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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PLANNING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
EFFECT OF THE SIX MOST RECENT OLYMPIC GAMES

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ABSTRACT

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PLANNING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT EFFECT OF THE SIX MOST RECENT OLYMPIC GAMES

By

Park, Myong Hyun

One of the difficulties the Olympic Games encountered of late was the huge cost of staging the largest world event. Since World War II, all Olympics--save the London games of '48 and the L.A. games of '84--were losing propositions. Staging the Games thus could result in the depletion of the host city resources, and the Games could leave their host city with a large amount of debt. How should a host city plan and prepare for the Games to reduce deficit and achieve its long-range goals?

The study used a case study research method and reviewed academic literature, journals, periodicals and newspapers to analyze the planning and urban development effects of the Olympic Games and to suggest steps that should be incorporated in the planning of the Games.

The Comparative analysis of the planning process and urban development effects of each of the six most recent Olympics revealed that the Games contributed much to the development of the host city when the Games were planned and prepared for in connection with the comprehensive and long range urban development planning and priorities of the city.

This paper is dedicated to
my country, my family,
and those who love the Olympics

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Appreciation is also noted to my motherland which made me what I am.

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CHAPTER 1

THE BASIS OF THE STUDY

A. The Problem

Since the French Baron de Coubertin revived the modern Olympic Games in 1896, the Games enjoyed growth and expansion. The increased number of events, competitors and spectators enhanced the status of international youth in terms of physical performance and the moral virtues underlying amateur sport. The Games contributed to international peace and understanding by inviting athletes from around the world to a competition every four years (Sanyal, 1970: 31). The Games thus became a part of modern civilization and the most important social phenomenon of modern times (Segrave & Chu, 1981: 22).

In spite of the noble ideals, phenomenal growth in size and popularity of the Games, the modern Olympic Games had some problems: chauvinism, political and commercial exploitation, and growing economic cost. Various proposals were made to save the Olympics from serious crisis. An important feature of the proposals was the call for a permanent site for the Games. It seemed clear, however, that Coubertin's original idea was to stage the Games in a wide

variety of locales to carry the message of Olympism throughout the world, which was limited by the cost of hosting the Games.

One of the difficulties the Olympic Games encountered of late was the huge cost of staging the largest world event. To cite some examples, Tokyo (1964) spent \$2.7 billion (Cicarelli and Kowarsky, 1973: 3), Munich (1972) \$600 million (U.S. News & World Report, 8/21/1972: 58), Montreal (1976) \$2 billion (Forbes, 4/15/1976: 47), and Moscow (1980) spent more than \$3 billion (Smith, 1980: 68).

Since World War II, all Olympics--save the London games of '48 and the L.A. games of '84--were losing propositions. In economic terms, since the benefit/cost ratio of the Olympics was clearly less than 1 (Cicarelli and Kowarsky), the Olympic Games too often meant ruinous debt for the host cities, which made citizens of Denver and Zurich reject the chance to host the Olympics (Zotti, 1983: M-24).

Staging the Olympic Games, with the construction of facilities necessary for conducting two weeks of sports events, could result in the depletion of the host city resources. The Games sometimes left their host city with a large amount of debt and/or new unwanted facilities, which might mean that no country or city would make a bid for hosting the Games, and which might check the development of the Olympic movement. Another possibility which a large amount of cost of hosting the Games might bring is that hosting the Games will be the monopoly of some rich

countries and cities which hosted the Games and/or which have good facilities of sports, transportation and accommodations. To avoid the above two situations and guarantee the continued development of the Olympic movement, a country and city must be able to get many benefits from the staging of the Games. Here rises a problem; how does the host city utilize the Olympics to achieve its long-range goals or objectives and thus justify the staging of the Games?

B. The Purpose of the Study

This study was designed to investigate the relation between the planning for the preparation of the Olympic Games and the effects of the Games on the host city development. It was assumed that the planning process of the Olympics had close relation to the effects of the Games on the host city's development. It was also assumed that the planning process had some independent variables and that the effects of the Games involved some dependent variables. The identification of the independent variables and dependent variables was a step in this analysis.

This study also aimed to suggest some possible recommendations and guidelines for the planning for the preparation of the future Olympic Games, which will help to solve recurring problems related to the Olympics and contribute to the development of the Olympic movement.

The major emphasis was placed on the planning process of the Games and the effects of the Olympic Games on the development of the host city. Economic and social effects of the Olympics influencing the development of the host city indirectly, however, were not investigated in this study for the purpose of simplification.

To summarize, the study was designed to suggest steps that should be incorporated into the planning of the Olympic Games in order that the Games may be used as one of urban development strategies.

C. The Design of the Study

The study was designed to analyze the relation between the planning process of the Olympic Games and the host city development effects. For the sake of the above objective, this study:

1. reviewed the concepts and stimulants of urban development.
2. analyzed the planning process of the six most recent Olympics in chronologic order from the Tokyo Olympics (1964) to the Los Angeles Olympics (1984) in terms of the following independent variables:
 - a) purpose of hosting the Games;
 - b) type of the leading planning organization;
 - c) range of the planning;

- d) extent of financial support of the central government; and
 - e) extent of citizens' participation.
3. Examined the urban development effects of the games in terms of the following dependent variables:
- a) sports and recreation effect;
 - b) transportation effect;
 - c) housing effect;
 - d) tourism effect; and
 - e) other benefits.
4. Suggested some steps that should be incorporated into the planning for the future Games.

D. The Study Hypothesis

In light of the heritage, prestige, spectacle, and world-wide appeal of the Olympics, "few human institutions have been as durable, widespread, and imaginative as the modern Olympic Games" (Lucas, 1980:9). The host cities by and large prepared for the Games for more than five years and bore a huge amount of cost for the two-week period of competition.

Cicarelli and Kowarsky (1973:5) observed that

the Olympic Games could generate sizable economic benefits to the host community. In addition, the Olympic Games rewarded the host city with non-pecuniary benefits such as prestige, international recognition and confidence of the people.

Using the above premise, the following hypothesis was developed: the Olympic Games contribute to urban development

of the host city when the Games are prepared in connection with the comprehensive and long-range urban development planning and priorities of the city.

E. Definition of Basic Terms Used
in the Study

This paper was written, for the most part, in layman's language. To make the meaning of certain concepts clear, some of the terms and concepts involved in this study were explained in this section.

1. The Olympic Games means the modern summer Olympic Games. The Winter Games were held since 1920. The analysis of the Winter Games was excluded from this study because they were small in scale and not general in their locations.
2. Host city refers to the city which staged the Olympic Games or which was selected as a site for the Olympic Games.
3. Host community refers to the host city plus its Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) which garner the most direct effects of the Olympics.
4. Planning means arrangement of preparation undertaken by the host city, the host country and the host Olympic Organizing Committee. The preparation includes making a bid for hosting the Games.
5. Planners are designated as those people engaged in the process of planning. They usually belong to the

government--central, state, city--or the Olympic organizing committee.

6. Effects of the Olympic Games are the favorable and unfavorable results of the Games which the host city or country obtains.

CHAPTER 2

THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

A. The Definition of Urban Development

The concept of development differs from one person to another as well as from one country to another. Development implies improvement, growth, and change (Christenson and Robinson, 1980: 7). It is concerned conventionally with the transition from less advanced to more advanced social stages, and the concept of development as applied to society is a very complex one. Development when treated as a normative concept, is almost synonymous with improvement. In this context, development means social transformation in the direction of advancing to a better state or quality, or increasing productivity. Development as growth involves technological and economic transformation, focusing on economic prosperity; as social change it means putting a particular ideological orientation into action to restructure the social normative and economic order for desired ends (Christenson and Robinson.) Hermansen (1972:8) argues that development is different from social change and the concept of evolution. On the other hand, Seers (1972:24) pleads for a definition of development based on well-being.

To conclude, (development means creating conditions for the realization of personality.)

Urban development also has different meanings to different people. Some important definitions are as follows:

1. Urban development means urbanization or urban growth. Berg et al. (1982: 24-43) explains four stages of urban development: urbanization, suburbanization, desurbanization and reurbanization.
2. Urban development refers to real estate development of urban areas. Smith (1975) uses the term 'urban development' as the meaning of real estate development, which is closely intertwined with building or construction activities.
3. Urban development means urban redevelopment or renewal. Michigan State University Libraries and Public Information book use the urban redevelopment instead of the term 'urban development.'
4. Urban development refers to building new towns. The term 'urban development' of Mandelker's article (1966) of "A Legal Strategy for Urban Development" refers to building new towns.

In this study, the term urban development refers to building or improving roads, utilities, housing, sports and recreation facilities, accommodations, industrial estates, shopping areas and other elements of physical apparatus of a city. Urban development includes urban redevelopment and restructuring.

To conclude, urban development means alleviating urban problems as well as improving urban conditions and enhancing urban amenities, thus making the city a better place to live.

B. Review of Factors Affecting Urban Development

Very few people have tried to study the factors affecting urban development systematically and comprehensively, so very little information appeared in the literature. However, urban development is a very important subject for both urban administrators and urban dwellers. According to Branch,

the great variety of cities throughout the world is self-evident: small, middle sized, and large; old and new; often operating under very different economic, political, social, religious, and cultural conditions. They exist in very different physical environments. One or more of many circumstances may dominate a city at some point in time, but certain situational conditions are of underlying importance at all times in comprehensive urban development (Branch, 1985: 29).

Branch (1985: 29-34) argues that the geographic situation of a city is not only an essential consideration in its initial location but affects its subsequent functioning and shapes physical form. The function the city performs is its most basic feature influencing every aspects of its operation and development. History and culture also affect both the physical character and social characteristics of cities. Natural catastrophes such as

floods and earthquakes, social upheaval, and war may disrupt or stimulate urban development (Rimmer, 1986: 125). Rimmer argues that Japan's urban development is significantly affected by its role in the global economic system. Klaassen (1981:152) emphasizes national economic growth as a stimulant to urban development. Federal or central government subsidies also contribute to urban development (Gelfand, 1975: 120). Hall (1985: 416) contends that "the enterprise zone would represent an extremely drastic last ditch solution to urban problems in U.S.A. and U.K.." Castells (1973: 49), Abu-Lughod (1980: 131-49) and King (1976: 181-209) argue that colonialism contributed to urban development in Latin America, Africa and Southeast Asia.

C. The Relation Between the Olympics and Urban Development

Since the revival of the modern Olympic Games in 1896, 20 Olympic Games were held: Three scheduled Games could not be held because of World War I and II. Seventeen different cities hosted the Games: London, Paris, and Los Angeles each staged them twice.

Through the first third of the twentieth century, the Games were generally staged with a minimum of expense, but the modern games always became more luxurious and larger in terms of the number of participants and events, which contributed to the rising cost of hosting the games. Since the Rome Olympics in 1960, extensive television coverage

placed the host country on the center stage of world attention. Most host countries tried to exploit the Olympic Games, in a sense, as display to promote the country's or city's image within the international community. For the sake of this goal, host cities spent huge amounts of money in carrying out wide-scale urban development programs as well as building direct Olympic facilities. For instance,

Japan spent the incredible sum of \$2.7 billion on the 1964 Olympic Games. Of this amount, only \$70 million went for Olympic facilities; the rest was spent on other projects related to the games (Cicarelli and Kowarsky).

Thus,

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) always objects to Olympic Games expenditures which include the cost of major urban improvements that might not have taken place without the catalyst of the Olympic Games (Lucas, 1980:175).

The Olympic Games made the policy-makers of the host city place a high policy priority on urban development, which promoted to attract investment to improve urban conditions.

CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A. The Conceptualization of the Study

Whatever they said publicly about hosting the Olympic Games, most host cities staged the Games for gains, pecuniary or non-pecuniary. Getting the Olympics and then not fitting them into any context of national and social goals is a gross waste of money, time and energy. The planners of the host city can use the Olympic Games in order to achieve its long-range goals or objectives. How much effect the Olympic Games have on the host city development depends heavily on how the Olympic Games are planned and prepared for. This study was designed to analyze the relationship between the planning of preparation for the Olympic Games and the effects of the Games on the host city development.

B. The Subject of the Study

The bulk of this study was a historical review of the planning process and urban development effects of the Olympic Games. For the purpose of the above objective, the six most recent Olympic Games were reviewed:

1. The Tokyo Olympics (1964)
2. The Mexico City Olympics (1968)
3. The Munich Olympics (1972)
4. The Montreal Olympics (1976)
5. The Moscow Olympics (1980)
6. The Los Angeles Olympics (1984)

Limitations of time and scope of the research required the exclusion of the Olympics prior to the Tokyo Games in 1964 as well as the Winter Olympics from the study. It might be desirable to include all of them, it was assumed, however, that the choices provided in this study were of a diverse enough nature to raise issues and allow conclusions to be drawn with regard to the planning and urban development effects of the Olympic Games.

C. The Study Method

A case study research design was used in this study for investigating the relationship between the planning of preparation for the Olympic Games and the urban development effects of the Games, and for testing that the Olympic Games contributed to urban development of the host city when the Games were prepared for in connection with a comprehensive and long-range urban development planning.

For this study, a case study was deemed the most appropriate research method, because this research was designed to study intensively the background and the results

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of the planning of each of the six most recent Olympic Games.

Statistical means of measuring the effects of the Games upon the host cities by and large was ruled out. It would be extremely difficult to collect appropriate data for the statistical measurement of the six events over the necessary time periods.

D. Study Materials

The following sources were used in obtaining data and background information for the study: academic literature; engineering, planning, economic and business journals; and periodicals and newspapers.

Periodical literature, published between 1963 and 1985, was used as a primary sources of data. Periodicals reviewed were as follows: Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Reports, Sports Illustrated, Business Week, Economist, Advertising Age, Forbes, Sunset, Engineering News-Record, Ramparts, Yachting, New Yorker, Business & Economic Dimensions, Saturday Night, The Nation, The Christian Century, Canadian Dimension, Last Post, Design, National Review, Reader's Digest, Holiday, and Development and Change.

CHAPTER 4

THE STUDY FINDINGS

To meet the study objectives as set forth in Chapter I, this chapter provides a detailed discussion of the study findings: the six most recent Olympic Games from the Tokyo Games to the Los Angeles Games were investigated chronologically in terms of the planning process of the Games and the urban development effects on the host city.

The planning process of the Games was analyzed in terms of the following five independent variables: 1) purpose of hosting the Games; 2) type of the leading planning organization; 3) range of the planning; 4) extent of the financial support of the central government; and 5) extent of citizens' participation. These five independent variables were chosen because they were assumed to influence the urban development effect of the Games most.

Each of these variables was evaluated on the basis of the following scoring criteria:

- 1) Purpose of hosting the Games - urban development effects of the Games varied with purpose of hosting the Games. The more economic benefit planners pursued, the less the urban development effect was,

and the more the planners pursued display, the greater urban development effects. If the main purpose was economic benefit, the assigned value of this variable was 1. If the purpose was display, the assigned value was 5;

- 2) Type of the leading planning organization - though the organizing committee of the country chosen for the celebration of the Games was responsible for the Games and must make all the necessary arrangements (Henry, 1948:325), governments (central, state and city) often played a leading role in planning the Games to utilize the Games according to their purposes of hosting the Games. When the city government played a leading role in planning, it considered urban development more than any other organization. When the organizing committee played a leading role in planning, it considered urban development less than any other organization. If the organizing committee played a leading role in planning, the assigned value of this variable was 1. If the central government played a leading role in planning, the assigned value was 3. If the city government played a leading role in planning, the assigned value was 5;
- 3) Range of the planning - the urban development effects of the Games depended heavily on how the planning of the Games was incorporated in the

comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the host city. The more the planning was incorporated, the greater the urban development effects, and vice versa. If the planners neither incorporated the planning of the Games into the long-range planning and priorities of the host city nor considered the post-Games use of the new facilities, the assigned value of this variable was 1. If the planners considered the post-Games use of the new facilities, the assigned value was 3. If the planners incorporated the planning of the Games into the long-range development planning and priorities of the host city, the assigned value was 5;

- 4) Extent of the financial support of the central government - it cost huge amounts of money to stage the Games. The cost usually exceeded the financial ability of the host city and the organizing committee, which required the financial support of the central government to prepare for the Games more comprehensively. The more the financial support, the greater the urban development effect. Likewise, when there was less financial support, the urban development effects were fewer. If the support was slight, the assigned value of the variable was 1. If the support was moderate, the assigned value was 3. If the support was considerable, the assigned value was 5;

- 5) Extent of citizens' participation - citizens' attitude toward the Games also influenced the urban development effects of the Games. The more positive citizens' attitude, the greater the urban development effect. If the citizens opposed the staging of the Games, the assigned value of this variable was 1. If the citizens neither supported the Games nor opposed the Games, the assigned value was 3. If the citizens supported the Games, the assigned value was 5.

Urban development effects of the Games were investigated in terms of the following five dependent variables:

- 1) Sports and recreation effect;
- 2) Transportation effect;
- 3) Housing effect;
- 4) Tourism effect; and
- 5) Other benefits.

Each of the five variables was evaluated based on the following scoring criterion: If the Games had slight urban development effects on the host city, the assigned value of the variable was 1. If the Games had moderate urban development effects, the assigned value was 3. If the Games had considerable urban development effects, the assigned value was 5.

A. The Tokyo Olympics (1964)

Tokyo was awarded the 1940 summer Olympic Games, but the Games were never held because of the outbreak of World War II. The 18th Olympic Games in 1964 were an event which the Japanese had looked forward for almost a quarter of a century. The Tokyo Olympics were the first Games held in the Orient and also the first live televised Olympics in the U.S. via the NASA-owned Syncom III satellite (Business Week, 4/29/1964: 34).

1. Planning Process of the Games

a) Purpose of Hosting the Games

Since the late nineteenth century, Japan introduced western technology and became industrialized rapidly. After the Sino-Japanese War (1894) and the Russo-Japanese war (1904), which resulted in an expansion of industry, Japan became a strong state and reached out into the larger world to secure raw materials for her factories and markets for her finished products. As a result of her defeat in World War II, many of the facilities of Japan were destroyed and Japan was ruled by the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces (S.C.A.F.). Taking advantage of the Korean War as one of the opportunities for economic recovery, Japan enjoyed unprecedented economic growth and became one of the world's major industrial powers.

Through hosting the Olympic Games, Japan tried to erase forever the international image of Japan as a defeated World

War II aggressor (Newsweek, 9/7/1964: 37). Japanese planners looked on the eighteenth Olympiad as a golden opportunity to demonstrate that Japan was the leading industrial nation in Asia, and the only country in the eastern hemisphere that had both the facilities and energy necessary to stage the Games (U.S. News and World Report, 12/2/1963: 69). Furthermore, many Japanese viewed the Games as a milestone in their country's history. Connery observed that

they saw staging the Games as a sign of Japan's maturity as a modern state, a return to respectability after the dark years of militarism, and an opportunity to show off their nation's talents (Connery, 1961: 38).

Roxborough (1975: 144-5) argues that

one reason for hosting the olympics was that the Japanese had long been a sports-conscious people. Japanese court invited wrestlers from all over the land to participate in Sumo, horse-racing, archery from horseback, football, ball-throwing, and tug-of-war contest as well as swimming and other aquatic sports were practiced eight centuries ago and were depicted by artists of that distant age. Japan held goodwill meets with various countries since the 1920's. The Japanese also hosted such large scale meets as the Third Far Eastern Games (1917), the sixth Far Eastern Games (1923), the ninth Far Eastern Games (1930) and the Third Asian Games (1958). It was the success of the Asian Games that really whetted the sporting desires of the Japanese for the biggest festival of all, the Olympic Games.

Since Japan tried to demonstrate the industrial development of the country and to show off the nation's talents, this variable was given 5.

b) Type of the Leading Planning Organization

The master plan of the Tokyo Olympics was provided by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government when it applied for

hosting the 1964 Olympic Games (The Seoul Metropolitan Government (S.M.G.), 1982: 93). In consideration of the fact that a fourth of the Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee (TOOC) personnel were the city government officials (S.M.G.: 56) and that mayor of Tokyo was sometimes chairman of the TOOC (Zotti), the TOOC and its planning of the Games seemed to be much influenced by the city government. The city government had the State Minister in charge of the Olympics, who was largely responsible for Tokyo's face-lifting (Time, 9/11/1964: 30). Before the Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee was established, the city government, the Japan Amateur Athletic Association (JAAA) and Ministry of Education cooperated with each other and coordinated their plans for the Games. The Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committees, which was inaugurated on September 30, 1959, took over planning and organizing of the Olympic Games (The S.M.G.: 49). The government, central and city, helped the TOOC to do the job.

Since the Tokyo city government played a leading role in planning and preparing for the Games, the variable was given 5.

c) Range of the Planning

The master plan of the Tokyo Olympics, which was provided by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, required that new facilities should be constructed in connection with a long-term urban development planning of the city. The Japanese took the Olympics to provide the impetus for

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appropriating funds and finishing the projects which were long needed. The city council also expressed this idea:

Staging the Olympic Games and the preparation of the Games should contribute to the modernization of Tokyo. Emphasizing the spiritual and educational importance of the Olympic Movement alone can not justify hosting the Games. The Olympic Games should be utilized to recover the declining urban conditions. What Tokyoites really want is not hosting the Olympics but the construction of new Tokyo (S. M. G.:29).

The planners of the Olympic Games integrated the preparation of the Games into the long-range urban development objectives of Tokyo and thus solved many urban problems, so the assigned value of this variable was 5.

d) Extent of the Financial Support of the
Central Government

For the central government, the cabinet minister in charge of the Olympics coordinated major Olympic projects of various agencies. He explained the Olympics planning and projects at cabinet meetings and pursued understanding and supports from the central government level. Every ministry of the government made plans for the matters under its jurisdiction with a consultation with the city government and the TOOC. The central government constructed many new facilities such as the National Gymnasium and the super express Tokaido line which belonged to and which were maintained by the government. The government bore a third of the expense of the TOOC and dispatched some government officials to the TOOC (The S.M.G.: 55-6). Thus, this variable was given 5.

e) Extent of Citizens' Participation

Citizens' participation was very positive. Many civic groups such as the Tokyo Olympics Movement Promotion Council and the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce strived to "promote understanding of the Games, beautify the metropolis, improve public, business and traffic morals, and enhance civic pride (Chapin, 1964). Newsweek depicted then situation of Tokyo as follows:

During the preparation, the dust from a thousand building sites enveloped central Tokyo, the whine of donkey-engine winches, the rattle of rivets and the rumble of cement mixers and dump trucks jangled the nerves of Tokyoites almost beyond endurance, and Tokyo's 10.5 million citizens stumbled over broken concrete and timber-covered streets (Newsweek, 9/7/1964: 36).

Nevertheless, Tokyoites endured and cooperated with the government to make the Games successful. Since citizens of Tokyo supported the Games, the assigned value of this variable was 5.

2. Urban Development Effects of the Games

Tokyo, the world's largest and ugliest city (Kieran et al. 1977:363), was visited by

two great disasters which resulted in heavy casualties--one was the great earthquake and fire of 1923, the other was the air raids during the Second World War. In the first disaster, Tokyo had about 300,000 houses burnt with about 1,500,000 victims. It was most fortunate for Tokyo at that time that great sympathy and assistance were extended to the city not only from within the country but also from many foreign countries, as a result of which reconstruction work under the planning of the central government was completed in seven years and an entirely new modern city was born.

The losses caused by the air raids were far greater than those of the 1923 disaster. Deaths totaled about 100,000; wounded about 130,000; missing about 7,000; and the total number of persons whose homes were destroyed by the air raids about 3,000,000 (Robson, 1968:720-1).

Within ten years after the end of the war, most of the facilities of Tokyo were rehabilitated to the pre-war level or even above that standard. Tokyo, however, was not presentable for the Olympic Games in 1964, and about 3 billion dollars was spent to rebuild much of Tokyo and its highways, railroads, subways and hotel facilities for the Olympics (Newsweek, 10/19/1964: 66). Most of the projects were long needed in this city of more than 10 million.

a) Sports and Recreation Effect.

For the elaborate stadia, gymnasiums and other sports facilities for the Games, Japan spent 62 million dollars (New York Times, 7/5/1964). The organizers gained a valuable backlog of experience by staging the Third Asian Games in Tokyo in 1958. Many events of the Olympic Games were staged at the facilities in the Meiji Shrine Park, now called the Olympic Park, but almost everything was expanded and improved. The National Stadium, seating 60,000, was enlarged at a cost of \$2.8 million to seat 85,000 and accommodate 100,000 spectators in all (Connery: 41). This stadium then boasted a wondrous new electronic scoreboard big enough to flash 500 letters at a time (Newsweek, 9/7/1964: 36).

The Olympic Park was the central unit of a sports complex that included a new metropolitan gymnasium, a

handsome swimming pool and even the Prince Chichibu Rugby Ground. Dominating the Olympic Tokyo was Architect Kenzo Tange's shell-shaped National Gymnasium Complex, with annex, specially built for the Olympics by the Japanese Government at a cost of close to six million dollars. Inside the structures were accommodations for gymnastics, basketball, swimming, diving and Judo matches (Time, 9/11/1964: 39).

In addition to the facilities already mentioned, Japanese organizers also provided facilities for fencing, weight-lifting and shooting, as well as practice fields for track athletes and parking lots for thousands of cars.

Clearly, the Olympic Games left behind excellent sports facilities for the young people of Japan.

The Olympic village was built on a 227-acre site at Asaka, known as Camp Drake when it was the site for the American security forces in Tokyo, a little more than nine miles from the Olympic Park. At a cost of \$8.3 million, the Tokyo housing agency and Japan's aptly named Self-Defense Forces erected 55 dormitory buildings, most of them four stories high, to house 9,000 athletes and 3,000 Boy Scouts and servicemen who helped run the village (Connery: 38).

The larger part of the Olympic village area, 130 acres, was made into a park at a cost of \$2 million. Nine of 55 buildings that were used as dormitories for the Olympics were converted into a youth center which was run by the Ministry of Education (New York Times, 7/30/1967: VII, 1: 6).

Since the Games had considerable sport and recreation effects on Tokyo, this variable was given 5.

b) Transportation Effect

The job of transporting millions of spectators and the contestants to and from the stadiums was always extremely important to stage the Games successfully.

To solve the traffic problem, the national and city governments invested a huge amount of money in transport projects.

Japanese National Railway's 320-mile Tokaido line between Tokyo and Osaka was completed in time for the Olympic Games. Along the Tokaido route were concentrated 40 percent of Japan's population and 70 percent of its industrial output. The existing route was one of the most jammed rail lines in the world, with as many as 120 passenger trains and up to 80 freight trains a day (Business Week, 9/26/1964: 124). The need for the new Tokaido line was particularly pressing. The key to constructing the super-speed railroad lay in making the route as straight and flat as possible. Thus,

the super express Tokaido line cuts through 67 tunnels, crosses 3,000 bridges, and travels some 62 miles on elevated track. The cost was close to \$1.1 billion, which was financed by the Japanese government with a loan from the World Bank (Business Week, 9/26/1964: 125).

The super express, with stops at Nagoya and Kyoto, cuts rail time between Tokyo and Osaka to three hours, and compared with six on the old Tokaido line (Newsweek, 9/7/1964: 36).

A rapid transit link between downtown Tokyo and the international airport was a long-felt need. On the old route through narrow, circuitous streets, the trip was known to require two harrowing hours through heavy traffic. To solve this problem, the government constructed a monorail and an elevated highway. An 8.2-mile monorail, whose cost was \$54 million, reduced travel time to 15 minutes (Business Week, 9/7/1964: 36).

Olympic road-building plans provided 22 new access roads--\$470 million worth--and four super-expressways totaling 73 miles--\$420 million worth (Sports Illustrated, 2/11/1963: 12).

Twenty five miles of new subway--\$25 million worth--was constructed beneath "the random, rickety scab of slums, pachinko parlors and noodle shops" (Time, 9/11/1964: 30).

Since the Games had considerable transportation effects, this variable was given 5.

c) Housing Effect

Unlike other Olympics, Tokyo's Olympic Village was converted into a park and a youth center. But, nearly 10,000 buildings, ranging from four to seven stories in height, mushroomed near the city's center (Time, 9/11/1964).

Though all the new buildings were not used for housing, some of them were assumed to house Tokyoites. Thus, the Games had moderate housing effects and this variable was given 3.

d) Tourism Effect

The Japanese expected 30,000 foreign visitors during the Games. In Tokyo and a 50-mile radius there were only 11,460 beds in Western-style hotels (Sports Illustrated, 2/11/1963: 12). The government pumped \$93 million in loans into the city's hotel industry (Time, 9/11/1964: 39).

Two new hotels--the Otani and the Tokyo Prince added 1,600 rooms to the facilities of the huge new Okura and Tokyo Hilton hotels. Improvements to the 'ryokan,' Japan's traditional inns, added 4,000 more rooms to the total (New York Times, 8/9/1964: V, 6: 4). Through the Olympic Games, Japan was recognized by many westerners as a nice place to visit: the impetus of the Olympics raised the number of tourists of 1964 to 550,000--almost a tenfold increase over 1951 and a gain of virtually 60 percent when compared with the previous year (Chapin, 1964), and Tokyo became one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world (Tokyo Metropolitan Government Municipal Library, 1975: 213) .

Since the Games had considerable tourism effects, this variable was given 5.

e) Other Benefits

Besides refurbishing Tokyo, the Olympics gave Japanese businessmen a good chance to show their goods to the international set. Japan's watch industry undoubtedly got a real boost as a result of the Games;

Seiko Watch-k. Hattori & Co., Japan's biggest watch maker, made considerable hoopla over the fact that it broke a virtual Swiss monopoly in



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being appointed to provide the official timing devices for the games (Business Week, 9/26/1964: 40).

Besides watch, many of Japanese products such as Canon and Nikon cameras and the Sony T.V. set got world-wide fame. Japanese car makers also participated in the Olympic display;

Japan's automobile industry, while not directly exploiting the Olympics in its sales effort, nonetheless timed its annual show that year to wind up just as the Games began. Potential domestic and export customers in Tokyo for the Olympics thus got a glimpse of the latest in Japanese cars (Business Week, 1964b: 40).

On the other hand, the Olympic Games made Tokyoites change their ways of behaving in public such as the consciousness of traffic rules (Trumbull, 1964) and business and public morals (Chapin, 1964). Hundreds of thousands, who studied English and other foreign languages to assist foreigners during the Games, could play the leading role in bringing rapid economic growth of Japan through foreign trade after the Games.

In addition, it was estimated that more than 60,000 foreign visitors left \$31.2 million behind (Newsweek, 10/19/1964).

Since Japan and Tokyo had considerable benefits of the Games, the variable was given 5.

3. Conclusion

The Tokyo Olympics were planned by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government with positive support from the

central government. The planning aimed at civic improvements that were delayed for decades by war, red tape and lack of funds (Newsweek, 1964a: 36). The city government incorporated the planning of preparation for the Games into the comprehensive long-range urban development planning of Tokyo, and thereby improved the urban conditions. The national government assisted in preparing the Games greatly: the central government had a cabinet minister in charge of the Olympics. Distribution of the Olympic costs was commendable: the would-be owner agency of Olympic facilities bore the costs of building the facilities, and the Tokyo Olympic Organizing Committee paid for temporary facilities.

Tokyoites borne the inconvenience caused by the preparation for the Games and cooperated with the government to make the Games successful. The Japanese succeeded in hosting the Games and they were equally satisfied (Killanin & Rodda, 1983: 164). "Without the Olympics, Japan probably would not have risen to its high position in world trade so rapidly," Ryotaro Asuma, then mayor of Tokyo and chairman of the Olympic Organizing Committee, said in 1971 (Zotti, 1983: M-24). The Olympics also offered an arena where public encouragement was given to discipline, exertion, self-sacrifice and self-control--all virtues which the Japanese had prized traditionally but which had been played down in the postwar educational system (Eto, 1974:49).

For the Japanese, the Olympic spending seemed to be a good investment with a double payoff: lavish new public

works and added prestige for the area and the nation as a whole, so they hosted the 1972 Winter Olympics at Sapporo and tried to host the 1988 Summer Olympics at Nagoya.

To conclude, Japan hosted the Olympics to demonstrate the industrial development of the country and to show off the nation's talents. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government made the master plan for the preparation for the Games and incorporated the planning of the Games into the comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the city. The city government enjoyed the support (financial and other) from the central government and the citizens. The Olympic Games gave Tokyo a good opportunity to improve its urban condition. The Tokyo Olympics had considerable development effects on the host city.

The planning process and the urban development effect of the Tokyo Olympics were evaluated in Table 1.

B. The Mexico City Olympics (1968)

In the competition for hosting the 1968 Games, Mexico City had two things in its favor. The Olympics had never been held in a Spanish-speaking country, and the city had an abundance of athletic facilities that could be adapted for the international games (Fortune, 3/1963: 150). The award of the Games of the nineteenth Olympiad to Mexico City caused anger in many areas of the world. The thin air, which comes from the high altitude of Mexico City (7,349 feet or 2,134m

Table 1. Evaluation of the Planning Process and the Urban Development Effect of the Tokyo Olympics.

Planning Process		Urban Development Effect	
Variable	Score	Variable	Score
purpose of hosting the Games	5	sports & recreation effect	5
type of the leading organization	5	transportation effect	5
range of planning	5	housing effect	3
extent of government support	5	tourism effect	5
extent of citizen's participation	5	other benefits	5
Total	25	Total	23

above sea level), would be unfair to sea-level people who were the majority of the nations of the earth and hinder the performance.

1. Planning Process of the Games

a) Purpose of Hosting the Games

Mexico enjoyed a reputation for its political stability and economic maturity during the 1960s. As the first Latin Americans to stage the Olympic Games, the Mexicans tried to show the world that their capital had the facilities and organizing capabilities to do the job right. Zotti argues that

Mexico tried to use the Olympic Games to signal its graduation from the ranks of the developing nations and to convince the visitors that Mexico was no longer the land of 'manana', poverty and Pancho Villa (1983: M24).

Many students, however, felt that for a country with much poverty it was wasteful and misguided to be spending vast sums on the Olympic Games (Killanin & Rodda, 1983: 173).

Since Mexico tried to signal its graduation from the ranks of the developing nations through the Olympics, this variable was given 5.

b) Type of the Leading Planning Organization

The Mexican government played a leading role in planning and preparing for the Games. The federal government spent \$84 million on preparing for the Games, which was over half of the total cost of \$153 million (Business Week, 10/5/1968: 67). The floor-laying of the sports facilities

was a responsibility of the Olympic Organizing Committee, the rest of the construction was carried out by the Ministry of Public Works (Giniger, 1968b). The central government had the right to appoint the mayor of Mexico City (Business Week: 69).

The Mexico City Government was constructing a \$200-million subway (Business Week: 72), so it didn't have financial ability to alter the face of the city to support two weeks of sports. The city government had a minimum responsibility of planning for the Games such as city beautification (Time, 10/18/1968: 79) and water projects, and had only a little preparation for the Olympics to incorporate into the long-rang urban development planning of the city.

The Olympic Organizing Committee was in charge of organizing the Games and floor-laying of the sports facilities. The Committee also developed profitable business such as the sale of concessions, tickets, and television rights. In consideration of the fact that an architect headed the Olympic Organizing Committee (Business Week: 67), it was assumed that the committee focused much of its attention on designing new sports facilities. The committee revived the early Greek custom of sponsoring a "cultural Olympics" in conjunction with the sports (Underwood, 1968: 45).

Since the federal government played a leading role in planning and preparing for the Games, this variable was given 3.

c) Range of the Planning

A delegation of 200 Mexicans traveled to Tokyo to see how the industrious Japanese handled the games. The Mexicans learned that staging the big show could be extremely expensive. The Mexicans decided they would demonstrate to other small nations that a superb Olympiad could be staged at a reasonable cost and that all the new installations would be designed with a view to post-Olympic utility (Fortune: 150-2).

The planners, unlike Tokyo, could not use the Olympics to reorganize or renew the city--the city needed both--because of the limited financial ability (Fortune: 153), and they had only a few of the Olympic preparation programs to incorporate into the city's long-range urban development planning. The planners, however, emphasized the post-Games use of the new facilities. Thus, this variable was given 3.

d) Extent of the Financial Support of the
Central Government

The Mexican government hosted the Games to achieve the national goal of heralding the country's emergence from its "underdeveloped" status (Rand, 1968: 68), so the central government played a leading role in preparing for the Games. The federal government spend \$84 million on preparing the Games, which was over half of the total cost of the \$153

million (Business Week, 10/5/1968: 67), and much of construction work was carried out by the Ministry of Public Works (Giniger, 1968b). Thus, this variable was given 5.

e) Extent of Citizens' Participation

In spite of advertising the slogan of the Olympic Games: "Everything is possible in peace," Many Mexicans suffered from poverty and disease;

the slums of Mexico were teeming and many people died of malaria, pneumonia and dysentery which lurked in the countries of poverty (Hamill, 1968: 22-3).

Mexico also had political problem;

Mexico's young activists did not like President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz' government--it was kept in power through corruption, guns, a system of caciques spread throughout the country, and a smug belief in its own final worth--, and they were trying to bring it down. They were also unable to see any long-range good--economic stimulation, national pride--coming from a \$150 million Olympic expenditure (Underwood).

The members of the "student power" movement threatened to stop the Games by any means necessary, saying that "it seemed ridiculous to them to see a government spend \$80 million on a imperialist spectacle while millions of its citizens lived at sub-human level" (Newsweek, 9/2/1968: 58). In the end, there were rioting, gunplay and a general smashing-up of things on the university city campus (Ottum). Even the IOC and 124 national committees put out a statement which called upon all of the Mexicans to declare a spiritual truce and unite for the Games (Ottum: 43).

Since citizens of Mexico opposed the staging of the Games, this variable was given 1.

2. Urban Development Effects of the Games

Mexico City was a very rapidly growing city: the population of the Mexico City metropolitan area in 1960 was 2.8 million (Gold, 1982: 394), that of 1968 7 million, which caused many urban problems. The city was relatively affluent--its 7-million people had half the nation's cars and telephones for example--but it grew by 250,000 people a year, and it was hard to keep services caught up (Business Week, 1968). Pete Hamill of Ramparts depicted the then situation of Mexico City as follows (Hamill, 1968: 22-3):

One third of all Mexico City's families live in one-room apartments, eating and sleeping and making love in the same fetid hole, sharing a courtyard for their cooking, their washing and their toilet facilities. Another ten percent live in shacks and another fourteen percent are hidden in workers' colonies on the outskirts of the city, without water, electricity or sewage disposal facilities. The three major causes of death are malaria, pneumonia and dysentery, the killers which lurk in the countries of poverty.

Mexico City needed to develop and improve its urban conditions.

a) Sports and Recreation Effect.

The Games left behind many ambitious new buildings;

The Olympics' finest new structure was an \$8-million Sports Palace with a geodesic dome covered with copper, which was designed by a team led by a famous Mexican architect Felix Candela. It was used for the basketball competitions. To give a capacity audience of 23,000 spectators an unobstructed view of the action, the architects

did not use columns to support the roof. Instead, intersecting arches, anchored in sturdy buttresses of reinforced concrete, soared overhead, carrying a roof of plywood sheathed with copper (Fortune, 1963: 152).

Another work in the throes of construction was the combined Olympic swimming pool and gymnasium. Architect Manuel Resen Morrison et al. placed the two large arenas between three parallel rows of massive concrete columns. Cables, strung between the columns, carried a vast, sweeping roof of precast concrete over each arena. As in the Sports Palace, there were no interior columns to block views. Cost of the ingenious building was \$5,600,000 (Fortune).

Across the Sports Palace, an outdoor velodrome, seating 6,500, was constructed. The track of hardwood from the Ivory Coast in Africa had a 39-degree incline in its curves (Giniger, 1968b). To stage the Games, two existing huge stadiums were enlarged and refurbished;

Renamed Olympic Stadium, which was built for the University of Mexico in 1952 and which was the site for track, field, and some of the equestrian events during the games, was enlarged at a cost of \$3,600,000 from 65,000 to 80,000 seats. The other structure, the \$12,800,000 Aztec Stadium, was as brawny as the Olympic Stadium was graceful. Designed by architects Ramirez Vazquez and Rafael Mijares Alcerra expressly for soccer games, it was built by private entrepreneurs and was opened in 1966 (Fortune).

A new canal was created for the Olympic rowing and canoeing events beside the Floating Gardens of Xochimilco. It was twenty-two hundred meters long and a hundred and twenty-five meters wide, with beautiful calm water (Rand).

Since the Games had considerable sports and recreation effects, this variable was given 5.

b) Transportation Effect

Mexico City's transportation mess was very serious. With a growing middle class, more and more cars jammed the streets and city-circling freeways. To relieve this problem, the city was constructing a \$200-million subway scheduled for completion in 1970 (Business Week, 10/5/1968: 66). Much of one hundred and fifty million dollars Mexico spent on the games went toward the construction of athletic facilities rather than public works. Nonetheless, the city did manage to get a peripheral highway built. This highway connected the Olympic facilities which were widely scattered. In addition, modernization of the airport was speeded up and streets got face-lifting (Business Week, 67).

The Games had moderate transportation effects, so this variable was given 3.

c) Housing Effect

The Olympic village was a \$12.4 million apartment complex (Hamill: 23). Twenty nine six- and ten-story red brick and white concrete buildings with six mess halls, two gymnasiums, a track, a shopping center and a clinic, housed 10,000 athletes, team officials and some 2,000 news media personnel (Giniger). The structure was leased from its owner-builder, a government bank, for the duration of the Olympics. Afterward, the bank converted most of the project into a middle-income condominium apartment development (Fortune).

On the other hand, the shantytowns looked better. Inhabitants were given "buckets of free paint, and they responded with a typically Mexican gusto. Some shacks wore bright stripes, others had blazing coats of green or orange" (Time).

The Games provided considerable middle-income housing, but low-income housing was really needed in Mexico City. Thus, this variable was given 3.

d) Tourism Effect

Throughout Mexico, hotel-building went on at a rapid pace. In Mexico as a whole, the Department of Tourism helped finance more than 2,000 new hotel rooms a year in areas away from the customary tourist centers (Farber, 1966).

Four major new hotels were constructed in Mexico City and three old hotels were expanded. In total, some 2,000 new hotel rooms increased (Fortune: 153). The finest of the new hotels was the \$22-million, 715-room Camino Real, jointly owned by Western Internal Hotels of Seattle and its Mexican partners (Fortune).

In addition, there were plans for 100 new motels on the major tourist highways and Mexico submitted a program to the United Nations for the creation of a Maya Trail to run through this country into the forests of Guatemala and Honduras (Farber).

Since the Games had considerable tourism effects, this variable was given 5.

e) Other Benefits

With the Olympics exposing Mexico City's problems along with its modern tempo to world scrutiny, the city undertook a \$400-million urban renewal plan for the downtown area (Business Week). More than 10,000 trees--evergreen, eucalyptus and willow--were planted to shade the principal streets (Gold, 1967:). Water project and communication project were also much improved (Zotti).

Mexico City had moderate benefits of the Games, so this variable was given 3.

3. Conclusion

It could be concluded that the Mexicans planned to stage the Olympic Games at a reasonable cost and that all the new installations were designed with a view to post-Olympic utility. It was noted that the Mexicans planned to stress the often forgotten cultural side of the Olympics.

The Organizing Committee got positive support, financially and administratively, from the central government. The government, however, failed to get citizens' support and understanding of the Olympic Games, which resulted in student demonstrations.

Mexico's ambition to signal its graduation from the ranks of the developing nations through the Olympics exceeded its capabilities, financially and otherwise, by a considerable margin. The central government played a leading role in planning and financing the Games, decided to stage

the Games at a reasonable cost, and designed new installations with a view to post-Olympics utility. The city government, unlike Tokyo, could not use the Olympics to reorganize or renew the city--the city needed both--because of the limited financial ability. A series of student demonstrations destroyed much of the good-will Mexican officials hoped the Olympics would generate.

The planning process and the urban development effects of the Mexico City Olympics were evaluated in Table 2.

C. The Munich Olympics (1972)

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded the 1972 Summer Games to Munich due to well-organized Olympic plans, the cooperative attitude of the city of Munich, the state of Bavaria and the West German Government, and the compactness of the planned Olympic facilities (New York Times, 4/27/1966). The Munich Games were planned and organized elaborately, but the murder of eleven Israeli athletes by eight Palestinian guerrilla fighters during the games made the Munich Games the most tragic in all Olympic history.

1. Planning Process of the Games

a) Purpose of Hosting the Games

West German Chancellor Willy Brandt hoped that the athletic spotlight would illuminate a "new and different Germany" (Kirshenbaum, 1972: 34). The Munich Olympics were

Table 2. Evaluation of the Planning Process and the Urban Development Effect of the Mexico City Olympics.

Planning Process		Urban Development Effect	
Variable	Score	Variable	Score
purpose of hosting the Games	5	sports & recreation effect	5
type of the leading organization	3	transportation effect	3
range of planning	3	housing effect	3
extent of government support	5	tourism effect	5
extent of citizen's participation	1	other benefits	3
Total	17	Total	19

the first return of the Summer Games to Germany since the Berlin Olympiad in 1936. Hitler went all out to turn the Olympic competition into a "pompous extravaganza reflecting his vision of Nazi grandeur" (Lucas, 1980: 121-2). But this time around, the approach was more modest. From the outset, Willi Daume, the head of the West German Olympic Committee, pleaded for "a show of moderation and tact that would expunge impressions which were prejudicial to Germany's good name since 1936" (Newsweek, 4/10/1972: 32). Vogel, Mayor of Munich, who was the force behind the successful efforts to bring the Olympics to Munich, was interested in the aftermath of the Games (Birnbaum, 1972: 30), and the city had a master plan to use the Olympics to accomplish a "great leap forward" (Time, 9/4/1972: 37).

In short, the Germans wanted to display the country's post-war economic miracle, to achieve physical improvements in the city, and to erase the memory of the 1936 Nazi Olympics in Berlin. Thus, this variable was given 5.

b) Type of the Leading Planning Organization

The city government was in charge of overall planning of the Games. Munich's mayor, Vogel played a key role in bringing the Olympics to Munich (The Economist, 7/29/1972: 55) with a well-developed preparation planning for the Games. The Olympic Organizing Committee was in charge of organizing the Games and money-raising schemes. Revenues from lotteries, the sale of commemorative coins, and tickets and television income accounted for two thirds (The

Economist: 55) of the huge Munich Games cost of \$780 million (Lucas: 204). The city government, however, played a leading role in planning and preparing for the Games, so this variable was given 5.

c) Range of the Planning

The Munich Olympic plans were part of an over-all design to improve public facilities in the city (New York Times). The Olympic planners took great care to see that the buildings would still be useful after the games were over. For instance, the stadium had a capacity of only 80,000, which was small for the Olympics; a bigger one might subsequently have become an expensive white elephant (The Economist: 54). The city of Munich had a master plan to use the Olympics to accomplish a "great leap forward," and incorporated the preparation for the Games into the comprehensive long-range urban development and priorities of the city. The Olympic Games helped provide many facilities which were long needed in Munich. Thus, this variable was given 5.

d) Extent of the Financial Support of the
Central Government

The federal and state governments helped the city government and the Organizing Committee to plan and organize the Games. They assumed a large part of the costs: A third of the total cost was originally scheduled to be split three ways between the Bonn, Bavarian and Munich city governments, but the Bonn government carried half the cost; Munich and

Bavaria shared the rest with the help of a small contribution from the regional government of Schleswig-Molstein and the city of Kiel, where the sailing events took place (The Economist). The West German Defense Ministry donated the services of 22,000 Army troops to do maintenance, clean-up and administrative work. The armed forces also lent, without charge, 17 million dollar's worth of furniture for the Olympic Village (U.S. News & World Report, 8/21/1972: 58). A special agency composed of city, state and federal officials was formed to deal with the problems that would arise during the preparation for the Games (New York Times, 4/28/1966).

Since the financial support of the central government was considerable, this variable was given 5.

e) Extent of Citizens' Participation

Some motorists complained about the inconvenience caused by six unrelenting years of construction ((Lucas: 205), but the city had the fervor for the Games (Ottum, 1966: 68). It seemed that the citizens neither participated in preparing for the Games positively nor opposed the staging of the Games. Thus, this variable was given 3.

2. Urban Development Effects of the Games

Allied bombs destroyed 45 percent of Munich during World War II. With a characteristic sense of their own history, "Münchner rebuilt their town, stone for stone,

gargoyle for gargoyle, in the likeness of the past" (Birnbaum: 38).

Munich was one of West Germany's fast-growing cities and had one of the worst traffic problems in the country. It also suffered from the shortage of housing and recreation facilities (New York Times).

a) Sports and Recreation Effect

The Munich Olympics left behind many sports and recreation facilities;

One of them was the Olympic Park, a 740-acre area in the northern section of the city, less than 3 miles from the city's heart. The park area, previously known as the Oberwiesenfeld, was an undeveloped tract which once was the site of Munich's first airport but later degenerated into a combination of tiny private garden plots and dumping grounds. After World War II, one end of the area was used to pile up tons of rubble left from Allied bombing raids (Newsweek).

About five thousand workmen turned this ugly heap into a vast park of graceful hills and verdant meadows, planted 5,000 trees and added a lake and playgrounds (Birnbaum) at a cost of \$400 million (Newsweek).

The center of the eye-dazzling sports complex was the Olympic Stadium which accommodated 80,000 (including 33,000 standees) and which was used for soccer matches and other events after the Games (U.S. News and World Report). Besides that, the Olympic Park included many facilities;

A javelin throw away was the swimming stadium, which was built with 80 percent of its structure underground lest it appear too imposing. It had five pools on two levels, and a high-diving platform. Over a nearby ridge was the cycle stadium, a space-age affair that looked as if it

could land on the Sea of Tranquility. The main walkaway in the Olympic Park was a kind of carnival midway with restaurant, beer garden, refreshment booths, street theaters, pantomimists, painters, puppet shows and folk dancing. In addition, there were a wrestling hall, shooting range, basketball courts and equestrian grounds (Time).

Since the Games had considerable sports and recreation effects on the city, this variable was given 5.

b) Transportation Effect

Munich had a very serious traffic problem. The city center was redesigned to eliminate all traffic from the main shopping area. The traffic was syphoned off into the inner motorway (The Economist: 54). To help transport the throngs of spectators, a 6-mile subway was built with the assistance of the federal government. Railway lines were extended to improve commuter service for 30 miles in all directions. New roads and superhighways were built at a cost of some 50 million dollars (U.S. News and World Report: 59). A new airport was provided to deal with an increasing volume of traffic (Shabecoff, 1966).

Since the Games had considerable transportation effects, this variable was given 5.

c) Housing Effect

Nearly 7,000 new housing units were constructed for the Olympic athletes, officials and press (U.S. News and World Report: 59). To break up the rigid sight of one tall dormitory after another, smaller, cozier housing was incorporated into the village complex (Amdur, 1972). After

the Games, about 2,000 of those units were used by the University of Munich for student housing, the rest were sold or rented for private use (U.S. News and World Report).

Since the Games had considerable housing effects, this variable was given 5.

d) Tourism Effect

German officials expected 1.5 million visitors during the Games. The no. 1 headache of the German Organizing Committee was housing problem for the people who were able to get tickets (Durso, 1972). Before the Games, Munich had about 15,500 hotel beds plus 5,000 in tourist homes and elsewhere (Shabecoff). About 10,000 new hotel rooms were added in anticipation of the Olympics (U.S. News and World Report): hotel building was booming even more than in London (The Economist). Several famous hotels such as the Sheraton Hotel, the Hilton Hotel and the Holiday Inn were opened at the time.

The Games had considerable tourism effects, so this variable was given 5.

e) Other Benefits

One of the Bonn government's economists calculated that the extra tax revenue generated by the business springing directly or indirectly from the Olympics brought in an extra 49 million marks, more than offsetting the large federal spending on the event (The Economist). Through the Olympics,

many German products such as BMW, Siemens, Adidas and Puma became more famous internationally (Gonzales, 1972: 61-2).

Virtually every major German construction company had a hand in the building work, and altogether 400 different building firms were involved (The Economist).

Munich had considerable benefits of the Games, so this variable was given 5.

3. Conclusion

The city government played a leading role in planning the Games. The Olympic planners prepared for the Games as part of an over-all design to improve public facilities in the city, and they certainly considered the future use of the new facilities.

The German Organizing Committee financed two thirds of the total Olympic cost through elaborate money-raising schemes, which showed a possibility of self-financing of the Games.

The federal and the state governments' support was very positive, financially or otherwise, but citizens' participation and support seemed not to be positive. It was generally agreed that the Munich Games were well-organized and successful. As a periodical pointed out, the real winner of the 1972 Games was Munich: the city paid only 48-million dollars of the 780-million dollar total bill for staging the Games. In return, the city of 1.3 million people winded up with 420 million dollars' worth of new roads, railroads,

subways, buildings and recreation facilities. Without the Games, officials said, it would have taken nearly two decades to finance all these improvements (U.S. News and World Report).

With a view to display Germany's post-war economic miracle and achieve the physical improvements in Munich, the city government played a leading role in planning for the overall preparation of the Games with the supports from the federal and state governments. The Olympic Organizing Committee was in charge of organizing the Games and fund-raising programs.

The city had a master plan to use the Olympics to accomplish a "great leap forward." The citizens did not oppose the staging of the Games, but complained of the inconvenience caused by six unrelenting years of construction. To conclude, the Munich Olympics had considerable urban development effect on the host city

The planning process and the urban development effects of the Munich Olympics were evaluated in Table 3.

D. The Montreal Olympics (1976)

Contrary to the Mayor of Montreal's expectation that the Montreal Games would save the Olympic movement from such troubles as political wrangling, propaganda ploys, security fears and stupendous cost (Peerman, 1975: 1148), the Montreal Games dampened the Olympic spirits:

Table 3. Evaluation of the Planning Process and the Urban Development Effect of the Munich Olympics.

Planning Process		Urban Development Effect	
Variable	Score	Variable	Score
purpose of hosting the Games	5	sports & recreation effect	5
type of the leading organization	5	transportation effect	5
range of planning	5	housing effect	5
extent of government support	5	tourism effect	5
extent of citizen's participation	3	other benefits	5
Total	23	Total	25

1) A fourth of the 119 countries expected to participate dropped out before or during the Games for political reasons (Axthelm, 1976: 61);

2) More than 16,000 Canadian soldiers and police had to be mustered to deal with possible terrorist activities at a cost of at least 150 million dollars (Yalowitz, 1976: 16);

3) Montreal and Quebec Province spent nearly 1.5 billion dollars on Olympic facilities, which resulted in an estimated billion-dollar deficit and the delay of vitally needed public works (Yalowitz);

For all of these reasons, it was proposed that the Olympics be located permanently in one country--perhaps Greece, where the Games originated--with all participating countries helping to pay the costs (Yalowitz: 17).

1. Planning Process of the Games

a) Purpose of Hosting the Games.

Montreal's Mayor Jean Drapeau was touted as a national hero and possible future prime minister for his role in bringing Expo to the city (McMurty, 1973: 58). He also played a leading role in bringing the Olympics to Montreal because he thought the Olympics would do even more for Montreal than Expo'67.

Drapeau, who had no sports background, got the Olympic fever quite accidentally in the summer of 1963 (Wallace, 1972). The Mayor was in Lausanne checking out plans for the forthcoming Swiss National Exposition, Expo'64. On the way

to the Mayor of Lausanne's office. Drapeau looked at the building plaque which read "Comite International Olympique." The Mayor went inside and took the time to look around the IOC that day, particularly the museum. "That was the start. A spark was lit in the Mayor's mind" (Auf der Maur, 1976b: 22).

Montreal made a bid for the 1972 Summer Games, but the '72 Games were awarded to Munich. "Drapeau was upset, even humiliated at the defeat" (Deford, 1970: 79). In the next four years, Mayor Drapeau and his associates carefully "plotted to wean, cajole, influence, impress and win over the IOC members--at Expo, in Mexico City, at other IOC meetings, at the homes of the delegates" (Deford). In Amsterdam in 1970, Mayor Drapeau won the games for Montreal (Katz, 1970).

The primary reason the IOC selected Montreal over its competitors for the 1976 Summer Olympics had little to do with logical considerations such as the ability to stage and to finance the Games. Rather, it was a decision caught up in politics. When it came time to choose the site, the U.S. and Russia (represented by Los Angeles and Moscow) were the only other contenders that could afford the Olympics. Eager to avoid involvement in East-West political skirmishes, the IOC gratefully chose neutral Canada (Johnson, 1974: 31). To justify its decision, the IOC claimed it was impressed by Montreal's idea of a "more modest, less expensive setting," a return of the Games to a "human scale" (Katz).

When Drapeau was interviewed just prior to the opening of the Games, he referred to "the incentive for youth to love and participate in amateur sports as one of the main reasons for bringing the Games to Canada" (ABC Sport, 7/17/1976). He intended to make the Games "an event with charm" and of such "modest and human scale" that even poor countries would be encouraged to host future Olympics (Peerman). The Montreal Games were to be staged with "simplicity, dignity, and a real grandeur of friendship of peoples" (Katz). Montreal was to assume its "symbolic role of promoting a healthy, bicultural Canadianism and the city's image within the international community" (New York Times, 5/13/1970: 53:1).

The inspiration for the Games came from one desire: the Mayor's ambition to make Montreal "The First City of the World" (Kirshenbaum, 1976: 93). Drapeau stated that

there is no challenge too great for Montreal . . . Montreal is en route to becoming the City of the World. Twenty years from now, no matter what happens, it will have achieved this position, and it will be referred to in all parts of the world as The City (Deford: 76).

Another real motivation of Montreal was suggested by Bruce Kidd, who wrote that Drapeau's Olympic plan indicated a deliberate preference "for political monuments rather than social betterment" (Kidd, 1970: 10). The fact that the Olympic stadium in Montreal was to be the "grandest of all the domed stadiums would seem to provide support to this theory." With this in mind, it became obvious to Drapeau

that the "only suitable encore to Expo'67 was the Olympiad" (Auf der Maur: 22).

Since the Mayor's ambition to make Montreal "The First City of the World" and his preference for political monuments brought the Games to the city, this variable was given 5.

b) Type of the Leading Planning Organization

Mayor Jean Drapeau played a leading role in bringing, planning and preparing for the Montreal Games. The Olympic Charter describes national Olympic committees as nonprofit organizations responsible for the development and protection of both the Olympic movement and amateur sport. Following the selection of Montreal, the Canadian Olympic Association (COA) became responsible for organizing and staging the games. The COA, however, delegated the assignment to a special "organizing committee" known as "COJO"--Comite Organisateur des Jeux Olympiques--which promptly moved into the old Palais de Justice building next door to City Hall (Smith, 1975: 652). Whoever controlled the organizing committee controlled the games, and Drapeau--without accepting any official position at COJO--controlled it absolutely. The Montreal Games were planned and prepared mainly by Drapeau's city government. Thus, this variable was given 5.

c) Range of the Planning

Gerry Snyder, who was Jean Drapeau's most trusted advisor on the Olympic projects in the early stages and who later became a member of COJO's executive board and head of its revenue department (Auf der Maur), worked on so-called "corporate programs," the Olympics were to be merchandised just like any other sports event (Smith).

The self-financing plan for the Games was instituted in order to avoid direct citizen approval of major projects (Smith). Money was to be raised through sales of television and commercial rights to the Games, an Olympic lottery, and the implementation of coin and stamp programs (Auf der Maur. 24). The Olympic funding sources did not initially include increased taxes according to Drapeau because of the following Plans: 1) the Olympic Village would be converted to 4,000 units of low-income housing; 2) capital investments running into the hundreds of millions of dollars would not be necessary for such things as new highways and transportation systems; 3) the Metro was already going to be extended; and 4) Olympic events would be held all over the island (in existing buildings) including Expo islands (New York Times, 5/13/1970). It thus was expected that the above-mentioned financing programs would insure neither increase in taxes nor problems for Montreal or Canada.

The original estimate for the total cost of the Games was \$124 million (Wallace, 1972), and final cost estimate reached as high as \$1,4 billion (Giniger, 1980). Reasons for

this sizable difference included poor planning, needless early delays, unfamiliar construction techniques, labor problems, and galloping inflation (Pileggi, 1976: 62).

Drapeau's plan for the Games didn't include the real needs of the city such as low-income housing, sewage disposal plants, and more social services (Kid, 1971: 13-4). From the start, the Mayor's attitude in planning for the Games was based upon insensitivity and veiled secrecy (Auf der Maur, 1976b: 25). One of the good examples concerned Taillibert, the French architect who was hired by the Mayor and who designed and directed the Olympic construction from an office 4,800 kilometers across the sea from the site. An inquiry report by Quebec Superior Court Judge Albert Malouf said

the Taillibert stadium was extremely complex both from the point of view of design and from that of construction, and its choice was dictated by considerations of aesthetics and grandeur without any serious study of cost and feasibility beforehand (Thomas, 1980: 24).

In principle, the city of Montreal's public works department was in charge of construction according to designs from Taillibert in France (Auf der Maur, 1976b: 25). Drapeau failed to incorporate the preparation for the Olympics into the long-range urban development planning and priorities of Montreal. Thus, this variable was given 1.

d) Extent of the Financial Support of the
Central Government.

From the start, the federal and provincial governments told Montreal that they would not subsidize the Games

(Forbes, 3/15/1975: 92), which gave the Mayor complete freedom of action. Drapeau, in turn, renewed his pledge to Montrealers that he was not seeking Olympic financing from them (Smith).

To raise the estimated \$310 million needed to finance the games, Drapeau went to Ottawa where he got some important concessions from the Liberal government of Prime Minister Trudeau. Among these, the government authorized an Olympic coin and stamp program, promised to supply security for the games, provided \$25 million toward the broadcasting costs and, most important of all, authorized a nationwide Olympic lottery (Smith). The federal government, however, did not give financial aid. Thus, this variable was give 1.

e) Extent of Citizens' Participation

Many Canadians, residents of Montreal especially, wished that Jean Drapeau had failed in his all-out effort to bring the 1976 Olympic Games to Montreal-regardless of how much prestige might accrue therefrom (Peerman). The citizens of Montreal were worried about the cost of the Games, and there was serious opposition to the Olympics from the poor and disadvantaged of Montreal (Kidd). Thus, this variable was given 1.

2. Urban Development Effects of the Games

Montreal is an island surrounded by the St. Lawrence River. In those days of bringing the Games to Montreal, the city had poor urban conditions;

only three percent of Montreal's sewage was processed, and there was even more raw sewage floating down from the rest of La Bella Province. The petroleum refineries in the east end of town assaulted the city with smells (Deford: 81).

The city was bathed in red ink--the city owed the federal government \$123 million for Expo (Peerman). There were high unemployment rates. There was not enough low-cost housing. It was estimated that 25 percent of the citizens were subsisting just at or below the poverty level (Deford). Expo '67 gave Montreal a good transportation system and many hotel rooms (Peters, 1982: 17).

a) Sports and Recreation Effect

The stadium was planned to have a 50-story mast rising above it, so that a contractible roof could be lowered over the stadium like an umbrella. The mast was to contain 15 floors of training rooms, two floors of restaurants, and two Olympic sized pools, and a diving tank at the base (Wallace). Because of strikes and technical problems, the stadium construction did not begin until late in the summer of 1974 (Auf der Maur, 1976b: 28). It was ready in time for the Games, with only the bare essentials. The mast construction had to be postponed until a later date (Ruby). The stadium was the home of the Montreal Expos baseball team and the Alouettes football team. The field was serving as a public ice-skating rink (Giniger, 1978).

The velodrome was an elaborate building of "flying saucer" design. It was intended to cost \$8 million, but the cost escalated to \$70 million. It was to be completed in

time for the cycling World Championship of 1974. When the date neared and the facility was far from finished, a \$400,000 velodrome was built at the University of Montreal and it was thought to be a very good one (Auf der Maur, 1976b: 25). A swimming pool complex, which had the capacity of 10,000, was constructed adjacent to the Olympic Stadium (New York Times, 4/30/1975).

By way of a postscript, Olympic facilities followed the same path as those of Expo (the neglected Expo facilities cost the city \$6 million annually) (Ferguson, 1975: 30). Claude Charron, Sports Minister of Quebec, commented in January of 1977 that "the stadium is a white elephant and if you throw in the velodrome and swimming pool, you have to say that I'm in charge of a herd of white elephants" (Creamer, 1977: 8).

Since the Games left behind good sports facilities; though they were not fully used, this variable was given 5.

b) Transportation Effect

Some of the Olympic--related projects involved transportation systems. In total, several million dollars were budgeted for these infrastructure items (Engineering News-Record, 6/4/1970: 15):

- 1) a 12 mile subway extension--\$200 million (part of the 25 mile expansion of the subway; total cost of the project--\$500 million; and
- 2) relocation and extension of Trans Canada Highway system--\$100 million.

COJO also allocated \$41.2 million for underground parking at the Olympic Stadium, and the sum of \$12.7 million for a "simple overpass built to provide security for the athletes" (Smith: 653). This viaduct was an exclusive walkaway built so that athletes would be isolated from the crowds.

Since the Games contributed to Montreal's transportation moderately, this variable was given 3.

c) Housing Effect

Originally, Mayor Drapeau's miraculous self-financing scheme called for the Olympic village to be developed as a low-rental housing project to qualify for the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation financing. Even though outside experts--including the Quebec government, planners, environmentalists--worried about the loss of green space and many claimed it would be better to set up a temporary village or a decentralized, scattered village to alleviate the city's housing problems, the city and COJO opted for private development on the city's municipal golf course (Auf der Maur, 1976b: 26).

The Olympic Village, four 19-story apartment buildings that looked like "cross sections of an Aztec pyramid," was built to house 4,000 people in 982 units after the Olympics (Davis, 1976: 64), but during the Games they were required to accommodate more than 11,000 athletes and team functionaries (Pileggi: 65). While they were air-conditioned and contained colored televisions, they housed up to a dozen

athletes per room--"with one bathroom being shared by the twelve" (Deford, 1976: 32).

Nearly one year after the Games, the Olympic village was empty and desolate looking since it housed 12,000 athletes for two weeks. Claude Charron, the Quebec Minister of Sports, said that the village built at a cost of close to \$90 million would be sold to a special nonprofit public corporation for \$37 million" (New York Times, 6/12/1977).

Though the Olympic Village was not fully used for housing, the Games contributed to the city's housing increase moderately, this variable was given 3.

d) Tourism Effect

The 1967 World's Fair, Expo'67, was the stimulus for construction of hotel and motel space. They did not construct more hotel or motel rooms to accommodate visitors to the Olympic Games (Engineering News-Record). But hotels and motels within about 40 mile of Montreal were booked solid for July and early August before the Games. Many private residences were used to accommodate the visitors (Business Week, 5/17/1976: 133). Since the Games had slight tourism effects, this variable was given 1.

e) Other Benefits

Robert Bourassa, the Premier of Quebec, predicted that the Olympics would help to relaunch the Quebec economy (Canadian News Facts, 5/19/1970: 445). Drapeau told one commentator that

billions of dollar worth of publicity and world recognition would adequately compensate for the expense of the Games. He emphasized that the value of the Games could not possibly be determined in two weeks of competition. He hoped that the spirit of the Olympics would stay with Montreal, stay with Quebec and stay with Canada (Deford: 38).

The debt of more than \$1 billion, which the Games left behind, decreased city service and might limit even future urban development of Montreal. Since the Games had some negative effects on the city, this variable was given -3.

3. Conclusion

Montreal's handling of the Games was a prime example of the degree of disaster that can befall a city that failed to integrate the Olympic plans into the city's comprehensive long-term urban development planning. Priorities of Montrealers reflected the need for adequate housing, more green space, sewage treatment and the continuance of social program previously established. For Montreal to justify the Games, the solutions to these problems should have been incorporated into the Olympic plans.

Montreal failed to secure the financial support of the federal government and its citizens' approval of the Games.

An official commission of inquiry into the "disastrous" cost of Montreal's 1976 Olympic Games told a tale of irresponsibility, incompetence, corruption, fraud and greed that led to a final deficit of well over a billion dollars (Giniger, 1980). After three years of study, the commission placed most of the blame on Montreal's Mayor, Jean Drapeau,

who for 25 years enjoyed the support of the people for his preference for large-scale projects and municipal prestige.

Until an Olympic Installations Board took over management of the construction at the end of 1975, "the real project manager" was Mr. Drapeau, the commission said, adding that "he was entirely lacking in the aptitudes and knowledge required for this role."

In particular, it noted, "consulting architect, Roger Taillibert, was able to work in absolute freedom with no monetary restraints ever being placed upon him." The commission said the choice of Mr. Taillibert and his ideas was dictated by considerations of aesthetics and grandeur without any serious study of cost and feasibility beforehand. Other reasons cited for runaway costs were "galloping inflation, the saturation of the construction market at the time, strikes and work stoppage, corruption, fraud and other irregular practices."

It was assumed that the Montreal Games enhanced the image of neither Montreal nor Canada. The Montrealers, however, suffered from the decreased city services from park maintenance to teacher's salaries and increased property tax.

Mayor Drapeau played a leading role in bringing the Games to Montreal, planning, and managing the Games based on his ambition to make Montreal "the First City of the World" and his preference for political monument. He got supports from neither the central government nor the citizens. He

failed to incorporate the preparation for the Games into the comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of Montreal. The Games had slight urban development effect on the host city, but created billions of dollars of new and unwanted facilities that are believed to be "white elephants." The debt of more than \$1 billion, which the Games left behind, might limit even future urban development of the host city.

The planning process and the urban development effect of the Montreal Olympics were evaluated in Table 4.

E. The Moscow Olympics (1980)

The 1980 Olympic Games were not only the first Olympics awarded to a socialist state; they were also the first with a totalitarian host since 1936. The U.S.S.R. was "totalitarian" in that it sought to control every aspect of its citizens' social life (Kannin, 1981: 113). The Games were, however, marred by President Carter's boycott campaign, which was launched in an effort to punish Russia for its invasion of Afghanistan.

The essentially suspicious view of Soviet motives in hosting the Olympic Games was shared by concerned critics in North America and Britain. Fear and hatred of communists plus alleged discrimination against Soviet Jewry were the reasons for persistent calls for a boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow (Lucas: 228). Sixty-two nations, including, of course, the United States, refused to

Table 4. Evaluation of the Planning Process and the Urban Development Effect of the Montreal Olympics.

Planning Process		Urban Development Effect	
Variable	Score	Variable	Score
purpose of hosting the Games	5	sports & recreation effect	5
type of the leading organization	5	transportation effect	3
range of planning	1	housing effect	3
extent of government support	1	tourism effect	1
extent of citizen's participation	1	other benefits	-3
Total	13	Total	9

participate, and 16 of the 81 competing nations in the Moscow Games refused to carry their national flags into the stadium as a token protest against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (Fimrite, 1980: 12). The turmoil surrounding the 1980 Olympic Games raised the need for reform and change in the Olympic movement again.

1. Planning Process of the Games

a) Purpose of Hosting the Games

The Soviet Union was aware of the tremendous propaganda potential of hosting the Games, both as an opportunity to expose thousands of foreign athletes and visitors to the instruments of Soviet propaganda and as a means to facilitate the activity of the Soviet propaganda machine, by focusing world attention on Moscow, creating interest in the Soviet Union, and promoting goodwill towards it (Hazan, 1982).

Soviet leaders hoped to use "the Olympics as a showcase to impress the world with their communist society and to indicate international approval of their political system" (Martin, 1980b: 20). They spared neither money nor cleverness in their effort to cast Moscow in a dreamy light (Shah, 1980a: 52). To astonish the bourgeoisie, the U.S.S.R. completed 99 Olympic construction projects at a cost of more than \$3 billion (Smith, 1980; 68). Thousands of Russian workers swarmed across Moscow, throwing up new buildings, tearing down old ones, planting shrubs and spray-painting

anything that did not move, including cracks in the walls (Smith, 1980: 68). Powerful new General Electric high-intensity lights bathed nighttime Moscow in a sunny glow. Drunks and drug users, some 300,000 of them, were shipped out of Moscow for unexpected holidays in other cities, and dissidents were encouraged to leave, too (Shah, 1980b).

Since the Russians were worried about not only what sort of nonsports materials would be beamed to those outside the motherland, but also propagandizing within their borders, transmission of any film was rejected if it strayed even slightly from the subject of sports, and foreigners' speeches were also rejected (Time, 7/28/1980: 47).

Since the Soviet Union used the Games as a showcase to impress the world with their communist society, this variable was given 5.

b) Type of the Leading Planning Organization

The Olympic Games were hosted to achieve national goals, so the central government played a leading role in bringing the Games to Moscow, planning and organizing the Games. A Soviet five-year plan included an Olympic Games building plan (Lucas, 1980: 227). This construction plan was executed by four organizations--the Moscow City Council, Interior Ministry, Central Council of Trade Unions, and Soviet Army (Business Week, 8/25/1975: 33).

Since the central government was the leading planning organization, this variable was given 3.

c) Range of the Planning

The emphasis on reuse was a keystone of the Russians' Olympic construction plan: Anatdy Kovalev, chairman of the Moscow Sports Committee said "Not a single building will stand as a silent architectural memorial of the Games" (Schmidt, 1980: 7). According to officials, most of the Olympic facilities they built or upgraded were part of the master plan for Moscow, adopted in 1971, which covered development until 1990 (Engineering News-Record, 1/18/1979: 64). Under this plan, the city was divided into eight zones, each with from 600,000 to 1 million inhabitants and each of which was supposed to have one major and several small sports complexes. New facilities built for the Olympics were tailored to this plan. It was assumed that virtually all of the Olympic sites were put to everyday use by Muscovites after the Games were over.

Since the plans and preparation for the Games was incorporated into the comprehensive long-range urban development planning of Moscow, this variable was given 5.

d) Extent of the Financial Support of the Central Government

Since the planning of the Games was behind the Iron Curtain, there was no detailed information on how much the Olympic cost was and how many portions of the cost the central government bore. In consideration of the facts that the Soviet Union had a centrally planned economy and that she hosted the Games to achieve national goals, the central

government seemed to bear a large amount of the cost. In fact, Soviet leaders did not spare rubles to cast Moscow in a dreamy light.

The organizing and commercial plans were executed by the U.S.S.R. Olympic Organizing Committee. Ignati Novikov, the head of the committee, was the deputy premier in charge of all power construction projects, one of the top half dozen in the U.S.S.R. Second in command was Sergei Lapin, 64, a stern and polished diplomat who had been Ambassador to Austria and China and general director of Tass. At that time, as Minister of the State Committee for Television and Radio, Lapin was the Soviet Union's head propagandist (Johnson, 1977a: 16). The staffing of the Olympic Organizing Committee implied huge financial aids of the central government and the Soviet Union's intentions of hosting the Games: display and propaganda. Thus, this variable was given 5.

e) Extent of Citizens' Participation

There was enforced citizens' participation. "Thousands of university students, released early from classes, participated as cooks, waiters, dishwashers and guides" (Martin, 1980a: 28). Some "volunteers" participated in the city beautification project. Factory workers didn't try to buy produce in the stores as educated by party functionaries (Shah, 1980a: 46).

It could be said that the Russians neither supported the Games nor opposed the staging of the Games. Thus, this variable was given 3.

2. Urban Development Effects of the Games

Moscow was the foremost industrial, political, and cultural center of the Soviet Union. It was also the historic capital of Russia. The historical traditions of the city were preserved in the beautiful churches, palaces and fifteenth century walls of the Kremlin, in the severely classical buildings of the eighteenth century, and in the "Empire" style mansions erected after the Napoleonic wars. According to the "General Plan for the reconstruction of the city" adopted in 1935, the immensely broad streets and impressive new buildings were constructed since 1935 to reflect "the grandeur and beauty of the socialist epoch" (Robson, 1957).

a) Sports and Recreation Effect

The Russians repaired or built seventy sporting facilities (Shah, 1980a: 47), which were arrayed around Moscow and in other cities in such a way that they would be easy to get to and use long after the Games were over.

The centerpiece of Moscow's sports facilities was the then-22-year-old Lenin Stadium in the Luzhniki sports complex. The 103,000-seat structure got a bright coat of waterproofing paint, four 184-ft steel pylons to support new lights and upgraded seating (Engineering News-Record, 1979).

In addition to an existing Olympic-sized pool and an all-purpose indoor gymnasium, which got face-lifting, Luzhniki also included one new facility, a 4,000-seat arena for Olympic volleyball tournament. Nicknamed the "Turtle," the concrete and glass structure stood on 28 legs, each weighting 82.5 tons, that supported rectangular roof sections. There was no internal support for the roof, which spanned about 328 ft. Designed by the Moscow Research Institute of Standard and Experimental Design, the arena was built of prefabricated components assembled at the site. Spaces between legs were filled in with glass and a coating of gold-colored epoxy covered the structure for waterproofing (Engineering News-Record, 1979).

The majority of new facilities in Moscow were in the 54-acre Prospekt Mira complex, which included a covered stadium with a combination of permanent and temporary seating for about 20,000 spectators, and a 13,000-seat swimming hall. For the main stadium, a team under chief architect Mikhail Posokin designed an elliptical structure rising 131 ft and covering 7.4 acres. It had a steel truss roof bearing on a reinforced concrete ring beam supported by steel columns around the perimeter. Inside was a soundproofed partition that could be moved across the width of the stadium to alter playing area sizes required for basketball courts, boxing, ice rink, and other purposes.

The Prospekt Mira pool building, which adjoined the stadium, was divided for the Olympics into two sections, one

where 8,000 people were able to watch swimming and water polo, and another for 5,000 to see diving contests (Engineering News-Record, 1979).

The third major sports complex was in Krylatskoye, where rowing, cycling and archery took place. A new rowing canal was created on a swampy site and filled with water from the nearby Moscow River. A system of gates ensured that it could be filled or drained by gravity from the same source. A steel and concrete stand for 3,400 spectators was in place along the canal edge (Engineering News-Record, 1979).

Also at Krylatskoye, the Russians constructed a small velodrome. Its 9-m wide (29.7 ft) track is 333.3 m (1,093 ft) long. The interior of the structure was faced with limestone, and the Russians brought Siberian larch logs, which they said were equal to any African wood, to surface the track. Krylatskoye also included a 13.5 km (8.3 miles) outdoor cycling track (Engineering News-Record).

Since the Games had considerable sports and recreation effects, this variable was given 5.

b) Transportation Effect

Except for constructing a new \$100-million terminal at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport in order to ensure a good first impression (Shah, 1980a: 47), the government did not undertake special transportation projects.

Since many of the Olympic sites were separated by substantial distances, the city provided special Olympics

buses and some 15,000 extra taxicabs (Engineering News-Record, 1979). In addition, the government took steps to minimize encounters between Soviet citizens and foreigners, and to reduce traffic (Martin, 1980b: 29): 1) about 250 miles of streets were designated official thoroughfares open only to Olympic vehicles, including 6,200 special buses; 2) police confiscated the license plates of drivers for minor offenses (Shah, 1980: 46); 3) schools were off and thousands of Muscovites went out of Moscow for vacation during the Games; and, 4) Russians living outside the capital were not allowed to travel to Moscow except on official business (Martin).

The Games left behind a big transportation facility, thus this variable was given 3.

c) Housing Effect

The Soviet Union constructed the eighteen high-rising buildings of the Olympic Village (Martin, 1980b)--a complex of 16-story apartment buildings with restaurants, saunas, and medical and training facilities--to house about 12,700 athletes who were expected to compete in Moscow. The Olympic Village, about a 20-minute drive from Luzhniki, was arranged in three squares on a 264-acre site (Engineering News-Record, 1979). Its buildings were of the same precast modular concrete construction that comprised most of the Soviet housing program.

After the Games, the Olympic Village was converted into an apartment complex (Schmidt) which were occupied by 14,000 "lucky Muscovites" (Smith).

Since the Games contributed to the increase of housing units considerably, this variable was given 5.

d) Tourism Effect

The Soviet Union constructed nine new hotels and enough new restaurants to accommodate 70,000 extra dinners (Shah, 1980a: 47). Thus, hotel accommodations in Moscow were doubled. The Soviet Trade Union Organization constructed five 28-story, 2,000-bed hotels, which formed a 10,000-room complex, on a site at Izmailovo. These, too, were of standard Soviet precast design and construction (Engineering News-Record, 1979). When the Olympics were over, the complex reverted to use by trade union members on excursions to Moscow. The complex was part of the Russian effort to expand city accommodations from 45,000 to 75,000 beds by 1980.

Since the Games had considerable tourism effects, this variable was given 5.

e) Other Benefits

The center of Moscow looked beautiful, after huge efforts to plant flowers, trees and grass, resurface the roads, remove eyesores and generally brighten up everything in sight (Martin, 1980b: 29).

The Soviets expected about 300,000 visitors including 120,000 from the West. The Americans, Japanese, Canadians,

Australians, British, Italians and West Germans produced only 13,200 tourists because of the boycott (Shah & Schmidt, 1980: 48). This represented a potential hard-currency shortfall to the Russians of more than \$145 million. About \$16 million in hotel and travel deposits were in Soviet banks and they did not refund any of them. NBC paid the Soviets \$80 million for the exclusive television rights to the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games (National Review, 4/29/1977: 483).

The Soviet Union could not achieve the goals of hosting the Games sufficiently because of the boycott which decreased tourists and television coverage, but they had moderate benefits of the Games. Thus, this variable was given 3.

3. Conclusion

The Russians' Olympic planning was well-organized and incorporated into national development goals. The Russians built new Olympic facilities in consideration of the post-game use of them; the emphasis on reuse was a keystone of the Olympic construction program. Since most of the sports facility construction plans were included in the nation's five-year plan and the master plan for Moscow, not a single building stood as a silent architectural memorial of the Games.

The Soviets were also saving money by sticking to orthodox building methods, mostly the kind of prefabricated

reinforced concrete work used in their massive housing programs. Further, costly purchasing from abroad, which was once expected to be a big factor of cost in the Olympic programs, was kept to a minimum.

The central government planned and prepared for the Olympic Games, because the Games were brought to Moscow to achieve national goals or needs: propaganda, more sports facilities, more housing and more hotel rooms. One of the deputy premiers was in charge of the Olympic Organizing Committee, and many ministers of the central government participated in the Olympic preparations.

Hoping to use the Olympics as a showcase to impress the world with their communist society, the central government planned the Games to achieve the national goals and bore the cost of more than \$3 billion. A Soviet five-year plan included an Olympic Games building plan and the Russians constructed 99 Olympic facilities in consideration of the post-Games reuse of them. There seemed to be enforced citizens' participation. The Olympic Games had considerable urban development effects on the host city.

The planning process and the urban development effect of the Moscow Olympics were evaluated in Table 5.

F. The Los Angeles Olympics (1984)

Los Angeles (L.A.) hosted the 10th Olympiad in 1932, so the city had an abundance of sporting facilities and experience in the Olympic Games. Unlike the previous Games,

Table 5. Evaluation of the Planning Process and the Urban Development Effect of the Moscow Olympics.

Planning Process		Urban Development Effect	
Variable	Score	Variable	Score
purpose of hosting the Games	5	sports & recreation effect	5
type of the leading organization	3	transportation effect	3
range of planning	5	housing effect	5
extent of government support	5	tourism effect	5
extent of citizen's participation	3	other benefits	3
Total	21	Total	21

the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games were the first dependent on private rather than government funding (Sunset, 8/1983: 142). They were the first corporate Olympics, the first real effort to finance the Olympics primarily through sophisticated marketing strategies and unprecedented corporate involvement rather than government support. The Games were planned, organized and managed by the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC), a group of 62 top businessmen and civil leaders who relieved the host city of the awesome burden of financing the Games (Business Week, 10/12/1981: 115).

The Los Angeles Games were the largest ever held, with 7,800 athletes from 140 nations competing in the Games (Mathews et al., 1984: 35). Fifteen Soviet block countries, however, stayed out of the Games (Callahan, 1984). The Olympic movement was marred by politics again. The New York Times urged President Reagan to pursue his proposal to remove the Olympic Games from political realm by accepting the Greek offer to cede a permanent site in Olympia to neutral international committee (New York Times, 5/16/1984). Sen. Bill Bradley and Rep. Stand Parris each introduced a resolution that called for establishment of a permanent site for the Olympic Games to insulate them from the unwarranted and disruptive international politics (New York Times, 5/17/1984).

The 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles generated a surplus of at least \$215 million (Hayes, 1984), so the Los

Angeles Games could have a strong influence on succeeding Olympics.

1. Planning Process of the Games

a) Purpose of Hosting the Games

After two failed bids for the 1976 and 1980 Summer Olympic Games, Los Angeles succeeded in bringing the 1984 Summer Olympic Games. Governor Jerry Brown, one of the most enthusiastic backers of the Games, expressed his view of the Games. He said:

"They are just games and people should see them for fun. We want them to be modest, a little exciting. We don't want to have the Olympics for the sake of anything but the Games themselves. People talk about the economic impact. It could actually be negative. Prices could go so high during the Games that they would be a detriment to the economy. The Olympics aren't going to generate many new jobs--nearly everything is built. We aren't doing it for state pride or local morale. There shouldn't be any ulterior motives to the Olympics. They're just games, frivolous things. They are not really necessary. But don't forget, some of the least necessary things in life are the most important. Art, religion, friendship, leisure, time, games--they make life worth living. There's enough dreariness and seriousness around without making the Olympics into something they're not. They're to enjoy (Johnson, 1977: 69).

On the other hand, the campaign for hosting the Games was mounted by a committee of local businessmen, professional people, educators, a few professional athletes and sports team executives and show business people. The organization was called the Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games. With roots going back to the 1932 Games, the committee of Olympics supporters became well

organized and knowledgeable about the needs for staging the Summer Games during the preparation of bids for the 1976 and 1980 games. That is, they wanted to display the continuing vitality of the city that was regarded as a prototype of the new American metropolis and an incubator of ideas and life styles (Lindsey, 1977). The citizens of Southern California anticipated that the Olympics would inject tourist dollars into the local economy and that they would bring boomtime to the West Coast (Giller, 1983: 6).

Since the main purpose of hosting the Games was economic benefit, this variable was given 1.

b) Type of the Leading Planning Organization

When L.A. launched a major effort to host the 1976 Olympics, Governor Brown said "We are invoking the spirit of Sparta. There will be zero government money spent, zero." The mayor of Los Angeles, Tom Bradley also said, "The trend toward astronomical cost will halt here" (Johnson, 1977b: 34). The Southern California Committee for the Olympic Games (SCCOG), which was organized in 1939 with an eye to helping other U.S. cities win an Olympics and eventually bringing it once again to the City of Angels, conceived an austere and super-efficient Olympic Games:

1) most sports events were to be held at existing facilities; 2) only three new facilities were to be built--a swimming stadium (\$15 million), a canal for rowing and canoeing (\$3 million) and a portable wooden velodrome track (\$500,000); 3) the estimated price of new construction for the Olympics including a face-lifting of the Coliseum was a mere \$33.5 million; 4) in addition to these capital expense, operating expenses were \$150

million; 5) total budget was \$183,5 million; and 6) the estimated total revenue was \$184,2 million (Johnson, 1977b: 64-9).

Nonetheless, there was talk of establishing a permanent "citizens' watchdog" committee over the Olympics as well as holding a referendum that might overturn the best-laid plans (Johnson, 1977b: 64).

The corporate approach to the Olympics was thrust on Los Angeles when Proposition 13 proponents carried a city charter amendment prohibiting use of tax money to fund the event. A group of businessmen took over, formed the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC), and hired Peter V. Ueberroth, founder of a travel agency, to tap business for funds (Business Week). Although most Olympics were government-controlled, the Montreal debacle prompted Los Angeles to refuse any official role. The nonprofit LAOOC took total responsibility (Business Week, 1/8/1979: 21).

Because of a city charter amendment, the Los Angeles planning department and other city agencies were prohibited from working on Olympics planning, and some critics feared that this lack of planning would backfire on the holders of the eight million tickets for various Olympics events (Fulton, 1984: 4). Public planners involved in only a few areas such as transportation, fire protection, street maintenance and security which the LAOOC asked and paid for (Fulton: 4-5).

Since the LAOOC played a leading role in planning and organizing the Games, this variable was given 1.

c) Range of the Planning

The LAOOC hired the Los Angeles planning firm of Economics Research Associates--a veteran of world's fairs--to examine the economic impact of the Olympics on the city. It also hired some 20 different planning and architectural firms to create the look of the 1984 Olympics (Fulton: 8-9).

The committee's basic ideas of managing the Games were to reduce the cost and to increase the revenue. For the reduction of the cost, the Committee decided to emphasize the use of existing facilities and minimization of the new facility construction, that is, they decided to refurbish some of the 24 existing sites and construct only three new ones (Holmes, 1983: 69). They also planned to recruit over 50,000 volunteers to work during the Games (Hawkins, 1984: 52).

For the maximization of the funds, the Committee sold U.S. television rights to ABC for \$225 million--nearly three times the price NBC negotiated for U.S. rights to the Moscow Games and almost 10 times what ABC paid for the 1976 Games in Montreal (Yovovich, 1984: M-9). The next big move was the decision to greatly streamline and upgrade the role of the corporate sponsors. The corporate sponsorship programs in previous Olympics "had been very sloppy and not very well done," said Mr. Ueberroth, "Lake Placid had 381 sponsors, and there were an official yogurt, an official tobacco, nine kinds of official autos. . . . It was overcommercialized, and when you start doing that kind of thing, what value is

it to be a corporate sponsor? (Yovovich: M-10)" The new strategy was to limit official sponsorships to select thirty corporations, with only one sponsor in any product or service category (Business Week, 10/12/1984).

While the organizers believed the Olympics would bring a lot of money into Los Angeles, they did not intend to use the games as a vehicle for urban development (Fulton: 5).

The LAOOC constructed two new sports arenas; a velodrome (cycling stadium) at the California State University and a swimming pool at the University of Southern California. They would be used by university students after the Games.

Since the Olympic planners considered post-Games use of the new facilities, this variable was given 3.

d) Extent of the Financial Support of the
Central Government

Unlike previous games, the 1984 spectacular had no government subsidy (Hawkins, 1984:54). When Angelenos tried to win the 1984 Games, it was assumed that a good deal of federal money would be forthcoming if L.A. got the Summer Games. California Congresswoman Yvonne Brathwaite Burke, a leading Olympic advocate on Capitol Hill said;

The Government has appropriated \$58 million for the Lake Placid Winter Games in 1980 and \$12 million for the Pan-American Games in Puerto Rico in 1979. Certainly there will be a sizable amount available for a Summer Olympics in Los Angeles (Johnson, 1978:24).

Since the citizens opposed use of tax dollar to fund the event, the 1984 Games were financed primarily through

sophisticated marketing strategies and unprecedented corporate involvement rather than government financial support. Thus, this variable was given 1.

e) Extent of Citizens' Participation

For the citizens' participation, a private poll taken in 1977 to determine if there was grass-roots support for the Games revealed that 80.9% of the people approved if they could be held without any city money. That figure plunged to 35% if the Games might result in a deficit (Johnson, 1978: 25). As the Games neared, Los Angeles gushed with enthusiasm and hoopla over the summer games and Angelenos by the thousands volunteered to do something they could help to insure the success of the first privately financed games (Hawkins): 1) some 50,000 of the 85,000 staff members of the LAOOC were volunteers (Hawkins); 2) some local firms, such as AT & T, urged employee car pools, to lessen traffic (Hawkins); 3) Citizens joined car pools, took bus, changed their working hours or simply left town to reduce traffic (Sanoff et al., 1984: 21); and 4) some 3,500 industries cut operations up to 30 percent during the Games to reduce pollution--the city had its longest July smog wave in 10 years (Hawkins).

Since citizens' participation and support were very positive, this variable was given 5.

2. Urban Development Effect of the Games

Los Angeles was the second most populous city and metropolitan area (after New York) in the United State. The city sprawled across some 464 square miles (1,202 square kilometers) of a broad coastal plain agreeably situated between the San Gabriel Mountains on the east and the Pacific Ocean on the West (Britannica, 1985: 307). The city was the seat of Los Angeles County, which contained more than 80 other incorporated cities within its 4,083 square miles. The metropolitan area paid for its spectacular growth by acquiring present-day urban attributes;

smog-filled skies, polluted harbors, clogged freeways, crowded classrooms, explosive ghettos, and annual budgets teetering on the brink of bankruptcy (Britannica).

The Committee did not intend to use the Games as a vehicle for urban development, and the city government was prohibited from working on the Olympics except providing the services the Committee paid for, which meant that little public work projects were carried out to accommodate visitors.

a) Sports and Recreation Effect

The 1984 Olympic Games left two new good sports facilities behind for the city in spite of the Organizing Committee's policy of minimizing investment in the new facilities. Southland corporation (the 7-Eleven store chain) constructed the velodrome (cycling stadium) at California State University in Dominguez Hills at a cost of over \$3

million (Engineering News-Record, 9/9/1982: 31). It had 2,000 permanent concrete bench seats, and temporary Olympic seating for another 6,000. McDonald (the fast-food empire) provided \$4 million for a new Olympic swimming pool and diving well at the University of Southern California (Giller). The Atlantic Richfield company built 7 tracks and refurbished the Coliseum Stadium at a cost of \$9 million.

In addition, the LAOOC and its corporate sponsors built a new shooting range in Chino, substantially refurbished the East Los Angeles College Stadium, improved facilities for the handicapped at California State University, Fullerton and East Los Angeles College, built a new tennis stadium at UCLA, and made major improvements in the Exposition Park area (Bradley).

Since the Games had moderate sports and recreation effects, this variable was given 3.

b) Transportation Effect

The Los Angeles central business district already handled more than 350,000 vehicles a day, and skyscraper boom was creating further congestion. On the other hand, more than 200 arenas, training areas, athlete villages and other Olympic sites stretched over 150 miles from Santa Barbara to San Diego County (Hawkins: 52). Accordingly, transportation planning was very important--transportation was the area where a number of public agencies got together and did serious planning for the Olympics.

Without building new facilities, the LAOOC and the city solved transportation problem during the Olympics through very careful planning and considerable cooperation from citizens (Bradley). According to Bradley's report,

the Olympic Committee took responsibility for transporting athletes, officials, and the press through using a complex shuttle bus system, while the Southern California Rapid Transit District (SCRTD), working with state and local transportation agencies, handled the spectators and visitors. The SCRTD system included 24 separate shuttle bus lines, charging \$2.00, \$4.00 or \$6.00 per ride depending on the length of the trip. The Olympic shuttles logged 1,175,000 boardings during the 16-day period of the Games with as many as 472 buses in use on a single day. The city provided special bus lanes and drop-off points for the Olympic shuttles, and helped arrange for parking at bus loading areas. The city also used a computerized traffic signal coordination system to keep auto traffic moving smoothly (Bradley).

A \$700 million improvement program of Los Angeles International Airport and some highway projects were completed in time for the Games. Los Angeles deputy mayor Ray Remy, the city's liaison with the LAOOC said "They were not done for the Olympics, but they are needed" (Zotti: M-26).

Since the Games had slight transportation effects, this variable was given 1.

c) Housing Effect

Without building the Olympic Village, the LAOOC housed athletes, coaches and officials at the University of Southern California, University of California at Los Angeles and University of California at Santa Barbara (Hawkins: 52).

The organizers of the Olympics did not intend to use the games as a vehicle for redevelopment (Fulton: 5). It was, however, assumed that the 1984 Olympics had slight indirect effect on the housing of the host city. Thus, this variable was given 1.

d) Tourism Effect

There was no consensus on how many additional visitors would be looking for lodging during the Olympics. LAOOC officials put the number at 100,000 to 250,000; other estimates ranged as high as 400,000 to 600,000 (Bradley), Economic Research Associates estimated that there were approximately 65,3000 hotel rooms in Los Angeles County and 145,600 hotel rooms in the 7 Southern California counties (Bradley). Some Angelenos were worried about the lack of affordable hotel rooms (Holmes). Among the things the LAOOC didn't ask government planners for help with was assistance on accommodations and information for the people who bought tickets for the Olympics. "The Olympics Committee is doing nothing for the average tourists at all--and that's making a lot of people around the world very mad," said Calvin Hamilton, the long time planning director for the city of Los Angeles (Fulton: 6).

The Olympics stimulated to increase hotel rooms in Southern California. Engineering News-Record estimated that at least 2,300 new hotel rooms were built by 1984 (9/9/1982: 31). Since the Games had slight tourism effects, this variable was given 1.

e) Other Benefits

Southern California economic benefits generated by the staging of the 1984 Olympic Games were estimated at more than \$3.3 billion in 1982 dollars--a primary impact of almost \$1 billion plus the induced impact from the multiplier effect of each dollar spent (Fulton: 8).

The Olympic Games led to the creation of 68,000 four month jobs, and a smaller number of permanent jobs. The LAOOC staff grew from 13 in 1979 to 25 in 1980, 45 in 1981, 150 in 1982, 620 in 1983, and over 20,000 paid staff in 1984. The 68,000 total included non-LAOOC staff at new stadiums, businesses, and stores created for the Olympics and continuing beyond the Games (Bradley).

According to a study for the Olympics committee by Economics Research Associates in Los Angeles, the state and local governments garnered almost \$70 million in hotel, sales, ticket, income, and business license taxes, and another \$110 million in indirect tax revenue attributable to the games' economic influence on the region (Fulton: 5).

"The economic impact of the Games will extend far beyond the actual two-week period during 1984" said Mayor Bradley, adding that there were also the intangible and indirect benefits--international coverage and recognition, exposure to international art and culture, and the sports participation opportunities made available to local area youth" (Bradley).

A beautification program carried out in Southern California communities in preparation for the 1984 Olympic Games involved youth in beautifying Olympic practice sites through landscaping, planting, and general clean-up efforts. 7,500 Olympic roses were planted at Olympic competition and training sites throughout Southern California (Bradley).

Since the Games generated a huge amount of economic benefits and thus achieved the purpose of hosting the Games, this variable was given 5.

3. Conclusion

The LAOOC had total responsibility for planning, organizing and managing the 1984 Olympic Games. The Games became the first Olympic Games which were financed nearly 100% by the private sector and run by a private organization with a minimal government support.

Citizens prevented city officials from working on the Games, but they themselves took active part in preparing the Games. They worked as volunteers and participated in city beautification program, and reduction of traffic and pollution. Especially, broad-based support from the business community was one of the most important factors that made the Games successful.

The planning of the Games was well-organized: the LAOOC emphasized the use of the existing facilities and minimized the construction of new facilities; its marketing scheme

self-financed the Games. The planning was not connected with urban development planning of the city.

The Games brought jobs and dollars to Southern California, that is, the Games generated huge economic benefits, which justified the staging of the Olympic Games--reasons for hosting the Games were the injection of tourist dollars into the local economy and civic pride (Mathews et al., 1984: 35).

To conclude, Angelenos hosted the Games to get economic benefits through the injection of corporate and tourist dollars into the local economy. The LAOOC, which consisted of a group of businessmen, planned and organized the Games, but the city planning department and other city agencies were prohibited from working on the Olympics. The Games were run privately without any government funding, but citizens' participation was very positive. The organizers did not intend to use the Games as a vehicle for urban development and they did not incorporate the planning for the preparation of the Games into the long-range urban development planning of the host city. The Games had slight urban development effect on Los Angeles. The slight urban development effects of the Games were due to not the poor planning for the Games but the developed urban conditions of the city: the city had an abundance of sporting facilities, hotel rooms, highways, and universities.

The planning process and the urban development effects of the L.A. Olympics were evaluated in Table 6.

Table 6. Evaluation of the Planning Process and the Urban Development Effect of the L.A. Olympics.

Planning Process		Urban Development Effect	
Variable	Score	Variable	Score
purpose of hosting the Games	1	sports & recreation effect	3
type of the leading organization	1	transportation effect	1
range of planning	3	housing effect	1
extent of government support	1	tourism effect	1
extent of citizen's participation	5	other benefits	5
Total	11	Total	11

G. Summary of the Findings

The study reviewed the planning process of the six recent Olympic Games--the Tokyo, the Mexico City, the Munich, the Montreal, the Moscow and the Los Angeles Olympics--in terms of five independent variables which influenced the urban development effects of the Games on the host cities.

They were:

- 1) Purpose of hosting the Games - demonstrations of the development of the country and/or the city, or economic benefits.
- 2) Type of the leading planning organization - who played the leading role in planning for the preparation of the Games, the central government, or the city government, or the Olympic Organizing Committee?
- 3) Range of the planning--whether or not the planning was incorporated into the comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the host city?
- 4) Extent of financial support of the central government - did the central government bear a large proportion of the Olympic costs besides providing security service?

- 5) Extent of citizens' participation - did the citizens approve or oppose the staging of the Games in their city?

The study also examined the urban development effects of the six recent Olympic Games in terms of five dependent variables which were influenced by the independent variables of the planning process of the Olympic Games. They were: 1) sports and recreation effect; 2) transportation effect; 3) housing effect; 4) tourism effect; and 4) other benefits.

The result of each of the six recent Olympic Games was summarized in terms of the independent variables and dependent variables mentioned above.

1. The Tokyo Olympics: 1) Japan tried to demonstrate the industrial development of the country and to show off the nation's talents; 2) The Tokyo Metropolitan Government made the master plan for the preparation of the Games; 3) the Japanese finished many projects long needed in the city through the preparation of the Games, that is, planners incorporated the planning for the Games into the long-range development planning and priorities of Tokyo; 4) The central government bore a large amount of the costs--construction of national gymnasiums, construction of the super express Tokaido line and financial assistance to hotel industry; 5) The Japanese endorsed the staging of the Games--many civic groups such as

the Tokyo Olympics Movement Promotion Council and the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce strived to promote understanding of the Games, beautify the city, and improve public morals; and 6) the Olympics gave an impetus to appropriating funds and finishing many projects--many sporting facilities, 62 miles of four super expressways, 25 miles of new subway, \$470 million worth of new roads, a new monorail, increased accommodations, \$350 million worth of infrastructure improvement, and construction of nearly 10,000 buildings--which were long needed in the city. The Olympics contributed much to the urban development of Tokyo, the Japanese were satisfied with hosting the Games, which justified the staging of the Games.

2. The Mexico City Olympics: 1) Mexico tried to use the Olympics to signal its graduation from the ranks of the developing nations; 2) The federal government played a leading role in planning and preparing for the Games; 3) The Mexicans planned to stage the Games at a reasonable cost and they designed new installations with a view to post-Olympic utility. Besides sports facilities, they had only a few of the Olympic facilities to incorporate into the long-range urban development planning of the host city. What the Mexicans really needed was not sporting facilities but low-

income housing, more water, more electricity and sewage disposal facilities; 4) The federal government bore over half of the total cost of \$153 million; 5) Many citizens, primarily students, opposed the staging of the Games in Mexico; and 6) Besides sports facilities, increased hotel accommodations and middle-income condominium apartments (the Olympic village), Mexico City built a peripheral highway and speeded up the modernization of the airport. The city also undertook a \$400-million urban renewal plan for the downtown area. Water project and communication project were much improved. The Mexico City Olympics had moderate urban development effect on the host city.

3. The Munich Olympics: 1) Munich wanted to display Germany's post-war economic miracle and to achieve physical improvements in the city; 2) The city government was charged with overall planning of the Games; 3) The city had a master plan to use the Olympics to accomplish a "great leap forward," and incorporated planning for the Games into the long-range urban development planning and priorities of the city. 4) The federal and state governments assumed a large part of the Olympic costs; 5) The citizens did not oppose staging the Games, but complained of the inconvenience caused

by six unrelenting years of construction; and 6) The Olympic Games contributed much to the urban development of the host city--a 6-mile subway, the extension of federal railway line, 275,000 square meters of new roads and super-highways, \$200-million worth of sports installations, 7,000 new housing units and about 10,000 new hotel rooms. They were long-needed projects.

4. The Montreal Olympics: 1) Mayor Jean Drapeau's ambition to make Montreal "the First City of the World" and his preference for political monument brought the Games to Montreal; 2) The real project manager of the Games was Mr. Drapeau; 3) The planning of the Olympic preparation was separated from comprehensive long-range urban development planning of the host city; 4) Montreal didn't get financial support from the federal government; 5) Many citizens opposed the staging of the Games in Montreal; and 6) The Games had little urban development effect on the host city--billions of dollars of new and unwanted facilities were created, but the Games did not bring sewage treatment, low-income housing, preservation of open space and pollution control that many Montrealers really needed. Instead, the Games left Montreal with more than \$1 billion debt.

5. The Moscow Olympics: 1) Soviet leaders hoped to use the Olympics as a showcase to impress the world with their communist society; 2) The central government planned and organized the Games to achieve national goals; 3) A Soviet five-year plan included an Olympic Games building plan, and Soviet Union constructed the Olympic facilities as parts of a master plan for Moscow, adopted in 1971, and covering development through 1990; 4) It was assumed that the central government spent several billion dollars on preparing for the Games in consideration of the reasons for hosting the Games, staffing of the Olympic Organizing Committee and a centrally--controlled political system; 5) There seemed to be enforced citizens' participation; and 6) The Games contributed much to the urban development of the city--repairing or building seventy sporting facilities, construction of a \$100-million terminal at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport, construction of an apartment complex for 14,000 families, and expansion of hotel accommodation from 45,000 beds to 75,000. All these facilities were tailored to comprehensive and long-range development plans.
6. The Los Angeles Olympics: 1) Angelenos hosted the Games to get economic benefits through the injection of corporate and tourist dollars into

the local economy; 2) The Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, which consisted of a group of businessmen, planned and organized the Games; 3) The Los Angeles planning department and other city agencies were prohibited from working on the Olympics planning, and the organizers did not intend to use the Games as a vehicle for urban development; 4) The Games were run privately without government funding; 5) Citizens' participation was very positive; and 6) The Games had slight urban development effect on the host city. The Games, however, achieved the goals of hosting the Games--the Games generated a surplus of at least \$215 million and more than \$3.3 billion worth of Southern California economic benefits, which justified the staging of the Games.

The planning processes of the six recent Olympic Games were compared on the basis of the assigned scores of independent variables in Table 7.

The high total score of a host city meant that the city had well-organized planning for preparation of the Games. Likewise, low total score indicated poor planning. Tokyo, Munich and Moscow had well-organized Olympic plans intended to bring considerable urban development effects to the cities. The plannings of these three Olympics were

Table 7. Comparison of the Planning Process of the Six Olympic Games.

Site I.V.*	Tokyo	Mexico City	Munich	Montreal	Moscow	L.A.
Purpose of hosting games	5	5	5	5	5	1
Type of the leading organization	5	3	5	5	3	1
Range of planning	5	3	5	1	5	3
Extent of government support	5	5	5	1	5	1
Extent of citizens' participa- tion	5	1	3	1	3	5
Total	25	17	23	13	21	11

* I.V. - Independent variables

incorporated into the comprehensive long range urban development planning and priorities of the host cities.

The urban development effects of the six Olympics were also compared on the basis of the assigned scores of the five dependent variables in Table 8.

The higher the total score of a host city, the greater the urban development effects of the Games. The Tokyo, Munich and Moscow Olympics had considerable urban development effects on the host cities.

H. Testing of the Hypothesis

The planning process of the Olympic Games presented in Table 7 had a strong positive correlation with the urban development effect of the Games presented in Table 8. The Games, which got high scores in Table 7, also got high scores in Table 8; and the Games, which got low scores in Table 7, also got low scores in Table 8.

The strong positive correlation between the planning process and the urban development effects of the Games was also identified by the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient (Nie et al., 1975:280). If X's are the assigned values of the planning processes of the six Olympic Games and Y's are the assigned values of the urban development effects of the six Olympic Games, the value of correlation coefficient

Table 8. Comparison of the Urban Development Effect of the Six Olympic Games.

Site D.V.*	Tokyo	Mexico City	Munich	Montreal	Moscow	L.A.
Sports and recreation effect	5	5	5	5	5	3
Transporta- tion effect	5	3	5	1	3	1
Housing effect	3	3	5	5	5	1
Tourism effect	5	5	5	1	5	1
Other benefit	5	3	5	-3	3	5
Total	23	19	25	9	21	11

* D.V. = dependent variable

$$r = \frac{\Sigma(X-\bar{X})(Y-\bar{Y})}{\sqrt{\Sigma(X-\bar{X})^2 \cdot \Sigma(Y-\bar{Y})^2}}$$

was 0.935 at $\alpha=0.05$ level, so the correlation between the planning process and the urban development effects was very strong: If r is more than 0.4, the correlation is strong.

The study chose five independent variables which were assumed to most considerably influence the urban development. Thus, the planning process of these five independent variables had a strong positive correlation to the urban development. On the other hand, the urban development effects of the Games depended heavily on their planning process.

Among the Six Olympic Games reviewed, the Tokyo, Munich and Moscow Games had considerable urban development effects on the host cities. They had three high-scored independent variables in common: 1) They all hosted the Games for the purpose of display; 2) They incorporated Olympic plans into the comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the host cities; and 3) They received financial support from central government.

The purpose of hosting the Games was not a sufficient but a necessary condition for bringing considerable urban development effects of the Games: The Montreal Olympics did not contribute to the urban development of the city despite the mayor's ambition to make Montreal "the First City of the World.

Every city that incorporated Olympic preparation into the comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the host city got considerable urban development effects of the Games. Thus, the hypothesis set forth in Chapter I which the Olympic Games contributed much to the urban development of the host city when the Games were planned and prepared for to be incorporated into the comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the city was supported by the study findings.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Restatement of the Purpose of the Study

This study was designed to investigate the relationship between the planning process of the Olympic Games and the effects of the Games on the host city development. The study revealed that the planning process of the Olympics had five independent variables which influenced the urban development of the host city. The value of the dependent variables of the urban development effects of the Games varied with these independent variables. The identification of the independent and dependent variables was a step in this analysis.

This study also aimed to suggest possible recommendations and guidelines for planning and preparing for future Olympic Games, which will contribute to the development of the Olympic movement.

The major emphasis was placed on the effects of the Olympic Games on the development of the host city. The economic and social effects of the Olympics, which influenced the development of the host city indirectly, were

not investigated in this study for the purpose of simplifying the study.

To summarize, the study was designed to suggest steps that should be incorporated into the planning of the Olympic Games in order to maximize the urban development effects of the Games.

B. Overview Statement of What Was Done in the Study

To achieve the study objective, this study reviewed the six recent Olympic Games in chronological order from the Tokyo Olympics (1964) to the Los Angeles Olympics (1984).

The planning process of each of the Six Olympics was investigated in terms of five independent variables: 1) purpose of hosting the Games; 2) type of the leading planning organization; 3) range of the planning; 4) extent of the financial support of the central government; and 5) extent of citizens' participation.

Urban development effects of the Olympic Games were also analyzed in terms of five dependent variables: 1) sports and recreation effect; 2) transportation effect; 3) housing effect; 4) tourism effect; and 5) other benefit.

The relationship between the planning process and the development effects of the Games was analyzed and identified.

C. General statement of Findings

The study reviewed the six recent Olympic Games--the Tokyo, the Mexico City, the Munich, the Montreal, the Moscow and the Los Angeles Olympics--chronologically, identified the five independent variables in the planning process of the Olympic Games and the five dependent variables in the urban development effects of the Games, and evaluated the planning process and the urban development effects of each of the six Olympics. Based on the study findings, each of the six Olympics was summarized in terms of the five independent variables and the urban development effect of the Games.

1. The Tokyo Olympics: with the view of demonstrating the industrial development of Japan, the city government planned broadly for the Games with positive supports from the central government and the citizens. The planners of the Games incorporated the planning for the preparation of the Games into a comprehensive long-range urban development planning of Tokyo, which gave an impetus to appropriating funds and finishing many projects which were long needed in Tokyo. The Games left behind many sports facilities, four express ways, new subways, a new monorail, new roads, infrastructure improvement and increased hotel rooms. The Tokyo Olympics had considerable urban development effects on the host city.

2. The Mexico City Olympics: with a view to signal its graduation from the ranks of the developing nations, the Mexican government planned and prepared for the Games without citizen's participation. The Mexicans planned to stage the Games at a reasonable cost, and they designed new installations with a view to post-Olympic utility. The Games left behind such facilities as sports installations, increased hotel rooms and middle-income condominium apartments. What the citizens really needed was not grandiose sporting facilities but low-income housing, more water, more electricity and sewage disposal facilities. The Games did not provide what the citizens really needed, but the Olympics had moderate urban development effects on the host city.

3. The Munich Olympics: with a view to display Germany's post-war economic miracle, the city government used the Olympics to accomplish a "great leap forward" through provision of many facilities which Munich needed for a long time. The planners of the Games incorporated the planning of the Games into the comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the city. The federal and state governments bore a large part of the Olympic cost. The Games left behind a subway, the extension of railway line,

super-highways, new roads, 7,000 housing units and increased hotel rooms. The Munich Olympics had much urban development effect on the host city.

4. The Montreal Olympics: Mayor Jean Drapeau's ambition to make Montreal "The First City of the World" and his preference for political monument brought the Games to Montreal without the supports of the central government and the citizens. The real project manager of the Games was Mr. Drapeau. The planning for the Olympic preparation was not incorporated into a comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the city, which created billions of dollars of new and unwanted facilities that were believed to be "white elephants." The Games did not provide sewage treatment, low-income housing, preservation of open space and pollution control that Montreal really needed. The Montreal Olympics had slight urban development effects on the host city.

5. The Moscow Olympics: With a view to use the Olympics as a showcase to impress the world with their communist society, the Soviet government planned and organized the Games to achieve national goals--propaganda, more sports facilities, more housing and more hotel rooms. A Soviet five-year plan included an Olympic Games building plan, and the Soviet Union constructed the Olympic facilities as

part of a master plan for Moscow, adopted in 1971, which covered development until 1990. There seemed to be enforced citizens' participation. The Games provided many facilities which the Soviets needed. They were construction of terminal at Moscow's Airport, 14,000 apartment units, expansion of hotel accommodation, as well as various sport facilities. The Games had considerable urban development effects on the host city.

6. The Los Angeles Olympics: with a view to inject corporate and tourist dollars into Southern California, the LAOOC planned and organized the Games without the governments' support. The Los Angeles planning department and other city agencies were prohibited from working on Olympics planning, and the organizers did not intend to use the Games as a vehicle for urban development. The Games had slight urban development effect on the host city. The Games, however, achieved the goals of hosting the Games--the Games generated a surplus of at least \$215 million and more than \$3.3 billion worth of Southern California economic benefits, which justified the staging of the Games.

The analysis of the relationship between the planning process and the urban development effects of the Games revealed that they had strong positive correlation. Only a

good planning process brought considerable urban development effects of the Games to their host city.

D. Conclusions

Based on the findings of the study, the following, conclusions were drawn:

1. When the planning of the Olympic Games was incorporated into a comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the host city or when the Olympics were prepared to carry out parts of a master plan for the development of the city, the Olympic Games contributed much to the urban development of the host city.
2. The urban development effect of the Olympic Games was more obvious when the host country hoped to use the Olympics to display the development of the country than when the Olympic Organizing Committee intended to draw dollars into the host community.
3. The urban development effect of the Olympic Games was more obvious when the central and/or city government planned the Games than when an Olympic Organizing Committee did.
4. The urban development effect of the Olympic Games was more obvious when the host city received financial support from the central government than when it did not.

5. The urban development effect of the Olympic Games was more obvious when the citizens supported the staging of the Games than when they opposed it.
6. The less developed the host city, the more the urban development effects of the Games, and the more developed the host city, the less the urban development of the Games; Tokyo and Munich got considerable urban development effects of the Games because the two cities were not presentable for the Olympic Games when they were chosen as host cities, but Los Angeles got slight urban development effects of the Games because L.A. already had developed urban conditions.

To conclude, the Olympic Games can be used as one of urban development strategies, when the planners of the Games incorporate the planning of preparation for the Games into the comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the host city.

E. Implications of the Study

Based on the findings of the study, the following implications were presented for consideration:

1. The Olympic Games had economic or non-pecuniary effects on the host country besides the urban development effect. The Olympics could create an economic boom in the host community and country, and bring forth billions of dollars worth of

publicity, world recognition and the people's confidence and pride, which might be more important to the host country than the urban development effect.

2. More emphasis could be placed on the possibility that the Olympic Games can be self-financed. Self-financing program do not necessarily contribute to the development of the Olympic movement. Strict insistence on cost efficiency is vital, but excessive commercialism might tarnish the spirit of the Olympism (Segrave & Chu: 34). Self-financing Olympics might have little urban development effect on the host city.
3. There were calls for establishment of a permanent site for the Olympic Games to insulate them from the unwarranted and disruptive international politics. The establishment of a permanent site alone will not protect the Games from all political problems such as boycott, and it will be against the development of the Olympic movement and Coubertin's original scheme that nations should share the pleasure of convenient spectation and honor of hosting the Games (Jenk, 1982: 4). It also might deprive the cities vying to host the Games of an opportunity for urban development.

4. Political considerations should not be the final criterion from which the Olympic sites are selected. The selections of Mexico City and Montreal as Olympic sites were due to not their ability (financial and managing) but political considerations. The shortage of ability resulted in a huge deficit in Montreal and bloody clashes in Mexico City.
5. Like the Olympic Games, such world events as World's Fairs, which attract millions of people from all over the world and which it takes much time to prepare for, could have positive urban development effect on the host city of the World's Fair. The fair might require nearly the same planning process as that of the Olympics.

F. Limitations of the Study

This study had some limitations:

1. The author had only limited access to the information about the Olympic Games reviewed above due to the limited research time.
2. Very little data by and large was released concerning the planning processes of most Olympic Games.
3. This study used mostly such material as reports of periodicals and newspapers. The author could not identify the truth of the reports.

4. Urban development programs which were not covered by periodicals and newspapers reviewed by the author were not available for examination in this study, though they were undertaken in connection with the preparation for the Games.
5. This study investigated only direct urban development effects of the Games until the Games were held, but the Olympic Games also have indirect, post-Games and long-range effects.
6. The six Olympic Games reviewed were held in various places in the world, which made field research difficult due to time and money.
7. The scores of the variables were given by the author subjectively based on the findings because there was no measuring system of them.

G. Recommendations

Based on the findings, conclusions, and implications of this study, a number of recommendations for the planning for the future Olympic Games and further research were proposed.

1. Recommendations for the planning for the future Olympic Games.

- a) The host country and city are recommended to have financial and managing ability to stage the Olympic Games. A lot of facilities are needed to stage the Games, and the costs of the Olympic Games have increased. This is the first factor to

consider when they decide to host the Games. Montreal and Mexico City were assumed not to have this ability.

- b) The host city is recommended to have more or less basic facilities such as sporting, accommodation and transportation facilities to host the Olympics, which might reduce the costs of staging the Games and which might increase the possibility of self-financing the Games. The more facilities the host city has, the less the Olympic costs are.
- c) It seems that the support of the central government is essential to the process of the Olympic preparation in order that the host city may derive urban development effects from the Games. Montreal and L.A., which did not receive the financial support of the central government, had slight urban development effects of the Games.
- d) The host country and city are recommended to secure citizens' understanding and support for the Olympics for the success and justification of the staging of the Games.
- e) A country had better host the Olympic Games at the time when sports are booming among the people, when the Olympic facilities can be fully utilized by the people after the Games and when many products of the country are attracting world-wide fame to get more economic benefits of the Games.

- f) The planning for the preparation of the Games is recommended to be incorporated into a comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the host city to maximize the urban development effects of the Games. The Olympics can be successful and justifiable in terms of urban development when they bring the facilities that the citizens have really needed for a long time. Post-Games reuse of all new facilities should be considered when they are designed.
- g) The Olympic Organizing Committee had better develop marketing programs positively to maximize their revenues to avoid deficit financing of the Games.

2. Recommendations for the Further Research

Since the findings and conclusions of this study are tentative, subsequent research is recommended. It is hoped that further research will be fostered by this study.

- a) The study found that the Olympic Games contributed much to the urban development of the host city when the planning for the preparation of the Games was incorporated into a comprehensive long-range urban development planning and priorities of the city. The staging of the Games, however, can not be justified only for contributions to the urban development. The benefit-cost analysis of the

Olympic preparation programs is recommended to judge the efficiency of the Olympic investment.

- b) This study did not emphasize the economic effect of the Olympic Games. Economic benefits generated by the staging of the Games can influence the post-Games urban development both directly and indirectly. It is recommended that the economic effects of the Olympic Games should be investigated together with the direct urban development effect of the Games to judge the real or comprehensive urban development effect of the Games.
- c) A comparative analysis of the urban conditions of the host city from the time when the city is selected to host the Games to the time when the Games are held is recommended to investigate the urban development effects of the Games more reasonably. The urban development effects of the Games may be obtained even sometime after the Games.
- d) Measuring systems of the planning process and urban development effects of the Olympics are recommended to be developed to analyze their relations more scientifically.

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