

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# THE INFLUENCE OF JOHN LOCKE ON THE SPECTATOR

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF M. A. Howard Leroy Woolfan 1934





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## THE INFLUENCE OF JOHN LOCKE ON

# THE SPECTATOR

### BY

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A TELEIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE MACULTY OF MICHIGAN STATE COLLECE IN PARTIAL MULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS.

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Chapter I

When one picks up a modern newspaper and reads in its upper corner that the circulation of that edition is in excess of one million copies, one is not amased at the widespread influence exerted by the press. One is apt to think of such influence, however, as a strictly modern phenomenon. That this is not so is shown not only by the fact that the freedom of the press has been a bone of contention for several centuries, but also by the fact that one of the earliest progenitors of the modern newspaper, The Spectator, reached a daily issue of ten thousand copies.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, as Steele tells us. "an edition of the former volumes of Spectators of above nine thousand each book, is already sold off."2 In turn, the writings of any author who influenced the writers of The Spectator would become, insofar as that influence reached, a matter of general knowledge; of this nature were the writings of John Locks.

Locke, one of the foremost of English philosophers, was born on the twenty-ninth of August, 1632. He lived through one of the most troubled periods in English

<sup>1.</sup> W. J. Courthope, Addison, p. 109. 2. Spectator, No. 555.

history. During his lifetime occurred the struggle between Charles I and Parliament, the accession to power of the Presbyterians and Independents, the execution of Charles, the rule of Cromwell, the Restoration and reigns of Charles II and James II, the Glorious Revolution, and the constitutional settlement of William and Mary. His close connection with the realities of political life and his pragmatic attitude give his writings a freshness which has never been lost.

Locke's family was closely concerned with the troubles of the revolution. His father, a country attorney, joined the army of Parliament when the Civil War broke out; he returned home after two years, his fortunes considerably diminished.<sup>1</sup>

Looke's education, in spite of these family troubles, continued without interruption. He spent gix years at Westminster School, and in 1652 went up to Oxford, where he matriculated at Christ Church College.<sup>2</sup> Here he came under two influences, one of which was his personal contact with John Owen, dean of Christ Church College. Owen left the imprint of his tolerant temper on the mind of the young scholar. The other influence of his Oxford days was that of Descartes, several of whose doctrines

2. Ibid., pp. 7,8.

<sup>1.</sup> A. C. Frager, Locke, pp. 6,7.

Locke incorporated in his writings.<sup>1</sup> Locke's choice of a profession was difficult for him; for a short time he acted as a tutor at Oxford. His interest in experimental science led him into a study of medicine, and in 1688 he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society.<sup>2</sup>

In 1666 an even more important event occurred in the life of Locke, for in that year he met Lord Ashley-later, the first Earl of Shaftesbury. He was associated with the Shaftesbury family for the next fifteen years, holding minor political offices. When Shaftesbury died in 1682, Locke withdrew to the Continent.<sup>3</sup> He spent his time of exile in Holland, and returned to Europe in 1689, following the Glorious Revolution and accession of William and Mary.<sup>4</sup> The remainder of his life was quiet, being spent chiefly in bringing out a series of philosophical works.<sup>5</sup> He died at Oates on October twentyeighth, 1704.<sup>6</sup>

Locke'r writinge were, like his life, varied, being concerned with such subjects as religion, politics, metaphysics, and epistemology. His earliest published work was, characteristically, <u>A Letter concerning Toleration</u>, in which Locke is concerned with the distinction between

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John Locke, <u>Selectione</u>, p. viii.
<u>Ibid</u>., p. 30.
<u>A. C. Fraser, Locke</u>, p. 72.
<u>Ibid</u>., p. 77.
John Locke, <u>Selectione</u>, p. xiv.
A. C. Fraser, <u>Locke</u>, p. 266.
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church and state. The state owes protection to all churches as far as the security of their properties and the freedom of their worship are concerned, but must not exhibit political favor to any. Looke does refuse, however, to tolerate atheists, on the grounds that disbelief in God destroys the basis of morality.<sup>1</sup>

From this work. Locke turns to a discussion of <u>The Reasonableness of Christianity</u>. He states as the three essentials of Christian faith the existence of God, the Messiahehip of Jesus, and the principles of morality as set forth in the Bible.<sup>2</sup> Two of these, the existence of God and the principles of morality, form the content of <u>natural religion</u>--i.e., the religion acceptable to all rational minds which pay attention to the evidences in nature and the connection of their own ideas. For some men, however, revelation is essential to recall their minds to God and virtue, and Jesus bears this revelation.<sup>3</sup>

Besides the three essentials of Christian faith, many other doctrines can be demonstrated by use of the Scriptures. However, of these doctrines we are not perfectly sure, and should neither force others to

8. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. xxv.

<sup>1.</sup> John Locke, Selections, p. IIII.

<sup>2.</sup> Ibid., p. XXV.

agree with us, nor exclude them from civil equality because of opposing beliefs.1

Thue back of Locke's plea for toleration are the convictions that reason proves whatever is necessary to know to prepare oneself for future life, and that disputes in religion are due to matters of little moment. Locke unknowingly fostered scepticism by his reliance on reason, although his intent was directed toward a closer welding of man's intellect and religion.

Probably more far-reaching than Locke's interests in religion were those concerned with political and educational theory. His political theory is set forth in his <u>Treatises of Government</u>, which he wrote "to establish the throne of our great rectorer, our present King Killiam.<sup>2</sup> and "to justify to the world the people of England whose love of their just and matural rights, with their resolution to preserve them, saved the mation when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruim."<sup>3</sup>

The basis of Locke's political philosophy is the theory that man makes the transition from a natural state to a political state by means of a social contract. In a state of nature, man is governed by moral law-the law of nature, as Locke calls it. From this stage,

<sup>1.</sup> John Locke, Selections, p. xxvi.

<sup>2.</sup> Quoted by Lamprocht, Louke's Selections, p. xxVii. 3. Ibid., p. xxVii.

men pase to a state of government by a social contract, under which individual rights are relinquished to a central authority, to preserve order. Thus the government has only those powers given it by the contract, and the people have a right to defend themselves against usurpation of illegitimate power. Locks is here aiming to discourage tyranny, not to encourage revolution.<sup>1</sup> In any friction between the people and a particular ruler, the social contract is the basis of judgment.

Of Locke's educational writings, <u>Some Thoughts</u> <u>concerning Education</u><sup>2</sup> is interesting as a work "designed to give practical guidance to a friend who sought advice on how to educate his son."<sup>3</sup> Locke views education as training for a future career, and not as mere occupation of the years between boyhood and manhood. This is very intelligible when one remembers that Locke regarded his Oxford days as of little practical value. As Locke says, "He [the tutor] should acquaint him [the pupil] with the true state of the world, and dispose him to think no man better or worse, wiser or foolisher, than he really is."<sup>4</sup> Locke wishes to provide escape from the pedantry which reigned at Oxford when he was a scholar,<sup>5</sup> and to give

John Locke, <u>Selections</u>, p.xxi.
Edited by R. H. Quick.
John Locke, <u>Selections</u>, p. xxxii.
John Locke, <u>Some Thoughts concerning Education</u>, p. 71.
Ibid., p. 74.

boys a chance to study current events and natural sciences; to endow them with those social graces which will fit them for a place in life;<sup>1</sup> and to adjust the content of the study to the prospects of the pupils.<sup>2</sup>

Locke emphasizes the moral element in education as well as the intellectual element. He makes a plea for the judicious moulding of character, so that the pupil in reaching manhood will be subject to high and noble impulses: "Place him [the pupil] in hands where you may, as much as possible, secure his innocence, cherish and nurse up the good, and gently correct and weed out any bad inclinations, and settle him in good habite."<sup>3</sup>

Locke's greatest contribution to philosophy, however, is his momentous <u>Essay concerning Human Understand-</u> <u>ing</u>,<sup>4</sup> which had its inception probably in the winter of 1670-71.<sup>5</sup> Locks was meeting with "five or six friends," and an impasse was reached over some point in the discussion. It was then decided "it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with."<sup>6</sup> Locks worked for nearly twenty years on the <u>Essay</u>, which was first published

John Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education, p. 69.
Ibid., p. 83.
<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 129.
Edited by E. F. Dutton.
A. G. Fraser, Locke, p. 32.
John Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, p. x.

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in 1689.

The first division of the <u>Besay</u> is entitled <u>Of</u> <u>Innate Notions</u>, and is devoted to the idea that at birth the mind is like "white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas."<sup>1</sup> All our knowledge comes from experience, which, in turn, comprises sensation and reflection. This conception of the mind is, of course, an introduction to Locke's empirical theory of knowledge. He rejects innate ideas and inducitable principles of the human mind, and thereby the political, metaphysical, and theological systems founded on such principles.

From this rejection of innate ideas, Locke proceeds<sup>2</sup> to demonstrate an entirely new type of dualism--a dualism in which he demonstrates that sense qualities are the original starting point of the mind in its efforts to gain knowledge. On the one hand are material bodies made up of atoms, and on the other, knowing minds. Locke concentrates his efforts on developing a theory of knowledge founded on this dualism. The mind has power to act upon simple ideas in three ways:

"(1) Combining several simple ideas into one compound one; and thus all complex ideas are made. (2) The second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex.

<sup>1.</sup> John Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, p. 59. 2. Ibid., Book II, "Of Ideas."

together, and setting them by one shother, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one: by which it gets all its ideas of relations. (3) The third is separating them from all the ideas that accompany them in their real existence; this is called 'abstraction:' and thus all its general ideas are made.<sup>1</sup>

All complex ideas may be "reduced under these three heads: 1. Modes. 2. Substances. 3. Relations."2 Modes are "complex ideas which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themrelves, but are considered as dependencies on or affections of substances: such are the ideas signified. by the words, 'triangle, gratitude, murder'." There are two kinds of Modes, simple and mixed. Simple Modes are those "which are only variations or different combinations of the same simple idea, without the mixture of any other, as a dogen, or score." Mixed Modes are compounded of simple ideas of several kinds; for example, "beauty. conficting of a certain composition of colour and figure, causing delight in the beholder."<sup>3</sup> Substances are "such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting

John Locke, <u>An Eccay concerning Human Understanding</u>, p. 108.
Ibid., p. 109.

<sup>3. &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 109.

by themselves, in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus, if to substances be joined the simple idea of a certain dull, whitish colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, and fusibility. we have the idea of lead."<sup>1</sup> Relations consist "in the consideration and comparing one idea with another."<sup>2</sup>

From this point of view, Locke goes on to show that all metaphysical terms can be derived, by applying the above ideas, from perfectly definite simple ideas. Such ideas as extension, motion, eternity, and God can be derived from simple ideas by the use of either modes, substances, or relations. Locke does not, however, define what "experience" really means, and thus leaves a problem for future philosophers.

From this discussion of ideas, Locke proceeds to Book III, "Of Words." Many disputes have arisen merely through wrong usage or application of words.<sup>3</sup> He sets forth various remedies: "to use no word without an idea," "to have distinct ideas annexed to them in modes," "to take care in applying words," "to make known their meaning,"<sup>4</sup> and "to use the same word constantly in the

 John Locke, <u>An Essay concerning Human Understanding</u>, p. 107.
<u>Ibid.</u> p. 110.
<u>Ibid.</u> p. 412.
<u>Ibid.</u> p. 414 ff.

enme sonse."1 Thus Locke argues for an exact and reientific use of language.

Locke's subject in Book IV is "Knowledge and Opinion." Having examined ideas in general in Book II, he now proceeds to show what these ideas tell us in the way of truth. "Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them."<sup>2</sup> "Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. There this perception is, there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge."<sup>3</sup>

The varying clearness of our knowleige lies in the different ways of perception which the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas. Some ideas the mind perceives at first sight, by "intuitive knowledge;" for example, we know immediately that black is not white, "that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two."<sup>4</sup>

John Locke, <u>An Essay on Human Understanding</u>, p. 423.
<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 424.
<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 424.
Ibid., p. 433.

The next derree of knowledge is "deponstrative." "where the mind perceives the spreacent or dissarcement of any ideas, but not immediately." Thus the mind. being willing to know the agreement or disagreement in birners between the three angles of a triangle and the two right once, cannot, by an immediate view and comparing them, do it . . . In this case the mind is fuin to find out some other angles, to which the three engles of a triangle have an equality; and finding these equal to two right once, comer to know their equality to two right ones."<sup>2</sup> Thur, if knowledge depende only on the connection between our idens. it becomes subjective, arbitrary, and unreal. Locke, however, is not aware of this problem.<sup>3</sup> There is a third degree of knowledge, sensitive knowledge, which is discussed later.

At to the problem of whether knowledge is real. "It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is uniformity between our ideas and the reality of things."<sup>4</sup> One kind of knowledge, however, may be termed real, because it refers to nothing beyond itself. "All

our complex idear except those of substances being archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of anything, nor referred to the existence of anything, as to their originals, cannot want any uniformity necessary to real knowledge."<sup>1</sup> Mathematical knowledge, for example, is real because we are dealing only with ideas which we ourselves have found, and whose truth is independent of whether or not there are any real objects in the world. Moral knowledge is another case in point.<sup>2</sup> However, when we turn to substances, a new factor enters, in the idea of real existence.

We have a real knowledge of three kinds of substances, of which the first is knowledge of our own existence.<sup>3</sup> Of this, we are certain by intuition. A second kind of real knowledge is that of the existence of God. We are certain of this because we know that something exists, as is instanced by our own existence. Furthermore, something must have existed from eternity, since nothing can produce no real being. All our perception and knowledge must be present in greater degree in the eternal reality from which we spring. Thus an intelligent being (God) must exist as the source of our

<sup>1.</sup> John Locke, An Essay on the Human Understanding, p. 483. 2. Ibid., p. 484. 3. Ibid., p. 528.

knowledge.1

The third port of real knowledge is that of our remeations. "for I think nobody can, in cornect, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels."<sup>2</sup> This knowledge is real, first, because organs themselves, such as eyes, connot produce sensation; second, because ideas from actual sensation are different from those stored in the mind; and thirdly, because "our senses . . . bear witness to the truth of each other's report concerning the existence of sensible things without us."<sup>3</sup>

This much is true concerning certain knowledge. However, snother factor, judgment, supplies the want of certain knowledge. "For, that [true knowledge] being very short and scenty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the actions of his life perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge. Es that will not est till he has demonstration that it will nourish him, he that will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do but sit still and perish."<sup>4</sup> Then

 John Locke, <u>An Essay concerning Human Understanding</u>, p. 528.
<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 537.
<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 539.
<u>Icid.</u>, p. 554.

Locke goes on to consider probability, or "the appearance of agreement upon fallible proofs." Probability, which supplies "the defect of our knowledge, has two grounds: First, the conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation and experience. Secondly, the testimony of others, vouching their observation and experience. In the testimony of others is to be considered, (1) The number (2) The integrity (3) The skill of the witnesses (4) The design of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited (5) The consistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation (6) Contrary testimonies."<sup>1</sup>

Thus it can be seen that Locke's work leads to a genuine scepticism. In spite of this, Locke retained his faith in the rational nature of the world. For him, reason was limited to what sensation and reflection provide in the way of simple ideas, and for him, the existence of God and the ideals of Christianity were perhaps even more real than objects about him.

It might be well to say a few words on Looke's ethical ideas, as set forth in the <u>Besay on the Human</u> <u>Understanding</u>. His ethical theory is not worked out in much detail, but is important as being characteristic

<sup>1.</sup> John Locke, <u>An Essay concerning Human Understanding</u>, p. 554.

of the "moral philosophy of England of a later day." For Locke. "Good and evil . . . are nothing but pleasure or pair. or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil, then, is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good and evil is drawn on us from the will and power of the lawmaker, which good and evil. pleasure or pain, attending our observance or breach of the law, by the decree of the law-maker, is that we call 'reward' and 'punishment'." As far as Locke is concerned, ethics can be made a demonstrative science, for the existence of God has been proved (for him. at least) and the true ground of morality is "the will and law of a God. who sees men in the dark, has in his hand rewards and punishments, and power enough to call on account the proudest offender."2

In showing the influence of these writings of Locke on the <u>Spectator</u> papers, it may be well to have an understanding of the chronological relations between Locke and the main writers of the papers, Addison and Steele. The <u>Epistola de Tolerantia</u> was published im March, 1689, <u>Two Treatises in Government</u> in February, 1690, and the <u>Essay concerning Human Understanding</u> in

John Locke, <u>An Essay concerning Human Understanding</u>, p. 279.
Ibid., p. 29.

March. 1690.<sup>1</sup> In these years (1689-1690) Addison was a student at Oxford.<sup>2</sup> as was Steele.<sup>3</sup> Thus both were at a stage of their careers when the philosophy might be an important part of their curricula. In fact, at this time an attempt was made to introduce into the universities Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, which had just been published. "It met with immediate success, and led to a voluminous literature of attack and reply; young fellows of colleges tried to introduce it at the universities, and heads of houses eat in conclave to device means for its suppression."4 If the students of today form a criterion, such a suppression would have the effect of causing Looke's Essay to be widely read, and would make it even more likely that Addigon and Steele might have become familiar with the Essay during their university days.

Addieon went abroad in 1699, where he remained until 1704. When he returned, Steele introduced him to the circle of with at Will's Coffee-house, and to the Whigs at St. Jame's Coffee-house. In 1706 Steele became manager of the <u>Gazette</u>, the official government newspaper, and kept this position until 1710, when the

<sup>1.</sup> A. C. Fraser, Locks, p. 297.

<sup>2.</sup> N. J. Courthope, Addieon, p. 28.

<sup>3.</sup> Austin Dobson, Richard Steels, p. 8.

<sup>4.</sup> H. R. Sarley, A History of English Philosophy, p. 106.

whise fell. 1 Both Addison and Steele were then members of Parliament.


The journalistic endeavors of Addison and Steele probably had their inception in the fact that Steele was managing the Gazette, and thus had access to plenty of news.<sup>2</sup> There had been periodicals before the Tatler, but they were chiefly newspapers, occasionally utilizing letters to the editor or sesays. "Steele evidently projected a periodical that should combine reforming comment on current follies and vices with reports of current events." From this type of serial Addison and Steele developed the "chief proce invention of the century," the periodical essay.

The first of the periodical ventures. The Tatler, ran from April 12, 1709, to January 2, 1711.4 It appeared three times weekly and totaled 271 numbers. The commencement of the Tatler was Steele's own idea. Addison's real cooperation began in the autumn of 1709.<sup>5</sup> The Spectator ran as a daily periodical from March 1, 1711, to December 6, 1712, (555 numbers) and represented the combined efforts of the two men. In 1714 Addison

- 4. Ibid., p. 16d.
- 5. Ibid., p. 168.

<sup>1.</sup> Bredvold, L. I., R. K. Root, and G. Sherburn. Eighteenth Century Prose, p. 167.

<sup>2. &</sup>lt;u>Jbid.</u> p. 167. 3. <u>Jbid.</u> p. 167.



revived the Spectator as a tri-weekly (Nos. 556-636), and in 1715 William Bond continued it to No. 696; but "Steele had no part in these continuations, which are certainly of inferior interest."

Perhaps a short examination of The Spectator as a whole will help to orient the position of Locke in reference to the periodical. The general purpose of The Spectator is expressed by Addison in No. 58, in which he gave "the great and only end of these my epeculations is to bunish vice and ignorance out of the territories of Great Britain." Furthermore, he tells up in No. 262 that he excludes such topics as vice, irreligion, and scandal. The idea of the periodical is based on a club containing representatives of the constituent parts of society: the church, the bar, the army, the landed interest, the monied interest, the interest of the world of fashion, together with the Spectator himself, who is interested in all types of men, and judges the extent to which their acts are reasonable. The variety of the papers springs not so much, however, from the diversity of the club as it does from an unusual diversity of subject matter. Literary criticiem, the pleasures of imagination, the

<sup>1.</sup> L. I. Bredvold, R. K. Root, and G. Sherburn, Eighteenth Century Prose, p. 168.

London scene, rational pleasures--all find a place in The Spectator.

In a periodical which aims at such a high objective as the improvement of the taste, manners, and morals of a nation, it is important to find what influences came to bear upon the authors. Certainly an important consideration in choice of subject would be the immediate need of entertaining in order to gain the nation's attention. When the papers on philosophical subjects were written, the writers of <u>The Spectator</u> may have selected the work of Locks as a basis for many of their discussions because his philosophy "blends spontaneously with the ordinary language of all educated men, "1 and because they believed his writings formed the logical foundation for reforming the nation. That Locks did have material influence on <u>The Spectator</u>, this paper proposes to show.

<sup>1.</sup> Leslie Stephen, English Literature and Society in the Eighteenth Century, p. 47.

### Chapter II

Because of the diversity of Locke's writing, I have grouped together those issues of the <u>Spectator</u> which show his influence, as far as possible under the headings politics, religion, education, and ethics. The remaining numbers of the <u>Spectator</u> which show Locke's influence have their inception in the epistemological theories of the <u>Essay on Human Understanding</u>, and are thus placed together in the following discussion.

As far as politics are concerned, the one paper which shows Locke's influence definitely is No. 3,<sup>1</sup> which is an allegorical allusion to the financial crisis following the Revolution. A hall is depicted, in which is seated a beautiful virgin, who sets much value on the acts of Parliament. She pales whenever these acts are in the least menaced, and whenever a message is brought to her from the outer world. As she site there, various phantoms enter, including Tyranny and Anarchy, and Bigotry and Atheism. The lady faints away, the spectres dissolve, and a new scene is

1. Spectator, Vol. I, p. 12.

revealed. Some "very amiable phantoms are disclosed, including Liberty. with Monarchy on her right hand, and Moderation leading Religion." The lady revivee. and the assembly is once more happy.

Here Locke's influence can plainly be seen. Tyranny and anarchy are also assailed by Lockel as being dangerous to government, and bigotry and atheism are especially attacked in his writings.<sup>2</sup> Looke discusses true liberty as associated with monarchy. in his Treatise of Civil Government. <sup>3</sup> in which he emphasizes the necessity of a central power to protect the rights of all.

The influence of Locke's ideas on religion is plainly perceptible in No. 389,<sup>4</sup> in which there is an attack against atheign and zealotry by Budgell.<sup>5</sup> Atheiets are sttacked on two grounds: "The first is. that the greatest and most eminent persons of all ages have been against them<sup>6</sup> and complied with public worship as long as it was prejudicial to the honor of God and the good of mankind. The second is that the

<sup>1.</sup> John Locke, Selections, p. 75.

<sup>2.</sup> Ibid., p. 49-50.

<sup>3.</sup> Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>4.</sup> Spectator, Vol. V, p. 261. 5. Eustace Budgell, Addison's cousin, and a collaborator on The Spectator, lived from 1686 to 1737. He wrote a translation of Theophrastus, started and carried on The Bee, (1733-1735) contributed to The Crafteman. and issued some family monographs on the Boyle family. His later life was unhappy, and he finally committed suicide. (From the Biographical Index in Vol. VIII of The Spectator.)

<sup>6.</sup> Spectator, Vol. V, p. 262.

idea of God is either innate. or readily observable. or has been handed down by tradition. The first of these reasons is clearly traceable to Locke's attack on atheists as set forth in The Reasonableness of Christianity. Furthermore, Locke's name is definitely mentioned in this paper, in the quotation, "The Flatos and Cicorog among the ancients: the Bacone, the Boyles, and the Lockes emong our own countrymen, are all instances of what I have been saying" -- i.e., Looke is one of the "foremost persons" above quoted, who have opposed atheigm.

Addison attacks seal for mere sectarian beliefs. and also atheism, in Spectator No. 185.2 These same ideas are to be encountered in Locke's writings on religion. Locke, too, was opposed to sectarianism in religion. He believed men should not contend over matters of little moment as far as the spirit of Christianity is concerned. He was diametrically opposed to atheism. 3 too, on the grounds that it leads to immorality.

In No. 186<sup>4</sup> Addieon further attacks atheism, and supports "the great received articles of the Christian

Spectator, Vol. V, p. 262.
Spectator, Vol. III, p. 62.
Quoted by Lamprecht in John Locke's Selections,

p. xxiii, from <u>A Letter of Toleration</u>.

<sup>4.</sup> Spectator, Vol. III, p. 66.

religion," which have been proved by suthority of divine revelation. Locke expresses the idea of religion as revealed through Christ in <u>The Reasonableness of Christianity</u>. "In this state of darkness our Saviour found the world. But the clear revelation he brought with him dissipated this darkness, made the one invisible true Cod known to the world, and that with such evidence and energy that polytheism and idolatry have nowhere been able to withstand it."<sup>1</sup>

Paper No. 643 sets forth the idea that revealed religion has advanced morality in "that it has given us a more just and perfect idea of that Being whom every reasonable creature ought to imitate." This idea parallels that set forth by Locke in <u>The Reasonableness of Christianity<sup>2</sup></u>in which he explains that men are lazy intellectually, and that Jesus, as the bearer of revelation, is necessary to recall the minds of men to God and virtue.

The next subject showing Locks's influence is education, which is dealt with in a series of <u>Spectator</u> papers by Budgell. The first of these is No. 307.<sup>3</sup> in which the writer proposes that state examiners be appointed to "inspect the genius of every particular

3. Spectator, Vol. IV, p. 217.

<sup>1.</sup> John Looke, Selections, p. 54.

<sup>2.</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

boy." and to allot him a part suitable to his particular talents. He goes on to say that instead of adapting studies to the genius of the pupil, teachers expect the pupil to adapt his genius to studies. Looke sets forth parallel ideas in Some Thoughts concerning Education: after moral habits have been set up in the pupil. "it will be fit to consider which way the natural make of his mind inclines him . . . . There are not more differences in men's faces and the outward lineaments of their bodies, than there are in the makes and tempers of their minds." Furthermore. "He that is about children should well study their natures and aptitudes, and see by often trials what turn they easily take, and what become e them . . . . Every one's natural genius should be carried as far as it could; but to attempt the putting snother upon him, will be but labor in vain."2

In No. 313<sup>3</sup> Budgell continues his discussion of education with the question as to whether education by a private tutor or at a public school is preferable. He then quotes Locke: "Mr. Locke, in his celebrated Treatise of Education, conferses that there are inconveniences to be feared on both sides: 'if,' says he,

<sup>1.</sup> John Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education, p. 82. 2. Ibid., p. 40. 3. Spectator, Vol. IV, p. 243.

'I keep my son at home, he is in danger of becoming my young master; if I send him abroad, it is soarce possible to keep him from the reigning contagion of rudeness and vice. He will perhaps be more ignorant at home, but more ignorant of the world, and more sheepish when he comes abroad.'<sup>\*1</sup> Budgell goes on to paraphrase Looke's contention<sup>2</sup> that virtue is attained with more difficulty than knowledge of the world; hence parents should accustom their sons to meeting strangers, but should give them a private education. Budgell comes to the conclusion that a private education is the most natural method for forming a virtuous man, and a public education for making a man of business. The author owee a debt to Looke not only for the inspiration of his paper, but also for the content.

In No. 337.<sup>3</sup> Budgell contributes a third essay on education. The main idea of the paper is that one should not teach Greek or Latin as so many sentences, but should point out the virtues of the men read about in those languages. In this way the instructor can inculcate ideas of virtue in the minds of his pupils along with a knowledge of Latin and Greek. The paper is concluded by the following: "In short, nothing is more wanting to

<sup>1.</sup> Budgell quotes from John Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education, p. 46.

<sup>2.</sup> In Some Thoughts concerning Education, p. 47.

<sup>3.</sup> Spectator, Vol. V, p. 63.

our public schools, than that the masters of them should use the same care in fashioning the manners of their scholars, as in forming their tongues to the learned langunges. Where even the former is omitted, I cannot help agreeing with Mr. Locke, that a man must have a very strange value for words, when preferring the languages of the Greeks and Romans to that which made them such brave men, he can think it worth while to hasard the innocence and virtue of his son for a little Greek and Latin."<sup>1</sup> Budgell is paraphrasing ideas set forth by Locke in <u>Some Thoughts concerning Education</u>.<sup>2</sup> It can be readily seen that Budgell owes the whole inception of his essay to ideas derived from Locke.

Budgell's final erray on education is found in No. 353.<sup>3</sup> He rets forth the idea that pupils should be trained to practical arts and sciences, and should not be designed for schools unless they show aptitude for such pursuits. Pupils should be taught the writing of letters in English, rather than being perplexed with Latin spistles. The keeping of accounts and shorthand are recommended as useful arts. The derivation of these ideas from Locks's Some Thoughts concerning Education is easily perceptible. He says:<sup>4</sup> "Whatever foreign languages

2. p. 46.

<sup>1.</sup> Spectator, Vol. V, p. 67.

<sup>3.</sup> Spectator, Vol. V. p. 128.

<sup>4.</sup> John Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education, p. 166.

a young man meddlee with (and the more he knows the better) that which he should critically study, and labor to get a facility, clearness and elegancy to express himself in, should be his own." Locke criticises those so-called scholars who look on Latin and Greek as being the only refined tongues, and neglect to teach their pupils correct English.<sup>1</sup> He recommends practice in English letter writing,<sup>2</sup> the keeping of accounts,<sup>3</sup> and shorthand.<sup>4</sup> Budgell's indebtedness to Locke is thus clearly discernible throughout the paper. In fact, this series of four papers seems to be based on ideas derived from Locke's Some Thoughts concerning Education.

In papers No. 381 and 387, Addison's indebtedness to Locke for ethical ideas is shown. In No. 381, the writer praises cheerfulness as conducive to happiness. The man who is cheerful is a "perfect master of all the powers and faculties of his soul." Furthermore, a cheerful state of mind shows "a constant habitual gratitude to the great Author of Nature."<sup>5</sup> Atheism may deprive a man of this cheerfulness of temper. But to Addison the idea of atheism is untenable. "For my own part, I think the being of a God is so little to be doubted, that it

John Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education, p. 166.
Ibid., p. 164.
Ibid., p. 182.
Ibid., p. 137.
Spectator, Vol. V, p. 235.

is almost the only truth we are sure of, and such a truth as we meet in every object. in every occurrence. and in every thought." As I have shown before, Locks attacks atheism in A Letter concerning Toleration. saying that it is one belief which should not be tolerated. Furthermore. Locke believed the existence of God not only capable of perfect demonstration, as he shows in An Essay on the Human Understanding, but also that Hig being is more certain than that of any other exterior to us.

Locke's influence is more evident, however, in No. 387.<sup>2</sup> in which Addieon continues his discussion of cheerfulness, considering it in its "natural state," and reflecting on "those motives to it, which are indifferent either as to virtue or vice."<sup>3</sup> He then says: "Those who are versed in philosophy may still carry this consideration [1.e., how Providence helps keep one cheerful] higher, by observing that if matter had appeared to us endowed only with those real qualities which it actually possesses, it would have made but a very joyless and uncomfortable figure; and why has Providence given it a power of producing in us such imaginary qualities as tastes and colors, sounds and

3. Itid., p. 257.

<sup>1.</sup> John Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, p. 52. 2. Spectator, Vol. V. p. 254.

smells, heat and cold, but that wan, while he is convergant in the lower stations of nature, might have his mind cheered and delighted with agreeable censations?"1 The relation of this passage to the following in Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding is readily seen: "The infinitely wise Author of our being . . . having given a power to our minds, in several instances, to choose amongst its ideas which it will think on, and to pursue the inquiry of this or that subject with consideration and attention--to excite us to these actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of, has been pleased to join to several thoughts and several sensations a perception of delight."2

Locke's name is definitely brought in at the conclusion of this paper, in which Addison says<sup>3</sup> that the evils in the world should not destroy our cheerfulness: "This interspersion of evil with good, and pain with pleasure in the works of nature, is very truly ascribed by Mr. Locke in his Essay on Human Understanding to a moral reason. in the following words:4

'Beyond all this, we may find another reason why God hath scattered up and down reversi degrees of pleasure

<sup>1.</sup> Spectator. Vol. V, p. 256.

<sup>2.</sup> John Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, p. 81. 3. Spectator, Vol. V, p. 257.

<sup>4.</sup> Quoted by Addison from Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, p. 82.

and pain, in all the things that environ and effect us, and blended them together, in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with: that we finding imperfection, dissatisfaction, and want of complete happiness, in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of Him, "with whom there is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.""

It seems probable from a survey of these two papers, that Addison not only owed many of the ideas set forth in them to Locks, but was actually inspired in their writing by ideas derived from the philosopher.

## Chapter III

The influence on <u>The Spectator</u> of the political, religioue, educational, and ethical ideas of Locke has been demonstrated. There remains to be seen the influence of the <u>Essay on the Human Understanding</u>. The papers expressing ideas derived from the <u>Essay</u> do not follow any definite classification. They are dealt with in the order in which they appear in <u>The Spectator</u>.

The first of these papers. No. 37, can hardly be termed an important example of Locke's influence. Addison lists some books which a lady has collected "either because she had heard them praised, or because she had seen the authors of them." Among these books appear "Lock of Human Understanding;' with a paper of patches in it," "a spelling book," "a dictionary for the explanation of hard worde," and "The New Atalantie, with a key to it" along with "A Book of Novels," "The Ladies' Calling," and "Advice to a Daughter." The lady does not hesitate to place those books which she enjoys side by eide with those which she feels she ought to read. It was evidently fachionable for the ladice of Addison's time to pretend to enjoy the philosophy of Bacon and Locke. This paper shows, then, that Locke had wide currency among those who wished to be thought intellectual.

The next paper to show the influence of The Essay on the Human Understanding is No. 62. In this paper. Addison shows his contempt for that conceited style which was popular with certain writers of his time; he wishes writing to be logical, clear, and free of unnecessary adornment. He bases this paper on a quotation from Locke: "Mr. Look has an admirable reflection upon the difference of wit and judgment. whereby he endeavore to show the reason why they are not always the talents of the same person. His words are as follow: 'and hence, perhaps, may be given some reason of that common observation, that men who have a great deal of wit and prompt memories, have not always the clearest judgment, or deepert reason. For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures, and agreeable vigions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite in the other side. In separating carefully one from another, ideas wherein can be found the vast difference, thereby to avoid being mieled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion; wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of wit which strikes so lively in the

fancy, and is therefore so acceptable to all people."" Addigon calle this "the best and most philosophical account that I have ever met with of wit."2 He goes on to explain that not every resemblance of ideas is wit. unless it is one that gives delight and surprise to the reader. Furthermore, there is this distinction between true and false wit: true wit is the resemblance of ideas, as in metaphore, similitudes, allegories, and burlesques, whereas false wit is the resemblance sometimes of single letters, as in anagrams; sometimes in eyllables, as in doggeral rhymes; sometimes of words. as in pune: and sometimes of whole poems, as in those "cast into the figures of eggs, axes, or altars."3 There is also a kind of wit called "mixed." which consists partly in the resemblance of ideas, partly in the resemblance of words. Addison goes on to give examples of various authors and the types of wit they used. In concluding the essay, he admits his indebtedness to Locke in the words: "Mr. Lock in the passage abovementioned has discovered the most fruitful source of wit."4 Addison, it can be seen, does not give the philosophical connotations of the ideas he gets from Locke--

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Quoted from the <u>Eccay on the Human Understanding</u>, p. 102.
Spectator, Vol. I. p. 232.
<u>Ibid.</u> p. 233.
<u>Ibid.</u> p. 237.

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he merely expands them by following the train of ideas suggested, and then proceede to show the literary application of the ideas thus expanded.

In paper No. 94.<sup>1</sup> Addison reflects on the question of the duration of time, and purposes to show that "those parts of life which are exercised in study. reading, and the pursuits of knowledge, are long but not tedious, and by that means discover a method of lengthening our lives, and at the same time of turning all the parts of them to our advantage." The writer then quotes a passage from Locks<sup>2</sup> to the effect that we get the idea of time from reflecting on that train of ideas which succeed one another in our minds. When we fix our mind on a single idea. we fail to notice the passage of time, and thus the time spent in contemplation passes more quickly for us. Addison gives this a witty turn by saying that we may shorten our time by thinking of nothing or few things, and lengthen it by reflecting on many things. He then tells several etories to illustrate the point, showing how, through the power of Mohamet, years were made to seem as minutes. Addison comes to the conclusion that "The hours of a wise man are lengthened by his ideas, as those of a fool

1. Spectator, Vol. II, p. 49. 2. John Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, p. 123.

are by his passions: the time of the one it long. because he does not know what to do with it; so is that of the other because he distinguishes every moment of it with useful or amusing thought; or in other words, because the one is always wishing it away, and the other always enjoying it."<sup>1</sup> Thus that thought which in Locks served merely to illustrate that the ideas of duration are derived from reflection, furnishes the facile mind of Addison with a whole train of ideas, which he gives a witty and extremely pleasing turn, thereby combining instruction and entertainment.

In paper No. 110, Addison turns his attention to ghosts. He begins his essay by telling of the ruins of an old abbey, supposedly haunted, which is near the home of Sir Roger de Coverley. He tells how a milkmaid was frightened by hearing a rustling in the bushes, and how, with the sombre appearance of the place, "I do not at all wonder that weak minds fill it with spectres and apparitions." He then gives proof of the derivation of his ideas from Locke:

"Mr. Locke<sup>2</sup> in his chapter of the Association of Ideas, has very curious remarks to show how by the prejudice of education one idea often introduces into the

<sup>1.</sup> Spectator, Vol. II. p. 52.

<sup>2.</sup> It is interesting to note that here the spelling is Locke, while elsewhere it is usually Lock.

mind a whole set that bear no resemblance to one another in the nature of things. Among several examples of this kind, he produces the following instance: 'The ideas of gobline and sprights have really no more to do with darkness than light; yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often on the mind of a child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives; but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that he can no more bear the one than the other.'<sup>#1</sup>

Addieon then tells, in a rather facetious wein, of how Sir Roger's house was partially haunted, the portion that was supposedly haunted not being used. Finally Sir Roger celled in his chaplain, who exorcised the haunted rooms, thus making them habitable. Such stories of haunted houses may have some grounds of plausibility, however, writes Addison, and then quotes Lucretius, who had various ideas on the return of the soul after death, and Josephus, who told a story of the return of a husband after death to his wife who had married again.

<sup>1.</sup> Here Addison quotes from the Essay on the Human Understanding, p. 317.


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It is interesting to note how an idea from Locke can raise in the fecund mind of Addison not only a host of reflections on ghosts past and present, but also some reflections on the immortality of the soul, which are in turn related to the other <u>Spectator</u> papers by means of the Sir Roger de Coverley device. And perhaps the reading of Locke on goblins may have had other reverberations in the writings of Addison, more especially in paper No. 12.<sup>1</sup> That Addison may have used ideas from Locke without giving definite oredit is shown in this paper, in which the influence of Locke becomes perceptible only after reading No. 110.

In paper No. 12, Addison tells (i.e., in the person of the "epectator") of his residence with a widow who has "a great many children." When the "spectator" comes home one evening, he finds various girls of the neighborhood gathered before the fire telling ghost stories. "Indeed, they talked so long, that the imaginations of the whole assembly were manifestly crazed, and I am sure will be the worse for it as long as they live." Addison notes in particular a little boy of twelve, who is a frightened auditor of the tales. The writer then observes: "Were I a father,

1. Spectator, Vol. I. p. 46.




I should take a particular care to preserve my children from the little horrors of imagination, which they are apt to contract when they are young, and are not able to shake off when they are in years." The relation of this to a passage which in Locke lies in juxtaposition to that<sup>1</sup> quoted by Addison in paper No. 110, is obvious:

"I mention this [antipathies arising from a wrong connection of ideas] not out of any great necessity there is, in this present argument, to distinguish nicely between natural and acquired antipathies; but I take notice of it for another purpose, vis., that those who have children, or the charge of their education, would think it worth their while diligently to watch and carefully to prevent the undue connection of ideas in the minds of young people."

Thus papers No. 110 and 12 show an interesting parallel. In No. 110, Addison gives Locks credit for his ideas; in No. 12, he derives his idea from the same portion of the Essay on the Human Understanding, but makes no mention of Locks. Perhaps in the former instances Addison was conscious of his indebtedness to Locks, while in the latter, though he was influenced

1. i.e., on p. 317 of the Essay on the Human Understanding.



by Locke, the realization of such indebtedness may not have been perceptible by his mind--i.e., he used an idea which was dormant in his memory without tracing it to its source. Perhaps the conclusion might be drawn, from this unconscious influence, that Addison was so familiar with the <u>Essay on the Human Understanding</u> that Locke's ideas had become, seemingly, his, and he was not aware that he was using an idea which was not the product of his own mind.

The next two papers which show the influence of Locke exhibit the same parallel: in the first, Addison gives no credit to Locke for his idea, but in the second he does. In paper No. 120,<sup>1</sup> Addison tells how Sir Roger de Coverley remarks on the writer's close observation of the latter's fowls. This leads to an essay on the instincts of animals in which Addison says, in part: "Reason shows itself in all occurences of life: whereas the brute makes his discovery of such a talent, but in what immediately regards his own preservation, or the continuance of his species. Animals in their generation are wiser than the sons of men; but their wisdom is confined to a few particulars, and lies in a very narrow compase. Take a brute out of his

1. Spectator, Vol. II, p. 137.

instinct, and you find him wholly deprived of understanding."1 Compare this passage with the following in Locke.<sup>2</sup> in a section entitled "Brutes abstract not:" "Nor can it [i.e., the failure of animals to abstract] be imputed to their want of fit organs to frame articulate counds, that they have no use or knowledge of general words; since many of them, we find, can fashion such sounds and pronounce words distinctly enough, but never with any such application. And, on the other side, we who, through some defect in the organs, want words, yet fail not to express their universal ideas by signs, which serve them instead of general words; a faculty which we see beasts come short in. And therefore, I think; we may suppose that it is in this that the evecies of brutes are discriminated from man; and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distence. For if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances, reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they received them from their

1. Spectator, Vol. II. p. 140.

2. John Locke. Essay on the Human Understanding, p. 105.


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senses. They are, the best of them, tied up within those narrow bounds and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction."

The parallelism of the ideas of Locke and Addison can be seen when one notes that both remark on the fact that reason is to be observed in all types of men, but is absent in animals; and that both believe animals to be rational within narrow bounds only-that is, animals are guided purely by instinct. This latter idea is emphasized especially by Addison, who concludes No. 120 with an example which shows how a hen takes great care of her eggs, and knows exactly how to hatch them, but cannot distinguish between an egg and a piece of chalk, and does not notice a diminution in number if one of her eggs is removed.

No. 121 is a continuation of No. 120. In this paper, Addison discusses instinct more fully. He notes that while animals do not reason, yet they are subject to various emotions, such as anger, malice, and revenge. He then writes:<sup>1</sup> "I shall add to these general observations an instance which Mr. Locks has given us of Providence, even in the imperfections of a creature which seems the meanest and most despicable in the whole

1. Spectator, Vol. II, p. 143.



animal world. 'We may,' says he,<sup>1</sup> 'from the make of an oyster, or cockle, conclude, that it has not so many nor so quick senses as a man, or several other animals: nor, if it had, would it, in that state and incapacity of transferring itself from one place to another, be bettered by them. What good would sight and hearing do to a creature, that cannot move itself to, or from the object, whercin at a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation be an inconvenience to an animal, that must be still where chance has once placed it; and there receive the efflux of colder or warmer, clear or foul water, as it happens to come to it?'"

For Locke, then, there lower animals have all the renges necessary for their conditions of life. They do not need resson, which would often be a hindrance rather than an aid. As this shows the wisdom of the Creator, who has fitted both men and animals to their respective environments, Addison comes to the same conclusion--that any study of animals would "redound to the glory of the All-wise Contriver," in that it would tend to show that God "puts every creature in a condition to provide for its safety and subsistence


1. John Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, p. 96.

in its proper station." Addison owes to Locke not only the main idea of his essay, but also the conclusion derived from that idea.

The next paper showing the influence of Locke, No. 373. 1 is written by Budgell, who begins the paper thus: "Mr. Lock, in his Treatise of Human Understanding, has spent two chapters upon the Abuse of Words. The first and most palpable abuse of words, he says, 2 is, when they are used without clear and distinct ideas: the second, when we are so inconstant and unsteady in the application of them, that we sometimes use them to signify one idea, sometimes another. He adds, that the result of our contemplations and reasonings, which we have no precise ideas fixed to our words, must needs be very confused and absurd. To avoid this inconvenience, more especially in moral discourses, where the same word chould constantly be used in the same sense, he earnestly recommends the use of definitions. 'A definition," says he. 'is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known.' He therefore accuses those of great negligence who discourse of morel things with the least obscurity in the terms they make use of, since upon the fore-mentioned ground he does not scruple to

<sup>1.</sup> Spectator, Vol. V, p. 208.

<sup>2.</sup> John Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, pp. 397 ff. 3. Ibid., p. 413.



say. I that he thinks morality is capable of demonstration as well as mathematics."

Budgell then proceeds to show that modesty and virtue are two words which have been misused. It is extremely noticeable that Budgell is far inferior to Addison: where Addison takes ideas from Locks and gives them witty expression, Budgell merely paraphrases the philosopher; where Addison carries Locks's ideas to a logical conclusion, Budgell merely mentions the ideas and leaves them, as it were, in mid-air, to conclude the escay with ideas which are, to say the least, expressed with a lofty moral attitude; and where Addison speaks charmingly while instructing his reader, and does not give the impression that he is trying to teach a class, Budgell is didactic and tiresome.

The next paper influenced by Locke, No. 413, is the work of Addison.<sup>2</sup> The writer says that pleasure arises from the contemplation of that which is great, new, or beautiful. The contemplation of God is the ultimate happiness of our scule, but He has annexed beauty to the idea of that which is new, to encourage us to pursue knowledge; to that which is like ourselves, to encourage us to propagate the species; and

<sup>1.</sup> John Locks, Essay on the Ruman Understanding, p. 418. 2. Spectator, Vol. VI, p. 63.

to all other objects. "that He might render the whole creation more gay and delightful." Furthermore. though the beautiful colors of the world about us may be due "to the different impressions of the subtle matter on the organ of sight," it is not improbable that the goul will continue to see the same beauties after death. though "perhaps . . . excited by some other occasional cause." Addison concludes: 1 "I have here supposed that my reader is acquainted with that great modern discovery, which is at present universally acknowledged by all the enquirere into natural philosophy: namely, that light and colors, as apprehended by the imagination, are only ideas in the mind, and not qualities that have any existence in matter. As this is a truth which has been proved incontestably by many modern philosophers, and is indeed one of the finest speculations in that science. if the English reader would see the notion explained at large, he may find it in the eighth chapter of the second book<sup>2</sup> of Mr. Lock's Essay on Human Understanding." This quotation is interesting not only because in it Addison acknowledges his debt to Locke for the theme of the essay, but also because he shows that he has a high opinion of the philosopher by


1. Spectator, Vol. VI, p. 65. 2. John Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, p. 83.

referring the readers of The Spectator to The Essay on the Human Understanding for a fuller explanation of the enbjectivity of light and colore.

The influence of Locke is again perceptible in paper No. 519. in which Addieon expresses wonder at the diversity and multitude of living organisms. God has filled the world with creatures which form a gradation of species rising from the lowest type of animals to man. Addison comes to the conclusion that, "If the scale of being rises by such a regular progress. so high as man, we may by a parity of reason suppose that it still proceeds gradually through those beings which are of a superior nature to him, since there is an infinitely greater space and room for different degrees of perfection, between the Supreme Being and man, than between man and the most despicable insect."2 He then quotes a long passage from Locke's Lesay on the Human Understanding, after having made the premise that the gap between God and man will never be filled. The passage from Locke is to the effect that since there are gradations from the lowest "parts of matter" to man. we have reason to think there may be a similar gradation from man to God, except that "there are far

- 3. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 167.


<sup>1. &</sup>lt;u>Spectator</u>, Vol. VII, p. 166. 2. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 169.



more species of creatures above us. than there are beneath: we being in degrees of perfection much more remote from the infinite being of God, than we are from the lowest state of being, and that which approaches nearest to nothing." The relationship between the passage from Locke and Addison's essay is very close, for Addison's essay is essentially a restatement of Lockian ideas. The contribution of Addison here coneists mainly of restating Locke's ideas in language which lends them grandeur. The writer concludes his essay by saying that no creature is as wonderful, and as deserving of one's attention as man, who, forming the ling between the highest and lowest, can contemplate alike both the invisible and the visible world.

Addison gives further illustration of his indebtedness to Locke in paper No. 531. 1 in which he states that we form our notion of Cod by attributing to Him the kind of epiritual perfection we find in our can souls, to which we add the idea of infinitude. He then writes. "Though everyone who thinks must have made this observation, I shall produce Mr. Locke's authority to the same purpose, out of his Essay on the Human Understanding.2 'If we examine the idea we have of the

- 1. <u>Spectator</u>, Vol. VII, p. 210. 2. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 223.



incomprehensible Supreme Being, we shall find, that we came by it the same way; and that the complex ideas we have both of God, and separate spirits, are made up of the simple ideas we receive from reflection; e.g., having from what we experiment in ourselves, got the ideas of existence and duration, of knowledge and power; of pleasures and happiness; and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without: when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so putting them together, make our complex idea of God.'" Although Addieon begine this quotation by saying that "everyone who thinks must have made this observation." it is nevertheless evident that it is to Locke he owes the ideas for the essay.

Addieon continues the paper by saying that he had considered God only in the light of reason and philosophy. but that these are not sufficient to see him in "all the wonders of his mercy"--one must have recourse to revelation fully to appreciate God. He ends the paper with the thought that the Jews never use the name of God in their religious discourses, and yet we take His name in vain. Addieon admonishes his readers against profamity and perjury.

It is evident, then, that Addison is indebted to

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Locke for the ineviration of the paper, and for a statement of a conception of God. The other ideas arise naturally (at least. for a facile mind like that of Addison) from the main conception. and add nothing new to the thought, merely serving to emphasize it and develop its connotations.

In paper No. 57d. 1 Addison turns his attention to the question of personal identity. and writes: "hr. Lock.<sup>2</sup> after having premised that the word 'person' properly significe a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself; concludes, that it is consciousness alone, and not an identity of substance. which makes this personal identity of sameness. Had I the same consciousness (says that author) that I saw the Ark and Moan's flood at the general deluge, was the same self, place that self in what substance you please, than that I who write this an the same myself now whilst I write (shether I consist of all the same substances material or immaterial or no) that I was yesterday; for as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other subetances."

1. Spectator, Vol. VIII, p. 79. 2. In Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, p. 251.

Addison then tells a story which is "in some measure applicable to these pieces of philosophy," and which concerns an Eastern king who discovers that a follower has the secret of reanizating any dead body with his own soul. The king in hanting kills a deer, and asks the servant to prove his power. The follower animates the deer, and then returns to the king. The king learns the secret after much pleading, and to test it animates the body of the deer. The treacherous follower then animates the body of the king, and returns to the palace, giving the order that every deer in the kingdom shall be slain. The king then animates the body of a nightingale, and flies to the palace, where the bird becomes a favorite of the queen. Meanwhile, the queen's lapdog dies, and the king's soul leaves the nightingale to animate the body of the lapdog. The queen finds the body of the nightingale and is lamenting its death when the king's follower, in the guise of the king, enters. To assuage the queen's grief the king's follower enters the body of the nightingale, whereas the true king reënters his own body and wrings the neck of the nightingale, thus killing the follower who had betrayed him.

This story, which is derived from A thousand and

<u>One Ferrian Tales</u>,<sup>1</sup> well illustrates Addieon's happy faculty of seizing on and relating various incidents which he has encountered in his reading. In this instance, the philosophical quotation gives an excuse for presenting the story, and the story embellishes and emphasizes the philosophical idea, the two thus forming a peculiarly apt relationship.

The final <u>Spectator</u> paper which shows the influence of the Essay on the Human Understanding is No. 600,<sup>2</sup> in which Addison says that our happiness is the same whether it proceed from "external objects, or from the impressions of the Deity upon our own private fancies," but that this consideration is not the important one. That is important is that the soul achieve happiness by exalted employment of its faculties. "The happiness may be of a more exalted nature in proportion as the faculty employed is so, but as the whole soul acts in the exertion of any of its particular powers, this whole soul is happy in the pleasure which arises from any of its particular acts. For notwithstanding, as has been before hinted, and as it has been taken notice of by one of the greatest modern philosophers, we divide the soul


<sup>1.</sup> A book of the day, by Ambrose Philips. Ferhaps this paper was written partly to give a puff to Philips, who advertised his book in No. 576. (This information about Philips is derived from the notes to Vol. VIII of The Spectator.)

<sup>2.</sup> Spectator, Vol. VIII, p. 148.

into reveral powers and facultier, there is no such division in the soul itself, since it is the whole soul that remembers, understands, wills, or imagines. Our manner of considering the memory, understanding, will, imagination, and the like faculties, is for the better enabling us to express ourselves in such abstracted subjects of speculation, not that there is any such division in the soul itself."


That the person referred to by Addison as "one of the greatest modern philosophers" is Locke is evident when one considers the following passage in the <u>Essay</u> on the <u>Human Understanding</u>, in a section called "Faculties:"<sup>1</sup> "For when we say, the will is the commanding and superior faculty of the Soul; that it is or is not free; that it determines the inferior faculties; that it follows the dictates of the understanding, etc.; though these and the like expressions, by those that carefully attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughte more by the evidence of things than the Sound of words, may be understood in a clear and distinct sense; yet I suspect, I say, that this way of spenking of faculties has misled many into a confused notion of so many distant agents in us, which had their several

1. p. 166.



provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in questions relating to them."

This passage is significant not only in that it demonstrates the origin of Addison's conception of the soul, but also in that it gives a clue as to whom Addison considered to be "one of the greatest modern philosophers." Aith such a high estimate of Locas, it is no wonder that Addison was frequently influenced by his writings.



## Chapter IV

The remaining papers which show Looke's influence are important not in that they reflect Locke's thoughts. but in that they know the sttitude of Addison and Steele toward Locke's writings. The first of these, No. 242. 1 is written by Steele, and contains the following: "What I have to beg of you now, is, to turn one epeculation to the due regulation of female literature. so far at least, as to make it consistent with the quiet of such, whose fate it is to be liable to ite insulte; and to tell us the difference between a centleman that should make cheepecakes, and raise paste, and a lady that reads Lock, and understands the mathematics." This quotation forms the conclusion of a letter supposed to be written by a correspondent who does not like young ladies who have too great a knowledge of philosophy. The correspondent gives as instances of such obnoxious young ladies his niece, who assures him that pleasure and pain are imoginary distinctions, that fire is not really hot, and that color is nothing but the various infractions of the sun; and another young lady who assures him that to say show is

1. Spectator, Vol. VII, p. 272.

white is a vulgar error. "In short, the young husseys would perswade me that to believe one's eyes, is a sure way to be deceived; and have often advised me, by no means, to trust anything so fallible as my senses." That these tenets--i.e., the subjectivity of sensations--are derived from Locke is not as impertant a consideration as that Steels selects Locke as a philosopher who is widely read.

The next paper to refer to Locke is No. 291,<sup>1</sup> written by Addison, who is giving a discussion of criticism. He says: "Mr. Lock's <u>Essay on Human Understanding</u> would be thought a very odd book for a man to make himself master of, who would get a reputation by critical writings; though at the same time it is very certain, that an author who has not learned the art of distinguishing between words and things, and of ranging his thoughts and setting them in proper lights, whatever notions he may have, will loss himself in confusion and obscurity." Addison goes on to say that a critic should have good insight into all the parts of learning.


The quotation given above seems to me to furnish proof that Addison regards highly Locke's <u>Essay on the</u>

1. Spectator, Vol. IV, p. 151

Human Understanding, especially when he recommende to critical writers a book dealing with epistemology. Even if Locke were mentioned nowhere else in <u>The</u> <u>Spectator</u>, this one paper would be adequate proof that Addison was familiar with the work of Locke.

The final paper mentioning Locke in a general way is No. 533. 1 written by Steele. The paper consists of another one of those letters from a pseudo correspondent, a device used so frequently in The Spectator. The writer tells of a social gathering at which some young officers were drinking lewd healths. "You may easily imagine the confusion of the entertainer, who finding some of his friends very uneasy, desired to tell a story of a great man, one Mr. Lock. (whom I find you frequently mention)." The "story" concerns a gathering at which are present, among others. Locke and Shafteebury. The company starts playing cards immediately after dinner, whereupon Locke retires to a window, where he is writing, when one of the lords present asks him what he is writing. He replies, "Why, my lords, I could not sleep last night for the pleasure and improvement I expected from the conversation of the greatest men of the age."

1. Spectator, Vol. IV, p. 220.



Probably the most important aspect of this paper is the reference to Locke as the man "you frequently mention." Steele is here recognising the debt which the writers of the <u>Spectator</u> owe to Locke. Even though Steele does not use material from Locke's writings in those of <u>The Spectator</u> papers which he writes, nevertheless he recognises the influence of Locke on the papers as a whole.


In conclusion, it might be enlightening to recapitulate, and see what writers of The Spectator came most under the influence of Locke. Budgell has a series of four papers on education which show the influence of Some Thoughts on Education, and one paper chowing the influence of An Eccay concerning the Human Understanding. The remainder of the papers showing Locke's influence are written by Addison, and certain passages show the writer's indebtedness to Letters of Toleration, The Reasonableness of Christianity, and An Eggay on the Human Understanding. The work of Locke which has the greatest influence on The Spectator is An Essay on the Human Understanding. Steele has written no papers actually showing the influence of Locke, but he recognizes in several instances the influence of the philosopher. It is interesting to note, too, that there must have been widespread interest in the writings of Locke during the early eighteenth century. Otherwise,

the writers of such a popular periodical as <u>The</u> <u>Spectator</u> would not have devoted numerous papers to ideas derived from Locke. If the papers of a philosophical type had not proved popular, they would probably have been discontinued. As it actually occurred, the influence of John Locke is perceptible throughout <u>The</u> Spectator.


Furthermore, the ideas utilized by the writers of <u>The Spectator</u> are as varied as the works of Locke from which they are derived. In the essays are treated such diverse subjects as politics, religion, education, ethics, the difference between wit and judgment, the origin of ideas, the subjectivity of sensation, and the achievement of happiness. Thus it can readily be seen that Lockian ideas form many of the stones in that foundation for a rational life which is laid down by <u>The</u> <u>Spectator</u>; and contribute to the endeavor to "enliven morality with wit, and to temper wit with morality."

The audience of <u>The Spectator</u> consisted not only of politicians and business men, but also of women; Addison felt it "his business rather to persuade and conciliate their understandings, than to treat them as if they were his scholars."<sup>1</sup> It cannot be doubted, then,

1. W. J. Courthope, A History of English Poetry, p. 84.



that Addison had high regard for the writings of John Locks, in that he utilized ideas derived from them to instruct and reform that large audience of the early eighteenth century which was reached by <u>The</u> <u>Spectator</u>.



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