—‘ 4 AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD ViET’NAM. 1934:1963 Thesis for flu Degree cf M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Alan. F. Amati. 1963 LIBRARY Michigan State University fin.“- ABSTRACT AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM, 1954-1963 by Alan F. Arcuri The principal objective of American policy towards South Vietnam between 1954 and early 1963, the period covered in this study, has been to prevent Communist expansion into this country. The United States_has been concerned with the loss to the Communists of South Vietnam in itself; it has also been concerned with the consequent Communist threat to all the rest of Southeast Asia. Thus, American aims in South Vietnam have been mainly military. In addition, American means of attaining these aims have been largely military: the bulk of American support for the government of South Vietnam has been for military and security related purposes. The United States replaced France.as the dominant foreign influence in South Vietnam following the Geneva Agreements of July, 1954. In the first year of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, extending from the time of the Agreements, American support for the regime was. at certain critical junctures, indispensable for Diem's survival in office. Alan F. Arcuri Between 1956 and 1959, American policy-makers took pride in their Vietnam policy: Communism had apparently been con— tained north of the 17th para11e1--the partition line between South Vietnam and the Communist regime of North Vietnam: economic rehabilitation was progressing at a satisfactory rate; the Diem regime appeared to have established itself firmly in power and political stability existed in the country. Communist activities within South Vietnam attracted inter- national attention in late 1959, when they began taking significant military form! 1By 1961, the Communist-led National Liberation Front had extended its military and political power across the Vietnamese countryside on such a scale that it posed a serious danger to the Ngo Dinh Diem government--and to America's key objective in South Vietnam. It was then that the United States reappraised its policy towards South Vietnam. The outcome of this examination was a great increase in military and other assistance to the Diem government and a‘reaffirmation of American support for Diem. The United States has sought a military solution to the guerrilla warfare mounted against the Vietnamese govern- ment. It has, in the period under review, viewed Ngo Dinh Diem as the best, the only means of effecting this solution. It is a conclusion of this study that the United States erred in putting such great emphasis on the military aspect of security, to the detriment of political.considerations, and in committing itself so thoroughly to the support of Ngo Dinh Diem. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM, 1954—1963 Alan F} Arcuri A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Political Science 1963 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to sincerely thank Professors Wesley R. Fishel and Guy Fox for their assistance. Professor Fishel was particularly helpful in sharing some on-the—scenes accounts of American diplomacy in Vietnam from 1954 to 1956 when he was an important political advisor to the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. My greatest thanks goes to Professor Robert Scigliano who enthusiastically directed my thesis. He spent many hours providing information and direction and many more hours providing suggestions and corrections. Moreover, he made his personal files on Vietnam available. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Professor David A. Booth. As his graduate assistant I was given the benefit of a rewarding year of 'instruction in research techniques. He was generous with his time and scholarly advice and encouragement. ii PREFACE This study examines American policy toward Vietnam during the short period of Vietnamese independence. Thus, it covers the years between 1954 and 1963, but includes some material on American policy towards that country during the final years of France's hegemony there. The study focuses on America's political and diplomatic relations with the Vietnamese government and therefore largely excludes from consideration American military, economic, and technical assistance efforts. The main interests of the study are the several critical junctures of Washington's relations with the Saigon regime and how American policy-makers met, or failed to meet, the problems posed at these times. Two purposes run through.American policy toward ’ Vietnam during the period studied: an attempt to stop the spread of Communism and an attempt to establish a viable political order. Since 1961, the United States has been increasingly concerned with inducing the Vietnamese govern- ment to pursue the path of political and social reform as a means of strengthening itself and of quelling the guerrilla warfare being carried out by a Communist-led National Liberation Front. iii American policy has vacillated between considering reforms a necessary precondition for peace and stability and regarding peace and stability a necessary precondition for reforms. This inconsistency, it seems to the writer, coupled with the fact that the Communists have attempted reforms while carrying out their "war of liberation,' seems to suggest a need for a re-examination of a fundamental tenet of Washington's policy. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l The United States in World Affairs 1 Vietnam: Background 4 The United States, France and Vietnam: 1950-1954 9 Questionable Assumptions of American Policy, 1950-1954 16 II. THE UNITED STATES AT THE BRINK: 1954 . . . . . 21 United Action and Allied Disunity 21 America's Role at the Geneva Conference 30 The Final Agreement at Geneva, July 20, 1954 36 Conclusions 42 III. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM: PERIOD OF CONSOLIDATION, 1954-1956 . . . . . . . . . . 45 Summary 62 IV. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM: 1957-1962 . . 66 Introduction 66 "An Outrageous Scandal?" 68 The Attempted Coup d'etat, November 11, 1960 75 Viet Cong Terrorism and Washington's Reappraisal 81 Pressures to Reform and Repercussions 90 V. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Senator Nuke Mansfield's 1962-1963 ‘ Appraisal 98 Conclusions 101 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 INTRODUCTION The United States in World Affairs After World War II the United States reluctantly assumed the role as leader of the non-communist world. The principal goals of American policy were to stop communist expansion and to encourage free, if not democratic, govern- ments. America's postwar strategy from 1945 to 1952 was never officially formulated. The policy of containment grew out of an awareness that the Red Army was not going to evacuate Eastern Europe. Indeed, the Soviet Union seemed bent on world conquest. The containment doctrine-was best stated by George Kennan, the Foreign Service's foremost expert on the Soviet Union. According to Kennan, a permanent feature in the cold war would be Soviet "pressure, increasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal" of overthrowing capitalism. His answer to the Kremlin's expansionist goals was an American policy offlong-term, patient, but firm.and vigilant con- tainment."1 1X [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, 25 (July, 1947), p. 575. l In 1952, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced a new military strategy called massive retaliation: sometimes referred to by critics as brinkmanship. Simply stated, massive retaliation warned a potential enemy that aggression against the United States or an ally, would spell atomic destruction for the aggressor's homeland.2 Dulles also briefly flirted with a moral crusade called liberation. Liberation was intended to reverse the containment policy of the Truman administration, which Dulles condemned as "negative, futile and immoral."3 Its purpose was to roll back Soviet ascendency. On August 30, 1952, shortly after the policy of liberation was first proclaimed, the London Economist stated: "Uhhappilyi‘liberation‘ applied to Eastern Europe - and Asia- means either the risk of war or it means nothing. 2John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," Life, 32 (May 19, 1952), p. 146. 31bid., p. 152. An insight into Dulles' foreign policy is found in his spiritual dedication to a."righteous and dynamic" faith in Christian morality transcending expediency in the conduct of international affairs. In other words, if AmeriCan policy is just and the Communists' is unjust, any middle ground or compromise would be "nonmoral diplomacy." See John Foster Dulles, "Principle Versus Expediency in Foreign Policy," in Henry P. Van Dusen (ed.), The Spiritgal Legacy of John Foster Dulles (Philadelphia: The westminster Press, 1960), pp. 121-127. See also John Foster Dulles "The Foreign.Policies and National Security," Vital Speeches, 20 (February.l, 1954), pp. 332-335; John Foster Dulles, "The Threat of a Red Asia,".Department of State Bulletin 31 w _ (April 12, 1954), pp. 539-541; John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," Foreign Affairs, 32 (April, 1954), pp. 353—364. 'Liberation' entails no risk of war only when it means nothing."4 American inaction in the anti-Communists revolts in East Berlin and other East German cities in June, 1953, and during the bloody uprising in Hungary in late 1956 upheld the Economist's contention.5 America could not risk war to liberate Eastern Europe. Washington's monopoly on atomic weapons had been brdken and replaced by a stalemate with the Soviet Uhion. Sir Winston Churchill succinctly heralded the contemporary era in world politics as the "balance of terror": either side could destroy the other, and bring destruction upon itself. The focus of this study is American policy toward Vietnam between 1954 and 1963. In its broader context, this is a case study of American policy in the postwar period. Washington's policy toward Saigon has passed through several phases of cold war strategy: containment, massive retalia- tion and "balance of terror." The study seeks to uncover the 4Quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, "The American Tradition in Foreign Policy," Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy_in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962) p. 212. 5Idem. Ironically America's liberation policy gave the Soviet Union an excuse to maintain and strengthen its military forces in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, it led the peoples of several Communist countries to believe that liberation was something other than a campaign slogan. See Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism: A Study in Politicsgand Foreign Policy Since 1950 (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1956), pp. 146-148. continuing strands of American policy through changes in cold war strategy. Vietnam: Background Vietnam belongs to the southeast extremity of the Asian mainland, referred to by French geographers as the Indochinese peninsula. It is bordered by China to the north, Laos and Cambodia to the west, and the South China Sea to the south and east. Vietnam has an unusual shape. It has been graphically described by comparing Vietnam's two large fertile deltas, the Red River in the north and the Mbkong in the south, and the long narrow coastline connecting them, with two baskets of rice attached to a bamboo pole used by the peasant to carry his load. The analogy is particularly fitting because rice is such an integral part of the peasants' existence. The great majority of Vietnam's 32 million people make their home in the deltas or along the lowland rim of Central Vietnam and 75 per cent of them make their living from agriculture. Vietnam lost its independence in a series of colonial wars with France between 1858 and 1883. In order to facili- tate conquest, France denied the existence of Vietnam as a nation and divided it into three parts: Tonkin in the north, Annam in the central region and Cochinchina in the south. France also subjugated Laos and Cambodia during this period. Added to Vietnam's three "separate" peoples, Laos and Cambodia formed the five parts of the French Indochinese Union. Cochinchina was made a French colony, the other four French conquests became protectorates. The conquest of Indochina added a rich source of wealth to France's empire. For the next 80 years, France's mercantilistic policy exploited the Indochinese people. The Vietnamese accepted French rule no more equably than they had accepted that of the Chinese centuries earlier. They resisted the French colonial design, first through revolts led by the traditional mandarins, then, after the opening of the twentieth century, by revolts inspired by the rise of Japan as a world power and by the Chinese revolution of Sun Yat Sen. In the 1920's, some groups, led by French- educated Vietnamese intellectuals, sought moderate concessions from the colonial power. France rebuffed all attempts, force- ful and conciliatory, to loosen its hold over the country, and extremist groups came to play more and more of a prominent role in Vietnamese political agitation during the 1930's. One of these, the Indochinese Communist Party, led from outside Vietnam by a brilliant Vietnamese intellectual, Nguyen Ai Quoc-—1ater to become better known as Ho Chi vMinh—-gained ascendancy over the others, and it was later to emerge from the Second World War as a dominant force in Vietnam.6 6Ellen J Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1954), Chap. 3. The French did not emerge from the war in nearly as satisfactory a condition. They were compelled to accept Japanese military occupation of their Indochinese preserve in 1940, and then had their colonial administration shunted aside by the Japanese in the spring of 1945. Shortly before their own collapse, in August, 1945, the Japanese strongly encouraged indigenous groups in all three countries of Indochina to assume control. In Vietnam, the group best prepared to do this was the Communist Party, through the instrumentality of a front organization called the Vietnamese Independence League, or, in a shortened version of its Vietnamese name, the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh proclaimed a Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in September, 1945, and established itself firmly in Hanoi. The French reoccupied the southern half of Vietnam during the fall of that year, and drawn-out negotiations were entered into between the French and Viet Minh to reach some kind of accommodation. Attempts to reconcile French and Viet Minh designs over Vietnam failed, amidst mutual recriminations, and fighting broke out between the two sides in December, 1946.7 .Peace was not restored to Vietnam until July, 1954, when, at Geneva, Switzerland, French and Viet Minh represen- tatives agreed to a ceaseefire arrangement that divided Vietnam at the 38th parallel and provided for the withdrawal 7Dona1d Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina (New York: Oxford University Press, 196177 pp. 166-178. of French and Viet Minh forces to the south and north of the parallel, respectively. The Geneva Agreements not only marked France's acknowledgement that it could not subdue the Viet Minh movement by military means, but also its acquiescence in the extension of Viet Minh control over all of Vietnam: the Agreements promised reunification elections for no later than July, 1956. It was commonly accepted that a majority of the Vietnamese would vote to reunify the country under Viet Minh authority. Vietnam is both a new and old country. As an old state, the kingdom of Nam Viet was flourishing several cen— -turies before the birth of Christ. As a new state Vietnam was formed as a result of the Geneva partition of 1954 which split Vietnam at the 17th parallel into the Republic of Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The latter .is a Communist state and was officially proclaimed on September 2, 1945. The Republic of Vietnam, also referred to as South Vietnam and Vietnam.was a creation of the Geneva partition of July 20, 1954. The Republic of Vietnam received slightly less than half of Vietnam's 127,000 square miles and retained approximately 11,900,000 of its population (since increased to about 15,200,000). It is from the Geneva Agreements that the re-emergence of Vietnam to independence can be dated. The Viet Minh, as we have noted, were given the northern half of Vietnam. In the.South, a new government, headed by Ngo Dinh Diem, a long-standing opponent of French colonialism, was installed, on July 7, 1954. Although Diem was nominally under the control of His Majesty Bao Dai, the Chief of the truncated State of Vietnam, he was given full civil and military powers and he was, little over a year later, to depose of his superior in a national referendum in which the Vietnamese people opted for a republic under Diem's direction. In 1956, a republican constitution for South Vietnam was promulgated, providing for an elective president, vice-president, and National Assembly, an independent judiciary, and a series of rights and freedoms similar to those found in constitutions of western nations. A written constitution does not, of course, necessarily correspond to political realities and, in the case of Vietnam, the political realities consisted of a highly centralized government directed by Ngo Dinh Diem with the increasing help of close members of his family. It is the brief period of modern Vietnamese indepen- dence--from 1954 to the beginning of 1963--that furnishes the backdrop of this study of American policy towards Vietnam. Before turning to an examination of American policy during this period, however, some attention should be given to the growing American involvement in Vietnamese affairs during the final years of French control over Vietnam's destiny. The United States, France, and Vietnam: 1950-1954 The United States became interested in France's relations with Vietnam during World War II, in connection with its own efforts to beat back the Japanese extension into Southeast Asia. American weapons and other material were parachuted to Vietnamese resistance forces within Vietname— mainly, because they were the organized, to the Viet Minh—- in return for which the United States and its Chinese ally were provided with intelligence about Japanese military activities within the country. In 1944, President Franklin Roosevelt directed his attention to policy towards this region. He remarked on one occasion that: France has had the country - thirty million inhabitants - for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning. . . . France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indochina are entitled to something better than that.8 Again, in 1945, Roosevelt spoke his mind about Vietnam's future. The French, he reiterated, had done nothing to improve the lot of the Indochinese people, and he suggested to both Premier Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that the area be placed under an international trusteeship until it should be ready for self-government.9 8Quoted in Hammer, op. cit., pp. 42-43. 9Allan B. Cole (ed.), Conflict in Indochina and International Reparcassions: A Documentary History, 194541955 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 47-48. In December, 1947, William C. Bullitt, former ambassador to 10 But neither Roosevelt nor his successor in office was willing to push any such scheme in the face of British and French hostility. Washington followed largely a hands-off policy toward Vietnam until the victory of the Chinese Communists in late 1949. The establishment of Communist authority over the great Chinese mainland changed radically the balance of power: China not only undertook to acquire the economic and social bases of a modern world power through a forced march. but, in addition, posed itself as an arch-enemy of American policies in Asia.10 The struggle between the French and the Viet Minh thus took on a highly important aspect to American policy-makers. In late January, 1950, the French National Assembly ratified agreements that gave Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos the status of Associate States within the French Union. This gave the cloak of legitimacy to the regime of His Majesty Bao Dai, which had been installed in Vietnam nearly a year before as a means of drawing off support from Viet Minh. (Bao Dai had resigned as hereditary ruler of Vietnam in 1945 on the heels of the Viet Minh proclamation of a Russia and France, seemed to express Washington's attitude .toward la sale gaerre. "The nub of the problem is . . . the establishment of cooperation between the French and the Annamite Vietnamese nationalists for the elimination of the Communists. That is not impossible because there.isno vital conflict between the real interests of the French and those of the Annamites." Ibid., p. 83. 10See J. H. Brimmell, Communism in South East Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 391-401. 11 Democratic Republic, and had spent much of the time between then and 1949 negotiating with the French over the conditions for his return to power.) The United States acted quickly upon the French action by extending recognition to all three of the Indochinese states; a total of 32 other nations also gave the Bao Dai regime their diplomatic recognition. The American action came in response to the actions of Communist-bloc nations, which had, only the month before, given their recognition to the resistance forces under Ho Chi Minh. To Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the Communist recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (which at that time was in firm control only of the back country of Tonkin) was proof that the Viet Minh regime was Communist and a "mortal enemy" of independence and nationalism.11 American recognition of the Associate State of Vietnam was predicated on "our fundamental policy of giving support to the peaceful and democratic evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government and independence."12 The American explanation appeared more as a rationalization to calm the American anti-colonialist conscience than an accurate reflection of the new state of affairs in Vietnam. 1Brookings Institution, Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy 1950 (Menasha, Wis.: George Banta Publishing Company, 1950), p..313. 12Department of State, Bulletin,. 22. (February 20, 1950), PP. 291-292. 12 After February, 1950, France continued to be the guardian of Vietnam's foreign policy; it maintained key political and economic controls over the domestic life of the country; and it continued to furnish the army that kept the war against the Viet Minh going. Indeed, the American aid that poured into Vietnam after the diplomatic recognition of the Bao Dai regime was channeled through French, not indigenous, authorities. On March 8, 1950, the United States agreed to send economic and military equipment "to the states of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and "13 After the outbreak of the Korean democratic development. War, in June of that year, President Truman ordered a heavy increase in military assistance to Indochina,l4 and in October it was announced that a Nulitary Assistance Advisory Group would be established in Saigon under the command of a brigadier general in order to handle the receipt and dis- tribution of military equipment and supplies sent to Vietnam.15 It is interesting to trace, through the monetary value of aid provided to France for the Indochina War, the growing involve- ment of the United States in Vietnamese affairs. For the 13Department of State, Bulletin, 22 (June 12, 1950), pp. 977-978. l4Hammer, op. cit., p. 271.. 15New Yerk Times, October 5, 1950, p. 4. 13 one-year period extending from July 1, 1950, American military aid in Indochina--practica11y all of which was used in Vietnam--totaled $119,000,000; for the succeeding year, it totaled more than $1,000,000,000. The total American allo- cation to Indochina for the four year period 1950-1954 came to about $2,600,000.16 By associating itself with the French military effort in Vietnam, the United States necessarily associated itself with French colonialism in that country, albeit a colonialism that was being rapidly dissipated as France, under the urgency of countering the Viet Minh appeal, transferred an increasing number of functions to Vietnamese hands. The United States regularly urged France to grant greater independence to its Indochinese states, but it was not strongly positioned to force French assent to its views. Writing for the New York ggmaa, in June, 1950, James Reston depicted the difficulty of the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in the following terms: He may want the French to be more liberal in Indochina, but it is the French who have the 170,000 troops in that country, and these troops are the main protection of the whole of Southeast AalaThe French were still loath to fight for French Indochina in order to set it free. Moreover, Mr. Acheson is in no position to put much pressure on 16William B. Dunn, "America and the Crisis in Vietnam," (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1960), p. 140. - See New Yerk Times, April 7, 1954, p. 1. Ibid., August 2, 1954, p. 2. l4 them to do so, for the last thing he can stand at this moment is another major defeat in Asia. America's difficulty in its Vietnam policy ran deeper. The United States was deeply committed to a strategy of containing Communist expansion. It viewed Vietnam, and the rest of Indochina, as of key importance to the political stability of all of Southeast Asia. This meant, as the Indochina War became more serious, that the United States leaned more and more heavily upon military means to achieve success and, inasmuch as France was pro- viding these means, it meant that it leand more and more heavily upon France as the agency by means of which the con— tainment of communism might be achieved. The irony of the American dependence upon a colonial power to accomplish its ends began to appear in 1953. In (April of that year, France put forth the suggestion that a settlement in Indochina be a condition for a settlement of the Korean War. In the French National Assembly, in June, 1953, Pierre Mendes—France spoke of the grave necessity for France to lighten its Indochina burden. This burden, Mendes-France said, "is a crushing weight on our shoulders and it gnaws away the vital forces of the nation."18 The United States was, by 1954, paying about 80 percent of the 17New York Times, May 7, 1950, Section IV, p. 3. 18Quoted in Dunn, op. cit., p. 153. 15 French costs for conducting the war, but, for France, this was not enough.19 The French economy was still being strained by France's own expenditures in Indochina, and the French government was demanding that even a greater proportion of the military expenses be borne by the United States. But France's problems were more than financial: it was engaged in a war whose prospects for victory were becoming increasingly dim: and, win or lose, it appeared that France's days in Vietnam were numbered, for the nationalists in Vietnam no less than the Communists were opposed to their country's subordination to France. Added to these unhappy prospects was the growing opposition to the war among the French people and the mounting attacks upon its continuation in the French National Assembly. In short, as the United States became more committed to France's cause in Indochina, the French became less interested in pursuing it.20 As one American diplomat in Saigon wryly remarked of his country's para- doxical position: "we are the last French colonialists in Indochina."21 19Hammer, op. cit., p. 313. Dunn states, "[America's] program of economic and technical assistance for Southeast Asia was continuously expanded, that for military aid grew from massive to monstrous." Dunn,.op. cit., p. 138. zoNew YorkTimes, April 23, 1953, p. 7. 21Hammer, op. cit., p. 319. 16 _Qaestionable Assumptions of American Poliay, 1950-1954 Ellen J. Hammer, a keen student of contemporary Vietnamese political affairs, has criticized United States policy toward Vietnam between 1950 and 1954 for acting under three false assumptions: that the French would grant complete sovereignty to the Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the event of a victory over the Viet Minh: that Bao Dai had substantial popular support and that his government was gaining in vitality: and lastly, that the French military position was constantly improving.22 The first indictment seems to be validated by France's persistent unwillingness to grant complete independence to Vietnam. Not until immediately before the Geneva Conference when all seemed lost did France offer complete independence. Bao Dai's reputation as a collaborator with the French, and his life of leisure in a critical period, when many Vietnamese ve- hemently disliked the French, are sufficient to give credence to Hammer's second observation. Lastly, for a brief period in 1950, before his death, General de Lattre de Tassigny, Commander in Chief of the French Expeditionary Forces, had grasped the offensive and won several important engagements. Nevertheless the rebel forces increased in number and 22Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina Continues (Palo Alto, Ca1.: Stanford University Press, 1956), pp. 142. l7 matured in combat skill.23 Early in 1954 John F. Kennedy, at the time Senator from Massachusetts, succinctly stated that the United States had been misled by the French: Every year we are given three sets of assurances: first, that the independence of the Associated States is now complete; second, that the independence of the.Associated States will soon be complete under steps "now" being taken: third, that military victory for the French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just around the corner. Both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations optimistically appraised the French military position in Indochina. In June, 1952, Dean Acheson spdke optimistically of victory by the Associated States since the Communist aggression had been checked and the three states had assumed a "constantly greater role" in their own self-government. "I do not think it is generally realized," Acheson said, "to what extent these new states in fact control their own affairs. Only a limited number of services related to the necessities of the war remain temporarily in French hands."25 General Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, declared in a speech made on February 23, 1954, that."the 23Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Vol. I (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), pp. 90-91. 24 ' John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 60. 25Department of State Bulletin, :26 (June 30, 1952), pp. 1009. 18 military situation in Indochina is favorable and the Viet Minh advances are largely 'real estate' operations without any military significance."26 From the beginning of its pre-l954 involvement, the United States neglected to take cognizance of the outstanding world phenomenon of the last two decades: the rise of Asian nationalism.27 It seriously underestimated the nationalistic appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh,28 the only effective force in Vietnam fighting for independence.29 This Asian ferment was seen by American policy-makers in the context of an East-west conflict. To the many Indochinese, however, the struggle was between independence and colonialism.30 America's approach to Asian nationalism has been in terms of vehement anti-Communism and military force. It would only be a slight exaggeration to say that in Vietnam, the American policy of aiding the French prevented the development of a strong independence movement that was at the same-time 26Ngo Ton Dat, "The Geneva Partition of Vietnam and the Question of Reunification During the First Two Years, August, 1954, to July, 1956" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963), pp. 59-60. 27Victor Purcell, "Indochina and the Prospect in South-East Asia," Yearbook of World Affairs, 1955 George W. Keeton (ed.)(London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1955), P. 126. 28New York Times, May 2, 1954, Section IV, p. 8. 29Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina Continues, p. l. 30Brookings Institution, Major Problems of United .gpates Foreign Poligy 1954 (Menasha, Wis.: George Banta Publishing Company, 1954), p. 299. 19 free of Communist direction. The significance of neglecting nationalism and acting under questionable assumptions in formulating and implementing foreign policy is that the United States had chosen to "oppose Vietnamese Communism almost entirely by military means" and thereby possibly -"failed to win the confidence of the Vietnamese people."31 It seems evident that from 1945 to 1954 the pre— eminent characteristic of France's relations with Indochina was the French incapacity to frame a policy for the successful conduct of the war.32 After four years of military assistance and financial support by France and the United States, the Bao Dai experiment failed to create a self-sustaining government. It did not have the support of the people, consequently it could not fulfill its primary mission of offering a positive alternative to the Viet Minh. On the contrary, Viet Minh strength increased. In early 1954, after an expenditure of over a billion dollars in United States aid, the military outlook in Vietnam was less hopeful than it was in early 1950, at the time Washington recognized the 33 "As American aid to the French increased State of Vietnam. so did the Chinese aid to the government of Ho Chi Minh. The Communist.threat to Indochina, far from diminishing, 31Hammer, The Straggle for IndochinayContinues, p. 2. 32Lancaster, op..cit., p. 264. 33 Dunn, op. cit., p. 162. 20 had increased to the point where, by the spring_of 1954, it seemed that only drastic measures could prevent a Viet Minh victory."34 . 34Miriam S. Farley, United States Relations with Southeast Asia: with Specific Reference to Indochina, 1950- 1954,(New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1955), . 4. 'U II THE UNITED STATES AT THE BRINK: 1954 At the beginning of 1954, the seriousness of the military situation in Vietnambecame rudely apparent. The French were not, as had been predicted, gaining the ascendancy over the Viet Minh: they were rather losing greater stretches of the countryside to them. A serious situation turned to imminent disaster when, in March, it became clear that the Viet Minh had surrounded a large French garrison at the military fortress of Dien Bien Phu, located in the mountainous terrain of north-western Vietnam, near the Laotian border, and were threatening to overwhelm it. The reaction of the Eisenhower Administration to the events of early 1954 deserve close scrutiny. These events are an important prelude to the Geneva Conference that began on.April 26. The Conference was to deal with problems relating to Korea and Indochina: only the latter phase is germane to this study. United Action and Allied Disunity .On February 9, 1954, Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, felt that the military situation was serious. 21 22 However, "a military victory would be perhaps both possible and probable."1 On February 10, before the engagement of Dien Bien.Phu began, President Eisenhower said he was "bitterly opposed" to sending American troops to Indochina.2 On March 10, Eisenhower promised that there would not be American involvement in war without a prior declaration from Congress.3 After a visit from General Paul Ely, French Chief of Staff, on March 20, the American view of the war began to change. Ely dissipated American optimism regarding a victory in Indochina.4 He drew Washington's attention.to the seriousness of French military position at the beleagured garrison at Dien Bien Phu. He told the Pentagon of the catastrophic implications of a defeat. Help was needed. Given increased American aid, Communist advances could be checked, as they had been in South Korea.5 Ely reported back 1Quoted in New Yerk Times, May 4, 1954, p. 4. 2N'ewY’or‘k Times, February 10, 1954, p. 1. For two reviews of official statements in the winter and spring of 1954, see New York Timap, May 4, 1954, p. 4, and Chalmers M. Roberts, "The Day WeiDidn't Go to War," Reporter, 11 (September 14, 1954), pp. 31-35. See also Marquis Childs, The Ragged Edge: yThe Diapyyof.a Crisis (Garden City, N Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), pp. 120-191: James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life, 40 (January 16, 1956), PP. 70-79. 3New Yerk Times, May 4, 1954, p. 4. 4Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, pa fin d'une guerre; Indochina 1954 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1960), p. 71. 51bid., p. 72. 23 to Paris that he recieved a "very definite impression" that Washington would be receptive to the idea of a massive air- strike to relieve the fortress at Dien Bien Phu.6 One reporter states that Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed American intervention to General Ely at a meeting at the Pentagon without being asked.7 Statements by top-level officials made in the next several weeks seemed to reflect a new and sterner policy for Indochina. On March 22, Admiral Radford said, "the French are going to-win. It is a fight that is going to be finished 8 On March 24, President Eisenhower stressed with our help." the "transcendent importance" of Southeast Asia to the free world.9 A few days later the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs announced that the retention of Indochina was "just as critical as the retention of Korea."10 6Quoted in Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 300. 7Roberts, op. cit., p. 32. It appears that someone who attended the April 3rd meeting "leaked" the story to Roberts. nuke Mansfield, a highly respected member of the Senate said, "I have a great deal of confidence/in Mr. Chalmers M. Roberts . . . ." After checking the April 3rd account of the secret meeting, he said, "I gather, there is no substantial dis— agreement with it." Congressional Record, 100 (June 9, 1954), p. 7919 and Ibid., (July 9, 1954), P. 10137. 8Quoted in Congressional Record, 100 (July 8, 1954), p. 10001. . 9New:XOrk Times, March 25, 1954, p. 1; Department of State, Bulletin, 1%) (April 12, 1954), pp. 539-542. 10William'B. Dunn, "America and the Crisis in Vietnam," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1960), p. 199. 24 Dulles was deeply concerned over the use of Chinese advisors and supplies in the siege of Dien Bien Phu. In a speech to the Overseas Press Club on March 29, he reiterated previous warnings designed to impress Communist China with the fact that aggression "might lead to action at places and.by means of the free world's choosing, so that aggression would cost more than it would gain." Dulles called for the collective defense of Southeast Asia. Communism should be met with "united action" which involves "serious risks."ll Eisenhower had called for "united action" as early as April, 1953,12 but now the term took on a more precise meaning. On April 3, the United States went to the brink of military intervention in Indochina. A top level policy meeting was held at the State Department. Eight prominent members of Congress attended along with three other high ranking government officials. Dulles and Radford led the discussion. The purpose of the secret meeting was to sound national leaders on a planned joint-Congressional resolution authorizing air-strikes to relieve Dien Bien Phu. Questions directed at Radford and Dulles revealed that air-strikes from.American carriers would probably mean war: Radford was the only member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who approved 11Quoted in New York Times, March 30, 1954, p. 4. 12"The free world . . . knows that aggressions in Korea and Southeast Asia.are threats to the whole free community to be met only through united action. . . ." Quoted in New York_$imes, May 4, 1954, p. 4. 25 of this plan and it was revealed that America's Western allies had not been consulted in the plan. All eight members of Congress thought that Dulles should get the cooperation of those allies who might be asked to participate in any united action in Vietnam. Dulles spent the next three weeks intensively trying to gain allied support for American inter- vention in Vietnam.',"3 On April 10, Dulles flew to London on "a mission of the purpose of which was to obtain British support for his "united action" plan.14 .This plan peace through strength, stipulated two preconditions for "united action." France must grant real independence to the Associated States with- in the French Union, and the allies, especially the Commonwealth nations, must share America's concern for Indo- china and therefore take an active part in any intervention.15 The talks revealed that Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, disapproved of an immediate "united action" l3Roberts, op. cit., pp. 31-32. The high-ranking officials who attended the meeting were: Under Secretary of Defense Roger Keys, Navy Secretary Robert B. Anderson: Thurston B. Morton, Dulles' assistant; the eight prominent .legislators were William Knowland, Eugene Millikin, Lyndon B. Jehnson, Richard B. Russell, Earle C. Clements, Joseph Martin, John W. MCCormack and J. Percy Priest. For an interesting discussion of Dulles' diplomacy in 1954 and 1955, see Charles 0. Lerche, "The United States, Great Britain and SEATO: A Case Study in the Fait Accompli," Journal of Politics, 18 (August, 1956), pp 459- 478. . l4 Quoted in Congressional Record, 100 (June 9, 1954), p. 7919. ' 15Roberts, 0 . cit., p. 34. 26 intervention. Dulles' plan for air-strikes had to be cancelled.16 Washington acknowledged the grave importance of Indochina, but felt it could not "go it alone." Over 30,000 American fighting men had been lost in the Korean War. The cost of an Indochinese war would probably be as great or greater, according to General Matthew Ridgeway;l7 therefore, a strong prior allied commitment was considered essential. At the conclusion of the talks in London a communique was issued saying, in part, that "we are ready" to examine the "possibility of establishing a collective defense. . . . in SoutheastAsia.18 Dulles thought that an ad pap organization should be set up at once to give the allies a united front at the forthcoming Geneva Conference. He therefore called a meeting on April 20 of ten nations principally concerned with Indochina to begin talks on the formulation of a collective defense organization in Southeast Asia. Eden, upon hearing of the proposed drafting meeting, instructed England's Ambassador to the United States, Roger Makin, not to attend. Evidently there was a misunderstanding regarding the word "ready." Dulles thought Eden had reneged 16Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Vol. I (Boston: Heughton Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 107-108. 17Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960), p. 119. 18Quoted in Eden, op. cit., p. 109. 27 on a commitment to form a Southeast Asian organization.19 The creation of a "united front" did not materialize. Dulles could not persuade Eden to join an immediate inter- vention, nor to agree to a collective defense organization, nor to agree to concur in an allied minatory declaration regarding Indochina. Eden would not consider a collective defense organization while the Geneva Conference was in session. He thought that such an organization would seriously prejudice the chances of a settlement at Geneva. The British Foreign Secretary further disagreed with Dulles' view that a "united front" would deter Communist China from supplying the Viet Minh.20 During the month of April, the military situation at Dien Bien Phu had steadily deteriorated. The Eisenhower Administration continued to stress the strategic importance of Indochina. On April 7, Eisenhower likened Indochina to the first of a "row of dominoes": if it should fall all of Southeast Asia would be lost. A week later Radford said Indochina's loss "would be a prelude to the loss of all Southeast Asia and a threat to a far wider area."21 On April 16 in an "off the record" talk, Vice-President Richard M. Nixon spoke of the "futility of negotiation" with the IIIELQ-, pp. 110-111; Roberts, loc. cit. ZoEden, op. cit., pp. 104, 114; "A NATO for South East Asia, " Economist, 171 (April 17, 1954), p.165. 21Quoted in New York Times, May 4, 1954, p. 4. 28 Communists. Britain and France, he continued, should adopt Dulles' plan for "united action." A retreat in Asia must be avoided even if "the Administration should have to face up to the situation and dispatch forces."22 On April 22, Dulles met again with Eden. Dulles still spoke of an ag.hpp coalition of nations to be organized as soon as possible. On the following day a message came from General Henri-Eugene Navarre, then the Indochina commander, saying that the situation at Dien Bien Phu had become desperate. Navarre urgently requested a major United States air-strike within 72 hours: otherwise the fortress would be lost. The French General Staff thought that an air-strike would destroy a large part of the Viet Minh attacking force and thereby boost the defenders' morale.23 The British General Staff disagreed. It thought that an air-intervention, at this time, could have no appreciable effect on the battle.24 The American Joint Chiefs of Staff, except for Radford, thought that an intervention could not succeed without ground forces.25 Eden thought an intervention might expand the war to international proportions. He predicted that ground troops 22Quoted in Ibid., April 17, 1954, p. 1. 23Eden, op. cit., pp. 111-112. ' 24Ibid., p. 114. 25New Yerk Times, June 16, 1954, p.38. 29 would have to be called within 48 hours after the air- strikes. On April 24, Dulles privately told Eden thathrance could not be kept in the fight unless the United States did what it could "within the President's Constitutional powers" 26 Neither Dulles nor to join French forces in the fight. Radford was explicit as to how the allies were to join the French in their fight. The British Government's decision came on April 24, and in effect, vetoed Dulles' "united action" plan for Indochina that was tentatively scheduled to go into operation on April 28th.27 .The following day brought a new note to an old melody. At a meeting at the Quai d'Orsay, Dulles acknowledged that it was too late to save Dien Bien Phu. Nevertheless, the United States would immediately organize the entire Indochina region if France would promise to remain in the-war. If France and the other allies were amenable, the United States, according to Eden, planned to "move armed forces into Indochina" and internationalize the struggle in an attempt to protect SoutheastAsia.28 Neither France nor England was enthusiastic at the prospect of a world war. After Eden flew to London to consult 26Quoted in Eden, op. cit., p. 114. 27Ibid., p. 117. 281bid., p. 116. 30 Prime Munister Winston Churchill, British support for any American intervention was flatly refused. On April 27, Winston Churchill announced to a cheering House of Commons that the British Government was "not pre- pared to give any undertaking about United Kingdom military action in advance of the results of Geneva." Churchill felt that he was being asked to sanction a plan that would mislead I Congress and, furthermore, might lead to a major war.29 America's Role at the Geneva Conference The Geneva Conference began on April 26. Eden has reported that the issue of "intervention continued to dog us." Dulles took a new tack. On May 1, his position was that British “moral support, not military assistance, was needed for "united action."30 In other words, Dulles' original position in early April on "united action," had shifted. He had then asked England, and the other allies, for real participation: now he wanted moral support for his plan to intervene in Indochina. The exact type of action Dulles had in mind remained vague from Britain's perspective. Eden would not change his stand, and was still firmly set against intervention. Eden and Dulles were at loggerheads. In April and May there was no allied policy with respect to the conditions for a settlement at Geneva. Rather 29 Ibid., p. 117. 3°1bid., pp. 121, 126. 31 there were three separate policies: ‘Washington wanted to seek a solution to the Indochina crisis outside the Conference .yia intervention: London wanted to negotiate a settlement; and Paris wanted an American intervention to save Dien Bien Phu but did not want to internationalize the conflict.31 It was no secret that many United States officials considered the Conference a waste of time. Eisenhower saw ‘the Conference as a maneuver by the Communists in order that they might gain time-to build-up their military strength.32 Dulles was not at all sanguine about an honorable peace and believed the battlefield rather than the conference table was the best solution. On May 4, he departed from Geneva. This unexpected move appeared to be a protest against the prob- ability of a harsh settlement. Dulles persisted in favoring a collective defense organization for Southeast Asia. He remained opposed to the partition of Vietnam until late June. He refused to negotiate with Chou-En-lai. Indeed, Dulles even refused to acknowledge his presence for fear of being attacked by right-wing Republicans for truckling with the enemy. In short, any settlement of the Indochina War, short of military defeat of the Viet Minh seemed unacceptable to the United States.33 . 31"Mr. Dulles in Paris," Economist, 171 (April 17, 1954), p. 174. 32Eden, op. cit., p. 144. 33New Yerk Times, May 2, 1954, p. 3. 32 On May 8, 1954, under the most unpropitious circum- stances, the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference began. The beleaguered and battered fortress at Dien Bien Phu had fallen on May 7 and with it any realistic hope of a French victory over the Viet Minh in Indochina.34 The significance of Dien Bien Phu as a symbol of French strength was extremely important.35 With its loss the symbol was shattered. The Viet Minh could negotiate from a position of strength since they had decisively beaten the cream of the French forces. The weak French government wanted peace and came to Geneva to try to find an acceptable political settlement to a military situation that seemed untenable. The Russians, Chinese and English wanted to prevent the internationalizing of the conflict in Indochina. It was fundamental to United States over-all policy to negotiate from a "position of strength." Without over- whelming military superiority Dulles maintained that the Communistswould exploit the West's inaction as a sign of disunity.36 Dulles thought it necessary, at least until the latter part of June, for the allies to unite in some manner in order to indicate a readiness to take forceful action in Indochina should the Conference fail or should the 34Lancaster, op..cit., p. 318. 35Eden, op. cit., p. 126. 36John Foster Dulles, "The Issues at Geneva," Department of State Press Release No. 238 (May 7, 1954), pp. 2,4. 33 Communists demand too much at the bargaining table. Only in this way, he felt, could the allies overcome their negotiating weakness at Geneva. If ten nations could unite, Dulles thought, the threat of a combined intervention would be a cogent reason for the Communists to temper their demands. The American delegation at Geneva was "deeply aggrieved," according to Eden, when England repeatedly refused to go along with Dulles' "united action" proposal.37 In late May, the American delegation at Geneva acknowledged that concessions to the Communists would have to be made. American policy at the Conference was directed towards limiting the extent of the concessions. This new -1ine ruled out any armistice that would give all of Indochina to the Communists.38 In June, Mr. Dulles was still talking about a "united action." On June 9, he asserted that "united action" was just as practicable as it had been on-April 16, 1953, when President Eisenhower first mentioned the term. Dulles thought the negotiations at Geneva were sufficiently "barren" that the British would now consider alternatives.39 The outlook for a settlement looked dim. On June 20, Walter Bedell Smith, the head of the American delegation departed from the Conference leaving U. Alexis Johnson, United States 37Eden, op. cit., p. 127. 38New Yprk Times, May 26, 1954, pp. 1-2: Ibid., June 24, 1954] p. 130 ‘ 3911231., June 9. 1954. p. 1; Ibid., June 16, 1954, p. 2. 34 Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, in charge. A visit to the United States by Prime Minister Churchill on June 24 improved Anglo-American relations. Following his visit, the British and American governments in a joint statement warned Communist China that "the inter- national situation would be seriously aggravated" if the French were "confronted with demands which prevented an 40 acceptable agreement regarding Indochina." The two countries agreed to seven points essential to an acceptable settlement. For the first time since the beginning of the Conference the United States had a policy other than intervention or the formation of a Southeast Asian collective security organi- zation. The joint memorandum which was not disclosed publicly at the time, is worth quoting in full since it corresponds closely to the final agreement at Geneva. 1) To preserve the integrity and independence of Laos and Cambodia by assuring the retreat of the Viet Minh forces from the two countries. 2) To preserve at least the southern half of Vietnam and, if possible, an enclave in the northern delta, the line of demarcation of which should not pass south of Dong-Hoi (to the north of the 17th parallel). 3) Not to impose any restrictions on Cambodia, Laos or the prereserved part of Vietnam to maintain stable non-communist regimes, especially on the right to maintain sufficient forces for internal security or on the right to import arms and call upon foreign advisors. 40Quoted in Ibid., June 29, 1954, p. l. 35 4) Not contain any political clause which might lead to the loss of the preserved zones to the benefit of the Communists. 5) Not to exclude the possibility of a later unifi- cation of Vietnam by peaceful means. 6) To permit the transfer under humane and peaceful conditions, and under international control, of all those who wish to pass from one zone of Vietnam into another. 7) To provide for an effective system of inter- national control.4 Mendes-France had established a 30-day deadline for concluding an agreement when he became Premier of France on June 20. Dulles was fearful that this deadline would pressure France into accepting a bad bargain. Therefore, he had refused to return to Geneva, and it was only at Mendes- France's urgent request that he finally agreed to visit Paris on July 13. The French Premier never told Dulles that a satisfactory settlement would be facilitated if there was a high-ranking American delegate at Geneva. Dulles, however, maintained before Mendes-France that "in any case, the accord which you will sign at Geneva will be bad. we cannot be present without the appearance of favoring a new Yalta."42 Mendes-France evidently dispelled Dulles' suspicions that France would seek "peace at any-price" and depart from the 7-point United States-British memorandum of June 29.43 41Quoted in Lacouture et Devillers, op. cit., pp. 244-245. 42Quoted in Ibid., p. 249. 43W: July 20, 1954, p. 2. 36 The indefatigable Secretary of State returned to Washington on July 16 claiming that "a formula for Allied unity had been found" which would not compromise America's principles and which would have beneficial effect on the outcome of the Geneva Conference.44 Walter Bedell Smith was sent back to Geneva. He arrived on July 17 for the final phase of the Conference. The Final Agreement at Geneva, Julyy2QL,l954 On July 20, 1954, the armistice bringing peace to Indochina was signed by General Delteil representing France and by Ta Quang Buu representing the Viet Minh. The United States refused to sign the final agreement on the grounds that it had no "primary responsibility in the Indochina war."45 More to the point, Dulles did not want to "sanctify" an agreement which placed millions of persons under Communist 46 rule. ."We can accept such things as a fact," Dulles said, and he added: we can accept them as something we do not consider it right to go to war about, as we have in North Korea, in East Berlin, in Austria, and in the satellites. But we cannot endorse it and guarantee to the Communists the enjoyment of the fruits of their aggression. 44Quoted in Ibid., July 15, 1954, p. 1. 4SDulles quoted in New York Times, July 15, 1954, p. 4. 45Ibid., June 29, 1954, p. 3. 47Quoted in John Robinson Beal, John FosterDulles: 1888-1959 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 216. 37 President Eisenhower conceded that the agreement "contained many features which we do not like."48 Walter Bedell Smith, Special Ambassador to the Geneva Conference, made an official statement saying in part.that.the United States would: refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them [the agreements] . . . and it would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.49 Smith tersely summed-up the Conference when he said that "diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield."50 It seems as though Dulles' conduct during the Conference, as well as his decision not to underwrite the final agreement, was influenced by domestic considerations. He was aware that a Communist victory would raise a furor with a powerful group in Congress51 who saw any compromise 48Department of State, Bulletin, 80 (August 2, 1954), pp. 162-163. 49Quoted in Allan B. Cole (ed.), Conflict inIndochina' and International Rapercussions (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 175. 50Quoted in New Ybrk Times, July 24, 1954, p. 4. 51Senators Joseph McCarthy, William Knowland, William Jenner, Styles Bridges, Homer Ferguson, and H. Alexander Smith were members of this conservative Republican group. See James Reston, "Now Dulles Under Fire," New Yerk:gimes, February 24, 1954, p. 2; Norman A. Graebner, The.New Isolationism: A Stud in Politics and Forei Polic Since 1950 (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1956), pp. 166-167. 38 with the Communists as a defeat. The aggressive attitude of this impetuous group is best typified by the remarks of the Republican Senate leader, William F. Knowland, when he spoke of France and Britain as preparing to negotiate a Far Eastern ."Munich." "When you yield to international blackmail," he 52 The said, "it is surrender on the installment plan." Republican's policy at Geneva was also criticized by Democratic Senator Mansfield. He assailed the Eisenhower Administration for incurring a diplomatic defeat in Indochina in seeking a military answer to a political problem. Mansfield charged that the Conference was a failure in American policy because an “all or nothing" solution was sought. He claimed that the Chinese Communist regime gained a firm foothold in Southeast Asia and enhanced their international stature.53 The settlement that split Vietnam at the 17th parallel was generous for the west, extending beyond what the military and political situation dictated.54 Realistically, partition was probably the best solution that the western powers Could have hoped for. The armistice had succeeded in reducing the chances of an international crisis. Tensions had subsided as the Conference ended and as the United States 5ZQuoted in New York Times, May 4, 1954, p. 4. 53Congressional Record, 100 (July 8, 1954), pp. 9997-9998, 10001. . 54Hans J. Morgenthau, "Vietnam -- Another Korea?" Commentary, 33 (May, 1962), p. 370. 39 retreated from.the brink of intervention. Ironically, the independence that the Vietnamese had fought for had been realized in a peace that ruptured the nation. The Viet Minh achieved recognized control over half of Vietnam. If they had pushed too far or too hard the United States might well have intervened. There would also ‘have been the risk of alienating the Colombo Powers.55 ~Perhaps the Viet Minh calculated that the free elections to be held in the summer of 1956, as stipulated in the Geneva Agreements, would unite the country under the aegis of their celebrated leader, Ho Chi Minh. If so, they were naive. But few other delegates at Geneva seriously believed dif- ferently. A legal occupation of South Vietnam seemed inevitable.56 The Great Powers, other than the United States, were reasonably pleased with the settlement. The French had finally ended an unpopular and costly war. They defended their action against Dulles' charges that it was a disaster to negotiate a peace with the Communists by replying that 57 the United States had done.the same thininn Korea. Domestic political instability had weakened France's government 55."The,Bal-ance Sheet of Geneva," New Statesman and Nation, 67 (July 24, 1954), p. 89. The Colombo Powers are India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia. 56Beal, op. cit., p. 214. 57New York Times, February 4, 1954, p. l. 40 and almost mandated the decision to end the war. Premier Mendes-France had pledged that if a settlement was not reached by July 20 he would strongly urge reinforcing the Expedionary Force in Indochina with French conscripts: previously only regular army officers, volunteers, and foreign legionnaires had been used. Then he would resign. The use of Frenchmen in Indochina would increase the size and the cost of the war of attrition. If Mendes-France hadresigned, as he threatened to do, further disorder would be heaped on a government already beset by acute financial difficulties.58 A "favorable and honorable" settlement for France was achieved. Anthony Eden maintained that the partition was the least damaging solution and thought that America's persistent saber-rattling would lessen the possibility of a settlement at Geneva.59 A "threat of intervention," seemed to be behind the repeated compromises of the Communist bloc. Eden said, "I was sharply conscious of the deterrent power of the hydrogen bomb . . . I do not believe that we should have got through the Geneva Conference and avoided a major war.without it."60 581bid., July 18, 1954, p. 1. 59Lancaster, op. cit., p. 321. 6OEden, op. cit., p. 139. The Chinese, according to. Eden, believed with some justification, that the Americans were on the brink of attacking them. Eden, op. cit., p. 135. 41 Molotov praised Anthony Eden's role at the Conference, which he said "cannot be exaggerated." Eden risked being called an appeaser61 when he acted as a conciliator and liaison between the Communist and American delegations. He 'skillfully used the lever of a third world war to move Chou En-lai and Molotov toward compromise. The main-spring in this level seemed to be the possible use of atomic weapons by the United States, if the Conference failed to reach an acceptable settlement.62 61Quoted in George Glasgow, "War and the Method," Contemporary Review, 186 (September, 1954), p. 182. 62The answer to two questions at a press conference inferentially supports the claim that atomic weapons would have been used if the Conference failed. "Question: Mr. Secretary (Dulles), one of the points made here is a claim the Indochina settlement reached at Geneva was a victory for our policy of deterrence. I'd like to know, sir, in what respect did we put the Chinese Communists on notice or warning that, unless they accepted this settlement, which I recall we didn't like very well at the time, we would do all kinds of drastic things to them? "Answer: There was a program for 'united action' in the area and you will recall that I went first to London and then to Paris and reached what I thought was an agreement on 'united action.‘ We had hoped to get the united action into force-promptly and before the Geneva Conference was held. HOwever, later on it developed that the British and the French preferred to wait and see what came out of the Geneva armistice talks before agreeing to the 'united action' proposal. Therefore, it was a matter of common knowledge, all the world knew, that if there should be a breakdown of the Geneva talks then the British and French were prepared to go ahead with us on the program of 'united action' which we had announced in advance. "Question: Mr. Secretary, did that program in any way imply the possible use of atomic bombardment of South China in the event they moved.into Indochina with their .troops? - -"Answer: It involved, if necessary a common military effort there with whatever weapons would be 42 Conclusions Dulles' Indochina policy is explained when he stated, "I believe that in general most of our problems came from not making sufficiently clear in advance what the dangers "63 Dulles made it clear to are to a potential aggressor. the Chinese that there was a definite danger of total war. The chance of a Chinese miscalculation concerning the use of troops in Indochina or encouraging a harsh peace at Geneva was greatly lessened. The weakness of peripheral containment of Communism by threatening massive retaliation did not (and has not) deterred Communist aggression in Indochina, even though it probably was a cause of a generous partition of Vietnam for the Western powers. Dulles' persistent quest for a collective security pact in Southeast Asia as a vehicle for intervention in Indochina exemplified the narrowing of policy alternatives. It was difficult for the Republicans to compromise at Geneva because of their strong election campaign castigating the Democrats for failing to hold the line against the implacable Communists. They charged the Democrats had "waged war in Korea without the will to victory . . . and by their appropriate." Quoted in New York Times, January 12, 1956, p. 10. To the writer's knowledge, England has never accepted Dulles' stand. 63 Quoted in New York Times, April 1, 1954, p. l. 43 hampering orders [had] produced stalemates and ignominious bartering with our enemies."64 Perhaps these denunciations implicitly committed the Republicans to a strong, and in- advertently more rigid, foreign policy than the situation at Geneva dictated.65 The "new look" in American cold war strategy of emphasizing massive retaliation and placing less reliance on local defenses did not seem to appreciate the means of combatting Communist irregular warfare nor could it reconcile the dilemma of supporting a strong military position in Vietnam while trying to foster a healthy independent government.66 The United States did not want to fight another Korean-type war which in General Ridgeway's terms would be a "harebrained tactical scheme,"67 costing thousands of American lives. Air-strikes on the jungle fortress at Dien Bien Phu quite possibly whould have escalated the war to international proportions and quite probably would not have been decisive without a major landing of ground forces. In the final analysis, John Foster Dulles made the best of a 64Quoted in Herbert Agar, The Price of Power: America Since 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 164-165. 65Farler OB. Cite, pp. 7-8. 66Ibid., p. 4. 67 Matthew B. Ridgeway, Soldier:‘ The Memoirs of - Matthew B. Ridgeway (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 278. 44 bad situation at the Geneva Conference. He reluctantly balanced a basic principle of not yielding to Communism with French necessities of ending an agonizing war. This balance reduced world tensions and facilitated a generous peace for the Western powers. III AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD VIETNAM: PERIOD OF CONSOLIDATION, 1954-1956 The political situation in Vietnam immediately following the Geneva Conference consisted of a series of crises. Each crisis threatened Ngo Dinh Diem's position. His survival as Premier is due in part to his obstinacy and courage and in part to the support rendered him by the United States. This chapter examines American policy during this crucial period. After the Geneva Conference, American policy-makers were confronted with a difficult situation. Geographically, Vietnam was truncated; economically, it was depressed. The viability of the infant government of Ngo Dinh Diem seemed uncertain. In June, 1954, Bao Dai, Chief of State had designated Diem as his premier, giving him."fu11 powers" over governmental matters.1 But Premier Diem's authority was in fact quite limited. He did not control the army: the militant Hao Hao and Cao Dai religious sects were lB-Co, "Indochina: The Unfinished Struggle," world Today, 12 (January, 1956), p. 23. 45 46 threatening to overturn him, and a gangster-like organization called the Binh Xuyen was running Saigon.2 The prdblems confronting Ngo Dinh Diem seemed.insur- mountable. The guerrilla war that had been waged since 1946 was not transferred to the political plane. "Nothing short wrote Ellen Hammer, "would be enough 3 of a political genius, to cope with the situation." It was against this troubled background that Senator Mansfield made his now well-known Report on Indochina, on October 15, 1954. After an analysis of the grave situation, Mansfield praised Diem for his "intense nationalism and equally intense incorruptibility. . . ."4 Diem's government, Mansfield said, was "based on sound principles of national independence, an end to corruption. . . ."5 The Senate's Southeast Asia expert concluded his report with a recommen- dation: ."In the event that the Diem government falls . . . 2Francis J. Corley, "Vietnam Since Geneva," Thought, 33 (Winter, 1958-59), p. 534. See Bernard Fall, "The Political- Religious Sects of Vietnam,” Pacific Affairs, 28 (September, 1955), pp. 235-523. Miriam S. Farley, "Vietnam Kaleidescope," Far Eastern Survey, 24 (May, 1955), pp. 77-78. 3Quoted by Joseph Buttinger, "The Miracle of Vietnam," in Richard w. Lindholm (ed.), Vietnam: The First Five Years, (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1959), p. 30. 4U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Mike Mansfield, Report on Indochina, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., October, 1954, p. 10. 51bid., p. 14. 47 the United States should consider an immediate suspension of all aid, . . . except that of a humanitarian nature."6 Mansfield's report helped crystallize American policy toward Vietnam, and marks the beginning of determined American support for Ngo Dinh Diem. This support was based principally on two factors: Diem had a reputation for integrity and patriotism, and he seemed to be the best, if not the only, choice avail- able.7 The first major internal threat Diem had to face after coming to power was the opposition of General Nguyen Van Hinh, Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army. This opposition consisted of two dissident religious sects, a militant gangster-like organization which controlled Saigon's police, and a national army which apparently owed its loyalty to Hinh. Premier Diem suspected a coup d'etat. He therefore ordered the recalcitrant pro-French Chief of Staff to leave on September 11, 1954, for a vacation in France, which in effect exiled him.8 This was a bold move since General Hinh commanded the army. Hinh refused to obey the Premier's directive. The crisis that ensued lasted 6Idem. 7Miriam S. Farley, United States Relations with éflaatheaat Asia: with Specific Reference to Indochina! 1950- léfléfi (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1955), 55. See Senator Mike Mansfield's comments, Comess'ional Record, 101 (May 2, 1955), p. 5290. . 8New York Times, September 12, 1954, p. l. 48 several weeks. In this chaotic period there was no effective government.9 Premier Diem's days seemed numbered. Direct American intervention, however, helped stave off a possible military pppp 10 On November 17, upon his arrival in Vietnam, General J. Lawton Collins, President Eisenhower's Special Envoy, said that the United States was not interested in "training or otherwise aiding a Vietnamese army that did not give complete and implicit obedience to its premier."11 While in Saigon General Collins cautioned officers of the Vietnamese army that the United States would give "every possible aid to the Government of Ngo Dinh Diem and to his 12 If Mansfield's Report on Indochina was I the birth of United States policy toward Vietnam, CollinS' Government only." warning to General Hinh was its christening. . Pressure was exerted by the United States on Bao Dai to ask his Chief of Staff to leave for France.13 Since __T_. 9Brian Crozier, "The Diem Regime in Southern Vietnam,‘ Far Eastern Survey, 29 (April, 1955), P. 51. 10"General Hinh talked openly of plans to seize the government by a coupyde main." Corley, op. cit., p. 542. Alt is no exaggeration to say," commented an observer who was on the scene, "that today [late June 1954] the President's (Sip: Premiers?] power ends at the gates of his governmental palace." Peter Schmid, "Free Indochina Fights Against Time," Commentary, 19 (January, 1955), p. 28. 11Quoted in New York Times, November 17, 1954, p. 14. 12Quoted in Farley, op. cit., p. 56. 13Crozier, loc. cit. 49 Washington was paying for the maintenance of the army, which included the salaries of the soldiers, General Hinh thought he had better not jeopardize economic and military aid. Leaving Saigon on November 18, Hinh said, I only had to lift my telephone and the coup d'etat would have been over. Nothing could have opposed the army. But the Americans let me know that if that happened, dollar help would be cut off. The country cannot survive without American help. We would only have played into the Viets' [Viet Minh's] hands with a revolt.14 The chances of bloodshed were reduced when Hinh was removed from the country. Bao Dai dismissed his Chief of Staff on November 29.15 On October 24, the United States decided that effective, January 1, 1955, American aid would be channeled directly to Vietnam. Hitherto, aid had been given primarily through French authorities. President Eisenhower expected that "this aid will be met by the Government of Vietnam in undertaking needed reforms."l6 Possibly these "needed reforms" meant a more compromising attitude by Diem toward the dissident sects. Donald R. Heath, United States Ambassador and General Paul Ely, FrenCh Commissioner General 14Quoted in Schmid, loc. cit. 15Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 350. 16Quoted in New York Times, October 25, 1954, p. 6 President Eisenhower in a letter to Premier Diem allegedly speaks of "indispensable reforms." The letter must be viewed with reservations since the account published in the Times was a French version and France favored the removal of Diem in the fall of 1954. 50 had allegedly urged Diem throughout his first months in power to take the leaders of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects into his cabinet.17 On September 25, Diem consented to form a more representative government. It seems likely that American aid and support were conditioned on the Premier's inviting representatives of the different sects into his shaky government. In other words, increased direct aid from the United States was dependent on "indispensable reforms" which seemed to amount to forming a coalition cabinet. According to one American expert on the scene, "the United States was now exerting the greatest amount of influence on political events in Vietnam."18 The crises continued. There was a mutual antipathy between the francophobic Diem and the francophilic Bao Dai. The Chief of State, with French backing, attempted to cut away Diem's political support. He did this by encouraging an anti-Diem coalition called the United National Front, established on March 4, 1955. It was comprised of the leaders of the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen armies. ~The United Front coalition wanted to keep its armies independent and to remain sovereign over the territories it dominated.19 On ”Trig” October 13, 1954, p. 3. 18Wesley R. Fishel, "Problems of Democratic Growth in Free Vietnam" in Wesley R. Fishel (ed.), Problems o§_Freedom: South Vietnam Since Independence (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 13. 19New York Times, March 27, 1955, Sect. IV, p. 5. 51 March 21, the United Front issued Diem an ultimatum: it gave the Premier five days to replace his cabinet with a 20 21 five-man council. Diem refused to accept this ultimatum. An armed clash seemed imminent. In early March Bao Dai received a letter from the United Front asking for the Premier's removal.22 Even though it seemed that the Chief of State favored such a move he hesitated. His support for the United Front became luke- warm. In all likelihood this was due.to a personal letter 23 While he received from President Eisenhower on March 9. the contents of the letter are unknown, it seems safe to surmise that it reminded the Chief of State that the United States was supporting the legal government of Ngo Dinh Diem. In April General Collins wavered in his support for Diem. He seemed to favor the French view that the first step in finding a solution to the crisis in Vietnam was to get rid of Diem. When Collins returned to Washington on April 20 he was reported to recommend the replacement of Diem by another premier more acceptable to the French and the sects.24 According to one close American observer of 20Crozier, op. cit., p. 53. 21Fall, op. cit., p. 252. 22New York Times, March 11, 1955, p. 2. 23Lancaster, op. cit., p. 390. 24Wells C. Klein and Marjorie Weiner, "Vietnam," in George.MeTurnan Dahin (ed.), Government and Plitics in~South-- east Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1959), p. 340. 52 Vietnamese events, this recommendatidn was made at a meeting of the National Security Council.25 Homer Bigart of the New York Times writes that Colonel (now Major General) Edward G. Lansdale, the Premier's military advisor, per- suaded Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, that the United States should stick with Diem. -The CIA chief convinced his brother, John Foster Dulles, that Lansdale was right, Collinswrong.26 In late April, 1955, American policy wavered.27 Diem was advised to avoid a military showdown with the sects.28 General Collins feared that open fighting might provo e‘an all—out civil war. A Vietnamese spokesman, commenting on Diem's contemplated attack on the Binh Xuyen, said: Our hands have been tied by the intervention of General Collins. He wants us to wait six more days, but I doubt if Premier Ngo Dinh Diem can do that. The people want something done about the Binh Xuyen whom they fear and hate.29 Disregarding American advice Diem decided forcefully to eliminate opposition elements. He said, "We are determined 25New York Times, July 25, 1962, p. 4. zéggngregpional Record, 101 (May 2, 1955), p. 5290. 27Wesley R. Fishel, "Free Vietnam Since Geneva," Yale Review, 49 (September, 1959), p. 72. Fishel states, "The American special envoy in Saigon insisted that the government try to negotiate a settlement. Ngo refused, and within a few days the vice gang's forces were routed and their leaders fled the country." 28Quoted in New York Times, April 1, 1955, p. 7. 291219,, April 28, 1955, p. 11. 53 to give the final blow to the Binh Xuyen, otherwise this business will never finish. If the Army is independent of the Government and the police are independent of the Government, then there is no Government."30 A pitched battle with the Binh Xuyen Was fought and won in the streets of Saigon. Once the battle began on April 28, the New York .Timaa reported on the following day the "united States [was] giving Premier Diem all possible backing in his struggle with the rebellious Binh Xuyen."31 Troops of the Hoa Hao sect took to.the hinterland and were put on the defensive. In late June, 1955, all organized sect resistance was ended.32 April and May were months of civil strife and turmoil. On May 4, General Collins allegedly told a group of American correspondents in Saigon that he favored a Vietnamese constitutional monarchy with Bao Dai as the Chief of State.33 This statement apparently indicated that Collins favored a compromise settlement between Diem and the sects that would avoid bloodshed. Two days later the State Department dis- avowed any intention of supporting Bao Dai.34 391219., April 29, 1955, p. 1. 31Fall, op. cit., p. 253. 32New York Times, May 5, 1955, p. 7. 33ipig., May 7, 1955, p. 1; Ibid.,.May 8,.1955, p. 1. 34Congressional Record, 101 (May 2, 1955), p. 5290. 54 A debate in the Senate on May 2, 1955, lends credence to the charge that American policy wavered during the period immediately preceding the armed clash with the Binh Xuyen. It was a confusing and critical period in Vietnam. Senator Mansfield reiterated his recommendation that the "immediate suspension of all aid" should occur if Diem.was overthrown, but Senator Hubert Humphrey praised Diem's independent regime as worthy of the "wholehearted support of the American Government and our foreign policy." I was pleased to see . . . that we again clarified our policy. But we cannot have these hot and cold flashes. We cannot have a policy that is in and out, that is certain and uncertain. There has been entirely too much of this. We must make our policy clear, because to waver and indicate any doubt or uncertainty is to play into gge hands of the rebel forces in South Vietnam. . [Italics added] Mansfield denied the allegation that American policy had wavered. _"There has been no letdown in our support of Premier Diem."36 Humphrey retorted that United States policy did waver and that the State Department had permitted the situation to "drift." He referred particularly to American pressure on Diem to form a coalition government in late April. The debate ended with Mansfield discounting certain news- paper accounts that were mentioned by Humphrey. Mansfield reminded his colleague "that the first thing General Collins did upon his arrival at Saigon this morning [May 2] was to 351bid., p. 5291. 36Idem. 55 have a conference with Premier Diem, and to reaffirm, once again, the support of the United States Government of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem."37 On May 11, Humphrey again charged that "from time to time within the past month our Government's policy has been unclear, dubious and at times vacillating, in reference to free Vietnam." He said that General Collins had exerted pressure on Diem to form a coalition government. Moreover, according to Humphrey, Collins was reported to have recom- mended that, "we might let the government of free Vietnam go by the board unless there was a coalition. . . ." It seemed "incredible that we should waver at this critical hour," Humphrey continued. This political bargaining was beneath the dignity of the United States.38 As long as the absent Chief of State plotted with France, Diem's position was endangered. On April 29, 1955, Bao Dai summoned his premier to Cannes.39 Diem refused to leave Vietnam: his departure might have meant his dismissal. Edgar Faure, France's Prime Minister, felt that "for some time past [Ngo Dinh Diem's] government has not been well adapted to discharge the mission with which it has been 40 entrusted." Pressure by France and Britain to back Bao Dai 37CongressionalRecord, 101 (May 11, 1955), p. 6103. 38New York Times, April 29, 1955, p. 3. 39Quoted in Lancaster, op. cit., p. 390. 40New York Times, May 8, 1955, p. l. 56 was resisted by Secretary Dulles.41 The French, who were largely responsible for Diem's appointment, foresaw the extinction of French influence and commercial interests. Therefore, they favored the Premier's removal and his replace- 42 ment with "a like-minded but more flexible man." The United States suspected France, in collusion with the Chief of State, of slipping supplies to the rebellious Binh Xuyen.43 The British were concerned over their stake in Malaya. They were interested in a stable Vietnam to act as a buffer state between Malaya and Vietnam. Consequently, Britain favored Bao Dai as the best hope for keeping the peace since he was the symbol of legality.44 The United States strongly reaffirmed its support of Diem as representing the ”legal government,"45 despite French opposition. The United States stood alone in believing that the Premier was suited to the task before him. Joseph Buttinger claimed that the Western allies lacked unity: "England does not support, France actually fights, American 46 policy in Vietnam." American efforts were largely 41Quoted in Ibid., August 24, 1955, Sect. IV, p. 3. 42_I_Igi_d.. April 29. 1955. p. l. 4;;pig., May 8, 1955, Sect. IV, p. 2. 44Ibid., May 7, 1955, p. 1. 45Joseph Buttinger, "Are We Saving South Vietnam?," New Leader (Supplement), 38 (June 27, 1955), PP. 3-4. 46Lancaster, op. cit., p. 390. 57 responsible for forestalling any attempts by the French- supported Chief of State to reassert his authority.47 Two articles in the New York Times of May 11, suggest that Diem was influenced by American and French pressure. Diem announced a major reorganization of his Nationalist Cabinet. The changes were intended to broaden the Vietnamese Government. Cabinet officials were drawn from different areas and, according to the Tampa, represented almost all political groups.48 This "enlargement" of the Vietnamese Government led France's Premier Edgar Faure and Britain's Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, to announce their support for the Premier.49 Previously, both nations had serious reservations concerning Diem. On May 12, a United States-French agreement was promulgated formalizing what appeared to be a quid pro quo: France would support Diem and withdraw its remaining troops from Vietnam for Dulles' pledge to support the reunification elections called for by the Geneva accords. Despite Secretary Dulles' statement he emphasized that Mr. Diem was not "in his pocket" and there- fore could not guarantee the agreement with the French Government.50 France's pledge not to oppose the Diem 47 . New York Times, May 11, 1955, p. 5. 481bid.. p. 1. 49 ’ Ibid., May 12, 1955, pp. 1-2. 50William B. Dunn, "America and Crises in Vietnam" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1960), p. 264. 58 Government was in effect, an acknowledgment of the sunset of French influence in Vietnam.51 Ngo Dinh Diem did not want to risk deposing his enemy Bao Dai unless assured of American backing. On May 7 N90 Dinh Nhu, the Premier's brother, sought encouragement from the western powers regarding the contemplated ouster of the Chief of State.52 On the same day a State Department release sounded a very encouraging note: "The United States has great sympathy for a Nationalist cause that is free and effective. For this reason, we have been and are continuing to support the legal government of Ngo Dinh Diem."53 G. Frederick Reinhardt, new United States Ambassador to Vietnam, gave Diem another indication of American approval. Reinhardt handed Diem.documents of appointment addressed to "The Chief of the State of Vietnam." These credentials ignored any reference to Bao Dai and apparently signified America's willingness to support Premier Diem over Bao Dai.54 ~After approximately three weeks of uncertainty, American policy firmly supported Diem. Any doubt as to united States support was disspelled by Senator Mansfield's 1955 report on Vietnam. He reaffirmed —r— 51New York Times, May 7, 1955, p. 1. 52Quoted in apaa., May 7, 1955, p. l. 53_I_p_ia., May 29, 1955, p. 2. 54U.S. Congress,.Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Mike Mansfield, VietnamL Cambodia and Laos, 84th Cong., lst Sess., October, 1955, p. 14. 59 his previous statements backing Diem. American policy had "effectively served the United States during the past year." This was largely due to the "decent and honest" government 55 in Vietnam. Along with impressive moral characteristics Mansfield, who had been dubbed "creator of the Diem regime,"56 could not boast a tried political leader who emerged unscathed from what appeared to be an impossible situation of anarchy. A referendum was held on October 23, 1955, to choose between Bao Dai and monarchy or Ngo Dinh Diem and a republic. The plebiscite gave Diem an overwhelming majority of 98.2% of the vote.57 This was the first national vote taken in South Vietnam.58 A republic was established with Ngo Diem as its President. Not only did the victory in the referendum remove Bao Dai from the Vietnamese political scene, but it served as a popular mandate for the infant republic.59 Diem's national and international prestige were greatly enhanced.60 An imprimatur of legitimacy was achieved since the plebiscite legally severed Diem's ties with Bao Dai. 55Brian Crozier, "The International Situation in Indochina," Pacific Affairs, 29 (December,.l956), p. 322. 56New York Times, October27, 1955, p. 1. 57Ibid., October 24, 1955, p. 1. ngpig., October 23, 1955, Sect. IV, p. 8. 59William Henderson, "South Vietnam Finds Itself," Foreign Affairs, 35 (January, 1957), p. 291. 60Department of State Bulletin, 33 (November 7, 1955), p. 760. 60 After the Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed, Ambassador Reinhardt cordially greeted the new government. He looked forward to the same ”friendly relations which have 61 It is so happily existed between the two governments." doubtful if Diem would have called for a referendum without the acknowledged support of the United States. President Diem was aware that American aid was a sine qpa non for 62 This fact has led to charges the survival of his regime. that he was "America's man." It is noteworthy that the charges warranted a response by Secretary Dulles who asserted Vietnam was free and "not a puppet Government, it is not a Government that we give orders to and tell what we want it to do or what we want it to refrain fromdoing."63 American influence again became important when President Diem needed support to by-pass the July, 1956, reunification elections. Secretary Dulles agreed with Diem that the chaotic conditions in Vietnam precluded free elections.64 An American assertion that if the elections were really free "there would be no serious risk that the Communists would 61New York Times, April 30, 1955, p. 1. 62Department of State Bulletin, 32 (May 30, 1955), p. 873. 63New York Times, March 15, 1956, p. l. Dulles' statement concerning free elections was not viewed as a contra- diction since the joint United States—French policy pronounce- ment.which stipulated that the reunification election "should be held under genuine freedom." See New York Times, May 12, 1955, p. 2. . 64Department of State Bulletin, 33 (July 11, 1955), p. 50. 61 win,"65 remains moot. The important point is that the United States strongly supported Diem's decision. The ruling group in Vietnam was not going to risk the future of the young Republic on national elections. A message from the newly elected National Assembly said: ."we do not consider ourselves as bound by the Geneva agreement, which has been signed against the will and in contempt of the interests of the Vietnamese people."66 With the passage of the election deadline on the last day in-July, 1956, another obstacle was overcome. There were no-"spontaneous uprisings" as the Vietnamese Government had feared. The peaceful passing of the "crisis date" was a good indication of the increasing strength and stability of the Republic of Vietnam.67 After the Geneva Conference, America's influence in South Vietnam's military affairs kept pace with its increased role in the political sphere. The United States assumed the major responsibility of reorganizing and training Vietnam's . army. Frenchmen were still training Vietnamese troops at .the end of 1955. The methods used, however, and most of the instructors, were American. It became evident that the French Expeditionary Force would soon leave Vietnam. An undercurrent of Vietnamese hostility toward France and the 65Quoted in New Yprk Times, March 9, 1956, p. 5. 661bid., August 6, 1956, p. 3. 67 1 Ibid., November 4, 1955, p. 2. 62 curtailment of France's financial and military commitment were indications of the diminishing role they would play in Vietnam's future.68 Summary The political vacuum left by France after the Geneva Conference was partially filled by the United States. Ngo Dinh Diem may not have been "America's man;' as the French charged, but he was heavily dependent upon American aid and support. Washington exerted considerable influence in Saigon. By and large, this support was obdurate.69 There were two instances when American support equivocated: when General Collins urged Diem to form a coalition government and not to battle the Binh Xuyen in late April:70 and when General Nguyen Van Vy, a Bao Dai supporter, briefly took control of the army in a bloodless coup in early May, 1955.71 681t is noteworthy that in 1955 the New York Times published more than ten different articles mentioning United States support for Diem or urging FranCe or Bao Dai to consent to the Premier's leadership. As a result Of statements by State Department officials and Secretary Dulles personally, -American prestige was virtually tied to the success or failure of Ngo Dinh Diem. _The United States, therefore, could almost be considered godparents to the Republic of Vietnam. 69New York Times, April 8, 1955. p.‘7; ibid., April 19, 1955: p. 3; ibidol April 281.1955: p. l. 701bid., May 1, 1955, p. l. 71 See John W. O'Daniel, "Free Vietnam:' Modern Miracle, American Mercury, 88 (March, 1959), pp. 146-152. 63 On the other hand, the United States intervened to support Diem at several critical junctures in his struggle to survive. The United States used the threat of aid sanctions to discourage General Hinh from executing a pppp d'etat. It repeatedly cautioned Bao Dai of the probable consequences of overthrowing his Prime Minister. It backed the "legal government" of Ngo Dinh Diem when he desperately needed assistance. It encouraged the plebiscite that ousted Bao Dai. It favored Mr. Diem's stand in the face of French and British opposition on the question of holding reunifi- cation elections. President Diem accomplished a "near miracle"72 in surviving several military crises in consolidating himself in power. He survived by skillfully combining political acumen and stubbornness. He chose to fight his enemies rather than to come to terms with them. This boldness when the Western powers cautioned moderation, reaffirmed American confidence in the Premier. At times, Washington's support seemed to exert a strong influence on forces threatening the Diem regime. This support was principally founded on Senator Mansfield's recommendations of Diem as a man who "stands for a decent and honest government in an independent Vietnam."73 721bid. 73Congressional Record, 101 (May 2, 1955). p. 5289. 64 Mansfield was a champion of the Diem regime in its darkest hours. He did more, perhaps, to marshal sorely needed aid and to focus attention on the plight of Vietnam's shaky government than any other United States official.74 Professor Wesley R. Fishel, a political advisor to Diem between 1954- 1956, writes that Mansfield's October, 1954, report was of prime importance. "Without [Mansfield] there most certainly would app have been U.S. backing for the Diem government. He was the strong and unwavering 'spine' of what otherwise looked for the most part like a spineless policy-—if indeed 75 [Emphasis in original.] it was a policy at all." Why