SUPPLY RESPONSEIN ARGENTINA: __ i AGGREGATE PLANTED AREA IN CROP PRODUCTION Man 8 paper for the Degree of MS - MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY ~' CHRISTINE A; MARTIN ‘ 1998 rmMP‘Yfi __. l..iBRARY Michigan State University M MICH. STATE UNIV. PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. To AVOID FINES return on or before date due. MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE 6/01 o'JCIRC/DatoDuopss-sz SUPPLY RESPONSE IN ARGENTINA: AGGREGATE PLAN TED AREA IN‘CROP PRODUCTION by Christine A. Martin A Plan B paper submitted inpartial fialfillment of the requirements for "the degree of Master of Science 31.10% M f0 A53 if» adj wacfl é..w‘mt9~rrw/LJ Michiganl State University December 1998 Michigan State University Abstract SUPPLY RESPONSE IN ARGENTINA: AGGREGATE PLANTED AREA IN CROP PRODUCTION by Christine A. Martin Research Supervisor: Dr. Scott Swinton Major Professor: Dr. Christopher Peterson This study attempts to explain the variation in aggregate crop acreage in Argentina in the period 1960-97. It improves on, previous studies by incorporating an expected yield variable and input price variables, extending the period of analysis, and attempting an aggregate crop acreage supply response of six crops. A single equation model is developed and the naive, moving average and simple weighted average price expectation mechanisms'are examined. Results show that a moving average specification of price expectation accounts better for the data. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I thank Dr. Chris Peterson for his willingness to accept a non-traditional ag-econ student and his guidance throughout the master’s program. I am also grateful to Dr. Scott Swinton for his direction in the completion of this paper and to Dr. Roy Black for his guidance. I am thankful to my classmates and colleagues in their support and assistance throughout this program. Last, but not least, I am indebted to Santiago Liboreiro for the loving and patient assistance and support he gave, without whom this paper could not have been completed. I dedicate this paper to my children, Megan and Nicolas. Now they can play on the computer! CHAPTER 1 Introduction Supply Response in Argentina: Aggregate Planted Area in Grain Production Argentina is well known for its beefi which is raised on extensive natural pastures. Argentina also produces a substantial amount of grain and oilseeds, which include wheat, corn, sorghum, soybeans and sunflower- Sixty-five percent of Argentina’s 279 million hectares is suitable for either agriculture or livestock. Of the 183 million acres of arable land, in 1992, approximately 80 percent was in natural pasture, the remaining land in annual or perennial crops. Annual crop acreage in 1992 was approximately 19.75 million hectares, and the cattle stocks was approximately 53 million head. In 1996, apnua] crop acreage increased by 14.2 percent to 26.4 million hectares, while cattle stock decreased 3 percent to approximately 51 million head. In recent years, analystshave'predicted that With grain prices rising faster than cattle prices, most of the pasture land would. shifi into grain production even further. There have been periods in Argentina’s agricultural history when government has played a major role in affecting the uses of arable land. Today, the Argentine farmer is fi‘ee of any government regulation, and the use of the land is based on his/her decision. This deciSiOn regarding the use of land is primarily based on income. Consequently, as the prices pf grains, and yields, have risen, farmers have shifted to crop production. Studies conducted on the supply response of crops to prices in Argentina are not very extensive. Reca (1980) examines pricing policy in Argentina from 1950 to 1975 for seven major agricultural products: wheat, corn, grain sorghum, beef cattle, wool, rice, and cotton. Reca presents three estimates of the Argentine producer’s price responsiveness: aggregate crop production, crop production‘in the Pampas, and outside the Pampas.l Using a Nerlovian model, Reca analyzed aggregate output as a filnction of prices lagged one year, credit availability, technology and weather. These last. two variables were entered as dummy variables. "Reca concludes that “the model discussed strongly supports the contention that product prices were one of the key determining variables of the behavior of agricultural production'in Argentinain the last twenty-five years.” To analyze the supply responsiveness in the Pampas region, Reca’s linear regression. model described area planted to crops and Oilseeds as a filnction of ‘expected’ product prices, prices of substitutes, level, of technology, availability of credit, and weather. These irt'clu‘ded product price lagged one year, yield, and credit availability, beef cattle slaughter, and stock of beef cattle as independent. variables. The yield variable was detemrined as a dummy variableiinstead of the actual yieId. Reca concludes that the influence of cattle production appears strong, and that cattle and crops compete for the use of land. A second study conducted by Wainio (1983) looked at the effects of government intervention on the responsiveness of grain area to price movements during the late 1940’s through the late 1 970’s. His linear model consisted of four equations, one for each of the following crops: wheat, corn, flaxseed, and sunflowerseed. He includes in his model the price of each cropi'lagged one year, price of cattle lagged one year, and acreage planted to the crop lagged one year (partial adjustment). His decision to lag prices one year was based on the results ofReca’s study. Input costs and crop yields were not included in the regression model- Wainio’s study also did not include soybeans since they were not very important during the period of the analysis. Wainio determines that farmer’s price expectations seemed to be based on prices received for the previous'harvest, however, these same expectationshad a delayed effect on subsequent years’ decisions as well. In a third study, Sturzenegger describes the effects of intervention on output between 1961 and 1985. He assumes the" producer maximizes profit as a function of price of wheat, corn, sorghum, soybean, sunflower, beef, variable inputs and fixed inputs. No variable for crop yield is'in'clu'ded in the estimation medel. All variable inputs are combined into one input variable due to lack of information The fixed inputs represent soil conditions, rainfall and sunlight. Sturzenegger includes a coefficient of adjustment which is extrapolated from two previous empirical studies. 1 The bulk of the grain and oilseed production in Argentina comes from the Pampas. Grain crops and oilseeds oonpete-withbeef cattle fertheuseof IandinthePampas. 7 In the US. and other countries, studies on the response of crops to prices are extensive. Askari and Cummings summarize most of the work performed until 1976. Until then, most of the studies mentioned were directly or indirectly based on Nerlove’s supply response model, published in 1958. Studies on the measurement and analysis of price responsiveness 0f agricultural supply has continued since then. More recently, many studies have incorporated the rational expectations hypothesis and risk in their modeling to analyze and measure supply response. (Gardner (1976), Fisher (1932), Eckstein (198.4), Holt and Johnson (1987), Holt and Ardubyala (1992)) With the implementationof ArgentinePresident CarlosMenem’s Convertibility Plan (CP) in 1991, the Argentine economy has improved drastically and this may have affected the Argentine agricultural prOducef’ s'behavior. The stabilization of the economy has allowed the Argentine farmer to change. his farming practices in several. ways, piimai'ily by being able to purchase imported goods less expensively, purchasing and adopting new technology, and by not having to keep cattle as a capital investment due to rising inflation. Menem’s CP also reduced government intervention in Argentine agriculture- The government has reduced the trade taxes drastically, and it does not intervene in the determination of grain prices. The ports and elevators have been privatized and. the National Grain Board has been dismantled. In signing Mercosur, the trade agreement with Brasil, Paraguay and Uruguay, Argentina has removed all taxes on trade with these countries. Reca and Wainio’s analysis did not include soybean since it was not a relevant crop during their period of study. The first commercial scale soybean production did not occur until 1975 when about 0.5 million hectares were planted. By 1997, there were 7.2 million hectares of soybean seeded acres, becoming one of the nation’s most important crOp. Cattle is still an important aspect of Argentine agricultural production, primarily since domestic consumption of beef is still very high. However, with the improved economy and high world grain prices, and that most of the grain production is exported, the Argentine producer has increased his grain production at the expense of cattle pasture. Several Argentine analysts, through personal interviews, predict that more acreage will be shified .from pasture tograinproduction.2 This study works towards explainingthe variations in aggregate grain acreage in the line of Reca and Wainio. This study improves ontheirs in that the period of analysis is extended to 1997, itincludes soybeans. (an increasingly important crop), and it improves on their model specifications by incorporating an expected yield variable and input price variables- Other price expectation behaviors, aside from naive price expectations where the previous,period’s price is used as the expect price for this period, are also analyzed. 2 Sparks America del Sur and Secretaria dc Agricultura, Ganaderia y Pesca. 9 . Aside fi'om an attempt at analyzing the aggregate crop acreage, the results obtained from this paper may benefit those in the industry who might be able to use this information in their organizations’ strategic plans. The purpose of this study is to develop a single equation econometric model that explains the variation in aggregate crop acreage in Argentina. It is a simple comparative advantage model between cattle and crop. It will examine several price expectation mechanisms, adjustment processes, and the explanatory variables needed to explain the aggregate acreage put into crop production. It is expected that the: 0 Argentine producers have naive price expectation behavior, . Argentine producers experience a significant lag between economic shocks and crop production, and o Cattle and grain prices, input costs and technology afl’ect grain production acreage. The chapters to follow include a background on Argentina and its agriculture, a literature review on supply response studies in Argentina and on other supply response studies, a conceptual and empirical model, results and discussion of the econometric model, and conclusions. 10 CHAPTER 2 Argentina “Until the Great Depression of the 1930’s, agriculture was the staple sector of the Argentine economy.”3 Between 1860 and 1930, the exploitation of the rich land of the Pampas strongly pushed economic growth. During this period, Argentina grew more rapidly than the United States, Canada, Australia, or Brazil, countries similarly endowed with rich land, which. also accommodated large inflows of capital and European imnrigration. During the first three decades of this century, Argentina outgrew the other four countries in population, total income, and. per capita income as shown in the table below. T_able 1: Comparative Growth in Income and Population 1900-1984 Pieriod/Item 1900-04-to 1925-29» . Argentina Australia --Brazil Canada United States Population 2:8 ’ 1.8 2.1 2.2 - 1.) Income " 4.6 7.2.6 3:3 3.4 2.9 Per cgita Income . . .18 ~ 0.8 1.2 1.2 . 1.3 1925-29 to 1980-84 Population " " '“1i8 ‘ ~17 2.5 1.5 ‘13 :Income - 2 8 3 9 5 5 3 9 3.1 Per capita income 10 2 2 3 0 2. 4 1.8 (Avera armual rates in percentages, Cavatlo and'Mundlak, 1989) However, beginning in the 1930’s, the Argentine economic vigor deteriorated rapidly. This loss ip vitality was especially‘dramatic in agriculture. 11 2.1 Policies The Great Depression in the 1930’s reduced Argentine agricultural exports. The Argentine govemment’s response to this was to start an import-substitution program for manufactured goods, a multiple exchange rate scheme, and a price support program to stimulate farm preduction. Two central government agencies were created, the National Grain Board (IN G) for grain and oilseed production and National Meat Board (IN C) for meat and its derivative products. Support prices were fixed, which exceeded market levels for wheat, corn and flaxseed during 1933-35, and support’ed by ‘JN G purChases. The price support program together with favorable exchange rates for agricultural exports, began alarge expansion of grain and. oilseed. area in Argentina. Strong export” demand during 'thelast half of the thirties stimulated further giowth. World War H brought difficult times for agricultural producers and traders Disrupted market and shipping activitiesproduced the ingest grain surpluses in Argentine history- However, storage was inadequate and losses were great. Afier WWII, agricultural prices rose substantially, and'had it not been for government intervention, this would have been a good opportunity for Argentina to increase its exports. The government of Juan Peron implemented a strong protection for domestic 3.Mundlak, ~Yair and Domingo Cavallo, ‘Agn‘culume and Eoenemis Growth in Argentina, 1913- 1984”, p. 12. , 12 manufacturers and high taxation on agricultural exports. As manufacturing and urban services were more labor intensive than export oriented agriculture, the policies implemented reflected Peron’s main concern for income redistribution to labor. Specific agricultural objectives of the Peron government were to shift economic and human resources fi'om rural to urban sectors, redistribute resources within the agricultural sector from landed class to the landless tenants and workers, and generate revenue and foreign reserves for industrial development through agricultural exports. The government nationalized mass transportation, warehousing, port operations, and commupication services. Intervention extended to electrical generation and distribution, to controls in banking. and foreigntrade which limited imports mainly to raw materials‘and semi-manufactured goods for useby beginning domestic industries. The Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Trade (IAPI) controlled agricultural trade. It controlled all exports and, as sole’buyer, made all domestic purchases of grains and oilseeds. IAPI also controlled imports of food and agricultural inputs. The governrr’ent 'fixed producer prices and subsidized retail food prices through 1946-55, with substantial subsidization of domestic wheat consumption. Farmgate prices were announded before harvest the. .Thegovernment ,nationéliZed the railroads in 1946-47 when trains carried the bulk of the internal grain shipments. The futures market closed and wasn’t reopened until the late 1980’s. In the late forties and early fifties (in 1951, Argentina experienced a severe drought causing an agricultural crisis), some price and marketing regulations were eased in an attempt to stimulate production and exports of Argentina’s major agricultural exports, however, not in time to impede the steady decline in grain production due to a full decade of inadequate incentives. l 13 In 1955, Peron’s government was overthrown by the military, beginning a period of political instability which lasted until 1973. The Argentine economy slowly became more market oriented through this periOd. The NGB took over most of the duties of IAPI (which was closed). and refrained fiom. direct market intervention except when it imported grains to offset prOduction shortfalls. International grain and oilseed trade gradually returned to the private sector- Market determined prices set by daily quotations replaced administered piices on the commodity exchanges. Export duties were generally low except for a 25% grain export duty imposed in 1958. Atthe end of the 1950’s, the National Institute of Agricultural TechnOlogy (INT A) was created and was responsible for technological research and extension. In 1973, Peron was re-elected and most of the firstPeron govemment’s policies were reintroduced- The state once again became the only buyer of wheat, corn, sorghum and sunflower. Fixed producer pricesbecame effective at the farmgate for wheat in 1974 and for the other three products in 1975- High export taxes and exchange rate controls were implemented again .The , government banned vegetable oil exports between 1973 and 1976 to insure domestic supplies and control consumer prices. A military junta took over in‘March 1976 and gradually returned control of the economy to the private sector. The government. removed domestic price controls and returned domestic marketing to the private traders. In late 1979, private traders could invest in terminal port facilities and to rent state-owned storage capacity. The 14 government removed export taxes on all major grains and oilseeds by November 1976. The NGB continued to administer the commodity price support program for grains and oilseeds (although market prices were higher than support prices for the entire period), to manage government-owned storage facilities, to collect export taxes, to issue export licenses and to set export quotas when necessary. Taxes on eXports varied fitom 2 to 13 percent, and restrictions on imports and exchange controls shifted from extremely high levels in 1975 to almost complete elimination by 1980. Tarifl's on permitted imports varied in an opposite direction from the quantitative restrictions and the exchange controls, moving from a subsidy of 6 percent in 1975 to an actual tarifl of 26 percent in 1984. As a consequence of the'poli'cies implemented during the period 1970-84, the rate of inflation rose to historicalhigh levels, becoming volatile while the economy stagnated, except fpr a short-livediboom'during' the world commodity crisis in 1973-74. A fourth economic period inArgentina began in 1989 with the election of President Carlos Menenr, and the implementation of the “Convertibility Plan” (CP), devised by the. Minister of Finance Domingo Cavallo, in 1991. President Menem’s political agenda was to drastically change the nationis economic structure. This change in structure included: the convertibility to dollars of the Argentine currency, the Central Bank’s autonomy, fiscal adjustments,.modemization of the government, opening the 15 economy to foreign investors, privatization of public companies and the deregulation of the commodity markets. The CP, implemented in April of 1991, fixed the Argentine peso to the US. dollar at 1: 1 parity and obliged the CentralBank to fund this convertibility with gold in reserves valued at market prices. The same law prohibits the Central Bank to finance the Treasury; deficit and to give loans to the government, national, provincial or municipal. These laws have been strictly enforced, even, during the Mexican financial crisis of 1995. Since the implementation of the CP, inflation has been greatly’reduced, from an annual rate of 84%‘in 1991 to 0.1% in 1996. Another consequence of the new plan, Argentina’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 1996 increased 4.4% from 1995. The economy is improving and inflation is non-existent. Market deregulation and reduction in export taxes and import tariffs were also established by the CP. The elimination of commercial obstacles has led to a dynamic market environment. Until 1990, there was a certain. anti-commerce and anti-export bias, manifested by the barriers .to importsand. exports. In 1991, when the CP came into effect, these barriers were slowly reduced. Average tariffs decreased from 39 percent In 1988 to 10 percent in I995, together with the elimination of almost all export licenses. In 1992, all export taxes were annulled, with the exception of those 16 on oilseeds and cowhides. As a consequence, Argentine total exports, which totaled US$11,977 million in 1991, reached US$23,774 in 1996. The CP also greatly affected the agricultural sector. Widespread privatization has improved the network of country and terminal elevators, railroads, and waterways. These improvements have lead to an increase in storage and loading/unloading capabilities, and quality of service. An improved economy and non-existent inflation has also allowed the Argentine producer to improve technology, i.e. purchase of new farm equipment, purchase fertilizer, purchase better seed. 2. 2 Geography and Land Occupancy Argentina encompasses distinct climactic zones, fi'om sub-tropical to arctic, which , allows for the production of a Wide variety of agricultural commodities. The bulk of Argentina’s arable land is in. the Temperate Zone. Sixty five percent of Argentina’s 279 million hectares of land are suitablefor either crop orlivestock. Sixteen percent is forested, and the remainder is unsuitable for either cultivation or forestry. In 1993, of the arable land, 23 million hectares was used as annual or perennial crop production, 15 million hectares was under improved pasture, and 145 million hectares was natural pasture (Mch and Schmitz). The major geographic zones are: the Pampas, the Chaco, the Andean zone, and Patagonia. l7 The Pampas is that largest ecological zone and the dominant grain-producing area. Its 45 million hectares spread out from the city of Buenos Aires and covers most of the provinces of Buenos Aires, Cordoba, La Pampa, Santa Fe and Entre Rios. The area has temperate climate, between'750 and 1000 mm of rainfall annually, and contains about 50 percent of Argentina’s arable land. Two thirds of the Pampas afea has deep fertile sOils ’similar to the Great Plains of theUnited States. ' The Chaco is the northern lowlands along the River Plate. This area has heavier rainfall and poorer sOils, especially in thenortheast, and contains important forest resources. The principal agricultural products are cotton, nuts, tea, rice, tobacco, citrus, and cross-bred cattle. The Andean zone, west and northwest of the Pampas, is hilly to mountainous, poorly Watered, and with aIew exceptions, .can only be cultivated under irrigation. The principal agricultural products are sugar, tobacco, citrus, grapes for wine, and miscellanéOus cash crops, including beans. Patagonia, about the. same size as the Pampas, receives only minimal rainfall, is sparsely populated, and isdevoted mainly to sheepfarming and to the production of some high quality temperate-zone fi'uits (McCarry and Schmitz). 2. 3 Agricultural Sector According to Reca, between 1960-1974, the share of crops in total agricultural production grew at the expense oflivestock." The increased share of crops was due to l a number of factors, which included the introduction of improved crop varieties and 18 technologies, which increased the relative profitability of crops, and the considerable cyclical fluctuations in beef prices which discouraged development in this sector. Within crops, grains and oilseeds increased their proportion of production in the period mentioned at the expense of industrial crops (cotton, sugarcane, tobacco, wine grapes, etc. . .). The share of fruits and vegetables remainedconstant. The composition of livestock production showed some changes, but. not enough to alter substantially the picture prevailing at the beginning of the 1950’s. The share of beef production increased slightly, but remained close to two-thirds of all livestock production. 2. 3. 1 Grain and Oilseed Production Wheat was the first crop grownin thePampas area of Argentina, and is Argentina’s most important crop. In 1996, 7366 thousand. hectares were planted. Wheat is sown in the fall and harvested in late spring and early sumrirer (N ovember/December). Wheat yields have improved due to the use of improved varieties and the use of chemicalinpUts in the 1990’s."'1'he most significant 'eVent'in wheat production was the introduction of semi-dwarf wheats in the mid-1970’s. An estimated “96 percent of the area used for wheat is now sown—to.these.high-yielding varieties.”4 The greatest advantage derived from the‘introfluCtiOn of these varieties is an earlier maturity of the l crop. Use; of early-maturing varieties has enabled farmers to double-crop wheat with r " Lacroix‘; Richard, Michael I'MCCmyJVIamiew Melviahomand Lowell Hill, “Argentina: Grain and Marketing, finstitutions and Policies”, p.12. 19 0N .._..._l...rlr_7+_r.......nl4_..+...Frrnhnhtwo 18.: .......~ -88 woos. .8... -88 :82 . . . 5.8.. 25:an c. 3.2 .35 “.85..“ 3 2:2“. serene” puesnoul soybeans. See Figure 1 for planted area per crop. The seeded area of corn in Argentina has been declining primarily due to the increase in wheat-soybean cropping. Over “80 percent corn grown comes from northern Buenos Aires, southern Santa Fe and southeastern Cordoba provinces.”5 Though the seeded area has decreased, corn yields have been increasing, as a result of several factors, including the introduction ofh'ybrids and the use of improved agronomic practices (such as planting at higher densities and increased use of fertilizer). Corn is sown in Dabber/November and harveSted inMay. Soybean is a relatively new crop in Argentina and did not become economically significant until the mid-T970’ 5. Argentina is now one of the world’s four main producer of soybeans as a consequence to the increase in production. Production technology was introduced to Argentina from theUnited States, and Argentine farmers have adopted this new crop into their rotation quite rapidly. This increase in production was stimulated by warldwide demand for vegetable oils and oilseed meals and the availability of agricultural technology. Area sown to soybean is concentrated to the “Pampa Humeda”, which comprises northernBuenos Aires, southern Santa Fe and southeastern Cordoba, however, soybeans have also spread both south and west into drier areas. Soybeans'are sownin July/August for the first crop and December/January for the second. crop and harvest begins in April. Expansion in soybean seeded area is being achieved at the expense of area sown to com, sorghum 5 Ibid p.15. 21 and permanent pasture. Since 1980, soybean yields have been constant due to a buildup of pests and diseases in the traditional areas and to the expansion of soybean cropping into less favorable land. Sunflower is a traditional crop in Argentina. Production was stimulated in the 1970’s by the same factors that stimulated soybean production, i.e. world demand for vegetable oil and oilseed meals. Sunflower production began in southern Buenos , Aires province. In the 1980’s, the area sown expanded northwards. This increase in area sownwas in responseto improved technology, especially the introduction of . superior hybiids, as depicted in the increasein yields. Sunflower is normally sown in September and harvested in March. Sorghum production in Argentina is declining due to the fall in world sorghum prices. Sorghum is normally sown in fire drier areas 01' the Pampas towards the west. However, sorghum is being replaced by soybean and sunflower. It is sown in October/November and harvested inMarchIApfil. Sorghum yields have been practically stagnant since the introduction of hybrids in the ‘60’s and ‘70’s. F laxseeq production in Argentina has’beendeClining during the period of this study due to decreasing world prices and at the expense of increasing wheat, acreage. . Flaxseed is Sown in May7June andharvestedinDeceinberlJanuary. It is normally sown in the eastern Buenos Aires province, Entre Rios, Santa Fe and Cordoba. 22 2. 3.2 Fertilizer Argentina does not produce suficient fertilizer to satisfy domestic demand, consequently, imports are required. According to Argentine Secretary of Agriculture, since the CP in 1991, the apparent domestic consumption of fertilizer has increased tremendously. The favorable outlook of grain prices, substandard soil nutrients and the genetic yield potential with fertilizer application were the major incentives for the increase in fertilizer consumption. {igure 2: mm in Argentina, 1984-1995 1409' 1399 « 1000 9 800... $99 9 .490‘ zoo - 7‘0 - r r r r T l l T 1 7 r Thousand Tons 1992 1993 1994 1996 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1999 1991 —National '~—¢—‘1mpofled +Total As Figure 2 shows, fertilizer consumption during the 1980’s fluctuated between 280 thousand tons and 350 thousand tons This apparent consumption implies a “6 or 7 kilogram of fertilizer per hectare of arable land usage.”6 Despite the apparent low consumption of fertilizer, the Argentine producer compensated for this by incorporiitin‘g crop residuals into the soil afier harvest and by rotating crops on the 6SAGYP 23 land. According to Wainio (1980), about 75% of the fertilizer consumed is applied to intensively cultivated crops such as sugar cane, wine grapes, and links and vegetables. The remaining 25% is used on grains. The most heavily fertilized grain is wheat, although only about 15.5% of total wheat acreage is fertilized. According to SAGyP, the fertilizers most used by Argentine producers are urea and diammonium phosphate. 24 CHAPTER 3 Literature Review There have been few Argentine studies conducted on the supply response of crops to prices. The literature on supply response is, however, extensive. What follows is a review of the Argentine studies, and selected studies pertaining to risk, and pricing behaviors and rational expectations. - 3.1 Supply Response in Argentina One of the Argentine studies looks at the shift in the cattle industry with respect to prices and economic incentives during the mid 1930’s through the mid 1960’s conducted by Jarvis in 1969. Jarvis believed previous studies were oversimplified for the cattle industry in Argentina, and these studies resulted in negative short-run responses on cattle for slaughter. According to Jarvis, these oversimplified studies extrapolated the negative short-run response into long-run responses, not taking into consideration that with less slaughter, what results is a growing herd through larger calf crops, Which would lead to increased slaughter over time. Consequently, he developed microeconomic models to illustrate his views, and from this, he built an economic model that may be used to explain the historical. reaction of the cattle sector to exogenous shocks such as those caused by climatic variation and by changes in the domestic demand for beef or for other related agricultural products. According to 25 Jarvis, results show that cattle producers systematically reallocate their “portfolios”-- that producers are price responsive--and due to the interactivity shift with the agricultural sector between grains and livestock, this also implies supply response by field crop producers. The study performed by Reca in 1980 examines pricing policy in Argentina fi'om 1950- 1975 for seven major agricultural products: Wheat, corn, grain sorghum, beef cattle, wool, rice, and cotton As part of this, Reca explores the relationship between prices and agricultural output, Since it'has important economic and political consequences; Reca presents three estimates of the Argentine producer’s price responsiveness: inthe aggregate, crop production‘in' the Pampas, and outSide the Pampas (the latter not discussed inthis study).7 Using a‘Nerloviantype linear model, Reca analyzed aggregate output as a function of prices lagged one year, credit, technology and weather. The agricultural WPI (WholeSalePrice Index) relative to non-agricultural products lagged onyear was used. Technology and weather were entered as dummy variables. Reca defined two difl‘erent technological levels, one covering the period of 1950-64, and the other the rest of the period- Reca admitted that this was a very crude approximation to a difficult problem Difi‘erent alternatives were analyzed. Reca concludes that “the. coeflicients show a remarkable stability.[...]Keeping in mind the conceptual and statistical limitations of the analysis carried out, the model discussed strongly supports the contention that product prices were one of the key » 7 The bulk of the grain and oilswdproductioninArgentina comes from the Pampas Grain crops and oilseedsreompete with beef- cattle-for thcuse of India the-Pampas. 26 determining variables of the behavior of agricultural production in Argentina in the last twenty-five years.”8 To analyze supply response in the Pampas region, Reca’s regression model described area planted to crops and oilseeds as a function of ‘expected’ product prices, prices of substitutes, level of technology, availability of credit, and weather. Price was determined as a weighted sum of the previous year prices of the five crops. The structure of weights used to construct the price series changed according to the relative importance of each crop in aggregate production value in three different periods: 1950-59, 1960-68, 1969-74. Yield was determined as a dummy variable, taking on a value of zero until 1965, one thereafier. Credit, beef cattle slaughter, and stock of beef cattle were the other independent variables. Reca’s equation does not include the price of cattle (price of a substitute) as an independent variable, nor does it include input prices. Reca concludes from this regression study that, in terms of policy, “ an artificially depressed price may not cut down substantially production from one year to the next...0ne crop may very well expand in area, but this will not hold for all the crops taken together. The effects of artificially low prices for crops will become evident some time later through the disinvestrnent process in agriculture which they will inevitably trigger.” One of Reca”s hypotheses was that even though there is some flexibility in the animal unit/land. ratio, a larger stock of cattle requires more land which is then excluded from crop use. Based on his regression coefficient, which was only 8 Rear, Lucio 6., “Argentina: Country Case Study of Agricultural Prices and Subsidies”, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 386, April 1980. ‘ ‘ 27 marginally significant, he concluded that his hypothesis was not correct. It must be noted that by including the stock of cattle asan independent variable, one might be causing multicollinearity since there might be a relationship between independent variables, for example, if .price of grain increases, stock of cattle might decrease, requiring less pasture acreage. Reca also concludes that the influence of cattle production also appears strong, andtbat cattle and crops compete for the use of land. A study by Wainio in 1983 looked at the efi‘ects of government intervention on the responsiveness of grainareatopricemovements duringthe late 1940’s through the late 1970’s. In this study, Wainio calculated short and long-run price elasticities, together with cross price elasticities for wheat, corn,flaxseed, and sunflowerseed (the four important grains competing for land during the length of the study), under government interventionand nongovemment intervention price programs. His linear regression model consisted of four separate equations (one for each crop) with the following explanatory variables:«ircrreegeplantedto.thernlh crop lagged one year; deflated price of each croplagged one year; and deflated price of beef lagged one year. The decision to lag prices only one year was based in part on the results of Reca’s study which yielded better results withasimple one year lag than with a more sophisticated geometric lag of a series of past annual prices. Beef prices were included to capture the competitiverelationship between grains and livestock. Wainio did not include input costs in the regression model- A partial adjustment process is hypothesized for each of the four. commodities. These four equations were estimated simultaneously, using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). In order to test 28 whether govermnent intervention influenced producer decisions, zero-one dummy variables representing market-managed periods were included. Price indices for the four crops were a three month average based on the three months after the crop was harvested. These prices were deflated by the cost of living index. Acreage data was aggregated at the national level. From this, Wainio learns that farmers react differently, but not uniformly, for different crops and in difl‘erent price determining environments. Wainio also determines that farmer’s price expectations seemed to be based on prices received for the previous harvest, however, these same expectations had a delayed effect on subsequent years’ decisions as well. For wheat, approximately 65 percent of the total wheat area adjustment took place in the year following the harvest. For com the first year adjustment averaged approximately 20 percent; for flax about 25 percent; and for sunflowers, about 50 percent- Wainio’s study did not include soybeans since they werenot very important during the period of the analysis. A fourth study by Sturzenegger describes the effects of intervention on output, between 1961 and 1985, where .he assumes the producer maximizes profit as a function of price of wheat, corn, sorghum, soybean, sunflower, beef, variable inputs , and fixed inputs. Due to lack -ofinformation, all variable inputs are combined into one input variable. The fixed inputs represent the fixed agronomical conditions for agricultural production, such as soil.conditions,rainfall, and sunlight. No variable for crop yield is included in the. estimation equation. Specific one month averages for , each crop were used for the calculation for producer prices (January values for wheat, May values for corn, sorghum, soybean and sunflower) and an annual average for beef 29 cattle. Sturzenegger deducts transportation and distribution costs fiom the quoted market price to derive a farmgate price in domestic currency per ton. A coefficient of adjustment is also included in Sturzenegger’s study, however, the size of the coefficient is extrapolated fi'om two previous empirical studies. Sturzenegger’s results are then compared to Mundlak, Cavallo and Domenech’s and Fulginiti’s study9 In Mundlak, Cavallo and Domenech’s, “Agriculture and Economic Growth in Argentina, 1913-84”, the authors examine the relationship between agriculture and overall economic growth, particularly, the influences of economic policies of three sectors; agriculture, nonagriculture excluding government, and government; with a _ special emphasis on examining the important role ofthe real rate of exchange. It is a ' “comprehensive and formal analysis of the causes behind the poor performance of the Argentine-economy” during mostofthe 20m.century. The main conclusion derived by the authors is that incorrect economic policies led Argentina to lag behind the trend grth of countries with similar potential. In a study by the USDAanleTA ofsupply and demand for selected agricultural products fi'om 1946-1965, supply projections for grains and oilseeds (the only agricultural products discussed'in this review) are derived. Area of grain and oilseed. production was estimated as a firnction of real price of product, real price of competing or complementary.product,real price ofmajor inputs used in production, 9 Fulginitipetfonned a snrdy-on ‘rrhe Structureef Agricultural Technology: The Case of Argentina” in 1986. 'Fulginiti’s results are published'in'Sturzenegger’sstudy. 30 yield and climatic conditions. Price variables were lagged for different periods of time in weighted and non weighted form. Each product (crop) was estimated using a linear equation model for each regionand for-thecountryas a whole. 1° The best modefwas chosen (based on estimated signs of the coefficients, statistical test of significance and magnitude of the partial regression coeflicients) and used to make the supply projections. Since the products estimated were numerous, a review of the wheat and sunflower acreage estimation is detailed here. For the northern Santa Fe region (which produces about 4% of total wheat production) after more than 35 alternative linear equations obtained by combining the various variables (price of wheat, price of com, price of flaxseed, price. ol'beef cattle, input prices, yields, weather, and seeded acreage to wheat lagged one year), the authors obtained an equation with what they deemed a decent R-squa'red of 0.61. Howevenit entailed removing two variables that had unexpected signs (input prices and yield lagged one year) and using the support price of wheat rather than the market price of wheat. For the La Pampa and western Buenos Aires province (which produces about one-third of Argentina’s wheat) afier the 35 linear equation attempts, no equation Wasdeemed satisfactory due to the magnitude of the statistical coeflicients, therefore the projection of the. wheat. seeded area for this region was made usinga lineartrend method. In the case of sunflower acreage, afier several multiple linear. regressions with results that did not allow the choice of an equation suitable forprojectionpurposes, the authors derived a linear trend equation for the area seeded to srmflower. '0 The country is divided into specificagricultural‘prodnction‘regions for each crop. 3 l 3. 2 Review of Other Supply Response Literature Askari and Cummings (1976) detailed at least 500 studies in supply response analysis, directly or indirectly related to the basic framework proposed by Nerlove in 1958. Studies on the measurement and analysis of price responsiveness of agricultural supply has continued since then. Below is abriefsummary of the most representative articles of what has been accomplished since Nerlove. Supply response analysis has evolved to include risk. It is understood that output response in the case of arisk averse producer would respond negatively to related price variability. Just (1974) introduced the concept of price uncertainty into supply response. Just proposed including the variance (or standard deviation) of past prices as an explanatory variable in the supplyresponsemodel. Aradhulla and Holt (1989) obtained good results in such a framework for the broiler industry. In Chem and Just’s (1978) supply responseand demand model for processing tomatoes in California, they formulate supply and demand equations in which they include. the , producer’s expected price and expected yieldin their Nerlovian adaptive expectation model- While making price and yield predictions, the producer is subject to making errors in prediction. The fact that the grower has to make decisions in an unsure environinent is called uncertainty or risk- The widely adopted mean-variance criterion is used to measure riskand uncertainty by incorporating the variance (or standard deviation) of past yields and prices in addition. to the expected yield and price as another explanatory variable in the supply response model. 1 32 It was not until the early 1980’s that price rationality was introduced in agricultural supply response as a price expectation mechanism for econometric modeling and estimation based on the work of Muth (1961). Irwin and Thraen (1991) evaluate that literature in detail. They concluded that results about rational expectation in supply response are mixed. Although results in Goodwin and Shefl'rin (1982) give support to the hypothesis, in the broiler chicken industry, while studies in the soybean sector are not that conclusive. Some studies, Gardner (1976), used fiitures prices as a proxy for rational expectations price behavior held by producers. However, several doubts can be put in this type of approach, since futures prices are “endogeneity determined”. In his article, “Futures Prices in Supply Analysis”, Gardner hypothesizes that the price of a fiitures contract for next year’s crop reflects the market’s estimate of next year’s cash price. 3.3 Summary Previous studies on supply response in Argentina have basically three limitations. The three limitations are: the use naive price expectation behavior, the omission of a yield variable and/or inputs price variables, and they do not include soybeans in their analysis which has become an important crop in Argentina. These three limitations are addressed in the model analyzed. 33 CHAPTER 4 Econometric Modeling: Conceptual and Empirical 4.1 Background and Conceptual Model It is assumed that Argentine producers want to maximize their profits given their production constraints, that of two outputs (crops and cattle) and various (inputs. In Argentina, cattle and crops compete for the use of land. Let the production firnction be yt = f(xtt, X21...xnt) (i) y2 = g(X12, Xzzmxnz) (11) where y; and y; are vectors denoting the two outputs, f and g the production fimctions for y1 and y2, and the first subscript on each x denotes the input, the second subscript. denotes the product to whichitis applied. The total amount of XI and x2 used in the production of y; and y; are X1 = X11+X21+.-.+ an X2 = X12fX22+...+ Xn2 34 Total revenue R from the sale of y] and y: is R = Pryl+ P2Y2 (iii) = Prf(X11, X21.-.an)+ P280112, X22---Xn2) (iV) where p; is the price of y, and p2 isthe price of y2. The total cost is the sum of the quantities of inputs multiplied by their respective prices C = v1x1+ V2X2+...+ v..xn (v) = V1(er+ X12)+V2(X21+ X22)+---+Vn(an+ an) (Vi) Profit is revenue minus cost: 11 = R-C (vii) = P1Y1+ WY? va1- V2X2‘~--‘ an“ (viii) = ptflxtt, X21...xnt)+ ng(xt2, X22...xa2)- vt(xtt+ xt2)- V2(X2t+ X22)-...- vn(xal+ xn2) (ix) Maximizing profits entails taking the first derivative of the profit function with respect to each input used, in the production of the output andsetting it equal to zero: 6W6x11=p18t76x1pv1=0 (X) 6W6xzr=p16fl OX21-V2=0 (X1) 35 6W6xn1=p16t7 aXu-Vn=0 (xii) 8W6x12=p28g/6x12-v1=0 (Xlll) 6W6x22=p26gléx22-v2=0 (XlV) arr/aitfpzag/axnflfio (xv) From the system of equations x through xv we can solve to obtain the input demand equations. X11: f11(1)» P2, V1, vzr'": Va) (XVi) x21= f2}(p1:p2, v1, V2,..., v“) (xvii) an= flrlpr, P2, V1, V2,.--, Vn) (XViii) x12: f12(p1, p;, v;, v;,..., V“) (xix) X22: f22(1’1, P2, V1, Vzama Vn) (XX) . . Xn2= £12031, 122, V1, V2,---, Va) (705) . Substituting xvi through xxi into i and ii, the outputfirnctions are obtarned: Yr: MRI, P2, V1, VZr") Va) (xxii) YZ= £2031, 132, V1, V2,-.., VII) (XXiii) In the case of crop production, output is determined by acreage allocation and weather conditions afl‘ecting crop growth, acreage being the single most important input whose usage level the producer has to choose. 36 From the input demand equation above obtained, a functional relationship of crop acreage to product prices and other input prices can be stated. A: f(p1, p2, V1, V2,..., Vn) (XXlX) Total agricultural output is a function of planted area and weather. Supply response models in agriculture are typically modeled as planted area and not total output due to the difficulty in modeling weather. Most agricultural commodities take time to produce. Characteristically, decisions about resource allocation are taken well before output is generated, due to the very nature of the biological processes involved. Consequently, the realized output and actual resulting income may differ from the ones prevailing at the time the decisions are taken. Typically, resource allocation decisions are tied to the expectation of the final outcome and price. As one of many possible functional forms, Nerlove proposes a model to measure the responsiveness of acreage to prices: desired acreage is a linear function of expected prices, as follows: A*t=ao+atP*t+a2Zt +Ut (1) 37 where A*. is the expected acreage in. period t, P*t is the expected price in period t, Z. is the orher factors that affect supply/production in period t, and U. is the error term. However, the desired acreage is not directly observable, therefore, Nerlove proposes the following hypothesis of desired acreage‘behavior: At-At-1=Y(A*t-At-1) (2) where A.-A..1 measures the actual change in acreage between two periods, A*.-A..1 is the desired change in acreage between two periods, and y is known’as the coeficient of adjustment, such that 0 127 100 15.76 1966 , 114 90 14.15 1967 121 95 15.02 1968 . 124 98 15.39 1969 91 14.35 1970 * 110 17.34 1971 70 11.04 1972 75 11.82 1973 161 25.38 1974 218 34.37 1975 142 22.39 1976 - 134 21.12 1977 ~ 133 20.97 1978 “140 ' 22.07 1979 179 28.22 1980 213 33.58 1981 195 30.74 1982 159 25.07 1983 170 26.80 1984 173 27.27 1985 ‘167 26.33 1986 '158 24.91 1987 . 174 27.43 1988 195 30.74 1989 ' ~ 204 32.16 1990 198 31.21 1991 205 32.32 1992 . 195 30.74 1993 ' 196 30.90 1994 201 31.69 1995 225 35.47 1996 193 30.43 1997 196 30.90 1998 UNCTAD, Dry Cargo Tramp Voyage Charter, except for '55-'68 wlbase 1960=100,USDlmt 89 Igble 7: Planned Area in Argenting Wheat Corn} Soybean ! Sunflower Scighum Flaxseedi Total 1959/60 4792 3062’ 0.9, 1250 730 12281 11063 1960/61 4275 3222 1 l 1122 937 1 1ng 10686 1961 I62 4952' 3300 10] 1351 1075 1307:, 1 1995 1962/63 4847; 3420. 21 j 983 1072 1503 11846 1963/64 6276? 3778; 14? 873 1218 1409 13568 1964/65 6497 3693? 18} 1173 1246 1172 13799 1965/66 ’ 5724, 3921 i 171 1181 1346 12941 13483 1966/67 6291 4157T 18, 1362 1454 924; 14206 1967/68 6613! 4473 23 1194 1841 711 14855 1968/69 6680} 4595 31 1354 2151 879 15690 1969/70 6239; 4666 30 1472 2568 952 15927 1970/71 4468: 4993 38 1614 3122 973 15208 1971/72 4986’ 4439 80 1533 2759 539 14335 1972/73 5627 4251 169 1652 2974 509 15183 1973/74 4252, 4134 377 1342 3114 415 13633 1974/75 5183? 3871 370 1 196 2602 520 13741 1975/76. 5753.3 3696 443 1411 2358 471 14132 1976/77 7192; 2980 710 1460 2780 722 15844 1977/78 4600 3100 1200 2200 2650 950 14700 1978/79 5230 3300 1640 1766 2540 893 15369 1979/80 5000 3310 2100 2000 1884 1070 15364 1980/81 ' 6196 ‘4000 ”1925 1390 . 2400 780 16691 1981/82 6566. " 3695 2040 1733 2712 851 17597 1982/83 74101 3440.. 2382 1930 2657 * 910 18709 1983/84 7200; 3484 2920 2131 2550 810 19095 1984/85 6000? 3620 3300 2380 2040 620 17960 1985/86 57007 3820 3340 3140 1400 750 18150 1986/87 5000 3650 3700 1891 1127 758 16126 1987/88.. 4850 . 2825 4413 . 2117 1075 671 15951 1988/89 4750 2685 4670 2313 830 574 1582 1989/90 5500 2070 5100 2800 800 600 16870 1990/91 6178 2160 4967 2372 752 590 17019 1991/92 4751 2686 5004 2724 823 431 16420 1992/93 4548i 2963 5320 2187 810 215 16043 1993/94 4910[ 2781 5817 2206 670 148 16533 1994/95 5308’ 2958 6011 3010 622 156 18065 1995/96 5088 3415 6002 3411 671 196 18781 1996/97 7367 4153 6670 3120 804 94 2207 1997/98 5919 3752 7176 3511 920 116 21394 Bolsa de Cereales 90, in thousand hectares, SAGyA for data 1970-96 90 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 '1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Wheat 124.97 150.05 142.29 152.64 185.32 139.06 143.71 142.25 131.72 137.86 128.28 132.30 152.84 ' 270.75 264.24 ' 211.41 61.48 126.01 156.20 154.67 194.08 190.31 149.36 92.51 80.17 82.72 73.19 102.71 128.52 69.40 100.54 109.1 3 98.71 107.96 192.22 117.28 90.95 I_able 8: Argentine Real Crop Price in US$/Metric Ton Corn Soybean Sunflower Sorghum 122.69 148.52 145.81 175.13 157.72 178.19 153.68 127.87 118.24 126.53 128.38 125.94 146.44 251.16 242.31 169.68 45.89“ 114.30 131.29 120.18 154.21 128.60 101.76 85.03 97.89 84.69 64.95 59.95 78.50 116.52 64.39 75.24 79.81 82.73 103.58 81.73 130.59 85.01 77.87 200.67 226.37 237.25 232.96 254.85 347.47 625.81 608.16 409.17 ' 227.69 373.81 254.24 286.53 218.73 214.92 204.51 163.29 192.56 144.38 124.86 154.42 212.85 237.35 113.89 138.69 160.48 172.97 192.59 162.22 206.45 229.58 175.76 Source: Bolsa de Cereales and SAGyP 91 231.70 305.06 245.37 258.62 348.22 311.70 235.58 189.84 176.45 207.22 228.35 287.84 434.93 515.62 534.88 353.18 171.45 352.14 265.48 326.08 203.80 247.15 212.85 148.51 243.45 166.31 114.31 136.20 167.25 181.73 109.09 126.05 139.71 "'171.33 190.51 164.42 172.95 " 167.57 205.37 96.10 103.09 114.59 125.85 103.52 129.50 118.79 100.77 96.41 96.18 94.60 103.05 120.26 190.11 226.77 148.15 42.85 90.19 95.89 92.59 130.55 111.24 80.19 73.48 75.08 63.64 52.75 49.00 63.18 82.20 54.35 54.84 65.95 63.21 74.12 56.73 105.79 66.40 63.57 F laxseed 238.16 306.97 273.09 268.05 281 .02 249.34 238.78 200.12 232.69 244.59 215.86 183.98 331 .20 513.03 808.72 372.01 307.73 323.80 243.68 346.64 277.08 258.50 244.95 150.66 187.88 162.92 155.69 130.35 163.53 262.07 178.59 134.70 140.43 184.82 171 .98 217.29 154.68 226.68 21 1 .13 1960/61 1961/62 1962/63 1963/64 1964165 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 . 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 ; 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79' 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 - 1962/83 j 1983/84- 1984785 1985/86 - 1986/87 ' 1987/88 ~ 1988/89 1989/90 - 1990/91 . 1991/92 1992/93 199394 1994795 ; 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 VNheat 1160 1295 1522 1575 1835 1321 1198' 1260 983 ’ 1352 1329 ‘ ‘1267 1591 1657 1410 1626 1711 ‘ 1355 1729 1692 1549' 1400 2049 1837 2305 1617 1778 1879 1836" 1892 1896 2173 2320 2022 2166 1936 2241 - 2585 _T_able 9: Argentine Crop Yield Com Soybean Smflower Sorghtm Flaxmd 1767 1894 1648 1801 1678' 2150 2466 1942 1929 2330 2442 1862 2721 2840 ‘2508 2117 3278 3647 3107 2570 3801 3028 3030 3140 3563 3745 ’3189 3774 2910 3461 6078 977 1163 972 1146 1035 1147 1188 1089 1124 1032 1624 1143 1732 ' 1440 1363 1603 2121 2174 2313 1724 2005' 2090- 1754 1?“!5' 1988 2141 1897 2264 1653 2156 2275 2291 2158 ' 2039 2045 2105 1721 2760 651 718 611 628 746 765 902 891 737 632 -890 '948 ‘868 984 1184 1262 1106 1441 1346 1268 1435 1444 1451 1752 1413 1435‘ 1902 1963 1718 1812 1661 1265 2159 1660 1751 1458 2524 1805 1752 " 1908 2040 2085 1663 2328 2539 2493 2758 2776 3194 3033 2314 3595 3187 3214 2911 3155 3125 3067 3347 2531 2812 3331 3621 3952 3506 3459 3876 ' 3685 4800 Source: Bolsa de Cereales and SAGyP, in tons per hectare 92 3889982689 587 698 638 634 752 568 721 625 630 899 816 700 748 762 761 8 915 916 742 S 797 8998698 TOE“ 1068 1321 1175 1256 1251 1413 1380 1260 1219 1402 1488 1213 1630 1676 1544 1635 1922 2014 1972 '1655 ‘ 2123 1937 2037 2214 2107 2253 1853 2103 2474 2512 2417 2411 2471 1 959/60 1 960/61 1961/62. 1962/63 1963/64- 1964765 1965766 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/.71., 1971772 1972773 1973774 1974775 1975/76 1976/77 1977778 1978779: 1979780 1980781 1981782 1982783 ’ 1983/84 1934/95, 1985786 1986787 1987/88 1988/89'“ 1989/90 _, ‘ 1990791 1991792 1992793 1993194 1994795 1995/96 1996/97' 1997/98 Priceei'hnuarywfie‘ " ’ and Real Urea Price Real Cattle Pfice 0.5151 0.6135 0.5389 0.5281 0.5675 0.9473 0.9726 018585 0.5940 0.5952 0.5401 0.6599 .. 1.0634 , 1.4020 2.0820 1.6547 1.1654 0-3987. w _ 95095 0.5313; . 0.9698 1.1509 0.8682 0.6550 ‘ . 0.5905 0.6224 0. _~ ... 0.4930 0. 0.5226 0.5948; 0.4305 0.5248 0.7652 0.6576 06082 0.6296 aw.-...... 0.8631 Table 10: Real Agentine Cattle Price. Cattle Weight. Real Diesel Price Cattle Real Diesel Real Urea Weight 437 441 428 426 431 444 443 440 437 445 . 452 .413..- E 55. 93 £588§§§§§§§§8§§8358E5855 Pfice 0.1899 0.1909 0.1703 0.1746 0.1755 0.1945 0.1958 0.1541 0.1342 . 0129? . _ 0.128 04997., - 1 0.2444, x 0.3139 0.4933 0.3044 0.1200 f 0.1360 f 02482 0-2822 0.2934 0.3691 0.2288 0.1576 0.1883. 0.1790 0.2178 0.2018? 0.2129} 0.2273, 4 f 0.2014“ ' 0.2820 02641 I . 02057.! x 0.2241 0.1846 0.2173 "‘0-‘23397: .. 0.0000 Pflce 472 § 470 ., 175. 257 BIBLIOFRAPHY 94 BIBLIOGRAPHY Aradhulla, Satheesh V. and Matthew T. Holt, “Risk Behavior and Rational Expectations in the US. Broiler Market”, American Agricultural Economics Association, Volume 71, 1989, pp. 892-901. Askari, Hossein and John Thomas Cummings, Agricultural Supply Response: A Survey of the Econometric Evidence. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976. Bolsa de Cereales, Numero Estadistico 1990. Bolsa de Cereales, Buenos Aires, 1991. Chem, Wen S. and Richard E. Just, “Econometric Analysis of Supply Response and . Demand for Processing Tomatoes in California”, Giannini Foundation, Number 37, Berkeley, CA, September 1978. Dillon, John L. and Jock Anderson, The was of Resmse in Crop and—Livestoc 'i ~ Production, Pergamon Press, New York, 1990. Ferris, John N., Agg'cultural Prices ancLCommodity' Market Analysis,-WCB/McGraw— Hill, Dubuque, Iowa, 1997. Fundacion de Investigaciones EconomicosLatinn Americanos, Statistical Database, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1998. Gardner, B.L., “Futures Prices in Supply Analysis”, American Journal ' ultural ’ Economics, Volume 58, 1976, pp. 81-84. Goodwin, T. H. and SM Shefl‘rin, “Testingthe Rational Expectations Hypothesis in an Agricultural Market”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 64, 1982, pp. 658- 667. Gujarati, Damodar N., Basic Econometrics, McGraw-Hill, New Yorlg 1992. Helmberger, Peter G. and J can-Paul Chavas, The Economics of Agricultural Prices. 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Chapter 4, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1990. Wainio, J GMT, “The Effect of Government Intervention on Grain Acreage Supply ResponSe: The Argentine Case, 1946/47-1979/80”, Master of Science Thesis, Texas A&M University, May 1983. World Bank, “Argentina, Economic Memorandum”, World Bank Country Study, Volume 1', Washington'D.C., 1983. 97 (164432-, JK 77 /1..1 3 1293 02428 8429 ‘