THE MAKlNiG or THE CIRCULAR mores: THE UNITED STATES IN THE 30m. REBELMON Thesis for the Degree of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSiTY Linda Marie Madson 19:66 mumHymnWWW“mum [@3322 | University THE MAKING OF THE CIRCULAR NOTES: THE UNITED STATES IN THE BOXER REBELLION by Linda Marie Madson Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts 1966 APPROVAL SHEET Title of Thesis: The Making of the Circular Note: The United States in the Boxer Rebellion Name of Candidate: Linda Merie Hadson Master of Arts, 1966 2% £2 6/ Thesis Approved: ; ‘ Dr. Paul A. Va g Professor of History Impartment of History Date Approved: February 1966 -i- TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Chapter I. THE BOXER REBELLION: ORIGIN AND NATURE II. THE CHINESE RESPONSE III. THE AMERICAN RESPONSE IV. THE MAKING OF THE CIRCUIAR NOTE V. CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY -11- Page N 14 29 66 73 , ‘ ‘FM I. -u‘V-d R; ‘5 ' Y" 5.4 V *L NTRODUCTION At the turn of the century the United States was actively involved in the crisis within the Chinese civilization. Forces and circumstances coalesced with personalities during this period to pro- voke two momentous diplomatic declarations which formed until 1949 the basis of the United States policy toward China. The Sine-Japanese War, 1894-1895, had dispelled the myth of China's military strength, initiating a move among the European Powers to carve from China national Spheres of influence. To this scramble for concessions the Uhited States had reaponded with the Open Door Notes, September 6, 1899, which aimed at preventing the partition of China. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900, which renewed the threat to China's sovereignty by creating a situation that demanded foreign intervention, occasioned the Circular Note of July 3, 1900, that completed the "Open Door Policy." The July 3rd Circular with its promise to uphold the "territorial and administrative integrity of China" was more than an effort to secure economic Opportunity in China by crystallizing the tenuous modus vivendi achieved in the first Open Door Notes. It was a necessary response on the part of both Americans and Chinese, entailed.mutual reSponsibilities and benefits, to the Boxer crisis which threatened the lives and property of American citizens and China's integrity. Moreover, the U.S. Consular despatches suggest that the Circular Note originated not in washington D. C. under the guidance of Secretary of State, John Hay, but with the United States Consul-General, John Goodnow, on—the-scene in Shanghai, China. The evidence further suggests that the Circular Note was the result not of American but of Chinese initiative. -1- CHAPTER I THE BOXER REBELLION: ORIGIN AND NATURE The violently anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion of 1900, which served as the catalytic agent in the making of the Circular Note, capped a decade of sporadic attacks against native Christians and foreigners.1 Confined for the most part to the northern provinces of Shantung, Chihli,and Shansi, the Boxer attacks began in earnest late in 1899 and reached the explosive point in late June, 1900, with the siege of the foreign legations in Peking. It raged.most fiercely until August 19, 1900, when an eight-nation allied army of approximately 19,000 soldiers under the nominal leadership of the German General von Waldersee lifted the siege. A combination of many factors, both domestic and foreign in nature, produced in 1900 a situation conducive to the Boxer Uprising. Prominent among these are the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895, and the consequent scramble for concessions indulged in by the Powers, the failure of the Reform Movement of 1898 and the subsequent reactionary jpolicy inaugurated by the Manchu Government, diplomatic and.military jpressure applied by the Powers, unenlightened missionary and merchant activity, an economic crisis produced by the impact of the west and the recent war, and, finally, natural catastrophes. Famine and floods between 1897 and 1900 aggravated the postnwar social unrest. A drought in the provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Shantung, g 1Paul A. varg, Missionaries. Chinese1gand Diplomats(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), pp. 38-47. -2- A i. and Honan in 1897, 1898, and 1899, and in the province of Chihli in 1899 and 1900 resulted in a famine. Then the Yellow River floodaig; m1- ling the already large number of homeless peasants.2 An economic crisis intensified the social restlessness. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895, which followed the tragic Sine- Japanese war, imposed a heavy indemnity on China. The impact of the West had already revealed China's economic backwardness, and the foreign nations had quickly taken advantage of the situation to realize their interests. In addition to the economic privileges enjoyed by foreign.merchants in China, the foreign governments held the balance of trade. According to historian Victor Purcell, the value of China's imports had increased be- tween 1869 and 1899 from.51 million taels to 264 million. China's once favorable balance of two million taels was now an unfavorable one of 69 million taels a year. The influx of foreign industries and capital had devastated the local Chinese manufactures and had increased unemployment.3 Lawlessness increased as the thousands of homeless and unemployed peasants resorted to banditry to earn a livelihood. To meet the reparation demands and settle the claims of foreign merchants and missionaries, the Nanchu Government raised taxes, further stimulating popular discontent with the government and resentment toward the foreigners.“ The missionaries, by interferring with the process of local Chinese law, constituted another disrupting factor. In diSputes which arose 'between Christian and non-Christian Chinese or between the converts of rival sects, the missionaries championed the cause of their own converts _~ ZVictor Purcell, The Boxer Uprising; A Background Study(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 177-78. 31mg. , p. 173. “Tyler Dennett, Ameriggns in Eastern Asia(New York: Barnes & Noble, 19,41) 9 P0 6500 .1. o - NW The tag --Y— and pressured the local authorities to settle the issue in their favor.5 They prohibited their Chinese converts from participating in and supporting through taxes the community festivals and ceremonies which to them seemed idolatrous.6 Besides refusing to conform with Chinese custom and law, the missionaries distinguished themselves in numerous other ways. They preferred living in.missionary compounds to life among the Chinese and maintained their own customs, dress, food, and.manners.7 Even more incomprehensible to the Chinese was the nature of the Christian gospel. Man, not God, was the center of the Chinese universe. The Christian doctrines of salvation and.damnation were, therefore, mean- ingless to the Chinese.8 He could not accept the idea that the mission- aries had travelled so great a distance to save the Chinese soul. Missionary aggressiveness which utilized.its governmental representatives to force the opening of the Empire to evangelization 9 buttressed what seemed to the Chinese the more reasonable truth that the missionaries were in actuality the political agents of the foreign governments.10 Another factor reSponsible for the anti-foreign Boxer attacks was the political and.military'pressure applied by the Powers on the Manchu Government.11 By supporting the Reform Movement of 1898 the foreign nations had aroused the suspicion of the Manchu Court.ih They had 5Purcell, pp. 132-34. 6Varg, p. 33. 73214., pp. 314-35. 8Purcell, pp. 126-27. 9Dennett, p. 563. love-1'89 P0 1+1. 11George Nye Steiger, The Qgigig and ngelogment of the Boxer Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927). p. 281. frustrated the Empress Dowager's attempt to dethrone the Emperor Kuang- Hsu by ignoring the appointment of P'u Chun as the Heir Apparent to the Throne.12 Constant foreign intervention on behalf of the economic and religious interests of their respective nationals further aroused the government's enmity. The tax increases necessitated by the reparation demands and incessant settlement claims and the religious, economic and socia1.privileges which accrued to the foreigner through the "extra- territorial" rights obtained in the unequal treaties aroused a Chinese hatred for everything foreign.l3 As a result of foreign intervention the Manchu Government had lost face in the eyes of the people who blamed it for the disturbing fereign presence and the distressing social conditional"+ Military pressure from the Powers in the winter and Spring of 1900 caused the Manchu Government to suSpect that the foreign governments planned the immediate partition of China. The detachment of legation guards to Peking from.Tientsin on January 25, 1900, and again on May 2815 and Admiral Seymour's expedition of JUne 10 ordered by the foreign governments despite the protests of the Thungli Yemen, contributed to the actual Boxer outbreak and the success of the pro-Boxer policy forwarded by the reactionary'party at the Imperial Court.16 The continued.presence of the foreign gunboats on the rivers and along the coast kept alive the 12Chester Tan, The nge; Qgtastrgphe(New'York: Columbia university Press, 1955), pp. 56-57; Arthur W. Hummel, ed., Eminent Chinesg of the fimfiing42grigd(2 vols., washington: United States Government Printing 0ffice,_19#3), I, 394. 13Dennett, pp. 650, 652. l”Steiger, pp. 198, 202; Dennett, pp. 650-652. 15 lélhid., p. 75; Steiger, p. 233. Tan, p. 63. Chinese fear of an imminent invasion and partition of the Empire.17 However, the immediate cause of the explosive situation was the threatened partition of China. The Sine-Japanese War and the humiliating Peace of Shimonoseki had revealed China's military weakness and thereby encouraged the foreign powers to demand territorial and economic conces- sions from China. The murder of two German Catholic missionaries by Chinese bandits in November 1897 provided Germany with an excuse to appropriate Kiaochow Bay, including the port of Tsingtao as a naval base together with economic privileges in the form of railroad and mining rights. In 1898 Russia leased for twentyhfive years the southern tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and Talienwan. England achieved Chinese recognition of the Yangtse Valley as her Sphere of in- fluence, leases on Wei-hai-wei and Kowloon as well as approximately 2,800 miles in railroad concessions. In 1895 France received mining privileges in the provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung. Railway rights fol- lowed in 1896 and in 1898 France leased for 99 years the bay of Kwang-chou.18 The carving of China into spheres of influence and leaseholds strengthened the Chinese hatred for the foreigners. The humiliation experienced by the Chinese was doubly frustrating because of the recent failure of efforts at reform and modernization. To a group of concerned young Chinese intellectuals the outcome of the Sine-Japanese war proved the impotence of the conservative reform.program, the "Self-Strengthening“ movement, which had dominated the scene from 1860 to 1899. Under the leadership of K'ang Yuvwei(1858-1927) and with the support of the Emperor Kuang-Hsu, a moderate program aimed at institutional reform was pursued 17Steiger, p. 234. 18paul H, Clyde The Ear gast(2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958), pp. 313-317. from June 11 to September 21, 1898. However, the forces of reaction proved too strong and on that date a coup d'etat, engineered by the Grand Secretary Jung-lu and the Governor of Shantung, Yuan Shih-k'ai, returned the Empress Dowager to the throne and brought to power the anti-foreign reactionary party whose policy prevailed and facilitated the Boxer Rebellion.19 Missionaries, diplomats, and merchants, who often charged one another with responsibility for the Boxer uprising and shifted among themselves the blame for the anti-foreign sentiments expressed by the Chinese, in the end concurred in attributing the Boxer Rebellion to the ferces of reaction.20 In his report to the State Department, the United States Consul,at Hankow, L. S. Wilcox, cited two factors as active causes of the Boxer uprising. One was the coup d'etat of September 21, 1898, which brought the pro-Boxer reactionary party to power. The other was the weak policy pursued by the Legations in view of the foregoing reality.21 However, to attribute the Boxer outbreak to the reactionary policy adopted by the Manchu Government reveals a certain lack of understanding on the part of those involved of the true nature of the crisis. The Boxer Rebellion was evidence of the severe economic, social, and political dis- location in the Chinese-civilization.22 China in 1900 was ready for a rebellion. It was, in fact, long over due. 19Tang Ssuryu and John K. Fairbank, ' a's e nse to the West: A W. 182.321.92.1(Cambridam Harvard University Press, 1951+). Fe 187. 20Purcell, p. 123. ZlU.S. Department of State, Consular Despatches, U, S, Consulate, Hankgw, (hereafter cited as USCD-H), L. S. Wilcox to David J. Hill, Oct. 4, 1900, e summary covering the period from June 1 to Oct. 4, 1900. 22Wolfgang Franke, Das Jahrhundert der ' esischen Rev utign._l§51; lflflgflMflnchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1958), p. 81. “a J I Q '- _ , , . o I. I I e . - a e " ' C .._ .. _ _ q_ . ‘ ‘ ‘ . ‘ - .,. t e e II I \ ’ A .w ' f . u I‘ S . I I I . a \ ‘ I u \' e . ~ ‘ | - \v . .. . 9- . _ . .UDI . ‘ ‘-‘-b - e. I e. u r I e _ e e . e » e r_ . '1 ' o- e y . . ~ '. . R ' 1’ -8- In an on-the-scene observation Sir Robert Hart wrote of the Boxer Rebellion that "this episode of today is not meaningless-it is the prelude to a century of change and the keynote of the future history of the Far East: The China of the year 2000 will be very different from the China of 1900!"23 Correct in his prephetic assessment of the im- plication of the Boxer Rebellion, Hart erred only when assigning it the position of a forerunner of change. For the Boxer Rebellion finds its meaning, for China and the world, as the midpoint in the century of the Chinese revolution which began with the Taiping Rebellion, 1850-1864, and ended in 1949 when.Mao Tse—tung proclaimed the Peeple's Republic of China.2# Composed largely of illiterate peasants, the Boxer Rebellion was a national uprising of both an anti-dynastic and an anti-foreign character.25 which had its origin in a secret organization known as the Boxer Society, or the "Ikho Ch'uan"("Boxers of’Right and Harmony").26 An expression of widespread.popular discontent with its roots deep in very real social, political, and economic disorders, the Boxer uprising was directed both against the missionaries who were the most numerous and who most immediately affected their lives? End against the Manchu dynasty'which the peasants blamed for the foreign encroachments and social disorder.28 An attempt at reform.from the bottom upward, in the 23Sir Robert Hart, The 59 Ego mth eLgnd of Singmflondon: Chapman 8.: Hall, 1901), p. “'9. 2“Agnes Smedley', ”The Social Revolution," in Ching, ed. by Harley FR thNair(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), p. 166. 2 5Purcell, pp. vii, 209, 223. 26Franke, p. 80. 27Purcell, pe 181+. 28Dennett, pp. 652-653. -9.- wake of the abortive Reform Movement of 1898, the Boxer Rebellion failed to achieve its objectives, according to Communist historians, because it lacked an ideology and program as well as a unified leadership.29 Although the foreigners did not record the existence of the Boxer Society until the spring of 1899,30 it had reappeared in the provinces of Shantung and Chihli in 1896 and had already came to the attention of the Throne in the summer of 1898.31 In July 1898, Chang Juemei, then Governor of Shantung, first reported the existence of a society whose members were practicing "boxing" in self-defense against the Christians.32 After an investigation, Chang identified the organi- zation as the secret "Ikho Ch'uan" (Boxer) society.33 That the Boxer society appeared first in Shantung province and in a violently anti-Christian form is significant. Shantung was the German sphere of influence. The German occupation was noted for its cruelty against the Chinese inhabitants and for its aggressive mission- ary activity. A coastal province, Shantung had a geographical proximity to the scene of the recent war with Japan. Its inhabitants were illit- erate and very superstitious. These characteristics in addition to the foreign aggression and frustration of war found the Chinese in Shantung province particularly prone to the appeal of the secret societies. 29Fx'anke, p. 81+. 3°Purcen, p. 180. 31mm, pp. 1+5, 52. 32Purcell, p. 196. 33121g., p. 194. t. -10- Historians differ as regards the nature and origin of the Boxer disturbance. The debate centers on the problem of whether the Boxer a society was primarily and essentially anti-Christian and anti-foreign or anti-dynastic. The distinction is a matter of importance on which the proper interpretation of the Boxer Rebellion depends. Historian George Nye Steiger declared that the Boxer society was not an ancient, secret organization but that it came into existence in 1898 as a lawful and loyal organ of the Manchu Government. It was in the beginning neither a revolutionary nor a heretical organization.3h Steiger bases his interpretation on the meaning of the phrase "IPho T'uan," the title which designated the Boxer society in 1900. The term "T'uan" means militia and according to Steiger the Boxers were a volunteer mi- litia grOUp, recruited in reaponse to the Empress Dowager's decree of November 5, 1898, which ordered the reorganization of the army.35 Foreign military pressure, in Steiger's opinion, accounted for the anti-foreign form it assumed-in 1900.36 In general, however, historians have based their interpretations of the Boxer society on the study of Lao Nai-hsuan(l8#3-l921). In 1898 Lao published his pamphlet, "Study on the Origin of the Boxers," in which he concluded that the Boxers were a heretical and rebellious sect, inti- mately associated with the secret societies.37 The I-ho Ch'uan has a complicated historical development. In outlining its genesis, historians have defined it as a conglomeration 34Tan, p. 38; Purcell, p. 187. 35Tan, pp. 38-A3. 36Steiger, p. 231+. 37Tan, p. 30. of secret sects, including among them the Red Fist Society, the Eight Diagram Sect and the Big Sword Society, which relate ultimately to the heretical White Lotus Society founded around 1133 by the monk mac TZu- yuan.38 The White Lotus society emerged as a distinct political or- ganization in 13h9 when it associated with the "Red Turban" Rebellion to overthrow the Mongol Yuan dynasty.39 It maintained an obscure exis- tence, practicing its magical rites in secret and making only Sporadic appearances in the course of Chinese history until it emerged in 1898 as the I-ho Ch'uan. By virtue of its organization, rules, ritual, and its Taoist element the I-ho Ch'uan was recognized as a secret society}+0 From Taoism came the physical and spiritual exercises known as "boxing" which gave the society its name.ul By practicing certain respiratory, gymnastic, sexual, dietary, and alchemical techniques, the Boxer became possessed by a spirit or god, attaining therein the ultimate Taoist goal, immortality (Hsien)-—of the physical body.42 The cult of invulnerability, a distin- guishing characteristic of the I-ho Ch'uan, derived from this Taoist idea of immortality.“3 Having attained "Hsien" the Boxer believed himself immune to foreign bullets, a belief which collapsed with the test of experience. 38Purce11, p. 1H8. 39mm. , I‘LOTan. pp. 38-39. ulPurcell, pp. 162-163. 1+2Ibid., pp. 6h, 237-38. “3mm. I" 9‘ To fully appreciate this characterization of the I-ho Ch'uan as a secret society it is necessary to understand the role such societies have played in Chinese history. Secret associations were common among the Chinese peasants from the earliest times and were, in fact, their "traditional mode of direct political action."44 Moved by economic, political, and social disorders, the peasants would prepare in secret for open rebellion. Placed thus in its proper context, the Boxer Rebellion clearly constituted a threat to established government. It was primarily and essentially anti-dynastic and, in 1900', also anti-foreign. Moreover, the Manchu official hierarchy recognized the society'for what it was and the reactionary party skillfully molded it into a movement to "cherish the dynaSty; exterminate the foreigners."u5 In his study of the Boxer Rebellion Victor Purcell sought to determine the point at which the society had abandoned its anti-dynastic program and adopted the slogan "CheriSh the Ch'ing; destroy the foreigners." The opportunity to strike an alliance with the Boxers presented itself to the court reactionaries in autumn of 1899. With their defeat at P'ingyuan in October, the surviving Boxers pushed the anti-dynastic, White Lotus, faction to the background. Believing it to be their only chance for success, the remaining sects adopted a pro-Nanchu.policy.#6 .After the setback at P'ingyuan the Boxers pledged their loyalty to the govern- ment and proclaimed their sole object to be the destruction of the quwen and Eleanor Lattimore, The flaking of Modegp China(New York: ‘W.'W. Norton, l94#), p. 122. “5H. F. NacNair and D. F. Lach, Modern Ear Eastern Ipternational Belatign§(2d ed.; Tbronto: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1955), p. 2&2. “6Puroo11, pp. 17, 265-266. foreigners and Christianity. Their plot to rebel against the dynasty became a secret known to only a few of the principal leaders.”7 The circumstantial alliance of 1899 between the Boxers and the reactionary party at the Imperial Court did not, however, mean that the Manchu Government had officially adopted a pro-Boxer, anti-foreign policy. That development occurred gradually after a struggle between rival factions in the court at Peking and as a result of foreign poli- tical and military pressure against the Manchu dynasty. 47Purcell, p. 2.10. CHAPTER II THE CHINESE RESPONSE The Manchu Government's ambiguous policy toward the Boxer Rebellion reflected a power struggle within the Imperial Court. Under the influence of the reactionary party and deSpite the protests of the moderate faction the Imperial Court adOpted the 'pro-Boxer, anti-foreign' policy which led to foreign military intervention. With the coup d'etat of September 21, 1898, engineered by the reaction- ary party, the "Hundred Days of Reform' ended; K'ang Yu-wei, the celebrated reformer, fled to Japan, Emperor Kuang-Hsu was imprisoned and the Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi returned to the Throne. Although the reactionary party was now in power, the Imperial Court launched a firm, but not anti-foreign, domestic policy.1 To raise the prestige of the Manchu Government in the eyes of the people and to render the pressure of the foreign governments less effective it inaugurated a program of military and administrative decentral- ization.2 Whfle not itself anti-foreign, the Court was, however, ambiguous in its attitude toward the anti-foreign Boxer Society, vacillating between suppress- ing and supporting their activities. With regard to the Boxers the Court pursued a policy of pacification. Although it had issued decrees ordering the local authorities to suppress the Boxers and to protect the Christians and foreigners, it often did little to enforce them.3 'x— 1Chester Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 60. 2George Nye Steiger, The Origin and DeveIOpment pf the Boxer Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), pp. 89-90, 99. 3 Tan, p. 60. -14- -15- Under the decisive influence of the reactionary party, the Court became increasingly pro-Boxer in its orientation. Yu Hsien, a violently anti- foreign official, had succeeded Chang Ju-mei in April, 1899, as Governor of Shantung and the Boxer Society had flourished in that province.4 Although the Court, under foreign pressure, removed Yu Hsien and appointed to the governorship Yuan Shih-k'ai who ruthlessly suppressed the Boxers in Shantung, it had not abandoned its pro-Boxer sympathy. For it ordered Yuan to be lenient, reappointed Yu Hsien as the Governor of Shansi, and issued a decree on January 12, 1900, in which it declared the existence of many kinds of societies, denied the true character of the Boxer Society, and permitted the peOple to join them for defense against the bandits.5 As a result of such measures the Boxer Society grew and Spread throughout the neighboring pro- vinces. The Imperial Court had earlier given evidence of its increasing pro- Boxer, anti-foreign sentiment. On November 21, 1899, the Empress Dowager issued a secret edict to the viceroys, governors, tartar generab, and pro- vincial authorities which clearly illustrated the direction the Imperial Court was taking. It had determined that the foreign intrusions into China must cease and was willing to wage war to achieve this end if necessary. With a warning to those officials who Opposed a militant policy and who had remained conciliatory in their relations with the Powers, it called for a ”united front , 6 against our aggressors." 4Ibid., pp. 48-49. 51bid., p. 54. 6U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating Lg the Foreign Relatigns 9f the United States, 1900 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), (hereafter cited as USFR), Hay to Conger, January 2, 1900, enclosure No. 2, pp. 84-85. -: -16- Thus by late autumn 1899 the Empress Dowager had seemingly been brought into the reactionary camp and endorsed their pro-Boxer and anti-foreign policy. The reactionary party, which was composed largely of Manchu officials and led by Prince Tuan and the two Grand Secretaries, Hsu T'ung and Kang-I, hated the foreigners for both personal and partisan reasons. Tzu Hsi and the reactionary officials believed the Reform Movement of 1898 to have been under foreign control and directed at destroying the Manchu dynasty.7 Particularly did the Empress Dowager and Prince Tuan resent foreign interference in internal affairs. For the foreign diplomats had blocked her attempt to dethrone the emperor and had frustrated Prince Tuan's attempt to install his own son, P'u Chun, who had been named the Heir Apparent, on the throne.8 Because they challenged the reactionary policy, the Han Chinese with some moderate Manchus in the Imperial Court also incurred the enmity of the reaction- ary party. Hsu T'ung, the most militantly anti-foreign among the reactionaries, said that "before we can hepe to drive these foreigners into the sea, we must exterminate one Dragon, two tigers, and thirteen sheep,"9 referring reSpectively to the Emperor Kuang Hsu, Jung-1n and Li Hung-Chang, and the Yangtse viceroys with the other moderates at Peking. Firmly believing it possible to expel the foreigners from China through a common effort, the reactionaries hated the above named for their refusal to contribute to a united front against the 7Tan, pp. 56-57. 8Arthur w. Hummel (ed.), Eminent Chinese g the Ch'ipg Period (1644-1912) (2 vols., Washington: United States Printing Office, 1943), I, 394. 9E. Backhouse and J.O.P. Bland, Annals and Memoirs 2; the Court 2; Peking (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914), p. 450. -17- foreign aggressors.10 The reactionary party had determined to exterminate the foreigners. In their Opinion, the Boxer disturbance afforded the ideal Opportunity to strengthen the Manchu dynasty in the eyes of both the peeple and the fOreign nations. They would divert this expression of pOpular discontent away from the dynasty and direct it against the foreigners whom they blamed for the diasters of China's recent eXperience.11 In its pro-Boxer, anti-foreign policy of late 1899 and early 1900 the Manchu Government reflected, then, the attitude of the reactionary party at Court. But, whereas the central governmental authorities moved steadily toward a pro-Boxer policy, the provincial officials and moderate members of the Court, believing it meant the ruin of China, urged the suppression of the Boxers. The Imperial Court had not unanimously favored a policy of supporting the Boxers and utilizing them to expel the foreigners from China. Some members of the Court at Peking Opposed this prOposal and sought to convince the government to suppress the Boxers in the best interests of China. In a joint memorial of June 1900, Hsu Ching-ch'eng, Senior Vice-president of the Board of Civil Office, and Yuan Ch'ang, Director of the Court of Sacrificial Worship, wrote "...that China [mus57 suppress the Boxers herself...to avoid having foreign soldiers help...in this suppression."12 To them it was a 10Chien Po-chan, et al. (ed.). Historical Materials relatipgutg the Boxer Rebellion (4 vols.; Shanghai: PeOple's Publishing House, 1961), (hereafter cited as HM), Chung-wai Daily, Shanghai, Nov. 2, 4, 5, 1900, IV, 209. 11Military Secretariat to Governors and Viceroys, June 26, 1900, HM, I, 187. _———-_- mentary Survey, 1839-1923 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 191. -l8- question of China's very survival. They pointed out that one nation could not successfully fight all the nations, and should the Boxers kill the diplomatic envoys the foreign powers would form an alliance ”to avenge them- selves to the death."13 During its reign of power the reactionary party executed the two ministers for these Opinions which challenged their policy. However, opposition continued. The Southern viceroys, concerned for the welfare of the south- eastern provinces, organized the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance, to save China from the consequences of the reactionary policy and the Boxer disturb- ance.14 Including also the Central viceroys, moderate members of the Court in Peking, the Governor of Shantung, Yuan Shih-k'ai, and the Grand Secretary Jung-lu,15 the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance was dominated by the Vice- roy of Hupeh and Hunan, Chang Chih-tung, and Viceroy of Liang-Kiang at Nanking, Liu Kun-yi, Viceroy of Liang-Kwang at Canton, Li Hung-Chang, and Sheng Hsuan-huai, the Director of Railroads and Telegraphs. To all intents and purposes the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance constituted a‘gg £3252 government during the Boxer Rebellion. The Southern viceroys took charge of governing the provinces outside the Boxer areas 17 and assumed reSponsibilities for the conduct of foreign relations as well. 13Ibid. 14Chung:wai Dail , Shanghai, November 2, 4, 5, 1900, "On the Situation after the Removal of the Government to Sian," HM, IV, 209. 15Controversy surrounds the role played by Jung-1n. See Hummel, I, 405-409 0 16John 3. Kelly, A Forgotten Conference: The Negotiations At Pekipg, 1900- 1901 (Geneve: Librairie E. Droz, 1963), p. 35. 17Tan, p. 35. -19- In addition they plied the Tsungli Yamen and the Imperial Court with telegrams and memorials in which they urged the suppression of the Boxers and the protection of the foreigners. The Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance Opposed the Boxer uprising on a clear understanding that the disturbance would bring foreign military inter- vention and result in the partition of China. A warning to that effect from Sir Robert Hart moved the Southern viceroys to action. On June 8 Hart had informed Sheng Hsuan-huai that if the situation failed to improve the foreign nations wouldcbfinitely combine forces and threaten China.18 Russian activity in the Yangse Valley a week later which threatened to end in an international conflict convinced the Southern viceroys of the need to act immediately in order to prevent the Powers from taking advantage of the Opportunity to occupy territory.19 As a consequence of Hart's warning and Russia's maneuvers, the Southern viceroys decided to memorialize the Throne, advocating that the Imperial Court take strong measures against the Boxers.2 In their numerous memorials to the Throne the Southern viceroys attempted to woo the Imperial Court away from the pro-Boxer reactionary policy to one of suppressing the Boxers. Government support of the Boxers, they maintained, would ruin China and destroy the Manchu dynasty. Chang Chih-tung, for example, argued that the Boxers while professing to exterminate the foreigners had in fact initiated a rebellion.21 18Sheng Hsuan-huai to Li Hung-Chang, June 9, 1900, HM, III, 325. 19Chang Chih-tung to Liu Kun-yi, June 18, 1900, BU, III, 327. 2OSheng Hsuan-huai to Li Hung-Chang, June 9, 1900, BU, III, 325. 21Tan, p. 65. to se he co: I n ‘R‘ W V.” a of the lit ca (‘11 :3: later [Entre- It W01; be ten 5€§uer Ia? ., II -20- The Southern viceroys continued throughout the period preceding the siege of Peking to argue that the situation created by the Boxers would bring foreign intervention and the partition of China and to urge the suppression of the Boxers. Chang Chih-tung cabled the Tsungli Yamen, point- ing out the dangers to China in the Boxer disturbance. "I fear," he wrote, "that the disturbance in the north will give the foreign nations an excuse to send in their trOOps."22 On the pretext of protecting their nationals, he continued, they would station troops along the railroad lines. As proof of foreign ambitions Chang cited the numerous earlier foreign requests to station trOOps along the road from Hankow to Hsin-yang. Should this occun he concluded, China was lost.23 Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung followed the latter's cable with a joint telegram to the Tsungli Yamen on June 15 urging the immediate suppression of the uprising as a step to prevent foreign intervention.24 At the same time Liu cabled Grand Secretary Jung-lu regarding the effect of killing the foreign diplomats would have on the world. In a meeting before the throne three days later Jung-lu pointed out that to harm the diplomatic representatives was contrary to international law and a great humiliation to the foreign nations. It would only unite the foreigners to seek revenge upon China. In that event, he concluded, China's defeat was a foregone conclusion with disastrous con- sequences to both China and the Manchus. 22Chang Chih-tung to the Tsungli Yamen, May 31, 1900, HD, I, 113. 23Ibid. 2Z'Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung to the Tsungli Yamen, June 15, 1900, HM, III, 326-327. 25Chin-Sam's Diary, HM, I, 48-49, -21- Despite their vociferous denunciations of the Boxer activities and their rational arguments against the reactionary policy, the Southern viceroys failed to influence the Imperial Court to suppress the Boxers and protect the foreigners. A series of four meetings between June 17 and June 20 signified the triumph of the reactionary party and resulted in the declaration of war against the Powers, leading finally to the siege of the foreign legations at Peking. June 17 to June 20 were critical days for the Court at Peking. On June 17 an outraged Empress Dowager summoned the Imperial Council before the Throne for an emergency meeting to determine the Throne's reply to a four- point memorandum presented by the Powers. The memorandum called for: first, a definite residence for the Chinese emperor; second, for the Powers to take over the collection of revenue in all provinces; third, for the Powers to assume command of China's military forces and, finally, that the Emperor Kuang Hsu be restored to power, which the Empress Dowager at the time declined to mention.26 Investigation has since proved the memorandum to be a forgery and a ruse devised by the reactionary party to induce the Empress Dowager to decide in favor of war against the Powers. However, at the time it was not questioned and proved effective in achieving their aim. Particularly was this true as regards the fourth point. The meeting of June 18 discussed the question of peace or war. By June 19 the Empress Dowager had decided on war and sent a despatch to the foreign ministers ordering them to leave Peking. Some of the ministers had desired to fight only France, since France dominated the missionary field, but these 26Hung Yu-ting, ”A true account on the Boxer Uprising," HM, I, 48-49- 4‘. :29. -22.. the Empress Dowager ignored.27 A war decree on June 20 ordering the pro- vincial authorities to support the Boxers and exterminate the foreigners closed the discussion.28 It is only fair to point out that foreign military operations in the meantime seemed to have been a decisive factor in the Court's final action. After the attack on Taku on June 17. the Imperial Court determined to main- tain China by war if necessary and in that event it would utilize the Boxers.29 However, other military activities also influenced the Court's decision. The 2,000 men expedition led by Admiral Sir E. H. Seymour which set out from Tientsin on June 10 for the Peking legations brought a protest on June 13 from the Manchu Government which considered the legation guards sufficient 30 to protect the foreigners. At the same time, the Court issued decrees to In Lu, Governor of Chili, and Generals Nieh and Lo, ordering them to resist the foreign advance. On June 18 Admiral Seymour's force clashed with the Boxers, with General Nieh Shin-ch'eng's31 Front Division and with General Tung Fu-hsiang’s Rear Division and after several days of fighting was defeated.32 On June 21, the same day the Imperial Court issued the edict declaring war against the Powers, 27Ibid., 49. 28Ibid. 29Tan. p. 75. BOSteiger, p. 234. 31 General Nieh Shih-ch'eng, who died in this battle, was actually against the Boxers. see Hummel, I, #07. 32Jerome, Ch'en, Yuan Shih-Kai, 1850-1916: Brutus Assumes Egg‘gggplg (Stanford: Stanford university Press, 19 l , p. 8. -23- it had received a memorial from In Lu, Governor of Chili, who painted a bright picture of the fighting around Tientsin.33 Undoubtedly this Boxer victory and the foreign military action were factors in the Court's decision to support the Boxers. In rationalizing its pro-Boxer, anti-foreign policy it cited the over-whelming strength of the Boxers and the aggression of the foreign nations.3u The Imperial Court had concluded that war with the foreign Powers was inevitable and righteous. On June 20, Prince Tuan issued the edict to the provincial authorities ordering them support the Boxers and exterminate the foreigners. Members of the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance then faced the decision of what attitude to take toward the war and what policy to pursue. They decided to straddle the fence. Ostensibly the viceroys obeyed the edict: in reality, however, they, still maintaining the futility of war, dissociated themselves from it. Ignoring the edict, they took measures to prevent the Boxer disturbance from spreading to the southeastern provinces and to protect the foreigners rather than harm them. Telegrams sent by these viceroys and governors which give an impression of supporting the war really illustrate their unwillingness to back the Central Government in its policy. For they are replete with apologetic excuses explaining why they could send neither troops nor provisions to aid the war effort in the north. In one such telegram Yuan Shih-k'ai pointed out that his first duty was to protect his province and explained, regretingly, that the defense of 33Tan, p. 75. 3“Military Secretariat to Governors and Viceroys, June 26, 1900, HD, I, 187. -24- Shantung prohibited sending the 3,000 soldiers as ordered by the Court. His force of 7,000, much smaller than that maintained in Chili. he said, was still inadequate for his needs. But, regardless of this fact, the troops would be useless for fighting: having been transferred back and forth from Shantung to Tientsin, they were practically exhausted and constituted no match for the Boxer attacks along the road.35 Similar memorials from Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung likewise pleaded that the defense of the southeast prohibited send- ing a detachment for Peking at that time.36 Convinced that the Boxer uprising would entail foreign military inter- vention and result in the partition of China, the Southern viceroys had formed the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance to save China from the consequences of the reactionary policy and the Boxer disturbance. After the outbreak of hostilities they continued to memorialize the Throne, urging the suppression of the Boxers. At the same time they negotiated with the Powers with the expressed purpose of preserving the territorial integrity of China.37 Main- taining the position that China was not at war with the foreign nations, the Southern viceroys sought primarily a truce so that the Chinese could suppress the Boxers and thereby forestall a foreign military advance against Tientsin and Peking. Meanwhile, should they fail to achieve that objective, they took measures to preserve the Southeast and negotiated with the Powers to confine the Boxer disturbance and foreign military operations to the north. 35ruan Shih-K'ai, memorial, June 28, 1900, HD, I, 198-199. 36Liu Kun-yi, memorial, June 26, 1900, HD, I, 190: Chang Chih-tung, memorial, July 21, 1900, HD, I, 357-358. 6 37Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, memorial, June 26, 1900, HM, III, 33 -337- -25- Not only did the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance dissociate itself from the war in the north but it endeavored also to free the Manchu Govern- ment from responsibility for the Boxer attacks against the foreigners. To preserve diplomatic relations with the Powers the Southern viceroys adopted the principle that the Boxer uprising was a rebellion against the legitimate authority of the Empress Dowager.38 Chang Chih-tung maintained that the current hostilities were the work of Prince Tuan and the reactionaries who had usurped the Imperial authority, not the desire of the Throne itself}9 On this premise Chang cabled the Chinese Ministers in London, TOkyo, and ‘washington instructing them to inform these governments that the Court was not anti-foreign and was taking steps to suppress the rebellion.)"0 The Southern viceroys opposed the pro-Boxer, anti-foreign policy adopted by the Imperial Court and maintained relations with the Powers not, as Communist historians charge,“1 out of a traitorous sympathy for the foreigners in their straightened position. As their memorials to the Throne and their diplomatic correspondence with the United States illustrate, their policy was grounded in a genuine concern for the best interests of China. Their actions stemmed from a careful analysis of the total situation and a thorough under- standing of the relative power positions of China and the foreign nations. After a realistic appraisal of Chinese military strength and on a corresponding appreciation of the capability of western military power, the 38Hummel, I, 30. 39Ibid. no ulHu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955). pp. 143-144. Chang Chih-tung to we Ting-fang, June 22, 1900, USFR, pp. 273-274. -26- Southern viceroys opposed the military policy expounded by the Court reactionaries. A memorial from Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung declared war with all the powers to be a basic error. One nation could not fight all the nations and win. Complete defeat was the only prospect, they pointed out.“2 The Southern viceroys' decision to negotiate with the Powers to arrange for the protection of the foreigners and the preservation of the Southeast territory was likewise grounded in a perceptive understanding of the con- temporary power configuration. The suspicion and jealousy which prevailed among the Powers, they realized, made impossible a peaceful partition of China. world war and a consequent ruin of trade was the only prospect.“3 But aside from that fact, the Southern viceroys pointed out that partition in itself was not conducive to foreign interests which were essentially commercial.4u Troops would be required to maintain peace. To guard the boundaries and preserve their rights would necessitate taxation, duties, and trade restrictions which would limit the scope of commerce and trade, and the source of income.u5 Upon their understanding of the total situation the Southern viceroys decided to exploit that mutual jealousy and to negotiate with the Powers to achieve their objectives. In a joint memorial to the Throne Liu and Chang presented the rationale behind their decision. Fearing British power, the h uzLiu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, memorial, June 26, 1900, HD, I, 19 -1950 haghggg;g§;_2§;ly, Shanghai, January 28, 1900, "A Discourse on Why the Nations Must Adopt a Principle of Peace First Essay.“ HM, IV, 187-188. halhiQ-o November 17. 22. 1900. HM. IV. 236. ”51b1d. -27- other nations had decided against occupying the Yangtse Valley and England, too, in order not to encourage the other nations, had refrained from inter- vention. The best policy under the circumstances, it concluded, was to exploit that mutual suspicion.46 Of all the nations involved in the Boxer uprising the United States seems to have inspired the greatest degree of confidence among the Southern viceroys. Liu Kun-yi, the United States Counsul-General John Goodnow noted, was more friendly to the Americans than to any of the other foreigners.“7 Not least among the factors responsible for that trust and the Sino-American rapprochement achieved during the Boxer crisis was America's formal disavowal of any territorial ambitions in China as expressed in the Open Door Notes of 1899. The Chinese recognized, Liu told Goodnow, that the United States was the only nation which from the beginning could be depended upon not to grab territory.“8 American moderation in the Boxer rebellion to date also impressed the Southern viceroys. Admiral Kempff aboard the 0.5.8. NEWARK had not partici- pated in the allied attack of June 17 on the Taku forts.h9 Whatever the reason behind the Admiral's decision, the act proved providential. It was, perhaps, the most important single factor responsible for the Southern vice- roys' decision to direct their policy toward the United States. 6 héLiu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, memorial, June 26, 1900, HM, III, 33 -337. 47U. 5.. Dapartment of State..ansulan_Desnatches. .H.S..Qonsulate W (hereafter cited as 03013.3), Goodnow to Hay, July 8,1900, a summary report from July 1 to July 8,1900. uslbid. “QKelly, pp. 31-32. -28. A telegram to the Tsungli Yamen informed Jung-lu of the Southern vice- roys' decision. The Boxer disturbance was a hopeless situation, it read, and negotiation was the only answer. Noting that the United States had not participated in the shelling of the Taku forts, the cable concluded that ”it may be possible to ask the American Minister to intercede and ask for a truce so that the Chinese could suppress the Boxers...-."50 and to mediate so that "no nations would dispatch war ships into the Yangtse."51 5°L1 Ping-heng, Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung to Jung-lu, June 20, 1900, HM. III, 329. 510hang Chih-tung to wu Ting-fang, June 21. 1900, III. 330. CHAPTER III THE AMERICAN RESPONSE The Boxer Rebellion posed a dual threat to American interests in China. 0n the one hand it jeopardized the recently established Open Door Policy. For it created a chaotic situation and demanded foreign military inter- vention which could lead to the partition of China that the United States considered inimical to its interests. 0n the other hand, the Boxers them- selves threatened immediately the lives and property interests of Americans in China. If the Boxers failed to expel the United States, along with the other foreign nations, from China, then the Powers, by partitioning the Empire, would exclude her. The character of the American response to the Boxer threat can be defined as moderate. Despite some instances of American military pressure on the Manchu Government, diplomacy overshadowed the military as the prime instrument in securing American interests.1 Moderation on the part of the United States during the Boxer Rebellion can be attributed to an element of ignorance, the absence of a policy, and an isolationist attitude which sought to avoid alliances and encouraged independent action.2 The management of American affairs during the incident rested largely with two United States diplomats, the American Minister to China, Edwin H. Conger, and the United States Consul-General, John Goodnow. During the period 1Tyler Dennett, Americans 23 Eastern Asia (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1110., 1941), p. 6314's 2Foster Rhea Dulles, The Imperial Years (New Yerk: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956), p. 116. -29- -30- prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities between the Boxers and the foreign soldiers Edwin H. Conger assumed the responsibility for safe- guarding American interests.in China. Following the siege of the Peking Legation, which lasted from June 22, 1900, to August 14, 1900, and the consequent incarceration of Conger, it devolved on John Goodnow. Instructions from the State Department to the American diplomats in China suggest that the United States at the turn of the century had policy goals but no policy toward China. Secretary of State John Hay confirmed the fact himself when, defining the prime objective of United States diplo- macy, he cabled the American Minister, Edwin H. Conger, that "we have no policy in China except to protect with energy American interests and es- pecially American citizens and the legation."3 How these objectives were to be secured remained unsaid. Moreover, the State Department appears to have declined playing more than a minute role in making decisions during the crisis--some of which, as it turned out, were policy-making decisions. In the absence of a defined policy, Conger and Goodnow possessed an almost un- limited amount of freedom and influence in determining the course of action the United States would pursue. Secretary Hay had practically given Conger 'carte blanche' in dealing with the Boxer crisis. In response to a request from Judson Smith, the CorreSponding Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, he instructed Conger "to do whatever he could" for the protection of American missionaries in Shantung province. The only stipulation the 3U.S., Department of State, Papers relating tg the Foreign Relations 9; w the United States, 1900 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902}:— (Egreafter cited as USFR), Hay to Conger, June 10, 1900, p. 143. -31- State Department placed on its diplomats was that in protecting American interests they should "act independently...where practicable, and con- currently with representatives of other powers" if necessary.” Above all, there must be no alliances committing the United States to future action.5 Hay had established the broad framework within which the American diplomats in China could operate. However, the actual determination of policy during the crisis devolved on the diplomats and particularly on Minister Conger and Consul-General Goodnow. When evaluating America's policy toward China at this time it is, therefore, necessary to look immediately toward the diplomats at the scene of action. The nature and quality of the American response depended, in the final analysis, on their assessment and understanding of the situation. Conger's reports to the State Department conveyed but a superficial understanding of the Boxer Rebellion. As had Wilcox, the consul at Hankow,6 Conger, too, attributed the Boxer uprising to the forces of reaction. "There can be no doubt," he wrote Hay, "that it [the Boxer RebellioQY'receives its first impetus from the influential advisors of the Empress Dowager, Kang-I and Hen Tung, who are known to be malignantly hostile to all foreigners or "7 foreign ideas. However, the Boxer Rebellion was more than an expression of reactionary “Hay to Conger, January 18, 1900, USFR, pp. 89-90. 5Hay to Conger, June 8, 1900, USFR, p. 143. 6U.S., Department of State, Consular Despatches, U. S. Consulate Hankow (hereafter cited as USCD-H), Wilcox to Hill, October 4, 1900, USCD-H. 7Conger to Hay, May 8, 1900, USFR, p. 120. -32- anti-foreign sentiments and the roots of the movement went much deeper than the factional diSpute within the Imperial Court. The Boxer uprising was evidence of a severe social, economic and political dislocation within the Chinese civilization. An expression of pOpular discontent with the state of affairs, it was directed against the Manchu dynasty, which the peasants blamed for the conditions, as well as against the foreigners. That the American diplomats had not fully understood the nature of the crisis is revealed by the United States policy. Failing to perceive the true nature of the Boxer Rebellion, Conger underestimated the widespread and deep- seated hatred the Chinese felt toward the foreigners and, therefore, was quite unprepared for the form it took. Moreover, he resorted to diplomatic and military pressure to force the Manchu Government to meet its treaty obligations when, in reality, the Government was powerless to act against the Boxer. Attempts to suppress the society would only increase its anti-dynastic fervor. The Manchu Government found the only path open to it and determined to direct the forces of rebellion against the:breigners. However, Conger's problem in assessing the true nature of the crisis was compounded by the ambiguous policy pursued by the Imperial Court. Throughout the period prior to the siege he experienced great difficulty in determining the diaposition of the Imperial Court toward the Boxers. The Empress Dowager's secret edict of November 21, 1899.8 advocating a militant anti-foreign policy, and the Imperial Edict of January 11. 1900.9 encouraging the development of the Boxer society, led him to suspect that the Imperial Court had endorsed an 8Conger to Hay, January 2, 1900, enclosure No. 2, USFR, pp. 84-85. 9Conger to Hay, January 15, 1900, USFR, p. 88. -33- anti-foreign policy. Rather than punish Yu Hsien, the violently anti- foreign ex-governor of Shantung, he noted that the Court had honored him by bestowing the characters of "Fu" (happiness) and “Shou” (longevity)10 and by reappointing him to the governorship of Shansi.11 Yet, Conger noted, the Manchu Government gave verbal and written assurances as well as concrete evidence of its desire and ability to suppress the Boxers. For example, it had appointed Yuan Shih-k'ai as the governor of Shantung and had detailed 8,000 Chinese tr00ps to Shantung for the protection of the missionaries and the suppression of the Boxers. Con- sequently, Conger could never quite decide whether the Manchu Government was too weak and too afraid or simply unwilling to suppress the Boxers.12 The ambiguous policy pursued by the Court made conclusions difficult and, consequently, action of any sort risky. On the basis of his understanding and in terms of the situation con- fronting him, Conger could have responded in no other manner. His chief responsibility was to protect American lives and property interests and the only channel available to him was to deal directly with the constituted authorities. Moreover, Conger's approach harmonized with the American practice of supporting the government in power, thereby strengthening it and reducing the threat of partition.13 10Conger to Hay, January 29, 1900, USFR, pp. 93-94. llConger to Hay, March 23, 1900, USFR, p. 112. 12Conger to Hay, June 4, 1900, received October 24, 1900, USFR, p. 140. 13Thomas A. Bailey, §_Diplomatic Histopy of ppp American People (6th ed.; New Ybrk: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 19587: p. 305. -34- During the Boxer crisis Conger combined political pressure with military coercion to force the Manchu Government to comply with American demands. Between November 1899, and June 1900, when Boxer mobs then besieged the Peking Legations, Conger repeatedly informed the Tsungli Yamen of reports he had received from American missionaries living in the interior which told of violent attacks against native Christians and foreigners by the Boxer society and revealed the lack of protection and opposition to the Boxers given by the local suthorities.1“ Protesting this violation of its treaty obligations, Conger continuously requested the Central Government to issue orders to these local officials instructing them to take measures for the protection of American citizens.15 He also demanded that either the Government act itself or that it order the local authorities to suppress and abolish the Boxer and Big Sword societies.16 Missionaries at home and in China favored the adoption of military measures. Frequent letters from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, forwarded to Conger by Hay, suggested military coercion as a more effective policy in inducing the Chinese Government to take measures against the Boxers and for the protection of the missionaries. In just one of his numerous letters Judson Smith, corresponding secretary of the organization, wrote that "it would seem that the presence of United States' war ships in Chinese waters might be an added guaranty of safety to American citizens re- siding in that Empire.”l7 1“Conger to the Tsungli Yamen, November, 1899 to June 1900, USFR, pp. 77-154. 15Ibid. 16Ibid. 17Snith to Hay, February 7, 1900, USFR, p. 97. -35- American businessmen also pressured Hay to intervene in China. Alarm- ing reports from Shanghai in May and June 1900, aroused a concern for their projected investments in China. In several conferences with Hay, John Foord, Secretary of the American Asiatic Association pointed out the gravity of the situation and a memorial from the Association urged Hay to join with the 18 The American-China Development other Powers and apply adequate force. Company supported the Association with another memorial on June 15 which demanded of Hay a "strong policy...for the protection of life and property, and the safeguard of the large investments planned, and...already made through the organization."19 As the situation grew increasingly critical and because of the apparent equivocation on the part of the Imperial Court, Conger advised, threatened, and in the end resorted to a 'gunboat policy' to induce the Court to meet American demands. In late January Conger suggested that the United States appear with British and German war ships along the China coast "in order to emphasize our demands and to frighten the Chinese into a compliance with them."20 By March 9, l900, Conger felt that the situation warranted a naval demonstration by the combined powers in the North China waters.21 In the spring of 1900 Conger joined the other Powers in an implementation of the gunboat policy, a decision which was to culminate in full scale 18C. S. Campbell, Special Business Interests and the Open Door Poligy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19517, pp. 68-59. 19Ibid., p. 71. 20Conger to Hay, January 29, 1900, USFR, p. 94. 21Conger to Hay, March 9, 1900, USFR, p. 102. -36- hostilities between the Boxers and the foreign soldiers.22 Increasingly violent and more frequent Boxer attacks against the foreigners in mid-May and the apparent ineffectiveness of the Central Government's efforts to suppress them induced Conger to wire Admiral Kempff and request his immediate 23 Shortly after, deSpite the protests of the Tsungli Yamen, presence at Taku. Conger followed his wire to Admiral Kempff with an order for additional legation guards at Peking.24 The presence of Boxers in Peking had led Conger to eipect an immediate siege. Oanune 4 be wired the State Department to that effect and asked that in theewent of a Boxer siege it would instruct Admiral Kempff to join the other Powers to relieve the Legation.25 Foreign military Operations in June brought on actual hostilities and led to the siege of the Legations. What appeared on June 9 as a crisis situation provoked an impulsive reSponse from Conger and the British Minister Sir Claude MacDonald. Without consulting the other ministers the two tele- graphed Tientsin requesting that an expedition be sent to Peking immediately. The next day when the crisis had passed they rescinded the order but it was already too late. Admiral Seymour had left for Peking with an international force of approximately 2,500 soldiers. About half-way to Peking Boxer soldiers, supported by native villagers, attacked Seymour's force and forced 22George Nye Steiger, Origin and Develgpment pf the Boxer Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), p. 234. 23Conger to Admiral Kempff, May 17, 1900, USRF, p. 127. 24Conger to Hay, May 26, 1900, USFR, p. 131. 25Conger to Hay, June 4, 1900, USFR, p. 141. -37- 26 a retreat to Tientsin where it was besieged until relieved by an allied army. Had it not been for the impulsive action taken by MacDonald and Conger, it is at least questionable whether an actual war would have broken out between the foreign governments and the Boxers. Boxer anti-foreign activities would, of course, have continued, perhaps eventually succeeding in expelling the foreigners from China and in destroying the debilitated Manchu Government. However, foreign military Operations consolidated the Boxers with the peasants in the countryside, who joined in the destruction of railroad and telegraph lines, and led, at length, to the siege of the Peking Legations.27 With the siege of the Legations the first stage of the American involve- ment in the Boxer Rebellion ended and the second began. During the crisis period of the Boxer Rebellion the United States pursued two courses Of action. In the North it acted concurrently with the other Powers, cOOperating in military Operations to rescue the American nationals besieged in Peking. In the South, under the direction of the United States Consul-General at Shanghai, it employed diplomacy as an instrument to secure American interests. During this period the United States embarked on an independent course of action which would lead to a Sino-American rapprochement and culminate on July 3 in the Circular Note. For all practical purposes John Goodnow was the American Minister to China during the Boxer crisis. Minister Conger was among those besieged in Peking and in virtue of his position as Consul-General, which placed him second in authority, Goodnow took over his superior's duties. Goodnow had eXpected 26Steiger, pp. 280-281. 27Ibid. -38- to begin a scheduled leave of absence sometime around July or August, but the Boxer uprising intervened and he assured Secretary Hay that he would postpone his vacation until the trouble subsided.28 The situation had decreed that he play an important role here, and the crisis found him engaged in policy-making decisions of immediate and long-range consequence. For it was during this period that the United States, in reSponse to the exigencies Of the situation created by the Boxer Rebellion and as the result of a Sino-American rapprochement achieved through the efforts of John Goodnow and Liu Kun-yi, issued the famous Circular Note. Under Goodnow's direction the United States emerged as an influential force in the resolution of the Boxer crisis. For Secretary of State John Hay had permitted him an extraordinary freedom of action in China and did himself accept the leadership given him by Goodnow.29 The fulfillment of his chief reSponsibility, that of protecting the lives and prOperty of American citizens in the Yangtse Valley, involved him in prolonged and delicate negotiations with the Chinese authorities. Upon his assessment of the immediate situation, Goodnow lent United States support to the policy formulated by the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance. In view of the important role he played in influencing the formulation of American policy during the Boxer Rebellion, Goodnow's personal Opinions become a legitimate focus of attention. His understanding of the situation, of the forces Operating in it and their effect on the American position in China, are of immediate relevance to the decisions he made and the course of action he Subsequently pursued. 28U.S., Department of State, Consular DeSpatches, U.S. Consulate, Shanghai, (hereafter cited as USCD-S), Goodnow to Hay, June 11, 1900. 29Goodnow to Hay, June 28, 1900, USCD-S; Goodnow to Cridler, June 29, 1900, USCD-S. -39- Like Minister Conger, Consul-General John Goodnow had noted the great financial and commercial Opportunities in China that awaited American invest- 30 ments and he, too, promoted an energetic American policy in China. But unlike Conger who urged the United States to enter the railway and territorial 31 John Goodnow believed that the future of American concessions competition, trade in China depended on the maintenance of the Open Door Policy.32 At present, he pointed out, American trade reachaionly Northern China but, in the absence of discriminations, it would extend to all parts of the Empire. The American cotton goods trade, Goodnow believed, could penetrate the British Sphere of influence in the Yangtse Valley through the Open Door. Taking into consideration Goodnow's Opinion on the importance of the Open Door to America's future in the China trade, it is understandable that he would view with alarm the Russian-British hostilities which menaced the Yangtse Valley in middle June and threatened to erupt into an international conflict that could only lead to the partition of China.34 As he had strongly urged American economic penetration of China, so, too, would he favor a positive United States' policy in the Boxer crisis. Undoubtably another important factor in Goodnow's desire that the United States play an active role in resolving the Boxer crisis was his understanding of the international situation at the turn Of the century. Goodnow had compre- 30Conger to Hay, November, 1898, quoted by A. Whitney Eriswold, Th3 E33 Eastern Policy gf the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 59; Goodnow to Hill, December 23, 1899, his paper to the American Association of China on the Isthmian Canal as affecting trade with China. 31 Conger to Hay, Eriswold, p. 59. 32Goodnow to Hill, December 23, 1899, USCD-S. 33Ibid. 34Goodnow to Hay, June 24, 1900, USCD-S. -40- hended the nature of the contemporary power configuration and understood its implications for the immediate crisis. That Goodnow perceived the consequences of international jealousy is evident in his reSponse to the crisis precipitated by Russian and English hostilities in mid-June. Requesting that the Navy Department deSpatch two American cruisers to the Shanghai area, he explained that it would help the situation and "not make trouble."3S At the time only a few English boats patrolled the river. Although the number was insufficient to provide adequate protection, the addition of British ships was unthinkable. For both the Chinese authorities and the other Powers were jealous of what appeared to be England's claim to the Yangtse Valley.36 Moreover, should any one of the other treaty Powers move to isolate the Yangtse Valley, the others would follow to claim their share of the Spoils. Only the United States with its formal disavowal of any territorial ambitions could act in the Yangtse Valley without creating an international crisis. Particularly had the disturbance in the North with its attendant immediate and long-range consequences to American lives and prOperty interests in China aroused Goodnow's concern. Should the trouble in the North continue much longer or should the Boxers defeat the foreign trOOps, the uprising would extend into Central and South China with disastrous consequencesibr the foreign interests. The expulsion and murder of the foreigners in the interior and the ruin of trade were then inevitable. Already the districts of Hankow, Chinkiang 35Goodnow to Hay, July 17, 1900, USCD-S. 361bid. -41- and Shanghai contained the elements of an anti-foreign disturbance in the form of the rough pOpulation common to port cities.37 At Hankow, consul Wilcox noted, the soldiers, native villagers and officials, with the exception of Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, were anti-foreign and would at any moment join the . 38 Boxers in looting and murdering the foreigners. These conditions created an uneasy feeling among the foreigners which their lack of protection intensified. The only armed boat in the area was a British gunboat. At the time the U.S.S. CASTINE was in repair dock.39 In this early period of the crisis the foreigners were skeptical of both the ability and the desire of the Chinese authorities to protect them. For, although the viceroys continued to increase their forces and strengthen their forti- .. . . . . .. 40 .. fications, they ignored the foreigners precarious pOSition. OffiCial . . . . 41 Chinese protection at this Stage was to the foreigners a myth. However, with the increasing seriousness of the foreign threat to the territorial integrity of the southeastern provinces, the Southern Viceroys would soon offer to maintain peace and protect the foreigners in their provinces if the Powers would agree not to interfere in the southeast territory. And Goodnow, upon his assessment of the military situation in both North and South China and mindful of the vulnerability of the foreigners' position in southern China, would endorse the plan formulated by the Southern Viceroys for the preservation of the Yangtse Valley. 37Goodnow to Hay, June 14, 1900, USCD-S. 38Wilcox to Hill, October 4, 1900, USCD-H. 39Goodnow to Hay, June 14, 1900, USCD-S. AOGoodnow to Cridler, June 29, 1900, USCD-S. 41Goodnow to Hay, June 14, 1900, USCD-S. -42- Goodnow's belief in the importance of maintaining the Open Door and his understanding of the military Situation led him to support the Southern Viceroys' efforts to confine both the Boxer disturbance and foreign military Operations to the North. Intervention in the Yangtse Valley, both Goodnow and the Viceroys realized, would lead to the partition of China. And partition, as Goodnow well knew, would unite all China against the foreigners.42 Although his understanding of the crisis in the Chinese civilization may have been no less superficial than Conger's and the other foreign diplomats, John Goodnow had graSped well the nature of the immediate situation. He had himself obtained the confidence of the Southern Viceroys who continued through- out the crisis to inform him of their attitude toward the events in North and South China. Liu Kun-yi confided in Goodnow regarding the Southern Viceroys' position toward the war in the North and their attitude toward the reactionary party at the Imperial Court as well as their Opinion concerning the diSposition of the Yangtse Valley during the crisis and the future of China in the settle- ment which would follow its resolution. As a consequence, Goodnow was able to convince Hay of the Southern Vice- roys' sincerity. Speaking for the Southern Viceroys, Liu Kun-yi, Goodnow informed Hay, told the Empress Dowager that the reactionary policy meant the ruin of China. While in Peking he had converted the Empress Dowager's nephew and generalissimo of the Chinese armies, Jung-lu, to his way of thinking. AS Goodnow understood it, the Southern Viceroys had united in Opposition to Prince Tuan and the reactionary party whose insane policy they believed could only lead to the partition of China. The Southern Viceroys, Goodnow clearly perceived, 42Goodnow to Hay, July 16, 1900, USCD-S. -43- were determined to maintain the integrity of China.43 Goodnow's perceptive analysis of the immediate situation, his awareness of the forces Operating in it and of their implications to American interests in China, led him to Subscribe to the policy of the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance. To Goodnow it was a matter of paramount importance that foreign military intervention be prevented and that the Boxer disturbance be confined to the North. The future of the American China trade and the immediate security of American lives and prOperty interests depended on the realization of both Objectives. The convergence of American and Chinese interests in the territorial integrity of China facilitated the Sino-American rapprochement achieved during the Boxer Rebellion which culminated in the Circular Note. 43Goodnow to Hay, July 8, 1900, USCD-S. CHAPTER IV THE MAKING OF THE CIRCULAR NOTE An aversion to an extension of the Boxer disturbance that had engulfed North China in late June 1900 brought the diplomatic corps at Shanghai and the Southern Viceroys together in negotiations for the preservation of the Yangtse Valley. DeSpite the concurrence of foreign and Chinese interests in the preservation of the Yangtse Valley, only the United States made the ”territorial and administrative integrity" of China a policy goal. Forces, circumstances and personalities had prOpelled the United States into such a position where in early July at the suggestion of the Scuthern Viceroys, it issued the Circular Note. These factors had prediSposed the United States to a favorable reception of Chinese overtures suggesting that it formally guarantee the integrity of China. They were, however, matched by equally important factors which encouraged these provincial authorities to take the initiative and to direct their diplomacy toward the United States. On July 3, 1900, the Viceroy at Nanking, Liu Kun-yi, sent a telegram to Secretary of State John Hay via the United States Consul-General in Shanghai, John Goodnow, urging President McKinley to accept the leading role in the Boxer drama. China's only hope in its moment of crisis, Liu continued, was the United States of America, if it were willing to abandon "selfish Schemes" and make a settlement.1 That same day, July 3, Secretary Hay sent the famous Circular Note to the representatives of the United States in Berlin, London, Paris, Rome, St. Petersburg, and Tokyo, instructing them to inform the reSpective ministers for 1U.S., Department of State, Consular DeSpatches, U.S. Consulate, Shanghai, (hereafter cited as USCD-S), Goodnow to Hay, July 3, 1900. -44- -45- foreign affairs of the United States' attitude toward China. Reaffirming the "principle Of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire," the Circular Note further declared that the ”policy of the Govern- ment of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, 13nd7 preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity...."2 Although it cannot with finality be asserted that Liu Kun-yi's telegram had evoked the Circular Note, the weight of the evidence suggests that the Viceroy's request and the American action were no mere coincidence. Whereas the immediate situation in China demanded such a proclamation, the American response to events in China during the past year and particularly within the two week period prior to July 3 had evoked that request while the visionary policy pursued by the Southern Viceroys had prepared the United States to accept the lead at this time. Moreover, this remarkable policy declaration was not the product of that sole diplomatic entreaty. Rather, the Circular Note emerged from negotiations initiated by the Southern Viceroys concerning the preservation of the Yangtse Valley. It was, in fact, an expansion Of the June 26 Agreement between the Southern Viceroys and the foreign powers whereby the Powers promised to refrain from military inter- vention in the Yangtse Valley and the viceroys guaranteed protection of foreign lives and prOperty within their jurisdiction. Symbolizing the acme of Sino-American rapprochement during the Boxer crisis, the Circular Note marked the zenith of American influence in the Boxer Rebellion. Realizing that the Boxer uprising would bring foreign military inter- vention which would undoubtedly result in the partition of China, the Southarn 2U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating £2 the Foreign Rglations 2f The United States, 1900 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), (here- after cited as USFR), Hay to Herdliska, July 3, 1900, p.299. -46- Viceroys had formed the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance to preserve the Southeast from the consequences of the Boxer disturbance. They hOped to obtain a truce so that the Chinese could Suppress the Boxers and, if failing to achieve that objective, to confine both the Boxer disturbance and foreign military Operations to the North. The formation of Such an alliance was indeed timely. The military situation in the Yangtse Valley demanded joint action on the part of the Southern Viceroys. Already in the middle of June Russian activity in the area threatened to explode into an international conflict. Approximately 150 Russian soldiers on board a Russian tea boat approached Hankow, but English pressure forced them to withdraw. Following this threaten- ing maneuver the English consul at Hankow approached Chang Chih-tung with a proposal to send British warships into the interior to protect the Yangtse Valley. Chang refused, saying that he and Liu Kun-yi could provide adequate protection.3 In retrOSpect, these Russian maneuvers set off a chain reaction which culminated in the June 26 Agreement, the prelude to the Circular Note. Aroused by the threat of Russian and British hostilities4 over the Yangtse Valley with its attending implications for the future of China, Chang Chih-tung, Liu Kun-yi, Li Hung-Chang and Sheng Hsuan-huai discussed what course of action to pursue for the preservation of the Southeast Pro- vinces. To stabilize relations with the foreign Powers and relieve their anxieties concerning the lives and prOperty of their reSpective nationals 3Chien Po-chan, et al. (ed.), Historical Materials Relating £3 the Boxer Up- rising (4 vols.; Shanghai: PeOple's Publishing House, 1961), (hereafter cited as HM), Chang Chih-tung to Liu Kun-yi, June 18, 1900, III, 327. 4Regarding English and Russian motives see George Nye Steiger, China and the Occident: The Origin and Development 2f the Boxer Movement (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), pp. 37-39, 48-49. -47- residing in the area was, they realized, the only way "to preserve the territorial integrity of South China."5 On that understanding these viceroys directed their diplomatic activity toward gaining the trust of the Powers in both their desire and ability to protect the lives and prOperty of the foreigners in their provinces so that the foreign nations would refrain from military intervention in the Yangtse Valley. In view of their objective, Prince Tuan's edict of June 20 ordering the provincial authorities to Support the Boxers and to exterminate the foreigners posed an immediate problem. Li Hung-Chang, Chang Chih-tung and Liu Kun-yi accepted Sheng Hsuan-huai's suggestion that they ignore it. Not only had the Southern Viceroys decided to ignore the edict but they attempted to Suppress it entirely, fearing its probable effect on the foreign governments. Knowledge of the Court's order to exterminate the foreigners, they knew, would panic the foreign governments and result in naval and military intervention in the Yangtse Valley. For that reason the Southern Viceroys posted the edict only in the native sections of a few Chinese villages where, hopefully, it would escape the notice of the Powers.7 The Southern Viceroys had determined not to obey the Court's orders. Aware 5National Bureau of Historical Documents, Section on the Ming and the Ch'ing, Historical Documents Relating_£g the Boxer Uprising (2 vols.; Peking, Chung-hua Book Co., 1959), (hereafter cited as HD), Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, memorial, June 26, 1900, I, 194-195. 6Sheng Hsuan-huai to Li Hung-Chang, Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, June 24, 1900, HM, III, 332; Li Hung-Chang to Sheng Hsuan-huai, June 25, 1900, HM, III, 334. 7U.S., Department of State, Consular DeSpatches, U. S. Consulate, Hankow, (hereafter cited as USCD-H), Wilcox to Hill, October 4, 1900, summary report from June 1 through September, 1900. -48- of the seriousness of the situation, they united and acted in concert, fully conscious that the safety of the foreigners and the territorial integrity of the southeastern provinces rested on their shoulders.8 The members of the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance, having assumed reSponsibilityibr China's foreign relations during the Boxer Rebellion, sought particularly to cultivate American friendship, and directed their diplomacy primarily at the United States. Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung noted that the United States had not participated in the allied attack on the Taku forts. Encouraged by this American moderation and evidence of good will, they informed Jung-lu of their decision to ask the American minister to intercede with the governments of the several nations to arrange a truce so that the Chinese could 9 Suppress the Boxers and to convince the other nations not to intervene in the Yangtse Valley.10 Chang Chih-tung immediately extended a diplomatic feeler to the State Department in order to determine the United States position regarding the diSposition of the Yangtse Valley. To the Chinese Minister in Washington, Wu Ting-fang, he cabled that "the Americans uphold equality and justice and never Oppress an underdog; consequently the United States did not participate in the attack on Taku."11 Chang instructed Wu to contact the President and the State Department to find out if the nations planned to send ships into the 8Sheng Hsuan-huai to L1 Hung-Chang, Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, June 25, 1900, HM, III, 334. 9Li Ping-heng, Liu and Chang to Jung-lu, June 20, 1900, HM, III, 329. 10Chang Chih-tung to Wu Ting-fang, June 22, 1900, USFR, p. 273. 11Chang to Wu Ting-fang, June 21, 1900, HM, III, 330. -49- Yangtse Valley. Wu was to assure them that he, Chang, and Liu Kun-yi would provide complete protection to the foreigners in this area and also to request the United States to convince the other governments not to diSpatch warships into the Yangtse.12 From Chang's instructions, it appears that the Southern Viceroys were in actuality striving for a multilateral agreement among the Powers to their prOposed policy for the Yangtse Valley. On Jun: 22 when Wu Ting-fang informed Secretary Hay that Viceroys Liu and Chang were willing and able to maintain the peace and to protect the foreigners in the five provinces under their jurisdiction, he asked that the United States would for its part abstain from military interference in the Yangtse Valley and request the other nations to pursue the same course of action.13 On June 25 Wu informed Li Hung-Chang that the United States had promised not to send warships into the Yangtse except in an emergency.14 In addition to his conditional acceptance of the Southern Viceroys' proposal, Hay told Minister Wu that he would inform the other governments of the viceroys' assurances and of the American policy. Although the Southern Viceroys had not achieved the desired multilateral agreement, this initial foray was, nevertheless, fruitful. They had obtained a bilateral agreement between themselves and the American Government whereby lzlbid. 13Memorandum, Department of State, June 22, 1900, USFR, p. 273. 14Wu Ting-fang to Li Hung-Chang, June 25, 1900, HM, III, 335. 15Hay to Wu Ting-fang, Washington, June 25, 1900, USFR, p. 274. -50- the United States would refrain from military action in the Yangtse if the Southern Viceroys would maintain order and protect the lives and property of American citizens. But. even more important for future Sino-American relations during the Boxer Rebellion, the Southern Viceroys had found the United States favorably disposed to consider their proposals for a resolution of the crisis. The Southern Viceroys then proceeded to determine the actual extentin which the United States would participate in a settlement of the Boxer crisis. Their next diplomatic move was an attempt to obtain a truce in the North. In accordance with their decision to negotiate through the United States, Chang Chih-tung sent a cablegram to Minister Wu on June 23 who then forwarded it to the State Department. The Empress Dowager, Chang informed Secretary Hay, had summoned Li Hung-chang to Peking to negotiate a settlement with the Powers and pointed out that to continue fighting while awaiting his arrival would render a peaceful solution more difficult. After declaring the Imperial Government to be innocent of the Boxer outbreak, Chang requested the United States to confer with the governments of the several Powers and to urge the cessation of military Operations so that the Imperial Government could suppress the Boxers. As an assurance of the Southern Viceroys' sincerity he added that the provincial authorities in the Yangtse and along the coast had assumed responsibility for the protection of the foreigners in their provinces.16 The Southern Viceroys were again only partially successful. Not only did 16Chang Chih-tung to Wu Ting-fang, June 23, 1900, USFR, p. 274. -51- President McKinley decline to interfere with the American naval and military personnel in China, but he also refused Chang's request to intercede with the other governments in recommendation of the Viceroys' proposalal? Although Hay's reply concerning military matters in the North was negative, the United States did recognize the Viceroys' position that the Imperial Court was not supporting the Boxers and that, therefore, China was not technically at war with the Powers.18 The United States was to maintain that attitude throughout the crisis and during the settlement negotiations which followed. By those moves the Southern Viceroys had succeeded in preserving diplomatic relations with the Powers through the United States. Moreover, they had ascertained the degree to which the United States would participate in resolving the Boxer crisis. Bay's replies had indicated that while the united States did not feel itself to be in any position to act effectively in resolving the entire crisis, it would, and did, make an agreement, although limited, at the local level of the Yangtse Valley. Events, however, would soon demand and succeed in extending the American degree of partici- pation from a bilateral to a multilateral agreement regarding the Yangtse Valley. While the English and Russian maneuvers in mid-June had aroused the Southern Viceroys' concern for the security of the Southeastern Provinces, leading to limited diplomatic activity and agreements, English activity a week later created an explosive situation, eliciting a vigorous response from the 17Hay to wu Ting-fang, washington, June 25, 1900, USER, p. 275. 18Ibid. -52- Southern Viceroys at both the military and diplomatic level. The English Consul-General, Warren, had suggested to Liu Kun-yi that the viceroys request British protection in the Yangtse Valley. However, 19 the British suggestion was, Sheng Hsuan-huai told Liu, a trick. For J. C. Ferguson, an American employed by the Chinese Government as the foreigner adviser to the Viceroy,20 had personally informed him that contrary to the British assertion the consuls had no intention of occupying the wu- sung forts at the mouth of the Yangtse. The other foreign nations would not favor British occupation of the Yangtse forts, Sheng continued.21 More- over, both knew that if the English fleet should occupy the Yangtse Valley the other nations would follow on the same pretext of protecting their nationals. Their realization that the whole southeast would be lost should inter- national rivalry erupt had initially led the Southern Viceroys to consult with the Consuls-General in Shanghai to prevent England and the other nations from taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the disturbance in the 22 The conflict over the Yangtse North to occupy the territory in the South. Valley which now seemed imminent jeopardized the Southern Viceroys' plan to "preserve the southeast...as a base to avert catastrophe."23 With these 19Sheng Hsuan-huai to Liu Kun-yi, June 20, 1900, HM, III, 328. ZOGoodnow to T. w. Cridler, June 29. 1900, 03:20-3. ZlSheng Hsuan-huai to Liu Kun-yi, June 20, 1900, HM, III, 328. ZZChang Chih-tung to Liu Kun-yi, June 18, 1000, HM, III, 327. 23Sheng Hsuan-huai to'Li Hung-Chang, June 26, 1900, HM, III, 335. -53... factors in mind, Sheng had Liu Kun-yi instruct the Taotai in Shanghai to inform the Consuls-General of all the nations that the Chinese authorities would protect the territories from the wu-sung fort to the areas around the Yangtse and would brook no interference.2u However, by June 24 an increasingly critical Situation threatened to demand military intervention. As an added measure of security, Liu Kun-yi made military preparations. SuSpecting that the English planned to seize the Yangtse River forts, Liu had ordered unqualified resistance.25 In compliance with Liu's orders, the commanders of the Kiangyin and Wu-sung forts prepared for possible action. They repaired the walls of the Shanghai arsenal and ordered the Chinese ships on the river readied for immediate action. Armed guards policed the area at night and a thousand extra soldiers reinforced the divisions already stationed at the Kiangyin and Wu-sung forts?6 and armed men continued to come south by way of the Grand Canal.27 Alarmed by the situation, John Goodnow had himself requested that the Navy Department dispatch a ship to the Shanghai region.28 All realized that a conflict between the Chinese and the foreign powers was inevitable unless the parties involved would reach an agreement. The initiative at this juncture came from the Southern Viceroys. In the 2“Sheng Hsuan-huai to Liu Kun-yi, June 20, 1900, HM, III, 328. 25Goodnow to Secretary of State, June 24, 1900, USCD-S. 26Goodnow to Hay, June 29, 1000, USCD-S. 27Goodnow to Secretary of State, June 24, 1900, USCD-S. 28Ibid. -54- opinion of Sheng Hsuan-huai, Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, the resolution of the crisis lay in a multilateral agreement between the Southern Viceroys and the foreign governments. They decided to propose to the Consuls-General in Shanghai that the foreign governments refrain from military intervention in the Yangtse Valley while the Chinese authorities would maintain order and protect the foreigners in these provinces. In formulating their policy the Southern Viceroys declined to accept sole responsibility for the destruction of property and the loss of lives because it would leave them no room to maneuver in the future settlement.29 In its final form, the proposal from Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung would suggest that the Consuls-General should protect Shanghai while the Southern Viceroys would protect the Yangtse Valley.3O Chang then sent the Taotais of Hankow and Wu-chang along with his private interpretor to the U.S. Consulate Office at Hankow and instructed them to ask the Consul, L.S. Wilcox, to inform.his government of the position that he, Chang Chih-tung, Viceroy Liu Kun-yi and the governors of the Southern Provinces would take regarding the Powers. Encouraged by the American response to their previous suggestions, the vicerOYS and governors desired to make a definite bilateral agreement with the United States. Regardless of what the Government in Peking may request or order they pledged themselves to keep peace in their provinces. They requested that the United States would in return not make war on their provinces but would assist them in keeping the peace.31 29Chang Chih-tung and Liu Kun-yi, memorial, June 26, 1900, HM, pp. 104-195. 303heng Hsuan-huai to Liu Kur -yi, Li Hung-Chang and Chang Chih-tung, June 24, 1900, HM, III, 332. 31Wilcox to Goodnow, June 25, 1900, contained in his report to Assistant Secretary of State David Hill, October 4, 1900. as” -55- At the same time Viceroy Liu arranged a meeting between the Shanghai Taotai, Mr. Ferguson, Sheng Hsuan-huai and the consular body in Shanghai for June 26. The idea seems to have orginated with a scholar living in Shanghai at the time by the name of Hsi Yin. Concerned about the situation in the North and its effect on the southeast provinces, Hsi Yin obtained an interview with Sheng Hsuan-huai. Pointing out the danger in the immediate situation, he suggested that an agreement be made between the foreign nations and the Southern Viceroys. Sheng, however, worried about his lack of authority to deal with such affairs. But Hsi Yin offered a simple solution, proposing that he contact the viceroys and suggest that they send an emissary to the Shanghai Taotai. instructing the taotai to negotiate with the consuls.32 As a result of Hsi Yin's efforts the consular body met with the Shanghai Taotai, Mr. Ferguson, Liu's advisor, and Sheng Hsuan-huai on June 26 to discuss the disposition of the Yangtse Valley in the present crisis. Because the Shanghai Taotai was poor at negotiation Sheng served as consultant for the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance. John Goodnow, who knew about the order to exterminate the foreigners, was the leader of the discussion. When asked, Sheng lied about the matter and assured Goodnow that the Court had approved their policy.33 Promising to protect foreigners living in areas under their jurisdiction regardless of events in the North, the Southern Vice- roys sought in return assurances from the Consuls-General that the foreign BZHSi-yin, "Keng-tzu Ch'uan-Huo Tung-nang Hu-pao chih Chi-shih" (A True Account of the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance during the Boxer Rebellion), in Jen-wen Yueh-kan (Ren-wen Monthgz), Shanghai, Vol. II (1931), No. 7. P. 1. 33Ibid. -56- governments would not attack the Nanking and Hankow viceroyalties.3)+ The result of this meeting was the multilateral June 26 Agreement. Signed by the Senior Consul Valdez, the Consul-General for Portugal, and agreed to by all the Treaty consuls in Shanghai the Agreement read as follows: The Diplomatic Corps acknowledges with gratitude the assurance of their Excellencies Chang Chih-tung, Viceroy at Wuchang and Liu Kun-yi, Viceroy at Nanking, that they would maintain peace and order, protect life and property in their provinces and assume responsibility for any damage done through lawless activity in these provinces. For their part the Diplomatic Corps assures Their Excellencies that our governments have had no intention and now have no intention, either individually or collectively to take any hostile action or/and land any hostile force in the Yangtse valley, so long as Their Excellencies are able to, and do, maintain the rights of the foreigners in their provinces ag provided for in the Treaties with the Government of China. 5 Consul-General Goodnow informed Secretary Hay of the agreement that same day, cabling that the Diplomatic Corps had guaranteed noninterference while the Viceroys of Nanking and Hankow maintained peace in the Yangtse Valley.36 Hay's reply, formally authorizing the consuls to consult with the vice- roys and take measures fir the protection of American lives and property,37 in effect recognized Goodnow's "fait accompli." The United States had, under Goodnow's direction, officially moved beyond its original position and entered into a multilateral agreement for the preservation of the Yangtse Valley, Soon, however, the compelling force of events and personalities was 34Goodnow to Hay, June 14, 1900, USCD-S. 3533,. 36Goodnow to Secretary of State, June 26, 1900, USCD-S. 37Goodnow to Cridler, June 29, 1900, uscns. -57- to project the United States into a position where it would make an unilateral declaration on the diSposition not only of the Yangtse Valley but of the entire Chinese Empire. EVents in North China around the beginning of July submitted the June 26 Agreement to its first test. The Boxers had already murdered the German minister. As yet the other ministers were safe but their situation was desperate. Only three legations remained standing and Prince Tuan, indisput- ably in power, had ordered the Boxers to attack.38 With the city gates closed, the Emperor and Empress Dowager imprisoned in the Palace and the Boxers in control, anarchy reigned in Peking.39 As the situation in Peking deteriorated, distrust developed between the Southern Viceroys and the Diplomatic Corps in Shanghai. For their part, the foreign diplomats feared that the worst had befallen their nationals in Peking and suSpected the Southern Viceroys of suppressing vital information and of equivocation while they maneuvered to achieve a position favorable for negotiation. With the notable exception of John Goodnow, these repre- sentatives distrusted Li Hung-Chang, the nominal leader of the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance, believing him to be in reality employed by the Empress Dowager. Indeed, Goodnow admitted, Li was reputed by the foreigners and Chinese alike to be an unmitigated scoundrel, but added that he himself had experienced nothing except friendly relations with him.“0 By the beginning of July the suppressed edict had been transformed into a trump card in the hands of the Southern Viceroys. Goodnow now informed 38Goodnow to Secretary of State, July 1, 1900, USCD-S. 39Goodnow to Secretary of State, July 3, 1000, USCD-S. quoodnow to Secretary of State, July 17, 1900, USCD-S. -58- Hay of Prince Tuan's order commanding the provincial authorities to support the Boxers and exterminate the foreigners. The Southern Viceroys, he understood, had concertly ignored it.“1 But there remained the recognized danger that should the Boxers prove successful, the viceroys would naturally support their own people.u2 The conditional nature of the June 26 Agreement 43 While protecting created a feeling of insecurity among the foreigners. foreign lives and property, Chang Chih-tung was active also in fortifying his own definses. Scores of large junks containing from one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fifty soldiers from the provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kiang-si and Kwang-tung were arriving at Hankow several times a week. To the foreigners living in the Yangtse Valley the edict and the Boxer victories made an extension of the Boxer disturbance an imminent possibility. While the Diplomatic Corps worried whether the Southern Viceroys would maintain their position and fulfill their promise to protect the foreigners regardless of the direction taken by events in the north, the Southern Vice- roys were concerned about the effect of these new develOpments on the dis- position of the Yangtse Valley. The Powers had dispelled the idea of partition as detrimental to their interests but the events of a prolonged disturbance could force a change of mind.“5 Russia, they noted, had already revealed her designs on Manchuria. On the pretext of protecting her nationals Russia took control of the customs house at Newchang. The danger was that these moves ulGoodnow to Secretary of State, July 1, 1900, USCD-S. IZWilcox to David Hill. October 4, 1900' USCD'H‘ “31bid. unIbid. h5122s:zsa.£2:2a2. Shanghai. July 1. 1900. HM. IV. 178. -50- would arouse international jealousy and lead to a world conflict and the partition of China.46 Particularly did the Southern Viceroys fear that the revelation of the suppressed edict would arouse the Powers' concern for their reSpective nationals and result in a negation of the June 26 Agreement. As that agreement was conditional on the maintenance of peace and order in the Yangtse Valley, an extension of the Boxer Rebellion would lead, they realized, to foreign military intervention. In that case China was lost. The Southern Viceroys had discovered in the deteriorating situation in the north a need to reaffirm the June 26 Agreement. In discussing the current situation, Liu, Chang and Sheng concurred in the opinion that these developments plus the increasing fear and panic in the South made it manda- tory that both sides should declare that regardless of events in the North the arrangement made concerning the protection of the foreigners and the dispatch of foreign troops into the Yangtse Valley must be respected.u7 At this time Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung decided to reassure the Consuls- General of their sincere intentiOns by sending a written renewal of their earlier commitment.u8 However. convenient, the foreign Powers had also recognized the need to reaffirm the June 26 Agreement. Under the direction of John Goodnow the United States emerged at this moment as the leader of the foreign Powers. The Southern Viceroys' response to the June 26 Agreement had impressed Goodnow. hélbid. 47Sheng Hsuan-huai to Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, July 1, 1900, HM, III, 344. usIhid. -60- Encouraging reports from the missionaries in the smaller cities of his district indicated that the Viceroys, in accordance with the agreement, had taken precautions against trouble and had prepared to meet it should such arise.ug They had posted proclamations in almost all of the cities and villages in the Yangtse Valley commanding the native inhabitants to keep the peace, to respect the foreigners rights and to protect their property.50 Chang Chih-tung had himself furnished escorts and gunboats to afford American nationals a safe retreat from the interior. Moreover, he had cooper- ated to the extent of wiring the governors of the four provinces north of Hankow over which he had no jurisdiction, requesting them to assure American citizens a safe conduct through their provinces.51 Convinced of the Southern Viceroys' sincerity, John Goodnow, in recognition of their mutual concern for the security of the Yangtse Valley, made the initial move to allay their fears. The other Powers followed suit. On July 1 he assured Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung that the United States would not attack the Central and Southern provinces as long as they maintained 52 order and protected the foreigners. He also urged them to immediately 53 issue a proclamation commanding peace as agreed, regardless of the edict. Honoring Goodnow's promise, Hay instructed him to inform the Viceroys that the State Department had ordered the American forces not to attack the southeastern ugGoodnow to Cridler, June 29. 1900, 0300.3. 50%. SlWilcox to David Hill, October a, 1900, USCD-H. SZGoodnow to Hay, July 8, 1900, USCD-S. 53Ibid. -61.- provinces as long as peace existed and the viceroys protected the lives and property of American citizens.54 Moreover, he informed Goodnow that he had communicated the American purpose to the other Power355 with the result that when Goodnow directed the remaining U.S. consuls to inform the viceroys concerned of the United States' position he was able to give the added assurance that "all nations are acting together."56 The Southern Viceroys responded to Goodnow's overture on the local and the national levels. They conducted their diplomatic activity in terms of the effect of the immediate situation on both the Yangtse valley and the ultimate future of China in the settlement which would follow the resolution of the crisis. In view of the possible collapse of the Manchu Government, which to them the recent developments in the north made imminent, the Southern Viceroys had not only determined to reaffirm the agreement, but they would attempt to expand it into a settlement which would include all China.57 With regard to local affairs in the Yangtse Valley, on July 2 Liu Kun-yi, after remarking on the genuinely friendly intercourse which had always existed between the United States and China, accepted Goodnow's proposal concerning 58 the previous agreement. Pledging himself and Chang Chih-tung to protect Snlbid. 55Ibid. 561b; . 5VSheng Hsuan-huai to Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, July 1, 1900, HM, III, 344. 58Goodnow to Hay, July 8, 1900, enclosure No. 2, summary report July 1-8 USCD-S. the Americans and all other foreigners in the Yangtse Valley, he promised to issue a satisfactory proclamation to that effect and to instruct by telegraph the provincial authorities in the South.SQ As a result of Goodnow's actions the Southern Viceroys and the foreign Powers concurred in a reaffirmation of the June 26 Agreement, Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung issued a proclamation in which they assumed the "responsibility of protecting not only Shanghai but the whole of the Yangtse Valley and the ports in the interior, as well as commerce and the foreign . . 6 miSSions... ." 0 In return the Consuls-General promised that so long as the viceroys are able to and do meet their commitments the foreign govern- ments would abstain from both individual and collective action and land no force in the Yangtse Valley.61 American initiative at this propituous moment had stabilized a volatile situation in Southeastern China. From John Goodnow the Southern Viceroys had learned that the foreign Powers were amenable to a reaffirmation of the June 26 Agreement. They now determined to attempt to extend the settlement beyond the Yangtse Valley to cover the entire Empire. Encouraged by the policy the United States had pursued throughout the crisis to date, particularly within the last few days, the Southern Viceroys sought to achieve this ultimate objective through a direct appeal to the United States. The viceroys approached the issue from two sides, directing their diplomacy toward the United States Department of State through the U.S. 59Ibid. 60Goodnow to Hay, July 8, 1900, enclosure No. 3, USCD-S. 6lipid. -63- Consul-General Goodnow in Shanghai as well as the Chinese Minister in washington. Sheng, Liu and Chang agreed that the Taotai of Shanghai should draw up a memorandum for the Consuls-General to the effect that "the agreement [June 267 signed mentioned nothing about a future settle- 62 Liu and Chang then cabled Wu Ting-fang in washington D. C. and ment." instructed him of the procedures he should follow. Liu Kun-yi again communicated directly with Goodnow in Shanghai. In this conversation with Goodnow he explained to him that the Southern Vice- roys had opposed the reactionary party on the conviction that this policy was the best means to maintain the integrity of China.63 Following his explanation, Liu urged the President to assume the lead in the settlements following the resolution of the crisis as he did in negotiations leading to the 'Open Door' agreement.6u According to instructions received from Liu and Chang, on July 3 Wu Ting-fang sent to the State Department an inquiry from the Southern Viceroys concerning the protection of foreign lives and property and a 'clear under- standing' to be arrived at between the Chinese and the various foreign powers regarding, in effect, Chinese territorial and administrative integrity in the South.65 Forwarded by John Goodnow, Liu Kun-yi's personal appeal arrived the same day, urging President MbKinley to accept the leading role in the Boxer 62Sheng to Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, July 1, 1900, HM, III, 344. 63Goodnow'to Hay, July 8, 1900, USCD.S. 61‘thid. 65Memorandum from Wu Ting-fang to Hay, July 3, 1900, USER, p. 276. -64- drama because China's only hope in its moment of crisis was the United States of America, if it were willing to abandon "selfish schemes" and make a settlement.66 The Southern Viceroys were successful in their attempt to broaden the June 26 Agreement. That same day, July 3, 1900, Secretary Hay issued the famous Circular Note. Reaffirming the "principle of equal and im- partial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire,“ he further declared that the ”policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, [Eng] preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity."67 Under the impetus of forces, circumstances and personalities, the United States had become an active, influential participant in Chinese affairs. Within the course of a few weeks it had shifted its position from a bilateral to a multilateral and conditional agreement concerning the status of the Yangtse Valley to make, finally, a unilateral declaration which guaranteed the sovereignty of the Chinese Empire. Although the Circular Note was to a great degree the product of a visionary policy pursued by the Southern Viceroys, factors predisposing the United States to a favorable reception of the Chinese overtures were matched by equally important forces which encouraged the Southern Viceroys to take the initiative and to direct their diplomacy at the United States. Not least among these common factors was the immediate situation. The power 66Goodnow to Secretary of State, July 3, 1900, USCD-S. 67Hay to Herdliska, July 3, 1000, USER, p. 294. -65- configuration at the turn of the century and the threat posed by the Boxer uprising demanded a policy such as the Circular Note expressed. Both the Chinese authorities and the foreign governments realized this, as indicated by the June 26 Agreement. But, although the other Powers, by making the Circular the basis of their policy during the Boxer crisis and the settlement which followed at Peking, had recognized the need of such a policy, that same power configuration which had demanded it found the United States to be the only nation in any position to make a formal proclamation regarding the 'status quo' in China. CONCLUSION The United States at the turn of the century had, it appears, no well-defined policy toward China. A strong, guiding force emanating from washington D. C. was consPicuously absent during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Consequently, American diplomats in China enjoyed a degree of freedom unthinkable in the complex world in which diplomacy today operates. In 1900, however, the responsibility for American diplomacy had devolved, to a greater degree, on the diplomats on the China scene rather than those in washington. Minister E. H. Conger and particularly Consul-General John Goodnow were able to exert a decisive influence on the formulation and character of the United States policy. Although the United States had emerged from the crisis in China with no well-defined policy, it had clearly enunciated several policy goals. These objectives formed the essence of the Open Door Policy which served until 1949 as the basis of America's China policy. The Open Door Policy, we have noted, evolved in two separate stages, both rooted, however, in the internal decay which racked the Chinese Empire. The tragic Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), and the ensuing Peace of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), had revealed China's military weakness and economic backwardness. The European Powers recognized in the Chinese defeat an opportunity to realize their ambitions and accordingly they moved to acquire territorial and economic concessions from China. To the scramble for concessions which threatened the partition of the Empire and endangered American interests in China the United States had responded with the first Open Door Notes (September 6, 1899). Although somewhat reluctantly, the Powers accepted the principle of equal economic opportunity in China . -66- -57- The Open Door Policy was put to its first test in 1900. Ironically, the challenge originated not with the European Powers but with the reactionary Manchu party in the Imperial Court at Peking and the Chinese Secret I-ho Ch'uan (Boxer) society. However, because it created a situation demanding foreign military intervention, the Boxer Uprising of 1900 renewed the threat to partition the Empire. The United States countered this dual threat to American interests with the so-called second 'Cpen Door‘ note, the Circular Note of July 3, 1900. That July 3rd Circular first reaffirmed the principle of equal economic opportunity in China and then moved beyond that initial objective, in form if not substance, to guarantee the sovereignty of the Chinese Empire. Forces, circumstances and personalities had coalesced in 1900 to produce the Circular Note. The union of this complex of factors was achieved, we have noted, largely through the efforts of the Southern viceroys who on their understanding of the power configuration at the turn of the century had initiated the diplomatic negotiations. The Southern viceroys had acted in concert and formed the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance out of a genuine concern for the future of China which was threatened with partition because of the reactionary party's policy and the Boxer Uprising. American moderation in the crisis to date, particularly Admiral Kempff's refusal to take part in the allied attack on the Taku Forts, had encouraged the Southern Viceroys to direct their efforts at obtaining an agreement concerning the territorial integrity of China toward the United States. Consul-General John Goodnow’s perceptive analysis and understanding of the immediate situation had led him to support the policy of the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance. Military intervention in the Yangtse Valley, Goodnow feared, would lead to the <73, -68.. partition of China. Partition, he pointed out, would unite all China against the foreigners. In Goodnow's opinion America's immediate and future interests in China depended on the maintenance of the Open Door and the preservation of the territorial integrity of China. While factors inherent in the immediate situation had demanded and achieved the Circular Note, other factors of both an American and Chinese origin and character had facilitated the Sino-Americanlapprochement which made the Note possible. The particular character of the United States presence in China at the turn of the century determined to a great degree the nature of the American policy in China. In contrast to its position in the Philippines, the United States was in China a 'have not' nation. Having officially arrived late on the China scene, at the moment when the European Powers had already appropriated the best territories, the United States rejected territorial imperialism. However, it appears that, despite the desires of some businessmen, missionaries, politicians and diplomats, the United States public at large would not have tolerated the possession of Chinese territory. Such would have contradicted the American tradition. America had dreamed of an economic empire in China but that dream was ill-founded and, consequently, never materialized. But regardless, economic interests were subordinated to the higher interests represented by the missionaries. American penetration of China was less in the nature of economic ”imperial- ism" than of cultural "imperialism." American merchants and diplOmats, like the missionaries, conceived it to be their honorable duty to preach Christianity and Democracy to the Chinese. -59- The United States had adopted in China a policy of moderation. The nature of the American position and interests in China had led to the formal rejection of territorial ambitions as eXpressed by the Open Door Notes of 1899. At the time of their issuance the author of the Open Door Notes, W} W. Rockhill, had desired to pledge the United States "to assist in maintaining the integrity of the empire"1but realized that such a commitment was then politically unrealistic and would never obtain the support of the McKinley Administration.2 He therefore contented himself with the inclusion of a provision which called for the Chinese to collect the duties within the foreign spheres of interest. While not explicitly stating it, the Open Door Notes of 1899, by preserving Chinese jurisdiction in the leased territories, implied that the maintenance of Chinese 3 sovereignty was their objective. What was more, as Rockhill pointed out, the Notes would enhance American prestige and increase its influence at Peking: for the Chinese would perceive in them the American aversion to a partitioning of China.# That the American diplomats were conscious of the objective and motivation expressed by the Open Door Notes became evident in the course of diplomacy during the Boxer crisis. On instruction from Secretary Hay5 1Rockhill to Hippisley, August 3, 1899, quoted by Paul A. Varg in Open Door Diplomat: Egg Life 2f W. W. Rockhill (Urbana, 111.: The University of Illinois Press, 1952), p. 31. 2Foster Rhea Dulles, The Imperial Years (New YOrk: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956), p. 205. 3Varg, Open Door Diplomat, p. 32. ”Rockhill memorandum to Hay. August 28, 1900, Varg, p. 32. 5U.s., Department of State, Papers Relating g9 thgpForeigg Relations gfptgg United States, 1900 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), (hereafter cited as USFR), Hay to Conger, March 22, 1900, p. 111. xi -70- Conger attempted on May 9, 1900, to induce the Manchu Government to protect the lives and property of American citizens and to suppress the Boxers by an appeal to the constancy of United States friendship for China as recently evidenced in the ”renewed assurances" it secured from the treaty Powers "not to interfere with the integrity of the Chinese Empire."6 American diplomats, with the missionaries and merchants, had prepared the United States for an active role in China. When the circumstance arose in summer of 1900 both Americans and Chinese were amenable to an American guarantee of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity. A propensity to attribute the Open Door Notes of 1899 primarily to economic motives, however ill-founded, has tended to regard the Circular Note as economically motivated. But, as the U. S. Consular DeSpatches indicated, such an interpretation serves to oversimplify, to distort rather than to clarify the issue. For the Circular Note was more than the realization of an American objective to secure equal economic opportunity in China. The prime, if not the sole, preoccupation of the United States at the time was to protect with energy American lives and property interests endangered by the Boxer Uprising. Viewed in the context of its origin, the Circular Note was an expedient measure, a necessary response to the crisis created by the Boxer disturbance. It cannot be properly understood except in terms of this crisis and in relation to the June 26 Agreement from which it evolved and without which, it can reasonably be doubted, it would never have been. 6Conger to the Tsungli Yamen, May 9, 1900, USFR, p. 125. -71- The 'Open Door' policy, historians successfully argue, did not constitute a departure from the traditional American policy toward China. The 'most-favored-nation‘ clause in the unequal treaties between China and the Powers had decreed that no nation should enjoy special interests in China. ‘With the Open Door Notes of 1899 the United States had verbalized the policy on which the other nations, until the concessions scramble, had tacitly operated. Nor did the Circular Note with its guarantee of Chinese sovereignty constitute a radical departure from the traditional Open Door policy. It had merely reaffirmed the principle of equal economic opportunity in China and defined the principle underlying that objective. However, by making explicit what was implied in the first Open Door Notes the United States action constituted a fresh approach to the problem. By affirming Chinese "territorial and administrative entity" the United States had embarked on a positive China policy. Contrary to historical opinion of which Chester C. Tan is representative, the United States played an active, influential role in the Boxer Rebellion both during the crisis and in the settlement conferences which followed at Peking.7 The other foreign nations had testified to the influence of the United States in their recognition of the need for such a policy.8 The German Chancellor, Count von Bulow, stated as much in accepting the idea to neutralize the Yangtse Valley because it would provide ”a barrier against the ambitions that might lead to the partition of China."9 Although they did not formally recognize it, the foreign Powers‘ acceptance of the 7Chester C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 128. 81bid. 9Dulles, p. 218. -72- Circular Note was implicit in the fact that they made it the basis of their policy during the actual crisis and in the settlement conferences at Peking. Mutual jealousy among the nations which disallowed agreement on the division of China may well have been the decisive factor in preventing its partition. However, had it not been for the United States' positive role, as symbolized by the Circular Note, that jealously could have prevailed and culminated, most probably, in an international conflict. BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURC"" Chien Po-chan, et al. (ed.). Historical Materials Relating to the Boxer Uprising. u vols. Shanghai: People's Publishing House, 1901. Hart, Sir Robert. These from the Land of Sinam: Essays on the Chinese Question. London: Chapman & Hall, LD., 1901. Hummel, Arthur'w. Eminent Chinese of the Ch' ing Period, 1699-1911. 2 vol. Washington: United States Printing *Office, 1953 National Bureau of Historical Documents, Section on the Ming and the Ch'ing. Historical Documents Relating pp phe Boxer Uprisipg. 2 vols. Peking: Chung-hua Book Company, 1959. Hsi-yin. "Keng-tzu Ch'uan—huo Tung-nan Hu-pao chih Chi-shih“ (A True Account of the Southeast Mutual Defense Alliance), in Jen-wen Yuen-kan (Jen-wen Monthly), (Shanghai), Vol. II (1931), No. 7. Teng, Ssu-yu and Fairbank, John K. China' 5 Response to the Nest. A Docu- mentary Survey, 1839-1923. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. U.S. Department of State. Consular Despatches. U.S. Consulate, Hankow. U.S. Department of State. Consular Despatches. Qpfi. Consulate, Shanghai. U.S. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900. washington: Government Printing Office, 1902. a u I o I C 9‘ _ . . o m o C . o. I l: _ a O. 0.. p I I c _ . O C O . ‘ '0 i . I f ‘ I I a I u 0 o C 1 C v. x I I v . BIBLIOGRAPHY SECONDARY SOURCES Backhouse, E. and Bland, J.O.P. Annals And Memoirs 9; BBQ Court gifl Peking. Boston: Houghton Iifflin Company, 1914. Bailey, Thomas A. ‘A Diplomatic History 2; the American People. 6th ed. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1958. Bemis, Samuel Flagg. A Diplomatic History 2: the United States. 9th ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955. . "The Shifting Strategy of American Defense and Diplomacy." Essays in History and International Relations in Honor 92 Geo_ge Hubbard Bla&eslee. Edited by Dwight D. Lee and George— E. McReynolds. Norcester, Massachusetts: Clark University Publication, 19b9. Blake, Nelson M. "England and the United States, 1897-1899." Essays in Histogy and International Relations in Honor of George Hubbard Blakeslee. Worcester, Massachusetts: Clark University Publication, 1999. Campbell, 0.3., Jr. Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951. Dennett, Tyler. Americans in Eastern Asia. New Ybrk: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1941. . John Hay: From Poetry 32 Politics. New Ybrk: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1933. Dulles, Foster Rhea. The Imperial Years. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956. Franke, wolfgang. Des Jahrhundert dgg chinesischen Revolution, 1851-1949. Muchen: R. Oldenbourg, 1958. Griswold, Whitney A. The Far Eastern Policy of the United States. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. Joseph, Philip. Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1804-1900. London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1928. - Kelly, John S. A Forgotten Conference: The Negotiations gt Peking, 1900-1901. Geneve: Librairie E. Droz, 1963. Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951. Latane, J. H. America as a‘WOrld Power, 189231947. Vol. XXV of Th2 American Nation: A History. Edited by A. B. Hart. New York: Harper & Bros., 1909. Lattimore, Owen and Eleanor. Them Wing of Modern China. New Ybrk: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1955. Lattimore, Owen. Studies ig Frontier Histogy: Collected Papgrs, 1928-1958. Paris: Morton & Co. McNair, Harley Farnsworth (ed.). China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. . Mbdern Chinese History: Selected Readings. Shanghai: Commercial Press, Limited, 1923. , and D. F. Lach. Modern Egg Eastern International Relations. 2d ed. Toronto: D. Ban Costrand Company, Inc., 1955. Purcell, Victor. The Boxer U rising: A Background Study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19 3. Influenced by the Oriental Situation. New Yerk: The Macmillan Company, 1925. Steiger, George Nye. China and the Occident. The Origin_ and Development of thg_Boxer Movement. New Haven: Yale University Press, —l927. Tan,Chester C. Egg Boxer Catastroohe. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Varg, Paul A. Missionaries, Chinese, And Diplomats. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. . Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W} Rockhill, Urbana, I11.: The University of Illinois Press, 1952. VITA Name: Linda Marie Madson Permanent Address: 1261 Liberty Street, Green Bay, Wisconsin Degree and Date to be Conferred: M.A., 1966 Date of Birth: April 21, 1942 Place of Birth: St. Paul, Minnesota Secondary Education: St. Joseph Academy, Green Bay, Wisconsin Collegiate Institutions Attended Dates Degree Date of Degree St. Norbert College 1960-1969 B.A. 196H Major: American History Minor: Aesthetics O; HICHIGRN STATE UNIV. LIBRARIES I m Illlll gm l 312930159 4389