THE CUSTER LEGEND:

AN AMERICAN FOLK-MYTH

Thesis for the Degree Of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGL

Earl Kaye Brigham
1948

 

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THE CUIZTESTI L‘sinlIID: AZ! All“. {IAN FOLL’L-i..Y'l‘H

BY
EARL Knit—:1 BRIGEU’M

A TXESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of hichigan
State College of Agriculture and Applied Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

EASTER OF ARTS

Department of English

1943

 

TABLE OF COHTLRTB

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Appendices....o.o.....................

22
37

117
125

172
178
182

PRLFACE

This study represents a culmination of several years
formal research, and many more of natural interest. The name
of Custer means such in Horth Dakota and hontana where I re-
sided before coming to fiichigan. I have talked personally
with one of Custer's troopers (Jacob Horner of Bismarck) and
made the accepted pilgrimage to the battleground.

However, these are merely the nominal requirements
for membership in The Club. Of far more importance have been
my correspondence with recognized authorities, chief among
them Fred Dustin of Saginaw, and certain original contributions
of value in the fielfl.

To illustrate, the majority of the Army and haul
Journal items here used have never apneared elsewhere. All
are valid, and one or two have great value. Other writers have
touched the "Journal" as a source, but I am certain I am the
first to have made an exhaustive page-byupage examination of
the entire files. is a result, much of this paper can truth-
fully be said to be "new and original" from an historical
viewpoint.

The subject naturally overlaps history and American
Literature, but to my knowledge has never before been treated
in this manner. by purpose is first to show that there is an
invalid Custer Legend, then to re-exanine some of the means

by which it came into existence.

11

Inevitably this leads into matters of great contro-
versy, but I am fully prepared to produce five more substanti-
ating sources where I have cited but one.

This brings up certain matters of style. Few people
outside this limited field can realize how often all valid
rules of research and evidence are evaded. It is a seemingly
trivial matter, but I wish to state definitely that I have
been wholly honest in the use of elided quotations; I have
not - as both critics and defenders of General Custer have
done inexcusably - used ellipsis marks to distort fact.

For similar reasons the inter-linear system of notes
was adopted. It defines the source unmistakably and at once,
in a paper necessarily heavily documented. This also accounts
for fullness of citation, and certains variations in form.
Works once cited in full are thereafter cited by title or
the author's name, whichever is advisable in a field where
all titles seem to read alike. A few are also given full biblio-
graphical entry because of importance to the general field,
although only incidental here.

With the exception of a convenient hyphenation, all
Aral and NavyJourna; reference is complete as to volume, page,
and date. I have also included in the appendices certain items
for immediate reference, and a personal theory on the Battle
of the Little Big Horn.

In addition to the College, hichigan State, and Lansing
Public Libraries, I had the opportunity of using the North
Dakota State Historical Library and the Public Library of

111

Anaconda, hontana - in the last two I was able to locate
material not available in hichigan. I wish to express my
appreciation to the staffs of them all for the courtesies
shown me.

Although plan and content of this study is entirely
my own, I am indebted for the inspiration and title to a
short passage of Fred Dustin's speaking of "the myths that
went to make up the Custer Legend of the Little Big Horn."
Actually, I have touched but a few of the major ones.

As for the rest, as I freely acknowledge all week-
nesses, I also lay complete claim to whatever excellencies
as well. This has truly been a one-man job. I wish to say
too, that had I had more time I would have written a shorter

H

thesis. It is my hope that the "amens are modulated and

not too many in number.

Earl K. Brigham
Lansing, hichigan

August 21, 1948.

iv

THE CUSTER LEGEND

There is a fungoid growth of folk myth surrounding the
historical figure of general George Armstrong ouster that can
never be wholly eradicated. It was spawned in the unhealthy
ciisats of blind adoration and bereavement, and ourst into
flourishing strength when fed by the distillation of a thou-
sand lies. It has been deliberately nourished and tended
until its unvholesoss vegetation has not only obscured the
true measure of the can, but has poisoned the senory of a
dozen others unfortunate enough to be in historical associa-
tion.

It has nothing to do with his legitisats record ss s
Civil war cavalry leader - s record even the most dispassion~
ate reading can truthfully sun up as “brilliant.“ It has
nothing to do with his true achievements on tbs lets fron-
tier, his peaceable handling of Indisn affairs and the open‘
Log of ass lands. and it has scarcely nothing at all to do
with the actual facts of his far-famed 'masssore' at the
Little Big Horn River on June 25, 1876.

It had its inception, naturally enough, in the sudden
passing of a vivid, colorful figure under circusstancss
mysterious and dramatic enough to satisfy the most Gothic
isagination. lo barn in that, for such spontaneous folk nyth
cones quickly to be recognised as something apart from
'unsdornsd fact, and any strong-minded nan dssd has his ova
Parson noses. The garden variety of historical ivy seldo-

serves for long to obscure the existence of Cromwellian warts.

-1-

But when the natural cycle of such folhmyth is
inhibited, the grovth becomes rank and poisonous, distorting
the outline of both the man and the events of his life until
barely recognisable. then those who have carefully nourished
it retire satisfied. But inevitably, sooner or later, scle-
one more fastidious as to fact comes along to scale the bark
of history clean, to show the fungous and the tree as two
.'things apart. and fro: then on, the tree shows scars it need
never have bared.

such a process has already taken place in the case of
General ouster. In the case of the man, Frederic van de
Water has done an accurate - and savage - character dissec-—
tion in the book 0 -mnter. In the case of the last
battle, l'red Dustin - critically analysing material accusu-
lated for over fifty years of his lifetime - has given us his
definitive history ghe duster M.

'!o a greater or lesser degree each has been comple-
aented or aided by the sorts of such duster scholars as n. A-
arininstool, 001. I. 5. Graham, m. aharles xuhlman, Charles
3. some. Capt. E. 8. Luce, o. a. Libby, charles I. asap,
“mouse 8. narquis, and others. And one writer at least,
hasier mat, has redeemed an inexcusably inaccurate earlier
work with a recent contribution of great value: the story
of charlee Windolph, last survivor of the actual battle,
mm with ouster.

'fhe cumulative results of such studies has served, and
will serve, to bring the duster Legend into closer line with
accurate history. It is true that his storybook reputation

has muffered in the process, but this is the fault of those
who refused to let true historical waters seek their level -
not of the modern day scholars. Ironically, those who pro-
fessed to love his best have done his the greatest disservice,
for only when the myths have been dispelled and his undeserved
fame dissipated will he claim the place in history that is
rightfully his: “the nurat of the Union Army,“ and a great
frontiersman who -- had he appeared on the western scene thirty
years earlier - might have eclipsed fluent.

that a “hand-fed“ ouster Legend exists is patent to
anyone honest enmgh to make more than a cursory examination
of the history of the Battle of the Little Big flora. (there
are still those who are not, and they shall be mentioned
later). But how it came into existence as an American folk
myth, and some of the artifical means employed to disseminate
it, has never, been carefully demonstrated. Such is the purpose
and the object of this paper.

-1-

To a pro-conic book generation the ouster Legend needs
little explanation. Those final arbiters, the tobacco and
distilling companies, have long educated the American public
to the “true“ story of “duster“s Last stand“ with nultiwolcr
lithographs of a nontsna gotterdameru_ng: the invincible
n. s. cavalry overwhelmed by hordes of anthropcid Sioux,
Duster - wielding a sabre that had been shipped to fort
.Llncoln and in a full set of regimentals left at home in a
closet - dying godlike the last nan.

In matter of truth, the popular artists may have been

as close as anyone - for seventy-years study has brought the
true details in little better focus - but cited as authori-
ties, or used to inflame pro-duster sentiment, such paintings
of “The Last stand“ have only served to bolster wholly unre-
lated theories. and many false myths.

as a result, a representative version of the ouster
Legend runs something like this - in an imaginative cracker-
barrel session:

“ouster'd made the 7th the best dem' regiment in the
whole Army, and whipped the Indians so often they'dve
surrendered without a fight if they'd known it was “Long
Hair“ was after them. But it seems he'd out his hair short
Just before the battle, so the Sioux didn't recognize him.
‘ae'd done that because he was mad. 101: see, when secretary
of war nelknap was impeached master furnished all the evi-
dence against him, and as a result President Grant took his
couand away from him.

“Everybom knew the Sioux were shaping for a showdown
fight, and duster was the only man who could handle them; but
Grant removed him Just the same. that was early in 1876.

But Terry, who was one of the other generals, was scared of
tackling the Indians alone, so he demanded that Grant let
duster go. 30 duster finally got his old regiment ba&, and
as soon as he got to lontana he sailed right into them -
rerry turned the expedition over to him - and overtook the
whole Sioux nation on the banks of the Little Big Horn.

“nut something went wrong with actors very carefully
worked out plan of battle although he divided his forces the

same way he'd done in all his Indian victories. Major'neno
turned yellow and ran away from the village as soon as a
bunch.cf old squaws flapped their blankets at hue, and be
absolutely refused to go‘to duster“s support the way held
been ordered to. ouster signaled him from downriver by firing
three shots, but ammo wouldn't go. Reno could practically see
duster being wiped out. ais own man called him yellow.

duster died last up on the hill, and when sitting Bull found
out who he was he wouldn't let the Indians touch his body.
they were all scared of 'Long Hair.“

«oh yes. em. .a. another officer named Benteen who
had all the ammunition.- Custer sent orders to him 'Hurry up
with.the packsl' but Benteen hated duster's guts so much.he
Joined.Reno instead, and they Just waited there, even though
there were no Indians for miles around. neither of them had
a man.killed.until the Indians had.massacred duster and come
back.“

questioning'might bring out the startling facts that
“Reno was dead drunk as well as yellow;“ “all the Indians were
better armed than the troops, every warrior had a repeating
rifle and maybe a couple of revolvers, too;“ “the only our-
vivor was Carley, a crow scout - he took a Sioux blanket to
ouster to let him escape, but Custer told bye to go instead;“
“all the rest of the crows ran clear back to powder River;“
and “the reason Sitting Bull could fight so well was because
he was half-white and had military training.“

or it might go into a dozen minor myths: “Raln~in-

the-race had sworn to get revenge on Custer, so he cut out

his heart and ate it.“ (Interruption, “No, it wasn't general
Guster's heart Rain~in~thc~7ace cut out, it was captain Ion
Custer!“ “no, it was general ouster; it says so in Longfel-
low“s poem!“ “so, it was Tom Custer!“ etc. etc.) or,
“rhere0s an old guy right in our home town that was the only
white man to escape alive. He was captured by the Sioux, but
Sitting Bull said “Let him go; he's too young to die!“ He's_
got absolute proof.“ (on investigation, the “actual survi-
vor“ turns out to have been only seven years old at the time
of the Battle - much the youngest man on the expedition -
and.undeniably “too young to die“ at the Little Big Horn).
And so the cracker-barrel experts - with or without
West Point training or college degrees, verbally or in expen-
sively brought out editions - go on. a,mention of Ousteris
civil Var record, the‘xellowstone and Black Hills expedi-
tions, or names like gibbon, crodk, Chief gall, crazy Horse,
congressman Glycer, captain.naonougall, “Washita“, and uitch
Bouyer, ordinarily bring only a blank look - and a muttered
explanation about “amateurs“ trying to horn in on the argu-
ment. And so it will go on, as long as there exists an Army
officer who has ridden a horse, a man whose grandfather
actually knew an Indian (no preference as to tribe), or a
hack writer with.time between beers to bat out something

sensational on any given anniversary of the battle.1

 

1. lo hats need be dropped to start a fight among
pro- and anti-custer factions, only the obscurest and most
off-hand reference. to illustrate, LIFE for June 21, 1948,
ran reproductions of several of the “Last Stand“ paintings'-
the point of the article being that a Chicago man made an
exclusive hobby of collecting all the different versions he

could find. this led to a flood of “Letters to the Editors“
on everything from the color and length of Custer's hair to
the final whereabouts of the famed equine survivor “ Comanche.
(cf. LIFE, July 12,1948, pp. eff. ) my father informs me

that ouster's Last stand was the cause of many arguments and
knock—down fights even in the Wisconsin lumber woods of the
early 1900's - although not a lumberjackpresent had ever seen
anything'but a woods Indian, and the only information any pos-
sessed was sketchy hearsay at the best.

 

It is not mere facetiousness, however, that begins a
study of the duster Legend in such a manner.. our “cracker
barrel version“, formalised in style, and occasionally docu-
mented, can be found in literally dozens of books and period-
ical articles. some are honestly labedled as fiction, and
many are honest attempts at historical research - colored.by
old preJudices. nut by far the greater number are fiction
masquerading as history - backed up only by the same old half-
truths and discredited suppositions, truculently presented as

if vehemence is an adequate substitute for critical proofs.2

 

2. a specific example of each type is offered for per-
sonal comparison. (1) Fiction: [he Easter of the trong;
hearts, by Elbridgs 3. Brooks. (New fork: E. P. on ton &
50., 1898). Jack, the young hero, knew everybody personally
from duster to Sitting Bull. Bis Indian friends tell him the
“true“ story of Custer's Last stand, similar to the version
above. (2) History: Custer, Fighter of the Plains, by
Shannon Garst. (New york: Julian Messner, Inc., 1944).
Garst's bibliography shows he had access to most of the best
ouster material, but he prefers to present the same old
threadbare inaccuracies ~ refurbished by convenient conversa-
tions unknown to other writers, and the actual participants.
Gsrst's book is a “Juvenile,“ but there is no excuse in even
a Juvenile history for cutting the pattern to fit the cloth -
particularly with correct sources at his fingertips. (3)
liction-as-Histony: duster the Last of the Cavaliers, by
Frasier Hunt. (new Io fissopolitanioox carp” 1928).
Hunt, a popular war correspondent of world‘War I, is supposed
to have written this book as a favor to are. duster, to refute
“lies“ that were beginning to appear about the battle.
apparently he complied the same afternoon, as mistakes - quite
aside from.any theories on the battle itself - are in great
number on facts that the most elemental research or proof—

 

reading would have corrected. It is not docunented, and
there is no bibliography. In his 1947 book I Fou ht with

star, referred to in the text, and a collaboraéon with his
son, fiunt has yielded nothing in his admiration of ouster,
but has gained a proper objectivity that makes it as valua-
ble as the first work is useless.

 

Broken down, the principal points of the ouster Legend
seen to be that: (l) ouster was the foremost - nany inply
the “only“ - Indian fighter in the post-civil tar amy. no
nade “his“ regiaent, the 7th a. s. cavalry (incredibly con-
fused by sons with the 7th uichigan cavalry of the Union
my), “the best on the plains. “ and though a strict disci-
plinarian, he was “the beloved leader and friend of all his
son. “

(2) Custer was a political nartyr. gs a Union Dene-
crat, he was of an Opposite political faith to the party in
power. so when he had “caposed“ the panpering of such tribes
as the tiowas in his book Lufe on the glains, he" acquired
the sanity of powerful figures in Washington. then, when
through sole obscure neans it was learned he held inportant
evidence against secretary of war Belknap, and testified
before the Olyner Investigating Omittee, he “broke
Bennap. “ Grant, in retaliation reacving hia froa coanand
of the already authorised 1875 Sioux upedition, was finally
forced by “the clanor of public opinion and protests from the
my“ to allow Custer to go. ‘

(3) duster was betrayed in his final battle. “Divid-
ing his forces as he did in all his Indian battles“ he sent
captain Benteen with one battalion to the left, and major

Reno directly against the village, while be surprised the
'Indians free “the lower end. “ Reno “made a cowardly retreat
, without losing a man, “ Benteen “deliberately delayed in obey-
ing an order to Join mater“, and meter died with all his
ass “looking back for help. “ While it is granted that Reno
and Benteen, too, were fired upon, “Custer“s battle lasted
long after unset. I and free then on a hundred ainor ayths
spring up free the battle itself. s

the points could go on interninably, but to any but
the cultiets of master history enough have been given. A
re-covering of well worn historical and literary ground is
inescapable, but sons of the tsdiousness necessary to first
presenting “the Cluster Legmd“ and then explaining its
origins can be avoided. It can be avoided by comparing typ-
ical quotations with correct statements of fact - wherever
possible returning directly to an authentic and accurate 393:

temporanegus sources.

In “DIM-KILLER
Says nichigan's general J. n. xidd in 1910:

In this Indian warfare [1866 to 1870]
Custer and his regiment, like ouster and the
third Cavalry division in the last campaign of
the civil war, were easily foremost. He was the
most successful Indian fighter of his day, and
was so regarded by all the military authorities.
for this reason when a campaign was determined
upon to end the Indian troubles, he was looked
upon as the proper leader.

3. J. a. Kidd, “Historical Sketch of aeorge Armstrong

Custer,“ in geremonies ttendin the veiling of the Egues-
trian tatue to his or era or Armstron 8 er b e
i

gtate o gichisganL an pedica e a t e (gt! 0 Monroe. 3 c -
gan, Me :03rth, ginfieen mdred and :en, p. 03f.

 

 

          
   
   

 

(Hereafter, any reference to this historical sketch shall be
cited only as J. H. xidd; any reference to other parts of the
printed proceedings only as Monroe Ceremonies 1910.) General
Kidd was an Icnia man with a distinguished Civil War record
in his own right. His book Personal Recollections of
Cavalrigan (Chicago, 1895) is a valuable source 0? ma erial
on 353 er's Civil War period; but it does not make him an
authority on the last battle.

 

this certainly implies that any fight in vhich meter
and the 7th Cavalry did not participate was of little impor-
tance. actually, however, Custer took part in only three
engagements which by any interpretation of the facts - giving
him full benefit of the fact that numbers of troops engaged
was often the least important factor in Judging Indian war-
fare ". can be considered major Indian battles. these were
the Battle of Washita in 1868, the Isllowstone fight of 1873,
and the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

at washita, lovenber 2'7, 1868, Custer with 11 troops
of the regiment destroyed a sleeping village of 103 Cheyennes
under slack kettle, and an unknown - but small - number of
Kiowas and papahoes. ms loss was some 23 men killed and 14
wounded. on the Isllcwstcne in 187:5, one man was wounded in
the gugust 4th skirmish, and 4 killed and 4 wounded on august

11th «- with an Indian loss “much larger than ours. “‘

 

(Hereafter, [red 91s n or . be understood to
refer only to these works. any 0 r works by either author
will be cited in full.)

4. Cf. fred metin, Egg ggster [ragegb pp. 25-27;
and Cyrus 2. Brady, ndian s an F1. ters, p. 1625f.
é! Q j. Erafi, sEEII

 

Considering only the organised warfare on the “Plains“ -
for neither Custer nor the regiment saw action in the important
Paints or nodoc campaign of 1872.73 - there were many impor-

tant engagements that had nothing to do with either. Some of
then were the Wetter-an uassacre' (18“), Flu Oreek (186?),
the Wagon next and 'Hayfield' fights (186?), Beecher's
Island (1868), summit springs (1869), lorth.york of ned River
(1872). Pale Duo (1874). can sort of the erazoa (1374),
I"Washita River" (1874), ncclellan creek (1874), and of
course Reynolds right and (groove 1876 repulse on the Rose-
has.5

 

6. Cf. struthers Burt, powder River (new york:
yarrar a ninehart, 1938), pp. 81M ass z.; and Stanley
Vestal, Warpath and council Lire (low to Handel House,
1948), passin.

 

this scarcely made meter lithe nest successful Indian
fighter of his day ‘nor his nginent. '...eaeily foremost. I
[or was it to the discredit of either. nut ouster was excel-
lent newspaper copy, his victory at washita be case at a
time when the country was sick of the bueblimg campaigns on
the frontier, and he was not at all‘adverse to presmting his
work in a glowing light in articles for the tutors eagazines.
It was, as his comanding officer colonel sturgis was to any
later:

...He wrote Inch upon the subject of

Indian warfare and the people of the country who
read his articles naturally supposed he had great
eXperience in savage warfare, but this was not so,
his experience was exceedingly linitcd, and that
he was overreached by Indian tactics, and hun-
dreds of valuable lives sacrificed thereby, will
astonish those alone who nay have read his writ-
ings - not those who were best acquainted with. 6
him and knew the peculiarities of his character.

 

6. egg-lag Journal, Vol. 13, p. 806 (July 22, 1876).
this was _n_9___ e alone urgis Interview! but a separate

letter to the editors of the $42513 Journal, dated 'st.
Louis Barracks, July 14, 1876. n o . 3 rgie disclaims
such of what was quoted of his in the 'Interview", but
ironically his disclaimer was printed before the interview

was given wide publication. (Cf. Vol. IE, . 826).

 

Just how good a fighting force the 7th Cavalry was is
still hard to acted-nine. one reason is that the Custer parti—
sans use every conceivable srgunent to enhance the reputation
of their idol, often canceling off each other. talk of I'that
matchlese veteran force, i 'that splendid and experienced
regiment, I Ithe swagger seventh Cavalry. is always linked
with slurring comments on the material of the nu, so as to
show his talent for making soldiers out of Iruffians. ' ‘

mt before he could set about the task of
subduing the unruly redskin, ouster found himself
with another Job of major proportions on his
hands. It was the immense Job of whipping the
motley crowd of ruffians that composed the
Seventh Cavalry into a snappy military outfit to
suit his exacting tastes....uost of the mob that
made up his division had no love of a soldier's
life. they had enlisted mainly to get their
eXpenscs paid to the west. shortly they would
slip fro. the camp sons night and go to the gold
fislds....of course, there were good soldiers,
too, but the ranks were made up nainly of ruffians.
Custer was determined to make a real cavalry out-
fit of them inspite of obstacles. as adopted
'aarryowen‘....1te catchy tune...helped to lift
the spirits of this unruly mob that Custer was
drilling sc mercilessly.

7. shannon caret, ster i ter of the lain
p. lOlf. (Hereafter cited as §$non get.) 1 E3" stated

ny personal opinion of aarst'e book in lots 2, above.

 

there is probably considerable truth in the statement,
but it is unreasonable in its sweeping manner. after all, one
of the finest fighting forces of World war II - the New
Zealanders at Il'hernopylae - gloried in the acne of “Blaeey'e

lob.0 It also brings an important point to light: at this
period of American history, volunteers were considered for
superior in morale and dependability to Regulars, odd as the
notion strikes us today. and ouster'e civil War admirers un-
consciously thought of the seventh in the same terms as the
crack volunteer regiments he commanded in wartime, thereby
reaching the natural conclusion that subordinates must have
mishandled a splendid fighting machine.

on this point it is a little surprising to read 23
lotion's comment on the Last stand:

...8eldom in history can we find instances

of euch.comp1ete destruction of men, many of when

might no doubt have run away. the personal con-

trol of the leaders must have been nagnificent to

enable thee to hold to their colors to the death

of every man of five companies of regular sol-

diers, not volunteers, not men interested in a

cause, but man she seng into the army for a liv-
ing, perhaps a refuge.

 

8. (Review of Whittaker's fe of ster). The nation,
Vol. 24, p. 180 (larch 22,18??).1 was a representative
attitude, however. freeper William slaper of the 7th tells
of his enlisting: Ont that time, any young'man wearing the
uniforI of a United States soldier was looked upon as an
idler - too lazy to work. Being in my own home town, and
well known, I felt scnewhat ashamed of being seen in uniform.

(See I. Av arininstool, A 122028? With ggeter, p. 18.)

 

No one seems to deny, however, even critics lflke Van de
Water or Dustin, that ouster had a high talent for organise-
tion and training, and that he infused his men - as a regiment -
with an undeniable 331115. rho-as Windolph, our oldest living
Congressional nodalist and last living.eurvivor of the actual
battle at the Little Big nuns, still recalls:

‘Iou felt like you were somebody when you
were on a good horse, with a carbine dangling from

its snail leather ring socket on your Icclelland
saddle, and s colt arny revolver strapped on your
hip; and a hundred rounds of anmnition in your
web belt and in your saddle pockets. you were a
a cavalry-an of the seventh Regiment. Ion were
a part of a proud outfit that had a fighting
reputation, and you were ready for a fight or a
frolic....oh it was a fine regiment, right
enough. And there wasn't a man in it who didn't
believe it was the greatest cegalry outfit in
the entire united states Army.

 

9. [ruler and Robert. met, on ht with Quater,
pp. 53, 56. (acre-after cited only by t ed

 

It would be caviling to point out that any other veter—
an of 96 years feels the same way about 3;! reginent, or that
windolph, as a troop '3' nan, received his direct training
tron Captain Benteen, not Custer. Obviously scnething of the
immense self-confidence and dash that was duster at his best
could impart itself eve: to a recruit, particularly a wide-
eyed inmigrant lad like Windolph, freshfron Ger-any.

iffeotivenese of the regilent was another matter, how-
ever. the problu seems to be that ouster was far too oftu
533 at his best. In 1866, his handling of the Volunteer 3rd
Iichigan cavalry in feline brought on a general utiny. In
1867, his harsh treatment of deserte‘rs - ('bring none in
alive') and failure to recover the bodies of two troopers
killed by Indians near Downer's station -- and, incredible in
the light of his present-day fans, to try to exact reprisal -
led to a court-nartial - lthe little-known verdict: Guilty;
suspension frol rank and command, and forfeiture of pay for

’on. ’08:.10

 

10. these incidents are thoroughly covered in many

duster studies; some, like Hrs. Custer excusing the actions
and attributing the 186'? court Martial to "enemies, ' and
others placing undue emphasis on minor points to add to his
discredit. Actually, as a study of Army life and regulations
of the period disclose, much of the blame should go on the
system itself: It offered far too many possibilities for a
martinet to exact harsh punishments in the name of discipline.
for Water, who functioned best himself when under the firm
hand of a sheridan or a stanlsy, the privileges accorded rank
were solstimes disastrous. (For full discussion see rre______d_
metin, pp. 13-16; 20-23; van de Water, 010 -Hunter,"""" pp.
1277-135, 168-177. Both eXplcde hrs. Custergs EeIIef that is
Jealous enemy- brought the charges and that the court was
packegkwith Ilenemies. ' Actually, it was ordered by General
hanco . ’

 

rhere were many similar incidents, but most seem to
point up the fact that Custer Judged everything by his person-
al reactions. He was made of Ibuggy springs and rawhide-
himself, easily remained alert on three or four hours sleep,
and was seemingly tireless. It made him blind to the average
physical resources, or discomforts,‘ of his enlisted men. and
since he traveled with extra horses for his own use, the
totaled strain on the regiment could exceed hulan endurance.

william c. slaper has given us what is probably the
enlisted man's view of duster - as distinct from Vindolph's
description of the regiment and its clan:

...ae was a fearless and brave soldier,
and many will agree with me that he was also a
hard leader to follow. He always had several
good horses whereby he could change mounts every
three hours if necessary, carrying nothing but
has and saddle, while our poor horses carried
.men, saddle, blankets, carbine, revolver, haver-
sack, canteen, 10 days' rations of cats and 150
rounds of 45-caliber ammunition, which of itself
would weigh more than ten pflnds and We had no
extra horses to change off.

 

ii. a. a. arininstool, roo or with deter, p. 47.
(Hereafter cited only by title). ve purpose omitted two
comments often used against Custer: 'ne treats his dogs

better than his semi and ”there goes taps, and before we get
a ecuthful to eat reveille will sound, and 'old curley' will
hike us out for the march. i hrs. ouster mentions in her
writings that the General was aware of both coements and
thought them highly humorous. This I consider naive of her,
but not necessarily incorrect. Not knowing the true source
of either - whether made by good soldiers or malcontents -
or the circumstances, they met be disregarded to be fair.
slaper, however, was a high type Regular, who proved his
coolness and bravery in the final battle. Like n'indolph,
however, he was under a troop commander agreed by all to be
a 'fine officer'w- in the fullest and highest sense of the
tern - captain f. a. trench.

hrs. caster also unwittingly confirms this in an
account of riding cross-country with her hisband, who frequent-
1y left her behind in the chase: “often we had no path, and
the general'shorse 'vie' would start up steep banks after we
had forded streams. It never occurred to his rider, until
after the ascent was made, and a faint voice arose from the
valley, that all horses would not do willingly what his
thorough-bred did. '12

!_._‘

12. Elizabeth 3. ouster, goats and gafddles, p. 65.
(this is the 1913 edition, and it mus e po n out that
It's. ouster re-edited the 1885 version, omitting sole comments

that some critics turn against her husband. The two texts
show such variance, although uniuportant).

 

tor the present, then, it is fair to conclude that
ouster was not the enlisted man's idea of a 'good officer”
and that his such-vaunted status as. a IIbeloved leader! was
the estinate of persons not forced to serve under him.

two other points must be considered in Judging the
effectiveness of the 7th Cavalry, when it actually set“ out
upon the Villa-fated 1876 Sioux Espediticn. Its officer person-
nel, and its enlisted personnel. Compared with the original

-17-

regiment of 1887, the officers were of high type in 1876, but
there still remadns General Stanley's savage comment on those
belonging to “the duster gangs! stanley, not duster, was in
command of the lBfia'xellowstone EXpedition, but apparently
his first problem was to demonstrate the fact to duster.

The following xuotation - consolidating from letters
of June 28, July 1, and August 15, 1873 - is complete in
itself:

m28]...1 have had no trouble with duster
and vii try to avoid having any, but I have seen
enough.of him to convince me that he is a coldbloode
ed, untruthful and.unprinoipled man. as is uni-
versally despised hy all the officers of his regi-
ment, excepting his relatives and one or two syco-
phants. [only 13...: had a little flurry with
Custer as I told you I probably would. so were
separated four miles and.I intended.hdm to assist
in getting the train over the Muddy River. With-
out consulting me, he marched off 15 miles, cool!
sending me a note to send him forage and rations.
I sent after him, ordered him to halt where he
was, to unload his wagons and send for his own
rations and forage and never presume to make
another movement without orders. I knew from the
start it would have to be done and 1 am glad to
have had so good a chance when there could be no
doubt as to who was right. an was Just gradually
assuming command, and now he knows he has a com-
handing officer who will not tolerate his arro-
gance. [august 15]...cusisr‘behaves very well
since he agreed to do so. ‘

 

13. General o. s. etanllh Personal memoirs; as quoted in
die ~nunter, p. 242f. Respecting t5e”two officers, Joseph.
Eafiirge, 55b noted upper lissouri steamboat captain, said:
I'custer seemed to me to be generally unpopular; that is, I
rarely heard him well spoken of. stanley, on the other hand,
always appeared to be a gentleman of rare qualities, one who
never forgot to treat a civilian as a man - something that
mang7officers were little disposed to do. (See [red yaetin,
p. .

The irelatives' are easily identified - Capt. roe
Custer and.rirst Lieutenant James Calhoun, who married

 

 

largeret Custer - the Oeycophants', less easily so. certainly
the latter would include dept. rhosae a. Hair, and possibly
capt. George w. rates and the Regisental Adjutant, Liout. w.
w. Cooke - all who came to the 7th cavalry with custer - and
Keogh, who was considered auster's closest friend. mt family
relationshdps extended throughout everyzfrontier unit of the
tines, since traditions ran high and the relatives of officer
personnel were naturallythrown together. In the 7th, not
only was Calhoun a brother-in-law of Custer, but Capt. nyles
hcylan was Calhoun's brother-in-law. Lieuts. Gibson and
McIntosh‘were also married to sisters.

lush more important, was the split in officers dating
free the battle of Washita in 1868. at that tine, Major Joel
:lliot, Sgt. ~laJor xennedy, and 15 troopers were out off two
miles fro- the Iain force, and wiped out. although.the battle
was on love-her 27th, it was not until necesher 7th that
ouster recovered the bodies - having made no effort at the
tine of the battle to aid Elliot, although firing was heard
'nearly all day, i and reported to hie.1‘

14. See W shape. 6 a 7, pp. 187-208.

 

Benteen, who had been a wartime brigade cosmander, had
once had the far younger Elliot as a subordinate, and was ex-
tremely loyal to his. He never forgave ouster for what he
repeatedly referred to as the major Elliot affair. i from
then on the officers were divided into 'mster' or 'Benteen'
factions, with the younger west Pointers coming in trying to
remain friendly with both. It could scarcely be termed s

healtw situation for a combat unit.

as to the sen, by 1876 the enlisted personnel was
probably of a higher calibre than the Iruffians’ of the ”811'
sont's earlier years but it also showed a much lower percent-
age of battle-tried sen. rho figure generally advanced is
“305 to 405' new recruits. this may be high, as easy writers
have tried to prove, but we can state definitely that sees
212 new sen Joined the reth between October 1875 and la!
ion.”

15. god motile, p. 108: '...on october 20, 1875, one
hundred and y recruits arrived at Port 3. Lincoln, fifteen

of when had served previously. ' -la Journal, Vol. 15,

p. 593 (april 22, 1878): turns Sup . o noun e Recruiting
service was ordered April 15 to forward sixty-two recruits to
at. Paul, linn. for assign-ant to the 7th Cavalry as follows-
25 to Go. a, 19 to c. a, and 18 to do. x. (s. 0., s. 3., AW).'

A“

although windclph now recalls that '. "me thing that
people get wrong about the recruits was tint about half of
the 150 now see we had were son who either had Civil war
service or had already served a five-yenr hitch in the emu!“

 

16. I [ought With Qufier, p. 60.

his seeory is at fault both as to the newer and percentage.
At the Reno court of Inquiry in 1879, what the locorder,
Lieut. Lee. tried to bring out the fast that lost of the
recruits were eraservicesee, Sergeant oulberteon of troop a.
refused to raise his estisste of.'-'ibout one out of ten. I17

17. [red metin, p. 109.

 

Along the April recruits were willie. c. slsper, whose

story 8- A. mainstool has preserved, and Jacob Horner - who
is still living in Bismarct, I. p. aorner reports that of his
contingent, 78 were left unmounted for lack of horses, and he
himself walked .318 miles in cavalry boots to the supply camp
at Powder River. nany took off their boots entirely and
marched barefooted, and all were almost entirely unfit for
duty at the finish. dose obtained horses at Powder River,
but Horner and several others had to remain at the Supply
camp - part of sons 85 men of the rsgisent who never left it
for the battle.“

 

16. Usher 1.. mrdick and Eugene 0. Hart, Jacob mrner

and the indies ganpai%g of 1876 and 1877, pp. lO-IB.""WItE"'

s w n p 0 Les 3. p. - who a been frequently re-
ferred to - Borner is the last of 'custer's seventh cavalryfl
although only Windolph was in the actual Battle of the Little
Big Horn. Earner lives at 609 rourth 5t., Bis-arch, with a
personal friend of lay family's, Hrs. Hugh a. ncOulloch. I had
dinner with his there June 8, 1945. as has been embaraseed in
the past by sensation-seeking persons who find his story too
prosaic, apparently resenting his failure to go into the
battle without a horse, too. since he has a good colbat
record against the Nez Force and in subsequent campaigns up
to 1881, the 1876 echdltion is a shall part of his very
interesting life story, and has been overemphasized. I heard
in July of this year (1948) that he is still alive. ‘

*7.

"the most successful Indian fighter! and his “easily
foremostl regieent are this seen to be the first part of the
duster Legendreadily disproved. Leaning backward to be fair
we can come to this appraisal of the 7th cavalry of 1878 and
its acting commander:

It was a good representative line outfit of the
'Indien-fighting m- - ouster had made it a top parade-
ground regisent, but going into battle it was as average as
any other in the Cavalry line, with at least 301 untried

recruits, some not properly fit nor equipped for combat.
that it gained in glamour and publicity from the natural
color - and personal press-agentry - of its Lieutenant Colonel,
it lost in effectiveness through his erratic handling of offi-
cers and mu. .

the smatohless seventhi was matched or surpassed in
frontier service by the first, second, third, Fourth, Fifth,
or Sixth, when it was under the direct command of Custer. It
is now generally overlooked, but while the ‘seventh dates its
traditions from the Little Big Horn - the worst defeat ever
sustained by the Regular army - its reputation really begins
3353 the battle. the Custer Legend gave the regiment a uni-
fying and inspiring tradition that set the 7th Cavalry apart
as the Alcrlcan Light Brigade - a tradition that made the
highest type men proud to serve in the ranks or in comand.
there is no need to further belabor the obvious: that ouster
notably failed to give it in life, he gave it in death.

as to Custer himself, he always needed a strong band
on his check-rein. with the wise rlsasantoa, the cautious
forbert, or the shrer Sheridan superior - and present - his
dash made him a superb field officer; others could do the
staff work. If his fearless charges opened weak points in
the Confederate lines, troops were. rushed up to exploit them.
If he broke on the spearpoint of southern fire, he could
fall back on the main army and re-form for a fresh assault,
his retreat quickly covered. Van de water has summed it up
neatly: |‘Bcre was no strategist; but a tireless body and a

nind as hungry for war as a bent bow. Custer was a weapon

that Sheridan knew how to use. .19

 

190 flogl"m§t0?, pe 59.

 

nut sith.other*uinds to worry out the plans for skilful
retreat or consolidation of unexpected gains, custer could
ignore such things in his tactics. such dependence on his
superiors cans to be second nature, and indeed in tine cans
to seen to be no dependence at all; “Custer'e Luck. sesned
all-sufficient to any situation. and in a great war it was.

But in 'peaoe' on the frontier, natters were different.
There sore no quick connunicatione, no great nasses of non at
the disposal of his superiors or of hin. and against the Sioux,
with a connand he had purposely - and contrary to plan ~ made
independent, he proved tragically inadequate. The vital part
of muster'e 13¢" - a clearoninded superior in heavy force,
easily oommunicated.vith.~ he deliberately outrun at the Little
Big Horn.

rm POLITICAL HARM

the second important nyth in the duster Legend is that
caster was a nan martyred by his enemies for political reasons.
Blzen tried to 'gst hint for Washita. Be I'got'I Belknap, the
inpeached secretary of War. and Grant I|got hieu for Igettingi
Belhnap.‘ duster Ialcne' had the courage to upon the frauds
being perpetrated by the Indian traders, including of course
the selling of guns superior to those used by the arny. In
all cases, the inplicaticn exists that duster was sat on par-

ticularly hard because he was a Democrat, the others 'all'
Republicans.

duster came by his party loyalties honestly and
naturally. His father was a Democrat and even though a
Republican congressnan, Jam gingham, was persuaded to ap-
point hin to west Point, ouster considered hinself a penc-
crat. ouster owed his Lieutenant colonecy to andres Jonson,
free when he had triedunsuccessfully to gain permission to
Join Juarez in nexico for a year. Johnson first offered hil
a full Colcnccy of the newly organized 9th cavalry, a negro
reginent.2° nut he had refused. Ironically enough, long

 

20. grad metin, p. 15.

 

after duster was dead it was the colored troopers of the ninth,
arriving by forced narches, who saved ouster" old reginat
after they had Irevengsd' hin at Wounded Ines in 1890.21

 

21. Stanley Vestal, the uissouri (nee fork: Parrar a
Binshart, Inc., 1945), pp. 237-211. Ironically enough,
Benteen had been offered a Majority in the Ninth about the
same tine, but refused it. although in 1&3, when he reached
his uajority through Regular my pronotion, Benteen was then
assigned to the ninth. one of the things which shakes the
ouster affair so fascinating to so many persons is the many
minor ways in which the lives of the principals were so inex-
tricably bound up - although the limited size of the any from
1866 to 1898 made much of it as natural as it see-ed fateful.

 

However, duster nade such an inpression on President
Johnson that he was invited to accompany his on the famed
“Swing around the circle. ' Later he attended an abortive
Soldiers. and Sellers. convention at Cleveland, allegedly in
hopes of furthering his own aspirations for the presidency.

-24-

so sass . terrific political blunder by introducing the then
infasous nethan a. Forrest fron the platforn - an unthinkable
breach of etiquette for a Union officer in use. It finished
his naive hepes for a political future. 22

22. trederia Whittaker, A Popular Life of goal
e a. Custer, pp. 345-545. (Hereafter c e as W sr's
s . ave purposely refrained from citing Whittaier on
any material used so far, because he is the source on nine-
tsnths of the misconceptions forming the ouster Legend. By
establishing the Legend from other sources, knowingly or un-
knowiingly inspired by him, and then treating his part, the
artificial character of so many myths yet current can better
be illustrated.

 

 

 

Ouster's quarrel with general 3!. 3. Haaen was a little
diffitu lt to construe on a political basis. It was princi-
pally concerned with the afternsth of the Battle of Washita
in 1868. general Hasm had been eXpressly assigned to fort
Cobb, Indian ferritory, by General shes-nan to protect the
Kiowa Indians under their treaty Irights. * than sheridan
and duster entered the Kiowa reservation, insisting that the
Kiowas had tsxa part in the battle and not be punished,
Essen sent word to the oolunn:

Indians have Just brought in word that our
troops today reached the washita some twenty niles
above here. 1 send this to say that all camps
this side of the point reported to have been

reached are friendly and have not been on the war
path this season. 23

 

In a brilliant move, Sheridan and custer arrested the
Kiowa chiefs who accompanied the courier to attest their good
faith by their presence, and took them to Fort Cobb. or as

ouster states it in a letter to his wife of December 19,
1868, I...we refrained fron attacking, but permitted...l.one
wolf and many other chiefs and warriors to cone into our

lines. '2‘ The tribe which Hazen had managed to assemble near

24. Elizabeth B. caster, [gllgving the Eldon, p. 46.

Ouch immediately scattered, and there were bitter words be-
tween the three officers. Hazen stated later in print:

I saw at once that they Sheridan and ouster
held as accountable for seriously earring the sac-
seas of their operations by earning then, two days
previously, that the Indians between the-selves
and my setup were settled under my peaceful protec-
tion....'rheir opinions that the Iioaas had fought
the! at the battle of Washita were so firmly fixed
that I thought it both futile and unwise to
endeavor to correct their impressions. 25

 

26. General w. 3. Kazan, eons corrections to g Life
on the Plains,‘ (81:. Paul, 1875) as quoted in glorL-jmn er,
pa Elle

 

 

fi—r

When cueter's articles for M in 1875-74 were pub-
lished as gauge on the rising-Juan fork, 1874) he called
Hazen's dispatch the word of a :l'ool'I in about so any words,
and cast other aspersions on his character, record, and abil-
ity. asses retaliated vith a brief pamphlet Mormtions
mu on the pigs;- in which he took meter, the tunes
Battle of washita, and his book all apart in indignant and
scathing prose. 1t sell-demented as to the exact facts,

1. e., the xioea tribe had been assenbled by bin at Port cobb
on November 20, 1868 - a full seek before the battle - and
that the trail Custer was following was made 2.212%! the
battle.2° '

 

26. glog-Qnter, p. 210f; [red mstln, p. 26.

that was the I'political" then-custer controversy.
Later, before the Clymer Committee, Custer oddly rang in
Hazen's name, saying that because Hazen had violated a gag
fnle imposed by secretary aelknap, leknap had exiled him to
fort Buford, at the month of the zelloastone. Hazen denied
this in a letter froa oincinnati, any 14, 1876, to the"g!z
and lag: gournal,27 but see summoned to Washington anyvsy.

27. see e§gz~hagz gournal, Vol. 13, p. 661 (lay 20,
1876). 'l have own roe at that order did not
elanate from the War Department.I .cf. sheridan's gay 2nd

letter to Belknap '1 have yet to learn that you had anything

to do with ordering that regincnt.... ' (hm-la! gourng,
'01e 13. pe 6‘2)s

_._k

The absurd part of the 'political charge is that Hazen, too,

 

like Custer, was a life-long Democrat.

The Belknap controversy is another matter, and reasona-
bly sell-knasn. It can be scenarized'briefly. It began with
a letter sent by the same general Hazen to James A- derfield
in January of 1872, stating that J. 8. Vans, the post trader
at Fort 3111 (which had replaced Old Fort Gobb) was paying
$12,000 a year for the privilege to caleb P. marsh of New
tort. Harsh handled all the affairs of tire. Bowers,

Belknap's sister-ln-lal who lived with bin in Washington, and
who becameflhis wife following the death of the first Hrs.
Belknsp.

The first Hrs. Belknap influenced her husband to give

larch the postetradership at Fort Bill. as in turn contracted

it to swans for the su- steted. to return the favor, Harsh
offered one-half of the anount to are. Belhnap. since he was
handling for Mrs. Bowers preperty to the value of $90,000,
the Fort Sill money was included with the legitimate dividends-
which on the elevation of Mrs. Bowers to the second are.
Bemap were often paid directly to General Belhnap.

this was construed by Belknap's enemies as a bribe,
but his friends insisted he was unaware of the source of the
money coming to his wife. Whichever the true case, and it
has yet to be settled satisfactorily from an historical
standpoint, the 1872 charge was dug out by a Democratic con-
greasi onal investigating committee, headed by Beister Glyler,
and made an issue in the 1878 caspaign. on Karen 2, 1878,
cm» recommended that the We begin inpeacheut proceed-
ings against Belknap. The sane day, nelknap resigned as
Secretary of war, sole say to flee the country, others say to
prevent an investigation that would expose nrs. nemap's
part.“

 

28. see rred bustin, pp. 29-$ assin. Dustin takes a
verygood cese tE‘E Belfiap was innocen o s wife's trans-
actions on the post-traderships. He is supported by a letter
written to the new York netting 20st, larch 13, 1878, aimed
'J. c. ' and identified as a captain John dodxsan; the letter
was reprinted in the Army-gag gournal, Vol. 13, p. 614
(larch 18, 1878). It has been over ooked by all historians
of the case as far as I an able to ascertain.

 

Olyler, however, felt Justified in launching a full-
scale investigation, and Custer offered himself as a witness.

hazier flint states the standard version of this part
of the Cluster Legend:

...0uster felt that there was a strong odor
of graft around the war department and he didn't
hesitate to make his views known. as was a demo-
orat, and he rather enjoyed airing his views on
this Republican administration of Grant's. some-
how, some way, Mr. Heister Glymer found out that
ouster had some damaging information against
nelknap, and wasn't afraid to talk. Immediately
he fight for him to come to Washington and testi-

y.

29. trasier aunt, gggters Last 9f t9; ggvaliers,
p. 130. (Hereafter cited by t e).

there has been much said about this 'somehow, some ways

 

 

Glyler learned of custer's Iinformation,l but secondhand oom-
ment can be dispensed with entirely. ouster informed Glyner
himself, as this contemporary news item clearly indicates:

the newspa ers report that General Custer,
larch 3, telegrap d from st. Paul, Minn., to ur.
Holster ell-er, member of Congress, that, 'An in-
vestigation of the traderships along the uissouri
'niver would eXpose as disgraceful a state of
affairs as has recently Bass discovered in con-
nection With fort Bill.-

 

30. was? ionrnal, Vol. 15, p. cos (larch 11,
1878). there may a so ave can a letter (See gloat-Hunter,
p. 272), or those who so state may only have been con us as
to exact means. several other sources giving similar material

2;: be disregarded here as the news item clearly precedes them

 

' Since the 1878 Sioux Campaign was already past the plan-
ning stage and into the actual organisation. caster then tried
to avoid actual appearance, offering to testify by wire, by
mail or messenger. Despite aid given him hy General ferry
and others, who saw that his appearance might delay the
column, in the end he went, and according to another recent

apologist,

Water's presence, however, was required
and, fussing and fuming, he set out for Washing-
ton. His exasperation at having been called
away from his important plans did not tend to
temper his testimony against Belknap to any
great extent. Without mincing any nerds he told
what he knew about the graft connected with post
traderships. Reporters interviewed him. Willing
to let the chips fall where they would, he spoke
hds mind and was quoted in the newspapers.31

 

31. Shannon get, 9. 13f.

 

once on the stand, and subject to legal insistence on
something more than hearsay, duster made an extremely poor
witness. His sworn testimony nearly boiled down to two
points: as was so suspicious of the secretary of War he could
hardly be civil to him on nelknap's 1875 inspection of Fort
Lincoln, and he knew of some dealings in corn clearly marked
for the Indians.

testified Buster, when asked how long Belknap stayed
at [Port Lincoln; and with who- he stayed:

Well, sir, he did not stay with anybody....
I how of his caning and gave such attention as
his official position required; a salute was
fired, but my knowledge of his transactions and
my opinion of them was such that I did not meet
him at the edge of the reservation, as was custom-
ary. I stayed at my door and waited till he came,
and transacted what businesg 1 had to transact
with him and he went away.3 *

A.“

32. from Deals of Post waderships' as quoted in Bed
25‘“. p. 4:1.

 

this puzzled Belknap so much he wrote to aensral J. v.
l'crsyth of sheridan's staff to see if his on memory was
incorrect. Forsyth replied with a letter - headed “Headquar-
tars nilitary Division of the Iissouri, Chicago, Illinois,

April 15, 1876' ~ which he gave Belknap permission to publish
or circulate as he saw fit:
fly near General Bennap:

In acknowledging the receipt of your let-
ters of Friday and Sunday, 1 take the opportuni-
ty of saying that your recollections of the visit
to port Lincoln is correct. upon our arrival at
the steamboat landing at tort Lincoln, the report
was brought to us that General Custer was ill,
and I supposed from what was told me tint we would
find him in bed; but, to my surprise, when we
drove up to the front of his quarters, General
Custer came out in uniform to the sidewalk in
front of his house to meet us, and welcomed on
to house and post. wring our stay at Lines 1
had a few mommts private conversation with him,
and he told me that he had been very sit all
night with dysentery or diarhoeia, and that he
was in bed when our arrival was reported, but
that he made the effort, got up and dressed so
as to be able personally to meet you, show you
the post, etc., etc.

I remember that are. master was desirous
that we should stay for luncheon with than, and
said that she would send out and invite all the
ladies of the garrison: that they were all an:-
ious to see the secretary of War, etc. When in-
formed by you cf your limited time and stay with
thn, she eXpressed her regret, and spoke of the
disappointment of the ladies of the 7th cavalry.

aensral Gunter drove you around the post,
both the upper and lower one, and upon your re-
hire to his quarters sent for all the officers
of his command and presented them to you. when
we left the house general ouster got into the
ambulance, or wagon, with you, and accompanied
you to the steamboat landing, went on board the
boat, and remained on board up to the last mo-
ment, only leaving the steamer as she pushed off
from the bank. He acted as though he was anxious
to see as much of you as possible, and by his
g?’m“ to make your stay as agreeable as possi-

e.

III fact, you were, in my opinion, treated
by General George 5. ouster airing your visit at
his post (port Lincoln) last summer with all the
politeness, courtesy, and distinguished consider-
aticn that he was capable of, or could think of.
As regards wine, etc., your stay at his house
Was too limited for any entertainment; and as
everybody in the party knew that the host did not
drink liquor of any kind, no one espected wine,

or anything of the sort.

I have yet to meet a single officer of the
.irmy who approves of the action of either Custer
or [ecock as to their testimony. It is nothing
but hearsay, which is largely made up of frontier
gossip and stories.

yours truly, .33
J. w. rorsyth

, 33. ggjan Ionrnal, Vol. 15, p. 595 (April 22,
1876). I reproduce this etter in full principally because it
has never appeared elsewhere in print, although the North
Dakota Historical Society has an us. of mine on the matter.

.Both Dustin and van de Water were ignorant of it, accepting
custer's version fully.

 

0f the testimony that he had been forced to receive il-
legal corn while commandant of tort Lincoln, on direct orders
of the Secretary of war, the following item is complete, and
needs no consent:

the lew york Itiles says: In his testimony
before the clymsr committee, General duster stated
that while at tort abrahaanincoln, he refused to
receive a certain amount of corn, believing it had
been stolen from the Indian dept.; that he reported
the facts to the War Dept. about Sept. 1875, that
no action was taken upon his report and that sub-
sequently he was obliged, by orders of the war
Dept. to receive the corn. ur. clamor applied to
the Secretary of War for a copy of General Custer's
report, and the secretary of war has replied say-
ing: '1 have caused a careful examination to be
made in the office of the secretary of War, the
offices of the AdJutant General, quartermaster-
General, and.the commissary-oaneral for the re-
port stated to have been made by General Custer.
but no report of that character can be found; nor
is there any record of the receipt of such report,
or of any directions to can. custer from the War
Department or any of its bureaus respecting this
subJect.'

34. army-flan Journal, vol. 13, p. 615 (april 29.
1876).

 

Two weeks later, the committee had additional reports
fro. Lt. -Gen. Sheridan and General terry, commanding the
Dept. of Dakota, definitely settling the matter, and utterly
discrediting actor's testinony:

. ...8heridan: 'It is shown by these
papers that the corn was received at Fort Lincoln
on orders of Brigadier General 'rerry, con-ending
the Dept. of Dakota, after a thorough investiga-
tion of the whole transaction. I ...General ferry
says: “the transaction was fully inquired into
here, and by evidence given under oath it was
shown conclusively, I think, that no fraud had
been oo-itted or attempted. to make assurance
doubly sure, however, before payment was made to
the contractors they were required to give ample
bonds to idennify the governnat in gase fraud
should be subsequently discovered. '3

.35. 9211311 Ionml, Vol. 13, p. 612 (Hey 13, 1876).

 

'yearlessly‘ and almost proudly“ Custer nay have told
that he knew, but what he knew turned out to be utterly worth-
less. Even a lifetime friend and defender like Col. 0- A.
('ssndyi) l'orsyth had to admit long afterward, .'his evidence
was all hearsay and not worth a tinker's den. "36

 

WV.—

36. O. 1'. Bragg, p. 217. 'fhis forsyth should not be
confused wit nera . w. Forsyth who wrote the letter to
Belknap cited in Note :53. "Sandy“ rorsyth, like ouster, had
been a protege of son. sheridan's in the civil war - in fact,
accompanying hin on the famous ride at winchester. as also
served with ouster on the 187.3 Iollowstone upedition under
General stanley. acne years after the Battle of the Little
Big Horn he was given couand of the 7th cavalry, and since
he was in oomand at Wounded Knee in 1890, it was said udely
that he opened fire with Hotchkiss antonatic guns on the Pine
Ridge sioux encamnent to 'revsnge ouster. -

 

wt in trying to sneer nelknap who he may have despised

for good personal reasons, althougi none are known, ouster

wielded his tar brush too widely. as broughtgin the muse of
orvil Grant, younger brother of the President, and then in a
wild effort to prop up the collapsing edifice of his 'evidenoe'
unbelievably impugned the personal honesty of want himself.

of a captain Raynond and orvil Grant, and Raymond's
appointment as post. trader at Port Berthold by telegram,
ouster charged that Iunnaynond showed the telegram to several
persons in Bismarck, and clained that he paid orvil want
:1,ooo for getting the appointlent for him. ~37 Unsupported

3?. I [ought With gster, p. 125. this part of the
length transcrip s of One er's testinony that frazier and
Robert that have included in Windolph's story, on pp. 124—131.

 

 

by proof this was bad, but far worse was to cone. When Presi-
dent Grant's executive order extending the boundary of the
dioux Reservation to the east bank of the Hissouri ease up in
the testimony, Custer left the unmistakable implication that
it had been done - not to control better sale of rum to the
Indians as publicly stated -- but to favor the same non deal-
ing in post traderships, again including orvil grant.

there was much other, but what meter left the stand
for the last time he made immediate plans to leave for fort
Lincoln. first, however, he called at the White Rules, and
seened genuinely surprised that Grant - whom he had Just
branded publicly as so personally dishonest he would use his
executive power to aid his younger brother - that Grant should
not be interested in seeing hie. I

Idolaters picture his as sons sort of a ragged, but
pure-of-heart, nilitary orphan, shivering in the rain outside

the rich m‘ a palace. and to heighten synpatlv for duster,
they nearly always telescope this scene in the White House
lobby With others yet to cone in a few days. For on April 20,
Just when ouster was actually leaving, he was again handed a
sumons frcn Olyler to remain in Washingtonfor the formal in-
peachlent proceedings of secretary Belknap.

flaking every effort to evade the duty, ouster finally
went through channels first to sham, then up to the new
Secretary of War, alphonso raft, and from ear: to grant.
But grant had a new answer: since General custer's presence
'.seemed to be so necessary in Washington” let the tort
Lincoln oolunn move under a different commander. Buster's
carelessness with his political tar brush had painted his
right into a corner. This was the myth of 'Grant's Revenge. I

after nuch discussion as to who would supersede Custer
as head of the sioux mpedition, general Terry accepted
Sheridan's suggestion that he go hinself. as to the reginent,
on nay 6, 1876, s. o. 60, Dept. of Dakota stated in regard to
the 7th Cavalry: “Gupanies A. O. D. F. I...to form part of
column from port abrahan Lincoln against aioux Indians, under
major 51. A. gone. all baggage and families left in quarters
at fort. -38

 

58. See gray—gag; (wag, Vol. 13, p. 640 (may 13,
1876).

A;

the renainder of the story, at least, has been kept in
a nearly correct form, only that it is interpreted to scan

that the my Just sinply couldn't get along without duster,

and that ferry, sheridan, Sherman, and Grant gave way before

a whirlwind of righteous public indignation. ouster franti-
cally left washington without proper authorization, and was
caught up short in Chicago, being placed under arrest. finally,
however, after nany futile efforts, a telegran to Grant coeposed
for his by ferry - Iappealing as soldier to soldier not to let
his regiment larch without bl." - brought a reprieve. He

could go with the colunn, but only as in connami of the 7th
cavalry.

Long as this re-hash has been, it is short compared to
the nany neticulcus studies ends of this brief interval in
custsr's life. not all have been constricted into a brief
popular nyth: duster "got‘I Belknap and orvil Grant, and
Grant purposefully husiliated Custer for doing his duty. But
the keen-sighted nerican public, god bless ten, forced their
wicked president to stay his hand - and wasn't he sorry, too,
when only a few brief days away the man he (Grant) had
wronged was dead.

Ire. ouster quite understandably, but anazingly,
managed to compress the whole series of events - free the
larch 3rd telegras to sly-er to Buster's reinstatement and
arrival at the tort may 10th - into

'fhe preparations for the expedition were

ccnpleted before u husband returned free the
test, whither he had been ordered. 39

 

39. goots'and gaddles, p. 248.

 

and even as recently as 194?, rrasier met cannot

resist titling one chapter is his otherwise clear-spoken bod

on rho-as Windolph, “was Grant's Harsh Rebuke Responsible for
Onster's Death?“ A higher respect for his cherished newe-
nanu reputation for getting only true fact no longer lets
hi- ignore contrary evidence - as he did in his 1928 book -
but he must still end cryptically, with a rhetorical wagging
of the head: .

...orent had been stern with his. not
Easter had his reginent bad and there was action
ead.
lo nan will ever know for certain how each
all this had to do with ouster's actions and de-
gigicnzocn the Little Big Horn forty-seven days
‘ ere '

so. i ggifgt with Ester, p. 135. It Inst be clearly

Wood t s s as er and Robert met here speaking,
at from Windolph who was actually in the battle.

All Windclph has to say is: 'i'here was a lot of suspicious
talk going on all around the place Port Lincoln . Duster
was still in the East, and you could hear a hundred tales 'of
how he was being kept away frcl the expedition because he had
got under the skin of President Grunt. ' (p. 0f.)

 

 

Of all the meter nyths asking up the Legend, “this is
in nany ways the most disgusting, for there is always a
blasphelous hint of getheelane in the choking recital of
cueter's incense forbearance toward Grant. meter, pure of
heart, free of g::ile,ntterly forgiving even as the crown of
thorns is pressed down on his brow. ouster forgiving Grant
for believing that proves nietruths under oath could be given
out with personal nalice. duster Iarohing bravely to a fore-
see‘n fate, forced to his death by a vindictive political
ens-y. .

tater a mall child donut-gs left, With a placard:
'lext seek, EAST LINKS! 0

THE DEAD ERG

laturally, the most important part of the ouster
Legend deals with the Battle of the Little Big Born, June 25,
1876, and events Just before or after. the battle, and the
circumstances surrounding Custer's death, have spawned myths
With a profusion to make many facts still impossible of deter-
mination. rred Dustin spent over 50 years gathering naterial
and eliminating unnecessary detail - and still needed 220
oversize pages and several appendices to present as economical
an account as exists of Buster's life, and is still adequate
to cover controversy. md Instill at 82 is still finding new
material, worthy of consideration.

the congressional library can show sons 28 pages solid
of Custer titles, and Captain 3:. 3. use, present superin-
tendent of the Custer national lament, has already been
over two years in conpilieg s ccnprehensive meter bibliogra-
pm - and it last be constantly revised to include unknown
itens of real value. and now, seventy years after the
battle - in which tens of thousands of nilitary sen and
civilians have trumped the battlefield - he has located the
site of an heretofore overlooked skirnish line, share die-
mounted ma 'apparently put up a good bet fight for half an
hour or more. "1 It night conceivably revise all existing

 

41. Personal conversation with E. 3. mos, superinten-
dent of the Custer national ucnunent, larch 14, 1948.

theories, at least as to duster's final - and yet unknown -

novaents.

therefore, before going into sons of the major nythe
capable of disproot on the such-argued. such -investigated,
nuchrpraised. and such-condeaned Lest stand, as sill give in-
tull the briefest - and in nany. eany says the most sensible -
account of the battle. It was given direct to the famed
Indian painter z. a. Burbank by two Icons, the great obeyenne
chi e: :

'lbap big fight. asap dust.'*2

 

42. E. A. Burbank and :rnest Royce, rbank on 'the
Indians (Osldsell, Idaho: the Caxton Printers, I§ZI§, p.'173.
s. or course, has no relation to Hamlin garland's ramous

interviev with Two Icons printed in Ecolure's magazine. vol.

11' IO. 5, 1398.

 

A standard account or the duster Legend. and one lent
an air of authority because of its writer. is that attributed
to (xx-s.) Annie Gibson rates, the grieving m... or Captain
George I. rates, killed with.ouster. Appearing in 1903.in a
book entitled ghe no; ggneral, a compilation of Mrs. ouster's
Various writings by one Mary E. aurt, it bears a footnote:
"Idited.frca a paper prepared by Annie Gibson rates and re-
vised hy Lieutenant~deneral Nelson.A. Iiies.‘ one ct the
gallant sidovs or the 7th Cavalry, and a lieutenant-general
or the army: now could anyone help but accept it as true
history ~ even when “edited' by the 1900 version of a sob-
sister. ‘

Enough of it will be quoted.fully to shes the Legend
as it existed 30 years after the battle, and as it still
exists vith.individual variation or esbellishsent:

two days after the Battle of the Little
Big Horn the sun rose bright and glorious over
the Boy General as he lay in that long sleep
fro: which no mortal wakes. [A true leader to
the last, he lay at the head of his army on
the summit of a ridge overlooking the battle~
field, surrounded by his heroic followers. Here
with.hin were his two brothers, to. custer and
Boston, and his nephew Armstrong Reed, captain
rates, Lieutenants cooks, Smith, and Reilly, all
lying in a circle of a few yards, their horses
beside then. The companies had successively
thrown themselves across the path.of the enemy.
the last stand had been made by Iates's company.
not a nan escaped to tell the tale, but it sac
inscribed upon the surface of the barren hills
in a language more eloquent than words.

, 1n the ravine belcs lay the troops
arranged in order of battle, as they had fought,
line behind line, shoeing share defensive posi-
tions had been successively taken up and held
till not a man was left to continue the fight.
...Lieutenant snithfls akirnishers, still holding
their gray horses, were lying in groups of four.
Lieutenant Calhoun was on the skirmish-line, and
Lieutenant crittendon and each of the comp had
fallen in the place to which the tactics sou d
have assigned then.

The true soldier asks no questions; he
obeys, and ouster was a true soldier. He gave
his life in carrying out the orders of his con~
landing general. He was sent out to fight and
was expected to accomplish results. He had ad~
vanced carefully and cautiously upon the enemy,
taking three tines as much tine for the approach
as is regarded necessary in the marches of caval—
ry troops to-day. He often took counsel with his
officers and halted to examine all abandoned camps
and trails. no was instructed not to let any
Indians escape, and was expected to compel th.
to settle down on their reservations. He had
trained and exhorted his men and officers to loy-
alty, and.vith.ons exception they stood true to
their trust, as was shown by the order in which
t fell. A lieutenant holding an important
she tered.positicn, who should have kept the ene-
ey at bay and could easily have done so, became
excited and panic~stridken, gave confused orders
and counter-handed than, and finally led a stane
pede which allowed the Indians to concentrate on
one point and advance on duster‘s hand with over~
ehelning numbers. ‘

The govern-ant, through its Indian agents,
had unwittingly provided the savages sith.hetter
rifles than it had given to its one soldiers.

These reservation Indians had frol.tine to tile
slipped away free their rightful grounds and
Joined the hostile red men. they should have
been reported to the War Department by the agents
enployed to look after then....And so it happened
that custer'Ient out to meet-less than a thousand
Indians and found hinself face to face with three
'thousand, supplied with.long-range rifles with
which they could stand at a safe distance and
take effective ail, while his own men had to ex-
tract empty and corroded cartridge—shells, often
with their'knives, fro: their inferior short-
range rifles. a few days previous to this
, general crooks had been sent by the commanding
General, ferry, to do battle with the Indians in
another place. so was defeated, and the Indians,
intoxicated with the victory, had come with great-
er courage against duster, and this, with.many
other unavoidable oircunstances, forced the bat-
tle before Terry and his men could.oome up and
unite with duster's forces. general Terry was new
to Indian warfare and had to plan the battle as he
put it, frol,h.conjectural map of an unexplored
country,‘ and without knowing positively the sit-
uation of the enemy. so was the brave Seventh
Cavalry sent down to the Valley of Death, and the
Theroopylae of the western plains is on our
national records.

when a relief corps was sent to look up
Guster's trail, the column cans to a part of the
division that had been led.hy the runaway liens
tenant. The son were still fighting in the tmlr
her. They gave cheer upon cheer to the soldiers
who had some to their relief, and the Indians
1.11 ba“....

a,quarter of a century has elapsed since
the Battle of the Little Big Born. at that ties
sitting Bull in Dakota, and crazy Horse in Wycling,
uith.their allies crcw'xing, Gall, Low neg, fihlph
' and two Moons kept a territory of 90,000 square
miles in terror, slaying without mercy travelers,
settlers, woodchoppers, and hunters. yo-day hun-
dreds of thousands of happy peeple in snug holes
on well-tilled far-e, or’in pretty villages, rev
Jcice in the peace and prosperity of the same
country which still has roan enough for as lany
Indians as ever lived there.

. as a pioneer the name of George Arlstrong
duster will live side by side with that of
Lsdalle Captain John smith, Boone, and Hiles
standish. and he has won unfading glory as a
soldier, through his efficient seals devoted
patriotism, and high courage‘ghat counted death
in loyal service, a victory.

 

43. nary a. Burt, ed., e 0 (new tort:
Charloo Scribner'e acne, 1908), pp. ~204.

 

Obviouely thie 1e e book for younger reodere. like
Shannon aoret'e 1944 Juvenile, but neither ie eoeily dinieeed.
Gent. ee previouely etoted (see note 2, above). had full
eoceee to eone of the coat carefully writta cueter mote
existent. And nee Burt in her day had the help of General
nilee. captain Godfrey and bio toned gentug article, and tire.
Iotee - particularly in the uteri-l Juet quoted. me lice
Burt in her preface: marble ie 3 chapter In: deelred by
all the young readere who are intereeted in getting o clear
account of the Battle of the Little Big Horn. It ie the only
ellple, reliable, and brief account of that battle that ha:
been put in shape for childrm'e reading.‘

'8ilple' and 'childron'e reading' it ie, indeed, but
the one etory - often little better told - can be found in e
dozen 'ednlt' booke written einoe lice mrt‘e time. there-
fore, Ire have the loot inportent port of the meter Legend in
o convenient nuteholl - ready to be eroded and found may
by enelytioel cooperioon with demented toot. god the very
toot thot it io o 'Juvenile I, end coneequoutly lore repre-
eentotlve or popular thinking, “too it ideol for our
purpoeee.

1t io neeeeeery to recepitulete briefly the eveete
leading up to Gunter bode; preeent in the Big Horn country
the fateful week or hie death.

(I Deco-her 6. 1875, the comiuioeer of Indie:

-42-

Affairs, under instructions of the secretary of the Interior
sent the following word to several different Indian agents:

...notify Sitting Bull's band and other
wild and lawless bands of Sioux Indians residing
without the bounds of their reservation, who roam
over western Dakota and eastern Montana including
the rich.valley of the Yellowstone and Powder
Rivers, and make war on the arickarees, Mandans,
aros Ventres, Assiniboines, Blackfeet, Piegans,
aroma and other friendly tribes, that unless they
shall remove within the bounds of their reserva-
tion (and remain there) before the diet of Janu-
ary next, they shall be deemed hostile and treated
accordingly by the military force.44

 

44. P. E. Byrne, soldiers of‘the lains, p. 25.
(Hereafter cited as P. E. ByrneS. The Isoldiers' in Byrne's
title does not refer to Army troops but to the hostile
Indians whose military abilities. saneuverings, and strategy
he analyzes and evaluates as exceeding that of the officers

and men sent against then.

 

The letter did not reach any of the agents until
December 20, and because of the severe winter weather runners
sent out to the Indians in some cases did not even reach the
Sioux until after the expiration of the January 31st time
limit; and in other cases there was no possible way in which
the order could have been complied with in the brief time re-
naining. nevertheless. at the precise time of expiration,
the Secretary of Interior surrendered Jurisdiction over the
I'lmstiles'I and the war Department started planning punitive
action. ‘

Sheridan, as commander of the nuilitary Division of
the Hissouril - embracing all territory bordering the
Iissouri and rest to the Rocky'uountains - operated through
two departmental commanders: crook and Terry. crook col-

handed the Department of the Platte. and was equal in rank

and separate in action from Terry, commander of the Depart-
ment of Dakota, and at all times Custer's superior officer.

Crook was never under ferry's command, and he was
never “sent by the commanding General, ferry, to do battle
with the Indians in another place.0 He opened the 1876 cam-
paign by moving out of Fort Fetterman, Wyoming Territory, on
larch lst, with 10 full troops of Cavalry. 2 companies of
Infantry. 86 wagons, 4 ambulances, and a pack train of 400
mules. On March 16, general J. J. Reynolds with 6 troops of
cavalry attacked.Crazy Horse's Village. was repulsed and
thrown back on the main column under crook. crazy Horse then
so harried the main force the entire eXpediticn withdrew to
its base at retterman.

It was this defeat of Crook's that brought about the
concerted movement ouster was to take part in. crook was to
forl another column of some 1050 men fron‘Wyoming; general
John gibbon to for: a Montana column of some 400 men from
Fort Ellis; and there was to be a Dakota column of sale 1200
sen, originally slated for Custer. Terry was to be in
overall command of both the Montana and Dakots columns, and
after ouster's blunders in Washington took active command of
the latter. The three forces were to drive the hostiles back
to their reservations.

crock, independent in command. moved his second eXpe-
dition in three months from tort Fetterman on May 26th. on
June 17th he overtook a force of Sioux on the Rosebud in

Hontana a few miles south of Custer's defeat a.week later.

for the second tine Crook was defeated by Crazy Horse and
withdrew to a temporary base at Goose Creek. He had no con-
tact with.rerry's force - except through the headquarters of
sheridan in Chicago - until after the Battle of the Little
Big Horn.“5 this is his only connection with the Custer

A—-

‘5. go 3. ”PRO, ppe 38-57 28381..

Legend, except as a convenient contrast designed to heighten
Custer's fame - and lessen the stigma of defeat.

I'C:rook,“ says General xidd, alike duster, had seen
service in the Indian country but, unlike duster, had not
distinguished himself by any marked success as an Indian
fighter.l45’ In the 1876 campaign honors seemed to be about

 

46. J. H. 8.13": p. 104. General Sherman, however,
rated Crook 1ourgrea‘test Indian fighter“ - and a study of
his career lends the tribute great support.

 

 

even, except that crook lost but 10 dead and 21 wounded - and
returned to win at slin Buttes in September. ouster took
some 225 sen to death with his, and his regiment was rendered
virtually ineffective, never again campaigning as a unit.
ferry and Gibbon, however, made contact on June 8,
1876, and Joined forces on the Iellovstono. tron June 10th
to the 19th, Reno sith part of the 7th cavalry was on a scout,
and returned with reports of a great Indian trail leading
toward the valley of the nig Horn River. vith.this intelli.
gence ferry and Gibbon formulated a plan on the night of June
21st - custer sitting in through the courtesy of his superiors

and to soothe his still bruised ego. the plan was simple:
ouster with the main body of cavalry, the 7th» would march.up
the Rosebud (south) and by a long swinging march meet Gibbon's
slower moving column of mixed.infantry and.cavalry near the.
mouth of the Little Big Horn on June 26th, trapping the
Indians between then.

Irhe true soldier asks no questions; he ebeys, and
ouster was a true soldier. He gave his life in carrying out
the orders of his commanding genoral' - so says are. Iates
(or General niles through lies Burt). But there is no ques-
tion at this late date that duster most certainly dieobeyed
his orders. as did not follow the route tenatively laid out
for him by his superiors - and there was no good reason for
his not doing so - and he brought on the battle a full 24
hours before schedule.

Every type of excuse has been advanced for his, General
Godfrey even italicising parts of rerry'e written order to
custer to excuse his departing from it. general uilee pro—
fessed for years to have an affidavid Ifron a party also
present! at the council of war proving that terry verbally
gave Custer a free hand. And finally Isrry's plan was belit-
tled as 'fatuous' or Iprepoeterousl based.on a Iguessl that

the Indians vero on the Little Dig Horn.47

 

‘3. See 9. 2. Brad*, Appendix A, pp. 359ff.; Fred
ggstin, passim.; a-ogz-Hun or, pp. 356-320; etc., etc.

Y.

 

the written order is not going to be quoted or repro-
duced in full here (a virtual sacrilege in a Custer paper -
but see Appendix I). because in the final analysis it is of

little inportance - save that had Custer actually triumphed
in his premature attack its wording might have strengthened
his alibi. certain parts, for example, have been treated like
the words of christ by his critics, unbelievable stress being
placed on his failure to scout a watercourse named 'rulloch's
creekI according to definite instructions. and the courteous-
ness of address used by Terry to boost the morale of his
crestfallen subordinate has been tortured by apologists into
a carte blanche to let Ouster start a brand new campaign of
his own, if he felt like it. the controversy over the last
order is a study in applied semantics, not history.

cutting through the hedgerows of verbiage, the problem
of feet against myth comes down to a for simple points: (1)
what was decided at the conference of June 21st? (2) was
ouster present at that conference, and therefore aware of
what was decided - regardless of any forms of military
formality thereafter carried out? (a) If duster was given
complete independence of operation could it be done without
a clear understanding on the part of his superiors present?
(4) Did Terry and gibbon understand that custor was to be in I
position at a certain stipulated time, and did they so con-
duct their own movements? (5) If Gibbon. and ferry were in
agreement as to what part caster was to play - and meter was
present and therefore informed - and Buster's movements were
at variance with this agreement, then ouster dieobeyed his
orders.

The reports of gibbon and Terry are thus of far more
importance than the famed written order. Said ferry in his

-47-

report to-sheridan:

...gt a conference which took place on the
21st between colonel Gibbon, Lieutenant Colonel
custer, and myself, I communicated to them the
plan of Operations which I had decided to adopt.
It was that colonel gibbon's column should cross
the Iellowstone near the mouth of the Little 31g
Horn, and thence up that stream, with the expectar
tion that it would arrive at the last-named point
by the 26th; that Lieutenant colonel Custer with
the whole of the seventh cavalry should proceed
up the Rosebud until he should ascertain the
direction in which the trail discovered by naJor
keno led; that if it led to the Little Big Horn
it should not be followed; but that Lieutenant
colonel custer should keep still farther to the
south before turning toward that river, in order
to intercept the Indians should they attempt to
pass around his left, and in order, by a longer
march, to give time for colonel albbon'a column
to come up. a

This plan was founded on the belief that
at some point on the Little Big Born a body of
hostile Sioux would be found; and although it was
impossible to make movements in perfect concert,
as might have been done had there been a known
fixed objective to be reached, yet, by the Judi-
cious use of excellent guides and scouts which we
possessed, the two columns might be brought within
coOperating distance of each other, so that either
of them which should be first engaged might be a
'waiting figgt' - giving time for the other to
can @000.

 

48. is reprinted in I [ought 11th Qgster, p. lief.

 

said Gibbon in his report to Sheridan:

...rhat evening the plan of operations was
agreed upon. Lieutenant Colonel duster, with the
seventh cavalry, was to proceed up the Rosebud
till he struck an Indian trail, discovered during
Major Reno's scout. as my scouts had recently
reported smoke on the Little Big Horn, the
presence of an Indian camp some distance up that
stream was inferred.

Lieutenant Colonel Ouster was instructed
to keep constantly feeling toward his left, well
up toward the mountains, so as to prevent the
Indians escaping in that direction and to strike
the Little Big Horn, if possible above (south) of
the supposed ocation of the camp, while ay command

~40-

was to march.up the yellowstone to the mouth.cf
the Big Horn to the mouth of the Little Big Horn
and up that stream, with the hope of getting the
camp between the‘two forces. is it would take

my command three days to reach the mouth of the
Big Horn, and probably a day to cross it over the
Yellowstone, besides two more to reach the mouth
of the Little Big Horn, and Lieutenant Colonel
custer had the shorter line over which to operate,
the department commander strongly impressed upon
him the propriety of not pressing his march too
rapidl’000049

 

49. gas reprinted in ;_[ought With ouster, p. lief.

 

and said ferry in his confidential telegram to Sheridan,
July 2, use, ‘. week after the battle:

...rhe movements proposed for goal. gibbon's
column were carried out to the letter and had the
attack been deferred.until it was up I cannot doubt
that we should have been successful....

I send in another dispatch a copy of my writ-
ten orders to Custer, but these were supplemented
by the distinct understanding that gibbon could not
get to the Little Big Home before the evening of
the 26th.50

 

50. as quoted in [red gustin, p. 197.

 

Unless even now - since ouster apologists keep the bon~
troversy raging - absolute proof could be brought forwardnthat
gibbon and ferry were men lacking in integrity, or as officers
of such.mendacious character as to color, distort, or omit
pertinent facts for self-protection in their official reports
to their superior officer the fact of disobedience is indis-
putable. Nor “can it be said, as has at times been hinted,
that gibbon and Terry were cursed with the failing memory of
old age. "drizzled old general gibbon“ and 'kindly old
General terryi were 50 and 49 years old respectively at the

tilce

[or was terry's plan e.'prepcsterous guess,“ but e
skilful use of limited intelligence. as had definite infor-
maticn as to terrain, the crow scouts led by Hitch nouyer
being on familiar ground, Reno's scout having covered the
country from the Powder to the Rosebud, and captain Ball's
scout of April 24th to nay let having passed right over the
site of the coming battle. It was for this reason he wanted
the Infantry as well as the Cavalry within supporting dis-
tance. is to numbers of Indians neither Terry, nor any other
officer in the army, could conceive of such immense numbers
concentrating forces prior to actual proof in the battle.

But the final test of his ‘fatuous plan“ was the
actual location of the Indians, and the actual position of
Gibbon'e column on the day appointed. ferry and gibbon were
in the valley of the Little Big Horn, within ten miles of the
battle site, the evening of June 26th, and in the morning of
the 27th advanced directly over the battlefield. The myth of
s carte blanche order or of ouster “giving his life in carry-
ing out the orders of his commanding generelI is exploded:
nether, his disobedience brought death to 225 men, and a
battle was lost.

“He had advanced carefully and cautiously upon the
enemy, taking three times as much.time for the approach as is
regarded necessary in the marches of cavalry troops today.'
The time regarded necessary, of course, must always depend on
a particular set of conditions at a given time. auster's
conditions had lese to do with the speed of his horses than
with the coordinating of it to properly complete a Junction

with gibbon. But the 'carefully and cautiously. must be
broken down.

the 7th cavalry left the Iellowstone June 22nd and went
into action shortly after noon of the 25th. the actual line
of march has variously estimated from 90 miles (J. n. xidd),
106 miles (Godfrey). 125 miles (Benteen), and 10? miles not
counting extra mileage for gene and Benteen (trod Dustin).
Godfrey has stated in making one of his estimates, I...t'hat
is to say, ninety-one miles up to noon June 25 when it was
decided to attack, and one kindred six miles in all four
days. That doesn‘t indicate that we made _f_o_g_-_9_g_d marches. .51

 

51. c. 1. Brady, Appendix A, p. 390. Kidd obviously

has taken do rey s ower estimate. Benteen'e estimate is
used by rerry in his July 2nd telegram to General sheridan.

on a straight average Godfrey would, of course, have
been right but the marches varied in length, and grew pro-
greesively longer as men and horses grew more tired and the
battle approached. Dustin roughly agrees with Godfrey in his
total but has broken it down by times as well as days in his
study:

.. .on June 22, the cos-end marched twelve
miles, going into camp about 4:00 p.m. on the
23rd, starting at 6:00 e.m. the march was thirty-
three miles, camping at 4:50. on the 24th, mow-e»
ing 33 6:00 a.m., marched until 1:00 p..., moving
out again at 5:00 p.l. and camping at 7:45 p.m.,
distance twenty-eight miles. on the 25th, the
command marchedat 1:00 a. m., none of the men
having had more than three hours sleep and many
none at all. this march continued until about
4:00 a.m., and was resumed at 8:00 a.m., cover-
ing a distance of probably fourteen miles to the
ravine at the foot of the crows nest. From this
point to the meter yield monument the distance
is not less than twenty miles over his route, and

Reno in reaching his final position traveled still
farther, while Benteen's troops added at least
six to eight miles in their march.

It will be manifest, therefore, that Guster's
and Reno's battalions marched over sixty miles from
five o'clock in the morning of the 24th to approxi-
mately two o'clock in the afternoon of the 25th;
Benteen upwards of seventy miles and the pack
train and its escort over fifty-five miles - in a
period of thirty-three hours including halts, with
very little sleep or food, hardly any water,
almost no grass, and but few cats for the
animals.52

 

52. in: menu, p. 102.

 

Godfrey to the contrary, that does sound like “forced!

marches. However, Windolph.recalle today:

...we were all fairly tired, men and horses
alike, but we weren't anywheres near being worn
out. Each of us had started with a twelve—pound
bag of cats tied on to our saddles and we were
almost to the end of them. But we'd let our
horses graze as much as we could and with two or
three cats a day our mounts were doing fairly
well. lost of them were strong young cavalry
horses.55

53. I [ought With ggster, p. 73!.

 

to the

But trooper slaper in 1925 - and that many years closer
actual march in his memory - states flatly:

...Thie forced march had much to do with
the worn condition of our horses during the bat-
tle of the Little Big Horn. The grazing had been
poor for several days, and as we were traveling
in light marching order ~ that is, without wagons -
there was little, if any, grain for our horses.54

 

54. A Iggoper With ggsteg, p. 26.

 

and finally we now have the comment of Lieutenant prank

Gibson, written to his wife July 4, 1370 - only ten days after

the actual events:

...on the twenty third, we struck an
Indian trail, only two days old, so we marched
night and day at a trot and gallOp with occasion-
al short halts so, of course, the men and horses
became exhausted for the need of rest and food
but still we went pushing and crowding along. 55

 

55. Mrs.) Katherine Gibson Fougera, with Custer“s
gavalgy, p. 266f. The letter was headed “damp on the Yellow-
stone River, Montana territory, July-«4, 1876. I hire. Gibson
mentions that it was written in pencil on government toilet
paper. there is also a letter of Benteen's of the same date
now available, but he makes no special mention of the march
to the battlefield.

 

“cautious“ Custer actually seems to have been on the
march, in most cases throwing out Indian scouts and watching
for danger signs, but “careful“ would have to include more
thought as to what he was doing to his men and animals than
is shown. as for his march taking “three times as much time...
as regarded necessary...today“ one wonders where General
liles was when Mrs. Iates made that. comparison, or if he
actually would ride men three times harder than ouster did
his.

as to his “often taking counsel with his officers, “
Lieutenant album has also left us the impression made by his
doing so, since it was completely contrary to accustomed pro-
cedurm Again quoting from his July 4th letter to Hrs.
Gibson:

. “as we marched along through the heat I
could not but recall the rather odd talk we had

with ouster the evening of the twenty second.

When officers“ call was sounded we assembled at

his bivouao and squatted in groups about his

cot...we were cautioned to husband our mules and

ammunition and, finally, he asked all officers to
make suggestions to him at any time. this struck

us as the strangest part of the meeting, for you
know how dominant and self reliant he always was,
and we left him with a queer sort of depression.
ucxntosh, Wallace, Godfrey and I walked back to
our tents together and finally Wallace said - I:
believe General Custer is going to be killed.“

“VII?“ aa.d 0061?”.

'Because 1 never heard him tank in this
way bggore - that is, asking the advice of any-
one.I

66. gith figster's ggvalgz, p. 267f. aodfrey tells the
same story in his 2 Century article - but with an interest-
ing difference. as omi s s qualifying phrase "- that is,

asking the advice of anyone;l which changes the meaning con-
siderably.

 

 

and tindolph adds an eyewitness account of how duster
received an actual suggestion - one from Benteen on the morn-
ing of the battle. Windolph wanted permission to trade
‘horses with a trooper named uccurry, and rode up to Benteen
to get it:

...:[ went to look him up and get his per-
mission, and I found him with General duster and
several of the officers at a conference. 1 ap-
proached as near as seemed respectful and while
I was waiting to catch.aenteen's attention, 1
:ouldn't help but overhear part of the converse-

ion.

Charlie Reynolds, the famous white scout -
who was never to see the sun set that day - was
talking, and I heard him say that there was the
biggest bunch.cf Indians he'd ever seen over
there. Finally I heard Benteen say to Custer:
'Hadn't we better keep the regiment together,
General? If this is as big a camp as they say,
we'll need every man we have.“ _

Guster's only answer was: iron have your
orders.|...57

 

.57. I [ought With ggsteg, p. 78f.

 

All of which leads us naturally into the most vicious
myths of all: senteen's I'treacheryfl and.nsno's 'cosardice' -

or sometimes "drunken cowardice“ - and the disobedience to
orders of both. nrs. Iates refers only to 'a lieutenant
holding a sheltered position...led a stampede" or 'the runs-
way lieutenant', but other writers of Juvenile literature -
intended as such or not - are less circumspect.

rrssier Hunt's 1928 book is full of off-hand refer-
ences to Reno and Benteen by name, pointing them up as the
villains of the piece. 'Lovely Hrs. ouster rods by his side
this first day. They talked of many things - of the genersl's
young brother and his nephew, accompanying them on the eXpe-
diticn; of the hate that uaJor none, the senior officer in
his command, and nenteen, his ranking captain, bore tor him.
as would conciliate these two....'ro uaJor Reno -- who had for
three days been chafing under the fancied insult that cluster
was degrading his rank by giving him nothing to do - was
assigned the advance....He [none] had only hats and preju-
dice against custer....'rhey [Reno and Benteen] had only scorn
for him - those two who hated him... 'etc., etc. ad nauseum,

ad infinitum. 58

*_

68. duster, _I_.ast of the cavaliers, passin.

 

Shannon caret goes at it like a good pulp fictioneer,
sowing the seeds of suspicion against Reno and Benteen with a
blaasmith's subtle touch. He requires a fuller excerpting,
and his embellished account of the battle shows an opinionat-
ed vindictiveness lacking in fire. rates.

duster looked over the officers who were

to assist him, appraising them swiftly. Benteen
hated him bitterly, he knew, and a slight trace

of scorn crossed his face as he looked at the
older man - scorn that one should allow personal
spites and anilosities to becloud military
matters. But Benteen was a capable and courageous
soldier. ouster felt that he could depend on bin
in an emergency in spite of his personal feelings.

A slight frown clouded his face as his
glance passed quickly over Reno. Reno was a
young man who had acquitted.hdnself creditably in
the Civil War. He, too, was inexperienced in
Indian campaigning. Ouster’didn't quite trust
Reno, and he hardly knew why. It was a feeling
based more on instinct than fact. Probably Reno
would come through all right....

and later -

In the rapid-fire manner in which he gave
directions, he said, “You are to march with the
greatest possible rapidity. Each officer will
look carefully to his men and do what is eXpect-
ed of hill. 0 He looked levelly at Reno and
Benteen as he said this.”

59. ghannon Garst, pp. 145, 151. The unintentional
irony of the e He, 00, was ineXperienced in Indian can-
paigning' almost redeems Garst's book.

 

Ouster*s bitterest enemies could scarcely do worse by
his than suchswriters. the bestowing of s christ-like for»
bearence on hin in his political episodes sakes one sorely
angry: but the nelodrsnatic Galahad pictured in these passages
‘unfairly turns on his the demolishing weapon of laughter.
Instead of a nan of indisputable personal bravery going to
death, he takes m the sire of the model tenth of the story-
books, who always states priggishly: “You may have my bicy-
cle, Geraldine. Being a gentleman means more to me than los-
ing my dearest possession.' l

of Benteen's active dislike and scorn for Custer there
can be little doubt - some of it beyond question dated fro-
the “Major Elliot affair. at Washita, but the causes went

farther back and deeper than that. Benteen was an embittered
idealist with an nnshekable code of conduct that gave hi. the
invincible courage to stand up to man. God. the Indians - or
his superior officer. It was his great strength throughout
a life that night have broken a lesser nan.

Beateen was a Virginian win retained loyal to the
union and fought in the Union arsy during the Civil war -
with all the heartbreak such a course necessarily brought to
a native Southerner. as ccuanded a brigade of volunteers
in the campaigns of the West! and held a regular army brevets
of colonel. In the years imediately preceding the Little
Big Horn he was in command of Fort nice - an old army post
. south of Bismarck that read once been abandoned and allowed to
go ruin, and which was never repaired when garrisoned once
more.

tort Lincoln had few enough conveniences, but it was
at least not isolated, as Bismarck was Just across the river
a busy driverport as well as ternirms of the new northern
Pacific. old part nice was - and is - completely isolated.
mty there actually drove sen insane, and sateen in the
winter of 1876 buried his youngest child in the desolate post
cenetery by the rotting hulks of the fort'e aquarters. '50.

 

 

,. ' ht: 9%“ er|s ogavel , pp. 224-256. Hrs. Gibson
' gives as wviv cture garr son life as any of Mrs.
ouster's books - and of an even more heartbreaking kind. The
Benteen child died while his father was out on special duty,

and Mrs. Gibson helped Hrs. Benteen prepare the burial - even
donating her wedding dress to line the nakeshift casket.

 

He had made his personal sacrifice to opening of the west

long before the Custer family.

yet his conduct was such that enlisted sen as well as
officers became undying partisans of this iron captain who
shoved and asked no favors. Interestingly enough, the two
7th cavalry veterans still living both eXprese their trsnen~
dons admiration for asnteen - although Homer's springs from
' the lee. Peres esnpsip of 1877 rather than the caster

nassacre. 51

e1. norner still resenbers the sight of aenteen forn-
ing and leading a nountsd charge under fire at canyon Creek.
Sept. 15. 1877. (see acob Burner. p. 20f.) tindolph as a
troop a nan begins his s cry or yrasier mat with have
proud to have known and fought under captain senteen of '3'.
He was Just about the finest soldier and the greatest gntle-
nan I ever knew. and 1 night as well say right now that Im
a Benteen nan.... ' (Bee I [ought With ggster, p. 2f.) Sale
believe that Windolph is prejudiced because Benteen made hi-
a sergeant in the field at Little Big Horn, but the fact re-
nains that *no troop commander is a hero to his :nen'I unless
he is outstan . Blaper has left sinilar testimony as to
captain trench o in", as has Willian uorris. But nany
others are conspicuous by their absence,

 

There is likewise on record endless testinony fro-
officers like Gibson. wallace, Barnum, Edgerly - who were on
Reno gill - and later additions to the seventh like E. a.
Garlington and Hugh 1.- Scott. all of it shows that Benteen
was of the best of everything that the phrase 'old my“ still
inplies. .

All of which is to say that Bentecn was not only a nan
of recognised integrity and courage, as an officer he was
such that we ‘know meter was not. Since the barren satisfac-
tion of living up to his personal code was all too often his
only reward he was repelled by the vivid master's delight in
personal glory as he was by his thoughtless treatnent of the

rank and file. fro. the first nesting he disliked hil.
ouster spent nest of the tine in reciting his civil tar
prowess, interspersed with reference to the third Division
order book. '1 had been on intimate personal relations with
many great *genersls and had heard no such bragging as was
stuffed into me that night,l wrote Benteen of the younger.

man's conversation.52

 

62. gig-mater, p. 155.

 

Actually the. only ccsmon ground the two men shared was
their matchless, almost foolhardy. personal bravery. Both
gloried in a good hard fight, and seemed to delight in defy-
ing enemy bullets. Beyond that they were exact opposites.
'noubtless the younger superior felt obligated to Justify his
rank to an equally eXperienoed subordinate. but free that day
on Benteen was the foreboding and ever-present conscience of
the 7th cavalry. xv.) at the Little Big Horn he was right
when he urged meter to keep the reginsnt together (See lots
67 above).

the final charge against Benteen :1me down to
whether or not he deliberately tarried once he had received
the famous order: 'Benteen. done on. Big Village. as
quick. Bring packs. p. 3. Bring pacedI days the ouster
Legend, through caret:

...as Benteen read the message he could
hear the sound of firing up the valley.
The language of the note was urgmt.

Benteen knew what duster neant by 'packs. " It

neant ammunition, and he was obviously in dire

need of it. yet aenteen sent no word to his
oomander and made no move to send his pad

mules that were already loaded with 2,000 rounds
of rifle ammunition each. ,.
Wm Benteen failed to heed that urgent cry
for help will never be known.
He did, however, urge his troops along to
where he could Join up with Reno's sen on the
bluffs along the river. 53

 

63. chanson Est, p. 168.

 

three inferences are plain: Bentsen had the packs with
his, neuteen deliberately lagged, and Bentesn deliberately
Joined Reno instead of going to duster. and, of course, this
was really Custer-ts 'second' message to genteen: Sgt. Daniel
[snipe having given the first. low to check facts against
nythc. I

The packs were a separate battalion - formed by Custer -
with captain nepougall and Troop a as a guard, and first
Lieutenant Mathq in charge of the sales. All told there were
about 1.30 Ion. They were not 'with" Benteen until both battal—
ions Joined neno on Reno 3111. It was to captain ncpougall,
Sergeant Xanipe was properly directed, with any nessage to
Benteen secondary 'if he saw hin,‘ xanipe says:

ouster and his troops were within about
oneehalf mile of the east side of the Indian
camps when I received the following nessage fro-
Captain 'rhonae duster xanipe's colpany commander :
'do to captain nonougall. tell his to bring pack
train straight across the country. If any packs
cone loose, cut the. and cone on quick - a big
Indian camp. If you see captain Benteen, tell
hi- to cone quick - a big Indian camp. '

on my route to Captain chougall I saw
captain Benteen about half way between where I
left General Custer and the pack train. He and
his men were watering their horses when first
seen. captain nonougall and the pack train were
found about four miles fro. the Indian camp. the
pack train went directly to the bluff where I
left duster's five troops. When we reached there

we found Reno with a relnant of his three troops
and Benteen with his three troops.“

64. I [ought gith ngter, p. 82. This is fron Kanipe'e
own account written ater or t nontana Historical society
magazine.

 

Benteen's officers apparently did not feel at the tine
that they Ihad lagged.“ again using Lieutenant Gibson's letter
of July 4, 1876, we get a very concise account of what happen-
ed up Benteen's Joining Reno:

...Benteen's battalion...was sent to the
left about five miles to see if the Indians were
trying to escape up the valley of the Little Big
Horn, after which we were to hurry and reJoin the
couand as quickly as possible. we never saw
ouster after that. He went on with the balance

' of the command and, when he got in sight of the
village, ordered Reno, with companies a, c, and u
to cross the Little Big Horn and open the fight....
all this tine you monougall with a company was
about three miles in our rear, bringing up the
pack train. When we got within two miles of the
village Benteen got a note from cocks custer's
adJutant which ran thus - icons on-big village-
be quick-bring packs. i we didn't wait for the
packs as we felt pretty sure no Indians had passed
our rear.

When we reached the battleground we found
utter confusion. Ilene had made a charge and had
been repulsed....we Joined our three companies
with Reno's, put ourselves in position on the
hill, and waited for honougall to come up with
the packs, and Just before he reached us the
Indians cemenoed to swarm around us like devils,
thousands of then all with modern rifles, while
we were usi old carbines, so we were inediate-
1y on the de eneive.“

 

65. gith Queter's gavalgy, p. 288f.

 

Benteen also wrote s. lengthy letter to his wife July‘e,
1876, but his official report to Reno dated the same day is

more concise as to the points mentioned. The important

excerpts are:

...sscther ails and a half brought no in
eight of the stream and plain in which were sole
of our dismounted men fighting, and Indians
charging and recharging the. in great nunbers.

The plain seemed alive with then. I then noticed
our sen in large numbers running for the bluffs
on right bank of the stream. I concluded at once
that those had been repulsed, and was of the opin-
ion that if I crossed the ford with my battalion,
that I should have had it treated in like manner;
for, from long eXperience with cavalry, I Judge
there were 900 veteran Indians right there at

that tine against which the large element of re-
cruits in my battalion would stand no earthly
chance as mounted men. I thm moved up to' the
bluffs and reported my command to Major 1:. 5.
Reno. I did not return for the pack train
because I deemed it perfectly safe where it was...;
and another thing, it savored too much of coffee-
cooling to return when I was sure a fight was pro-
gressing in the front, and deeming the train was
safe Without me.66

 

66. cu ht ith ster p. 135:. on verbal orders.
nenteen wade a written accountIH'g of his tine and novenente
for inclusion in Reno's fornal report.

 

Olly one acre staple of the kind of errors propagating
the meter Legend need be cited. General J. a. Kidd, in his
intense adniration for his fellow lichigan soldier, grew
original with the truth in regard to the ease of ccunnicaticns
between Benteen and cluster:

...Benteen had plenty of tine to overtake

Custer if he had zealously and in good faith obey-

ed the order to 'Ccne on.“l and 'ne quick). the

trunpeter who brought the order went back and was
killed with the others. 5?

 

67. go go tidd' p. m.

 

‘l'he 'trunpeter who brought the order, 0 John Iartin -
who as Giovanni lartini had fought under Garibaldi - actually

-sz-

died in Brooklyn, 3. 2., December 24, 1922, more than forty;-
six years after “the others. '5‘

 

66. rcoper [ith Queter, p. 125. The same year of
his death, 12, Trummter mar n was located by Col. w. a.
orahsn and his story printed in the u. s. gavalg Journal for
June, 1923.

 

In Reno's case, separating myths, lies, runore, suppo-
sition, slander, and vicious insinuaticn from fact is a pro-
digioue task. neno was made the goat of the master disaster,
and unfairly subjected to sons of the cost nendacioue and
savage attacks on public record. some are so utterly unfair,
and far afield from known conditions, in their basic precise
as t3 arouse"indignation even at this late day.

It was named at once, without waiting for proof,
that Reno - as the only other field-grade officer with the
reginent at the Battle of the Little Big Horn - was not only
fully aware of Custer's plan of combat once the issue was
Joined, but had presunably had a hand in drawing it up and
was given explicit orders as to his part in it. consequently
when he was repulsed in the initial attat on the Indian vil-
lags, withdrew to the hills, and then failed to cake a June.
tion with duster-0s immediate command it was prise facie evi-
dence to mister adherents of wilfull disobedience to orders.

When the dramatic facts of the Last stand became
known - that not a an under ouster escaped alive - the ugly
word 'cowardice' was thrust forward as a reason for the
'disobedience. ' then the courtsartial of public opinion
sharply diverged as to the prinary cause of all. one faction

brought forth a myth of 'drunkenness, ' and another persisted
in charging clear-headed treachery -— based on a mythical
hatred of Cluster. In the seventy-two years given tho since
the battle Reno's detractors have yet to bring forth valid
proof for either. V

an official Court of Inquiry (not a Icourt—nartial"as
the tea is popularly understood) investigated all the charges
in 1679, and completely exonerated Reno. mt it was terned a
Iwhitewash' - although nearly every surviving officer of the
fight was present and cone enlisted nan - and conveniently
disregarded by his detractors. since none was even then
under a two-year suspension fr- rank and pay on another
ccurt-nartial charge - he was found guilty of IIecnndaloue
nisccndnct' at rcrt aberchrcnbie in 1677, on charges which
' have no relation to the battle - he was in a poor position to
fight bad.

And he continued to nske hinself a convenient target.
after resuming his rank in the 7th Cavalry in 1879, he was
subJected to one of the cost farcial ccurts-nartial on record,
and dismissed fron the service for 'ccnduct unbeccning an
officer and a gentlenan. '3 so renained about washington for
the next ten years, seeking reinstatenent and drinking heavily
to forget his wrongs. while under surgery for a growth on
the tongue, he died in a Washington hospital on larch 30,
1869.

’ These separate, and often totally unrelated events,
are telescoped in the (meter Legend into one convenient.
dancing sequence, in fern scnething like this: 'nenc caused

Custer's defeat and death at the Little Big Earn, was court-
martialed, dismissed fron the service and drank himself to
death.‘ It is little wonder the Legend has survived so nsny
writings with such an Open-and-sInt case against Ouster's
second—in-command.

nut many recent duster scholars have found plenty of
hidden springs in that aopen---and~--shut case. i E. a. Bruin-
stocl and 001. w. a. Grahan have rather conclusively Justi-
fied Reno's movements in the river bottom, and Fred metin
has dmolished most of the grave charges made about his con-
duct on the hill. Since that tine some new evidence of a
contemporary nature has come to light, and in the second part
of this paper - explaining how the Water Legend was artifi-
oally created - other *hiddm springsa will be disclosed.

for the present we will concern ourselves only with
the way it exists, and try to show Rae's true actions. done
of the minor myths can be dispelled first, before the naJcr
charges are considered - although we definitely shall not
recover every disputed point of the battle. "~

me had a civil War record nearly as distinguished as
meters, and he antedated his in service. He graduated
"her 20 in the west Point class of 1857, and was consis-
sioned in the first Dragoons. at the opening of the war he
was made Captain of the First cavalry, and rose through “gal-
last and meritorious services in the field' to arevet uchr
(Kelley's ford, March 17, 1863),'Brevet Lieutenant colonel
(Cedar creek, October 19, 1864), and use comicsioned colonel
cf the 12th Pennsylvania July 20, 1366. three nonths

~55-

previously, on uardh 15, 1865, he had been given brevet con-
nissions of Colonel and Brigadier General or the U. 3. Volun—

teers. w

 

W_ Y __._

69. cu ht ith ater, p. 16.3; [Ed metin, p. 16.
Dustin notes esseshere (p. 2155 that We have never noted his
being called 'oeneral, 0 as the writers almost invariably call
Custer. N But I am certain in my own mind that this had
nothing to do with disparaging Reno, but rather to avoid con-
fusing hill with Brig. 6811. J. 1.. Reno, noted Civil War cavalry
leader greatly admired by Lincoln and killed in 1862. It is
after general Jesse 1,. Reno that old Fort Reno in waning,
Reno, Nevada, and tort Reno, ohlahosa were naned. As to
Custer - in fact and Regular my rank only a Lieutenant
colonel -- always being called Iceneral ', I have need it ny-
selr throughout this paper because that is the way he is
numbered in the popular nind.

 

as as not Join the 7th Cavalry until 1359 - after the
Battle of Iashita - and spent such of the tine tron then until
1874 on special service in the West: scouting expeditions
into Colorado, protecting railroad surveys, and escorting the
commission establishing the final Canadian line. It was true
that he has left no record of previous participation in indies
shirmishing, but he. was scarcely ineXperienced in the West.
In point of technical fact, his frontier service long ante»
dated Custer's, as Reno served from the ties of his gradnaz-
tion‘rron West Point in 1057 until ordered East in 1851 at
fort Walla Walla, washington Territory.

‘ Reno was, then, a veteran and eXperienced Cavalry
leader of high ability, and he was hardly what objective
examination would tern 'nev' to the test. me personality
was rather colorless, however, and he cannot be said to have
been prepoeseseing; there was. never a “Reno factions in the

Seventh as there was definitely-3* a I'aenteen faction' and a

“Custer gang-J But no valid proof of his hating Custer exists.
However, since even a careful (for his tine) writer
like Brady believed in it, it will have to be briefly consider—
ed. Ignoring the inaccurate work of Hunt or caret entirely we
find: .

His relations with General Custer had not
been friendly; so ininioal were they, in fact,
that water was begged, before starting on the
fatal campaign not to intrust the command of any
supporting movenent to Reno. Custer refused to
allow any such personal considerations to prevent
Reno receiving the command to which his rank
entitled him. 0

70. g. T. Brag. Kata. p0 2320

 

Who begged Custer is not stated (though the inference
elsewhere scene to be that it was rare. Custer), and the state-
sent rings pretty such of sonething growing out of the centre-
versy, rather than contributing to it. while we cannot
directly refute it, we do have the word of non contemporary
to tb events that casts such doubt upon its existence it
met be considered ayth instead of fact. Van de Water gives
us so. of their canes:

It is probable that, later, Reno grew to
loathe Custerts honor! as a men will detest
another whose death has brought hi- oblcquy.
There is scant warrant for the tale of earlier
animosity. generals Scott and darlington, who
Joined the 7th Cavalry imnediately after the cane
paign, never in those early days heard the story
of this alleged hatred. colonel varnun, sole
surviving officer [19.34] who rods with Custer,
also denies it. so does rheodore coldin,
veteran of the Little Big norn. Benteen hated
his superior with a divine consistency. other
officers in his regiaent disliked ouster. the
only warrant for the legend of a Ilene-duster
feud is the Majors later admission that, through
long acquaintance, he had come to have small

regard for his Lieutenant colonel's military
ability.”-

 

71. o “Mtor, p. 298. Reno made a statement at
his court of Inqu ry Chicago in 1879: Well, sir, I had
no confidence in General ouster as a soldier. 1 had known

hi- all throu h the war.“ sec maul; Journal, vol. 16,
p. 493 (reb. e, 1879) for a season 0 s estiaony.

M to the rumor of Reno's being drunk - and as such
naturally unfit to ccusand - this lie is one of the easiest
to nail. yhe tuner was not even born until at least two
years after the fight, as was clearly brought out at the 1879
Court of Inquiry. there it was senticned -- as a ruler -
duriag cross-examination, and carefully investigated: two
civilian packers, anarchill and frett, were brought in and
questioned. Both tried to prove that Reno was drunk, but the
testisony of officers presmt not only clearly refuted the
charge, but branded it definitely as pure moor.

the pertinent parts of the testinony cf Lieutenants
Hathey and Edger]: and captain senteen say:

Lieutenant nothey: '1 saw no indication
of drunkenness on his part, and never heard an
intination of it until last spring.... i

captain nenteen: ”I any say I was with
Iajor Reno all the time the night of the 25th. I
saw his every fifteen or twenty ninutes till 3:00
a.n. I laid down in his bed. He was as sober as
he is now. He is entirely sober now and was then.
there was no time during the 25th and 26th when
there was any indication of drunkenness on the
part of uaJor Reno. He could not have been stag-
gering and stamering without my knowing it. ... I

Lieutenant Edgerly: '1 saw uaJcr Reno the
night of the 25th about nine o'clock. Be cm
along toward where I was from the direction of
captain aenteen's line. as was perfectly sober.
no evidence that he had been drinking at all. I
saw his again at two o'clct, and he was perfect-
ly sober then. 1 no vcr heard the faintest suspi-
cion of intoxication until 1 came here to

Chicago this. tine. 1: he had been intoxicated
the officers would not have permitted has to
exercise commend.'72

72. trod stin, pp. 215-214. Dustin had opportunity
to examine tEb ofg§cIZI transcript, which is hard to obtain.
waever, the sworn teatisony can be followed very easily
through the tu11.reports published during the court by vari-

ous newspapers, and especially through the 52%: and "all
gournal coverage. to get a full picture - an a so u
oppor unity to decide for oneself the charge that the court

was a "whitewash' - see a ournal. Vol. 16, pp. 407,
442-443, 475, 4931, 513, e-565? iJan. Is to March 15, 1879).

levertheless, the 'drunkfi charge was revived after
Reno's death and.cyrue rownsend Brad: gave it serious con-
sideration enough to adk Captain E. s. Godfrey - in the last
several years of his life very zealous in protecting his
reputation as the Duster authority - a direct question on it.
aodrrsy answered, no! '1 don't think Reno was drunk, for I
don't believe there was enough whiskey in the whole comand'
to.leke a 'drunk'.‘73

73. g. 2. Brag. Appendix 1.. p. we. Bred: was no to
out the ques on ecause of an article in the northwestern

christian Advocate for septelber 7, 1904, citing €53 fiev. nr.
Kitfifir”fiawarde' conversations with Reno - both the sen then
dead - as proof. But the article quickly degenerates intone
sad little tract on the evils of demon run, with uajor aeno
the supposed terrible eXauple. It was Just another historical
tosdstccl springing true the lush.ground.or revived contro-
versy.

The testimony of officers present under oath, and the
word of Hajor Reno's most distinguished detractor; when they
agree, ruler must not only be discounted but put out or cir-
culation as well.

Reno's actual conduct in the fight is a matter more
complicated to shoe in its true outline. Much of the

criticism of it had dyed dam with the Court of Inquiry and
his death in 1889, when Godfrey revived it in his fsned
Qentgg article of January 1892. In his recapitulation of the
causes of ousterIs defeat, he stated:
: The overpowering nunbers of the
enuy an t ir uneXpected cohesion.
SEQED: Reno's panic rout free the valley.

THIRD: the defective extraction 0 the
snpty cartridge shells fro- the carbines.

 

7e. :dward s. Godfrey, “duster's Last aattle,‘ dentu
gguine, Vol. 43 (21 n. s.), p. 585 (January, 1892).'

 

Since Godfrey was the only officer actually in the
battle who ever published an article on it, his word was
accepted everywhere as authoritative and final. and since he
rose to the rank of Brigadier General, it was considered an
absolutely conclusive military verdict as well. But actually
Godfrey was no more an eyewitness of Reno's movements in the
valley than nary a. Burt or are. rates or natier aunt and
Shannon caret. sodfrey, as an officer of Bentea's battalion.
knew nothing of Reno's novensats until asnteen Joined Reno on
nono's mu: and senteen had been ordered free the colon
sons ten niles free the point where ouster gave Reno his
orders, and the actual attad was opened.

11’ an analysis is to be objective at all it is hands—
tory to keep in aind col. w. a. arena-is warning:‘

“the truth is - and I think you will recog-
nize it when you think it over ..., that seat of the
criticisn and condemtion of Reno cones fro- nen
who were not with hie in the valley, and whose ideas
upon that matter were based on hearsay, not always
too accurate; and upon the natural disdain that

arose fron his passing the ma to lenteen, as soon
as the latter cane up.

“I hold no brief for Reno, but I believe
in giving even the devil his due; and it is not
necessary to attack and condemn Reno In order t3
attack and condemn Reno in order to account for
what happened to Custer. I75

75. x. A. Brininstool, war Reno vindicated (Iron a
Letter written in 1925 by Col. w. a. graham, U. 3. a.), p. 19.
the italics are Colonel Graham's.

4—.

And if an analysis is not to be objective there is no
point in asking it. .

Reno's part in the battle was in two distinct roles:
(l) as leader of the advance guard, consanding troops II. A.
and a, he went down the river botton at a gallop and opened
the attack. Wha he was not in unexpected force by the
Indians he dismounted his sen near a grove of tinber to fight
on foot, until he would be supported by ,the main force under
water. when the sioux began to outflank his, he counted his
sen and cut through the. to the hills, in an action costing
several lives.

(2) once on the hill, he was Joined by Benteen's bat-
talion, the pack train under Lieutenant Mathey, and the rear
guard under captain ncoougall. AI ranking officer he aesused
general ”wand. tEben the pack train was finally up, he nade
a novssent in the direction taken by water - noving slowly
because of the wounded - but was again attached in force.
withdrawing to his original position - as supposedly the best
quickly available for defense - he threw up sketchy breast-
works, and was immediately besieged by large nusbers of
Indians, Iany of when could occupy higher ground. 'fhe siege
lasted through the nights of June 25th and 26th, and was

relieved only by the appearance of Gibbon and ferry - saron-

ing up the valley for their intended Junction with duster.
therefore, we will first separate nyth fron fact on

his role in the valley, and then as to his actions on the hill.

There are two schools of thought on the valley
maneuvers (among the nsno critics). one is that he was Justi—
fied in dismounting his sen to fight on foot, but was
Icowardly' in leaving his position in the tisber. The other
,is that he was not Justified in discounting at all, and
should have charged through on horseback - even if every nan
was killed.

Both have one definite stunbling block to their
theories: alsost absolute agreesent by critic and partisan
alike that master's only order to Reno was that the village
was stunning away“, to “move forward at as rapid a gait as
you does prudent, and charge afterwards, and that the whole
outfit will mpport you. '75

 

76. [red Dustin, p. no. the order was actually
delivered to fieno 5y flout. docks, the adJutant. - all writers
agree on the phrase ||the whole outfit will support you,‘ which

Reno gives in his official report. (cf. Ester, Last of the

gavaliers, p. 187;J J. H. asidd, p. 111: Me or Reno vindicated,
p s p. etc.)

as a result it becoses necessary to explain away the

 

 

fact that meter nest assuredly did not support Reno. this is
done by nystic and cryptic references to ”rho Plan. 0 If in
the plan, Custer told Reno that he would I's'uppcr’t" his by
riding up the bluffs along the flank of the village, and Reno's
course of action was definitely laid out for hin by his

~72-

superior - and he failed to follow it - the case against Reno
in the valley was clinched.

laJor name 1. Reno and Custer marched on
together with the plan to separate before they
cans to the Valley. Reno, with three troops, was
to continue straight down the Valley; Custer,
with five troops, would go to the northwest.
Captain McDougall, with one troop, was to follow
with the lupply train."

 

77. ghannon Est, p. 163.

 

With the plan in existence, Reno obviously should
either have kept riding rhrcugh the Indian village, or - if
Justified in discounting by their great force - was failing
to carry out The Plan by leaving the valley for the all.
This naturally led to making out as poor a case for Reno as
possible by talk of the 'inpregnablei position in the tinber,
and of giving the impression that Reno's force was much
greater than it actually was, and ouster's much smaller -
thus "proving. that Reno had sufficient use to at through to
caster, but that caster lacked sufficient sea to cut through
to Reno.

trailer mat repeatedly nenticns 'neno‘s whele force
of 170 son. and meter's “H.192 enlisted nen, thirteen
officers, four Indian scouts, one civilian scout and three
additional civilians - ill all leu than one third the strength
of .the reginmt.... ~78 the infermce plainly being that

A.‘

78. gator, Last of the Cavaliers, pp. 171; 184.

 

ousteris force exceeded Reno's by only 22 nan.

actually, Reno's force - counting everyone with it,

473-

2? Indian scouts (Rees, crows, Dakotas, and 2 half-breeds),
2 white scouts, 2 surgeons, and 2 interpreters - was not more
than 150 men. Custer‘s total force reached 225 - an actual

difference of 75 nsn.79

79. Fred gustin, p. 108.

attention then shifted to that aimpregnable position in
the timber" - and beyond that, always The Plan:

Here in the woods he Reno was, in a very
few ninutes, almost completely surrounded by hos-
tiles, but he had a three-foot cut bank along the
two sides, and heavy cottonwoods in the rear for
protection. rhere is little question but that he
could have held out here for hours, against
almost any number of Indians.

Perturbed at the non-appearance of Custer,
who had told him that llthe whole outfit will sup-
port you. - which support Custer was about effec-
tively to give by attacking the Indian village on
its flank farther to the north and across the
river ~ Reno completely lost his head.30

 

 

80. gustgrg Lgst of the ggvaliers, p. ladf. Cf.
gs Ia Brag, pe 23 e

 

Now all that is needed is proof of The Plan. But there
is none, no one has yet produced evidence invalidating Reno's
own statement:

...No nention of any plan, no thought of
Junction, only the usual orders to the advance
guard to attadk the enemy....1 sent word to
Custer that I had the enemy in my front very
strong, and than charged...supposing my command,
consisting of 120 officers and men and about 25
scouts and guides, followed by the columns of
Custer....Iou will see by this that I was the
advance guard and first to be engaged and draw
fire, and was consequently the command to be sup-
ported, not the one from which support could be
eXpected....ill I know of Custer from the time he
ordered as to attack until I saw his buried, is
that he did not follow my trail....31

4-

81. ms meno's Reply to Rosser, II Aggy-lag ionmal,
Vol. 14, p. ll (August 12, 1878). the Confe erate acner
r. L. Bosser had been a west point classmate of ouster's, and
a fir-.friend after the civil War - in which they met in
battle several times. After the Battle of the Little Biz Home
he openly attacked none as bringing about Custer's defeat and
massacre in letters to several different newspapers of wide
circulation.

 

As a matter of fact, even Godfrey, who revived the
charges with his Ipanic rout from the valleys analysis, some-
what altered his ideas in the years following the appearance
of the gentug article. When the historian Joseph Hills
Hanson was preparing his book ggefiqcnquest of the gissogg,
aodfrey wrote his concerning chapters pertaining to the
battles

“Don't forget that ouster told Reno that the whole out-
fit would £21.32! and support his. Reno had the advance, and
ouster did follow to a point near the Little Big Horn and

then branched off to the right, but that was not premeditat-
ga, s82

82. Joe h I. Hanson, 1133 ggngusst of the lineal-i,
lots, p. 286. r e italics are Go rey s. so e c e , but

the book came out in 1908. '

 

 

Further supporting Reno ‘- and Godfrey - is the known
fact that the regimental adjutant, Lieutenant Cooke, and Gap-
tain Keogh of rroop I - both later found killed with Custer -
actually started toward the village with m, obviously be-
lieving his was the direction of the, main attack.“5

'85. This was brought out in Lleut. G- D. Wallace's
testilcny at the Reno Court of Inquiry in 1879. Of. 001.

w. a. Graham, the story of the Little gig lion, p. 55.

Whatever rhe Plan really was, it was ouster, not Reno,
who failed to carry it out. nut before leaving it - and the
myths it here by sophistical parthenogenesis - a commonsense
conclusion by Dr; charles xuhlman should be quoted:

It is the Opinion of most military men
that Reno had a right to assume that Custer would
support him from the rear. all, or nearly, all
the officers who testified at the Inquiry in 1879,
said they so understood the order. this implies
that Custer, when he gave the order, either
intended this kind of support and later changed
his mind, or else deliberately betrayed Reno.
,‘s Hr. Brininstool and others have repeatedly
pointed out, when ouster changed his apparent
plan, it was absolutely necessary that Reno should
be informed of it. The contention is so obviously
well-founded that no fair-minded person will be
inclined to dispute it. since Reno positively de-
nied under oath that he received.any communication
whatsoever from ouster after parting from him at

* the lone tepee, and no reliable evidence has been

found that a messenger was sent, the suspicion has
arisen that custer intentionally betrayed Reno.

this is a deduction I find it impossible to
accept, as I find it impossible to accept the
charge that Reno and Benteen later intentionally
betrayed custer.34

 

84. charles Kuhllan, auster and the ggll gage, p. 10.

 

than there is serious talk among scholars that fgggtgr
betrayed Eggg' a.myth has certainly completed its cycle. all
that remains to be proved or dispelled of the action in the
valley, them, is Reno's leadership and whether or not he dis-
played cowardice. the officers that went into.the valley
with none were Capt. rhonas a. trench of Troop 11, capt.
uyles Hoylan and first Lieut. charles c. Denndio of troop a,
first Lieut. Donald.nc1ntosh and 2nd Lieut. aeorge n.
Wallace of troop G, Lieutenants Charles a. varnun.and Luther
R. fibre in charge of the scouts, and Lieutenant Benjamin

45-

ncdgson, neno's adJutsnt.

nontosh and Hodgson were killed, but all of the other
officersexcept trench testified at the Reno Court. and in
addition - and perhaps more important - we have the opinions
of several enlisted men to draw on as to Just what happened
in the valley. This evidence alone is sufficient to condemn
or acquit Reno's actions in the valley - that of any others
not present is hearsay. ‘ ‘

Brady-states the version still part of the Oustcr' ‘
Legend, though.arininstool and Dustin have already saploded
most of it: '

It is a painful thing to accuse an army
officer of misconduct; yet 1 have taken the opin—
ion of a number of army officers on the subject,
and everyone of them considers Reno culpable to a
high degree....1 am loath to believe that Hajor
Reno was a coward, but he certainly lost his
head;... ais indecision was pitiful. Although
he had suffered practically no loss and had no
reason to be unduly alarmed, he was in a state of
painful uncertainty as what to do next....

...rhere had yet been no panic, and under
a different officer there would have been none;
but it is on record that Reno at last gave an
order for the men to mount and retreat to the
bluffs. Before he could be obeyed he counter-
mended that order. Then the order was repeated...-
It was then repeated for the third time. Finally,
as those farther away saw those nearest the flur~
ried commander mounting and evidently preparing
to leave, the orders were gradually communicated
throughout the. whole battaliom...£ventually
they broke out of the tinber in a disorderly
column of fours....

Reno calls this a charge, and he led it.
He was so excited that, after firing his pistols
at the Indians who came valiantly after the flees
ing soldiers, he threw them away....nll semblance
of organization was lost in the mad rush for
safety. The troops had degenerated into a mob.'5

h ‘—

35. Ge :e E:E. pp. 2‘0“”:‘1.

thirty-two officers and men or scouts were killed, 7
men wounded, and Lieutenant Deaudio and 15 men left behind in
the timber, in the entire action in the valley. General J.
a. xidd dismisses the skirmishing on foot, and the action
along the line of retreat, with a single sentence: lawns ran

an; to the M11. without making any fight to speak of. a“

 

86. g. g. ‘idd, p. 114;.

 

For this reason, and similar deprecatory remarks by
other military men of rank, it seems wise to give some idea of
what the enlisted men thought first - as enoisted men have
the very telling habit of Judging a commanding officer by how
many of then he gets out of a tight spot with their necks
whole, rather than concerning the-selves with the fine points
of pure military.

Said Sgt. F. A. Culbertson of “A“ Troop at the Reno
Court:

If the skirmish line had not been retired,

or had been held there three minutes longer, 1

don't think anyone would have gotten off the

line. I don't think uaJor Reno could have held

the timber but a very few minutes. Hy estimate

of the number of Indians about his position on

the skirmish line and in the timber, is about

1000 to 1200. During the 25th and 26th 1 saw

laJor Reno several times in positions of great

danger....1 saw no evidence of c wardics on the
part of KaJor Reno at any time.

87. ‘ trooper‘with guster, p. 103.

Said Sgt. Thomas o'leill of 'G' Troop in an private
account of his adventures in the valley (he was one of the

Ben left behind):

473-

As the Indians came out in great numbers
to Oppose us, and moreover as from this point we
could see the extent of the village and the
immense number of Indians it contained, and how
impossible it appeared for us - about 130 or 140
men - to attempt the charge through.such a super-
ior force, our officers decided to act on the de-
fensive. orders were thereupon given to"Dismount
and prepare to fight on foot.0 three troopers out
of each four men dismounted, the fourth.man hold-
ing the horses....

...our right rested near the brush, the
left extending about two hundred yards across the
plan, the men being three years apart on the
line....3hortly the Indians began to close in our
left flank, which was not as well protected.
major Reno evidently realized the danger of our
being surrounded, or flanked, and wheeled our
line....Iwenty men under Lieut. ncIntosh (of
whom I was one) were ordered to deploy in skir-
mish line and scout the brush, in order to sonar--
tain if the Indians could attack us from the rear
....As we discovered no Indians between us and
the river, the lieutenant came back and report-
ed....

But we observed that they were forming in
greater numbers on our left, where they could de-
liver a flank fire. It was thought by our offi-
cers that they were forming for a charge on that
end. A bridk consultation was held by the offi-
cers, who shouted back and forth from their posi-
tions on the line. It was decided to retreat to
a place where they could defend themselves bet-
ter, as we were losing many men and horses. The
order was thereupon given by Major gene to 'get
to your horses, men.‘ While this order was being
given and executed, the fire from the troupers
slackened materially - in fact, it practically
ceased....

Reaching our horses the command "Mount.
was given. It was to be a charge to reach the.
other side of the river....gvery man of our ‘
small command seemed to realize fully the deeper-
ate situation we were in, and what was expected
of him - which was to keep up a constant fire
and make every shot tell.

As.we emerged from the thicket the war-
whoop burst forth from a thousand throats: It
was a race'for life: The Indians pressed in
closely on each side of the column, firing into
the trappers, while the troOpers in turn answer-
ed the fire. It was a hand-to-hand conflict,
both Indians and troOpers striving to pull each
other from their horses....I saw six or seven of
our men in the act of falling from their horses
after being shot....

Before I had ridden two hundred yards, my
horse crumpled under me, stricken by an Indian
bullet, and I wag left dismounted in the midst of
the Indians....

 

88. Trooper with ouster, pp. 60-65. O'Neill saved
himself by ding in the timber, where he met Lieut. Defiudio
on foot. after several narrow escapes they were able to Join
the survivors on the hill at night.

 

A

Said William slaper of 'u' IroOp of the same general
events:

...In a short time word came to retreat
back to the horses in the timber. we got there
as quickly as we knew how. In this excitement,
some of the horseholders released their animals
before the riders arrived, and consequently they
were placed afcct'vhichbmade it exceedingly crit-
ical for tha. It was said that before Reno gave
the order to mount and retreat, he rode up to
Capt. trench and shouted, Iwell, ram, what do you
think of this?“ capt. French replied, 'I think
we had better get out of this.‘ Reno there upon
gave ,the order, although I did not hear it.. ..I
could hear nothing but the continual rosr’of
Indian rifles, the sharp, resonant bang-bang of
cavalry carbines, mingled with the whoops of
savages and the shouts of my comrades.

...I cannot say that the retreat from the
river bottom - and further on - had a very mili-
tary appearance, but I can say that I saw nothing
disorganized about it, although so many had gone
on ahead of me and were so far in advance that
what they did, or in what order they retreated, I
cannot say With positive certainty....

...I believe one reason why so many of the
men escaped was because of the intense dust which
was raised by the horses and ponies of the combat-
ants. It hung in dense clouds, and was almost
impossible to see fifty feet in any direction.

...th,aenc not made that move out of the
river bottom when he did - Just in the nick of
time - we could all have shared the fate of duster
and his men....

 

89. “_grooper With gueter, pp. 30~35.

 

trooper William uorris, also of in. Troop, answered

Brady's version directly in a letter which is printed in the
Appendix of Indian tights and fighters. He also made similar
comments later in correspondence with Robert Bruce, uaJor A-
B. ostrander, and E. A. Brininstool, which mstin makes much
use of. In his 1904 letter he adds certain facts to the
recitals given:

Reno, very preperly, gave the command 'Bat-
talion halt - prepare to fight on foot - dismount'.'
He directed trench to send ten men from the right
of his troupe to skirmish the woods, before the
"numbers four. proceeded there with the horses.
we immediately deployed as skirmishers and opened
fire. the odds were at least thirty to one, as
our line of fours out did not exceed seven offi~
cers and ninety men....In less time than it takes
to relate it, the Indians were on three sides of
us. We were ordered to lie down, and every man I
could see, except Reno and French, were fighting
lying down. Reno walked along the line giving
instructions to the men, while French was calling
his men's attention to his own marksmanship with
an infantry long~tom that he carried.

...We were perfectly cool, determined, and
doing good execution and eXpected to hear Custer
attack. us had been fighting lying down about
fifteen minutes when one of our men came from the
timber and reported that they were‘killing our
horses in the rear....Reno then made his only
error; he gave the command, Inetreat to your
horses, menJI trench.immediately corrected the
mistake with the command, “steady, men - fall
back, slowly; face the enemy and continue your
fire.‘l 'u' troOp fell back slowly and in perfect
order, held the Indians in check until Ia' and
'0' had mounted. Several of their horses had
been shot, and their riders, consequently, very
much disturbed.

...ccrporal scollen and private Sommers
fell in the charge from the timber to the ford.
It was a charge and not a retreat, and it was led
b, 3.110....

In view of the conflict between the fore-
going and the statements contained in your arti-
cle, I adk you to investigate the matter further,
with a view to correcting the false impression
that your readers must have concerning Reno and
his command. In conclusion, I ask you “how in
God's name! you could.expect Reno, with.cne
hundred and twenty men, to ride through upwards

‘II. III\ ‘Jik

 

 

-Sl-

of three thousand armed sicux, and then be of
assistance to ouster or anyone else? I say we
were sent into that valley and caught in an am~
bush.like rats in a trap. That if we had romaine
ed ten minutes longer, there would have been not
one left to tell the tale. That the much abused
Reno did charge out of the timber, and that we
who survive owe our lives to that identical
charge which he led. to, at least, give him
credit for’saving what he did of his command.90

 

lorris was severely wounded going up the hdll, and spent the
siege in the improvised "hospital".

 

with such evidence from the enlisted men of all three
troops involved, it is unnecessary to go into_lengthy quota-
tion from the officers actually in the valley. to will
merely add pertinent excerpts from the 1879 testimony of
loylan, Wallace, varnum, flare, and ncnudio. they will be

condensed into one fnnal comment:

gaptain.hc¥lan: “the object of leaving
the tim er was, possible, to save the command
....If we had stayed 50 minutes longer in the
tinber unsupported, I doubt whether we would
have gotten out as many as we did....uajor Reno
gave his orders during the advance to the bottom
as cooly as any men under the circumstances.
During the afternoon of the 25th he seemed per-
fectly cool....I saw nothing in naJor Reno which
betrayed evidence of cowardice....In my Judgment
-if he had continued to charge down that valley,
he would have been there yet....l

Lieutenant Wallace: nusJorneno's conduct
was all ESE? could he eXpected of anyone. the
troOps could not have been handled any better....
If we had remained in the timber, all would have
been killed....I can recall no act of MaJor Reno's
during those two days that exhibited any lack of
courage as an officer or soldier that I can find
fault with, nor any lack of military skill.‘

Lieutenant Vernal: “as to laJcr Reno's
conduct - certainly there was no sign of cowardice
or anything of that sort....We could not have
'unitsd with Custer except by going through the
village to him, or his coming to us. neither
force could have done that....l

entennnt Here: “There were probably a
thousan Indians opposing Reno in the bottom. If
all the Indians had followed us they would have
got us all....1 can only estinate his conduct by
the way it turned out. 1 think his action saved
what was left of the regimt....1f none had con-
tinned to advance mounted, 1 don't thing he would
have got a man through. The column would not have
lasted five minutes. His dismounting and deploy-
ing was all that saved us....I saw no evidence of
cowardice on Reno’s part....I

youtenant peaudic: '1 saw no indication
of cowardice on Reno's part, nor any want of skill
in handling and disposition of men. When he
halted and dismounted I said 'Good for you,‘ be-
cause I saw that if we had gone five hundred
yards further we would have been butchered..."91

 

 

91. 9 Trooper With guater, pp. 99-103; Cf. Fred
Dustin, pp. - a ass n. A contemporary account of the
fesflmony can be found By checking the 535; and Navy Journal
references given in note 72.

 

'chard...pitiful indecision...practically no loss...
no reason to be unduly alarmed...neno calls this a charge,
and he led its - hos arrogantly fatuous it all sounds when
placed beside the word of men who were actually in the valley.
that this part of the Legend has been fully accepted for
years, not only by fireside tacticians in the civilian ranks
but by men of military prominence as well, makes us look -
from 1876 onward - lflke a whole nation of colonel alinps.

only the unintentional irony of a Brady footnote is
needed to make the picture complete:

It is painful to call attention to these
facts [Reno's 'hatred' of auster, corardice,
courts~martial, drunkenness, etc.:], especially
as uaJor Reno has since died; but the name and
fame of a greater than he have been assafled for
his misconduct, and in defense of Custer it is

absolutely necessary that Reno's character and
services should be thoroughly understood....92

 

92. g. f. Brady, note, p. 232f. 1 have not even
bothered wit s cry of Reno «throwing away his pistols,‘I
even though Godfrey countenanced it and embellished then with
ivory-handles. Brady has evidence in his very own book (see
p. 272) that it was not so, and that the Benteen family still

had the very pistol, as Reno and Benteen exchanged sideanss
later in the summer of 1876.

 

I'Ancther good story ruined'by a damned eyewitness:-
yor an account of the siege on the hill, and the
relief by ferry and Gibbon, we night as well again burn to
shannon darst's historical fairy tale for receptive young
minds. But the fact is too important to relegate to a foot-
note'that the conversation he records between Reno and
ferry - and most of his other “quotes“ - are absolutely, be-
yond any question or defense, his own inventions. If it is
to he pleaded that he merely uses an author's license in re-
arranging facts, the answer is that he is posing as e chil-
dren's historian, not a writer of fiction.‘ If fiction was
what is intended.- and it is nowhere else borne out in the
text - then like Elbridge Brooks, Ernest Boycox, and dozens
of other honest novelists. he should clearly so label it. I
He is in the best traditions of the duster Legend,
but by 1944 his fictions ere inexcusable:
‘As white~haired.nenteen gallogzd up, a .
disheveled Reno ran out and seized t bridle rein
of his foal-fleshed horse. Reno was wild-eyed.
Hie hat was gone and he wore a bandenm handherr
chief about his head.
'yor god's sake, help me, acnteenl' he
cried. ||I'velcst all but ninety of my men. the
Indians have us surrounded.'
Benteen looked around. taking in the situ-
ation which did not look sociesperate. Several
groups of Indians were deployed about along the

river, shooting now and then. But there was no
hard fighting going on.

However, heavy firing could be heard to
the north.

...Still the heavy firing continued to the
north and still Reno and Benteen did nothing.

pistraught officers came up to the two who
were in command and cried, 'uhat are we doing
here? Why don't we go to Ouster's aid?“

'In the name of all that's soldierly, why
are we clustered here like a bunch of scared
squawst' soneone else cried.

Then a heavy volley was heard, followed
by silence and two more volleys. The soldiers
looked at each other. This was plainly a signal
for help.

Captain Welt pleaded and wept with.neno,
who only threw his hands in the air and strode

away.

Weir signaled to his orderly to cone with
hue. rhe two, with one troop, made way to the
bluff where they had seen Custer wave his hat in
Jaunty farewell...1'hey could see great warns of
Indians in continuous action.

Their troop had gained the ridge without
being nolested.yet it would have been suicidal
folly for that lone troop to go charging down....
when suddenly Indians on horseback came charging
over the hill. There was nothing for weir and
his men to do but go galloping badk to Reno, who
quickly ordered his troops to return to the top
of the bluff.

... Early the next morning Reno's nen
saw a cloud of dust coming in the east. Soon
they saw the blue uniforms of ferry|s and Gibbon's
nen. A glad cry rose free the throats of the
Reno command.

“What happened to duster?! was Terry's
first question.

'1-1 was going to ask you the same thing,“
Reno stammered.

The two sen looked at each other blankly.

“But you were to re—enforce hhs,‘ ferry
shot the words out accusingly.

'But 1 was attacked. we were surrounded
here until the Indians got word of your approach.
Then they pulled out.‘ Reno's excuse sounded
hollow.

Benteen sat by wordlessly. He did not
choose to speak up and tell of the order - the
desperately urgent order he had got from Custer....

“Have you seen nothing — heard nothing?!
ferry deeanded.

'While we were engaged with the Indians
there was heavy firing to the north. Late in the
afternoon the firing ceased. Shortly afterward
the Indians swan-ed upon us free all directions.-

ferry'e face turned white. Irollow ne,l

435-

was all he said.

the troops galloped to the north. When
they came to the valley where weir and one troop
had looked down upon the fighting, each.man
involuntarily reined in his horse and removed his
hat, placing it over his heart....l93

 

fire W

93. ghannon garst, pp. 159-162.

 

It is probably unnecessary to point out the fact, at
this stage of the study of the Legend, but ferry knew nothing
of Guster's "plan“ until he arrived at the battlefield. as
most definitely did not accuse of Reno of failure to re-en-
force ouster, ever. and his own definite plan, agreed upon
in the June 21st conference, had been disregarded - a mild
word - by ouster. But again we have contemporary accounts,
written while the battle was fresh in everyone's mind.

Lieutenant oibscn to his wife, July 4, 1878:

...Renc had made a charge and had been re-
pulsed, and driven back, his three troops cane
riding back to us in disorder....we then Joined
our three companies with‘neno's, put ourselves in
position on a hill, and waited for nonougall to
cone up with the packs; and Just before he reached
us the Indians commenced to aware around us like
devils, thousands of then, all with modern rifles,
while we were using old carbines, so we were put
immediately on the defensive. We heard ousterOs
command fighting about five miles off in our
front, and we tried repeatedly, but in vain, to
Join him. It was impossible as we could neither
abandon our wounded sen, nor the packs of the
whole command. neno ordered weir to take his
company and try to make connection with Custer,
but he returned saying he could find no sign of
Ouster's command and.that there were enough lode
ians there to eat up his company a hundred tines
over.

when our whole eight companies a, B. O, D.
G. I. H and I! went up to the highest point we
could find, and with field glasses tried to lo-
cate caster, but could see absolutely nothing,
and finally concluded that he had gone to the
timbers about six miles off and fortified

himself. we found our present position hard to
defend so we moved back to where we made our first
stand. The Indians fought usvuntil late that
night. of course no one dared close an eye, and
at three o'clock in the morning. June twenty-sixth
they opened fire on us again, harder than ever and
all day long....In all this time we had heard
nothi of Custer so we concluded he had gone with
anner reruns.

about eight o'clock on the morning of the

twenty-seventh we saw clouds of dust arising about.
five miles in our front. We watched it steadily
with glasses and soon saw a column advancing.
Then the question arose as whether they were Ind.-
ians or soldiers. Some thought one way and some
the other, so Reno sent some scouts out to ascer-
taim, and in about half an hour they returned and
said it was ferry with aibbon's command....

Had Gibbon's command n6 come the Indians
would not have left us, and it would only have
been a question of tine for them to get us all,
for our ammunition would have giva out, likewise
our provisions....

 

.94. th s er! av , pp. 265—272.

 

captain senteen, in a letter to his wife, same date, .
says:

I must tell you now what we did - when I
found Reno's comand we halted for the packs to
come up - and then moved along the line of
bluffs towards the direction Custer was supposed
to have gone. Weir's company was sent out to
communicate with ouster but it was driven back.
we then showed our full force with auidons fly-
ing, that Custer might see us - but we could see
nothing of him, couldn't hear much firing, but we
could see an immense body of Indians coming to
attack us from both sides of the river.... 5

 

so. 1 12931:; With mater, p. 189.

 

It has since been agreed that weir's forward movement
was on his own initiative, and not on orders as understood by
Gibson and Benteen at the tin. the accepted version is that

he went to Reno and demanded immediate action, but was over-

ruled by neno and Benteen until the packs could come up.
Storming and swearing, he then mounted withhis orderly and
started alone. However, his second in command of 'D' troop,
Lieutenant Edgerly, believod‘he was acting on orders and
mounting the men moved after him.

Windolph fills in the details for us:

Reno and Benteen and two or three of the
officers held a little conference, and we saw
Lieutenant Hare, who had charge of Reno's Indian
scouts, suddenly mount Godfrey's horse and head
back down our trail to the southward. Maybe it
'as fifteen or twenty minutes, or possibly a half
hour, before he came up at a trot with several
pack mules, loaded with amunition boxes. the
rest of the dean ammunition mules slowly drib-
bled in, and before long the pack train itself
cm “p.00. '

It was now maybe 4350- and the sun was
still fairly high in the sky. We troopers didn't
know what was going on, but I remember that cap-
tain Weir suddenly rode off to the north alone,
and a minute later, Lieutenant ndgerly, second .
in command of '1)! followed with the whole troop.
the pack mules were coming up about this time -
and there was a lot of speculating going on. as
I recall, none had seven wounded men, some of
th- in pretty bad shape....

It's pretty hard to estimate time under
such circumstances, but as I've tried to recom-
struct the situation over the years, I believe
it must have been about 5 o'clock when Reno and
Benteen ordered the whole outfit to move north-
ward, in the general direction Captain Weir and
his troop '9' had taken a good half hour before.
The wounded mu who could mount were put on
horses, but the others were carried in blankets
by details of six troopers on foot. It-was slow
and painful work, and I've always figured that
most of the officers thought it was a question-
able move.

we'd gone less than a mile when we got in
sight of Weir's troop. Way off to the north you
could see what looked to be groups of mounted
Indians. there was plenty of firing going on.

Pretty soon it looked as if the India
masses were coming towards us. It didn't take
long to realize that this was true. Here we
were stretched out all over hell's half acre, a
troop on this hill knob, another in a little

valley and over there a third troop. Behind, at
a slow Walk, came the pack trains, the wounded
men and the rear gnard.

Reno and Benteen both sensed the danger
and ordered a withdrawal. the advance troops
were dismounted and fought as skirmishers. soon
the Indians were pressing hard, and itwwas only
the good luck and the hard courage of Lieutenant
Godfrey's troop, fighting stubbornly on foot,
that kept disaster from overtaking us. we were
able to regain Reno's Hill while Troop It“ kept
the Indians back until the men, retreating slow-
ly, got close enough to the hilltop to make a
dashsfor it....95

 

96. I [ought filth guster, pp. 98-99.

 

It should be noted that sons writers, like caret, don't
even give Reno credit for this forward movenent. others, like
trazier Hunt, deprecate it for its slowness “as a snail might
crawl over the rolling hills', and then come up with the sug~
geetion - based on shrewd hindsight - that the mule train and
the inJured should have been left under the rear guard and

....Reno and Benteen, with the 230 effec-

tive use of their own troops, taking along at e

gallop five or six of the fastest ammunition

mules, could form a flying wedge that could

strike the hostiles a blow on the flank that

would dismay than, and unquestionably relieve
the pressure on Custer.97

 

97. ggster. Lgst of the gsvaliers, p. 192f.

 

w

this is some improvement on General xidd, who was also
not there:

...who will say that, if Reno had taken up
the march.imnediately with the seven tr00ps that
he then had with him, in the direction of the
sound of that firing, there would not have been a
different story to tell of the Battle of the Little
Big aornt98

98o Jo He Sldd, pe n“. .

he one present, except possibly weir, seems to have
questioned that a forward move toward (Buster's supposed
whereabouts was made as quickly as possible, or that it would
have been possible to separate from the packs and the wounded.
There is, of course, also a fine point of semantics involved:
When Reno ceased forward movement in the valley because of
the numbers ‘of Indians it constituted Icowardlcei; when the
violently pro-ouster Weir did the same for the same reason

uthere was nothing for him to do but go galloping back to

Reno. '

Again as a final comment there is the 1879 testimony
of Rare, the acting adjutant, and aenteen:

Lieutenant Hare: I1 can't think that
laJor neno lost much time in moving in Buster's
direction; I went to the pack-train and then to
capt. Weir....and when returning from Capt. Weir,
met Reno advancing. He could not have moved to
where I met him if he had lost much time. His
column moved altogether and about a mile or so.
I reported to major Reno that capt. weir had
ceased his forward movement because the whole
country was covered with Indians; at least 1500
in sight, and the country was favorable for the
concealment of a larger force... '

0 tall! Ontoen: .eeeA Io;-°a‘ Dalila
have been We gown the river aim the direction
metegohad gone but we would all have been there
yet. 'I

99. [red Fetin, p. 143-143. tor a full and carefully
analytical aocoun 0 he fight on the hills, see Chapter
XXIII. ppe 159‘148e

 

More myths after ouster. I
It should be pointed out that Reno was also charged

 

-so-

later with proposing to save the force on the hill by aban-
doning the packs and the wounded. Ithat he did not is obvious,
but to the 'Iexperts'I flailing blindly around in frantic
efforts to avoid the inevitable conclusion tmt ouster sprung
his own trap, Reno was damned if he didn't and damned if he
did.

the only remaining matter is that of Reno's pernnal
conduct and leadership on the hill. the word of three men
present will give us sufficient evidence for an honest, ob-
Jective conclusion as which is fact and which fancy. It is
said that he surrendered all command to Benteen and was per-
sonally Iyellow. I first turning to Lieutenant oibson's
letter:

...say nothing about what I am about to

tell you, but if it hadn't been for Benteen

every one of us would have been massacred. Reno

did not know which end he was standing on, and

Benteen Just took the management of affairs in

his own hands, :33 it was very fortunate for us
that he did....‘

 

100. flith Queter'e gavaln, p. 272.

Gibson, however, was a longtime 'Benteen man. who ido-
lized his indomitable troop commander. trooper Blaper, who
equally admired captain. trench, pays high tribute to Reno's
conduct during the same period - and moreover was with him
in the valley. Says Blaper:

2 must say that I had to admire laJor Reno
during the entire fighting on the hill. 1 also
saw him twice in the river bottom, and he did not
seem to be at all ruffled. to a man in such a
responsible position it must have been a trying
time, without the support in sight which Custer
had promised him. our ammunition had been nearly

~91-

exhausted during the fighting in the bottom, and
had we not retreated to the hill, we certainly
would have been wiped out in a very few minutes.

I observed Reno several times during the
fighting on the bluffs, and can well remember his
walking about among the men through the night.
He would tap a man with his boot and remark,
'Don't go to sleep, boys.I I cannot understand
why he was not shot down while walking about, as
none of the troopers were able to make a move
without drawing the fire of the Indians. 1 know
it encouraged his fellow officers as well as the
troopers. I have read articles pertaining to
this part of the Little Big norm in which it was
stated that Reno was drunk. this 1 brand as a
lie. at no time did I observe the least indica-
tion of drunketgiss on the man, nor see him use
any liquor....

 

101. ‘ moper with meter, p. 42f.

 

Captain HacDougall, who commanded the battalion con-
taining the pack train and the rear guard, was not, as far as
any material in print would show, a “ouster man,“ a 'Benteem
man“, and certainly not a “Reno man.I as testified in 1879:

As to Major Reno's oonduct.....np seemed
perfectly cool....buring the fighting the after~
noon of the 26th when the firing was heswy...heno
asked me to walk around the lines with hha....the
balls were flying around.and the men in the
trenches firing....He was perfectly cool then.

He had no enthusiasm, but was as brave as any man
there....1 think uaJor Reno would.make as stubborn
fight as any man, but I don't think he could
encourage men like others. men are different;
some are dashing and.others have a quiet way of
going through. I think he did as well as anyone
could do. I thought that when he adked.me to

walk afsund with him that he had plenty of

nerve. 2

 

102. [god metin, p. 137.

the conclusion: Reno was a brave man, with the kind
of good solid “guts. to impress an equally bray. tPOOper'*

recalling events nearly so years after the battle - during
which time Reno had been constantly vilified, lied about,
and sneered at. But as a personality he was colorless,
leaving auch to be desired in inspiring leadership by his
officers ~ particularly when placed in contrast to the lion-
hearted.3enteen.

Reno, caught unexpectedly in the spotlight, perforned
his duties as a.commander with high credit, but played the
role poorly. the intrepid Bentecn, niscast as the menace,
played his suddenchange of character with great sest. rho
dazzling ouster set the stage for a one-nan show, and then
missed his own cues. and certain claques on.unpaid admis~
sions refused not only to accept the change in program, but
also the reason for the change. Hence, rhe duster Legend.

m use suns

If it is understandable by now how cueter's personal-
ity and often dramatized actions before the battle gave rise
to so each fictitious history, it is even more understandable
how the dramatic setting of Irhe Lest stand! generated myths
by the thousands. After trumpeter Hartim turned back with
his message to Benteen no white nan ever again saw auster*or
any of his man alive. as had ridden once.to the bluffs to
look down in the valley, and.Lleutenant benedic, at least,
had recognized his. tron than on stories of his actual
route and.final actions are all supposition, all theory, all
guess.

Mrs. Intes and Brady talk.of the “trOOpers in line,

their officers in position', leach in the place to which tac-
tics would have assigned thewI - but only imagination so re-
arranged the bodies. Benteen, who was the first officer of
the seventh to reach the site (actual discoverer of bodies
1was Lieutenant Bradley, chief of mbbon's scouts), stated
descriptively: "there was no line on the battlefield. Iou
can take a handful of corn and scatter it over a floor and
make such lines. I moreover, in stripping the dead, the
Indians undoubtedly dragged many from the position in which
they fell. they were Cbunchedl and that was about all that
could be said. .

keogh and calhoun seemed able to have forned their
troops for defense, but the rest showed no sign of organiza-
tion. The evidence of the battlefield is clearly inconclu-
sive as to direction of advance or retreat. to illustrate,
once on the bluffs, the only place duster could reach the
river was at a dry watercourse called nedicine tail Coulee.
mm the time of the battle on, Godfrey and most others have
assumed that ouster went M the coulee free the northeast,
was turned back at the ford - with a loss of men - and then.
swung due north to nonunent Hill, where the final stand was
made.

mt Dr. Charles xuhlman of Billings, uontana, cover-
ing exactly the sale ground - and with the sale evidence
available - has reached a conclusion entirely opposite. He
believes that ouster went up the cculse, made a northeasterly
circuit — then west - to the hill; and that the bodies found
near the ford were odd nen fleeing south 3:52.! the final‘

~94:-

etand. and he sakes an equally good - or better - case for
it, ccnpletely contradicting all present theories of the
battle. 103

 

103. see gusts:- and the Gall 39.5.!» accepting Dr.
xuhlnan'e theory not only exonera es Reno and Benteen - but
Custer as well - of any intentional betrayal or cowardice.
Il'his is certainly an attractive point in its favor, but only
a minor one. or. xuhlnan supports his thesis brilliantly,
buttressing it well with cogent analyses of Indian testimony,
the terrain, the hostiles' psychology, and sound tactics
under given conditions. If captain Luce's recent discovery
of a hitherto unknown dismounted skirmish line tends to sup-
port xuhlnan, the theory may win wide acceptance.

 

then such things are possible, it would be eisest to
disregard the mm of the Last stand entirely - as the naJor-
ity are capable of neither proof nor disproof. sole, however,
are so persistent even to this day that they met be treated
with. loreover, by odd chance - or a startling conentary on
the general public's love of truth and Justice - these (with
a single exception) are of the few we can eXplcde beyond
question. 0 .

It is no accident that those to be considered fit
aptly into dine novel phraseclcgy. they are:

(l) the Indians Better med than the troops, or the
Real Cause for the White nsn's Defeat.

(2) the Revenge of Rain-in-the-Race, or the yiend who
ate te- Ouster's Heart. (there is also in existence a
pirated edition reading “general ouster's heart. I)

l (3) the Unspeekable oesecraticn of the Dead and

prisoners lost yoully tortured, or the truth nest callcuely
Iutilated by certain lee tort newspapers with ”input for

-ee-

the feelings of the Bereaved.

(4) Curley, the toung crow scout, or the only true
Ionly true survivor' of ouster's Last stand. (a sequel to
the salt for the powder, or meter Deserted by his cowardly
Indian Scouts.)

(5) the cut cuater0s flair, or win was the soneral's
Body Left untouched! (this by an earlier oastcn a. Keane.)

and finally, one which met not be treated facetiously
for it deals with the real - and never identified - hero of
the Last Stand, a can who deserves as eagnificent a moment
as Buster's, engraved with the simple tribute of the valorous
Cheyenne: was BRAVES? W.

or by his usual description (5) "rho lien on the White-
Faced Horse. II

Every sum in the ouster fight from none to Godfrey
agrees that the Indians were equipped with repeating rifles.
whose range exceeded that of the cavalry carbine, and that
many carried modern revolvers as well. However, as Fred
metin has aptly pointed out, statenents such as thatoby
Lieutenant varnun . lthe Indians rode alongside of the cola-s
pulping winchesters into it! - have been nisinterpreted to
lean that 9.11.. of the Indians were so arled.

Instead of all the Indians being 'arled vith the
latest patterns of repeating rifles and revolvers! with a
“taper-abundance of ammunition! a very few had such guns and
these were handled by the older, battle-tried warriors, best
able to use then to advantage. nany of the younger men were
not mad - in the modern sense - at all. an ogallala Sioux,

-ee-

Eagle Bear, who fought in the fight when he was sixteen told
trasier aunt in 1938:

I with the other young men were out with
the horses when we first heard the firing. I
rushed back on my favorite pony and picked up my
pistol and bow and arrows. only a few of the
young warriors had guns. 1 was luchyi I had a
pistol, as well as my bow and arrows. 0

 

10‘. fight with duster, p. 218.

 

P. n. nyrne, eetinating the sunber of warriors against
ouster as 2500, believes that not nore than 1000 at the out-
sidel were supplied with firearms, and he cites George Bird
crinnell in ccsfirsation:

"hen the fight began: about half the Indians
had guns and the renainder bows, for which, how-
ever, they had nany arrows. the guns were of may
sorter mule-loaders, Spencer carbines, old-
fashioned Henry rifles, and old Sharps nilitary
rifles. The sharps were probably the best guns
they had except those recently captured from the
soldiers. * 05

105. George Bird arinnell, :he rightist; gheyennes
(Iew fork, 1915) as quoted in 2- g. gzrne, no e, p. .

After the greatest effort, only half of
sitting Bull's warriors were able to obtain fire~
arms, and of these the majority had old flint-
locks condemned muskets, muzzle-loaders and
snooth bores. there was plenty of propaganda
claining that the Indians were even better arsed
than the troops - a fantastic yarn: read the
reports of the guns turned in when Indians sur-
rendered. Granted that they may have hidden some,
would men who were well-armed with repeating
rifles have retained the wretched old-fashioned
guns that they did turn int Those weapons were ~
mostly so old-fashioned that they belonged in
the msems....the gun which sitting Bull pre-
sented to his 'brotheri frank arouard was a
Hawkins rifle -- forty years out of date: fixed
ammunition was so hard to get that the Indians
all learned to save and reload enpty cartridge

shells. . . . 105

106. stanley Vestal, ittin 11 ion of t
Sioux, p. 148. Cf. 5nd nus in, p. crazy Horse's
an surrendered in re were only 117 guns “mostly
Winchesters and carbine-oi for more than .300 warriors - and

this proportion is generally accepted as a good approximation
of arse-est of the Indians at the Little Big Horn.

 

1t lust be stressed, however, that this does not mean
that reports of the Cavalry's Springfield carbines breaking
down under fire were untrue, or of trocpers having to extract
the spent cartridges with knives. The extent of this occur-
ring has been tremendously exaggerated, but the importance
has certainly been not. If a trooper fired his carbine
10,000 tines and it only niefired once for an easily correcta-
ble reason, that is not a reflection on the quality of the
firearm: But if that once was when he was fighting for life
against a charge of equally courageous Indians arsed with
bow-and-arrow that once was mough. It still retained a good
gun - and beyond question the majority of carbines taken by
the Indians in ouster's fight were serviceable - but the Ian
who had it nisfire only once was dead.

In this respect, Reno's report of July 11, 1876, to
the chief of the ordinance, general 8. V. Benet, is extremely
pertinent. Reno reported an espediture of 38,030 rounds of
carbine ammunition and 2.854 of pistols and said in part:

I have the honor to report that in the en-
gagement of the 25th and 26th of June 1876...cut

of 380 carbines in my command six were rendered

nnserviceable in the following manner (there were

more rendered unserviceable- by being struck by
bullets): failure of the breech block to close,

and leaving a space between the head of the car-
tridge and the end of the. block, and when the

piece was discharged and the block thrown open,
the head of the cartridge was pulled off and the
cylinder remained in the chamber, whence with the
means at hand it was impossible to extract It....

...An Indian scout, who was with that por-
tion of the regnlent Custer took into battle...
says that from his hiding place he could see the
men sitting down under fire and working at their
guns....I also desire to call attention to the
fact that my loss would have been less had 1 been
provided with some instrunent sinilar to the
trowelobayonet, and I as sure had an Opponent of
that arm been present on the night of June 25th
he would have given his right arm for 50 bayonets.
1 had but 3 spades and three axes, and with then
loosened ground, which the sen threw into piles
in front of then with tin cups and such other
articles as could in any way serve the sale pur-
poses.

l07. A§gy~1a§¥ Journal, Vol. 14, p. 26 (august 19,
_la7d). The on y s cc are mine. This should be read with
an editorial in the same nagazine for Septesber 16th, which
sales the surprising commentzi...we all thought that Reno had
done well hustpart of the bad business. But the Chief of
ordnance has,}from his palatial offices in Washington, pre-
ferred charges against that officer for giving aid and some
fort to the enemy by saying in his report that the Indians
were better armed than the troops....' (aggyélazy gourna ,
'01. 14. pe 88s)

__L 4 A...__.4

But the fact still remains that ease of the Indians did

 

 

have repeating rifles while none were of regular issue to the
troops - although sheridan's cavalry were using then in the
Civil war, some thirteen years before. since no one would
admit furnishing then to the hostiles, this led to a bitter
grey suggestion of the.day that the Winchester arse cospany
ought 'tc prosecute the Indians for infrdngenent of patent,
since they must be manufacturing them theseslves.‘ _

and it must be pointed out that the ouster disaster,
and Reno's report did bring action. when the recrganised
7th}0avalry started on its 1877 espedition, 12 sen of each

troop were armed with long range rifles, as well as the
normal complement of carbines and revolvers. In addition,
every man carried a sabre and an intrenching tool, and con-
fortable 'prairie beltsi - holding 40 to 60 cartridges - had
replaced the old unwieldy cartridge pouch. the governaent
had learned a bitter 1uson.1°°

108. sax-Ian ioumal, Vol. 14, p. 732 (June 23,
1877).

 

By now 'i'he revenge of nain-in-thr-l'ece' ought by all
standards of history been buried deep beyond disinteraent
under a mountain of invalidating fact. let on July 12, 194..
we find a Hr. George 0. Appell of water Kill, I. I. - in a
letter showing his to be well infer-ed on ulster history -
writing the editors of LIFE Magazine:

...still another brother, Ton, a troop
connander and holder of two medals of honor, was
eliminated and had his heart out out and used as
a lacggsse puck in that evening's festivities

1090 LIFE, “1’ 12. 19“, D. Go '

 

this is the same old min-in-the-race nyth, with ath-
letic enbellishmots and no direct charge as who did the
mutilation. 'rhe‘ aore conmon version is that Rain-in-the-
face, in revenge for his arrest by captain rates and to.
custer acne years earlier, fulfilled a blood oath, killed ro-
Custer, and ripping his heart out ate it. i'his was even
given credence by Hrs. auster,u° and iaproved on by the

 

llO. poets and gaddles, p. 204 (1913 edition).

gentle, but doddering, old post Henry W. Longfellow. ’ In his
poem, "the Revenge of Rain-in-the race.“ Longfellow switched
the unpleasant compliaent froa captain Ion duster to seneral
George a. (rust er.

But both have been positively disproved so often it
is tiresome to trace it out. or. H. a. Porter, the only one
of the commandfis surgeons who survived the battle, stated
positively during his lifetime that there was not the
slightest evidence to mpport the charge, and since part of
his duties was to examine the bodies on the field for identi~
fication - and in so doing he identified to- duster — that
settles the natter. no in addition, 1:. 1. Barry, the
famous frontier photographer and personal friend of Rein-in-
the~race (Barry got hhs his appointment as an Indian police~
nan which he held to his death), stated flatly at the tins
of his death in 1905:

'1 was sorry to hear of the death.of Rain-
tnrthe-rnce. He was a great Indian, and he has
been grossly saligned in some respects. It has
been so widely published that it is hardly pos-
sible to contradict it now, that Rein-in-the-Face
killed roa.custer and then cut his heart out.

'1 investigated that story, and did it
early. and found that it was not true. Rein-in-
the-race has often talked.with.ae about that
report. It has worried.hdn that the public
should accept it as true. low that he is dead,
we may look for a recurrence of the libel on the
old chief. as was a great warrior and a typical
Sioux. He has killed many white sen, no doubt,
but the story of his cutting Tom ouster's heart
out should not be allowed to go undisputed.

There are several :11 living who are ready to
prove what I say. '

lll. irrought with Custer, p. 301'. cf. P. E. e,
p. ltof; £§e Dustin, p. l337'135; etc., etc. The only

'real proo n ex s once dates from an 1894 'interviewi

 

 

-101-

when Rain-in-the-Face was appearing in a wild seat show at
Goney Island, in which the sen responsible admit getting his
thoroughly drunk and prompting him over the rough spots. It
was reprinted by c. 1. Brady but was even then thoroughly
discredited.

there was no question, however, that you ouster's'bcdy
was terribly mutilated -— almost beyond recognition «- and
Slnper remarks that the arrows Ibristled in it.“ Windolph
has sisilar renarhs. the truth was terrible slough, but the
newspaper accounts ~ with no thought for the feelings of the
relatives of the dead - made it ghastly beyond all excuse,
adding a carnival of evisoerating detail on the torture of
men taken alive.

fhey had almost immediate refutation from a man who
knew. Lieutenant Janos s. aradley, chief of Gibbon's scouts,
was the first nan to discover the massacre, and he stated
definitely in a letter of July 25, 1876, to the Helena
(nontana) m:

“of the 206 bodies buried on the field,
there were very few I did not see, and beyond
scalping, in possibly a majority of cases, there
was little mutilation. Many of the bodies were
not even scal ed, and in the comparatively few
cases of disfgguration it appeared to no as the
result of a blow with a knife, hatchet or war-
club to finish a wounded man, rather than
deliberate mutilation. Many of ouster's nen
must have been disabled with wounds during the
fight, and after the savages gained possession
of the field, all such would probably be mainly
killed in the manner indicated. the bodies were
nearly all stripped, but it is an error to say
that tellog, the correspondent, was the only one
that escaped this treatment. 1 see several u-
tirely clothed - half a dozen at least - who,
with Kellog, appeared to owe their inunity to
the fact that they had fallen sons distance fros
the field of battle, so that the Indians had not
cared to go to than, or had overlooked then when
the plundering took place.

-102-

'Ihe real mutilation occurred in the ease
of Reno's men who had fallen near the village.
These had been visited by the equaws and children,
and in sons of the instances the bodies were
frightfully butchered. Fortunately, not many
were exposed to such a fate. ouster's field was
none distance from the village, which probably
eXplainilghe exemption of those who had fallen
theree .

 

112. Trooper with gator. p. l72f. Brininstool
does not indica s whether the a cs are his or’Bradley's.
Bradley also refutes the Rain-in-the-race myth. (see p.169.)

‘-

nevertheless, Janes cordon Bennett's sensation—monger-
ing new fork gerald unnecessarily revived the more when
-the bodies were disistsrrsd.for formal burial in 187?. the
work was in charge of col. lichasl v. Sheridan, brother of
the general, and six lines were taken fros his report and
distorted by the Herald in a story the 55!! and.!s!z gournal
bitterly characterised, 'as cruel and inconsiderate speci-
ass of Journalistic mooring arcan be isagined. 0

' tbs gournal referred its readers to a letter'of ur.
a. a. Price to the Philadelphia zeleggagh denying any truth
to the gerald's sensation. Price went fros philadelphia to
the battlefield ion behalf of the family of Lieut. Benjamin
H. Hodgsos killed under Reno to take charge of the rsnaius,‘
and his letter corroborated.Bradlsy:
' «...-there seems to be a Widespread belief

that the heads of the killed were in most cases

hammered and beaten in, and the bodies horribly

mutilated. this is erroneous. The cases of

mutilation were fewer than could be eXpeoted under

the circumstances, and smashed skulls were the ex-

ception, only occurring where the bodies lay

within reach of squats. Neither den. Custer nor

Lieut. Bcdgson were mutilated or disfigured in

any way, the latter falling where he was covered
by Col. Reno's and col. Benteen's fired!1 5

113. £211“! journal, Vol. 14, p. on (July 28.
187?). .

_l

that leaves us only the lurid tales of torture, and
that we can destroy with a single reference. tron Ice-p on
Iellowstone, July 36, 18760 General alfred H. terry hinself
wrote this letter to the Helena (nontana) gerald, of which
this is the full text:

Please publish the fact that there is not
the slightest evidence that any one belonging to
General Ouster|s command was captured alive and
tortured by the sioux. on the contrary, every-
thing leads to the belief that every officer and,-
nan was killed while gallantly fighting. I dean
it proper to make this statement to contradict
the harrowing accounts given in some papers in
regard to tortured prisoners.

Alfred a. ram. Brigadier aeneralJ-l‘

114. w -- a Journal, vol. 14, p. 22 (August 19,
1876). the ieen Is Ehaded Ifalse neport,‘ and I consider it
the final word.

 

 

In the years following the battle, the Icnly true
survivors' of ouster's Lest stand have exceeded the entire
nuabsr of troops and civilians in the Note Colo-n, let
alone the 7th.cavalry. all have been disclosed as lentalLy
irresponsible, publicity seekers, or plain donned outright
fakes, until now the list has been narrowed down to the only
true 'only true survivor!I - curley, the crow scout.

curley was actually in the battle, was actually
assigned to austeris immediate comand, and beyond all ques-
tion was the last to see his or his son alive. But he left
the field before the final action, and eventually nads his

way to the supply steamboat tar test, where he tried to
infona Captain Grant Marsh and the military nu present of
the disaster. Since he did not speak English, and no inter-
preter was then present, his pantonine of the battle was in-
correctly construed. .

When he was properly interviewed a short tine later
through an interpreter, his story was too modest, too un-
eventful, and too lading in sensation to please the white
'historiansi, and they doetored it fantastically to suit
their one preconceived nations. as a remit, curley was un-
fairly terned a liar by both the Sioux and his own people,
although he was of good reputation.

the enbellished versions of his I'esespe'l still cling
to us, nainly in the fern favored by un's 'Letters to the
xditors. *‘ correspondent George o. mpell, already mentioned

‘

says :

“Ions nan not on Lieutenant cook's roster
got away, as far as most historians and authri- '
ties on the massacre can ascertain. so was
curley, a Mountain crow scout, who threw a blan-
ket over his head to look like a Sioux. no rods
in rings mingling with the Sioux, and gradually
reached the conbat. afterwards he escaped in the
ease way and rode as far as the fork of the Big
flora and Little Big Horn, where the supply
stealer was waiting, and told the first story of
the massacre. fie added, and later repeated often,
that he had offered George duster the use of a
blanket for a like escape, and tut duster
refused. '

Bot correspondent Robert w. Bullet of Union, I. J.,
has a better version;

'...1 think you will find that an Indian
scent of the crow tribe cased curley survived by
cutting open the stonach of a fallen horse and
hiding in it. nus

~105-

 

115. LIFE, July 12, 1948, pp. e~s.

leitherare correct. the true facts have been known
to “most historians and authorities“ since at least 1928,
when Thonas B- marquis published his life of 1'. H. worse
who spent his lifetime mug the crows as an interpreter
(lenoire of -a White grow :ndian. new Icrk, 1928). Larorge
saw curley inediately after the battle, and acted as inter—
4 preter for Lieutenant nradley in an interview, shortly
thereafter. l[Ihis part of Lal'orge's story says:

I interpreted for Lieutenant Bradley when
he interviewed mrly both spellings are some ,
several days aft-er the ouster battle had oc—
curred. as was spoken of then as the 'sole sur-
vivor. of the disaster. But he hinself did not
lay clains to that kind of distinction. on the
contrary, again and during the long exni-
nation of him by are ey, the young scout said,
'1 was not in the fight. When gazed upon and
congratulated by visitors he declared, “I did
nothing wonderful; I was not in it. II fie told us
that when the engagement opened he was behind
the other crows. as harried away to a distance
of about a mile, paused there, and looked for a
brief tine on the conflict. Soon he got still
farther away, stopping on a hill to take another
look. fie saw sons horses running any loose over
the hills. He turned back far enough to capture
two of the aninals....
nonantio writers seized upon early as a

subject suited to their fanciful literary pur-
oses. In spite of hinself, he was treated as a

ero. He took no special pains to deny the writ-
ten stories of his unique dinning. He could not
read, he could speak only a little uglish, and
it is likely he knew of no mean why he should
make any special denial....

116. rho-as n. Iarquis, senoirs of a white $1:

this is conclusive in itself, but there also exists

-lm ..

an authoritative interview with Charley less than six years
after the battle, and therefore, historically speaking, al-
aost coateaporary. The only possible basis for contention

is that Lerorge was also the interpreter here, but since he
would.have no basis to misinterpret - and.his known character
and reputation would refute such a charge anyway - the coin-
cidence in inconsequential.

The interview was conducted‘by Lieut. charles I. Roe,
Adjutant of the 2nd cavalry, at tort ouster, u. 1., on narch
s, 1882. under the date of March 10th he seat 1: to the
‘Agglflsnd lat! Journal, where it was printed in full. 'shat
makes the interview of Roe authoritative, as stacked.against
conflicting interviews supposedly obtained'hy eastern news-
paper correspondents of the sane general tine, is not only
his known integrity as an officer, but also his relation to
the events. nos led Gibbon'e advance that relieved Benn,
and after Lieutenant Bradley was one of the first on the bat-
tle site.

His note to the editor said, “the sensor of‘expression
is his Curley's , no mm being ends to change it in any-
way. the reaarks in brackets are nine.‘ Vith.Layorge's
clear account for eclpsrison the following parts are inpcr-
tent:

...rhen can. duster told four of the

scouts to go on ahead; 1 (curley) was one of

the-....nmut a ails from Little Horn the conand

’separated, part went down Ash Creek. the other

part 1 was with came along down the ridge east

side of Little Horn. Hitch Boyer and fotr scouts

went down the ridge, and while going down the

ridge could see the Indians going from the vil-
lage to fight Reno; when scouts get near a deep

-107-

cooley they went off ridge. down towards Little
Horn. and ouster with command kept on ridge....
The four Grow scouts commenced firing into the
village. While riding on the ridge the command
rode two-by-two. and Mitch Boyer (half-breed in-
terpreter - R.) told me the two men at the. head
were brothers (Gen. Custer and his brother).

the White Horses were the first company.
They case down ravine to its south, and one nan
on a gray horse with stripes on his are rode
down into the river, went across, and rode into
the village very fast, right into the Indians;
acted like a an that wanted to die....rhe Sioux
commenced the firing and the trocps fired back.
remaining mounted; that is, only the front part
of the line fired; the line (or column - n.) was
stretched up deep coolcy, and away hack on side
of ridge. the Sioux were not surprised mt
acted like thq knew they were casing. The
trocps then turned fro. the south of cooley...
the sen in the lead notioning with their hands to
go northeast, when the cospanies broke fro. the
Iain colusn as if to nest on the Iain ridge again;
while the conpanies were sowing, the Indians
crossed the river at the south of cocley and fur-
ther below...and all along the river below Gus-
ter. They rode right up to the conned, firing
all the tile, plenty of thu.1|he troops fought
on the ridge, firing into the Indians as they
case across the river and up the slopes....

the Sioux got after the Grove and ran them
away back to pack train. this side of uh creek,
halt a mile fros Little Horn. Ithe Sioux got all
around custer's command..."

after getting to the pack train I (Carley)
left the other scouts and came bad: to one of
the ridges behind where duster was fighting, a
little higher ridge. 1 took out my glasses and
saw there was no one moving, no firing, and the
troops all appeared to be killed. there were
Indians all around me. I remained there a little
while. saw the Indians fighting Reno, who had
gone on to the hill. Reno's couand saved out of
timber (west side of Little Horn) and was running
baa sane tine crews were running ba¢ (on East
side of Little Horn) driven by the Sioux. I
could see then (Reno's non) running while crews
were running. When I got back to hill in rear of
ouster, I could see Reno's sen cosing up on top
of hill and saw then firing. Reno's sen ran from
tilber ahoxn: sane tine (hunter's waned turned
north free deep cooley. and ease tine crows ran

back.
(curley) thifi it was about two hours
fro: tine co-and turned fros deep cooley until I

~109-

cane back and they were all killed....1 could see
from where I was the 31011: moving around among
the dead bodies, picking up things, some on foot
and sons mounted.

...When I left the ridge the sun was
nearly down, then I went don the ridge on the
east side, and went down through the bad lands on
east side of Big Horn River, and came to the
Iellowstone, opposite Fort Peace (about fifty
niles fros custer Hill - n. ). there I found
Terry's trail; followed it, and finding I could
not overtake the command (rerry) I went to the
Boat; whifi7was caning up the Big Horn, and got
on O...

 

117. %1angournal, Vol. 19, p. 761 (larch 25,
1882). the 1s er s ea c "the caster Massacre, narrative
of curley, A crow scout. * this letter was addressed to the
editor of the Journal and - as far as my research can deter-
mine - never printed. my complete as. on it is in the files
of the Montana Historical Society, and I have furnished
copies to Fred metin and capt. g. a. Luce, superintendent
of the ouster National Monument. Its existence was unknown
to either of then, and ur. Dustin supports my belief that
it is not only completely 'newl but absolutely authoritative
as to Curley's actual movements.

 

Carley, then, by his own frank admission left the
meter command at the same tine Reno was driven from the
timber, and seems to indicate clearly that the fight on
ouster gill was over before acne even got out of the valley
and Benteen cane up - although he tells elsewhere in the
story of hearing firing 932133 the ridge to which he return-
ed. His story clearly supports others as to the appalling
rapidity with which meter was overwhelled -- but no blanket
for meter, no riding in rings, no sasquerade, and certainly
no ”chat: and the Whale". Iontana version.

Not only another hero story ruined by an eyewitness,
but ruined by the hero hilself.

rho sequel to the curley myth, that the Indian scouts

4.09?

(usually all identified as "Crows” I'bolted“ and 'didn't
stop skedaddling till. they reached Powder River, 170 miles
away' can be quickly discredited. Dustin, who has made a
particularly careful study of their actual movements, has
brought out the following:

there were 42 Indian scouts with the comand as it
prepared for battle - 29 arikara (“no”), 4 Dakota, 2 Black-
feet (actually halfbreed). and the great half-breed Hitch
Bouyer With 6 Gross. three goes with Reno, and Bouyer with
(water, were killed in the battle, and one Ree and one crow
were critically wounded -- over 10;: casualties. and while
several withdrew with a captured pony herd Just before the
Sioux closed the siege lines on mac. at least 8 were still
present at the end of the fight. Indian or White, it was no
record to be ashamed of - particularly when it is considered
that their superior mobility and knowledge of the territory
could have allowed every single one to escape alive. 113

 

118. [red pgstin. pp. 90, 110, 128-134 passin.

 

the silliest, nest inconsequential controversy of all
has to do with the length of master's hair. Even as late as
the 1930's, young north mots boys who had gazed in ass at
the battle relics in the state meterical Iuseun at Bidsrck.
tinkled furtively on the box grand piano that once graced
Fort Lincoln, stood subdued before the glanced-in reginental
colors, and stopped spellbound before the lagnificent Indian
rcgalia knew the significance of the length of water's hair.

They night be privileged to trace out the lines of

-110-

the old fort on the landan side, standing on the very ground
where the last review was held, or kicking old cartridge
cases and perhaps a horseshoe free the hard prairie sod, ig-
noring then, and going home to forget it all - save the
importance of General ouster's hair.

old Indian veterans of New uln and sully's 3111,
Canyon Creek, and Bear Paw Liountain rheumatically walked the
streets of their own hone towns, or rated in the sun on
neighbors' porches - and people not so old who talked
familarly of grant Marsh of the-‘Far West, of buffalo water-
ing where buildings stood, of nee scouts and blue-clad
trocpers clattering past in the morning sun, of personal ac-
quaintance with great Dacotah warriors - they were all
snubbed as only a schoolboy can ignore an amnlt.

But General ouster’s hair - that was different!
Everybody knew that if he hadn't of cut his hair, the Indians
would have fled without a fight at his nosing. they didn't
scan to fight Wong his“ (only sffete peterners said 'xel-
low Hair“); they killed bin by nistake. and once they'd '
killed his they didn't even scalp hie, they-were so scared.
Iou can bet that there'd a been a different story out there
in Montana that day if caster had had his long yellow hair!

[at only the Murat of the 0. 3. am,‘ but the San-
son, too. Apparently duster's hair was sore important than
his tactics, or the imense reach of Sitting Bull's encamp-
ment on the Greasy Grass.

Again it is the LIFE subscribers who most recently .
have revived the question - and by artificial respiration at

'_‘I .‘-—-

that. one personally thanks the. editors for mentioning that

Gutter had a haircut, perhaps because he 1...‘ barber himself

with an eye to all favorable publicity. (Though such a tes~

tinonial certainly has its drawbacks). mt urs. a. n.

Conway cf llinerel Wells. Texas. has reason to be in disagree-
sent. she states: -

airs: Ouster's hair was long at the ties
of the massacre and he was not scalped. .

In my possession I have an affidavit
signed by an old Indian scout, Bob lixon. in
Ranger, i‘ex., gay 18, 192? in which he states
that after the battle he was one of the first to
arrive at the scene and that the general's head,
both arms and legs had been severed free his
body but were all together and that his long
dark hair was still on his head.119

11’. um. “I: 12. 1948, p. 8e

 

Bob lixon may well have been with the regiment - but
not as a scout for they are all known - and may have found a
body in such condition. mt nearly three generations have
- taken the word of custar's wife as to the color of his hair.
And Van de Water, who wrote his book while tarsus was still
alive. states that varnun and master had cropped their hair
tight with horse clippers the night before the expedition
left fort Lincoln. 13°

 

120. o -mnter p. 301. certainly this denon-
strates the he 3 ' s o ' coy to which aatters of the duster
controversy have risen when a forsal note of reference is
necessary to prove that a man did or did not out his hair
between the dates of such—and-such. But the son's partisans
have laid so much stress on this. and equally insignificant
points of dispute, it is actually needed.

L— ‘-
v——v

as to the disnenbernent of auster's body. and its

-112.

general condition. that we can flatten out and roll up for
good. Lieutenant Bradley's testimony is again in clear
denial on the point, but the word of a man still living is
also available. It was Benteen who identified duster
(ironically enough); and sergeant windolph, proud.in his new
chevrons earned and presented in the field, held Benteen's
horse. '
Custer was lying a trifle to the southr
east of the top of the knoll - where the monument
‘ is today. I stood six feet away holding Captain
Benteen's horse while he identified the general.
His body had not been touched, save for a single
bullet hole in the left temple. near the ear,

and a hole in his left breast. as looked almost
as if he had been peacefully sleeping....120

 

120. I Eases With ouster, p. 110.

 

. there were other tales of course. The uses of tort
Barthold and.fcrt Lincoln always believed that ouster had
killed himself. and the untouched condition of his body lent
weight to the supposition, for the Plains Indians respected
suicides as men touched by the areat spirit. But the bladk
powder of the day always left vicious burns at close dis-
tances, and there were no such.marks on Custer's wounds.

On an apposite tangent, the hopeful conjecture arose
free the first that duster was so treated out of respect for
his unequalled bravery. and that conjecture has been treated
as fact. But scalping and mutilation of an enemy was an al*
most ritualistic treat-est of a brave and fallen foe. and
with equal sense its omission could be distorted - if any-

were so inclined - into a reflection on ouster's bravery.

the preponderant testimony is that none of the Sioux
knew ouster well enough to recognise hi. (the Cheyenne. re-
aenbering the slaughter of their wives and children at
Washita, say have). and in the and, sore likely than not,
failure to scalp his - and sons of his men (See note 112.
above) - was nere oversight in the flush of unparalleled
triumh: An oversight which met have been keenly regretted
in later years. 121

121. the attitude use probably sillilar to that held
by points Brown. a ranker in the aim: forces of sitting
Bull, toward the farfamed horse uc:.ormnwhe. ' He mentions
seeing Comanche move slowly out of the fight, and thinking
nothing cf it. But later |Iknouing how much store the whites
seemed to set by him, old paints was evidently sorry they
had not finished his off when they had the chance. ' see
Bruce nelson, Land of the acotahs (Kinneapclis: University
of uinnesota Press, . p. .

 

whether duster died last of all as invariably pic-
tured - Leonidas among his Spartans - it decidedly a soot
point. fro moons told Hamlin Garland in 1898:

...we shoot, we ride fast, we shoot again.
Soldiers drop, and horses fall on then. soldiers
in line drop. but one man rides up and down the
line - all the tile shouting. no rode a sorrel
horse, with white face and white forelegs. 1
don't know who he was. He was a brave III.

Indians keep swirling round and round. and
the soldiers kill only a few. lany soldiers fell.
at last all horses killed but five. once in a
while some man would break out and run toward the
river, but he would fall. at last about a hun-
dred men and five horsemen stood on the bill all
bunched together. all along. the bugler kept
blowing his commands. as was very brave too.
Then a chief was killed. I hear it was Long
Hair, I don't know; and then the five horsemen
and the bunch of men, maybe so forty, started
toward the river. the man on the sorrel horse
led them, shouting all the tile. no wore a buck-
skin shirt and had long bla¢ hair and mustache.

-114-

He fought hard with a big knife. Hie men were
all covered with white dust. I couldn't tell
whether they were officers or not. one nan all
alone ran down toward the river, then round up
over the hill. I thought he was going to escape,
but a Sioux fired and hit his in the head. He
was the last man. He wore braid on his arms.

...uost of them we left Just where they
fell. we came to the man with the big mustache;
he lay down the hills towards the river. the
Indians did not take his buckskin shirt. The
Sioux said. What is the big chief. that is
Long mix-.1 1 don't know. I had never seen
his“ the san on the white-raced horse was the
bravest nan.1

 

122. Hanlin garland, 'aeneral Custer's Lest tight as
seen by two noon,ll * cclure's a asine, nay, 1m. as reprint-
ed in 5 {ougt with one or, p. ‘ . Even the cheyennes who
claine c we ouster place the site within a few
feet of the Monument on the hill and he was stripped; all
efforts to connect him with the man who led the last charge
have failed because of the location, the black hair. the
horse, and a hundred sinilar contradictions. i’he nan with
the "braid" on his arms, however, is generally accepted as
being first sergeant Jones Butler of calhoun's troop I. -
found a nile-and-a—half from the hill, toward Reno. All-
though even in his case there are obvious discrepancies fron
two icons. account. (for the points in sutler's case see
Fred Dustin, p. 186.)

 
 

 

If are. Conway’s Bob lines was actually at the scene
at all, there is Just the remotest possibility that he was
looking at the body of IIthe man on the white-faced horeel -
the real hero (1 the Last stand. no Moons talked to Hamlin
Garland twenty-two years after the battle, but the mystery of
the more in nuckskini was known and discussed as early as
1977. ‘

In august of that year the st. paul Pioneer Press re-
lated identically the sans story, attributing it to Red
gorse, a sub-chief of the uinneconjou sicux, who had recently
surrendered at his agency. then . too, the description could

be fitted satisfactorily to no one of ouster's officers, ac-
cording to what was known of how they looked and dressed the
day of the battle., the pioneer Press finally cane up with
an ingenious solution: the Indians were confused as to
which part of the battle; they really were referring to
Reno's fight, and the hero was captain French, the only of-
ficer in Reno's battalion wearing buckskin.

and French had blat hair and a big mstaohe. mt
the theory tell of its on weight. trench's hair was cut
short. and he had ridden a grey horse in the fight - not the
flfaned sorrel with four white feet. ' and sad Horse had been
as positive as two Moons in the details of the charge. the
nystery still ruained.123 -

 

125. £211“! iournal. Vol. 15, p. 9‘ (Septuber
16. 1877). ' ’

And tb nystery still renains. the direction taken
by the last futile charge might seem to indicate Lieutenant
a. E. Smith. for his troop was found clustered in a depres-
sion due south of the nonunent - and Snith had a heavy nus-
tache and dark hair. But Smith was the “Grey Horse troop.‘
and he was one of the officers in the group about ouster. all
presunably properly identified.

The mustache and the hair also fitted young Lieuten-
ant Van w. Reilly - only eight months an officer and but
five with the seventh - but Reilly, too, was in the group by
the nonunent. Last there was Lieutenant H. u. Harrington -
black mustache, black-haired - and never identified among

-116-

the unknown dead.

Harrington was second in comand of 'fol auster's
troop «- and I'c'I troop was one of three mounted on sorrel
horses. whether or not he was wearing buckskin is not
known «- but it is believed not. let, in the heat of battle,
even an Indian night mistake an army shirt covered with
sthick white dust. for buckskin.

garland. or the editors of ncclure's, footnoted the
interview with two Moons with a suggestion that the sun
might have been Ia scout.“ mt the fearless crow half-breed,
hitch mayor, was the only scout killed with water's hat-
talion, and though ideally a nan to lead a forlorn hope and
undeniably black-haired, he had no mustache. hark kellogg.
the newspaper correspondent, was found still booted and
clothed toward the river, but at that point resemblance
ceases. and there yet remains pr. aeorge E. Lord, the sur-
geon. He was a first lieutenant in the medical corps (as
distinguished from civilians hired as Icontraot surgeons')
and of long western experience - and the necessary metache.
3e held rank, and he was probably capable enough to col-and -
but no trace of him has ever been found.

It is fascinating speculation, albeit profitless. of
all the nyths of the Last stand, here is the one with the
lost solid basis in tmth. and forever the most disconcert-
ing. all the nail facts in hand but one - and that one
hopelessly beyond proof or disproof. 'fhe man on the white-
faced horse,“ 'the hero in buckskin,“ 'the Bravest Ran” the
real hero of ouster's Last stand - and forever unknown.

-117-

II

this, then, is the duster Legend, a thing apart fros
history and of little enough acquaintance with fact. duster,
darling of fortune. humiliated by vindictive superior? be-
trayed by treasonhidden subordinates, driven by destiny, dy-
ing Wodan-like among the exulting rrost giants. It sounds
like second-rate Wagner, written With an eye to the peanut
gallery.

And so, actually, it was; the second-rate Wagner
responsible is still well enough.known, although his.full
contribution to the duster Legend is not. nut first it must
.be strongly reiterated how little the Legend has in col-on
with.the actual fame and career of George A. ouster.
fhrough factors both.of his own making and others beyond all
hunan control. he was dead: and after that he was little
more than a convenient hall-tree on which to hang the rainent
of a glory hastily patched together by others.

But before discussing the three individuals most con-
cerned with prepagating the Legend, some extenuating circum-
stances must be considered. Custer served his country in
peculiar tiles - tiles that set off both his fine points and
his flaws in bold relief. From the civil War he rightly
emerged a figure of renown; but postwar service overempha-
sized his weaknesses, and others as well as hinself suffered
the consequences. the scope of operations. as well as the
hardships of the frontier. played an important part.

Fron.april ladl.until nay 1866. the union army had
officially mustered 2.772.408 troops. Even counting bounty-

Jumpers, short-tern enlisteents, and deecrters it was a tre-
nendcus military organization ~ matched even against modern-
day standards. the total strength of the Federal forces
under arant's command at the war's end was 1,000,516. nut
by october 1867 the volunteers had all been mustered out and
the Regular Army was at a maximum strength of Just under
57,000, and by the tile of the Battle of the Little Big Ebrn
its authorized strength had long been fixed.by congress at
25,000. .

such rapid constriction inevitably worked.great hard-
ship on many deserving career men. political influence was
brought into every conceivable use, and brevet or volunteer
rank was bitterly flaunted in every regiment - often the last
valuable possession of proud but near penniless nen. is a
result, arny dispatches were full of colonele and generals
whose Regular rank night still be only that of a first
Lieutenant on retirement.

Pronotion was an a strict seniority basis. and Ifew
died and none resigned! - although the casualty rate via the
court-martial route was high. Compulsory retire-eat of
officers was not even discussed.until 1880. and non-collis-
sioned officers and enlisted.nen - even after years of
service - were cut loose with nothing but a curt recommende-
tion of character.

Benteen, a Captain when the seventh was activated in
1866, only reached uaJor by 1893. Gibson, a first Lieutenant
at the Little Big Horn, when retired in brdken health fro-
the long years of frontier hardship in 1893, was still a

.119...

captain. the only way to break the rigid rule of pro-otion
was by a special act of Congress, increasing the organization
of the retired list by one particular file in one particular
rank.

Ironically, even as the news of the disaster sped
East, Custer reached the position of senior Lieutenant
Colonel of the cavalry are through Just such an act, and
stood first in line for the next Colonelcy vacated.12‘

_‘

124. Gal. w. H. Emory of the 5th.oavslry was retired
as brigadier general, by a special law authorising the
President to increase the number of retired officers in that
rank by one. Wesley Merritt then became colonel of the 5th,
naJor Elner otis became Lieut.-col. of the 9th, and Capt.
George B- Sanford.najor of the let. on news of Buster's
death, otis became Lieut-col. of the 7th. see Arlzzgagz
gourn , vol. 15, p. 752 (July 1, 1876).

 

In fact, so rigid were army regulations, and so con-
stricted in red tape, that such special acts were a con-
siderable part of any business accomplished by congress in
any session - often merely to correct errors in the records,
or relieve the War Department bureaus free a specific
dilenna.

It nade for a strange arly in many ways. Joseph
rilford, senior'uajor of the seventh, while acting quarter-
neeter at Belsn, lewmnexico, in 1862, lost his papers. as
was swiftly exonerated by his superiors, but was only dis-
charged of his liability by 33,2048 in 1876 - fourteen years
afterward.

and captain trench, while under orders at Camp Rubles,
n. 1., to await call as a witness at the Reno court of

Inquiry in 1879, got slightly drunk, “lost through willful
misconduct a horse, property of the c. s.,' andnwas found
guilty by a general court martial of violating the I15th,

38th and 65th Articles of We!" - and sentenced to be dismissed
from the service.

His sentence was commuted to suspension from rank, on
half pay, for a year, and he was shortly afterward retired
for sounds and disabilities acquired in frontier service -
but a man testified by all to be one of the finest officers
of the regiment had been inexcusably humiliated after a brile
liant record in the civil War and against the Indians. and
for a broken down cavalry nag at that.

It all made for unnecessary tensions and frictions.
petty intrigues, political maneuvering, rulers, elanders,
charges and ccuhter-charges, and an interminable Jockeying
for advantage in every are, in every regusent, at every post.
firs. ouster has left us a vivid description of what the
eyeten meant - and did - to career officersz‘

...Until after a coloneloy is reached
everything advances by grades. Death, dismissal,
resignation, and retiring from illness or from
age are the causes that make vacancies. the
bride tenderLy reared could not reconcile her-
self to the calm calculation of officers who sat
down to go over the list of those who ranked
them, and to estimate how many years it would
take for those in the way to be removed, either
by Divine Providence or by dismissal. With
finger on the rm Register they disposed of one
after another n something after this fashion:
Such a one Neill 'hand in his chipe' soon if he
don't leave John Barleycorn alone.’ such.and
such a one “is going under from disease contract-
eed during the war, or from an old wound.‘ a
third ahas had a fortune left him, and he will
'1ight out' for civil life soon.' still another
I'begins to totter with age and inbecility, and

 

77-0‘

can't sit a horse any longer; he will be retired
shortly. of another who was constantly being
tried it was said, “Some court-martial will get
him yet and send him flying.‘

and of the news of the death of an officer at some other post
...fh. officers said, if they liked him,

'Poor fellow! 1'. sorry he's gone;' but the ,
inevitable question that followed was, "Who- will

it promote?" the Re ister was at once in
requisition, and the *Ils IooEed up. 125
125. [allowing the Guidon, p. 282-283.

ouster was both the target and the instigator of

 

 

attempts at the Iold army game- of forcing a brother officer
into premature dismissal or retirement. His side of the
story has been often retold, but the other is less known. to
cite a specific externple, he made a definite effort to “get!
Major Lewis Herrill of his own regiment - senior to Reno -
for reasons not now at all clear, since he already ranked
him. .
’ While acting against the tin xlux Klan in south
Carolina, Merrill had accepted 321,400 in rewards from the
oarpetbag legislature for his work, which he claimed he had
the right to do, as 'he did not think it improper to take
the rewards of the state simply because he was an officer. II
as was called before the House Military um:- Committee on
July 3, 1876, and duster was invited to testify: but did not.
the ethical question certainly appears clear enough by
today's standards, but Icrrill was fully exonerated.
Incredibly, however, it was not on this highly vul-
nerable point that Custer spread tales about Merrill, but

rather on an unrelated rumor that he had accepted a.bribe

in 1870 - one which was officially discredited by the general
of the Army, sherman. and Merrill attacked ouster bitterly
in public print:

...some years ago the slander was covertly,
under seal of confidence and with cowardly purpose
that it should do its mischief unknown to me, put
in circulation at Fort Leavenworth when I was not
there by General George A. ouster. that know-
ledge of it did by a lucky chance come to ne‘a
few weeks later. that I immediately demanded an
official investigation, which was refused on the
ground that the author of the vile tale had
placed nothing on official record; that I at
once renewed my demand for investigation, denand~
ing it strongly as a legal right, and was met by

. a‘second refusal; that so soon thereafter as a
sudden change of station permitted, I demanded
through the proper authority that general Custer
should not any longer be allowed to bulk an in-
quiry by working in the dank, but should be cam-
pelled'to make it a matter of such official
record as would obviate the objections made to
instituting an investigation; that thereupon and
after'much delay, instead of the official action
demanded, he wrote no a private and pretendedly
friendly letter in which he ignored all notice
of my demands for investigation, though well
knowing of then and the reasons for refusal, and
sympathizingly repeated the story as if he were
now for the first time telling it, and felt it
my due that I should have notice of it first of
all; that finally after eight months of effort,
he was driven to take the course which to a.nan
of honorable instincts would from the first have
needed no fingerpost; that then when the person
ignother dropped officer of the army) whom he at

at gave as authority was officially inquired
of in regard to it, he first evaded and finally
Wholly shirked out of willingness to father the
slander or tge responsibility to establish it as
a f‘c‘eeeelz

12‘e 38. "Ia Jouml, '01e 13' p. 528:. (m
B, lflfld). Herrileugas In €53 East at the time on detached
service with the Philadelphia centennial Commission, and his
letter was sent to both.the lew‘xcrk .mes and the 'Journalc‘
as was criticized later for attacking a. sad man,‘ but
this was not so at the time; custer was still in Washington
when he first made his charges, and in st. real when they were

 

printed. as is supposed to have said that he would answer
them when he returned from the Sioux Expedition. an attack
on Herrill's South carolina activities would have, at least,
seemed to have had Justification - but to attack him on m
discredited bribe story apparently unrelated shows how little
duster heeded or understood the dangers of hearsay evidence.

-

Aside from the names involved, it could have been a
dozen other typical my quarrels of the period. It was a
strange army indeed; a thousand personal disseneions of every
nature, and still what Lord.tolsey termed, Imam for man, the
finest in‘the world.‘ and ouster shows up prominently as an
example of what brought about both.

Always remembering that to Mrs. duster her husband's
presence heralded the Second Coming, goats and saddles, £93;
lowing the auidon, and gentigg on the plains should be care-
fully read for a clear picture of the bitter disappointments,
the heartbreak, and the mere everyday inconveniences that
routine could make unbearable when on duty on the frontier.

' It was something to be endured by all, but more than
one officer of strongfltsnperment than duster sought means to
palliate it. Drink was an accepted means, and the court-
marticl records of the period show a high mortality rate for
‘that reason. ouster, who neither drank nor smoked, found
different means in his flamboyant love of blooded dogs and
horses, his personal press-agentry in articles for magazines
like‘gglggy, and above all his constant efforts to make an
independent fortune - for his wife's sake even more than his
own.

But he was not a financier, and he was invariably

poorly advised by those passing for such. lush has come down

4.24-

to us only as rumors - suns as high as $30,000 plunged into
worthless Colorado mining ventures, and maneuvering on margin
in Wall Street. one such attempt we have acne specific
figures on, as seven years after his death one of his pronis-
sory notes - endorsed by Ben Holliday, the western stage~linc
nagnate - was a subject of litigation in the Supreme court

of the District of colunbia.

The transactions are obscure and the detd ls unimpor-
tant, but the following facts are a little startling: Deal-
ing through the brokers mail and frank Justh, in the six or
seven nonths preceding rebruary 10, 1875, ouster brought
stocks on margin to the aggregate of $389,985, made a total
profit .of 3552, and ended with.nst losses of $3578.12?

Aun—
*-

127. «is Journal, vol. 20, p. 1146 (Jul! 21,
1885). the lees Is Essie! “general ouster in Wall Street. II
It also shows that his estate was able to pay less than 10
cents on the dollar on the claim.

 

Among the bulls and the bears his cause was as hopeless as
among the victorious hostiles at the Little Big Horn. where
seems little reason to doubt that he was almost financially
bankrupt when he left tort Lincoln, May 10, 1876.

and certainly there is no question where sympathies
must lie at the picture of the ranrcd cavalrynan of the
Plains noving about new Icrk, among the greater and lesser
robber barons of the age. they might licnise hin socially,
but they always made hin feel the presence of his worn any
overcoat and of his wife's lack of stylish costune. And
these same men, whose outright stealing was shaded only by

use:

the barest outline of the law, were constantly agitatilg for
further reducing the size and maintenance costs of the
frontier way. It must have been pure gall and wormwood to
one of his excessive sensitiveness and personal background.

res, there were certainly extenuating circunstances
for a legitimate ouster Legend.

But for the Legend as we have shown it exists there
was little excuse. In the main, it can fairly be said to be
the work of three individuals: nrs. ouster, his first
biographer rrederick Whittaker, and his eninent military
apologist E. S. Godfrey.

THE GALLAN! Elbow

’ tlizabeth Bacon duster was a woman of real beauty,
considerable literary attain-est, and strong character.
Elderly residents of ncnroe still testify as to her great
charts and magnificent poise. Ker presence on the lecture
platform was magnetic, and her writings fully equal to the
best dealing with the late frontier. When George mstrong
ouster won Elisabeth Bacon he scored a victory more important
tolhie fans than any of his military attain-eats.

Her life was dedicated to her husband's memory, and in
the soul—shaking grief of her bereavement she grasped wildly
at any supposition or rumor that might erase what she feared
wasa stain on her hero's spotless name. yo her, he was
always Galahad on a white horse, and in their personal rela-
tionship he certainly so appeared.

This has always been an obstacle to partisans and

'128-

critics alike, for so very few seem to realize that it was
perfectly possible that Custer - when with his wife - was
exactly as she pictures his; and at the same time - in his
dealings with others and in the field - quite another figure
indeed. Like the Lake Erie on whose shores he was raised,
he had great depths and muddly shoals in disconcerting
contiguousness.

Hrs. ouster was still alive for the arth anniversary
of the Battle of the Little Big Horn and, naturally, treated
with great deference for the gallant woman she was. She
outlived her husband by almost fifty-seven years, dying in
new york in 19:53.

Shewell deserved a separate legend of her own, but
her presence was in many ways a detriment to the natural
workings of history. Anyone who questioned her theories of
the battle, or of her husband's godlike character, was
suspect of attacking her as well - and new a cad, under-
mining everything fine that a sentinental public preferred
to believe was fact. It was merely unwise to question the
tales of faithful George and Honest abs, but to attempt to be
objective about ouster, the Martyr, was downright physically
dangerous while his wife still lived.

If her stories of garrison life were valuable, her
theories of what actually happened that June 25, 1876, are
so emotional and so based on hearsay as to be very nearly
worthless- But they had an odd, and wholly unintended, '
result. one of them, her re-editing of Godfrey's Century
article for a 1921 pauphlet, finally caused the Custer

-127-

historian Fred Dustin to take to print, and eventually to
bring out his monumental studyizhe Custerfggagggz.125

 

128. The pamphlet was Fred Dustin, ghe custsr Fight:
sons criticisms of den. 3. a. oodfre 's uGusterTs gag
EattIe ' In the CENTURY wa.azIne for Eanua ~ 1892igand of
are. s‘er s ~amp‘ie o 'e no lywoo~, "R; Pritatély
pr n.e- . 3‘s was circulated in nanusoript for several
years before its publication, and its reception among Custer
scholars - principally E- a. arininstool and R. 8. Ellison -

led Dustin to bring out in 1959 The guster gragggz, which.x
have cited frequently in this paper.

 

 

Her contribution to impartial history was largely neg-
ative, but her contribution to the Custer Legend almost in-

measurable. It was, as summed.up by Frederick van de Water:

We” ouster's fifty-odd years

of glorifica have enshrined her husband
in the folk-lore of America. she proclaimed his
hero, and since she was his widow, men who

thought otherwise held their peace. she outlived
them all.129

129. g%o;z-nunter, p. 361. rhat she was strengthened
by allies equa nvu arable to refutation should be obvi-

ous. Mrs. yates' paper (as edited by General miles and Mary
E. Burt and who knows who else) I have quoted. And when
Cyrus wansend Brady was attempting to be inpartial in his
1904 study he was subjected to a letter free one of Gusteris
sisters - unnaaed, but presumably Margaret Calhoun ouster,
widow of Lieut. Galhoun, killed.in the Last stand - begging
bin not to take the position that ouster had dieobeyed his
orders. (see c. 2. Brady, Appendix 5, note, 9. 596.) How.
ever, none of e c or surviving relatives were gifted.with
Hrs. ouster'e attainaents as a writer, and.ccnsequently of
little individual influence.

w.—

levertheless, however notional and naturally biased
her views, Elizabeth.custer's actives here always of the
highest, and her actions on an equal plane. Even though she
was left nearly destitute, as hinted at above, everything’
she did in his behalf was honorably inspired and completely

-128-

beyond nercenaryuotive. The same can not be said of the
individual responsible for ninety-of-a-hundred myths and nie-
statoments on duster in print: frederict Whittaker.

"MAJOR RENO'S ACCUSER' .

rrederick Whittaker was a garrulous, flamboyant figure
of the post-civil War era who eternally gloried in two self-
bestowed patents of nobility: sceneral ouster's Biographer'
and major Reno's Accuser. 0 Born in London in 1838, he cans
to userioa about 1850, and served throughout the civil war
with the 6th new york Volunteer Cavalry. a second lieutenant,
he acquitted hinself creditably in many actions, and cans out
a nrevet captain - a fact which he never for an instant al-
lowed anyone to forget.

after the war, he resuaed his work as chief ficticneer
in the stable of Erastus Beadle, famed publisher of blood-
thirsty dile novels. 'rwo titles are sufficient to show cap-
tain Whittaker's style, and qualifications for historical
biography: 'rhe Death's Head Rangers: a tale of the Lone
Star state! - still quoted as a classic of its kind - and
"Double Death, or, lli‘he spy clean of Wyoming. 0

In tine he graduated to the more sedate pages of 1h;
M and the __Ar_m_y_and nmcurnal - at one time under the
sale ownership. His My articles were of a type of archer
and price, . Amohamet as a Soldier and Post, 0 Weather triadic-uI
etc. but one is important in its clues to his personality.
In 1975'!» produced 'rhe [artyr of nalaklava' violently a. -
puting all existing theories of the tactics of the Light

fligade. It is revealing in that it shows how seriously he
took himself as an expert military analyst, and the delight
he took in Gothic mystery, for he even romanticized himself
with the nom de plus of 'Lsunce poynts. I

now well he actually knew meter is open to great
question. It has been erroneously assumed even by a man like
Van de water that Whittaker accompanied meter when Lee's
first flag of surrender was accepted, but this is not so.
ouster was accompanied by a Whittaker, but it was ment.-Col.
whittaker of the 1st Connecticut - a regiment in Custer's
Third cavalry Division - not rrederitt Whittaker, 'Brevet
captain 6th I. 1- Veteran cavalry. '

nevertheless be was a zealous admirer of Custer both
during the war and afterward, and he followed his western
career with extras interest. and on news of the Last stand,
he burst into song with the only reasonably good duster pool
written, 'mster's Last chargell - Which is not neant to
imply that it had great literary nerit.13°

 

1:50. mt he did catch the rhytl- of mounted riders
in his lines: 'Deadt Is it possible? He, the bold rider,
meter, our here, the first in the fight, Charming the bul-
lets of yore to fly wider, Shunning our battle-king's ring-‘-
lets of light.” etc. For a fair Judgment it should be con-
parsd with Will Carleton's ”the Heart and the sword;“
Leavitt mantis “The Last charger Longfellow“ 'Ths Revenge
of Rain-in-the-l'ace; ' or 311a wheeler 's'iloox's interminable
epic uouster. I If whittaker and Longfellow were matched on
their meter poems alone, Longfellow would have no place in
American Literature.

He was an obvious choice for ouster articles, and in
septenber, 1876, flag published his first tribute to his
here. In it he modestly compares duster to Raphael, non Job

.130-

of austria, the admirable Crichton, Henry v of England, the

Blaa prince, Alexander, Titus, Byron, shelley, and Joseph

Rodnan Drake - all Ibeloved of the godu and none “outliving
their fortune. ' {ha mentioning others who did I{outlive
their formats!I he thinders home his point with a flourish of

trumpets, and loud alaruns:

“...ro Custer alone was it given to Join a roIantic

life of perfect success to a death of perfect heroism; to

unite the splendors of Ansterlits and thermopylae; to charge

like uurat; to die like Leonidas...etc. 0 not his «meat on

the campaign - especially on gene - are the only matters

that give his article any interest today, in view of his

subsequent actions.

and in

In it he makes two statements worth singling out:

...ns who are wise after the fact can see
it; but it is hard to say on whom the blame of
the losses which followed should be fairly laid,
except it be on the commander of the whole
column. ferry sic committed the fatal error
of dividing his forces; for which, however, it
is difficult to Judge him severely when we remem—
ber how scant were his means of information of
the real strength of the enemy....

comparing Washita to the Little 813 Born

. ..At washita there were three different
cups, and nearly as many at the Little Big
Horn; but flauster's nickl caused him to strike on-
ly the camp at the end of the line, which he do-
stroyed by surprise; and he had the further ad-
vantage of keeping the others all in his front
much demoralized. it the Little Horn he struck
the very centre of a line of lodges several
miles long, and the enemy was waiting for him.
Reno, whose attack on one flank of the line most
resembled the Iashita attack, had not the force
to make it effective; but he managed to escape
after a severe mauling. Custsr's attack, even
had he known what was before him, had not a
chance of success....

.151-

131. rrederiok whittaker, I'dyeneral George a. ouster}
Gal , Vol. 22, pp. 370-371 (septuber 1876). Even as mild
a s%a¥ement as this, and similar material in “The Galaxy
niscellany-‘e Advertisera - presumably also by Whittaker -
was accompanied by an editorial note, in part: “...As this
hastily written account based upon early newspaper dispatches
reflected upon Brevet colonel gene, 0. s. 5., major of the
seventh cavalry, it is due to Colonel Reno to say that the
editor...has thus far seen no reason to reflect upon his
action in the engagement....we wish to save an officer who
has deservedly well so high a reputation in the military
service as Colonel none from even the possibility of miscon-
ception.l (see note, p. 571).

 

txcept that the criticise of terry is that now ccm~
sonly made of duster, the statements are quite in line with
the facts. and whittaker remained as Judicial there would
have been no false ouster Legend of any consequence. now-
ever, even as the @1221 article reached the public, Whit-
taker had received the first of his much-vaunted accolades,
as the following LE! and gag ionrnal item discloses:

losers. sheldon a 60., publishers of the
writings of moral ouster will shortly publish
a biograplv of that deceased officer, the pro-
ceeds of which, after paying eXpenses, will be
devoted to the benefit of Mrs. mister. the work
has been entrusted to 81".. Capt. Prederiok whit-
taker, lately of the staff of the army and
Navy ournal. With a view to render this his-
tory as comp etc as possible, this gentleman re-
quests that all who can furnish any information,
personal anecdotes, etc. concerning General Gus-
ter at any time of his career will send the same
to his, care of SEELDOI e 00., 3 mil-ray at. new
fork, praising to acknowledge the game with
thanks and use them in the meloir.1

1876) 132. W Journal, vol. 13, p. 836 (August 5,

 

the book was obviously designed to cash is on the cur-
rent publiciv of the battle «- helped by a play for sympathy

~132-

in aiding the widow - and never intended to be definitive or
necessarily authoritative." the methods of obtaining the
material, as outlined, also support the theory that this was
to be a Iquichie' - comparable in our own tiles to the
“MacArthur thsjlagnificentl books brought out between pearl
Harbor and the fall of Bataan, and so embarrassing now to so
any people. (Particularly general Mac‘l'tIIH‘).

Moreover, the netmds show up especially important in
view of whittaker's soon-to-be stated claims of lhaving
spent months of patient research. 0 most significant of all
is the complete absence of proof in any form that Whittaker,
up to the Reno Inquiry, ever got as far West as chicago. tot
even today his word is accepted as authoritative on any num-
ber of complex setters concerning the battle.

aetveen the tics of the.gglg§[ article and.tbs appear-
ance of ths‘biography, supposition and slender had already
thrown out their roots. the anti-administration papers, like
the new xork 1932.15- played up any angle of the disaster
which would enban’ass president arm. and sensation-seeking
papers, like the‘gggalg which had so often found auster’apt
feature 009’. filled their columns with any material which
would serve to increase circulation. It was not a chapter in
Llerican Journalistic history to make a modern news-an
proud. ‘

Persons havim not era a remote relation to the
actual battle were cited as authorities. Th3 confederate
general '1'. L. Bosser from the first savagely attacked Reno on

the first news of the battle, and not even a calls letter free

the great cavalry leader General aver-ill silenced him for an
instant.153 Buffalo 3111. in Philadelphia after Just making

 

133. since averill's letter to the n. I. erald was
written on July 12, 1876 -- and news of the battle not
reach [Port Lincoln until July 5th, and the East by telegraph
the next day - it can be seen how much thought was given to
Rosser's charges. Averill, who had done Indian fighting as
well as being the only union cavalrynan to defeat Nathan 3.
Forrest, said in part: In behalf of a gallant soldier who
cannot now know of any public criticism, nor be in position
to repel it, I ask leave to say a word...rhe undertaking to
criticise an action by those not experienced in Indian war-
fare when there is but a vague understanding of the plan and
a total ignorance of tapograpby would seen an extraord
venture....1t was nerely a question of tine with either
Water or Reno...“ for assisting or supporting each other,
after beconing engaged with 2 miles of Indians between thu.
it was entirely out of the question....1n any case none is
not to be held responsible. I have known both water and
Reno fron youth, and had plenty of opportunity to appreciate
their superb qualities as cavalry leaders, both having
served in ny comand in virginia....Let us hope that peeri-
oans may not be nistaken in their generous attitude that the
dead are always right.... 0 its Journal, Vol. 13, p.
823 (July 29, 1876). for an es. 0 her impartial newspaper
opinion use see [red metin, pp. 205-206.

 

such an outstanding record as drook's chief of scouts he had
been smarily dismissed, told the m, I...aeno stood
inactive when only a ridge separated hin fro! Buster” ..neno
is to blame and I told hin so. ' nosser and cody at least
knew soaething of the Plains. but this was not at all neces-
sary in order to be given great prominence. [any a two-bit
nonenity, never heard of before or again, was quoted in final
front-page Judgment of grant, sheraan, ferry, and Reno.

and in this healthy atmosphere for clear-headed and
inpartial analysis, one of ouster's avowed]; uncritical wor-
shipers sat down in ut. Vernon, n. 1., and settled offhand
points of dispute Cluster scholars evu nos approach vith great

434-

cauticn. nut dine novels in cloth covers and high-grade
paper are still dine novels. After a 'very thorough and care-
ful erasination' of “accessible factsi, Whittaker's ‘ Foals!-
Eife of general aeogge A. Custer was in the handsof the
public the first week in pecenber, 1876.

It is not likely that Uhittsksr hisself at that ties
considered his Ipopular‘ life! a final word on Guster's
career,“ and the battle which was isnediately terned a inas-
snore." nut since he soon came to do so, there is in that ‘
no excuse for his'future conduct. In fact, a gracious note
of praise and thanks from Mrs. Buster, a cos-endatory word
or two froa persons of like views, and he quickly reached
the position that not only his book but he hinself spoke
gx cathedrs on every question or objection.

Judged solely on its neans of coapilation of facts
and original purpose it is a creditable piece of work, even
today our only source for the bulk of Interial pertaining A
directly to duster“ life. at valid fast is too often
intertwined with-nagination, and in too sany places gives
way entirely to it. The vital flaw in thittaker's work at
its best can be aptly demonstrated by a matter wholly unre- '
lated to the Last stand -‘ and consequently more revealing of
nethod and less excuseabls. '

the unadorned fact of the incident is this: on may
'22., issz, acolellan's am found the way to Rich-cad blocked
by the Chickahoniny River. Lieut. caster, acting under orders
from General .1. a. narnard, chief of the engineers, made a

valuable reconnaissance across the stress, proved it forda-
ble, and also saw an opportunity to cut off a Confederate
picket line. general Barnard made his report to ucclellan,
calling attention to ouster's work.and what he had observed
as to the eneay's weak position. unclellan, to when duster
was already known, questioned his closely and was impressed
enough to ask custer to Join his staff as a Captain. ‘fhe
following morning, Captain ouster was assigned a force of
two cavalry troupe and one infantry company, crossed the
Chickahoniny at dawn, and won his first victory.

fold in that manner alone it reflects high credit on
Custer, and indicates where his neteroric rise to a General's
rank began, and that it was soundly based in military abili-
ty. But his dine novelist biographer was constitutionally
incapable of such a recitation. Instead we find added
touches - reliniscent of Beadle d 00.:

caster, being on staff duty, happened to
be around and Barnard beckoned to his to cone
with his, not knowing who he was at the tine.
Both passed through the picket line, and went
down the r1ver...and finally the two found then-
selves alone on the margin of the stress, the
dark flow of dhich gave no revelation of its
depths, nor the nature of its botton. Turning
to his young subordinate General Barnard said,
'Jqu in:'....rhe young officer waded the stress
in noaentary eXpectation of being fired at by
the enemy's pickets on the other bank. [All
around his was quite unknown. there was every
reason to suppose that rifle-en were in the
bushes beyond, and ouster was in open river,
perfectly exposed. as had drawn his revolver
and held it above the water, which rose to his
arapits in the middle of the strean; and his
feet sunk several inches into the soft, sticky,
black sud of the bottos. General Barnard in his
report calls it lfir. bottoms,“ but it will be
noticed that the general did not wade it
hinself.... '

 

-155-

Arrived at the other side, ouster peered
through the bushes and cautiously ascended the
bank, being rewarded for his eXplorations by a
distinct view of the enemy's picket fires, some
distance off, and by the sight of their nearest
sentry lazily pacing his post, quite unconscious
of the proximity of any foe. By this time Barnard
...began to make silent signals to hum to come
back, but the young fellow never heeded them till
he had carefully examined the whole of the enemy's
position, and had found that their main picket
post was so situated in the midst of a bend of
the river that it might easily be cut off by a
bald dash O O 0

...!he general and his young subordinate
mounted and rode up to the house, where they
found McClellan about to ride out with his staff
...Here Custer fell back while Barnard went on.
In these army matters, the reader sust always
remember the credit assigned to an officer or
soldier is almost always in proportion to his
rank....1n this case Custer had made the risky
reconnaissance, but as Barnard was the chief
engineer it would all go to Bernard's credit.

80 the boy thought, at least. He was only a
humble second lieutenant, and the riotous life

he had led at washington the previous winter,
with the sudden shock of revelation and repentance
produced by his sister's solemn warnings and
prayers, had tended to sober and subdue his....
he had led an anusually wicked life....noreover
he had spent most of his money, was hard up,
shabby in his dress, and that moment was all
covered with the black mud of the Chickahosiny.
He felt very keenly the contrast between his own
forlorn appearance and that of the neat and hand-
some staff of McClellan....Genera1 Barnard rode
by ecclellan's side...and finally it came out
that the general had not gone himself, but sent
in some young officer, really could not say who -
had seen him lounging near headquarters - guessed
he was somewhere near - would the general like

to see him?

Certainly the general would like to see
his...where was he? Word was passed...from a'
stately chief of staff, covered with buttons,
through a still more gorgeous aid-de-oamp, thence
to another and another....At last he was found
and brought up, dirty and muddy with unkempt hair,
cost not brushed but all creased from being slept
in, trousers far from guiltless of rage, boots
sore russet than black with red reflections, cap
once blue now purple fros.sany rains and suns.
Such was the figure that presented itself before
ncclellan....

-137-

then it was the ucclellan broke the silence
abruptly, llDo you know, you're Just the young man
I've been looking for, ur. fuster. How would you
like to come on my staff?‘ 34

 

134. ‘Whittaker's‘gigg, pp. loaélli.

Horatio Alger and the correspondence school adver-
tisements do it better, but they make no pretense of writing
history. Unfortunately for Brevet captain whittaker, 6th,

3. I. veteran cavalry, General J. c. Barnard was stillnalive
when his book appeared. and in an excoriating letter of
June 12, 1877, he took both.biographer and biography to
stern task. It is a lengthy letter, but the point of shit-
taker's history by eabellishssnt and insinuation is so
clearly demonstrated by it, such.of it should be quoted.
quickly getting down to cases deseral Barnard begins:

...It is sosewhst characteristic of a style
of 'historieal writing’- of which this book is a
type, that even official statesents of those whose
statements is the sole source of inforsaticn on
the subject are disregarded. [Refers to his re-
ports, etc. on day ouster waded the chickahom-
iny]....!he sole object was to find as to depth
and character of the bottom. ouster drew no
Iirevolver" - the stream did not rise 'to his
armpits" - and the enormous depth of IIseveral
inches of soft, sticky black mud' is in its very
phraseology, a creation of the historian.

Hy official report is very brief and very
explicit. “as waded across without any diffi-
culty (the depth being almost four feet); and a
few days afterward, emboldened by this experi-
sent, he caused the length of the stream to be
waded from the bridge for a half mile below. The
attadk and capture of the enemy's pickets by has
and Lieut. Bowen was founded on these reconnais-
sances to which the successful results are due.I
In this there is entire and full credit to
ouster, both for what he did undsr'sy orders and
under my eye (and I repeat, as my instrument),
and what he subsequently did of his own prosptings.

as to the occasion in hand. I simply ven-
ture to state in Opposition to so trustworthy and
conscientious an historian "that ouster did not
ascend to the opposite bank,“ did not "peer
through the bushes to the other side,“ and was
not “rewarded by a distinct view of the enemy's
picket fires;' had not Iicarei‘ully examined the
whole of the enemy's position:* had not Ifound
their main picket post to be so situated in the
midst of a bend of the river that it might eas-
ily be out off, etc., etc.‘ To 'spin yarns' is
quite a harmless doing compared withnusing lwhole
cloth! of this fabric for lIhistor'yJ

What follows, page 112 and 113, is mostly
pure invention, libelloue on me in its substance,
and utterly at variance with fact.

I"rhe general and his young subordinate
mounted and rode up to the house, where they
found noclellan about to ride out with his staff,
etc., etc. Here Custer fell back and Barnard
went on.‘ And then follows some profound and
touching reflections concerning Ithose Army sat-
tere' by which it seems duster 'sade the risk. and
'it would all go to Barnard's credit.“ The sessar
tiosal and truly apropos allusions Just here to
his (ouster's) Iriotous life', his 'repentanee
produced.by his sister's solemn warnings and
prayers“ carried to a.clisax of bathos that he
'had spent most of his money, was hard up, shab-
by in his dress, and at that moment was all
covered with the plat ad of the Chickahominy'
certainly entitle the 'historian' to a high
place -- in his line.

the “general and his young subordinate'
did.not “ride up to the house,' for there*was
none, the headquarters being_(as the author has
once stated) not at I".Jb'idow gaines' house! but in
the field, near cold Harbor. They did not Ifind
McClellan about to ride out with his staff.' He
was seated in the open air of his camp with
several of his officers....

duster did not “fall back;' he accompanied
me to the presence of Gen. ucclellan (to whom, as
I have before observed, he was known), and what-
ever report was made was made by us in common...
and, finally. duster was not 'oovered with the
black mud of the Chickahominygi his lower gar-
ments were wet and that was all.

The subsequent baseless injurious state-
msnt that I Iby mediallan's side made my (Ihisi)
report as if ignoring GusterI (which, however, 1
had a perfect right to do), that 'the commander
listened, asked a few questions, and finally it
came out that the General had not gone himself,
but sent some young officer - really couldn't say

who - had seen his lounging near headquarters -
guessed he was somewhere near, etc. etc.I

the I'cloth“ such.stuff as this is lads of
is indeed 'wholei enveloping a libel as wanton
and complete as itself. ,

...Unistory,' either of a great war or of
an individual who has played a'brilliant part in
that war, and who laid down his life on the bat-
tlefield, is indeed a grave thing. those who
survive have acne clains, however. They who suf-
fer fron the spatterings of libellers who attempt
to nagnify their heroes hy recklessly defaning
others are better off than those whose future
history is to be read in pages lute these I have
been noticing.

It was not my fortune to see each of Gen.
ouster subsequent to the events alluded to. 1
never had cause to imagine that he indulged so
foolish a belief as that 1 withheld hin any credit
due (my reports show I do not); nor to doubt that
he recognized the really vaiggble service I ren-
dered hill on this occasion.

as & Ezlardl B!te EaJe gen. QtOe

 

1877) .

 

those damned eyewitnesses again.
Bernard's letter would seemed to have put a total

quietus on any nan caught over-correcting history, but Whit-
taker innediately displayed one of his most irritating attri-
butes, a love of long contentious letters - often with.ns

little fact to go on as his dine novels. as at once replied
to general narnard, explaining that he had gone to see the
general personally and had been referred to the official
report and certain other naterial, but

...rhese, however, were very neagre. they
referred to an incident which was the tuning
point of auster's life as a mere trifle, and were
avowedly founded on the very confused recollec-

‘tion of a veteran officer as to an event trifling

to his but very important to Custer. and I been
content with such a onersided version of the
story I should deserve censure as a historian.
As it was, I supplenented den. Bernard's

recollection with other information and tho re-
sult ie the etoq_ae a an a; in o mafia gel--
Tecth true. I may seem exaggerateé to con.
Barnard, t then ho dooo not prorooe to have
known much cf Gunter, hie antecedonto, or his
toolingo. I: I had not, I ohoufl not have writ-
ten hie 1ii‘o. and tho general not rouonhor that
it woo motor'o life, not Barnard”, that I wao
Ono otatolont with which the general
quarrels io about the I'ooi’t, oti¢y blad and of
tho bottom. of the Chiotahoainy. Permit no to
m that I havo been there ao roll ao gen.
urnard, and know from oxporionoo that thoro io
ouch and almost where along ito couroo. to
to tho minor pargnga—r'o of the affair. I loavo
n: careful statement, founded on various infor-

mation tidtoad againot tho noncry o
gonoral.

 

136. gig! gonna, vol. 14, p. 755 (me 30.
187?). rho 1 co aro no.

negrottably, motor no Juot approaching this van

incidoat in hio liar Memoir“ for M, when ho too killod,
or we might ho obio to torovor don Whittakor trol bio our
month. In worko liko Mo on tho 1131.333, cantor night so
out of hill way to bring in a noodlooo olnr on “oral Baton,
hut hio war reminioconooo cutter only from an "or—adornment

a: 5:11. - not fact. the only ototenont Guotor hao loft on
tho chickaholiw incident in that ho oorvod on tho etc“ or
moral w. r. ('Baldy') saith '...util tho om found ito
advance to aichoad obotruotod by tho troacherouo and tor-
tuouo windingo of tho Chickahonihy, o. stream which, however
chargoablo with can. of the ainfortnnoo of tho W of tho
[Pate-ac. woo oil-cot litorall)‘ n stopping-Itch. for w
personal advanconont. I137

 

187. a. A- motor. War lmiro,‘ m, Vol. 22.

p. 455 (octobor, 1876).

 

w

Whittaker” lather information! and Wariouo intona-
tion! - Iin the main perfectly true.‘ however, keeps elaborat-
ing on Custer-'3 memory in incidents occurring during his
life. and on the details of the final battle gets utterly
out of hand. on the basis of 'Yarious information. he
pilloried Reno. openly slanderod grant. publicly belittlod
terry, and attemtod to libel Benteen. mt the tough-minded
Benteen proved another matter: He toed Whittaker away like
a yapping our, and continued his unnerving course of con-
ociouo rectitudo.

me nustin speaks of thittoter'o "floaty-rive nrtho
on tomty-fivo pages, 0 but a full count would show his .
guilty of too much christian forbearance. rho Barnard inci-
dent could not possibly be clearer, and it io but one of a
undrod dealing vith the Civil war services of Motor. once
into caster's career on tho plains. Whittaker works up real
enthaiaon for his tea, to his on satisfaction managing to
'explaln'I the 1886 mutiny and the 1867 court~nartial, excuse
the abandonment of Ellito at Washita, present a I'true"
account or the Iellowotone and Black 5111. eXpediticns - ape
in passing slur or sneer mcock, Sully, sturgio. Eaton,
and stanlq.

Crook - and the scapegoat or the tort Fetternan eXpe-
giitiono. J. J. Reynolds - he reserves for special treatment.
Reynoldo' action of March 16, 1876, he cmareo unreasonably
to Washita - ignoring the fact that the brilliant Oglalla

-142-

strategist crazy Horse was very much alive in the Powder
River action. while Black Kettle was shot in his sleep at
washita; and considerations of tapograpw involved. Horo-
over. he draws almost his entire information from stories.
print ed in the let york Eibuno. not necessarily a reliable
source.

“heat everyone. I donatioally asserts whittsker.
sittiq comfortably in Mt. Vernon. l. 1., two thousand silos
asay, ivas to bias for only one thing - want of ones-g. I
and he suns up matters to his on satisfaction:

at the real trouble scene to have been
simple enough - a want of heart, an excessive
caution in every one. especially the leader.
wfien Custer went after Indians, he hinself was
alvays in the advance, and looking out for his
enemy. at the Washita we have found him with
the advanced scouts on all occasions. and watch?
ing the enemy hinself. Here, on the other hand.
we see neither BrooE nor Reynolds out in front.
the night wasted in idle waiting, and the battle
commenced at 9 o'clock with the result of every-
body falling Just a little short of his work.

the ponder River fight which, under
duster, would probably have ended in the complete
destruction of the band of crazy Horse.
nerely in burning eons of his property....

hi 13.. thittaker's Life. p. 543. all the itagics are
So , o

 

the reasoning is 01911 one: If Groove defeats of 1876
can be sheen due to a Ivant of enorgfi then esoteric
debacle on the um. 31¢ son-a - with a total of 26's nuoa
and 56 wounded against tb Orcok's total of 14 killed .14 31
sounded - can be excused by an excess of it. and finally it
is orplained,

...Orook had gained his reputation by a

~143-

pursuit and extermination of small scattered
bands of Apaches in arisona....aesides this.
Crook was getting older, and having been made a
brigadier was not so likely to work as ouster,
who was till only a lieutfxant-cclonel. thanks
to the seniority rule.... 59

 

139. Whittaker“ lgifo, p. 545. crook was then a
palsied 48.

 

mt it is in two of the final chapters - Icuster and
Grant- and “the Last Battle! - that Whittaker gains an
immortal place as an historian: a place inadequately occu-
pied at present'by Gaston 3. loans, certain friends of the
late or. acebbels, and the editor of 25% Hero so find
where nest of the myths of the motor Legend have their
printed genesis. It is true that Whittaker dress liberally
on nesspapor accounts, but it is equally true that only the
including of then in his biograpw has preserved thee in all
' their pristine untruth these sovuty-odd years. no is a
primary source of misinformation for time '1'. Brady. for
General xidd, for [ruler Bent, and for Shannon caret -- all
of who. have been quoted at length in this paper.

faking first the chapter Master and grantl sons of
the more egregricus myths apparent - oftm conveniently
italicized by the author of '"rho Death's Head RangersII his--
self «- can be noted for an overall citation.

:93 nudism-fighter of the plains: “gutter had never
at not with a single disaster while in connsnd of an inpcr-
tent expedition, and he had been blessed vith more couplets
success in his gndian meditions than an! other office}: in

the regular 5. ' (ztalieisod in original.)

meter and olyner: ....oonecne suggested that amoral
duster knee sonothing about corruption on the part of the ex-
oeoretary aelknap 3 he had been heard by sonoono to say that
he heard sonething on the subject, and so forth. on this ‘
vague infernation the sapiont chair-tan telegraphed a emails
to Gunter...and so started a train of cirounstanees which
was to end in the untinely death of the best cavalry chief
on the anorican continent. ' (sion: Indians not included.)

ouster, Olyler and Sitting Bull: I.. .mster has been
blamed by his enemies. when the real party to blame was the
officious chairnan who persisted in calling his. on Glyner's
shoulders, moreover. rests the responsibility of deferring
guster's departurcgefter fittiflll a ehole month. Had he
gone in april...custor night be alive nee. I (Italics and
reasoning shittskor's.) '

master andmant: I... grant node up his nind that
duster had turned against his in his period of trial....custor
heard of this, through private sources. and knee that the
President's inpreoaion as to his tootinoay was quite unfoundo
ed. I (Pause for scene change) i...rhon the rreeidut sent
out “...-a that he refused to see colonel meter, ad ouster
oat den and wrote his quiet, nanly letter. honest and
proud, sad and dignified....1t was useless. grant refused
to see his. II (Italics and nolodrena the nrovet Captain's.)

caster. sly-er and Grant: 'i'vc non store to blano for
all the troubles; meddling. officious Heister Olyner...
obstinate, ilplaoabls “tum was actually willing to
inperil the shale fate of the Sioux campaign and permit

r145-

tundreds of lives to be lost; to gain his revenge on caster
....grant well know in his heart that Gunter alone was fit
to command." an Whittaker; all hocey.)1*°

 

no. shittaker's Life, pp. 545-562 pencil.

 

The chapter Irhe Lest nattleI is patod with highly
significant quotations fron Ian officer's present during the
whole caspaign. whose name we at present withhold. I Ian
officer present with the upedition who stained the ground,
but whose sane we prefer to withheld for the present, I and
Ithie officer told the story personally to are. ouster after-
wardsI etc. etc. etc. the officer is never nased at any
place in the book. ouster writers now are virtually certain
that Captain weir was Whittaker” source, but that provides '
no excuse whatever for slanderous accusations on ancnyncus
authority.

If it was Weir, Whittaker might better have stated so.
for weir was an officer in the fight (although not in the
valley action with Reno), and he had a long and honorable
record both in tin Civil war and on the frontier. an slbion
nan, he left the University of uichigas to bosons a second
Lieutenant of the 3rd nichigan Cavalry on October 15. 1881.
served throughout the war and was broveted a Lieut. ~colonel
of the Volunteers. no Joined the seventh as a first
Lieutenant at its organisation. and was always a Icnster
nan.I _ .

However. while Weir’s accusations openly attributed
to weir would have given whittakor's theories real weight,

they would also have subjected flair and whittaker to open
refutation by non who were trying to protect auster's repu-
tation and Lars. Guster's feelings. Beyond any question.
whatever on open debate would have proved about Reno or
Benteen. it most definitely would have established the fact
that duster had dieobeyed his orders deliberately. had sent
needlessly tired men and worn-out horses into a trap, and
had not only authored his own destruction but also that of
225 men under his.

there were very good reasons for Whittaker“ 'officer
presentu to remain enonyuous. and for Whittaker to keep his
so. It would not only have disgraced his hero '- but at the
best temporarily - but also have spoiled the sale of his
book. And once broveted 'oeneral auster's liographerl,
rrederiok Whittaker had no desire to resume his for-er rank
as nerely the author of 'Double Death, or, the Spy-queen of
mating; and other stories. I

'i'he Last BattleI need not be exhaustively analyzed, I
only certain key myths noted. as devotes great effort to
going over rerry's written order with a microscope; inter-
preting‘ to suit his own notions - not those of the men actual-
ly present at the conference of ear where the plane were
drawn. He then sorutinizes Reno's official report and comes
up with the conclusion tint Reno is accusing duster unfairly
by saying:

1 think (after the great number of Indians
there were in the village) that the following
reasons obtained for the misfortune; his rapid

aarohing for two days and one night before the
fight, his attacking in the daytile at 12 1a.. and

~147~

when they were on the i vive, instead of early
in the morning, and las%fi', Es unfortunate 1‘1
division of the reginent into three commands.

 

570. 141. gene's Report as quoted in Whittaker” Life, p.

 

ten are referred to part I of this paper for the true
answer, but Whittaker Justifiee and explains everything by
saying, 'mster was a pe-aliar nan. He fought in a peculiar
way, and needed to have non under hin uses to his rapid ener-
getic style, and who understood his. ' (Bis italics. of
course). I

fhd rest of the chapter is overloaded with similar
sophistry, and insinuating phrases - often italicised - like,
I'...ie it any wonder Reno's battalion was beaten, when they
are ready to succumb to squaws, old non, and boys”. '31
took genteen two hours and a half to cover a distance of
three niles."both admit by their testinony that they diso-
beyed orders” 0the reasons. were, gene's incapacity and m—
teen's disobedience.l and lNiown they went. Lightersd in
oeiticn. Ian after nan dropping in his place. I

' so also brings in the pretty little story 'or (barley

and his sioux blanket - adding the touch of curley washing
off his crow warpaint and letting his hair dovn like a
Sioux. and then finally utterly discredits his book, his
sources of infcnatien, and unself as is historian! by the
nest incredible blunder of all. for a full page-end-a-half
he paints a vivid picture of the last ninutes- of action on
nonunut Hill of ouster fighting with his 3533; until at

.1‘8-

last shot down by that arch-villain of then all: Rain-in-
the-race.

ouster and his sabre - here we not only have the
start of a nyth, but also the authority for a hundred bar-
room lithographs of Icuster's Last stand. I Custer Ifighting
like a tiger with his sabreI - and every sabre in the regi-
meat at Port Lincoln. It is a very poor try. Whittaker
night at least have run an old filn backward and given us a
nyeterious am swathed in white eanite rising from the Little
Big Horn to hurl the brand Excalibur at an astonished Sir
hedivere. certainly this cannot be laid to any Iofficer
present with the expedition. I But it does do high credit to
the tutelage of Erastus c. needle.

and finally , in en epilogue. Whittaker leaves his
IfacteI to the world to Judge whether he is Inot right in
these conclusionsgI

1. 55d Reno fought as rguster fought and
had aenteen obeyed Queterts o crs , the battle

of the Little Big Horn might have p_roved fisfer's
as an grea es in an Y c 011.

2. Had not President grantE moved by
rivate reven oe displaced cue err ron e con-
can 0 Lincoln colunnl ouster would‘Be
alive today and the gndian War settled. 142

 

 

 

142. Whittaker's fe, pp. GOG-607.1t should be
reiterated that none of t e'Italics quoted from the “Life'
are nine; all are thittaker's.

 

It should not be thought that Ithe worldI Judged
WhittakerIe theories favorably at the tine. In fact, the
opposite was more the rule than the exception. Lbs nation
generously called it In very good book, but...repellsntly

-149!-

large and heavy.I and states with.true impartiality in its
review of the battle account:

...80 Captain Whittaker tells the story,
with earnestness and great conviction, and we
'leave it as he tells it with.but two additional
renanks - that he makes a strong prina facie case.
but that he is such an admirer and panegyriit of
Custer that his advocacy is to be regarded with
caution....1

 

143. Inhittdker's ILife of austerI I :hs gatich
Vol. 24, p. 180 (larch 22, 1877). ' .

A

the a and navy {cur-al, who had given Whittaker
nueh advance publicity as a for-er staff nenber, was less
restrained. two passages free the long review are pertinent
here:

rhere is such in the book we can heartily
. praise. and enough that calls for grave censure....
Before the official reports of the General and Lt.-
General of the Army have been made. this rash
writer furiously arraigns. tries, convicts, and
sentences the president, Major Reno. and Captain
Benteen for indirectly causing the death of
general Custer....31nce the above appeared in
rint can. ahernan and Lt.-aeneral sheridan...
we in their report to the war pepartnent, after
months of careful consideration of all facts and
much evidence not nade public, unequivocally con-
nended Reno as a brave and discreet soldier who
had plainly performed his whole duty, and plainly
ascribed the disastrous termination of Ouster's
fight to the unfortunate division of his connand....

and also

...Capt. whittaker has an absolute faith
in his hero, and a fire conviction that any opposi-
tion to his or to hds plans is of necessity to be
ascribed to stupidity or nalice. re indiscrimi-
nately land your hero is undoubtedly the easiest
way of writing biography, and there is such ex-
cuse for it in the case of a work hastily rushed
into print to catch the fleeting’tide of popular
interest. It is questionable, however, whether
the subject of eulogy gains or loses nest by such
partisanship, and we could have wished to see den.

-159-

Buster's career considered in a more Judicial and
call spirit....

How far Grant, duster, Reno or Benteen is
responsible for the terrible misfortune we have
yet to learn. Nor would this information affect
our opinion that George Lnsstrong ouster was a
nest gallant soldier, a superb cavalry leader, a
true conrade, a warnhearted generous nan. a faiths
ful friend....lone would sooner deprecate the at-
tempt to raise a senorial shaft to one soldier
upon the fragments of ancther's reputation, than
the Ian who sleeps quietly in a hero's grave in
the land of the Dacctahs. 44

144. ' mien Journal vol. 14 p. 314 (meter
23, 1375). ' '

 

But next to writing dine novels. rrederich thittaker
liked to write letters - long contentious, argulentative
letters, sparkling withrthe fool's gold of self-esteem but
assaying less than an ounce of worthwhile fact to the ten of
parenthetical phrases. as answered with.a letter longer
than the review itself, and demolished hineelf the last
excuse that could be made for his errors on the basis of
haste and incomplete infornaticn.

' Bandsoeely granting every man a right to his own opin-
ions, he then begins the pertinent part of his olains:

...I do, however, wish to clear the duster
biography from the charge of ireetlessi partisan-
ship, and especially from being “regardless of
facts-....ro the gray, through.you, I desire to
say this: Whatever nay be the errors in haste in
other parts of the Imire of ouster. in the chap~
ters entitled 'drant and cueter' and 'rhe Last
Battle! there are no such errors. They were our-
posely kept back till the whole book was in type
with the object of utilising every scrap of in-
fornation, however. snail, that could be gleaned
of events transpiring_ec recently, and one of
tha so far away. they were written and rewritten.
corrected again and again with the object of get-
ting at the facts whatever they night he, and who.
ever might be struck by then. I wrote then, on

-lfilr

the best evidence available, after long and
patient research, after hearing both.sides of the
questions, not only one....

When I wrote the chapter on 'Grant and
Custerl I linited.nyse1f to as cold an account
possible of the whole trouble between the two
men, letting the telegrams which I verified from,
their originals speak for themselves, my only is-
bor being to arrange them in chronological order.
Those telegrams to and from the General of the
Army and others left no opinion possible to an
unbiased.nind.but the one arrived at, and nothing
but the assumption that such telegrams are forger-
ies can invalidate that part of the argunent....

then with high.praise for his own unbiased state of

lied and absolute accuracy, he shows hinself - like
rrederidk in “the pirates of Panzanoel - an unwilling slave
to duty:

1877).

...tith.regard to the correctness of
conclusions on given data as to the last batt e,
they can only be determined by a careful examina-
tion of the evidence, as careful as 1 gave to it
for weeks and months during whiohlny attention
was devoted to finding out the bottOI facts of
the case, which I can see may be perfectly con-
sistent with the highest official reports....

of personal aninosity against the officers
criticized in the last part of the back I have
none. Could I have avoided telling what I have,
I would have done so, but duty left me no alter-
native but to speak out.145

145. arnlylavy Journal, vol. 14, p. 547 (January 6,

 

rhe IJournal'sI editorial consent in the ease issue

nust be included, for it strikes at the very heart of all

Custer controversies.

We fail however to see in the “patient re-
search' of a few months or a conscientious desire
on the author's part to utell the truth as he
sees it,“ any good reason for making charges af-
fecting the reputation of officers who do not de~
serve to be publicly branded without an opportuni-
ty for public defense....xothing but the most

-162-

absolute desonstrstios coco-panied by the proof
would Justify such statements as he has nude, and
this he has not given. Hence our criticise. The
reports of anonymous newspaper correspondents,
and an ex arte statement of the conclusions
drawn from e ers, of which we have not so such
as the names of the writers, is not proof on
which to base criticism affecting character and

‘ reputation. 1“

1“. £211“! gournal, vol. 14, p. 346 (January 6,
187?).

 

By an interesting coincidence, the same day the above
exchange took place, Benteen was penning one of his very
few comments on the battle and Whittaker - or’much else for'
that matter - ever to get into print. It is s truculent,
hard-hitting letter that in effect tells Whittaker, and any ,
one else who holds the ease opinions, to spread the slander
if he wishes and go to hell with it: History will vindicate
Benteen and his conduct, if vindication is required; end.if
not, history can go to hell, too.

Dated ”tort nice, p. 1., Jan. 6, 1397- it says:

In the issue of your paper of nee. 23, I _
see thst you review the con lete life of General
a. a. ouster, by nrevet ap . rederick thit-
teker, 6th ll- !. cavalry.

I desire to thank you for the sensible
remarks therein contained - fist: and Rene
fought as Custer fought, and Benteen obeyed
Ouster'e orders, the battle of the Little Big
abrn ui ht have proved Ouster's last and great-
est Indian victory.'. I put right here, without

~ fear“cf contradiction; yes, and his first Indian
victory too! I‘rhe Battle of washits.ii Is con-
prised in this grand total. (I do not mean to
include custerls war record in this assertion).
I have been with ash. ouster since the organiza-
tion of the 7th Cavalry, and. claim to know
whereof I speak; nor do I desire to get into s
controversy about his merits 4 or otherwise - as
seen free my standpoint, as now I cannot, or
would not, say what 1 would and did while General

-155-

ouster was alive. 1 say here, that colonel Reno
and I thought during the siege of June 25th and
26th at the Little Big Horn that he, Reno, was
the abandoned party, and spoke of it as another
'IlaJor Elliot affiarn thinking that General
ouster had retreated to the mouth of the river
where the steamboat was supposed to be, and that
gene's command was left to 1ts fate. I an
accused of disobeying mete“ orders. Nothing
is further from the truth, and I do not think the
matter of sufficient inportsnce to attempt to
vindicate myself, but can rest contentedly under
the ban when 1 have the consoling belief that the
contrary is so well-known by all my military
superiors and subordinates.

you spoke rightly when you denominated
Whittaker s. 'rash writer, I for in a letter to me
he acknowledges his information has been obtained
from what 1 can demonstrate to be most questions--
ble authority. I have not attempted to defend
myself on such insinuations, because the game is
not worth the candle. I have s child - a tan--
yesr-old boy; if he learns from his father's
daily life what his character is, as he must,
will it make much difference to him in after
years, in stumbling across thittaker's book, to
see his father quoted as having neglected the
first duty of a soldier? No, air; as I hope to
demonstrate to him by daily life that the asser-
tion was altogether without foundation, and I
have no idea that any pain will ever be caused
him, should he in after life not find the con-
trary confirmed by weightier evidence than in
Whittaker's book. '

There was a slight undercurrent in the 7th
Cavalry which you, as a public organ, might
know, and which knowledge may throw some light on
matters which hr. o'xelly, the Herald reporter,
wrote, and from which Whittakermned his one,
viz: colonel Reno's official r ort of the bat-
tle of the Little Big Horn broug t not with it
the need of satisfaction which I believe the
writer wished, but his mentioning ne specially
was an invidiousness of which he thought not.
lost certainly 601. Reno asked me not for counsel
in preparing his report. Howeverft'fie report
when received by the regiment drew from one offi-
cer the exclamation in public, Inst he doesn't
mention me)! (calling out his own name). from
that meat on an be said, the society for
uutuel admiration was organised in the regimat,
end assiduously did they work - Colonel norm be-
ing the chief objective point, I the second fro-
being unfortunate enough to have been specially
mentioned by Colonel R. is his official report.

-1“-

the meetings of the society have been held in
secret; no lst class men were contributing mu-
bers; none of then can bear the test of light
and truth; but still they don't want their light
hidden under a bushel, and they have succeeded
in getting vile slanders into public printed,
through the greatest organ this country has, and
yet they are not happy: low, through whittaker,
the story goes into history (1).

I can on with Othello:

'Ahd little of this great world can I

speak,

lore than pertains to feats of broil and
battle;

and therefore little shall I grace my
cause

In speaking of myself; yet, by your
gracious patience,

I will a i - a portion of a—II round un-
varnish'd tale deliver

01‘ my whole career. ' ----

And you, sir, can do with it what you will.
I'. w. Benteen, m. 001. u. 3. ~14?

147. .ruly-lag Journal, vol. 14, p. 378 (January 20.
187?). This s ano r a completely overlooked by all
Custer students.

 

 

But whatever his published preference for the sabre,
Whittaker made his greatest charges with the pen, thundering
up the glacis and through the sally-ports like a knight-errant
(the pun is intended) of old - only all to frequently leav-
ing it to others to notice that he had left his horse behind.
It goes without saying that his reply to Benteen is internin-
able, but again certain excerpts met be given because they
show how Whittaker“ repeatedly damned himself and his
'historical- nethods with his own mouth. first portraying
Benteen as slandering a dead nan, he states at last

...:here is no question I think that
colonel Benteen wishes to convey in these words

that general caster unnecessaril abandoned.najcr
Elliot to his fate, aid firther’ghat the Indians
defeated Custer in the battle of Washita. Sheru
idan's reports of 1888, etc. are cited, but no
direct answer made to the charge ...Whether Ben-
teen's conduct of June 25, 1876, will bear the
same tests as those applied to auster's in 1868,
time will tell.

...In no letter to Colonel Benteen have I
ever acknowledged the source of my information
to be such as he can possibly show to be question-
able. as wrote me first a short note, stating
that he had seen a review of my book in the
Herald, and that he proposed to send me his wer-
sIcn of the battle to show wherein 1 misrepre-
sented hdm. ‘xn answeringfihis note I admitted the
difficulty of rocurifig a direct Information
'Eid GXpPOBBB he earnest Esp. that he mighf‘fie
able to adduce sens facts that would compel me
to alter my Opinion of his conduct at that fatal
battle. a,few days later I received the promised
'version' from colonel nenteen whichuwas a more
amplification if the letter in last week's
'Journal.!.... 48

 

 

p
'f

' I“. -I& J “ml, '01. 1‘. De $5 (Jtmal'i 2?.
1877). In this case the ItZIIos are mine; it is a habi
hard to avoid in studying mush.of Whittaker.

 

whatever his brave front,‘lhittaker nevertheless ap-
proached the formidable senteen with great caution from then
on, although he abated his letter writing to the public press
not a whit (no pun intended this time). only one more ex-
change of the letters on his book written directly to the
and lav; gournal will be given, but they, too, bring
out points too important to pass over. .

an undated letter signed '35--! was incorrect on
criticizing whittaker for checking nonrce, Michigan, instead
of new analy, ohio d auster*s birthplace - for early facts
on his life, but was correct on the following:

...10 quote from Capt. Whittaker's comaua-
ication in the Iqurnal* of Jan. 6: Iny a chain

~155-

of circumstances over which he had no control,

he Custer was drawn much against his will into
the midst of a political contest the most
acrimonious that has been known in our national
history since the civil War. ' nid not Capt.
Whittaker in his laborious research discover a
telegram sent to the non. Heister clymer early
in the Belknap investigation, in substance as
follows? "an investigation into the post trader-
ships upon the Upper uissouri will reveal a state
of things quite as bad as at tort sill. signed,
a. A. ousterd What then comes of the much
prated theory of reluctance to visit the city of
Washington? Did not the telegram alone cause the
summons before the committee of which the Hon.
Holster Glymcr was chairman? was not that tele-
gram olearly officious and unmilitaryt....149

 

149'. «a Journal, vol. 14, p, «as (latch is,
1877). I have Even {he telegram in Part I of this text.

r ‘

Whittaker - these “various information' and unnamed
nofficers present' allowed him to slander others without
restraint - took the correspondent .3“.-. to severe task
for not signing his name, wholly innocent of any irony. and.
his answer revealed, in very small part

...Assuming that the telepan really

passed, which evidence in my’ possession leads me

to doubt, I see nothing in the message more than

the natural disgust of an honorable officer

against the theft and bribery which he was com-
polled to see around him, unpunished....150

 

150. Aging gournal, vol. 14, p. 531 (March 24,
1877).

 

the 'various and other information! from “officers
present whose names of the present I shall withhold" had
now graduated into |'evidence in my possession. 0 Even when
caught in an honest error, Whittaker was not capable of ad-
mitting it - could not, in truth, for his edifice was not

even built upon sand, but mud, and in a flood of unadorned
fact it collapsed.
Nothing more is seen of him in the correspondence

coluans of the Army and havLJournal. There were too many

 

ailitary non to balk at theories of Indian warfare drawn
free the library of Beadle a Go. there were too many read-
crs whose knowledge of the rules of historical evidence es-
barrassed him. From then on he withdrew to the more friendly
pages of the N. I. £93113 where peasants and other low-born
rabble were less likely to dispute a gentleman's word with
vulgar demands for facts.

» three significant events had happened. rirst, captain
weir had died suddenly on pecuber 9, 1876, while on
recruiting duty in new york city. me cause was said to be
Doongestion of the brain,‘ although what precisely was scant
is not clear. second, Reno, while in cos-and of port
abercrabie, n. 1‘- , was conrt-eartialed and suspended from
ranh for two years. the charge specified 'scandalcus conduct
toward the wife of another officer of the garrison during his
ast‘bsenceul the sentence of 'dienisaal free the service! was
ailigated by the secretary of war, in view of Reno's long
and honorable record. third, the sales of thittakerfie 'Life'
were falling off.

thittaker now began to state openly that voir had fur-
nished his' his evidence against Reno, and talked openly of a
oourt-nartial for cowardice. Since there were legal points
involved - one obvious one.bsing that WhittAKer had no proper
status to prefer charges ~ this was soon changed to a deaand

 

for a public investigation. general Rosser and others added
fuel to the flame, and after a year had amused such violent
public opinion against 3on0.

this was dramatized by one of the easy phoney inter-
views with sitting null, then under Canadian protection north
ofthe line. It scene clear that the correspondent of the
H. I. M actually went to Fort welsh, Canada, and talked
to Sitting Bull through the local northwest haunted Police
superintendent, since at the tine a joint emission was
trying to arrange his return to the Sioux agencies. It was
published on novsnber 16, 187?, and 'prcved' that neno was
responsible for the defeat the Little Big Horn.

the s. I. 19114., outraged at the scoop, thereupon pub-—
lished their exclusive 'interview,‘ two days late. According
to the 10333. the old chief spoke fluent french, and there-
fore their correspondent spoke directly to him, without a:
interpreter. This was an even more distorted version of
custer's death. Ithat Sitting mil may well have spoken to
neither - and most decidedly not in 'excellent l'rench'I -
now seems entirely likely. He spoke only the nacotah dia-
lec'ts of which literal translation word-for-word was extreme-
1y difficult.

‘ nevertheless, this was the capshsaf to all the Indian
Itestincny' and Whittaker undo the nest of it in his aany
allegations. finally, lay 18, 1876, in a letter to the
territorial Delegate fro- vyoaing, w. w. cortlett, he de—
nanded an official congressional investigation of Reno's con*
duct - in his capacity as 'General custer's Bicgrapher. I

 

~159-

The reasons he gave were:

First: Information coming to no fro: par-
ticipants in the battle, written and oral, is to
the effect that gross cowardice was displayed by
Major narous a. Reno, 7th U. s. Cavalry, second
in command that day; and that owing to such
cowardice the orders of Lt. col. duster, command-
ing officer to said Reno, to execute a certain
attack were not carried out....

That after Major Reno's cowardly flight,
he was Joined by Capt. F. s. Benteen...and that
he remained idle with this force while his super-
ior officer was fighting against the whole force
of the Indians, the battle being Within his know-
ledge, the sound of firing audible from his posi-
tion, and his forces out of immediate danger fro:
the enemy.

that the consequences of this second exhi-
bition of cowardice and incompetency was the nas-
sacre of Lt. col. duster and five companies of
the 7th.u. s. cavalry.

the Second dealt with the fact that charges could be
proved only by persons in the u. 3. service who could be
ordered to testify only by congress. hence the need of a
congressional Investigation.

Third: The only official report of the
battle now extant is the report written by Major
Reno...false and libellous to the memory of the
late L3. 001. ouster in that it represents the
defeat...as owing to the division by cueter...
into 3 detachments...and to ignorance of the
enemy's force - all serious charges against the
capability of said duster as an officer; where-
as the defeat was really owing to the cowardice
and disobedience of said Reno and to the willful
neglect of said Reno and Capt. Benteen to Join
battle with the Indians in nu port of their com~
sanding officer when they might have done so.
and it was their plain duty to do so.

the yonrth.is to the effect that the welfare of the
army requires that blame should be officially establsihed
'to the end the Service may not deteriorate by the retention
of cowards.“ A -

"unw-

Fifth: Justice to an officer of the pre-
viouely unstained record of ment.-col. Gunter
denande that the. accusation under which his men--
cry BO! reete, in the only official account of
the Battle of the Little Big Horn noe extent,
ehonld be proved or dieproved.

In concluding he then makee a etatenent highly inpor-
tent in light of vhet took place when he appeered at the
Reno court of Inquiry.

I have given {ion ae briefly ee 1 cen ey
reeeone for eating t e inveetigation, and tb
feet I an confident of being able to prove. ‘he
vitneeeee will be all the living officere of t
7th 0. 8. Cavalry who vere preeent at the battle
of June 25, including naJor Reno and Capt. Ben-
teen - myself to prove the etateeent of en offi-
cer eiece deefieed. eede ee a fee deye before
hie death... 1

161. .3304; gem-eel, vol. 15: p. 74? (me 22,.
1878). the genre quc ee e meld. r

_‘

Reno, on hearing of the cofllett letter, addreesed
one of hie on to the heed of the House military effeire coe-
nittee, H. B. Banning, stating that he was in Iaehington for
the very purpeee of aching en inveetigation to clear hieeelf

 

strangely referring to lhdtteker no on 'irreepeeeible
source. ' Gangreee, hoeever, adjourned eithont eny action.
and none appealed direct to Preeident neyee. wee tha
ordered the rescue neno court of Inquiry te eeet in Ohicece
on January 6. 1m I'for the purpeee of inguirieg into neJcr
1mm conduct at the Battle of the Little Big horn. '

‘ 1: the pertieen preee had bed no my there mild
have been no need whateoever for Judicial inveetigetion. the
Clevelend M, to cite e paper outeide of Ice york. eee
typical:

-161-

...Reno'e disobedience of orders in not
continuing his charge through the Sioux camp, and
his cowardice in retreating from his upregnable
position in the woods before he lost a man, boo
cause the sioux shook their blankets’at him and
threatened a charge, is newr thought to be the
chief cause of the duster disaster. and if an
impartial investigation was made of Reno's con-
duct he would be found to be respmsible for the
fate of Custer and his men.152

 

152. Aral-lag Journal. vol. 16, p. 101 (septelber
21, 187?).

 

the slanderers, Whittaker always in the forefront,
had done their work well. And if the dine-novelist”: actions
were only irritating up to the point of the ell-ax of all
the lusteria, innuendo, unsupported ruler, and open lies,
they were soon to be revealed as absolutely nauseous. It
grows increasingly hard not to dislike hederich whitteher
intensely as matters progress.

For the ment.. hovever, he use almost a hero. The
m, with very little prodding fro- hie, cane out with
this on beoenber 28. 1878, a week before the court was to
assemble:

...one of the officers commanding a culpa-
ny...under Ramona" nvt. Lt. col. rhea. n.
weir, who died in use xork city in December of
the same year. and the is said to have made and
ssorn to a statement before his death in which
he claimed to have been in full vice of the
Water fight...and tint he so reported to Reno
and urged that help be given their caradee. the
statement adds, it is said, that Reno flatly re-
fused to make the movement as urged. and see
cpenly accused at the tins of cowardice by hie
own officers.

...i'his sworn statement vas placed, before
calonel weir's death in the hands of a well-knot:
new york est—officer of the volunteers, who is
widely tho-n as an admirer and biographer of the
late General duster, and who solemnly proeised

 

~162'

Colonel weir not to rest until the matter was
officially investigated, and not to let the con-
tents of this statement become publicly known
until an investigation was ordered.153

 

163. - a Journal Vol. 16 . 36"! (Jenna 4
1879). £21!!! s s P 37 s

 

laturally people were greatly puzzled hy the identity
of the person to when captain weir had made his statement,w
although we can safely guess that he was not only an aduirer
of the I'late general Custer! but also the very nuch.living
Brevet Capt. Frederick whittaker; Papers like the gggalg
were positive that the Iweir Affidavit" would clinch their
long campaign of cent and libel against naJor Reno - thereby
clearing ouster's name and increasing circulation revenue.

But here and there a doubting voice was raised. the
Chicago 13332 had a story at startling variance with the

gerald:

the officers attached to on. sheriden's
staff express no opinion regarding the charge of
cowardice against under Reno. they believe,
however. that the court will be able to elicit a
vast aeount of highly interesting testilony re-
lating to the fight in which ouster end his band
net with.externination. other officers of the
grey, temporarily sojourning here, are more out-
spoken in their views of the case. sole of the!
do not scrupls to say that the inquiry will
result in tarnishing the lustre of general Buster's
name and renown as a warrior. they are of the
opinion that it will be shown that Custer, by a
hot-headed haste to achieve all the glory for
himself. and by a virtual disobedience of orders,
brought about the awful disaster which appalled
the nation and the world. This, they think, will
be one of the results of the inquiry, not that
Guster's conduct is under investigation, but be-
cause in showing what Reno did or did not do to
avert the calamity, it rill also be shown in
what degree ouster alone was responsible for his

~165-

own luented fats.. . . 15‘

 

18'”) 154. Amy-Hag Journal, vol. 16, p. 407 (January 18.

 

The testimony proved a blow to the Whittakerites.
Every officer called except Godfrey testified under oath that
Reno had showed no cowardice in leadership or in personal
actions.“ the testimony bore out definitely that his actions
had saved what remained of the reginent. Godfrey's euphemis-
nistic charge of “nervous tinidityi tended to discredit him,
rather than Reno.

unny still say of the Reno court. with rrazier mat:
With a few exceptions it is proper to say that, by and
large, it became more a whitewash than a serious attenpt‘ to
get at the bottom of tin tragedy. at all costs the honor of
the ugliest and of the any bad to be sustained. of the
officers called only Lieutenant aodfrsy penittsd hisself to
be critical of Ream-155 f

 

156. was with meter. p. 177.

 

Since mt presents no proof, but only an opinion, we
must fern a Judgnent a shot actually transpired. It should
be reesmbsred that even at this tine none was under aspen-
sion from rank and pay. his conduct at tort aberoroabie had
destroyed what little personal popularity he had ever had
among the officers. although the picture of the paunchy tired
little naJcr as a threat to every lath in the reginmt is now
alnost laughable. not it was not so considered at the tics.

and every narried nan had his wife to consider, and every
bachelor officer that he was testifying about a cad end a
bounder.

there was no obligation to whitewash Reno. If the
true facts of the Little Big nor-n were adverse to his. at
the tine it was only one acre black sark against a self-dis-
graced nan - and half the press of the country would have
cheered any coloring of eviduce that Iilitated against hin.
on the other hand, coloring it to protect his. as mat in-
plies, would bring greater discredit to the service ~ not
sustain the honor of the reginent. If nsno was the only
reason the reginent was whipped by the Indians, the regi-
nentts honor would be cleansed by public exposal of his
guilt. f

And there is yet. the pmbl. that every man was speak-l
ing under oath. 1f the actual facts of the battle sustained
the charges against Reno as urged'by whittaker and lesser, the
only way men who took part in it could whitewash Reno would
be to lie under oath. For}!!! today is not a canon thing.
and witnesses once sworn feel the-selves under a truendous
. obligation. with the co-issioned and non-co-issioned sen
of the frontier any, honor was often literally their only
possession of value - and certainly it would not be risked
aerely,to save the feelings of a sea in Reno's personal
predicament. ‘

out last of all it is allost inpossible t. read the

daily news accounts and be convinced of a whitewash. Each

witness was examined and re-exanined by a man whose syrups-
thies were with Custer, not Reno. The Recorder. 1st Lieut.
Jesse M. Lee. 9th Infantry. repeatedly demonstrated that he
disapproved the way the evidence was pointing, and did every-
thing possible to bring out contrary proof. one illustration
will show what is meant:

...!he Recorder asked witness if at the
tins of the fight he entertained a good opinion
of gen. ouster and was in accord with hin. col.
Benteen said that his opinion was as good as it
ever had been, and he was as much in accord with
gen. custer as he ever had been. hr. ailbert
objected to further interrogations of this kind.
Recorder Lee said it appeared to be the tendency
of the testinony to show that can. ouster was an
incompetent officer; that he had no definite plan
of battle; that his massacre was due to that
fact, and that major Reno was thereby exonerc
ated. Be desired to elicit the facts regarding
the feeling between ocl. nenteen and can. ouster
in order to litigate this tendency. 156

 

156. Minn gournal. vol. 16. p. 473 "chi-nary O,
1879).

 

water's rights were more than well-protected at the
Reno court of Inquiry, and in the final analysis it doesn't
seen 'pmperi at all of critics like Hint to discredit its
findings for Reno as a Whitewash. ' Reno was exonerated on
much the same line Recorder Lee objected to, and it is very
close to the verdict of history.

mt whittaker has been left hanging in the air,
anticipating his great nonent of triunph when 'his' investiga-
tion should prove out his slanderous charges and his book
break all sales records. Then cones a sudden thadding anti-
clinax. The 'Journal's' account tells it to the point:

trod whittaker on the 27th day of January
handed into the none Court a paper signed I'najor
Reno's Accuser.‘| in which he asked that he might
be allowed to question the witnesses. the Record-
er said that - though he didn't consider hinself
in the light of a prosecutor ~ he thought. he was
conducting the examination thoroughly, and he
also felt that he was able to continue the nan-
agement of the case himself. Hr. oilbert (Reno's
counsel) did not object to the questions being
put, but he did object to Captain Whittaker, not
otherwise interested in the investigation than
that of 'a sensation,“ to be allowed to examine
witnesses.....157

Y7

157. ply-Nag gournal. Vol. 16, p. 4'73 (lebruary B.
1879).

 

that was all there was to it, no third act unlocking
of the real villain, no nelodranatic producing of the
Papers, no Weir ‘ffidavit - and nothing acre said about it.
Posters all over the countryside advertising two little
Eva's and real blocdhcunds - and than the show is canceled
without notice.

to deprive a aeglonaniao. such as whittaker had shown
hinself to be. of his suprene nonent there had to be an
exceptionally strong reason. and there was. In the Phila-
delphia gundgl mes for larch 16, 1879, there appeared a
story by Robert lewton Price - believed to be the cane nan
who took charge of Liwt. Hodgson's bow. and refuted wild
tales of great mutilation when the dead weredisinterred in
1877. It was titled in the mind new; gout-n . '1‘!»
Secret of the Reno trial... with consents by their Washington
correspondent. '

the inportant part is self-explanatory:

Ir. price in his article gives us sons

 

 

1167:

idea of the man Whittaker, she has tried to lake
a hero of hinself and to turn an honest penny for
himself at tin same tine by getting subscriptions
to his life of meter, "only four dollars and
twenty-five cents each.” lton the publication of
this valuable biography,‘ says nr. price, 'synpa-
t seemed to wane and the ordinary advertising
so once see-ed so futile, so recourse nuet be
had to something startling.

about this tine Gel. tier [sic] of the 7th
cavalry was detailed on recruiting service and
stationed in new tort. wier's only weakness was
that of nany other wholesouled men - too craving
an appetite for exhilarating stimulants, and
through it whittaker found his opportunity. as
it had become pretty generally understood that
Ouster's mistake had been a fatal one for his in
more senses than one, his 'biogrspher' concluded
to follow Josh Billings! advice as to the proper
method of making a correction - Iby cussing sun-
body else fur it. ' wier died suddenly, and in- ‘
nediately after his demise there began to appear
from tine to tine, throughout the press of the
entire country, insinuations against Reno and
genteen. Hints soon became definite charges and
ouster was promoted from hero to martyr; even
the subscription limitation on the circulation
of the book was less rigorously enforced. Whit-
taker returned to the attad: nobly and was again
equal to the emergency. '

low, after 001. tier was dead, Whittaker
professed to have an affidavit made by the deed
officer setting forth that Custer was overwhelm-
ed and his comand massacred because of the
treachery of both Reno and Benteen. on the nest--
ing of the Court of Inquiry Whittaker was asked
to produce the affidavit. mt,‘ s s Hr. Price,
Ihe declined. two reasons effective influenced
its suppression: the first and merely noninal
one was that tier never made the affidavit
alleged; and the second and material drawback was
the resence of captain oharles araden, late of
tin th, now retired because of wounds received
in the tellosstone fight of 1873. this gentle-
Ien was in Chicago to testify that he had been a
guest at the sane hotel in low tort with tier
sole tine before and up to within a few days of
the latter's death, and that tier had frequently
complained that Yhittnker was constantly pester-
ing bin to sign a paper which stated that none
failed to assist ouster when he could have done
it, and was therefore responsible for the nassa-
ere. as Weir further eXpressed not only his
intention of not doing it, but expressed his
opinion of the self-sacrificing patriot who made

the proposal in the stream: at and most euphatio
eloquence of a trooper. I

158. 5%mazi foumal, Vol. 16, p. 5811. (larch
22. 1879) The nape ng e used throughout on Weir'e name.

The inaplioation ie quite clear that Whittaker promot-
ed the whole Reno investigation to bolster up the nagging

 

 

ealee of hie ouster biography. or am the “Journal! etatee
boldly I'to bleet the reputation of deeerving men in order to
lake none: out of a worthleee book. I Thie ie most likely
too extreme I. view, as Whittaker eee hardly such an iepor—
tent figure that investigation of the Last stand could not
have occurred without hie. nut that, for his part, he
forced the Inquiry for such reasone is reasonable. md the
widely heralded Weir affidavit” was never presented at
all - even though the “well—known new york eat-officer of the
Volunteer“ had eo 'eolennly pronieedl dolonel Weir.

imajor Reno'e Aeomqera was neatly hoist by hie oen
peterd. And though he declaim‘ed as he left the Inquiry that
'ee the biographer of the late Gen. duster he deemed it his
duty to promise to the peOple or the United states that he
would eee that congress right the reputation of gen.
meter,“ he etalke out of the eoene or the duster Legend.
In 1884 he use again in fine'fettle dieputing an editorial
claim or the flew fork tribune that dine novels eaueed Juve-
nile delinquency. (note the date). Beyond that there ie
only eilmee - the utter relief or eileeoe.

But in the‘ end, the libele put in motion by whitteker
got gene anyway. He remed hie rank and pea at [art nude

in the sled nine in lay-1879, eae court-nertialed for the

eeecnd tine in love-ber 1879, and diuieeed fro- the m in
larch 1880. However, the tree one ie ecarcely that einple.
and it hae been groeely nieinterpreted.

col. 8. n. sturgie, who had rem-ed active comend of
the 7th upon ceeter'e death, had a beautiful daughter Ella,
with aepiratione to be an actress and not above being
pleased with attention: of nan: ahirere. neno'e barely
eerited reputation an a eenece to vceanhcod eae non vell-
rooted in the regimental mind. So. ehen on the evening of
love-ber 10th, he looked at Illa sturgie through a window,
colonel eturgie found quick neane for e. cenrt-nartial
charge. I

Since nice eturgie vae fully clothed and eeated with
her nether. IaJor fine no in the preeence of at least three
other officere. and one of the. at leaet teetified else to
looking at General'e daughter, it eae a little difficult to
prove hin a peePiflS 1'03: Ileteed. :lla entrain told the
court - with more then a hint of nel nerte in her drautic
teetieony - that ehe feared Reno eould ehcot her ehee ehe
dieocvered hie, become of cone fancied grudge ageinet her
father. 1: vae an accueation rather difficult to fit into
the Army's rigid regulation“ for legal proceedinge.

In order to give the court-nutial cone eenblance of
legality, however. Reno eae tried on three different chargee
- none concerning the xlla atnrgie incident. on I'oondnct
Elbow-ing an officer and a gentle-ana he one charged with
(1) on October 26th etrikinc Lieut. licholecn with a

billiard one; {2) on met 8th getting drunk in a billiani
roo- snd mashing a window and fiseveral tines. eantcnly and
in a serious manner. did knock money out of the hand of the
saloon keeper” and (5) airing the absence of the post
trader w. 2. ranchers he had visited hie residence While in
a disgusting condition of intoxication. on august 3rd.

the sane Lt. nichelscn testified as to 6) that
several of then took supper washers and hiefivife, that
all had several drinks. neno fell asleep in hie chair and
was taken hone to hie quarters. ranshave hinself testified
similarly adding: Ineno did not innit ”self or n: family. 0
As to (l) everyone agreed that nicmlson (who later became
a general) had started the fight, and that Reno had hit hi-
eith the one only on repeated provocation; and finally that
(2) was 'a quiet spree,‘ - although that was definitely a
matter of relative opinions. ‘

If it was not a franc-up to soothe col. Sturgis‘ .
sffronted dignity. it was at least a fares. and shoe Sturgis
telegraphed December 9th to the at. rsnl Pioneer-green In
your issue of the 4th a: evidence before the court martial
is given incorrectly: in fact all the evidence has be.
garbled before leaving needeoc-d; I the m counted: at
is perhaps because the evidence has been garbled that so
little has appeared ehich seems to afford any reasonable
ground for the charges against nsnc. or for the solemn and
expensive for-e of a court-Israel. *159

20,. 1679).

nosever, the uncomfortable members eventually found
Reno 'gziltyi - With a recommendation for leniency by the
majority of the court. the endorsements of general ferry
and General ahernan are not only self-explanatory but reveal-
ing as well:

(Terry) ...such bein the vice taken of
the case by these members 0 the court the find-

ing upon this charge should not have been in .
eith a recommdation'to mercy, but It effing?!

have been not c"uilt to the charge.
' £53 sentence is Ianifeetly excessive as e
pnnishnent for the acts of which uaJor none was

found guilty under the first charge and its
specifications, but as I have no power to modify
it, and as my disapproval of it would put an end
to the case. leaving najor Reno vithout any pun-
ish-ent ehatever, 1 family approve. I Join,
however, in the recommendation of a majority of
the nonbers of the court that it be nodified....

(Sherman) In view of the reconnendaticn...
it is respectfully reconmended that the sentence
of the court be modified at suspension fron con-
land for the space of one year with loss of half
pay. and that during the time of suspension iiaJor
Reno be confined to the linits of the post where
the headquarters of his re inent may be, and
that he be reduced fiv fi es in the list of
majors in the cavalry. 50 .

ice. A§fiag ionrnal. vol. 17, p. 664 (Karen 20,
1880). rhe fu case n summed up on p. 625f. (March 27,
1880). Italics are nine.

 

 

Both believed their recommendations would be accepted.
but it see not to be. Hayes first offered Reno a chance to
resign, which Reno correctly refused in view of the circu-
stances. the. latter then tang fire until narch 16, 1880,
when the President - concluding ethat in giving the “Jar an
opportunity to resigs he did all he could do without doing
great violence to public opinion. - approved the sentence.
Kajor neno ceased to be an officer of the U. s. m. one

-172-

cf the most vicious and unwarranted slander campaigns had

run its course. arevet captain Frederick Whittaker, 0th

a. ‘1'. veteran Cavalry, "General Ouster's Biographer' and

major Reno's accuser' '- the man who could have son the

Battle of the Little Big Horn (had it been fought in m.

Vernon, H. I.) - had produced his greatest dime novel.
and some people still accept it as history.

THE m WHO um CHESTER.

But if captain Whittaker vas an earlier.- nudaeious
version of Humor Hoople - saved always from utter. complete
exposure by the bunblim course of fate - there was nothing
of the sort about another captain: :. 3. W01.

aodfrey cane frcn vest Point Just after the Civil var
to Join the 7th cavalry on its initial organisation. and
eventually rose to the rank of brigadier general of the regu-
lars. His frontier service began at once, and stretched very
nearly free washita in 1838 to wounded xnec in 1&0. as dis-
tinguished hiuelf in his first action for his exceptional
coolness under'fire. and in-tins became kneel throughout the
army for his courage and ability. ‘

He served on the xellovstone expedition vith distinc-
tion, and was noted at the Little Big acre for discounting
his troop to fight on foot in the rearguard action that
saved “Captain. 'eir vhen Reno node his advance along the hills
to try and locate duster. on veir's death, aodfrey became a
captain in the seventh and a troop oouander. as use an ad-

sirer, but not necessarily a partisan, of Bentem's; and in

 

 

~173~

the beginning he disliked duster as heartily as he despised
RmOe
Al noted. at the Reno Court of Inquiry. he Was the
only officer “to criticise Reno's conduct. um his writings
were mach full of statements that he 'had told the: at
Chicago that he thought of as... but at the a... his testi—
nosy was rather evasive. He came up with the dancing
euphemisl I'nervous tinidity! when asked pcintblank if at.
such-and-such a point daring the action on Reno's 3111. Reno
had 43in cowardice. It was the place for a direct charge. ‘
openly stated in exact words, for the nan he later donned
after his death was being investigated by an official court
convened for exactly that purpose.
His testing at the 1899 court vent about as follows:
Godfrey said: '1 was going to the pack-
train, we started across together. the Indians
set up a heavy firing on usyand IlaJ. Reno dodged
and said. ‘Iim damned if I want to be killed by
Indians. 1 have gone through too Iany battles.
He said it in a laughing way. '
rho question see asked his by Reno's coun-
selx “When Reno dodged that bullet, he said in
a laugh way that he did not care to he killed
...by In ans as he had gone through many battles?“
Godfrey answered. "teed
Question: Inid that indicate any fear?“

answer; lfinot fear; I thought it vas ner~
vous tiniditle 61

161. [red Estin, note 3. p. 13..

A...

If acdfrsy me anything here than that with which to
unmask lens as a coward. he passed up his finest opportunity
to so testify: under oath. lietorically, it leaves but tvo
conclusions possible: ' Either every officer at the Reno court

43M-

exeept Godfrey was nistska. or falsifying under oath, or
Godfrey was mistaken. lore likely. Godfrey, 'a bante- fight-
ing 00¢. with the heart of a lion, found anything but a
flasboyant demonstration of courage insufficimt to his
standards.

In the years after the battle he collected as such
saterial bearing on it as he could find. presenting papers
on it at post lycsens and the. sort. and as he possessed a
clear crisp style of exposition he began to trite mob for
any publications on the subject of tactics, dissonsted
fire, frontier earfare. eteet’era. It helped to gain his
needed recognition is his line. and he see eventually chosen
for the general staff school at fort Leavenworth.

the duster controversy had pretty sell died dose by
the ties of sounded goes in 1890. none had been exonerated,
dinissed, and was a year dead at the tins of the punitive
action on the Pine Ridge Agency against the Iahcst Dancer».
noeever, since it one the 7th cavalry shieh did what little‘
actual cclbat that occurred, there sas loose talk of 'mster
at last revenged. '~ omseqoently, public interest .eas re-
vived in the affair at the Little sis son, and captain
Godfrey prepared an article on it for the 22.2225! sagasine-

It was published is Juan-y, 1.892, and established
Godfrey as m caster authority. Ithere were any errors of
siaple tact, expected in such articles, and sole appended
co-snts by Col. J's-es a. try - all skin: as bad a one
possible for the ace dead scapegoat Reno. In addition,
Godfrey, 1s eta-ing up. directly attributed doctor's some

4.75-

to Ineno'e panic route free the valley. O

. And despite any opposing armsnt fro- cfficers of
the expedition yet living. Godfrey's every word and line was
accepted as absolutely authoritative, absolutely incapable
of, correction or ieprcvueet. hid duster disobey his orders?
captain acdfrey, who was not present at the council 6 var
between ferry, gibbon and caster - and admittedly unconver-
cant as to any known plan at the ties of the battle - said
so: That settled it. ‘

could haJor Reno have completed his charge through the

valley, or rmained in the timber dismounted, and saved
Custer? captain aodfrey, who was with senteen and never in
the valley at all, said tea: and that settled that, too.
Was it possible that auster's route was unknown to none in
the valley! the lap prepared by aodfrey for the center: vas
gotten out, and need as a final nthcrity - free which there
was no appeal. em: in the face of a doe» sanifest inaccur-
acies as to place-noses and terrain, hate the carelessness
of either oodfrey or his engraver -- or both.

' Did anybody‘arise to raise questions as to any point
‘ ehatscever of Godfrey's theories, he could be withered by a
'captain Godfrey was in the battle; where were you” There
was no answer. - aodfrq alone of the 7th cavalry officers .
actually is the fight published an article in a naguine of
national praise-Ice and circulation- In the silitary Journals
others might quibble, but in the public periodicals and the
public nind oodfrey was was. duster triter.

~175-

And it cannot be said that aodfrey found it unpleasant.
sole of his letters in print are as poor apecinene of his-
torical reasoning as any of Prederid Whittaker”. fie scene
to have been consulted on every work on duster to appear fro:
the tin of his 1892 “master's Last nettle' to his death in
1938. And matters thich were once only opinion on his part,
hardened into absolute fact. the farther he got fron the
battle, the more infallible he came to regard his on memory.

In time. this all had an interesting and inpertant re-
suit for the Cluster Legend. His prominence as a ouster
authority naturally brought him into orbit of the gracious
widow, and aodfrey who had disliked Custer. alive name to be
a staunch - and often illogical - defender of his dead. 21ml
the-seeker after fact had two irruovable obstacles in his
way. If he unearthed facts beyond disproof to tin detriIent
of ouster, he could not get the! published. for he was new
not only insulting the gallant presence of Hrs. ouster as
well as her husband's lustrous name, he was also insulting
that fine old new fighter general a. 3. Wm. ‘

und anyway, granting that the general night he get-
ting old and did make a mistake arise in his article. shat
kind of a pipsquesk are you to pit your nilitary ability
agaiast a general officerof the Iold my't' or (if not a
civilian) What do you young punts fro. an M 8111 or
salar or Bellow wood knee about tea-palm on the old fret-.-
tier sitb oaseshot carbiaes and short rations and screening

Sioux" - and so on.

finally, in 1921, are. Custer and Godfrey Joined

forces. The cantugz article was reprinted in pamphlet fore
in anticipation of the coming Piftieth Anniversary of the
battle. In it, oodfrey's original errors - honest and
Wholly understandable - were IadJuetedI from the perspective
of half-a-century so as to shoe Custer in absolutely the
best light possible and the long-sincs-disgraced Reno in the
worse. and. as we have said. it Was the their inaccuracies
of this 1921 pamphlet that brought matin into the field.171

.

m a» ma mm- W-

. I ... _..._

significantly, it sas not until 1934 after fire. ouster
and General Godfrey had both passed away that van de water's
flog-Enter appeared. the first serious objective atteapt to
portray ouster apart fro- his Legendgand many others have
since follcsed. at last, as the South Dakota historian
Deane Robinson put it, “the conspiracy of silencea had been
broken.

The gallant unsecing sides. the upright, tough-“bred
battle veteran , and the self-sacrificing biographer - only
trying to make an honest penny out of a "rhetorical work“
turned out between dine novels - these three comined to
wreck irretrievably one man‘s life and career. and to turn
another's honest reputation fro: the field of history into
that of folk-lore. Here than any other oimnstance or
factor. Elizabeth B. caster, general E. s. oodfrey. and
rum-ice Whittaker - 'late Brent Captain on: u. 1.“ Veteran
cavalry' - established tint collection of syths called who

caster Legmd. *

m

the future of the ouster Lesend oen he predicted with
ressoneble soonrnoy. the pendulum has been on its heck-swing
already twenty yeers or more, and in the end the Legend will
not only be wholly discredited but e Ian's deserved repute-
tion and rightful place in Micah history will he deluged
as well. Because. in the we of s dead men. shortsighted
and fanatical admirers helittlsd other men's accomplishents,
character, and reputations to enhance thetof General Meter,
Custer an in turn be so treetsd. And been» the some).
processes of history were deliberately inhibited, the mo-
tion will be savage heyend n11 historical Justificstion.

to illustrate, the controversy has even penetrated to
the peges of Wbstetries. end leerned
sediesl see of the highest fess psss odd scents studying end
dissecting the elections]. dine-ice of the [era of the Little
31¢ mrn. pen]. a. flilty, late uejor aeserel of the ledioel

 

corps end the Veteran Lhinistrstios, for sue-pie, trseee
everything beck to the new oholere’ epiduio at tort niley.
answering his own question. “Did cholers defeet
austere“ he resecns. res: It see news of the cholera epidemic
st rort alley thst ceased cluster to leevs his mend without
orders. and ride to the fort to sake sure that his wife wee
ell right. It see this action that caused his to be court-
eartisled - and free this msiliation his ego never fully

recovered.

.179-

'11:. giant hsd been stabbed in the back by pyglies.
His pride had been severely rounded, and the wound fostered,
leaving an ugly scar. Ithis scar could be made less...dis-
figuring only by rspclishing his reputation to s brilliance
that could blind the public to the defect. I Hence the debacle
of the Little Big Horn, according to Dr. flawley.

fit, on the other hand, the faced psychiatrist xerl
lennieger openly diagnoses meter as s Ipsychoneurotic. ' 1n
world war 11. flatly announces pr. Isnninger, duster would
have been discharged for that reason. and never allotted to
serve is bettle. ileurotie general“ may be brilliantly sue-
eeesful, but are too often as dangerous to their on side as
the essay. find, most bitter irony of all. one of the reasons
on which he bases his conclusion is that duster 'in all his
Indian battlesl slaughtered Indian sense and children
«bebimeiiyunz

 

172. "the general Was leurcticfi m. 701. 60,
p. 90f. (August 18, 1.947).

. The extravagant lies are caring hole: the eyth-eakers'
misstatenents are being taken seriously - and used to dash
their godlike hero. Poor ouster end his three Indian
battles, in one of which - Inshita ~ he killed scan and
children: scarcely 'habitually. ' But then, exactly who was
it kept alive the lyth of his -...,. Indian victories, his

 

floutstandingi'success on the plains, his 'easily foremostl
reputation? It was the Roderick Ihittakers, the J. E-
xidds, the [ruler gents, and the shame: aarsts - certainly

-130-

it was not pr. leaninger nor laJor general aawlsy. History
is patient only so long, then it kicks back.

In such lancer will history soon cast off the Outer
began, perhaps by the 75th anniversary of the battle in
1951, although it will inevitably linger long in the reces-
see of the aserioan uind beyond the reach of the light of
feet. then that is done, the personal cane and military
reputation of George Arestrong duster will fight vainly to
remain at only absolute zero. and any, any books sill be
embarrassing by their very presence on the library shelves.

when slowly, but certainly, with the unprejudiced
facts no longer fouled with myth and canard, students will
turn again to this dashing figure - but this tine to the
brilliant cavalryun of the storey '60“, the may General!'
of the civil war, the murat of the u. 3. my.‘ In passing.
his true services to the frontier - his peaceable settling
of the southern plains Indians in 1869, his work on the
yellowstone and his opening of the sled mils - these will
be rseopised. and the rest eharitebly forgotten. the
fungous will at last be scaled clean of the tree.

In the final evaluation of history. undoubtedly ee
shall return very nearly to the brief. can, fair contapcr-
an appraisal of I! nation. with'slander and supposition
already ranpant all about, and the litter of battle still
scarring the slopes of the Little 318 m. and the last
lei-tally wounded nan but a week dead, the following appeared
in the July lath issue:

~181-

...rhough he had had muoh.experienoe in
Indian fighting ever since the close of the war,
it will hardly be thought disgraceful that he al-
loved hinself to be entrapped. Hus personal
bravery was very exceptional, and his successes,
especially in the last year of the ear when he
was our model executive cavalry officer, were so
great and so uniforn that to dare and to do
naturally came to seen to him one....173

173. {he latlon, Vol. 23. p. 17 (Jul: 13, 1875)..

and.thst statement, as succinct as this paper is
long. is the true sunnation of the life of General oeorge a.
Custer.

Anything else is the ouster Legend.

~182-

-)«; j-~~ -. - n “t"
J“ . L if; i! 1 EL: ."‘.«)

It seems that it is absolutely imoossible to write any
kind of a paper on the Custer controversy and avoid having
’to include at least one appendix. This thesis in that reopect
is no exception. However, the following items seem to have a
definite bearing on matters discussed in the text, and should
be available for insediate reference.

I. deneral Terry's final order to Custer. II. The
whereabouts of all officers on the rolls of the 7th Cavalry
.June 25, 1876 - this because regimental officers no place near
the battle are sometimes cited as conclusive proof on matters
which they had no iniediete knowledge of. III. The petition
signed by 235 enlisted survivors of the battle, July 4, 1876,
that Reno be promoted to Lieut.-Col. and Renteen to Lnjor for
their "bravery, coolness, and decision" shich "saved the lives

of every man now living."

iv. by personal theory of the battle;
properly no part whatever of the text, but which is as sound
as most. Buried back here, no one has to read it if he does
not care to do so. V

I should also include the findings of the 1879 Reno
Court of Inquiry, but the document is too lengthy, and like-
wise in readily available in full in books which can be found
in either the College or the hichigan State Library. Specifie
sally two following: Fred Dustin, The Custer Tragedy, pp. 209-

211; and Frazier and Robert Hunt, I Fought With Custer,

pp. 178-181.

-183-

The same can be said for the lists of dead and wounded
in the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Those can be found in
Appendices II 5: III of Dustin‘s work, and 11' it wished to
check them against a contemporary report you are referred to
the Army and NavIJourngl, Vol. 13. pp. 7859785 (July 15, 1876).
Frazier and Robert Hunt have also collected much material of
great value which should be studied closely for a clearer under.

standing of both duster, the man, and his famed Last Stand.

J! .H J." J 1‘ _,"g 1.1
Irv!" if if if}:

~18#~

Appendix I

Here, for the millionth-odd time, is Custer's final
written order from General Terry. In reading it, however,
it must always be remembered that this was not a recommen-
dation from one officer to another of equal rank, nor even
merely an order from a superior to a subordinate. This was
a field order covering a definite plan of action worked out
a formal conference of war at which Custer was nrescnt in
person, and igznhich he took_part. Re;ardless of what person—
al conclusion is reached as to its strictness or latitude,
in cannot be divorced from the conference of which it was a
result.

 

Headquarters Deeartment of Dakota,
(in the Field)

Game at Routh of Rosebud River,
Eontana, June 22, 1376

Colonel: The brigadier general commanding directs
that as soon as your regiment can be made ready for th
march, you proceed up the nosebud in pursuit of the Indians
whose trail was discovered by :ajor Reno a few days since.
It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite in-
structions in regard to this movement; and were it not in.
possible to do so, the department commander places too much
confidence in your zeal, energy and ability to wish to imp
pose upon you precise orders, which might hamper your action
when nearly in contact with the enemy. he will, however, in-
dicate to you his own views of what your action should be,
and he desires that you should conform to them unless you
shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks
that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain
definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of
leads. Should it be found (as it appears to be almost certain
it will be found) to turn toward the Little horn, he thinks
that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as
the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little
Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to
preclude the possibility of the escape of the Indians to the
south or southeast passing around your left flank.

The column of Colonel Gibbon is new in motion for the
mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it
will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the
forks of the Little and Big Horns. Of course its future move-
ments must be controlled by circumstances as they arise: but
it is honed that the Indians, if upon the Little horn, may
be so nearly enclosed by the two columns that their escape

~185-

will be impossible. The department commander desires that on
your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the
upper part of Tullock's Creek; and that you should endeavor
to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's column with the
information of the result of your examination. The lower
part of this creek will be examined by a detachment from
Colonel Gibbon's command.

The supply-steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as
far as the forks, if the river is found to be navigable for
that distance; and the department commander (who will ao-
company the column of Colonel Gibbon) desires you to report
to him there not later than the expiration of the time for
which your troops are rationed, unless in the neantiae you
receive further orders.

Very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
Ed. W. Smith
Captain, Eighteenth Infantry, A.A.A.G.

Lieut. Col. G.a. Custer,
Seventh Cavalry.

(5 :1; I... ...

.. «. Z!
If 7'1" ii ’1‘ «'7'

Annendix II

 

The roll of 7th Cavalry officers on Lay 17, 1875, the
day the Takota Column left Fort Lincoln, is important for a
clear understanding of m19 ny later accounts of the battle. At
least 13 of the re3iment' s 41 officers we1~e on detac11ed duty
at the ti: e, leavin5 the unit actually u11der-officered. Ard
of the 23 actually with the column one, irst Lieut. henry J.
Nowlan, remained with Terry as acting field quartermaster.

The 27 actually in the battle al'e de 915nsted as to
battalion, commander, and whether or not killed in t 9 action
e ther in the valley, on the hill, or under Custer. The where-
abouts of those not with the column are given as closely as
can be done through a careful study of the abstracts of Army
orders given in the nrny and Levy Journal.

Officers of the 7th Cavalry

 

Colonel: 8.9. Sturgis.
Lieut. Colonel: George A. Custer*§1
halors: Joseph G. Tilford, Lewis IMer 11, Larcus A. Renos- 2

Castains: F.W. Benteen#3, hyles W. Keogh91,u.v. Sheridan,
George W. Yatessl, Thomas Weir}, J. E. Tourtellotte,
Thomas H. Frenchg, Owen hale, Charles B. illsley, Lyles
hoylanQ, Thomas Custerfil, T.L. LcDoua all”

First Lieuts Henry J. thonlanS James M. Bell, W.R. Cooke“1
Henry “Jae? son, Algernon E. Smithfil, Edwards S. Godfreyg,
Donald Efficlntoshs Edward G. Lathey Janes_Calhoun*1,
Francis L. Gibson3, James E. Portersi, William,T. Cray~
croft, Charles C. DeRud102

Second Lieuts.: Charles 3Braden, Benjamin H. Hodgsonse, sin-
field S. Edgerly3 Charles W. Larned, Andrew H. have,
Georse D. hallaceé, Charles A. Varnqu, H.E. Harring-
ton* , Luther R. Harez, James G. Sturgisfil, William
Van W. Reilly*

 

 

In addition 2nd Lieut. John J. Crittenden, 20th Infantry
accompanied the regiment, because of the shortage of officers,
and was killed with Custer.

Killed, June 25, 1876
Commanding a battalion
With Custer

With.Reno

With Benteen

With packtrain

With Terry

W#UMH§?:#

-187-

The presence of the thirteen not with the column is
accounted for in the following manner:

Col. S.D. Sturgig -~ Supt. of the Army hounted Recruiting
Service and head of the Army Retirement Board in St.
Loni B . 21:40.

Eager Joseph G. Tilford .. On leave. Granted a month's leave
of absence effective at the end of the summer field
Operations. 1875. and on Hovember 13, 1875, given an
extension of ll months.

major Lewis Kerril; -- On special duty with the Commission
of the Internationa Exhibition of 1876, by order of
President Grant.

 

Capt. John E. Tourtellotgg -- On special duty as aid-de-canp
to General of the Army W.T. Sherman.

Capt. Owen Hale —- Detailed a member of a general court-
martial at St. Louie on April 6, 1876, and on hay 27th
ordered to remain to act as recorder to the Army He-
tirement Board headed by Col. Sturgis.

Capt. Charles B. Illsle1_~- On special duty as aid-de~camp
to aajor General John Pepe, ;

Cast. Lichael:v. Sheridan -- On special duty as aid—de-canp
to Lieut. General Philip Sheridan.

lg} Lieut. James H._Be;;’-- On leave. Ordered to rejoin the
regiment on July 12. 1876.

.lgt Lieut. Henry Jackson .- 0n duty at the Signal Headquarters
of the Army. Ordered to rejoin.regiment on July 12.
1876.

185 Lieut, William T. Crazerogt'aa Ordered to temporary duty
in St. Paul, Kinn., May 27, 1876, and ordered same
date to report for examination by the Army Retirement
Board in tashington, D.C. (Retired on surgeon's certi-
ficate of disability, June 28, 1878).

2nd Lieut, Charleg Braden -- Ordered day 27, 1876, to the
'-Army Eetirement Board in Washington, D.C. (Retired on
June 28, 1878, for wounds received on the 1873 Yellowb

stone expedition).

 

.‘nd Lieut. Charles W. Larned - Detailed a member of general
court-martial at West Point, N.Y., on March 25, 1876.

 

 

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.
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~188.

Ordered to rejoin regiment on July 15, 1876. (Resigned
his regimental commission August 14; 1876. to become
a professor at West Point);

gag Lieut, Andree-H. have a— on leave of absence on surgeon‘s
certificate of disability; Ho record of when he re;
Joined the regiment; but was on duty in 1877.

There are certain accounts in which some of the officers
named above are cited as authority. because they were of the
7th Cavalry. Certainly they would be in better position to re-
ceive firstohand accounts of the battle than most; but it must
be emphasized that none or the thirteen were in the battle or
even with the Fort Lincoln column.

###£##

-139-

Apgendix III

One of the most embarrassing documents in existence
for those who like to feel that history gives them an un-
qualified support in placing the entire blame for the dis-
aster at the Little Big Horn.on Heno’ s ”cowardice" is the
-petition signed by 235 of his enlisted men requesting his
promotion to Custer' 8 rank and position. It cannot easily
be explained away. One writer who seems to wish it was not
in existence, speaks of "the strange and touching letter”
and considers it an "important sidelight on the feelings of
the troopers“ before the fear and excitement of the battle
had died out - leaving an unpleasant hint that men who were
actually in the battle were not as qualified to Judge the
conduct of their officers as well as those great distances
away in time or space.

Another deprecates it by saying that” the first ser-
geants “could get the men to sign anything. But considering
the unsurpassed quality and courage of the topkicks of the
Indianpfighting Army, and their cold dislike for inefficient
officers, this in itself is a high though unintended compli-
ment. Since the exact numbers of enlisted men and officers
going into the battle is not yet known, and scouts and ci-
Vilians are usually included in causality lists, figures are
hard to come by. But approximately 315 non-come and enlisted
men survived the battle, of which about 52 were seriously
wounded enough to be evacuated by steamboat to Fort Lincoln,
900 miles downriver. Of some 263 man still on duty, then,
July 4,1876, 235 signed the following recommendation for a
man the Custer Legend would have us believe was "as yellow
as they come."

It would seem to be a pretty final word of what the
men in the ranks actually thought at the time .. 10 days after
the battle - of ”Reno' s incapacity and Bentoen-‘s disobedience.”

Camp near Big Horn.on
Yellowstone River,

To his
Excellency the President
and the honorable Representatives
of the United States.

Gentlemen:

We the enlisted men the survivors of the battle on the
heights of Little Horn.Rivor, on the 25th and 26th of June
1876. of theJTth.Regiment of Cavalry who subscribe our names

-190-

to this petition, most earnestly solicit the President and
Representatives of our Country, that the vacancies among

the Commissioned Officers of our Regiment, made by the slaughp
ter of our brave, heroic, now lamented Lieutenant Colonel.
George A. Custer, and the other noble dead Commissioned offi-
cers of our Regiment who fell close by him on the bloody
field, daring the savage demons to the last, be filled by the
Officers of the Regiment only. That hajor>h.a. Reno be our
Lieutenant Colonel vice Custer, killed; Captain F.w. Benteen
our major vice Reno, promoted. The other vacancies to be
filled by officers of the Regiment by seniority. Your pee
titioners know this to be contrary to the established rule of
promotion. but prayerfully solicit a deviation from the usual
rule in this case, as it will be conferring a bravely fought
for and a Justly merited promotion on officers who by their
bravery. coolness and decision on the 25th.and 26th of June
1876, saved the lives of every man now living of the 7th
Cavalry who participated in the battle, one of the most bloody
on record and one that would have ended with the loss of life
of every officer and enlisted man on the field only for the
position taken by major Reno. which we held with bitter te-
nacity against fearful odds to the last.

To support this assertion - had our position been taken
100 yards back from the brink of the heights overlooking the
river we would have been entirely out off from water; and from
behind those heights the Indian demons would have swarmed in
hundreds picking off our men by detail, and.before midnight
June 26th not an officer or enlisted man of our regiment would
have been left to tell of our dreadful fate as we then would
have been completely surrounded.

‘ mm prayerful hope that our petitions be granted, we
have the honor to foward it through our Commanding Officer.

Very respectfully
(236 signatures).

* i 'I

moving through channels the petition reached General
of the Army W.T. Sherman a month later. He did not present
‘it to President Grant, but instead gave it the following one
dorsementz

Headquarters of the Army
of the United States
washington, D.C.

August 5. 1876.

The Judicious and skilful conduct of major Reno.andl
Captain Benteen is appreciated, but the promotions caused'by
General Custer's death have‘been made by the President and

confirmed by the Senate; therefore this petition cannot be
granted. When the Sioux campaign is over I shall be most
happy to recognize the valuable services of both officers
and men by grant favors or recommending actual promotion.

Promotion on the field of battle was fiancleon's favor-
ite method of stimulating his officers and soldiers to deeds
of heroism, but it is impossible in our service because comp
missions can only be granted by the President on the advice
and consent of the Senate, and except in original vacancies.
promotion in a regiment is generally if not always made on
the rule of seniority.

W.T. Sherman,
General.

*fi-fi‘

It has occurred to me that.this petition was drawn up
principally to further Captain Bentcen’s promotion. rather
than Reno's. but their most vociferous critics or admirers
have never so suggested. Moreover, to follow out the idea, if
Rene use yellow and Benteen solely responsible for saving the
remnants of the regiment (another commonly advanced theory)
the enlisted men would certainly have been under no obligation
to ask Reno's promotion. They were, in fact, asking that the
Official Regulations and the laws of the United States be set
aside to give two officers what they felt to be highly merited
promotion. In such a case, if it had been Benteen alone they
meant to recommend, a petition citing_his name alone would
have had every bit as much chance of success, and their opinion
of Reno's personal conduct and military ability would have
been made unequivocally plain.

eases

-192-

Appendix IV

Here, stated very briefly, is my personal theory on
the controversial aspects of the Battle of the Little Big
Horn based on an objective study of all the major pro- and
anti-Custer accounts in print. It is, I believe, not only
fair and reasonable to all involved, but fully backed up by
any clearcminded examination of the actual evidence. It re-
presents conclusions I have reached after at least ten years
consideration and discussion with others.

O Basics.

It is not necessary to possess a detailed map for an
understanding of this theory of the Battle of the Little Big
Horn; any map of hontana showing the principal watercourses
will do. By reference to such a map it will be seen that the
Big Horn and Rosebud Rivers are both tributaries of the Yel-
lowstone, rising to flow northward to the main stream. At
their mouths they are about 55 miles apart, but the headwaters
of their smaller streams rise in the same height of land, due
southeast of the Custer Battlefield. Rosebud Creek and Reno
Creek (flowing into the Little Big Born, thence to the Big
Horn) have their origin within two or three miles of each

other e

The watercourses actually involved thus form a crude
circle on the map of hontana. Custer, starting at the mouth
of the Rosebud.was to work upward {to the South), roughly a
third of the circle. Gibbon, with.a large infantry contingent,
was to march up the Yellowstone to the Big horn, then up the
Big Born to the Little Big Horn, roughly two-thirds of the
circle. Since Custer not only had the shorter distance, but
also a mounted force, he was to so conduct his marches in dis-
tance, direction, and speed as to coordinate with Gibbon's
slower moving force. As a result, it was planned that at some
time on the 26th of June, 1876 - probably in the evening -
the circle from the mouth of the Rosebud would have been com.
plated and both forces at opposite ends of the valley of the
Little Big Horn for a concerted attack on the Indian encamp-
ment believed to be there.

Gibbon, accompanied by the overall commander Terry,
carried out his plan to the letter - arriving in the valley
the evening of the 26th.and marching over the exact site of
the battle the morning of the 27th. Therefore, his actions
are no longer of consequence to us.

Custer, however, by forced marchesand by taking a
direct line of march, arrived at the divide between the Rose-
bud and Rene Creek shortly after midnight of June 24th. Here

-193-

he informed his officers that the command would remain con-
cealed all day in order to scout the country and prepare for
an attack on the 26th. So far Custer had violated his orders
by his swift, direct march (and by failing to scout Tulloch's
Creek - see Appendix I), but had not yet upset the plan of
action. It was only his noontime attack on the 25th which
actually accomplished this.

Therefore, Custer's purpose can be reasonably guessed
at as something like this: By hiding in the divide for a day
his men and animals would be rested, and he would have full
information for a dawn attack the morning of the 26th. This,
as he well knew,-would be at least 12 hours before Gibbon was
in position, but technically within the spirit of his orders.
With a sweeping surprise attack (as at hashita) he would de-
stroy the Indian village in short order, and be in possession
of the field and a wholly independent victory when Gibbon and
Terry actually arrived. His instructions could easily be con.
strued to cover such a case, he would actually have delayed
attacking until the ggy specified, and his triumph would have
made criticism of other violations mere cavilling.

With this plan in.mind, he refused to believe reports
from his Indian scouts as to the proximity of the village and
its size. he apparently was already convinced in his own mind
that the encampment lay further down toward the Yellowstone,
perhaps about at the forks of the Little Big Horn and the Big
.Horn. As to size, he was positive the scouts were exaggerat-
ing as no Indian encampment of that scope had ever been heard
of - and at any rate with 600 mounted troops in a dawn attack
felt positive that he could gain by surprise any advantage he
gave away in.numbers.

Early the morning of the 25th, he moved the regiment
some ten miles down the divide to a sheltered position in a
coulee. Here, apparently (granting all the above), he proposed
to remain for the day - as the men were ordered to make as
little noise as possible, build no fires, and no bugle calls
were given. However, as he was returning from a personal scout,
word was brought that Indiana had actually been seen by the
command, one had been shot, and others were in contact. There
fore concluding that concealment was useless, that he was dis-
covered, and that "they might try to escape" he started his
premature movement.

Having completely disregarded the reports of his scouts
he was moving to an attack for which he had no intelligence
on which to base a plan, and therefore actually had none at
all, hoping to improvise to meet any uneXpected conditions. He
then made his famous division into battalions, giving Reno and
Benteen no orders for concerted action or reuniting because he
had none in his own mind. Then - again because he absolutely

-194-

refused to accept the intelligence of his couts when it con.
flicted with his preconceived ideas - he sent Benteen in his
useless movement to the left. If this was to be a third prong
against the village, it shows his utter, deliberate ignorance
of the terrain, as Benteen would be completely sealed off by
high.country from the valley of the Little Big Horn.

Custer then moved on with his own battalions, and the
one under Reno, down the creek leading to the Little Big Horn.
First, he ordered Reno to one side of the stream, then called
him back again with his men“ so the force moved as a unit. It
was at this point that the lone tepee" was sighted, and he
believed himself in immediate contact with the village. There-
upon he gave Reno the long puzzled-over order "to attack, and
you will be supported by the whole outfit." Obviously, Custer
was moving in as a single force, Reno was to be the advance
only, and the direction of the full attack was to be down the
bottom of the valley. This is particularly borne out by the
presence witthenc, as he opened the action, of Capt. Keogh
- who commanded at least two of the troops directly under
Custer - and Lieut. Cooke. Cooke as adjutant had the important-
responsibility of relaying Custer's orders, and therefore
would not have started with Reno had he not understtod that 3;;
the battalions were moving in together.

And such was probably Custer's actual intention when
he issued the order. But it must always be kept in mind that
he was improvising - not acting from a predetermined plan -
and that he did not believe that the village was where it was
in truth, nor that it could possibly be of the reach reported
to him. Therefore, ignorant by his own choice of the topography,
as he reached the gentle slopes leading to the heights over-
looking the valley, he swung the main force quickly to the
right. His purpose obviously was to make a short dash along the
ridge and come thundering down on the flank, or below, his
”small" Indian village: an intended movement of a mile or two
to be climaxed by a charge from the bluffs. He sent no word to
Reno, because he expected to.reuhite with him almost at once
in the center of the Indian lines. It would still be a brief,
swift, explosive action and the triumph to be his would still
placate Terry and Gibbon for disregarding the overall plan.

But the rest is history (to coin a phrase). Hiehcouts
were right and he was wrong. The one mile along the bluffs
stretched into three or more before a descent was found suit-
able to mounted men. and then before?: miles both way - came
the heart~chilling sight of the greatest Indian encampment in
history; Reno, his intended advance, was already overwhelmed
in the valley and cutting througfljthe hill. Benteen, whom he
ordered back from his "valley chasing" to be in on "the kill"
Joined Reno. and the packs soon followed.

But his improvisation, his disregard of his intelligence,
and his lack of plan had already cut of? Custer. Before Benteen
Joined Reno he was in desperate action, by.the time of the ar-
rival of the packs his force was overwhelmed, and shortly after
the last man of his immediate command was dead. “ha tever his
true intention in regard to Terry’ s orders; he had chosen to
ignore his intelligence, had failed to follow out even an im—
provised plan of battle, had separated his force int 0 units with
no plan whatever for reuniting, and was wiped out with half the
regiment in some thirty minutes.

” No one betrayed anyone. No one was cowardly. No subordi-
nate was inefficient or dieobeyed orders. A premature attack
was launched with deliberate disregard of topography, location
of the encampment, effective numbers of the Indians' forces,
and the regiment was defeated in detail.

A commander unconsciously depending on the existence of
a great force on which he could fall back if need be ~ but from
which he completely out himself off a deliberately placeihis
command in a position where he'felt necessitated to drive into
a trap. A personally brave soldier died needlessly from his own
mistakes, and with him 225 men.

And had not misguided friends interferfed his death
would have wiped the slate clean, and this would be all there
was to the Battle of the Little Big Horn.

-196.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following is not intended to be a comprehensive
Custer bibliography, nor even a complete listing of all the.
material examined in preparation this paper, which would
run literally into hundreds of entries. Such a listing could
b¢.Just1fied only by an attempt to supplement doubtful va-
lidity of the research by an excess of references, an action
I consider the meticulousness and the accuracy of the study
leaves unneeded. Moreover, voluminous bibliographies are the
hallmark of more than one wholly inaccurate work on General
Custer; they have proved themselves to be poor substitutes
for integrity. Occasional works of great general value - but
only of indirect bearing on the subject under discussion — I
have given a full bibliographical entry in the notes of the
text. The carefully selected chief sources listed below were
those most pertinent and valuable to my thesis.

ggmyand ngy_Journa;: Files 1873-1882.

Brady, Cyrus Townsend. 'gndian Fights and Fighterg. Garden
City and New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1912.

Brininstool, E.A. A rTrooper With Custer. Columbus: The
HunterbTrader-Trapper 00., 1925. (The story of W.C.
Slaper).

Brininstool, E.A. hanr Reno Vindicated. Hollywood, Cal.:
E.A. Brininstool, 1935. (From a letter written by
Col. v.13. Graham, U.S.A., in 1925). (Privately
published).

Burdick, Usher L., and Hart, Eugene D. Jacob Horner and the

dian Cam ai s f 1 6 d l . Baltimore: Wirth
Brothers, 1 2. a ‘

Burt, Mary “3., ed. The Bo Genera . New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1903. (A compilation of the writings
of Elizabeth B. Custer).

Byrne, Patrick E. Sgldiers o; the Plains. New York: hinton,
881611 and C00, 192 e

Custer, Elizabeth B. Eggts gnd Saddles. New York and London:
Harper and Bros., 1 5.

Custer, Elizabeth B. Fellgwing the Guidon. New York: Harper
and Bros., 1890.

Dustin, Freda The Custer Fight: Some Criticisms of Gen.
E.S. Godfrey's "Custer‘s Last Battle;r in the CAETERY
haoazine for January, 1832: and of hrs. Elizabeth
Custer's Pamphlet of lag;, Hollywood, 031., 1935.
(Privately publishedjm

 

Dustin, Fred. The Custer Tragedy. Ann Arbor, hich»: Edwards
Brothers, Inc., 1939.

Fougera, Katherine Gibson. With Custer's Cavalry. Caldwell,
Idaho: The Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1950.

Garst,.8hannon. Custer Fi hter of the Plains. New York:
Julian.hessner, Inc., 1955.

Graham, W.A. The Story of the Little Big Horn. New York and
London: The Century 00., 1926.

 

Hunt, Frazier. Custerl The Last of the Cavaliers. New York:
Cosmopolitan Book Corp., 1928.

Kidd, J.H. ”George Armstrong Custer, A Historical Sketch,"
. Ceremonies Attending the Unveiling of the Equestrian
fitatue to hajor General George Armstrong CUEEQE“QY_EE§
State of highigan, and Formally Dedicated at the City
of honroe,,hichigan, June Fourth, hineteen Hundred and
222. pp 0 6 9-117 e

Kuhlman, Charles. Custer and the Call Saga. Billings,
ment.: Charles Kuhlman, 19A0.'TPr1vately published).

Pearson, Edmund. Dime Novelg,por, Following An OldgTrailrin
gopular Literature. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1929.

Van de Water, Frederic F. Glory-Hunter, A Life og2Genera;
George A. Custer. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Eerrill Co.,
1934.

Whittaker, Frederick ,. "General George A. Custer," Galax ,
Vol. 22, pp. 362-371 (September, 1876).

Whittaker, Frederick. A Pooular Life of Gen. George A.
Cgster. New York: Sheldon and Co., 1876,

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