MULTI-LEVEL FISHERIES GOVERNANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON FISHERS’
ADAPTATION STRATEGIES IN TAMIL NADU, INDIA
By
Julia Marie Novak Colwell

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Fisheries and Wildlife – Master of Science
2013

ABSTRACT
MULTI-LEVEL FISHERIES GOVERNANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON FISHERS’
ADAPTATION STRATEGIES IN TAMIL NADU, INDIA
By
Julia Marie Novak Colwell
Fishers, like other resource users, follow a range of adaptation strategies in response to
environmental or economic stresses. This paper examines variation in fishers’ adaptation
strategies in the presence of local and regional institutions. In the context of marine socioecological systems in Tamil Nadu, India, I examine the effects of village and district level
variation in governance structure on a common group of users (fishermen). I find that, in the
absence of local or regional constraints, fishers adapt to changing conditions by changing effort.
In situations of legal pluralism, where regional and local level fisheries management rules
conflict, fishers defer to local level institutions first at the expense of state management
regulations, as anticipated by previous studies. However, local institutions may avoid placing
behavioral constraints on fishing, leading again to adaptation through the increase of effort
instead of the promotion of rule-following behavior. Conversely, where local level institutions
have weak claims over users’ collective action (e.g., in the case of a heterogeneous village),
district level regulations are successfully enforced, constraining fishers’ adaptation responses.
In this latter case, fishers resort to gear selectivity in the presence of district level regulations
which place temporal restrictions on effort. This suggests that while village level heterogeneity
may be detrimental to the establishment of successful local institutions governing commons
management, it may actually enable the successful implementation of district level, resource
management regulations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Mark Axelrod for his time, dedication, enthusiasm
and helpful feedback on multiple revisions of the thesis. I would also like to thank my
committee members Dr. John Kerr and Dr. Brian Roth who provided helpful feedback, guidance
and support in the preparation of this research project.
I would like to thank the Asian Studies Center and Dr. Siddharth Chandra for
contributing extensively to the research goals through the Foreign Language Area Studies
Fellowship Program – US Department of Education through which I have been funded for the
entirety of my Master’s work. The language understanding I have achieved through this
program in both Tamil and Hindi has empowered me to successful carry out my field research.
I would also like to thank Johny Stephen (University of Amsterdam and Madras Institute
of Development Studies) and S. Velvizhi (MS Swaminathan Research Foundation) for their help
in the coordination of research activities and translation of key Tamil fisheries vocabulary.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................... vi

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. vii

1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................1
1.1 Current Literature ..............................................................................................................4
1.1a Adaptation constraints: Dependent variable ..................................................................4
1.1b Rules ............................................................................................................................5
1.1c Heterogeneity and relational pluralism ..........................................................................6
1.1d Legal pluralism ............................................................................................................7

2. THE FISHERIES IN TAMIL NADU: INCREASED CAPACITY AND CHANGING
CATCH ......................................................................................................................................9
2.1 Case selection ....................................................................................................................9
2.2 Fisheries management in Tamil Nadu: Current structure .................................................. 12
2.3 Current conditions and adaptation responses .................................................................... 13
2.4 Sample characteristics ...................................................................................................... 15

3. METHODS ........................................................................................................................... 20
3.1 Qualitative methods ......................................................................................................... 20
3.2 Unit of analysis ................................................................................................................ 21
3.3 Sampling techniques ........................................................................................................ 21

4. EXPECTED OBSERVATIONS ............................................................................................ 24

5. RESULTS ............................................................................................................................. 26
5.1 Adaptation strategies and constraints ............................................................................... 26
5.2 Rules and legal pluralism ................................................................................................. 28

6. DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................................... 31

iv

6.1 Adaptation constraints ..................................................................................................... 31
6.2 Rules ............................................................................................................................... 32
6.3 Heterogeneity vs. homogeneity: Conditions behind legal pluralism .................................. 33

APPENDICES .......................................................................................................................... 37
APPENDIX A: Interveiw questionnarie ................................................................................. 38
APPENDIX B: Coding table .................................................................................................. 39

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 40

v

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Sampling distribution .................................................................................................. 17
Table 2: Village-wise variables ................................................................................................. 18
Table 3: Expectations matrix ..................................................................................................... 25
Table 4: Coding matrix ............................................................................................................. 39

vi

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Tamil Nadu marine socio-ecological system.................................................................3
Figure 2: Hypothesis matrix ........................................................................................................8
Figure 3: Map of Tamil Nadu .................................................................................................... 16
Figure 4: Religion & community ............................................................................................... 17

vii

1. INTRODUCTION
Socio-ecological systems, or SESs, as the name suggests are comprised of both social and
ecological variables (Ostrom, 2009) which are highly interconnected (Perry et.al. 2011). These
systems are impacted by stresses derived from environmental and economic changes, in
particular those associated with changing market conditions (which can result from
globalization). Leichenko and O’Brien (2008) describe these dual stresses as ‘double exposure’.
This double exposure has ultimately led to negative outcomes for various components of marine
systems like fish stock collapse and changes to social structures (Ommer & Team, 2007).
Fisheries managers hope to keep the system in balance through the implementation of
regulations, but fishermen still adapt in different ways to capacity and market changes. The goal
of this research is to understand what types of rules and regulations are most effective in a
context of changing market conditions and decline in fisheries ecosystem health.
We examine this question by looking at fishers’ adaptation strategies with the aim of
understanding what conditions constrain their adaptive capacity. We are particularly interested
in understanding how adaptation strategies change in the presence of overlapping governance
systems and how community characteristics may influence fishers’ adaptive mechanisms.
The local level, marine socio-ecological systems in Tamil Nadu, India have been
impacted by both stresses derived from environmental and economic change. Environmental
stresses were stimulated by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the resultant aid response. Aid
was commonly funneled into fishing villages along the Tamil Nadu coast both directly from
NGOs and through the central and state governments. Tamil Nadu alone received over $566
million USD from the Indian government in the immediate aftermath (Kruks-Wisner, 2011;
Singh, 2005). Grants were provided by the government to purchase new gear and to repair boats
1

that were damaged (Mathew, 2005). This overwhelming response has had lasting effects
through the addition of excess capacity to the fishery in Tamil Nadu, defined simply as ‘too
many fishers chasing too few fish’ (Pomeroy et al., 2006; Silvestre et. al, 2003).
Economic stresses are exhibited by both domestic and international market changes in
demand for certain seafood products as well as government subsidies focused on the marine
product export industry. The government of Tamil Nadu has developed its fishery with an eye
on the international market and increasing levels of globalization. The provision of various
subsidies (as outlined later in the paper), can give fishermen a different type of adaptive capacity
to respond to market changes. Access to information technology has also increased with
globalization. With increased access, stresses on the system are able to diffuse more quickly
across both markets and society, and due to the interlinked nature of socio-ecological systems,
this rapid diffusion also impacts the coupled ecosystem components (Held, 2000; Young et. al.,
2006) as exhibited through the schematic below where stresses ultimately affect fish catch (a
measure of ecosystem health).

2

Figure 1: Tamil Nadu marine socio-ecological system
For interpretation of the references to color in this and all other figures, the reader is referred to
the electronic version of this thesis

The above stresses impact local SESs (Ostrom, 2009; Perry, et.al, 2011) and to
understand how, there are several key components that we must explore according to Ostrom
(2009). All SESs are comprised of a resource system (in our case a coastal fishery), resource
units (fish stocks), users (fishermen), and governance systems (rules that affect the adaptation
strategies of fishermen). To begin to understand how this system works, it is important to
explore the individual variables and how they are related (Ostrom, 2009). We therefore choose
to focus on user adaptation decisions based on variation in governance systems. In all cases,
fishermen are faced with similar stresses, but they adapt different strategies to cope. This
variation is precisely what we aim to explain.

3

1.1 Current Literature
1.1a Adaptation constraints: Dependent variable
Although research is limited, scholars have proposed a number of ways that resource
users will adapt in the face of changing environmental conditions. Bavinck (1998) outlines that
in fisheries, people tend to adapt by targeting specific species either because of their market price
or because of species availability. Bavinck notes that changing environmental conditions, as
seen through fishery ecosystem health is one of the key driving factors behind these adaptation
decisions.
Coulthard (2008), in her study surrounding adaptation strategies to climate change within
a South Indian lagoon fishery finds that those fishermen willing to diversify their fishing
practices are better equipped to adapt to changing environmental conditions. She finds that
traditional, caste fishermen are less willing to give up their ancestral methods of harvest and in
fact it is the non-traditional, Dalit fishermen who are willing to diversify their harvest techniques
based on changing species abundance and availability. She therefore concludes that tradition is a
key factor in guiding and potentially constraining adaptation strategies.
Often intertwined with tradition, livelihood resilience has also been identified by scholars
as a key factor in determining adaptive capacity (Moench and Dixit, 2004; Moench, 2005).
Livelihood resilience is broadly defined as a resource user’s willingness and ability to earn
sufficient income for themselves outside of their “experienced coping range” (Coulthard, 2008).
Adger et. al. (2003) in their study on adaptation strategies to climate change in developing
countries outline that reducing dependence on resource systems or certain aspects of a resource
system have been important adaptation strategies utilized to deal with changing environmental
conditions. This adaptation strategy is of course mitigated by one’s level of livelihood resilience

4

as in some cases resource users will not be able or willing to decrease or modify their
dependence on a resource.
Fishermen (of mechanized and even motorized boats to some extent) have been known to
use the above strategy to adapt to declining stock availability in a particular fishing ground. If
fishermen have the ability to decrease their dependence on one fishing ground by diversifying
the grounds they fish on, they will use this strategy to cope with poor conditions (Bavinck,
2001).
1.1b Rules
Scholars have suggested that mechanized boat fishermen exert a considerable amount of
effort in devising adaptation strategies to circumvent regulations (Bavinck, 2001). We therefore
turn to the literature on rule creation and enforcement. Extensive research has been conducted
on community characteristics which enable the successful creation and implementation of local
institutions (rules) to manage common pool resources such as fisheries (Ostrom, 1990, 2007;
Agrawal, 2001). However, limited research has been carried out which looks at why certain
resource users are less likely than others to follow rules (Madrigal-Ballestero et. al. 2012).
Some scholars have found a positive correlation between people’s willingness to follow
rules and the level of economic dependency they have on the resource (Madrigal-Ballestero et.
al. 2012). Others have found that the content of the regulation (rule legitimacy) is particularly
important. In a study of rule compliance within fisheries in Denmark, Nielson and Mathiesen
(2003) outline that if regulations are imposed that are incompatible with traditional fishing
practices or reasoning, fishermen will not follow them. Agrawal (2001) goes onto address that in
situations where central authority (outside authority) attempts to regulate resource use, it can
effectively cut the relationship of responsibility felt at the local level to the maintenance of the

5

resource, thereby affecting rule compliance. The imposition of outside rules is expected to have
a negative relationship with the ability of those rules to impact fisher’s adaptation strategies
because it threatens their relationship of responsibility with the resource and outsider rule content
may be seen as illegitimate. This point brings us to the role of relational pluralism and its impact
on rule creation and enforcement.
1.1c Heterogeneity and relational pluralism
We see through the literature on commons management that ease and effectiveness of
enforcement are key contributing factors to the successful development and application of rules
(Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990). Bavinck (2001) outlines that village level
organizations are the loci of rule-making and enforcement. These organizations can have
different levels of efficacy though, dependent on the level of heterogeneity of the people which
compose them, as outlined below.
In India, Cohn (1987) outlines that most individuals have a set of dual social relations:
one which aligns them with a village community and another that aligns them with their caste or
sub-caste. For each of these dual relationships there also exists a set of legal norms and a set of
people that have the authority to enforce said norms. In multi-caste villages sometimes these
dual relationships conflict and the community as a whole can “suffer from a lack of community
identity and an inability to take collective action” (Bavinck, 2001, p. 51). In this case, the
institutions formed within the village may only be able to exert minimal social pressure towards
rule compliance (Bavinck, 2001). This village level heterogeneity will thereby negatively impact
the ability of rules to effectively constrain adaptation behavior. These scholars therefore would
expect adaptation strategies to be unconstrained in heterogeneous villages.

6

Alternatively, in villages where these dual relationships are intertwined given the
homogeneity of religion and caste, Cohn states that caste norms and village norms operate within
the same social boundaries. In these cases, Bavinck (2001) outlines that village authorities have
the potential to form robust common interest strategies for collective action. Therefore,
homogeneity is alternatively expected to lead to resource use situations where users’ adaptation
strategies are limited by village institutions. This is largely explained by Coulthard (2008) who
outlines that an individual’s adaptation decisions “are made within a wider social and cultural
context of norms, values and rules, often determined by antecedent collective action” (p. 479).
Following this logic then, it is expected that in homogenous villages, resource users will first
defer and consult village norms and then adapt (in line with those) in their best interest.
1.1d Legal pluralism
What if there are discrepancies between village and district (or external) level laws with
each staking a claim to fisheries management? This situation can lead to difficulties in rule
enforcement. In Bavinck’s (1998) study on legal pluralism within the fisheries sector in Tamil
Nadu, he outlines that ‘state law ends where fishermen law begins’. He finds that state level
fisheries management bodies don’t feel the need to intervene in situations where fishermen law is
effective. Sometimes though, fishermen’s law has different priorities than state level laws.
Within the broader purview of village/state actors, this phenomenon is called legal pluralism and
occurs when there are multiple rules present at various levels applicable to the same resource
system. Bavinck (1998) outlines that “fishermen law generally has a greater legitimacy among
fishermen; official law, however, which is backed by the power of the state, dominates the
formal landscape” (p. 151).

7

In this study we have the opportunity to examine this key characteristic (legal pluralism)
due to the complex governance hierarchy in India: where village organizations and their
institutions are key players in local resource governance and district and state level (where in
some case, fisheries management regulations have been enacted) must compete with those at the
village level. Drawing from the literature on adaptation, legal pluralism, rule legitimacy and
common-pool resource management, I constructed following hypothesis matrix:
Figure 2: Hypothesis matrix
Village stakes
claim to
management?
Yes

No

District regulations present?
Yes

No

Fishermen will follow village level rules

Fishermen will
follow district
regulations

Fishermen will defer to
village norms first then
adapt their effort to market
and stock conditions

Young et. al. (2006) calls for research which takes into account institutional and
demographic influences on socio-ecological systems. In order to examine the literature-derived
hypotheses above we focus on marine socio-ecological systems in Tamil Nadu, India which are
ideal cases to study given the variation in rules and social structure characteristic of each village
studied. While focusing on common resource users, systems and units, we are able to
concentrate on the effects of variation in governance systems on the adaptation strategies of
fishermen.

8

2. THE FISHERIES IN TAMIL NADU: INCREASED CAPACITY AND CHANGING
CATCH
2.1 Case selection
Tamil Nadu was chosen as our initial study site due to the variation in district level
fisheries governance and state level management regulations. This state has a rich tradition of
village governance organizations (panchayats) which in some cases stake claim to resource
management within their territory. Panchayats are village councils largely comprised of elected
male members of the dominant caste within the village. These groups are highly active in
everyday village life and have traditionally taken responsibility for managing the village
commons and for dispute settlement (Kruks-Wisner, 2010).
Amongst villages, there is variation in community structure at the local level in terms of
both caste and religion. This provides an opportunity to study the impacts of village level
heterogeneity vs. homogeneity on the constraints posed on adaptation strategies. Again, in all
cases I look at a particular user group (fishermen) working within a comparable resource system.
I then ask how these variables effect their adaptation decisions.
Tamil Nadu accounts for roughly 15% of India’s total marine fish catch (Bavinck et. al.
2008) with Chennai harbor contributing the most tonnage of fish landed and exported from the
East coast of India (Salagrama, 2004). Its coastline measures roughly 1076 kilometers and has
the largest continental shelf of the Eastern Indian coastal states (Salagrama, 2004), which has
contributed to the success of the Tamil Nadu prawn (Penaeus spp.) fishery. The initial bulk of
the exports was and continues to be prawns, but fishermen and exporters have since branched out
to numerous other species as international demand is identified and continues to grow (Bavinck,
2001).

9

Tamil Nadu’s fishery was heavily impacted by the Blue Revolution and pink gold rush
(referring to the boom in the prawn fishery from 1965-1980 [Bavinck, 2001]), with large
portions of the fishing fleet making the transition from man-powered or motorized boats to larger
boats with mechanized gear (Kurien, 1985). The Blue Revolution in India was meant to be the
marine equivalent of the Green Revolution in agriculture which vastly changed India’s farming
system in the 1960s. The central government of India promoted the industrialization and
mechanization of fishing throughout the country and each state adopted different practices
towards common goals. These goals included increasing overall catch, an increase in
contribution from fishing to India’s GDP as well as enhancing food security. The Tamil Nadu
state government began incorporating fisheries targets into its five year plans in 1956 by
launching a marine fisheries development program (Bavinck, 2001). These five year plans are
economic development goals which set targets and priorities for each sector of the economy.
Bottom-trawling, a common method used for prawn harvest was advocated for
widespread adoption during the Blue Revolution. This has been one of the key contributing
factors to the current depressed state of the fishery in Tamil Nadu. Trawling is the most
destructive form of fishing currently in use (Watson, 2006). In addition to destroying the trawled
environment, shrimp trawlers also tend to discard up to 90% of the catch brought on deck
(Venkataraman & Melkani, 2007). The provision of these types of boats was common as part of
aid packages after the 2004 tsunami, with many NGOs adopting villages and indiscriminately
distributing mechanized boats (Mathew, 2005; Beaumont, 2009).
The heavy promotion of trawling is currently observed in the composition of the fishing
fleet. A full 61% of the mechanized fleet in Tamil Nadu depends on trawling as their primary
harvest method, mainly for prawns. Due to the destructive nature of this harvest technique and

10

excess fishing capacity, catch has been steadily declining. As a result, a significant portion
(roughly 39%) of the mechanized fleet has transitioned to other gear types such as hook and line
or gill nets (Bavinck et. al. 2008).
Bavinck (2001) outlines that one consequence of the government of Tamil Nadu’s
fisheries development efforts was the establishment of a dual fishing economy. Tamil Nadu’s
robust artisanal, traditional fishing culture continued to fish in much the same way as they had
historically. Alongside them was built a new, commercially oriented fleet that fished with
foreign trawlers and other mechanized boats. This dichotomy in resource use and the resultant
financial benefits built a new class of fishermen that was looked upon by policy makers as the
success of their efforts. They were also considered to be the growing middle class of fishermen,
a profession which was previously defined by its economic backwardness.
Many of these rising middle-class fishermen focused their efforts on prawns, given the
lucrative price received on the export market. Before the Blue Revolution, fishermen mainly
sold to the domestic market, with an exception being dried fish sold to Sri Lanka. The Blue
Revolution and the embedded emphasis on export oriented development uncovered immense
opportunities in terms of international demand, of which prawn was one of the most sought after
commodities. In response to this demand, the Indian government founded the Marine Product
Export Development Authority (MPEDA) in 1972 to promote the development of the fisheries
export sector (Bavinck, 2001).
Tamil Nadu is the most productive region in India for prawn production. The state has
focused its development initiatives through the provision of subsidies for boat refurbishment and
trawl gear (Bavinck, 2001; Subramanian, 2009) to exploit this valuable marine resource, which is
now significantly depleted. Interestingly, although fish landings have increased, the catch per

11

unit operation and per capita production of labor has been declining, in both the mechanized and
non-mechanized sectors (Sathiadas et.al, 2007). This decline in production implies that the
coastal resources of Tamil Nadu are becoming heavily depleted. Therefore, understanding the
impact of various stresses, including market and environmental changes on this highly diverse
fishery can be pivotal in understanding ecosystem implications and projecting impacts on other
highly diverse social-ecological systems.
2.2 Fisheries management in Tamil Nadu: Current structure
There is a high degree of legal pluralism within fisheries management institutions along
the Tamil Nadu coast. At the local level this range includes non-state actors such as the well
developed and important village level institutions which claim exclusive authority over their
adjacent waters (Bavinck, 2001). These non-state actors, depending on the village are either the
village or caste panchayat or the Boat Owners Association (BOA) within that village, the latter
of which is a dues-paying membership body of mechanized boat owners.
State actors operate within the purview of the Tamil Nadu State Fisheries Department
and also act through district level offices. Bavinck (1998) outlines that the fishery officers
within districts generally have a high degree of respect for the authority of non-state, village
level fishermen councils and see state power as finite: ending where fishermen’s law begins.
There is an annual 45-day closed season from 15April – 29May, locally known as the
“monsoon ban” on mechanized boat fishing in effect in Tamil Nadu. This time zoning effort by
the government began in 2001 in Tamil Nadu and is also observed, at a different time of the year
in Kerala in congruence with their monsoon. It is meant to allow for the rejuvenation of fish
stocks (Bavinck et.al, 2008). This regulation is generally followed by the majority of mechanized
boat owners in Tamil Nadu (Sathyapalan et.al, 2008).

12

2.3 Current conditions and adaptation responses
There are currently over 10,500 mechanized boats operating within the coastal waters of
Tamil Nadu (CMFRI, 2010). The indiscriminate distribution of boats, post-tsunami, has
contributed to overcapacity and overfishing in the coastal waters of Tamil Nadu. Over the
decade prior to the tsunami, fish production in Tamil Nadu was already drastically declining
(Mathew, 2005) and post-tsunami research and recommendations explicitly advised against
recreating the problem of over capacity which existed pre-tsunami. Not only did the allocation
of new and better boats reinstitute overcapacity but it also gave rise to an unsustainable, highly
capitalized and fossil fuel dependent artisanal fishing base (Kurien et.al, 2005). The provision of
various subsidies targeting fisheries development has helped maintain excess fishing capacity, to
which declining ecosystem health is attributed (Salagrama, 2004; Sumaila & Pauly, 2006).
Increased capacity has led to an increase in resource use conflicts between artisanal and
mechanized boat fishermen. In response to increasing levels of resource use conflicts between
artisanal fishermen operating non-mechanized boats and the commercialized mechanized fleets
targeting the same species within the same fishing grounds, fishermen in certain districts have
negotiated a 3:4 day share regulation. This regulation states that mechanized trawlers are
permitted to fish three out of the seven days of the week, whereas the other four days are
reserved solely for artisanal, non-mechanized craft (Sathyapalan et.al, 2008).
Numerous fishermen along the Tamil Nadu coast have reported a significant decline in
the quantity of many traditionally caught species (Sathyapalan et.al. 2008). In general, many of
the fishermen interviewed blame this decline on the increased number of mechanized boats
fishing in the coastal waters and particularly noted the influx post-tsunami. Fishermen have also
reported changes in species availability. This is supported by a recent study done by Sathyapalan

13

et. al. (2008) showing shifts in species composition within the Palk Bay fishery. Fishermen
related that certain species of iral (prawn), ullam (Hilsa shad; Tenualosa ilisha), and kola (flying
fish; Hirundichthys spp.) are becoming rare (among others) while the prevalence of local
varieties of parai (trevally; Carangidae), sura (shark; Rhizoprionodon spp.), and naththili
(anchovy; Engraulidae) are increasing. Many attributed this change in species availability to
over fishing and the environmental effects of the tsunami.
Fishermen have adapted different strategies given the above changes. One of these
adaptation strategies is to fish outside of Tamil Nadu’s territorial waters. Although district level
regulations prohibit fishing outside their general jurisdiction, many fishermen, particularly in the
Palk Bay region cross into Sri Lankan waters to fish (Bavinck et.al., 2008; Sathyapalan et.al.,
2008). This particular adaptation strategy has led to increased conflict between Indian fishermen
and the Sri Lankan Navy, resulting in injury, gear confiscation, disappearance and even death
(Vivekanandan, 2005). Fishermen in all three districts also widely report crossing into the
waters of Andhra Pradesh.
Due to the overexploitation of near shore fishing grounds (Bavinck, 2001), more
fishermen are making near shore vs. deep sea fishing decisions. Fishermen in Nagapattinam
reported that maththi (local variant of sardine) used to come very close to shore and now due to
heavy fishing pressure, the fishermen must go farther and farther out to catch them.
Additionally, other species normally caught closer to shore are also on the decline, forcing
fishermen to fish farther out and deeper, which comes with an associated increase in risk and
cost.

14

2.4 Sample characteristics
Three villages in three separate districts in Tamil Nadu were selected for this study
(pinpointed in Figure 3 below): one in which fishermen perceive no constraints to their adaptive
capacity, one in which district level regulations effectively constrain adaptive capacity, and
another where local level rules are the primary driving factor behind fishermen’s adaptation
decisions. Village names are not utilized due to the sensitive nature of certain pieces of
information participants provided regarding illegal adaptation strategies.

15

Figure 3: Map of Tamil Nadu

Table 1 denotes the sampling distribution between the three villages studied. There were
no non-mechanized boat fishermen interviewed in Village R or Village C because the villages
were almost completely composed of mechanized boat owners and fishermen.

16

District
Ramanathpuram
Nagapattinam
Cuddalore
Total

Table 1: Sampling distribution
Non-mech.
Mechanized
Village
fishermen
fishermen
(motorized)
Village R
14
0
Village N
4
13
Village C
6
0
24
13

Total
fishermen
14
17
6
37

There is variation in community structure and demographics within the three villages
studied, which is representative of general district-wise trends as seen in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Religion & community

Religion & Community

Fishing families

30000
25000
20000
15000

Cuddalore

10000

Nagapattinam

5000
0

Ramanathapuram
Nagapattinam
Cuddalore

Ramanathapuram

CMFRI, 2010
Village R in Ramanathapuram is made up of a mix of castes and religions. In general,
religion was reported to dictate gear specialty. Because of the high degree of heterogeneity
among resource users in Village R, the primary local fisheries institutions were the BOAs, of
which there were 7 with one overarching BOA authority. These BOAs were heavily divided on
caste and gear lines. As a result of this fragmentation, there was a lack of village level rules in
Village R that pertained to all fishermen. Another feature worth noting is that Ramanathapuram

17

district in general, due to its proximity to Sri Lanka has been at the nexus of the India-Sri Lanka
fisheries conflict. This has led to a significant police presence in the coastal mechanized landing
areas and the area itself has gained significant national attention due to the frequency of conflicts
reported.
The other two villages studied, Villages N & C were much more homogenous in terms of
caste and religion. All members of each village were from traditional Hindu fishing castes. In
Village N there was some degree of heterogeneity in terms of gear used but that was reflected in
the representatives chosen for the village panchayat, the primary local fisheries institution.
Within the panchayat, the trawlers, gill netters and fiberglass boats owners were represented
proportionally to the frequency with which they occurred in the village. In Village C, all
residents were from the same traditional Hindu fishing caste and all utilized trawl gear. Table 2
outlines the village level demographic differences.

District/Village
Ramanathapuram
Cuddalore
Nagapattinam

Table 2: Village-wise variables
Caste
Religion
Primary
gear
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Traditional
Hindu
Trawl
fishing caste
Traditional
Hindu
Mixed
fishing caste

Primary local
fisheries inst.
BOA
BOA
Panchayat

In Village R (Ramanathapuram district) there are a few district level fisheries
management regulations that are not present in the other two villages studied. In
Ramanathapuram, non-mechanized and mechanized fishermen negotiated a 3:4 day share
regulation such that trawlers are permitted to fish a designated three days out of a week where
non-mechanized boats are permitted to fish the other four days. Additionally, trawlers are
limited to trawling a maximum of three hours at a time before they must pull up their nets and

18

they are limited to a maximum trip duration of 24 hours (Sathyapalan et. al., 2008). These
regulations were largely followed within the fishing community studied in Village R, which
allows an opportunity to compare how fishermen in other districts, without the presence of these
types of temporal regulations adapt to external shocks.
In addition to these temporal restrictions (which applied to Ramanathapuram only), there
is also a spatial restriction that pertains to mechanized boats in all three villages studied (a Tamil
Nadu state fisheries regulation). This regulation states that the area within three nautical miles of
the coast is reserved for the operation of country craft, such as kattumarams. Mechanized boats
are not permitted to trawl within this three nautical mile zone (Sathyapalan et. al., 2008).

While

this regulation was mentioned in interviews in Village R, it was not in Villages N and C though
it pertains to the entire coast.
In Village N (Nagapattinam district), central management regulations have been
attempted through the district fisheries department. These regulations are in the form of gear
restrictions, such as bans on trawl nets and juvenile fish catch as well as minimum net mesh size
but have been largely unsuccessful. In Village C (Cuddalore district), the district fisheries
department focuses largely on welfare schemes and no fisheries management regulations were
identified.

19

3. METHODS
3.1 Qualitative methods
Semi-structured interviews at landing sites in three villages in three separate districts
were carried out between June and late August 2012 (please reference Appendix A for interview
instrument). As Tamil is not my native language, I anticipated the need for a research assistant
and/or native speaker to assist in carrying out the data collections. A local translator was
identified with the help of our local partners, and the translator delivered the questions to the
fishermen and translated their answers into English.
When it was apparent that the English speaking skills of each translator varied, I
attempted to mitigate this by translating the interview questions into Tamil with the help of a
native Tamil speaker and teacher. Furthermore, when difficulty was expressed by the translator
in translating fishermen’s answers into English, the translator wrote the fishermen’s answers in
Tamil and it was later translated with the help of a Tamil fisheries professional in Tamil Nadu
and in some cases a native Tamil speaker and teacher in the US after data collection was
complete.
During the data analysis stage, each sample (fisherman interview) was examined,
emergent themes and concepts were identified and a list of concepts was compiled based on a
corpus-based coding system, which allowed for the detection of patterns amongst samples
(please reference Appendix B for coding table).
Participant observation was carried out at both beach landing sites within the villages in
Ramanathapuram and Nagapattinam and established docking sites for trawlers in Cuddalore and
Nagapattinam. Special note was taken as to the roles of people working at the site, the landing
process including how the fish were sold (e.g.: auction, transfer to middleman, etc.), quantity and
species landed.
20

3.2 Unit of analysis
In qualitative data collection, it is important to specify a unit of analysis because “each
unit of analysis implies a different kind of data collection, a different focus for the analysis of
data, and a different level at which statements about findings and conclusions” can be made
(Patton, 2002, p. 228). Therefore, although participants in this study were fishermen, and my
sample size is the total number of fishermen interviewed, my unit of analysis is the village since
all proposed explanations for variation in adaptation strategies are at the village level. This is
further justified because it is actually the authorities at the village level that enforce the rules (or
choose not to)(Bavinck, 2001). This is the appropriate unit of analysis because it is the variation
in adaptation strategies between villages that I aim to explain.
3.3 Sampling techniques
Purposeful sampling, a method aimed at selecting information-rich cases for study was
chosen as it promotes in-depth understanding of a particular research question. This allowed for
in-depth inquiry focused at understanding under what conditions fishermen are able to adapt and
which rules are most effective in curbing effects on fish catch. While this in-depth
understanding comes at the expense of empirical generalizations (Patton, 2002); it can highlight
the conditions which lead to certain outcomes, which is an important goal of this research. As
the purpose of the study was to examine and understand different adaptation strategies used by
fishermen in the face of external shocks, it was important to investigate village situations where
different types of rules were applied. In the future, random sampling techniques in addition to a
larger sample size will be necessary to make empirical generalizations.
Within the broader purview of purposeful sampling techniques, two sub-strategies were
used: maximum variation sampling as well as snowball sampling. Maximum variation sampling

21

was used to select our study villages. This is a technique used to identify common themes which
may be present across villages that otherwise have a high degree of variation between them
(Patton, 2002). A small sample size, which is characteristic of this study, can be problematic as
a high degree of heterogeneity between and amongst samples can complicate the analysis and
generalizability of the data. This strategy actually “turns that apparent weakness into a strength
by applying the following logic: Any common patterns that emerge from great variation are of
particular interest and value in capturing the core experiences and central, shared dimensions of a
setting or phenomenon” (Patton, 2002, p.235). In this way I have attempted to mitigate for the
weakness of a small sample by identifying and maximizing on the shared experience information
obtained from the analysis. This technique also allows one to identify village level variables
which seem to have the greatest impact on the shared experience. Because Indian society is
extremely heterogeneous this technique is particularly useful in an applied context. As a result, a
great deal can be learned from the shared outcomes discovered.
In order to separate the possible demographic effects of a heterogeneous sample on
decision making from the effects of the rules on fishermen’s decision making process, a
technique called process tracing was employed. Semi-structured interview questions were
delivered and participants were asked to specifically outline their reasons for choosing a
particular adaptation strategy versus alternative options (Ranyard & Svenson, 2010). By asking
these targeted why questions, I was able to “focus participants on information relevant to their
motives and reasons for a decision” (Ranyard & Svenson, 2010, p.126). These reasons in turn
help in understanding the decision making process fishermen went through in response to
external shocks and which variables played a significant role in their adaptation decisions.

22

Snowball sampling was used to identify fishermen within villages to interview. This
technique was utilized because it focused time and effort on information-rich cases and allowed
for maximum interview efficiency in obtaining information from key-informants. In each village
visited, we began our interviews at the local landing center and carried out the interview with an
identified fisherman or boat owner. That particular person would then suggest further people
who could answer our questions, in effect snowballing the sample to a wider range of
knowledgeable participants (Patton, 2002).
Snowball sampling, while appropriate for this study, does have a number of limitations.
Snowball sampling is a nonprobability sampling technique which prevents the generalizability of
the data to the larger fisherman population (Johnson, 2001). This technique was employed
because I was targeting a specific subset of the fishermen population which was ill-defined:
those who had been fishing for at least ten years or more. These fishermen were purposefully
targeted for their knowledge of how changes in conditions (both economic and environmental)
over time have affected adaptation responses.

23

4. EXPECTED OBSERVATIONS
Scholars have shown that village level heterogeneity complicates the establishment of
successful village level institutions (Agrawal, 2001). Based on this, I expect that adaptation will
be unconstrained in Village R due to the heterogeneous nature of the village. Villages N and C
are characterized by a homogeneity of identities and interests. I therefore would expect to
observe the establishment of strong village level, resource management institutions and
adaptation therefore to be constrained.
If district level regulations affect fishermen’s ability to devise adaptation strategies, I
would expect to see different adaptation strategies adopted in Village R (Ramanathpuram
district) and Villages N (Nagapattinam district) because those districts have attempted to regulate
fishing. In contrast, I would expect that fishermen in Villages C (Cuddalore district) would
increase their fishing effort, as seen through hours spent fishing when the market price for certain
species is high in the hopes of increasing catch and the resultant on-shore pay-off.
If village level institutions affect fishermen’s adaptation strategies, I expect to observe
fishermen deferring to and consulting the local village level institution regarding any changes in
effort or decisions regarding gear usage and/or fishing holidays. In the case of strong village
level institutions that stake a claim to resource management, it is expected that fishermen’s
adaptation strategies will be constrained in line with those local rules. If the local rules are lax,
but the village organization strong, it is expected that fishermen’s adaptation strategies will be
unconstrained. In this way, if village level institutions affect fishermen’s willingness to follow
rules, I expect to observe unconstrained fishing in all three villages because none of the three
studied villages employ strict village-level rules.

24

Finally, in regards to legal pluralism, I expect to observe that in specific cases where
district and local level rule conflict, fishermen will follow local rules and disregard district/state
level regulations. In other words, district management regulations would be relevant only where
the village does not stake a claim to management. As a result, district regulations should be
influential where the village is not involved in management (Village R) because the district
regulations are backed by the power of the state. Village level rules (or lack thereof) should then
be consequential in other locations (Villages N & C). Based on the aforementioned village
characteristics combined with the literature-derived hypotheses, the following expectation matrix
was constructed.
Table 3: Expectations matrix
Variable

Village C

Village N

Village R

Heterogeneity

Constrained

Constrained

Unconstrained

District regulations

Unconstrained

Constrained

Constrained

Strict village rules

Unconstrained

Unconstrained

Unconstrained

Village & district rules

Unconstrained

Unconstrained

Constrained

25

5. RESULTS
5.1 Adaptation strategies and constraints
In Village C, 5 out of 6 fishermen reported changing their net to adapt: 3 out of those 5
reported changing their net in accordance with market prices of certain key species. When the
price for prawns is high, they use a prawn trawl net which has a smaller mesh size. When the
price for prawns is low, they switch to a fish trawl net with a larger mesh size. Two out of those
five fishermen reported that the quantity of certain species caught has a greater impact on their
choice to change nets. In this case, whichever species they are catching more of, they will select
a net accordingly and focus their effort there. Additionally, if they continue catching, they will
continue fishing. One fisherman in this group (C3) stated that price doesn’t matter only quantity
matters. If they’ve been catching more of something they will keep fishing for that. This
implies that given the absence of temporal effort restrictions, continuing to fish is an option
employed by some fishermen in Village C.
In Village N, 8 out of 17 fishermen reported changing their nets to adapt: 6 of those
fishermen reported changing their net in response to changes in market prices while 2 reported
that they change their net primarily based on quantity caught. Additionally, 9 out of 17
fishermen reported that they will either increase or decrease their effort (in terms of hours spent
fishing) based on price or quantity caught. 5 out of the 9 reported price as the driving factor
behind effort decisions. These fishermen reported that, for example, if the price for prawns is
high, they will increase their effort for prawn fishing. Four out of the nine reported that quantity
determines their level of effort. These fishermen stated if they are catching a large quantity of a
particular species, they will focus their effort on that species and continue to fish. Fisherman N8
reported that price does not affect the amount he fishes. He will go early to a place at 6am and if

26

there is prawn there, he will stay until 6pm. If he doesn’t catch any, the price doesn’t matter, he
will still come home. Fishermen N6 and N7 reported that it didn’t matter if the price is high or
low. If there is quantity, they will keep fishing. If there isn’t, they will stop.
In Village R, two out of the fourteen fishermen expressed they did not change their
fishing practices in order to adapt to the changing market. These fishermen stated that regardless
of market price they exert the same amount of effort. One of these fishermen (Fisherman R6)
outlined that he doesn’t change anything about the way he fishes, because to change something
costs money.
The remaining 12 out of 14 fishermen interviewed in Village R reported changing their
net as a common adaptation strategy in response to shifting market prices. If the market price for
prawn decreases past a certain point, the fishermen will change their prawn trawl net to a fish
trawl net, which has a larger mesh size. In this way, they report adapting to the market. A group
of four fishermen (Fishermen R4-R7), after outlining the district level regulations that apply to
them stated that they cannot increase their effort if prawn price increases because of the timezoning regulations.
Lastly, one fisherman (R11) reported that a number of fishermen were adapting to the
effort regulations and the perceived negative impact they have on catch and therefore profit, by
turning to a new black market for sea cucumbers. He reported the sale of sea cucumbers is
banned in India, but because they fetch high prices in Japan and China, they are sent through Sri
Lanka and exported to these countries. This strategy supplements the trawler’s income
considerably since at the time of the interviews, the price for prawns was very low. Fisherman
R11 reported that the fishermen were “forced” into doing this because their current profit was
very low if non-existent.

27

5.2 Rules and legal pluralism
In Village C, 3 out of the 6 fishermen referenced the presence of the BOA within their
village, but primarily as a dispute settlement body between fishermen. This village organization
does not act in a resource management capacity and stakes no claim to fisheries governance.
Additionally, there are no district fisheries regulations to contend with as the district fisheries
department works mainly in a welfare capacity.
In Village C, all fishermen reported following the government’s monsoon ban but when
it came to other regulations governing how they fish one fisherman (C4) reported they will go to
the government as a group of 10-15 villages for a meeting to negotiate (if there is a regulation
they don’t agree with), but if the government doesn’t budge, they will do what they think is best
anyways. Another fisherman (C3) stated it is the people who choose the rules which govern
them.
In Village N, 12 out of the 17 fishermen interviewed referred to their local panchayat as
the primary fisheries governance institution whose rules they do follow. Fisher N13 stated, after
discussing the district’s ban on trawl nets stated that the panchayat also upheld the ban on trawl
nets for about two days, but then agreed that it was O.K. for fishermen to use trawl nets. After
this decision, the entire village went back to using them regardless of the government regulation.
Fishermen N11 & N12 stated that it’s the panchayat that makes the rules. Of note though is the
common remark that the panchayat doesn’t give any restrictions to the fishermen except to not
fish on festival days. Fisherman N3 reported that the panchayat advocates for the fishermen to
catch what they can.

28

In Village N, 13 out of the 17 fishermen interviewed reported that they know of
district/state level regulations that apply to them, but choose not to follow them. Most fishermen
who provided a reason for this outlined that the government makes regulations that they cannot
follow and regulations that aren’t enforced. Therefore due to the fishermen’s depressed
economic situation, they are compelled, or “forced”, to disregard them. Fisherman N2 reported
that he doesn’t follow the regulations of the government except the 45 day ban, and doesn’t
recognize them either. He stated that the government makes regulations they can’t afford to
follow because their income is so low. Fishermen N4 reported that the government banned small
mesh-size nets (maththi valai) but he uses it anyways, because when the government first
introduced the net, he bought it at a subsidized rate but it was still very expensive. He felt he
couldn’t afford not to use it. Fisherman N5 stated that the government regulations are there but
he doesn’t follow them. The Fisheries Department makes them. He stated that the government
banned trawl nets but since so many big fishers use them they just paid the fisheries department
some money and now they can use them again.
In Village R, only one fisherman out of 14 interviewed mentioned the presence of the
Boat Owners’ Association (Fisher R7) and stated that the association advocates on behalf of
fishermen. Fisher R7 also happened to be the president of the BOA. These village organizations
are highly fragmented, and due to their fragmentation, have been unsuccessful at establishing
local level institutions governing fisheries management. Therefore, in Village R, district
regulations do not have to contend with village level rules governing fisheries resources.
In Village R, of the 14 fishermen interviewed, nine fishermen answered the questions
regarding rules they follow. All nine of the fishermen referenced the district level regulations
that apply to them. These include the 3:4 day share regulation, 3 hr. max trawl time and the

29

monsoon ban. Two of the nine fishermen specifically noted that before these temporal effort
restrictions were put into place (i.e, 1994) in Ramanathapuram district, they exerted more fishing
effort. Fisher R14 stated that before the 3 day trawl maximum, he fished his boat 6 days/wk.
Another fisherman (R13) reported that before the three day trawl regulation was set in 1994 they
would go out daily either from 5am-4pm in the rainy season and do overnight trips in the normal
season.

30

6. DISCUSSION
6.1 Adaptation constraints
The data suggests that while price is a contributing factor leading to adaptation decisions
(Bavinck, 1998), fishermen are also adapting to overall fish catch quantity. In some cases, as
seen in Village C fish catch quantity is much more important in determining adaptation strategies
than price. This particularly comes into play after the monsoon ban is lifted. The monsoon ban
is the only state level regulation fishermen consistently reported following. Prior to the ban, the
market supply is low because fish catch is low. During the ban, there is no mechanized fishing
which helps fish populations recover, but it also drives up the price of seafood since there is still
demand but no supply. After the ban lifts, however, all fishermen return to sea, catching larger
quantities than pre-ban (Kurup, 2009). Fishermen and export agents reported that post-ban,
heavy fishing pressure effectively swamps the market with seafood which drives the price down
because there is so much supply. At this point, exporters actually stop buying from fishermen
until they are able to empty their freezers.
In Village C, which is not governed by district level regulations, fishermen opt to
increase their effort in response to rising prices or quantity caught, in addition to employing gear
selectivity options. In Village N, despite district efforts to regulate, fishermen follow similar
strategies to Village C. In Village R, where fishermen are governed by district level regulations
limiting fishing effort, the data suggests that fishermen respond to these same stresses through
gear selectivity only instead of effort changes.
Additionally, in the presence of the effort restrictions, some fishermen in Village R
reported turning to black market opportunities in sea cucumber harvest to make up for their
perceived economic losses from legal fishing activities. This suggests that while temporal effort
restrictions are successful at constraining adaptation strategies, particularly by limiting fishers’
31

ability to increase effort, there are also potentially negative and unanticipated consequences to
these regulations if fishermen feel they are put at a disadvantage.
6.2 Rules
The data suggests that rule legitimacy is positively correlated with enforcement, as
suggested by the literature. In contrast with Village R, it became apparent through interviews
with all fishermen in Village N that the state and district level fisheries regulatory bodies have a
serious problem with enforceability and applicability of regulations at the local level. There is a
significant disconnect between the village level panchayat and the Fisheries Department within
the village studied and this has the potential to have serious implications for sustainable harvest
and ecosystem health, given that all state and district level management regulations are
disregarded except the monsoon ban.
While all fishermen in all villages observe the monsoon ban, it is in fact the time post-ban
where there is opportunity for continued management of harvest. The regulations that are
enforced at the district level in Ramanathapuram, at least in Village R, appear to effectively
promote the continued management of harvest by putting temporal limits on effort. In Villages
N and C, without the presence of temporal restrictions on effort, the post monsoon opportunity
for continued harvest management appears to be lost and fishermen continue to exert heavy
pressure well into the lean season, when production is low (Bavinck et. al. 2008). During this
time many fishermen report an inability to catch enough to offset their trip costs. This fishing
strategy depresses the market price for all fishermen and to a certain extent (the exact extent is
beyond the scope of this paper), reverses some of the ban’s progress in terms of stock
regeneration.

32

6.3 Heterogeneity vs. homogeneity: Conditions behind legal pluralism
Village N, characterized by homogeneity of identities and interests exhibited a strong
village panchayat whose interests and rules conflicted with those of the state/district. Our data
supports the hypothesis that in situations of legal pluralism, where there are inconsistencies
between district and village level rules, the ability of district level regulations to constrain
fishermen’s adaptation strategies will be limited. This is clearly exhibited by the fact that in
Village N, 13 out of the 17 fishermen interviewed reported disregarding all district/state
regulations (with the exception of the monsoon ban), supporting their village panchayat’s
decisions in terms of fisheries management.
In contrast, the evidence in this study suggests that the regional fisheries regulations were
better enforced in a heterogeneous atmosphere (Village R) where there was a large degree of
variation in resource users. This seemingly contradicts some of the theory behind successful
commons management (Agrawal, 2001) in that rules (albeit district regulations) were
successfully enforced in Village R versus Village N which was homogenous. As scholars
anticipate, our data shows that within a heterogeneous village, local institutions were
unsuccessful in building strong common interest strategies for fisheries management. However,
this absence of village rules opened up the possibility of greater district influence, and fishers
instead deferred to district regulations. This supports the hypothesis that fishers will defer to
state/district law in the absence of a strong village law because it’s backed by the power of the
state. This leads us to hypothesize further that in situations where heterogeneity may be a
disadvantage to the successful implementation of local level institutions, it may actually be an
advantage for state level institutions, allowing them greater opportunity to exert management
authority: an issue which merits further study.

33

7. CONCLUSION
Fishermen already report changes in catch and species availability as well as stock shifts
as presented earlier in the paper. The system is adapting by evolving new markets, such as the
market for crab and cuttlefish. Fishermen are adapting by modifying their nets to catch different
species and the demand is only increasing both internationally and domestically. The
implementation of regulations and enforceability thereof appear to be the component of the
system that continues to lag behind the rest. Without this pivotal filter, the resultant negative
impacts on fish catch will continue to be seen.
Other factors may also condition adaptation strategies devised by fishermen. One of
these confounding factors may be the wealth of individual fishermen, a variable that was not
addressed in this study. Higher levels of wealth may increase a fisherman’s adaptive capacity to
changing conditions. Wealth also may impact livelihood resilience by increasing an individual’s
opportunity to earn income outside fishing if necessary. Addressing inter-village differences in
economic status and its potential influence on resource users’ perceived adaptation constraints
would be an important component in a follow-up study to this research.
Limited data was gathered in this study on information access and the role of cell phones
in devising adaptation strategies. Initial reports were mixed: some fishermen stated that they
utilize cell phones to communicate among boats if schools of fish are seen. Fishermen can use
this information to coordinate their effort to maximize the returns. Another group of fishermen
stated that they may use their cell phones to check the market price at a number of nearby
landing centers and then land their catch accordingly. Still another group reported that even if
they are able to get market information on their phones at sea, landing in other places usually
means an increased cost in fuel and time, which is not worth what small increase in profit they

34

would get upon landing. Future research is needed to clarify the potential relationship between
information access and adaptation responses.
Additionally, examining the village level variables that enable effective rule enforcement
will be important in future fisheries management attempts. An examination of demographic
variables and their impact on local versus regional institutional efficacy seems warranted. Given
the sample size of this study it is difficult to separate the heterogeneity of resource users and the
high level of state government presence in the case of Village R in Ramanathapuram where
district level regulations were effectively enforced and followed. Incorporating other villages
that are not located in politically sensitive zones but are also heterogeneous in nature will be
important in understanding potential variables that lead to successful resource governance. A
larger sample size consisting of heterogeneous villages in politically sensitive zones in addition
to a control set of heterogeneous villages which are unassociated with politically sensitive zones,
but whose districts also exert management authority, would allow us to better separate the effects
of these two variables. This additional information will be important in developing policy
suggestions.
This analysis has shown that fishers will continue to adapt to changes in markets and
species availability. District regulations and robust village level institutions have the potential to
constrain adaptation strategies. The reality of legal pluralism that exists in many coastal villages
in Tamil Nadu, and largely throughout India needs to be accepted (over just acknowledged) but
also utilized to successfully build sustainable harvest strategies. Therefore, fisheries
development at the state level may benefit from increasing their efforts in building credibility
with village organizations. This could potentially be fostered through mentorship programs of
younger fishermen initiated by marine colleges and the Fisheries Department. Additionally, a

35

key motive for successful resource management is the provision of adequate incentives for
resource conservation (Agrawal, 2001). Therefore, increasing the incentives for fishermen to
follow district level regulations is also worth exploring.

36

APPENDICES

37

APPENDIX A

Interview questionnaire:

Name:

Location:

Position:

1) Before you started in this job, what did you do for work?
-Why/when did you switch?
2) Has the species you’ve caught changed over the past 10 years?

3) Has the amount of fish and prawn you’ve caught changed over the past 10 years?
-Why?

4) Who do you sell your catch to
-Why?
-Do you negotiate the price?
5) What is the typical price per kg prawns you receive upon landing
-How has the price changed over the past 10 years?
-Why has it changed?

6) Where does your catch go from the beach?

7) If the price of shrimp rises or falls, does it change the way you fish?
-(ex: different net, how often you go out, etc.)

8) What type of rules govern how you fish?
-who makes those rules?
-do you have a say in them?

38

APPENDIX B

Coding table:
Questions: What causes fishermen to choose different adaptation strategies in the face of
changing market conditions and species availability? Which rules are most effective in
constraining adaptation strategies?
Table 4: Coding matrix

Concept/Theme
Changing price

Code
ΔP

Changing catch

ΔC

Adaptation strategy

Adapt

Rules applicable

Rule

Presence and function of
community-level
governance organization

Summary
Fisherman: The price of
prawn is decreasing and the
price of fish is increasing
Fisherman: Catch is
decreasing for all species
due to the increased number
of boats fishing
Fisherman: I can’t increase
my effort if the price rises
for prawns but I can invest
in a new net in the hopes of
catching more
Fisherman: The government
banned small mesh-size
nets, but I use them
anyways.
Fisherman: There is a 15
member panchayat, all
members are men and all
members fish.

Inst

39

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40

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