9 . Pr‘_\ HI] I. ,rv QRM .'- L PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested. " DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE J___J , 2/05 cJClRC/DathJndd—MS Michigan State University Urban and Regional Planning/ Urban Studies Plan B Research Paper Gender Planning Policy: Urban Design with Women in Mind Prepared by: Johnna M. Matthews In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science Urban and Regional Planning/Urban Studies 2004 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the many people who supported me in this endeavor to complete this Plan B paper. I especially appreciate the support of my extended office “ family to my oflice mother, Celeste, thank-you for your spirit and your faith in God, which have definitely helped me along the way to see the road at the end of the tunnel. Bernard, thank you for your undying willingness to help me no matter what my mood. Jimmy Bell (Jackson State University) thank- you for your guidance and support and for helping me to choose this topic that so matches my interests. Thanks to Rex LaMorefor being my advisor and helping me to complete this with minimal stress. Thank—you to Herb Norman for UP-897. Without that class and your guidance I would still be lost today. Thank-you to Eric Strauss who recruited me fiom Jackson State University. T o my mother and father, John and Alberta Matthews, thank you for your support and encouragement. Finally, I would like to thank God, through which all things are possible, for allowing me this opportunity. Thank-you to everyone! Table of Contents VI. VII. 1.0 Introduction - - -- -_ _- ........... _ - .... 1 2.0 Women’s Experience and Fear of Safety in the Public Realm ............ 3 2.1 The Gendered Nature of Crimes that Women Fear 6 2.2 Neighborhood Environment and Crime - - -_ _ - --_10 a. Physical Characteristics -- ........................ .10 b. Social Characteristics _-_ .............. ..14 c. Characteristics of Neighborhood Boundaries - - -- 16 3.0 Approaches to Community Safety -- ..... _ 18 a. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) .......................................... _ --19 b. Defensible Space _ .......... 21 c. The Three- 0 Approach - 23 d. Community Building ............................................................. .25 3.1 Traditional Crime Control vs. CPTED ...................................................... 27 4.0 Neighborhood Design .................................................................................. 29 5.0 CPTED in Action: Case Studies - ............... --_-_ - - ______ .34 a. Cincinnati, Ohio - .................................... - - .34 b. Houston, Texas ......... _ ............. ........ .35 Lessons Learned From 25 Years of CPTED Practice ..................................... 37 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 41 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 43 1.0 Introduction Developing safer cities and diminishing the fear of crime should be a central component of any planning process. However, when one considers the safety of females, the issue becomes increasingly magnified. Women’s experience of safety around public spaces in urban areas is believed to be significantly different to that of men. “It is believed that women face problems of such significance in cities and society, that gender can no longer be ignored in planning practices” (Bell, 1998). City Planning departments as well as college programs specializing in planning education are gradually becoming sensitive to gender perspectives in response to the past tendency to exclude the experiences of women in urban space when defining, interpreting and acting upon planning issues. “Tertiary planning courses are now including subjects such as gender and planning; aiming to explore, examine, analyze and challenge conventional planning thought and practice from the perspective of gender” (Bell,1998). Women and community safety, in the context of planning and urban design, has been the focus of a number of initiatives in Australia in recent years. The aim of such projects has been to influence the planning and design of urban areas and introduce programs, which will increase the safety and perceptions of safety for women in the use of the public domain (Bell, 1998). The purpose of this paper is to explore the extent of fear that women experience in the use of and access of public spaces and the role of urban design in planning safer places for women. Additionally, this paper will explore some of the trends and solutions to issues of women and community safety, with particular attention given to the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concept and Oscar Newman’s Defensible Space concept, which are both “based on the premise that proper design and effective use of the physical environment can produce behavioral effects that will reduce the incidence and fear of crime in urban areas (Crowe, 1991 ), thereby improving the quality of life for women”, and society as a whole. 2.0 Women ’5 Experience and Fear of Safety in the Public Realm Women’s experience of safety in urban areas is different to that of men. Urban settings and the way they are designed affect levels of fear which are higher among women and which vary by location, time of day, mode of transport and the level and nature of other uses. Women in particular, construct detailed mental maps of parts of the urban area which feel safe, and those that don't and should be avoided. They should, therefore, be involved in this design and in the planning process (Bell, 1998). The Center for Cultural Risk asserts that women’s fear of violence and crime affects their lifestyle, routines and the way they experience urban areas and the public realm, in particular. Recent research undertaken as part of the National Campaign Against Violence and Crime (Center for Cultural Risk, 1998) explores the nature of fear of crime and those more vulnerable to fear than others. This Center’s research suggests that it is far from clear that individuals who have experienced victimization are necessarily more fearful than those who have not. The literature goes on to report that it is important in understanding women’s fear; to see crimes against women as focused acts of intimidation. The Center contends that there are many myths about levels of victimization of women, crime location and offenders (Center for Cultural Risk,1998). “Women, particularly older women, are more likely than men to modify their behavior to avoid risk of crime. This pattern has repercussions for their use of the public realm, i.e. go out less, return home earlier or go out at night only with an escort. Women are more fearful of some crimes and locations than others. They feel less safe on public transport than in the general community, but are in fact at lower risk” (Bell, 1998). The consequence of the comparatively high level of fear among women as reported by the Center for Cultural Risk (1998), is that women’ 5 use of public space is less than men’s in that they utilize a narrower range of locations and frequently limit use to the daylight hours. Some aspects of the environmental setting which increase levels of fear, include higher traffic flows, rapid change in a neighborhood, evidence of disorder or incivility in an area, signs of physical and/ or social decay and lack of community cohesion, the dominance of males who are drunken and disorderly, low levels of street activity, poor lighting, dark alleyways and pathways and a decrease in visibility as a result of tall trees or bushes that need to be trimmed (White, 1995). A study administered in Australia suggests “overwhelming” evidence that women are fearful of particular situations including: . any mode of transport other than the car; 0 going out at night; 0 walking to shops or to a friend’s house; 0 use of public transport, in particularly at night and if multi-storied; 0 driving alone at night; and 0 open spaces (parks and the countryside) and pathways (alleyways and underpasses) (Bell,1998) “Fear that women experience in deserted public places lead to a sense of vulnerability to stranger attack because there are no others to deter or prevent the attack. Therefore, the presence of a companion of either sex increases the level of safety felt by women. In enclosed spaces, fear is linked to the limited number of exits and the opportunity for offenders to hide out of sight of others. Therefore, levels of activity and potential entrapment spots are factors which affect levels of fear among women” (Bell, 1998). The Center for Cultural Risk emphatically states that women need to be seen as multiple identities as stressed by the recent National Campaign Against Violence and Crime (NACAVC) research, which reveals how differing ages of women fear different things, i.e. teenage girls are more likely to be fearful about traveling on public transport, although they are more likely to take risks even though they may fear certain settings. Older women are, in many aspects, the most relaxed about traveling, although they avoid traveling at night (Center for Cultural Risk, 1998). Fear plays a part in the way women use public space, whether they use it at all, and if so, when they use it and what locations they use. The impact of fear, whatever the cause, on women’s use of urban places has implications for the role that planning and design of the public realm can play in increasing the use of spaces by women and reducing levels of fear (Bell,1998). The design of the public realm has been shown by recent research to be a major influence on women’s sense of safety in that space. 2.1 The Gendered Nature of Crimes that Women Fear “The crimes which women fear most- sexual harassment and sexual assault- are crimes perpetrated predominantly against women, by men. Men are sometimes victims of these crimes, but are unlikely to fear them. These crimes are sexual crimes against the person and are far more horrifying to contemplate than robbery or car theft” (Crime Prevention Division, 1999). Crimes against women also include murder, robbery and both aggravated and simple assault. These crimes can induce grave fear among women (US Department of Justice, 1996). Women who are or who have been sexually harassed in some form often report higher levels of fear of crime, than those who have not experienced harassment. A report published by the Australian Institute of Criminology found that in Australia, fear of crime is strongly associated with one’s having received harassing, obscene or threatening telephone calls (Crime Prevention Division, 1999). Verbal and sexual harassment are often experienced by women in public places. The harassment can be intimidating and cause feelings of powerlessness and fear. Violence is a reality in the lives of women all over the world. In Canada, 39 percent of adult women are sexually assaulted at some point in her lifetime by strangers. Both the reality and the fear of violence have kept women from participating fully in community life. About 56 percent of Canadian women are afraid to walk their own neighborhood after dark. Only 19 percent of men feel this way (www.canterbury.nsw.gov). Similarly, in the United States, the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) and Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system data show that between 1992 and 1994, the number of violent crimes committed against women reached almost 14 million: 0 an estimated 4.4 million in 1992; . 4.8 million in 1993; and o nearly 4.7 million in 1994 (Craven, 1997). From 1973 to 1994, the violent victimization rates of women and men converged. In 1994 women were about two-thirds as likely as men to be victims of violence. Of the 10.9 million crimes of violence in 1994, 4.7 million were against women. The rate of victimization was 43 per 1,000 women about two-thirds the 60 violent victimizations per 1,000 men (US Department of Justice, 1996). Twenty years ago women's likelihood of victimization was less than half that of men. The overall trend indicates that the rates of victimization for men and women converge; the rate for men decreasing and the rate for women remaining relatively stable or increasing (US Department of Justice, 1996). Somewhere in America, a woman is raped every two minutes (US Department of Justice, 1996). In 1994 there was 1 rape for every 270 women, 1 robbery for every 240 women, and one assault for every 29 women. For homicide, the least frequent, there was 1 female victim for approximately every 23,000 women 12 or older (US Department of Justice, 1996). Persons age 12 or older experienced an average annual 140,990 completed rapes, 109,230 attempted rapes and 152,680 completed and attempted sexual assaults between 1992 and 2000, according to the National Crime Victimization Survey (table 1). Most rapes and sexual assaults were committed against women. Female victims accounted for 94% of all completed rapes, 91% of all attempted rapes and 89% of all completed and attempted sexual assaults between 1992 and 2000. One of every four rapes takes place in a public area or in a parking garage (US Department of Justice, 1996). Table 1 The NCVS collects information on violent victimizations of which only some were reported to law enforcement. Overall, a higher percentage of female victims than male victims reported violent crimes to law enforcement (table 2) (US Department of Justice, 1996). Assault Assault In 1995, the UCR reported that females represented 23% of all known homicide victims in the United States; 9 of every 10 female victims were murdered by males. The UCR also reported that women with an annual family income under $10,000 were more likely to experience violence than those with a family income of $10,000 or more (Craven, 1997). Sometimes women do not report violence against them because they don't realize a crime has been committed. For example, many women may not realize that harassment is a crime. Or, at home, women may not know that being emotionally or physically abused is domestic violence, which is a crime. Sometimes when women report violence they receive a poor response from services (Freeman, 1981 ). If a service provider does not understand violence against women, they will not understand that violence can take many forms. They may even deny that it happens at all. Often times, the lack of understanding is because of a lack of information. Sometimes it is because of sexist and/ or discriminatory attitudes (Freeman, 1981). A lack of understanding can mean no action is taken. The Safe Women Project has found that sexual harassment and sexual assault are often not discussed in community safety forums. If violence against women is not acknowledged and discussed, then reducing the threat of this violence cannot be planned into community safety initiatives (www.cpu.sa.gov). 2.2 Neighborhood Environment and Crime Abundant literature exists on the relationship between neighborhood physical and social conditions and crime. However, there are several major problems with this body of research. One is that studies showing a relationship between poverty and crime take a monolithic view of low-income neighborhoods (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams, 1982). They do not explain why some poor neighborhoods are relatively safe, while others are dangerous. Second, studies tend to examine either social conditions or physical design, rather than taking both into account. Third, while many studies infer that the effect of social or physical characteristics on crime is transmitted through informal social control, this latter factor is seldom actually measured (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams, 1982). This section focuses on both objective characteristics of neighborhoods that are believed to have been linked to crime and the informal territorial control in neighborhoods that is believed to transmit the effects of objective conditions. The literature on the relationship between the objective conditions and crime will be reviewed. These conditions are defined as physical design, social 10 characteristics and characteristics of neighborhood boundaries (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams, 1982). a. Physical Characteristics. Three general categories of physical characteristics have been associated with neighborhood crime: building type, land use and street design. The underlying theme of this research is that physical design can either foster or retard social interaction among neighbors, informal street surveillance and a proprietary attitude toward the neighborhood. All of these are believed to deter crime. i. Building type. Oscar Newman’s study of the effect on crime of physical design, particularly buildings and streets, spawned a large number of subsequent studies on the notion of defensible space. Newman found in a study of public housing that the taller the building, the higher the crime rate. He also reported that residents of high-rise public housing displayed greater animosity toward police than those in low-rise projects (Newman, 1973). He inferred from these findings that in tall buildings there is a forced disassociation between dwellings and street activities and a sense of alienation both from the surrounding neighborhood and other residents of the project. Thus, areas with a high proportion of high-rise dwellings would be expected to have higher crime rates than those characterized by low-rise structures. Related to 11 ii. the issue of height, it has also been found that neighborhoods with a high proportion of single-family dwellings have lower crime rates than those dominated by multi-family dwellings. The explanation offered for this finding is that residence in a single-family dwelling encourages more of a proprietary attitude toward the surrounding area than residence in a multi-family building (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams; 1982). Street design. Proponents of the defensible space perspective assert that the more the street design is able to delineate public and private areas, the greater its effectiveness in reducing crime. Gardiner (1978) argues that the location of a major artery in a residential area encourages crime. A street that accommodates large numbers of people living outside the neighborhood increases both the number of potential victims and offenders in the neighborhood (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams, 1982). In addition, the large numbers of people who use these streets make it difficult for residents of the area to distinguish neighbors from strangers, and therefore, weakens the neighborhood’s informal surveillance capacity. Studies have found that the location of major arteries in residential areas increases residential burglary and fear of 12 iii. crime. Thus, low crime neighborhoods are expected to have fewer major streets than adjacent high crime neighborhoods. Several other aspects of street design are also believed to affect crime including building setbacks, street lighting and visual obstructions created by shrubbery, high fences and the like, all directly affect the ability of neighborhood residents to informally surveil the area (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams, 1982). Land use. Jane Jacobs (1961) asserts that diverse land use is a key element in crime deterrence (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams, 1982). By diverse land use, Jacobs mean that neighborhoods and blocks within neighborhoods have many different functions, that is residential, commercial, institutional and leisure. Multi-functional areas will attract a continual flow of people throughout the day and evening hours. Jacobs suggests that this is the most effective means of insuring informal surveillance, what she refers to as “a basic supply of activities and eyes.” In contrast, the domination of a single land use, regardless of what it is, results in a scheduling of use, such that the area is guaranteed to be deserted for long periods of time (Greenberg, Rohe, Williams, 1982). Despite the persuasiveness of Jacobs; arguments, diversity per se, may 13 not be sufficient to reduce crime. Dertrick (1977) found that residential burglary occurred more frequently near commercial areas. Moreover, certain commercial establishments and service facilities may attract potential offenders to the area and thereby promote crime. Thus, both the extent and type of diversity must be taken into account. In addition, land use that creates boundaries may also have an effect on crime. Depending on its location, a railroad, expressway or commercial district may help to reduce crime by creating or reinforcing neighborhood boundaries or may help to increase crime by slicing through the core of the neighborhood (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams, 1982). b. Social Characteristics. Research on the social correlates of crime has a long history, beginning with the classical ecological studies of Chicago in the 19205. The bulk of the literature shows that crime is most prevalent in poor, nonwhite, transient areas. The usual explanations are that such areas both breed and attract criminals and lack the cohesion to deter criminals coming from within or outside. However, the major problem with this research is that it usually does not go beyond simple statistical correlations to an understanding of the underlying relationship (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams, 1982). Three neighborhood social characteristics have been emphasized in the 14 literature: economic status and race, residential stability and life cycle stage of the residents. i. ii. Economic statggnd racial composition. Many studies show that crime rates tend to be highest in low income, predominately black neighborhoods near the city's core (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams, 1982). However, it may not be that a high percentage of blacks or low-income people, per se, promote crime, but rather that they tend to have low rates of home ownership which may discourage the formation of close ties and a sense of responsibility for the neighborhood (Felson, 1987). Residentigl stcLbility. Studies have suggested that crime is lower in residentially stable neighborhoods. The underlying assumption is that long-term residence results in the formation of strong emotional ties to the neighborhood, the ability to distinguish between neighbors and strangers, and the development of informal interaction with others living in the area. These qualities are often viewed as the best defense against crime. Low-income neighborhoods are typically viewed as targets for crime. However, this may be true because these 15 iii. areas also tend to be transient. In attempting to explain differences in crime between neighborhoods, it is therefore important to separate the effects of stability from those of economic and racial composition (Felson, 1987). Life cycle state of residents. The life cycle of individuals is defined by their age and family type. Abundant individual level evidence links crime to adolescence and early adulthood (Felson, 1987). Neighborhoods with a large proportion of adolescents would therefore be expected to have high crime rates, particularly for crimes which tend to be locally committed. Victimization reports show high rates of fear of crime among the elderly but low rates of victimization. Thus, neighborhoods with a high percentage of elderly people would be expected to have high fear of crime, but low rates of objectively measured crime (Felson, 1987). Characteristics of Neighborhood Boundaries. The critical difference in crime levels between two adjacent neighborhoods may be the characteristics of their borders. A “buffer zone” or “no man's land” separating two neighborhoods is an area in which no one lives permanently and over which no exercises control. It is, therefore, 16 regarded as dangerous. Railroads, expressways and large industrial concentrations are examples of such areas. Because few people venture into them, they may inhibit potentially antagonistic people from entering a neighborhood. Furthermore, anyone who crosses such boundaries is likely to be immediately obvious to neighborhood residents. Thus, a neighborhood with such a “buffer zone” may have less crime than a nearby area with one. Second, a low crime neighborhood may be a transition area between a transient, low crime neighborhood and a stable middle income neighborhood (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams, 1982). This section expounded on two major bodies of research which attempt to account for differences in crime rates among neighborhoods; physical characteristics, such as the spatial arrangement of buildings, street design and diversity of land use, which was inspired by Jane Jacobs (1961) and later by Oscar Newman (1972) (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams 1982). The second body of research, which originated with the urban ecological perspective developed at the University of Chicago in the late 19205, is concerned with the social correlates of crime- residential stability, racial and economic composition and neighborhood change (Greenberg; Rohe; Williams, 1982). Implicit in both bodies of research is the assumption that the design of the physical environment or socio-economic characteristics affects the ability of neighborhood residents to maintain control over the physical space which they inhabit. This makes residents more or less able to defend their neighborhoods 17 against crime. Thus, territoriality, the maintenance of control over an area by the inhabitants of that area appears to be the critical intervening variable that mediates the relationship between the social and physical environment and the level of criminal activity, and perhaps, fear of crime. Objective physical, social and boundary characteristics presumably have a direct effect on crime and an indirect effect, by promoting or inhibiting informal territorial control. In the absence of strong social bonds and social cohesiveness, crime is likely to flourish. Communities in transition are more likely to produce criminal behavior than one that is stable and organized. 18 3.0 Approaches to Community Safety Gardner asserts that as crime rates accelerate, an increasing number of cities are requiring the incorporation of crime prevention features in their design of cities. In response, city officials, security professionals and community residents must become acquainted with the principles of CPTED and learn how they relate to architectural design, urban planning and crime prevention (Gardner, 1995). “Traditionally, security concerns have been given low priority in the building process. Until the late 19605 when the federal government took an interest in crime prevention in urban housing, few serious attempts were made to develop a workable philosophy for controlling crime through architectural planning and design. In the early 19705, several studies financed through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) demonstrated that architectural design could be effectively used to influence crime rates in housing developments. These studies showed that by combining security hardware, psychology and site design, a physical environment could be developed that would, by its very nature, discourage crime” (Gardner, 1995). This section will focus on four crime prevention strategies including CPTED, Oscar Newman’s Defensible Space concept, the Three-D Approach and Community Building, which all contain corresponding principles of crime prevention techniques. 19 a. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, or CPTED, “is based on the premise that proper design and effective use of the physical environment can produce behavioral effects that will reduce the incidence and fear of crime, thereby improving the quality of life” (www.cpu.sa.gov.au/sa_cpted.htm). “Put simply, CPTED is based on the idea that people’s behavior within the urban environment, particularly in terms of the possibility of offending, as well as an individual’s perceptions about their safety is influenced by the design of that environment” (www.cpu.sa.gov.au/sa_cpted.htm). Criminals make rational choices about their targets and generally: 0 the greater the risk of being seen, challenged or caught, the less likely they are to commit a crime; . the greater the effort required, the less likely they are to commit a crime, and o the lesser the actual or perceived reward, the less likely they are to commit a crime (Gardner, 1995). We can design and manage the environment to ensure: there is more chance of being seen, challenged or caught; greater effort is required; the actual or perceived rewards are less; and opportunities for criminal activity are minimized (Gardner, 1995). Using the physical environment as protection against incursion dates back to the cavemen, however, it wasn’t until recently that the problem of creating a defensive environment was approached from both the physical and the psychological aspects at the same time. This blend of disciplines is the backbone of the CPTED concept (Crowe, 1991). 20 The goal of CPTED is the reduction of opportunities for crime to occur. This reduction is achieved by employing physical design features that discourage crime, while at the same time encouraging legitimate use of the environment. CPTED also makes possible designs that offer protection without resorting to the prison camp approach to security. Use of fortress-type construction is minimized, and where necessary, integrated into the overall design, reducing negative visual impact. This approach is also cost-effective, since hardware applications are made during construction rather than added at a later date (Crowe, 1991). To understand fully how CPTED is used, one must examine its components and the philosophy behind them. Although crime prevention through design is itself relatively new, its individual elements are common security techniques. The uniqueness and success of CPTED stems from the manner in which these techniques are integrated with, and applied to, the architectural design process. Three principles central to CPTED are as follows: 1. Natural Surveillance. Criminals usually do not want to be seen. Placing what is happening discourages crime (Crowe, 1991). For example, placing cafes and kiosks in parks increases natural surveillance by park users, while placing clotheslines near play equipment in a multi-unit development increases natural surveillance by park users, while placing clothelines near play equipment in a multi-unit development increases natural surveillance of the play area (Crowe, 1991). Barriers, such as bushes or sheds, can make it difficult to observe activity (Crowe, 1991). 21 2. Access Control. Access can be restricted by physical barriers such as bollards, fences, doorways, etc. or by security hardware such as locks, chains and alarms. Human measures can also be used, such as security guards. All these methods aim to increase the effort required to commit a crime and therefore, reduce the potential for it to happen (Crowe, 1991). 3. Ownership. People usually protect territory that they feel is their own and have a certain respect for the territory of others. Fences, paving, art, signs, good maintenance and landscaping are some physical ways to express ownership. Identifying intruders is much easier in a well-defined space. An area that looks protected gives the impression that greater effort is required to commit a crime. A cared for environment can also reduce fear of crime. Areas that are run down and the subject of graffiti and vandalism are generally more intimidating than areas which do nOt display such characteristics (Crowe, 1991). b. Defensible Space One of the central concepts in the CPTED field is that of defensible space. The defensible space concept evolved some 30 years ago by Oscar Newman, an architect and city planner known internationally for his work in community planning, assisted housing, crime prevention and racial integration. In his theory of defensible space, Newman argues that the physical environment can be designed to release the latent sense of territoriality and community among inhabitants so as to allow these traits to be translated into their assumption of 22 responsibility for preserving a safe and well-maintained environment (Newman, 1973). To provide maximum control, an environment is first divided into smaller, clearly defined areas or zones. These zones become the focal points for the application of the various CPTED elements. “Defensible Space” is the term used to describe an area that has been made a “zone of defense” by the design characteristics that create it (Newman, 1973). Under the defensible space guidelines, all areas are designated as either public, semi-private or private (Newman, 1973). This designation defines the acceptable use of each zone and determines who has a right to occupy it under certain circumstances. Public zones are generally open to anyone and are the least secure of the three zones. This is particularly true when the zone is located within a building or in an area with uncontrolled access and little or no opportunity for close surveillance. Semi-private zones create a buffer between public and private zones and/ or serve as common use spaces, such as interior courtyards. They are accessible to the public, but are set off from the public zone. This separation is accomplished with design features that establish definite transitional boundaries between the zones (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). Private zones are areas of restricted entry. Access is controlled and limited to specific individuals or groups. A private residence is a good example of a private zone (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). 23 Division between zones is generally accomplished with some type of barrier. These can be either physical or symbolic. Physical barriers, as the name implies, are substantial in nature and physically prevent movement. Fencing, some forms of landscaping, locked doors and the like are examples of physical barriers. Symbolic barriers are less tangible. Nearly anything could serve as a symbolic barrier. The only requirement is that it define the boundary between zones. This type of barrier does not prevent physical movement. All that is required is that it leave no doubt that a transition between zones has taken place. Low decorative fences, flower beds, changes in sidewalk patterns or materials and signs are examples of symbolic barriers (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). c. The Three-D Approach For CPTED and Oscar Newman’s defensible space concept to be a success, it must be practical and understandable for the normal users of the space. That is, the normal residents of a neighborhood and the people who work in buildings or commercial areas must be able to use these concepts. Why? Because these people know more about what is going on in that environment and they have a vested interest (their own well-being) in ensuring that their immediate environment operates properly. The technologist or specialist, who may be a traffic engineer, city planner, architect or security specialist, should not be allowed to shoulder the responsibility alone for safety and security. The specialist needs to follow the dictates of the users of the space, because of his professional competition (Crowe, 1991). 24 The Three-D approach to space assessment provides a simple guide for the layperson to use in determining the appropriateness of how her space is designed and used. The Three-D approach is based on the three functions or dimensions of human space: 1. 2. 3. All human space has some designated purpose. All human space has social, cultural, legal, or physical definitions that prescribe the desired and acceptable behaviors. All human space is designed to support and control the desired behaviors (Crowe, 1991). By using the Three-D approach as a guide, space may be evaluated by asking the following questions: Designation What is the designated purpose of this space? What was it originally intended to be used for? How well does the space support its current use? Its intended use? Is there conflict? Definition Design How is the space defined? Is it clear who owns it? Where are its borders? Are there social or cultural definitions that affect how that space is used? Are the legal or administrative rules clearly set out and reinforced in pohcy? Are there signs? Is there conflict or confusion between the designated purpose and definition? (Crowe, 1991). How well does the physical design support the intended function? How well does the physical design support the definition of the desired or accepted behaviors? Does the physical design conflict with or impede the productive use of the space or the proper functioning of the intended human activity? 25 o Is there confusion or conflict in the manner in which the physical design is intended to control behavior (Crowe, 1991)? The three principles of CPTED and strategies associated with defensible space are inherent in the Three-D concept. Does the space clearly belong to someone or some group? Is the intended use clearly defined? Does the physical design match the intended use? Does the design provide the means for normal users to naturally control the activities, to control access and to provide surveillance? d. Community Building Beneath the obvious problems of even the most distressed low-income urban neighborhood lies a great reservoir of human energy and aspiration. “We witnessed the power of unselfish collaboration and commitment to community” (Spitzer, 2001) after the “shameful” 9-11 attacks. Firefighters, police officers, emergency technicians, construction workers and countless ordinary citizens of all races and faiths joined together in a heroic fashion to help others in a united front. “A very important measurement of the true efficacy of any crime prevention initiative is the level of participation of community residents” (Spitzer, 2001 ). A critical factor in determining the success of CPTED is the role that the individual resident plays and the level of collective efforts to reinforce environmental design and prescriptions (Spitzer, 2001). “Community is central to the concept and practice of crime prevention. Civic leaders have embraced the concept that a united community (residents, merchants, workers, law enforcement and government) working toward a common end will lead to safer and healthier neighborhoods. Crime prevention 26 theorists have often used the term “co-production of public safety” to describe the notion that as everyone shares the benefits, so must everyone take part in establishing them” (Spitzer, 2001). The social, economic, demographic and the crime rates of neighborhoods were studied in the project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods. The study suggested that communities with elevated rates of collective efficacy whatever their socioeconomic situation, recorded lower crime rates and less disorder. This confirms the belief that a “community in which neighbors mutually support one another and are actively involved with law enforcement and others is a safer neighborhood” (Spitzer, 2001). “Community partnerships have proliferated across this country and others in the past few years, working to prevent crime and violence” (Spitzer, 2001) According to Spitzer, Neighborhood Watch, now involves more than 50 million Americans, and has become a vehicle for engaging and empowering communities in collaborative problem solving (Spitzer, 2001). Spitzer also asserts that according to the recent National Crime Prevention Council poll, about one in six Americans volunteer in a program that prevents crime. Of those who volunteer, four in ten help with Neighborhood Watch. One in four said that they needed to assume a more active role in their neighborhood in order to prevent crime (Spitzer, 2001). “Neighborhood watches are revitalizing neighborhoods by clearing out drug dealing, making parks safer for children, reducing thefts and burglaries, wiping out graffiti and vandalism and conducting programs for youth and seniors” 27 (Spitzer, 2001). Through their hard work and joint efforts with law enforcement, residents are realizing concrete accomplishments in public safety, community beautification, housing and more. They are ultimately reducing the opportunities for, fear of, and causes of crime (Spitzer, 2001). Once incorporated into policy in cities, businesses, schools and residential and corporate neighborhoods will gain from the application of environmental design concepts of natural surveillance, access control and ownership, which will reduce opportunities for criminal activity. It will be commonplace for community and zoning plans, public space design and school blueprints to incorporate the physical and situational barriers to crime. 3.1 Traditional Crime Control vs. CPTED Gardner suggests that traditional crime control methods involve the apprehension and punishment of offenders. His premise behind this method is that criminals will be either rehabilitated through punishment or they will be kept away from the rest of society and prevented from doing further harm. He believes that the response to increased levels of crime, therefore, is to put more police officers on the streets, toughen sentences for offenders and build more prisons. Gardner also contends that this traditional approach to controlling crime does not; however fully address the crime problem. His focus addresses the punishment aspect of crime, not the prevention. Gardner suggests that although the presence of police officers in a particular area may prevent an offense from occurring there, it is impossible to have a police officer patrolling 28 every part of the city every hour of the day. He concludes that although the prospect of incarceration and punishment in theory should deter criminal offenses, however, there is no practical evidence to support this argument (Gardner, 1995). Gardner’s research does not support a correlation between the number of prisons built or tougher sentencing and the occurrence of crime. More fundamentally, he asserts that this approach is geared towards punishing crimes that have already occurred, not preventing them from happening in the first place (Gardner, 1995). It has been argued by proponents of CPTED that crimes occur where there are opportunities for criminal acts. If these opportunities were removed, then the number of incidents of crime should be reduced. Factors that create opportunities to commit crime can be found in both the physical and social environment. For example, if there is inadequate lighting, assailants are able to conceal themselves and remain undetected by potential victims. Similarly, if residents of an area are unfamiliar with each other and avoid questioning strangers about their reasons for being in the area, persons with criminal intent can move freely without being detected (Gardner, 1995). 29 4 .0 Neighborhood Design Surveillance and target hardening are two forms of physical design which may reduce opportunities for criminal behavior. Other direct environmental strategies revolve around specific attributes of multi-residential units and neighborhoods. It has long been argued by CPTED proponents that security and safety concerns must be taken into account in neighborhood planning and design (Schneider; Pearcey, 1994). The following identifies and examines specific neighborhood attributes in light of CPTED principles. These attributes include open public spaces, pathways, housing and immediate surrounding areas, land use and spatial planning and access and exit control. Qpen Pflcflrces. Of particular importance to CPTED strategies in residential areas are the open, public spaces which are particularly susceptible to crime and vandalism. It is these “unowned” spaces, as Newman (1972) calls them, which form a principle target for his theory of defensible space. CPTED principles also advocate physical design to provide safety and security in itself, the priority in public space being good visibility at all times. This not only provides less opportunity for offenders, but in turn increases the popularity of public spaces, which serves to deter criminals. The following design strategies are recommended for public spaces: 0 provide at least one safe pedestrian route; . design for easy maintenance; a use surveillance from overlooking buildings; . avoid layouts in which the rear of houses adjoin open spaces; and 30 0 open spaces should be protected from access by unauthorized vehicles (Schneider; Pearcey, 1996). Pathngg. Pedestrian pathways are highly susceptible to personal crime, and often serve as conduits to property crime. The former can often be traced to the design of pathways. Unlit, secluded and unsurveillable paths with plenty of hiding spots and blind corners provide a perfect opportunity for personal crimes (Schneider; Pearcey, 1996). The Leicestershire Constabulary (1989) provides the following guidelines for designing safe pedestrian pathways: . pathways should be short and direct as well as straight and narrow; sharp bends which restrict views should be avoided; a there should be maximum surveillance of footpaths including lighting and visibility of paths from dwellings; 0 there should be maximum visibility for pedestrians who use the path; . underpasses should not be used; c pedestrian pathways that do not follow a road should be kept to a minimum; and 0 paths should lead somewhere, for example, to shops or bus stops (Schneider; Pearcey, 1996). Housing and Immediate Surrounding Areas. The design of housing and immediate surrounding areas often provide many cues to and opportunities for the perpetrator and as such represents important targets for CPTED. Much of the CPTED principles in this area stem from target hardening techniques as well as defensible space strategies. Coleman, for example, argues that suburban developments of largely semi-detached homes should be arranged where each plot has only one frontage onto the public street (Schneider; Pearcey, 1996). 31 Reasons cited for the protective nature of this design strategy include fewer escape routes for offenders and the maximization of eyes watching the street, neighboring houses and their yards. Ground level circulation around houses should be minimized because communal pedestrian routes through pedestrian homes will increase the security risks. Fencing between properties should inhibit access and carriage of stolen goods, but should not be so high as to restrict surveillance by neighbors (Schneider; Pearcey, 1996). Security lighting attached to houses is also recommended to illuminate the immediate surrounding areas. Windows should be located where they are not easily accessible from the ground or the roof. In sum, when designing to maximize security in and around homes, Gonzalez suggests that the following questions should be asked: 0 Will there be adequate exterior lighting around each home? 0 Are windows on the ground floors kept to a minimum, especially those that can’t be seen from the street? . Will adequate security features be designed into each home? . Are entrances to homes designed so that they are clearly visible to police patrols? . Will security locking devices, hardware and other anti-intrusion devices be used? . Will home addresses be clearly visible at all times? a Are sidewalks designed so that they are clearly visible to residents and police patrols? . Are there a minimum number of points of concealment? 32 . Is there sufficient access to sidewalks and residences in the development for emergency vehicles? (Schneider; Pearcey, 1996). Landscape Design. Landscaping is an important element of CPTED; especially in light of the concealment opportunities many types of plants, trees and shrubs create. The over-riding CPTED principles which guides landscape design is that ground-level planting should not provide concealment for attackers or burglars; there must be maximum observation at all times (Schneider; Pearcey, 1996). The Leicestershire Constabulary recommends the following landscaping principles for safety: . plant growth rates should be assessed prior to landscaping; . plants should be regularly maintained and trimmed; . shrubs should be set back from the edges of paths; . the use of thorny plants should be considered; - formal hedge heights should be specified the lower the better; 0 landscaping should be vandal-proof; and 0 access and loss of privacy from landscape features should be considered (Schneider; Pearcey, 1996). Access and Exit Control. The primary objective of access control is to deny entry to a crime target and to create a perception of risk in offenders. Conversely, the objective of exit control is to limit the easy escape or at least create the perception of a difficult escape for offenders. Access and exit control is premised on the assumption that thieves, attackers and vandals are more likely to hit targets which are easy to get in and where a fast getaway is 33 possible. Access and exit control work at both the neighborhood and the building level (Schneider; Pearcey, 1996). The creation of defensible space through the demarcation of controlled space is the central component of the psychological aspects of access control. Psychological access control is achieved by designing symbolic barriers, which delineate private, controlled space. Symbolic barriers can be created by a row of stones, a flower garden or a change in ground level. By delineating controlled space, these symbolic barriers are intended to promote surveillance, more responsiveness in users in protecting their territory while promoting greater perception of risk by offenders. Thus, controlled space accomplishes the effect of an access control strategy effectively keeping intruders out due to an increased perception of risk (Schneider; Pearcey, 1996). The greater number in access points also seems to result in an increase in crime. Thus, a central part of access control is limiting the number of entry points. According to Sakissan real and symbolic access control at the neighborhood level includes the following: . utilize fences, garden gateways, shrubbery, etc. to limit access while ensuring that these barriers do not inhibit surveillance; 0 minimize the number of entries to a site; . design vehicular and pedestrian circulation so it is obvious how people and vehicles are supposed to enter and leave the site, one-way streets and cul-de-sacs are preferable; and 0 put entrances to the site in places where they can be watched (Schneider; Pearcey, 1996). 34 5.0 CPTED in Action: Case Studies C incinnaLi, Ohio: “Making Piglic Housing Comnynities Safer (mg Maintaining Improvements”. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) Executive Director Don Troendle believes in “back to basics” management that focuses on customer service and recognizes that residents of public housing are entitled to the same kinds of services as others in the rental housing market. As a result, he decided to begin a comprehensive program of physical, social and administrative improvement on Authority properties (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). The program is a partnership between management, resident councils and the residents, and is designed to address the unique problems and needs of each community (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). Among the programs and activities the Authority has initiated are the following: o Curb Appeal. This effort is designed to create clean, attractive places to live, and includes a variety of activities dedicated to that purpose. To reduce litter problems, each unit has been assigned an area that must be kept clean. Residents are given 90-gallon trash bins for once-a- week pickup, and litter receptacles have been installed in common areas for use by pedestrians. The Authority regularly removes graffiti, tows abandoned cars and sweeps streets with new equipment that makes street cleaning a one-person task (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). c To aid in defining territory and responsibility, CMHA has installed fencing. Wrought iron defines yards and creates barriers to unwanted foot traffic while promoting a residential appearance for the property. The fencing was installed in combination with street closings that help identify “neighborhoods” and reduce drive-through access. . Lease Enforcement. A newly created lease form makes clear the rights and responsibilities of both residents and staff, and outlines new rent collection rules. Residents who are delinquent in paying rent more than twice in 12 months will be evicted. Clear rules and consistent enforcement have resulted in a reduction in eviction filings for the Authority. CMHA has also increased the amount of the security deposit 35 in an effort to promote resident investment in the unit. The lease enforcement program has been combined with a 90-day inspection program and training for new tenants who do not meet standards for care-taking (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). Impact Maintenance. A coordinated program of interior and exterior repairs, upgrades and preventative maintenance is designed to reduce maintenance calls and total repair costs by dealing with a variety of issues at one time. CMHA offers maintenance training for residents as part of this program. Comprehensive Modernization. As part of its modernization program, the Authority has converted four-story walkups to townhomes with separate entrance ways, and recycled fencing defines private yard space to help families create neighborhood “villages” (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997) Investing in the Community. CMHA offers a broad range of programs to strengthen individuals, families and neighborhoods. These include support for resident business initiatives, adult literacy and GED programs, resident training in carpentry and painting trades, leadership skills and mentorship programs, conflict management classes, and drug abuse education. The programs are complemented by an increased law enforcement presence (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). Director Troendle indicated that the program has taught him how important it is for residents to be proud of where they live. Projects that define individual territory, like fencing and landscaping, create momentum and establish agency credibility, and reduce other problems, like litter, over the long term. The implementation of this project has resulted in a 12 - 13 percent decrease in crime on CMHA property in each of the past three years. Residents recognize the agency’s commitment to improvement even if changes are currently limited to building exteriors and yards (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). Houston, TexaLs: Revitaliging Parks. The Parks to Standard Program is a continuation of the Neighborhoods to Standard theme created by former 36 Houston, TX mayor, Bob Lanier. This program was the City of Houston’s first large-scale commitment to renovate existing parks, and is believed to be the largest effort of its kind in the country (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). Implementation of Parks to Standard began with individual park assessments, including community input, with a focus on crime prevention through environmental design. The result was a master plan/ program that included landscaping enhancements, renovation of recreation centers, sports fields, and courts; swimming pools, bath houses and restroom facilities; picnic areas and playgrounds; trails and walkways; and compliance with the Americans Disabilities Act (ADA) access requirements (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). Phase One tested the program concept in 77 of Houston’s 277 community parks. The $52 million budget for Phase One included resources from voter- approved public improvements bonds, federal Community Development Block Grants (C086), and private donations from local sponsors (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). CPTED was an integral aspect of this phase, which included several innovative approaches to park improvement: . Many of the modifications were designed to address park-specific problems, including: trails that provide access to remote areas of the parks (nicknamed, “CPTED trails”); and motion detectors and high intensity lighting that improve opportunities for surveillance of after- hours congregation points. 37 . To increase the presence of uniformed police in parks, work rooms with computer terminals were installed in all community recreation centers for use by on-duty officers. 0 Graffiti and other signs of decay and disorder were removed. 0 Maintenance and other policies were revised to enhance park operations (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). The renovations resulted in increased patronage and renewed sense of ownership by the community. The Parks to Standard program will eventually bring all 277 parks into compliance with consistent, comprehensive standards for accessibility, safety and security (National Crime Prevention Council, 1997). 5.1 Lessons Learned From 25 Years of CPTED Experience There are a number of lessons to be learned from the CPTED literature. The following does not portend to be an exhaustive accounting of these lessons. It does, however, attempt to identify the major lessons that must be understood in order to pursue CPTED research, applied projects and policy. CPTED is more successful in stcglglg, socially-cohesive environments. Notwithstanding the contradictory findings of the numerous CPTED studies, research has consistently demonstrated that the success of crime prevention initiatives are critically dependent upon the existing degree of stability and social cohesion within a community. This research informs one of the most important lessons to be learned from the CPTED literature: while architectural design is necessary to create spaces that can be defended, actual intervention by legitimate users of the environment depends on a number of complex and interacting social, demographic and behavioral variables. At the heart of these inter-related variables is a strong sense of responsibility for and control over 38 the local environment by residents (Atlas, 1991). This sense of community is clearly related to the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of neighborhoods. In particular, research has found that crime prevention strategies have been most successful in middle- and upper-income, racially- and socially-homogeneous neighborhoods made up of long-tern, home-owning residents (Lavrakas, 1980; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Greenberg, 1985). This success is due to many reasons, including greater resources to provide security, strong political contacts, closer ties with police departments, greater social cohesion, higher rates of public participation and shared norms and values. In contrast, studies have shown that crime prevention strategies have particularly failed in those communities that need these programs the most: low-income, socially and racially heterogeneous, high-crime neighborhoods (Greenberg, 1989). This lack of success is a mirror reflection of why these programs succeed in higher-income neighborhoods: lack of resources and political contacts, instability and transience, lack of social cohesion and informal social control, poor relations with police, poverty and other deleterious socio- economic conditions (Atlas, 1991). Each community must be treated as unique. One of the fundamental lessons for future CPTED policies and programs is that each environment must be treated on its own merits. In other words, there are no standard environmental design solutions to reducing crime in different apartment buildings, public housing complexes or neighborhoods. The contradictory findings within the CPTED field, as well as the recognition of the host of 39 intervening variables unique to individual neighborhoods, suggest that crime in a residential environment will be influenced by the specific physical, social, economic, political and ecological characteristics of that environment. In order for CPTED principles to be applied appropriately they must cater to that specific environment. Each neighborhood has to be carefully analyzed and assessed in order to establish its unique profile (Atlas, 1991). CPE) shoJuld be promoted and supported by raising awareness and education. Sociologists argue that future efforts in crime prevention by the federal government would be better spent raising awareness and providing education on environmental design approaches to crime as a first step toward empowering communities to plan, implement and evaluate their own CPTED and local crime prevention activities. Education and awareness-raising should target all those actors potentially involved in planning, implementing and supporting environmental design approaches to crime. Community residents, building managers and commercial owners must be educated on how to pursue CPTED projects in their neighborhoods as an exercise in local problem solving. Police must be sensitized and educated on how to conduct environmental security assessments. Public- and private-sector architectural, planning and design professionals should be sensitized to and educated about safe and secure environmental design principles. Local politicians and other policy- makers should be educated on how to promote and support CPTED initiatives (Atlas, 1991). 40 CPTED demonstration gojects can serve as a foundation for future pciigiep. CPTED literature has shown that where local, state and national governments have been most useful in this area (in addition to education) is their involvement in finding and/ or studying demonstration projects and other types of applied models. Demonstration projects have served as an effective and efficient allocation of government resources. Not only does it allow for the application of CPTED theories and concepts in needy communities, but it has provided the laboratory for their testing and evaluation and their eventual modification, improvement and dissemination of results (Atlas, 1991). CPED initiatives mjust emphasize resiclentpprticimtion and control. Within the CPTED literature the most oft-cited partners in a multi-agency approach to environmental design are professionals, such as architects, planners, housing management personnel and the police. Increasingly however, the literature has emphasized that success in CPTED initiatives is contingent upon the participation of the community itself. One of the most important aspects of resident participation is that without maximum community involvement in the application of CPTED principles, crime rates will not diminish. If there are gaps in community crime prevention, crime is simply displaced to other parts of a city, thereby maintaining high crime rates in communities (Mayhew, 1984). 41 6.0 Conclusion The field of urban planning would not be complete if it failed to recognize the role of physical environment in encouraging or preventing crimes in cities. The design and management of our environment shapes the world in which we live and impacts on human behavior. A “good” physical environment can reduce crime as well as feelings of fear and unease in an area. As the main victims of certain kinds of crime, women have always been concerned about their safety and their children’s safety in their use of public spaces. So the principles of urban planning that enhance safety of the entire population can be defined from the point of view of women. If the urban environment is made safer for women, all the most vulnerable groups, and in fact, the entire population will benefit. Additionally, women in the community have important local knowledge. Their experience of fear of crime, actual crime, or safety will help to define the community safety issues in an area. Active community participation in any safety activities is crucial. Implementing planning guidelines for safer cities involves three steps: . an awareness by planners of the issues and an acknowledgement that they have a positive role to play in mitigating crime in public environments; 0 using these guidelines in their day-to-day planning practice; and o engaging in a process of mutual learning with the community to add and modify these guidelines. Most planners already recognize the importance of considering safety when reviewing plans. A number of cities have developed “do” and “don’t” guidelines for use by planners and developers. What has been missing is a 42 process, from the developer’s first rough draft to the final evaluation, for including these concerns. Additionally, when used in planning the word “safety” is usually thought to refer to protection against fire, flood, disease or injury rather than to designs that reduce crime or fear of crime. Therefore, planners must first revise their definition of “safety” so that discussions of crime and crime prevention are part of routine planning activities. Once that has been accomplished, crime prevention strategies such as CPTED, Defensible Space, Three-D Approach and Community Building can be incorporated into a number of plans, ordinances and policies. 43 Works Cited Atlas, S (1991). Other side of CPTED. Security Management: 15-26. Bell, Wendy. (1998). “Women and Community Safety.” South Australia: Bell Planning Associates: 2-6. Canterbury City Council. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: Codes, Policies and Development Control Plans. Accessed July 13, 2004. h_t;p: / /www.canterbury.nsw.gov.au/ building/dcp/dcp29. htm. Center for Cultural Risk. (1998). “Fear of Crime Volume I: Audit of the Literature and Community Programs as Part of the National Campaign Against Violence and Crime. Canberra: 21-28. Craven, Diane. (1997). Sex Differences in Violent Victimization. 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Safe and Secure Neighborhoods: Physical Characteristics and Informal Territorial Control in High and Low Crime Neighborhoods. U.S. Department of Justice: National Institute of Justice: 7-19. National Crime Prevention Council. 1997. “Designing Safer Communities: A Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Handbook.” Washington, DC: 7-41. Newman, Oscar. (1973). Creating Defensible Space. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc.: 20-43. Schneider, Steve and Pearcey, Patti. 1996. “The Theory and Practice of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design” B.C. Coalition for Safer Communities: 11-28. South Australia Crime Prevention Online. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Accessed July 13, 2004. http: / /www.cpu.sa.gov.au/sa_cpted. htm. Spitzer, Eliot. 2001. Building “Community” for Effective Crime Prevention. Accessed November 26, 2002. http: / / www.oag. state. ny. us/ press/ statements/ crime _prevention.html. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs. 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