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PLAN B

UP 889 - Research Paper

National Develogment Plan at Taiwan

Da- Yuan Huang
A20153015

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Statement of Purpose

3. Brief Background
1) Social Changes
2) Concept of Development
3) Plan Formation

4. Overall Frameworks
1) Raising National Income
2) Sufficient Resources for Economic Growth
3) Balanced Regional Development
4) Raising the Quality of Life
5. Plan Process
1) Progress
2) Bottlenecks
6. Policy Revising
1) Cause and Effect
2) Economic Stimulus Package
3) Adjusted Development Plan
7. Analysis of Implementing Approach
1) Positive Effects
2) Implementation Deviations
8. Recommendations
1) Land Acquisition
2) Human Resources
3) Fiscal Reflections
4) Technology Transfer
5) Intergovernmental Cooperation
6) Institutional Improvement

9. Conclusion

End Notes

Map Figure (Taiwan)

INTRODUCTION

Over the past forty years, Taiwan has experienced remarkable economic
success and a spectacular rise in its material standard of living. More
recently, however, amid rising prosperity and affluence, there have been
signs of imbalance and dislocation, including traffic congestion,
environmental pollution, and a lack of cultural and recreational facilities.
Moreover, a tightening supply of low-skilled labor and a declining work
ethic are posing a threat to business activity and hampering the further
improvement of the nation's quality of life.

The economic imbalances and social dislocations are largely a result of
insufficient investment in the areas of transportation, culture, and education.
Development in these areas has failed to keep pace with the economic
development.4 This indicates a need of integrated comprehensive planning
to accelerate the nation's modernization process. The "Six-Year National
Development Plan", a forward looking blueprint for national development,
seeks to address that need. This plan proposes a series of important public
construction projects aimed at resolving current development bottlenecks,
and calls for the promotion of social and economic equity, the fair
distribution of the fruits of development, and improvement of the national
quality of life. Its major priorities are to rebuild social and economic order

and promote balance development. The four key goals include: 4~ 9

1) Raising national income,
2) Providing sufficient resources for continued economic growth,
3) Promoting the balanced development of various regions,

4) Raising the national quality of life.

STA T EMEN T OF PURPOSE

By any standard, NT (New Taiwan Dollar) $8.2 trillion, about US$300
billion, is a tremendous amount of money. When the government of Taiwan
launched its "Six-Year National Development Plan" (1991-1996), which
calls for spending this amount of money on improving Taiwan's
overburdened infrastructure, people were first stunned by its expansiveness
and extraordinary cost. Besides legitimate concerns about the challenge of
financing the 775 projects which make up the plan, people also worried
about the government's ability to do so much so soon. Both the Premier,
who initiated the plan, and the Council for Economic Planning &
Development (CEPD), which pulled the plan together in six months,
indicated from the beginning that constant review and evaluation were
essential and all the construction work should be implement with thorough
planning, good quality, and at reasonable price.9 However, it is impossible,
for example, to predict accurately the problems associated with building a
single mass-transit tunnel along one major artery in Taipei. Try multiplying
the possible problems by 77 5 projects administered by close to thirty
ministries, agencies, and local governments! Therefore, in fact, throughout
the plan's implementation, review and revision are very much under way.
Various projects, large and small, are already behind schedule because of
unforeseen complications in acquiring adequate land, labor, and technology.
There are concerns, similar to those about the nation's capability in
achieving the Ten Major Construction Projects two decades ago, when the
late President Chiang insisted on carrying out the projects, saying that "If

we don't execute the projects, we will regret it tomorrow." '5

In this spirit, we should learn and continue to follow. Even with major
bottlenecks ahead, we must not assume that these problems won't solved by
firm political commitment and a more efficient administrative system. The
national development plan, begun in 1991, will soon be three years old.
While the plan's goals can be expected to remain constant, considerable
adjustment can be expected in the ways to fillfill them. Taiwan is clearly in
the midst of structural transformation, eagerly seeking the change from a
newly industrial country to a developed country. Meanwhile, it's a good
time and experience for me to learn certain specific lessons from the
process of implementation of the national comprehensive plan, as well as to
try to constitute some theoretically feasible suggestions to improve the plan
at a certain level through the analysis of decision making policy, social and
cultural changes, and economic impacts in accordance with the subjective

and objective environments at home and overseas.

BRIEF BA CKGROUND

1. Social Changes

Although, over the past forty years, Taiwan had experienced very harsh
military threats and invasions from the mainland China Communists, yet,
fortunately, under the long-term, governmental planned economic
leadership, we also started to advance from the agricultural and rural area to
the industrializing and urbanizing society during the 19603.1 The gross
national product (GNP) has grown from NT $17,495M (US$660 M) in
1952 to NT $5,770,163M (US $217,742M) in 1993, a grth of 329 times
in only 41 years.12.'3 This, definitely, has a strong influence on urban

development. However, the territory of Taiwan is only 35,873 square

H's-alivinfllr. P. a.

kilometers in size, and it is almost impossible to grow any bigger, but the
1952 population of about eight million increased rapidly to more twenty-
one million in the 1993, which means that the population density has grown
2.6 times over that period of time. This could be the second highest
population density in the world},lo Also, the highly centralized urban
population in the two major metropolitan areas, Taipei (north) and
Kaohsiung (south), which caused the population growth rate to decrease in
the central and east part of Taiwan, results in the considerable regional

disparity in population distribution.

2. Concept of Development

As a result of these factors, we encounter severe problems in the
metropolitan areas, such as overcrowding, traffic congestion, lack of public
infrastructures, environmental pollutions, land misuse, and inadequate
housing supply. They also exist in the other areas less severely. Thus, our
government tried very hard to solve these problems and proposed a huge,
systematic, and constructive project, the so-called "Six-Year National
Development Plan", which indicates a need for comprehensive planning to
accelerate the nation's modernization process, and it has been adopted in
1991. The plan's primary purposes are: 6’9

l) to increase the gross national product (GNP) and economic competence;
2) to make up the imbalance development between the urban and rural
areas;

3) to build a more reasonable resources distribution system;

4) to propose a series of important public construction projects aimed at
resolving current bottlenecks;

5) to call for the promotion of social and economic equity as well as the fair

distribution of the fruits of development; and

6) to upgrade the peoples' living standard as in the western welfare
countries.

About 60 percent of the projects in the plan in terms of financial
requirements are ongoing projects that have been individually approved in
accordance with administrative procedure. The various projects have
different completion dates. Some will be completed in less than six years;
others will require more than six years to finish.4

Actually, since 1953, the government has carried out ten medium-term
economic development plans, and annual plans have been implemented
since 1972. All but one of the medium-term plan have covered four years
(the exception being six years during the oil crisis). However, the current
six-year plan is an integrated administrative branch of the government, just
like a total comprehensive plan that sums up all the economic and cultural
projects planned by most previous planners and made the goal of the plan
more clearerJ“,l5 In other words, it becomes the most important and gigantic
plan of Taiwan's governmental authority, and only through a concerted
effort by both the government and people will Taiwan be able to meet these
challenges, overcome the problems that now face it and continue to enjoy

long-term grth and stability.

3. Plan Formation

Formation of the plan required a remarkable amount of teamwork. The
various projects were first proposed by twenty-five ministries and agencies
of both the local and central governments. Proposals for public investment
projects were drafted by the Taiwan Provincial Government, and the
Municipal Governments of Taipei and Kaohsiung, then screened and
compiled by the CEPD in accordance with policy goals, as well as the
availability of national resources. The final plan, incorporating input from

government, business leaders, legislator, scholars, and other experts, was
5

approved by the Executive Yuan (Cabinet) in the middle of 1991.4419
Therefore, successful implementation of the plan will depend not only on
the efforts of individual government agencies in their own respective areas
but also on active participation by the private sector and strong support
from the general public.

In order to make a fair and meaningful study for this planning program, two
main categories, 1) the overall frameworks and 2) process of the plan , will

initiate the research objectives of this paper.

OVERALL FRAME WORKS

As mentioned earlier, the plan is divided into four key policy goals: 1.
Raising national income; 2. Providing sufficient resources for Continued
economic growth; 3. Promoting balanced regional development; 4. Raising
the quality of life. Due to the huge and complex structure of this plan, it is
not practical and necessary to study every details of these projects included
in the plan, and, as a matter of fact, I would like to focus more on the
overall guidelines and predicted indexes than other items to appropriately

introduce the policy purpose of the plan.

1. Raising National Income

Sustained economic growth is an indispensable prerequisite for greater job
opportunities, higher income, and improved national welfare. To ensure
sustained growth over the next six years, the government will launch a
number of major public development projects which will stimulate
domestic demand, enhance overall productivity, and promote efficient

resource allocation to assure stable future growth. The economy is targeted

to grow at an average annual rate of 6.0 percent and consumer prices are
expected to rise by no more than 5.0 percent in 1991 and by no more than
3.5 percent each year for the rest of the period. Maj or objectives and policy
measures are as follows:2,4a3,9,14

1) Agriculture - Agriculture will maintain zero grth and its
development will focus on types of production that are technology-intensive
and high value-added, and have considerable market potential. The
objective to narrow the development gap between the urban and rural areas
is to improve the efficiency of farmland use, and upgrade the community
services as well as living conditions in remote neighborhoods. Setting up
forest areas for both agricultural and recreational purposes are all the basic
policies.

2) Industry - Strengthening Research and Development, promoting
production automation, upgrading product quality, and controlling pollution
will be major priorities in industrial development. Annual industrial growth
will average 6.9 percent, with manufacturing expanding 6.5 percent per
year. There will be considerable improvement in the structure, with both
heavy and light industries. At the same time, helping the finances of small-
and medium- size enterprises and improving their management to reduce
their vulnerability are also an essential policy for industrial development.

3) Services - The service sector will be required to provide modern, high-
quality, services not only to meet the production and productivity goals of
industry but also to satisfy the demands of increasingly affluent and
sophisticated consumers. The following policy guidelines have been
formulated with a view to achieving annual growth of 7.8 percent in the
service sector during the plan period:

A) Strengthen the framework of laws and regulations governing and

facilitating the operation of service industries.

 

B) place special emphasis on manpower planning and training in service
industry.

C) Achieve a more rational distribution of service establishments and step
up the procurement of land required for the construction of service

facilities.

2. Sufficient Resources for Economic Growth

Efficient productive resources are the key to industrial modernization and to
attaining the economic growth target. With that in mind and to ensure the
development of modern industrial establishments at optimal locations, the
government will carefully monitor the distribution of productive resources,
like land, water, energy, and transportation facilities during the plan period.
It also envisions the emergence of Taiwan as a financial center, a regional
transportation hub, and a major leader in high technology in the western
Pacific. A preliminary estimate for public projects is NT$1.9 trillion for
government expenditure; NT$2.1 trillion coming from investment by public
enterprises and will be provided out of their own finances; NT$600 billion
open for private investment; and NT$3.6 trillion to be provided through
government capital accounts. Of this latter amount, NT$2.5 trillion will be
financed with government current surpluses, and the remaining NT$1.1
trillion will be financed in part with government bonds and in part with
proceeds from the sale of public properties and the stock of public
enterprises. It should be noted, however, that all projects are subject to
change due to budgetary constraintsfliii‘al4

Planners are optimistic about obtaining the necessary capital, because the
fixed capital needs for the plan, after deducting expenditures for land,
condemned buildings, and nationwide insurance, will equal about 13.8
percent of the estimated GNP of US$1.4 trillion for the six years compared

with the 15 percent of GNP required for the Ten Major Construction
8

Projects completed in the 19703. Meanwhile, based on past performance,
private investment during the plan should total around 12.5 percent of GNP,
so the combined public and private investment is expected to be 26.3
percent of GNP during the planned period, whereas the national saving rate
can be expected to stabilize at 29.3 percent of GNP. Thus, the supply of
capital will exceed demandfi,”

Major construction projects can be grouped into six principal categories as
detailed belowzz’4’6’79a‘2»l4

1) To upgrade industrial facilities: Various measures for industrial
zoning and development will be carried out to modify the industrial
structure and provide for balanced regional development. Such measures
include:

A) Preparations for establishing new high-technology industrial parks, and
basic industrial zones in coastal areas.

B) Promotion of the rational distribution of service industries and
development of multiple downtown areas in large cities.

C) Establishing regional and local branches of administrative, managerial,
financial, and information agencies to supply better service for public.

D) Setting up service industrial centers in local living perimeters to promote
efficient growth of service industries in regional center or multiple
downtown areas.

2) To solve land problems: Unproductive farmland will, at the right
time and in the right proportion, be converted to intensive industrial,
commercial, residential, and recreational uses, and used to build major
transportation facilities. Specific measures call for developing the
Changhua coastal industrial zone (middle part of Taiwan), the Yunlin
coastal basic industrial zone (central west), and the Hualien cement

production zone (east).

3) To improve and expand transportation system: Developing
Taiwan into the transportation hub of the western Pacific, the following
measures are carried out.

A) The second trans-island freeway. the first high-speed railway, and
fourteen other major east-west highway networks are under construction.

B) Improve harbor administration, facilities, and the construction of access
to highways.

C) Expand the Taipei and Kaohsiung international airport, and upgrade
flight control systems, customs procedures, and better rapid transit system
between the Taoyun international airport and Sungshan's domestic airport
(Taipei).

4) Water resource conservation plans include:

A) Accelerating the construction of the Yuli (east), Tainan (south), and
Chichi (north) reservoir; expanding existing city water supply facilities to
make running water more widely available.

B) Updating field irrigation and drainage facilities, intensifying plans for
the management of reservoir catchment areas.

C) Strengthening preventive measures against water pollution, and
improving management of ground water extraction.

5) To ensure a stable energy supply: The following measures are to be
implemented:

A) Diversify both domestic and imported sources, emphasizing the use of
liquefied natural gas in particular.

B) Develop energy technology, conduct research on energy conservation,
and explore new sources of energy.

C) Promote a rational energy pricing structure and raise the efficiency of
energy use.

6) To enhance manpower training: Making optimal use of manpower

resources and raise labor productivity include:
10

A) Broadening the scope of professional and career education with life-long
opportunities for study and raising the level and quality of vocational
training.

B) Strengthening labor laws, improving the working conditions,
employment services, and harmonious relations between labor and

management.

3. Balanced Regional Development

In order to achieve more balanced development and avoid the pitfalls
associated with rapid industrialization and urbanization, population
congestion must be alleviated, industrial sites have to be distributed more
evenly, and systems for the delivery of modern community services need to
be more equitable. Moreover, differences in regional development must be
mitigated, transportation construction intensified, and the living standard of
all regions elevated, so as to achieve the goal of balancing regional
development. Toward this end, the plan gives top priority to accelerating
the development of backward areas by improving their housing, schools,
cultural, medical, transportation facilities, and public service. The objective
is to realize the full potential of each region, so as to slow down the flow of
population to overcrowded urban centers and to narrow regional differences
in development. Other objective also include to provide people of each
region with satisfactory job, comfortable recreation, and healthy social

atmosphere.

4. Raising the Quality of Life

The ultimate goal of economic development is to improve the national well-
being and quality of life. To help realize this goal, eighteen living
perimeters will be established in proximity to major industrial centers. The

perimeters will be self-contained communities, providing living
11

accommodations, recreation, education, medical, and shopping facilities to
residents, and will be served by rapid mass-transit networks.9 In addition, a
national health insurance program will be inaugurated in 1994 to provide
medical insurance coverage for all the people. Environmental protection
legislation and administration will also be strengthened to ensure higher
environmental quality and more effective ecological preservation. Within
the period of years, the planning and development should improve social
welfare and security, strengthen environmental protection, and greatly
upgrade the quality of life in the whole Taiwan area. The per capita GNP
should reach US$14,000 by the year of 1996, putting the ROC among the
ranks of developed countries.6

There are two principal measures for achieving this goal: 4,6,9J0’12J4

1) Establishing living perimeters - The eighteen such perimeters, four
of them located among the northwestern and northeastern part of Taiwan,
three are around the metropolitan areas of Taipei, four in the middle, and
the remaining perimeters are distributed among the south, southeast, and
cast, will be set up to meet the six major social needs of residents. The
following measures are directly related to accomplish this goal:

A) Transportation facilities - A transportation network that provides fast
and convenient intra- and inter-city transport. Every town of more than
50,000 people will be connected by highway, every city of more than
100,000 people will have an expressway system, and every metropolitan
area of more than 1,000,000 people will have a rapid mass-transit system.
B) Housing - Eighty percent of housing will be owner occupied. The
objective is to provide each household with its own house, and each person
with his or her own room. The area for each household is to increase from
30 ping (1067.5 sq. ft.) to 34 ping (1209.8 sq. ft). The total amount of

living construction shall come to 150,000 units.

12

C) Cultural and educational facilities - Every township is to have a library.
The facilities of each local cultural center are to be improved. Institutions
for higher education and adult education are also to be augmented at all
levels in the community.

D)Working environment - Employment opportunities will be created in
each perimeter by improving the local industrial infrastructure. Industrial
areas and commercial service centers will be established. Polluting factories
will be moved to designated areas.

E) Recreational facilities.- Leisure time is to be increased to an average 45
hours a week. Every Township is to have a swimming pool and a baseball
field. A playground for children is to set up for each Li (borough) of the
city. And every major city is to have its own center for cultural, artistic, and
folk arts performances. Museums and art galleries are to be within one
hour's reach. Recreational facilities should be planned in coordination with
local resources.

F) Medical network - Remote areas where medical resource are poor will be
provided with regional hospitals and basic medical institutes. Medical
personnel working in remote areas shall be given special allowances.

G) Shopping facilities - Large shopping centers and modern supermarkets
will replace traditional markets for weekly, monthly, seasonal shopping
need.

2) Strengthening environmental protection measures - Due to its
relatively small size, congested traffic, overcrowded population, and
extremely rapid economic development, Taiwan is confronted with serious
environmental pollution problems. In order to deal with these problems, the
government will adopt the following measures:

A) Garbage disposal - Erecting 21 waste incinerators with a daily disposal
capacity of more than 17,000 metric tons of waste and opening 55 local and

23 regional sanitary landfill sites all over the island.
13

B) Industrial waste disposal - The Environmental Protection Administration
will be responsible for building a pilot industrial waste incinerator with a
daily capacity of 100 metric tons. The Ministry of Economic Affairs will set
up industrial waste management centers in northern, central, and southern
Taiwan to dispose of solid wastes from industrial parks.

C) Sewer systems - The plan calls for an extension of sewer systems so as
to increase the percentage of population served by the systems from 3
percent to 14 percent by 1996.

D) Water pollution control - Comprehensive pollution management and
treatment projects for 44 rivers will be implemented.

E) Air pollution control- Presently, in northern Taiwan only 84 percent of
the 365 days in a given year register below a tolerable pollution count,
while in eastern Taiwan, 100 percent of the days are within the limit. The
plan calls for raising these percentages to 90 percent for northern and
southern Taiwan, 95 percent for the central Taiwan, and 100 percent for the

eastern part of Taiwan.

PLAN PROCESS

1. Progress

After the national development plan was launched, it received both praise
and criticism. The plan's boldness makes some people nervous. They worry
that the plan will be criticized if construction falls behind schedule or if
some projects have to be put temporarily on hold. These concerns raise
another common misunderstanding that the plan is an exact, inflexible
blueprint for the future. In fact, the six-year plan sets guidelines and goals,

and specifies projects that are needed to fulfill them.16 While the plan's

14

goals can be expected to remain constant, considerable adjustment can be
expected in the ways to realize them. Common sense, really, though
commonly overlooked. For example, it is unworkable to predict accurately
the problems associated with building a high-speed railway along from
Taipei to Kaohsiung city. Try adding the possible problems of total projects
administered by close to thirty ministries, agencies, and local governments.
Actually, due to unpredictable difficulties in acquiring adequate land, labor,
and technology, various large projects are already behind schedules. At the
same time, as expected, worrisome financial difficulties have also emerged
for some big-ticket items. According to CEPD, of ninety-one large projects,
each with a budget exceeding NT$20 billion (US$800 million), only fifty-
five have broken ground; the other thirty-six are still in various stages of
planning.14 The plan's 1992 budget was about US$30 billion, but only 80
percent was spent. Some major infrastructure projects cannot catch up with
schedule.6 Even all of these impacts are visible and physical facility
projects, however, another "shadow" infrastructure must also be noticed and
constructed, such as a complex array of trained manpower, laws,
regulations, and administrative proceduresfi” Taking again the high-speed
railway as an example. Complicated laws and regulations are needed to
govern the operations of such a train because the old ones were designed for
slower-moving, steam, oil, or electric trains. They are inappropriate and
inadequate for the new high-speed rail system. And new laws and
regulations cannot be adopted wholesale from France, Germany, or Japan -
they must be crafted to fit local requirements. Legislators, administrators,
and legal experts will have a lot of work to do before the first load of
passengers makes the first ninety-minute trip from Taipei to Kaohsiung.9

Thus, the plan must be understood in a broader perspective. It encompasses
projects that predate and extend beyond its six-year time frame, it involves

sophisticated fine-tuning during its regular process of review and revision,
15

and beside building the hardware needed for continued economic
development, the plan is also forcing an extensive upgrading of the island's

administrative and legal "supportware".

2. Bottlenecks

The government of Taiwan had hoped that implementing the six-year
development plan would thoroughly change and upgrade Taiwan society by
solidifying the island's infrastructure constructions, stimulating economic
booms, and raising the quality of life on this land. Nevertheless, Taiwan's
development is currently facing the struggles of being transformed and
remodeled due to the high price of land and labor as well as other factors.
Many traditional industries have moved off the island. The continual
revaluation of Taiwan currency, the rise of regional economies worldwide
and the re-emergence of trade protectionism have depleted the strength of
industries primarily processing goods for export and left them unable to
continue development.

Now that the plan has been under way for almost three years, the
bottlenecks can be more accurately identified. Missed deadlines are
plaguing many of the plan's project. What're the causes? The followings are
five chief effects of them.

1) Land acquisition problems;

2) Financial imbalance;

3) Shortage of human resources;

4) Inadequate technical skills; and

5) Complicated coordination procedures among government agencies.

1) Land Acquisition Problems:
This effect ranks high, if not first, on the list of problems delaying

construction. Land prices in many areas have tripled since early 1986
16

because of real estate speculation. In addition, after martial law was lifted in
July 1987, people were less hesitant to take to the streets to air their
dissatisfaction with government decisions.l At that time, a "protest culture"
permeated society and oftentimes owners went to the streets to protest
against the low prices offered by the government to buy their land. A
buying spree in the real estate market landed a number of the plan's projects
in a predicament. Under the plan, one-third of the total investment was used
to buy land. The huge demand has set off a craze for land, resulting in
soaring prices.3 Construction of number of projects undertaken by the
Department of Transportation and Communication has stagnated because of
difficulties in acquiring land. The second-phase project of the Kaohsiung
Airport cannot get going because of problems in requisitioning land, and
the governments concerned have no alternative but to build another airport
at a different site.5 Matters were complicated by some government's
willingness to negotiate with owners over compensation for construction on
their land. One example, the compensation offered for tea- growing areas
was different between Taoyuan and Hsinchu county governments on the
planned route of the northern section of the second freeway. The different
prices triggered disputes, after twenty months, and the expressway bureau is
still trying to solve the land problems. Time has been wasted in ways like
that.5,7

More than schedules are being influenced by the land-acquisition problems.
Costs are also sky-rocketing. Like the cost of construction on the second
freeway averages NT$1.5 billion (US$60 million) per kilometer, compared
with US$4 million for the first freeway completed in 1978. Land costs
account for 32 percent of the total budget in the second freeway, while they
amounted to only 8 percent in the first one.1’9,12 Land acquisition is
invariably a long and complex process. It usually takes at least eighteen

months, and involves altering land use designations, primarily from
17

agricultural to residential, commercial, or industrial use, as well as getting
approval from local and central governments, announcing the change of

land-use to the public, and executing the actual land expropriation.

2) Financial Imbalance:

Since the plan was drafted, main debate has focused on how to finance the
mammoth US$300 billion development plan. The CEPD, which was
responsible for drafting the plan, has optimistically estimated that funds will
be easy to obtain. Critics, on the other hand, complain the plan is ill-
conceived, too expensive, and the necessary funding will be difficult to
secure.5 One year into the plan, the government was already facing
mounting financial problems. Despite the government's bright forecast,
financial problems have begun to emerge. In fiscal year 1991, the central
government registered a budget deficit of NT$257 billion (US$103 billion).
To cover this shortfall, the central government, in addition to appropriating
NT$22 billion from the accumulated budget reserves, floated NT$235
billion in bond issue to cover one quarter of it, operating expenses. The
Ministry of Finance (MOF) expects that bonds will become the source of
the majority of funds for the plan and for the government's basic operating
expenses. Outstanding government bonds topped NT$350 billion (US$14
billion) in fiscal 1992, making up 32 percent of the central government's
total budget. The figure is expected to reach 142 percent in fiscal 1996. In
fiscal 1992, 5.2% of the government's expenditures went to the payment of
principal and interest on bond issues, and that figure would reach 30 percent
or more by 1999. The MOF warns that a major financial crisis is looming,
threatening to bankrupt the nation and leave a formidable financial burden
for further generation.4»6»9l12

Due to budget inaccuracies for the plan, construction funds have gradually

become a heavy burden on both the Taiwan authorities and the public. The
18

plan needs a total investment of NT$8.2 trillion, of which only NT$2.0
trillion is to be supplied by the ordinary budget. The remaining NT$6.2
trillion is to come from an inadequately funded special budget.2 Funds have
to be raised by issuing public bonds and through land transfer. The total
investment for the six-year plan is likely to be NT$11 trillion. The
investment required for over one quarter of the projects was initially
underestimated, and expenses will continue to increase in the future. For
example, the budget for the construction of the high-speed railway project,
which has not yet begun, has grown from its original NT$300 billion to
over NT$430 billion. The shortage of these funds can be solved only
through the issuance of public bonds, and the huge debts will bring
tremendous pressure on the authorities and the public},9

Private investment has also seriously lagged behind government
projections, creating other bottleneck for further development. But, the sale
of government's properties may be achieved according to the schedule.“
The government will pocket an estimated NT$600 billion (US$24 billion )
from the first phase of the privatization program of twenty-two
govemment-run enterprise.” However, it will be actually take much longer

than expected to obtain the funds.

3) Shortage of Human Resources:

The shortage of labor manpower and experienced professional also directly
affect the implementation of the development plan. Statistics show that
Taiwan needs an additional 120,000 ordinary laborers, and that the shortage
of engineers is rated at 63 percent.5 It is another reason why projects are
falling behind schedule. Even the pressure was slightly relieved in April
1992 after the government lifted the ban on foreign labor, the expressway
bureau, for instance, has imported 1,800 foreign workers, primarily from

Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesiafi” But the construction companies
19

still cannot hire enough laborers. However, the shortage of unskilled labor
is only part of the problem. The need for experienced engineers gets more
acute following the launching of each new project. One major reason for
the shortfall is that after all the Ten Major Construction Projects were
finished in the late 19703, the government didn't undertake many large-scale
public works. Experienced engineers either retired or changed jobs to
something more profitable and less strenuous, like investing in the stock
market",9 Meanwhile, according to the Construction Industry Foundation
for Research and Development, the net value of construction industry will
jump to NT$680 billion (US$27 billion) from the current NT$180 billion
(US$72 billion) in six yearsJW' As a result, private sector engineering
company are offering top dollars to attract engineers, including those
already working on six-year plan projects with other firms.5 Turnover is
high in the market and a common occurrence that construction companies
undermine each other's business by scrambling for experienced people. On
the other side, the construction sites are full of recent college graduates, but
they cannot take immediate action when problems arise. They always have

to ask for instructions, which really wastes time.

4) Inadequate Technical Skills:

Many of the plan's projects, such as Taipei's MRT and the high-speed
railway between Taipei and Kaohsiung, require cutting-edge high
technology. It is hoped that through the construction of these projects, new
technology can be transferred to help develop related industries in Taiwan.
One goal for local business is to develop the expertise necessary to handle
long-term maintenance of these systemsfillo,14 There is substantial money to
be made. In the case of high-speed railway, the costs for five years of
maintenance are expected to be roughly equivalent to one year of

construction costs.9 If we can produce some of the component parts
20

u. _ ___.«_

 

 

ourselves, lots of money can be saved. In addition, we can eventually export
this technology to mainland China and Southeast Asia.

In the past, the task of developing means for technology transfer has
received relatively low priority. For example, three nuclear plants where
built on the island by the mid-19803, but the construction of the fourth
plant, a major project in the six-year plan, will still primarily count on the
foreign technology. It's because the three plants were all tum-key
projectsfi”l5 Currently some observers complain that government officials
are still reluctant to address technology transfer issues because of their great
complexity. But this attitude is being challenged in both the public and
private sectors. At present, the Technology Cooperation Regulation governs
technology transfers, but since the regulation was promulgated in 1962 and
mostly recently revised in 1964, it suffers from being outdated and too

vague for today's high-tech environment.5

5. Complicated Coordination Among Governmental Agencies:

A lot of the six-year plan projects require the corporation of various
government agencies. Breakdowns in communication between different
levels of government and agency can complicate matters. In the course of
implementing the plan, one of the biggest resistances came from the pass-
the-buck attitude and low administrative efficiency of various
departments?14 The six-year plan was first put forward by various
departments on the basis of their local conditions. Since the plan was not
based on the consideration of the overall situation, conflicts often occurred
among the various agencies during their implementation of the plan. Two
projects which well illustrate this are the construction of high-speed railway
and the development of new cities.5,”

Contractors are also overwhelmed by the number of offices they must deal

with during their work. "We don't have ability to handle so many
21

government agencies," says a major contractor within the plan. "We hope
our clients can solve all related problems and just let us do the construction
work". Waste soil disposal is an example. "We think our client should
coordinate with the Environmental Protection Administration first, then tell
us where we can dump the waste soil".3’9,7.lo The complaint hits a sore spot.
Another contractors working on the huge tunneling projects that are part of
the Taipei MRT have had tough time finding places to dump the tons and
tons of soil excavate each day},7 Usually the government requires the
companies to solve their own dumping problems. Because there is no large
dumping area in urban areas, construction companies have to send
truckloads of soil to distant districts. It is estimated that from 1993 to 1995,
between 3 million to 3.5 million cubic meters of waste soil will be dumped
annually”,l4 Originally, the MRT authority received permission from the
Department of Public Works and Taipei county government, to dump 3.6
million cubic meters of dirt at the coast near the suburb Linkou, reclaiming
60 hectares of land“,9 But when application was made to change the land-
use designation, an entertainment company complained that the county's
Department of Education had already given it permission to open up a
recreational beach in the same area and they protested against the
dumping.“7 The case is not yet resolved, and will involve decision made
by the Ministry of the Interior. Although several dump sites plan have been

studied, waste soil problems is continuing.9

POLICY RE VISIN G

1. Cause and Effect

Except for those obstructions mentioned above, the six-year plan has also

22

triggered the problems unexpected by the government, such as a drop in
private investment and a sharp price rise. The plan was originally aimed at
boosting non-governmental investment by encouraging the participation of
the public's funds. In fact, however, the amount of investment fi'om the
islanders is decreasing, because most projects within this plan, particular
the transportation constructions, require large amounts of investment, big
risks, slow recovery of investment and the limited access for general public
to participate. Since the plan's attempt to bring in a large amount of funds
from the people is not supported by relevant decrees, the public naturally
hesitates to give it an enthusiastic response. Because funds are not in place,
the government can only rely on issuing of public bonds to raise funds.
Fund-collecting measures such as issuing government bonds, raising
interest rates and increasing taxes have, as a consequence, stimulated
continual price hikes and substantial rises in production costs. During the
first five months of 1993, the average growth rate of the island's price index
was 5.08 percent, far ahead of the 3.5 percent growth rate, estimated by
Taiwan authority in the six-year plan?“

Meanwhile, one main purpose of the plan is to sustain an annual GNP
grth of about 7%, but grth slipped to 6.1% in 1992 and the
government is forecasting, probably optimistically, 6.2% a year on average
up to 1996.'2~l3 Taiwan's major export markets are in countries in recession.
A lot of local business is moving to China and Southeast Asia. Tax
collection is becoming stagnant and inflation is a big worry. On top of all
this, some of the corruption scandals involving members of government are
tied to infrastructure projects, many of which are behind schedule.
Government authorities eventually concede that the original plan is a rough
program mixed with unfeasible ambitions, over-estimated budgets, and

inefficient administrations.

23

On July 1, 1993, the Taiwan's Cabinet approved a three-year (1993-1996)
stimulus package designed to spur growth by helping the private sector
through low-cost loans and other measures. Two weeks later, the
government's chief planner announced a long-expected midcourse reduction
in the nation's massive six-year development plan. The two moves mark the
influence of new Premier Lien, who wants to scale back the huge and
expensive six-year plan, and to upgrade Taiwan's infrastructure and propel
it into the ranks of developed nations in a more pragmatic and efficient

way.

2. Economic Stimulus Package

How to cut tremendous budgetary spending without threatening economic
growth, which is already sluggish by Taiwan's recent standards? The answer
that Taiwan government confides in, is to get the private sector to take up
the slack. To do so, the stimulus package includes the following main
pointsflo’lhlil6

l) NT$40 billion (US$15 billion) in loans to small- and medium-sized
businesses;

2) NT$20 billion for high-technology enterprises;

3) Nearly 30,000 hectares of govemment-owned land will be released for
private enterprise;

4) A five-year tax holiday offered to certain hi-tech industries;

5) More foreign workers will be allowed into the country to help relieve a
labor shortage in construction and manufacturing; and

6) broadening the list of semi-finished industrial goods which may be
imported from mainland China for processing in Taiwan.

The new package does not intend a sharp near-term increase in growth, but
aims instead to keep the expansion in GNP and private investment from

falling below present annual levels of 6-7% and 10-15%, respectively. Even
24

Taiwan's Central Bank is said to oppose the loans, but in an outright
showdown the government would probably prevail. Its three-year time
frame coincides with Premier Lien's presumed term of office and with
President Lee's own tenure. Politics is no minor factor here because the
ruling party - Kuomintang (Nationalist) faced a party congress in August
and local elections later in year of 1993. It is eager to show that it is doing
something to help the private sector, particularly small businesses.
However, critics says the blueprint, like previous planning policies, is
generally long on guidelines, goals and objectives but short on specific
projects. The government's plans are still unrefined at the industrial level,
and many manufacturing companies are reluctant to work with its
programs.‘l Large private-sector companies plan several years in advance,
but government policies, which are often vague and unpredictable to begin
with, can easily go astray during implementation. Besides, the amount of
funding they are offering can't make a dent in what the private sector really
needs. Other businesses say most of the plan will benefit big corporations,
not the 95% of manufacturing companies which are small-and medium-
sized. They complained that the Cabinet is doing nothing about what they
regard as a larger hindrance to growth - the Central Bank's anti-inflation
policy of high interest rates and tight liquidity.l "16

But economists believe that the new strategy is significant less as a
conventional stimulus package than as a fundamental shift in emphasis
towards the private sector, which the government wants to be more deeply
involved in the six-year development plan. Taiwanese companies are
investing in infrastructure projects in Vietnam, the Philippine and China, so
why not at home?”~14,'5 If government could encourage the private sector to
get involved in public projects instead of state-run enterprises, we'd get

better efficiency and less corruption. That is what the government intends.

25

This time the whole economic package focuses on how to encourage the

private sector to invest.

3. Adjusted Development Plan

Almost at the same time, the six-year national development plan is,
actually, being modified overall for the first time since it was adopted with
great fanfare in 1991 (and it should run to June 1996). The planned
reductions will slash the total cost by 22% from NT$8.2 trillion to NT$6.3
trillion (US$242 billion) and reduce the number of projects to 632 from
775. Time schedule of the plan is also changed to take at least 12 years to
complete, instead of six years.'3~'5,I6 It is not very clear, however, exactly
where the axe will fall. The chief government planner said the CEPD,
which renewed this draft of the plan, will make a more specific framework
in the near future. The cuts would come in secondary projects, sparing the
major items, such as, presumably, a high-speed railway planned for the
island's west coast. Even some of the cuts are on paper, since the original
plan was deliberately inflated for impact, but the program is shrinking in
reality as well as in theory.

The government believes the cuts will bring the original development plan
into line with the reality - meaning fiscal restraints and public resistance,
because the new Legislature, elected in December 1992, is increasingly
opposed to the enormous borrowings the plan has already required, and
there are growing doubts that the program is being administered either
honestly or efficiently. Indeed, the program has been persistent all along by
an intense national debate over whether it is either feasible or affordable.
There were fears that it would cause highly inflationary as well as other
social impacts. Today many insist the government has borrowed too much
for the plan; outstanding issues of government bonds have quadrupled since

1990 to NT$550 billion (US$21 billion) in 1993, and is crowding out
26

private borrowers.5’9"3 The Ministry of Finance also warns that issuing too
many government bonds could hurt the financial stability and threaten to
bankrupt the nation.'4

One of the major reasons the six-year plan was launched in the first place
out of fear that the economy faced a serious slowdown - economic grth
had slowed to 5.2% in 1990, and hundreds of manufacturers were
abandoning the island for lower-cost China and Southeast Asia. Private
investment was contracting with those developing countries. Some policy
advisers called for an unprecedented level of deficit spending to close the
gap in infiastructure investment and spur growth. But circumstances have
changed. While almost a full percentage point below government forecasts,
economic grth exceeded 6% in 1993 and during the first quarter of
1994.'7 The CEPD expects the plan to boost growth to 6.7% from 6.3%.
Private-sector investment grew 18% last year.16 These trends explain the

necessity of adjustment and re-evaluation of the initial development plan.

ANALYSIS OF IMPLEMENTING
APPR OA CH

The goal of the six-year plan is, theoretically, to provide the clear incentives
and functional programs to achieve the overall upgrade of Taiwan's society
at the national level while dealing with economic problems and the different
points of view from various participants in the course of implementation.
From the view of the planning process, the many difficulties facing
Taiwan's project implementation are simply caused by the hasty drafting of
the plan. Such a gigantic plan was made up in just six month's time as if it

were done under the urge of law, in response to the government's blueprint

27

requirements, or the competition of comparing respective strengths among
various levels of governments, each devising plans including more projects
and greater sums of money than each other. Hasty planning for quick results
and interdepartmental rivalry have resulted in an unrealistic plan. Blindness
is evident in the planning decisions and it needs to be examined.

The approach utilized by Taiwan's government to initiate the objectives and
to implement the policies of the plan can be approximately described as a
blend of top-down and incremental perspective. Taiwan officially
constitutes the national development plan through a central planning bureau
- CEPD, but the local government's economic and planning systems - from
provincial to municipal agencies - are composed of autonomous, self-

governing working organizations.5

1. Positive Effects

On the bright side, this approach can facilitate the institutional condition of
some particular policies or projects within this specific implementation
structure. Even they may involve various public and private agencies on all
levels of the intergovernmental system. Choosing the combined perspective
reflects Taiwan authority's belief in the importance of initiating guidelines
for projects, the interest in political effectiveness of administrative
organizations and the decision-making procedures it established. Several
key characteristics of this approach used to implement planned policy can
be principally stated as following:

1) Implementation here represents putting policy or project into effect
through a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions
geared to achieving them;

2) The progress of implementation has the ability to forge subsequent links
in the causal chain, mainly with coordination and managing various

elements, to obtain the desired results;
28

3) Whereas implementation for the plan begins with a set policy and
projects, the policy formation process starts with a review of previous
governmental efforts at political, socioeconomic and community
development and events leading up to the adoption of the plan; and,

4) In accord with the principle of incremental planning, it assumes that once
the plan is officially adopted, the adaptation and modification of enacted
polices, objectives, and projects can have an easy access to the local-level
environments when considerable impacts or changes occurred during
implementation process.

The approach, therefore, is easily to be maintained for a long-term period
because it is concerned with the initial policy, the enactment process of the
original program, and subsequent changes during implementation at both
the national and local levels, while the program was substantially altered.
Also, it is generally consistent with Barrette and Fudge's view that "rather
than treating implementation as the transmission of policy into a series of
consequent actions, the policy action relationship needs to be regarded as a
process of interaction and negotiation, taking place over time, between
those seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom action
depends", which taking "what is done" as the central perspective, then
focusing on the actions (such as, responses to environmental pressures; or
to pressure from other agencies) seeking to influence or control the groups
or individuals, and seeks to examine the degree to which action relates to

policy implementation.18

2. Implementation Deviation

But, unfortunately, the approach, practiced by Taiwan's government,
departs in several ways from their original concepts and consistencies, in
particular, from the distinctions between policy formation, the enactment

and funding of projects as well as its practical implementation process. The
29

following effects explain the deviation of the blend approach which
occurred in the course of policy implementation:

1) The official planning attitude toward central control and management is
still severs as a centerpiece within the combined method, and the
incremental executive system provides only limited access for local level
agencies. Consequently, the unbalanced planning progress reduces the
effectiveness of administrative organizations, and increases the degree of
complexity to implement the policies or projects of the plan.

2) The failure to make a proper in detail assessment of the plan's needs
before stepping into the official enacting process and unfeasible budgeting
have made policies are not practical to translate into implementation and led
to the repeated revisions of projects.

3) Different plans of local governments are constructed by a mixture of
individual experience, rules of thumb, various skills and some specific
public interests. The common philosophy and scheme about planning is
basically not existing on all levels. The situation makes the accomplishment
to integrate a comprehensive national development plan becomes more
complicated.

4) The lack of efficient feedback and responsibility systems has resulted in
the low sensitivity of evaluation, high consumption of resources and the
weakening of the plan's action potential to engage in further national
development. Any new information or news about the policy being
converted into actual public investment, once released, will trigger a series
of responses, such as a real estate buying spree, as well as other impacts,
which may mark a beginning of bankruptcy of the plan.

5) Departments of the central government concerned generally request few
opinions of the local agencies or landowners before they want to start the
nation-level plan in their advance schedules. The monopoly by the authority

not only generated obstacles to the implementation of the plan, but caused
30

disputes over responsibilities and rights. The lack of close coordination
between various levels of governments is the main reason for the failure to
eliminate the bad habit of everyone doing things in his own way, which will

adversely affect the progress and efficiency of the entire plan.

RE C OMMENDA T I ONS

As a planning student, it is beneficial and essential lesson for me learning to
look at the implementation process of the national development plan not
solely in terms of putting policies and projects into effect, as well as of
observing what actually happens or gets done and seeking to understand
how and why, but also in term of trying to provide some potential
suggestions for the problems. The very size of the plan and the number of
the projects submitted for inclusion in it, made it necessary to set priorities
of development, to remove or alleviate the implementation bottlenecks, and
rebuild the government's administrative systems. After these efforts, we
may hope the implementation results of this national development plan can
be basically improved and truly complete the upgrade of Taiwan's society
and public welfare at the same time. The following suggestions or strategies
are developed for the study both from the actual situations and theoretical

assessments. The major items include:

1) Land Acquisition:
Knowing the serious impacts of land-acquisition disputes in the six year
plan is not a difficulty thing, but, what's the solution? It caused much

complex discussion in the whole country. Some analysts argue that disputes

31

will not end until Taiwan addresses a larger underlying problem: rampant
land-price speculation. The land -acquisition issue stems from land prices.16
Nearly everyone, from landowners to urban planners to government
officials, advocates that the government have to offer a fair market price
instead of the traditional "published [and value", which usually can not
reflect the proper land value, However, why has the government been
reluctant to do so? The main reasons are that it would further strain the
budget, and that it is very difficult to determine accurate market values. In
addition. the government would lose a long-held right. Despite these
obstacles, the government should admit that market prices are already used
when expropriating land for industrial development projects. Under the
1991 Statute for Upgrading Industry, the government must pay land prices
that are consistent with the general purchase and sale price. Therefore, such
a policy could be expanded in conjunction with revisions to the land-value
increment tax now being discussed”,16

A new approach that revising land-acquisition law can provide an
innovative regulation that would establish a channel that landowners can
use to appeal land prices. Under this suggestion, people could take disputes
to an administrative court. The law must first be approved by the executive
and legislative branches, a process both public and private sides can expect
taking less than two years, to solve land disputes and it allows the
government to begin work before compensation is paid, so that progress on
projects will not be held up during negotiations.

We also can recommend that government increase their use of other
incentives for landowners, such as forming joint ventures, or returning a
portion of the land to them after the development is complete. These
incentives are already available with some six-year plan projects, but not
all.9 For example, joint land development has provided one way to break up

the logjam in many instances. The Department of Rapid Transit Systems
32

was the first to adopt this method, which emphasize the cooperation
between the government and private sectors. Landowners can be developers
or investors, and are responsible for the joint development plans which
should be submitted to the local government for approval. The best benefit
of this proposal is that the government gets the land without paying huge
amounts of money for land expropriation, and the landowners keep the land
as well as make money on it. To sum up, the most important function of this
kind of joint development plan is to reduce time spending, and to let the
public get efficient facilities as soon as possible.

After all, simply paying more and more money in land acquisition fees is
not a viable solution if the plan's projects want to stay on schedule and
within their budgets. Because even a dispute can be settled by increasing
compensation, but if the government doesn't have enough money, the
project will be stalled again. It is reasonable to say that, according to the
report of the Public Constructor Supervisory Board, if the land problems are

solved, most projects can be carried out smoothly.l ”5‘16.

2).Human Resources:

In face of the concerns of shortage of labor force and skilled professionals,
experts in government and the private sector are suggesting that new
projects be released for bid at a slower pace and hope the government will
establish a more detailed time-table for the whole plan, and set priorities for
all projects because of the limited human resources”,16 Meanwhile, the
government also should realize that public construction is, by its nature, a
long-term and ongoing effort. While the plan will complete a number of
major construction projects, the work will have to continue into the future.
Experienced technical personnel and laborers will therefore be used in
carrying out new projects in later years. In addition, the availability of

experienced technical personnel will not only heighten the quality of
33

domestic engineering work, but also strengthen the nation's capability in
bidding for overseas construction projects, thereby promoting the

internationalization of the Taiwan's construction industry.

3) Fiscal Reflections:

Over the past forty years, the island's infrastructure lagged far behind the
economic development, and the six-year plan aims to fill the gap. However,
this kind of remedy may be too ambitious and could end up stabilizing the
economy. Fortunately, the government appears to have detected the
problems. The plan has been revised not to be completed in the six-years
period, which may be the only way to solve the financial and budgetary
problems asserted by most of the local people. Despite the widespread
doubts about the nation's financial ability to handle the plan, however, the
money is not the most serious problem, but the government's ability is the
concern. In fiscal 1993, for instance, of the NT$668 billion (US$267
billion) budgeted for the plan, only 80 percent had actually been utilized. At
the same time, the other main reasons also effect the plan for falling behind
schedule, allocating budgetary funds as well. As a result, it appears

inevitable that the execution of the plan will be exceed six years.

4) Technology Transfer:

When facing the situation of outmoded and vague technology regulations
which still govern technology transfers, the government and private sectors
need to reach a consensus on proceeding, then work together to make it
happen. Until the regulations are updated, we can specify more new and
proper procedures for technology transfers in the contracts. But first, to
understand the extent of our ability and what we really need to learn is
important factors for us to upgrade the overall technological skills.

Meanwhile, on the supply side, we also have to consider what the
34

technology superiors can teach us. Moreover, the obstructions, which may
cause advanced foreign companies to hesitate to transfer their technology
because they don't want to us become their competitors, should be
eliminated. After all, building a partnership between local companies and

foreign consultants is a feasible solution.

5) Intergovernmental Cooperation: The solution for the coordination
problems among various levels of government is one of the major works
that the central government should currently take responsibility and finish
it. The better way is to set up a national level organization, like the "public
construction supervisory board" with high rank official as the chairman.
The primary functions of this board will be to supervise the quality,
techniques, and schedules of all national major public works, which
originated in different agencies related to the works. In the traditional
pattern, all the departments are doing their own projects, and the
communication with one another is rare, but right now, the board is
responsible for arrangement and coordination among various departments
to set up timetables to release the projects. Furthermore, after the board
becomes more mature in every respect, it can be expanded to be the official

Council responding the overall national planning.

6) Institutional Improvement:

Since the economic stimulus package and adjusted development plan were
launched last year, it's clear that the government has changed its tack and
wants the capital of the private sector into public projects. The offering of
rent rate and tax incentive provide the more flexible way to encourage their
participation in the plan. But there still are bureaucratic obstacles to such
investment. Furthermore, Taiwanese entrepreneurs, accustomed to quick

returns, are reluctant to invest in financially dubious ventures at home when
35

the rewards across the ocean are better. Therefore, only through the totally
political reformation and continuous administrative innovation, can the
Taiwan's government prove to its people that the future national
development is the stable, progress, and prosperous broadway when the

promised improvement in their quality of life becomes a fact.

CONCLUSION

Although the six year national development plan is concerned with the
economic growth, it also places great emphasis on balanced regional
development and the expansion of both infi'astructure hardware and
software needed to upgrade the overall quality of life of Taiwan's citizens.
Through this plan, with special attention given to industrial and commercial
facilities as well as cultural and social activities, Taiwan’s government can
hope to rebuild social and economic order and promote more evenly
balanced development to achieve the western developed nation status.
When it is accomplished, the people on the island will enjoy a life much
richer in culture and material goods.

Even if major bottlenecks happen in the course of implementing the plan, it
would be inaccurate and impractical to assume that if these problems were
all solved tomorrow everything could be kept on schedule exactly. In fact,
some much larger complications have continued to emerge in the
implementation process. It is becoming clear that Taiwan is actually in the
midst of transforming two kind of infrastructures - physical constructions
and governmental systems - at the same time. Several powerful mechanisms
and innovative stratagems for reexamination, adjustment and evaluation are

now in place, an effective reform that has great potential to put the plan into

36

a wholly different perspective. As the national development plan is fine-
tuned in the months and years ahead, the setting of clear priorities shall help
ensure that Taiwan will enter the twenty-first century with an overall
infrastructure that meets the economic, social, and culture needs of its

people.

37

End Notes

1. Marc J. Cohen, “Taiwan at Crossroads: Human Rights, Political Development
and Social Change on The Beautiful Island”, Asia Resource Center, Washington,
DC, 1988.

2. WuDuun, Sheryl, “$300 Billion Project to Rebuild Taiwan Draws Bidders from
Around World” The New York Times, Oct. 27. l991,v14l, sec. 1.

3. “Dream be Delayed: Taiwan's Infrastructure Problems”, The Economist, Aug. 7
1993, V321, n7733. p37-38

4. “The R.O.C. Six-Year National Development Plan in Brief”, Government
Information Office. Taipei, Taiwan, Aug. 1991.

5.'Hong-qiang Wan, “Taiwan's National Construction Plan Bogs Down”, Beijing
Review, August 3, 1992, v35, n3], p22-24.

6. “Big-Budget Spending in Infrastructure - Taiwan Comes of Age” Far Eastern
Economic Review, Oct. 15 1992, \1155. n41, p39-41.

7. Deborah C. Chan, “The Environmental Dilemma in Taiwan” Journal of
Northeast Asian Studies, Spring 1993, v12, n1, p35-58.

8. C. L. Tsay, “Industrial Restructuring and International Competition in Taiwan”
Environment & Planning, Jan. 1993, v25, n1, p111-122.

9. "Special Issue on National Development Plan", Free China Review,
Government Information Office, Taipei, Taiwan, Nov. 1992.

10. Jason C. Hu. “Straight Talking: Autobiography of Premier of the Republic of
China (1990-1993)” Government Information Office, Taipei, Taiwan, Jan. 1993.
11. Julian Baum, “Mid-Course Correction”, Far Eastern Economic Review, July

15 1993.

12. “Republic of China Yearbook, 1991-1992” Published by Kwang Hwa
Company, Taipei, Taiwan, July 1992.

13. ”Republic of China Yearbook, 1992-1993” Published by Kwang Hwa
Company, Taipei, Taiwan, July 1993.

14. “The 10th Mid-term Economic Development Plan of Taiwan (1990-1993)”
Edited by the Council for Economic Planning & Development, (Chinese Edition)
Taipei, Taiwan, Dec. 1989

15. “Efforts to Constructure the Modemized Country” The Central Daily Press,
(Chinese Edition), Taipei, Taiwan, Jan. 14, 1993.

16. “General Administrative Report of the Premier Lien to the Congress” The
Central Daily Press, (Chinese Edition), Taipei, Taiwan, Sept. 26, 1993.

17. “Report on Premier Lien’s Policies”, Sinorama, Vol.19, No 2, Feb. 1994.

18. Barret, S., and Fudge, C., eds. "Policy and Action: Essays on the
implementation of Public Policy" London and New York: Methuen, 1981, p3-30.

 

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