Management of game populations in North America is primarily approached through adoption and enforcement of hunting and trapping regulations. The level of compliance with these regulations is typically unknown. Utilizing enforcement to maintain compliance depends upon instrumental models of behavior that focus on "rational calculations of utility," through which individuals balance deterrence with their perceived potential for personal gains from illegal acts. Alternative approaches to gaining compliance may employ normative models of behavior that focus on an internal sense of duty arising from moral obligation, social norms, and "procedural justice" through adopting regulations using what are perceived to be fair processes. Research in diverse contexts has indicated agencies may strategically utilize procedural justice to build trust and create normative influence through a sense of responsibility to comply. Normative influence may also promote cooperative behavior that extends beyond basic compliance. Bovine tuberculosis (bTB) eradication efforts in an area of Michigan where the disease is sustained within the white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) population required reduction in densities and concentrations of deer in order to decrease disease transmission. Eradication strategies included adoption of baiting regulations and liberalized hunting regulations to promote harvest of female (antlerless) deer. Hunters contested the need for these regulations, and prior assessments suggested the frequency of baiting violations and inadequate cooperation with reaching necessary harvest levels limited the effectiveness of eradication efforts. I developed a conceptual framework that included instrumental and normative factors expected to have influenced hunter violations, cooperation with population management efforts, and trust in the agency. I conducted a mail survey of 3,500 bTB area deer hunters to quantify the rate of violations and used logit modeling to assess factors affecting violations, cooperation, and trust. Factor analysis validated the conceptual framework. I estimated the minimum baiting violation rate was 25%. Among instrumental influences, the perceived risk of punishment was not significant, but the expected severity (through belief that revocation of hunting privileges was a potential penalty) was significant. Personal gains via perceived enhanced opportunity to take at least 1 deer were associated with violations and with cooperation (purchasing antlerless licenses). Results indicated procedural justice may build trust, but the potential benefits for subsequent reduction of violations and improving cooperation were less clear. This research presented an opportunity to examine how agency actions and policies contribute collectively to compliance, cooperation, and trust rather than studying these outcomes in isolation. Detailed assessment of individuals' trust, compliance, and cooperation with specific actors exercising specific authorities is a necessary approach for developing recommendations to enhance government performance. To meet their public trust responsibilities, I suggest state wildlife agencies should consider ways to affect both instrumental and normative factors to increase effectiveness of management and build trust. Authority to revoke hunting privileges for illegal use of bait should be pursued. Efforts should be considered to advise hunters regarding the best locations and methods of hunting that do not involve using bait, provide assistance through habitat management to increase deer sightings, or encourage hunters to harvest antlerless deer rather than bucks. Convincing hunters that the best available science is used to inform decisions may offer an opportunity to enhance trust and compliance.
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