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YOUTH INDEVELOPMENT:
WORKERS BRIGADE AND THE
YOUNG PIONEERS 0F GHANA
Thesis-for the Degree of M .u A.

MICHlGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

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ABSTRACT

YOUTH IN DEVELOPMENT: WORKERS BRIGADE
AND THE YOUNG PIONEERS 0F GHANA

By
Diane Szymkowski

The central focus of this thesis is an examination
of the relationship between the development of a large,
unemployed youth cohort in African cities and the utiliza-
tion of the youth sector in national development.

Certain consequences of the development of this co-
hort in the cities, such as acts of delinquency and riots
in the towns, lack of sufficient manpower in the rural areas
and strain on services within the cities, were perceived
as a growing problem by the governments. There is a direct
correlation between the governments' perception of the con-
sequences of this youth cohort development and the enactment
of programs for youth in national development. These pro-
grams served to re-direct the youthful activities into what
the governments viewed as more acceptable channels.

In the introductory section, the appropriateness of
the concept of youth cohort, as compared to other popular
conceptions of youth, for this particular problem is exam-

ined. A general review of programs utilizing youth in

Diane Szymkowski

development in African nations is undertaken in order to
demonstrate the connection between cohort development and
the incorporation of youths into these programs.

The main body of this paper consists of a case study
of the Workers Brigade and the Young Pioneers of Ghana with
data for the case study being gathered from available re-
sources in the United States. Since every nation has a
particular notion of what development means, the study be-
gins with a Specification of the Ghanaian concept of develop-
ment, which was a socialist model. In undertaking the path
of socialist development, the Ghanaian Government aimed at
full employment; freeing the economy from alien control;
ensuring Ghana's participation in the Pan-African economy;
and ensuring that the socialist policies of the nation were
fully implemented.

It was found that in Ghana, the Workers Brigade and
the Young Pioneers were begun as a response to rioting in
Accra, and other perceived negative consequences of youth
cohort development in the cities. Both organizations par-
ticipated in socialist development, were closely connected
with political activities and had projects designed for school
leavers. While the Brigade was chiefly directed towards
already existing problems of school leavers, the Young Pio-
neers was more preventative of such problems, attempting
to ensure that they did not occur in such serious proportions,

by working mostly with the very young who had not yet dropped

Diane Szymkowski

out of school.

-Possibilities for youth in development as indicated
by the Brigade and the Pioneers were two-fold--service to
the community and benefits for the youths themselves. While
the Brigade was involved in projects in agriculture, con-
struction and industry; the Pioneers was largely concerned
with smaller volunteer projects. Both provided some type
of technical training, opportunities to make international
contacts, and participation in different associational group-
ings. Although the Brigade and the Pioneers did not fulfill
many of their goals, they did play an active role in the
socialist development program of Ghana.

It appears that the cooptation of the youth into the
Brigade and the Pioneers served effectively to divide the
cohort into impotent units. As such the youths were no
longer so problematic and were instead more responsive to
the needs of the government. In effect, the overall national
development needs were stressed more than the long-range
needs of the youths. Hence, the problems of youths were
used as an excuse to incorporate them into development
projects which may very well have served chiefly for na-
tional purposes rather than their needs.

The overall conclusion from this study is that gov-
ernments often incorporate youths into development projects,
if their actions or the consequences of their actions are

a hindrance to the governments' plans. Such social control

Diane Szymkowski

of youths may prove disadvantageous to the long-range de-

velopment of the youths.

YOUTH IN DEVELOPMENT: WORKERS BRIGADE

AND THE YOUNG PIONEERS OF GHANA

. ‘]\LL
x.

Dianegssymkowski

A THESIS

submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

1972

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to express my deepest appreciation to Dr.
Ruth 3. Hamilton, my major professor, who has directed
this project from the initial stages. Her suggestions,
encouragement and understanding have proven to be invaluable
assets both in the preparation of this thesis and through-
out my entire graduate program.

I also wish to express my gratitude to Dr. John
Hunter and Dr. Vincent Salvo who offered essential recom-
mendations and criticism. Special thanks to Mr. John
Nabila, a Ghanaian citizen, who helped to clarify critical
items of his country's culture.

Finally, I am especially thankful for the assistance
I have received for many years from my parents, Kathi and

Sr. M. Desponsata.

ii

To Chris

in loving memory

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF CHARTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Chapter
PART I. GENERAL ORIENTATION
1. THE PROBLEM: YOUTH IN CONFLICT AND CHANGE. . 1

Statement of the Problem

Conceptions of Youth

Cohort Development: Some Possible Sources
Youth and Government: the African Example

PART II: CASE STUDY OF GHANA AND YOUTH COHORT IN DEVELOPMENT

2. GHANAIAN SOCIALISM AND YOUTH IN DEVELOPMENT . '27

Historical Background
Beginnings and Aims of the Brigade and the
Pioneers

3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRIGADE AND THE YOUNG
PIONEERS O 0 0 O 0 O O O O 0 O O O O 0 O 0 0 46

Activities Particular to the Brigade
Agricultural Wing
Construction Wing
Similar Activities of the Brigade and the
Young Pioneers
Industrial Section
Wider Purposes
Encourage the Wider Community to Accept
Innovations
Develop Associational Groupings of the
Youths
Build a Political Base

4 0 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS 0 C O O O O O O O O 98

What Was Accomplished in Line with the
Expressed Purposes of the Brigade?
Issues Raised by such Programs
Summary

BIBLIOGRAPW O O O 0 O 0 0 O 0 O O O O O O O O O 0 0 O 119
APPENDICES O O O O O O 0 9 O O 9 O 0 0 O O O O O O O O l 24

Table

7.1

7.2

LIST OF TABLES

Males and Females, ages 15—24, in municipal and
urban councils: population and unemployed. . .

Schemes in Ghana aimed at youth unemployment
problems: 1963-71. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Strength and intake of the Workers Brigade,
1958-64, 1965, 1967 o e o o o e e o e o e e o 0

Land acquired and utilized by Cooperative,
State, Institutional and Peasant farms in
Ghana, 1965 O 0 O O 0 O O O O 0 O O O O O O O 0

Workers Brigade camps and products. . . . . . .

Unemployed in municipal and urban councils in
Ghana, 1960, ages 15-24 and 15+ from these
counCils O O 0 O O O 0 0 O 0 O O O O O O 0 O O O

Unemployed in municipal and urban councils in
Ghana, 1960, ages 15-24 and 15+ from these
counCiISO 0 O 0 O O 0 0 O O O 0 O O O O O O O 0

Females, ages 15-24, in municipal and urban
councils: population and unemployed. . . . . .

Females, ages 15-24, in municipal and urban
councils: percentages on population and un-
employed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Males, ages 15-24, in municipal and urban
councils: population and unemployed. . . . . .

Males, ages 15-24, in municipal and urban
councils: percentages on population and un-
employed 0 O O O O 0 9 O 0 O O O 0 0 0 O O 0 0 O

Explanatory notes for 1960 census data in
Ghana, Tables 6-8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General level of unemployment: 1960-70, Africa

Page

29

32

4O

52

54

131

132

133

134

135

136

137
138

LIST OF CHARTS

Chart

Workers Brigade Camps . . . . . . . . .
Ghanaian Money. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Administrative Sections of the Brigade.
Israeli Nahal . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Workers Brigade Camps . . . . . . . . .
National Organizers . . . . . . . . . .

Structure of the Brigade. . . . . . . .

vi

Page

47
124
124
125
128
129
130

PART I. GENERAL ORIENTATION

CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM: YOUTH IN CONFLICT AND CHANGE

Statement of the Problem

In the last decade in the United States, numerous
efforts by governments have been focused upon youth unem-
ployment. Riots in cities like Watts, Buffalo and elsewhere
were undoubtedly strategic elements prompting the widespread
enactment of programs like the Job Corps. For instance,
in July, 1971, an advertisement appeared in Newsweek for
the Mayor's ”Give a Kid a Summer Program” of Detroit. Its
message warned, ”There will be over 200,000 kids age 13 to
20 on the streets this summer . . . 200,000 kids with nothing
to do is not something Detroit needs right now.”

Problems of civil disorder produced by mass unemploy-
ment have been typically handled by governments through
public relief. As Piven and Cloward have shown in Regulat-
‘iggthe Poor,l historical evidence demonstrates that in the
United States and England, relief has served as a mechanism
for social control for decades. Similarly, programs meant
for unemployed youth often parallel relief as a tool for
restoring order by keeping the youths employed.

Youth unemployment problems have been cropping up in

developing countries in much larger proportions than in the
United States. Industrialization, urbanization and educa-
tional experiences further complicated an already explosive
demographic situation in the 1950's and 1960's. In fact
rioting by unemployed young men in Accra, Ghana, in 1957
prompted the move to establish the Workers' Brigade, a group
used in national development.

During the 1960's youth became an integral part of
development proposals throughout Africa. In spite of the
fact that some proposals, which utilize youth in development,
were motivated by long-range goals, many programs were re-
garded as temporary 'conflict-reducers.' The development
of the youth cohort was perceived by the governments as a
threat because they felt that the magnitude of youthful un-
employment, in terms of duration and numbers involved, threat-
ened national security and led to increasing crime and de-
linquency. To consider such proposals as solely initiative
endeavors offered by the governments to activate youth is
therefore misleading. In essence, African governments had
acted in response to the perceived negative consequences
resulting from the presence of large numbers of school
leavers in the cities. Some of these consequences were:
acts of delinquency in the towns, lack of sufficient man-
power in the rural areas (because of the rural to urban

migration), riots and other disturbances, and extra strain

on services within the cities.

These perceived difficulties were complicated by the
changing conditions of portions of traditional society as
a result of industrialization and by changes due to inde-
pendence. The latter is particularly important in that many
economic problems of African society were directly related
to the controls created by the colonial powers, followed
by the changed economic strategies of neo-colonialism.

At times, the youth element has remained unactivated
by the government or 'non-involved' in national and other
concerns. Conversely, youth has often risen up through its
own power and has become involved in deviant behavior. It
is evident that,

In developing countries, youth participation repre-
sents, on the one hand, a tremendous political oppor—
tunity to raise the country to new levels of achieve-
ment and national growth and, on the other hand, a
recurrent political threat for governments whose
record of achievement may not be to the liking of
its younger generation.2

This youth element has been utilized by the govern-
ments to introduce new modes of behavior and new normative
systems, to demonstrate the benefits of innovations, to
develop international relations, to work on national de-
velopment projects, to build a political base and to ensure
the future security of the nation.

The central focus of this paper is an examination
of conflict and change in a developing country as seen by

examining the relationship between the large, unemployed

youth cohort in African cities and the utilization of the

youth sector in national development. In this paper, it
will be demonstrated how the youth sector can, on the one
hand, be affected by the processes of induStrialization,
urbanization, and educational transformations, and, on the
other hand, how youth can be used to effect changes in de-
velopment, as illustrated by the Workers' Brigade and the
Young Pioneers of Ghana. It is hoped that by analyzing the
Workers' Brigade and the Young Pioneers, the foundation will
be laid for future comparative studies of youth and its role
in development, within the developed as well as the develop-
ing countries.

In this introductory chapter, the advantages and im-
plications of the use of cohort as a tool for analyzing youth
in change will be reviewed. Consideration will then be given
to selected African programs using youth in development.

Part II will be detailed study of the Ghanaian Workers
Brigade and Young Pioneers, which were youth groups utilized

for national development.

Conceptions of Youth
The mere specification of 'youth' can lead to need-
less bickering over biological boundaries, which are neces-
sarily rigid. Zolberg, in ”Youth in Tropical Africa,“ argues
that the term youth should be defined in terms of a ”rela-
tionship between a set of successive generations rather than
absolute biological age. . . . These generations tend to

be defined in terms of access to more or less Specified

 

status positions in the relevant institutions of the society
under consideration.“ He states that once the youth attain
relevant positions and lose their statuses youth the ”cohort
may retain its status as youth in relation to incumbents of
longer tenure” yet will be regarded by "its own successors
much as it earlier viewed its predecessors."3 The term youth
is too general for the intent of this paper and distinctions
based upon age boundaries conceal the degree of overlap be-
tween the age groups.

Age grade, as used by Eisenstadt and others is a ”broad
definition of human potentialities and obligations at a given
stage of life."4 In a rapidly changing or highly mobile A
society, the obligations, at a given stage of life, are often
diffuse and the age grade appears to be less relevant than
in societies where obligations between different age groups
are explicit.

Finally, the idea of a generation or generational
conflict can be deficient in that conflicts arising in modern
societies are not, strictly speaking, 'fathers fighting sons'
or vice versa. Many other factors, such as the onslaught
of wars or educational changes, cross-cut generations and
negate its usefulness. Ryder clarifies this point:

Many writers have used the succession of cohorts as
the foundation for their theories of sociocultural dy-
namics. This approach has been aptly labeled 'genera-
tionism', because the writers mistakenly transfer from
the generation to the cohort a set of inappropriate

associations. Some generationists maintain that there
is a periodicity to sociocultural change caused by the

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biological fact of the succession of generations at
thirty-five year (father-son) intervals. There is no
such periodicity. Other generationists develop a con-
flict theory of change, pitched on the opposition be-
tween the younger and older 'generations‘ in society,
as in the family. But a society reproduces itself con-
tinuously. The age gap between father and son disappears
in the population at large, through the comprehensive
overlapping of life cycles. The fact that social change
produces intercohort differentiation and thus contributes
to inter-generational conflict cannot justify a theory
that social change is produced by that conflict.5

Since the concepts of youth, age grade and generation
are inadequate for the purposes of this paper, the concept,
youth cohort, will be employed. The concept of youth cohort
has distinct advantages and provides an appropriate tool
for analysis.

As defined by Ryder, a cohort is an ”aggregate of
individuals who experienced the same event within the same
time interval."6 In other words, it is the coincidence among
persons of some important life cycle event, sometimes the
year of birth, but also such things as the year of entering
the military service, or the year of the first vote.

Ryder suggests that the cohort can be ”differentiated
by the changing content of formal education, by peer group
socialization and by idiosyncratic historical experiences,"7
as well as by the time of entrance into the labor market,
by legislation that is age specific, by the size of the
cohort relative to other cohorts and other factors. Moller8

narrows Ryder's concerns to one predominant factor, arguing

that an unprecedented or overly large number of young people

is a political and cultural force and supports his assertion

with examples from the Protestant Reformation, China's Stu-
dent Hovement and other youth movements.

Holler holds that ”. . . As a rule, young people be-
came conSpicuous in public life in periods of rapid demographic
growth."9 Cited as an example of his perspective is Egypt's
first modern political party, which was composed of the po-
litical youth cohort which rioted in 1919. This same party
was later attacked by younger street fighters and guerillas
who wanted leadership to be in their (guerilla) hands.lo
Holler emphasizes that the ”. . . demographic factor oper-
ates independently of the industrial, modern or 'anti-imperi-

alist' social context."ll

Still, it is apparent that the
three later factors do complicate the demographic element.

Instead of being the standard bearers for a new in-
dustrial-urban order, the youth may instead spurn this role
and filter into the ranks of criminals and juvenile delin—
quents. Though deviance is often conceptualized negatively
as departure from norms, some deviance may be positively
seen as innovative behavior. Thus, it should be remembered
that youth may simply be enacting their role as change agents
being directed toward normative ends through rejecting the
normative means; or toward deviant ends while-accepting the
normative means.

Eisenstadt lists a number of possible ways of cate-
gorizing deviant youth groups and the conditions under which

they arise. Relevant in this paper are the categories of,

“Unorganized youth delinquents arising in situations of
'culture contact'; and juvenile delinquent groups of differ-

«12 While the de-

ent degrees of organization and cohesion.
viance in the first is totally negative to the larger com-
munity and is largely unorganized or individualistic; the
deviance in the second rejects the normative means while
pursuing the normative goals of the larger society and has
varying degrees of organization. The first usually results
from culture contact, with the second being a common result
from situations where families have migrated to more indus-
trialized societies or urban centers in developing countries.13
°These types have been reviewed in order to indicate some of
the ways that youth becomes deviant and may then cause prob-
1ems for the government.

When youth feels it necessary to rebel or publicly
announce their dissatisfactions, they may appeal to others
in more powerful positions to redress certain grievances.
They may threaten to disrupt selected activities if the more
powerful fail to comply. As Herbert Moller sees the problem,
there are only two strategies available to the weak-~guerilla
warfare or insurgency and non—violent methods. He considers
activist youth as weak and holds that, ”Since activist youth
are weak, facing established governments vastly superior
in military power to their own, as in open battle, would

.14

be self-destructive. In strictly military terms, the

youth may be weak, but in other ways, the youth may be strong

enough to coerce governments into responding to major socie-
tal needs. A pressing question at the initial stages of
this project therefore was, what permits the youth sector

to achieve consideration from the larger society in terms

of its needs and desires? Is it because of the amount of
visibility of the youth as, for instance, large numbers in
the cities? Or does the youth sector pose a threat because
of its size and potentiality for Spontaneous actions? Per—
haps the answer to these questions can be found by analyzing

factors which affect the development of youth cohorts.

Cohort Development: Some Possible Sources

It might be hypothesized that the more factors there
are which distinguish one particular cohort, the more likely
it will be that this youth cohort develops a sense of con-
sciousness and, hence, is capable of acting collectively.
The African youth cohort developed as a result of rapid
changes, economic, political and social, which were taking
place within the countries. The major sources of cohort
development are Specifically tied to rural-urban migration,

unemployment and educational experiences.

Rural—Urban Migration

Africa's rate of urban growth is the most rapid in
the world and this is due largely to migration rather than
natural increase. Most able-bodied, competent and progres-

sive young men are leaving the rural areas and thus defeating

10

the governments' hopes of developing the agricultural sector
in order to increase the standard of living. Once in the
cities, the migrants have a much poorer chance of obtaining
a job than people who have been long resident in the cities.15
In response to the rapidly growing problems of unemployment
and rural decline, the governments began to implement various
development schemes, which are ”mainly agricultural projects
aimed at keeping adult males and youths on the land, while,
at the same time, increasing national income."16
The Economic Commission for Africa met in Lagos, Ni-
geria, in 1967 to discuss the exodus in African nations of
young people from rural areas and the resulting wastage of
talent. Participant nations included: Algeria, Cameroon,
Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar,
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda
and Upper Volta. The countries noted having the following
elements in common: net increases in population (high pro~
portion of children to total population, numerous young labor
force entrants, and comparatively few labor force openings);
relatively low average level of economic and social develop-
ment; rapid urbanization; and heightened expectations of youth

through education and the mass media.17

Unemployment
Employment opportunities are often the prime drawing
factor of young people to the cities, and large numbers of

unemployed youths in the cities are considered potential

ll

threats to stability. It should be remembered that unemploy-
ment resulting from the large numbers of migrants, and, as

dealt with in Western economies, does not fully clarify the
extent of the problem in the African countries. Hanna re-

ports that three types of underemployment are also widespread:
partial, meaning the worker puts in less time than he is

able; disguised, referring to low-intensity work; and poten—
tial, "when there is a substitutability of capital and labor."18
This point is supported by Birmingham who contends that “Un—
employment in Western economies is measured by the number

of people without jobs, who are actively seeking work. The
application of this notion does as much to obscure the problem
of underutilization of labour as it does to illuminate it."19
He suggests that the subconcepts of 'dnguised unemployment“
and 'underemployment' be used to present the problem more
accurately. This should serve to alert the reader to the

fact that the problem is even more crucial than available

statistics would indicate.

Educational Experiences

Among the unemployed youths in the cities are two
types of school leavers: those who have completed a certain
stage of education and those who have dropped out before
completion of a stage.20 A school leaver may be further
specified as one who could not afford to go further because

of financial limitations or because of limited facilities

for further schooling.

12

It is essential that one speak of unemployed school
leavers rather than simply the unemployed because participa-
tion in an educational system awakens the students to new
perspectives and gives them higher expectations. A. J.
McQueen set up a typology of youth, which places students
in four categories on the basis of their economic integra-
tion (high-low) and their socio-cultural integration (high-
low). 0f concern to us here is the category of persons in
which there is high socio-cultural integration, as with the
school leavers, and low economic integration, as with the
unemployed. He holds that this group, the Stable Transi—
tional Youth, will be ”Strongly inclined to risk illegal
and unconventional practices which are functional for gain-

ing education and work."'21

He further asserts that radical
politics and crime are the possible outcomes resulting from
the existence of marginal youth, which are of the greatest
significance for African countries at present.2

Abernathy feels that education increases the desire
of the young to live in the city as well as raising their
vocational aspirations. "The elements of the desire are
well known: the excitement and variety of the city, the
opportunity for more interesting and higher-paying work,
the freedom from parental and small-community pressures,
the possibilities of further education. . . .“ In Nigeria
he found that,

Because of the high concentration of school leavers
in such cities as Lagos, Port Harcourt, Ibadan, Onitsha,

l3

Aba, Sapele, Benin and Enugu, their problems are highly
visible. By the very act of migrating, many of these
persons, formerly the underemployed of traditional agri-
culture, have become the unemployed of the modern city.
The problem is aggravated by the desire of the young
migrants to remain more or less permanently in the
cities, rather than, as in previous years, to stay
there for a limited time period only.23
Rural-urban migration by school leavers is seen by Abernathy
as the physical reunion of government leaders with the bulk
of their populist agitation. This reunion can be both bene-
ficial and detrimental.

Recognition of the gravity of the unemployment situa-
tion began in the late 1950's and continues until today.
Reasons for the concern of African countries over young job
seekers, with from four to ten years of formal education,
include the fact that the magnitude of the unemployment,
both in terms of duration and numbers involved, threatens
national security and that the long period of youth unemploy-
ment leads to increasing delinquency and crime.24

In this section some of the factors which reflect
commonalities of experiences of the youth sector in various
countries were reviewed. These factors were rural-urban
migration, unemployment and educational experiences. With

this background it is essential to look at some of the ways

governments have responded.

Youth and Government: The African Example
Government reactions to deviant and rebellious actions

by youth have assumed various proportions and forms. Some

14

nations have attempted to co-opt the youth and re-channel
their energies; some others have struggled to repress the
dissenters; and yet other countries have bided time until
the discontent had passed.

At this point, specific examples of youth proposals
will be cited as one instance of government reactions which
attempt to co-opt the youth and re-channel their energies.

The first major inter-agency effort on youth work
in Africa took place initially in Lagos, Nigeria, in 1967
and continued in Niamey, Niger, in May, 1968. Attention
was directed towards the unemployed youths, with from four
to ten years' schooling, because of these reasons: 1) the
problem of more jobless youth in the cities was rapidly
expanding; 2) aSpirations are aroused through the process
of formal education which cannot be realized; 3) too great
an exodus from rural areas can lower farm production and
delay modernization; 4) the rapid influx into the cities
puts a squeeze on scarce amenities; and 5) investment in
these youth (via education) is being wasted.25

Both the report from the Niamey meeting and the UNESCO
report, previously mentioned, indicate the need to depart
from the past procedures of using youth programs as tem-
porary conflict reducers. From Niamey, the conclusion reached
is that the main effect of social programs dealing with youth

26

unemployment has been to ”reduce social tension.” Recom-

mendations were that a stress be laid upon giving youth a

15

sense of social cohesion with the rest of the community and
that social and economic programs be made more interdependent.
Advice from the UNESCO report was that, “It is essential

that a youth policy should be comprehensive rather than in-

27 Instead of making policy

voked by fears or sudden crises.”
statements either for or against comprehensive programs,

the various youth policies, reviewed here, will be incor-
porated in order to illustrate the tacit and implicit aims
and procedures of such programs.

The range of such projects in tropical Africa, which
have been devised by governments to deal with the unemploy-
ment problem among school leavers are put into two categories
by A. Gallaway. These are l) the largely works schemes,
which are usually of a temporary nature, and in which voca-
tional training is sometimes provided; and 2) the largely
specialized training schemes, which may include practical
work.

Among the largely works schemes are, ”National con-
struction, human investment, workers brigades, compulsory

28 Youths are usu-

national service and labour volunteers."
ally utilized in physical labor for national needs, such
as assisting in construction of dams, roads and irrigation
systems. Whatever experience is needed is generally gained
while on the job. With these schemes economic appraisals

are often less important than the recruit's development of

personal discipline and more favorable attitudes toward

society.29

l6

Specialized training schemes include ". . . youth
centres, youth clubs, trade centres and trade schools.”
Recruitment is selective and voluntary. Some provide fur-
ther training in skills, some further general education, some
are 'correctional' and some are involved in self-help proj-
acts.30 It is the aim of a few of the institutions of this
type to remain self-supporting; the rest are financed by
the local or central governments and by private sources.3l

Togo began a program to instill into her youth a
desire to 'return to the land' in 1962, called the Jeunesse
Pionere Africole (JPA). The bulk of the trainees are from
sixteen to twenty years old and are given monthly stipends
and food provisions. After a six-month training period in
modern agricultural methods, during which time they run a
farm on a commercial basis, they return to their own villages.
Upon their return, many of them become involved in co-opera-
tive settlements and various self-help projects, such as
helping to build roads and markets. Gilji, the location
of the farm training school, has become a regional demon-
stration center for the Togolese peasants. Further instruc-
tion in new techniques is provided for the young people as
they begin their own projects. Troubles with the youth
“hanging around corners" have been decreased since its
implementation, though no precise figures are available.32

Farm settlement schemes in Nigeria's Southern Regions

address themselves to similar purposes. The Western Nigeria

Settlement Schemes began in 1960 based upon the principles

of the Israeli moshavim, i.e., individually owned and oper-
ated farms. Here the objectives were: to attract young,
educated people to farming as an occupation and to demonstrate
that farms can be operated effectively by young people. In
Mid-Western Nigeria, farm institutes hoped to train young
farmers to introduce new ideas and modern farming techniques.
Mention is made in the Eastern Nigeria Projects, proposed

in 1962, of the ~attempts to reverse the trend of migration
from rural to urban areas by making life more attractive . . .
[and] to provide some employment and livelihood for primary
school leavers who cannot be absorbed in industry, public
services and commercial houses at the present level of the

33 Initial results from the Nigerian

Region's development.“
Settlement Schemes proved disappointing on the basis of
profitability of the farms. In 1966, it was concluded that,
“The capital outlay per settler on the present Farm Settle-
ment Schemes, renders it impossible to make any contribution
to the unemployment problem in a country where the popula-
tion is growing at the rate of some 1.1 to 1.4 million per
annum. So far, there has been little to learn by adjacent
farmers from the existing settlements and results from an-
other major effort of the Schemes--the creation of a pros-
perous and enlightened class of farmers from primary school
34

leavers--have been negative and expensive.”

A 1967 doctoral dissertation by Dupe Olatunbosum dealt

18

with the performance of farm settlements as compared with
the school leavers farms in Western and Mid-Western Nigeria.
He explains that, ”In making this evaluation, the regular
farm settlement scheme is contrasted and compared with the
less capital intensive schemes in the Midwest, the school
leavers farms."35 Employing three measures of performance,
”the social psychological characteristics of the farmers,
efficiency of tree crop production and internal rates of
return on investment . . ." he found the school leavers
farms to be superior. "The greater efficiency in the use

of resources is due to the absence of a relatively unproduc-
tive large capital investment in housing and amenities."36
Since the school leavers either lived with families, close
to where they were working, or returned to their homes in
the evenings, a saving on housing was possible.

Turning to Dahomey, one can see one of the African
countries which appears to be least equipped for industrial-
ization. An influx of young people into the towns has been
substantial. It is reported that,

By 1964, Cotonou has increased its population six
times over previous years to a total of 109,328; even
Porto-Novo, which is expanding far less rapidly, doubled
its population over the same period. . . . In the towns,
where there is little industry, unemployment is sub-
stantial and steadily increasing. It is estimated that
in 1963, there were 30,000 unemployed in Cotonou and
Porto-Novo and that this number was growing by 5,000
a year. In Cotonou in 1964, there were 20,000 unem-
ployed including 1,000 women. In the 15 to 19 age

group, the proportion of unemployed in the towns rises
to fifty per cent.37

t I

.101

“\

 

l9

Dahomey has had numerous campaigns to curtail unem-
ployment and encourage young people to return to the land.
Among the schemes sponsored by various private bodies and
institutions there are the Young Christian Workers Movement,
begun in 1954; the Catholic Scout Movement, 1956; the Back
to Land Action Group (GRAJERET), 1959; the Anti-Employment
League, 1959; and the Return Movement, 1964. The Ministry
of Labour and Manpower Service established programs aimed
at jobless citizens between the ages of 18 and 50, to enable
them to work on projects of national importance. Due to
the magnitude of the problem, the government has tried a
variety of programs aimed at curtailing unemployment of
youths.

Young itinerant groups of volunteers, called the
Young Workers Brigades, carry out special assignments in
remote areas. Another group, established by the government,
was the National Workers' Employment League, 1960, by which
the government took over both the GRAJBRET scheme and the
Anti-Employment League, which had both failed. The aim of
the new organization was to abolish tribal and geographical
distinctions, to teach the recruits a trade or enable them
to improve their own land. One rather small-scale experi-
ment is that developed at Agonvy, whereby the unemployed
were each given a plot of land and, after a specified time,
were entitled to two-thirds of the sales of their output.

Finally, the Dahomeyan armed forces initiated schemes

20

beginning in 1963 with the Army pioneers, the primary objec-
tive of which was to implant a sense of nationalism and
unity into the young people. As for absorbing unemployment,
another aim, the scheme had limited effects. Considering
all the proposals begun in Dahomey, "None of the schemes,
either past or present, appears to take account of the ethnic
or sociological factors which might facilitate success.“38
Tanganyika (now part of Tanzania) and Nyasaland both
proposed Workers Brigades. Tanganyika appropriated £10,000
for an experimental settlement in 1962, with the intention
of creating a permanent Workers Brigade if the experiment
proved successful.39 Consideration of such proposals came
as a result of rising unemployment in the country. In 1962,
Nyasaland was planning a Brigade-type organization to meet
rising unemployment in the cities.40
Mali's Civic Service Program deals with present de-
ficiencies in overall national development as well as pro-
viding a means of coping with potential increases in urban
unemployment. Basically, the Service hopes to train young
men to act as rural promoters of community works after they
leave the service. Techniques are devised to rehabilitate
young unemployed people in the towns, to improve the life
of rural communities, and to develop the young person's
national conscience. Activities of the Service are broadly

placed under three headings: technical training, intellec-

tual training and physical training. One preference derived

21

from the implementation of this service is that of recruit-
ing young people who have not yet tried to abandon the land
rather than those who have already done so and are more dif-
ficult to work with.41 Once again, the hope to forestall
future unemployment and other difficulties is evident.
Supplementary to this is the ”Work for Honor Programme”
which persuades but does not force the masses to assist in
small-scale development projects in their own communities.
After independence in 1962, a tea project was set up
in Bonyoro, Uganda, as a settlement scheme for school leavers.42
High hopes for the project were based on the assumptions that
young people, with some education, would be easily innovated
and committed if given the opportunity to obtain their own
land. Factors underlying the failure of this scheme indi-
cate the complexity of problems which many African nations
are facing. Selection of people from different tribal back—
grounds meant that there was often a very minimal basis for
common understanding or common normative rules. People were
not obliged to stay on the farm, so many left after the har-
vest was over and they received their share of the profits.
Most school leavers had no agricultural background and did
not care for that type of work. People from neighboring
areas felt that the government was stealing the land. From
the technical point of view, the most important lessons learned

were that the crop selected must ensure a sufficient profit

for those involved and that more careful surveyance of land

(on

3

.EE

 

.714

C. N
.10:

. I
"u

I!

22

should be undertaken to avoid poor sites.

The Nyakashaka scheme in Uganda took from 1963 to
1967 to attain a full settlement population. Settlers were
to be supervised for three years and given their own land
after this period. Again, the aim was primarily to provide
opportunities for school leavers, though it was also a tool
used to demonstrate to the peasants more recent methods of
farming. Success with this scheme was attributed to the
stringent selection of settlers, i.e., all of the settlers
were in their own region and with members of their own tribal
group, and to the close relationship between the manager and
the settlers.43 Additionally, caution was taken to sort out
those who were interested in making farming a permanent career
rather than simply a step to other educational and job oppor-
tunities.

Kenya Association of Youth Centres were organizations
in Kenya which dealt with youthful unemployment. Some 11,000
young people belonged to such centers in 1966. Yet many of
the centers have recently lost membership since the govern-
ment reduced its contribution, holding that instructors were
not well qualified; and because, for the young, there was
an absence of any clear-cut rewards in terms of status or
earning power.44

A Joint Working Party of the Youth Department of Kenya

began its report in March, 1966, acknowledging the serious

crisis presented by the school leaver problem. Recommendations

23

from the Party, if enacted, would probably be the most com-
prehensive schemes for school leavers in all of Africa. A
few of their many suggestions were: the establishment of
a chain of frontier settlements for youths along the Kenyan
border, to protect the country; better standards of rural
living, to encourage the young people to stay in the country;
and use of the school leavers in massive literacy campaigns.45
In summary, African countries have responded to the
existence of large numbers of school leavers in various ways.
The similarity of the countries' concerns over youth unem-
ployment was made explicit at the Niamey meeting of 1968.
Among these concerns were: 1) rapid expansion of jobless
youth in the cities; 2) arousing of aspirations, through
formal education, which could not be fulfilled; 3) insuffici-
ent rural manpower; and 4) pressures on amenities in the
cities. Such consequences of cohort development were per-
ceived negatively by the governments, which then acted to
control the youth sector. Specific illustrations from Ni-
geria, Dahomey, Tanganyika, Mali, Uganda and Kenya provided
information on schemes ranging from collective farming and
vocational instruction to military service. The remainder
of this paper is devoted to an in-depth analysis of two youth

schemes in Ghana: the Workers Brigade and the Young Pioneers.

Notes on Chapter 1_

lFrances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating
the Poor (New York, 1971). .

2Commission for Social Development, Preliminary Report
on Long-Term Policies and Programmes for Youth in National
Development, 20th session, Jan. 7, 1969.

3Aristede Zolberg, ”Youth as a Political Phenomenon
in Tropical Africa," Youth and Society, I (Dec., 1969), 214.

 

4S. N. Bisenstadt, From Generation to Generation (Glen-
coe, 111., 1956), p. 22.

5Norman E. Ryder, “The Cohort as a Concept in the
Study of Social Change,“ Amegican Sociolo ical Review, XXX
(Dec., 1965), 853. Cf. Rue Bucher and Anselm Strauss, ”Pro-
fessions in Process,“ American Journal of Sociolggy, 66 (Jan.,
1961), 325-34.

61bid., p. 845.

71bid., p. 843.

8Herbert Moller, "Youth as a Force in the Modern World,‘I
Comparative Studies in Society and History, X (April, 1968),
237-60 0

9Ibid., p. 237.

loIbid., p. 246.

llIbid., p. 2400

12Eisenstadt, o . cit., p. 307.

13Ib1d., p. 310.

l4Moller, op. cit., p. 258.

15“Urban Growth and Social Development in Africa,“
in Urbanization: Development Policies and Planning. Inter-
national Social Development Review, No. 1, 1968, pp. 39-47.

lsIbid., p. 40.

24

25

17Social Welfare Services in Africa, No. 7, Youth
Employment and National Develppment in Africa (New York,
1969), p. vi.

18William and Judith Hanna, Urban Dypamics in Black
Africa, Center for Research in Social Systems (Washington,
1969), p. 72.

19Walter Birmingham et al., eds., A _Study of Contem—

orar Ghana: The Econom of Ghana, Vol. I (Evanston, 1966),
p. I4‘.

20David Abernathy, The Political Dilemma of Popular
Education (Stanford, 1969), p. 42.

21Albert McQueen, “Education and Marginality of Afri-
can Youth,“ Journal of Social Issues, XXIV (No. 2, 1968),
192.

 

22

 

Ibid.
23

Abernathy, O o Cite, ppo 199-2000
24Youth Employment, op. cit., p. 6.
25Ibid.
26

Ibid., p. 22.

27.Pre1iminary Report, op. cit., p. 35.

28Archibald Callaway, "Unemployment among African
School Leavers," The Journal of Modern African Studies, I
(No. 3,1963), 253.

291bid., pp. 253-55.

3OIbid., p. 255.

3lIbid., p. 256.

32"Togo's Youth Learn a Trade,“ Ghanaian Times
(April 19, 1968), p. 7.

33FAO,A Agr icultural Development in Nigpria: 1965-80
(Rome, 1966), p. 339.

34 41bid., p. 347.

26

35Dupe Olatunbosun, “Nigeria Farm Settlements and
School Leavers' Farms--Profitability, Resource Use and Social-
Psychological Considerations,“ unpublished Ph.D. disserta—
tion, Michigan State University, 1967, p. 175.

36Ibid., p. 347.

37”Back to the Land: The Campaign against Unemploy-
ment in Dahomey,” study prepared by E. Costa, International
Labour Review, XCIII (Jan., 1966), 30.

381bid.

39"Tanganyika May Set Up Workers Brigade,“ Ghanaian
Times (Oct. 23, 1962), p. 12.

4O"Nyasa1and to Have Brigade,” Ghanaian Times (May 14,
1963), p. 12.

41"Civic Service and Community Works,“ study prepared
by C. Rossillion, International Labour Review, XCIII (Jan.,
1966), 50-65.

42This information was derived from an interview with
a Ugandan citizen.

43Caroline Hutton, “Nyakashaka--A Farm Settlement
Scheme in Uganda,” African Affairs, LXVII (April, 1968),

44Christian Council of Kenya, After School What?
(Nairobi, 1966), pp. 59-60.

451bid.

PART II. CASE STUDY OF GHANA AND YOUTH COHORT DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER 2

GHANAIAN SOCIALISM AND YOUTH IN DEVELOPMENT

Historical Background

With the colonial period, economic, political and
social institutions based upon 'alien' models were trans—
planted into African societies. At first, conflicts arose
between the indigenous people and the carriers of these in—
stitutions. Later a minority of the indigenous peoples were
put into various positions in order to consolidate the hold
of the mother country. There arose a new type of conflict
between the elites, who had the influence and power and
benefited from the new institutions, and the masses, who
derived little benefit from the new institutions. Austin
gives a very explicit description of the increasing disjunc-
tion between the young school leavers and the traditional
authority structure. These young people who were, around
1950, without work, found very few outlets for their ener-
gies in the native authority and status systems. Meanwhile,
the chiefs and elders watched the growth of the educated
commoner class with suspicion and regarded them as malcon-
tents or agitators. In this evaluation, the school leavers

were seen as beginning to cohere as a distinct group, whose

27

28

common interests cut across traditional boundaries, who had
English as a common language and who were dissatisfied with
their lot. Most of them drifted to the cities in search of
work and new opportunities, but stayed to become involved
in serious political agitation.1

The middle school leavers of Ghana mounted the thresh-
old of the nationalistic surge, once they discovered how
few of their hopes would be fulfilled under the administra—
tion of the colonial regime. Together with the discontented
ex-servicemen, the school leavers became amassed under
Nkrumah's party of the 'common man,’ the Convention People's
Party, which included under its wings such groups as clerks,
drivers and school teachers.2

At first, Ghana realized some benefit from the school
leavers' trouble-making sprees in the cities, since their
agitations added to the general striving for independence.
However, once Ghana attained nationhood in 1957, it was no
longer the struggle of the unemployed school leavers and
others pitched against the colonial government, but an urban
uprising of discontents against their home government. Riot-
ing by young people in Accra was the immediate precipitant
of the establishment of the Workers Brigade in 1957.

The dimensions of the cohort of unemployed youth
within the cities around the time of independence, can be
discerned, in part, from the 1960 population census of Ghana.

The data in Table l were selected from the census

29

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mm.” a a a a Mad». flwl 685.1.
88 8:6 was men 8.8 no} , 08.8 «Sam
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as 8.8 a Em 938 8% E68 H836
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H wanna

30

for the urban and municipal councils. Although males and
females, 15-24, usually composed about 20 per cent of the
population in each council, they often represented over one-
half of those unemployed in each council. If one considers
the percentages of 15-24 year olds unemployed, the range is
from about eight to 15 per cent. As mentioned previously,
such unemployment figures do not reveal the full scope of
the problem as would figures on 'disguised employment' and
'underemployment.‘ Since data on the latter two are unavail-
able, the unemployment figures will provide a rough estimate
of the problem (Table 6 in the Appendix provides the tabula-
tions used for Table 1. Tables 7 and 8 break these figures
down into separate male and female rates).

Independence put the elites into a position where
they were capable of directing their country's development
for the benefit of the majority of its people. To speak of
youth in development, one must understand the concept of
development chosen by the elites after independence. Spec-
ifying what development meant for them, helps one to isolate
the factors and the changesfor which the various models of
development were designed.

Response of Nkrumah and the Government:
Socialist Development in Ghang

Between the time of the establishment of the Workers

Brigade in 1957, and 1961, Ghanaian leaders decided upon a

plan of development which was to crucially influence the

31

Brigade, the Young Pioneers and other programs for youth.
For Ghana, development was to follow a socialist path. In
July, 1962, the Convention People's Party adopted a ”Programme
of Work and Happiness," which shaped the implementation of
the Seven Year Development Plan (1963/64 and 1969/70) through
the Brigade, the Pioneers and other groups.

In undertaking the path of socialist development,
the Ghanaian Government aimed at full employment; freeing
the economy from alien control; ensuring Ghana's participa-
tion in the Pan-African economy; and ensuring that the social-
ist policies of the nation were fully implemented.3

Full employment was only one aSpect of this socialist
development plan. Employment of youth was only one part
of full employment. Youth may very well have served overall
societal purposes, say in the other three areas of socialist
development, without accomplishing much for their own inter-
ests and well-being.

The government created numerous schemes to help unem-
ployed school leavers from 1963 until the present. Table 2
presents some of the more important ones.

Youths had been active in political agitation from
the early part of the 1950's. From independence in 1957,
the government programs for youth were largely aimed at the
increasing problems of unemployed school leavers. With the
adoption of the socialist development model in 1961, most

economic and social schemes in Ghana were unified along the

32

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33

lines of this model.

Within the context of socialist development in Ghana
there were some opportunities offered to the youths through
participation in the various government programs. For one
thing, the programs were central to the ”Work and Happiness
Programme,” which served to bring the message of socialist
development to the level of the common man. Their member-
ship enabled many youths to participate in a full range of
development projects from agricultural and construction work
to factory production.

These organizations made use of new machinery and
implemented new techniques in farming. To this extent, the
youths gained experience which would be valuable if they
later returned to their villages. Youths who were sent to
the Nkrumah Leadership Training School at Okponglo were in
a situation whereby they could acquire new skills in trades
like carpentry, masonry, motor mechanics and electrical en-
gineering.

Through the Brigade and the Young Pioneers, some of
the young people of Ghana came into contact with nations
like Tunisia, Israel and the German Democratic Republic.

This happened through membership in the Brigade band, by

participation in training programs in such countries, by
exchange visits of youth delegations, and by working with

the technicians and others sent to assist in the administra-

tion of the Brigade and the Pioneers.

34

The public good was also addressed by the groups that
would provide relief to flood victims, and help stranded
motorists. They demonstrated to the chiefs and others what
was being done for the people through their projects in agri-
culture, industry and construction.

As the agricultural vanguard or agricultural army,
the Brigade participated in drives to bring more food to
the people. These drives endeavored to decrease Ghana's
dependence on imported foodstuffs, and thus attempted to
free the economy from alien control.

When the People's Militia was formed to defend the
Pan-African community from imperialistic oppressors, the
Brigade and the Young Pioneers enrolled large numbers of

their members en block into the Militia.

Beginnings and Aims of the Brigade and the Pioneers

Workers Brigade
Peter Hodge reported that in 1957, while Nkrumah was

attending a London conference, large—scale disturbances be-
gan in Accra. At the root of the problem was unemployment.
“Stimulated by the separatist tribal group of Ga, the Ga
Shifimo ere, gangs of unemployed young men roamed the
streets of Accra voicing strong resentment over the lack
of work, the current housing shortage and expressing some

disillusion on the honeymoon of independence."4 As a re-
sult of this incident, Hodge asserts that the Brigade was

initiated.

A
l

"-

'1

l'

I"

I“

35

Rioting was also mentioned by P. C. Lloyd in his re-
port on the beginnings of the Brigade. ”The Ghana Workers'
Brigade was founded in 1957 as a direct response to the grow-
ing unemployment among school leavers, which seemed to be
inciting outbreaks of violence, frequently directed to eth-
nic ends."5

Nkrumah had published a White Paper6 which contained
proposals for the establishment of the Workers Brigade, after
this outbreak in Accra. As stated in the document, the gov-
ernment hoped through this program to provide employment
for some of the unemployed, to train youth for their role
in national development, and to assist in rural development
projects. It was also a device intended to decrease the
rural-urban drift of the young7 and to influence the intro-
duction of modern farming techniques. Another basic element
of the program was the effort to instill into the youth a
reapect for the manual and agricultural occupations.8
Through their participation in the Brigade, the youth would
be able to develop a sense of national consciousness. It
is in this last sense, that the Brigade has been compared
to the U.S. Civilian Conservation Corps of the 1930's, since
they both were designed to curtail unemployment while empha-
sizing the patriotic value of manual labor.

Quite early in its existence the Brigade was influ-
enced by Israeli schemes for youths. In the fall of 1959,

a Ghanaian mission to Israel enabled members of the delegation

N:

pus

-\\

36

to observe the workings of the Nahal, an Israeli national
youth organization (see Israeli Nahal, Appendix, for more
details). On their return, the members recommended that
the Workers Brigade model itself after the Nahal group.
One member of the delegation, John Tettegah, became a Bri—
gade commander shortly afterwards and is reported to have
requested the technical advice and assistance of four Nahal
officers.9
From that point, Israeli officers were found in vari-
ous advisory capacities at least until 1963. Newspaper re-
ports document the fact that two Israeli officers of the
Nahal formation, Lt. Col. Oren and Major Levy, had spent
two years in service with the Brigade helping with the ad-
ministrative details and the implementation of new schemes.10
Although Specific mention of other Israeli experts
is not made, it appears that the Ghana-Israeli venture lasted
for some time beyond May, 1963, when a technical agreement
was ratified by the two nations. On the basis of this agree-
ment, Israel promised to provide technical assistance in
many fields, such as agricultural and vocational training,
which were central items in the workings of the Brigade.11
Furthermore, some officers and other experts in the
Brigade spent time training in Israel. One such group of
eighteen people from the Brigade and the State Farms spent
six months in Israel in a course dealing with various modern

farming procedures.12

37

It has been mentioned by both nations that the Workers
Brigade was never the exact model of the Nahal. Col. Ababio,
one of the first national organizers of the Brigade, said
that although the Israeli and Ghanaian schemes had as their
basic orientation, services in construction and agriculture,
the two were dissimilar in many reSpects.l3

Kreinin, who wrote the book, Israel and Africa, ar-
gued that the Brigade, in its first two years, lacked a final
objective which would have guided the Brigade and, instead,
dealt only with intermediary purposes, which he does not
explicitly clarify. (It should be remembered that in 1959,
Israel began its assistance to the Brigade.) He considered
the main content of the Brigade to be work and training in
modern agricultural techniques and campaigns against illit-
eracy, though vocational training was also provided in limited
areas.l4

Projects additionally included erection of buildings
for schools and small communities, irrigation and drainage
systems, small road construction and small water and rural
electricity supplies. Kreinin is the only researcher to
mention, as one of the proposed concerns of the Brigade,
the creation of cooperative settlements as the eventual goal
of the various agricultural camps.ls

Organization of the Brigade was to have as its founda-

tion, base camps in each region which would serve as places

for the initial one-to-three-month training period which

Q

‘.

38

all recruits underwent.16 The Brigade was to be headed by
a National Organizer, who had had some military training.17
This organizer was to be assisted by seven regional organ-
izers and an ancillary staff. For the first year, it was
estimated that one-half million pounds would be required
and these funds were to be provided by the government.18
Men and women could enlist for a period of two years
during which they would be given uniforms, living quarters
and a minimal allowance.19 Payment for the allowances was
to be in accordance with the type of work performed.
Compulsory enrollment was permitted since the Brigade
could direct the unemployed to join the Brigade and render
some useful service. However, volunteer enlistment was to
become the main source of enlistment. Though the coercive
potential of the proposals has been criticized, enrollment
seems to have been mainly voluntary. In 1958, the United
States Department of Labor noted that 2,300 volunteers had
been enrolled since the program began. What is important
is that 21,000 persons had volunteered but could not all

be accepted21

due to the limited resources of the Brigade.

The para-military structure of the Brigade was another
significant feature. Uniforms and rigid physical training
were part of the program from the start. Some of the chief
criticism of the Kom Commission, which was later established
to investigate the Brigade, was directed against the para-

military aspects of the Brigade.

.J. . .J. c u I ...I . d Em .C .. a , a u .5 s 3. «x.

39

Before dealing with the details of the Brigade's ac-
tivities, brief reference will be made to the strength of
the Brigade. In Table 3, the figures for the Brigade from
1958-1967 are listed. In 1958, the total strength was 1,772
and had risen to 11,320 in 1960, 16,000 by 1965, and 17,000
by 1967. If the figures are correct, the Brigade in 1960
had an enrollment which was roughly one-third of the total
unemployed, 35,262, of the 15-24 year olds, males and females,
in just the fifteen urban and municipal councils (Table 1).
Women represented less than ten per cent of the total enroll-

ment.

YounggPioneers

Three years after the Brigade was established, the
Young Pioneers was begun. Instituted in 1960,22 the Young
Pioneers was to be a para-military organization, a political
wing of the Convention People's Party. All literate youth
between the ages of four and twenty-five were eligible for
membership, and applicants would be placed under one of four
distinct age groups in order to ensure uniform psychological
development.23 In reality, the children were not simply
'eligible' but obliged to join and numerous youth organiza—
tions were handed over to the Young Pioneers. If it was

successful, the movement was to incorporate every child in

Ghana.
Directive No. 2 from Nkrumah to the youth of Ghana

said that it was “compulsory for all youth organizations . . .

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41

to participate fully in the leadership courses and other
training schemes organized by the Young Pioneers movement."24
Daily announcements listed the new entrants to the movement
and indicated which schools, institutes, and other organiza—
tions were heeding Nkrumah's message. For instance, the
Department of Social Welfare and Community Development at
Obuasi gave its boys'and girls' club there to the Young Pio-

25 Teachers and other adults

neers to be administered by them.
often donated their services as Pioneer instructors and were
publicly commended for doing so.

Within two years of its inception, the Pioneers was
said to have over 7,000 branches with over one million mem-
bers.26 Still, the Young Pioneers aimed at enrolling every
individual youth which meant a total figure exceeding two
million.27

From the beginning, the Young Pioneers proposed to
guide the youth in upholding the socialist ideals of Osagyefo,
the President.28 Children were to start to appreciate every-
thing Ghanaian in origin in order to counteract the days
when every local thing was deSpised.29 This purpose is re-
iterated by the Deputy Minister of Education, "For too long
there has been the complete divorcement of books from the
everyday lives of our youth. . . . Children were taught to
look down on anything African in origin as inferior. . . .

Young Pioneer programmes will form an integral part of the

curriculum of the schools and at the first danger of

42

divorcement from practical life would be completely elim-
inated."3O

And, ”. . . the mind, body and soul of the youth of
Ghana" were to be trained in civic reSponsibilities.3l Such
responsibilities included the presence of a contingent of
pioneers at almost every national function, beginning from
their first appearance in July, 1960, at the Accra Sports
Stadium. At the time, they took part in the Republic Day
Celebrations.32

The code of discipline of the Young Pioneers sounds
like the Boy Scout code: "Love of country; discipline and
obedience; honesty and morality; punctuality; reliability
and secrecy; comradeship and forebearance; love of work;
field craft; unaffectedness; self-control and striving to

faultlessness.“33

Although compared by Kreinin and others
to the American and British Boy Scout movements, the more
specific historical precedent is the Young Pioneers, founded
as an institution by Lenin and used in the Soviet Union,
China and elsewhere. The orientation of the Young Pioneers
has been toward a radical transformation of the society by
developing in its young people a total commitment to the
transformation, along socialist lines.

Some allege that the Young Pioneers were taught that

Nkrumah was their god, which probably was derived from state—

ments like the following:

43

Monitors: 'Nkrumah is immortal. We do not want to
say that he lives forever but that his inspiration, his
soul is eternal.‘

Pioneers: 'For the cause of Ghana and Africa, I am
prepared. I promise to live according to the ideal of
the redeemer Kwame Nkrumah, Founder of the State of Ghana
and creator of the African personality.'3

One of the chief critics of the Young Pioneers, who argued
that the group was atheistic, was the Anglican Bishop of
Accra, who was deported in 1962 for his statements on the
Pioneers. Official statements denied this allegation before
the coup which toppled Nkrumah. The government asSerted

that the goal of the Pioneers was ”to inculcate into the
youth the fear of God, service to the State and the spirit
of Nkrumahism."35

In this chapter a brief introduction to the Ghanaian

model of development, that is, socialism, was given. Details
on the historical emergence of the youth cohort and the be-

ginnings of the Brigade and Pioneers were also included.

Notes on Chapter 2

1Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana: 1946-1960 (New
York, 1964), p. 382.

21bid.

3Birmingham et al., The Economy of Ghana, Vol. 1
(Evanston, 1966), p. 451.

4Peter Hodge, ”The Ghana Workers Brigade: a Project
for Unemployed Youth," British Journal of Sociology, 15
(June, 1964), p. 114.

5P. C. Lloyd, Africa in Social Change (Baltimore,
1967).

6National Workers Brigade (Accra, 1957), p. 1.

7”New Brigade Camps for Sefwi Area," Ghanaian Times
(April 24, 1962), p. 6.

 

 

8The Ghana Repgrt (New York, 1964), p. 100.

9Mordechai Kreinin, Israel and Africa (New York, 1964),
p. 100.

10

“Two Israeli Brigade Officers Praised,” Ghanaian
Times (Jan. 2, 1962), p. 3.

llWest Afrigg.(June 29, 1963), No. 2404, p. 732.

12'18 Farmers Back from Israel,“ Ghanaian Times
(March 17, 1964), p. 9.

13"Two Israeli Brigade Officers Praised,” op. cit.
l4Kreinin, op. cit., p. 101.

lsIbid.

16

National Workers Bri ade, op. cit., p. 2.

17A. B. Williams-Baffoe, “Experience with Large-Scale
and Plantation Farms in Ghana," published in Joint Seminar
on Problems and Approaches in Planning Agricultural Develop-
ment, UNESCO, Addis Ababa, 1967.

44

45

18National Workers Brigade, op. cit.

19The Ghana Report, op. cit., p. 219.

20National Workers Brigade, op. cit., p. 1.

21U.S. Dept. of Labor Statistics, Summagy of the Labor
Situation in Ghana (Oct., 1958), pp. 6-7.

22"Young Pioneers Play Important Role,” Ghanaian Times
(Jan. 26, 1962), p. 6.

23”Ghana Young Pioneers is 2 Years Today,“ Ghanaian
Times (June 14, 1962), p. 5.

24Ghana Students in the U.S. Oppose Aid to Nkrupgp,
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the In—
ternal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws (of
the Committee of the Judiciary-U.S. Senate), 88th Congress,
2nd Session, August 29, 1963, and Jan. 11, 1964, Washington,
1964, p. 26.

25”Young Pioneer,“ Ghanaian Times (Feb. 20, 1962),
p. 6.

26Spio-Garbrah, "Why Youth Movements in Africa Are
Essential,“ Ghanaian Times (July 12, 1962), p. 5.

27"Pioneers Shape the Youth's Mind," Ghanaian Times
(Feb. 23, 1962), p. 7.

28”Train the Youth to be Useful-Secretary,“ Ghanaian
Times (Feb. 2, 1962), p. 9.

29"Young Pioneers Play Important Role,“ op. cit.

30"The Task of the Young Pioneers,” Ghanaian Times
(Feb. 16, 1962), p. 7.

31”Ghana Young Pioneers is 2 Years Today," op. cit.

32”Young Pioneers Play Important Role," op. cit.

33”Ghana Young Pioneers is 2 Years Today," op. cit.

34Jane Rouch, Ghana (Lousanne, France, 1964), pp.

70-71 0

35“Ghana Youth Alive to Religious Beliefs,“ Ghanaian
Times (Aug. 21, 1962), p. 9.

CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRIGADE AND THE YOUNG PIONEERS

After this review of the purposes for which the two
organizations were created, details of the implementation
of their plans will now be presented. Since the Brigade
alone dealt with agricultural and construction activities,
an examination of these activities will be undertaken first,
and will be followed by a look at similar activities which

the two were involved in.

Activities Particular to the Brigade
Aggicultural Wing

Three wings formed the central working division of
the Brigade: the agricultural wing, the construction wing
and the industrial wing. Each of these sections developed
differently and took a different path towards dissolution.
One after another, the three sections were subsumed under
larger government organizations until the Workers Brigade
was totally disbanded in 1971.

On the map, the Workers Brigade camps have been lo-
cated to provide a general picture of the placement of the
camps in Ghana. All of the names were derived from newspaper
articles and from the report of the Rom Commission. In 1966,

the Rom Commission reported that there were seventy camps,

46

 

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48

though only sixty-two have been found on the basis of the
sources used for this paper. (The Kom report did not list
all the names, but only referred Specifically to the ones
under investigation.)

Williams-Baffoe mentioned that the worsening unemploy-
ment problems in Ghana made it essential to locate the camps
in all regions so as to check the rural-urban drift and hence
lessen the numbers of unemployed in the cities. In other
cases, farms were set up in places where unemployment was
already serious in order to deal with the problem.1 Thus,
the farms were located so as to prevent the worsening of
unemployment problems and to deal with already existing
problems.

How relevant was the agricultural wing of the Brigade
to the total agricultural industry? What was the nature of
its innovativeness? How did it supplement the rest of the
agricultural industry?

In 1962, the agricultural wing became the main focus
of the Brigade. A. B. Williams-Baffoe, the Deputy Chief
Agricultural Extension Officer for the Ministry of Agricul-
ture in Ghana, dealt with this change of emphasis of the
Brigade in an evaluation in 1967. Nkrumah had rechristened
the Workers Brigade the Agricultural Army2 in 1962 and
speeches were made to the recruits urging them to go for-
ward and 'conquer' the problems of the forest and produce

more food and cheaper food for the people.3 Members were

49

encouraged to engage in similar 'battles' for the good of
the people of Ghana. It was reported that:

The year 1962 saw radical changes in the governmental
machinery for the administration of the country's agri—
cultural industry. The Ministry of Agriculture and the
various divisions within it were completely reorganized
and a new structure was introduced. Out of the old
General Agricultural Division, a State Farms Corporation
was established to take part in the actual agricultural
production. This was a departure from the old practice
of the establishment and operation of the 'experimental'
agricultural stations . . . instead of the Ministry and
its divisions providing only agricultural services and
advice to the farmer, the new structure imposed on them
the additional responsibility for the production of agri-
cultural produce. (These changes had one main aim, namely
to supplement agricultural production in the private
sector)with production from State agricultural establish-
ments.

This citation clarifies the transformation of the govern-
ment agricultural machinery from an advisory role to an active
role as producers of foodstuffs. Along with the other State
farming organizations, the Workers Brigade was to fulfill
these transformations under the rubric of the Seven Year
Development Plan of Ghana, 1963/64 to 1969/70.

Additional objectives, introduced at the time of the
1962 overhaul, were listed by Williams-Baffoe. These were,
”to produce foodstuffs for the people who live in areas where
foodstuffs were supposed to be in decline; to produce raw
materials to feed local factories; and to produce sufficient
food items for export purposes in order to earn the country
some foreign exchange.“5

Each individual farm was coordinated with the National

Brigade organization through one of its seven sector

50

headquarters. Planning of the operations was largely the
responsibility of each camp, which would submit its proposals
for approval to the National Headquarters. Sales of all
produce were handled by a Special marketing division in every
camp with most of the foodstuffs being sold at the Sector's
Food Marketing Depot.

For the agricultural wing, Israeli technical aid lasted
close to 1967, according to Williams-Baffoe. This aid con-
sisted of the Government of Israel supplying an ”agricultural-
ist, an operations officer, a civil engineer and a medical
officer.”6 These men received their housing and salary from
the Brigade. Occasionally, scholarships were provided for
competent brigaders for study in Israel.

How relevant was the Brigade in terms of the entire
agricultural industry? Of the prOposed total of government
expenditures in agriculture under the Seven Year Development
Plan, the agricultural wing of the brigade was to receive
L 4.5 million of the total L 67.5 million. The rest was
distributed in this manner: L 30,700,000 for service for
the private farmer, L 10,800,000 to the State Farms,

L 11,750,000 to the fisheries development, and L 2,600,000

to forestry.7 Thus appropriations for the agricultural wing
amounted to about seven per cent of the total agricultural
expenditures. In terms of budget allocations, the wing re-
ceived about one-half of what the State Farms did. The State

Farms Corporation and the Brigade were both considered the

51

leading instruments for modernization of farming in the Gov-
ernment plans for the Seven Year Development Plan.

With its allocation, the Brigade managed 280,877 acres
compared to 345,080 managed by the State Farms Corporation
in 1965. Of the Brigade's total acreage, roughly seven per
cent was planted to crops. These acres planted to crops rep-
resented only .24 per cent of all the planted areas in Ghana.
The largest holders of acreage planted to crops were the
peasant farms whose acreage of 7,937,305 was 98.58 per cent
of all planted areas (see Table 4). Williams-Baffoe states
that the acreage in use rose steadily to 36,713 in 1967, of
which 34,610 was to be cultivated and 3,103 was to be for
plantations.8 Hewever, in 1968, due to re-organization, the
Workers Brigade agricultural wing cultivated only 16,000
acres.9 As regards total product, the smallholders or
peasants are by far the most important,10 as can be seen
on the basis of these figures. Thus, the Brigade in terms
of total acreage and of acres planted to crops represented
a very minor portion of the total agricultural industry.
Reliable figures on the actual production, resulting from
the acres planted to crops, and compared with total agri-
cultural production have not been found. These data on
actual production figures from the Brigade would be proper
indicators for judging the success of the Brigade farm pro-
duction.

Despite the small size of the Brigade's holdings and

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actual use of land compared with the entire agricultural
industry, the agricultural wing and the State Farms were
regarded in the Seven Year Development Plan as the chief
instruments for initiating large-scale farming. While indi-
vidual farmers were slow to adopt innovations, the farms

of the agricultural wing and the State Farms Corporation
would use new advances in agricultural science,11 in order
to achieve rapid, more effective results. As the term was
used after 1962, the Workers Brigade implied a workers move—
ment serving as the main agricultural vanguard.12

Agricultural camps of the Brigade produced such items
as yams, cassava, plantain and groundnuts. The listings
in Table 5 indicate where these camps were located and what
they produced.

One of the more famous of the camps was the one at
Somanya. Comments by Kreinin regarding the Somanya camp,
north of Accra in the Northern Region, concluded that this
was the most impressive of all the Brigade camps. He found
that over 1,000 acres had been cultivated with modern agri-
cultural equipment and techniques. Future plans for the
camp included participation in the Volta Dam project, con-
struction of housing for women and possibly the initiation

of several cooperative villages.20

Net profits from the camp, from its establishment
until 1962, were given as L G 10,192 by the Deputy Minister

of Defense, Mr. W. K. Oduhene. Total sales from the camp

54

 

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m manna

 

3ft]

55

21 However, in 1967,

before expenses amounted to LG 35,560.
a writer reported that the camp had been steadily deteriorat—
ing until 1965, when it was deserted. As one of the few
successful camps, the Somanya center had once been an attrac-
tion to foreigners and diplomats. Under new leadership in
1967, the farm had once again been put into operation. Prod-
ucts to be grown included maize, 700 acres; groundnuts, 65
acres; rice, 30 acres; tobacco, 30 acres; yams, 5 acres;
cassava, 25 acres; and vegetables, 20 acres. Competitions
were organized among the various camps and sectors,22 to
create more vigorous efforts at production, and Somanya
participated in the forefront.

Only one item was found referring to the Brigade's
efforts in animal husbandry. This was a report on the Nungua
Poultry Farm production for 1964. Profit for that year was
nearly 14 per cent.23 (This information was published in
1967.)

Industries were supplied with raw materials by some
of the Brigade farms. For instance, the Damongo Brigade

supplied tobacco for the tobacco industries.24

The camps

at Attebubu, Apam, Essiam and Asin Bereku provided ground-
nuts for the oil factories in their regions. For Ghana,

the furnishing of raw materials for factories was relatively
new. Through such an endeavor, the country would begin to

build the vitally needed link between certain agricultural

products and their manufacture. Success in forging such a

56

link would mean that Ghana would no longer be only a supplier
of raw materials to other countries, but would be capable
of developing her own industrial sector with the materials.

As part of the campaign of 1962 to improve the agri-
cultural sector, Brigade officials promised to begin growing
oil palms, cashew, rubber and nutmeg in addition to maize,
yam and cassava, which were already being grown. To develop
the camps in areas of diversification, LG 50,000 was set aside
by the government.30 Such diversification would enable Ghana
to develop a more stable economy, dependent upon a number
of crops rather than only one crop, as had previously been
the case.

Repeated efforts were made to provide cheaper sources
of food for the people by locating markets in more accessible
areas and by increasing the amount of food production. The
intensity of the campaign to produce more foodstuffs was
evident as late as 1947 from the warning issued by the last
National Organizer of the Brigade, J. E. de Graft Hayford.
Brigade units were to be shut down if they failed to produce

35

sufficient foodstuffs. Those brigaders found to be hard-

working were to be transferred to more profitable farms if

their camps were closed down.36
During the period from 1962 until 1967, the efforts

in food production were accompanied by the dispersion of

market centers throughout Ghana. Bimbilla, Somanya, Kanda

and other brigade camps had established marketing depots to

were

tub-.‘q
55.2.4

05 A.
NV

I..-

57

service neighboring areas previously lacking such facilities.
Where available, these depots furnished many people with food-
stuffs which they would normally have had to travel miles

to obtain.

In 1965, national efforts were made to assure closer
coordination among the nation's chief production units, the
Agricultural Wing of the Brigade, the United Ghana Farmers
Cooperatives Council, the State Farms Corporation, and the
Young Farmers League. An agricultural council was to be set
up so that representatives from each council would be able
to meet periodically and seek solutions to common problems.37
The Brigade reduced its nine regional units to five. Zonal
commands were: the Northern and Upper Regions (Zone A),
Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo Regions (Zone B), Central and Western
Regions (Zone C), Eastern and Volta Regions (Zone D) and
Greater Accra (Zone E). This new administrative organiza—
tion was expected to increase efficiency and hence produc-
tivity.38

Previous to the investigation of the Rom Commission,
it was alleged that the Brigade's efforts were in a large
measure responsible for Ghana's decreased dependence upon
imported foodstuffs. In fact, one source held that the
Brigade's harvests had prevented famine in the country and

39 It is

had increased the living standard of the people.
unlikely that this assertion is true. First of all, the

other production units, such as the State Farms Corporation

(.7
O' 9‘
r'

nqn‘

BUM.

5.31011

58

would also have been involved in bringing more food to the
people, if indeed this was the case that famine had been
prevented.

On the other hand, later reports indicated that most
of the Brigade projects had totally failed. Even though the
Brigade's total holdings in planted areas was small in pro-
portion to total planted areas in Ghana, its use of the land
could have been productive enough to produce significant
amounts of produce if modern techniques and new machinery
were effectively introduced into the camps. However, J. A.
Dadson confirms that neither the modern knowledge nor the
techniques and machinery were fully implemented.

If we go to the Workers Brigade camp at Kanda we will
see over 100 trucks abandoned; . . . 3 caterpillars dis-
mantled and 6 tractors broken down. Worst of all, 50
Jeep petrol engines are left unused and abandoned and
the explanation given is that their petrol consumption
is too high. Fifty Diesel Jeeps have been bought to
replace these. So, the 50 Jeeps with petrol engines
have been abandoned6 although they are still in good
running condition.4

The Brigade became renowned for its practice of leaving new
machinery in disuse for long periods. It is further reported
that, “in spite of the considerably high capital inputs per
labor, the use of labor technology on the state and the

41 Thus,

Brigade farms was no less than on the cooperative.”
the Brigade did not make full use of the technology or the
machinery it was given.

In an effort to assist farmers who needed additional

labor for their farms, the Brigade introduced a new program

if. lfiél

.
T'r‘!!!‘
O‘DU“:'

25052

siOn 1
3cm;
Cf ta

‘d-tu,

59

in 1966, which was a valuable contribution to the farmers.
Through the Brigade, the farmers were able, under this plan,
to obtain workers for help in harvesting their crops. This
applied specifically to the cocoa farmers, who had to request
workers from the Brigade through the Brigade sector super-
visors and were then to pay the laborers 24 pesewas a day

for each brigader employed by them. During their time as-
sisting the farmers, the brigaders were most likely receiv-
ing a supplementary payment by the Brigade, since the amount
the farmers gave was quite minimal. If the brigaders lived
far away from the area, the farmer would be required to pro-
vide some accommodations and food for the brigaders.42 The
mobile labor force available for the farmers from the Brigade
represented one of the unique accomplishments of the Brigade
and was an acknowledged success even after the coup ousting
Nkrumah.

In 1966 after Nkrumah was overthrown, the Rom Commis-
sion was set up to investigate the Brigade. Although the
Commission's findings will be given in detail later, some
of the recommendations, which apply to the Brigade's Agri-
cultural Wing, will be mentioned here.

Upon review of the Rom Commission's recommendations,
the Government removed the Brigade from the Ministry of De-
fense and placed it under the Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare, though it still retained some of its previous func-

tions and the name, Workers Brigade. From this point on,

Brigad
held a
the BC
Smut
zeta:
Rate:
the C;
Hem 1

'?«.S I

' I
‘ ‘ ‘51
‘IM

A,‘h

bywe“

60

the Brigade Board was to consist of the National Organizer
and different representative departments, which included the
Ministry of Agriculture and the Public Works Department.
(See Administrative Sections, Appendix.) This, then, was
the first time that the Ministry of Agriculture had had an
administrative role in the Brigade.

This Brigade Board had been suspended just after the
Brigade began. Since the Chairman of the Board was also to
hold a position on the Finance Committee, the suspension of
the Board meant, in effect, the suSpension of the Finance
Committee. Thus, it can be seen how it was possible that
certain camps, which were unprofitable for years, were re-
peatedly voted funds for their upkeep. After the report of
the Commission was published, approximately 6,000 brigaders
were laid off due to the unproductive nature of their camps.
This move affected about ten out of the seventy camps.43

It is significant to note that the profitability of
the farms was not part of the initial proposal for the Workers
Brigade. Beginning in 1962, emphasis began to shift towards
making the agricultural wing operate more profitably on a
commercial basis. Original objectives were chiefly to bring
the young unemployed school leavers under some kind of con-
trol, to check the rural-urban drift of the young and to
promote national consciousness in these young people. Even

though each of these aims was still central to the Brigade,

the inability of the Government to fully support the Brigade's

61

labor intensive schemes reversed the primary concerns from
predominantly social considerations to economic ones.

Explicit terms on the actual implementation of a

largely commercial slant were issued by the Government,
which stated that,

The individual farm units within the agricultural
wing will be operated on the same organizational prin-
ciples as those under the State Farms Corporation. Each
farm will be managed separately by its commandant who
will be a trained agriculturalist. Government invest-
ment in the farms will be regarded as a medium-term loan
with interest and profit payable over an agreed period.
Government will make no more provision in the general
recurrent budget for the wages and other operating
expenses of these farms, but will be prepared to con-
sider other forms of financial assistance, for example,
guarantees, or loans for increased working capital.

All current cost will be met out of the revenues
of the farms themselves and such commercial bank credit
as they can raise. Each farm will prepare an annual
development and production programme. . . . 4

It appears that the Government never fully implemented this
refusal to supply funds for maintenance since the Brigade
was carrying numerous farms which were not making a profit
even after this policy statement was issued in 1963. Still,
it was evident that the Government was initiating a series
of measures designed to eliminate unprofitable farms. Em-
phasis had shifted from the concern with school leavers and
rural development to economic viability.

Under the guidance of the last national organizer,

de Graft Hayford, it appears that the agricultural wing for

the first time employed sales promoters, which were charged
with the duty of locating where particular products were

most in demand. Farm produce from the wing had increased

62

during his term of office, 30 per cent over previous periods.
De Graft Hayford pointed out that in the past much of the
produce had rotted on the farms because there was no proper
arrangement for the marketing of the Brigade's produce.45
Hence, he attributes the increase of 30 per cent chiefly
to improved marketing techniques. Factories were supplied
with the Brigade's produce such as jute, kinaf, sugar cane,
copra, coconut and pineapples.46

Over the period from 1969 until 1971 the Brigade's
separate wings each followed different courses which eventu—
ally led to their being dissolved individually. The agri-
cultural wing was the final wing to be disbanded. As an-
nounced on April 30, 1971, the agricultural wing and hence
the Workers Brigade was taken over by a new set-up known as
the Food Production Corporation. Policies of the new cor-
poration would be determined by the re-organization commit-
tee, headed by the Minister of Agriculture, Dr. K. Safo-Adu.
Personnel of the Brigade were to be re-trained and assigned
to new duties.47 The Food Production Corporation also intro-
duced an incentive bonus scheme to encourage workers to work
longer hours.48 Thus, the Brigade agricultural section was
removed from government hands and placed under a more pri-
vate institution.

Conclusions reached by A. B. Williams-Baffoe, the
Deputy Chief Extension Officer with the Ministry of Agri-

culture, indicated directions the Brigade might have taken

63

to increase its efficiency. First of all, any site for an
agricultural project should be selected on the basis of care-
ful scrutiny of the weather and other relevant information.
Staff should be reduced to the lowest number that could ef-
.fectively administer the program and only the most qualified
persons should be chosen as managers of the unit farms.

Since the land may be used over a long period of time, steps
Should be taken to acquire the necessary titles to the land.

Equipment such as tractors and other machinery should
be standardized and accompanied by at least ten per cent
spare parts for each piece. Each farm would also find it
essential to ensure itself of the availability of local re—
pairmen or a local maintenance crew in case of break-downs.
To prevent the maintenance section from becoming a liability,
it should be run on a strictly commercial basis.

The competence of planners and managerial staff of
each unit farm could be judged by the manner in which these
men independently executed their own programs. So it was
urged that each unit farm should be largely independent in
planning its schedule, implementing that plan and finally

marketing its produce.49

Construction Wing

Data on the construction wing are sparse. Under this
section of the Brigade, the scope of activities encompassed
the construction of small roads, the erection of houses,

sewage work, irrigation schemes and rural electricity supplies.

64

Living accommodations were constructed for the Brigade
members by the construction division as self-help projects.so
Estate houses, worth about LG 4,000 were being built by the
construction section of the Kwadaso Brigade in Kumasi in
1962. Upwards of 96 families were to be accommodated there.
Work was supervised by the Ghana Housing Corporation.51
Mr. James Owusu, chairman of the Kumasi Municipal
Council, announced that the two Legion villages near Kumasi
were going to be developed using manpower from the Brigade.52
People in the villages were sure to remember the Brigade
more favorably, having met members of the Brigade working
in their home areas.
Members of the Tamale Field Unit carried out jobs,
that would normally have been given on contract, on reduced
rates. One such project was the laying of slabs to cover

drains in Tamale.53

It should be noted that when the Brigade
submitted estimates, they only included costs for materials.
Labor costs were paid out of the Brigade funds.

Brigaders were involved to some extent with the Volta
River project. Limited largely to the construction of re-
settlement villages, the Brigade built its first resettle-

ment village at Nkwakubio near Akasombo.S4

Projects in
progress in 1963 included the construction of 377 houses
at Kiara in the Volta region for those displaced by the

flooding of the Volta Lake.55

The Brigade also assisted victims who lost their homes

65

from heavy rainfall. One hundred and two brigaders from
five Central Region camps were dispatched to construct tem-
porary housing for some 2,000 people, in the Benstir area
of the Cape Coast, who had lost their homes.56

Workers built a new township at Danyigba and erected
there 187 houses; reconstructed a former Brigade camp at
Winneba into a training depot for the Ghana Police; con-
structed an airfield at Afienya for the Ghana Gliding School;
and re—decorated the premises of the Institute of Education.57
Such efforts as these put the Brigade in favor more with
the officials of Ghana than the common man.

Government committees often hired the Brigade for
work in their regions. Among the contracts won by the Bri-
gade in 1968 were the construction of feeder roads in the
Central Region, awarded by the Central Regional Committee
of Administration. Explicit in the awarding of the contract
was the determination to make the Brigade more economically
viable. The awarding of the contract to the Brigade was
also designed to eliminate some of the unscrupulous con-
tractors. In that same year, the Brigade undertook the
construction of the Nungua Housing Project, from which an

income of NC 2,000,000 was expected.58

Mention of the hiring of a quantity surveyor59 to
advise the national organizer on construction details in
April, 1968, suggests that this one was the first professional

surveyor ever engaged by the Brigade, other than the Israeli

66

personnel. References to the Brigade mobile survey team

in 196460

do not clarify whether the team members were trained
within the Brigade, though this was probably the case.

The construction section was turned over to the Min-
istry of Social and Rural Development in December, 1969.
This move was part of a major attempt by the Government to
streamline the functions and operations of the Ministries.
After this, only minimal relations were maintained with the
Ministry of Defense, the ministry originally responsible
for the entire Brigade. Objectives under the Ministry of
Social and Rural Development were not very different from
those aimed at by the construction wing of the Brigade:
”community and rural water developments, rural industries,
feeder roads, construction, flood relief work and youth work
in the country.61

Before the construction wing was taken over by the
Ministry of Social and Rural Development, the Rom Commission
had advised that the Brigade's construction wing should place
more emphasis on small-scale rural development projects such
as boring of wells, building of health centers and construc-
tion of public utilities, such as schools and markets. It
was thought inadvisable for the Brigade to attempt to handle
such.1arge constructional activities as the Volta River

Authority settlement townships.62

an:

. .

67

Similar Activities of the Brigade and the Young Pioneers
Industrial Section
Vocational training, factory work and various crafts
were part of the activities undertaken by the Industrial
Wing of the Brigade.
Basic enterprises handled in this wing were: ”Animal
husbandry, kente, and chair weaving, ceramics, hoe repairing,

63 Essiam Workers Bri-

tailoring and vehicle body building.“
gade was one of the places where workshops were set up for
basketry and other enterprises.64

The actual intent of the Brigade regarding vocational
training is hard to discover. One source reported that,
"The Workers Brigade will not produce highly skilled tech-
nicians."65 Persons with exceptional ability are sent to
technical institutes for some advanced type of training.
Upon leaving the Brigade, ex-members will be able to provide
mostly low-level skills. Rather than a specific skill, the
Brigader should emerge from his experience more civic-minded
and willing to continue contributing to the nation's develop-
ment.66 Still another source agrees with the above senti-
ments,stating that the Brigade would not include commercial
subjects in its training program.67

However, evidence indicates that the program was at
times able to provide some training that enabled men to ac-
quire skilled jobs upon their termination of two years' serv—

ice with the Brigade. Some members were trained as storekeepers.68

68

Training was given in the operation of tractors, heavy ma-

69 Various trades were

chinery, and automobile engineering.
taught such as ”tailoring, fitting, carpentry, welding, Spray-
ing, vehicle and electrical maintenance.70 Products made
by the brigaders and displayed in showrooms included mat-

71 Here,

tresses, pillows, handbags, sandals and furniture.
the Brigade can be seen as the training ground for some types
of technical skills.

As part of the Workers Brigade program, the Kwame
Nkrumah Leadership Training School was established at Okponglo
in 1961. Run as a polytechnic institute, the school offered
instruction in motor mechanics, automobile engineering, dress-

72

making, accounting and typing. Additional offerings were

73 One of the in-

catering, sewing, masonry and carpentry.

structresses at the Institute was Miss Felicia S. Brenya,

who taught a course in electrical engineering,74 and was

pictured with a group of brigaders she was teaching in 1962.
From its inception in 1963 until June, 1965, 668 stu-

dents were graduated. Mr. A. D. Acquah, the commandant of

the school, said that courses lasted from six months to one

year. He explained that the introduction of bookkeeping

and accounting into the curriculum resulted from the Brigade's

own need for more accounts clerks. According to Mr. Acquah,

tractor drivers were employed, after their service in the

Brigade, with the United Ghana Farmers Council Cooperatives,

the Young Farmers League and the State Farms Corporation.

69

Enrollment in 1965 included 582 students of whom 222 were
women.75

Women trained at the school were employed by the State
Transport Corp. and other departments of the Government.
However, the majority of the women who studied dress-making
were employed at the mattress factory at Nungua or the Bri—
gade's Garment Factory in Accra.

Young Pioneer members were trained at the Pioneer '
Youth Institute in Accra, opened in 1962. It was hoped that
this institution would provide a potential source of skilled
manpower and would solve Ghana's “greatest social setback

76

of unemployment,“ by training school leavers in various

trades.77

“Since its inception, the institute has been train-
ing over 500 school leavers who, for various reasons, could
not only not continue in any higher institution of learning
but are also unemployed. . . . But we know that there are
hundreds more in the Accra Region who roam the streets with

no aim. . . . At the root of the problem, unemployment serves

78

as the principal basis of all social evils.” Thus, in its

initial stages, the institute was to be limited only to those
“unemployed school leavers who are resident in the Accra
Region."79

Courses were taught in the areas of agriculture, build-
ing, trades, communications, home economics, child care,

80

typing and office management, and radio repair.81 Courses

were tentatively fixed at six months in the classroom and

70

three months' practical training. Tuition was free. At
the start there were over 800 boys and girls in training
at the Institute.82
Mr. Shardow, national organizer of the Young Pioneers
movement, inaugurated a L 25,000 auto-metal workshop in July,
1965, as an addition to the institute in Accra. Equipment
was donated by the German Democratic Republic. This particu-
lar workshop was being run jointly by the Young Pioneers
and a nine-man team of German Democratic Republic technical
instructors. At this time, Mr. Shardow said that the insti-
tute was a full time technical training school where future
engineers and technologists were being prepared. He added
that more than 90 per cent of the students at the institute
were signed up for gainful employment throughout the country
even before they completed their studies.83
Those trained at the institute were also to serve
as the nucleus of "Pioneer Cities,“ which would be centers
for sciences, technology, agriculture and the fine arts. 4
The ”Pioneer Cities” were to be self-contained communities,
located at vantage points throughout the country.84 Unfor-
tunately, no mention was made of these cities after this
and it appears that none were ever started.
A second institute of the Young Pioneers, Kwame
Nkrumah Institute of Pioneering Youth, was opened at Kumasi,
in 1965. This institute offered 18-month courses in carpentry

and joinery. Twenty students and eight instructors from

an»

F5

.nm

‘1

71

the German Democratic Republic were sent there to help with

85 Both of

the administration of the institute's affairs.
the Young Pioneer Institutes had intensive ideological train-
ing on socialism as part of their activities.
Outside of the two institutes, the Young Pioneers
were taught boat construction, with the aims of arousing
an interest in the youths in seafaring and of preparing them
to man Ghana's naval forces in the future.86 It was upon
receiving advice from Israel that seamanship should be intro-
duced that the course was established.87
Brief mention was made of a group of Young Pioneers
from Okwambo in Akwapim who visited the Party press in Accra
and toured development projects and other places of interest
in Accra. Later, they went to Oksombo to view the last phases

of the hydro-electric projects there.88

The tours, such as
these, and the skills,such as boat construction, served to
cultivate the Young Pioneers towards the expected ideals

as much as the more formal ideological instruction.

In addition to the training programs offered in the
Brigade and the Pioneers, the Brigade operated several fac-
tories.

Factories, run by the Brigade, produced only a lim-
ited selection of products. At Kwadaso Female camp in Kumasi,
the camp made a monthly income of LG 25 - LG 35 from a small

89

tailoring and sewing industry. In 1964, the Brigade dis-

closed plans to establish a L 60,000 mattress factory at

72

Tema, which would produce about 60 mattresses a day and em-
ploy a considerable number of men and women. A new laundry
worth L 22,000 was to be attached to the Brigade Garment
Factory in Accra.90

The Brigade Garment Factory in Accra was the largest
industry operated by the Brigade. Construction of the fac-
tory began in 1962, and full operations were started in 1963.
The engineer from the Brigade who designed the factory was
Major 2. Levanon. Levanon said that machinery had been or-
dered from the German Democratic Republic and five Ghanaians
had been trained there to operate the machinery. Modern
amenities, such as a stand-by generator, were to be provided
in the factory.91

Col. Ababio, who at the time was the National Organizer
for the Brigade, said that the factory would sew uniforms
for the Army, Police, Workers Brigade and Young Pioneers.
Employed in the LG 85,000 garment factory would be 150
brigaders, of whom 100 would be skilled and the remainder
unskilled. German engineers would be installing the equip-
ment when it had arrived. A five-month training course in
Germany had been completed by a team of five men and one
woman from Ghana, who were to take charge of running the

92 The machines were sent from the German Demo-

93

machines.
cratic Republic in the latter part of 1962.
Possibilities were envisioned of offering cheap cloth-

ing, manufactured by the factory, to the people of Northern

73

Ghana.94 There is no evidence that these possibilities were

realized. If they had been the people would have associated
another type of benefit with the government through the Work-
ers Brigade.

In May of 1963, equipped with 120 sewing machines,
the Brigade tailors were working on 14,000 bush shirts for
the Ghana Police Services and 2,500 uniforms for the Geolog-
ical Survey. Approximately 200 people were said to be em-

ployed at that time.95

From these examples, it can be seen
that the chief customers of the factories' garments were
the government departments in Ghana.

Initially, many of the tailors and seamstresses who
were employed at the Garment Factory were taken from other
Brigade jobs and trained at the factory. As more members.
were needed, tailors and seamstresses, trained at the Brigade

95 It had been

School of Trade at Okponglo, were employed.
boasted that the factory was the “best equipped garment fac-
tory in Africa. The cutting machine can cut about 250 pieces
of material in five minutes and the output is about 500 pairs
of men's trousers in a day."97

Some of the Brigade's products may have been exported.
The Garment Factory officials signed an agreement to export
NC 1,000,000 worth of locally manufactured shirts to an

98 If this agreement

American company in January, 1968.
was carried out, the Brigade would have begun to produce

some of the traditional Ghanaian clothes for export.

74

Unfortunately, reports in 1967 revealed that the
Brigade Garment Factory lost NC 261,904 in its first fifteen
months of operations. At fault was the inefficient manage-
ment of Mr. Charles Peterson, the then chief administrator
of the organization.99

Again, the Kom Commission found significant failings.
From 1/1/64 until 3/31/65 the factory showed a loss of
LG 26,000. Factors contributing to the loss were: i) raw
materials received by the storekeeper were not covered by
invoices or any other documents, ii) materials were issued
to the factory without any requisitions, iii) surplus mate-
rials were not returned to the store when contracts were
completed, iv) lack of a system of costing jobs, and v)

100 However,

absence of records on cash paid and received.
it was not unusual for state enterprises to lose money.
When they did they were subsidized by the government for

their losses.

Wider Purpgses

Certain of the Brigade activities could not be placed
under its formal, or stated purposes. There were ”wider
purposes,“ which were strategic to the workings of the
Brigade, but which were, strictly Speaking, steps beyond
the declared aims of the organization. The categories con-
sidered in this section may overlap in parts, but this di-

vision appeared to be helpful in distinguishing the various

broad patterns of activities.

75

Encourage the Wider Community to Accept Innovations.
Government papers, like the Ghanaian Times and the Qgily
Graphic repeatedly mentioned the Brigade and the Young Pio-
neers and their activities. A thorough investigation of
the Ghanaian Times from 1957 until 1971 revealed that the
frequency of articles referring to the Brigade and the Young
Pioneers and the content of the articles was designed to
achieve the fullest possible impact on the public. Articles
appeared at least once a week and, at times, more often,
from 1957 until 1964. The new change in government on
February 24, 1966, when Nkrumah was ousted by a military
coup, led to an expected decrease in the number of articles
on the Brigade and the Young Pioneers, except during the
period of the Rom Commission. Contents of these articles
included items on sports activities, cultural shows, marches
and blood donations. Still, while Nkrumah was in office,
the numerous newspaper accounts of the Brigade activities
were rather obvious attempts to encourage the people outside
the Brigade to accept the Brigade and thus cooperate with
its innovative efforts.

In addition to this technique, the brigaders often
marched throughout the cities in formation to demonstrate
their support for the Government, to denounce so-called
'enemies' of the State or to greet foreign statesmen. For
instance, a march by brigaders through Accra in May of 1967

was aimed specifically at “deploring the recent insurrection

76

of a small section of the Ghanaian Army, which resulted in
the death of Lt. General E. K. Kotoka, General Officer Com-
manding the Ghana Armed Forces."101 Such public diSplays
by the Brigade informed the people of Ghana of its support
of the government and encouraged public sentiment along the
same lines. Outsiders or foreigners would also witness such
support for the government.

Public ceremonies were often attended and demonstra-
tions given by the Young Pioneers. Over 3,000 pioneers
marched as part of Positive Action Day observances in Accra

102

in 1962. When Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, Mikoyan,

visited Ghana, he witnessed a physical and cultural display
by the Workers Brigade and the Young Pioneers in his honor.103
On the first anniversary of the Pioneers, ceremonies were
held publicly throughout the country. At Tamale, the Pio-

neers sang the "Party solidarity songs."104

This again shows
the close connection between the Party and the Pioneers.

Pioneer groups often staged various cultural cere-
monies, which were designed to show respect for the Ghanaian
culture. People witnessing these diSplays would have been
grateful for the acknowledgment of the worth of traditional
culture, while participants should have learned about the
culture of Ghana, with which they might not have been well
acquainted.

Campaigns were started by the movement to explain

the Young Pioneers' aims and ambitions to parents and others.

77

Films of the Young Pioneers were taken by technicians from
the German Democratic Republic and were given to Ghana, for

05

use and distribution throughout the country.1 Chiefs were

told of the objectives and were often requested to perform

some minor service for the Pioneers like making their drums

06

available1 to the Pioneers or teaching youngsters about

traditional culture. Some did indeed work as instructors,
on a volunteer basis for the Pioneers.107 Properly imple-
mented, this practice would create a new sense of solidarity
between the chiefs and the children, while at the same time
increasing the chiefs' prestige through their performance
of a valuable service to the Pioneers.

People were asked to observe the brigaders in other
civic-minded projects. In Sekondi, members of the Brigade
and the Young Pioneers assisted in that city's operation

108 Relief work following floods109 be-

clean-up campaign.
came another service of the Brigade. Heavy flooding in
Accra was met by an emergency relief squad of 600 brigaders.
Teams of these men had rescued hundreds of stranded pedes-

110 Pitching in to help the people

trians and motorists.
does illustrate for the people that the members of the Bri-
gade and Pioneers were concerned about the people of Ghana
and were not too proud to dirty their hands in manual labor.
Few things can match the beneficial effects of personal con-

tact such as the two groups participated in.

Pioneers helped the people of Jinijini to build a

four-c
car:th
Sunyan
the di
coast:

with 1

pital:
In K0;
paign
in th.

try, l

were

78

four-classroom block for a school during a voluntary work
canpthere.lll Over 100 members of the Young Pioneers in
Sunyani were to take part in self-help projects throughout
the districts of their region, Brong-Ahafo. Plans were to
construct a vocational training center at Attebubu and work
with street drains in Dormaa-Ahenkro.112
Other times, the Young Pioneers spent time at hos—
pitals, cleaning windows, sweeping and watering flowers.113
In Koforidua, and other places, they undertook clean-up cam-

114 Additional projects included helping the SiCk

paigns.
in the hospitals, clearing slums in some parts of the coun-
try, cleaning projects at Government Departments and State
Corporations, and harvesting of crops on State Farms in the
summer.115 Care for the unfortunate as in the hOSpitals

or the slums would carry a message, to those receiving the
help, of true consideration for the people by the young
people in the Pioneers. The services to the various govern-
ment places would have endeared the more elite portions of
the society.

A minor activity of the Brigade, that is, brigaders
donating blood, might have served three different aims.
Newspaper reports on brigader blood donations demonstrated
that the brigaders performed a service to the community.

If donating blood was a relatively new practice, then the

116

mention of people earning certificates for this action

taught the people the value of such a contribution. Finally,

79

the individual acknowledgment of particular brigaders117

lent an air of competitiveness by encouraging one brigade
camp to outdo another, as well as giving prestige to the
individuals.

One last item which has been loosely placed in this
area of obtaining community acceptance of innovations involves
the transfer of lands to the Brigade by the chiefs. Appar-
ently chiefs were asked to donate land, but were not openly
coerced. (Some might have been misled into giving the land
or might have been forced.) From what Kreinin reported,
”Land for the camps was provided free by tribal chiefs who
are interested in having a camp nearby, for they appreciate
the demonstrative impact as well as the income it yields

to the villages."118

(Since land was communally owned, the
chief did not usually have the right to sell the land with-
out the consent of the rest of his people. What often hap-
pened is that the land was 'loaned' to a person for tempOrary
use only.) This income refers to the number of people from
the area who were taken in as Brigade members.

Chiefs who gave land to the Brigade were often thanked
at public ceremonies or commanded through press announcements.
One article reported that Abakrampa Workers Brigade received
two and one-half square miles from the chiefs and elders

of Abura-Dunkwa.119

Another time, congratulations were
extended by Mr.,Acquah, a District Commissioner from the

Cape Coast, to five chiefs who gave land for the establishment

80

of a Brigade camp. This gift amounted to 1,280 acres of
land near the Cape Coast.120
Furthermore, efforts were made to include the chiefs
and other people to certain Brigade functions. At times,
the chiefs were invited to attend the opening ceremonies
of the Brigade camps, as was the case at the Sekyedomase
Brigade camp opening.121 Courtesy calls were paid to vari-
ous chiefs, one example being the visit paid by Mr. M. A. K.
Owusu, commander of the Sefwi, Denkyira and Aowin areas,

122 One

to the chief of Asanwinso, Nana Ellour Kwaben.
omanhene, Nene Lanima Okpata, along with the traditional
councillors visited the mechanized camp at Somanya. Later
he addressed the female section of the Brigade and stated
that it would be valuable if the Government could arrange
many more tours of the Brigade farm, so that chiefs, farmers
and institutional representatives could witness the scien-

123 More will

tific methods of farming being employed there.
be said on the transfer of land in the section on the Rom
Commission.

These instances, where chiefs were publicly thanked,
illustrated one of the mechanisms whereby the transfer of
land was facilitated. If the chiefs felt that they would
receive both prestige and financial benefits for their area,
they would be more willing to give land to the Brigade.

Invitations to Brigade ceremonies and courtesy calls were,

similarly, vehicles for winning favor with the chiefs, who

were,
Since
were
elde;

Iv fa
H
I8...

and

Pfe\

81

were, in most cases, still the chief guardians of the land.
Since such actions indicated respect for the chiefs, they
were appropriate for securing the favor of the chiefs and
elders, and hence their people. On the other hand, if people
were forced to relinquish portions of their land, these gentle
persuaders from the Brigade made the coercion seem a bit more
acceptable. It was also expected that after familiarizing
the chiefs with the activities of the Brigade, they would
begin to implement certain innovations in their farming and,
thus, they would encourage many people in their areas to
employ more modern equipment and methods.

Besides attempting to legitimize the new order, by
publicity, marches through the cities, community service
projects and ”courtesy tours,“ the Brigade also helped bring
some of the people closer to the more modern sector through
literacy campaigns. Kreinin had included literacy campaigns
as one of the main activities, but they do not appear as
expressed aims in any other source. Members of the Brigade
were asked to volunteer to instruct the illiterates both
within and outside of the Brigade. Literacy committees were
formed within the various camps and brigaders participated
124

in mass literacy campaigns in the neighboring communities.

Within the Brigade, the literate ones taught the illiterate,125

and literacy certificates were presented to workers who were

previously illiterate.126

82

Develop_Associational Groupings of the Youths. Tradi-
tionally, socialization often proceeded on the basis of age
groupings, by which specifically defined rights and responsi-
bilities were designated.

In a rapidly changing society, expanding socialization
opportunities are almost inevitable. For an increasingly
mobile youth sector, geographical and social, a wider range
of socialization alternatives is a necessary element to
achieve a greater commitment to a more urban and industrial
life style.

One alternative was the creation of associations,
groups of individuals united for a specific purpose or pur-
poses. In the Brigade and the Young Pioneers there were
sports clubs, a band and other similar groups.

The Ghana Workers Brigade Band toured countries like

127 and Tunisia.128

Rumania During the fifteen months ending
in December, 1965, the band, together with the boxing and
football clubs, had an income of C 17,370.64. Musical in-
struments for that same year cost the Brigade C 8,654.54
which brought the total Spent on instruments up until that
point to C 18,467.35. Though other sections of the Brigade
were criticized and in some cases eliminated because of the
Kom Commission Report, the band section and the drama sec-
tion were retained because the Kom Commission had found that
these two sections were profit-making.129 Members of the

130

dance troupe toured foreign nations and held dancing

83

competitions and shows within Ghana.l3.l

Connections with other nations were to provide the
Young Pioneers with opportunities to broaden their outlook.
Young Pioneers went overseas, other nations sent delegations
of youths to the Pioneers and other nations initiated organi-
zations similar to the Ghana Young Pioneers.

On the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet,Young Pio-
neers, Mr. Leonid Yabochkov, director of the Soviet Cultural
Ministry, went to Accra and presented books to the Ghana
Young Pioneers.132

Members of the Pioneer movement went to many foreign
conferences and welcomed many foreign youths to Ghana for
conferences on similar problems. It was said that the pro-
motion of international relations was to lay a foundation

for world peace.133 In 1962, members went to the Soviet

Union, Czechoslovakia, G.D.R., Poland and China.l34

Youths
from Gambia attended school at the Pioneer Institute in Accra.
This was only one of the African nations sending their young

135 Mem-

people to Ghana for instruction at the Institute.
bers of the Free German Youth of the G.D.R. visited the Young
Pioneer group in 1962. Hence, the Pioneer members had ample
opportunities to make international contacts.

Some countries enacted plans similar to Ghana's.
The Young Pioneers movement, in Jamaica, began in 1963 with

1,000 unemployed and untrained young men. It recruits boys

between the ages of 15-20, mainly from the towns. Recruits

84

are taught farming, building construction, carpentry, elec-

136 Cuba also had a Young

trical and mechanical engineering.
Pioneer League, begun in April, 1961, dedicated to the task
of educating the Cuban children so that they become good
citizens.137

0f the activities confined to Ghana, Sports were im-
portant. The various sports were emphasized from a competi-
tive and a cooperative viewpoint. Competitions were fre-
quently documented, ”Brigade to Meet Police” (boxing);
"WOrkers Brigade in 5-3 Victory" over Government Printing
Press (table tennis); "Brigader Wins in Fast Time” (track);

138 Cooperation was

and “Brigade Takes on Central" (soccer).
stressed by encouraging all brigaders to take up sporting
activities seriously. To this aim, sports equipment was
often presented in ceremonies to the camps.139 In reality,
then, the Brigade sports program combined in the notion of
sports two different aims: to instill a sense of solidarity
within the Brigade against other groups and to root all mem-
bers in ”communal rather than individualistic social prac-
tices.'l4o Sports competitions pitched the Brigade against
non-members and the latter implies the unity of members
through sports activities.

The Young Pioneers were similarly involved in sports

like boxing and track.141

As with the Brigade, the sports
enabled the Young Pioneers to develop a sense of in-group

solidarity, by competing with non—Pioneer groups, especially

85

if the events were also money-making events.

It would be expected that membership in these types
of associations based upon particular interests would pro-
vide a foundation, for the youths involved, for participa-
tion in similar organizations which are said to be more pre-
dominant in the urban sector. The chief distinction between
these associations or groupings would be the fact that mem-
bership in the associations usually encompasses only a very
limited or partial section of the person's total activities,
whereas traditionally, most different spheres of activity
overlap considerably.

Of course, young people were introduced to these same
types of associations or groupings in school, so the Brigade
in this sense simply made an extension of the formal educa-
tional system by its implementation of such associations.

Build a Political Base. From the evidence on the
Brigade one can clearly distinguish three levels of polit-
ical instrumentation: national, Pan-African and international.
The first two were closely connected with the Convention
People's Party as will be further elaborated.

Indications of the potential use of the Brigade came
early. In 1962, the Deputy Minister of Finance and Trade,

Hr. Onwuna-Agyeman, told members and officials of the Bri-
gade of “their responsibility to the Party and the State.'142

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, the C.P.P. gathered

a broad political base from the discontented ex-servicemen

86

and school leavers, which provided the momentum for the inde-
pendence agitations. It was later revealed by the Kom Com—
mission that of “all the various wings of the disbanded C.P.P.,
none excelled the Workers Brigade in notoriety." It contin-
ues, '. . . many of the brigaders were well known ex-convicts
or criminals and former action troopers of the disbanded
C.P.P. They operated more or less like the 'commando' unit
of the C.P.P. and terrorized individuals into submitting to
the will of the Party of Party functionaries. This was the
' most notable during elections which they helped rig.”l43
During one election, Austin noted that local opposition to
the C.P.P. propaganda resulted in the shooting of two bri-
gaders in the Ashanti Region by irate villagers.144
Members of the Young Pioneer group were involved in
the national political activities. As stated earlier, the
group was begun as a wing or an offshoot of the ”dynamic”
C.P.P.
Pan-African aims were also evident. Men and women

145 Aside from the more

received daily military training.
obvious consequences of developing the bodies of the young
people and instilling into them a sense of discipline, the
military exercises could be easily beneficial in combat

situations. Note that following the creation of the Ghana
People's Militia by Nkrumah in November of 1965, Mr. Kofi

Baako, the Defense Minister, "commended the Workers Brigade

for enrollment en block [my emphasis] as full-time members

87

of the Ghana People's Militia, a few minutes after the an-
nouncement of its formation by Osagyefo, the President.“146
The creation of the People's Militia came after the enact-

147

ment of the Defence of Africa Bill in Ghana. This Militia

was to defend African nations from the theft of their inde-
pendence by people like the "racist Ian Smith" and others.148
Young Pioneers were also trained for the People's Militia.

Among the things listed by the Mom Commission as under—
lying causes of Brigade malpractices were the paramilitarism
in the Brigade and its unnecessary political interference.
In line with this criticism, uniforms were banned from future
use149 and more careful review of qualifications for admin-
istrative positions were to be made.

On an international level, the numerous trips taken
by the Brigade and the Pioneer members via the band tours
and the youth group exchanges, do point to a definite en-
deavor to connect the Brigade and the Pioneers closely with
other nations. This promotion of international relations
through the young people had the advantage of linking Ghana
with these countries in other areas, say as with economic
or technical assistance being received from Israel or the
German Democratic Republic.

In this section, the agricultural and construction
wings of the Brigade have been examined, followed by a pre-

sentation of the areas of overlapping concerns of the Brigade

and the Young Pioneers. These areas were: industrial work

88

and vocational training; and wider purposes, that is, encour-
aging the wider community to accept innovations, developing
associational groupings of the young and building a political
base.

It is obvious that all of these youth programs in Ghana
and other African countries were not successful. However,
the range of the activities is impressive and demonstrates
the numerous possibilities for reSponding creatively to needed
societal changes. The so-called developed countries such
as the U.S. have much to gain by giving serious thought to
some of the development programs discussed herein. Many of
the pressing social problems affecting the poor and the ra-
cially oppressed groups of this country might be reaponded
to in similar ways. On the one hand, it can be said that
some of the responses are merely different ways of establish-
ing greater control over the unfortunates. This issue must
receive some new consideration.

On the other hand, developing countries have in many
instances reSponded creatively, and it is to these issues
that all countries must look. Perhaps countries will be
able to extrapolate the essence of such creativity and in-
corporate this quality into programs that seek to fully de-

velop the youth rather than control them.

Notes on Chapter 3

lWilliams—Baffoe, Op. cit.

Z'Ashanti Brigade Camps,“ Ghanaian Times (July 12,
1962), p. 5.

3"24 Brigade Tractor Operators Pass Out,” Ghanaian
Times (March 1, 1962), p. 9.

4Economic Survey: Ghana, Accra, 1963.

Williams-Baffoe, op. cit.

03 (fl

Ibid.
West Africa (May 4, 1963), No. 2396, p. 481.

m \J

Baffoe, op. cit.

9"Brigade Opens Depots in All Regions," Ghanaian Times
(April 24, 1968), p. 1.

10Ghana: An Economic Survey(Aug., 1964), Accra,

p. 4.

11§gyg§_Year Development Plan: A Brief Outline,
Office of the Planning Commission, 1963/64-1969 70, Accra,
p. 7.

12"Workers Brigade, a Training Ground for National
Servicef'Ghanaian Times (June 7, 1962), p. 5.

13"More Brigade Camps for the North,” Ghanaian Times
(Dec. 17, 1962), p. 4o

14"98 Brigaders Are Now Qualified Storekeepers,"
Ghanaian Times (Jan. 19, 1966), p. 3.

15"They Learn Tractor Driving,” Ghanaian Times (July 26,
1962), p. 4.

16"Brigade Answers the Call," Ghanaian Times (Nov. 15,
1962), p. l.

l7"Brigader Farms Make Marked Progress,“ Ghanaian
Times (Dec. 6, 1962), p. 7.

89

90

18Ibid.

19"Abakrampa Brigade Grows, More Lime, Oranges and
Lemon," Ghanaian Times (May 28, 1964), p. 7.

20Kreinin, op. cit., p. 101.

21"Brigade Camp Makes L 10,192 Pr0f1t2" Ghanaian Times
(NOV. 15, 1963), p0 30

22"A Look at Somanya Brigade Farm,” Ghanaian Times
(June 2, 1967), p. 7.

23Williams-Baffoe, op. cit.

24"They Unload Tobacco:" Ghanaian Times (Aug. 30’
1962), p. l.

25”Ashanti Brigade Camps," op. cit.

26"Brigaders to Work on Oil Palm Farm,” Ghanaian Times
(Feb. 1, 1962), p0 89

27"ertoe Brigade Steps Up Food Output,” Ghanaian
Times (Sept. 8, 1964), p. 7.

. 28"Around Ashanti Brigade Camps," Ghanaian Times
(July 12, 1962), p. 5.

29John Nabila, Cash Croppin in Da omba, Report No. 5,
Institute of African Studies, Univ. of Ghana and Program of
African Studies, Northwestern Univ., Summer, 1968, p. 24.

30"Food-Brigade Joins the Big Government Drive,”
Ghanaian Times (Oct. 31, 1962), p. l.

31"Brigade Plans Big Groundnut Farm in Brong,"
Ghanaian Times (Jan. 21, 1963), p. 6.

32"Brigaders Maize Ready for Sale,” Ghanaian Times
(Jane 22, 1963), pa 20

33"Brigaders Provide Food for All,“ Ghanaian Times
(Sept. 27, 1962), po 50

34"More Food for All,“ Ghanaian Times (May 142 1965):

p. 9.

35”Brigade Units Will Be Closed Down if...,” Ghanaian
Times (Feb. 25, 1967), p. 9.

91

36”Brigade Camps MUSt Pay Way,” Ghanaian Times (July 8’
1967), p. 1. 7'

37"Agricultural Council to be Set Up,” Ghanaian Times
(Dec. 21, 1965), p0 9.

38"Our Own Brigade Creates Zonal Commands,” Ghanaian
Times (Aug. 13, 1965), p. 1.

39"Workers Brigade, a Training Ground for National
Service," op. cit.

4OJ. A. Dadson,“Socialized Agriculture in Ghana, 1962-65,”
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1970, p. 186.

41Ibid.

42"Brigaders to Get 24 p. for Work on Farms," Ghanaian
Times (Oct. 26, 1966), p. 12. ’

43"Probe Ordered into 10 Bodies,” Ghanaian Times
(March 18, 1966), p. 12.

44Seven Year Development Plan, 9p. cit., p. 8.

45nBrigade Opens Depots in All Regions," op. cit.
46Ibid.
47

Albert Armah, "Workers Brigade Re-Organized,”
Ghanaian Times (April 30, 1971), p. 1.

48"Female Brigaders to Train in Poultry Farming,"
Ghanaian Times (June 1, 1971), p. l.

49Williams-Baffoe, op. cit.

so"Brigaders to Build Free Quarters for Members,“
Ghanaian Times (Aug. 27, 1965), p. 9.

51"New Houses for Workers,” Ghanaian Times (May 12,
1962), p. l.

SZuGifts to Legion Villages," Ghanaian Times (Feb. 99
1962), p. 8.

53“Tamale Brigaders Lay Slabs," Ghanaian Times
(March 10, 1964), p. a.

54uFood-Brigade Joins the Big Government Drive.“ 22f
cit.

92

55"Brigaders Are to Build 564 Homes in the Volta,"
Ghanaian Times (Nov. 13, 1963), p. 7.

56"New 'Homes' for 2,000 Cape Coast Flood Victims,"
Ghanaian Times (June 10, 1962).

57”Brigade Opens Depots in All Regions,” op. cit.

58”Brigade to Get Contracts in the Central Region,”
Ghanaian Times (July 20, 1968), p. 5.

59"Brigade Opens Depots in All Regions,” op. cit.

50u3rigade Survey Team in Action,” Ghanaian Times
(July 31, 1964), po 7.

61”3 Ministries Will Care for Brigade,“ Ghanaian Times
(Dec. 23, 1969), p. 14.

62Repprt of the Commission, op. cit., p. 68.

63Ghana Yearbook, 1964, p. 64.

64"Commander Visits Camps," Ghanaian Times (Dec. 22,
1965), p. 9.

65The Ghana Report, op. cit.

66Ibid.

67"Brigade Has No Plans to Study Commerce," Ghanaian
Times (May 30, 1962), p. 3.

68”98 Brigaders Are Now Qualified Storekeepers,"
Ghanaian Times (Jan. 19, 1966), p. 3.

69"Brigade Has No Plans to Study Commerce,“ op. cit.

70"Workers Brigade a Training Ground for National
Service,” Ghanaian Times (June 7, 1962), p. 5.

71“Getting Set for Brigade Exhibition,“ Ghanaian Times
(Oct. 29, 1969), p. 12.

72"Brigade Helps in Nation Building,“ Ghanaian Times
(April 10, 1961), p. 7.

73"668 Have Passed Out of Brigade Training School,“
Ghanaian Times (June 30, 1965), p. 9.

74“She Teaches Brigaders,” Ghanaianpzimes (March 16,
1962), p. l. W

93

75*Worker8 Brigade a Training Ground for National
36!V1C8:” 22;_E$E'

76”Young Pioneers Opens an Institute to Help School
Leavers,” Ghanaian Times (Feb. 9, 1962), p. 6.

77nLearning to Repair Radiop'Ghanaian Times (July 19,
1962), p. 9. ‘

78Williams-Baffoe, op. cit.
791bid.

8°Ibid.

81

National Workers Brigade, op. cit.

82”Quick Technical Training to Our Youth,“ Ghanaian
Times (May 7, 1962), p. 5.

83”25,000 Pioneers Auto Workshop Opened,“ Ghanaian
Times (July 9, 1965), p. 8.

84Williams-Baffoe, op. cit.

85”Kumasi Gets New Youth Institute,” Ghanaian Times
(Dec. 3, 1965), p. 9.

86”Pioneers Build Own Boats in Sekondi,“ Ghanaian
Times (March 14, 1963), p. 7.

87Kreinin, op. cit.

aanPioneerS Visit the Party Press,“ Ghanaian Times
(Aug. 24, 1965), p. 9-

89”Around Ashanti Brigade CampS," OE. cit.

90“L 60,000 Mattress Factory Planned for Tema,”
Ghanaian Times (April 28, 1964), p. 12.

91west Africa (March 17, 1962), No. 2337, p. 303.

92”Army, Police Uniforms to be Sewn Here,” Ghanaian
Times (Aug. 25, 1962), p. 4.

93"Brigaders Produce More Food,“ Ghanaian Times
(Oct. 23, 1962), p. 6.

94'More Brigade Camps for the North,“ Ghanaian Times
(Dec. 17, 1962), p. 4-

94

95”Brigade Gets Garment Factory,“ Ghanaian Times
(May 8, 1963), p. l-

96”Brigade Factory Has Made Big Progress,“ Ghanaian
Times (Aug. 31, 1964), p. 5.

97Ibid.

98Mike Atsutse, “Brigade to Export Materials,“
Ghanaian Times (Jan. 10, 1968), p. 1.

99"Workers Brigade Lost NC 261,904 in 15 Months,”
Ghanaian Times (June 16, 1967), p. 12.

100Report of the Commission, pp. 54-55.

IOlflBrigade Plans Route--March Tomorrow,“ Ghanaian
Times (May 2, 1967), p. 8.

102"Pioneers to Observe Positive Action Day,” Ghanaian
Times (Jan. 4, 1962), p. 3.

103”They Cheer Pioneers Display,” Ghanaian Times
(Jan 13, 1962), p. 1.

104"Pioneer Anniversary in the Regions,“ Ghanaian
Times (June 17, 1965), p. 5.

105"GDR Films for Pioneers," Ghanaian Times (Jan 15,
1962), p. 5.

106"Offer Your Drums to Pioneers, Chiefs Urged,”
Ghanaian Times (Feb. 1, 1962), p. 8.

107"Two Chiefs Join Pioneers,“ Ghanaian Times (March 2,
1962), p. 4.

108"Brigaders, Pioneers Help in Sekondi Clean-up Move,”
Ghanaian Times (Aug. 17, 1962), p. 3.

logflBrigade's Relief Work Is Praised," Ghanaian Times
(July 5, 1962), p. 5.

110"Baako Leads Brigaders to Rescue Motorists and
Pedestrians," Ghanaian Times (June 21, 1962), p. 13.

111"Pioneers Help Build School,“ Ghanaian Times
(Sept. 21, 1965), p. 13.

llZ'Pioneers to Help Build Centre at Attebubu,”
Ghanaian Times (Aug. 18, 1962), p. 6.

95

113“Young pionaers,“ Ghanaian Times (Jan. 30, 1962),

p. 6.

114"How Young Pioneers Clean-up the Town," Ghanaian
Times (March 20, 1963), p. 7.

llS-The Movement that Injects Patriotism into the
Youth,“ Ghanaian Times (April 5, 1963), p. A.

 

 

llS'Brigaders Donate Blood," Ghanaian Times (Sept. 17’
1965), p0 9'

ll7-Brigaders Donate Blood,“ Ghanaian Times (Aug- 20.
1965), p0 3'

118

Kreinin, op. cit.

119"Brigade Offered Land for Maize Farming,“ Ghanaian
Times (May 2, 1967), p. 4.

120-5 Chiefs Give Land for Brigade Camp,“ Ghanaian
Times (Feb. 25, 1965), p. 9.

121"New Block for Brigade,” 92222$32_I$535 (July 21’
1965), p. 3.
122

"Chief Wishes Brigaders Well,“ Ghanaian Times
(Nov. 19, 1965), p. 8.

123"Okpata Visits Brigade Farm,“ Ghanaian Times (May 23,
1962), p. 4.

124"Three More Brigade Camps for North,“ Ghanaian Times
(OCto 14, 1965), p. 90

125"Certificates for Brigaders," Ghanaian Times (July 102
1965), p. 9.

126”New Brigade Camps Will Be Set Up at Tamale,”
Ghanaian Times (Jan. 29, 1962), p. 6.

 

 

127"Brigade Band in Rumania,” Ghanaian Times (July 21,
1965), p0 2.

128"Brigade Band for Tunisia,” Ghanaian Times (July 12:
1965), p- 5-

129

White Paper on the Re rt of the Commission of En-
guiry into tge Functions, Opeggtions and Administration of
the Workers Bri ads, 1968, p. 7. 7

 

96

130The Ghana Report, op. cit.

131"Brigade Cultural Show,” Ghanaian Times (Aug. 11,
1965), p. 5.

132"Soviet Books for Pioneers,” Ghanaian Times (May 19,
1962), p. 6.

133,.0ur Youth at Work," Ghanaian Times (May 17, 1962),

p. 5.

134”Young Pioneer Plays Important Role,” Ghanaian
Times (Jan. 26, 1962), p. 6.

135"ll Pioneers Off to Prague,” Ghanaian Times (Aug- 6.
1965), p0 3.

136”Jamaica Adopts our Youth Organization,“ Ghanaian
Times (Nov. 8, 1963), p. 5.

137”The Happy Cuban Young Pioneers,” Ghanaian Times
(Jan. 8, 1962), p. 4.

138”Brigade to Meet Police," Ghanaian Timeg (Sept. 27,
1967), p. 11. “Workers Brigade in 5-3 Victory,” Ghanaian
Times (March 25, 1963), p. 11. “Brigade Takes on Central,"
Ghanaian Times (June 18, 1968), p. 11. ”Brigader Wins in
Fast Time,” Ghanaian Times (March 22, 1965), p. 11.

139"Brigaders Told to Refrain from Rumour-Mongering,"
Ghanaian Times (June 10, 1965), p. 3. ”ertoe Gets a Gift,”
Ghanaian Times (Aug. 30, 1965), p. 10.

140Deobold B. Van Dalen, Mitchell and Bennett, A World
History of Physical Education (New York, 1963), p. 307.

141"They Win Young Pioneers Knock-Out," Ghanaian Times
(Aug. 28, 1965), p. 10-

142"Brigade Camp Plans for Okim Oda," Ghanaian Times
(May 15, 1962), p. 4.

143Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into
the Functions, Operations and Administration of the Workers

f

Brigade, p. 2.

144Dennis Austin,.Politics in Ghanal 1946-60 (New
York, 1964), p. 390.

14S”Big Rush to Join Militia,” Ghanaiaanigg§_(N0V- 29:
1965), p. 10

97

l46”500 Brigaders Pass Out at Okonglos" Ghanaian Times
(Nov. 29, 1965), p. 7.

147"Brigade Opens Depots in All Regions," gp;_g£§-

1486hana: An Economic Survey, 09- Cit-

149Report of the Commission, 99¢ Cit-

CHAPTER 4

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS

The conclusion of the Mom Commission was that the
Brigade had totally failed. The Young Pioneers was banned
the very day that Nkrumah was overthrown. Besides the more
blatant shortcomings, what can be gleaned from these two
organizations in regards to youth and its role in develop-
ment? What were the contributions made by the Brigade?
and the Young Pioneers?

First of all, let us look at the Young Pioneers.
Unlike the Workers Brigade which lasted for some five years
after the coup, the Young Pioneers were banned immediately
after the National Liberation Council took over in March
of 1966.1

The United States held Senate hearings as early as
1963 and 1964 to consider the demands of students from Ghana
who wanted the United States to discontinue aid to Nkrumah.
Quite a bit of criticism was leveled against the Young Pio-
neers by the students who testified. One testimony revealed
that the children were told that they no longer belonged

to their parents or anyone else but Nkrumah.2 Another held

that the children were enrolled, against their will at times,

and instructed in communism.3 When students in Mfantsipim,

a province in the Cape Coast, refused to join the Pioneers,

98

99

their teacher supported them. He was then questioned by
police and later died of injuries received during the inter-
rogation. It was noted that a military academy, a naval
academy and an air force academy were established through
the Young Pioneers with officers usually as young as four-
teen years.4

One final point is the reference to the African Free-
dom Fighters as an organization established to overthrow
African governments, that is, governments of the puppet or
neocolonialist regimes.S Members from both the Workers Bri-
gade and the Young Pioneers were eligible for membership in
and often trained for the African Freedom Fighters.

Criticism from the new government of Ghana was just
as severe. It was noted that parents and guardians were
sometimes incarcerated because of reports from their child-
ren to security officers. Within the schools, discipline
was close to impossible since members of the Young Pioneers
were assured of immunity by their officers. If any head-
master enforced discipline, he faced political victimization.
In place of the parents' control, the children were capable
of forcing parents into submission because of fear of polit-
ical reprisals.6

A probe to investigate the Young Pioneers was ordered

in March of 1967.7

As of this time, it is doubtful that
the probe occurred, though it might well have been conducted

without much coverage from the newspapers.

100

When Nkrumah was ousted in 1966, the National Libera-
tion Council ordered a probe into the activities of the Con-
vention People's Party, the Ghana Young Pioneer Movement,
the Ghana Farmers Cooperative Council, the Ideological In-
stitute, the Workers Brigade and other units.8 The Mom
Commission was the name of the commission Specifically ap-
pointed to investigate the Workers Brigade. The Mom Commis-
sion began its proceedings in July, 1966, and continued until
June 26, 1967.

one of the principal findings was that the original
Finance Committee of the Brigade (see the Administrative
Sections, Appendix) had been suspended in 1959 along with
the suspension of the seven-member Brigade Board. Since the
Board was to be in charge of control and management of the
.Brigade, its suspension meant that there was no effective
control and management and further that the Board's check
and control in the Finance Committee was non-existent.9

Since some of the sections of the agricultural wing
did not operate profitably, the Commission advised that the
unproductive units should be dissolved and its labor force
employed in other development work.10

Other administrative and financial changes, recommended
for the Brigade, included the closing of all exclusively
female camps, the revision of the Welfare Fund, initiation
of time cards for monthly rather than for four-month periods

and the introduction of time clocks.11

101

Regarding personnel, the Kom Commission had the fol-
lowing overall recommendations. First, all officers ever
convicted of crimes were to be fired; and all other members
(non—officers) convicted of crimes should be placed in care-
fully selected positions, where they could be adequately
supervised. Next, a minimum educational qualification, for
example, a Middle School Leaving Certificate or its equiv-
alent in job experience, should be the basis for future em-
ployment in the Brigade. Third, salary scales were to be
reviewed. Finally, the Brigade's age of compulsory retire-
ment should be the same as that in the Civil Service and
Statutory Corps, this being sixty years.

Its conclusions were:

"1) that since its inception the Government has spent
over LG 15 million on the Brigade without any hope of ever
retrieving any part of this sum;

2) that most brigaders take their pay as unemployment
benefits;

3) that most of its projects have completely failed;

4) that in the past the Brigade was used as an instru-
ment of terrorism, for rigging elections, and was a dumping
ground for people of dubious character;

5) that most of the produce and products were stolen
before they got to the market and were sold, with the greater

part of the money realized never reaching the Brigade coffers;

and

102

6) embezzlement on a large scale by its main officers.“12

The Commission clarified the policies on land acquisi—
tion employed by the Brigade. Its Report states that, "A
perusal of these agreements (between the Brigade and the
grantors of the land) reveal that in none of the acquisitions
did the Brigade pay any compensation, and that what was in
all cases granted was possessory license and not an absolute
gift of the land so occupied."l3

At the time of the inquiry, total acreage of the Bri-
gade was over 42,000 acres. Thus, it was recommended that
the acquisition of lands be regularized in conjunction with
the Attorney General's Office. Most of the grievances which
arose in reSpect to these land transactions started when
the offers made to the land grantors, of employment for sig—
nificant numbers from their areas, went unfulfilled or when
offers were realized but men were later laid Off.

Aside from the more critical comments, one project,
reviewed favorably, was the last experiment of the Brigade
in 1966, which made a labor force available to the cocoa
farmers. Since this was a success, it was advised that the
project be continued and that the project be extended to
include farmers of other crOps like rubber, tobacco, corn
and yam.

Closing comments by the Commission indicated that
it was the unanimous decision of the members of the Commis-

sion to retain the Brigade since the original purposes, as

103

stated in the National White Paper creating the Brigade,

were still valid and acceptable.14 The only restrictions
were that the Brigade be divested of its military pretensions
and be converted gradually into a corporation. It was clear
to the Commission that “the Brigade cannot be another Nahal
or Kibbutz, because the spirit which animates these movements
in Israel is of a particular type and cannot be imported

into Ghana.”15 And finally, it was decided that, "It may

be an advantage to the Brigade and the nation as a whole

if the Brigade will start a scheme of training in certain
trades, so that school leavers are not forced to make the

Brigade a blind-alley career but as a means to an end."16

What Was Accomplished in Line with the
Expressed Purposes of the Brigade?

1. By 1968, the Brigade had established marketing
depots in all regional capitals. These served the purpose
of making foodstuffs more readily available to the people
and supplying this food at cheaper prices.

2. The last project of the Brigade, by which the
brigaders were employed at minimal costs, by the cocoa
farmers, was regarded by the Mom Commission as highly suc-
cessful. Suggestions were made that the program be expanded
to include the other types of farmers who might need help
in harvesting.

3. Mechanization and agricultural innovations were

once the trademark of the Somanya camp, the 'showplace for

104

foreign diplomats.' At one time, around 1966, it began re-
covering from a period of stagnation. New techniques and
machinery were obviously used effectively in the earlier
stages of the camp; later stagnation appears to have been

a common result in all the camps, since much machinery went
to waste after the initial enthusiasm.

4. Nungua poultry farm made a profit of 14 per cent
in 1964, as reported in 1967. Bimbilla camp provided good
food at cheaper prices than the regular markets, as reported
in 1968.

5. Brigade farms produced raw material for factories,
from 1962 until 1968. These materials included tobacco,
rubber, jute, kinaf, sugar cane, copra, coconut and pine—
apples.

6. The Brigade band was found to be a profit-making
enterprise and the Commission recommended that it be retained.

These then were the more tangible, concrete accomplish-
ments. As with most failures, one learns. If one could
accurately judge how much the Brigade and the Pioneers de-
veloped socialist ideals in the members as well as the other
people of Ghana, one would obtain a more complete picture

of the activities of the Brigade and the Pioneers.

Issues Raised py Such Programs
A number of issues surfaced as a result of this par-
ticular study. The growth and the decline of development

programs for youth suggest many of the larger concerns of

105

the so-called developing countries. While it is impossible
to exhaust the range of issues, some of the major ones are
indicated below.

1. The multitude of programs created in Ghana to deal
with problems of unemployed school leavers was quite inef—
fective.

As Table 2 (p. 32) indicates, there have been numerous
programs which were meant to deal with the youth problem
at least from 1957 until 1971. Yet, the school leaver prob-
lem still exists in crucial proportions. Ghana's general
level of unemployment had gone from 11,300 in 1960 to 17,660
in 1970. (See Table 9, Appendix.) Simply the fact that
the nation still feels a need to implement programs for
school leavers indicates that the problem has not been elim-
inated.

At the root of the problem is the outmoded educational
system. Attacks on the end results will never be totally
effective. Further, it seems that in a country where re—
sources are scarce, any overlaps that exist between programs
place a strain on these resources. Better coordination should
be sought among these programs to avoid such overlaps.

2. Another aspect of the programs themselves is that
multi-functional groups like the Brigade might be unpractical
for a developing nation.

More Specialized groups might be more self-sustaining.

The eventual placement of each of the wings of the Brigade

106

under more specialized organizations seems to indicate that
programs might be more effective if they delimited the area
of their concerns into say one aspect of development, e.g.,
agriculture. Again, for economic viability, the more Spec-
ialized group might be more useful.

If, on the other hand, one wanted to give the youth
the largest possible offerings, then the multi-purpose group
could prove more appropriate. Still, the entire issue of
multi-purpose versus more Specialized groups bears further
investigation before definitive statements can be made.

3. The transfer of land from the people to the Gov-
ernment or to one of its organizations in national develop-
ment, creates numerous problems.

Chiefs donated land to the Brigade, but later demanded
the return of the land, which the Brigade had no legal title
to; or else they demanded that they be compensated for plan-
tations which were destroyed by the creation of camps. With
communal ownership of lands in many parts of Africa, even
the acquisition of titles to the land does not solve the
problem.

People in other development projects have accused
the government of stealing the land even after it was proper-
ly acquired. The root of the problem is that any type of
permanent transfers of land will meet resistance from the
people who do not abide by such a value system. The pur-

chasing of land is part of the alien legal structure which

107

has not been fully understood or accepted by the people in
many cases. Once again, serious consideration must be given
to the education of the people and especially to the accom-
modation of the laws to their wishes wherever possible.

In the meantime, countries attempting to acquire land
for projects might investigate the possibility of leasing
the lands they need for set periods of time.

4. A parallel concern is that programs which entail
a multitude of abuses of privileges and power risk the chance
of alienating the more modern from the traditional sector
and vice versa.

There would have been a tremendous change in the
cleavages between the traditional and the modern sectors,
if the Brigade and the Pioneers had not enabled people in
the groups to break laws or bully people, simply because
of their positions in the Party or membership in the organi-
zations. Hostility was generated by the actions of certain
brigaders and pioneers and this indeed made people less sup-
portive of innovations and of socialist aims, rather than
generating loyalty to the Government and the entire program
of development.

5. A similar problem relates to the effect of such
programs on the nature and development of the cohort itself.

Perhaps cooptation of the youth into the Brigade and
the Pioneers served to effectively divide the cohort into

impotent units. If the prime similarity between the youths

108

is their unemployed status, then the moment they obtain a
job, they will no longer feel close to those who remain un-
employed. This is especially true where tribal or other
factors might run contrary to the cohesive nature of the
unemployed school leaver position. Once again, one might
want to know how many factors the youths do have in common
and whether these factors would provide a sense of long-
lasting cohesiveness.

As mentioned previously, in the specification of the
cohort, the common elements in the youths' experiences were
unemployment, partial education, and their position as young
people. Participation in political activities became another
unifying factor. Two of the common elements might be inter-
preted as rather transitional stages, that is, the constantly
changing position of youth and the intricately interrelated
problem of unemployment. Political experiences and some
education might be more permanently incorporated character-
istics of a cohort. These are all empirical questions which
need much more attention from behavioral scientists as well
as governmental agencies.

6. This brings us to the next issue that one must
not judge a program in development solely by its economic
viability, as was done in the last years of the Brigade.

Though every program has a cost in terms of resource
allocation, even in socialist countries, economic profita-

bility alone becomes a rather sterile way of looking at a

109

program. The initial concern, which was expressed over the
school leaver problem, was later changed to an emphasis on
the economic profitability of the Brigade.

Many intangible aspects of the program may become
much more meaningful than questions on the ability of an
organization to become a successful business enterprise.
One of the better procedures is to consider how such a pro-
gram fits into the entire concept of national development
for a particular nation. Any opportunities the youths gained
in the way of training, contact with other nations, and ex-
periences in groups should be considered primary concerns.

It has been remarked that:

The size of a youth group, its national or interna-
tional character and the complexity of its organization
should not be criteria for determining its importance
for national development work. Some of the best ef-
forts have been made by groups hardly larger than
neighborhood gangs and with nowhere to meet except
each other's houses. These varied local groups tend
to come and gO--they do not have the life span of the
larger national or international movements, do not have
their national cohesion, administrative experience or
school and church structure to extend their movement.
They are, by the same token, less stereotyped, more
flexible and responsive to local needs and often at-
tract the type of person who is repelled by the for-
mality, the uniform and the prestige of the larger
movements.l7

Perhaps it would be more appropriate to supplement the more
organized groups with some that are more flexible. These
and other policies would encourage a variety of criteria

rather than a purely economic review of the group's progress.
7. It is difficult to manipulate the populace against

neo-colonialism and other types of control, which alien powers

110

still exert over a country even after independence.

Once the enemy is no longer physically in the country,
it is more difficult to mobilize the people against the less
obvious types of control like foreign investment or owner—

ship of the plantations and factories.18

A model, such as
provided by the Israeli Nahal, was put under a defense or-
ganization and was successful. On the other hand, the place-
ment of the Brigade under the Ministry of Defence led to
numerous abuses within the Brigade. People in Israel know
exactly who they are defending themselves against and what
they are fighting for, but the spirit motivating these people
towards defense of their homeland in Israel is not to be
found as readily in countries not engaged in open combat.
Implementation of a program of socialism in a country is
bound to be met by reactionary elements who have profited
from the old system. This was what happened in the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China.19

The hard fact is that most common people, who do not
understand the intricacies of the economic system which binds
their country to other countries, will not be readily mobilized
into a fight against alien strongholds. Either a nation
must educate the masses or expect to lose them in any con-
frontation against neo-colonialism.

Nkrumah and his Ministers wanted to build a socialist
nation. It is not at all evident whether the people of Ghana

fully supported this goal or rejected it. When one government

111

overthrows another it may or may not represent the majority
of the people. What might be the case is that the abuses,
which accompanied the introduction of the socialist program,
turned the people away from the government instead of bring-
ing them enthusiastically behind the programs. What is more
likely is that the people of Ghana would have backed the
socialist program if they had been better informed about

the issues and had not witnessed all the corruptions accom-
panying the programs. The chiefs gave the land, but they
wanted it returned; they did not truly understand or believe
in the ownership of the land by the government. Perhaps,

if there had been a full scale indoctrination program whereby
all the people would have the socialist goals clarified,
there might have been a more open show of support for the
socialist programs.

One nation which has had relative success in 'educat-
ing' her people as to the national revolutionary goals was
Red China. PeOple who were illiterate were taught to read,
so that they could read Mao's works and discuss them. Every
break from work finds the workers engaged in studying who
are reactionaries, what should be done to them, and so on.
Furthermore, the students were made to work side by side
with the peasantry on the intricacies of dialectical mate-
rialism or other revolutionary concerns, while additionally

teaching the students the value of manual labor.20

Some African nations have considered regional economic

112

unions to be the solution of neocolonialism. Other nations
have instituted various reforms aiming to increase their
control over their own economy, for instance, Tanzania's
Arusha Declaration of February, 1967. This declaration was
implemented through the nationalization of certain key sec-
tors and of most large-scale economic activity, with the
purpose of decreasing foreign control of Tanzanian economic
development.21

Finally, one might speculate that perhaps the people
who are most against socialist development in the African
nations may be those people who were most in a position to
lose if the socialist program was fully incorporated into
the Ghanaian economy. This of course is open to question.

8. In some cases the philosophy of the national
leader, president or prime minister may have a significant
effect upon the implementation of a youth program as did
Nkrumah's philosophy.

Nkrumah's philosophy Obviously permeated many of the
Brigade and Young Pioneer activities. Future studies might
attempt to trace the details of his philosophy as related
to the development of a youth program in national develop-
ment. For this paper only a brief review of his philosophy
will be given to illustrate how his philosophy influenced
the groups.

For Nkrumah, development of a socialist nation was

to be guided by the political party, the C.P.P., the ”elitist

113

vanguard whose task is to move the masses toward socialism
and his conviction that society can be properly organized
through collective ownership of the means of production."22

Just as socialism in Ghana could not be separated from

the C.P.P., Ghana's socialistic development could not pro-
ceed independently of all other nations in Africa. As one
of the chief Spokesman for Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah argued
that socialism had to be a cooperative venture among all
African states.23 It was only through socialism that eco-
nomic independence would follow political independence. As
Nkrumah himself saw the role of his government:

My government . . . was pledged to the twin task of
achieving economic independence for Ghana, and of par-
ticipating in the wider African revolution. The former
implied the adoption of socialist policies, since in
the African situation genuine independence is incompat-
ible with capitalism; while the latter involved us in
actively supporting the liberation and unity movements
in Africa.2

The Brigade was intimately connected with the C.P.P.;

while the Young Pioneers was a formal branch of the C.P.P.
Brigade members were heavily involved in political activi-
ties, often at the cost of infuriating the people through
their rigging of the elections. The Pioneer Institutes were
both used for ideological instruction in socialist ideals.
When the People's Militia and the African Freedom Fighters

were formed the Brigade and Pioneers were often enrolled in

blocks into these Pan-African organizations. Finally, on
the international level, both groups had the opportunity to

make contacts with students and technicians from other countries.

114

It is not at all certain that the national leader
should never attain such influence over a group. In this
case, Nkrumah's involvement had turned both groups into
socialist tools and in most cases, the political connections

were detrimental to the groups.

Summary
In Ghana, the factors of change which the models of

development were reacting to or building upon, were the same
factors of change within Ghanaian society which gave shape
to the cohort.

Very few of the Brigade projects succeeded, in terms
of being economically profitable. Yet one must interpret
the Brigade not only in light of its economic viability,
but also in its position in the plan of socialist develop-
ment. From the angle of its role in the entire development
program for full employment, freedom from alien control,
ensuring the role of Ghana in Pan-African economic dealings,
it appears that certain activities of the Brigade were bene-
ficial to these aims. Since it is much more difficult to
measure success in regard to the intangible objects, like
socialism, one cannot conclude whether the Brigade was suc-
cessful. Its role was as one unit in the entire program
of development. Hence, its evaluation will be largely that
it did actively attempt to reach the goals of the socialist

program. The main suggestion is that one Should not ask

simply, did the Brigade accomplish what it set out to

115

accomplish, but also what part did it play in the total pro-
gram of development? D

Possibilities for youth in development as indicated
by the Brigade and the Young Pioneers were two-fold--service
to the community and benefits for the youths themselves.
While the Brigade was involved in projects in agriculture,
construction and industry; the Young Pioneers was largely
concerned with smaller volunteer projects. Both provided
some type of technical training and opportunities to make
international contacts as well as participation in different
associational groupings.

Both organizations participated in the socialist de-
velopment schemes, were closely connected with political
activities, and had projects designed for school leavers.
The Brigade had the authority to enroll members compulsor-
arily, though it relied heavily on volunteer enrollment.
With the Young Pioneers, it was mandatory for every youth
in Ghana to be a member. While the Brigade was chiefly
directed towards already existing problems of school leavers,
the Young Pioneers was more of a preventative of such prob-
lems, attempting to ensure that they did not recur in such
serious proportions, by working with mostly the very young
who had not yet dropped out of school.

Problems of unemployed youth in the cities is a con-
cern throughout Africa. If the main effect of these programs

is to reduce social tensions, as the Niamey report states,

116

or if the programs have been invoked by sudden crises or
fears as the UNESCO report suggests, investigation should
be made of the utility of these programs for the youths and
their societies.

The advice from the conference in Kenya on school
leavers, directs our attention to the central issues of any
plan for youth in development in Africa:

In a wider sense, the youth of Africa is in the gap
which exists between the rich and the poor nations, be-
tween aSpiratiOns and realities, between the traditional
society of yesterday and the modern society of tomorrow.

. . . the Problem is to mobilize this rich source
of energy, enterprise and initiative into channels which
bring satisfaction to the individual and worthwhile fruits
for the society as a whole.25

Nations of the world should be cautious of employing
their youth for overall societal purposes, if in the process

the youth is expended.

Notes on Chapter 4

1"Young Pioneers Banned," Ghanaian Times (March 8,
1966), p. 1.

2Ghana Students, op. cit., p. 29.
3.1.24.2-
42mi-
Silvie
5 6"Young Pioneers Out,“ Ghanaian Times (March 8, 1966),
p. .

7"Accounts of the Pioneers Will Be Probed,“ Ghanaian
Times (March 9, 1967), p. 1.

8"10 Camps to Close Down," Ghanaian Times (Sept. 6,
1966), p. 3.

9Rgport of the Commission, pp. cit., pp. vii-viii.

 

loJean Due, Illinois Aggicultural Economics, 9 (July,
1969), 33.
ll

Repprt of the Commission, op. cit., p. 52.

12Ibid., p. 66.

l31bid., p. 64.

14Minority Repprt of the Commission of Engpiry into
Ehe Functions, vperations and Administration of the Workers
Brigade, p. 12. .

15Ibid.

16Ibid.

17Preliminary Report, op. cit.

18See Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism: The Last Stags
of Imperialism (New York, 1966).

117

118

19See William Hinton, Fashen (New York, 1966), espec-
ially Chapter ll, "Beat the Dog's Leg."

20Dick Wilson, Anatomy of China (New York, 1966), p.
86.

21Reginald Green and Ann Seidman, Unity or Poverty]
(Baltimore, 1968), pp. 122-24.

 

 

22Abdul Said, The African Phenomenon (Boston, 1968),
p. 98.

23Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (London, 1968),
p. 62.

2

4Ibid., p. 99.

25Remi Clignet and Foster, The Fortunate Few: A Stud
of SecondarypSchools and Students in the Ivory Coast (Evanston,
19667, p. 161.

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121

Hutton, Caroline. “Nyakashaka--A Farm Settlement Scheme
in Uganda,” African Affairs, 67 (April, 1968), 118—23.

Labor Developments Abroad, Vol. 14, No. S, May, 1969, 12-13.

McQueen, Albert J. “Education and Marginality of African
Youth," Journal of Social Issues, XXIV (No. 2,1968),
179- 94.

Moller, Herbert. "Youth as a Force in the Modern World,"
Comparative Studies in Society and History, X (No. 3,
April, 1968), 237-60.

Ryder, Norman B. "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of
Social Change," American Sociological Review, 30
(DeCe, 1965), 843-610

Zolberg, Aristede. "Youth as a Political Phenomenon in Trop-
ical Africa," Youth and Society, 1 (Dec., 1969).

ififlfifififlflflfli
Ghanaian Times (1957-1971).

West Africa, May 4, 1963, No. 2396, 481.
West Africa, March 17, 1962, No. 2337, 303.
West Africa, June 29, 1963, No. 2404, 732.

West Africa, June 22, 1963, No. 2403, 703.

Reports--Published

The Christian Council of Kenya and the Christian Churches'
Educational Assoc. After School What? Further Edu-
cation, Training and Employment of Primary_3chool
Leavers. Nairobi, March, 1966.

Commission for Social Development. Preliminary Report on
Long-Term Policies and Pro rammes for Youth in Na-
tional Development. UNESCO, Jan. 7, 1969.

Ghana. Commission to Enguire into the Functions of the
Workers Brigade. July, 1966-June, 1967.

Ghana: Economic Survey, 1962. Central Bureau of Statistics,
Accra, 1963.

122

Ghana Students in thg U.S. Oppose U.S. Aid to Nkrumah. Sub-
committee to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and other Internal Security
Laws. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1964.

Ghana Year Book. 1964. Daily Graphic Publication, Accra.

International Social Development Review. Urbanization:
Development Policies and Plannipg, No. 1,1968.

Minority R_port of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into
the Functions, Operations and Administration of the
Workers Brig_de. Accra, 1967.

National Workers Brigade. Accra, 1957.

Repprt of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Func-
tions, Operations and Administration of the Workers
Brigade. Accra, 1967.

Report of the Conference on Unemployed, Out-of-School Youth
in Urban Areas. Social Dynamite. National Committee
for Children and Youth. Washington, 1961.

Seven-Year Development Plan: a Brief Outline. Office of
the Planning Commission, 1963764-1969/70. Accra:
Government Printing Office.

7-Year Plan for National Reconstruction and Development.
Financial Year 1963764- 196977 0. Accra: Office of

the Planning Commission.

Social Welfare Services in Africa, No. 7. Youth Employment

and National Development in Africa. New York: UN,
1969.

1961 Statistical Year Book. Ghana. Central Bureau of
tatistics.

Summary of the Labor Situation in Ghana. U. S. Dept. of Labor
Bureau tatistics, October, 1958, pp. 6— 7.

White Paper on the Report of the Commission of Enguiry into
the Functions, Operations and Administration of the
Workers Brigade. Accra, 1968.

Williams-Baffoe, A. B. "Experience with Large-Scale and
Plantation State Farms in Ghana,“ Joint Seminar on

Problems and Approaches in Planning.A ricultural
Development. Addis Ababa: UNESCO, 1g65

123

1970 Year Book of Labour Statistics. Geneva: International
Labour Office.

Unpublished Materials

Nabila, John. Cash Cropping in Dagomba. Report No. 5.
Institute of African tudies, Univ. of Ghana and

Northwestern U, Program of African Studies, Summer,
1968.

Olatunbosun, Dupe. Nigerian Farm Settlgments and School
Leavers' Farms--Profitability, Resource Use and—Social-
Psychological Considerations. Ph.D. thesis, Michigan
State University, 1967.

APPENDICES

124

Ghanaian Honey

pesewa s l¢
120 pesewas a 1C
100 pesewas a 1 NC

At first, Ghana used the British pound, L , which
they converted, after independence to the G.L , which was
closely related to the fluctuations of cocoa on the inter-
national market and thus did not necessarily equal the British
pound. The C is based upon the standard of 20 shillings -
1 pound a 120 pesewas. And the NC or new Ciis based upon

100 pesewas 2 NC.

Administrative Sections of the Brigade:
Board and Finance Committee

Original Board as established Board as re-organized by

by Section 4 of the Workers the Kom Commission

Brigade Act

1. National Organizer 1. National Organizer

2. Director of Social Welfare 2. Representative of Hinistry
and Community Development of Labour and Social

3. Representative of the Trade Welfare
Union Congress 3. Representative of the

4. Representative of the Ex- Ministry of Agriculture
servicemen's Union 4. Representative of the

5. Representative of the Public Works Department
United Ghana Farmers Council 5. Representative of the

6. Two other persons who in . Christian Council of
the opinion of the Ministry Ghana .
of Labour and Cooperatives 6. Professional accountant
have knowledge and experi- of at least 5 years'
ence and were likely to experience
contribute to the successful 7. Practicing Barrister of
management of the Brigade at least 7 years' stand-

ing who should be chairman

Finance Committee
as established by Section 17 of the Workers Brigade Act
1. Chairman of the Board
2. National Organizer
3. Two other members of the Board

125
The Israeli Nahal

The Nahal began in 1948 shortlyafter independence
as an alternative to military service. During their defense
service, young people are utilized to carry out development
work, if they so elect. The experience provides them with
training in agricultural and community life. Although the
law provides that all conscripts into the defense service
should participate in a brief training period in the Nahal
group, the law has been applied to only about onequarter
of the conscripts. At present, the Nahal isla specialized.
unit for those who intend to pursue agricultural or community
life upon leaving the service. Members are allowed to take
part in educational and social projects in communities while
in the service. Though chiefly agricultural, the Nahal has
recently adopted some industrial courses.

Recruitment techniques employed by the Nahal are a
bit unique in that people are usually recruited as groups
and allowed to remain intact. Since eighty per cent of
Israel's population are town dwellers, most recruits are
from these town areas. There are three basic phases to the
Nahal movement. First, there is a period of basic training;
second, members are sent to an agricultural settlement for
one year and operate under the supervision of Nahal in—

structors. Running costs of the service are covered almost
completely by revenue gained from the labor of members dur-

ing this phase. Third, the young people are detached from

126

the group and begin their own settlement. Not all elect
to stay on in an agricultural or community settlement, some
return to studies or find other employment.

Success has occurred in both tangible and intangible
respects. The Nahal has persuaded over oneéthird of the
youngsters who have passed through its hands to settle in
agricultural communities. Of the remaining two-thirds, the
period of service has, in most cases, helped their attitudes
toward civic and social matters to be more favorable. While
in the service all members contributed to national develop-
ment. Sections of the Nahal group have served as volunteers
to new towns and have helped the towns deal with problems
of expansion and development. Another aspect is the ability
of the Nahal to assimilate young people of very different
education, background and outlook.

The Nahal, one of a large number of youth organiza-
tions in Israel, was built upon the existing structure of
the defense service. This enabled it to coordinate its
activities much more rapidly and effectively than organiza-
tions which must develop administrative structures while
concurrently attempting to initiate recruits into the pro-
gram. ”. . . a further characteristic of the Nahal experi-
ment, as it has evolved up to the present, appears to be
the concordance between its objectives and the major pre-
occupations of economic and social growth and the security

of the country.”

127

”Viewed in this light its activities are seen to be
one aspect of a concerted effort to settle the frontier
zones and development areas and promote them economically;
to encourage the flow towards the land and achieve a better
balance between town and country and between various branches
of activity; to level out economic and social conditions in
general and wield together a population of diverse background

and culture; to inculcate a national and civic spirit into

young people. . . .” (78)

Abakrampa
Abono Kokwado
Abosso (Aboso)
‘Abura Dunkwa
Accra

'Adamsu

'Adeiso (Adaiso)
Aivinasi

Akim Oda
Anagye near Takoradi
'Ankaful

Apam

Asawinso (Asanwinso)
Assin (Asin)
Attebubu
Bereku
Bimbilla (Bimbila)
Bogasu (Bogosa)
‘Bole

‘Borae

Brimse

Damango

‘Dormaa Ahenkro
Effiduasi
Ejura

Essiam (Esiam)
Gomoa Denkvira
Jachie

Kanda (Accra)
'Klukpo
Korforidua
Kparigu

Workers Brigade Camps

ertoe

Kumasi

'Kumawu

Kwaamang (Kwamang)
‘Kwadaso

'Kwahu Tafo
Mpataba

'Nabogo

‘New Edubiase
Nungua

'Navrongo
Okponglo

Old Yafo
Omankorpe

Paragu (Parago)
'Salaga

'Saltpond
'Schodumose
Sekondi-Takoradi
Sekyedomase (Sekodumasi)
Somanya

'Sumyani

Tamale

‘Techiman

Tema

‘Tumu

‘Winneba

'Yendi

’Zue-Wa

These camps include proposed as well as functioning
camps and it is not known if all the proposed camps were

actually established.

Such uncertainty is a result of the

fact that the names were gathered from newspaper articles,
which did not always follow through on previously mentioned
items. Nevertheless, the listing should give an almost com-
plete picture. Of the sixty-two listed here, twenty-three
were mentioned only once and these are designated by ‘.

The rest, being mentioned more than once, were definitely
functioning since articles related activities the camps were
involved in. In 1966, the Kom Commission reported that there

were seventy camps.

129

National Organizers

1. Brigadier A.J.D. Turner lst National Organizer from
March, 1958, to 4th October,
1959

2. Mr. John K. Tettegah 2nd National Organizer from

9th October, 1959, to
13th April, 1960

3. Mr. J. E. Ababio 3rd National Organizer from
14th April, 1960, to
6th August, 1963

4. Lt. Col. Musa Kuti 4th National Organizer from
6th August, 1963, to
16th May, 1966

5. Air Commodore 5th and last National Organizer
J.E.S. de Graft-Hayford' from January, 1967 -

Source: Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into
the Functions, Operations and Administration of the
Workers Bri ade, Appendix VIII.

‘J.E.S. de Graft-Hayford was appointed during the
time when the Rom Commission was still in progress. The
report from this Commission did not include him in this
listing. According to the Ghanaian Times, l/10/67, he took
office in January, 1967, and apparently held the office un-
til the Brigade was finally disbanded in 1971.

130

STRUCTURE OF TEE BRIGADE

 

 

[ National Headquarters

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Administration
1. Operations 5. Accounts/Audit
2. Main Secretariat 6. Education/Welfare
3. Records .7. Publicity and
4. Quartermaster Publications
1 __'_ _T
l a p, T l
1 2 3
Agriculture Construction Industrial
1. Arable Farming 1. Surveying l. Tailoring
Serials Pulses, Section 2. Upholstery
etc. 2. Draughtmanship 3. Shoe Making
3. Carpentry 4. Weaving
2' gifntafionrgggzing 4. Masonry 5. Carving
citrfig cashew ’ 5. Plumbing 6. Sewing
m o ’ nd ’ 6. Blacksmithy 7. Mechanical
ing Q In 7. Steel Bending Transport
P a n a 8. Painting 8. Cabinet
3. Livestock 9. Electrical Works Making

Poultry, piggery,
rabbits, cattle
and sheep

Source: Repprt of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into
tpe_Functions, Operations anduxdministrationrof
,the WorkersfiBrigade, Appendix VI, p. 93.

131

Table 5 A

Unemployed in municipal and urban councils in Ghana, 1960:
Ages 15-24 and 15+ from these councils

I

 

‘ “

Unemployed, ages 15—24
"as“a per cent of unem-

 

 

Unemployed ployed, ages, 15+ in
Region and age M F these councils
Sekondi-Takoradi
total 15+ 4,656 2,144 3926 _ 57 74
15-17 541 675 6 00 °
18-19 661 358
20-24 1,293 398
Cape Coast
total 15+ 1,693 1,723 1761 a 51 55
15-17 239 413 3416 ' °
18-19 200 228
20-24 381 300
Swedru
total 15+ 447 432 §Q§’- 68 94
15-17 105 164 879 ‘
18-19 93 69
20-24 101 74
Nyakrom-Nkun
total 15+ 513 272 577 - 73 50
15-17 129 115 785 ’
18-19 82 62
20-24 138 51
Tarkwa-Abosso
total 15+ 1,595 472 1241 3 60 04
15-17 254 173 2067 °
18-19 239 82
20-24 415 78
Accra
total 15+ 14,235 9,184 13733 3 58 64
15-17 1,646 2,326 23419 '
18-19 1,954 1,534
20-24 4,272 2,001
Tema Development Corp.
total 15+ 991 283 758 B 59 50
15-17 94 66 1274 '
18-19 128 61
20-24 330 79
Nsawam
total 15+ 652 461 720 3 64 69
15-17 112 135 1113 '
18-19 116 91
20-24 170 96

132

Table 6 B

Unemployed in municipal and urban councils in Ghana, 1960:
Ages 15-24 and 15+ from these councils

 

Unemployed, ages 15-24
as a per cent of unem-

 

Unemployed ployed, ages, 15+ in
Region and age M F theSe councils
New Juaben
total 15+ 1,056 665 1255 72 92
15-17 180 219 1721 °
18-19 193 147
20-24 358 158
Oda Swedru
total 15+ 1,306 490 1182 65 81
15—17 265 231 1796 '
18-19 198 100
20-24 302 86
Keta
total 15+ 355 363 .451 63 23
15-17 73 91 718 ’
18-19 54 50
20-24 92 94
Obuasi
total 15+ 677 237 570 62 36
15-17 139 75 914 '
18-19 108 43
20-24 171 34
Kumasi
total 15+ 7,316 3,234 6871 65 13
15-17 1,211 1,185 10550 '
18-19 1,164 592
20-24 2,071 648
Sunyani
total 15+ 384 108 315, 64 02
15-17 71 44 492 '
18-19 58 20
20-24 101 21
Tamale
total 15+ 2,167 598 1293 46 76
15-17 264 166 27 5 '
18-19 188 77
20-24 475 123

133

Females, ages 15-24, in municipal and urban councils:
population and unemployed

 

Total
unemployed,
Population Unemployed A11 females males and
of females, females, ages 15+ females in

 

Region ages 15-24 ages 15-24 unemployed each region
Sekondi-

Takoradi 12,225 1,431 2,144 6,800
Cape Coast 5,208 941 1,723 3,416
Swedru 2,087 307 432 879
Nyakrom—Nkun 2,037 228 272 785
Tarkwa-Abosso 4,968 333 472 2,067
Accra 39,666 5,861 9,184 23,419
Tema 2,756 206 283 1,274
Nsawam 2,704 322 461 1,113
New Juaben 5,047 524 665 1,721
Oda Swedru 4,912 417 490 1,796
Rate 2,749 235 363 718
Obuasi 2,743 152 237 914
Kumasi 22,744 2,425 3,234 10,550
Sunyani 1,381 85 108 492
Tamale 5,965 366 598 2,765

TOTAL 117,192 13,833 20,664 58,709

134

Table 7-2

Females, ages 15-24, in municipal and urban councils:
percentages on population and unemployed

 

Unemployed Unemployed
females, 15-24, females, 15-24,
as a per cent as a per cent

Females,
15-24, as a

 

per cent of of all females, of total
total popu- 15+ unem- unemployed,
lation in ployed in 15-24, males
Region region region and females
Sekondi-

Takoradi .99 66.74 21.04
Cape Coast 9.15 54.61 27.55
Swedru 10.16 71.06 34.93
Nyakrom—Nkun 8.53 83.82 29.04
Tarkwa-Abosso 10.08 55.51 12.68
Accra 1.02 63.82 25.03
Tema 10.16 72.79 16.17
Nsawam 9.08 69.85 28.93
New Juaben 9.38 78.80 30.45
Oda Swedru 9.35 85.10 23.22
Keta 9.25 64.74 32.73
Obuasi 10.32 64.14 16.63
Kumasi 10.42 74.98 22.98
Sunyani 8.73 78.70 17.28
Tamale 10.25 61.20 13.24

10.19 66.94 23.56

 

 

 

135

Table 8.1.

Males, ages 15-24, in municipal and urban councils:
population and unemployed

 

 

Total
.unemployed,
Population Unemployed A11 males' males and
of males, males, ages 15+ females in

 

Region ages 15-24 ages 15-24 unemployed each region
Sekondi- A

Takoradi 13,988 2,495 4,656 6,800
Cape Coast 6,461 820 1,693 3,416
Swedru 20,545 2,275 299 447
Nyakrom-Nkun 1,654 349 513 785
Tarkwa-Abosso 5,259 908 1,595 2,067
Accra 47,454 7,872 14,235 23,419
Tema 3,530 552 991 1,274
Nsawam 2,514 398 652 1,113
New Juaben 6,114 731 1,056 1,721
Oda Swedru 4,453 765 1,306 1,796
Rate 2,640 219 355 718
Obuasi 2,980 418 677 914
Kumasi 27,171 4,446 7,316 10,550
Sunyani 1,782 230 384 492
Tamale 5,122 927 2,167 2,765
TOTAL 133,398 21,429 38,043 58,709

136

Table 8.2.

Males, ages 15—24, in municipal and urban councils:
percentages on population and unemployed

 

 

’Unemployed
Males, Unemployed males, 15-24,
15-24, as a males, 15-24, as,a per cent
per cent of as a per cent. of unemployed,
total popu- of all males, '15-24, males
lation in unemployed in and females
Region region region in region
Sekondi-

Takoradi 11.34 53.59 36.69
Cape Coast 11.35 48.43 24.00
Swedru 11.07 66.89 34.02
Tarkwa-Abosso 10.67 56.93 43.93
Accra 12.22 44.89 27.28
Tema 13.01 55.70 43.33
Nsawam 8.44 61.04 35.76
New Huaben 11.36 69.22 42.48
Oda Swedru 8.48 58.58 42.59
Keta 8.88 61.69 30.50
Obuasi 11.21 61.74 45.73
Kumasi 12.45 60.77 42.14
Sunyani 11.27 52.86 46.75
Tamale 8.80 42.78 33.53

11.60 56.33 36.50

 

 

 

137

Explanatory Notes for 1960 census data in Ghana,
Tables 6—8 . .

A11 places listed in the census-as municipal and
urban councils were included here, omitting those designated
as local councils. More specifically,.”There are fifteen
local councils which we may regard as 'urbanized', that is
with more than half of their total population residing in
towns of 5, 000 population or over." (John Hunter, Popula-
tion Growth in Ghana, 1948-60, p. 276). All councils are
found in tables under the heading of region.

Population for all areas of Ghana, local, municipal
and urban, was 6,726,815. Of this total, the municipal and
urban councils represent 17%.

Totals for Tables 6-8 which are percentages were
derived as in the following example:

Table 1 -

_gmles and females, ages 15-24 in region 87 120 =
Total population in Accra region ‘ §§§?§§€' 22°43

The males and females, ages 15-24, in the municipal
and urban councils represent 4% of the population in all
these councils, that is 250,590.

Total unemployed in all regions was 760,130, which
is 11.3% of the population.

Total males and females, 15-24, unemployed in munici-
pal and urban councils was 35,262 which is 5% of the unem-
ployed in all of Ghana.

_Males and females, 15-24, urban and municipal areas
Total population, all age groups, urban and municipal
councils

250 590

1,149,62 = 21°79 0f the Population in these councils

138

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