

PHILIP SELZNICK: ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIST

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

David Michael Betz

1964



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PHILIP SELZNICK: ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIST

By

David Michael Betz

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

1964

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Charles P. Loomis, my chairman, for his stimulation and assistance in writing this thesis. His broad reading and understanding of sociological theory were very helpful. My gratitude also goes to Drs. Form and McKee whose open doors were a constant source of encouragement.

An especial note of thanks goes to the students in Sociology and Anthropology with whom discussions have been most instrumental in helping me to formulate and evaluate a set of sociological tools which have become more than a semantic comfort.

Finally, I should like to thank Phyllis, my wife to be, for her corrections, encouragements, and confidence all of which contributed greatly to the accomplishment of this project.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The nature of sociological theory draws varied and widely differing accounts as to the content of an integrated and unified disciplinary theory. This lack of order or consensus can be attributed to several factors. Certainly the infant stage of growth of sociology as a formal discipline is a crucial condition to consider. But another factor is the matter of needless semantic confusion. Theorists sometimes use different terms to describe the same process or phenomenon. Others use the same term to describe different processes and phenomena. This is what Merton has called the "terminological confusion" in present sociological theory. The problem is to eliminate the use of idiosyncratic terms; the findings should be consolidated and standardized.

One of the objectives of any science, whether it be natural, physical, or social, is to standardize, systematize, and make intelligible the materials that are defined as relevant. This material can and should be orderly and accessible. There should be a compilation and synthesis of empirical findings. Order must come out of the confusion.

In his book, Social Systems--Essays on Their Persistence and Change, Professor Loomis seeks to bring together and classify the concepts that are recurrent in the literature of system analysts. The objective of the book was to draw-out and synthesize those elements, conditions, and processes of social action into a compact systematic model. It represents an attempt to construct a more useful tool for analyzing a level of social phenomena. This compact theory can be used as a directive in the field of research. Loomis calls it the Processually Articulated Structural Model, hereafter denoted as the PAS Model.

The basic assumption upon which the model is built is that the elements and processes treated are requisite to orderly interaction and the functioning of a social system. The theorist analyzing this level of organized human behavior must be cognizant of at least the phenomena which these basic elements and processes seek to describe, whatever he may call them. "Whatever system one is viewing, whether it be the master system society or any of its component sub-systems (community, family, etc.), the elements that constitute it as a social system and the processes that articulate it remain the same."¹

¹Charles P. Loomis, Social Systems: Essays on Their Persistence and Change (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 1960), p. 5.

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze in depth and the large-scale formal organizational theory of Professor Phillip Selznick. This writer has chosen to use the PAS Model to facilitate and achieve that objective. It is felt that this will facilitate a systematic point-by-point comparison with other large-scale organization theorists. This standardizing procedure allows a comparison with other analysts of social systems of varying sizes. Thus a depth analysis and comparison can be made with any theory that can be placed in the PAS Model.

Importance

The PAS Model as a taxonomic scheme reduces divergencies, aids in the organization of thought, and emphasizes the importance of clear conceptualization of thought. Its use in sociological theory has been demonstrated at two levels; as a theory in and of itself,² and as a tool for theoretical comparison between different theorists.³ The PAS Model has been used as a vehicle for a set of logically interrelated sets of propositions in the research situation. The model has further been used to help clarify the unintegrated terminology used by so many

²Ibid., and Loomis and Beagle, Rural Sociology: the Strategy of Change (N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1957).

³Charles P. Loomis and Zona K. Loomis, Modern Social Theories (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 1961).

contemporary theorists. The scheme aids in the classifying and ordering of variables in human behavior. Thus, the model facilitates the organization and comparison of many theoretical conceptualizations through a point-by-point comparison.

The classifying and ordering of elements in sociology can be compared with the classification of elements in chemistry. The work in chemistry has advanced to the point where a chart of atomic weights and structure presents a whole history of integrated research effort. The discoverer, the research materials, and the original site of discovery is left out of the chart for the chart is a composite of research findings from several centuries. The attempt in sociology is also to construct a chart of fundamental elements that are basic building blocks in human behavior. Consolidation of concepts that describe recurrent processes in human behavior can lead to a model that can explain and predict the structure and outcome of elements in interaction.

This thesis is an attempt to take a step in the direction of constructing a chart of elements to help combine research efforts and to help develop a vehicle of research to study large-scale organization by juxtaposing Selznick's theory on the PAS Model.

Organization

To carry out the above purpose, this thesis will be divided into three parts. The first section will deal with the methodological and theoretical orientation of Professor Selznick and the intellectual background out of which he has arisen.

The second section will deal with the juxtaposing of Selznick's organizational theory on the PAS Model. The content of this section will result in codification for the Model is designed to deal with this type of procedure. The purpose is not to describe the TVA or the Communist operations as organizations. To deal with the total empirical description and development of books such as TVA at the Grass Roots and The Organizational Weapon, without paraphrasing and abstracting the total contents would be an injustice to the author. The purpose is to find and abstract a general theory of organization out of his research works and writings. The organization of this thesis will reflect and be in accord with that purpose.

The third section will be a treatment of social change and a few observed parallels that exist between Parsons' treatment of internal-external pattern differentiation and Selznick's internal-external logic of interpretation. Both of these considerations are based upon and forged out of a methodological approach and theoretical orientation.

CHAPTER II

THEORY AND BACKGROUND

"Among the practical aims, the theoretical puzzles of modern social sciences is the assessment of human institutions. . . . We wish to know what goals or objectives can be attributed to it, what capabilities it has, what strategies it lives by, and what its probable line of evolution may be. This analysis must take account of the internal features of how it works as well as how it fits in a larger context, maintaining itself. This is done to diagnose the organization's own troubles and how it relates to other institutions and the community at large."⁴

The above statement succinctly summarizes most clearly the academic concern of Professor Phillip Selznick. He has focused most of his academic interests on large-scale formal organizations. His publications include: two theoretical articles in the American Sociological Review ("An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy" in 1943 and "Foundations of the Theory of Organization" in 1948);

⁴Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p. v.

a book on government agencies in TVA At the Grass Roots, a second book on the strategy of the communist party in The Organizational Weapon, and a third book on large-scale organizations in Leadership in Administration. More recently he has demonstrated an interest in law by writing an article on the sociology of law in Merton's Sociology Today. While at the Center of Advanced Studies for the Behavioral Sciences in 1961, he wrote "Sociology and Natural Law" which can be found in the Natural Law Forum. He collaborated with Leonard Broom in 1955 in writing one of the most popular introductory textbooks in sociology. They have revised the text more recently to produce two more editions in 1958 and 1963, respectively.

Professor Selznick graduated from Columbia University in 1947 under the tutelage of Robert K. Merton. This academic background under Merton greatly influenced Selznick's interests and method of analysis. It is reflected in his concern with the psychological aspects of organization and the role of the informal structures in understanding organizational changes and leadership policy. Merton's use of latent functions is clearly used in Selznick's concern with latent structures, latent commitments, and latent functions in organizational analysis. The emphasis is placed on the internal patterns of activity, emergent informal groups, and their modifying and undermining formal policy and action.

It is interesting that Selznick gives reference to Parsons for the idea and method of structural-functional approach, even though Merton was the student under Parsons earlier. The method of utilizing latent models of function, commitment, and structure is a conspicuous example of Merton's influence on Selznick. There are references and footnotes given to Merton on unanticipated consequences, practical action and the resistance of the social structure and the possible dangers in positing a set of "needs" for an organization. Selznick acknowledges an intellectual correspondence and a continual reference with his teacher.

An intellectual debt in Selznick's theory can be traced beyond just the formal academic training or interaction. He draws explicitly from Max Weber, Chester I. Barnard, Herbert Simon, Robert Michels, Daniel Bell, Waller and Henderson, and Roethlisberger and Dickson. But he maintains his own identity by concerning himself with the sources and forms of rational as well as the nonrational aspects of behavior in the large-scale organization. By focusing on both the formal role demands as well as personalities as a whole, he is able to cast new light on the role of leadership and the effect of informal relations within the formal system. Clearly, it can be seen that he departs from the rational, hierarchical structure with its strict subordination which Weber conceived it to be.

Selznick's perspective converges amazingly close to several other theorists in sociology. Perhaps the most clear examples are Homans and Parsons. With Homans, Selznick shares an internal-external distinction in his theory which becomes crucial when analyzing patterns of activity which function to maintain and guard the system from external danger and attack. Selznick's use of external-internal logic is so close to Parsons' pattern variables that their influence on Selznick is very probable. With Parsons, he shares a pronounced psychoanalytic perspective. Both use much the same orientation to the analysis of a social system; it is viewed as a relatively autonomous system within an environment.⁵ But this calls for an overview of Selznick's consideration of the types of large scale organizations.

Types of Large-Scale Organizations

Selznick has addressed himself to what he would term formal organizations, bureaucracies, and institutions. However, all three can be considered purposive organizations under the generic term associations. He defines associations

⁵ Gouldner argues that Selznick and Parsons utilize a "natural system" approach as opposed to the "rational system" approach characterized by Weber's model. However, it is this writer's feeling that this analytical distinction is somewhat artificial even though some analytical clarification might be made. The subject can be found in Robert K. Merton, et al., Sociology Today (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 400.

as "special purpose organizations, such as trade-unions, corporations, and political parties. . . . Associations are usually based on limited, utilitarian interests. . . . In general the more specific and practical an association's objectives, the more impersonal and narrow will be the individual's relation to the group."⁶ Thus, formal organizations, bureaucracies, and institutions are all considered as particular types of associations.

This paper will deal with the concepts formal and informal organization. All associations have a formal structure which Selznick feels consists of: a division of labor, delegation of authority, channeled communication, and co-ordination.⁷ The formal structure represents the expression of a system of rules and objectives defining the tasks, powers, and procedures of participants according to some officially approved pattern. This formal structure is an arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some purpose through the allocation of functions and responsibilities. It may be viewed as a tool or instrument, subject to calculable manipulation. The existence of rational, calculable action is not denied, but Selznick goes on to say that the administration "never succeeds in conquering the non-rational dimensions of

⁶Leonard Broom and Philip Selznick, Sociology: A Text with Adapted Readings (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 32.

⁷Ibid., pp. 220-21.

organizational behavior. The latter remains at once indispensable to the continued existence of the system of coordination and at the same time the source of friction, dilemma, doubt, and ruin."⁸

The other important concept which Selznick stresses is the informal structure. "It is used to denote those patterns that emerge from the spontaneous interaction of personalities and groups within the organization. . . . An organization's informal structure is made up of the patterns that develop when the participants face persistent problems that are not provided for by the formal system."⁹ The participants tend to interpret and restructure the role demands placed upon them by the organization. Even though they are assigned a prescribed segmentary role, guided by the ideals of discipline and rationality, they tend to participate as whole persons, i.e., not functionally specific or in an affectively neutral way. They tend to resist depersonalization.

Selznick views the organizational system from the analytical standpoints of an economy and an adaptive social structure. Empirically, however, they cannot be separated for they represent an empirical whole. The conception of an adaptive social structure is useful and is

⁸Philip Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," ASR, Vol. 13 (1948), p. 29.

⁹Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 227.

employed with great facility with the structural-functional model or method of analysis. But Selznick modifies his position on considering the organization as being an economy, in that an economy is viewed as a rational, purely instrumental consideration of scarce resources. But in fact the scarce goods and resources are not always used rationally and instrumentally in the actual working action system. The appointed leadership is given access to these scarce goods and resources but it does not act in purely rational and technical ways as prescribed. Leadership tends to make concessions, make commitments, and seek support for its actions. Control and consent become inseparable and indivisible in a stable organization.¹⁰ The actual action system is made up of leaders who tend to act as wholes. The emergent informal structure becomes part of the action system as they modify and manipulate the formal structure. And so the economy with its formal, technical approach to scarce resources is replaced analytically with the conception of a cooperative system of action. "The winning of consent and support is conceived to be a basic function of leadership. . . . The indivisibility of control and consent makes it necessary to view formal organizations as cooperative systems, widening the

¹⁰A somewhat related concern is that of Lipset's in effectiveness and legitimacy of a government system. He argues that any system of government must be both effective and perceived as legitimate over time for a stable relationship between the leadership and the governed to result. This point can be found in Seymour Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 81.

frame of reference of those concerned with the manipulation of organizational resources," i.e., the economy.¹¹ Because the informal structure seeks to manage tension through the organization of power centers by modifying and manipulating the formal structure, the organization is viewed as a cooperative system.

To summarize this overview of Selznick's general theoretical framework, the following major ideas can be given:

1. Organizations are viewed as cooperative systems and adaptive social structures, made up of interacting individuals, sub-groups, and informal plus formal relationships.
2. Relate variable aspects of organization (such as goals) to stable needs and self-defensive mechanisms.
3. There is a quality of recalcitrance in the tools of social action, involving a break in the continuum of adjustment and defining an environment of constraint, commitment, and tensions.¹²

This theoretical orientation will now be analyzed in terms of the PAS Model.

¹¹Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," op. cit., p. 26.

¹²Ibid., p. 33.

CHAPTER III

THE PROCESSUALLY ARTICULATED STRUCTURAL MODEL

Knowledge--Selznick's Contribution

Many have criticized Selznick for reifying the system. These commentators find ample evidence for such conclusions. Perhaps the existence of such factors as an organizational identity or character becomes so real to the researcher after working so closely with large-scale activities that he reifies the existence of them. The purpose of this thesis is not to criticize Selznick's formulation of the organization, but it is this writer's feeling that reification only becomes a real problem when it hinders the formulation of questions and clear conceptualization.

Selznick's contribution to sociological knowledge as theorist, writer, and researcher in the field is evidenced by his writings and the reference other writers give to these works. The latter is a way of acknowledging the importance and contribution he has made to the field of large-scale organization. Some of his concepts and methods of approach have become part of the language, part of the tools for understanding and structuring research problems in the field of sociological operations.

The professional sociologist perhaps knows Professor Selznick best by his book The Organizational Weapon. Here he analyzes the Communist movement through the bolshevik strategy and tactics; specifically, it is a study of organizational practices and strategies. He is concerned with analytically constructing a working model of the combat party. The focus is on the construction of a model which describes the special capacity and nature of the system. It is not a full historical account of the Communist Party.

Selznick's first book TVA at the Grass Roots, is his most well known work outside of the field. He makes a very strong case for the process of systemic linkage and how it can be used to maintain stability and to channel the sentiments of the people for democratic development of a whole region. The concept which describes this process is "cooptation." He defines it as "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence."¹³ Cooptation has received wide circulation and acceptance in fields outside of sociology.

Anyone interested in the field of large-scale formal organizations or bureaucracy sooner or later becomes

¹³ Philip Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949), p.13.

acquainted with the writings of Professor Selznick for they appear and are quoted in much of the work done in this area. His article, "An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy" appears under the section of bureaucracy in Coser and Rosenberg's book, Sociological Theory. The article, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization" can be found in Etzione's book Complex Organizations, and again in Merton et al.'s book, A Reader in Bureaucracy. Blau and other contributors to Blau's book make numerous references to Selznick's book on TVA in Formal Organizations.

The special contribution of Professor Selznick is in the understanding of organizational practices and actual operations. In his formulations, the elements of belief and sentiment provide the foundation and cement around which the organization may exist; socialization of new members and open communication channels play the critical role in maintaining the system as an on-going system of actors. The leadership must educate the membership and set the ultimate goals of the system; he must fill the organizational forms with content, i.e., infuse the system with a set of beliefs and values around which the membership can work and identify. In socializing the membership to view the system as a source of meaning and pride, the membership becomes an integrated unit with morale and power.

Cognitive Mapping and Validation of Selznick

Selznick argues that a "logic of approach" must be developed for the analysis of human institutions. He points to the depth and dynamic analysis of a personality system and feels this can be a very usable type of model in analyzing social systems. Psychoanalysts, particularly ego psychologists, view the personality system as a relatively autonomous system, conceptually isolated, with strivings, conflicts, and defensive patterns that can be studied and accounted for in terms of inner needs.

The suggestion is that the logic or mode of analysis associated with dynamic psychology may be similar in essential ways to the analytical logic of sociology, at least when coherent, adaptive social organisms are being studied. . . . The essence of this interpretive process is the drawing of conclusions, from the study of observable "indicators" that some underlying pattern of configuration exists.¹⁴

His "logic of interpretation" calls for the construction of a simplified model which can be isolated from its environment. The problem is one of isolating a crucial set of interdependent variables that depict the essential features of the system; an effort is made to identify the uniqueness of the organization by determining its central goal or objective and then relating this objective to certain inferred needs. These needs will help define and help describe unique tensions which that system will

¹⁴Selznick, The Organizational Weapon, op. cit., pp. vii, viii.

experience under certain conditions.

The first step then is to discover the uniqueness or distinctive organizational characteristics of the system in question. These sets of characteristics, whether they be in performing a role, realizing particular objectives or goals, or whatever else, are then related to "needs" which they are felt to fulfill. These "needs" of the system whether they be organizational or normative commitments are assumed to help prescribe determinable choices and directions of action. Thus, the distinct or unique identity of the organization is related to the function it plays in the maintenance of the structure.

The study of inherent tensions is a crucial phase of interpretive analysis because this procedure helps to identify the system at hand. Systems may be located empirically by specifying their special characteristic inner conflicts. . . . There is an important difference between disturbances created in a system by enviroing forces and those inherent tensions which arise from the system itself. . . . Inherent tensions are rather such as are generated by the very act of delegation, which creates new centers of interest and power, yet is an indispensable phase of organizational experience. Thus stress must be placed on the qualifier inherent.¹⁵

The method is to relate a function with an inferred set of needs; this is the structural-functional approach. This type of analysis seeks to relate contemporary and variable behavior to a presumptively stable system of

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. x-xi.

needs and mechanisms. The structure of relationships, rewards, and decision-making is assumed to function effectively to satisfy the "needs" of the organization over time. The system as noted earlier, is adaptive or develops means of self-defense through its leadership to maintain itself over time.

"It is a postulate of the structural-functional approach that the basic need of all empirical systems is the maintenance of the integrity and continuity of the system itself."¹⁶ The maintenance of the formal system as a generic need may be denoted in terms of the following imperatives. They are the need to keep:

1. The security of the organization as a whole in relation to social forces in its environment. (It maintains its boundary against the outside.)
2. The stability of the lines of authority and communication. (This includes power, decision making and initiation of activity and communication, communication of sentiment and tension management.)
3. The stability of informal relations within the organization. (This includes the communication of sentiment and tension management.)
4. The continuity of policy and of the sources of its determination. (This includes power, decision making and initiation of activity as both are modified by the informal or sub-sets of power.)

¹⁶Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," op. cit., p. 29.

5. A homogeneity of outlook with respect to the meaning and role of the organization.¹⁷ (This includes the institutionalization of a set of beliefs about the organization and its character and identity with the respective goals and norms that guide it.)

The crucial assumption and organizational "need" is that there be integration and continuity within the formal organization. This basic assumption is inherent within the structural-functional approach. Selznick couples this method with the logic, the type of analysis which is associated with the psychoanalytical approach.

This type of consideration certainly places an emphasis on the condition of time but there is no attempt to reconstruct a history of the system under study. The method becomes one of selecting and drawing out those aspects which are most useful for an understanding of the system. Almost all of the publications of Selznick's are based on secondary materials and documentary sources. But he does precaution the use of materials which are restricted to that which is publicly acknowledged and known for this may not reveal the true nature of the system. This should be supplemented with interviews and observations of actual practice. Internal memoranda and working papers will help reveal the special insights and internal nature

¹⁷Ibid., p. 33.

of the system.

If the use of personal interviews, gossip channels, working papers and participation opens the way for error, it remains, however, the only way in which this type of sociological research can be carried on. . . . An empirical analysis of a particular organization, of its doctrine, of a phase of policy in action, of its interaction with other structures, was our objective. But in order to trace the dynamics of these events, it has been necessary to attempt a reconstruction, which is to say, a theory, of the conditions and forces which appear to have shaped the behavior of key participants.¹⁸

Special attention is given to the latent structure of the organization to help determine the latent function or emerging purpose of the formal system. Latent refers to that which is in the process of becoming. This function may be the actual intended function or a concomitant latent function. "The basic idea is that sociological interpretation should be viewed as the search for models of latent structures."¹⁹ The focus is put on latent commitments, latent structures, and latent functions of the system for special insights.

Selznick's prevailing interest and accent has been on the internal activity as it modifies the external activity of organizations. His gathering of material has followed this emphasis.

An understanding of the system can be gained when an internal situation charged with conflict qualifies and informs actions ostensibly determined by formal

¹⁸Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 250.

¹⁹Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. xi.

relations and objectives. A proper understanding of the organizational process must make it possible to interpret changes in the formal system--new appointments or rules or reorganizations--in their relation to the informal and unavowed ties of friendship, class loyalty, power cliques, or external commitments.²⁰

Knowing

Belief (knowledge) as an element.--The social structure of any system "includes the shared beliefs of the participants."²¹ This element plays a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of any organization. "Although ideology to be translated into power, requires organization, effective organization requires ideology."²² This ideology presents a common goal and purpose which brings the group together and integrates a set of beliefs which allow individuals to work together under a common purpose. The beliefs play an indispensable role in integrating and disciplining a group of individuals.

Selznick postulates that a homogeneity of outlook with respect to the meaning and role of the organization is a requisite need for a formal organization. This plays the crucial role in maintaining an organized unit of action. The minimization of disaffection requires a unity derived from a common understanding of what the

²⁰Selznick, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," op. cit., p. 23.

²¹Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 96.

²²Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 10.

character of the organization is meant to be. When this homogeneity breaks down, as in situations of internal conflict over basic issues, the continued existence of the organization is endangered. It must retain the ability to be adaptive to changes if it is to remain an enduring adaptable organization. "The development of administrative ideologies as conscious and unconscious devices of communication and self-defense are crucial."²³

The focus is on the set of beliefs which a collectivity of actors share and their role in maintaining this integrated unit against external pressures or systems. The analysis of the communists cadre or the small cell units within the Party is the case in point. The Party's power and unity are attained by isolating its membership from interacting with the "outside," either ideologically or socially; the party is then able to monopolize in instilling a set of beliefs, thus giving the member meaning and direction with which to carry out his activities. "For as Stalin, that greatest master of revolutionary action has taught us, theory gives those engaged in practical work the power of orientation, clarity of vision, assurance in work, and belief in the triumph of our cause."²⁴

²³Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 96.

²⁴Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 39.

In TVA and the Grass Roots, the importance that the grass roots doctrine had in establishing an identity and rapport within the TVA's field of action is clear. "By working through state and local agencies, the Authority will provide the people of the valley with more effective means by which to direct their own destinies. The TVA may then become more integrally a part of the region, committed to its interests and cognizant of its needs, and thus removed in thought and action from the remote impersonal bureaucracy of centralized government."²⁵

Cognitive mapping and validation as a process.--In all of Selznick's works there is emphasis given to the vital role of education and training the member to the organizational point of view. "To mold the minds of individuals according to a definite pattern creates a homogeneous organization, and this is an enormous aid to communication. A broad context of understood meanings ensures that in the performance of assigned tasks, the spirit as well as the letter will be observed."²⁶

Because of the great importance placed upon the role of leadership in developing the organization, an emphasis is given to the education and training of new personnel. It is the leadership's task to instill into the membership an outlook, an identity, and a set of procedures

²⁵Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 37.

²⁶Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 18.

for them to follow. "It is the unity that emerges when a particular orientation becomes so firmly a part of group life that it colors and directs a wide variety of attitudes, decisions, and forms of organization, and does so at many levels of experience. The building of integrity is part of what we have called the institutional embodiment of purpose and its protection is a major function of leadership."²⁷

But belief systems may arise within the formal organization which serve to undermine and deflect the formal goals of the organization. Examples are cliques like that found in the Bank Wiring Room and the "bureaucrat-leader" who wants to stay in office. These centers of power with their own set of beliefs may arise due to different locations, functions, or existential conditions. Both sets of deviant beliefs alter the strictly rational, formal operations within the organization. The "bureaucrat-leader" tends to consciously or unconsciously construct an ideology peculiar to his social position; it serves to explain and justify his actions. He tends to identify his administration with the very existence of the total organization; there tends to be a plea for the centralization. The bureaucrat-leader tends to call on the "collective submission to the collective interests" and the conservative position is

²⁷Ibid., p. 138.

taken to justify the status quo.²⁸

Formal action is taken within the organization to train and educate new members to a set of beliefs and procedures. The communists even as a voluntary organization serve as an excellent example. "A long process of indoctrination and action is required to inculcate methods of organization which work so deeply that they select and create congenial personality traits."²⁹ Thus, the organization not only attracts persons with a type of personality and set of beliefs but it inculcates a point of view and a set of beliefs which are important for both internal integration and external adaptation to the external environment while reaching its rewards and goals from the outside.

The more radically different the organizational activities are from the outside community, the less that system can rely on the general education provided by the outside. This type of organization must provide its own educational or training system.³⁰ The communists leadership extensively use political discussions to train their members. These meetings reach down to the lowest levels of the party. Every unit in the organization is educated and indoctrinated to agitate them into action. "An important Leninist principle is reflected in the rule that organized

²⁸ Selznick, "An Approach . . .," op. cit., p. 54.

²⁹ Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 57.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 36.

education and self-study must be supplemented by participation in communist activities. The primary function of each type of education is to steel the loyalties of the party member, to immerse him in the movement, and hence create a life commitment."³¹

But there are two ways this cognitive mapping experience can be directed; it can be directed to the internal operations of the system or to the external environment. When a set of beliefs are directed to integrating and strengthening morale, it may be referred to as ideology. Propaganda is often associated with externally directed beliefs which are an organizational strategy.³² Both the TVA and the communists have utilized a set of beliefs; they have had both internal and external functions.

Feeling

Sentiment as an element.--Selznick fails to analytically separate the elements belief and sentiment at all times. The term sentiment is frequently used interchangeably with some concepts as involvement, cohesion, commitment, and morale. An ideology is an affectively loaded belief system; it is a commitment to a way of thinking. The utility of doctrine and ideology as a morale-builder is made explicit.

³¹Ibid., p. 47.

³²Ibid., p. 244.

The Marxist doctrine plays the decisive role in fulfilling this morale function. It provides categories of thought--the class struggle, theory of the state and of economic crises, and the nature of historical development--which can be manipulated to bolster Leninist's aims.³³

But this internal relevance of doctrine and beliefs is not unique to the communist movement for in any political campaign or other organizations, there are meetings and talks just designed to integrate and strengthen morale. But sentiment in social action can be turned against and function to undermine the formal goals of the organization. This can come about by commitment to procedures or through the organization of sentiment in small sub-groups which undermine and deflect the formal goals.

Every formal organization develops a more personal and informal organization within it. This informal organization is based on personal relationships; it arises spontaneously and is usually directed to control some specific situation.³⁴ This emergent structure is ultimately based on sentiments of preference or tension. The expression of these preferences or tensions is the non-rational dimension of organizational behavior. This dimension is indispensable to the system for it allows modification and coordination. Out of it arise new procedures and structural forms which is part of an adaptation process; it helps the organization survive.

³³Ibid., p. 39.

³⁴Selznick, "Foundations . . .," op. cit., p. 27.

Organizational character, institutional identity, and group values capture and also are capable of sustaining group identity because they form the basis of group feeling, cohesion, and morale. "In building an activist social movement, it is important to give the membership a sense of striving for a goal so that attitudes of dedication may be reinforced; this may be accomplished by special propaganda emphasis. Similarly, the stress on action aids group solidarity by maintaining a continuously alert membership. Personal commitment to the group is reinforced in the course of mutual support in action and as lives are organized around the group as a focal point."³⁵

Tension management as process.--The formal system of rules and procedures tends to generate friction and dilemmas. Individuals seek to control those conditions which generate friction and tension by forming cliques or sub-groups. This emergent structure becomes the avenue of channeling and managing that tension and sentiment. The Bank Wiring Room study and Barnard's findings illustrate the informal adaptation of sub-groups to sources of tension. Thus the informal structure provided those avenues of aggression, solidarity, and prestige-construction required by individual members.³⁶

³⁵Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 35.

³⁶Selznick, "An Approach . . .," op. cit., p. 47.

The above is in essence what Selznick terms the "organization-paradox." The paradox manifests itself in a modification of the initial goals toward which the organization is directed. The management of tension presents a pressing problem for every cooperative system. There are "needs" which are essential for the maintenance of an integrated organization; but there are also desires and sentiments of the membership within that system. A partial resolution of this dilemma comes when the informal structure is created to manage or cope with the existential conditions of the sub-group members. In all systems "we find a persistent relationship between needs and commitment in which the latter not only qualifies the former but unites with it to produce a continuous state of tension."³⁷

The above patterns under tension management can also be viewed in Parsons' language as internal-instrumental activities for they facilitate adaptation. They are boundary-maintaining and tension managing devices that help preserve the sub-system.

Communication of sentiment as process.--"Indoctrination and the sharing of key experiences--especially internal conflicts and other crises--will help make a unified group."³⁸ These ties of sentiment and self-interest

³⁷ Selznick, "Foundations . . .," op. cit., p. 32.

³⁸ Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 46.

help provide effective means of adjustment for individuals; this in turn helps to widen opportunities for effective communication within the organization. "Emotional identification with the organization creates resources of energy that may increase day-to-day effort and, especially, be summoned in times of crisis or threat."³⁹ Thus ties of sentiment which are communicated to others within the group strengthen those bonds and cement relationships which sustains the formal authority and its goals.

Along the same line, Selznick supports Lenin's directive. "The main objectives of the educational work should be to liquidate the fear and pessimistic moods among the workers; . . . to rouse the enthusiasm, confidence and fighting spirit of the workers, and to win public sentiment behind the campaign."⁴⁰ This is accomplished by slogans, mass meetings and demonstrations. The mass meetings are invaluable for this objective in that morale is heightened as personal contact is established.

Clearly, an ideology can serve the function of integrating the group for it provides the membership with a cause, a mission, and a justification for their actions. The communist ideology and the grass roots ideology of the TVA both represent examples of setting forth a set of

³⁹Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 18.

⁴⁰Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 105.

beliefs and justifications which were designed to bolster the morale and identification of the membership to their respective goals or mission. They provide the symbols for communicating an identity or sentiment. In this sense using Parsons' pattern variables, they represent patterns of internal-consummatory activity, designed to "give primacy to the communication of sentiment, supportive to the integration of the whole group."⁴¹

Achieving

End, goal, or objective as an element.--"The most striking and obvious thing about an administrative organization is its formal system of rules and objectives. . . . The organization is designed as a technical instrument for mobilizing human energies and directing them toward set aims."⁴² But the goals, ends and objectives of organizations vary with the type of system.

The interest of Selznick is in a theoretical approach to formal organizations. Particular goals are not treated as such but they do enter tangentially to the discussion as they relate to the analysis of particular organizations and their adaptation. For example, the goal of the TVA was to raise the standard of living in the Valley States;

⁴¹Loomis, op. cit., p. 46.

⁴²Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 5.

the communist goal was to gain power and social control.

Power is the decisive rationale of going to the people, and justifications are left to History. The leadership is thus freed for a purely technical approach to mass manipulation. . . .

Conspiratorial organization in bolshevism stems from the continuous and systematic search for "pieces of power," regardless of whether this search ultimately leads to the overthrow of a government. It serves these revolutionary aims, but is useful for more immediate goals as well.⁴³

Because the organization is viewed as an adaptive mechanism, goals and means of achieving them are not felt to be constant; they change over time. Selznick summarizes: "Institutional aims cannot be taken as given, for they are conditioned by changing self-definition, by alterations in the internal and external commitments of the enterprise."⁴⁴ All goals are subordinate to the survival of the organizations.

Goal attaining activity as process.--The goal of the TVA project was to raise the standards of living for the residents of the Valley States. To reach this goal, the self-conscious leadership of the TVA coopted strong centers of power within their policy making structure, thereby gaining the needed support to survive in the Valley. The TVA was forced to compromise with elements from the outside; by incorporating these hostile elements, the TVA

⁴³Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 54.

⁴⁴Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit. p. 82.

was able to adjust to its field of operations and attain its goal.

No organization subsists in a vacuum. . . . It must pay some heed to the consequences of its own activities (and even existence) for other groups and forces exist in the community. These forces will insist upon an accounting, and may in self-defense demand a share in the determination of policy. Because of this outside pressure from many varied sources, the attention of any bureaucracy must be turned outward.⁴⁵

In short, the TVA had to adapt itself to the external environment and share some of its power to realize its aims.

The energies of the communists have been focused primarily upon gaining positions in groups and institutions which will in return offer a means of moving to greater conquests of power until the control of the social structure of a society is secured. The foundation of this effort is in the formation of the combat party (cadre or cell unit). The principles by which the combat party is guided in this power-seeking quests are marked by a high degree of adaptability and expediency in tactics.

There are problems in defining goals and prescribing the procedures to carry them out, for they have subtle implications for the adaptability of the organization. The goals of the large organizations are often stated rather broadly, thus allowing for a certain generality

⁴⁵ Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

because it is difficult to foresee whether more specific goals will be realistic and sound. But these are the leadership's problems. "In defining the mission of the organization, leaders must take account of: (1) the internal state of the polity, the strivings, inhibitions, and competences that exist within the organization; and (2) the external expectations that determine what must be sought or achieved if the institution is to survive."⁴⁶

Because of these internal interests and outside forces, the leadership must minimize risks by achieving long-run, as well as, short-run objectives to keep the system running smoothly. The communists keep their members constantly deployed, even when they have no chances to reach their goal. Keeping them activated serves to give them experience and pass away the time.

Concomitant latent activity as process.--Selznick places great emphasis on the process of achieving goals and its nature to precipitate other goals which are unrelated to if not contradictory with the initial goals.⁴⁷ These problems of an internal or external nature demand attention and solutions which may find priority over the original goals. This is in part, giving support to Michels thesis of the "iron law of oligarchy." Selznick argues

⁴⁶Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

⁴⁷In both the article "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," and the book TVA at the Grass Roots, Selznick acknowledges the work of Robert K. Merton on this problem of unanticipated consequences.

that "there are processes inherent in and internal to organization as such which tend to frustrate action toward professed goals."⁴⁸

Concomitant to organized action is involvement and commitment to personnel, institutions, or procedures which effectively qualifies the initial plan. These commitments may lead to unanticipated consequences resulting in a deflection of original ends. This displacement tends to be in the form of compromises or retreats from the initial goal to a more functional or cooperative program. "Our frame of reference is to select out those needs which cannot be fulfilled within approved avenues of expression and thus must have recourse to such adaptive mechanisms as ideology and to the manipulation of formal processes and structures in terms of informal goals."⁴⁹

These informal patterns arise spontaneously to handle certain tensions or fill specific needs of the personnel. The "action system" of an organization is composed of individuals acting and not just as formal participants in the system. There is a convergence between the personal needs and the organizational demands. Individual interests and perspectives, especially when shared by others and organized into a group, may change or circumvent the official goals of the system. When there is

⁴⁸Selznick, "An Approach . . .," op. cit., p. 49.

⁴⁹Selznick, "Foundations . . .," op. cit., p. 32.

a bifurcation of interests between the organizational and personal goals, tension results. When this tension is experienced by others, there tends to emerge an informal structure which manages this tension through the control of those stressful conditions. It is this dilemma or emergent structure which Selznick calls the organizational paradox. The informal structure deviates and modifies the legal system of the organization; it is a new structure in the process of becoming.

These deviations tend to force a shift away from the purely formal system as the effective determinant of behavior to: (1) a condition in which informal patterns buttress the formal as through the manipulation of sentiment within the organization in favor of established authority; or (2) a condition wherein the informal controls effect a consistent modification of formal goals, as in the case of some bureaucratic patterns. This trend will eventually result in the formalization of erstwhile informal activities, with the cycle of deviation and transformation beginning again on a new level.⁵⁰

The organization-paradox looms as the real problem in the organization. This dilemma in human behavior is represented by an inescapable commitment which cannot be reconciled with the "requisite needs" of the social system. On the other hand, the individual has personal goals and needs of affection and response and so he gives a commitment to elements of the system which can provide them; but jointly, his membership in the formal organization demands involvement in goals and procedures which he may not find

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 27.

satisfying. If this is experienced by many members, tension results but with a probable modification of the initial goals. Thus a paradox exists with regard to the legal structure of the organization.

In TVA at the Grass Roots, Selznick points out two fundamental sources of unanticipated consequences in organizational activity, which will be treated as concomitant latent activity. They are: (1) the limiting function of the end-in-view, i.e., by keeping the eye on the ball, one loses the perspective of distant goals; and (2) commitment limits the lines of action that can be taken. A commitment represents a sanctioned line of action by either rational, self-conscious power figures or by non-rational unreflective social forces such as socialization into a group or culture. More specifically, commitments can be: (a) to unique organizational imperatives to maintain the system, its order, discipline, unity, defense, or consent, (b) to an institutionalized method, belief, end, means, or technology, (c) to the social character of the personnel, (d) to the social and cultural environment, and (e) to centers of interest generated in the course of action.⁵¹

The organization must constantly adapt and modify its activities internally and externally, in relation to

⁵¹Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., pp. 254-57.

changing situations if it is to survive and reach its goals. There is always the danger of a concomitant latent effect of introducing outside interests, specialized perspectives and value orientations which will alter and undermine intentionally or unintentionally the goals of the organization.

Norming, Standardizing, Patterning

Norm as an element.--"Commitments to ways of acting and responding are built into the organization. When integrated, these commitments define the 'character' of the organization. These become institutionalized patterns that decisively affect the competence of an organization to frame and execute desired policies."⁵² Thus viewed, the commitments are sanctioned lines of activity, constraining the actors to follow patterns and normative codes of action.

Selznick uses policy and commitment but neither of these concepts are analytically separated. He uses commitment in such a way that it incorporates what is here called an end, norm, or sentiment. Policy is used in both an evaluative and a decision-making sense. Policy as viewed by Selznick goes beyond the specified goals of the organization for they include prescribed ways of attaining them also. He refers to this process specifically as

⁵² Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 40.

"formalization of procedure."⁵³ This represents the process of institutionalizing a set of procedures and norms, thus reducing personal choice and the chance for them to determine the procedures. This limits open-endedness by externalizing discipline and incentives.⁵⁴ In short, prescribing and defining the procedures helps develop personal patterns, thus limiting idiosyncratic choice.

Less generally recongized is the effect of this personal involvement on the rational choice of methods. These self-images are natural products of organizational experience. They provide the individual with an ordered approach to their day-to-day problems, a way of responding to the world consistently yet involuntarily, in accordance with approved to explicit and formalized rules.⁵⁵

The policy of the TVA was to raise the standards of the people in the Valley States with the added requirement of carrying out the project with democratic planning. Because the norms of this federal institution were democratic, an ideology directed toward the "grass roots" was developed; the TVA was thereby forced to coopt powerful interest groupings, and consequently, the initial goals of TVA were modified.

In contrast to TVA, Selznick shows that the policy of the Communist Combat Party is guided by the norm of expediency--not democracy. Selznick quotes Lenin's directive.

⁵³Ibid., p. 106.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 107.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 17.

"Many adaptations of program may be required, and such adaptations are always permissible; the one indispensable requirement is that communists not surrender . . . simply because the "proletarian" stage of the revolution has not been reached."⁵⁶ These methods are inherently subversive because they represent an unstructured or unconstitutional base for their search for power. Constitutional systems give acceptable and unacceptable methods for bidding for power. But the methods used by the combat party are subversive and divorced from the values of the target group.

It is clear that the communists do have a body of principles useful to them in the struggle for power. However, it is not clear that these principles are relevant beyond organizational structure (the creation of the vanguard party and its agencies) and organizational strategy"⁵⁷ [methods which maximize the utility of the movement's organizational weapons].

The communists general lines or norms guiding action include: gaining access into target groups, neutralizing the competing force, legitimizing gained positions to entrench these toeholds against attack from the outside or inside, and mobilizing the captured groups so that they can be set in motion along the lines desired by the party. The detailed procedure for these operations is left for those in the field of operation, thus guarding against rigidity and collapse. This helps insure

⁵⁶ Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 92.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 38.

adaptability and success with the strategy.

Evaluation as process.--Since the set of commitments identify the "character" or distinct competence of the organization, the process of evaluation will be done in terms of that character-definition. When an organization develops a distinctive competence, "it becomes ill adapted to the fulfillment of other purposes, even those closely related to it."⁵⁸ These images and set of commitments inhibit the effective adaptation of new goals or programs.

Identifying these character-defining norms isolates and helps depict the organization under study. The character-defining norms of the Communist Party are mobilization and manipulation. "Everything must be subordinated to maximizing these values, for they define the combat character of the party."⁵⁹ Many adaptations in programming may be required and such adaptations are permissible. "All means are good which lead to victory over the bourgeoisie except those which result in the disintegration of your own army."⁶⁰ However, the one indispensable requirement is that the communists not surrender the organization or its identity. Strength, unity, ideological clarity are evaluated as the program must steer between the twin inherent dangers of liquidation and isolation--Right opportunism and Leftist sectarianism--in their own midst.⁶¹

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 56

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 103

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 73.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 73.

The TVA's character-defining norms were in the "grass roots" orientation and to raise the standard of living in the Valley States. The inherent tension or source of potential stress become gaining access and adjusting to the field of operations. Selznick described the process of incorporating powerful interest groupings which helped TVA adjust to its area of operations as cooptation.

Most of Selznick's work has been directed to the analysis of internal processes of organizations. He views the emergence of the informal structures as a means of assessing tasks and results which cannot be settled by the routine formula prevailing. Selznick reviews Barnard's three hypotheses and I quote:

The informal structure has three functions as it operates in the formal organization. It serves: (a) as a means of communication, establishing norms of conduct between subordinates and superordinates; (b) maintenance of cohesiveness in formal organizations through regulating the willingness to serve and the stability of objective authority; (c) the maintenance of the feeling of personal integrity, of self-respect, of independent choice.⁶²

Thus a set of procedural rules are worked out to handle the problems and tensions in these conditions.

It is Selznick's hypothesis that informal groups will form in every organization and that a modification of the formal rules will be effected through this informal structure.⁶³ These formal goals and procedures are

⁶²Ibid., p. 48.

⁶³Selznick, "An Approach . . .," op. cit., p. 47

evaluated by the norms of the informal group.

The day-to-day activity of men is ordered by those specific problems which have a direct relevance to the materials with which they have to deal . . . the initial formulations are not helpful in the constant effort to achieve that series of equilibria which represent behavioral solutions to the specific problems which day-to-day living poses.⁶⁴

The initial norms or ideal norms are one thing but the everyday problems encountered, independent of the initial goals or norms are something else. The more operational norms are relied upon in practice.

The formal structure is viewed as a more or less static tool or mechanism that tends to lag behind the needs of its membership. The formal level of organization is seen as a rather inflexible tool; the institutionalized procedures and rules were made for yesterday's problems and situations, but they do not always apply to the present conditions.

The actual procedures of every organization tend to be molded by action toward those goals which provide operationally relevant solutions for the daily problems of the organization as such . . . the ideals of those who construct the organization are one thing; the "facts of life" operating independently of and often against those ideals are something else again.⁶⁵

The classical example of a sub-group undermining the norms of the formal system is the Bank Wiring Room Study. This modification was realized through the emergence of informal group norms governing the rate of individual output.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 49.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 65.

Dividing the Functions

Status-role incorporating both element and process.--

"The division of labor, with its multiplication of more or less fixed positions, is perhaps the most obvious way of connecting policy and social structure. The assignment of formal roles sets out the tasks, powers, and expected procedures of the participants, including the lines of communication among them according to some officially approved pattern."⁶⁶ This represents the formal or more rational side to the organization.

Selznick's interest in the series of offices and the leadership group finds root in Max Weber's essay on bureaucracy. He makes reference to Weber in the discussion of the formal organization and its rational nature but departs from the singularly, rational, purposive conception of the organization to focus his attention on the actual functioning of groups and positions within the organization, i.e., the motivational and nonrational aspects of behavior in the formal structure.

Generally status and role are treated separately by Selznick. He defines role as "a way of behaving associated with a defined position in a social system." Consistent with his emphasis on the informal structure and nonrational aspects of organizational action systems, he defines role

⁶⁶Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 51.

as a process of "self-structuring," an adaptive process where the personal element enters into the definition of what is required.⁶⁷ "These roles are often independent of formally assigned positions or tasks, and are likely to be closely related to the personality structure of the individual." The working organization is not just a function of the formal or legal prescriptions of an office; it is a product of the interaction between the formal demands and informal patterns of behavior. The focus is on the actual functioning system which is dealing with whole personalities who tend to interact beyond the legal and prescribed role; the action system tends to be based on primary or informal relations. But this more personal structuring of the role demands is buttressed against the legal and formal demands of the office or position. Thus the working system tends to modify and redefine the formal system. This is the organizational paradox or dilemma. The action system adapts to the existential conditions, modifying the formal organization.

The formal-informal pressures that result in the organization-paradox is clear in the difference between the extent of delegation and the resulting role-performance.

Unfortunately for the adequacy of formal systems of coordination, the needs of individuals do not permit a single-minded attention to the stated goals of the system within which they have been assigned. Theoretically, these assignments are

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 83.

made to roles or official positions, not to individuals as such As a consequence, individual personalities may offer resistance to the demands made upon them by the official conditions of delegation. These resistances are not accounted for within the categories of coordination and delegation. . . . These deviations tend to force a shift away from the purely formal system as the effective determinant of behavior.⁶⁸

Ranking

Ranking as an element.---"There is a hierarchy of values attached to kinds of work. Equality between a worker in a unionized plant and the union organizer, in terms of money, does not alter the situation. It is the kind of work involved which is valued above the work of the ordinary members."⁶⁹ Thus a system of stratification or ranking is an integral part of the formal organization.

Selznick describes a vivid hierarchy in the ranks of the communist party. The organization itself is composed of layers of adherents who function at different levels of commitment and involvement. First, there is the hard core group in the party who are self-conscious agents, aware of the central role of power in bolshevism; they are the elite who are thoroughly indoctrinated, skillfully trained and rigidly disciplined. They represent the steeled cadres who are totally committed and

⁶⁸Selznick, "Foundations . . .," op. cit., p. 28.

⁶⁹Selznick, "An Approach . . .," op. cit., p. 51.

involved in the power aims of the communists. The second level is a large number of ideologically committed communists who must be continually convinced and reinforced to the ultimate professed aims of the party. Beyond this, but still within the party, there are elements of varying political reliability who for the time being accept communist discipline. The member in this third level of the party is not as deeply committed and so the impact of membership in the organization is not great.⁷⁰

The above paragraph points out the interdependence between participation, rank, and belief system. Those involved in a large amount of activity understand the reasons behind more of the decisions and directives; these persons tend to be closer to the decision making centers. The experiences of men in the system differ among different ranks systematically, because of their geographical and social location. These experiences and beliefs about the organization and its goals crucially determine the interest and sentiment they will attach to the organization; this in turn determines his promotion and ranking in the system.

Furthermore, Selznick points out that some organizations ranked higher than others in the Valley States and helped deflect the TVA program and initial plans. The Agriculturalists, because of their contact with the people

⁷⁰Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., pp. 47-48.

and with the powerful Farm Bureau, in the area, were able to demand concessions and alter the initial goals of the TVA project.

Evaluation of actors and allocation of status-roles.--As noted above, it is almost impossible in Selznick's analysis to separate evaluation of the actor from the allocation of a status-role. In any internal activity, it would seem difficult to divorce or separate performance, evaluation, and assignment for they interlock in a ranking and division of labor system. Nevertheless, the ranking system does serve in the capacity of "fixing authority, dividing the work effectively, and supplementing formal incentives."⁷¹

A general theme of evaluation of actors can be found throughout Selznick's works. Rank in an organization is accorded in terms of function, worth, and dedication to the organization. Patronage in the communist party is in terms of loyalty and commitment. The awarding of offices is by the party, rather than by individuals.

Elections become administrative devices . . . because their slate is based on a technical evaluation of the relative merits of individuals . . . political examinations and review of their activities (become) the basis for the election. . . . Under such conditions elections become equivalent to promotions rather than political contests. The name for this administrative way of selecting new leaders is co-option.⁷²

⁷¹Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 95.

⁷²Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 31.

The communists have tried to overcome the gap between the role demands and the personality by trying to fit the person to the role he is to perform. Selznick quotes a communist directive, "The committee should try to achieve the greatest possible division of labor, remembering that the various kinds of revolutionary work demand various capacities and that a person who is absolutely useless as an organizer may be invaluable as an agitator, or that a person who does not possess the endurance demanded by conspiratorial work may be an excellent propagandist and so on."⁷³

Controlling

Power as an element.--This is another element which is central to Selznick's theory of formal organization. "The mobilization of technical and managerial skills requires a pattern of coordination, a systematic ordering of positions and duties which defines a chain of command and makes possible the administrative integration of specialized functions."⁷⁴ If the organization is to be maintained, stable lines of authority must be maintained; but leadership must win the consent and support of the membership. Stable leadership, and organizations can only be founded on the basic partnership of control and consent;

⁷³Ibid., p. 23.

⁷⁴Selznick, "Foundations . . .," op. cit., p. 25.

any organization must be a cooperative system.

Authority is always embodied in a particular structure and leadership, but social power itself has to do with subjective and objective factors which control the loyalties and potential manipulability of the community. Where the formal authority or leadership reflects real social power, its stability is assured. On the other hand, when it becomes divorced from the sources of social power its continued existence is threatened. This threat may arise from the sheer alienation of sentiment or because other leaderships control the sources of social power. Where a leadership has been accustomed to the assumption that its constituents respond to it as individuals, there may be a rude awakening when organization of those constituents creates nucleuses of strength which are able to effectively demand a sharing of power.⁷⁵

The peculiar danger in the modern world, Selznick argues, is the problem of bigness, for implicit in vast size is centralization of decision making. Power comes to be exercised far from its field of operations; it is exercised far from those who feel the demands of those decisions. "It is in this proliferation of Washington-oriented agencies rather than in the mere grant of power to the federal authority that there is reason for fear. . . . A centralized agency, remote from the field of operation, lays a deadening hand upon its officers 'on the line' by relieving them of the responsibility for significant decisions."⁷⁶

The leadership of TVA became concerned with the adaptability of centralized decision-making powers. They

⁷⁵Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 15.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 24.

adopted a policy and ideology of "grass roots consent," i.e., they centralized leadership powers in the field of operations which reflected the sentiments and needs of the people to which that power was directed. The big obstacle was how to maintain relative autonomy from central control at the national level while still keeping its decisions above the selfish and powerful interests at the local level.

Great emphasis is placed on maintaining the stability of authority. Official policy is presented as unified; public utterances of members are controlled and efforts to change policy, except through approved internal channels, are prohibited. "Carrying out a 'party policy' requires the maintenance of lines of authority and communication, which is to say, organization."⁷⁷

Leadership in a normal voluntary association must continuously win the consent of the membership to ensure its tenure in power . . . he must take account of the possible defection of his rank and file. In the interests of effectiveness, however, an organization meant to function as a manipulable instrument must avoid imposing such limitations on the decision making of the leadership.⁷⁸

Power then is distributed among those who can mobilize resources, whether they be organizational, psychological, or economic.⁷⁹ Official leadership is usually most strategically placed to mobilize these resources;

⁷⁷Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 67.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 56.

⁷⁹Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 258.

but also there are contending interest-groups that do circumvent and gain partial control of the organization through the informal channel of communication. There may be rivalry among formal administrative units or feelings of insecurity in sub-groups. In either case, the reason for this organization of sentiment is to control the existential conditions while acting as a mechanism for the expression of personal relationships for which the formal organization does not provide.

Decision making and initiation of action as process.--

Selznick's interest in decision making and initiation of action concentrates on leadership. He analyzes the decision making process, who makes the decisions, and how they are derived in the large formal organization.

The first concern, that of the process of making decisions, is not very extensively developed by Selznick. He views the organization as a cooperative as opposed to a purely technical, rational or economic organization. It is a cooperative system in that decisions tend to be made through cooperation and consent, i.e., the leadership adapts to the inner and outer demands of the system which may mean linking with powerful interests in the field of operation or compromising to internal democratic planning within the system. Selznick also concedes that leadership has the right to coerce and persuade others, irrespective of what the subordinates want; however, in practice

leadership tends to make concessions to gain cooperation and consent.⁸⁰

Selznick further argues that an "iron law of oligarchy" may replace the democratic and technical priority of decision making. The conditioning factors of centralization of power, skill, and the growth of the system tends to encourage the emergence of the control by a few.⁸¹

This bifurcation of interest makes dominant for initiator and agent alike, the issue of control. What is at stake for each is the control of the conditions . . . to the solution of their own special problems. In this struggle for control, an informal structure is created, based largely on relationships involving personal influences rather than formal rules.⁸²

Those in office tend to establish commitments of their own: their own interests begin to take over and they try to maintain the status quo, i.e., to maintain their office or position of leadership.

The functions of leadership in the organization are viewed as crucial because the central issue in decision making is the choosing of key values and goals and then

⁸⁰ Gouldner argues that many industries have a representative centered bureaucracy where leadership and subordinate plan programs and sanction deviates in a cooperative system of administration. See Alvin Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 215-20.

⁸¹ Selznick, "An Approach . . .," op. cit., p. 53.

⁸² Ibid., p. 82.

building and coordinating a social structure that supports and carries it out.⁸³ Other decisions include recruitment and training or socializing new personnel, communication, and linking with other systems to realize goals. The leader must order and balance inner and outer demands, keeping the consent of the membership. He must keep the official lines of authority and communication safe.

Analyzed here are two types of decisions: administrative and critical decisions. The former type of decision is of a routine nature which is directed toward handling the technical day-to-day problems; it is concerned with keeping the administrative machine finely oiled and running smoothly. In contrast, the critical decision is directed toward setting the ultimate aims and goals of the organization. Herein are the decisions which set and develop the identity, the character, and the uniqueness of the organization itself. These decisions are left to top level leadership, not to administrative officials or bureaucrats at lower levels.

Selznick notes that the role leadership performs in decision making declines in importance as the formal structure approaches the actual determination and source of behavior.⁸⁴ The more the rules and obligations are

⁸³Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 60.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 92.

formal and consistent with the needs and expectation of its membership, the less need there will be for the leadership to perform its function; they become dispensable.

The leadership of the TVA, as discussed above and will be further discussed in detail under systemic linkage where it is most germane, averted outside opposition through the mechanism of cooptation. This is the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure to avert threats to stability in its field of operations. TVA incorporated the agriculturalist, thereby accommodating a critical center of power in the Valley States.

Selznick notes that the communists do not share with others their decisions in policy formation. "The communist nuclei of all kinds must be subordinated one to another in a strictly hierarchical order and system. To carry out their goals, the vanguard must gather all the reins into its own hands. Bolshevism cannot endure any break in the unity of command."⁸⁵ Because of the emphasis on indoctrination and institutional character-formation, its own ranks can be relied upon for an immediate source of power.

⁸⁵ Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., pp. 52, 91.

Sanctioning

Sanction as an element.--The concept of sanction per se is not utilized by Selznick; but instead, he uses terms such as constraint, restraint, and control to depict the same phenomena, i.e., methods of guiding action by rewards and punishment. "A commitment in social action is an enforced line of action; it refers to a decision dictated by the force of circumstance with the result that the free or scientific adjustment of means and ends is effectively limited."⁸⁶ They are structural conditions which shape organizational behavior, constraining the actor.

It is Selznick's implicit thesis that social relations are the foundation of both motivation and control. As individuals interact with one another, they learn to respond and build up a set of meanings; they begin to take one another into account when they act. These relations over time become predictable and patterned. The individuals find emotional support and satisfactions in this interaction, i.e., they become dependent on others. "The individual gains much from his involvement in social organization, but he always pays a price. That price is the acceptance of restraints, of limitations on the freedom to do as he pleases."⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 255.

⁸⁷ Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 18.

It follows that social relations become bonds of sentiment which give personal satisfactions but they become limitations to personal freedom. The sanctioning system inheres in the social process itself. Likewise, the formal organization, as a legal system, has a built-in set of positive and negative rewards for its membership. The formal structure usually contains a set of incentives and rewards such as promotions inside the organization which help control and limit the individual's freedom. If the individual seeks to advance or gain some of these rewards, he becomes dependent and must perform well in the assigned role.

The informal structure also has its means of sanctioning behavior. In the review of the Bank Wiring Room Study, there was clear evidence of a set of procedures by which control was maintained over the group members.

Application of sanction.--Selznick delineates the difference in the type of control exerted between the formal and informal structures.

In the review of the Roethlisberger and Dickson study in a shop department, the informal group had established control over the level of output. Sanctions were thus applied to group members who violated the rate of production set by the group. This emergent structure applied the sanctions to circumvent the formal production goals. Thus binging, ridiculing, and ostracizing group members

represent ways in which the group was able to control members in primary relations while "above all protecting itself from outside interference."⁸⁸

The formal structure has other ways of rewarding and punishing, usually based on a more impersonal and rationalistic basis. These may include incentive pay, promotions, or dismissals. The communists have the practice of patronage and the awarding of offices as a reward for the committed members. The concept of co-option represents a means of promoting a member who shows technical competence. But on the other hand, voluntary withdrawal can evoke the maximum penalty. The member of the cadre group becomes so bound that leaving the party is regarded as desertion in battle which "calls for a maximum penalty which can be expulsion, ostracism, economic boycott, defamation, and occasionally, assassination."⁸⁹

Facilitating

Facility as an element.--This element as used in the PAS Model includes all material entities required or utilized to achieve goals. Selznick expands the category to include organizational arrangements as resources. Perhaps this only represents a problem of reification such as calling the organization of the communists an "organizational

⁸⁸Selznick, "An Approach . . .," op. cit., p. 47.

⁸⁹Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 29.

weapon" and the institution as having an "identity" or "historical character."

An organization designed as a weapon is a specialized tool. Power as a goal requires technical skills, practices, and organizational forms. Organizations and organizational practices are considered weapons when they are used by a power-seeking elite in a manner unrestrained by the constitutional order of the arena within which the contest takes place. Its function is to mobilize the resources of its members and to weld them into a reliable and manipulable instrument of struggle.⁹⁰

He does deal with the material tools as facilities and their important connection to the realization of power. This power is tapped through personnel or organizational sources and can be the most important resources available to the organization. The Tennessee Valley Authority gained control of river lands, fertilizer, money, and moving water with which to generate electricity and increase the material standard of living for millions of people. The communists used newspapers, presses, people, and an organizational strategy to gain access to more facilities.

Utilization of facilities as process.--"The great emphasis on the importance of the party press--far in excess of that normal in political organizations--is due as much to the organizational utility as to the propaganda potential of the material issued."⁹¹ The press then becomes a vehicle to the people and the goals of the party. Quoting Lenin through Selznick, he says,

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 17-23.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 48.

A paper is not merely a collective propagandist and collective agitator, it is also a collective organizer. . . . To train a network of agents for the rapid and correct distribution of literature, leaflets, proclamations, etc., is to perform the greater half of the work of preparation for an eventual demonstration or uprising. It is too late to start organizing literature distribution at a moment of interest, a strike, or ferment; it must be done gradually, with distributions being made twice or even three times a month. The distribution machine must in no case be allowed to remain idle.⁹²

The objective, then, of any organization is to integrate and channel these resources so that they can be effectively used to achieve the organizational goals. "The conscious attempt to mobilize available internal and external resources for the achievement of a stated goal . . . is one characteristic of a viable organization."⁹³

Comprehensive or Master Processes

Communication.--Communication is viewed as central to the maintenance of authority and the organization itself. The carrying out of policy requires the maintenance of lines of communication, i.e., organization. Selznick reviews a principle of Lenin's.

A paper is not merely a collective propagandist and collective agitator, it is also a collective organizer. . . . With the aid of, and around a paper, there will automatically develop an organization that will be concerned, not only with local activities, but also with regular, general work; it will teach its members carefully

⁹²Ibid., p. 49.

⁹³Selznick, "Foundations . . .," op. cit., p. 23.

to watch political events, to estimate their importance and their influence on the various sections through the revolutionary party. The mere technical problem of procuring a regular supply of material for the newspaper and its regular distribution will make it necessary to create a network of agents of a united party, who will be in close contact with each other, will be acquainted with the general situation.⁹⁴

Ideology in the communists organization facilitates communication. Selznick notes that when the ranks are educated in Marxian theory, it aids effective communication for it offers a common language and approach for formulating specific directives. Communication seems to result from participation so the more participation by the membership, the more stable the lines of communication which in turn helps to maintain the organization and its goals.

Members playing different roles, and involved in varying degrees, will differ in their ability to understand the reasons behind many decisions. . . . This makes it difficult to channel information easily, and especially, to hold the organization to its basic goals and values.⁹⁵

But when the formal structure becomes too large and does not fill the needs of the membership, there emerges an informal structure to reduce the tension and fill those needs which the formal structure fails to provide. If the leadership does not communicate the

⁹⁴Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 49.

⁹⁵Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 98.

sentiments of the group, its continued existence is threatened.

The communists have guarded against this informal interest group problem and its deflecting the formal goal by disciplining, isolating, and envolving its membership. They provide opportunities for the member to communicate sentiment. But more importantly, they have a system of communication in their work; it is a system of reporting back. "This system of accountability is established through a hierarchy of committees. Every elected Party committee must report regularly on its activity to its Party organization. It must give an account of its work."⁹⁶

Boundary maintenance.--This concept is not used as such, but the same process is acknowledged and analyzed as it appears in such terms as self-maintenance, protection, and defense of the system. It becomes evident in the method of analysis. "Structural-functional analysis relates contemporary and variable behavior to a presumptively stable system of needs and mechanisms. This means that a given empirical system is deemed to have basic needs, essentially related to self-maintenance; the system develops repetitive means of self-defense; and day-to-day activity is interpreted in terms of the function served

⁹⁶Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 30.

by that activity and defense of the system."⁹⁷ If any organization is to survive over time, there will be several imperatives or generic needs which must be protected or maintained. They are:

- (1) the security of the organization as a whole in relation to social forces in its environment;
- (2) the stability of the lines of authority and communication;
- (3) the stability of informal relations within the organization;
- (4) the continuity of policy and of the sources of its determination;
- (5) a homogeneity of outlook with respect to the meaning and role of the organization.

The first imperative is associated with the concept of cooptation as developed in the book TVA at the Grass Roots. Both formal and informal cooptation are associated with a defense, but "the process of informal cooptation represents a mechanism of comprehensive adjustment, permitting a formal organization to enhance its chances for survival by accommodating itself to existing centers of interest and power within its area of operation."⁹⁸ The concept cooptation will be more extensively analyzed under systemic linkage where it properly belongs.

Imperatives two, three, and four do not have a characteristic or relatively distinct defense associated with them. However, two and four are often associated with the problems of autonomy for leadership decision making.

⁹⁷Selznick, "Foundations . . .," op. cit., p. 29.

⁹⁸Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 217.

More specifically, the communists keep very tight control over policy formation, so this requires very careful selection and recruitment of leadership. The incumbent leadership becomes responsible for introducing change into the organization. "Elections become administrative devices . . . because their slate is based on a technical evaluation of the relative merits of individuals . . . political examinations and review of their activities (becomes) the basis for the election. . . . Under such conditions elections become equivalent to promotions rather than political contests. The name for this administrative way of selecting new leaders is co-option."⁹⁹

Stability of the informal relations are ordered in the cadre by intentionally making the groups small. This factor of size, the explicit denial of the right to organize opposition, and emphasis on self-criticism tends to keep the formation of an informal structure from being realized.¹⁰⁰ However, in less totalitarian organizations the informal structure serves to fill certain needs and maintain informal boundaries. In the Bank Wiring Room, the emergent structure functioned to: (1) maintain the cohesiveness in formal organization through regulating the willingness to serve and the stability of objective authority; and

⁹⁹Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 31.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 33.

(2) maintain the feeling of personal integrity, of self-respect, and of independent choice. In asserting its control over the conditions of the job, the informal group is able to protect itself from outside interference; they exhibit strong resistance to change.

The fifth imperative is generally associated with the function of ideology for the membership and leadership group. In the case of the Communist Party and the Tennessee Valley Authority, ideology facilitated the identification of the in-group and sustained the interaction pattern. By strengthening the sentiment bonds internally, penetration from the outside becomes more difficult for "indeed, the communists have decreased their vulnerability by increasing their ability to reserve the use of Marxist cliches to inner circles."¹⁰¹

There is an inherent risk involved when cadre members penetrate or infiltrate target groups through systemic linkage as discussed below, for that member may place the interests of the target group above those of the party itself. "To build and sustain the system requires a heavy emphasis on the withdrawal of members from society and upon ultimate doctrinal purity; at the same time the member must be deployed in the political arena."¹⁰²

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 40.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. xiii

Systemic linkage.--Selznick utilizes a method by which he views the organization as a relatively autonomous system which seeks to adapt to its field of operations. But to achieve its own peculiar ends, the organization must link with other systems while still maintaining its identity and boundary. He refers to the linkage of systems for mutual benefit as a partnership with other institutions, or a cooperative venture.¹⁰³ It would not be inaccurate to state that the growth and development of the Communist Party and the Tennessee Valley Authority has rested crucially upon the success of linking systematically with other systems.

When two groups cooperate, communication between them is greatly increased. The boundaries of group membership may become obscure, and leaders may be called upon to justify the independent existence of their organizations. If pressure is generated for the amalgamation of groups, it may threaten the vested interests of the leaders as well as the long-run aims each group represents.¹⁰⁴

This cooperation with other organizations (here referred to as systemic linkage) is a field of administrative action fraught with policy implications. Cooperation with other institutions is much the same as cooperation with other individuals in that both require latent commitments and bonds. Commitment and dependence is inherent in systemic linkage and so represent potential sources of

¹⁰³ Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 34.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 34-35.

unanticipated consequences. They also represent an effective and controlling environment of decision so the reflective and self-conscious leadership must ask, "Cooperation for what and with whom and at what price?"

"The special problem of leadership posed to Leninism is that of joining a revolutionary elite to the social forces which it hopes will carry it to power. This relationship must (1) hold the leadership group together and (2) bind it firmly to the mass."¹⁰⁵ They seek to establish initial positions in groups which offer a base for expanding operations. These are used to gain greater conquests of power until the control of the social apparatus of a society is secured. Thus, the growth and development of the Communist Party comes by the process of systemic linkage through the strategic infiltration of front groups and indoctrination of key influentials.

Despite radical external changes--even to the extent of formal liquidation by merger with some larger political group--the cadre group will maintain its existence, retaining the main elements of Leninist organization. The party simply assumes the form of a progressive group within the larger organization, with its own national committee, educational apparatus, literature, and devices of penetration and control.¹⁰⁶

But there has been an inherent tension or dilemma in the history of the Communist Party as mentioned under

¹⁰⁵ Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 81.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 46.

boundary maintenance. The dilemma is one of following a policy between: (1) excessive isolation, i.e., no linkage to other systems; and (2) liquidation, i.e., in linking to the other systems, they become amalgamated or absorbed, losing their own identity and membership. The problem is one of maintaining a strong psychological boundary while also linking to other systems with the ultimate aim of controlling and mobilizing their membership, i.e., absorbing and mobilizing others without being engulfed or dissolved yourself.

The leadership of the TVA used a very different mechanism for gaining control. They established a democratic partnership with the people's institutions.

The Authority had to adapt itself not so much to the people in general as to the actually existing institutions which have the power to smooth or block its way. It therefore becomes ideologically convenient to fall in with the general practice in the area of identifying the existing agencies with the people, and permitting de facto leadership in the region to be its own stamp of legitimacy.¹⁰⁷

Thus the TVA sought to gain the consent of the people through the existing leadership just as the cadre group did. The crucial difference is that the TVA leadership extended its boundary, made concessions, and included potential threats into its decision-making body to avert possible destruction or danger.

¹⁰⁷ Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 61.

Leninists reach out to restructure their environment by creating new centers of power which may serve to increase the utility of the combat party. The party does not merely link itself to the masses, but in a significant sense creates them. It does so by establishing organs of access and control which transform a diffuse population into a mobilizable source of power.¹⁰⁸

This process of absorbing new elements into the leadership group or policy making group to avert possible destruction is called cooptation. These elements or systems which represent a potential threat are drawn within the boundaries of the system in an attempt to gain loyalty, exploit their power, and utilize their efforts to drain off their potential threat to the actualization of the organizational goals.

Cooptation as a mechanism can take two basic forms: (1) "formal cooptation, when there is a need to establish the legitimacy of authority or the administrative accessibility of the relevant public; and (2) informal cooptation, when there is a need of adjustment to the pressure of specific centers of power within the community."¹⁰⁹ Thus, the policy of "grass roots" represents a self-conscious ideology which seeks to keep an adaptive policy so that a power structure doesn't represent a vestigial relic, devoid of support or meaning.

In summary, cooptation is a boundary maintaining device as well as facilitating systemic linkage. It

¹⁰⁸Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 114.

¹⁰⁹Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 259.

represents an attempt to gain the opposition's loyalty, exploit their power, and utilize their efforts to endanger or threaten the realization of organizational goals.

Institutionalization.--Under the topic of institutions, Selznick points to two related usages of the term. But he differentiates between the use of institution as organized group and institution as established practice or fixed procedure. The latter may be demonstrated in examples such as marriage, democracy, or the secret ballot. "In either case, the idea of institution suggests that the group or the practice has a special identity, which may mean that it has a peculiar capacity to do a certain kind of job, that it embodies a special set of values, or simply that it has had a significantly unique history."¹¹⁰ The focus here is mainly on institutions as organized groups but it must be pointed out that they become difficult to separate when found in formal organizations.

"By institutionalization we mean the development of orderly, stable, socially integrating forms and structures out of unstable, loosely patterned, or merely technical types of action."¹¹¹ These forms and structures arise out of four institutionalizing processes that perform important functions. The processes are: (1) formalization,

¹¹⁰Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. vi.

¹¹¹Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 250.

(2) self-maintenance and conservatism, (3) infusion with value, and (4) development of a distinctive social composition and social base.¹¹²

Selznick, much the same as Max Weber, has an interest in the routinization of the rationally, purposive organization. Both formalization and self-maintenance come very close to approximating the process of routinization of charisma. "A very familiar phase in the life-history of organization is the formalization of procedure. The participants are controlled by making supervision more routine and by externalizing discipline and incentive. Formalization reduces the number of leadership decisions required."¹¹³ But if the system becomes too closed to new and novel ideas, it tends to soon become ill-fitted.

The second process, self-maintenance and conservatism, is also very similar to the process of routinization. "The degree of institutionalization depends on how much leeway there is for personal and group interaction. The more precise an organization's goals, and the more specialized and technical its operations, the less opportunity will there be for social forces to affect its development."¹¹⁴ Any organization is subject to some degree of institutionalization, for functions are performed via position-holders

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 108.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 16.

of some kind. Thus, institutionalization is a matter of degree, not a matter of presence or absence.

The third process is explicit when he observes that "in its most significant meaning, to institutionalize is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand."¹¹⁵ As an organization becomes valued beyond its means of arriving at other ends and is valued in itself, it takes on a value, a self, a distinctive identity. This involves the taking on of values, ways of acting and believing that are deemed important for their own sake. There is ^aself-maintenance quality in the organization."¹¹⁶

The fourth and last process in institutionalization can be exhibited by the implications of six factors or elements in the social system which have their affect on the maintenance and change of policy decisions. They are: the assigned roles (status-roles), internal interest groups (sentiment), social stratification (rank), beliefs, participation (communication), and dependency (power). "When we say that policy is built into the social structure of an organization, we mean that official aims and methods are spontaneously protected or advanced . . . there is a balance of forces In order to provide support for a (different) policy, it may be necessary to alter the social structure."¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 17. ¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 21. ¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 100.

Inherent within the process of institutionalization is the factor of commitment. "Plans and programs reflect the freedom of technical or ideal choice, but organized action cannot escape involvement, a commitment to personnel or institutions or procedures which effectively qualifies the initial plan."¹¹⁸

But commitments become unruly in that they are unanalyzed aspects of behavior. They block change and adaptation to new situations. They are sources of unanticipated consequences so in the action system, there can be a concomitant latent activity.

The systematized commitments of an organization define its character. Day-to-day decisions relevant to the actual problems met in the translation of policy into action, creates precedents, alliances, effective symbols, and personal loyalties which transform the organization from a profane, manipulable instrument into something having a sacred status and thus resistant to treatment simply as a means to some external goal.¹¹⁹

However, as noted before, the organizational character is dynamic for the very commitments the system makes to procedures or systems on the outside, the image or identity of the organization changes. Also, internal stress and sentiment, when organized, creates "unwritten laws" and informal channels which over time become formalized and part of the formal structure. Thus the cycle of deviation

¹¹⁸ Selznick, "Foundations . . .," op. cit., p. 32.

¹¹⁹ Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., pp. 258-59.

and transformation begin on a new level under new conditions.

Socialization.--"The more esoteric the activities of the organization, the less it can rely on the general education provided by the community, the greater the need for internal orientation."¹²⁰

This statement summarizes much of Selznick's thinking in regard to the role that socialization plays in organizations. The concern here is with the organizational character or identity and its connection with recruitment and the social backgrounds of those recruited from the outside environment. The focus is on an internal-external model of a system adjusting and adapting to a setting. The character of the organization and the identity which it has is closely related to the consideration of socialization and its significance for recruitment and indoctrination of new organization members. Questions like, what type of organization can contend with personnel from heterogeneous backgrounds and how will they go about training these new recruits, become important.

Leadership plays a crucial role in defining the crucial values and mission of the organization. Further, "the leader as educator requires an ability to interpret the role and character of the enterprise, to perceive and

¹²⁰Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 36.

develop models for thought and behavior, and to find models of communication that will inculcate general rather than merely partial perspectives."¹²¹ The Communist Combat Party represents a different pattern in that the incumbent leadership is responsible for introducing change and selecting new leaders. Leadership is recruited only from within the organization. Promotions are based upon technical and selective evaluations designed to recruit leaders only after they have become socialized to the goals of the organization. This administrative device of selecting new leaders is called co-option. It is a security-oriented device to insure ideological purity and the maintenance of an elite leadership. Co-option is a boundary maintaining device which relies upon socialization of these potential leaders.¹²²

Organizations that are concerned with their identity and character will tend to be more selective in recruiting personnel. Voluntary organizations may not be as free to select discriminately because of their inability to command resources, to attract and command its membership. These organizations will then tend to be forced by circumstance to emphasize the reorientation and socialization of deviant and questionable personnel. "By purging and

¹²¹Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 150.

¹²²Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 31.

indoctrinating the captured organizations, the communists change them in a fundamental way; they destroy the role and the loyalties of these institutions while keeping them organizationally intact."¹²³

One of the signs of a healthy organization is its ability to effectively orient new members and readily discard those who cannot be adapted to the established outlook. The in-service training program is an attempt to provide that orientation in some organizations.

Socialization represents a crucial step in dealing with problems of creating a special identity and unifying an organization. It may also be involved when policy innovation or change are concerned. The steps usually included are: (1) selective recruiting, (2) indoctrination, and (3) the sharing of key experiences--especially internal conflict and other crises.

By building the institutional core, the membership can perform the essential task of indoctrinating newcomers along desired lines. They can provide some assurance that decision making will conform, in spirit as well as letter, to policies that may have to be formulated abstractly or vaguely.¹²⁴

Sometimes a policy or doctrine is meant for internal consumption or integration such as was the case of TVA's "grass roots" policy and often the Marxian doctrine for the Communists Cadre. It can also be used to instill a way of

¹²³Ibid., p. 261.

¹²⁴Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 106.

thinking and a set of attitudes at all levels to facilitate decentralization.

Decentralization requires a preparatory period of training in which leadership has the opportunity to influence deeply the ideas that guide decision making at lower levels. . . . More useful is the collaborative development of plans and policies by as many levels of the organization as possible, so that a unified view, or at least understanding of the controlling viewpoint, will be achieved. . . . This entails the participation of top leadership in low-echelon decisions and the participation of subordinate staff personnel in high-level planning.¹²⁵

Social control.--"Both positive and negative forms of social control are often found in the same group, particularly if it mobilizes as well as disciplines its members."¹²⁶ The Communist Party units do just this.

"The task-oriented primary group through positive forms of social control attempts to satisfy the needs of its members for affection, respect, and a sense of meaningful participation."¹²⁷

The case of the Communist Combat Party is a good example of a system using both positive and negative forms of social control. Initial control is gained through the insulation and absorption of the new member. Insulation is to such an extent that the member is isolated from personal friends, relatives and even enemies--all who might have

¹²⁵Ibid., pp. 114, 115.

¹²⁶Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 166.

¹²⁷Ibid.

a corrupting influence. "To place a group under the banner of communism is primarily an exercise in social control."¹²⁸

Absorption is accomplished through an exhausting number of activities. They are designed to consume all of the member's available time, demanding his entire span of attention. "This high pitch of involvement gives the member a sense of meaningful activity: he is made to feel that he is 'achieving' something, rather than passively waiting for the millennium."¹²⁹

Starting with insulation and absorption, the communists are able to increasingly subordinate the individual to the party and its leadership. But most organizations are not this demanding or seek to control the person so totally. Selznick notes the relationship between social organization and social control. "The individual gains much from his involvement in social organization, but he always pays a price. That price is the acceptance of restraints, of limitations on the freedom to act as he pleases."¹³⁰ This involvement entails dependency on others for satisfactions and etc.

¹²⁸ Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 101.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 27.

¹³⁰ Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 18.

Stable social relations always entail a degree of social control within them for the individual participant. The control becomes greater when these relations are organized to some common goal or end, as is implied in the preceding paragraph.

Many naive people believe that they are being courageous when they stand up against the world and incur the wrath of remote and impersonal enemies while accepting the warm sympathy and encouragement of their friends. In fact, of course, conformity is relative to the specific social environment of the individual.¹³¹

The more involved and related tend to be more controlled by these bonds of dependencies. Obversely, the uninvolved and independent are not held by and constrained by social relations. "Isolation is indeed one way of minimizing social control, but from the standpoint of personal well-being the loss of positive values must also be considered. Too much freedom can disorient the individual, and may rob his life of direction and meaning."¹³² Just as Durkheim argued that the more uninvolved were more likely to select suicide when depressed, the isolated and removed are relatively free of social control and social constraints. The isolated have fewer social bonds and dependencies and thus are more independent of the group's controlling effect.

¹³¹Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 240.

¹³²Broom and Selznick, op. cit., p. 19.

The Organizational Weapon concludes with a few comments on the vulnerability of institutional targets to the communists; it is closely related to this problem of social control. He argues that our society represents a mass, a homogeneous, amorphous and undifferentiated social group. The individual represents a product of social disintegration. "The symptoms are identifiable: wide-spread alienation, a general cultural leveling, the compulsive search for substitute sources of security, and susceptibility to propagandistic and organizational manipulation."¹³³

Selznick does assume that power and control are social, generated in the course of action. It would follow that organized action would command more power and control for it represents a collection of actors, organizing for a common goal or mission.

Conditions of Social Action

Territoriality.--The "Grass Roots" doctrine is a policy that calls for power to be geographically located within the locale or field in which operations are directed. The policy is directed toward bringing leadership to reside in the field of its operation so an understanding and a grasp of the needs will go into decision making. Selznick quotes de Tocqueville.

¹³³ Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 286.

Certain interests are common to all parts of a nation, such as the enactment of its general laws and the maintenance of its foreign relations. Other interests are peculiar to certain parts of the nation, such, for instance, as the business of the several townships. When the power that directs the former or general interests is concentrated in one place or in the same persons, it constitutes a centralized government. To concentrate, in like manner in one place the direction of the latter or local interests, constitutes what may be termed a centralized administration.¹³⁴

By contrast, the communists keep their groups confined within a small territory and the leadership within the groups. There is the attempt to make this small task group a primary group as well, isolating the membership from the outside. This isolation is enforced by their constitution as well as by the gross number of activities within the party which tends to absorb him. "The prohibition of personal contact with enemies of the party is a measure enforcing insulation from personal friends and relatives who might have a corrupting influence."¹³⁵

Time.--The approach utilized here is to view the system within a historical perspective, i.e., how does the organization develop through time. This historical approach helps to focus on the developmental problems that arise in different stages of the organization. This allows the isolation and treatment of characteristic problems that

¹³⁴Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 25.

¹³⁵Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., p. 27.

arise under different conditions and stages of development.

In the early stages of an organization, leadership is most important for many critical decisions must be made with regard to the selection of goals, values and organizational character or an identity itself. But then as leadership has had time to institutionalize procedures, values, and an identity, the organization is no longer so vulnerable. "There is a normal tendency in organizations to permit a loosening of formal central controls after the character of the organization has been established."¹³⁶ Control and power may be more widely dispersed once sufficient time has elapsed to develop an organizational character. He summarizes this position by stating: "Hence we shall expect that a relatively high degree of centralization will be required in the early stages of institutional development. Later, when homogeneity has been achieved, decentralization will be feasible without undue loss of control."¹³⁷

The factor of time as a condition of social action is utilized to great advantage by the communists to activate its membership and draw them into the "inner circle" of the party. "Absorption may be accomplished by organizational

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 65.

¹³⁷ Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 65.

measures. The most obvious is the sheer volume of activity. Meetings, demonstrations, literature distribution, and recruiting may easily consume all the member's available time, leaving little chance for thought beyond the moment (hence minimizing opportunities for disaffection), defining a way of life that will be relinquished only with difficulty, and creating an immediate social contact of party affairs commanding the individual's entire span of attention. At the same time, this high pitch of involvement gives the member a sense of meaningful activity: he is made to feel that he is 'achieving' something, rather than passively waiting for the millennium."¹³⁸

But in most formal systems or organizations, they become more formalized, valued, and its membership more conservative over time. New strivings, needs, and tensions emerge. The informal structure emerges spontaneously to control these conditions by modifying or undermining the formal goals of the system.

Size.--The condition of size is connected to the characteristic of the organization whether it be in emergent informal groups or bureaucratic patterns in formal organizations.

Selznick looks on expansion as a characteristic mode of response available to an organization under pressure

¹³⁸ Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . .,
op. cit., p. 27.

from within. These responses necessarily involve a transformation (in this case, size) of some structural aspect of the organization. But there are other reasons why organizations may expand--"the availability of markets, legislative delegations, the swing of opinion--all may be accidental from the point of view of the organizational process."¹³⁹

Another sense in which Selznick uses size is in terms of the number of members at the different levels of commitment and involvement in the organization and its aims. He notes that the elite of an organization--those that are totally committed may constitute no more than one-tenth of a large party. These are the crucial leaders who mobilize and manipulate the membership. "Unless a group is susceptible to manipulation, at least after some preparation, it does not qualify for the distinction of being part of the masses. It follows that it is not the number which defines a mass, although the larger a group the more likely it is to be susceptible to manipulation."¹⁴⁰

The factor of the size of the organization and its units, condition the surroundings for the emergence of informal groups. This is implicit in Selznick but generally, the larger the units, the greater the chance of sub-groups forming. Quoting A. Rossi in A Communist Party in Action

¹³⁹Selznick, "Foundations . . .," op. cit., p. 33.

¹⁴⁰Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: . . ., op. cit., 83.

used by Selznick, he says, "An organizational structure based on groups of three lends itself to the selection and training of new leaders, if only because it multiplies posts of responsibility."¹⁴¹ Small groups are not good conditions for sub-groups to emerge so the Communist Party is also able to guard against formal goals and programs being modified or deflected by the emergence of informal groups. The communication channel lines are short, again guarding against distortion.

¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 27.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL CHANGE AND INTERNAL-EXTERNAL ACTIVITY

Selznick does not explicitly spell out a theory of social change but he argues that "a proper understanding of the organizational process must make it possible to interpret changes in the formal system."¹⁴² He analyzes social change within the structural-functional method, utilizing the internal-external "logic of interpretation." Patterned and variable activity is related to a system of needs and mechanisms. This activity that is isolated, characterizes a distinctness or unique capacity of the system. But every system exists within an environment of other systems which may compete, cooperate, or undermine the organization in question. Thus there are inner and outer tensions from which the conditions for change may arise.

The structural-functional approach is essentially an equilibrium model with an implicit assumption that the disequilibrium state or tension has motivational properties for change, i.e., this state is uncomfortable so measures are taken to correct this tension and establish a new

¹⁴²Selznick, "Foundations . . .," op. cit., p. 27.

balance. Change is viewed within a structural framework. "The adaptation is dynamic in the sense that the utilization of self-defensive mechanisms results in structural transformations of the organization itself."¹⁴³

The sources of social change may arise both within and outside of the organization. It may result from long-term plans and goals, initially unplanned, or completely unanticipated consequences. In any case, the conditions, circumstances and situation must be ultimately institutionalized before change can be legally, structurally, or formally acknowledged. Changes are realized within the structural framework.

The first source of social change may come from self-conscious leadership. "It is the function of the leader-statesman--whether of a nation or a private association--to define the ends of group existence, to design an enterprise distinctively adapted to these ends, and to see that that design becomes a living reality."¹⁴⁴ Cooperation with other groups may threaten the independence and the ability to realize those ends or goals which are initially set. Cooperation or incorporation of powerful elements that operate within the field of operations may

¹⁴³ Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 252.

¹⁴⁴ Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 37.

deflect or modify the formal goals as was the case with TVA and the Agriculturalists. Thus, change can be forced upon a system by forces external to it or even to elements from the outside which have been incorporated, i.e., coopted.

No organization subsists in a vacuum. . . . It must pay some heed to the consequences of its own activities (and even existence) for other groups and forces exist in the community. These forces will insist upon an accounting, and may in self-defense demand a share in the determination of policy. Because of this outside pressure from many varied sources, the attention of any organization must be turned outward, in defending the organization against possible encroachment or attack.¹⁴⁵

The leadership is not the only source of change. It merely represents the formal and legal side of the organization. Selznick focuses on the latent structure or the informal and motivational side of the organization. Rigid rules and procedures tend to break down when individuals respond to each other outside of formal prescribed roles. Operating and working rules tend to replace the formal rules and prescriptions. These modifications may arise out of the system as a whole or from different segments and parts of the organization. Discontent, aggressions, and the search for security may be the basis around which sub-groups within the organization emerge to control the conditions in which they find themselves. A latent structure

¹⁴⁵Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

emerges which is designed to manage the tension and sentiment of its membership. The new sub-system seeks to create an informal "structure," controlling and modifying the formal system of rules and legal procedures. Eventually this latent structure becomes the legal or formal system through the process of institutionalization of formal acknowledgement and acceptance, thus removing it from the realm of the subversive and idiosyncratic. This also changes or modifies the function of this system.

Even though the method is basically a structural approach, the emphasis here is on process. The elements within the system are important but stress is given to operations and actual practice. The point is made that much theory is an ideal or a constructed type such as the Weberian conception of bureaucracy, but the actual working system of real people in process is quite different. Selznick places the emphasis on the adaptive actual working system.

The formal organization is analyzed as a natural system in an environment with internal and external social pressures. In this way he emphasized the adaptive change and evolution of organizational forms and practices, not as a structural entity per se, but as a system of cooperative individuals adapting to the conditions in which they find themselves.

Adaptation is an activity which can be directed to internal or external stresses. To understand adaptation

and social change within the formal organization, there must be a study of: the development of administrative ideologies as conscious and unconscious devices of communication and self-defense; the creation and protection of elites, their training, and maintenance of policy; and the emergence of contending interest-groups, as they bid for dominant influence.¹⁴⁶ Thus, the understanding of an organization with its inherent tensions and adaptations to these areas of stress must be gained by an assessment of latent commitments, latent structures, and latent functions.

Internal-External Logic of Interpretation

The type of logic and method utilized by Selznick calls for a discussion of internal-external activity which is patterned differentially within the formal organization. The organization is viewed as a relatively autonomous system with internal and external stresses. This model is utilized to understand and predict the outcomes that the system will undergo. However, it should be pointed out that Selznick does not explicitly use the term pattern differentiation; but both utilize the "natural system" approach with an internal-external logic of interpretation. With Parsons, the organization is viewed as an adaptive and economic system with patterns of activity, differentiated

¹⁴⁶ Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

in terms of internally and externally directed patterns of activity. But because of the sentiment and non-rational elements in the formal organization, the most economical and rational avenues are not always taken. Because of this, Selznick prefers to view the formal organization as a cooperative system.

External patterns are defined by Loomis as that type "of interaction which displays the relations necessary for the group's adjustment to its environment and for the attainment of its goals."¹⁴⁷ The elements most importantly associated with the external patterns are: achieving with end, goal or objective as elements and goal-attaining activity as process; and controlling with power as an element and decision making and its initiation into action as process. This pattern tends to be instrumental and rational, but the leadership articulates both the external and internal pattern on occasions. "In the manifesting of the external pattern, tension must be managed, sanctions applied, facilities used, status-roles allocated, and action whether technical or political tends to be based upon rationally effective cognitive mapping and validation."¹⁴⁸

The internal pattern is defined as that "pattern of interaction which consists of those relations that focus

¹⁴⁷Loomis, op. cit., p. 40.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., p. 41.

upon the expression of sentiments of system members toward one another."¹⁴⁹ The primary emphasis here is on feeling with sentiment as an element and communication of sentiment as process.

Selznick gives extensive and explicit attention to internal-external functions. Every formal structure is a legal system. This rational, externally directed, purposive tool is used to mobilize energies toward set aims and goals. But the emphasis and interest is on the internal psychological or non-rational side of the organization as it reinterprets and changes the formal structure. The emphasis is on the emergent informal group deflecting or modifying the initial aims of the organization. Parsons would treat these emergent groups inside the system as internal-instrumental patterns, maintaining boundaries around organized sentiments, which are seeking to control the conditions which surround them. This is exemplified in the case of the Bank Wiring Room Study and Barnard's findings of the official's activity in the bureaucracy. Both represent cases of an informal structure arising to control the conditions of their existence within the formal organization.

The leader's function is to set the goals and see that they are realized. The elements of goal and power with their respective articulating processes, goal attaining

¹⁴⁹Ibid., p. 42.

activity, decision making and its initiation into action is the externally directed activity. This function of leadership is to define the mission of the organization and the means or procedure that will be selected to realize that goal. But "the pursuit of goals which initiated action demands continuous effort to control the instruments it has generated."¹⁵⁰ Effective leadership does not deal just with the external goal for "in defining the mission of the organization, leaders must take account of (1) the internal state of the polity: the strivings, inhibitions and competences that exist within the organization; and (2) the external expectations that determine what must be sought or achieved if the institution is to survive."¹⁵¹ In short, effective leadership must be cognizant of both internal and external conditions.

But Selznick views the path that leadership must take as a precarious one; they are faced with a dilemma. "Leadership, by the very nature of its position, is committed to two conflicting goals: if it ignores the need for participation, the goal of cooperation may be jeopardized; if participation is allowed to go too far, the continuity of leadership and policy may be threatened."¹⁵² Leadership

¹⁵⁰ Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 258.

¹⁵¹ Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 67.

¹⁵² Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 261.

needs consent to stay in office. This calls for some compromise or cooperation as developed above. But if there is too much sharing of power and decision making, the organization loses its identity and capacity to defend itself against outside attacks. The capacity to attain the ends and external rewards is greatly decreased. Selznick argues, "Authority is always embodied in a particular structure and leadership, but social power itself has to do with subjective and objective factors which control the loyalties and potential manipulability of the community. Where the formal authority or leadership reflects real social power, its stability is assured. On the other hand, when it becomes divorced from the sources of social power its continued existence is threatened. This threat may arise from the sheer alienation of sentiment. Where a leadership has been accustomed to the assumption that its constituents respond to it as individuals, there may be a rude awakening when organization of those constituents creates nucleuses of strength which are able to effectively demand a sharing of power."¹⁵³

Leadership then must win the consent of those he leads and channel these sentiments toward the ends of the organization. "Human relations are a great reservoir of energy. They may be directed in constructive ways toward

¹⁵³Ibid., p. 15.

desired ends or they may become recalcitrant sources of frustration. One objective of sound management practice is to direct and control these internal social pressures."¹⁵⁴ Thus leadership sets goals and expends its energy toward externally directed activities, but he builds these goals with the consent of internal sentiments.

But threats to the leadership and the continuity of policy do not arise just internally. "Institutional commitments also include such externally set goals as must be accepted if significant deprivations are to be avoided. These commitments arise wherever a specific payoff is externally demanded and can be enforced."¹⁵⁵ A specific example is the TVA having to share some of its critical decision making powers to be able to adapt and gain access into its field of operations. Selznick argues that this "grass roots" ideology was functional to helping the TVA adapt and adjust to the valley operation. Using Parsons' concepts it represented an external-instrumental pattern.

Sometimes this instrumental pattern can be directed internally in the activity of both official as well as the small worker groups such as the Bank Wiring Room group. Selznick points to the findings of C. I. Barnard in his study of executives. The executives within the bureaucracy

¹⁵⁴Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 8.

¹⁵⁵Ibid., p. 72.

solved their problems through the informal structure. This emergent structure served to provide its members with a channel of communication above and below, maintenance of organizational cohesiveness, and maintenance of personal integrity. This activity represented attempts to maintain boundaries, manage tension or control the existential conditions within the bureaucracy. In short, the activity was directed to adapting and controlling the conditions in which they found themselves.

"Actions are taken, policies adopted, with an eye more to the effect of the action or policy on the power-relations inside the organization than to the achievement of its professed goals. . . . Bureaucratization is in a sense the process of transforming this set of procedures from a minor aspect of organization into a leading consideration in the behavior of the leadership."¹⁵⁶ Thus internally adaptive activity can be directed to preserve and maintain sub-system or even individual interest as opposed to the support and integration of the whole as Parsons' discription is in the case of internal consummatory activity.

"The bureaucrats, like every other social type with a power-position to maintain, constructs an ideology peculiar to their social position. . . . The leadership creates the ideology of the 'collective submission to the

¹⁵⁶Selznick, "An Approach . . .," op. cit., p. 53.

collective will."¹⁵⁷ The existing leadership tends to be conservative, justifying the maintenance of the existing conditions; they tend to adopt the ideology of centralization if in power, while those out of office tend to call for autonomy.

In summary then, Selznick would analyze the system in terms of the internal and external states of the organization. There will be internally directed patterns of activity which seek to handle the inherent needs and tensions as well as integrate and strengthen sentiment within the system. There will be externally directed patterns of activity which seek to resolve the tensions and dilemmas between the needs for sound organization policy and the problems involved in adapting to an external environment. Thus any system of formal organization will be "molded by forces tangential to (its) rationally structured and stated goals."¹⁵⁸ The organization is a resultant of complex forces which no simple formula can explain. The problem is one of selecting tools to illuminate our analysis for a more penetrating understanding.

Conclusions

The preceding pages have been directed toward gaining an understanding of Selznick's organizational theory. His

¹⁵⁷Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁵⁸Selznick, TVA at the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 251.

formulation is a challenging analysis of both the formal and informal levels of large-scale organization. The analysis includes an unusual blend of psychological, ideological, and organizational elements. This is the area which reflects Selznick's interest in the motivational and nonrational aspects of the formal system. This relationship between the two structures is the central theme of his work and his use of the term "organizational paradox" describes this conceptualization.

Selznick's concern with the "organizational paradox" within the formal system and its implication for democratic planning centers on the interaction theme of the formal and informal structures. He is saying that conflict is inevitable. But it is out of the external pressures and the internal problems between the legal structure and the "emergent structure that is in the process of becoming," in which the organization changes and adapts.

Like all conservative or pessimistic criticism, such a statement of inherent problems seems to cast doubt upon the possibility of complete democratic achievement. It does cast such a doubt. The alternative, however, is the transformation of democracy into a utopian notion which, unaware of its internal dangers, is unarmed to meet them.¹⁵⁹

Selznick must be credited for isolating those factors which contribute to the paradox and for presenting them in a systematic and integrated analysis. His analysis of possible ways of adapting to conflicts stemming from

¹⁵⁹Ibid., p. 265.

sources external to the organization provide ways of compromising without losing sight of ultimate goals. The student of society reflects his concern here as a student in society. The stress is on cooperative systems which adapt to existential conditions during the process of attaining goals.

In conclusion, the insight, rigor, and close analysis required in using this model forces a growth and a sophistication that allows the student to measure his development. This requires clear conceptualization, thorough understanding, and an ability to reformulate and reconceptualize a set of propositions into a new framework. It is part of the training required for the formulation of good research questions and the organization of thoughts. This reward of intellectual growth within the discipline marks a significant point of development.

The use of the PAS Model has greatly helped the realization of the writer's goal. He has achieved a much greater clarity and order in the organization theory of Professor Selznick. The point-by-point comparison with the PAS Model categories demanded a clear understanding of Selznick's theory. But in this process of standardizing, it required a tearing down into parts and then a reconstruction, or synthesis. The segmentalization or compartmentalization destroyed the original empirical wholeness or uniqueness of his theory, but much of this is needed

to commit it to a consensual chart of elements and processes.

Again, it must be stressed that a theorist cannot be completely understood simply by adding up the sum of the parts, for the original empirical "wholeness" is destroyed in the recombination and rearrangement of the model to create a new theoretical order and transition. It is this writer's opinion that the PAS Model, by its inherent weakness in destroying the original theoretical order and conceptual arrangement, is most useful for the person actually doing the "PASing." It becomes difficult to conceptualize and grasp a working understanding just from reading a theory within the PAS Model. Hopefully a person "PASing" theoretical systems might gain a workable grasp of sociological theories of varying scope within the field to synthesize and make orderly the principles by formulating a new, more general theory arising out of these consensual categories.

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