LAND- POOR IN A ”LAND ABUNDANT" SETTING
. UNRAVELING A PARADOX IN MOZAMBIQUE

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LAND-POOR IN A "LAND-ABUNDANT" SETTING:
UNRAVELING A PARADOX IN MOZAMBIQUE

By

Higino Francisco de Marrule

.A PLAN B PAPER

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
Department of Agricultural Economics

1998

Abstract

LAND-POOR IN A "LAND-ABUNDANT" SETTING: UNRAVELING
A PARADOX IN MOZAMBIQUE

By
I-Iigino Francisco de Marrule

It is important to better understand why in Mozambique, a land abundant country by
Sub-Saharan Africa countries standards, there are seemingly many land-poor
households. In Mozambique, recent studies show that land plays a key role in
generating income for rural households, and those with less land tend to be poor.
Thus, the present study was intended to further confirm the existence of land-and
income-poor households, to understand the nature and evolution of this group and to
clarify the factors that are leading to its creation.

Data from 521 rural households across the cotton belt in Northern Mozambique and
from the Ministry of Agriculture 1996 National Smallholder Survey were used.
Additional data collection consisted of in-depth case studies in selected villages of
Nampula and Cabo Delgado Provinces, and field area measurements in these locations.

This study has confirmed the existence of a significant group of land- and income-poor
households in Northern Mozambique. Results also showed that land inequality
throughout the country is similar to that found in Nampula and Cabo Delgado, and this
inequality has changed little three years after the ending of the war. Analysis of the
relationship between land holdings and household income showed that the observed
inequality in land distribution is a problem, in that land holdings are a major
determinant of household income. Thus, land poor households face both a serious
income shortage and, in all likelihood, a critical food security problem.

Results show that understanding the way the customary tenure system and related
traditional decision making structures operate within the society is important to better
understand why some smallholders are land-poor. Findings indicate that there is an
effect on land access of local social hierarchy. In the Macua society specifically,
findings suggest that there is an effect of local social hierarchy on land access. The
role of the principal Atata was shown to be especially important in the Nampula
villages. It was shown that the size of Matala under the control each of principal Atata
varies greatly in these villages; that per capita land availability within these Matala also
varies greatly; and that households in small Matala are only slightly more likely to
possess fields outside their Matala than households in large Matalas. We, therefore,
hypothesize that the size of Matala is a key determinant of total land availability at the
household level, and suggest focusing further research efforts on this issue.

ii

Dedication

To Loulita and Junior, your love, patience and encouragement was crucial to my
achievement. I LOVE YOU.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge several people and institutions who contributed to the
completion of my Master Program. Thanks are due to Dr. Michael Weber, my major
professor for encouraging me to pursue graduate studies and for his guidance
throughout my course work. I am grateful to Dr. David Tschirley, my thesis advisor
for his productive guidance and supervision of the analysis and writing of this thesis. I
am thankful to Dr. Daniel Clay for his willingness to serve on my committee and for
his useful suggestion for future research on this topic.

My special thanks go to the members of the MAP/MSU Food Security Project in
Mozambique. As part of the team since 1991 , I have been exposed to an enjoyable
research environment and lots of challenges. For all the support and friendship, I
would like to thank the research team: Ana Paula Santos (estamos juntos neste barco
desde o inicio), Rui Benefica, Anabela Mabota, Jose Jeje, Pedro Arlindo, Paul
Strasberg, Cynthia Donovan and Diego Rose. I also would like to thank the support
staff for their dedication, friendship and smiles: Conceicao, Simao, Chico, Dava, Lalu,
Reginaldo, Augusto Musita, Dona Edite and the late sr. Onezio.

USAID Mozambique, through the African American Institute’s ATLAS program
deserve a special thanks for their financial support. Special thanks are also due to
Yolande Zhaler, Anita Johnson, marks Chabedi and Ketrini Thomas at the ATLAS
program.

In East Lansing, special thanks to my country mates Paulo, Flora, Naldinho and Rui
with whom I have strong ties of brotherhood. Thanks also to my Brazilians friends
Marcelo, Rosane and Fernando for their support and friendship afinal falamos
Portugues. Special thanks Leonidas Murembya, my friend and roommate.

The learning environment in the Department of Agricultural Economics was excellent.
In part, my success is also due to the friendship and productive interaction with my
fellow graduate students as well as with professors. To all, my sincere thanks.

Thanks to all members of my family, whose moral support and encouragement
regarding my education have been invaluable. Special thanks to my parents Marrule
and Rosalina, brothers and sister, just one word: Kanimambo.

Finally, I thank my wife Loulita. She has been an extraordinary source of support and

encouragement regarding my education. To my little boy Junior, my source of
happiness.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ......................................... viii

LIST OF FIGURES ......................................... x

LIST OF ACRONYMS ...................................... xi

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ............................ 1

1.0 Introduction ................................. 1

1.1 Research Objectives ............................ 3

1.2 Organization of the Paper ........................ 4

CHAPTER TWO METHODOLOGY ............................ 6

2.0 General Characteristics of the Study Area .............. 6

2.1 Procedures ................................. 10

2.1.1 Use of Existing Data .......................... 10

2.1.2 New Data Collection .......................... 15

CHAPTER THREE THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ............. 19
3 .0 Hypothesized Pattern of Land Distribution with no Limits to

Access ................................... 19

3.1 Insights from a Household Perspective ............... 22

3.1.1 Rural Labor Markets .......................... 25

3.1.2 Sale of Agricultural Commodities .................. 26

3.1.3 Rural Food Markets ........................... 26

3.1.4 Employment/Income Opportunities ................. 27

3.1.5 Development of Rural Human Skills/Capital ........... 27

3.2 Summary and Conclusions ...................... 28

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0

4.1
4.1.1
4.1.1.1
4.2

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM MOZAMBIQUE . . . . 29

Land Distribution in Smallholder Sector .............. 29
Relationship Between Land Holdings and Smallholder Welfare 36
Model of Household Welfare ..................... 37
Income Model Results and Interpretation ............. 39
Summary and Conclusions ...................... 45

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0
5.1
5.2
5.2.1
5.3

CHAPTER SIX

6.0
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4

6.4.1
6.4.2
6.5
6.5.1
6.5.1.1
6.5.1.2
6.5.1.3

6.5.2

6.5.2.1
6.5.2.2
6.5.2.3

6.5.3

6.5.3.1
6.5.3.2
6.5.3.3

6.5.4

6.5.4.1
6.5.4.2
6.5.4.3

6.6

FACTORS AFFECTING ACCESS TO LAND IN THE

SMALLHOLDER SECTOR .................... 46
Introduction ................................ 46
Variation in Land Holdings Within and Across Villages . . . . 47
Model of household Determinants of Land Access ....... 50
Land Model Results and Interpretation ............... 53
Summary and Conclusions ...................... 57
DYNAMICS OF LOCAL LAND ALLOCATION

SYSTEM ................................. 59
Introduction ................................ 59
Field Measurements ........................... 60
Organization of the Macua Society ................. 64

Customary Land Tenure Systems in NOrthern Mozambique . 67
Land Distribution and Access According to Traditional

System in Northern Mozambique .................. 72
Other Means of Gaining Access to Land .............. 75
Institutional Factors Contributing to Inequality inland Access 76
The Case Study .............................. 78
Varrua ................................... 79
Traditional Structure in Varrua .................... 79
Land Distribution in Varrua ...................... 79
Current Situation of Land and Income Poor Households in
Varrua ................................... 86
Mepine ................................... 94
Traditional Structure in Mepine ................... 91
Land Distribution in Mepine ..................... 91
Current Situation of Land and Income Poor Households in
Mepine ................................... 94
Nassimoja ................................. 94
Traditional Structure in Nassimoja ................. 95
Land Distribution in Nassimoja ................... 95
Current Situation of Land and Income Poor Households in
Nassimoja ................................. 96
Nacuca ................................... 99
Traditional Structure in Nacuca ................... 99
Land Distribution in Nacuca ..................... 99
Current Situation of Land and Income Poor Households in
Nacuca .................................. 100
Summary and Conclusions .......................... 102

vi

CHAPTER SEVEN RESEARCH PROBLEM, OBJECTIVES AND

METHODOLOGY . . '. ..................................... 104
7 .1 Research Problem, Objectives and Methodology ....... 104
7.2 Conclusions ............................... 105,
7.3 Implications ............................... 108
7 .4 Future Research ............................ 109
APPENDIX ONE Share Cropping and Number of Cashew Trees and Coco by
Districts and Greater Agricultural Region ............ 110
APPENDIX TWO Land Distribution per Household and Per Household Adult
Equivalent by Province ........................ 1 1 1

BIBLIOGRAPHY

vii

Table

2-1

2-2

24

3-1

4-1

4-3

4—4

4-5

4-7

5-1

5-2

LIST OF TABLES

Page '
Population Density in All Provinces of Mozambique and Nampula and Cabo
Delgado Districts, 1997 ................................... 9
Population Density in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Country, 1994 .......... 11

Cross Tabulation of Quintiles of Income per AE and Quintiles of Land per AE
(Hypothetical Case) .................................... 13

Cross Tabulation of Quintiles of Income per AE and Quintiles of Land per AB
in Monapo/Meconta, Nampula Province, Mozambique, 1995 .......... 13

Alternative Methodologies to Measure Cultivated Land Distribution Among
Smallholders ......................................... 21

Land (Cultivated and Fallow) per Household and per Household Adult
Equivalent by Surveyed Districts of Nampula and Cabo Delgado Provinces,

1991 and 1995 ........................................ 31
Land (Cultivated and Fallow) per Household by Surveyed Districts of Agro-
Ecological Regions of Mozambique, 1996 ...................... 34
Land (Cultivated and Fallow) per Adult Equivalent by Surveyed Districts of
Agro-Ecological Regions of Mozambique, 1996 .................. 35
Income Regression Results, Montepuez ........................ 40
Income Regression Results, Monapo/Meconta ................... 41
Income Regression Results, CARE-OPEN ...................... 42
White Maize Grain and White Maize Meal Prices (in US dollars) in Study

Zone, 1994-1996 ...................................... 44
Analysis of Variance of land Area (Cultivated and Fallow) per Household Labor
Adult Equivalent (weighted), in Northern Mozambique, 1995 ......... 49
Land Regression Results, Montepuez ......................... 54
Land Regression Results, Monapo/Meconta ..................... 55

viii

Table

5—4

6-1

6-3

6-4

6-5

6-7

6-8

6-9

Page
Land Regression Results, CARE/OPEN ....................... 56

Correlation Coefficient Between Total Field Area Declared and Measured, in
Varrua and Mepine (Nampula Province) and Nacuca and Nassimoja (Cabo

Delgado Province), 1997 ................................. 62
Comparison of Declared and Measured Areas in Nacuca and Nassimoja,
Montepuez, 1997 ...................................... 63
Comparison of Declared and Measured Areas in Varrua and Mepine,
Monapo/Meconta, 1997 .................................. 64
Number of Principal Atata by Nyhimu affiliation and by Head or Leader’s Name
in Varrua, Nampula Province, 1997 .......................... 71
Land Distribution by Chefatura in Varrua, Nampula Province, 1997 ..... 83

Sample of Household Land Access in Varrua Among Land and Income-Poor
Households, Nampula Province, 1997 ......................... 88

Sample of Household Land Access in Mepine Among Land and Income-Poor
Households, Nampula Province, 1997 ......................... 93

Sample of Household Land Access in Nassimoja Among Land and Income-Poor
Households, Nampula Province, 1997 ......................... 98

Sample of Household Land Access in Nacuca Among Land and Income-Poor
Households, Nampula Province, 1997 ......................... 101

ix

Figure

2-1

2-2

3-1

6-1

LIST OF FIGURES

Page
Map of Mozambique ..................................... 7
Areas of Influence of IV C and Private Cotton Companies in Nampula and Cabo
Delgado Provinces, 1995 .................................. 8
Conceptual Framework for Rural Household Economy .............. 23

Structure of the Traditional Authority in Varrua, Nampula Province, 1997 . 80

Areas of Influence of Chiefs in Cabo Varrua, Nampula, Mozambique, 1997 81

AE

DE
Frelimo
FSP

GAR

GPS

Ha

IV C

LAE
LOMACO
MAP/MSU
MOA
MSE
OPEN
SAMO
SSA
SODAN

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Adult Equivalent

Department of Statistics

Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique

Food Security Project

Greater Agricultural Region

Geographical Positioning System

Hectare

Joint Venture Company

Labor adult equivalent

Lonrho-Mozambique Agro-Industrial Company
Ministerio de Agricultura e Pescas/Michigan State University
Ministry of Agriculture

Micro and Small Enterprise

Oilseed Press Enterprises in Nampula

Sociedade Algodoeira de Monapo

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sociedade de Desenvolvirnento Algodoeiro de Namialo

xi

Chapter 1

l .0 Introduction
". . .it is ofien believed that incomes and consumption in the rural areas (of
Africa) are relatively evenly distributed. This belief is founded on the
assumption of land abundance, the role of the customary land tenure system in
preventing landlessness, and the widespread prevalence of subsistence
production based on family labor. One of the conclusions of this study is that
this picture is no longer valid in the African countryside. " (Ghai and Radwan,

1983)

Two years after Ghai and Radwan reached their conclusion, Lipton(1985) noted that it
was still widely believed that the laws and the customs of most African societies assign,
to each adult male, a cultivable area of the size dictated by family needs on the basis of
available family labor. In 1998 in Mozambique, conventional wisdom still supports
this perception of land abundance and equal access. Based primarily on the country’s
relatively low population density, it still is widely believed that land is abundant and

that the limiting factor to gain access to land was thought to be labor.

The newly approved Land Law implicitly accepts this view suggesting that the
customary tenure system be left to operate on its own and be protected from large

concessions. It does not explore the inner workings of the customary tenure system at

1

all. An implication one could draw is that those who worked on the law and its various
regulations assumed that equity in access to land is not a problem within the

smallholder sector.

Land tenure has proved to be a very sensitive issue in Mozambique as well as in other
parts of the world. The current and dominant debate on land in Mozambique points to
conflicts between large formal sector individuals wanting land and the people
(smallholders) within the customary system who may be affected by land allocation to
these individuals. This is an important issue which merits serious attention. Yet, we
believe that a full analysis of the issue of land access requires that the customary

system itself also be evaluated.

Evidence from a recent study in northern Mozambique points to the existence of many
households with access to much less land than would be expected, given the amount of
labor they have (MAP/MSU, 1997). One should recognize that inequality in access to
land would be a less important issue if land-poor households were capable of relying
more on income from non-farm labor activities or other assets. If this were so, one
would predict that in such rural areas the correlation between land assets and income

would be weak and rural poverty would not only be associated with land access.

At this point, there are two major questions to ask: 1) why is there a strong competition
for land in northern Mozambique? and 2) what is the situation of land access in the rest

2

of the country? Competition for land may be the result of lack of coordination among
all institutions related to land tenure associated with a limited amount of readily
available arable land nearby other economic opportunities. Finally problems may also
be caused by the fact that both commercial farmers and smallholders are being attracted
to the same areas, especially those areas with fertile soils, perennial water,
infrastructure (such as roads), and market access. One also could hypothesize that the
large commercial farmers enjoy an advantage over smallholders by exploiting the

formal tenure system to gain access to land.

Overall in Mozambique land is generally not scarce and is generally allocated through a
system that takes into account household needs and labor availability, yet to the extent
that there are land-poor households, it becomes important to: a) identify within the
rural smallholder sector who are the land poor households; b) determine if these
households tend also to be income-poor, and if so; c) try to better understand why they

are land and income-poor.

1.1 Research Objectives
This study has three main goals:
1) to determine whether there is a significant group of land and income-
poor rural households in northern Mozambique;
2) to understand the nature and evolution of this group, and clarify the

factors that are leading to its creation;

3

3)

to draw implications from the findings and suggest future research on

this topic.

The specific objectives of the study are as follows:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

to identify rural households from previous rural surveys that are land
and income-poor;

to confirm, through additional field work, whether the data on these
households is substantially correct (i.e., that these households are, in
fact, land and income-poor);

to compare the socioeconomic characteristics of these households with
other, better-off, households;

to determine to the extent possible, the factors that have led to their
being land and income-poor; and

to draw implications and recommendations for future research through

analysis of the findings from this study.

1.2 Organization of the Paper

This paper is organized in seven chapters. Chapter two provides details of the

methodology used, explains techniques applied for data collection at the smallholder

and village levels, and outlines the field measurement methods used. Chapter three

briefly discusses theoretical issues of land distribution in a land-abundant setting,

including insights from a household economy view of the rural households. Empirical

evidence on land distribution from recent studies in Mozambique is presented in

4

Chapter four. Factors affecting land access in the smallholder sector are discussed in
Chapter five. The dynamics of the local (traditional) land allocation system in
Northern Mozambique, including a number of case studies, are discussed in Chapter
six. Finally, Chapter seven summarizes the major findings, proposes recommendations

based on lessons learned, and suggests future research.

Chapter 2

Methodology
2.0 General Characteristics of the Study Area
The geographical focus of this study coincides with the location of a detailed household
survey conducted by Michigan State University and the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries Food Security Project in Mozambique (MAP/MSU FSP) during 1994/1995
(see Figures 2-1 and 2-2). That survey focused on Monapo and Meconta districts of
Nampula province and Montepuez district of Cabo Delgado province. This study focus

on the same areas.

The study zone is an area of relatively good soils, relatively high population density
compared to other areas of Mozambique and of strong competition for land, not just

among smallholders but from outsiders as well.

Table 2.1 presents population densities of all provinces of Mozambique, and for
districts within Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces. Except for Maputo province
(including the cities of Maputo and Matola), Nampula province has the highest average
density in the country (43.8 inhabitants/sz). Monapo district has one of the highest
densities in the country (72.1), but Meconta’s density is relatively low (29.2). Cabo
Delgado’s population density (17.4) is less than half that of Nampula, and Montepuez

is well bellow the province mean and among the lowest in the country (5.7). In

Figure 2-1 Map of Mozambique

   
   
     
 
      
 
    
      
     

  

CABO
NIASSA DELGADO

Putt.

 
 

. LIOIIIIIOI

  

NAMPUHA
.lll-n . W

  

but.

ZAMBEZIA

SOFALA

O Provinclal Capltal
- Provlnclal Boundarlos
' DlstrlctTowna

Figure 2-2. Areas of Influence of JV C and Private Cotton Companies in
Nampula and Cabo Delgado Province, 1995.

  

alema
//

CINPOFIM
KEY:

Ribaue

NAMPULA
JVC (Company) NAME

- District Capital .
0 Provincial Capital
*Cotton Gin LOMACO
a le A s
i
oma

 

Table 2.1

Population Density in All Provinces of Mozambique, 1997.

 

Province ‘ District Population Area (1w) Population Density
Niassa 1030203 122176 8.4
Cabo Delgado 1356363 77367 17.4
Montepna 90663 15871 5.7
Mneda 123354 14150 8.7
Nanlno 169475 9615 24.5
Muidumbe 65058 1987 32.7
Nangade 50347 3031 16.6
Palma 39843 3493 11.4
Pemba Mange 41330 1094 332
Quissanp 35024 2061 17
Balalna 123685 5619 22
Nampula 3426237 73197 43.3
Nampula (city) 369223 390 946.7
Nacala 217747 310 702.4
Mozambique Island 64738 186 348.1
Angoche 237119 2936 96.2
Brad 90963 2793 32.6
Lalaua 42283 4378 9.7
Malena 114996 6122 18.8
Meconta 103373 3733 29.2
Mecuburl 116313 7252 16
Memba 2261!” 4555 49.6
Moglncual 116250 4274 7.2
Mogovolas 23644 4771 60
Mona 241626 5677 42.6
Monapo 259439 3598 72.1
Mossurll 77862 3428 22.7
Muecate 61339 4075 14.93
Mus-rupula 122039 3100 39.4
Nacala-a-Velln 112243 967 116.1
Namapa 236747 5671 50.6
Nampula 106335 3650 29.3
Rlbaue 117699 6281 18.7
Zambaia ' 3763453 103127 36.5
Tete 1222231 100,724 12.1
Manlca 83815 61661 13.6
Sofala 1570491 67218 18.4
W 1518015 68615 22.1
Gaza 1388677 75549 18.4
Maputo (province) 2103110 23576 89.2
Country 13334001 783095 23.4

 

Sources: Ministry of Agriculture (1991): Diagnostico Nacional do Sector Agrario, Anexo.

general, the study zone has population densities that range from very low (Montepuez)
to medium (Meconta) and quite high (Monapo) compared to other districts and.
provinces of Mozambique. Yet these densities are not high by Sub-Saharan African
standards (See Table 2.2). In fact, there are seven countries with densities that

exceeded that in Monapo district, the most densely settled district in our study area.

2.1 Procedures

To address the research objectives of this study, existing household data were first
utilized to examine the issue of land distribution within the smallholder sector, and to
clarify household positions with respect to access to land. Following this analysis, new
quantitative and qualitative data were collected and analyzed. While in Mozambique,
bibliographical research on how the traditional system of land allocation works in

Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces was also conducted by the author.

2.1.1 Use of Existing Data

Between June 1994 and January 1996, the Food Security project surveyed 521 rural
households across the cotton belt (Nampula and Cabo Delgado Provinces, in Northern
Mozambique). According to Strasberg (1997) and MAP/MSU (1996), the sampling
strategy was as follows: 1) identification of a universe of the villages in the area under
the influence of a certain IV C, with more than 20 cotton growers in 1992/93
agricultural season; 2) stratification of the villages according to cotton production

schemes (block/dispersed) and from which the villages were selected (4 in each strata,

10

Table 2.2 Population Densities in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Country (1994).

 

Papulatlon Area Population Density
Coumry (Millions) (1W 11 Km’) (Irmabitants/lGn’)

Mauritius 1.1 2 550.0
Rwanda 7.8 26 300.0
Burundi 6.2 28 221.4
Nigeria 108 924 116.9
Gambia 1.1 11 100.0
Malawi 9.5 118 80.5
Uganda 18.6 236 78.8
Togo 4 57 70.2
Lesotho 1.9 30 63.3
Sierra Leone 4.4 72 61.1
Ethiopia 54.9 1097 50.0
Benin 5.3 113 46.9
Kenya 26 580 44.8
Cote d'lvoire 14 . 322 42.9
Senegal 8.3 197 42.1
Burkina Faso 10.1 274 36.9
South Africa 40.5 1221 33.2
Tanzania 28.8 945 30.5
Guinea-Bissau 1 36 27.8
Zimbabwe 10.8 391 27.6
Cameroon 13 475 27.4
Guinea 6.4 246 26.0
Mozambique 18.3 783 23.4
Madagascar 13.1 587 22.3
Ghana 16.6 796 20.9
Zambia 9.2 753 12.2
Congo 2.6 342 7.6

Central African Republic 3.2 623 5.1

Gabon 1.3 268 4.9

Botswam 1.4 582 2.4

Namibia 1.5 824 1.8

 

Note: Population figures refers to mid-1994.
Source: World Development Report, World Bank, 1996.

11

in each district‘); 3) census in all villages with the objective of identifying the types of
cotton production schemes in use; 4) random selection of households in each village
according to cotton production scheme within each strata. Each household was
interviewed at least five times during this phase of the data collection. Household level
questionnaires were designed to collect data to compute annual and seasonal estimates
of agricultural production and sales, off-farm activities, total household income, labor

use, food consumption, household demographic structure, and land access and use.

This database was used in the present study to identify households that are both land-
and income-poor, relatively speaking. In each village, households were ranked in
quintiles of income and land holdings (cultivated and fallow) per adult equivalent (AE),
with quintile one being the lowest and five the highest. A cross tabulation of quintiles
of income and quintiles of land per AE allowed for a classification of each household in
the sample according to their position in the cross tabulation table. There was no a
priori expectation about the pattern that would emerge from such a cross tabulation.
However, if one assumes that 1) agriculture is the only productive activity households
are involved in and 2) all agricultural land and labor has equal productivity, then it
would be expected that households would be lined up in a diagonal Northwest-

Southeast (see Table 2.3). But we know that in the study area these assumptions do not

 

Monapo and Meconta in Nampula province, Montepuez in Cabo Delgado province.

12

Table 2.3 Cross tabulation of Quintiles of Income per AE and Quintiles of Land
per AE (hypothetical case).

Quintiles of Land Per AE
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5

Quintiles of

Income per Q1 X
AB Q2 X
Q3 X
Q4 X
Q5 X

 

Table 2.4 Cross Tabulation of Quintiles of Income per AE and Quintiles of Land
per AB in Monapo/Meconta, Nampula Province, Mozambique (1995).

 

Quintiles of land Per AE
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Quintiles of Q1 21 6 5 2 2
Q2 6 ll 10 6 3
Income per
Q3 4 7 8 12 5
AE Q4 3 8 7 6 12
Q5 2 4 6 10 14

 

Source: FSP/MAP/MSU Survey, 1995.

entirely hold. Households have other sources of income off-farm and not all
agricultural land and labor has equal productivity. Thus, in the real world we would
expect some dispersion around the diagonal (see Table 2.4). The extent to which
households are concentrated along the diagonal is an indication of how important land

is in determining household welfare, that is income per adult equivalent goes up

13

strongly as a function of the amount of land the individuals in each household have

access IO .

Households falling in the lowest 40% (bottom 2 quintiles) of both income and land per
AE, were classified as land- and income-poor. Those in the highest 40% (top 2
quintiles) of each variable were classified as land- and income-rich. In addition to
these two groups, households were also classified as land-poor/income-rich, land-

rich/income-poor, and those in a transitional situation were just classified as others.

Within each village, households were classified according to the criterion above
described. Then, villages with a low percent of households in the categories of our

interest were dismissed.

Additionally, we wanted to capture possible differences inland allocation due to the
presence of JV C’s (wether the village have cotton blocks under control of the JV C).
Following these criteria, four out of twenty one villages were selected, two in each
province. Specifically, we selected, Mepine and Varrua in Nampula province and
Nacuca and Nacimoja in Cabo Delgado province. Within each of the selected villages,
households were selected based on their known land and income category, choosing
those households in land and income-poor, and those in land-poor but income-rich

categories.

14

2.1.2 New Data Collection

Once selected, households from the prior sample were revisited on two separate
occasions with specific objectives in each visit. In the first visit, data from the previous
survey regarding income sources and amounts, number and size of fields were checked.
In the latter case, all previously disclosed fields were measured, as well as any new

fields identified since the prior visit.

In a second visit, households were interviewed more informally to attempt to
understand the reasons for their being land— and income-poor. These interviews were

often combined with interviews of local leaders.

At the beginning of this work, there was a perception in the author’s mind that purely
economic and war-related factors2 would be behind the fact that numerous households
were land and income poor. This perception started changing when the author had
meetings with several key informants in Maputo and Nampula city. Most of the key
informants began to point-out that social factors related to the nature of the society in
Northern Mozambique would be more likely to better explain the situation. Thus, we
started to focus also on organizational issues, specially those likely to be related with
land access, of the matrilineal and matrilocal society found in Nampula and Cabo

Delgado Provinces.

 

The 15 years of civil war ended in late 1992.

15

Then, it was obvious, given the nature of the problem and lessons learned from the past
and field observation, that it was necessary to conduct informal interviews both with
local leaders in the selected villages and with each household in the poorest group.

The issue discussed in these interviews was mainly land access at the village and

household levels.

At the village level, participants in the interviews were not only government officials
but also representatives of the customary system’. Interviews were conducted in a
friendly atmosphere. Frequently participants showed their interest by saying that it was
the first time someone was asking questions regarding the traditional system of land
allocation. Indeed, the Frelimo government prohibited practices of the traditional
system of land allocation just after independence“. The traditional system inherent to
the society, was also banned. So the elders were at the beginning of interviews hesitant
to say things that might affect their lives in the future. However, explanation of the
purpose of the study and why it was important to have their sincere collaboration lead

to a more open conversation, and in most cases visits lasted for more than three hours.

The fact was brought to our attention that within the northern region, where the Macua

society is predominant, within the smallholder sector there are two systems of land

 

See chapter six for more details of the organization and structure of the traditional (customary)
system.

4 Mozambique independence was in June 25, 1975.

16

allocation, working in parallel. First the "traditional" matrilineal system is operating,
where the Atata (uncle from the mother’s side) plays a key role in the extended family.
Secondly, the other system operating is more related to the colonial and FRELIMO
structures (not matrilineal) in which Regulos (traditional chiefs) and others (Party

Secretary, e.g.) were predominant.

From the discussions with the leaders, the complexity of the issue became apparent.
For instance, we learned that in a single village, there were several Atatas, each one
with land under his control, called Matala in the local language. Among other things,
we also learned that supposedly there was "reserve land" , which the Regulo had the
power to allocate. What are the procedures to gain access to land within each system?
Do the systems interact with each other? Was there land available to all who wanted to
use it? These were some of the issues pursued during the interviews. Given the
limited amount of time and the need to carefully understand the issues under

discussion, we decided to conduct a more detailed case study in only one village.s

Varrua, in Nampula province was chosen given the existence of both systems of land
allocation. Also contributing to the choice of Varrua was the fact that after so many
visits, it would be easier to interact with both traditional and official authorities in

charge of land allocation. Thus in this village a detailed case study was conducted.

 

More details in Chapter six.

17

As part of the case study in Varrua, land under "control" of the "Cabo ", "Atata " and
"Chefes"6 was measured. For this purpose a Geographical Positioning System (G.P.S.)
was used. This is an easy device to operate. It allows for coordinates to be taken of
the area to be measured. These coordinates could later be entered in Geographical
Information System Software, such as Arcview which can be used to design a map
according to the coordinates entered and to determine the area inside the map. Just for
comparison, members of the "Servicos Provinciais de Geografia e Cadastro" in
Nampula province, said that using traditional measurements methods, they would take
about twenty to twenty five days to measure the same area as the author did in two

days using the G.P.S.

 

The role of these traditional structures will be better explained in chapter six.

18

CHAPTER 3.

Theoretical Considerations

The objectives of this chapter are to (1) present an hypothesized pattern of land
distribution with no limits to access and (2) develop a framework for analysis of the

rural household economy.

3.0 Hypothesized Pattern of Land Distribution with no Limits to Access

We begin by analyzing a pattern of land distribution with no limits to access. To do
that, we use the same specific assumptions as Binswanger and McIntire, that are (a)
population density in the area is low, implying that cultivable land is abundant; (b)
there are no " external "7 barriers to land access; and (c) simple or "traditional"
technologies are used by all households. As a result of these assumptions, land

3 available per household member should be nearly equal across households. In A
Binswanger and McIntire’s (1987) words, "cultivated area per working household

member is largely invariant to household size and wealth”.

 

7

In Mozambique, rural households have access to land-use rights at no monetary cost (Mocambique,
1997).

19

An important additional consideration is to think about cultivated land per adult-
equivalent‘. It measures how much land a household has compared with its calorie
needs, where the needs of an adult are greater than those of a child, and the needs of a
man are generally greater than those of a woman. Evaluating a household's land
holding per AE shows how truly the households are either "land-rich" or "land-poor"
by reflecting the differences between families with different numbers of members and

different proportions of adults and children.

As an expected result of the above assumptions of an impartial land tenure system, land
holdings per household would be anticipated to vary according to the size of the
household. Large households (more mouths or people to feed) will have access to
more land. As a result, land holding per AE would be expected to be much less
variable across households. This is shown in Table 3.1, with constant area available
per adult-equivalent across each quartile. While land area per household goes up from

quartile 1 to 4, it remains constant on a per adult equivalent basis.

 

For example, two households may have the same farm size but different consumption needs due to
their internal composition, even if each have the exactly same number of members. One way to take into
account this disparity (size and sex) is to use an alternative method based on a per adult equivalent. This is
similar to the per capita concept, but differs from it because it allows households to vary in terms of calorie
consumption based on gender and age of the members of a particular household.

20

In contrast, Table 3.1 shows a district with non-equitable land access, where the
situation of land per adult equivalent is quite different. When land holding is measured

on a per household basis, the shares of land again increases for the larger quartiles. But

Table 3.1 Alternative Methodologies to Measure Cultivated Land Distribution

 

 

 

 

Among Smallholders.
Quartile defined as: Land . Quartile defined as:
. area per household Available Land per adult equivalent
Quartile of land per AE per
district Ha % cultivated area Household Ha % cultivated area
District with equitable
land holding 2.5 100 2.5 1.0 100
Quartile l 1.0 10 1.0 1.0 25
Quartile 2 2.0 20 2.0 1.0 25
Quartile 3 3.0 30 3.0 1.0 25
Quartile 4 4.0 40 4.0 1.0 25
District with
inequitable land 2.5 100 2.5 1.0 100
holding
Quartile l 1.0 10 3.0 0.3 5
Quartile 2 2.0 20 4.0 0.5 8
Quartile 3 3.0 30 2.0 1.5 24
Quartile 4 4.0 40 1.0 4.0 63

 

Source: MOA/MSU Food Security Project (1994).

as the number of mouths to feed increases, land holding per AE increases rather than
remain constant. In this case a household in quartile 4 has 4.0 ha per AE, while
household in quartile 1 has only 0.3 ha per AE. This result illustrates a strong unequal

land access across the four quartiles.

21

3. 1 Insights from a Household Economy Perspective
Figure 3.1 shows a model of a range of income and food security strategies potentially
available to rural households. This is a conceptual approach which can be utilized to

analyze these households.

The subsistence farm economy approach assumes that households produce all their own
consumption needs, through agricultural and livestock production. Consumed
agricultural and livestock production constitute in-kind income. In general, one can

state that this is a relatively closed economy.

On the other hand, in a commercialized farm economy, besides including consumed
agricultural and livestock production, households have access to agricultural
commodity markets for sale of surpluses of food crops, cash crops and livestock,
allowing them to obtain cash income. This cash income can be converted into
household consumption by the way of food markets. Thus, a particular household can
have two alternatives for obtaining food: through own production, or through food

markets .

22

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Finally, if there are efficient labor markets and markets for goods and services, this
opens up possibilities for households to diversify their income sources. In other words,
besides the agricultural and livestock production and sales of food and agricultural
produce, one can think of a certain household selling labor and/or being involved in
micro enterprise activities. Note that labor availability is a major constraint a
particular household may face to becoming involved in all activities in a broad

household economy.

How does the household economy perspective relate to the issue of land access?
Agricultural production is only one of many possible sources of rural household
income. In theory, land-poor households could make-up for their lack of land through
increased wage earnings or through micro/small enterprises activities, followed by a
conversion of that income into food, goods and services. However, there are several
pre-conditions for this to happen:

1. Rural labor markets, and agricultural commodity markets for sale and
food markets for purchase, must be in place and function relatively
effectively;

2. There must be local demand, or the ability to reach more distant demand
for articles that can be produced by Micro and Small Enterprises (MSE);
and

3. There must be in place programs to develop rural human skills/capital.

24

3. l. 1 Rural Labor Markets

According to this conceptual framework (Figure 3.1), rural households have the option
to allocate their labor into farm and non-farm activities. If a household allocates labor
only to farm activities, the household generally falls into a subsistence farm economy
category, becoming part of a commercialized farm economy only if part of the
agricultural production and livestock is sold. If, on the other hand, households allocate
significant labor to non—farm activities, then the household would be in a much broader

category, that is, the household economy as previously described.

In a situation where there is land scarcity, the labor market would become an extremely
important source of income. However, if land is abundant, one should not rule out the
possibility of a household diversifying its source of income by selling labor, although it

may not be the major source of income for the household.

Previous studies on the labor market in Mozambique found most rural households
relying heavily on farm production. Indeed, MOA/MSU (1992) found that only 16%
of the rural household income in Monapo and Angoche, were originated from off-farm
payments, while in Ribaué this resulted in 11% of the total income. The same study
also found for Monapo and Ribaué, a negative relationship between the non-farm share
of household income and farm size; households with little land tended to earn more of
their income from non-farm sources. This suggests that some households were facing
constrained access to land, thus forcing them towards diversification beyond

25

agriculture. This situation puts significant pressure on the landless or near—landless
households, if one considers that there are not many off-farm activities available to
rural households because of the thinness and seasonality of the labor market (Strasberg,
1997 and MOA/MSU, 1992). Thus, rural households need to look for other
alternatives to earn cash income and transform this income into food, goods and

services.

3.1.2 Sale of Agricultural Commodities

The sale of agricultural commodities would be one of the most important sources of
income for households. The assumption is that households producing food crops
and/or cash crops would have access to markets for the sale of agricultural goods and
that these markets function effectively to convert the products into cash income. This
author found that for 55-97 % of the surveyed households, food sales represented a
major source of cash income, suggesting that this activity constitute an important

source of cash income.

3.1.3 Rural Food Markets

Households must have access to rural food markets that function effectively to allow
local consumers to convert income into food. In the case that rural food markets do
not function effectively, then households might be in a situation where they have to
produce most of their food requirements. Cash income they obtain from selling
agricultural goods sale will not be effectively converted into food. In other words,

26

households may find themselves selling agricultural goods (from their own production)
at low prices and buying food (during the hungry season) at very high prices, or in the
extreme case not being able to purchase food, even if they have cash. In the case
where households must rely almost exclusively on their own food production, land-

poor households would be severely affected.

Strasberg (1997), compared results of the 1991 Nampula Smallholder Survey and the
1994-1996 MAP/MSU FSP Smallholder Survey and found that food market

participation among smallholders had increased.

3.1 .4 Employment/Income Opportunities

Employment/ Income opportunities refer to rural MSEs. There must be a local demand
or the ability to reach (transportation and information system) more distant demand for
articles that can be produced by rural MSEs, thus creating employment opportunities.
In most of rural Mozambique, these opportunities are not in place or if they are,

transaction costs to access them are very high9.

3.1.5 Development of Rural Human Skills/Capital
Related to the issue in discussion, the development of rural human skills/capital may

play a major role in improving opportunities for rural households. Investment in

 

9 See Benfica (1998) for a detailed discussion on MSEs.

27

human capital pays off in the long-term. In the short-term it may represent a cost for
the government or institution providing it. In the long-term, skilled rural labor would
play a major role in increasing agricultural productivity, due to their willingness to
adopt new technologies (if on the farm), and to compete in the labor market in a much

better position.

3.2 Summary and Conclusions

In the study area there are not many non-farm income opportunities for households,
due to thinness of the labor market, weak food markets, poor development of rural
human skills/capital, and few MSEs opportunities. This situation leaves the
agricultural production position of the household as the dominant and reliable source of
income, thus increasing the importance of land access. Consequently, one should
expect a strong relationship between amount of land available and level of income

attained by households (Tschirley and Weber, 1994).

The next chapter will present empirical evidence on land distribution in the smallholder

sector, and the relationship between land holdings and household welfare.

28

CHAPTER 4

Empirical Evidence from Mozambique

This chapter brings together empirical evidence from Mozambique on two issues: land
distribution in the smallholder sector (section 4.0), and the relationship between land

holdings and household welfare (section 4.1).

4.0 Land Distribution in the Smallholder Sector

As shown in Chapter 1, Mozambique has a low population density by SSA standards,
suggesting relative land abundance. This section uses primary data from three sources
covering a five year period, to investigate whether this relative abundance has been

translated into relatively equal land access in the smallholder sector.

Tschirley and Weber (1994) examined land area under the control of sampled
households, using three alternative definitions of smallholder land holdings: cultivated
plus fallow land per household, cultivated plus fallow land per household consumption
adult equivalent, and cultivated plus fallow land per household laborer, and found that
there were wide differences in land distribution among smallholders, suggesting
barriers to access for some households. As was shown in the previous chapter, land
holdings per household would, in the absence of serious barriers to access, be expected

to be strongly positively correlated with household size. As a result, land holdings per

29

household adult equivalent and land holdings per household laborer would be much less

variable across households.

It was widely believed that with the end of the civil war in 1992, smallholders would
be able to move back to their ”areas of origin” (areas where people lived before being
displaced due to security reasons) and not only reopen their old fields but also have the
opportunity to open new fields. Therefore, given the perceived abundance of land,
land distribution within the smallholder sector would no longer be a contentious issue.
Yet three separate data bases collected since the end of the war suggest that land
distribution within the sector remains a problem. These data sets are 1) the 1993
National Agricultural Survey, 2) the FSP data set from Nampula and Cabo Delgado

and 3) the 1996 National Agricultural Survey.

Nine months after the signature of the Rome Peace Accordlo , the Department of
Statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (DE/MAP), conducted its first
National Agricultural Survey. Results of this survey were published by MOA/MSU
(1994), and indicated that the pattern of smallholder land distribution was still

problematic, and similar to that observed in the FSP study, using 1991 data.

 

10

The Rome Peace Accord was signed in October 4, 1992 and the smallholder national survey was
conducted around July 1993.

30

Table 4.1 Land (cultivated and fallow) per Household and per Household Adult
Equivalent b Surveyed Districts of Nampula and Cabo Delgado

ProvincesI 1 91 and 1995.

 

 

 

District / Household land area quartile m figmfir‘hofi Area permo‘llgmt a:quivalettt
WES—MEL
Monapo (1991) 2.14 100 0.77 100
Quart. 1 0.73 9 0.25 8
Quart. 2' 1.53 18 0.50 16
Quart. 3 2.19 26 0.75 24
Quart. 4 4.14 43 ' 1.60 51
Ribaué (1991) 3.49 100 1.00 100
Quart. 1 1.20 9 0.30 7
Quart. 2 2.72 19 0.69 18
Quart. 3 4.02 30 1.09 27
Quart. 4 6.12 42 1.96 48
Angoche (1991) 1.51 100 0.54 100
Quart. 1 0.59 10 0.17 8
Quart. 2 0.98 14 0.33 15
Quart. 3 1.49 27 0.50 24
Quart. 4 2.90 48 1.15 53
Montepuez (1995) 3.47 100 1.26 100
Quart. 1 1.62 9 0.59 12
Quart. 2 2.70 25 0.86 17
Quart. 3 3.55 22 1.20 24
Quart. 4 5.77 44 2.39 47
Monapo/Meconta (1995) 4.09 100 1.52 100
Quart. 1 1.76 11 0.68 12
Quart. 2 3.31 19 1.55 19
Quart. 3 4.37 28 1.67 27
Quart. 4 6.83 42 2.59 42
CARE (1995) 3.89 100 1.57 100
Quart. 1 2.15 11 0.83 13
Quart. 2 3.31 26 1.23 20
Quart. 3 4.17 26 1.62 26
Quart. 4 6.05 37 2.59 41

 

Notes: CARE refers to the districts of Nama . Ribaué, Mecuburi and Namapa.

Quartiles may the measure ofl area used.
Source: Tschirley eber, 1994. and 1995 FSP data set.

31

Table 4.1 uses FSP data from 1991 (war time) and 1995 (3 years after peace) to present
mean area and percent of total area per district held by land area quartile under two
definitions of land holdings: 1) land area per household and 2) land area per household
adult equivalent. As in 1991 and 1993, the same pattern of land distribution was found
in 1995, using FSP data sets (see Table 4.1). In 1991, the proportion of total land
holdings retained by the lowest quartile of households was within the range of 7-10%
percent, using the two measure of land holding above described. At the same time, 42-
53 % of land holdings were retained by the top 25 % of smallholders. Although few
changes were noticed in 1995, the bottom 25% of smallholders in each district studied
remained in the same relative position with low shares (9-13 %) of the total land
holdings. Essentially, this result suggests that indeed, there appear to still be factors

leading to inequalities in land distribution in the study areas.

To investigate whether land access was only a problem in these study areas in northern
Mozambique, the 1996 National Agricultural Survey data can also be used. A total of
sixty districts were grouped according to the Greater Agricultural Region (GAR.) to

which they belong.11 According to this grouping, the Monapo/Meconta districts fall

 

ll

GAR is defined as a large region with similar soils and climate, where a particular crop or group
of crops is predominant. The total area occupied by the main crop or main group of crops ranges from 50-
100% of the total cultivated area. GARs are designated by a system of digits, where the first digit is the
GAR and the second number refers to subdivisions based upon the percent of land under the main crop(s).

32

into the GAR l. 1, while Ribaué and Montepuez fall into the GAR 4 and finally

Angoche falls into in the GAR 1.2.12

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show that the pattern of land distribution throughout Mozambique
in 1996 followed that found in Nampula and Cabo Delgado by MOA/MSU in 1991 and
again in 1995. The proportion of total land holdings retained by the lowest quartile of
households was within the range of 5-9% using any of the two measures of land
holdings (per household and per household adult equivalent basis). At the same time
51-65 % of land holding were retained by the top 25 percent of smallholders.
Distribution is slightly less unequal in the lower density central regions, but in the
South inequality is at least as great as in the North. Hence, these results suggest that:
i) the land access problem appears to exist even outside the areas where the FSP has
been studying smallholder access to land and ii) the land access problem seems to

remain even though the war is over.13

Recall that the FSP study area, as was explained in the second chapter, is of relatively

high population density, relatively good soils, and strong competition for land, not just

 

‘2 For a detailed match between districts and GARs, see appendix 1.

13

For land distribution (cultivated area and total area) on both per household and per household adult
equivalent basis by province, see appendix 2. Land distribution pattern by province is similar to that found
when land holding is aggregated on a GAR basis.

33

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among smallholders but also from outsiders as well (mainly Joint Venture Companies
and large commercial farmers). This compares to other regions of the country with
lower population pressure and seemingly lower competition for land among
households. Thus, there would be reason to expect that land access problems would
not be as serious in other areas of the country with lower population density and less

competition from outside demands for land. However, data do not support this view.

4. 1 Relationship Between Land Holdings and Smallholder Welfare

1991 Nampula Smallholder Survey results suggested that household incomes were very
low in Ribaué, Monapo and Angoche. Average incomes per adult equivalent were the
lowest in Ribaué (less than US$45) where land holding were the largest, and highest in
Angoche (slightly more than US$70) where land holdings were the smallest. However,
incomes and consumption within each district were strongly and positively associated
with land holdings (Tschirley and Weber, 1994). This distinction is key: though mean
areas varies across districts, land size also varies a great deal across households within

a district and this variation is strongly associated with variations in income.

The remainder of this section will examine whether land holdings in 1995 continued to

play such a predominant role in household welfare, specifically household income.

36

4.1. 1 Model of Household Welfare
This section presents an econometric model designed to examine more carefully the
relationship between household income and land holdings. The model and the data are
similar to those used by Strasberg (1997) who defined household income as:
"the net value of income earned by resident household members from January to
December 1995 (. . .). It includes retained production, agricultural sales, off-
farm labor sales and micro-enterprise income, less the cost of purchased

agricultural inputs and non-family labor ".

This same definition is applied to the present study. The objective of the regression
model is to undertake new analysis to try to measure to what extent land holdings are
important in determining household income. One model is estimated separately for
each of the three study zones (Monapo/Meconta, CARE and Montepuez). The model
is:

INCOME PER CAPITA= f(ASSETS, STRUCTURE, INFRASTRUCTURE,

CASH CROPPING CATEGORY)

where,

ASSETS is a vector of household asset variables:
AREA_LAB is cultivated plus fallow land per adult laborer without any
exclusion of any land borrowed (mainly land from the Joint Venture Companies

namely LOMACO, SODAN and SAMO)

37

L_QUAL is the percentage of the farm size considered very fertile by

smallholder

NCASHEWP Number of productive cashew trees as of September 1995

CASH CROPPING CATEGORY is a vector of household cash cropping category
variables:
HIGH_INB 1 if high-input block cotton participant
0 otherwise
HIGH_IND 1 if high-input dispersed cotton participant
0 otherwise
LOW_IND 1 if low-input dispersed cotton participant
0 otherwise
HIBM 1 if high-input block maize participant

0 otherwise
STRUCTURE is a vector of household structure variables:
AGEHHH Age of head of household

EDUCMAX Maximum years of education, includes any household member >

15 years

INFRASTRUCTURE is a vector of village level variables

38

VILXXl..n Village level dichotomous variables. These variables are
incorporated in the model to control for variation in
infrastructure across villages, such as road quality, market
access, water resources, availability of maize milling services,

and distance to JV C supply depots that may affect productivity“.

Given the typical form of income, a log-linear functional form was chosen, requiring
that the coefficients of continuous variables be interpreted as the percentage change in
the dependent variable given a unit change in the independent variable. In case of a
dichotomous variable the percentage change implied by the coefficient, [3, is equal to

exppd.

4. l .1 .1 Income Model Results and Interpretation

Regression results show good performance of the model in terms of explanatory power.
Based on the adjusted r-squared, the model explains 50 percent of the variation in
capita income per in Montepuez, 51 percent in Monapo/Meconta and 27 percent in the ‘

CARE-OPEN zone (Tables 4.4 to 4.6).

As far as this study is concerned, the key result is primarily related to the effect of land

holding on per capita income. In each zone, total area controlled by smallholders is

 

See MAP/MSU FSP, 1996 for a complete inventory of infrastructure for each village.

39

highly significant (p-value =0.00), is positive and has a large impact on household
income per capita. The effect of increasing per laborer land holding by one hectare
results in an average increase in per capita income of between 35 and 47 percent across

Table 4.4. Income Regression Results, Montepuez.

 

 

 

 

Dependent Variable
Variable Household Income per Capita
B Std. Error Beta P—Value

AREA_LAB 0.28 0.05 0.35 0.00
LQUAL -0.02 0.14 -0.01 0.88
HIGH_INB 0.61 0.26 0.14 0.02
HIGH_IND 1.06 0.41 0.13 0.01
LOW_IND 0.25 0.08 0.16 0.00
HIBM 0.50 0.27 0.12 0.06
AGEHHH 8.0E-4 0.00 0.01 0.81
EDUCMAX 0.05 0.02 0.16 0.00
VILMTZl 0.28 0.14 0.13 0.04
VILMTZZ -0.17 0.14 -0.08 0.24
VILMTZ3 -0.58 0.15 -0.26 0.00
VILMTZ4 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.54
VILMTZS -0.31 0.13 -0.16 0.02
VILMTZ6 -0.39 0.14 -0.19 0.01
Constant 0.19 3.47 0.00
Adj. R squared 0.50

F—stat 15.03

 

Source: 1995, FSP data set.

40

Table 4.5.

Income Regression Results, Monapo/Meconta.

 

 

 

Dependent Variable

Variable Household Income per Capita

B Std. Error Beta P-Value
AREA_LAB 0.27 0.04 0.42 0.00
LQUAL 2.0E—3 0. 12 1.0E-3 0.99
NCASHEWP 7.4E—4 1.0E-3 -0.04 0.48
LOW_INB 0.22 0.13 0.19 0.10
LOW_IND 0.24 0.11 0.21 0.03
AGEHHH -1.5E—3 3.0E-3 -0.03 0.61
EDUCMAX -0.02 0.01 —0.07 0.24
VILMMl -0.43 0.18 -0. 19 0.02
VILMM2 0.05 0.18 0.02 0.77
VILMM3 0.35 0.11 0.23 0.00
VILMM4 -0. 17 0.13 -0.10 0.20
VILMM5 —0.28 0.14 0.16 0.05
VILMM6 0.50 0.13 0.30 0.00
VILMM7 -0.10 0.13 -0.05 0.45
VILMM8 0.36 0.18 0.15 0.04
Constant 0.21 3.78 0.00
Adj. R squared 0.51
F—stat 12.14

 

Source: 1995, FSP data set.

41

Table 4.6. Income Regression Results, CARE-OPEN.

 

 

 

 

 

Dependent Variable
Variable Household Income per Capita
B Std. Error. Beta P—Value

AREA_LAB 0.33 0.05 0.47 0.00
LQUAL 0.27 0.13 0.15 0.05
NCASHEWP 3 .6E-3 2.0E—3 0. 16 0.06
LOW_IND -0.23 0.12 -0. 19 0.05
AGEHHH -9.1E-3 0.00 -0. 19 0.02
EDUCMAX -0.16 0.02 -0.06 0.45
VILCARl -0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.71
VILCAR2 0.04 o. 15 cos 0.78
VILCAR3 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.56
VILCAR4 —0.09 0.14 -0.06 0.53
Constant 0.22 3.94 0.00
Adj. R squared 0.27

F-stat 6.22

 

Source: 1995, MAP/MSU data set.

the three study zones”. Decreasing land holdings decreases income by the same
percentage. This suggests that land-poor households in the study area are not able to
make-up for their lack of land through strategies such as selling wage labor, engaging

in MSE activities, or increasing the productivity of the land they have. This result

 

15

Strasberg (1997) definition of land holdings excluded all borrowed land the household had
(especially from the JVCs) and included this variable in the model along with the number of adults in the
household, while this study includes all land under control of the household in the cropping season on a per
laborer basis. Thus the coefficients obtained by Strasberg although statistically significant are lower than
those found in the present study. This is a clear indication of how robust the models are.

42

establishes the key role land holdings play in household welfare but seems to be
contrary to what some authors have found in different settings of Africa. Indeed,
where a more developed off-farm labor markets exists, land-poor households can obtain
cash income followed by its conversion into food through food markets. However,
Lipton (1985) argues that, although the amount of land held tended not to be correlated
with income or consumption, access to at least some land is crucial in determining

household well being.

With the still relatively weak state of food, labor and goods markets in the study area,
own production of calories becomes more important to households. Strasberg (1997)
reports that from 60-84% of household calorie consumption has its origin in own
production. These households also need some cash to purchase consumer goods.
Thus, most households sell food crops (especially maize grain) during the harvest time,
but some of these have to purchase food at higher prices during the hungry season.
Table 4.7 shows maize grain sales and purchase prices and maize meal purchase prices
in the study zone. Maize was chosen for illustration because it is the main source of

calories consumed by households.

43

Table 4.7 White Maize Grain and White Maize Meal Prices (in US dollars) in the
Study Zone, 1994-1996.

 

 

 

 

Maize Grain Maize Meal
Study zone Sales Price per Kg Purchased Price per Purchased Prices per Kg at
at Harvest Time Kg at Hungry Season Hungry Season
Montepuez $0.093 $0. 123 $0.357
”mm/Ma $0.079 $0.105 $0.287
onta
CARE/OPEN $0.079 $0.215 $0.428

 

Source: 1995 FSP data set.

In all study zones, maize grain purchase prices during the hungry season ranged from
1.3 to 2.7 times higher than the sales prices during harvest. At the same time, maize
meal appears to have had much higher purchase prices than maize grain. In this case,
prices are 3.6 to 5.4 times greater than harvest season sales prices of grain. The latter,
especially illustrates the difficulties households face to turn cash earnings into food

very efficiently.

According to Strasberg (1997), households in the study area rely on labor sales for a
minor part (from 3 to 13 percent) of household income. This is consistent with the
characteristics of the labor market in northern Mozambique (thin and seasonal),

associated with the low daily wage (US$0.45/day).

MSEs also account for a very small share of the net income in the study area. Of the

total net income, only 4 to 10 percent is originated from MSEs (Strasberg, 1997).

44

Overall, Strasberg found that retained production accounted for 47 % , 50 % and 59 % ,
respectively, of household income in Montepuez, Monapo/Meconta and CARE/OPEN

areas.

4.2 Summary and Conclusions

This chapter used data from multiple sources to analyze changes in land distribution
among smallholder households during the period between 1991 and 1996. Results
showed that land inequality throughout the country is similar to that found in Nampula
and Cabo Delgado and this inequality had changed little four years after the ending of
the war. Where income data were available, results also showed that the observed
inequality in land distribution is a problem, in that land holdings are a major
determinant of household income. Land-poor households face a serious income
shortage and thus are also likely to face a critical food security problem, especially in a

setting where rural food, goods and labor markets do not function efficiently.

The next chapter will identify and discuss different factors that could lead to inequality

of access to land among smallholders.

45

CHAPTER 5

Factors Affecting Access to Land in the Smallholder Sector

5.0 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to identify and discuss factors affecting land access
within the smallholder sector. These factors will be distinguished according to two
general categories: first, factors that are exogenous to the local (or "traditional")
system of land allocation; and second, factors that are considered endogenous to it.
Considering the study area, exogenous factors will include the presence of some large
private concessions, population density, population settlement (nucleated versus
dispersed), and characteristics of the family that affect their ability to work
(demographic factors), such as female head of household, age, dependency ratio,
education, illness and polygamy. Endogenous factors are defined as those which relate
to the manner in which the local system of land allocation works. This includes the
relation of husband and wife to the local power structure (official and traditional),

being native to the area and the clan to which one belongs.

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) will be used to measure the proportion of variation of
land area (cultivated plus fallow) due to endogenous and exogenous factors to the local
system of land allocation. This is followed by regression analysis to measure the
impact of each factor presumably important to land access within the smallholder
sector.

46

5. 1 Variation in Land Holdings Within and Across Villages

In a sample from many villages, one might expect a situation where between them there
is much variation in land holdings, but within a single village there might be a very
little variation, i.e. , most of the variation may occur due to different mean land holding
in different villages, with a very narrow spread within each village around its mean. A
very different situation could have similar means across villages, with much variation
within villages. Thus two courses of action may be taken depending whether a large
proportion of the variation comes from between or within villages. If a large
proportion of the variation is between villages, this result will lead one’s attention to
factors exogenous to the local land allocation system. On the other hand, if most of the
variation is within villages, then greater attention must be focused on the dynamics of
land allocation within the local system of land allocation (a mixture of formal and
traditional). It is also necessary to know whether or not the proportion of variation is
significant or not. Thus, to avoid guesswork or subjective evaluation, an objective

criterion is desired. The statistical procedure ANOVA is used in the analysis for this

purpose-

The ANOVA allows us to conduct a within-and between-village test of significance
among treatment means (i.e. mean cultivated area per labor adult equivalent). The
results are given on the basis of the probability, due to chance alone, of finding a

difference or differences as large as those obtained. The test of significance is cast in

47

the form of accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis, or in this case, the hypothesis of

no difference. The null hypothesis can be written as:
H0: pl = #2

meaning that there is no difference between the population treatment means. If the null
hypothesis is rejected, we have the alternative hypothesis H1. This hypothesis can take

the following form:
H1: pl at 11.2

the hypothesis that the population means do differ. The decision rule in the ANOVA is

based on the F—statistic test or p—value.

Table 5.1 shows results of ANOVA test for the sampled villages in Northern
Mozambique. Note that these are the same villages described in Chapter 2 (villages in

Montepuez, Monapo/Meconta and CARE/OPEN zones).

The very low p-value obtained in the ANOVA test indicates that mean land holdings
do, indeed, vary between villages. In other words, the null hypothesis of no difference
in the treatment means is rejected. Yet in proportional terms, 83 % (9449.6/11328.9)
of the total variation in land holdings is due to factors within the villages, while 17%

48

Table 5.1 Analysis of Variance of Land Area (cultivated+fallow) per Household
Labor Adult-Equivalent (weighted), in Northern Mozambique, 1995.

 

Source of Variation Sum of Squares Degrees of freedom Mean Square F-Statistic P-value
Between Villages 1879.312 20 93.966 342.379 0.000
Within Villages 9449.556 34431 0.274

Total 1 1328.868 34451

 

Source: 1995 FSP data set.

(1879.3/11328.9) is due to factors between villages. In our interpretation, then 83 % of
all variation in land holdings is associated with factors endogenous to the local systems

of land distribution.

These results are contrary to the conventional wisdom. Indeed, one would expect
much more variation in land holding between villages instead of within villages.
Location (being near a main road), presence of a large private company (JV Cs), soil
fertility, being near the district capital, are factors among others, that would attract
many people to these villages, increasing population pressure on the land and leading to
lower mean land holdings. In villages with very little infrastructure, located in remote
areas, far from the main roads, the expectations would be for less population pressure
and higher land holdings. On the other hand, considering that "... African societies
often claim that tribal (traditional) authority or practice assigns to each family, or to
each adult male, a cultivable area settled or slush-and-bum of a size dictated by the
family’s needs or by its available family labor" (Lipton, 1985), the expectation would

be little variation within the village. These results constitute a clear indication of the

49

existence of both endogenous and exogenous factors leading to inequalities of land
distribution in the sampled area (shown in the previous chapters). The obvious question

to raise is: what are the factors leading to such inequalities of land distribution?

The remainder of this chapter will identify and examine the factors playing a

predominant role in land allocation using regression analysis.

5.2 Model of Household Determinants of Land Access
This section presents an econometric model designed to examine more carefully the
determinants of household land holding. The objective is to measure to what extent

both endogenous and exogenous factors are important in determining household access

to land. The 1995 FSP data set is used.

Three sets of variables hypothesized to contribute to household access to land are
included in the model. Land access is defined in terms of cultivated plus fallow
hectares per labor adult equivalent in the household. One model is estimated for each
of the three study zones (Montepuez, Monapo/Meconta and CARE/OPEN). The model

is specified as follows:

Cultivated +fallow ha per AE =f(demo, exo, endo) where,
Demo is a vector of household demographic variables:

AGEHHH, Age of the head of the household

50

DEP_RAT Dependency ratio. Dependants are defined as those household
members less than 10 years old and greater than 65 years old.
The remaining members are assumed to be the working force
within the household. Thus, the dependency ratio is calculated as
a ratio of the dependents divided by the number of adults lying
between 11 to 64 years old.

FEMHHH 1 if female headed household
0 if male headed household

EDUCMAX Maximum years of education, includes any household member
>15 years old

POLYGAMY 1 if male is polygamous
0 otherwise

ND_ILL Total days sick among household laboring adults in the period

September 94-August 95.

Exo is a vector of factors considered exogenous to the local system of land allocation
including:
POPSETTL 1 if the population settlement is nucleated
0 otherwise
VILLXXl . . .n Village level dichotomous variables. It has the same definition as

in

51

Chapter four. This variable is intended to capture variations in

infrastructure across villages.

Endo is a vector of factors considered endogenous to the local land allocation system as
they were measured during the 1995 FSP survey and prior to the field work for this
study including:
FEM_RTA 1 if female related to traditional authorities
0 otherwise
MALE_RTA 1 if male related to traditional authorities
0 otherwise
FEM_NAT 1 if female is a village native
0 otherwise
MALE_NAT 1 if male is village native
0 otherwise
POWERTA16 1 if the role of traditional authorities in the village is considered
strong
0 otherwise
DPB 1 if a JV C or private owns a block within the village to which

smallholders do no have access,

 

16

Traditional authorities were classified as "strong” or ”weak” according to the role they play in the
decision making process in the village. Thus, the traditional authority was classified as "strong" if they have
an active and influential role in the village.

52

0 otherwise
A linear form was chosen, requiring that the coefficients of continuous variables be
interpreted as the change in the independent variable given a unit change in the
independent variable. In the case of dichotomous variables, whether or not it assumes

the value of zero, it will affect the constant term of the regression (the intercept).

5.2.1 Land Model Results and Interpretation

Regression results show poor performance of the model in terms of explanatory power
although there is overall significance at the 5 percent level in Monapo/Meconta and at
the 1 percent significance level in both Montepuez and CARE/OPEN. Based on the
adjusted r-squared, the model explains only 8 of the variation in land per labor adult
equivalent in Monapo/Meconta, 9 percent in CARE/OPEN and 13 percent in

Montepuez (tables 5.2 to 5.4).

The variables most often significant are AGEHHH (age of head of household) and
MALE_NAT (male native to village). AGEHHH is significant and positive in
Montepuez, and positive and nearly significant (p=0. 15) in Monapo/Meconta. This
suggests that older heads of households have generally been successful in obtaining
more land relative to household size over the years. MALE_NAT is positive,
significant and large (based on the size of the standardized Beta) in Monapo/Meconta

and CARE-OPEN. This result is interesting, suggesting as it does that households are

53

better-off in terms of access to land when the male does not follow the traditional

matrilineal practice of moving to his wife’s village. Note also that in Montepuez,

 

 

 

 

 

Table 5.2 Land Regression Results, Montepuez.
Dependent Variable
Variable Land per Labor Adult-Equivalent
B Std.Error Beta P-Value
AGEHHH 0.02 5015-03 0.26 0.00
FEM_RTA -0.06 0.13 -0.03 0.68
MALE_RTA 0.26 0.15 0.15 0.10
DEP_RAT 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.28
EDUCMAX -0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.49
FEM_NAT -0.13 0.14 -0.08 0.35
MALE_NAT 0.11 0.17 0.66 0.51
ND_ILL -1 .4E-03 1.0E-03 -0.09 0. 19
POLYGAMY 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.20
FEMHHH 0.58 0.54 0.07 0.29
VILMTZl 0.33 0.22 0.15 0.14
VILMTZ2 -0.26 0.22 -0. 12 0.23
VILMTZB -0.52 0.24 -0.21 0.03
VILMTZ4 0.20 0.25 0.09 0.43
VILMTZS -0.22 0.19 ~1.06 0.25
VILMTZG -0.17 0.19 -0.08 0.37
Constant _ 0.63 0.34 0.07
Adj. R-squared 0.138
Significant-F 0.00

 

Source: 1995 FSP data set .

54

Table 5.3 Land Regression Results, Monapo/Meconta.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dependent Variable
Variable Land per Labor Adult-Equivalent
1B Std._l_3_rror B_et_a P-Value

AGEHHH 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.15
FEM_RTA -1 .6E-03 0.20 -l .0E—3 0.99
MALE_RTA -l .6E-03 0.20 -l .0E-3 0.99
DEP_RAT 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.17
EDUCMAX -0.02 0.03 -0.06 0.51
FEM_NAT 0.03 0.22 0.01 0.91
MALE_NAT 0.60 0.22 0.30 0.01
ND_ILL -6.0E-04 l .0E-03 -0.05 0.55
POLYGAMY 0.26 0.26 0.08 0.32
FEMHHH 0.50 0.40 0.11 0.21
VILMMl -0.08 0.33 -0.03 0.81
VILMM2 -O.56 0.37 -0.18 0.13
VILMM3 -0. 11 0.38 -0.03 0.77
VILMM4 -0.44 0.31 -0.20 0.16
VILMM5 -o.39 0.35 I -0.16 0.27
VILMM6 -0.20 0.33 -0.08 0.55
VILMM7 -0.36 0.34 -O.15 0.29
VILMM8 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.97
Constant 0.90 0.40 0.03
Adj. R squared 0.08

Significant-F 0.03

 

Source: 1995 FSP data set.

55

Table 5.4 Land Regression Results, CARE/OPEN.

 

 

 

 

 

Dependent Variable
Land per Labor Adult-Equivalent
Variable LB Std.l_3rror 1&1 P-Value

AGEHHH 5.0E-03 5015-03 0.08 0.34
FEM_RTA —0.03 0.20 -0.01 0.88
MALE_RTA 0.03 0.20 0.02 0.87
POWERTA -0.22 0.14 -O.l2 0.13
POPSE'ITL -0.15 0.14 0.09 0.30
DEP_RAT 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.17
EDUCMAX -0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.33
FEM_NAT 0.03 0.22 0.02 0.88
MALE_NAT 0.57 0.21 0.29 0.01
ND_ILL -7.0E-04 1 05—03 -0.06 0.46
POLYGAMY 0.24 0.25 0.08 0.33
FEMHHH 0.52 0.39 0.12 0.19
Constant 0.83 0.35 0.02
Adj. R squared 0.09

Significant-F 0.001

 

Source: 1995 FSP data set.

though MALE_NAT is not significant, MALE_RTA is both positive and significant,
suggesting that here the male’s relationship to the structure of authority is more
important than that of the female. Both these results may suggest that traditional
matrilineal structures and practices have become less important in determining land
access than they presumably were in the past. Such a conclusion must, however,

remain tentative pending further research.

56

No other variables in the analysis were significant, except for some village dummies.
DPB, the variable indicating presence of blocks of land to which smallholders did not
have access, was insignificant in all cases and caused multicollinearity problems with

other variables, and so was eliminated.

Overall, the results of the model only explained part of the problem of land access in

northern Mozambique.

5 .3 Summary and Conclusions

This chapter used 1995 FSP data set to identify and discuss factors affecting land
access among smallholder households. An ANOVA test was used to identify the
proportion of total variation in land holdings that was within villages (hypothesized to
be associated with factors endogenous to the local system) versus across villages
(hypothesized to be due to factors exogenous to the local system of land allocation)
while regression analysis was applied to help measure the degree of importance of
each identified factor in land access. Results showed that most of the variation in land
access is within villages, suggesting that there are factors within the local system of
land allocation which are leading to disparities in land allocation among smallholder
households. The regression model used in the three study zones explained only a small
portion of total variation in land holdings, but the significant results for male native and
male relationship to local authority were very suggestive. The overall low explanatory
power is likely to be associated with omitted variables that will be identified in the next

57

chapter. These results lead to the need to conduct further analyzes of the local system
of land allocation to better understand the dynamics of the process. Thus, the next

chapter will be dedicated to an in-depth case study.

58

CHAPTER 6

Dynamics of the Local Land Allocation System

6.0 Introduction

Evidence from the 1991 MOA/MSU FSP study showed that land holdings were the
principal determinant of income in Nampula province. The 1995 FSP data set for
Nampula and Cabo Delgado showed the same pattern of distribution of cultivated land,
and showed that land holdings had significant, positive, and large effects on household
income across all three study zones. The 1996 National Agricultural Survey showed
that within the smallholder sector land was still relatively unequally distributed both
across the agro-ecological zones of the country as well as in all provinces of
Mozambique. This finding was consistent with what was found in 1991 and 1995 for

Nampula province.

Based on these findings, a key question remains: why do many households fall in the
category of low area cultivated per adult equivalent, while others do not? Or in other
words, why are there land and income-poor households in a setting of apparent land

, abundance?

In this chapter we suggest and discuss the importance of other factors that might be
influencing land access in the smallholder sector. These factors are namely: 1) the

evolution of the traditional system of land tenure; and 2) the interaction between the

59

traditional and the formal systems of land tenure. Given the fact that the evidence from
earlier analysis was not sufficient to distinguish the relative importance of these factors,
additional field work was conducted to try to understand social and economic
dimensions of the traditional system of land allocation. Particularly, this chapter
analyzes aspects of the organization of the Macua society, particularly those that may
affect land access and tenure in Northern Mozambique. This is an attempt to explain
the ongoing land paradox, by turning to a better understanding of relevant social and
political organizational aspects of the Macua society. As part of this effort, an in—depth

case study was conducted in the study zone.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: first we present results of field
measurements; second, we describe relevant characteristics of the organization of the
Macua society; third, we describe the customary land tenure system in Northern
Mozambique; and fourth, we analyze the dynamic of the local land allocation system
though a case study in Varrua (Meconta District). Finally, we draw conclusions from

the major findings.

6.1 Field Measurements
To verify the accuracy of total land area households declared in their possession, we
proceeded with measurement of fields of smallholders in four selected village of the

total village sample.

60

Results in Table 6.1, show a positive and significant correlation coefficient between
declared and measured field size in the four villages. The correlation coefficients for
Varrua and Mepine (Nampula province) were higher than those found in Nacuca in
Nassimoja (Cabo Delgado province). A study by Raffi, Freire and Fernandes (1994)
found similar correlation coefficients for Monapo and Montepuez districts. Thus, one
can safely conclude that smallholders have a fair perception of the amount of land they
have access to, implying that chances for misreporting land areas available were low.
Consequently, households reporting themselves as land-poor are indeed likely to be in

that situation.

In Tables 6.2 and 6.3, households are ranked by total declared area, then ranked again
by total measured area. Results from Montepuez show little changes in rankings and
total measured area. In Monapo/Meconta, rankings and mean holdings change more.
Yet even here, the two households with least reported area remain on the top. The
spread between households with least and most land decreases slightly in Montepuez
after measuring, while in Monapo/Meconta it increases. Overall, the results of the
land measurement eXercise confirm the earlier conclusion that land holdings are

markedly unequal within the smallholder sector in the area studied.

61

Table 6.1 Correlation Coefficient Between Total Field Area Declared and
Measured, in Varrua and Mepine (Nampula Province) and Nacuca and
Nassimoja (Cabo Delgado Province), 1997.

 

Village Correlation Coefficient between Declared
versus Measured Fields Area
Varrua (n=37) 0.9272
Mepine (n=39) 0.8134
Nacuca (n=55) 0.6263
Nassimoja (n=33) 0.5199

 

Note: All correlation coefficient are significant at 0.01 level.
Source: 1997 FSP data set.

62

Table 6.2 Comparison of Declared and Measured Areas in Nacuca and Nassimoja,
Montepuez, 1997 .

 

 

 

Household Total Declared Ranking by Declared Total Measured Ranking by
Number Area (hectars) Area Area (hectars) Measured Area
1 1.00 l 1.13 1
2 2.50 2 2.84 3
3 3.75 3 2.05 2
4 4.50 4 4.00 4
5 4.50 5 4.07 5
6 4.75 6 4.14 6
7 5.00 7 7.53 12
8 5.25 8 4.21 7
9 5.50 9 4.89 9
10 6.00 10 4.66 8
11 6.25 11 6.20 10
12 6.75 12 7.16 11
13 8.00 13 8.46 l4
14 12.00 14 7.75 13
15 12.00 15 10.72 15
Mean 5.85 5.32

 

Source: 1997 FSP data set.

63

Table 6.3 Comparison of Declared and Measured Field Areas in Varrua and
Mepine, Monapo/Meconta, 1997.

 

 

Household Total Declared Area Ranking by Total Measured Ranking by Measured
Number (Hectars) Declared Area Area (Hectars) Area
1 0.56 l 0.22 2
2 1.00 2 0.21 1
3 1.18 3 1.76 5
4 2.16 4 1.92 7
5 2.56 ' 5 1.80 6
6 3.50 6 1.05 3
7 4.00 7 1.22 4
8 4.13 8 2.37 9
9 4.90 9 2.13 8
10 5.25 10 2.97 10
11 7.85 11 6.75 11
12 15.00 12 15.60 12
Mean 4.34 3.17

 

Source: 1997 FSP data set.

6.2 Organization of the Macua Society

One of the best ways to understand any aspect of a given people is to adequately know
the social and political structures that frequently guide its human relations. One way of
visualizing the Macua society is as a series of progressively more aggregated social
units related by matrilineal, wcorilocal (after marriage, the male moves to the female’s
village) and exogamic ties (members from the same clanic segment are encouraged to
not marry each other). The smallest unit in this system is the N ’toko, a family unit

composed of husband, wife and children. Several N ’toko are organized into an N ’loko.

64

The head of the N ’loko is the principal Atata, and only his nieces, nephews and their
mothers (his sisters) from the N ’toko are members of his N ’loko. The husbands from
each of the N ’toko are considered outsiders. Several N ’loko are further aggregated into

a Nyhimu, or lineage, lead by the Humo”.

Many Mahimu (plural for Nyhimu) living near each other constitute a Chefatura”.
Many Mahimu live within the Chefatura, with several N ’loko per Nyhimu and several
N ’toko per N ’loko. The head of the Chefatura is often called Mwene in Macua
terminology. Each Mwene has next to him a very important woman, his elder sister
from the same mother, called pryamwene. She does not have visible power, acting

more as an advisor for the Mwene and as guardian of the traditions of the lineage.

The organization of the Macua land units mirrors the social organization just described.
Each principal Atata (head of an N ’loko) has authority over a Matala, a contiguous
block of land within which live the various N ’toko comprising his N ’loko. Within his

Matala, the principal Atata allocates to each N ’toko a smaller area of land called

 

17

In some areas, instead of Humo, Mwene is the next authority above the principal Atata (Note that
the terminology changes from region to region within the territory where the Macua society is found. For
simplicity, we will refer to Mwene/Humo with equal level of importance. Also, there is a Macua term
Ulupale or Atokwene, to distinguish important Mamwene (plural for Mwene).

18

Small territorial unit centralized in a Mwene/Hume from the dominant Nyhimu, who represents all
Mahimu in the territory. In Mozambique, Chefaturas were destroyed by the Portuguese to originate the
Regulados (Departamento de Historia da UEM, 1982). Note too that not all members of a givenNyhimu live
in the same Chefatura; a Nyhimu is typically spread over several Chefaturas and even Regulados.

65

N ’tala. This too is a contiguous block of land that the N ’toko has the right to work.
This land is allocated by the Atata to his nephews, not to the husbands who head each
N ’toko. Thus, the smallest land area within this system is the N ’tala worked by the
N ’toko, followed by the Matala over which the Atata has authority. Above this, the
Chefatura is the area of land under the authority of the Mwene, within which live

various Nyhimu.

According to Martinez (1989), this power structure is purely Macua without any
external interference. However, the arrival of the Portuguese led to colonization of the
country. The colonialists used the power structure already in place and introduced

three more important positions: Regulo, Cabo, and Chefe.

The Regulo is in charge of the total group of Chefaturas in a Regulado while the Cabo
is in charge of only a subset of the Chefaturas within the land under control of the
Regulo. It is important to mention that the Regulo appeared as the result of the
colonialist needs to find someone to be a mediator between them and the local

communities”.

 

19

The newly approved Land Law does not recognize explicitly the role of such traditional authorities,
although it recognizes the role of the local communities.

66

6.3 Customary Land Tenure Systems in Northern Mozambique.
The customary sector in Northern Mozambique consists of smallholders under a
matrilineal ethnic group (lineages or Mahimu). In this system, land had traditionally

been passed from mother to daughters or from family leader to female family members.

A newly married couple often resided permanently in the wife’s village, even though
this is not always required. In this case, the couple obtain land from the wife’s
principal Atata. However, if the couple moves to reside at the husband’s village, then
the husband traditionally acquired land from the extended family leader (principal
Atata) in his village. This land, however, cannot be passed to his children; it would

pass to a nephew or niece through the principal Atata.

In contrast, in a patrilineal system, not common in northern Mozambique, the man
claims land ownership and can pass on all land developments to his children. This

situation mostly occurs in Mozambique in areas South of the Zambezi River”.

In Macua areas of the North, there are various modes of transfer and tenure
arrangements that influence tenure security and the amount of land one has access to.

The first mode of transfer occurs when the husband resides in the wife’s village

 

20

The Zambezi River is frequently used as a natural limit of the matrilineal North and patrilineal
South.

67

(uxorilocal marriage) only on a temporary basis. If this is the case, some husbands will

retain rights to land in their own village", and may have more than one wife.

The second mode is concerned with rights to land following the death or divorce of a
spouse. In the case where the widow or widower continues to reside in the deceased’s
village, continued land rights are not all guaranteed. These situations can reduce the
incentives for a man to work in his wife’s village. Whenever either a death or divorce
becomes likely, the non—native spouse may have to leave the village to ensure access to
land. If the widow/widower remarries a native of the village, he/she does not have to
leave the village. This is more common for a widow, who according to Macua

tradition, should marry one of her brothers-in law, and stay in the village.

The third mode of land transfer and tenure occurs when land passes from uncles (Atata)

to nephews or nieces, bypassing the children.

In a typical Macua village, there are also communally held lands (preserved area),
controlled by the principal Atata which appear to be virtual open-access resources, with

few rules on user group membership.

 

21
The way these husbands can obtain land will be explained later in this Chapter.

68

The fourth mode of transfer and tenure is when the principal Atata cedes use rights
over specific tracts of land to families and family leaders. New land could be opened
through request to family leaders and traditional chiefs. This can be the case of the
newcomers. The procedure is as follows: the newcomer head of the household contacts
the traditional structures (represented by Regulo, Mwene, Atata, Humo) and/ or the
official authorities (represented by the Village’s President, Head of Production, and
Village Secretary) to be introduced in the village and to express their desire to live in
the village. Then, the Regulo indicates one Atata (the one he knows controls a
substantial area of preserved land) expecting him to cede a use right of part of the land
area under his (the principal Atata) control to the new family. This is a temporary
arrangement which may cease anytime”. Given the fact that this arrangement is
precarious, the head of the household will likely search for a more secure land
arrangement. This implies that after a year or two, the newcomer will be able to find a
place where a more permanent land access condition can be achieved. Usually, the
household will find this type of land at the outer limits of the Reguladoz3 and,
sometimes in the neighboring Regulado. This is one of many strategies a household

has to increase the amount of cultivable land they have access to.

 

22

Some reason for ceasing the arrangement could be bad behavior by the new family or that the Atata
needs to allocate the portion of land to his direct family member.

23 Territory under control of Regulo.

69

Linked to land access, there is a saying among the Macua that: "luck follows lineage"
(A sorte vai com o Nyhimu). According to information obtained from local sources
(village group interviews), in each village, there can be found more than one coexisting
lineage. As shown in Table 6.4 there are 7 coexisting lineages in Varrua. Some
lineages are regarded by locals as "strong" while others are seen as "weak". Local
opinion was also that when it comes to land issues, those belonging to a "strong”
lineage are more likely to get access to more and better land, compared to other
households that belong to a lineage considered "weak". So, if one was born in a

" strong " Nyhimu, the likelihood of obtaining more and better land is believed to be

higher.

How does a certain Nyhimu achieve the category of being considered a "strong"
Nyhimu? Local leaders suggested that there were several ways to achieve such status
and this is linked to the sources of traditional power. There is always one nyhimu that
assumes supremacy in a determined lineage territory. Consequently, its Chief assumes

the leadership above all other Mahimu. In the illustrated cases of Regulado Varrua

(Table 6.4) there are two Mahimu considered strong: Lapone and Lucazi. But, how
does a certain Nyhimu became the most powerful/influential? In the past, there were at
least two ways to reach that position: longevity in land occupation and conquering of

land.

70

Table 6.4 Number of principal Atata by nyhimu affiliation and by Head or
Leader’s Name in Varrua, Nampula Province, 1997.

 

 

Nyhimu Head or Leader’s Name
(Lineage) Varrua Mucuaranha Totela Tchotcho Total
Lapone 6 3 5 4 18
Mulima . 4 1 2 1 8
Lucazi 1 2 - - 3
Mali - 3 - 1 4
Selege - 3 - 1 4
Iatche - - l - 1
Mavele - - l l 2

 

Source: 1997 FSP data set.

Longevity in land occupation was the most common way of emerging and obtaining
legitimation of traditional power. The Mhimu that first settled in a certain territory
assumed the legitimacy over that territory and all other incoming Mahimu were
expected to recognize the legitimacy of the first Nyhimu and respect it (Irma Paula,
1997). Conquering of land: In a situation where agricultural production was still the
most important economic activity, households who did not possess sufficient good
quality land were envious of those who possessed the best land. In the past, possessing
arable land also increased the social prestige of the lineage leader as well as increased
military capability and the potential desire to conquer territories of other lineages. As
a result, economic and political power would be reinforced through a force of power to

take over land.

71

The social/biological necessity of exogamic marriages sometimes resulted in women
being kidnaped from a different Nyhimu, followed by their integration in a new lineage.
Men were also kidnaped as a means to reinforce the traditional authority of the lineage
leader. The kidnaped were most of the time treated as slaves (Epota, in Macua). Any
child resulting from a marriage of a female Epota with a male Epota would be
considered Epota too. Given matrilineal conceptions if descent, a child born from a
female Epota with a male Neti (free man, non-Epota), would also be considered Epota.
The major implication of this process is that Epota did not have the right to possess
land. Epotas usually would cultivate land of their "owners" (being the owners the
lineage leaders) in exchange for food. Exceptionally, Epota were able to escape their
condition. To do so, some Epotas would kidnap men and women to show tribute to
their "owners" , which in turn would let the Epota free and allocate then a piece of
land, although it was always small with respect to land holdings of others members of

the dominant lineage.

6.4 Land Distribution and Access According to the Traditional System in
Northern Mozambique

The process of land distribution and access in the smallholder traditional system

appears to be very complicated and extremely influenced by kinship. In broad terms

land allocation according to the traditional customary system can be distinguished as

described bellow.

72

Temporary Access: This is the first stage of gaining access to land by an individual.
Within a household, the head of a household chooses a small plot inside his/her
(N ’tala) field and gives it to his/her son/daughter on a temporary basis. The plot

works as an "experimental field".

Transitory Access: When a son/daughter reaches the age of 13-15, the head of
household increases the amount of land given on a temporary basis, to a much larger
portion, with the objective of increasing household production. This land comes from
the portion the household preserved for expansion purposes. A young boy/ girl is
allowed to use up to 50 percent the total production for their own benefit. Eventually,
the piece of land given will constitute part of the future inheritance. In this process the
young individual can obtain up to a 1/4 hectare (ha) plot or field. This is an

arrangement to prevent future land disputes within the household.

Definitive Access: This usually occurs when the individual reaches about the age of 18.
The head of the household contacts the chief of his residential zone in order to declare
that his son is ready to assume responsibilities, meaning that he can farm and constitute
his own family, therefore needing land. In turn, the chief contacts a principal Atata
that he knows who has "preserved land" and asks him to provide land to the young
man. A variation on this process occurs when instead of a principal Atata conceding
land, it is the father who actually provides it. The land given to the young man is also

on a definitive basis. In this latter case, the amount of land conceded usually varies up

73

to V2 ha. In cases of female headed households, the principal Atata assumes the

responsibility of the process of land allocation.

Assuming that the young man has constituted a family, as this family grows, the need
for more land becomes a necessity. However not all the time is it possible to open-up a
contiguous field. Sometimes contiguous fields available may not be suitable for crops
the household intends to plant. Thus, if the household’s existing land is located in an
area where he can expand the field, before doing so, the head of the household must
ask for permission to his/her nearest neighbor (in case he/she were the first in the
zone), or just inform them about his intention to expand his field in case there is plenty
of land between the two. Alternatively, if this is not possible, then the household can:
(a) turn in to the wife’s Atata and ask for more land; (b) ask the village chief (Regulo)
for more land; (c) go to a neighboring Regulado and ask for land from that respective
Regulo. As a result, a single household will have two or more cropped fields located
in distinct areas either within or outside the Regulado in which the household lives.

Overall this process can be called land accumulation.

The processes above described are very much influenced by the kinship to which one

belongs. Being from a "weak" Nyhimu might prevent one to gain access to more and

better land, either within or outside the Regulado in which he/she lives.

74

6.4.1 Other Means of Gaining Access to Land

Beside the means to access land as described above, smallholders have an alternative
option of gaining access to land from a Joint Venture Company (JV Cs) operating in
their areas. However, this access is not automatic. Smallholders have to go through a
registration process and if they are lucky, skillful and/or have good connections with
those managing this land, they can get some. However, this is a temporary
arrangement that can last, sometimes, only one crop season. In these fields,
smallholders are expected to cultivate a specified crop as specified by the IV C. In the
following crop season, all smallholders with the desire to obtain more land through this

system, must go through the same procedure as in the previous crop season.

The last arrangement which households theoretically have to obtain land, is through the
official system. But the burden they have to go through is so large and can last for
months if not years until they get the piece of land they need. This arrangement is

mostly used by large, private sector actors.

In sum, there are various arrangements for land distribution and access operating in
Northern Mozambique, especially in rural areas. These arrangements range from
traditional (matrilineal and patrilineal) to official (JV Cs and official land registration).
Although all these arrangements are in place, not all households have access to the
desired amount of land, especially according to the amount of labor and the number of

individuals to feed in the household.

75

6.4.2 Institutional Factors Contributing to Inequality in Land Access

Discussion with local informants always brought us back to the saying: "luck follows
the lineage (Nyhimu)" (A sorte vai com o Nyhimu). We asked those in the groups to
explain this saying. They immediately brought it down to the level of N ’loko: "If you
are born in a relatively poor N 'loko it is difficult to become rich (obtain relatively large
amounts of land)". When asked about the reasons for this; it appeared that most of the
time a poor N ’loko would belong to a Nyhimu considered weak. Thus, the principal
Atata would have a small Matala under his control. So, being born in a poor N ’loko
means that your principal Atata has less land that he can make available to all eligible

members of his N ’loko.24

We asked if a Matala can be expanded (and the reverse), and the unanimous answer
was ”that would be extremely difficult". The only way for a N ’loko to get more land
would be for individual members to leave the Matala and obtain land within the area
preservada (this could be within the Regulado or in a different Regulado). Doing this,

they would still be recognized as part of the original N ’loko.

These efforts to acquire more land highlight a second arrangement at work maintaining

inequality: the reception that males receive from the Regulo and Chefe, depending on

 

24

Why do some N ’loko have so little land to begin with? Others came back to the original saying: "A
sorte e dada por Deus" (luck is given by God). They also used the word "natureza" several times, implying
that one's position, originally given by Deus, comes to be seen as part of the person's character (natureza).

76

the N ’loko they come from. As an example, the key informants where asked to
consider the hypothetical case of two individuals, one from a "poor" N ’loko, and other
from a "rich" N ’loko. It was indicated that both were recently married, and the
husbands want to open fields that will be their owns, assuming that their wives already
have field from their principal Atata. (Note also that this example should apply equally
to a N ’toko from a poor N ’loko that wants to obtain land outside their N ’tala). Key
informants were asked who would have priority, and who would get the most land?
The answer, which we paraphrase, was very clear: "the individual from a rich N ’loko
would have priority and have access to more land". When asked why, the answer
came back to "natureza": " the Regulo would think that the "poor" individual would not
be able to adequately farm the lan ". They were also asked why would he think this
"natureza" would make a difference? Answer were simply the person from the better-

off N ’loko would be attended first and better by the Regulo.

A third factor appears to be related to what might be called traditional coping
arrangements based on the extended family. Key informants were asked "what would
happen if someone from a poor N ’loko nevertheless managed to get, for example, a
cotton field and make a good profit, attempting to reinvest that in cotton or another
income-generating activity?” The response was that the members of the extended
family would very quickly come to that person requesting assistance (essentially food

and cash), and soon that profit would be used-up by being spread-out among many in

77

the N ’loko. The effect of such traditional coping mechanisms dissipating savings has

been noted by other researchers in other countries (Lipton, 1983).

6.5 The Case Study

Detailed case studies were conducted in four villages, namely: Varrua, Mepine
(Nampula Province) and Nacuca and Nassimoja (Cabo Delgado Province). The choice
of these villages was based, among other factors, on: 1) the proportion of households
falling into the category of land and income-poor;2) the presence of a JVC (type of

cotton production scheme), 3) the role of the traditional authority in land distribution.

Given the exceptional quantitative and qualitative data collected in Varrua, this case
became the first to be presented. Lessons from this case whenever possible will be
generalized to other villages. That is for instance, the role of the traditional structure

found in Varrua has a lot in common with the role of traditional structures in Mepine.

Following the case of Varrua, Mepine, Nassimoja and Nacuca cases will be presented
in this order. In each case, attention is first devoted to the role of the traditional
authorities followed by a discussion of land distribution at the village level. Finally,
land distribution is also discussed at the household level, with emphasis on the cases of

land and income poor households.

78

6.5.1 Varrua
Varrua village is located in Meconta district of Nampula, in an area of a Regulado that

holds the same name as the village.

6.5.1 .1 Traditional Structure in Varrua

The traditional structure in Varrua does not differ from that previously described in this
chapter. In fact, Varrua shows the most complete traditional structure (see Figure 6.1)
because it includes most of the possible variations one can find when studying the
structure and organization of the Macua society. The influence this structure exerts on

land access and distribution is the subject of discussion in the following subsection.

6.5.1.2 Land Distribution in Varrua

Within the land area under the control of Cabo Varrua, three phases of land
identification and measurement were carried-out. First, each Chief (in charge of a
Chefatura) was identified and his Chefatura measured using a GPS. The results of the
analysis are shown in Figure 6.2. Second, within each Chefatura, each principal Atata

was identified and his Matala measured using measuring tapes and compasses.

79

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flaws: laid mm flaws: D
m e§§§3§8< +w o§§§§fl< w
1!? a. z IITI .r
{I +| +
d 38 8 asaq m .5 3 £25 9

 

 

 

an
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Ewen

 

 

 

Figure 6—2 Areas of Influence of Chiefs in Cabo Varrua, Nampula, Mozambique,
1997.

 

81

Finally, each head of household (N ’toko) within the each Matala was interviewed and
key pieces of information were obtained:
- How many people comprise his N ’toko?
- How many total fields does the N ’toko possess?
- Of this total number of fields, how many are:
- inside the Matala of the principal Atata
- within the JV C block outside the Matala,
- outside the Matala and not in the JV C block
The reason for obtaining this information was to better understand the effect of the size
of the Matala, and by extension the power and prestige of the principal Atata, on the
amount of land available to a household. If the size of a Matala could be shown to
significantly affect the amount of land available to a household, this could be
persuasive evidence of mechanisms within the traditional system that create and

perpetuate inequality of access to land. Results of these measurements are presented in

Table 6.5”.

Figure 6.2 shows the total land under control of the Cabo Varrua. It comprises
territories of four Chefaturas designated by their Chief’s name. The figure really only

shows three Chefaturas. This is due to the fact that Chefatura Mucuaranha was

 

2.5

There was insufficient time to measure each of the fields belonging to eachN’toko. Such data would
allow a quantitative assessment of the effect of Matala size on land access by households. Obtaining such
data is a top priority of future research.

82

Table 6.5 Land Distribution by Chefatura in Varrua, Nampula Province, 1997.

 

 

 

Chefatura
Varrua Tchotcho Mucuaranha Totela
1. Size of Chefatura (Ha) 49.4 176.4 201.3 304.0
2. Mean size of Matala (Ha) 4.5 22.1 16.8 33.8
Maximum size (Ha) 17.3 42.9 108.9 77.6
Minimum size (Ha) 1.3 8.4 2.5 6.2
3. Land per capita within Matala 0.23 0.79 0.59 0.96
(Ha/capita)
4. Fields within Matala (96) 25.7 52.0 36.9 38.8
5. Fields outside Matala (96) 74.3 48.0 63.1 61.2
Fields in block within 55.3 13.9 43.9 55.5
Regulado (%)
Fields outside Regulado (96) 44.7 86.1 56.1 44.5

 

Source: 1997 FSP data set.

subdivided in two to accommodate the Regulo who lives within this territory. Thus,

the land area where the Regulo is also Chief was included in the Chefatura

Mucuaranha. Why? According to local informants, if officially recognized, the Regulo

will move his residence to a different place where the Portuguese built a house for him.

Thus, the control he now exercises over part of Chefatura Mucuaranha will eventually,

be handed back to Chief Mucuaranha. Given this arrangement, it turns out that the

Regulo is a Chief and Cabo (important to note that in addition to these duties, the

Regulo is also the Village President).

83

How is land distributed within the area under control of Cabo Varrua? Table 6.5
shows land distribution and land access arrangements among Chefaturas”. It appears
that the mean size of Matala a is positively correlated with the size of Chefatura. With
exception of the Chefatura Tchotcho, land per capita within the Matala increases as the
size of the Matala increases. The result is that the Atatas with relatively large Matala
will have more land to distribute among households. The case of Chefatura Tchotcho
of a relatively high ratio of land per capita might be associated with relative location.
Compared to other Chefaturas, Tchotcho is located far from the main existing
infrastructures (road, market, hospital, rural shops), being in that way less attractive.
In contrast, Chefaturas located nearby the infrastructures tend to have smaller
minimum and mean sizes of Matala and low land per capita ratio (V arrua and
Mucuaranha). Due to this fact, smallholders in Varrua and Mucuaranha are the ones

with highest percentage of fields outside the Matala.

Households in Varrua and Totela have the highest percent of fields in the block within
the Regulado. These fields are located in the private block and subject to the
registration procedures previously mentioned. In Varrua, households tend to have
fields in the block because of the small amount of land readily available within the

Matala, while in Totela soil quality is the major reason for having land outside of the

 

26

Chefatura Varrua was deliberately included (although not included in Figure 6.1) to accommodate
a "defacto " created by the Regulo residing within the areas of Cabo Nantala, Chefatura Mucuaranha. Thus,
for purposes of land distribution by Chefatura, the latter was divided in two: Varrua and Mucuaranha.

84

Matala. In the latter Chefatura, most of the land is covered by old cashew trees. The

shade of the cashew trees prevents smallholders from cultivating crops under the trees.

In sum, the situation of land arrangements and distribution in the area of Cabo Varrua,
follows both the traditional and the official system of land allocation. Smallholders
have a diversified means of obtaining land. However, we still find the problem of some
smallholders being land and income-poor. In the hypotheses formulation for regression
analysis in Chapter 5 (Monapo/Meconta), among other factors, female relation to
traditional authorities and illness where, a priori, considered important in determining
the amount of land smallholders have access to. However, the regression results
showed no significant relationship between these variables and total land per capita in
households. As explained, due to lack of awareness at the time of data collection,
female spouse relationship to the Atata Principal was not included in the questionnaire.
But evidence from the group interviews revealed that illness and female relation to the
principal Atata, were indeed important in determining land access among smallholders.
For illness, the argument encountered was that elderly couples lack the ability to farm
large amounts of land, even if they had access to it. The argument for including
female spouse relation to the principal Atata is related to the matrilineal system in
place. In the course of the interviews other factors were pointed out as important in
determining land access such as: the concept of "strong" versus "poor" Nyhiniu; soil
quality, in particular in Chefaturas Tchotcho and Totela; perceived lack of interest in

agriculture; and the existence of a private block.

85

(Perceived lack of interest in agriculture): there are many people (especially among
the youth) who it is said appear to not like to farm. It is also said that many of them
prefer to engage in small businesses even though they would not get enough to feed
themselves and their families. In these cases, much of the time it appears they have to

rely on remittances from their parents.

(Pn'vate blocks): According to local sources, in the past the land area which today is
in private blocks used to be part of the land under the customary system of land
allocation. It alone occupies an area of about 500 hectares which is equivalent to 40
percent of the total area under the control of Cabo Varrua. Only a small part of this
block is being used by smallholders, under supervision of a JV C. At least 60 percent
of the 500 hectares is not utilized at all, being perceived by locals as belonging to a
local shop owner. Allegedly, if this portion returns to control of the Regulo Varrua,

there would be no excuse to have land poor in the village.

6.5. 1.3 Current Situation of Land-and Income Poor Households in Varrua
What is the current situation of those households found in the sample to be land and
income poor in Varrua? In the sample, there were three households in the category of
land and income poor. One of the households was made up of one female member,
who by the time of the field work, was suffering from heart disease. As a result she
was not available for interview. The other two households were made up of 5 and 6

members which for confidentiality purposes will be designated households A and B.

86

The head of the household A is native to the village. According to him it was an
exceptional case that when he married he did not abandon the village to live in his
wife’s village. She is from a neighboring Regulado. The head of household B is 28
years old and is native of the village. As in case of household A, the wife is also from

a neighboring Regulado.

Table 6.6 shows the type of land access arrangements and the respective tenure security
for households A and B. Results shows that the two households, and in particular A,
in terms of land access, are both involved in different types of arrangements, ranging
from a traditional system (matrilineal and patrilineal) to a more official arrangement
through a JV C. Note that, in a supposedly predominant matrilineal system, the
patrilineal system is also in place. The two heads of household said that they were not

secure in either living on or farming land belonging to their wives principal Atata.

Despite having more fields, household A seems to be in a worse situation than B. The
majority of the A household members are children less than 6 years old, and the head
of this household is suffering from a chronic illness. He seems to not have any hope of

seeing his family standards of living improving, due to his labor scarcity.

87

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Meanwhile, household B faces much better prospects. But before that, let us focus on
the history of the fields number 1 and 2. Field number 1 came from his father when the
latter died. His father had received a block of approximately 6 ha during colonial

times, which was a common practice at the time.

With three sons, each received about 2 ha upon the death of the father; an example of
patrilineal inheritance in a matrilineal area. The head of this household indicated that
this land is outside any control of the Regulo and other authorities in the village, and no
one can take it from him. He feels more secure about this land. However he cannot
pass this land to his sons. 'Upon his death, the land will pass back to his brothers and

to their families. His sons will eventually get land from other types of arrangements.

Household B, field number 2 was received in the classical matrilineal fashion. It lies
outside of the Regulado Varrua. His wife, who is from the neighboring Regulado, had
recently obtained the field from her principal Atata. The head of the household made it
clear that this land belongs to his wife, not to him. Should the couple ever separate,

the field will remain with his wife.

Contrary to the prospect from the head of household A, the head of household B
considered that he had at least two alternatives to gain more land and greater security.
He referred to a block of 4-5 ha that he received from his principal Atata, but about

which he felt very insecure. He indicated that the Regulo had already given half of it

89

to another person and indicated that he was concerned that if he were to go there and
work the remaining portion, the Regulo could also deliver it to someone else at any
point. This seems to be a clear example of conflict over land within the smallholder

sector. It may stem from conflicts between different inheritance systems.

The other possibility that this household spoke about was of going to a "different
principal Atata to get authorization to open land in the mate (preserved areas)". He
would then get title to this land, so that it could really be "his ". At the time of the
interview, this head of household had not taken any steps in this direction, but he was

not clear about how feasible his plan would be to implement.

In sum, household B and his successors appear to be quite vulnerable. The only land
over which the household head can be certain of his rights is the 2 ha received from his
father, and this land cannot be passed to his sons. While his income situation has
improved (he bought a bicycle in the past year), he remains in the land and income

poor category, though near the top of the low income category.

6.5.2 Mepine

This village is located in Monapo district of Nampula Province. Traditionally, Mepine

is part of the Regulado Meta.

90

6.5.2. 1 Traditional Structure in Mepine

The traditional structure in Mepine is similar to that found in Varrua with a slight
variation. Instead of Chefes de Zona, there are Capitdes, but their roles do not differ.
Compared to Varrua, in this village in particular and the Regulado in general, the
traditional authorities appear to not have much influence in the decision making process
of land distribution. Factors contributing to this situation will be addressed in the

following subsection.

6.5.2.2 Land Distribution in Mepine

Regulado Meta is virtually surrounded by several private blocks, including 11,000 ha
claimed by SODAN with cotton and sisal history. In addition to that, there is a private
block of 450 ha founded in 1930 by a Portuguese colono. The latter was in recent
years worked by the Administrador of Monapo district and now is being claimed by

another small commercial farmer.

According to the local informants, households living in the Regulado Meta do not have
access to much land due to the presence of the above describe private sector. To gain
access to more farm land, households have to rely on the land area inside their N ’tala,
or go to a neighboring Regulado and ask the authorities for land. Beside this
alternative, a few households have managed to gain access to land within the area of
the private block, under control of the small commercial farmer. However this

arrangement is temporary, and subject to termination at any time. There was a feeling

91

that the presence of the private sector land prevented households from obtaining good
farmland nearby their residence. However, local informants were unanimous in
considering that they needed some of the services provided by the private sector firms

such as providing inputs and a market for cotton production.

In part this is how they explain the existence of land poor in the regulado in general,
and Mepine in particular. As for the land within the N ’tala, it follows the classical
matrilineal mode of transfer, thus not different from the situation in Varrua”. The
difference is that the Matala appear to be smaller, resulting in less land to distribute

among households.

Other factors considered important to explain low land and income results were illness
which results in reducing the ability to work and age of the head of household. The

argument present was the same as for the case of Varrua.

In general, these were the major concerns with respect to land access in the Regulado

Meta.

 

27

In the villages of Mepine, Nassimoja and Nacuca field measurement ofMatala were not conducted.

92

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6.5.2.3 Current Situation of Land-and Income Poor Households in Mepine
Table 6.7 shows the types of arrangements of sampled households by field and
respective tenure security. In Mepine within the sample, four households were
identified as land and income poor. All households, with one exception, use more than
one land access arrangement. Those households using the official land arrangement
are the ones with tenure security problems. Household C, although with all land
within the N ’tala, being female headed and thus with tenure security, still is in the
category of land poor. As stated in the table, this fact is associated with her health

status .

Households A, B and D inherited land from their principal Atata. However, it appears
that it did not improve their situation. According to these households, they have

several fields but they are all small.

In sum, in Mepine, the major factor constraining land access among smallholders is the

presence of large private interests.

6.5.3 Nassimoja
This village is located in Montepuez district of Cabo Delgado Province. Originally it
was formed in mid-60's as part of the Portuguese efforts to control the population

during the Mozambique liberation struggle for independence.

94

6.5.3.1 Traditional Structure in Nassimoja

Given the nature of its origin, the traditional authorities in this village do not have
much power. In the village, the traditional authorities work more as a consultation
groups for the village’s President when the latter needs advice on how to solve
conflicts. The village belongs to the Regulado Pulupo. The relative unimportance of
traditional authorities in this area means that the traditional units of land distribution,

such as Matala, play a relatively unimportant role in determining land access.

6.5.3.2 Land Distribution in Nassimoja

There is no large scale private production immediately adjacent to the village with
exception of one privado. Despite this, most of the smallholders have their fields
located far away from the village. In some cases smallholders have to walk for about
45 minutes (one way) to reach the best agricultural land, where their fields are located.
Nearby land has been left in fallow and some was occupied by displaced persons during
the war. In addition, conflicts have emerged in the past provoked by local individuals
who, without any consultation, start farming other’s fallow land situated nearby the
village. During the interviews, these individuals were mentioned as "opportunists" and
" lazy ". Because of their behavior they were in a situation of land poor. Authorities
claimed that anyone could get access to land as long as he/she was willing to deal with
long walks in order to reach the best agricultural land. It was a consensus, in this
village that unless the person was sick, there would be no excuse to be landless or even

income poor. According to them, residents have also the opportunity to provide labor

95

to LOMACO (a IV C located in Montepuez district), which is done by a significant
number of households. Thus, one should ask about the situation of the land and

income poor in the village.

If a household needs land they should contact the local authorities represented by the
village’s President and ask him for a piece of land. In turn, the village’s President
indicates an area within the limits of the village where the household could farm. This
type of arrangement is designated "independent open access" and is often definitive.
The household is secure about these land, because it falls in the category of "preserved

lan " described in the case of Varrua, but it is under control of the village’s President.

6.5.3.3 Current Situation of Land-and Income Poor Households in
Nassimoja

In the household sample of this village, four households were reported as land- and

income-poor households. One the households was not available for interview. The

head of the household A has two fields and is asthmatic and old (70 years old). His

health status and age prevent him from working for consecutive hours. With only two

members, the old man is the one who takes care of the field crops, leaving his wife at

home. The other two households, B and C, are made up of 7 and 4 members.

Their fields are located an average of 50 minutes walk time from their home. In

addition to this fact, the majority of the fields are not located in the same area. The

96

fields are scattered in various directions, increasing the real walking time from home

to, for example, two different fields.

Table 6.6 shows the types of arrangements of sampled households by fields and
respective tenure security for households A, B and C. These households are involved
in three different types of arrangements: " independent open access" , consultation with
local authorities, and offer from a relative. Contrary to what was found in

, Monapo/Meconta villages where households were not "secure with all fields, results
shown in Table 6.6 indicate that households in Nassimoja are much more secure about
the fields use. According to local leaders, this fact is due to the origin of the village
which weakened the power of traditional authorities, thus encouraging a more "official"

system of land allocation to be in place.

In sum, in one case a major constraint facing land- and income-poor households in this
village is, illness. Another factor is more related to the local system and one’s decision
to farm more land. According to local informants, there is plenty of land to be
exploited if one needs it. Yet this research shows that households have to walk
significant distances to gain access to suitable land, and good land close to the village
has become the focus of conflict. This suggests that, in practice, land is not as

abundant and access is not as easy as they are perceived to be by local leaders.

97

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6.5.4 Nacuca

This is the second village located in Montepuez district of Cabo Delgado Province.
The village has its origin in what used to be called "Colonato Portugueszs" in the early
60's as part of the Portuguese efforts to colonize Mozambique. Like Nassimoja,
traditional authorities and traditional units of land distribution are less important here

than in studied villages of Nampula.

6.5.4.1 Traditional Structure in Nacuca

Behind the formation of this village, the Portuguese were interested in labor supply for
their private farms in the area. Thus, people were forced to migrate from their original
areas to a new one, which they are aware is not theirs. The result of this migration
was similar to that found Nassimoja, where the traditional authority does not hold
much power concerning land allocation. Aside from this fact, the village belongs to

Regulado Nantiqui. The Regulo lives in Montepuez town.

6.5.4.2 Land Distribution in Nacuca

As stated before, Nacuca was formed with the intention of being a reservoir of labor
supply for the Portuguese colonos . The village is completely surrounded by
LOMACO fields of direct production and fields where they allow smallholders to farm

under contract arrangement”. Although households, according to each one’s skill and

 

Portuguese settlement in the area.
29 For details see Strasberg (1997).

99

a bit of luck, can manage to have access to LOMACO fields under contract
arrangements, these households are bound to produce cotton on those fields. Thus, if
the household wants to diversify its own production, it has to pass through LOMACO
fields, which can take about 60 or more minutes, to reach land outside LOMACO’s
controlled areas. These observations were valid for households in the situation of land-
and income-poor in this village who pointed out that the major constraint they face is

related to walking time to reach their fields.

6.5.4.3 Current Situation of Land- and Income Poor Households in Nacuca
In Nacuca within the sample, four households were identified as being land- and
income-poor. Table 6.9 shows the types of arrangements of sampled households by
field and respective tenure security. All fields with exception of two, which were
offered by relatives, were obtained through the same land access arrangement, the

" independent open access". These fields are located within the limits of the village,
but beyond the LOMACO area of concession. In these areas, households identify land
which is not in use by anyone. To assure that no one will claim the piece of land
identified by the smallholder, it is common in the village that smallholders inform the
village president about the location and area of the field. For this reason, households
are more confident about the tenure security of the fields obtained through the process

just described.

100

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According to local leaders, the location factor of the fields has a direct impact on their
productivity. In fact, fields. are located in different directions, often 30 minutes or
more from their home. This situation is similar to that found in Nassimoja, another

village in Montepuez.

6.6 Summary and Conclusions

This chapter was intended to suggest and discuss the importance of factors that appear
to be influencing land access in the smallholder sector. We hypothesized that these
factors would likely be related to: 1) the evolution of the traditional system of land
tenure: and 2) the interaction between the traditional and formal (official) systems of
land tenure. To do so, a general analysis of the organization of the Macua society and
its customary system of land tenure was conducted with the objective of understanding
the social and political structures of that society, and how it influences the land

allocation arrangements.

To verify the accuracy of the total land area households declared in their possession,
we measured fields of smallholders in four villages of the total village sample and
compared those results to previously declared areas. The correlation between declared
and measured area was positive and generally high, and the ranking of households in
terms of amount of land did not significantly changed when fields were measured,

rather than using former declared areas.

102

Detailed case studies in four of the total village sample were also carried out, to better
understand, why so many households were still in the category of low area cultivated

per adult equivalent, while others were not.

Results show that understanding the way the traditional decision making structures
operate and interact within the society is important to better understand why some
smallholders are in a situation of being land poor. Findings suggest that there is an
effect of local social hierarchy on land access. In the Macua society the role of the
principal Atata was shown to be especially important in the Nampula villages. Table
6.3 suggested that the size of Matala that the principal Atata has may be a principal
determinant of land access among individual households. This specific issue will be the

subject of further research.

In villages located in Nampula province, the most important factors determining land
access were the power of the traditional authority, the presence of a IV C, illness, and
the existence of allegedly "lazy" people. Results also revealed that the traditional
structures are more powerful in Varrua and Mepine (N ampula province) than in
Nacuca and Nassimoja (Cabo Delgado province). In the latter villages, factors
associated with the presence of a large private sector company, associated with the
history of the origin of the villages, are the most important in explaining why there are
land and income poor. Other factors were, alleged "laziness" and the social pressure to

have more fields, even if these are small and highly dispersed.

The next chapter summarizes the objectives, methodologies, and major findings in

order to derive implications of the results.

103

Chapter 7

7. 1 Research Problem, Objectives and Methodology

Among Sub-Saharan Africa countries, Mozambique still enjoys a position of relatively
low population density. There is considerable conventional wisdom in the country
which supports the idea of land abundance and equal access, suggesting that the
limiting agricultural production factor is labor. This perception ignores the role of
social and institutional factors that influence household access to land in rural areas.
Indeed, previous studies by the MAP/MSU Food Security Project have identified the
existence of a group of land— and income-poor households in rural Northern
Mozambique. If in these rural areas there were many non-farm income opportunities
for households, and if labor and food markets functioned efficiently, then land would
perhaps not be the dominant factor determining income for all households. However,
the situation in rural Mozambique is quite the opposite. Land does play a dominant role
in generating income for households. Households with less land available compared to

their labor availability, tend to be poor.

This study was aimed to further confirm the existence of a land and income-poor
segment in the rural population. It was also to understand the nature and evolution of
this group, as well as to try to clarify the factors that are leading to its creation.
Finally, an objective was to identify possible implications of findings for the new Land

Law in Mozambique.

104

To address these objectives, several analytical methods were used. Descriptive analysis
of existing household data allowed an examination of land distribution and clarification
of household position with respect to access to land. Following this analysis, several
other analytical techniques were applied. First, analysis of variance helped quantify the
relative importance of endogenous and exogenous factors leading to the existence of
land and income poor households. Second, regression analysis allowed an estimate of
the importance of land holdings in total household income. This technique was also
used to attempt to measure the impact of several endogenous and exogenous factors
related to household access to land. Finally, in-depth case studies were completed
which involved revisiting households studied in prior surveys. These were done in
selected villages of Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces to explore in more detail the

land allocation system within the smallholder sector.

7.2 Conclusions

This study has reconfirmed the existence of a significant group of land- and income-
poor households in Northern Mozambique. Results also showed that land inequality
throughout the country is similar to that found in Nampula and Cabo Delgado, and this
inequality appears to have changed little three years after the ending of the war.
Analysis of the relationship between land holdings and household income showed that

the observed inequality in land distribution is a problem, in that land holdings are a

105

major determinant of household income. Thus, land poor households face both a
serious income shortage and, in all likelihood, a critical food security problem.

Results show that understanding the way the customary tenure system and traditional
decision making structures operate within the society is important to better understand
why some smallholders are land-poor. The role of the principal ATA TA was shown to
be especially important in the Nampula villages. It was shown that the size of Matala
under the control each of principal Atata varies greatly in these villages; that per capita
land availability within these Matala also varies greatly; and that households in small
Matala are only slightly more likely to possess fields outside their Matala than
households in large Matalas. We therefore hypothesize that the size of Matala is a key
determinant of total land availability at the household level, and suggest focusing
further research efforts on this issue. This traditional structure of land access had
relatively little importance in the Cabo Delgado villages, in part because of the

historical factors which down played the role of traditional processes in these areas.

Results in the Nampula villages were striking in that fields within the Matala were the
only ones that land-poor households indicated they felt secure about. Fields outside

Matala were nearly always seen as easily alienable by others.

Other factors also influence land access in both areas. In villages located in Nampula
province, these factors include the presence of a IV C, illness, and, according to local

leaders, the existence of "lazy" people. This concept of people who are lazy

106

"preguicoso" and do not wish to work hard in agriculture was continually mentioned by
village leaders in both provinces. We simply report these perceptions while noting that
the study identified other, more concrete factors which may be more helpful in

explaining the observed inequality in land access.

Factors related to historical social hierarchies in the area were also explored. We
considers these to be potentially important factors in a deeper understanding of the
reasons for the observed inequality in land holdings. The existence in the past of
Epotas (slaves) is one of these factors. According to village leaders, Epotas and their
descendants, with few exceptions, did not have the right to possess land. Also linked to
land access, local leaders referred to the saying "a sorte vai com o Nyhimu" , meaning
that being born in a " strong" Nyhimu increases the likelihood of gaining access to more
and better land. Results also revealed that the traditional structures are more powerful
in Varrua and Mepine (Nampula province) than in Nacuca and Nassimoja (Cabo
Delgado province). In the latter villages, factors associated with the presence of a
large private sector company, and with the history of the origin of the villages, are the
most important in explaining why there are land and income poor. Other factors noted
by village leaders were "preguicoso" (existence of "lazy" people), and the social

pressure to have more fields, even if these are small and highly dispersed.

107

7 .3 Implications

This and other studies are building a growing body of evidence that smallholder access
to land is an important development issue in Mozambique that warrents greater
attention. This study also reveals that very careful and detailed analysis is needed to
quantify the nature of the land access situation, and to understand the traditional
decision making processes which have established existing ownership and land use

rights within the smallholder sector itself.

Irnportantly, the newly approved Land Law in Mozambique establishes that local
communities should play a significant role in the management of natural resources.
Local communities are defined as a group of families or individuals that have the aim
of safeguarding their common interest through the protection of living areas, farming
areas whether cultivated or fallow, forest sites of cultural importance, pasture, water

sources, and areas of expansion.

While the important role of local decision making is welcomed and warranted, it is not
yet clear who exactly will take part in the local committees of land management, who
will head these committees, how to draw the limits of the land of the local community,
what criteria will be used to identify members of the local, communities, nor how to
secure at the local level land access for all members, without discrimination. Given the
likely fact that the process of identifying local communities will necessarily pass
through a balance of power at the grassroots level, the present research results suggest

108

that it is important that the role of all actors involved in land distribution, including
those of traditional authorities, be better understood. This is necessary not only to
protect the rights of the local communities but also to ensure and protect access to land
by all household within these communities. This study represents one step in this

direction.

7 .4 Future Research

It will be important in the future to much more fully analyze the effect of the size of the
Matala, and by extension the power and prestige of the principal Atata, on the amount
of land available to a household. If, on a more wide scale basis, the size of the Matala
is shown to significantly affect the amount of land available to a household, it will be
persuasive evidence of mechanisms within the traditional system of land allocation that

create and perpetuate inequality of access to land.

Detailed and careful anthropological and economic research is needed into the nature
and effects of local social hierarchies on land access. This research should identify to
what extent the past existence of Epota influences current land access patterns; and
should shed more light on the dynamics and practical importance for current land

access of the perception that luck follows lineage "a sorte vai com o Nyhimu".

109

APPENDIX ONE
Share Cropping and Number of Cashew trees and Coco by Districts and Greater

Agricultural Region

110

APPENDIX TWO

Land Distribution per Household and per Household Adult Equivalent by
Province.

111

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