.

Knowing

Belief (knowledge) as an element.--The social
structure of any system "includes the shared beliefs of

the participants."21

This element plays a crucial role in
the formation and maintenance of any organization. "Al—
though ideology to be translated into power, requires
organization, effective organization requires ideology."22
This ideology presents a common goal and purpose which
brings the group together and integrates a set of beliefs
which allow individuals to work together under a common
purpose. The beliefs play an indispensable role in inte—
grating and disciplining a group of individuals.

Selznick postulates that a homogeneity of outlook
with respect to the meaning and role of the organization
is a requisite need for a formal organization. This plays
the crucial role in maintaining an organized unit of

action. The minimization of disaffection requires a

unity derived from a common understanding of what the

 

20Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organi-
zation," op. cit., p. 23.

21Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,

p. 96.

22Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 10.

23

character of the organization is meant to be. When this
homogeneity breaks down, as in situations of internal
conflict over basic issues, the continued existence of the
organization is endangered. It must.retain the ability to
be adaptive to changes if it is to remain an enduring adapt-
able organization. "The development of administrative
ideologies as conscious and unconscious devices of communi-
cation and self-defense are crucial."23
The focus is on the set of belifes which a collect-
ivity of actors share and their role in maintaining this
integrated unit against external pressures or systems.
The analysis of the communists cadre or the small cell
units within the Party is the case in point. The Partyfs
power and unity are attained by isolating its membership

from interacting with the "outside,' either ideologically
or socially: the party is then able to monopolize in
instilling a set of beliefs, thus giving the member meaning
and direction with which to carry out his activities.

"For as Stalin, that greatest master of revolutionary action
has taught us, theory gives those engaged in practical

work the power of orientation, clarity of vision, assurance

in work, and belief in the triumph of our cause."24

 

23Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,

p. 96.

24Selznick, The Organizational weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 39.

24

In TVA and the Grass Roots, the importance that
the grass roots doctrine had in establishing an identity
and rapport within the TVA's field of action is clear.
”By working through state and local agencies, the Authority
will provide the people of the valley with more effective
means by which to direct their own destinies. The TVA

may then become more integrally a part of the region,

committed to its interests and cognizant of its needs,

and thus removed in thought and action from the remote

impersonal bureaucracy of centralized government."25

Cognitive mapping and validation as a process.—-In
all of Selznick's works there is emphasis given to the vital

role of education and training the member to the organi-
zational point of view. "To mold the minds of individuals
according to a definite pattern creates a homogeneous
organization, and this is an enormous aid to communication.
A broad context of understood meanings ensures that in the
performance of assigned tasks, the spirit as well as the
letter will be observed."26
Because of the great importance placed upon the
role of leadership in developing the organization) an
emphasis is given to the education and training of new

personnel. It is the leadership's task to instill into

the membership an outlodk, an identity, and a set of procedures

 

25Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 37.

26Selznidk, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,

p. 18.

25

for them to follow. "It is the unity that emerges when

a particular orientation becomes so firmly a part of group

life that it colors and directs a wide variety of attitudes,

decisions, and forms ofcrganization, and does so at many

levels of experience. The building of integrity is part

of what we have called the institutional embodiment of

purpose and its protection is a major function of leader-

ship."27
But belief systems may arise within the formal

organization which serve to undermine and deflect the formal

goals of the organization. Examples are cliques like that

found in the Bank Wiring Room and the "bureaucrat-leader"

who wants to stay in office. These centers of power with

their own set of beliefs may arise due to different locations.

functions, or existential conditions. Both sets of deviant

beliefs alter the strictly rational, formal operations

within the organization. The "bureaucrat-leader" tends to

consciously or unconsciously construct an ideology peculiar

to his social position; it serves to explain and justify

his actions. He tends to identify his administration

with the very existence of the total organization: there

tends to be a plea for the centralization. The bureaucrat—

leader tends to call on the "collective submission to the

collective interests" and the conservative position is

 

27Ibid., p. 138.

26

taken to justify the status quo.28

Formal action is taken within the organization to
train and educate new members to a set of beliefs and pro-
cedures. The communists even as a voluntary organization
serve as an excellent example. "A long process of indoctrin-
ation and action is required to inculcate methods of organi-
zation which work so deeply that they select and create

29 Thus, the organization

congenial personality traits."
not only attracks persons with a type of personality and
set of beliefs but it inculcates a point of view and a

set of beliefs which are important for both internal inte-
gration and external adaptation to the external environment
while reaching its rewards and goals from the outside.

The more radically different the organizational
activities are from the outside community, the less that
system can rely on the general education provided by the
outside. This type of organization must provide its own
educational or training system.30 The communists leader-
ship extensively use political discussions to train their
members. (These meetings reach down to the lowest levels
of the party. Every unit in the organization is educated

and indoctrinated to agitate them into action. "An important

Leninist principle is reflected in the rule that organized

 

28

Selznick, "An Approach . . ., op. cit., p. 54.

29Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 57.

30Ibid., p. 36.

27

education and self-study must be supplemented by partici-
pation in communist activities. The primary function of
each type of education is to steel the loyalties of the
party member, to immerse him in the movement, and hence
create a life commitment."31
But there are two ways this cognitive mapping
experience can be directed: it can be directed to the
internal operations of the system or to the external
environment. When a set of beliefs are directed to
integrating and strengthening morale, it may be referred
to as ideology. Propaganda is often associated with
externally directed beliefs which are an organizational
strategy.32 Both the TVA and the communists have utilized

a set of beliefs: they have had both internal and

external functions.

Feeling

Sentiment as an element.--SelzniCk fails to
analytically separate the elements belief and sentiment
at all times. The term sentiment is frequently used inter—
changeably with some concepts as involvement, cohesion,
commitment, and morale. An ideology is an affectively
loaded belief system; it is a commitment to a way of thinking.

The utility of doctrine and ideology as a morale-builder.

is made explicit.

 

31 32

Ibid., p. 47. Ibid., p. 244.

28

The Marxist doctrine plays the decisive role in
fulfilling this morale function. It provides
categories of thought--the class struggle,
theory of the state and of economic crises,

and the nature of historical development--which
can be manipulated to bolster Leninist's aims.33

But this internal relevance of doctrine and beliefs
is not unique to the communist movement for in any political
campaign or other organizations, there are meetings and
talks just designed to integrate and strengthen morale.

But sentiment in social action can be turned against and
function to undermine the formal goals of the organization.
This can come about by commitment to procedures or through
the organization of sentiment in small sub—groups which
undermine and deflect the formal goals.

Every formal organization develops a more personal
and informal organization within it. This informal organi—
zation is based on personal relationships: it arises
spontaneously and is usually directed to control some

34 This emergent structure is ultimately

specific situation.
based on sentiments of preference or tension. The expression
of these preferences or tensions is the non-rational dimension
of organizational behavior. This dimension is indispensable
to the system for it allows modification and coordination.

Out of it arise new procedures and structural forms which

is part of an adaptation process; it helps the organization

survive.

 

331bid., p. 39.

34

SelzniCk, "Foundations . . ., op. cit., p. 27.

29

Organizational character, institutional identity, and
group values capture and also are capable of sustaining
group identity because they form the basis of group feeling,
cohesion, and morale. ”In building an activist social
movement, it is important to give the membership a sense
of striving for a goal so that attitudes of dedication may
be reinforced; this may be accomplished by special propa-
ganda emphasis. Similarly, the stress on action aids group
solidarity by maintaining a continuously alert membership.
Personal commitment to the group is reinforced in the
course of mutual support in action and as lives are

organized around the group as a focal point.u35

Tension management as process.--The formal system
of rules and procedures tends to generate friction and
dilemmas. Individuals seek to control those conditions
which generatefriction and tension by forming cliques or
sub-groups. This emergent structure becomes the avenue
of channeling and managing that tension and sentiment.
The Bank Wiring Room study and Barnard's findings illustrate
the informal adaptation of sub-groups to sources of
tension. Thus the informal structure provided those
avenues of aggression, solidarity, and prestige-construction

required by individual members.36

 

35Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 35.

36Selznick, "An Approach . . .," op. cit., p. 47.

30

The above is in essence what Selznick terms the
”organization-paradox.” The paradox manifests itself in
a modification of the initial goals toward which the
organization is directed. The management of tension
presents a pressing problem for every cooperative system.
There are ”needs" which are essential for the maintenance
of an integrated organization; but there are also desires
and sentiments of the membership within that system. A
partial resolutionof this dilemma comes when the informal
structure is created to manage or cope with the existential
conditions of the sub-group members. In all systems "we
find a persistent relationship between needs and commit-
ment in which the latter not only qualifies the former but
unites with it to produce a continuous state of tension."37

The above patterns under tension management can
also be viewed in Parsons' language as internal-instrumental
activities for they facilitate adaptation. They are

boundary-maintaining and tension managing devices that

help preserve the sub-system.

Communication of sentiment as process.—JTndoctrin-
ation and the sharing of key experiences--especially

internal conflicts and other crises--will help make a

38

unified group.” These ties of sentiment and self-interest

 

37

Selznick, "Foundations . . ., op. cit., p. 32.

38Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 46.

31

help provide effective means of adjustment for individuals:
this in turn helps to widen opportunities for effective
communication within the organization. "Emotional identi-
fication with the organization creates resources of

energy that may increase day-to-day effort and, especially,

39 Thus ties

be summoned in times of crisis or threat."
of sentiment which are communicated to others within the
group strengthen those bonds and cement relationships

which sustains the formal authority and its goals.

Along the same line, Selznick supports Lenin's
directive. "The main objectives of the educational work
should be to liquidate the fear and pessimistic moods
among the workers; . . . to rouse the enthusiasm, confidence
and fighting spirit of the workers, and to win public

40 This is accomplished

sentiment behind the campaign."
by slogans, mass meetings and demonstrations. The mass
meetings are invaluable for this objective in that morale
is heightened as personal contact is established.

Clearly, an ideology can serve the function of
integrating the group for it provides the membership with
a cause, a mission, and a justification for their actions.

The communist ideology and the grass roots ideology of the

TVA both represent examples of setting forth a set of

 

39Selznick, Leadership in AdministrationL op. cit.,

p. 18.

4OSelznick, The Organizational weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 105.

32

beliefs and justifications which were designed to

bolster the morale and identification of the membership

to their respective goals or mission. They provide

the symbols for communicating an identity or sentiment.

In this sense using Parsons' pattern variables, they repre—
sent patterns of internal-consummatory activity, designed
to"give primacy to the communication of sentiment, supportive

to the integration of the whole group."41

Achieving

End, goal, or objective as an element.--"The most
striking and obvious thing about an administrative organi-
zation is its formal system of rules and objectives. . . .
The organization is designed as a technical instrument for
mobilizing human energies and directing them toward set
aims."42 But the goals, ends and objectives of organizations
vary with the type of system.”

The interest of Selznick is in a theoretical approach
to formal organizations. Particular goals are not treated
as such but they do enter tangentially to the discussion
as they relate to the analysis of particular organizations

and their adaptation. For example, the goal of the TVA

was to raise the standard of living in the Valley States:

 

41Loomis, op. cit., p. 46.

42Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,

p. 5.

33

the communist goal was to gain power and social control.
Power is the decisive rationale of going to the
people, and justifications are left to History.
The leadership is thus freed for a purely technical
approach to mass manipulation. . . .
Conspiratorial organization in bolshevism stems

from the continuous and systematic search for
“pieces of power," regardless of whether this

search ultimately leads to the overthrow of a

government. It serves these revolutionary

aims, but is useful for more immediate goals as

we11.43

Because the organization is viewed as an adaptive

mechanism, goals and means of achieving them are not felt
to be constant; they change over time. Selznick summarizes:
"Institutional aims cannot be taken as given, for they are
conditioned by changing self—definition, by alterations in
the internal and external commitments of the enterprise."44

All goals are subordinate to the survival of the organi-

zations.

Goal attaining activity as process.-—The goal of
the TVA project was to raise the standards of living for
the residents of the Valley States. To reach this goal,
the self-conscious leadership of the TVA coopted strong
centers of power within their policy making structure,
thereby gaining the needed support to survive in the Valley.
The TVA was forced to compromise with elements from the

outside; by incorporating these hostile elements, the TVA

 

43Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 54.

44Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.

p. 82.

34

was able to adjust to its field of operations and attain
its goal.
No organization subsists in a vacuum. . . . It must
pay some heed to the consequences of its own
activities (and even existence) for other groups
and forces exist in the community.‘ These forces
will insist upon an accounting, and may in self-
defense demand a share in the determination of
policy. Because of this outside pressure from
many varied sources, the attention of any bureaucracy
must be turned outward.
In short, the TVA had to adapt itself to the external
environment and share some of its power to realize its
aims.

The energies of the communists have been focused
primarily upon gaining positions in groups and institutions
which will in return offer a means of moving to greater
conquests of power until the control of the social structure
of a society is secured. The foundation of this effort is
in the formation of the combat party (cadre or cell unit).
The principles by which the combat party is guided in this
power—seeking quests are marked by a high degree of adapt-
ability and expediency in tactics.

There are problems in defining goals and prescrib—
ing the procedures to carry them out, for they have
subtle implications for the adaptability of the organization.

The goals of the large organizations are often stated

rather broadly, thus allowing for a certain generality

 

45
pp. 10-11.

Selznidk, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit.,

35

because it is difficult to foresee whether more specific
goals will be realistic and sound. But these are the
leadership's problems. "In defining the mission of the
organization, leaders must take account of: (l) the
internal state of the polity, the strivings, inhibitions,
and competences that exist within the organization; and
(2) the external expectations that determine what must be
sought or achieved if the institution is to survive."46
Because of these internal interests and outside
forces, the leadership must minimize risks by achieving
long-run, as well as, short-run objectives to keep the
system running smoothly. The communists keep their
members constantly deployed, even when they have no

chances to reach their goal. Keeping them activated

serves to give them experience and pass away the time.

Concomitant latent activityas_process.-—Selznick
places great emphasis on the process of achieving goals
and its nature to precipitate other goals which are
unrelated to if not contradictory with the initial goals.47
These problems of an internal or external nature demand

attention and solutions which may find priority over the

original goals. This is in part, giving support to Michels

 

 

thesis of the "iron law of oligarchy." Selznidk argues
46Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,
pp. 67-680
47

In both the article "Foundations of the Theory of

Organization," and the book TVA at the Grass Roots, Selznick
acknowledges the work of Robert K. Merton on this problem of
unanticipated consequences.

36

that "there are processes inherent in and internal to
organization as such which tend to frustrate action toward
professed goals."48
Concomitant to organized action is involvement and
commitment to personnel, institutions, or procedures which
effectively qualifies the initial plan. These commitments
may lead to unanticipated consequences resulting in a
deflection of original ends. This displacement tends to
be in the form of compromises or retreats from the initial
goalto a more functional or cooperative program. "Our
frame of reference is to select out those needs which
cannot be fulfilled within approved avenues of expression
and thus must have recourse to such adaptive mechanisms
as ideology and to the manipulation of formal processes
and structures in terms of informal goals."49
These informal patterns arise spontaneously to
handle certain tensions or fill specific needs of the
personnel. The "action system" of an organization is
composed of individuals acting and not just as formal
participants in the system. There is a convergence between
the personal needs and the organizational demands. Indi-
vidual interests and perspectives, especially when shared

by others and organized into a group, may change or cir-

cumvent the official goals of the system. When there is

 

48

Selznick, "An Approach . . ., op. cit., p. 49.
49

Selznick, "Foundations . . ., op. cit., p. 32.

37

a bifurcation of interests between the organizational and
personal goals, tension results. When this tension is
experienced by others, there tends to emerge an informal
structure which manages this tension through the control
of those stressful conditions. It is this dilemma or
emergent structure which Selznick calls the organizational
paradox. The informal structure deviates and modifies the
legal system of the organization; it is a new structure
in the process of becoming.

These deviations tend to force a shift away from

the purely formal system as the effective determinant

of behavior to: (l) a condition in which informal

patterns buttress the formal as through the

manipulation of sentiment within the organization

in favor of established authority: or (2) a condition

wherein the informal controls effect a consistent

modification of formal goals, as in the case of

some bureaucratic patterns. This trend will

eventually result in the formalization of

erstwhile informal activities, with the cycle of

deviation and transformation beginning again on a

new level.50

The organization-paradox looms as the real problem

in the organization. This dilemma in human behavior is
represented by an inescapable commitment which cannot be
reconciled with the "requisite needs" of the social system.
On the other hand, the individual has personal goals and
needs of affection and response and so he gives a commit-
ment to elements of the system which can provide them; but

jointly, his membership in the formal organization demands

involvement in goals and procedures which he may not find

 

SOIbid., p. 27.

38

satisfying. If this is experienced by many members, tension
results but with a probable modification of the initial
goals. Thus a paradox exists with regard to the legal
structure of the organization.

In TVA at the Grass Roots, Selznick points out two
fundamental sources of unanticipated consequences in
organizational activity, which will be treated as concomi-
tant latent activity. They are: (l) the limiting function
of the end—in-view, i.e., by keeping the eye on the ball,
one loses the perspective of distant goals; and (2) commit-
ment limits the lines of action that can be taken. A
commitment represents a sanctioned line of action by
either rational, self—conscious power figures or by non—
rational unreflective social forces such as socialization
into a group or culture. More specifically, commitments
can be: (a) to unique organizational imperatives to
maintain the system, its order, discipline, unity, defense,
or consent, (b) to an institutionalized method, belief,
end, means, or technology, (c) to the social character of
the personnel, (d) to the social and cultural environment,
and (e) to centers of interest generated in the course of
action.51

The organization must constantly adapt and modify

its activities internally and externally, in relation to

 

51Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit.,
pp. 254-57.

39

changing situations if it is to survive and reach its
goals. There is always the danger of a concomitant

latent effect of introducing outside interests, specialized
perspectives and value orientations which will alter and
undermine intentionally or unintentionally the goals of

the organization.

Nerming, Standagdizing, Patterning

Nbrm as an element.--"Commitments to ways of acting
and responding are built into the organization. When
integrated, these commitments define the ‘character'
of the organization. These become institutionalized
patterns that decisively affect the competence of an
organization to frame and execute desired policies."52
Thus viewed, the commitments are sanctioned lines of
activity, constraining the actors to follow patterns and
normative codes of action.

Selznick uses policy and commitment but neither
of these concepts are analytically separated. He uses
commitment in such a way that it incorporates what is
here called an end, norm, or sentiment. Policy is used
in both an evaluative and a decision-making sense. Policy
as viewed by Selznick goes beyond the specified goals of

the organization for they include prescribed ways of attaining

them also. He refers to this process specifically as

 

52Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,

p. 40.

40

53 This represents the process

"formalization of procedure."
of institutionalizing a set of procedures and norms, thus
reducing personal choice and the chance for them to
determine the procedures. This limits open—endedness by
externalizing discipline and incentives.54 In short,
prescribing and defining the procedures helps develop
personal patterns, thus limiting idiosyncratic choice.

Less generally recongized is the effect of this

personal involvement on the rational choice

of methods. These self-images are natural pro-

ducts of organizational experience. They provide

the individual with an ordered approach to their

day-to-day problems, a way of responding to the world

consistently yet involuntarily, in accordance with

approved to explicit and formalized rules.

The policy of the TVA was to raise the standards
of the people in the Valley States with the added require-
ment of carrying out the project with democratic planning.
Because the norms of this federal institution were demo-
cratic,an ideology directed toward the "grass roots" was
developed; the TVA was thereby forced to coopt powerful
interest groupings, and consequently, the initial goals
of TVA were modified.

In contrast to TVA, Selznick shows that the policy
of the Communist Combat Party is guided by the norm of

expediency--not democracy. Selznidk quotes Lenin's directive.

 

531bid., p. 106.

54Ibid., p. 107.

551bid., p. 17.

41

"Many adaptations of program may be required, and such
adaptations are always permissible; the one indispensable
requirement is that communists not surrender . . . simply
because the "proletarian" stage of the revolution has not
been reached."56 These methods are inherently subversive
because they represent an unstructured or unconstitutional
base for their search for power. Constitutional systems
give acceptable and unacceptable methods for bidding for
power. But the methods used by the combat party are sub—
versive and divorced from the values of the target group.

It is clear that the communists do have a body

of principles useful to them in the struggle

for power. Hewever, it is not clear that

these principles are relevant beyond organizational

structure (the creation of the vanguard party

and its agencies) and organizational strategy"57

[methods which maximize the utility of the movement's

organizational weapons].

The communists general lines or norms guiding
action include: gaining access into target groups,
neutralizing the competing force, legitimizing gained
positions to entrench these toeholds against attack from
the outside or inside, and mobilizing the captured groups
so that they can be set in motion along the lines desired
by the party. The detailed procedure for these operations

is left for those in the field of operation, thus guarding

against rigidity and collapse. This helps insure

 

56Selznick, The Organizational weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 92.

57Ibid., p. 38.

42

adaptability and success with the strategy.

Evaluation as process.-—Since the set of commit—
ments identify the "character" or distinct competence of
the organization, the process of evaluation will be done
in terms of that character-definition. When an organi-
zation develops a distinctive competence, "it becomes ill
adapted to the fulfillment of other purposes, even those
closely related to it."58 These images and set of
commitments inhibit the effective adaptation of new goals
or programs.

Identifying these character-defining norms isolates
and helps depict the organization under study. The
character-defining norms of the Communist Party are
mobilization and manipulation. ”Everything must be sub-
ordinated to maximizing these values, for they define the
combat character of the party."59 Many adaptations in
programming may be required and such adaptations are
permissible. VAll means are good which lead to victory
over the bourgeoisie except those which result in the
disintegration of your own army."60 However, the one
indispensable requirement is that the communists not
surrender the organization or its identity. Strength,

unity, ideological clarity are evaluated as the program

must steer between the twin inherent dangers of liquidation

and isolation—-Right opportunism and Leftist sectarianism—-

in their own midst.61

 

581bid., p. 56

6QIhid-. p- 103 6lIbid., p. 73.

591bid., p. 73.

43

The TVA's character-defining norms were in the
"grass roots" orientation and to raise the standard of
living in the Valley States. The inherent tension or
source of potential stress become gaining access and ad-
justing to the field of operations. Selznick described
the process of incorporating powerful interest groupings
which helped TVA adjust to its area of operations as
cooptation.

Most of Selznick's work has been directed to the
analysis of internal processes of organizations. He
views the emergence of the informal structures as a means
of assessing tasks and results which cannot be settled by
the routine formula prevailing. Selznick reviews Barnard's
three hypotheses and I quote:

The informal structure has three functions as
it operates in the formal organization. It
serves: (a) as a means of communication,
establishing norms of conduct between subordinates
and superordinates; (b) maintenance of cohesiveness
in formal organizations through regulating the
willingness to serve and the stability of objective
authority; (c) the maintenance of the feeling of
personal integrity, of self-respect, of indepen-
dent choice.6
Thus a set of procedural rules are worked out to handle
the problems and tensions in these conditions.

It is Selznick's hypothesis that informal groups
will form in every organization and that a modification
of the formal rules will be effected through this informal

structure.63 These formal goals and procedures are

 

621bid., p. 48.

63Selznick, "An Approach . . .," op. cit., p. 47

44

evaluated by the norms of the informal group.
The day-to-day activity of men is ordered by those
specific problems which have a direct relevance to
the materials with which they have to deal . . .
the initial formulations are not helpful in the
constant effort to achieve that series of equilibria
which represent behavioral solutions to the specific
problems which day-to-day living poses.
The initial norms or ideal norms are one thing but the
everyday problems encountered, independent of the initial
goals or norms are somethhng else. The more operational
norms are relied upon in practice.

The formal structure is viewed as a more or less
static tool or mechanism that tends to lag behind the
needs of its membership. The formal level of organization
is seen as a rather inflexible tool: the institutionaliZed
procedures and rules were made for yesterday's problems
and situations, but they do not always apply to the
present conditions.

The actual procedures of every organization tend
to be molded by action toward those goals which
provide operationally relevant solutions for the
daily problems of the organization as such . . .
the ideals of those who construct the organization
are one thing; the "facts of life" operating
independently of and often against those ideals
are something else again.

The classical example of a sub-group undermining
the norms of the formal system is the Bank Wiring Room
Study. This modification was realized through the emergence

of informal group norms governing the rate of individual

output.

 

64

Ibid., p. 49. 65

Ibid., p. 65.

45

Dividing the Functions

Status—role incorporating bothealement and process.--
”The division of labor, with its multiplication of more
or less fixed positions, is perhpas the most obvious way
of connecting policy and social structure. The assign-
ment of formal roles sets out the tasks, powers, and expected
procedures of the participants, including the lines of
communication among them according to some officially
approved pattern."66 This represents the formal or more
rational side to the organization.

Selznick's interest in the series of offices and
the leadership group finds root in Max Weber‘s essay on
bureaucracy. He makes reference to Weber in the discussion
of the formal organization and its rational nature but
departs from the singularly, rational, purposive conception
of the organization to focus his attention on the actual
functioning of groups and positions within the organization,
i.e., the motivational and nonrational aspects of behavior
in the formal structure.

Generally status and role are treated separately
by Selznick. He defines role as "a way of behaving associated
with a defined position in a social system." Consistent
with his emphasis on the informal structure and nonrational

aspects of organizational action systems, he defines role

 

66Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,

p. 51.

46

as a process of "self-structuring," an adaptive process
where the personal element enters into the definition of

what is required.67

"These roles are often independent

of formally assigned positions or tasks, and are likely

to be closely related to the personality structure of the
individual." The working organization is not just a
function of the formal or legal prescriptions of an office:
it is a product of the interaction between the formal
demands and informal patterns of behavior. The focus is
on the actual functioning system which is dealing with
whole personalities who tend to interact beyond the legal
and prescribed role; the action system tends to be based on
primary or informal relations. But this more personal
structuring of the role demands is buttressed against

the legal and formal demands of the office or position.
Thus the working system tends to modify and redefine the
formal system. This is the organizational paradox or
dilemma. The action system adapts to the existential
conditions, modifying the formal organization.

The formal—informal pressures that result in the
organization-paradox is clear in the difference between
the extent of delegation and the resulting role-performance.

Unfortunately for the adequacy of formal systems
of coordination, the needs of individuals do not
permit a single-minded attention to the stated

goals of the system within which they have been
assigned. Theoretically, these assignments are

 

67Ibid., p. 83.

47

made to roles or official positions, not to
individuals as such . . . . As a consequence,
individual personalities may offer resistance

to the demands made upon them by the official
conditions of delegation. These resistances

are not accounted for within the categories of
coordination and delegation. . .-. These
deviations tend to force a shift away from the
purely formal system as the effective determinant
of behavior.

Ranking

Rankingoas an element.--"There is a hierarchy of
values attached to kinds of work. Equality between a
worker in a unionized plant and the unior organizer, in
terms of money, does not alter the situation. It is the
kind of work involved which is valued above the work of the

"69 Thus a system of stratification or

ordinary members.
ranking is an integral part of the formal organization.

Selznick describes a vivid hierarchy in the ranks
of the communist party. The organization itself is
composed of layers of adherents who function at different
levels of commitment and involvement. First, there is
the hard core group in the party who are self-conscious
agents, aware of the central role of power in bolshevism:
they are the elite who are thoroughly indoctrinated,

skillfully trained and rigidly disciplined. They repre-

sent the steeled cadres who are totally committed and

 

68

Selznick, "Foundations . . ., op. cit., p. 28.
69

Selznick, ”An Approach . . ., op. cit., p. 51.

48

involved in the power aims of the communists. The second
level is a large number of ideologically committed communists
who must be continually convinced and reinforced to the
ultimate professed aims of the party. Beyond this, but
still within the party, there are elements of varying
political reliability who for the time being accept
communist discipline. The member in this third level of
the party is not as deeply committed and so the impact of
membership in the organization is not great.70

The above paragraph points out the interdependence
between participation, rank, and belief system. Those
involved in a large amount of activity understand the
reasons behind more of the decisions and directives; these
persons tend to be closer to the decision making centers.
The experiences of men in the system differ among different
ranks systematically, because of their geographical and
social location. These experiences and beliefs about the
organization and its goals crucially determine the interest
and sentiment they will attach to the organization; this
in turn determines his promotion and ranking in the system.

Furthermore, Selznick points out that some organi—
zations ranked higher than others in the valley States and
helped deflect the TVA program and initial plans. The

Agriculturalists, because of their contact with the people

 

7OSelznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
OE. Cite: pp. 47-480

49

and with the powerful Farm Bureau, in the area, were able
to demand concessions and alter the initial goals of the

TVA project.

Evaluation of actors and alloCation of status-
roles.--As noted above, it is almost impossible in
Selznick's analysis to separate evaluation of the actor
from the allocation of a status-role. In any internal
activity, it would seem difficult to divorse or separate
performance, evaluation, and assignment for they inter—
lock in a ranking and division of labor system. Never-
theless, the ranking system does serve in the capacity of
"fixing authority, dividing the work effectively, and
supplementing formal incentives."71

A general theme of evaluation of actors can be
found throughout Selznick‘s works. Rank in an organization
is accorded in terms of function, worth, and dedication
to the organization. Patronage in the communist party is
in terms of loyalty and commitment. The awarding of
offices is by the party, rather than by individuals.

Elections become administrative devices . . .

because their slate is based on a technical
evaluation of the relative merits of individuals

. . . political examinations and review of their
activities (become) the basis for the election. . . .
Under such conditions elections become equivalent to
promotions rather than political contests. The

name for this administgative way of selecting new
leaders is co-option.

 

71Selznick, Leadershipoin Administration, op. cit.,
p. 95.

72Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 31.

50

The communists have tried to overcome the gap be—
tween the role demands and the personality by trying to
fit the person to the role he is to perform. Selznick
quotes a communist directive, "The committee should try to
achieve the greatest possible division of labor, remember-
ing that the various kinds of revolutionary work demand
various capacities and that a person who is absolutely
useless as an organizer may be invaluable as an agitator,
or that a person who does not possess the endurance demanded
by conspiratorial work may be an excellent propagandist

and so on."73

Cpntrolling

Power as an element.--This is another element
which is central to Selznick's theory of formal organization.
"The mobilization of technical and managerial skills
requires a pattern of coordination, a systematic ordering
of positions and duties which defines a chain of command
and makes possible the administrative integration of

74 If the organization is to be

specialized functions."
maintained, stable lines of authority must be maintained:
but leadership must win the consent and support of the

membership. Stable leadership, and organizations can only

be founded on the basic partnership of control and consent:

 

73Ibid., p. 23.

74Selznick, “Foundations . . .," op. cit., p. 25.

51

any organization must be a cooperative system.

Authority is always embodied in a particular
structure and leadership, but social power itself
has to do with subjective and objective factors
which control the loyalties and potential manipul—
ability of the community. Where the formal authority
or leadership reflects real social power, its
stability is assured. On the other hand, when

it becomes divorced from the sources of social
power its continued existence is threatened.

This threat may arise from the sheer alienation

of sentiment or because other leaderships control
the sources of social power. Where a leadership
has been accustomed to the assumption that its
constituents respond to it as individuals, there
may be a rude awakening when organization of those
constituents creates nucleuses of strength which
are able to effectively demand a sharing of
power.75

The peculiar danger in the modern world, Selznick
argues, is the problem of bigness, for implict in vast
size is centralization of decision making. Power comes to
be exercised far from its field of operations: it is exercised
far from those who feel the demands of those decisions.
"It is in this proliferation of Washington—oriented
agencies rather than in the mere grant of power to the
federal authority that there is reason for fear. . . .
A centralized agency, remote from the field of operation,
lays a deadening hand upon its officers 'on the line' by
relieving them of the responsibility for significant
decisions."76

The leadership of TVA became concerned with the

adaptability of centralized decision-making powers. They

 

75Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 15.

76Ibid., p. 24.

52

adopted a policy and ideology of "grass roots consent,"
i.e., they centralized leadership powers in the field of
operations which reflected the sentiments and needs of the
people to which that power was directed. The big obstacle
was how to maintain relative autonomy from central control
at the national level while still keeping its decisions
above the selfish and powerful interests at the local level.
Great emphasis is placed on maintaining the

stability of authority. Official policy is presented as
unified: public utterances of members are controlled and
efforts to change policy, except through approved internal
channels, are prohibited. "Carrying out a 'party policy'
requires the maintenance of lines of authority and communi-
cation, which is to say, organization."77

Leadership in a normal voluntary association must

continuously win the consent of the membership to

ensure its tenure in power . . . he must take

account of the possible defection of his rank and

file. In the interests of effectiveness, however,

an organization meant to function as a manipulable

instrument must avoid imposing such limitations

on the decision making of the leadership. 8

Power then is distributed among those who can

mobilize resources, whether they be organizational, psycho—

79

logical, or economic. Official leadership is usually

most strategically placed to mobilize these resources:

 

77Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 67.

78Ibid., p. 56.

79
p. 258.

Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit.,

53

but also there are contending interest-groups that do
circumvent and gain partial control of the organization
through the informal channel of communication. There

may be rivalry among formal administrative units or feelings
of insecurity in sub-groups. In either case, the reason

for this organization of sentiment is to control the
existential conditions while acting as a mechanism for the
expression of personal relationships for which the formal

organization does not provide.

Decision making and initiation ofgaction as progess.--
Selznick’s interest in decision making and initiation of
action concentrates on leadership. He analyzes the decision
making process, who makes the decisions, and how they are
derived in the large formal organization.

The first concern, that of the process of making
decisions, is not very extensively developed by Selznick.

He views the organization as a cooperative as opposed to

a purely technical, rational or economic organization.

It is a cooperative system in that decisions tend to be

made through cooperation and consent, i.e., the leadership
adapts to the inner and outer demands of the system which

may mean linking with powerful interests in the field of
operation or compromising to internal democratic planning
within the system. Selznick also concedes that leader-

ship has the right to coerce and persuade others, irrespective

of what the subordinates want: however, in practice

54

leadership tends to make concessions to gain cooperation
and consent.80
Selznick further argues that an "iron law of
oligarchy" may replace the democratic and technical priority
of decision making. The conditioning factors of centrali-
zation of power, skill, and the growth of the system
tends to encourage the emergence of the control by a
few.81
This bifurcation of interest makes dominant for
initiator and agent alike, the issue of control.
What is at stake for each is the control of the
conditions . . . to the solution of their own
special problems. In this struggle for control,
an informal structure is created, based largely
on relationships involving personal influences
rather than formal rules. 2
Those in office tend to establish commitments of
their own: their own interests begin to take over and they
try to maintain the status quo, i.e., to maintain their
office or position of leadership.
The functions of leadership in the organization

are viewed as crucial because the central issue in decision

making is the choosing of key values and goals and then

 

. 80Gouldner argues that many industries have a
representative centered bureaucracy where leadership and
subordinate plan programs and sanction deviates in a
cooperative system of administration. See Alvin Gouldner,
Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Ill.: The
Free Press, 1954), pp. 215-20.

81Selznick, "An Approach . . .," op. cit., p. 53.

82Ibid., p. 82.

55

building and coordinating a social structure that supports

83 Other decisions include recruit-

and carries it out.
ment and training or socializing new personnel, communi-
cation, and linking with other systems to realize goals.
The leader must order and balance inner and outer demands,
keeping the consent of the membership. He must keep the
official lines of authority and communication safe.
Analyzed here are two types of decisions: adminis-
trative and critical decisions. The former type of
decision is of a routine nature which is directed toward
handling the technical day—to-day problems: it is concerned
with keeping the administrative machine finely oiled and
running smoothly. In contrast, the critical decision is
directed toward setting the ultimate aims and goals of
the organization. Herein are the decisions which set and
develop the identity, the character, and the uniqueness
of the organization itself. These decisions are left to
top level leadership, not to administrative officials or
bureaucrats at lower levels.
Selznick notes that the role leadership performs
in decision making declines in importance as the formal
structure approaches the actual determination and source

of behavior.84 The more the rules and obligations are

 

83Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,

p. 60.

84Ibid., p. 92.

56

formal and consistent with the needs and expectation of
its membership, the less need there will be for the
leadership to perform its function: they become dispensable.

The leadership of the TVA, as discussed above and
will be further discussed in detail under systemic linkage
where it is most germane, averted outside opposition through
the mechanism of cooptation. This is the process of
absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-
determining structure to avert threats to stability in its
field of operations. TVA incorporated the agriculturalist,
thereby accommodating a critical center of power in the
Valley States. A

Selznick notes that the communists do not share
with others their decisions in policy formation. "The
communist nuclei of all kinds must be subordinated one to
another in a strictly hierarchical order and system. To
carry out their goals, the vanguard must gather all the
reins into its own hands. 'Bolshevism cannot endure any

85 Because of the emphasis

break in the unity of command.“
on indoctrination and institutional character-formation,
its own ranks can be relied upon for an immediate source

of power.

 

85Selznick, The Organizational weapon: . . .,
op. cit., pp. 52, 91.

57

Sanctioning

Sanction as an element.--The concept of sanction
per se is not utilized by Selznick: but instead, he uses
terms such as constraint, restraint, and control to depict
the same pheonmena, i.e., methods of guiding action by
rewards and punishment. "A commitment in social action
is an enforced line of action; it refers to a decision
dictated by the force of circumstance with the result that
the free or scientific adjustment of means and ends is
effectively limited."86 They are structural conditions
which shape organizational behavior, constraining the actor.

It is Selznick's implicit thesis that social
relations are the foundation of both motivation and control.
As individuals interact with one another, they learn to
respond and build up a set of meanings: they begin to take
one another into account when they act. These relations
over time become predictable and patterned. The individuals
find emotional support and satisfactions in this inter-
action, i.e., they become dependent on others. "The
individual gains much from his involvement in social
organization, but he always pays a price. That price is
the acceptance of restraints, of limitations on the

freedom to do as he pleases."87

 

86Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 255.

87Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 18. .

58

It follows that social relations become bonds of
sentiment which give personal staisfactions but they become
limitations to personal freedom. The sanctioning system
inheres in the social process itself. Likewise, the formal
organization, as a legal system, has a built-in set of
positive and negative rewards for its membership. The
formal structure usually contains a set of incentives
and rewards such as promotions inside the organization
which help control and limit the individual's freedom.

If the individual seeks to advance or gain some of these
rewards, he becomes dependent and must perform well in
the assigned role.

The informal structure also has its means of
sanctioning behavior. In the review of the Bank Wiring
Room Study, there was clear evidence of a set of procedures

by which control was maintained over the group members.

Application of sanction.--Selznick delineates the
difference in the type of control exerted between the
formal and informal structures.

In the review of the Roethlisberger and Dickson
study in a shop department, the informal group had established
control over the level of output. Sanctions were thus
applied to group members who violated the reat of production
set by the group. This emergent structure applied the
sanctions to circumvent the formal production goals.

Thus binging, ridiculing, and ostracizing group members

59

represent ways in which the group was able to control
members in primary relations while "above all protecting
itself from outside interference."88
The formal structure has other ways of rewarding
and punishing, usually based on a more impersonal and
rationalistic basis. These may include incentive pay,
promotions, or dismissals. The communists have the
practice of patronage and the awarding of offices as a
reward for the committed members. The concept of co-
option represents a means of promoting a member who shows
technical competence. But on the other hand, voluntary
withdrawal can evdke the maximum penalty. The member of
the cadre group becomes so bound that leaving the party is
regarded as desertion in battle which “calls for a maximum
penalty which can be expulsion, ostracism, economic

boycott, defamation, and occasionally, assaSsination."89

Facilitating
Facility as an element.--This element as used in
the PAS Model includes all material entities required or
utilized to achieve goals. Selznick expands the category
to include organizational arrangements as resources.

Perhaps this only represents a problem of reification such

as calling the organization of the communists an "organizational

 

88

Selznick, "An Approach . . ., op. cit., p. 47.

89Selznick, The Organizational weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 29.

60

weapon" and the institution as having an "identity" or
"historical character."

An organization designed as a weapon is a

specialized tool. Power as a goal requires .

technical skills, practices, and organizational

forms. Organizations and organizational practices

are considered weapons when they are used by a

power-seeking elite in a manner unrestrained by

the constitutional order of the arena within which

the contest takes place. Its function is to

mobilize the resources of its members and to

weld them into a reliable and manipulable instru—

ment ofistruggle.90

He does deal with the material tools as facilities

and their important connection to the realization of power.
This power is tapped through personnel or organizational
'sources and can be the most important resources available
to the organization. The Tennessee Valley Authority gained
control of river lands, fertilizer, money, and moving water
with which to generate electricity and increase the
material standard of living for millions of people.

The communists used newspapers, presses, people, and an

organizational strategy to gain access to more facilities.

Utilization of facilities as process.--"The great
emphasis on the importance of the party press--far in
excess of that normal in political organizations--is due
as much to the organizational utility as to the propaganda
potential of the material issued."91 The press then

becomes a vehicle to the people and the goals of the party.

Quoting Lenin through Selznick, he says,

 

'90

Ibid., pp. 17-23. 91

Ibid., p. 48.

61

A paper is not merely a collective propagandist
and collective agitator, it is also a collective
organizer. . . . To train a network of agents
for the rapid and correct distribution of liter-
ature, leaflets, proclamations, etc., is to
perform the greater half of the work of prepara—
tion for an eventual demonstration or uprising.
It is too late to start organizing literature
distribution at a moment of interest, a strike,
or ferment: it must be done gradually, with
distributions being made twice or even three
times a month. The distribution machine must

in no case be allowed to remain idle.

The objective, then, of any organization is to
integrate and channel these resources so that they can
be effectively used to achieve the organizational goals.
VThe conscious attempt to mobilize available internal and
external resources for the achievement of a stated goal

. . . . . . 93
. . . 18 one characteristic of a Viable organization."

Comprehensive or Master Processes

gpmmunication.--Communication is viewed as central
to the maintenance of authority and the organization itself.
The carrying out of policy requires the maintenance of
lines of communication, i.e., organization. Selznick
reviews a principle of Lenin's.

A paper is not merely a collective propagandist
and collective agitator, it is also a collective
organizer. . . . With the aid of, and around a
paper, there will automatically develop an
organization that will be concerned, not only
with local activities, but also with regular,
general work; it will teach its members carefully

 

92Ibid., p. 49.

93

Selznick, "Foundations . . ., op. cit., p. 23.

62

to watch political events, to estimate their
importance and their influence on the various
sections through the revolutionary party.

The mere technical problem of procuring a
regular supply of material for the newspaper
and its regular distribution will make it
necessary to create a network of agents of a
united party, who will be in close contact
with each other, will be acquainted with the
general situation.

Ideology in the communists organization facilitates
communication. Selznick notes that when the ranks are
educated in Marxian theory, it aids effective communication
for it offers a common language and approach for formulating
specific directives. Communication seems to result from
participation so the more participation by the membership,
the more stable the lines of communication which in turn
helps to maintain the organization and its goals.

Members playing different roles, and involved

in varying degrees, will differ in their ability

to understand the reasons behind many decisions. . . .
This makes it difficult to channel information

easily, and especially, to hold the organization

to its basic goals and‘values.95

But when the formal structure becomes too large
and does not fill the needs of the membership, there
emerges an informal structure to reduce the tension and

fill those needs which the formal structure fails to

provide. If the leadership does not communicate the

 

94Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 49.

95Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,

p. 98.

63

sentiments of the group, its continued existence is
threatened.

The communists have guarded against this informal
interest group problem and its deflecting the formal goal
by disciplining, isolating, and envolving its membership.
They provide opportunities for the member to communicate
sentiment. But more importantly, they have a system of
communication in their work; it is a system of reporting
back. "This system of accountability is established
through a hierarchy of committees. Every elected Party
committee must report regularly on its activity to its

Party organization. It must give an account of its work."96

Boundary maintenance.--This concept is not used

 

as such, but the same process is acknowledged and analyzed
(as it appears in such terms as self-maintenance, protection,
and defense of the system. It becomes evident in the

method of analysis. "Structural—functional analysis

relates contemporary and variable behavior to a presumptively
stable system of needs and mechanisms. This means that a
given empirical system is deemed to have basic needs,
essentially related to self-maintenance: the system

develops repetitive means of self-defense; and day-to—day

activity is interpreted in terms of the function served

 

96Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
OB. Cite: p. 300

64

by that activity and defense of the system."97 If any

organization is to survive over time, there will be
several imperatives or generic needs which must be pro—
tected or maintained. They are:
(1) the security of the organization as a whole
in relation to social forces in its environment:
(2) the stability of the lines of authority and
communication:
(3) the stability of informal relations within the
organization:
(4) the continuity of policy and of the sources of

its determination:

(5) a homogeneity of outlook with respect to the
meaning and role of the organization.

The first imperative is associated with the concept
of cooptation as developed in the book TVA at the Grass
Roots. Both formal and informal cooptation are associated
with a defense, but "the process of informal cooptation
represents a mechanism of comprehensive adjustment, per-
mitting a formal organization to enhance its chances for
survival by accommodating itself to existing centers of

98 The

interest and power within its area of operation."
concept cooptation will be more extensively analyzed under
systemic linkage where it properly belongs.

Imperatives two, three, and four do not have a
characteristic or relatively distinct defense associated

with them. However, two and four are often associated

with the problems of autonomy for leadership decision making.

 

97

Selznick, "Foundations . . ., op. cit., p. 29.

98Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 217.

65

More specifically, the communists keep very tight control
over policy formation, so this requires very careful
selection and recruitment of leadership. The incumbent
leadership becomes responsible for introducing change into
the organization. "Elections become administrative
devices . . . because their slate is based on a technical
evaluation of the relative merits of individuals . . .
political examinations and review of theiractivities
(becomes) the basis for the election. . . . Under such
conditions elections become equivalent to promotions rather
than political contests. The name for this administrative
way of selecting new leaders is co—option."99

Stability of the informal relations are ordered in
the cadre by intentionally making the groups small. This
factor of size, the explicit denial of the_right to organize
opposition, and emphasis on self-criticism tends to keep
the formation of an informal structure from being realized.100
However, in less totalitarian organizations the informal
structure serves to fill certain needs and maintain informal
boundaries. In the Bank Wiring Room, the emergent struc-
ture functioned to: (1) maintain the cohesiveness in
formal organization through regulating the willingness to

serve and the stability of objective authority: and

 

99Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 31.

lOOIbid., p. 33.

66

(2) maintain the feeling of personal integrity, of self-
respect, and of independent choice. In asserting its con-
trol over the conditions of the job, the informal group is
able to protect itself from outside interference: they
exhibit strong resistance to change.

The fifth imperative is generally associated with
the function of ideology for the membership and leadership
group. In the case of the Communist Party and the Tennessee
Valley Authority, ideology facilitated the identification
of the in-group and sustained the interaction pattern.

By strengthening the sentiment bonds internally, penetration
from the outside becomes more difficult for "indeed, the
communists have decreased their vulnerability by increasing
theirebility to reserve the use of Marxist cliches to

inner circles."101

There is an inherent risk involved when cadre
members penetrate or infiltrate target groups through
systemic linkage as discussed below, for that member may
place the interests of the target group above those of
the party itself. "To build and sustain the system requires
a heavy emphasis on the withdrawal of members from society
and upon ultimate doctrinal purity: at the same time the

member must be deployed in the political arena."102

 

lOlIbid., p. 40.

lozIbid., p. xiii

67

Syotemic linkage.--Selznick utilizes a method by
which he views the organization as a relatively autonomous
system which seeks to adapt to its field of operations.
But to achieve its own peculiar ends, the organization
must link with other systems while still maintaining its
identity and boundary. He refers to the linkage of
systems for mutual benefit as a partnership with other
institutions, or a cooperative venture.103 It would not
be inaccurate to state that the growth and development of
the Communist Party and the Tennessee Valley Authority
has rested crucially upon the success of linking systemati—
cally with other systems.

When two groups cooperate, communication between
them is greatly increased. The boundaries of
group membership may become obscure, and leaders
may be called upon to justify the independent
existence of their organizations. If pressure
is generated for the amalgamation of groups, it
may threaten the vested interests of the

leaders as well as the long-run aims each group
represents.104

This cooperation with other organizations (here
referred to as systemic linkage) is a field of administra-
tive action fraught with policy implications. Cooperation
with other institutions is much the same as cooperation
with other individuals in that both require latent commit-

ments and bonds. Commitment and dependence is inherent

in systemic linkage and so represent potential sources of

 

103Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 34.

lO4Ibido' pp. 34_35o

68

unanticipated consequences. They also represent an
effective and controlling environment of decision so the
reflective and self-conscious leadership must ask,
"Cooperation for what and with whom and at what price?"
"The special problem of leadership posed to

Leninism is that of joining a revolutionary elite to the
social forces which it hopes will carry it to power.
This relationship must (1) hold the leadership group
together and (2) bind it firmly to the mass."105 They
seek to establish initial positions in groups which offer
a base for expanding operations. These are used to gain
greater conquests of power until the control of the social
apparatus of a society is secured. Thus, the growth and
development of the Communist Party comes by the process
of systemic linkage through the strategic infiltration of
front groups and indoctrination of key influentials.

Despite radical external changes-—even to the

extent of formal liquidation by merger with

some larger political group--the cadre group

will maintain its existence, retaining the

main elements of Leninist organization. The

party simply assumes the form of a progressive

group within the larger organization, with its

own national committee, educational apparatus,

literature, and devices of penetration and,

control.106

But there has been an inherent tension or dilemma

in the history of the Communist Party as mentioned under

 

lOSSelznick, The Organizational Weapon: - - -1
OE. Cite: p. 81.

l°6Ibid., p. 46.

69

boundary maintenance. The dilemma is one of following a_
policy between: (1) excessive isolation, i.e., no linkage

to other systems; and (2) liquidation, i.e., in linking

to the other systems, they become amalgamated or absorbed,
losing their own identity and membership. The problem

is one of maintaining a strong psychological boundary while
also linking to other systems with the ultimate aim of
controlling and mobilizing their membership, i.e., absorbing
and mobilizing others without being engulfed or dissolved
yourself.

The leadership of the TVA used a very different
mechanism for gaining control. They established a demo—
cratic partnership with the people's institutions.

The Authority had to adapt itself not so much
to the people in general as to the actually
existing institutions which have the power to
smooth or block its way. It therefore becomes
ideologically convenient to fall in with the
general practice in the area of identifying the
existing agencies with the people, and permitting
de facto leadership in the region to be its own
stamp of legitimacy.107
Thus the TVA sought to gain the consent of the people
through the existing leadership just as the cadre group
did. The crucial difference is that the TVA leadership
extended its boundary, made concessions, and included

potential threats into its decision-making body to avert

possible destruction or danger.

 

107
p. 61.

Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit.,

7O

Leninists reach out to restructure their environ-

ment by creating new centers of power which may

serve to increase the utility of the combat

party. The party does not merely link itself

to the masses, but in a significant sense creates

them. It does so by establishing organs of access

and control which transform a diffuse population

into a mobilizable source of power.108

This process of absorbing new elements into the
leadership group or policy making group to avert possible
destruction is called cooptation. These elements or systems
which represent a potential threat are drawn Within the
boundaries of the system in an attempt to gain loyalty,
exploit their power, and utilize their efforts to drain
off their potential threat to the actualization of the
organizational goals.
Cooptation as a mechanism can take two basic

forms: (1) Vformal cooptation, when there is a need to
establish the legitimacy of authority or the administrative
accessibility of the relevant public; and (2) informal
cooptation, when there is a need of adjustment to the
pressure of specific centers of power within the community."109
Thus, the policy of "grass roots" represents a self-
conscious ideology which seeks to keep an adaptive policy
so that a power structure doesn't represent a vestigal
relic, devoid of support or meaning.

In summary, cooptation is a boundary maintaining

device as well as facilitating systemic linkage. It

 

108Selznick, The Organizational weapon: . . .,
OE. Cite: p0 ll4e

109Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit.,
p. 259.

71

represents an attempt to gain the opposition's loyalty,
exploit their power, and utilize their efforts to endanger

or threaten the realization of organizational goals.

Institutionalization.--Under the topic of
institutions, Selznick points to two related usages of the
term. But he differentiates between the use of institution
as organized group ani institution as established practice
or fixed procedure. The latter may be demonstrated in
examples such as marriage, democracy, or the secret ballot.
"In either case, the idea of institution suggests that the
group or the practice has a special identity, which may
mean that it has a peculiar capacity to do a certain kind
of job, that it embodies a special set of values, or
simply that it has had a significantly unique history."110
The focus here is mainly on institutions as organized
groups but it must be pointed out that they become difficult
to separate when found in formal organizations.

"By institutionalization we mean the development
of orderly, stable, socially integrating forms and structures
out of unstable, loosely patterned, or merely technical

111 These forms and structures arise

types of action."
out of four institutionalizing processes that perform

important functions. The processes are: (l) formalization,

 

110Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
OE. Cit'l p' Vi.

111Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 250.

72

(2) self-maintenance and conservatism, (3) infusion with
value, and (4) development of a distinctive social composi-
tion and social base.112
Selznick, much the same as Max Weber, has an interest
in the routinization of the rationally, purposive organi-
zation. Both formalization and self-maintenance come very
close to approximating the process of routinization of
charisma. "A very familiar phase in the life-history of
organization is the formalization of procedure. The
participants are controlled by making supervision more
routine and by externalizing discipline and incentive.
Formalization reduces the number of leadership decisions

113 But if the system becomes too closed to new

required."
and novel ideas, it tends to soon become ill-fitted.

The second process, self—maintenance and conserva-
tism, is also very similar to the process of routinization.
“The degree of institutionalization depends on how much
leeway there is for personal and group interaction. The
more precise an organization's goals, and the more specialized
and technical its operations, the less opportunity will
there be for social forces to affect its development."114

Any organization is subject to some degree of institutionali-

zation, for functions are performed via position-holders

 

112Ibid..

113Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,
p. 108.

114Ibid., p. 16.

73

of some kind. Thus, institutionalization is a matter of
degree, not a matter of presence or absence.

The third process is explicit when he observes
that "in its most significant meaning, to institutionalize
is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements

115 .As an organization becomes valued

of the task at hand.”
beyond its means of arriving at other ends and is valued
in itself, it takes on a value, a self, a distinctive
identity. This involves the taking on of values, ways of
acting and believing that are deemed important for their
own sake. There isgself-maintenance quality in the
organization."116
The fourth and last process in institutionalization
can be exhibited by the implications of six factors or
elements in the social system which have their affect on
the maintenance and change of policy decisions. They are:
the assigned roles (status-roles), internal interest groups
(sentiment), social stratification (rank), beliefs,
participation (communication), and dependency (power).
"When we say that policy is built into the social structure
of an organization, we mean that official aims and
methods are spontaneously protected or advanced . . .
there is a balance of forces . . . . In order to provide
support for a (different) policy, it may be necessary to

alter the social structure."117

 

116 117

115 Ibid., p. 21. Ibid., p. 100.

Ibide' pe l7e

74

Inherent within the process of institutionalization
is the factor of commitment. VPlans and programs reflect
the freedom of technical or ideal choice, but organized
action cannot escape involvement, a commitment to personnel
or institutions or procedures which effectively qualifies
the initial plan."118

But commitments become unruly in that they are
unanalyzed aspects of behavior. They block change and
adaptation to new situations. They are sources of unantici—
pated consequences so in the action system, there can be a
concomitant latent activity.

The systematized commitments of an organization
define its character. Day-to-day decisions
relevant to the actual problems met in the
translation of policy into action, creates
precedents, alliances, effective symbols, and
personal loyalties which transform the organi-
zation from a profane, manipulable instrument
into something having a sacred status and thus
resistant to treatment simply as a means to
some external goal.119

However, as noted before, the organizational character
is dynamic for the very commitments the system makes to
procedures or systems on the outside, the image or identity
of the organization changes. Also, internal stress and
sentiment, when organized, creates 9unwritten laws" and

informal channels which over time become formalized and

part of the formal structure. Thus the cycle of deviation

 

118

Selznick, "Foundations . . .,. op. cit., p. 32.
119
pp. 258—59.

Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit.,

75

and transformation begin on a new level under new

conditions.

Socialization.--"The more esoteric the activities
of the organization, the less it can rely on the general
education provided by the community, the greater the need
for internal orientation."120

This statement summarizes much of Selznick's think-
ing in regard to the role that socialization plays in
organizations. The concern here is with the organizational
character or identity and its connection with recruitment
and the social backgrounds of those recruited from the
outside environment. The focus is on an internal—external
model of a system adjusting and adapting to a setting.

The character of the organization and the identity which

it has is closely related to the consideration of sociali-
zation and its significance for recruitment and indoctrination
of new organization members. Questions like, what type

of organization can contend with personnel from heterogeneous
backgrounds and how will they go about training these new
recruits, become important.

Leadership plays a crucial role in defining the
crucial values and mission of the organization. Further,

”the leader as educator requires an ability to interpret

the role and character of the enterprise, to perceive and

 

120Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
OEe Citol p. 36.

76

develop models for thought and behavior, and to find models
of communication that will inculcate general rather than
merely partial perspectives."121 The Communist Combat
Party represents a different pattern in that the incumbent
leadership is responsible for introducing change and select-
ing new leaders. Leadership is recruited only from within
the organization. Promotions are based upon technical and
selective evaluations designed to recruit leaders only
after they have become socialized to the goals of the
organization. This administrative device of selecting
new leaders is called co-option. It is a security-oriented
device to insure ideological purity and the maintenance of
an elite leadership. Co-option is a boundary maintaining
device which relies upon socialization of these potential
leaders.122

Organizations that are concerned with their identity
and character will tend to be more selective in recruiting
personnel. VOluntary organizations may not be as free to
select discriminately because of their inability to command
resources, to attract and command its membership. These

organizations will then tend to be forced by circumstance

to emphasize the reorientation and socialization of

 

 

deviant and questionable personnel. "By purging and
121Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,
p. 150.
122

Selznick, The Organizational weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 31.

77

indoctrinating the captured organizations, the communists
change them in a fundamental way; they destroy the role
and the loyalties of these institutions while keeping them
organizationally intact."123
One of the signs of a healthy organization is its
ability to effectively orient new members and readily
discard those who cannot be adapted to the established
outlodk. The in-service training program is an attempt to
provide that orientation in some organizations.
Socialization represents a crucial step in dealing
with problems of creating a special identity and unifying
an organization. It may also be involved when policy
innovation or change are concerned. The steps usually
included are: (1) selective recruiting, (2) indoctrination,
and (3) the sharing of key experiences--especially internal
conflict and other crises.
By building the institutional core, the member-
ship can perform the essential task of indoctrin-
ating newcomers along desired lines. They can
provide some assurance that decision making will
conform, in spirit as well as letter, to policies
that may have to be formulated abstractly or
vaguely.124
Sometimes a policy or doctrine is meant for internal
consumption or integration such as was the case of TVA's

"grass roots" policy and often the Marxian doctrine for the

Communists Cadre. It can also be used to instill a way of

 

123Ibid., p. 261.
124
p. 106.

Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,

 

78

thinking and a set of attitudes at all levels to facilitate

decentralization.

Decentralization requires a preparatory period

of training in which leadership has the oppor—
tunity to influence deeply the ideas that guide
decision making at lower levels. . . . More useful
is the collaborative development of plans and
policies by as many levels of the organization

as possible, so that a unified view, or at

least understanding of the controlling viewpoint,
will be achieved. . . . This entails the partici-
pation of top leadership in low-echelon decisions
and the participation of subordinate staff personnel
in high-level planning.125

Social control.--"Both positive and negative forms
of social control are often found in the same group,
particularly if it mobilizes as well as disciplines its

members."126

The Communist Party units do just this.

"The task-oriented primary group through positive forms of
social control attempts to satisfy the needs ofjts members
for affection, respect, and a sense of meaningful partici-
pation."127

The case of the Communist Combat Party is a good

example of a system using both positive and negative

forms of social control. Initial control is gained through
the insulation and absorption of the new member. Insulation

is to such an extent that the member isisolated from personal

friends, relatives and even enemies--all who might have

 

125Ibid., pp. 114, 115.

126Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 166.

l27Ibid.

79

a corrupting influence. "To place a group under the
banner of communism is primarily an exercise in social
control."128
Absorption is accomplished through an exhausting
number of activities. They are designed to consume all
of the member’s available time, demanding his entire span
of attention. ”This high pitch of involvement gives the
member a sense of meaningful activity: he is made to feel
that he is 'achieving' something, rather than passively
waiting for the millennium."129
Starting with insulation and absorption, the com—
munists are able to increasingly subordinate the individual
to the party and its leadership. But most organizations
are not this demanding or seek to control the person so
totally. Selznick notes the relationship between social
organization and social control. "The individual gains
much from his involvement in social organization, but he
always pays a price. That price is the acceptance of
restraints, of limitations on the freedom to act as he

130

pleases." This involvement entails dependency on others

for satisfactions and etc.

 

128Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . °t
op. cit., p. 101.

129Ibid., p. 27.

130Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 18.

80

Stable social relations always entail a degree of
social control within them for the individual participant.
The control becomes greater when these relations are organized
to some common goal or end, as is implied in the preceding
paragraph.

Many naive people believe that they are being
courageous when they stand up against the world

and incur the wrath of remote and impersonal enemies
while accepting the warm sympathy and encourage-
ment of their friends. In fact, of course, con-
formity is relative to the specific social
environment of the individual.

The more involved and related tend to be more
controlled by these bonds of dependencies. Obversely,
the uninvolved and independent are not held by and con-
strained by social relations. VIsolation is indeed one way
of minimizing social control, but from the standpoint of
personal well—being the loss of positive values must
also be considered. Too much freedom can disorient the
individual, and may rob his life of direction and meaning."132
Just as Durkheim argued that the more uninvolved were more
likely to select suicide when depressed, the isolated and
removed are relatively.free of social control and social
constraints. The isolated have fewer social bonds and

dependencies and thus are more independent of the group's

controlling effect.

 

131Selznick, The Organizational weapon: - . .,
op. cit.: P- 240°

132Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 19.

81

The Organizational Weapon concludes with a few
comments on the vulnerability of institutional targets to
the communists; it is closely related to this problemof
social control. He argues that our society represents a
mass, a homogeneous, amorphous and undifferentiated social
group. The individual represents a product of social
disintegration. FThe symptoms are identifiable: wide-
spread alienation, a general cultural leveling, the compul—
sive search for substitute sources of security, and suscept-
ibility to propagandistic and organizational manipulation."133

Selznick does assume that power and control are
social, generated in the course ofaction. It would
follow that organized action would command more power and

control for it represents a collection of actors, organizing

for a common goal or mission.

Conditions of Sociaerction

Territorality.--The "Grass Roots? doctrine is a
policy that calls for power to be geographically located
within the locale or field in which operations are directed.
The policy is directed toward bringing leadership to reside
in the field of its operation so an understanding and a
grasp of the needs will go into decision making. Selznick

quotes de Tocqueville.

 

l33$elznick. The Organizational Weapon: - - -:
OE. Cite; p. 286e

82

Certain interests are common to all parts of a
nation, such as the enactment of its general

laws and the maintenance of its foreign relations.
Other interests are peculiar to certain parts of
the nation, such, for instance,as the business of
the several townships. When the power that directs
the former or general interests is concentrated

in one place or in the same persons, it constitutes
a centralized government. To concentrate, in like
manner in one place the direction of the latter or
local interests, constitutes What may be termed a
centralized administration.

By contrast, the communists keep their groups
confined within a small territory and the leadership within
the groups. There is the attempt to make this small task
group a primary group as well, isolating the membership
from the outside. This isolation is enforced by their
constitution as well as by the gross number of activities
within the party which tends to absorb him. "The
prohibition of personal contact with enemies of the party
is a measure enforcing insulation from personal friends

and relatives who might have a corrupting influence."135

.Timg.--The approach utilized here is to View the
system within a historical perspective, i.e., how does the
organization develop through time. This historical approach
helps to focus on the developmental problems that arise
in different stages of the organization. This allows the

isolation and treatment of characteristic problems that

 

134Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots: OP- cit.,

p. 25.

135Selznick, The Organizational weapon: . - .,
OEe cit., p. 27.

83

arise under different conditions and stages of develop-
ment.

In the early stages of an organization, leadership
is most important for many critical decisions must be made
with regard to the selection of goals, values and
organizational character or an identity itself. But then
as leadership has had time to institutionalize procedures,
values, and an identity, the organization is no longer so
vulnerable. "There is a normal tendency in organizations
to permit a loosening of formal central controls after
the character of the organization has been established."136
Control and power may be more widely dispersed once
sufficient time has elapsed to develop an organizational
character. He summarizes this position by stating:
"Hence we shall expect that a relatively high degree of
centralization will be required in the early stages of
institutional development. Later, when homogeneity has been
achieved, decentralization will be feasible without undue
loss of control."137

The factor of time as a condition of socialaction
is utilized to great advantage by the communists to activate

its membership and draw them into the "inner circle" of

the party. "Absorption may be accomplished by organizational

 

136Ibid., p. 65.

137Selznick, Leadership in Administration, OP- cit.,

p. 65.

84

measures. The most obvious is the sheer volume of
activity. Meetings, demonstrations, literature distri—
bution, and recruiting may easily consume all the member's
available time, leaving little chance for thought beyond
the moment (hence minimizing opportunities for disaffection),
defining a way of life that will be relinquished only with
difficulty, and creating an immediate social contact of
party affairs commanding the individual's entire span of
attention. At the same time, this high pitch of involve-
ment gives the member a sense of meaningful activity: he
is made to feel that he is 'achieving1 something, rather
than passively waiting for the millennium."138
But in most formal systems or organizations, they
become more formalized, valued, and its membership more
conservative over time. New strivings, needs, and tensions
emerge. The informal structure emerges spontaneously to
control these conditions by modifying or undermining the

formal goals of the system.

.§i§g.--The condition of size is connected to the
characteristic of the organization whether it be in emergent
informal groups or bureaucratic patterns in formal organi-
zations.

Selznick looks on expansion as a characteristic

mode of response available to an organization under pressure

 

138Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . - -:
OE. Cite; pe 27e

85

from within. These responses necessarily involve a trans-
formation (in this case, size) of some structural aspect
of the organization. But there are other reasons why
organizations may expand--"the availability of markets,
legislative delegations, the swing of opinion--all may be
accidental from the point of View of the organizational
processJ‘139
Another sense in which Selznick uses size is in
terms of the number of members at the different levels of
commitment and involvement in the organization and its
aims. He notes that the elite of an organization--those
that are totally committed may constitute no more than
one-tenth of a large party. These are the crucial leaders
who mobilize and manipulate the membership. "Unless a
group is susceptible to manipulation, at least after some
preparation, it does not qualify for the distinction of
being part of the masses. It follows that it is not the.
number which defines a mass, although the larger a group
the more likely it is to be susceptible to manipulation.“140
The factor of the size of the organization and its
units, condition the surroundings for the emergence of
informal groups. This is implicit in Selznick but generally,

the larger the units, the greater the chance of sub—groups

forming. Quoting A. Rossi in A Communist Party in Action

 

139

Selznick, "Foundations . . ., op. cit., p. 33.

140Selznick, The Organizational weapon: ‘ ' "
OE. Cite. 830

86

used by Selznick, he says, "An organizational structure
based on groups of three lends itself to the selection and
training of new leaders, if only because it multiplies
posts of responsibility."l41 Small groups are not good
conditions for sub-groups to emerge so the Communist Party
is also able to guard against formal goals and programs
being modified or deflected by the emergence of informal

groups. The communication channel lines are short, again

guarding against distortion.

 

141Ibid., p. 27.

CHAPTER.IV

SOCIAL CHANGE AND INTERNAL-EXTERNAL ACTIVITY

Selznick does not explicitly spell out a theory of
social change but he argues that "a proper understanding
of the organizational process must make it possible to
interpret changes in the formal system."142 He analyzes
social change within the structural-functional method,
utilizing the internal-external "logic of interpretation."
Patterned and variable activity is related to a system
of needs and mechanisms. This activity that is isolated,
characterizes a distinctness or unique capacity of the
system. But every system exists within an environment of
other systems which may compete, cooperate, or undermine
the organization in question. Thus there are inner and
outer tensions from which the conditions for change may
arise.

The structural-functional approach is essentially
an equilibrium model with an implicit assumption that the
disequilibrium state or tension has motivational properties

for change, i.e., this state is uncomfortable so measures

are taken to correct this tension and establish a new

 

142

Selznick, "Foundations . . ., op. cit., p. 27.

87

88

balance. Change is viewed within a structural framework.
"The adaptation is dynamic in the sense that the utilization
of self-defensive mechanisms results in structural trans—
formations of the organization itself."143

The sources of social change may arise both within
and outside of the organization. It may result from long-
term plans and goals, initially unplanned, or completely
unanticipated consequences. In any case, the conditions,
circumstances and situation must be ultimately institutional—
ized before change can be legally, structurally, or
formally acknowledged. Changes are realized within the
structural framework.

The first source of social change may come from
self-conscious leadership. "It is the function of the
leader-statesman--whether of a nation or a private
association—-to defineizhe ends of group existence, to
design an enterprise distinctively adapted to these ends,
and to see that that design becomes a living reality.“l44
Cooperation with other groups may threaten the independence
and the ability to realize those ends or goals which are

initially set. Cooperation or incorporation of powerful

elements that operate within the field of operations may

 

143Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op- Cit-:

p. 252.
144Selznick, Leadership in Administration, opo Cit-:
p. 37.

89

deflect or modify the formal goals as was the case with
TVA and the Agriculturalists. Thus, change can be forced
upon a system by forces external to it or even to elements
from the outside which have been incorporated, i.e.,
coopted.

No organization subsists in a vacuum. . . .

It must pay some heed to the consequences of

its own activities (and even existence) for

other groups and forces exist in the community.

These forces will insist upon an accounting,

and may in self-defense demand a share in the

determination of policy. Because of this

outside pressure from many varied sources,

the attention of any organization must be

turned outward, in defending the organization

against possible encroachment or attack.145

The leadership is not the only source of change.

It merely represents the formal and legal side of the organi-
zation. Selznick focuses on the latent structure or the
informal and motivational side of the organization. Rigid
rules and procedures tend to break down when individuals
respond to each other outside of formal prescribed roles.
Operating and working rules tend to replace the formal
rules and prescriptions. These modifications may arise
out of the system as a whole or from different segments
and parts of the organization. Discontent, aggressions,
and the search for security may be the basis around which

sub—groups within the organization emerge to control the

conditions in which they find themselves. A latent structure

 

145
pp. 10-11.

Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit.,

90

emerges which is designed to manage the tension and senti-
ment of its membership. The new sub—system seeks to create
an informal "structure," controlling and modifying the
formal system of rules and legal procedures. Eventually
this latent structure becomes the legal or formal system
through the process of institutionalization of formal
acknowledgement and acceptance, thus removing it from

the realm of the subversive and idiosyncratic. This also
changes or modifies the function of this system.

Even though the method is basically a structural
approach, the emphasis here is on process. The elements
within the system are important but stress is given to
operations and actual practice. The point is made that
much theory is an ideal or a constructed type such as the
Weberian conception of bureaucracy, but the actual working
system of real people in process is quite different.
Selznick places the emphasis on the adaptive actual
working system.

The formal organization is analyzed as aratural
system in an environment with internal and external social
pressures. In this way he emphasized the adaptive change
and evolution of organizational forms and practices, not
as a structural entity per se, but as a system of cooper—
ative individuals adapting to the conditions in which they
find themselves.

Adaptation is an activity which can be directed to

internal or external stresses. To understand adaptation

91

and social change within the formal organization, there must
be a study of: the development of administrative ideologies
as conscious and unconscious devices of communication and
self-defense: the creation and protection of elites, their
training, and maintenance of policy: and the emergence of
contending interest-groups, as they bid for dominant

influence.146

Thus, the understanding of an organization
with its inherent tensions and adaptations to these areas
of stress must be gained by an assessment of latent commit-

ments, latent structures, and latent functions.

Internal-External Logic of Interpretation

The type of logic and method utilized by Selznick
calls for a discussion of internal—external activity which
is patterned differentially within the formal organization.
The organization is viewed as a relatively autonomous
system with internal and external stresses. This model
is utilized to understand and predict the outcomes that
the system will undergo. Hewever, it should be pointed
out that Selznick does not explicitly use the term pattern
differentiation: but both utilize the "natural system”
approach with an internal-external logic of interpretation.
With Parsons, the organization is viewed as an adaptive

and economic system with patterns of activity, differentiated

 

146
ppe 14-150

Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.,

92

in terms of internally and externally directed patterns of
activity. But because of the sentiment and non—rational
elements in the fonnal organization, the most economical
and rational avenues are not always taken. Because of
this, Selznick prefers to view the formal organization
as a cooperative system.

External patterns are defined by Loomis as that
type "of interaction which displays the relations necessary
for the group's adjustment to its environment and for the

attainment of its goals."l47

The elements most importantly
associated with the external patterns are: achieving with
end, goal or objective as elements and goal-attaining
activity as process; and controlling with power as an
element and decision making and its initiation into action
as process. This pattern tends to be instrumental and
rational, but the leadership articulates both the external
and internal pattern on occasions. "In the manifesting of
the external pattern, tension must be managed, sanctions
applied, facilities used, status-roles allocated, and
action whether technical or political tends to be based
upon rationally effective cognitive mapping and validation."148

The internal pattern is defined as that "pattern

of interaction which consists of those relations that focus

 

147Loomis, op. cit., p. 40.

14811616., p. 41.

93

upon the expression of sentiments of system members toward

one another."149

The primary emphasis here is on feeling
with sentiment as an element and communication of sentiment
as process.

Selznick gives extensive and explicit attention to
internal-external functions. Every formal structure is a
legal system. This rational, externally directed, purposive
tool is used to mobilize energies toward set aims and goals.
But the emphasis and interest is on the internal psycho-
logical or non-rational side of the organization as it
reinterprets and changes the formal structure. The
emphasis is on the emergent informal group deflecting or
modifying the initial aims of the organization. Parsons
would treat these emergent groups inside the system as
internal—instrumental patterns, maintaining boundaries
around organized sentiments, which are seeking to control
the conditions which surround them. This is exemplified
in the case of the Bank Wiring Room Study and Barnard's
findings of the official's activity in the bureaucracy.
Both represent cases of an informal structure arising to
control the conditions of their existence within the formal
organization.

The leader's function is to set the goals and see
that they are realized. The elements of goal and power

with their respective articulating processes, goal attaining

 

14911616., p. 42.

94

activity, decision making and its initiation into action

is the externally directed activity. This function of
leadership is to define the mission of the organization

and the means or procedure that will be selected to realize
that goal. But "the pursuit of goals which initiated
action demands continuous effort to control the instruments

it has generated."150

Effective leadership does not deal
just with the external goal for ”in defining the mission
of the organization, leaders must take account of (l) the
internal state of the polity: the strivings, inhibitions
and competences that exist within the organization: and
(2) the external expectations that determine what must be
sought or achieved if the institution is to survive."151
In short, effective leadership must be cognizant of both
internal and external conditions.

But Selznick views the path that leadership must
take as a precarious one: they are faced with a dilemma.
"Leadership, by the very nature of its position, is committed
to two conflicting goals: if it ignores the need for parti-
cipation, the goal of cooperation may be jeopardized: if
participation is allowed to go too far, the continuity of

152

leadership and policy may be threatened." Leadership

 

150Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. Cit-:

p. 258.
151Selznick, Leadership in Administration, OP- cit.,
p. 67.

152Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit.,

p. 261.

95

needs consent to stay in office. This calls for some

compromise or cooperation as developed above. But if there

is too much sharing of power and decision making, the

organization loses its identity and capacity to defend it-

self against outside attacks. The capacity to attain the

ends and external rewards is greatly decreased. Selznick

argues, "Authority is always embodied in a particular

structure and leadership, but social power itself has to

do with subjective and objective factors which control

the loyalties and potential manipulability of the

community. Where the formal authority or leadership

reflects real social power, its stability is assured. On

the other hand, when it becomes divorced from the sources

of social power its continued existence is threatened.

This threat may arise from the sheer alienation of sentiment.

Where a leadership has been accustomed to the assumption

that its constituents respond to it as individuals,

there may be a rude awakening when organization of those

constituents creates nucleuses of strength which are able

to effectively demand a sharing of power."153
Leadership then must win the consent of those he

leads and channel these sentiments toward the ends of the

organization. "Human relations are a great reservoir of

energy. They may be directed in constructive ways toward

 

1531bid., p. 15.

96

desired ends or they may become recalcitrant sources of
frustration. One objective of sound management practice

is to direct and control these internal social pressures."154
Thus leadership sets goals and expends its energy toward
externally directed activities, but he builds these goals
with the consent of internal sentiments.

But threats to the leadership and the continuity
of policy do not arise just internally. "Institutional
commitments also include such externally set goals as must
be accepted if significant deprivations are to be avoided.
These commitments arise wherever a specific payoff is

externally demanded and can be enforced."155

A specific
example is the TVA having to share some of its critical
decision making powers to be able to adapt and gain access
into its field of operations. Selznick argues that this
"grass roots" ideology was functional to helping the TVA
adapt and adjust to the valley operation. Using Parsons‘
concepts it represented an external-instrumental pattern.
Sometimes this instrumental pattern can be directed
internally in the activity of both official as well as the
small worker groups such as the Bank Wiring Room group.

Selznick points to the findings of C. I. Barnard in his

study of executives. The executives within the bureaucracy

 

154selznick, Leadership in Administration: OP: cit.,

p. 8.

15511616., p. 72.

97

solved their problems through the informal structure.

This emergent structure served to provide its members with
a channel of communication above and below, maintenance of
organizational cohesiveness, and maintenance of personal
integrity. This activity represented attempts to maintain
boundaries, manage tension or control the existential
conditions within the bureaucracy. In short, the activity
was directed to adapting and controlling the conditions in
which they found themselves.

"Actions are taken, policies adopted, with an eye
more to the effect of the action or policy on the power-
relations inside the organization than to the achievement
of its professed goals. . . . Bureaucratization is in a
sense the process of transforming this set of procedures
from a minor aspect of organization into a leading
consideration in the behavior of the leadership."156
Thus internally adaptive activity can be directed to pre-
serve and maintain sub-system or even individual interest
as opposed to the support and integration of the whole as
Parsons' discription is in the case of internal consummatory
activity.

“The bureaucrats, like every other social type with
a power-position to maintain, constructs an ideology peculiar

to their social position. . . . The leadership creates

the ideology of the 'collective submission to the

 

156

Selznick, "An Approach . . ., op. cit., p. 53.

98

collective will.”157

The existing leadership tends to
be conservative, justifying the maintenance of the existing
conditions: they tend to adopt the ideology of centralization
if in power, while those out of office tend to call for
autonomy. I

In summary then, Selznick would analyze the system
in terms of the internal and external states of the organi-
zation. There will be internally directed patterns of
activity which seek to handle the inherent needs and tensions
as well as integrate and strengthen sentiment within the
system. There will be externally directed patterns of
activity which seek to resolve the tensions and dilemmas
between the needs for sound organization policy and the
problems involved in adapting to an external environment.
Thus any system of formal organization will be Pmolded
by forces tangential to (its) rationally structured

158 The organization is a resultant of

and stated goals."
complex forces which no simple formula can explain. The
problem is one of selecting tools to illuminate our analysis

for a more penetrating understanding.

Conclusions

The preceding pages have been directed toward gaining

an understanding of Selznick‘s organizational theory. His

 

157Ibid., p. 54.

158Selznick,_TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit-:

p. 251.

99

formulation is a challenging analysis of both the formal

and informal levels of large-scale organization. The
analysis includes an unusual blend of psychological,
ideological, and organizational elements. This is the

area which reflects Selznick's interest in the motivational
and nonrational aspects of the formal system. This relation—
ship between the two structures is the central theme of

his work and his use of the term "organizational paradox"
describes this conceptualization.

Selznick's concern with the "organizational paradox"
within the formal system and its implication for democratic
planning centers on the interaction theme of the formal
and informal structures. He is saying that conflict is
inevitable. But it is out of the external pressures and the
internal problems between the legal structure and the
"emergent structure that is in the process of becoming,"
in which the organization changes and adapts.

Like all conservative or pessimistic criticism, such
a statement of inherent problems seems to cast

doubt upon the possibility of complete democratic
achievement. It does cast such a doubt. The
alternative, however, is the transformation of
democracy into a utopian notion which, unaware of
its internal dangers, is unarmed to meet them.

Selznick must be credited for isolating those
factors which contribute to the paradox and for presenting

them in a systematic and integrated analysis. His analysis

of possible ways of adapting to conflicts stemming from

 

15911616., p. 265.

100

sources external to the organization provide ways of
compromising without losing sight of ultimate goals. The
student or society reflects his concern here as a student
ip_society. The stress is on cooperative systems which
adapt to existential conditions during the process of
attaining goals.

In conclusion, the insight, rigor, and close analysis
required in using this model forces a growth and a sophisti-
cation that allows the student to measure his development.
This requires clear conceptualization, thorough understanding,
and an ability to reformulate and reconceptualize a set
of propositions into a new framework. It is part of the
training required for the formulation of good research
questions and the organization of thoughts. This reward
of intellectual growth within the discipline marks a
significant point of development.

The use of the PAS Model has greatly helped the
realization of the writer's goal. He has achieved a much
greater clarity and order in the organization theory of
Professor Selznick. The point-by-point comparison with
the PAS Model categories demanded a clear understanding of
Selznick's theory. But in this process of standardizing,
it required a tearing down into parts and then a recon-
struction, or synthesis. The segmentalization or compart-
mentalization destroyed the original empirical wholeness

or uniqueness of his theory, but much of this is needed

101

to commit it to a consensual chart of elements and
processes.

Again, it must be stressed that a theorist cannot
be completely understood simply by adding up the sum of
the parts, for the original empirical "wholeness? is
destroyed in the recombination and rearrangement of the
model to create a new theoretical order and transition.
It is this writer's opinion that the PAS Model, by its
inherent weakness in destroying the original theoretical
order and conceptual arrangement, is most useful for the
person actually doing the "PASing." It becomes difficult
to conceptualize and grasp a working understanding just
from reading a theory within the PAS Mbdel. Hopefully a
person "PASing" theoretical systems might gain a workable
grasp of sociological theories of varying scope within
the fieldto synthesize and make orderly the principles
by formulating a new, more general theory arising out of

these consensual categories.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Broom, Leonard and Philip Selznick. Sociology. 3rd
edition. New Yerk: Harper and Row, 1963.

 

Loomis, Charles P. Social Systems: Essays on Their
Persistence and Change. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van
Nbstrand, Inc., 1960.

Selznick, Philip. "An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy,"
.aaa, V01. III (1943), No. 9, pp. 47—54. Reprinted
in Coser and Rosenberg, Sociological Theory: A
Book of Readings. New York: Macmillan Co., 1951,
pp. 447-457.

. "Foundations of the Theory of
Organization," A§B¢ Vol. 13 (1948): pp. 25—35.
Reprinted in A. Etzione, Complex Organizations: A
Sociological Reader. New Yerk: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1961, pp. 18-32.

 

. TVA at the Grass Roots. Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949.

 

. ‘The Organizational Weapon: A Study of
Bolshevik Strategy and£Tactics. 1st ed. 1952.
Revised edition by Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press,
1960.

 

. Leadership in Administration. Evanston,
111.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957.

 

102

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