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WORK OF THE MICHIGAN LABOR
MEDI ATION BOARD

Thesis Ior fhe Degree of M. A
MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE

‘WiIIiam Beafiie Crawford
1950

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled
”Work of the Michigan Labor Mediation Board."
presented by

1111119.! Crawford

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

J— degree mum

Major professor

 

SUPPLEMENTARY
MATERIAL

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Jilliam Beattie CPanOPd

Submitted to the School of Craduate Studies of I'lichirfen
tete College of Avriculturo and Annlied Science
in partial fnlfillflent of the requirements

for the deeree of

EW”VW79 CK9.AHTS

Department of Economics

1950

I “LEE-LS

 

Chapter I

Chapter II

Chapter III

Chapter IV

Chapter V

Chapter VI

Chapter VII

Chapter VIII

Appendix A

Appendix B

Table of Contents

Introduction...................o.....

Origin and Development..........o.oo.

General Labor Disputes...............

Hospitals and Public Utilites........

Jurisdictional Disputes.......o.....o

Recognition and the Bargaining Unit..

The HutChinson ACtooo-ooooooooooooooo

Conclusions and Recommendations......

The Personnel Of the Boardocooooooooo

Strike Record Due to Labor-Management

DISPUteS in Michigan 1934-19390000000

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§?4.2I'I?7

14

45

66

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Chapter I
Introduction
Generally When a person wishes to write upon a

subject in the field of labor, he finds himself literally
swamped with material. Countless books and articles have
been written about unions, picketing, court decisions, the
National Labor Relations Board,1 and so ad infinitum. All
that remains for the author to do, then is to assemble the
parts, analyze the material and present his paper. The most
difficult task is giving an intelligent analysis of the data.

2 has not been

However the Michigan Labor Mediation Act
so fortunate. The Michigan mediation experiment definitely
has not received wide acclaim, Articles concerning the Act
and the Michigan Labor Mediation Board:5 are conspicious
because of their absence. It can't be denied that the
existence of the Act and the board is common knowledge,
especially to the experts in the field. Nevertheless, the
work of the board is a vague and hazy concept even to many
of the experts. .

It might be pointed out by some that the Michigan board
is relatively unimportant and does not deserve the attention
that, for example, the NLRB receives. It can't be denied that
an act of national scope is of greater interest to the country
as a whole. But it doesn't necessarily follow that the state
act is unimportant. In the first place the act covers

many people in the state that are engaged in small business.

In addition, the board mediates disputes with the Federal

Conciliation Service as well as those cases that aren't
considered to be under the interstate commerce clause.
Second, many new experiments in labor legislation come from
the state labor laws. If these were the only reasons, we
couldn't be justified in saying that the Michigan Labor
Mediation Board is unimportant.
One might contend with some justification that the
work of the board is unspectacular and therefore attracts
little attention. This is probably true in the sense that
the board does not issue decisions in the manner of other
labor relation boards. In fact a mediation body may well
appear to be unspectacular. But when we consider that the
Act places certain limitations upon the right to strike
it is not logical to assume that the Michigan board is
so unspectacular that it merits no attention at all.
Obviously then there must be a reason why the authors
have avoided the Michigan Act. The logical reason appears
to be that the information necessary to prepare such an article
is not available. The board publishes no decisions or orders,
or even attempts to gain the public eye gig the newspapers.
Even the £5225 Relations Reporter of the Bureau of National
Affairs4 is unable to obtain much information concerning the
Act or the board. Thus the information necessary to create an
article about the board is hidden away in the files of the

board or is stored in the minds of the members and employees

2

of the board. What lies under the surface of the Act can be
obtained only from the board or the thousands of employ-

ees and employers whose c ses have been handled by the
board. Consequently, most of the information in this report
is due to the generosity of the Michigan Labor Mediation
Board and its employees.

More information concerning the board could be help-
ful in.many ways. For example the experience of the board
could be passed on to others interested in the activities
of the state labor boards. It might be possible for an
index of the effectiveness of mediation to be shown in the
analysis of the board's cases. Some knowledge of the results
of the restrictions of the right to strike would certainly
be of great value. Finally, the peOple of the state and the
nation could have some scale to evaluate the procedures of the
Act and have a basis for an intelligent vote.

It is indeed unfortunate that more publicity has not
been given to the work of the Michigan board.

At this time I would like to make my basic assumptions
clear. Much confusion and misunderstanding will be
eliminated, if my personal beliefs in the subject of labor
relation are brought into the Open at the beginning of theé
report.

First of all, it is my Opinion that the policy of
collective bargaining is the best solution to labor

5

problems that is available at the present time. It is
admitted that the policy of collective bargaining has many
flaws and defects, but the advantages far outweigh the
disadvantages.

There are three basic ways of set ling labor disputes.
These'are:

l. Unilateral determination

2. Governmental determination

3. Collective bargaining

Unilateral determination is the settling of a dispute
by one party alone. We usually think of this asbeing the
settlement of the dispute by the employer. However, there
is no reason to assume that the union could not issue decisions
in the same manner if the Opportunity presented itself.
The determination of a diapute by one of the parties alone
invariably involves an arbitrary decision. The Opposing
party has to accept the decision or else. If we as a nation
believe in democracy, then the unilateral determination of
labor disputes should be eliminated.

No one who has any knowledge of the United States would
suggest that the policy of governmental determination of
a labor dispute would be acceptable as a public policy.
We are still skeptical of anything that smacks of govern-
ment. As long as the government activity produces no
monetary reward, the public is, if you will pardon the
expression, "agin it." Thus government determination Of

4

Jiillvillilllllllil‘l

 

 

labor disputes can also be ruled out as against public
policy.

We now find that we have eliminated two Of our three
possibilities as being against public policy. If for no
other reason, collective bargaining is the victor by default.
I shall not attempt to enumerate the advantages of
collective bargaining. Such a discussion would be out of
place in a report such as this. Needless to say, there
are many advantages that could be enumerated that would show
collective bargaining to be in the interest Of the public.

Next I would like to point out that I believe some form
of mediation and conciliation in a labor dispute will
also protect the public. If the mediator can eliminate
a strike or shorten the length of one, he is Of value to
the community and the nation.

Finally, I am of the Opinion that arbitration
should be the final step in the shOp grievance machinery.
The parties should have ample time to settle their
own grievances, but if they cannot, the collective
agreement should specify voluntary arbitration Of the
dispute. However, if the dispute is over the terms Of a
new contract, everything possible should be done tO
persuade the parties to settle the dispute themselves

and not bring in a third party to make a binding decision.

l. Referred to hereafter as the NLRB.

2. Michigan Laws (1939) Public Act 176, effective June
a, 1959. Referred to hereafter as MLRA or "the Act."
3. Referred tO hereafter as the "mediation board" or
"the board."

4. Referred to as Labor Relations Reference Manual;

cited as LRRM in the footnotes.

Chapter II
Origin and Development

Even before the enactment Of the National Labor
Relations Act in 1955, it had been the practice Of many
state legislatures to regulate industrial relations within
their respective states. Some Of the state acts have been
encouraging to labor organization, others have been quite
restrictive. It is signigicant to note that there was a
state mediation board in Michigan as early as 1915. That
board was a dead issue before the passage of the Michigan
Mediation Act Of 1959, but nevertheless it can be considered
as a precedent for the framers of the Michigan law.

As a consequence Of the many and sometimes violent
disputes that occurred during the 30's and possibly from.a
firm belief that the National Labor Relations Aetl had gone
tOO far in the encouragement Of union activity, some states
passed laws to restrict the Operation Of unions. One result
is the Michigan Labor Mediation Act of 1939.

One Of the purposes Of the Michigan Act was "to create
a board for the mediation Of labor disputes."2 The framers
of the Act were Of the opinion that the prevention and
prompt settlement Of labor disputes was in the public
interest. They stated "that the voluntary mediation Of
such disputes under guidance and supervision of a government

agency will tend to promote permanent industrial peace

and the health, welfare, comfort and safety Of the peOple

of the state."3

And thus was born the Michigan Labor
Mediation Board.

Before we examine the Operation Of the board, it will
serve us well to Observe briefly the character of the
Michigan Act. First, it must be reCOgnized that the Act
is "restrictive“4 in nature. That is, it places certain
Obstacles in the path Of labor organizations. Foremost
among these restrictions is the strike vote provision
which specifies no strike unless the procedures under the
Act are followed. Furthermore the Act gives little
encouragement to union organization other than a statement
that collective bargaining is legal and listing five
employer practices that are illegal.

Second, for violations of the Act the procedure is
the "court technique."5 That is, the court system is used
tO pOlice the Act instead of conferring quasi-judicial
powers upon the board as was done in the NLRA. Provision
is made for fines and imprisonment or both in the Michigan
Act.

Finally, as an overall observation the Act centers
around the mediation activities of the board in.5ny labor
dispute in.Michigan. Thus the central theme Of the Act is

the mediation approach to labor disputes.

Mediation.Aspect

Probably the greatest confusion concerning the MLMB
is the tendency for the casual Observer to compare it to
the NLRB. Nearly everyone is at least vaguely familiar with
the work of the national board, and logically assumes
that a state board performs the same duties with respect
to the industries within a state th;t are not subject to
the interstate commerce clause. But the Operation Of the
Michigan board is fundamentally of a different character.
It has no unfair practices to police, no authority to
issue cease and desist orders, no power to protect the right
to organize and bargain collectively; in fact it has few
powers usually conferred on an administrative board.
Perhaps the best comparison that can be made onea national
scale is with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service. Actually the Michigan board may send a member to sit
beside the federal conciliator in mediation proceedings
within the state. Now no one familiar with labor relations
would expect the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service to function efficiently if it were given the
responsibilities of the NLRB. Consequently it must be borne
in mind that the term "board" has an entirely different
meaning in the Michigan.Act from the common usage Of the
term as derived from the NLRA. No one should be surprised

that the Michigan Act does not follow the pattern of the NLRA

because after all the title of an act should give some

clue as to its contents.

In general then the work of the MLMB can be described
by saying that they have the duty to intervene and mediate
a labor dispute before a strike or a lockout occurs. If
a strike occurs without a notice to the board it is
deemed illegal and punitive action can be taken.by.the
courts.

Legal Provisions for the Board

We shall now turn to the provisions for the board as
given in the Act itself. The board is to consist of three
men selected by the governor with the advice and consent
of the senate. It will be important to notice that the
Act states that the "members of the board are to be selected

"6

without regard to political affiliation. One member shall

 

be designated as chairman by the governor. The appointment
is for a term Of three years with a new appointment coming
up every year. (Thus two of the three original members
were appointed for terms of one year and two years
respectively.)

The only requirements for a member that are set forth
in the Act are: First, that the member be a citizen of the
United States; second, that he shall be a resident of the
state of Michigan; and finally, that he be a qualified elector
of the state of Michigan for 5 years proceeding his
appointment as a member. Obviously these requirements
give no positive qualifications such as knowledge and

experience. Apparently, it is expected that the
'10

governor and the senate will select the best man availatle
for the Job. Furthermore the provisions preclude the
selection of a qualified man from Outside the boundaries

of the state of Michigan. Naturally it isn't surprising
that the legislature shOuld be interested in employing

the electors of the home state. While there may be many
men outside the state who could qualify for the job it will
give the employer some confidence if the man is a resident
of the state and interested in his problem. There shouldn't
be much difficulty in finding a man with the qualifications
even if the area is restricted to the state of Michigan.

The member shall take the oath of office and continue
to hold his office until his successor is appointed. Ifi
any vacancy occurs the new appointee shall hold Office for
the remainder of the unexpired term. In addition it should
be pointed out that a vacancy or absence will not hamper the
function Of the board. TWO members shall at all times
constitute a quorum, but official orders require the con-
currence of a majority of the board.

The removal Of a member may be accomplished by the
governor for "misfeasance, malfeasance, or misfeasance in
office, after'hearing."7 Fortunately, this provision has
never been used and remains a matter of conjecture as to
its exact interpretation.

The monetary renumeration received by the members
is not startling. When in actual pursuit of their duties

11

the members receive $20 a day with a limit of $5000 per
- annum. Actually the members have found that the job
demands their full time participation and the $5000 is the
equivalent of a salary. Actual traveling and other expenses
incurred are added to this figure. In addition there is
no restriction on other employment if the member can find
time. while $5000 plus expenses is not a sufficient amount
to attract the best man in the labor relations
field, it may be considered to be in line with comparable
positions in the state government. The complaint can
nevertheless be made that the salary is too low to be Of
much interest to the expert who doesn't have a strong
desire to serve his state.

The Executive Secretary is appointed by the members
of the board. The governor, however, may recommend a
selection to the board. The secretary attends the board
meetings and takes the minutes Of the session. At the
present time the secretary functions as the head of the
Lansing Office because the members have their Offices in
Muskegon and Detroit. The secretary assigns the concil-
iator to the disputes and in some instances acts as a
conciliator himself. Thus the Coordinator of Conciliation
is a fancy name for another conciliator.

All employees of the board are under Civil Service
except the Executive Secretary and the Coordinator of

Conciliation.

l. 49 Stat. 449 (1955). Referred to hereafter as NLRA.
2. Michigan Laws (1959), Public Act 176, effective June
8, 1959, Preamble.

5. gpgg., Section 1.

4. For this term I am indebted to 0.0. Killingsworth,

State Labor Relations Acts, University Of Chicago Press,

 

1948, chapter 11.
50 Ibide, pp. 132-135.
6. Michigan Laws (1959), Public Act 176, Section 5.

7. Ibid., Section 4.

13.

Chapter III

General Labor Disputesl

Unlawful Strikes in General

Before we analyze the procedure followed for

disputes in the Michigan Act, it is necessary to look

for a moment at the conditions that will make a

strike illegal and therefore subject to court action.

These provisions will apply to all of the procedures

that will be outlined below, so it will be helpful to

keep them in mind.

Briefly from Section 22a of the Act, it is

unlawful to call a strike or lockout:

l.
2.

3.

5.

Without first giving a notice to the board.
Without the authorization provided by strike

VOtee

 

While mediation is pending or proceeding,

 

or before the board or the parties declare
further mediation useless.

While mediation or an election is underway

 

in a jurisdictional dispute.

 

While the machinery for settlement Of public

 

utility dispute is pending or proceeding.

Furthermore, such unlawful acts by an employer or

a labor organization shall be punished by a fine Of not

more than $1,000 a day for each violation. Each day in

14

which the Offense occurs or continues shall be counted
as a separate Offense.

The Egggd, the attorney general, any prosecuting
attorney on behalf of the peOple, or any individual or
person may seek apprOpriate legal or equitable relief in
any circuit court having jurisdiction. While the Act
provides that the board may obtain an injunction, as a
matter of policy, they do not. However, this has not
always been the case. In the first years of the board's
life they did petition for injunctions.2 Clearly the
injunction implies force; and force has no place in
mediation, which is primarily a demonstration of tact.
Court action against the board is bound to create
adverse criticism.by the interested parties. The
solution quite obviously was not to seek the injunction.
The Provisions in General

Before a detailed examination of the "no strike"
provisions for general business units is undertaken,—
an over-all picture Of the action should be brought
to our attention. This will serve to give the whole
picture before the individual parts are explained. While
it might be desirable to analyze the parts and then
present the whole, I believe that a clearer picture will
be obtained by presenting the material as a whole first

and filling in the blanks later in the discussion.

15

The procedure to be followed by general business
breaks down into the following steps:

1. Notification to the board 10 days before the

 

threatened strike or look out.

2. Mediation in good faith.

 

5. Election to strike by the employees.

New we must add the meat to our skeleton and note
what these three steps are in reality. The first question
that comes to mind is, "What is a diapute?" If we look
to the Act we will find that "the terms 'dispute' and
'1abor dispute' shall include but are not restricted to
any controversy concerning the association or representa-
tion of employees in negotiation, fixing, maintaining
or changing terms of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation Of employer
and employee."3 Apparently any disturbance that might
lead to a strike or look out is intended to be covered
under this definition of "dispute." The last clause
was added by the Bonine-Tripp amendment of 1947 and
can be considered to be a direct inclusion Of
stranger picketing. So far there have been no court
decisions that have clarified the definition of a
diapute and the board has not been challenged on
account of the non-existence Of a dispute. Of course

there has to be some difference of Opinion or contro-

16

versy involved, so that a collective agreement shall not
be dumped into the lap of the board and written by them.
Thus the board usually refuses to handle "wildcat strikes"
and requires some negotiations to have been carried on.
1. The notification

The notification of the impending strike or
look out is sent to the board by the union in case
of a strike and by the employer in case of a lock out,
as a general rule. However, either party may send the notice
to the board.4 The notice, in addition, includes a
statement of the issues of the dispute. This notice has
to be sent or delivered at least ten days before the threat-
ened strike or look out is scheduled to take place.
It is important to understand that at the end of this
ten.day period, a strike may still be illegal. The main
function of the notice is to bring the dispute to the atten-
tion of the board. As a secondary function, it implies
that negotiations have been under way for a period of
time and one of the parties has decided that it is time
to resort to action.

The notification was extended from five to ten ,
days because it was frequently impossible for the
board to hold a mediation session before five days
in.many disputes. However it may be a matter of months

before a strike may legally be called if the mediation

17

sessions continue.

Upon receipt of the notice, the board sends out a
questionnaire.5 Formerly, the board called the parties,
but this proved to be quite expensive. This questionnaire
is primarily for statistical purposes, but it does ask
if the parties desire mediation. If the parties desire
mediation a conciliator is assigned to the case. The
conciliator, no later than the next day, contacts
the parties and sets a suitable date for all three parties
to hold a mediation session. The time varies, but as a
general rule the case has entered mediation before
ten days have expired from the first notification.

Provision is made also for emergency cases. Where the
board feels that the issue is "hot" or a “wildcat strike"
might occur, the dispute is given priority over preceding
cases and is brought to mediation as soon as possible.

II. Mediation

Mediation, conciliation and arbitration are three
terms that are quite common in newspapers and labor
relations reports. However common these terms may be,
it is evident that there has been some confusion over
their meaning, at least to the general public. Michigan
follows the generally accepted definition of the terms.
Conciliation is accomplished by the parties themselves.
That is, the conciliator merely keeps the group together

18

and depends upon his presence alone to bring about a
settlement. Remediation proceedings the mediator
(conciliator)6, has the added advantage that he can
suggest solutions and participate in the discussions.
In other words the mediator (conciliator) can actually
help the parties formulate their solution to the
dispute. However, arbitration is essentially the
settlement of the dispute by an Outsider, whose
decisions the parties agree to obey. Thus these definitions
place mediation in the middle ground between conciliation
and arbitration.
Section 10 of the Act sets down the framework
for the board to follow during the mediation.process.
"After the board has received the above notice
(notification Of the impending strike or lock out), or
upon its 213 motion, in an existing, imminent or
threatened labor dispute, the board may and, upon
direction of the governor, the board must take such
steps as it may deem.expedient to affect a voluntary,
amicable and expeditious adjustment..."7
It shall be the duty of the board;8
a. To arrange for, hold, adjourn or reconvene
conferences between the disputants.
b. To invite the disputants to attend such

conferences and submit their grievances or

differences.

l9

c. To discuss such grievances and differences

with the disputants or their representatives.

d. To assist in negotiating and drafting

agreements for the adjustment or settlement

of such grievances and differences.

The board and the conciliators have the power to
hold public or private hearings at any place within
the state. In addition, they may subpoena witnesses
and compel their attendance, administer oaths, take testi-
mony and receive evidence.g This provision gives the board
an effective club that might be used to bring some recale
citrant union or employer back to the mediation proceedings.
The mere presence of such a provision is probably enough
to command respect, at least it has rarely been.used.
It is indeed questionable if the mediation aspect of
the board could be maintained if such pressure
activities as are suggested by this section were the rule
instead of the rare exception. Nevertheless the power to
subpoena witnesses assures that the parties will attempt
mediation and not utterly disregard the Act.
When the mediator holds the first meeting his

first step is to ask the party that turned in the
notification to give its view of the disputed issues and
to discuss their position. The other party is then

given a chance to add to the issues and give their

20

position. After this is done, the conciliator adjourns
the meeting.10

The next step is to meet with each party and deter-
mine the important issues. As the union usually makes
the demands, it is convenient to meet with them first.
The list of important objectives serves to eliminate the
surplus issues that were thrown.into the negotiations. These
surplus issues are intended to warn the employer that
the union.regards them as important and may demand them
next year.

The conciliator then meets with the employer and
shows him the issues that he thinks should be settled
first. Naturally the conciliator is careful not to
imply that the other issues are not considered important
by the union.at this time. The employer then prepares
to mediate these issues first. The mediator then
brings the parties back together and attempts to work
out a settlement. If this does not produce an agreement,
the conciliator asks the employer to leave and attempts
to draw up an offer of settlement with.the union. This
offer is then presented to the employer as a "package"
and a settlement usually follows. In case all mediation
efforts are exhausted the conciliator suggests that
a strike vote be taken.

If the strike vote prOposition is accepted by either

21

party, the conciliator urges the union not to begin the
strike upon the receipt of the strike results. Instead
the conciliator impresses upon the union the solidarity of
the employees as expressed by the strike vote and advises
them to approach the company again. The actual threat

of a legal strike enhances the position of the union
considerably and a settlement may be reached.

III. The Strike Vote

Before the Bonine-Tripp amendment to the MLMA
in 1947, a five day mediation.period after the notificatiai
to the board was the sole requirement before a legal
strike could be called. The Bonine-Tripp amendment has
extended the notification period to ten days and makes
the further requirement that a strike vote be taken
of the employees in the bargaining unitFlbefore a
strike is legal.

The parties to the dispute have the duty "to
actively and in good faith participate in the mediation
thereof"12 before the strike vote may be taken. There
is no penalty stated for not participating in.mediation,
but one of the parties could bring the case to court
for enforcement. In.practice the conciliator generally
holds the meeting together with his prestige and the
threat of a subpoena until the parties begin to mediate

in good faith. It is interesting to note that several

22

all night sessions have been held to bring about mediation
in good faith.

Either party or the board may call a halt to
mediation proceedings, if it is thought that further
mediation will be to no avail.13 In other words, when there
seems to be no probability of settlement of the case
by the board, or one of the parties believe that a
strike vote will aid its cause the mediation proceedings
can be st0pped. As might beexpected, the union asks for
the strike vote in a majority of the cases.

If either of the parties notifies the board that
further mediation would be non-productive, the board must
hold an election.within ten days of such notice or if
that is not practicable, the election shall be held
within twenty days.14 If the board terminates the
mediation no time limit exists under the Act. However,
in order to be congruent, the board applies the ten-
twenty ruling when it causes the mediation proceedings
to cease (which is very rare).

In a strike election, the conciliator files the
Election Work Sheet15 with the election supervisor.

This work sheet states, among other things, the purpose
of the election, the bargaining unit and the issues
to appear on the ballot.

Every employee in the bargaining unit is eligible

25

to vote, thus including non-union employees.16 The
employer provides the election supervisor with a list of
eligible voters, which 13 approved by all parties. The
list is to include all hourly productive and maintenance
employees excluding supervisory employees with the right
to hire and fire, as of a certain specified date. If

the parties cannot agree on the eligibility of an
employee, he is allowed to vote on election day.

However, either party may challenge the employee as

an unqualified voter for cause. The election supervisor
then places the employee's vote in an envelope marked
"Secret Ballot" and seals the enve10pe. This envelope is
placed in another envelOpe marked "Challenged Ballot
EnveIOpe"17 and completes the information on the face

of the enve10pe. The position of both the employer and
employees are noted under the reasons for challenge.

The challenged ballot is then set aside until the completion
of the balloting. If the election.results hinge upon the
outcome of the challenged votes, the members of the board
determine the status of the employee.

The board has excluded supervisors and executives,'
discharged employees, part time employees and those employees
that are laid off with no immediate hOpe of returning
to work. Included among employees are those on leave,

sick leave, and employees temporarily laid off. If it

24

can be proven that an employee was discharged for union
activity, he is deemed to be an eligible employee in
the election. The policy of not rendering a decision
on the eligibility of a voter unless the challenged
ballots will determine the election has, of course,
greatly reduced the decisions made by the board, and
in fact such a decision is quite rare in strike elections.18

If an eligible worker is unable to be present at the
election because of sickness of physical disability,
a ballot will be mailed to him provided the employee
notifies the board in writing of his inability to
attend the election. This absentee ballot must be in the
board offices at least twenty-four hours prior to the election
or delivered to the election supervisor before the closing
of the polls at the place of balloting.19

A notice is posted in prominent places about the
place of business, stating the time, place, and purpose
of the election. The notice also contains information
regarding the eligible voters and absentee ballots.20
The employees and the employer may designate one
representative for each place of voting to observe the
casting and counting of the ballots. These authorized
observers or the agent of the board may challenge for
cause the eligibility of any person to cast his ballot.
There is to be no campaigning at the place of balloting

25

while the election is in progress.2

A statement of the employer's last offer shall be
attached to, or incorporated in, the ballot, if either
party makes this request.22 It is the Opinion of the board
that if strike votes are to be held, a statement of the
employer's offer is necessary if the procedure is to be
democratic. They correctly assume that the employee
should have some information on which.his decision to
strike can be based.25 However, the issue is sometimes
clouded by both parties insisting upon a great volume
of information.being included in the statement.

The board or its representative may keep the polls
Open as long as it deems necessary.24 This provision
is to enable all the employees to vote. Thus, if the
line of voters is around the corner at the deadline, the
polls are kept Open until all Of the employees have cast
their ballots. Quite often the places of balloting are
widely separated, in which case the polls are kept Open
until the ballots are assembled.25

The board shall count the ballots as soon as the
polls have closed, or as soon as practical, if it is
impossible to tabulate the votes immediately. The board
or its representative then issues a certification?6

of the results to the parties.

26

An election may be contested by submitting a petition
with reasons to the board within forty-eight hours
after the election is closed. Within another forty-
eight hours the board shall conduct an investigation of
the charges and make a binding decision upon the parties
as soon as it is possible.27

The results of the strike election shall be
valid for a period of thirty days after the receipt of
the certification from the board. This time may be extended
by a written agreement between all parties concerned.
If the employer requests the board to conduct the strike
election, the results shall be valid for any period
the board may decide, provided it is not less that thirty
days.28 Therefore, if the union does not win the strike
vote requested by the employer it cannot call a legal
strike or demand another election for at least thirty days
plus any extension the board may desire. This prevents
a union.from working the election to death and of course
places a great restriction on stranger picketing and
union organization.

If a majority of the bargaining unit does not favor
the strike, any strike that is called is considered
to be illegal.29 If the union wins (and they generally
do), a strike may then legally be called.

The parties may desire further mediation and request

27

the services of the board. If the board chooses, it may
intervene in the dispute and again attempt to accomplish
a solution. It has been found that the mediation
proceedings usually begin in earnest after the strike
election. If the services of the employees may be ter-
minated at any moment, both parties have an added
incentive to reach an agreement. Thus, the true
mediation of a dispute may begin only after the strike

vote.:50

The Theory and Evaluation of the Strike Notice

The basic idea behind a strike notice is to bring
a labor dispute to the attention of the board before
a strike has been called. It is thought that if a state
agency can intervene in a diapute before the work
stOppage has taken place, a settlement can usually
be brought about without a strike. The issues that are
brought before this agency are suppOsedly deadlocked and
the agency will contribute to the settlement by the
introduction of new ideas and wisdom drawn from the
agency's wide experience.

The strike notice is not necessarily the signal
for the Michigan board to begin mediation. It is rather
a notification that a dispute may occur. The Taft-Hartley
Act requires that a notice be sent to the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service 523 state mediation

31
agencies §_0_ days before the termination of a contract.

28

Consequently, there are notifications that are merely a
compliance with the law and do not require mediation
at that moment. The board is nevertheless aware Of a
potential dispute.

The strike notice has in reality caused many unions
to notify the board long before they actually plan to
call the strike. In the extreme case, the questionnaire
sent by the board is the first notice that an employer
has of the dispute. The employer may rush to the union
and determine what is wrong and make a settlement
before those "outsiders" from Lansing arrive on the scene.52
Moreover, it was the Opinion of the Regional Office of
the UAW-AFL that nearly 7 out of 10 disputes are settled
by the mere notification of a dispute to the board.

That is, the employer either agreed to the union's
prOpositions, or he relaxes his position so that a
settlement can be reached.33 If fear of state inter-
vention can persuade the employer to sign an agreement,
who can blame the union for being early with their
notification.

If the employer does not sign an agreement and
the board enters the dispute before the parties have
earnestly engaged in collective bargaining, the picture
is changed. Here the board may find that it is writing
the agreement for the parties. It may be recalled from the

discussion of mediation above that the board may enter

29

the dispute and is not required to enter unless the gov-
ernor so directs. This provision is included in the Act
to prevent the premature entry of the board into the
dispute. If there is an existing agreement, the parties
shall have made an honest effort to settle their differ-
ences by collective bargaining. If there is no agree-
ment, there must be a threat of a strike before the board
will lend its services. If every time an employer said,
”No", meant that a dispute existed, the board would be
swamped with requests to mediate threatened recognition
disputes when actually no real dispute exists. If the
union in question gains enough power to effectively call
a strike, then the board will attempt to mediate.

In actual practice, the strike notice has not been
offensive. While it may have some undesirable effects,
the good points outweigh the bad. If we are to have a
public policy of mediation, there must be some method
of calling disputes to the attention of the mediator
before a strike is in progress. If the dispute is med-
iated before the union and management have taken an un-
retractaele stand, neither party will "lose face" if it
accepts something less than was hOped for in the begin-
ning.

The correct timing of the entrance of the mediator

is one assurance of success. -There is no positive

30

method to assure that the board will enter the dispute
at the correct moment, but the 10 day notice at least
gives the board a cha ce to determine the moment of
entry.

The strike notice is also intended to be a cooling-
off period. This was obviously the case when the Act
did not call for a strike vote. It has been found that
the 10 day period is not too long to wait and may afford
the parties an Opportunity to prepare a statement of
their position and arrange a meeting with the board.
The parties may have been bargaining for weeks and the
extra 10 days is not considered by the board to constitute
a hardship for either party.

The board definitely believes that the strike notice
has served a useful purpose and will continue to do so
in the future. As long as the so called ”cooling-off
period" is only 10 days, I am inclined to concur in this
Opinion. If the period were lengthened and the parties

were getting "hotter” the outlook would be different.

The Theory and Evaluation of the Strike Election

For a full appreciation of the strike election,
we must consider the practices that prompted its pass-
age. There were stories circulating at the time of
the passage of the Bonine-Tripp Act about the methods
that unions were using to call the members out on strike.
Naturally these stories were heard by the legislature in
Lansing.

31

One of these stories concerns a union that was con-
templating a strike. One Sunday evening the local
union met and conducted its own strike vote. The
decision was against a strike. The next evening an-
other meeting was called and this time the hall was
extremely crowded and only a small portion of the mem-
bership could obtain a seat. The committee that was
selected to investigate the desirability of a strike
gave its vote orally and the answer was a firm "NO“
again. The union president, however, was not so eas-
ily discouraged. He called for a vote from the floor
by "those in favor stand up." As the majority of the
members were already standing the strike issue was
easily carried.

One other tale that was being told at that time
concerned another "prevalent" union practice. The mem-
bers after a long and hard day's work attended a meet-
uing to decide if they should strike. The meeting lasted,
with.many arguments, until well after midnight and
still no vote was taken. Now the members had worked a
full shift and had to return to work in the morning.

SO one by one they drifted out of the meeting and went
home for some rest. Soon all that remained at the
meeting were the radical union leadership and the vote

to strike passed with no Opposition. 54

52

The strike vote was designed to prevent such
union tactics and put the strike vote in the hands
of a state organization for supervision. The strike
vote quite effectively eliminated the practices that
were described above and if we consider O‘ly that aSpect,
the strike vote has been a huge success.&;

It may be safely stated that the legislature had
theseevils in mind when it passed the strike vote
provision. Many members of the legislature probably thouglt
they were voting on a procedure that would eliminate
only these undemocratic practices and did not attempt
an investigation to substantiate th°.£EEEE or freguency
of these Obviously undesirable practices. If all a
strike vote did was to prevent the calling of a strike
without the prOper consent of the employees, the vote wouli
be of some value if it 3333 prevented these undemocratic
practices by a union.

I cannot say wheUnr the legislature was aware of the
ill effects of strike votes or not. If they were not,
it is because the legislature did not Observe the
Operation Of strike votes as they were conducted under
the War Labor Board, for example. Possibly the legis-
lature may have thought that these shortcomings
"can't happen here."

.Well, it did "happen.here." In the first place the

strike vote nearly ruined the mediation aspect of the
whole Act. It was found that the central theme of the

35

Act was fast becoming "strike vote" instead of mediation.
Nearly every case was requiring a strike vote.56 We
might expect that the unions would wish to delay
negotiation until they had a legal right to strike.

It is rather surprising to find that the employers
themselves were stalling negotiations until a strike

vote was taken.37 A partial explanation of this ‘
phenomenon may be the Old idea that "our boys won't
strike, it's just those union representatives that

wish a strike." At any rate it was rapidly becoming a stan-
dard practice for bgth parties to delay true negotiations
until after the strike vote was taken.

Now if the parties do not use the strike vote as a
final step in negotiations the whole theory of the
Michigan Act is overthrown. The parties are supposed
to bring a deadlocked issue to the board and thrash
the dispute out with the help of the board as mediator.
When the parties make a mockery of this pre—election
mediation the effectiveness of the Michigan.Act is
sharply curtailed. It is true that the board may enter
into the dispute after the strike election but then we
might just as well hold the election as soon as possible
after the notification to the board and begin mediation
after the vote. In the rush to prevent strikes the

legislature seems to have forgotten the mediation

54

aspect Of the Act.

If it could be maintained that a strike notice
brought disputes before the board prematurely, this
fault is multiplied by a strike vote. If the parties wish
to have a strike vote taken and haven't honestly
attempted to bargain, the services of the board may be
useless. The old saying that, "You can lead a horse
to water but you can't make him drink," is a useful
analogy in this instance. The parties will wait until
the vote is counted before they begin to actually
engage in collective bargaining.

In addition, the strike vote is a restriction on
the organizing activities of the union. If a strike
is illegal before strike vote, the union will have
to proceed with the utmost care."58 If a picket line
is established and is not considered free Speech, an
injunction.will follow.39 Thus if the employees of
another concern picket a non-union establishment with
the intent of calling a strike the picket line may be
ordered dissolved.40 If a union cannot protect its
standards from the competition of nonrunion firms,
it may find itself in the embarrassing position of
having to forego a wage increase at a time when other
unions are granted a wage increase. If we are interested
in encouraging the policy of collective bargaining, then

regardless of the "rights" of the parties, we must allow

a

the union to attempt to organize the non-union employer.

It must be remembered that the union is the victor
in a strike election in nearly every case.4l' Now it
would not be logical to assume that every union.man
wishes to go on strike. He may have been a party to a
work stOppage before and certainly he will not quit
work because it is fun. Most workers live too close to
the margin to consider a strike humorous. If we can
conclude that a majority of the workers do not wish to
strike, then there must be another reason why the worker
consistently votes for these strikes. The fact is that a
strike vote has come to mean a vote Of confidence for the
union and not a decision to strike or not to strike.
The worker has placed his faith in the union and usually
will stand by this eXpression of faith.12 To borrow a
term from the psychologist, the strike vote is not a
valid test. That is, it does not measure what it is
supposed to measure.

Moreover, the strike vote is considered by the union
leadership as a pledge to strike if they do not receive
their demands. The union then feels that it is obligated

 

to strike. Before the introduction Of the strike vote
the board might stave off a strike for weeks with mere

persuasion. But now the union feels that it has to strike

or lose face completely.45 This cannot be considered in

harmony with the reduction of strikes.

36

Such a lengthy discussion of strike votes is hardly
necessary due to the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision
that said these strike votes were unconstitutional
because they were in direct conflict with the Taft-
Hartley Act.44 Thus if the company is determined to be
_ engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce,
the provisions of the Michigan Act have no application.
Nearly every employer can be considered to be engaging
in activities affecting interstate commerce, as the
definition now stands. The Michigan board may find
that if it enters a dispute, a strike vote cannot be
taken in a majority of cases. Purely intrastate
industries are the only exception to the interstate

commerce clauses at the present.

An Evaluation of Mediation by the Board

An exact measurement of the effectiveness of med—
iation is a difficult task. About all that can be
done is to look at the record, and then ask the parties
their Opinion.

As for the record, the board has done a remarkable
job. As a rule the percentage of strikes to cases is
something less than one or two percent.45 This ratio
isn't subject to the same criticism that is leveled at
a ratio of cases received to cases settled. Almost
every case is settled eventually and a board Could
easily attain 100% efficiency by keeping the cases Open
until they are closed. However, the number of cases

37

received is not an accurate measurement of the threat of
strikes. As was stated above the board receives many
notifications that will never need mediation or are settled
with the minimum of assistance of the board. Without reading
something into these figures that simply is not there, the
Michigan record seems to be very good.

The employers and unions and other interested persons
eXpressed a favorable reaction to the board with one exception.46
From this admittedly small sample I will conclude that the

mediation aspect of the board is functioning well.

38

1. My own term that excludes public utility and has-
pital,-state employees and jurisdictional disputes.

2. Verified by Carlyle A. Gray, Executive Secretary of
the board since 1944.

5. Michigan Laws (1959) Public Act 176, Section 2 (b).
4. The Taft-Hartley Act, Section 8 (d) (3), requires that
a notice be sent ot the state mediation agency at the
same time trat notification is given to the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service.

5. A c0py of the questionnaire is included in the

folder in the back cover.

6. Michigan defined its mediator as a "conciliator."

7. Michigan Laws (1939), Section 10. " '

8. 1233,, Section 10 (a), (b), (c), and (d).

9. 2232!: Section ll. 1

10. (This description of a hypothetical mediation proceeding
was supplied by James Greenfield, a conciliator with the
Michigan board since 1940.

11. The term "bargaining unit" is defined in Chapter V]
under the discussion of fiecéghitiénie; diaputes.

12. Michigan Laws (1959}.Public Act 176, Section 9. (2).
13. Ebid., Section 93. (1).

14. Ibid.

 

15. A cepy of the work sheet is included with the material
in the folder under the back cover.
16. Michigan Laws (1939) Public Act 173, Section 9a. (1).

17. A cepy of these envelopes is in the folder under the

back cover.

18. For the discussion of strike election, I am indebted
to Henry G. Trembly, an election supervisor.

19. Rules and Regulations Relating £2 Elections

 

Pursuant to Act No. 176 as published by the board.

20. A OOpy of the notice is included under the back cover.

21. Rules and Regulations Relatingtg Elections.

 

 

22. Rules and Regulations Relating £2 Elections,

 

 

also Michigan Laws (1939) Public Act 176, Section 9g.
23. From an interview with Carlyle Gray, the Executive
Secretary of the board.

24. 52122 and Regulations Relating tnglections.

 

 

25. Henry G. Trembley.
26. A cepy of this certification is in the folder
under the back cover.

27. Rules and Regulations Relating £2 Elections.

 

 

28. _I_1_3_i_q.

29. For a discussion of the validity of the strike

vote see Auto Workers 1. McNally 22 LRRM 2589, 22 LRRM 2170;
Shakespeare Co. 1. United Steel Workers 23 LRRM‘2341;
The Auto‘florkers case has been declared unconstitutional

by the U.S. Supreme Court

30.' James Greenfield.

31. Labor Management Relations Act (1947), Act of

June 23, 1947 (80th Congress, 1st session), Section

8., (d). (:5);

4O

52. James Greenfield, conciliator with the Michigan board.
35. Dale Simone, Regional Office of the UAWeAFL, Lansing,
Michigan.

54. These stories were given.by James Greenfield as a
reason for the passage of the strike vote by the legis-
lature. (They are not to be considered factual but merely
to show the setting in.which a seemingly innocent strike
vote provision.was passed.

55. It should not be implied that such practices as
outlined were standard procedure.

56. James Greenfield.

37. Ibid.

 

58. 'Frank Corser, International Representative Sub-
Regional Office of the UAW-Clo.

59. Shakespeare Co. v. United Steel Workers, (CIO),

25 LRRM 2541.

40.“ Consumers Sand & Gravel Co. 3. Kalamazoo Building &
Construction Trades Council, Michigan Supreme Court (1948)
521 Michigan 361, 22 LRRM 2119.

41. Carlyle A. Gray and John Greenfield. Unfortunately
the facts and figures on strike vote in unavailable at
this time.

42. Arthur H. Raab, Industrial Associates, Lansing, Michigan,
and first chairman of the board.

45. Ibid&

 

44. Auto Workers 1. McNally
45. See Appendix.B.

41

46. The exception is Arthur H. Raab who expressed the
Opinion that the board had lost the confidence of both

parties and was very partial to the union.

42

TI nrocedure in General

‘.

\

The procedure foilowed by the board ior ciseutos

‘1 O

inVOiV1ng oubl‘c utTlities and hcsuitcls falls 8 the

some general fattern as was observed in canqral lobe

dfsautes. However, thor' are certs‘n additional reauire-

_ J— 'V J. ‘.I L ‘\ 0 J— I V O

RMVWoS tor.,;1ave ix) DB not, if‘ri strilci 19 to 1M3 con-
:"‘)""Y‘IXI“] 1"r‘rfil "f“ " th 0 - ° °-.,.¢.. "’17 ‘

3; »_ea c. . A aln one general oroVi31‘ a Jill be

outlined briefly before the full descriwtion is v van.

tens are

i-ii
13'
CD
to

 

1. Iltiiicqtijn to the board :2 days before tle
strike or locko“t is scheduled.

2. radiation by the board.

5. Certification of the dis ute to the governor

 

within 5” darn of the notification,

4. A soecial ccnmisvioa is aioointed by the governor,

-c- .9.

 

 

 

 

5. A TQHQKE E332 239Q£39Vd all?” h? 32‘ 3990:91
(30*:aistiia*‘\vitfii’Y1 3.1 dPTfS.

6. Tod'atien for ;; da*s by to“ board,

7. oer,'f°c"tion of the ran" iii: 738V“s to 5b”

 

(7‘ StPlT-fo ‘3].00135’37’1 ”'3‘? ‘3’? bO-Z‘I'FT

"is involved :recedure

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legislat"re of the state of "ichiran as being of urine

45

importance.

and even tn:

,re

recommendations. Thus n1

utility dis;utes in fine

viewed national

emcrwrencir

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‘hoto‘ery s t a». tie

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53 .3

hours or other terms or

interpretation or a
shall be hanc

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to reoresentation, Wlnpfi .s ;n
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0853 SB‘Q’ICI‘

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44

'tal?‘ In section

of

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°€ “v an euilorcr subioct to
icintos concarri o wages,

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or concwrn.nc the
'1'
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with t'e wrovinions of
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excludes any reierencc

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3

‘L “ ‘ Fe H er ' '- rs ”P“ \
rmo- esoirrn*u if eixzo ire; c z

4 board to mediate PGJTG-

\
I

(I)
(U
’5

-° - tr“. . .2 ' .. ‘ .9 ....-, . .-
-tatlon cases. :10 irov SIon has; uGSJrLuw to aiol,
to unions that had Slroady been rocoorived 225 may be

‘4 "- L " “/\'v r" f I W —. v'vu— 1' \»-5 ‘. a A -_—. p :-
Fild TGC’lislthJflr‘Tle )U-SV‘f’r, Q-i-v>»)‘t_lvescd'-cnr7fl 3-1 r13 ,l_!33'::.'r‘~u?—
e . ‘ e an a ,0 ‘, ‘ ,l‘ _' ii ‘ .L 1

tion are con31c red to be incl a.d _n other certs or
conditi”“s of an 10”“20t.”

Eisouteo are "on 7red to case taro oh the settle—

do not toinincte in voidn or? arbitrct'on, any unsettle
2 ., '- ‘- ‘1 1 . ,S.‘ 3‘: .. .. .2 4- ‘ 7-. -_ , .2 '
d,scuto swal; .c candle. .3 aocordanco . on t e )T“ViSldnS

~m .L! «.2 - 0 ~ ~ .~-. H
I. totltlcation has boo“ HbSCPleO in ,no ineccooln

chaiter and the chi? chance to be noted '3 that the

no ’“tioq >'r*od has oo‘n extended to :1 e“‘s 'r the case
of oubitc utilities and hoss‘tfi‘s.
Tl. Ted ation

She bane r1 srocodi G ‘n mediation W’s diver finder

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P.)
3
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rervarnl_

_souteo and ne d not he resented acagn.

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The f rat sted o_ tie boarw is to litervene i6 tie cin-
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oital 06‘7M3b1l0 ‘fli’litf”iis=uto,si‘all 1w: “bl?"rtxw”... to

45

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onto” o.e ULS‘UUQ L no atton.o ass boo? ”fine to roacl
’ - w - . - A ~‘- C ‘K
on ‘aro;runit one ifv‘ case 1J3 cotewovu to ts - over or.
71.1 _ T H. 4- ‘ e e I! e I "1 j
ihe boa:n snrll nrye orb ration ii it cvnc u as
l _ "- .L. ." 3 . ._ .2 -- .2 ."I 3 {71‘ — . ' #-
toat i”rt er mediation is i”tl18. _cu3 in o‘b case of
1 (V. ’1 ‘q 1 {-7 r: 3‘11j‘nl: ‘1‘“ . “I -. J‘ 3 n '1“ Q .' tr .-‘ vs I) " v)‘ 4“ v a "I ~
(1 O n) _‘_D b C" .J- S -1‘ . - hi it) .8. C Li. 'J .- _V. _ LI I G 7‘) L: V O f) T) ‘ .’.I , ,i. I- h: .2: ‘ ‘ Cl"!
J_‘,> _ n _0 _¢*_ 0 ’ 1 'j 3 ' "
tie na'lation orocoss siai- e tcrfliuftou.
—- .— r1 __ e n e ;_ _'..W \ .
ill. oerfl?iicacion to one “over“or
- -0 4- - .3. .9 o . w L 1. , - .- ._ 1 ,2 . .° :. - . r: .'\ a
ll t i HiSW to nos not ones solelo 27.2 s: na;s
‘0 .1 '.| ’ J" - ‘ ‘ .' u‘ . ‘L n ‘3: . . ’ ‘ J ~ “ " I '1‘ " A . ‘l 1
lollo .n* b o rec iii oi -o str o “on as o- mhu bov¢c1
- D
p
.?-r . l. e- i. : 11: l. ' I , ,T .' . x. J— .1-“ -. ., - ‘-, "
L1 (‘5 {NW—Nb J CET’U ' f, HAL: 1'.) S , .‘ '0 L; A __, g, \ 7",”1’1"? 0
" .‘l‘ W ' f‘ ..-. .2 ., ‘ _
JV. '19 DosCIRl o“ _;.' on
"ma 4n. . H , -. . . .- A.» w“. 4.! 3. 4- +“ 3-:
sign ow: ~ovoynor receives one C wolf cation oi o o
1 - , o 1, '3 -'. , . _ _ ‘_ _ - .1- ,o -0 J- - . .-
ootrd in too C+_ . f a ‘53 h issue to a ewtc'al
m'fifivn ‘, a g ‘. T711, ('1 . ~ by ('5 f r q ’1 e *1 (1 '. ‘ 'u *\ '1 m '3‘ n I" ‘ 'V}
C ‘.lw.o Sn').if).qe ill -1 C) )""~.I ibiJ- L10 L '0.) ..j" (1' into L1") TM L a CC

46

.. . - .' S .. - . ' .' ,-.. ‘_- ‘ J-..
GlQl‘ ‘_;‘f."."h.“3i flv :J--T‘S F2- .‘n ’3. or}? Ell“) ovormor “Nil c.."3

J_ t ‘ P _ f. a 1 ‘ ’1 _e .. 4‘ e P\ - _
non—"o no \ lama, no rot rnc~ of ti . C ruins invokes
P7? ... .' l .’ - l 1 ._ .‘V. , .1- ... ‘-'1 .' .._-.. ..-.'. — ‘ . .3.-. .1.
inc co<rux¢;,"n srrl L cowr.nm, y‘oe c ’«J u .tho ror:'~VT at
.5 a .- '2. . l .L.‘ .. -. 1. .- ,_ - '1 .‘ _ . .* 1-. x. - 1 9. - .
m~.c b o it nice -zrll 8 Joan sin «e gofirn -n oerson or

~- ,. ,. J, - -..h.-J- 3 H? .- 1
0y co:isci wr -tuar re:re;»nt°tivoo. -oe hearrnss small

b9 informal and t”* or: ailinv rules of cv5fcncc are not

'7 ..

bindinv. ”he cofirission ssall have the never to admin-

I

O ‘ ‘ O | t s O I 'Q
" f" ‘9‘ ‘\ 1 -~ — . ‘ ', ' r; "“ " nu“ l‘ v f“ ‘ a- r ‘h {w r7! I) f‘ r; sq (4 ( ex.
1° , .r 00.0....‘7 I’C 3'; e l -;.L1.";l“»".‘CC‘ if .,_iul'.‘C...i._-ixla, , o. {3‘

t -—

v

\

- .' . .. ‘- ‘ l 7.. . -, we... 4. .m . .. . ..-_
oroduct:.n if sec» 0 o.s macers, coc.::Cos, a~r chests,

“ 1" ‘VT *n‘ 4" "-

CO
V j
.'\
,_.J
1’ ‘
,4
Q
3
K .2
' .3
"1‘
K
( I
’)
'2')
'1)
.1
fl

‘ —-. .1— :v‘ ‘ J- ’.- av. . “‘ ' r-‘y ' j I J‘
mater $1 to a y st 0 ~rm nation oi t_e is.Ves 'n a S‘Uce
”.3
n 1 - m -~ w- -\— - ~ ' -. f‘ w- n "f‘ n "A
off... ”’1‘“. T ’31? R' .,t‘ mo 1'15" S *S. U“ E". U-) .01.. .

.. _.. ‘

V. loo “cwort of the Special Cmmwi
V900 tro conclusion of the hearinvs, or ~
avs after itbfrriwtnticnt, t'o soocirl cowuission submits
” Written re art vitb recommonoations to toe covernor. A
majoritV vote of t“e manhors constitutes a recommendation.

' ‘. w

The findinrs and r cod ondatxons are {one noel c, but are
not bindinv noon the p rtios. incse re ortn ray not he
viveo the newsoaoor space bjfio rould hrirr the issue to
the attention of the Dublic. Tn ado tion the rewsoaocr

e e -, I _ O 1 e
(a - \ n 1,- -4 -. (5 ~ \ _ r. 4.31 . H (' " I" r. 3‘ r. m -. cry w ~rln r. ~ A:
C~~rt.‘-Cle nI-(‘._’ 1'..‘ --’W‘ ‘qto LI :1) C",_‘ - . s."‘--’.L 'n LxL_'\1. ‘ .V‘e 0". Hr e-".~1"'jj..ltb

from the resort.“

47

‘ " ’ ‘ ‘v P: x ’1 -. ~. r d J— 1. r“ r~ -w ‘ 1 v‘
Ln» revernev 'uKlVCFC d 017: GT pvt r Jert flea rac-

_. ., ,-,¢.. - 4.. ~”4.1M”... ..,-J. a. . f 1.
umeflueefiouc bW’UUHO; Hibh 9 CfidJ_€b€ fGC‘?C Of tWe C”.

‘J.

l

c—r
J
(‘1‘
44
C)
W
J
3
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I
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J
'fi
1 .J
C) J
r 3
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[/2
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.4
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L" 3
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_...-.. 4.4- 5., :- o -, _- :‘A- x - n - - : ‘
are-“ at wiut to sevtte t elr nifivfences u‘ meelfit-en

.. - 4.‘ a. .9 4. .- fl .: .-_* , *I T fnw 1.- ,1 . s. . ,
Rlufl th 83S;SbflflCc OJ eflu QQTJ. LEG HOSTS (”CAD QT”8

O)

T w 1;: IW'- M 7° w , ‘ L n ‘
he 93:. es te su:.mt twe CleutC to velav.sr; er;_trn—

+-
U

tion. If tEe Eisnute is net settlefi a; .

U)
L J
3

tion at tee efifl 6? tflfe ten Rev neried tte board Resin

0 Q .‘
ret7fles tne "evefifier and states the refl95fifihv whee,t7ed
“o
1sewes.
.-. .',~ 1 4-‘ 4— .‘.3. 1' 4.1:. .. °
It‘mvst be re on even ”We, r‘“ “ t”lS ett re perlod
r‘ a— -?v -, r F « ;- : - ° : “ V“ "i - ' ‘
e; n.439ex_.mrtelg A) Lain: a 3 ,..Te 143 hlLGLfLL and snullsn—

After the above nrecedure is COflpleted and an scree-

e Vote mey be callee.

not be repented. Ehe same obiectien, t“°t r991 bnrvninind
ma” 1’1th be qfii‘Dtv“ 71T19C3 11“ L, " 1‘. t‘ IE3 at]. ‘. fire ‘rfi1/\z v‘c" tr} 951’ :t S

laber dfisnutes. T“ feet t”e case me? be even streneer.
The cemeany enfl nnien are in 8T1 orebehilitv lnreer and

.o

have more exwerietce are hurefere will not he fr;fhtened

’3 J»— n 7". 7 0 #Q _ !'.1y‘ 4.,” .-... 1 A V V‘ a
01 Due 3,2te Oi anQL-Rfl. LHHR pgey W;11 Owl?’ “9’“

o

48

‘00
J.)

J
”3
*5
D
O
J
J
2
1
’fi
H
O
‘3
~T
I)
(‘f‘
3
3
D
U)
ES
31
..J
0
d;
E:
:1“
(1‘
15
DJ

tespitcls 11? effect the enb“c t1 1 1re1ter 1xtent tb1n
t DflPtTeS thessolves 11s affected. For this ressen
be Jublic b1s dec’Aed tb1t the re1nl1t_on 01 thes, lis-

O
putes ls 1:01ss1rv.

It wewld be 0 d'?ficult test to dev se a method

whereb? the 51311te ceulfi be settled prenetlw 31d neftber

pnrtv wsuld t: unduly hnrwefl. For ,"1‘1l1 we msy recu-

\

delefed the

15

lste the ri1ht t1 stri*e, bvt if the strik

a)
I_J
U)

estroyed.

c t
.D
O
k:
I
D
.3
Fr
cf‘
5 '1
"J
C t'
J.
d-
1J0
L)

union mty be resigned t1
Also if the finien's demands "re met, it may force the

_: 1 “I 14 In 1 fl '1 ~_ _ _ 1 :
emeleye ”nte be: krufi> CT. A metqec ass 50L to be cevlsed

\\/

th1t mi 1 recenc:le the V70WS of the sublfic, the em levees
-1 Tvo ~ -“w r 11’“ fl 4' .

and tee em3l1 1 to tug C1Molete Sfltl8f90t o. 1f 2‘1.
A Tsct-f314ihs bear” is 011 flatbed 0'n settliefl these

Dublic fibtevest dis ntes. The SD1 {17 cemwissien set mm

by tbs Eicqpcnw Act is 9 letm ef t“;s fact-ff1lin1 bn1r1.

brine the ??Tt193 tOTTtDO“ ant Ottcmht 9 ssfivtiqn,*‘ mhe

ful r90011enfleti1n, will try t1 brine tme demands an;

offers of thi res:ect1ve 111ties as close t11ether as

ence.’ rect-f’n1111 im111es the bowrfi \H 11 kn1w the

n1sit101 1f CQC' 111t7 and he? fer w1c‘ 1171 1ive on
0 Fl} 7 o ‘ ’7 o _: H o 1 1 .9
9 13319. Lqe s11crsl 011,133.11 1:11t be Bole t1 ef-ect

a c1melete settlem11t by 11111111 t1e p1rtf_ es Closer t1
91reement 116 t“en scbn€ttinn e rec1fl'1e1fiati1n that each

p1rty can accept. The s ec’al cow fission s?111d check

.- r . L: ,2 1 - 0 .- .2 7..
hlth t1e 1srt es are asce1ta1n :f 113 P9001mend1tg1n age

,_I

acceptable before it relerses these recomme e1d1.t11ns t1
the public. If the T commendsti1ns are rejected the
commission will 9r1b1bly PeC1ns der its posit_1n and

. 1 - .. , ,7 . 4.: ., '- °4. A --.,. a
suom.t no; rec: 1 pcith1ns. if :t bee1g s 91>1reut to

i - --\ *7. fl ‘ 7 3‘ -"_ q s . W
0111;0s_1n tzet To recon en€1t41rs 11;; o; tecevtee

4.1.“ .. 1 4-1-. , : 1 . ,: .
>ef1re tee; 0T3 Pe+e1 e1, J11 00:1;1sx11 1;?1 1r1bntl1

release the recon en<1t51ns 11d trust t1 nubiic 011171n

- . fl . —! A ‘ 4‘ Vl' .
t1 C1m1el the 181 see to eccent. Ah? 11013.1: t©1t .111

h1ve to be made between the nosit11ns of the hmrt1eg
sheuld be made with c1reful 0141311r11‘11 11d n1t b? an
arbitrary Sfilit 0' fiftf-f‘ftfi. Tn 111 case the Jecisinn

sherld be Witan th realm of ex)e t91cv 1? th‘ ssrties

'71 -. ,3: ‘ ‘ j -- fl 7 | —— x. ‘
gact-mens} (meme 1:3 1,181,191.13 n11; escey f1r Imo-

50

licity early in the proceedings. If the positions of
the parties to the dispute are printed in the newspapers,
the parties may feel bound to stand behind these positions
in order not to lose face. Thus the flexibility that is
desired in order to have the parties accept the
recommendation may be lost. The governor's office may
handle the publicity and merely state that a panel of
disinterested men has been appointed and is holding a
hearing on the case.18

There have been at least seven special commissions
appointed under the Act since the Bonine-Tripp Amendment
of 1947.19 These cases are:

1. Flint Trolley Coach Company. Flint, Michican.

2. Detroit Edison Company. Detroit, Michigan.

3. PeOples Transport Lines. Muskegon, Michigan.

4. Twin City Lines. Benton Harbor-St. Joseph,

Michigan.
5. Grand Rapids Motor Coach Company. Grand Rapids,
Michigan.
6. Pontiac City Lines. Pontiac, Michigan.

7. Dearborn Coach Company. Dearborn, Michigan.

51

The ordv’ Jonine-Tri

challencod b? the “ransnort dortcrs '
f" 1 (\ 1 a
-J A , . -\
VOCC-“l 0388. and tug 8'3’30lr‘l may. 2.4a
r'r- . _ 4. - '0 1 .2 - .
iJe case went to toe 101 can a n 3‘0
"2 '. I“ '1' r. '. 'z-r ‘vw ' r. : - -
sectlo“ J~ruawn a o‘ tne s,ucha_ c
_ 0 _g ‘_ ' n1. .1— _,_ o . _o .L.
unconstitutional t'e Jeru , ”e u
p. . ‘. - ' o I ‘ ‘
fine m moors of LAB nicl&t_ox so:

v'\

.‘J

tie Detroit .eison disoute early in 7 -
amvle of t‘e srcces of the special com‘

recofmendation sf the

If the Detroit Edison ”empary had ‘

been

there wovld have been vast repercussions
area due to loch of electricity. The

t5¢t lss

opinion

the I)U.bl"C by he prevent

Ci“

0‘
strife.
I". ‘ "~ . ‘ - -
fine reoules Transuort Fines case
favorable example of the 'ork of a so
J‘ - ° , . ‘ 1 ‘ . .- 4. .. ‘ 4.}.
a stri e was on} so, C‘t it Mas settl
‘ ‘ .,y ‘ ' a 4-‘ _ _
uSinq the recommendations oi ”9 aw c,
.7
g -‘.l
a baSis.
n|IV_ c '9 >0 - ‘ ,r‘ 1
In tre +IJU VFtLOS Limos vase tn
0 1 .. o 4_ q-
Sl“fl received a surnrjie re West by
4- {‘12 -. ,. .1. T
the case. A29 com>ana aar ed to arm
' . :— 4. '1 H 1“ - ° '.
dlS)”te ;as see» ed t.out ~ stri 0.
v p w ‘ s
fhe firand {011's vofei code 'ns

12Ct Of

1 int? '3”po

*e~.JX'i:'frolle1r
did not frnction.
“rt where the
sxor pas d clared
used.
hCVe ro’nted to
as a urine ex-

331on. firve
art’s Used the
is of S-‘tlement.
“sod b" a strike

0
ion proved

Is larae public utility

h "‘1-"\

3 Q (3. 1:1,“ CI’

(0

U]

ful commis-
—.‘-_'J-_
on to Choltrate
s'd tho

o a 1 u w J “ n 1‘ H 1 5
J3 Vigoa for '“p tree er and t e ee'rd Cleo recs .eyeee
“t [‘x" n fin "o n ‘n llfa“4 *' n""“ to fiw‘n Ir‘t ’NYV ' r
J. O - ‘ u a ( k_, )) WZLLL/ "J U k - u#' 1 l J A x

1 .0' J. w 2

89123]. ‘L '-;LJL’1.’..‘.‘.‘_ a St? ' ..

r“ '\ (\an f' Y. a \F P7 n won 3 1 '1 -r.‘t \w r .'717‘*.‘nn ~

Jr-1\. U NV .1 . I“ C ‘ .4. \Jq L J _____ 1 J ,i. I '.I, a u..

a J ‘,. 1.. w - a a 1 "3‘ P‘

O I N r] r11, ( n J {I r V1 23 Cage. 3'\ 1‘ .‘f‘ 1 n no-

\ ‘ r 1 ‘1“fi A e. ’ n“ A‘. ‘_l .v ‘d 4“‘ . .‘ - 1 1“ ,y“. “.“:‘ I j . c .‘ ' J"

00 1+:CC. _ t’ THC " ‘. 1' Ont-1.1-0718 O, ' 7'10 0'33 3? g. «‘71 . ,v.-l_'_‘ C . .3, ) 11.48
“A
v}

. , A;— . ‘1 ....' ‘. -.- .. . J- -‘ -.4. -91-, .°. --

was zeitlen wit-.rt rece rs e ~hrf 0 act o..

The Dearborn Coach Company case is an example of
the failure of a Special commission. The union wished
a raise in wages, among other things; the company main-
tained that it could not afford the raise. The posi-
tions of the parties remained steadfast and a long strike
resulted. The union finally agreed to a contract sub-
stantially the same as the old one. It is doubtful if
any method, short of compulsory arhitration, would have
settled this dispute because of the inflexible positions
of the parties.2

It is clear from the record of the public interest
disputes under the Michigan Act as amended in 1940, that
the special commissions so far have been a success.
Whether this record will continue remains to be seen.

The success of the public commissions is due in
partito the method of selecting the members of the

commission. The governor usually selects a professional

arbitrator or a man with arbitration experience and two

53

representatives of the public.28 Instead of arbitrarily
deSignating a commission, the governor has the parties

to the dispute pass on each member of the special commission
before he is appointed. This assures that the parties

have confidence in the impartiality of the commission.

In addition, the success of these commissions may
stem from the attempt to mediate the dispute. If the
parties are brought closer together, the possibility
of a settlement is greater. We saw in the Dearborn
Coach case the effect of the inflexibility of the parties
in the proceedings.

Furthermore, the policy of determining wheflMX’the
parties will accept the recommendation undoubtedly has
cortributed to the success of the Special commission.
However, the new provision is only one year old and the
real value of the present form of Special commissions
will be determined in the future. If the same success
is met in the future, soecial commissions are here

to stay.

54

Voluntary ”re tration

‘0

lrbor 11 sputes use tritten into the

.L“

_. 4' 1.. O
Arbwtrstion o_
.' . —. u. \ 'v Anna 7“,“ r .°-.- he ~: -- a
1~lChlf%U-<hct EMT out "w*;lnC-{HTLDJ a any ‘ert (1? 1:4? T7i ch

0 1

plficed particular emphasis Upon hospital and ophlic

for the knotty problems oi oeder establishments than

mos itals and public utilities. out the board has not

“ 3
6‘
PJ
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J
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4
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S

statutory

'V 0

G1 sputes. ’ols does not rule out the QOSTibliltV that

:3 ‘1 1 . ,« 4. i 9 _f 4- 4—? _ °n
the board co la suscest are trstion to one in bios.

u)
0
(D
d.
P‘
x.)
, S
0
J
“‘3
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b
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0
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s

new >ro—
cednre to he followed for are; trot on. First of all, it
states that any d.S)Ut e, other than a representation,

may lawfully be submitted to voluntHry erbitration under
(39
the Act. ;t is difficult to conceive of a situation

I ‘ J.

4. ,- _- - ° _ _ I .1.
twere tee Juestion of reofiesentetion wwuld we sent to

arb’trstion. .Asi de from tsis rather locicel observartion,

.1.

ct on on the

H
'rJo

the provision ma: be cons’dered a restr
recosnition of the union. Vowhere in the Act is a bind—
ine certification of a bPP“QlTlHT nment orevided. if a
on would be oindgne noon the parties.

But the Kichiqan Act leaves no decision of recomhition

to the emolover efter the enolofees have voiced their

1_ O

decision to tr? collectzve berooinino.

2,.‘1- 4.

. _. . u ‘
toe orov:siors of snco s“reewert ere leQIUT noon the
- '7 ‘ .. 1 7- 1 m- .

-ts;l be comoiied nit; unless tne darties

agree to submit the disoute to some other arbitration

‘ {:0
brocedure.”

Q

If no settlement by croitrrtion is :rovidsd in too
contract, on screenont to arbitrate must be reached in

order to send the dispute to arbitration. This serecnent

-. ‘ — 1. ° ‘ . 4. ‘, J. ‘I '-
n writ.ns sno inc-toe 9 snotooont t at coto

- , _

S

*4.

gust he

oerties will abide bv find perform the decision of the
arbitrator. The written o"roeflent or a snio‘enentel
Percenent contains tor issues to be erb;
provisions for tho otfment of the arlitrctor. If the
board finds that either sort? is nnsble to beer toe
exoense of arbitration toe board may desiante an arbi-
trator end he will be bald out of the General June.'

In ord r to escooo critgcisn for beins snitratY, the
boord sends 9 list of nrbitretors to tnc perties end
they rule out envone woo is unsatistoctorv. Lne erbi—
trator is tben Chosen fro? the remeinine ecceotable

7 :3
0.;
arbitrators. Tbis soreenent to arbitrote is enforce"

‘__-

able in OSUit" by any circnit Co“Pt bev‘oo jfi“isdictlnn.‘Q

The arbitrotor (or rrbitrstors; is oblicetefi t“

56

conduct henrfnos within 9“ doys oi ogs e oointnent.
Reosonsb“e notfco of s‘cn bearinos is elven to the
psrtiec “no they no? 81D”9P std be heard botb in gerson
end by connsol or ot

shell.kw3 infornwfl Pnd t

“l
. 'N
I. " I"
o ’0 a 73 _o > f: g f“ ‘ 4— v ‘ ‘ 3 w. o .-\
in Juolc_ol orocoe» ;.s sosll not re 0 ntino. Any

orsl or docwmortory evidence toot is doomed relevant b?

the orb trotor we? be received as ev‘flc"ce. A transcript
Ol tbe cose is to”eo if tto rrb’ rftor so desires or if
the o_rt es regwost a trenscriot at their o n cx>ense. 6
Within :1 Jens oftor tte conclusion of She oesr n"s
the er‘itretor sb ll formulate iis decision. To, arbi—

twntfil'" S. 9????A ofl’lf‘fl m’ bQ ‘3 Y‘ 2.71:)" +-

,1-

L j t" . ' ‘ I“ Orv ~ ‘ ~ fl w". -.
to toe J??tlw8. A93 9 srd glnl] be eyforcoobro :n equity

.-'~ '7
as an coreement of the parties.

1|

:1 1 O _ o, ‘ _. _ ‘. 1|_ 1‘ ‘R‘ _ -
Arbitrrt 131 of lsbor ddfifllb93 nos cecrlrfitrnlno favor

. ‘ 4‘1“. r\ , r\1’ ‘- - ~- '9 ‘, 1 '0- A . #1
beint of use enol. e“, e.oloiess soc tlo bubllc. ooeclol

H 1 g .- ‘.,‘ 5 PI _ ,, r- - ~ . ' .-
ouol_c in.eres,. comoulsor. orb trét so of even onbl-c

interest disontes is not wobno n. in fact the Licbioso

Q I ‘2 ‘ n < n
131 contained a orovhsion for conunlsorv nrb7tretion of

these sublic Interest disontes in 1947, but more of this

A discussion of the “orits of informal

1N
-3 '. 4

the 7fc3i~nfi :ct fidvocctes tee {Lformel enoroecfi ”A tHe

nrbitreti n proceeéincs that ere confiuctefl unfier the Act.

5 either oortv does not ejorove of tqe intermcl Psfirfiece

' I ‘7)
l

or an: other of to; grovisions of the erbr

they are still free to Trice a suitable arbitretiex
. ‘L’ ‘— /\ '. h m --~ ‘-

cleuse 1nto tmelr eereege-c.

I," , . -.- - " ‘ 2 .L- '7 . ~ _‘ .‘ .0 “ ‘ _' . ‘ _ _ .1.- r} '
“ refoco l canL*ce t-nt tit :nc_us do 0; cu_s Ora

’

tretion section fie the “ichiénh nct represents a mlld

Jocehtfive to mete crnitretion the final stew in settlind

6

,5
‘0
"5
(I)
"1
Ct

;_ 5". 3 1
son BS. Lrwe, the pert es nave t

ed is nréihj erbi—

a
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j
(a
d-
a
‘ 3
w
0'
P‘
d-
d
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al comfiiesion reconvends 1t, tofl 1f

(+—
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Iw
:1“
‘5‘
U.)
(0
5
O
"3

'V. . ‘ 9 J— ‘r .9 .‘ , vy . « ‘ \ -. I: 4‘1» I) ‘ .
twe cuollc te_es ts sushi ulth tee board a:« cat s)ec.el

comm1331on, the aressu e uev cause toe eert1es to s”rce
ts arbitrate.

It i qmite possible that the oerties would wrefer
to have a olfferert type of arbitration than the one pro-
vided in the Act. Obviously, the oerties me“ avoid tEe

1

Act by includiné nrbitretivn in the colxective eereement.
1 f)

- J. .. _ 4.1 l .9 q .9 A m i-
AQQUAGP reason lop tnc =ert;es Lev L~ twe

tretion meetinerv is tee ffict that the Lct me" be srenfled

-1.

J.

O -1 ‘ o o
to Inc ure convulsorv arb trht in of :utlmc JTtEP98t

disoutes. If tHe vothterv urocedwre es “c“ DroViflcd

- 1 ‘ —-q ~Ar~ 1 "
UTOdUCe {fivfirfiDle we? Ate ego toet ea? KGFH

58

}_Jo

the virtual elimination of iubiic i terest stribcs, the
e t3 chante the Act.'” Compulsory arci-
trétion would tflen ts?e the place of the SJGCifll commis—

. s ,— "V A ‘ - - ' - -‘ 5 ~ .«v-v I J'- --v r073 -.
ion for the math szent o: n;. cnecrects as tell as n-iev-

1 : - ‘4. 0 'r , --4.‘- 4— O 1.:
ovolic interest dloirte‘ . c'ent more reierence to arci-
5
”rs “on. The seeing-Triad ACt of 1"? QPWVldOd for com-

|_ | o _ __ _g '0 _ n — 'v a o .
JUVCS. ih.s »rov,s;oq '23 doclerec n constitutiwnel

. : Ln . -. -.- ‘- -. .2 _ J-2~. ' - - -,
becelee e swe-e was reQ'irec to serve in DMD cod-i:! ea

\ I‘ 5‘ . - I <~ "— . _\ '.' ' T- I . {‘ 2,1 -‘ -. '." .
emu Lot because tee cvwrt cioe,qroved be co ’VLSQTf 9_bl-

M s _|___"_ f _T 2 ’_ _ ‘fi- : _A v_ P" J_‘_ ‘ 0
lo H-1c, fl“ co‘wwusorr arcntrst on, b I h- ,e lot lb
F." A
a.) '-‘
O L,

rmnrld cennaifler crfirwilserv "1%):3r't‘fivs leenl.

There are two eistiect tries e? erbilrfitioe: firiev—
ance erbitrntzoe he” c‘etr ct urb3tret1on. tn “rievsfice
Rrfijtrfi

4.? n'.‘ .'.+. J. ‘ .‘ ‘ 0 .1 .‘ ° _ 4.‘. J.
-\ ~ :3 1 w a“: r n Y) : 1 t a v’} G A. D C‘ . fi?) fl " ' -~\ ’3. V"*'
‘1! I ' _. g, I I 4 _ .1 _'._ I". Ll ,‘ 3 ‘ .. ,\ :' C.) a ._; (3 ' J ‘ - - a; ,' ', -J I U u .'- -‘ k S

of the collective T5P¥Efi Wt tsfi tfius fiPter“in03 KWRt t3?

.1. - - . - ~ : A -‘ _ , _ - {‘1‘ ‘ ° L- .n
»€*\J'Cs 'v*%0 s: (1 ' .1; a I‘f‘*?50" “t. .L C :ufie oi
- . .1. - _ - '-- -. 4.7 0 .. 1 . ,N
““httrntwo rs h” n e lever e'-r~ bot: neioos e flan? e

. , 1‘ ~ . .. .‘ .9 ,- .- . _- J. m .0. y ‘_ . .g. , 0 A‘
Ac} gave two ,rov s on to fiPbLorptC d syutes tl’o erisc

’ ‘ - ‘, '1 - [‘0 J 0 ' W 1
(N 7. ‘x f‘. 4‘ A v n ‘ r‘ n ' - “n r~ +- n “ ' . t— ‘ ~
ere ._, ecu ‘; t3- 3 l . c .4 ct .re ;; t e“ 0* J
1 A- , . -- in ‘ ~ 1
ere trwter. J; .. 'r* \s ch‘rot reree to ~. "err we

' O _0 ~_‘ _ fi 1 o J V 7 ’1 J \ I '1 t
f‘ f‘ f" V A . :< 'I r A ‘~ ( n A r e \A ,— r » —\ f ,‘ ‘. ‘~‘ ‘-, (a . «V-
t J lo-h, in . ‘, }_ c ”1) e ,e on A r )_rt
f"-.- T" 2 .9 H ‘ .L.‘ .. ' ,3 i. _ A , 1.. . --
I- sf’ 9." (J C: F3_ ’t' . 15-“ er! 76!" all? Fifi-1 "I‘VE”"F: "3714C ‘1”.‘763 Fl"? "-77:33“

t ‘e iffézofw F'~' *z‘c- C’Vi-

I

. .
. 1.. ... 4. , _ 34.- in” 3D. 3-, - ‘ I - ‘ .24. L!
genv m9? ye r1» ;Js 9.1 cilr.rs. bortrrct frDLUPRDLfin,

3 ', , L‘- ."- ‘ .L— .L. . A- . 9 .L.‘; .- - 0 . \- . r -

esL(e frw' Lge irct that me c.er wnzor or genreoa ML
‘ : -. I- -. , - « .F. - ‘ ‘. ‘- -. \ -. 1v f, \
cos re L, is n\t _e rccerdr.ce witi n wnlLCg o; ew-

1

coureeire col ectlve bereririee. =estend of the werties

settliee teeir 6???treec s b* eh offer “WC coveter offer,
tEG flisflwte is settled 5" the eflict of n t“irfl gertv.
TFe or“? Relerse for swcH e oolicT is ttft cortrsct era’—

8 orld be liscer\ew.

34.: ,.\- ._.'_ r - . . - -
itie: volu-tfiy or 0‘ gm sort.

d
7)]
d
*3
'3
Cf.
o
g
3
:3
4
o
o
(D

-. 1‘ L e P ’1 a ‘9 " 9 v- -v : - W 3
;rat _s tee DTTtJCQ to a a-sontc '9, enter :rto are -

I r ‘ 0 .5" . .9 .1. .‘ j— v r‘ ‘ N .‘ 1’:
trntion of too r owr ;ree will -r tie! ere com:eilcw E0

4-

use arbitration bf low. If 'he orrties agree to suomit

their d ficreeccs (even contrects) to erbitrntioe, this

‘ r1 . .2" . .' 0 4-3 ‘ :a’
may on cons_lered an nit Dozen oi colleculve Dares 11r~

\J ‘4 \l

O {Y
-\ \4f‘VI'r\ av,
).'. U’

L1”- x’L ,

J
'1'
r.
.J
'J)
:1.
3
O
\ 0
J
:5
O

«J.

becense tier mrtuellr sir ved ’

6O

when arbitretion is covoulsory, it

‘)

1
1

Cain more bv erbit;“tioe tian would

‘

collective cereninin: fed thus refu

issue. The 133 e would then be erb.

m.-- -. .‘° .3 ..
uomoulsor, hroitrsti n -es eye

its destruction of collect've bnrfr’

i

O)

determination of lrber fiis utes. U

(YTAVYQIIW‘V'IT‘TWt ’; ‘r‘ ‘)'\’).‘T-3t.n~ by: In 21?): trpt’lr’,

wovernflent ”eterminfit on. Hut if t
.. . ' .L . 3 - .-

to afloOiet ac FPb¢tPFL7P for ever?

goverrment deterniretioe ef labor W

0 ’~ L‘. r .l'
arrive . all test HQUTd be necesse

. I
17' Mn M w -. w " Vt - .
we van? -1 ‘ ”ff. \1’1’3 DQJ IV ‘1

tbet C“fl‘U19“PY erbitrrtion is n

We st?

.1.

erecticellv cestrcvs

(N 1? .:' (\C o’ (a ,3 t"‘ r) t -.I t ‘1‘]: 1 l
| L '1 .4” ,._ - 4. L.

for“ of "OV9?W“Oht

ten the state (or env

‘. I
"e ere ee)reecmzne

4- : -

be is ob,i~tted
ursettled diswute,

lSJWtG hes in eftect

be obvious woulfl be for the covernor to aiooint birself

n ‘ ' ..
as the arbitrator. if We oiooxe

”evernfient determire-

1‘

tion of labor dfsuutc, then we cannot eédrove o; tbe

fl 1

- . u v ,- ’- 31.:N .‘ -- ~’ - ' -!
03130; cl 0 «urLlsery Orv) aret on.

Anv decision re”rr5ir~ tbe tvne of mecbieerv to be

used or the settlement of sublic,’

etérest disoutes will

be besed noon t“e riebts of tee nwbl’c Peeinst the richts

of the employer end the emolovees.
o 1

public heavily outweigh.tbe r7ebts

' V v' I N f1 ‘
tbe emologces, we cen cenqore even

If the rirbts of the
of the eflelover end

.
Vvvsrnwent determ1h8-

erv tor t‘o s‘ttlereet oi thrie inblic interest cisontes
must be e’scereea.

Tickle“ , for tFe bite bein* rt lobst, W?“ reolnced
comwrlsort erbxtrotios Kite velvntsrr erbitrrtioe Used

ENC

'\

‘0

Y1

--

Ct
1.

. ‘ 0 J. 'L.‘ .
unc beer“. if cue so

0 O
commissions Jrod“ce resnlts, comoulsort rrbitretion rev
not be cshs‘fiered necesisrv bv the leeisletnrs.

62

'1 .' .‘ ... . ~ _ . o n
1. car a dxscndq;on “; ”we néo;uration of wub110 tatereat

 

 

diSJUtQS 300 the dflciS‘dfi “f tn? ichi~9r Sunrefie Court
in Eyfés fif§_;3f:pgs 1° :§%n‘n includefl i“ the foldn
Under tFe brv” haver.

2. lich*¢dn unws (l )”), zuolfc Act 1:8, oeotidn ,. (h).
3. lplin: oection 17“. (”‘.

4. Ibfi€., Sect:wh l”r. (7;.

5. Ip}§,, Sectifin 1"fi. (a). (h).

E. "b‘d., Sectldn 171. (L). (L).

7. ;hli., east on l‘c.

3. Ib d., UGCtIOU Lid.

9. These 1Jens ~Fame exoross:~ 1n an interview "Ltfi

10. Eichifian LOWS (19 f), {vblic Act 176, éoctinn 133 (T).
re vote is canducted vndgr t”e save wro—
Visinn as wore ovtTined for ¢?hera lsbor n
T_e strike vote has to be cwnfiucted if a striVB is tfi be
thsfdered le¢ai. This is swbfiect now to tke recewt
rulinn‘ “I“ tho 7?. £5. Suwrame Cmmrt fin Auto '.'Jor:¢rs 3;.

MC Nally 22 LRRM 2589 wfiich fleclnced the str4Vn

vote to be in catflict titd tn: cht—inrtlcy hot anfl

1? who *nclusion of smail trafisuwrtnt?on coma¢n¥efi

"h

1 . . ' Q- .2 r a I — : 3 ‘
as unallc vt’llt‘*3 strem“os t49 _wen d; nuclwc ‘ht9°08t.

65

 

 

 

 

 

1?. An ;Kam:19 :s the 333??9“ 7S'1t91 ccse in Chains.
1:. in ,Kc7310 in ttc Tw’n Cities Zincs cf Tcncminae,
nichican ani harinct V, ‘iscnnsin.

15. :rofessor I. J. uyn'irdan, Dean of the school of
dusincss 5nd Eublic service, Riciigan State Colle~v.

16. Ibid.

17. Ram? of the icess nrescnted an sgccicl cannis~ions
were obtn mad from Professcr Tynmardcn.

1?. Prnfessor Vynvcrdefi.

19. This finvre w'q Obtaitefi frdm Farinrie 03d acc-
retarv In chorre 6f reedfds of the b0 rs. u

90. The text of th’s case, ngwsnort Wdrtfirs 1° fifdd1e,
is incluflei with tho material undar tHe back ccver.

21. Tlis case is also Ute“ ti ficmvfistrate the ucefulness
of the strike Vote oec01qe it is one 9f the fa? CRSLS
vhcre the unicn lost.

22. Carlmm A. ’?rafiu

23. Pr018286r nfindnrficn.

94. Clihtdz Fair, Gavernwwts unfice in the state capito
2‘. Ibid.

26. Thin.

T7. Ehid.

9‘. Ibid

?9. Tichicar Laws (1?? ), :uhlic Act 17”, ooctiou Cd (1)-
30 jbic., Section Cd (3). (a).

51. 221$}: Scctidn Cd (9). (b).

64

h
05"
O
J
‘0
U
L
C)
C—t—
)
3
\J
O

n

.9". Eat a sound basis 1‘? this noinifin 309 t:

I”: v " ‘ F] ”a . _ _ L ' 7 fl .' _ _- r“ ,3
irallcf uOflCfl ccse (Lrngs»dpt fit‘ctg V. H9307?) OJ./ H‘H

.. .~

 

"—- ———_

PI ‘ '1“ - '1 -1- a '
08. Erhnsaort nnrkcrs v. Gnccla uvu P tie OFCL

 

"I

40. frofessor gynccrden atd carlyle A.
41. 4Aperson contrnL1ed by th, Governar wau1d

same ourpose.

COVCPo

Chapter V
. Jurisdictional Disputes

In General

The procedure for jurisdictional disputes is almost
the S"me as the provisions for general labor disputes.
However, the emphasis is entirely different. The procedure
is briefly:

1. Notice by all parties to the board and to each

other.

2. Mediation by the board.

 

5. Election by he board.

The term "jurisdictional dispute" as used in the Michigan
Act, means that two or more unions are in disagreement
over which one shall be the bargaining representative of
the employees in a bargaining unit. We will comment on
this definition later. Obviously, the employer may be caught
in the middle of this inter-union warfare. As a matter
of fact, the employer may have an agreement with one of
the unions, and even have no objection to either union.
Of course there are occasions when the employer invites
union competition in order to destroy a union in his
plant. The provisions of the Michigan Act are directéd
primarily to protect the right of the employer and only
incidentally to protect a certified bargaining agent.

It can’t be denied that it is in the interest of
public policy to keep jurisdictional disputes to a
minimum. While competition fOr membership by unions has

66

many desirable features, collective bargaining cannot

exist if there is a constant undermining of a majority union

by its rival. Even if there is no union established

in the plant, neither union that is competing for

recognition.may be able to muster a majority. In addition,

inter-union disputes are probably the most violent form.of

union activity today, and the public has the right to demand

a maximum.amount of peace in labor organization. If we

exclude all other factors, jurisdictional disputes are

still undesirable because they destroy collective bargaining.
The Michigan Act has not made jurisdictional disputes

illegal. The provisions, however, make the spontaneous

calling of a strike for jurisdictional reasons illegal.

Thus the Act places limitations on the right to strike.

because of union competition, but does not eliminate

that competition.

I. Notification

The notice,or "statement of claim" as it is called
in jurisdictional disputes, is filed 53.9p£3_with the
board and a cepy of this claim.is sent to each interested
party. Withinlg days of the receipt of the statement of
claim, the other interested parties shall answer this
claim.in detail under oath. The original document of the
reply is sent to the board and at the same time a copy

is served upon each of the bther parties to the dispute.1

67

This notification alerts all of the parties and gives

them time to prepare their case. It might conceivably
scare one of the parties to the dispute and cause them

to withdraw; however, such a possibility is indeed remote.
The inclusion of "at once" in the Act is intended to force
the settlement of the diSpute at an early date and not when
all of the parties have exhausted their efforts of
organization. This provision undoubtedly gives the
advantage to the labor organization.that begins its organi-
zational drive first. If the employer can foster a dispute
before any union has a majority, the scales are tipped in

favor of the employer.

II. Mediation
’ Mediation proceedings in a jurisdictional dispute are,
quite obviously, not conducted under optimum.circumstances,
and usually end in failure. If either party believes
that it has the slightest chance of winning an election,
it will insist upon the election. And even if the party
does not expect to win the election, it still may attempt
.to prevent its rival (or rivals) from obtaining a
majority. The best result that can be reasonably expected
from.mediation is that it will persuade some party to
withdraw its claim and thus avoid an election. If that is

dine, then the question of representation still remains.

68

III. The Election

The conciliator will obtain a stipulation from the
parties that they will abide by the results of the election
and then delivers the Election Work Sheet to the election
supervisor.3 The election supervisor then obtains a
verified list of the employees that each labor organization
claims to represent.3 There may be a duplication of names
in the union lists, but this is of no consequence if an
election is to be held. The names wiIL however, have to
check with the list given by the employer as on the
payroll.

The supervisor then obtains from the employer a list
of employees in the bargaining unit as of a certain date.4
When the lists of employees from the labor organizations
do not coincide with the names on the employers list,
there is again a question of eligibility. However the
parties still have the right to challenge the voters and
the board will determine their eligibility if necessary.
The election procedure is essentially the same in
jurisdictional disputes as it was in the general labor
disputes, and need not be repeated.

If the labor organizations obtain a majority of the
ballots cast, and no one union has a majority alone, a
run off election is held. This run off election. is between
the two competing unions with the highest plurality of votes.5

Thus the Michigan board operates under the theory that the

69

majority of the employees have chosen collective bargaining
and the remaining issue is to decide which union will
represent the employees.

If an agreement exists with one of the parties to the
dispute, the board will hold an election only at the term-
ination of such contract.6 The Act theoretically prevents
the signing of an all union agreement with.a.minority
union when it states that "nothing in this Act shall
be construed to interfere with the right of the employer
to enter into an all union agreement with l labor
organization if it is the only organization established
among his employees and recognized by him, by consent,
as the representative of a majority of his employees."7
The employer is also allowed to make an all union agreement
with more than one labor organization.i£ they represent a
majority of his employees.8 Thus the employer is,theoretically
at least, forbidden to make a closed shop agreement with
the union of his choice. However, the enforcement of this
provision is delegated to the courts and is of no concern
to the board.

If it is necessary to Ppreserve or restore production,"9
the election.may be held before the expiration of the con-
tract. This weakens the above ruling to a considerable
extent. It would appear, then, that if there is a danger

of a strike, the election is to be held.

70

The board has thus given the rights of the employees
a preference over the validity of the collective agreement.
Therd can be no argument that collective agreements, if
they are to have a meaning, should be enforceable. I! a'
union has won the agreement by fair play, it should be
free to exercise its "rights" at least until the expiration
of the usual one year contract. If at the close of this
trial period, the employees are dissatisfied with their
bargaining agent, they should have the "right" to choose
another. Obviously this argument leads to the endless
discussion of "rights" and actually solves nothing.
One party's "rights" is relevant to all other "rights"
' and the protection of one set of rights involves the sup-
pression of another. Notwithstanding, we may still
safely maintain that, if there is to be any stability
in labor relations, the collective agreement must be

enforceable--short of slavery.

Evaluation

The definition of a jurisdictional dispute
excludes a dispute between two competing unizg who are
claimingaa certain type of work for their own.members.
So the Michigan Act really applies to rival union disputes.
The distinction is between the workers and the 1223 for
the workers.

It is admitted that an election for the true jurisdictional

71

dispute would be next to useless.10 Before the strike vote
was declared unconstitutional for industries engaged in
interstate commerce, this type of strike was, of course,
illegal without a notification to the board and a

strike vote.

If the board is confronted with a true jurisdictional
diapute, it notifies the national headquarters (Building
and Construction Trades Department in the case of the AFLD
and pleads for a prompt settlement. During the war this
resulted in a decision in a matter of days. There has not
been much occasion to notify the national headquarters
sincd the war.

It is difficult to determine whether the provisions
of the Act have encouraged or discouraged the private
settlement of jurisdictional disputes. First of all there
is no provision at all for a true jurisdictional dispute.
These might not be affected at all by the Act unless we
consider that the vote has an affect. At least we have
no firm basis for an opinion. Furthermore there have
not bden many examples of rival union or jurisdictional
disputes reported by the board in recent years.11 We

cannot be certain that the Act itself has encouraged the

private settlement of the disputes. It can be maintained,

however, that the parties g3 settle these disputes

privately and thus avoid the Act.

72

The building trades, electricians, teamsters, UAW-
CIO and UAW-AFL have avoided this provision of the Act.
They have made a positive effort to settle their differences

12 One of the

themselves without bringing in the law.
conciliators has expressed the opinion that the Spirit

of craft unionism has changed in recent years. They

seem to realize that if they do not put their own house

in order, they will not be able to meet the competition of

15 As the record now stands a true

the industrial unions.
jurisdictional strike of any length is exceedingly rare
in Michigan. There are, however, a number of short
."wildcat strikes" called for this purpose.14 If jurisdictional
strikes in the true meaning of the term, become prevalent,
the legislature will undoubtedly enact some sort of
restriction upon this activity as it has done in the case
of the strike vote.
The legislature directed its attack against rival
union disputes as the real offender. The vote was
indended to eliminate one of the unions as a contender
for the right to bargain for the employees. The board

15 and

has avoided entry into jurisdictional diSputes;
as we saw above, unions are inclined to aioid using the
Act. It is not surprising then to find that the

jurisdictional provisions have not been used over four

times.16

73

The board will require a written stipulation to be
given that the employer will recognize the union, if any,
that obtains a majority 6f the employees.17 This provision
provides some logic to the vote, but it has no basis
in the Act. It seems reasonable to assume that this
requirement will be declared véid, if it is challenged.

The whole concept of recognition under the Michigan
Act is a voluntary procedure and if the employer is

required to recognize a union because of atlandatogy

 

jurisdictional election the spirit of the Act is
violated.

The election procedure extends to the employees the
right to determine their bargaining agent by free choice
instead of a strike. The vote is positive action in the
settlement of a rival union dispute and is not a
provision that arbitrarily makes these disputes illegal.
Furthermore the board requires the winner to be reco gnized.
When viewed in this light the vote is clearly a device
to further collective bargaining. Nevertheless this
section of the Act is rarely used.

As will be pointed out later, a craft unit is
allowed to be a bargaining unit,if demanded. There is

the possibility that the two unions will be in competi-

tion for the s'me group of employees. But generally the

disputes have been between a craft union that wishes to

74

represent the men in its gagft;a in the plant and an
industrial union that wishes to bargain for 221.0f the
employees in the plant, including the men in the craft.
If the craft unit is given upon request, the field of
conflict is narrowed considerably. As long as the craft
unit can be obtained for the asking, the possibility of
a dispute for membership among rival unions is kept

to a bare minimum.

75

1. From Michigan Laws (1959), Public Act No, 176, Section

90;also Rules and Regulations Relating £2 Jurisdictional

 

 

 

Disputes as published by the board.

2. This is the same work sheet described in Chapter III.

5. Rules and Regulations Relating £3 Jurisdictional

 

 

Disputes.
4. 2219*
5. lg;g,.
6. gpgg.

7. Michigan Laws (1959), Public Act No. 176, Section 14.
8. Ibid., This provision is explained in Chapter vl.

9. Rules and Regulations Relating £2 Jurisdictional

 

Disputes.
10. From.a discussion with John Greenfield of the board

and Guy Oswald, Busines Agent of the Carpenter's Union,
Lansing, Michigan.

11. Carlyle A. Gray.

12. Based on interviews with the business agents of the
Electricians, Carpenters, Teamsters Unions.~ and the UAW -
CIO and UAW-AFL international representatives.

15. John Greenfield.

14. Guy Oswald, Busindss Agent, Carpenters Union, Lansing.
15. Carlyle A. Gray.

16. Marjorie Ward, Secretary in the Lansing Office of the

board in charge of records.

76

17. Carlyle A. Gray.
18. The board has apparently used a broad definition
of the term "craft" and applied it to anything the AFL

has demanded.

77

Chapter VI
Recognition and the Bargaining Unit
Representation Elections

The Michigan law does not compel the employer to
bargain with the union even if the union has signed a
majority of the employees. The employer must ggggg
to recognize the union. Thus there must be an agreement
between the union and the employer to accept the union
before the representation election is held. For this
reason the Michigan board labels this procedure a
"consent election."

First of all the parties must determine the bargain-
ing unit. If they are in agreement on holding an election
by the board, there is no difficulty in reaching an
agreement on the bargaining unit. They merely stipulate

1 If either of the

the unit and that job is finished.
parties didn't wsnt to hold the election, the argument
over the bargaining unit could rage on indefinitely and-
the board would be powerless to act.

The parties sign an "Agreement for Consent Electionéaj
under the-direction of the conciliator and it is approved
by a member of the board. The board makes every effort

to determine if the petitioning union represents a
reasonably substantial number of employees as an assurance

that the election will be able to designate a colledtive

bargaining agent. The consent election does not have its

basis in any section of the Michigan Act and is
considered to be an extra service of the board. As
the state will pay for the election, the board is of the
Opinion that the union shorld present substantial evidence
that they have a majority before the election is held
so it will be certified as the bargaining agent. As
a matter of fact it is a rare case indeed when the union
requests and loses.5

The Agreement for Consent Election contains statements
of the bargaining unit, the time and place of the election,
noticds of the election, the observers and the eligible
voters. In addition, the agre ment provides that if the
majority of the eligible voters select the union, the board
will certify that labor organization as the bargain ng
representative. The results of this election are binding
upon all parties if there are no objections to the election
or if the board refuses to recognize these objections.

As an alternative to an election the parties may
ggagg to‘a "cross check."4 Under this procedure, the
board checks the union cards and applications for
membership against the payroll of the company. The
company, if it has agreed to the cross check, is thus
at least morally bound to recognize the union if it has
a majority. However, if the board suspects that the employer
will not recognize the union even if they have a majority,

the board may have the parties sign a written stipulation

79

to the effect that the union will be recognized if it
obtains a majority. 5

It may appear that the voluntary aspect of union
recognition would mean that the employer is perfectly
free not to recognize the union. However, this is an
overstatement. If a union has signed a majority of the
employees, it can force a dispute. The mediation board
will then enter the dispute and attempt to settle it.

The board will explain to the employer that an election
would be the democratic way of determining the issue.
The board might point out that it is no concern of

the employer or the board whether the employees choose to
be represented by the union; it is the wishes of his
employees thrt are important. With the threat of a
strike at hand, the employer may consent to hold the
representation election.6 However, if he does not C"ive
his consent to an election, then a strike will usually
follow and the issue of representation will be settled
by economic power.

These consent elections for recognition are becoming
more and more numerous. The unions are realizing that
the Michigan board is available for such elections.7
If the union is able to_obtain the consent of the employer,-
the election may be held by the Michigan board. However,
if the election is challenged it may be voided because the

NLRB's jurisdiction is supreme if employees are engaged in

80

an industry affecting interstate commerce.8 If the employer
is subject to an election by the NLRB, where recognition
is mandatory, he may consent to an election held by the
board, where he agrees to recognize the union. As the word
has spread of the availability of the board to give
recognition election, the case load of the board has
increased.

It is significant to note that the Michigan Acto
does not state that strikes are diminished "by encouraging
the practice 'nd procedure of collective bargaining."9
The Act does not recognize that "the denial by employers
of the right of employees to organize and and the refusal
by emplo ers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining leads to strikes and other forms of industrial
strife and unrest."10 The Michigan Act is, however
supposed "to protect the rights and privileges of employees,
including the right to organize and engage in lawful
concerted activities."11 From the foregoing presentation
we may conclude that this protection is limited.
However, the Michigan legislature was consistent in

omitting any reference to encouragement.
I

The Bargaining Unit
Closely related to recognition disputes is the
determination of a "collective bargaining unit." However

the board's broad definition of the "bargaining unit"

81

and "craft" has virtually eliminated disputes over the

apprOpriate unit.

unit

An outline of the provisions for the bargaining

determination is as follows:

"The board, after consultation with the parties,

shall determine such a bargaining unit as will

best secure to the employees their right of

collective bargaining." This unit will be:

1. The employees of one employer in one plant
or business enterprise, but shall exclude

supervisory and executive positions.

2. Q; a craft unit.
3., 23 a plant unit.
4. Q; a subdivision of any of the foregoing units.

"Provided, however, that if the group of employees
involved in the dispute has been recognized by

the employer or identified by certification,
contract or past practice, as a unit for
collective bargaining, the boafd shall adopt

"12

such a unit.

The bargaining unit is considered to be the hourly

productive and non-productive employees including

maintenance men. Supervisors, executives, watchmen and

guards, confidential clerks and salaried and office

personnel are generally excluded. The plant unit is

usually chosen, however, a craft unit is considered

appropriate if it is demanded.13

82

If the craft union requests that the workers in
its trade be separated from the larger plant unit, the
request is granted. The bargaining unit may be as small
as one employee, if that employee represents a distinct
craft in the plant and he votes in favor of being
represented by the craft union.l4
It will be remembered from the preceding section
of this chapter that an employer is allowed to make an
all union agreement with.more than one labor organization
if they represent a majority of the employees. Thus if a
majority of the employees composing a craft unit desire
to be represented by a craft union, the employer may sign
a union shop agreement with the craft union., If there
are many craft units in the plant there may be many
collective agreements. The union.may not be able to
present a united front to the employer. This may have
the effect of dividing the employees so that their collective
strength is not as great as that of the employer.15
The bargaining unit may cover several cities if the
parties are willing to recognize such a unit or it
has been identified by pasttagreements or practices.16
City-wide bargaining units are common with unions such
as the teamsters, plumbers and caroenters.17 But as

a general rule the bargaining units are of the indus-

trial type in one plant as described by the Act.

85

In connection with bargaining units, it is sur-
prising to note the number of plants that are represented
by the UAW-AFL. While there is no comparison in
membership with the UAW-CID, it is significant that the
AFL, a predominantly craft union, has an active industrial
union in the state. This competition on an industrial basis
may be a partial explanation of why the bargaining unit
has not created much difficulty in Michigan.

There are almost no cases in which the bargaining
unit has come under surveillance. If the craft unit is
recognized if demanded and if the board is bound by past
practice in regards to a unit, the area for a conflict
is indeed small. This together with all the restrictions
on a union before it may strike has made a dispute over

the collective bargaining unit almost non-existent.18

84

1. It should be remembered that 531 unit could be

considered to be included under the Act. If the parties

agree to the election and there is a dispute over the

unit, the election supervisor will determine the unit,

subject to review by the board.

2. A copy of this agreement is included under the back cover.
5. Carlyle A. Gray.

4. A copy of this agreement is included under the back cover.

5. ,Carlyle A. Gray.

6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.

8. This is true if the employer is considered to be
engaged in interstate commerce.

9. 49 Stat. 449 (1955), Section 11. This Act is generally
referred to as the "Wagner Act."

10. 323g.

11. Michigan.Laws (1959), Public Act 176, Preamble.

12. Michigan Laws (1959), Public Act 176, Section 9e.
15. Carlyle A. Gray, John Greenfield and Henry Trembley.
14. John Greenfield.

15. Frank Corser, International Representative, Sub-
Regional Office, UAW-Clo, Lansing, Michigan.

is. Carlyle A. Gray and John Greenfield.

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.

85

Chapter VII
The Hutchinson Act

The Hutchinson Act of 19471 is the Act that for-
bids public employees to strike, but it gives the em-
ployees the right to take grievances to the board for
mediation.

The procedure outlined in the Act, concerning the
labor mediation board consists of two parts, one for the
individual and one for the group. The individual has
the right to petition the board for a review of his dis-
charge.unde” the Act, and the group may have its griev-
ances mediated by the board. The procedure is as follows:

I. The Individual

A. The employee may request a hearing by his
superiors regarding his discharge.
B. The employee may petition the board to re-
view the decision of the superiors.

II. The Group

A. A majority of the group or the supervisor
may petition the board for mediation of its
grievance. I

B. The board shall mediate the grievance.

The definition of a public employee is " a position
by appointment or employment in the government of the
state of Michigan, or in the government of any 1 or more

of the political subdivisions thereof, or in the public

86

school service, or in any public or special district, or
in the service of any authority, commission or board,
or in any other branch of the public service."2

If the board is to review discharges resulting
from a strike, it is necessary to know what constitutes
a strike. The definition of a strike is contained in
Sectiors l and 6 of the Act. "As used in this act the
word ‘strike' shall mean the failure to resort for duty,
the wilful absence frem one's position, the stoppage of
work or the abstinence in whole or in part from the full,
faithful and proper performance of the duties of employ-
ment, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or coerc-
ing a change in the conditions, or compensation, or the
rights, privileges or obligation of employment...."3 Not-
withstanding the provisions of any other law, any person
holding such a position who, by concerted action with
others, and without the lawful approval of his superior,
wilfully absents himself from his position, or abstains
in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper
performance of his duties shall be deemed to be on strike:

Provided, however, that such person, upon request shall be

 

entitled...to establish that he did not violate the pro-
visions of this act."4

The discharged employee, if he desires, files a
written request for a hearing to prove that he was not

on strike as defined by the Act. This request shall be

87

filed with the officers or body having power to remove
the employee within IQ days after the regular compensa-
tion of the employee has ceased. Within l9 days the
officer or body having the power to remove the employee,
shall begin a proceeding to dmernine if the employee

has viiated the Act. The decision of this proceeding

is made within 10 days. If the employee is held to have
violated the Act, this decision may be reviewed upon
petition to the labor mediation board.5 No one recalls
a case ever having been presented to the board by an in-
dividual because he was discharged due to a strike.

If a majority of any group of public employees
Sign a petition and present it to the board, their griev-
ance will be mediated. . Grievances will also be medi-
ated at the request of any public official in charge of
the employees.

The Act was designed to prevent state employees
from striking. The theory behind this is that the state
is sovereign and no one should be able to strike aga’nst
the sovereign. However, the Act gives the employees a vent
for their problems through the mediation board.

Many of the grievances handled by the board are
questions of recognition. Municipalities and some state
agencies are not allowed to sign a contract with a union.
These employees are governed then by a memorandum.of the
minutes of, for instance, a council meeting. The agreement

to recognize the union is included in these minutes and

88

next year the council may have a different idea about
recognizing the union.6 If the officers in charge of
these employees are firm in their decision not to
recognize the union, the mediation activity of the board
will mean nothing. There is nothing that says the
employees' union has to be recognized and there is no
chance of a strike.

If the grievance is some question other than recognition,
the board may use its prestige and ability to persuade
the parties to come to an equitable agreement. It must
be remembered that the employer (the state) has the
upper hand because it is illegal for the employees to strike.

Collective bargaining and thus mediation are effece
tively throttled when the employees cannot engage inoa
strike. The legislature has without a doubt restricted
collective bargaining with the passage of the Hutchinson
Act. The emphasis is definitely on the elimination of
strikes by edict rather than the settlement of disputes
through collective bargaining. The legislature did recog-
nize that laws will not eliminate grievances and provided
for the settlement by mediation of arbitrary decisions
of state officials. This procedure is much the same as
providing mediation as the last step in a plant grievance
machinery--the difference being that the union could
strike if it thought that the mediation proceedings were

to no (vai1,.

89

The provision for the mediation of state employees'
grievance gives these employees another recourse in law
instead of the right to strike. The provision was not

included to further the policy of collective bargaining.

90

1. Michigan Laws (1947), Public Act 536, effective
October 11, 1947.

2. 221g., Section 2.

5. 22l9°t Section 1.

4. EREQ': Section 6.

5. ngd.

6. gpgg., Section 7.

7. IEEQ.

91

Chapter VIII

4 Conclusions and Recommendations
The Board

Michigan has been quite fortunate in obtaining
competent men for commissioners on the board. Most
of the members have been successful practicing attorneys.l
They have generally taken the job as a commissioner not
because cf the salary, but because they were interested
in serving the state in labor relations. However, there
is no assurance that men of the same caliber will be chosen
in the future. It is a positive fact that these men
were chosen because of their political activities, for
nearly every member is or has been active in party politics.
A Democratic governor choses a Democratic member and a
Republican governor selects a man.from his party. Thus
the provision in the Act which states that "members of the
board shall be selected without regard to political
affiliations,"2 is in reality meaningless. It is evident
then that the board might at some time in the future be
filled with party "hacks" that know nothing about mediation
or labor relations. Indeed, we are lucky that it has not
been filled with incompetent political appointees.

Politics and a mediation board will not mix. If
either party to a dispute distrusts the members of the
board because of their political affiliations then the

mediation board will not serve a useful function.5

However it is difficult to separate politics from
mediation in a government agency. It is quite evident
that the election of board members would not help the
Isituation and might make it worse. We may have to trust
to the better judgment of the governor and hope he will
honestly appoint the best man available, because it would
be practically impossible to devise a test that would select
a competent mediator. If the precedent of appointing

a member of your own party was broken, perhaps the
political aspect of the board would disappear. At least
the governor should be held closer to the letter of the
law then has been the practice in the past. ‘

We cannot eXpect capable men to forego lucrative
positions and accept the salary that is paid to the
commissioners on the board. Thus the law field has been
a fertile recruiting ground for board members because of
the fact that lawyers may carry on their law practice in
addition to their-duties as a member of the board.
Professional arbitrators could;be considered for the position
of commissioner, but it is doubtful if an arbitrator
could continue arbitrating cases while at the same time
serving as a mediator. It is quite evident that if a
member has to handle two jobs to keep up his standard in
the community, at least one of these positions will suffer.
we must then offer the board members a salary large
enough to insure that a commissioner's job will be

considered a full time position.

93

The Mediation Aspect

The mediation aspect of the Michigan board should
be taken into consideration whenever a recommendation
is made concerning the board. It must be remembered
that the board is primarily a mediation agency. As
a result the board should not be given duties that imply
force or arbitrary decisions. If such duties were assigned
to the board cries of "strike breaker" or "pro-union"
would be heard and the mediation activities of the
board would be destroyed.

Thus no matter how firm a beleiver in collective
bargaining you may be, board enforcement of union
recognition is out of the picture. If the board is to
mediate disputes, that should be its sole job. It might
be desirable to set up another agency for enforcement
similar to the NLRB, but the enforcement duties should
not be handled by the mediation board. ‘

Therefore, if the board eXperiences difficulty with
such things as the determination of bargaining units,
eligibility of voters and jurisdictional and representation
elections, these activities should be placed in the hands
of a different state agency. So far there has been
little antagonism attached to these activities, but we
cannot assume that the future will be as bright.

Finally, it should be pointed out that an analysis

of the statistics on strikes has been purposely omitted

94

from this report. The number of strikes and their duration
is not an exact indication of the effectiveness of mediation.
There are far too many variables other than mediation that
enter into the problem. For instance the attitude of the
parties, the seasons of the year, the conditions in other
plants, and even the ines of the parties may all have a
share in the settlement of a dispute. However, the

available statistics of the board are given in Appendix B.

The Strike Vote

The strike vote procedure has been partially
throttled by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in.§u§g
Workers 3. McNally. The position of the board at the
present time is that they will not accept any new cases
involving interstate commerce. However, they will continue
to accept cases involving intrastate commerce as before.4
The board was pleased with the Supreme Court decision
because it keeps the board from taking an election in
large companies which they disliked to do.5 However,
it would be best to delete the strike vote from the Act.
The implication involved in the apparently innocent
provision for a strike vote was given in Chapter III and
need not be repeated.

There have been times when the strike vote has
been considered for inclusion in the national act.

Michigan has been a proving ground for this provision and

95

the eXperience of this state should be helpful in reaching
an intelligent decision on the strike vote. It should be
evident from the discussion that the strike vote has

been tried andfound a hindrance to mediation and labor
organization. The opponents of the strike vote can point

to Michigan as an example of the failure of the strike vote.

Arbitration and Public Interest Disputes

We noted in Chapter IV the affects of compulsory
arbitration. All that is needed now is to emphasize the
point that every' method of settling a dispute should
be attempted before compulsory arbitration is used. This
is especially true in disputes over new contract provisions.
There may be times when compulsory arbitration is the only
solution to a labor dispute. However, if compulsory arbi-
tration is used in ggggy case where the mediation board
cannot bring about a settlement within 50 days the provision
becomes extremely objectionable. Minor disputes that could
and should be settled by the parties might go to arbitration'
in a majority of cases. Compulsory arbitration is a
method to be used as a last resort and is far from a cure-
all for labor disputes.

If the special commissions are as successful in the
future as they have been in the past year, Michigan may
have a solution to the public interest disputes. It is

forgotten by many people that disputes are normal and they

96

cannot be legislated away. The important fact to keep
in mind is not the diSpute itself, but the results that
are obtained in settling the dispute.

Agreement rather that force should be the rule in
the settlement of labor disputes. If the parties
themselves agree to the solution, a lasting agreement is
usually reached. Much of the success of the present
special commissions is due to the fact that emphasis
has been placed upon mutual agreement and not on force.
Everyone connected with the settlement of the dispute
has tried to have the parties reach an agreement. If a
decision is forced upon the parties we cannot maintain
that a settlement has been reached. A strike may be
avoided, but the dispute is still present and was not
eliminated because a third party rendered a binding decision
in the matter. Successful labor relations depend to a
great extent on the mutual agreement of the partiesl

If the legislature and the people of the state are
expected to make an intelligent decision on labor legis-
lation, the work of the board will have to receive more
publicity than it has in the past. The people of the state
should be acquainted with at least the mediation proceedings
of the board. Probably not one person in a hundred
realizes that the board may have as many as 2,000 Open
cases on its books. The board may move in and settle a

dispute and not receive a word of publicity unless it is

97

a large company or a strike is near. If the peoule

of the state pay for the services of the board, they
should be entitled to know the accomplishments of the
board. Thus if the board needed money for expansion, the
people could ask, "Well, what do you do?" and the board
would be in an embarrassing position.

Aside from the self interest of the board, there is
another reason why more publicity should be given to the
board. The Michigan Act contains many controversial
issues, such as the strike vote, Special commission,
jurisdictional disputes, and closed (union) shop provisions.
There has been no factual analysis of these provisions that
I am aware of. Nor could there be because of the method
of filing cases by the board. A case is a case to the board
an? there is no separation of the cases into types.

There can be no valuable contribution to the education of
the public if the results of the provisions of the Act
cannot be obtained. The decisions of the legislature on
many of these provisions would still have to be based

upon broad generalizations. But the information is in

the mediation board's office awaiting tabulation. If we

are to gain the maximum.usé of the services of the mediation

board, the records of the board will have to be classified.

98

1. For the list of personnel of the board see Appendix A.
2. Michigan Laws (1959), Public Act 176, Section 3.

3. Arthur H. Raab maintains that this has already
happened. I cannot concur in this opinion to the full
extent that Mr. Raab meant it.

4. Philip Weiss, a commissioner on the board per Carlyle
A. Gray.

5. Carlyle A. Gray.

99

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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