A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF DR. DUNCAN E. LITTLEFAIR USING ROKEACH'S THEORY OF THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
WAYLAND CUMMINGS

1968

ABSTRACT

A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF DR. DUNCAN E. LITTLEFAIR USING ROKEACH'S THEORY OF THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND

by Wayland Cummings

Many rhetorical studies in speech criticism have sought to explain the communication event in terms of certain concepts articulated by Aristotle. With some success, critics have been able to produce scholarly works that explain to a degree the relevant variables associated with a specified communication event.

The purpose of this study was to explore non-Aristotelian criteria for explaining a speech event, with particular emphasis on the theory of the open and closed mind as articulated by Milton Rokeach of the Department of Psychology at Michigan State University.

The strategy for this study centers about the development of fourteen hypotheses based upon distinctions in Rokeach's theory and in certain logical relationships posited as significant to religious and scientific methods of inquiry. These hypotheses were applied to Dr. Duncan Littlefair of Grand Rapids, Michigan, who professes to be scientific in methodology, but is professionally a religionist.

It is not to be assumed that this study is the only valid means of speech criticism, but it does represent a step in the direction of using predictive theory developed in one of the social science disciplines as a means of explaining a past event. The place of experimental theory in speech criticism is an area that needs considerable scholarly effort.

The results of this study were that Dr. Littlefair is scientific in his method of inquiry. Several suggestions are made to improve the methodology used in this study, with the larger purpose of increasing the reliability of speech criticism.

A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF DR. DUNCAN E. LITTLEFAIR USING ROKEACH'S THEORY OF THE OPEN AND CLOSED MIND

By

Wayland Cummings

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Speech and Theatre

1968

Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Speech and Theatre, College of Communication Arts, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree.

William B. Loshbrook
Director of Thesis

Guidance Committee: William B. Loshbrook, Chairman
Gordon L. Thomas
Jessy M Anderson

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation for the many efforts and long hours contributed by Dr. William B. Lashbrook, who directed this thesis; Dr. Jerry M. Anderson, for his many insights which helped crystallize ideas presented here; to Dr. Gordon Thomas, who directed the course work; to Dr. Duncan Littlefair, who allowed full access to the church's records, the staff, and his own time, and to my family, who sacrificed time that would have been otherwise spent in the many common enterprises happy families enjoy.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF APPENDICES

INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Scope of the Study

Charles Glock and Rodney Stark, sociologists at the University of California-Berkeley, have crystallized what is evident to all but the most naive observer that religion and science have been, and still are, in conflict. He says:

> The more fundamental question posed by the prospect of additional scientific knowledge about nature and about man is what its effect will be on the saliency of religion. . . . If what can be attributed to God's will is made narrower and narrower. . . , religion seems destined to lose much of its power to inform and guide the human condition.[1]

Religion, in its rhetoric, has sought to inform and guide, and has been a source of authority for many, but as it, and in particular Christianity, has lost its ability to predict, its authority has waned. Part of the difficulty is that science and religion have different methodologies. The importance of knowledge, and how it is obtained, represent in large part the differences between the two methodologies.

---

[1]Charles Y. Glock, and Rodney Stark, Religion and Society in Tension (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965), p. 306.

Among some of the problems between religion and science are the questions of theory. Ernest G. Bormann, associate professor of speech at the University of Minnesota, has explained some of the important characteristics of good theory. He says[2] that theory must have postdictive ability, or the ability to explain the past, and predictive capacity, or the ability to predict the future. He explains that to do this, an understanding of language is equally important. He describes[3] three types: (1) syntactical language, which is the relationship between symbol and symbol; (2) pragmatical language, which is the relationship between symbol and interpreter, and (3) semantical language, which is the relationship between symbol and object. In order to understand the methodology of science, an understanding of inductive and deductive reasoning and how the three types of language may be related is necessary. Bormann states that the objective of science is to emphasize the denotative, or semantical, and to keep the connotative, or pragmatical, at a minimum. Thus, good scientific theory requires that its language be primarily the relationship between symbol and object, and to minimize whatever peculiar effect the researcher might have on

---

[2]Ernest G. Bormann describes this in his book Theory and Research in the Communicative Arts (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), in Chapters 4-6.

[3]Ibid., pp. 52-53.

the results of the theory. In science, syntactical language is generally the mathematical requirements in prediction, but it takes many forms as we study the religious methodology. Bormann then observes:

> Induction and observation are related to semantical dimensions, and analysis of the relationships that held between statements of facts and observables. Deduction relates to the syntactical dimension.[4]

The differences between religion and science--in terms of methodology--explain their separate limitations when theorizing about the nature of some supernatural being. Christianity's assertion of a Higher Reality is not subject to the semantical language requirements in inductive reasoning, while the pragmatical and syntactical language forms have been very useful to professionals in religion, or religionists. The question of validity has separated the two methodologies, for each methodology accepts different types of evidence as valid.

It then is unusual when there is a professional in religion who disclaims interest in the religious methodology and means of determining validity. Dr. Duncan E. Littlefair, minister of the 2,000-member Fountain Street Baptist Church in Grand Rapids, Michigan, has described himself as a naturalist, an empiricist, devoted to the scientific, inductive method, and at the same time is a religious

---

[4] Ibid., p. 69.

professional. He claims that he has been seeking during his 25 years in the pulpit the meshing of religion and science in terms of method.

Dr. Littlefair holds a B.A. and B.D. from McMaster's University in Hamilton, Ontario, and a Ph. D. from the University of Chicago. His contacts have been as wide as the general semanticist Alfred Korzybski, Astronomer Harlow Shapley, Poet Robert Frost, and the God-Is-Dead theologian and analytic philosopher Dr. Paul VanBuren of Temple University, Socialist Norman Thomas, and others. He also has studied with the late Albert Schweitzer, and with the world-renowned theologian Karl Barth in Switzerland.

His advocacy is set in the metropolitan area of more than 465,000 people, the majority of whom are Dutch-Calvinists and Roman Catholics. As an advocate, Dr. Littlefair has found a degree of success when it appears he should have failed, particularly with a methodology that contrasts so greatly with his community. He has attacked even the most cherished generalizations of the community, even the validity of religious statements about the assumption of a personal God. His sermons are printed and distributed to almost every state, and in several foreign countries.

The purpose of this study is to contrast the religious and scientific methods, and to develop a method of speech criticism that might reveal something about the kind of religious advocate represented here by Dr. Littlefair.

He represents an ideal subject, since religion can be generally understood here as dependent upon different means of validity than that of science, while Dr. Littlefair claims to use the scientific means of establishing validity.

A survey of the literature reveals that no such attempt has been made, either to study Dr. Littlefair, or to develop a means of speech criticism such as is presented in this thesis. In rhetoric, there is considerable difference of opinion as to what is inductive and deductive reasoning, let alone how it might be represented in argument, and the cognitions of speech-making.

The questions of inductive and deductive reasoning do not offer sufficient information for a theory of speech criticism. Therefore, we have turned to the theory of the open and closed mind as presented by Dr. Milton Rokeach, head of the Department of Psychology at Michigan State University. He has explored the relationship between belief and the cognitive processes, and has made certain important statements about the personality behind the open and closed mind. The link between his theory and induction-deduction is made as he discusses perceptual systems:

> Our findings point to the fact that we have succeeded reasonably well in distinguishing and measuring two interrelated aspects of personality and of cognitive functioning. There are many ways of talking about these two aspects: The resistance to change of beliefs and the resistance to change of systems of beliefs; rigidity and dogmatism; the analysis phase and the

> synthesis phase in thinking and perceiving; the overcoming of sets and the integration of sets; the separation of an item from the field and its reconstruction into new fields. Perhaps we are also dealing with the processes of deduction and induction.[5]

The religious and scientific methodologies, the contrast between inductive and deductive reasoning, the open and closed mind, the questions of validity--all are elements that require a close look in the development of a theory of speech criticism. In doing this, there are five general questions we shall ask:

1. What is the relationship between the religious and the scientific methods of inquiry?

2. How are the Rokeach predictions of the open and closed mind related to these two methods?

3. How would the two methodologies, and the open and closed systems be expressed in invention and argument?

4. Can the speech-making of Dr. Littlefair be characterized in meaningful ways to illustrate the contrasting methodologies?

5. What can be said critically of the audience?

---

[5]Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1960), p. 289.

This study cannot make accurate judgements on the general personality of the speaker. The cognitive processes are important, and although some implications may be made about certain personalities that are open-minded with others closed-minded, no reliable statement can be made of the speaker's general personality. It is also important to understand that the categories are narrowly drawn, and one may be open-minded on some things while closed-minded on others. Another important consideration is that speech criticism, by its very nature and kinship to literary criticism, is a monadic study; that is, all that can be said of the speech event is ex post facto. It is monadic--one part of the speech situation at a time, such as speaker, and audience--because the original event cannot be reproduced for experimental study. However, the use of a predictive theory such as Rokeach's does add weight to this study when we tip the predictions backward to explain the past, or the specific speech situation, though monadic in method.

Three sermons have been selected because of their availability, and because they represent a possibility for distinctions important to our theory of speech criticism. The sermons are: (1) "Valid and Invalid Claims for Religion," delivered September 30, 1962; (2) "Is a Non-Authoritarian Religion Possible?", delivered January 27, 1963, and (3) "The Function of Religion," delivered February 5, 1967.

Interviews with Dr. Littlefair and his staff were conducted. The audience was analyzed--both the community and the church--with interviews included. The method of research was the use of logical substance outlines based on critical dimensions described in Chapter III. A study of the speaker, his audience, and place factors were also included. The project will be reported in the following way:

Introduction: Purpose and Scope of the Study

Chapter I: Religion and Science as Methodologies

Chapter II: Rokeach's Theory and Methods of Inquiry

Chapter III: Toward a Criterion for Speech Criticism

Chapter IV: Dr. Littlefair, and the Social Context

Chapter V: The Two Audiences

Chapter VI: Littlefair's Messages

Chapter VII: Evaluation, Conclusions, and Suggestions For Further Study

Appendix: The Messages as Delivered

Bibliography

CHAPTER I

RELIGION AND SCIENCE AS METHODOLOGIES

Those who have sought to generalize about man and the world have sooner or later had to wrestle with the problem of knowledge. Philosophers have developed a discipline, which they call epistemology, or the study of knowledge. It is basic for it is a study about how, or whether, man can know anything, and if he does, by what means can he know anything.[6] All have assumed the dependability of the five senses of man, and there have been divisions among the philosophers as to whether there is any reality beyond man's senses, or whether the reality exists only in man's mind.

Dr. Elton Trueblood, a professor in philosophy of religion at Earlham College and nationally known Quaker, describes this question as a problem for both the theologian and the scientist:

> Of course, we all believe in the existence of the real world, but it is a wholesome exercise in humility to understand why we believe in it. We do so by taking a leap, a leap of epistemological faith. This is

---

[6]For an excellent discussion of epistemology, read Peter Caws' book, The Philosophy of Science (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1965), pp. 13-17.

> true whether we are scientists or philosophers or men of common sense, since we are all on the same ground in this important regard.[7]

Beyond this, there is an activity that both the scientist and theologian find in common--that of classification. Classification is that process by which a human being selects these "real" events, and makes decisions about equivalence.[8] From these classifications, it is a human process to theorize or explain the meaning of the events. It is at this point that the differing methodologies of science and religion begin to show distinctions. It may be that perhaps the scientist is really practical in that he is willing to settle for real events being what his senses tell him. On the other hand, it may be that the theologian is unwilling to do this, and he is haunted by the fact that there may be reality incapable of being perceived by man's senses, and that another method ought to be devised to comprehend it. At any rate, the scientist who may be equally distrustful of his own senses requires that his findings be repeated by independent and impartial inquiry.

The struggle over what to do with this epistemological problem is described by Will Durant, a world renowned philosopher and intellectual:

---

[7]Elton Trueblood, The Philosophy of Religion (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1957), p. 49.

[8]This step is defined by Ernest G. Bormann in Theory and Research in the Communicative Arts (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 107.

> But is philosophy stagnant? Science seems always to advance, while philosophy [and religion] seems always to lose ground. Yet this is only because philosophy accepts the hard and hazardous task of dealing with problems not yet open to the methods of science--problems like good and evil, beauty and ugliness, order and freedom, life and death; so soon as a field of inquiry yields knowledge susceptible to exact formulation it is called science. Every science begins as philosophy and ends as art; it arises in hypothesis and flows into achievement. Philosophy is a hypothetical interpretation of the known (as in metaphysics), or of the inexactly known (as in ethics or political philosophy);. . . .
>
> Shall we be more technical? Science is analytical description, philosophy is synthetic interpretation. Science wishes to resolve the whole into parts, the organism into organs, the obscure into the known.[9]

Once the epistemological problem is understood, and the fact that the religious and scientific methodologies have made different decisions concerning this issue, each then proceeds to construct theories of what reality is like. As was pointed out in the introduction to this study, the character of any good theory, whether in religion or in the sciences, is to explain the past and to predict the future. Human beings, remembering their own past and, of necessity, forced to make decisions about the future, theorize. One must be careful not to suggest that either philosophy or Christianity has not been concerned about predictive theory as well as postdictive explanation. The ancient Apostle's Creed is an excellent example:

---

[9]Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy (New York: Washington Square Press, 1964), pp. XXVI-XXVII.

> I believe [theory] in God, the Father Almighty, Maker [postdictive] of heaven and earth; and in Jesus Christ, His only Son our Lord; who was conceived [postdictive] by the Holy Spirit, born [postdictive] of the Virgin Mary, suffered [postdictive] under Pontius Pilate, was crucified [postdictive], dead, and buried; the third day He rose [postdictive] from the dead; He ascended [postdictive] into heaven, and sitteth at the right hand of God the Father Almighty [postdictive]; from thence He shall come [predictive] to judge the quick and the dead. I believe [theory] in the Holy Spirit; the holy catholic Church, the communion of saints; the forgiveness of sins; the resurrection [predictive] of the body, and the life everlasting [predictive] Amen.[10]

Durant's suggestion that philosophy and religion have always seemed to lose ground to science may be due to the hypothetical nature of philosophy, and the dogmatic nature of religion. Much conflict has arisen when religious dogmatic theory fails to predict; or its postdictions have been found inaccurate, or it has predicted what was not observable or capable of being tested in the scientific sense. The predictions of religion have largely failed, and the result has been a withdrawing in the time dimension of theory-making to explanations of the past, most of them beyond the reach of the scientific method, and often characterized by ethnocentrism. In some cases, predictions in religion have been pushed farther into the future, and thus beyond the opportunity of scientific testing.

---

[10]This creed, while not identical in all churches, is essentially the same. It appears here as written in The Methodist Hymnal (Nashville: The Methodist Publishing House, 1939), p. 512, and is in general use in most Protestant Churches.

Peter Caws, who is executive associate of Carnegie Corporation of New York, and formerly professor and chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Kansas, elaborates on this issue:

> Science, it was said, explains, while philosophy tries to understand. These are very closely related objectives, but it is not always true that having an explanation leads to understanding or that understanding means the ability to give an explanation. For centuries the will of God was given as the explanation of almost everything, but the people who advanced this explanation would have thought it blasphemous to claim understanding. Such an explanation would not of course count as scientific; not only is it very hard to find evidence for or against it, but also the idea of God seems obviously brought in from outside the realm of science; it declines to become involved with the supernatural, if there is any such thing. The scientific explanation of what seems to be supernatural shows it to be natural after all.[11]

The ultimate test of any postdictive theory becomes a question of whether it will predict or not. Often the test of postdictive theory has been its plausability. It is indeed obvious that a theory which explains only the past is circumstantial explanation. Further, such postdictive theory-making is as prolific of more postdictive theory as there are minds devoted to such a task. Postdictive theories of an event drop off in number as soon as one of them is able to predict reliably. It would take an intellectual schizophrenic to maintain postdictive theory in the face of another theory which both explains the past, and reliably predicts the future.

---

[11]Caws, op. cit., p. 11.

The conflict of the religious and scientific methods is told in part by the events of the world, and in particular the Christian Church prior to the Renaissance. The Christian Church in Medieval Europe was a monolith, with its power extended to one-third of the soil of Europe by the Thirteenth Century. For more than one thousand years the church had served as a uniting force, with its one catholic and universal theory of knowledge for all. This situation is described by Durant:

> The unity demanded, as the church thought, a common faith exalted by supernatural sanctions beyond the changes and corrosions of time; therefore, dogma definite and defined was cast like a shell over the adolescent mind of Medieval Europe. It was within this shell that Scholastic philosophy moved narrowly from faith to reason and back again, in a baffling circuit of uncriticized assumptions and pre-ordained conclusions. In the Thirteenth Century all Christendom was startled and stimulated by Arabic and Jewish translations of Aristotle; but the power of the church was still adequate to secure, through Thomas Aquinas and others, the transmogrification of Aristotle into a Medieval theologian.[12]

It is from Durant's explanation, and our understanding today of what took place in the Renaissance, that we see the drama of an intellectual collision unfold. In this study, and particularly in this chapter, it is seen in the collision of the religious and scientific methodologies. But in the minds of many historians and philosophers, it is seen as crystallizing in the works of Aristotle meeting those of Francis Bacon. Aristotle's role is described

---

[12]Durant, op. cit., p. 104.

by Edward H. Reisner, who for many years was professor of education at Teachers College, Columbia University, in New York:

> It was, accordingly, a matter of prime importance that the complete works of Aristotle became known in the universities of Europe in the latter part of the Twelfth Century. Christianity at this time was subject to competition from Mohammedanism, from Manichaeism and from the critical questioning of scholars in the universities of Christendom who were conscious of certain problems, even of discrepancies, within the body of Christian belief and practice. It is true that Aristotle alone had not provided the philosophical elements in Christian theology, but his prestige in every field of learning was so great and his philosophy in its main bearings was so apt for the task of Christian apologetics that he rapidly became the chief support of the church canon.[13]

It is the thesis of this paper that Aristotle's syllogistic reasoning--including the enthymeme--was important, and is today, to the religious methodology. The door to this is opened by Dr. A. R. Hall, a professor at Christ's College at Cambridge:

> As Aristotle declares in the opening of the Physics: "Plainly in the science of Nature, as in other branches of study, our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its first principles," principles however whose validity was tested by the rule of reason, not that of experiment. . . . Aristotle derived his universal truths before the application of intensive inquiry to the phenomena themselves, a procedure which Francis Bacon [in Book I of Novum Organum] contrasted with his own inductive method: "Now there are two ways, and can only be two, of seeking and finding truth. The one, from sense and reason, takes a flight to the most general axioms, and from these principles and their truth, settled once for all, invents and

---

[13]Nelson B. Smith (ed.), The Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 15.

> judges of all intermediate axioms. The other method collects axioms from sense and particulars, ascending continuously and by degrees so that in the end it arrives at the most general axioms. This latter is the only true one, but never hitherto tried."[14]

Thus, Bacon and his inductive method is set in juxtaposition to Aristotle and his deductive method from First Principles. Bacon damns the logic before his day by saying:

> And therefore that art of Logic, coming (as I said) too late to the rescue, and no way able to set matters right again, has had the effect of fixing errors rather than disclosing truth.[15]

Aristotle's First Principles, as a place to begin logical "inquiry," can be seen as having a necessary place in the epistemology of Christianity, rather than the unanswered epistemological assumption of the scientist. The Aristotelian-religious methodologies parallel, and the means of attack-argument is described by John Brubacher, who for many years was a professor of education at Yale University. He is important here, because he adds a dimension to this contrast of methodologies. He states:

> The mention of the dependability of knowledge that brings the discussion of reality and knowledge about reality to a focus is the concept of truth. . . . It is already evident in the Catholic philosophy of education that an infallible knowledge of truth is possible. Under proper conditions truth can be known with guaranteed certitude.

---

[14]A. Rupert Hall, The Scientific Revolution: 1500-1800 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 161.

[15]Charles W. Eliot (ed.), Famous Prefaces: Harvard Classics (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, Corporation, 1910), Vol. XXXIX, p. 144.

> Although it does not have the advantage of supernatural sanction, the Aristotelian position parallels the Catholic at many points in its claim for the singleness of truth. It has already been noted. . . . that it claims that there can be only one true philosophy of education. Such a position proceeds in the first instance from self-evident truths. These would be demonstrable to all by showing that any alternative proposition results in a reductio ad absurdum. Once granted that there are self-evident truths as a foundation for the philosophy of education, the detail of the superstructure follows without much difficulty.
>
> This auspicious start on a more or less harmonious conception of truth is interrupted by the realist and the experimentalist, however, for both explicitly reject any truths as self-evident or a priori. . . .
>
> Furthermore, the experimentalist adds that no such results should be accepted by anyone unless he believes substantially similar results would be achieved by other independent and impartial inquiry. Truth may be humanly contrived from what is found, but it emphatically is not a private matter.[16]

To summarize what has been expressed thus far, science and religion both make a leap of epistemological faith but with different conclusions as to what must be done about it, and both classify and theorize to some degree the past and the future. Differences become more clear when we see that religion affirms a reality that is supernatural and independent of observation. It has also been noted that there is an alliance of sorts between the logic of Aristotle and Christianity, and between the logic of Bacon and science. The contrast between deduction and Aristotle's First Principles, and Bacon's induction and observation are

---

[16]Smith, op. cit., p. 304.

evident. However, there are other more specific characteristics of the religious and scientific methodologies that should be noted.

In the religious method, observation is not to be fully trusted, and therefore authority becomes an essential characteristic for interpretation of the "real" world. Trueblood, after criticizing the scientific method, discusses at length the reasonableness of authority:

> When we rely on authority we are, in most cases, doing the most reasonable thing we can do. . . . The point is that when we rely on authority we are not, for that reason, guilty of credulity, because there is a reason for our reliance. We trust the men and institutions presenting the most reason for being trusted. We must use reason to determine which authority to follow, just as we use reason to determine which faith to adopt.[17]

Trueblood's willingness to rely on men and institutions "presenting the most reason for being trusted" leads to another characteristic of the religious method which is closely allied to authority. It is tradition, which is the combined judgements of loyal men to that authority. This second characteristic is indeed the opposite of the scientific concern for independent and impartial inquiry. Trueblood then denotes the kind of authority that is trustworthy:

> The authority we can trust best is that of disciplined insight with experience of an appropriate kind. If we can find, in any field, men who fulfill these conditions, and if there is substantial agreement in their independent judgements, we have as good an indication of what is genuine evidence as men are likely to find in this world.[18]

---

[17] Trueblood, op. cit., p. 70. [18] Ibid., p. 74.

This statement suggests a sort of sampling procedure, in which one finds himself willing to accept what the majority would say to be true. Trueblood emphasizes that there is such a thing as cumulative evidence, and that one can find ways of increasing probability. In each case, however, Trueblood[19] speaks of a majority opinion as sufficient to accept an ex post facto "hypothesis." It has the flavor of what scientists call Type II error, or the affirming of a null hypothesis. In presenting a theory, ontological in nature, it is easy to find something held in common. The question then becomes a matter of loyalty to one or another authority, and the battery of interpreters who form the differing traditions. Its result is, as Bacon notes, a doctrine of First Principles that ends in the fixing of errors rather than disclosing truth.

These same two points of authority and tradition are made in the Vatican II resolution on Revelation. Regarding authority, the Roman Catholic document states:

> Therefore Christ the Lord, in whom the full revelation of the supreme God is brought to completion. . . .Commissioned the apostles to preach to all men that gospel which is the source of all saving truth and moral teaching.[20]

And regarding tradition, the document notes:

---

[19]Ibid., pp. 67-76.

[20]Walter M. Abbot S. J. (ed.), The Documents of Vatican II (New York: The American Press, 1966), p. 115.

> This tradition which comes from the apostles develops in the Church with the help of the Holy Spirit [a supernatural guarantee of the dependability of tradition]. For there is a growth in the understanding of the realities and the words which have been handed down [the Catholic counterpart to Trueblood's statement on the trustworthiness of authority]. This happens through the contemplation and study made by believers, who treasure these things in their hearts, through the intimate understanding of spiritual things they experience, and through the preaching of those who have received episcopal succession the sure gift of truth.[21]

With this emphasis on tradition and authority in the religious methodology, the kind of language present in religion becomes important. Ernest Bormann's three dimensions of language--these are the syntactical, semantical, and pragmatical, and were discussed in the introduction to this study--present a framework for understanding the contrasts between the religious and scientific methodologies.

Because of the Aristotelian nature of the religious methodology, the religious method can be characterized as syntactical in its language of inquiry. The reliance of religion on authority and tradition further suggests the high importance of the pragmatical dimension. The semantical dimension, with its symbol-object relationship, would find an object that becomes a demonstration of its first principles, and thus deductive in nature. When the epistemological problem is based on a distrust of the senses, and depends on authority, objects or observations in the world become demonstrations of those First Principles. We then can

---

[21] Ibid., p. 116.

see Bacon's concern about Aristotle's method of inquiry leading to the fixing of errors. This kind of distortion of the semantical is implied by Trueblood:

> The truth which we seek in the spiritual life is trust in regard to Hume's second class of objects. Actual religion is concerned wholly with matters of fact, just as actual science is [both are concerned about the semantical dimension, but from different perspectives]. The nature of God is not the same as the nature of a tree, inasmuch as God is not known by the physical senses and the tree is, but the question of truth is the same in both cases. In both, the real question is the question of objective existence as a matter of fact. . . .[22]

This issue is even more clearly stated by Dr. William Hordern, professor of systematic theology at Garrett Theological Seminary in Evanston, Illinois. He notes:

> It is our thesis that faith as cognition, trust, commitment comes not after but before and with reason. It is the pre-rational framework within which reason operates.[23]

In another statement, he says:

> The statement, "Christ is Lord," sounds at first like a conclusion, so that we want to know [scientifically] what evidence leads to it. But this statement is not a conclusion from something else; this describes a basic orientation toward life and the world. The man who has the faith that Christ is Lord is a man who sees all things [objects] in terms of Christ's Lordship [objects as demonstrations]. Because he believes Christ is Lord, he will have a different evaluation of the significance of all events and facts. This is not a conclusion from facts; this is a frame of reference that selects, evaluates, and weighs the facts.[24]

---

[22]Trueblood, op. cit., p. 81.

[23]William Hordern, The Case for a New Reformation Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), p. 39.

[24]Ibid., p. 97.

Thus, facts and events do become in the Aristotelian sense demonstration, and it is born from the epistemological choice of the religious methodology. Because of the emphasis on tradition and authority, and the pragmatical nature of it all, the semantical, symbol-object dimension of language becomes distorted from the scientific point of view. In science, objects and facts are delineated from demonstration, and they become observations upon which inductive generalizations may be made.

The reasoning of religion becomes primarily deductive. Induction, if present, is only in the Aristotelian sense that the instances becomes examples or demonstrations.

The scientific method differs from the religious method in several important respects. First, its epistemological decision is to trust the senses, controlled by the necessity of impartial inquiry. Second, the scientific method is interested in reliable and valid predictions from theory, and that such theories cannot be accepted ex post facto. Caws, in his definition of science, notes this:

> [It is]. . . the explanation of nature in its own terms, together with all that follows from doing that successfully, such as the ability to predict how things will behave and hence to control them.[25]

A third difference is that in science generalizations or theories must be based on observations (an inductive process) and not on First Principles (a deductive

---

[25]Caws, op. cit., p. 11.

process). R. B. Braithwaite states that induction requires good policies for establishing general hypotheses on the basis of empirical data:

> In this they differ from many non-inductive policies for establishing general hypotheses, e. g., that of deducing them from metaphysical premises.[26]

This differentiation is important, for it emphasizes that induction does not take place on metaphysical premises, which would change induction into the Aristotelian sense of demonstration. It may be that this is the reason Aristotle's Rhetoric became so popular, along with other works of his, to Christians of the Scholastic Period, and why the work of Bacon was so devastating to much of religious methodology.

A fourth difference is that deduction in the scientific method does not take place from First Principles, but from inductive generalizations. Bormann says:

> The investigator uses deduction to arrange the symbols of these statements of fact and generalization [based on induction] into formal patterns permitted by the rules of logic or of mathematics to deduce or compute other statements of fact or generalizations that were implied but were not obvious in the original data.[27]

A fifth difference is that science emphasizes a particular kind of semantical dimension to its language. The symbol-object relationship is not a demonstration, but an observation. This, in turn, affects the syntactical

---

[26]R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1960), p. 258.

[27]Bormann, op. cit., p. 71.

nature of scientific language which in practice becomes the mathematical portion of good theory, since the scientist is seeking to make his theory predictive. The pragmatical dimension in the scientific methodology is minimized, and thus less reliance on authority and tradition. The scientist seeks to control any hidden variables due to the researcher by requiring that his conclusions be independent and impartial. To put it more succinctly, the researcher's loyalties must not obviate his conclusions. These points are discussed by Bormann:

> Induction and observation are related to semantical dimensions and analysis of the relationships that hold between statements of facts and observables. Deduction relates only to the syntactical dimension, and for the scientist this often involves a good deal of mathematics.[28]

In summary: The epistemological problem presents a situation of distrust for the senses to the religious methodology, while the scientist will trust his senses. Both methodologies theorize, but religion is primarily ex post facto in its explanation while science is interested in the predictability of the theory. The religious methodology is an inquiry based on First Principles, while science is concerned with inquiry based on observations. Religion relies on authority and tradition, while science steers away from this. Religion, thus, emphasizes the pragmatical dimension of language, while science minimizes it. The semantical

---

[28] Ibid., p. 69.

dimension of language to religion is a symbol-demonstration relationship, while to science it is a symbol-observation relationship.

The next chapter seeks to define the theory of the open and closed mind as presented by Dr. Milton Rokeach of the Department of Psychology at Michigan State University. From this, it is believed the theory will aid in a wider understanding of the two methodologies discussed in this chapter, and that both the theory and the methodologies here described will lead to a criteria for speech criticism. It should become more obvious that Dr. Littlefair, a professional in religion who claims to be scientific in methodology, presents an interesting subject for this thesis.

CHAPTER II

ROKEACH'S THEORY AND METHODS OF INQUIRY

Dr. Milton Rokeach, professor of psychology at Michigan State University, and author of the book, The Open and Closed Mind, has presented a theory on the personality and cognitive process of those who are highly dogmatic and those who are low dogmatic. His theory has striking similarities to the methodologies presented in Chapter I.

Dr. Rokeach's theory revolves around three dimensions or continua. Termed the belief-disbelief continuum, the central-peripheral dimension, and the time factor, Dr. Rokeach constructs a set of predictions for the open and closed mind. The purpose of this chapter is to draw some critical relationships between his theory and the religious and scientific methods of inquiry. While Rokeach has been concerned about personality characteristics, he has not done so without a discussion of the cognitive processes.

Rokeach notes that a belief system contains all the "beliefs, sets, expectancies or hypotheses that a person at a given time accepts as true" of the world in which he lives.[29]

---

[29] Op. cit., p. 33.

One's disbelief system is the contrary of the belief system; that is, all the beliefs, sets, and expectancies that to a degree a person rejects as false.

In defining open and closed minds, Rokeach presents a series of predictions, focusing on each of the three dimensions. Regarding the first dimension--the belief-disbelief continuum--Rokeach notes three general characteristics: (1) The open mind, compared to the closed mind, has smaller discrimination between beliefs, and greater discrimination between disbelief subsystems; (2) the open mind, compared to the closed mind, addresses itself to objective, structural requirements or logical relationships, and thus is more resistant to irrelevant motivational or reinforcement pressures, and (3) the open mind, rather than the closed mind, seeks information about a particular disbelief system from the adherents of that system. The closed mind tends to get its information about disbeliefs from its own positive authorities.[30]

The second dimension is the central-peripheral continuum of the belief-disbelief system. This dimension is conceived by Rokeach as existing on three layers: (1) A central region, or set of primitive beliefs, which are acquired about the nature of the physical world in which one lives; (2) an intermediate region, which includes a

---

[30]Ibid., pp. 39-40.

person's beliefs about the nature of authority and the people who line up with authority, and upon whom a person depends to help him form a picture of the world he lives in, and (3) a peripheral region which represents the beliefs derived from authority.[31]

In the closed system, Rokeach says he would predict such a person would (1) see the world as threatening, (2) have greater belief in absolute authority, (3) evaluate others according to authorities they line up with, (4) relate peripheral beliefs to each other by virtue of their common origin in authority, (5) find that the power of the authority depends on the ability of that authority to mete out reward and punishment, (6) accept all, or reject all, information stemming from an external source in a "package deal," and (7) evaluate others according to their agreement or disagreement with his own system.

The open system, Rokeach says, would (1) view the world in a more friendly way, (2) have fewer beliefs in absolute authority, (3) not evaluate others according to authorities they line up with, but rather independently from the source of authority, (4) evaluate the power of authority more on the basis of cognitive correctness, accuracy, and consistency with other information he possesses, (5) relate peripheral beliefs to each other by virtue of

---

[31] Ibid., pp. 62-63.

intrinsic or logical connections, (6) test by application those peripheral beliefs derived from authority (thus such beliefs would remain in isolation from each other), and (7) use beliefs held in common with others as less of a criterion for evaluating them. Others would be positively valued regardless of their beliefs.[32]

On the third dimension, Rokeach predicts only that for the open minded person things in the immediate future would be of service in confirming or not confirming predictions about the present. This represents a concern on the part of the person to test out beliefs, and therefore suggests a predictive concern and not just a postdictive explanation. For the closed system, things in the present would be of service in confirming the remote future. This is the ex post-facto explanation in terms of the authority figure.

It is the critical assumption in this thesis that Rokeach's theory has important counterparts to the religious and scientific methodologies, and that there are additional and more detailed observations one could make because of his theory. In order to aid in drawing these parallels, let us examine Figure 1. If there is, indeed, some kind of correspondence between the religious methodology and the closed mind, and between the scientific methodology and the

---

[32] Ibid., pp. 62-63.

FIGURE 1

A Comparison of Methodologies

Religious	Closed	Scientific	Open
Distrusts Senses	Unfriendly World	Trusts Senses	Friendly World
Postdictions	Present to Confirm Remove Future	Predictions	Immediate Future to confirm present
Generalizations based on First Principles	Trusts Absolute Authority	Generalizations based on Observations	Trusts Own Cognitive Judgements
Deduction From First Principles	Evaluates Others, Beliefs, Disbeliefs on basis of authorities lined up with	Deduction From Induction	Does not evaluate others, beliefs, disbeliefs on basis of authority
Semantical Is Symbol--Demonstration	External Information accepted or rejected on basis of authority in package deal	Semantical Is Symbol-Observation	Holds Information in isolation until tested
	Discriminates Between Beliefs and Disbeliefs, less discrimination Between Disbeliefs		Accepts Fewer Beliefs, less discrimination Between Beliefs
	Seeks Information From Positive Authorities		Seeks Information From Primary Sources
	Power of Authority Is in Its Reward and Punishment		Power of Authority Is in Cognitive Correctness

open mind, we see that: (1) The religious methodology distrusts man's senses amidst an unfriendly world, while the scientific methodology trusts man's senses, being open to a friendly world; (2) the religious concern about postdictions makes the present important in confirming the remote future, while the scientific concern for prediction brings interest in the immediate future in confirming or rejecting the present. What is in the present is less certain unless it can be tested and confirmed or rejected by the immediate future, a predictive concern; (3) the religious methodology makes generalizations based on First Principles, and therefore must trust in authority, while science as a methodology makes generalizations based on observations, and therefore trusts one's own cognitive judgements; (4) when deducing from generalizations on First Principles, the religious methodology would bring evaluation of others, beliefs and disbeliefs on the basis of authority figures; (5) since external information is accepted or rejected on the basis of authority, the semantical dimension in the religious methodology is a symbol-demonstration relationship, while in the scientific methodology the symbol-observation relationship brings an accumulation of information that is held in isolation until tested; (6) the religious methodology discriminates carefully between beliefs and disbeliefs, and finds less discrimination between disbeliefs, while the scientific methodology accepts fewer

beliefs as solid, and both discriminates well between disbeliefs as well as having less discrimination between beliefs; (7) the religious methodology seeks information from positive authorities, while the scientific methodology seeks information from primary sources, and (8) the power of authority in the religious methodology is in its ability to mete out reward and punishment, while the scientific methodology evaluates the power of authority on the basis of its cognitive correctness.

The key to understanding these methodologies seems to be wrapped in the question of how one relates to the world of real events, and whether he trusts in himself to do that relating or must turn to an authority figure that is more trustworthy. Rokeach notes in his book that the open-minded seems to be more open to this world of events, while the closed-minded narrows his world of events and has it channeled through some authority figure. This type of person cannot accept ambiguity about what he gets from his positive authority figure, but sees little difficulty in ambiguity about the relationship of disbelief subsystems. Rokeach says:

> The open-minded subjects appear to resist less, or in Rogers' (1951) terms, to be "more open to experience." Thus, they generally seem to take less time than the closed-minded subjects to synthesize as they proceed from problem to problem.[33]

---

[33] Ibid., p. 267.

Rokeach then discusses the closed-minded:

> Persons who are high in ethnic prejudice and/or authoritarianism, as compared to persons who are low, are more rigid in their problem-solving behavior. . . . they also have a greater tendency to premature closure in their perceptual processes and to distortions in memory, and a greater tendency to be intolerant of ambiguity [about beliefs].[34]

To summarize, we see a critical relationship between the open mind and the scientific methodology, and the closed mind and the religious methodology. These methodologies are concerned about how a person relates to the world of real events. Rokeach's theory considers the kind of person who is doing the relating to the world of real events. From this theoretical structure, it will be the concern of Chapter III to devise a means of speech criticism that will analyze the speeches and the speaker in terms of his methodology and his open and closed systems.

---

[34] Ibid., p. 16.

CHAPTER III

TOWARD A CRITERION FOR SPEECH CRITICISM

The purpose of this chapter is to translate the religious and scientific methodologies, and the open and closed systems of Rokeach into critical categories for speech criticism. To do this, certain terms must be defined, and categories presented.

In Chapter I of this thesis, theories were described as present both in religious and scientific methodologies. This was done in terms of explanation of what has been true (postdictive), and what will be true (predictive). While this has a scientific theme to it, nevertheless it has been demonstrated that both religion and science take part in this. We cannot critically separate the two methodologies merely on the basis of one being postdictive, and the other predictive.

Numerous rhetoricians, including Gerald Miller of the Department of Communications at Michigan State University, have classified propositions in argumentation. They have discussed propositions of fact, value, and policy. Miller takes what for some is an unorthodox step beyond

other rhetoricians by reducing the types of propositions to two--that of fact and value. He notes:

> I have made no mention of the type of proposition commonly labeled policy, a type frequently discussed in texts on argumentation and debate. This is because I held that a policy proposition has no distinguishing characteristics which set it apart from fact and value propositions; that is, I believe that if any meaningful proposition is to occur, a policy proposition must be disputed as either a proposition of fact or a proposition of value. . . . If "should" is defined in terms of means-ends interest (we would increase our gross national product, we would win the war, etc.), then the issue becomes one of fact, revolving around considerations of whether or not the stipulated ends would occur. If "should" is defined in terms of intrinsic ethical considerations (it would be morally good to do this, men of good will ought to behave this way, etc.), then the issue becomes one of value, revolving around the goodness or badness of these moral precepts.[35]

We have concluded that propositions are theories that relate together a set of data, or evidence. It is considered here that there is only one type of proposition, that of fact. While this may seem on the surface to be a hard line for some, it is not the exclusion of the question of what is bad or good. That question, for us, is a private judgement, both for the speaker and the audience, and it is a judgement that follows proof. The speaker has made that judgement on a proposition of fact when he includes it in his repertoire of beliefs and disbeliefs, and so it is with the audience. If this "proposition of value" becomes an

---

[35]Gerald R. Miller, and Thomas R. Nilsen (eds.), Perspectives on Argumentation (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1966), p. 36.

object of persuasion or argumentation, it becomes a proposition of fact, and substantive in nature. If we make the epistemological "leap of faith" that there is a pre-determined, invariable relationship between events, then value can be attributed only to propositions that are true, and some other degree of value on propositions that are false. The Apostles' Creed, as referred to in Chapter I, may be considered by some as a proposition of value, but its value to those who accept it is one of fact. A proposition's resistance to the question of truth or falsity does not necessitate the pessimistic conclusion that it can never be judged as true or false. If religionists and scientists are both consistent with their epistemological "leaps," then they must assume either that we have propositions of value, and no fact, or propositions of fact, and not value. The latter seems to be the more inviting. Value is a question of validity, or follows it, and thus belongs to proof as discussed later in this paper. Propositions of "value" are presented to audiences for their acceptance or rejection. Value judgements in rhetoric are an anomaly, for the very term "judgement" implies a decision of truth or falsity.

Theories, or propositions of fact, then are explanations of past events (postdictive), and since theories are concerned about control of events, they are predictive. Man normally is not interested in just knowing past events indiscriminately, but he wishes to know them in order to make

certain decisions about his theories--beliefs, sets, or expectancies--in the present. Hence, he is interested in control. These theories, as explanations, are of necessity inferences, either from one's First Principles or his observations. Whether deductive from First Principles, or inductive from observations, there are at least three types of explanations (theories) of events. We might seek to explain events by (1) causation, (2) correlation, or (3) definition-classification.

Causation here refers to the relationship between two events which states that condition A causes condition B. It should be understood that causation can be expressed in present-past tense (Effect B was the result of Cause A in the past), in the present-future tense (Event A will cause Future Event B), past-perfect tense (Earlier Event A caused Later Past Event B), and future-perfect tense (Future Event A will cause Later Future Event B).

Correlation, sometimes termed "sign" reasoning in argumentation textbooks, states that when Event A is present, Event B also is present. Analogy, whether figurative or literal, is also a kind of correlation, or one step removed from the "sign" reasoning as here defined. Analogy says that Event A is similar to Event B in x respects; Events A and B are thus alike in y respects, since they are alike in x respects. Thus, the correlation between Event A and Event

B in simple "sign" reasoning is extended to a correlation between x and y.

Definition is considered here in the same sense as Bormann defined classification. It is the "process of making decisions about equivalence"[36] of events. Definition includes what many textbooks in argumentation have considered as generalization and classification. Thus, the definitive characteristics applied to Group-of-Events A apply also to Specific-Event "a" from that group (classification), and the definitive characteristics applied to Specific-Event "b" also apply to Group-of-Events B. In other words, it states that what is true of a group is true of a member of that group, and what is true of a member of a group is also true of the group.

From theory which seeks to explain events, we turn to evidence or data that is offered in support of a theory or proposition. Miller considers two types of data: (1) experiential data, and (2) testimonial data.[37] He illustrates experiential data as direct observation of the "sun rising in the east," and testimonial data as that of "Columbus' discovery of America." He asserts that everyone can see the sun rise in the east, but not everyone can see Columbus discover America. However, such a differentiation

---

[36]Bormann, op. cit., p. 107.

[37]Miller and Nilsen, op. cit., p. 35.

as Miller makes does not consider the important question of validity and reliability of even the experiential data, a question that is as important to the one who sees the sun "rise" in the east as it is to the one who asserts Columbus (or maybe the Scandinavians) discovered America. The all-important question of validity which has been attached in science to theories is also properly applied to data, or evidence. It appears to us that the statements "Columbus discovered America," and, "I saw the sun rise in the east this morning," have more in common when concerned with validity, than comparing Columbus' discovery statement with one's assertion that there are such things as waterbabies in Argentina. The inductive tests of enumeration, insufficient statistics, biased statistics, and negative argument[38] qualify the Columbus statement and the sun-rise statement as empirical evidence. In the event that someone does not see the sun "rise" in the east, or someone can empirically validate that Columbus did not discover America, then these items of evidence are no more or less true because it was in one person's experience.

Dr. Miller defines his testimonial data as having two types: (1) statistical data, and (2) authority-based data.[39] He describes as the test for statistical data the

---

[38]Wesley C. Salmon, Logic (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 55-69.

[39]Miller, op. cit., p. 38.

offering of two questions: (1) Does it fit operational definitions? and (2) What about the accuracy with which data describes the existing empirical state of affairs? The tests of statistical data seems to us more properly to critically fit such statements as Columbus' discovery of America. He further describes his statistical data as a question that depends on "what is said." His contrasting of authority-based data, he states, is a question of "who said it." This, for us, suggests our second type of data--that of authoritarian data. Thus, we are back to the epistemological question discussed in Chapter I. Both scientists and religionists are concerned about truth, and both assume that it is there whether within or without man's experience. The two methods of finding it are through impartial observations (empirical data), and authority (authoritarian data). Authoritarian data, different from the testimonial data of Miller illustrated by the importance of "trusting" somebody's statement that Columbus discovered America, finds its validity in itself, and not in the appropriate inductive policies of Braithwaite[40] or Salmon.

With this discussion of theory and evidence in argumentation, there remain the questions of warrant, claim, and proof or validity. Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, using Stephen Toulmin's model of argumentation, define a warrant as follows:

---

[40]Braithwaite, op. cit., pp. 257-264.

> Whereas evidence supplies the informative data on which a unit of proof rests, the warrant provides the method by which the proof is derived. It answers the questions, "So what?" "How does the person advancing the proof get from these data to his contention?"[41]

Commonly, warrants have been declared as including three types: (1) authoritative; (2) motivational, and (3) substantive. These warrants, or methods of proof, have been described by Ehninger and Brockriede as:

> Since evidence may be carried to a claim through one of three routes, three general categories of proof patterns may be employed to establish or deny any statement:
>
> 1. Proofs in which the warrant asserts a relationship among phenomena in the external world--these may be called substantive proofs.
>
> 2. Proofs in which the warrant asserts an assumption concerning the credibility of the source from which the evidence is derived--these may be called authoritative proofs.
>
> 3. Proofs in which the warrant asserts an assumption concerning the emotions, values, or motives which direct the behaviour of these persons to whom the proof is addressed--these may be called motivational proofs.[42]

Ehninger and Brockriede then discuss substantive proofs in the same general sense that theory is discussed in this paper. It seems apparent, however, that beliefs and disbeliefs are cognitively stated by a speaker, and that the question of authority and motives are better discussed as

---

[41]Douglas Ehninger, and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate (New York: Dodd, Meade, and Company, 1966), p. 101.

[42]Ibid., pp. 125-126.

questions of validity, or proof. This statement does not deny that there is rhetorical appeal to authority and motives, but this appeal is seen better in the evidence accepted by a speaker as valid. In any condition, they are presented substantively.

Before any further discussion of the place of warrants in this thesis can be undertaken, a definition of claim and proof must be made. A claim, according to Ehninger and Brockriede, is the

> explicit appeal produced by the evidence and warrant, the appeal specific stand which, as a result of accepting the data and recognizing the validity of the reasoning, one is prepared to take on the question under consideration.[43]

They define proof as "the process of securing belief in one statement by relating it to another statement already believed."[44]

It is assumed in their definition of claim that the validity or proof of that claim can be established in the speaking situation. Since this is a matter of question, we shall consider the claim as not anything more than the purpose sentence of a speech, a term often expressed in elementary public speaking terminology.[45]

---

[43] Ibid., p. 102.

[44] Ibid., p. 99.

[45] This term is used in the textbook of Kenneth Hance, Milton J. Wiksell and David Ralph, Principles of Public Speaking (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1962), pp. 138-140.

The question of proof, however, is more critical. It is this area that differentiates for us the religious from the scientific methodology, the open and closed mind, the deductive from the inductive reasoning. Proof, essentially, is the question of validity for the claim based on the evidence and reasoning offered to support that claim. Ehninger and Brockriede have offered the authoritative and motivational warrants as methods leading to proof. Here we would understand it more in terms of proof and validity, or the certification for a given theory or claim. Thus, we consider here proof as of three general types: (1) authoritative proof; (2) motivational proof, and (3) functional proof. Since proof is considered as a question of validity for substantive statements, authoritative proof is audience certification of a claim on the basis of who said it. Validity is in the authority. Motivational proof is audience certification of a claim on the basis of the emotional need to believe it. Validity is in the emotional satisfaction that comes from belief. Functional proof is audience certification of the validity of a claim on the basis of inductive tests of enumeration, sufficiency, unbiased statistics, and negative argument. Further, it is a semantical concern which asks whether the theory both explains the past and predicts the future.

The first two types of proof are deductive, and closed-minded; the latter is inductive, and open-minded.

The first two can be certified immediately; the latter cannot be certified until some time after the speaking event. For the first two, validity is in the authority or the emotion; for the latter, validity is in its accuracy. For the first two, certainty is stronger; for the latter, probability is the best that can be expected.

Given all these conditions, Figure 2 illustrates the religious methodology in speech-making; Figure 3 shows the scientific methodology in speech-making. In Figure 4, we find illustrated the invention process for a speaker using the religious methodology, while in Figure 5 we find illustrated the invention process for a speaker using the scientific methodology. In Figure 2, we see that the religious methodology begins with authoritative evidence, constructs the proposition, and makes a claim. Certification of validity is in the authority, and perhaps on the basis of emotions. In Figure 3, the scientific methodology begins with empirical evidence, constructs the proposition, and makes a claim. Certification of validity is in the functional. Figure 4 shows the religious methodology in invention, where the speaker derives his beliefs and disbeliefs from authority which certify their own validity. In Figure 5, the scientific methodology is evidence that is empirical and functionally valid. Such a requirement naturally would require fewer beliefs than the one who uses the religious methodology, since the tests for validity are much more demanding.

In the speech-making process, one other distinction is important. The speaker using the religious methodology would give his speech with all that is necessary for validity to be found in the speech, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would invite examination and criticism of his claim. Validity would be sought, but through the requirements of induction.

With this understanding of the religious and scientific methodologies, the theory of the open and closed mind, and the observations made in this chapter about invention and argumentation, we would offer the following critical hypotheses:

World of Events

1. A speaker using the religious methodology would view the world as more unfriendly than a speaker using the scientific methodology.

Evidence

1. A speaker using the religious methodology would place more trust in authoritarian evidence than in empirical evidence, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would place more trust in empirical evidence.

2. A speaker using the religious methodology would use "empirical" evidence in the demonstration sense in that the evidence is unified by a pre-conceived

set of First Principles or authority-based theory, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would use empirical evidence in the inductive sense, in that the data is held in isolation until some theory explains it in its own empirical terms, and is validated.

Theories

1. A speaker using the religious methodology would derive his theories about the world of events from his positive authorities, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would derive his theories about the world of events from empirical observations of that world of events.

2. A speaker using the religious methodology would validate his theories about the world of events by his authority, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would validate his theories about the world of events by functional means.

3. A speaker using the religious methodology would be more sure of his theories, and have them highly defined syntactically, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would be less sure of his theories because of his functional concern for validity and semantical interest.

4. A speaker using the religious methodology would have a high differentiation between his beliefs and disbeliefs, with his disbeliefs less defined syntactically than his beliefs, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would have a low differentiation between his beliefs and disbeliefs, with high syntactical differentiation between disbeliefs.

5. A speaker using the religious methodology would evaluate authorities on the basis of their meting out reward and punishment, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would evaluate authorities on the basis of cognitive correctness, accuracy, and consistency with other information he already possesses.

6. A speaker using the religious methodology would evaluate people, their beliefs and disbeliefs on the basis of authorities they line up with, while a speaker using the scientific methodology would hold people in isolation from their beliefs and disbeliefs, and from the authorities they line up with.

Claim

1. The speaker using the religious methodology would display more confidence in the validity of his claim than the speaker using the scientific methodology.

2. A speaker using the religious methodology would seek immediate acceptance of his claim by his audience, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would seek examination and criticism of his claim by his audience.

Proof

1. A speaker using the religious methodology would consider his authority and tradition as the validation of a theory, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would consider the functional as the validation of a theory.

2. A speaker using the religious methodology would consider motivation (explicit or implicit) as validation of a theory for a given audience, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would consider motivational proof as irrelevant.

3. A speaker using the religious methodology would present his theories and claims for confirming of the remote future--an ex post facto criterion in the sense that a theory today validates an event in the remote future, while a speaker using the scientific methodology would have his theories held in isolation awaiting validation in the immediate future.

There are many implications that can be formed from the two methodologies expressed in these first three chapters. The concern for ethics in speech-making, the question of the self-esteem of the speaker and audience, the role of ethos-source credibility in open and closed systems are important. Some of these will be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis. We are now ready to look at our subject, Dr. Littlefair, who professes to be a religionist committed to the scientific method. We shall see first what kind of speaker he is, and what kind of speeches he makes in terms of the hypotheses presented.

FIGURE 2

Argumentation in the Religious Method



FIGURE 3

Argumentation in the Scientific Method



FIGURE 4

Invention in the Religious Method



FIGURE 5

Invention in the Scientific Method



CHAPTER IV

LITTLEFAIR, AND THE SOCIAL CONTEXT

Duncan Elliot Littlefair was born October 4, 1912, in an economically depressed area of Toronto, Ontario, the seventh son of seven children born to William Albert Littlefair, and Mary MacKenzie. William Albert, who was born in 1874, was a cabinet and furniture maker, with some degree of prestige from his peers in the trade. Duncan states that some of his father's work appeared in the Toronto Art Gallery, although it wasn't good enough to make a lasting impression on the community.

The Littlefair family, while Duncan was young, was not able to accumulate funds to lift the family out of the poorer class of Canadians who had not taken advantage of the economic boom of the early 1920's. The large family, and perhaps the unsteady income of the elder Littlefair, contributed to the inability of the Littlefairs in moving up the economic ladder. "We were poor, but proud poor," Duncan recalls, explaining that if booms were in Canada, his family never say them. An emotion that was to follow Duncan most of his life was experienced then. "I felt terribly trapped, almost panicky, at the thoughts of being caught in

that kind of situation," he said in an interview held December 15, 1967. His father died in 1926 at the age of 52, leaving the family with little money. Only a home that was paid for remained. William Albert was born in Ontario, the son of an immigrant from the Isle of Man, which is in the Irish Sea, equidistant from the border between England and Scotland, and Northern Ireland.

Mary MacKenzie Littlefair, born in Ontario in 1878, was the daughter of an immigrant from Northern Scotland. Neither of the parents had more than a fourth grade education. The brothers of Duncan all went through elementary school, none going beyond the ninth grade. All left home by the time they were 15 years of age, supporting themselves and thus contributing to the economic needs of the family.

The early life of Duncan apparently was extremely traumatic. It can be said that Duncan undoubtedly was a genius, pulled by his curiosity about the larger world beyond his home and neighborhood, and driven by a deep fear that his economically and educationally deprived environment would trap him as it had his parents and brothers. He relates that it wasn't enough for him to pass his courses, but he had to be good enough to get scholarships in order to attend school.

Duncan's father was not only uneducated by today's standards, but he was the undisputed head of the family. Conflicts between the parents were not uncommon, with Duncan

as the youngest often being used as the pawn between his parents. He recalls that his mother would "tell all" to him as a boy of 10 years, and at times he was forced to carry burdens of responsibility beyond his years. He relates an incident when his father was at a local pool hall with two or three of his older brothers, when the city's utility company personally called at his home regarding payment of a bill. Because of the violent temper of Duncan's father, and the apparent fear his mother had of him, she sent young Duncan--then about 10 years old--to the pool hall to get the money from his father to pay the bill. The predictable explosion of his father was indelibly marked on Duncan. He explains that in his early years he strongly disliked his father--"I was glad when he died"--and it wasn't until Duncan was about 40 years of age that he understood more of the sense of entrapment his parents must have felt as well as his own feelings at that time. He explains that those early years, when he often sided with his mother, probably led to his over-sympathetic response to women.

This kind of sympathetic response played no small role in his interest in the ministry, and in his many social campaigns for the underdog. He states that from the time he was 10 or 12 years of age he begged his mother to take him to church so he could hear the sermon delivered by the local Baptist minister. "He was a liberal for his day--not as I am, but Fosdickian [an illusion to Harry Emerson Fosdick,

minister-emeritus of famed liberal Riverside Church in New York City] in his liberalism," he notes. As a young man who felt captured in his environment, combined with the role ministers often played in the early days of this century as a leader and as a contact with the outside world, Littlefair's relationship with the Baptist minister is important in Duncan's choice of the ministry. "The community was a trap, and I had nightmares for years over it thinking I might get caught in it," he said. Thus, religion and the ministry represented an "out" for a very scared young man. He describes his own ambitions to enter the ministry as taking place from those early days of going to church. One might conjecture as to what could have happened if that first contact had been a lawyer, and not a minister.

Duncan's parents were apparently not pious, but they did require their children to attend Sunday School until they were about 10 years old. His mother, for many years, set aside her small weekly contribution to the church, but as for piety, Duncan says they were not so concerned. In interviewing Duncan, one gets the impression that Mary MacKenzie was as much or more proud of her Scottish ancestry as she was of her religion.

Duncan had little relationship with his older brothers. "I hardly knew them," he explained. His father, whose distance from Duncan in father-son relationship can be seen in the 38 years that separate them in age, was closer to the

older brothers. Almost 20 years separate Duncan from his oldest brother. The six brothers are: William Melville, born June 5, 1893; Archibald Clayton, born March 31, 1895; Allister McKenzie, November 12, 1896; William Clifford, December 19, 1899; James Stewart, October 19, 1906, and Edward Albert, April 23, 1908. The older brothers got along well with Duncan's father, he notes, then describing himself as "somewhat of a Mama's boy."

To earn money to attend college, Duncan went to work for a year after high school with an insurance company, earning $50 monthly. Failing to raise enough funds during the year, he became a waiter on an excursion boat in Lake Ontario during the summer of 1930, saving what was then a huge sum of money--about $200. Between this, and both forensic and sport enterprises, Duncan completed his A. B. in 1934, and B. D. in 1936 at MacMaster's University in Hamilton, Ontario. Most of his early speaking experiences were in oratory, and then for money. He also played football and Lacrosse with semi-professional teams, both owned then by the Toronto Mapleleafs, a professional hockey team with the National Hockey League.

Whether sports, oratory, or oral readings, all was done for money to stay in college, he states. From his entry into college in 1930, to the time he earned his Ph. D. in 1940 from the University of Chicago, Duncan had a supreme self-confidence in his ability to win in competition, and

he usually did. Whether a speech event or a sport, Duncan attacked the job as totally as he did in breaking out of his early environment which had inhibited him. He explained that when he discovered in college that he could make money playing Lacrosse, and although he hadn't played it since he was about 13 years old, he went out for the team and made it. His wife, who is the former Gertrude Bocker of New Haven, Connecticut, once left him at the door of the chapel at Garrett Theological Seminary in Evanston, Illinois, for a contest on Bible reading. Duncan relates that he told her to wait in the car, "Because I'm going to win it, and I'll be right back with the $50 prize." And as matter-of-factly as he went in, he returned--with the $50.

Duncan was married in Chicago, December 31, 1939, while completing his doctoral studies. He now has five children: Margo, born March 7, 1941; Wendy, February 15, 1943; Candi, September 12, 1947, and identical twins Allan MacKenzie, and Christopher Backes, born November 7, 1951.

The first step out of that early entrapment Duncan sensed in his years at home was in entering college, but he found college did not represent the open door to freedom. He still felt limited. He was determined to be a minister, his symbol of freedom, but the church as he saw it from MacMaster's University was little more than another limitation. The church was generally conservative, particularly the Baptist Church, and he found himself agitated over the

prospect. "What was I going to do in a prayer meeting, putting on an act I didn't believe," he explains. Duncan had been reading some of the works of Henry Nelson Weiman, a noted liberal and Christian naturalist of his day, who was teaching at the University of Chicago. "I played for time," Duncan states, "and I decided to move on to Chicago. And I soon discovered these were my kind of people." Duncan had escaped another limitation, the limitation of a conservative church he literally couldn't tolerate.

But the University of Chicago, and its function as an escape, couldn't last forever. In 1940, his last year at the university, Duncan had just about resigned himself to the best alternative--teaching. The dark shadows of his early life, symbolized in the question of what was he going to do now, were crowded back when he received a call [a religious term for a contract of employment] from Kenilworth Union Church, a liberal church in the Northern suburbs of Chicago. The church was Duncan's if he wanted it, and since he had always wanted to preach, he took the church. He held that post until 1944, when he accepted the post at Fountain Street Church in Grand Rapids, Michigan.

It was not an easy task for the congregation of Fountain Street Church to get Duncan as their minister. Kenilworth had represented the first sense of freedom, and the unknown factors about Fountain Street Church represented to him the possibility of a situation that might have left him

back where he was before Kenilworth. First contacts with Duncan brought abrupt negative answers from Duncan. The committee which represented Fountain Street Church, however, wanted Duncan because he was an open and avowed liberal, and an outstanding public speaker. Duncan's negative response to accepting the Fountain Street Church brought insistent appeals from the committee, such as this one:

> My dear [sic.] Dr. Littlefair, This is not written to urge you to come to Fountain Street Church [Of course, it was.] .... So I've had to get out and search for my facts--through the city hall, the employment office, the schools. . . . If this is true about thinking in the field of government and social welfare, it is doubly true in the field of Christian thinking. You can't develop Christian thinking from the ivory tower of a little stone church in a wealthy suburban community [referring to Kenilworth]. You can only develope it where it can be tested during the process of its growth in the crucible of daily life in a community presenting many facets of human living. . . . But of one thing I am sure: it is now--not tomorrow--that the world needs men like you. Whether you realize it or not, you have something that men hunger for--a depth and sincerity of conviction that prods men to aspire to the impossible. This is a quality that God has given to few men. Surely God has laid on those men the burden of giving of themselves without fear or stint to mankind. So come out of your ivory tower, young man. Go where you will. But administer through as wide a group as you can reach to the yearnings of men for a faith that will enable them to build a new world.[46]

In spite of this appeal, the answer was "No" until one member of the committee invited Duncan to come to Fountain Street Church for a dinner meeting, and tell the

---

[46]This letter was written by Mrs. Siegel Judd, a member of the Pulpit Committee, sent to Duncan and dated December 6, 1943.

congregation himself that he wouldn't come. It worked, and Duncan said he would come.

The dark shadows of entrapment, however, were not that easily dispelled for Duncan personally. It was certain this feeling would follow him to Fountain Street Church, as he might--and did--recognize the limitations of his new church. He had received serious offers from other churches, many of them of national reputation. In 1959, when he felt Grand Rapids was too used to him, he received an offer from an unnamed church. For the first time, Duncan decided to stay where he was, when he realized "they [Fountain Street Church] were as stuck with me, as I with them if I turn down this opportunity." He decided the trap was not a trap, but that the challenge was to "keep myself fresh, and to make this church go even more than it had." He resolved the long-time anxiety by accepting what is probably true for everybody--the human limitation.

There are several important questions to ask about Duncan Littlefair, with respect to the hypotheses of this paper. They will be discussed in the order presented in Chapter III, including the answers to such questions posed by his view of the world of events, evidence, theories, claims, and proof. We are interested here in these issues as they relate to conclusions about the methodology of Littlefair in invention. A general outline of his background has been considered, but the hypotheses will also serve to bring

out other important elements in the life of Duncan Littlefair. Following these hypotheses, we will consider specific preparation of speeches.

World of Events

Littlefair was asked in the interview with this writer whether he viewed the world as friendly or unfriendly. He responded:

> Oh, it's friendly. Just as friendly as can be. I just love it. When I hear that song of Louis Armstrong entitled "What a Wonderful World," I sense this. [He then quotes the poem from memory.] I can sit and cry, because I really feel the world is beautiful. And yet, the thing that hurts me is people, and their cruelties. I don't think the world is cruel. I look at the water, and I know it can get so rough. A couple of times I could have been swamped by it, but that's competitive; a fair fight. You don't have to be out there. You better learn how to handle it, and there's nothing to stop you. But people . . . I can't stand anybody taking advantage of others. This gets to be a passion with me.[47]

The world of events to Littlefair seems divided into two parts: The natural world, with its physical beauty, and the world of people. He sees the first world as friendly. The world of events is not here restricted to merely natural elements, but also to people--any event capable of perception. The hypothesis in this study says, however, that a speaker using the religious methodology would view the world as more unfriendly than a speaker using the

---

[47]This quotation is from a taped interview held by this writer December 15, 1967. All quotations in this form are from these taped interviews.

scientific methodology. We could say critically that Littlefair is open-minded about the inanimate world of nature, but relatively closed-minded about the people in that world. The proper question to follow is: Why should this be true? The answer, it appears, lies in the sense of entrapment Littlefair had as a youngster, and that emotion had a social dimension to it. His interpretation of there being equal odds with nature, but not with the world, suggests his deep, emotional identification with people who have been trapped themselves by society. Much of Littlefair's efforts in Grand Rapids have been involved in fighting for the "under-dog." He has sided with Negroes against the white community; he has served with numerous unpopular causes such as education for minority groups, the American Civil Liberties Union fight regarding prayer and Bible reading in public schools, and rehabilitation programs for deserted families. He has used his church's resources to begin such programs as closed-circuit television for Negro-ghetto schools. He notes about himself:

> I had to protect my own tenderness so that I could sustain it. And so I would withdraw from people, so that I wouldn't get hurt too much. Increasingly I can't stand to see anything hurt. This is why Schweitzer [Albert] meant so much to me; it was his "reverence for life." It's in my heart; it's in my heart, and it's not an intellectual thing. When I hear of two or three kids attacking one in the streets, I'm shocked to the core. My code was one-to-one; you don't take advantage of someone.

Yet, the ambivalence is clear as Littlefair related immediately following the above statement:

> But the world is a beautiful, beautiful place. I'd love to be able to write poetically about it.

We must conclude by our critical definitions that in the world of nature, Littlefair is open-minded, while in the world of people--particularly in the unevenness of social combat--there is closed-mindedness. These observations will have added significance when analyzing the speeches of Littlefair, particularly his theological positions. The importance of open and closed-mindedness regarding the world of events will have variable importance, depending on how other areas of invention are understood, and on the speeches themselves as measured by the different hypotheses.

Evidence

Our critical hypotheses are concerned with two factors: What is the source of the speaker's evidence, and what does the term evidence mean to the speaker? Our hypotheses state: (1) A speaker using the religious methodology would put more trust in authoritarian evidence than in empirical evidence, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would place more trust in empirical evidence, and (2) a speaker using the religious methodology would use empirical evidence in the demonstrative sense in that the evidence is unified by a pre-conceived set of "First Principles" or authority-based theory, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would use empirical evidence in the inductive sense in that the data is held in isolation until some theory explains it in its own empirical terms, and is validated.

To answer some of these questions, a taped interview was made by this writer with Littlefair in June, 1967:

> Question: Upon reading your sermons, you seem to be interested in men like Paul Tillich, and Jean-Paul Sartre. If you were to name some of these people you're interested in, whom [sic.] would you say have been effective in shaping you into what you are today?
>
> Littlefair: It's virtually nobody until Chicago. And then it's Weiman [Henry Nelson Weiman].[48] . . .
>
> Question: What about the former Chicago Divinity School dean, George Holman, who recommended you for employment both to Kenilworth and Fountain Street Churches?
>
> Littlefair: None. He got me my job. He wasn't personable, and not too significant. There was little thought-relationship with him. It was Weiman as a person. As a thinker, it was Hocking in a very surprising way.[49] Through the years he has been a very potent person on me, particularly through the one book, Religion in Human Experience [sic.]. I never read it through solidly. I would have to say that Hocking was a most influential person. And then Tillich, in his later years. I've got to say it, even though I don't like it; I find Schweitzer of importance, if for no other reason than his concept of reverence for life

---

[48]Weiman, who was born in 1884, is a Christian naturalist. His views are presented in an essay, "The Source of Human Good," published in summary form in Masterpieces of Christian Literature (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), edited by Frank N. Magill. He believes that naturalistic theism can best interpret and make available the resources of the Christian Faith.

[49]William Ernest Hocking, a turn-of-the-century theologian, might be considered a mystic. His work, in summary form, is entitled "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," and is published in Masterpieces of Christian Literature. His work, which was first published in 1912, states that the vision of God which is provided by the mystic experience supplies the logic, or basic reason, for the irrational loyalties which give life value.

which has given me a peg. I think also perhaps John Dewey, but not in the same way as these others.

Question: What about Locke and Hobbes?

Littlefair: No. The traditional philosophers have not meant one thing to me.

Question: You studied with Karl Barth. Why?

Littlefair: The same reason I decided to come here [Fountain Street Church] to work. If I am so critical of these guys, and he [Barth] was God at the time, I ought to know, I ought to really know what he's doing. I ought to expose myself to him; put myself right into the mouth of the lion and go find out. I didn't want to be criticizing them, and having people pick me up as not knowing. It was the same reason I got a Ph. D. I told you. It's an assurance. As I said to Wendy [his daughter], you cannot just be critical unless you beat them at their own game. She was critical of the Antioch [Ohio] College program. You've got to do their work swell. . . . You've got to beat them at their own game. Then you can criticize them. So, I've always made it a point to know my enemy. I get angry over people who try to shut off access to communism. Or shutting up Carmichael and his guys.

There are several important observations to make about Littlefair, and his sources of evidence. First, Littlefair doesn't discuss the influence his boyhood minister [Duncan couldn't remember his name, and other attempts to find out failed] had on him. There was a personal influence that helped to determine the kind of ideas Littlefair might look for. The choice of occupations, and the response to the world was influenced greatly by this minister. Thus, Duncan's response here that "virtually nobody until Chicago" had an effect on him is not quite true. His boyhood minister, based on evidence about Duncan's childhood struggles,

and his [Duncan's] choice of occupations suggest the large importance of this early age association.

Secondly, Duncan's struggle to escape entrapment is important, not only in evidence, but also in relating his attitude about the world of events. Hocking's mysticism did influence Littlefair as a rational explanation of his apparent fear of people and their cruelties to each other. Magill notes that Hocking believes it is through experience of God that man develops a concern for others and a motive for action on their behalf. Duncan has not emphasized any mystical notion about God, but he has had a strong emotion of sympathy for others coming largely from his life as a child. Weiman's natural theology, as another important person in the shaping of Littlefair, is seen in Magill's observations of Weiman:

> For new goods [Weiman believes that ultimate reality is a creative event which transforms persons so as to enrich the qualitative meanings of their appreciable world. Littlefair's sermons also express this concept] to emerge, continual transformations of the organism are required. The danger in religion is that it tries to conserve previous structures of transformation at the price of precluding future ones [Is this the source of Littlefair's quarrel with religion as a methodology?]. . . .The proper source of human devotion is the creative event, working in history and accessible to empirical analysis. . . . Faith is an act rather than a belief. It presupposes fellowship with men of faith and dissatisfaction with present purposes. . . . The only authority of any religious teaching is the evidence, produced by inquiry, that the teaching can sustain creative changes.[50]

---

[50] Ibid., p. 1085.

Magill concludes his summary by noting that the major influences on Weiman were Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead--another naturalist--and, interestingly, John Dewey. Littlefair's relationship with Dewey suggests a secondary relationship. Littlefair undoubtedly was interested in Dewey through his exposure to Weiman. And Weiman's "creative good" seems to correspond largely to Dewey's apparent attitude about supernaturalism. Durant evaluates Dewey in this light:

> Things are to be explained [by Dewey] . . . not by supernatural causation, but by their place and function in the environment. Dewey was frankly naturalistic; he protested that "to idealize and rationalize the universe at large is a confession of inability to master the courses of things that specifically concern us." . . . Divinity is within us, not in these neutral cosmic powers. "Intelligence has descended from its lonely isolation at the remote edge of things whence it operated as unmoved mover and ultimate good, to take its seat in the moving affairs of men." We must be faithful to the earth.[51]

Third, Littlefair's illusion to Schweitzer's reverence for life is also seen in his early childhood experiences, and his concern about the underprivileged with whom he symbolically identifies.

Fourth, and of particular importance to our hypotheses, Littlefair prefers to go straight to the authorities for what they say, rather than trusting completely those he accepts, such as Weiman. We can observe that while the Toronto Baptist minister of Duncan's youth brought him to the profession, and shaped his means of escape from that

---

[51] Ibid., p. 522.

early entrapment, it was Weiman who gave Littlefair the tools for handling his world. While Henri Bergson and John Dewey helped shape Weiman, they all were related in such a way to shape Littlefair's ideas and thought processes. Nevertheless, for Littlefair's recommendations to his daughter, or for himself and his travels to Europe to study under the "enemy" we can see he also sought information from others than his own positive authorities.

To understand evidence more completely, however, Littlefair was asked what he meant by empirical relationships.

> Littlefair: I meant it [empirical evidence] has got to be evidence that is capable of being subjected to scientific testing. And that means objectively observable, objectively confirmable, and repeatable.
>
> Question: What we call reliability?
>
> Littlefair: Yes, scientific testability. Your feelings are valid only so far as they are your feelings, and they are valid only as feelings. They do not prove one damn thing. And of course this is the question of whether you can have a religion on that basis. We always fail to make the distinction. We are talking about evidence now, a laboratory type approach. But when you have established something as being a fact, you still have to write songs about it, paint pictures about it, and write poetry about it.

To pursue the question of authority, and the use of evidence from authority, Littlefair was asked about the Bible. He answered:

> Littlefair: Many ask me how I use the Bible, and I respond that if I can find an illustration in the Bible of what I believe, than I use it. That's all it is for me. My thinking has got to stand on its own. I sure don't take it from the Bible.

In terms of the hypotheses, we would make these conclusions about evidence:

1. Duncan Littlefair does have authority figures, but he does place more trust in empirical evidence than in authoritarian evidence. As noted in Chapter III, empirical evidence is data impartially observed, with validity found in the impartial nature of the observation. Authoritarian evidence was described in the same chapter as data that is considered valid because of who said it. In empirical evidence, validity is in the data, while in authoritarian evidence, validity is in the one who presents that data. The fact that Littlefair went to observe the work of Barth and Schweitzer suggests a concern about empirical evidence rather than evidence solely from his authority--Wieman. For further evidence of our assertion here, we would offer his interpretation of the meaning of empirical evidence, his statements on the Bible as a source of evidence, and his suggestions to his daughter, Wendy. That Littlefair is considered here as driven to some degree by emotions does not mitigate the conclusion about his use of evidence.

2. We cannot conclude that Duncan Littlefair holds empirical evidence in isolation until some theory explains it in its own terms. We suspect there is much use of evidence in the demonstration sense. However, it is not held in the demonstration sense from authority, but rather from

motivation. This point will be clarified in the discussion on theories, and their sources for Littlefair.[52]

Theories

There are six questions in the critical hypotheses for theory that must be answered here: (1) What is the source of Littlefair's theories? (2) Does Littlefair validate his theories by use of authority, or by the ability of his theories to predict? (3) Is Littlefair sure of the validity of his theories, or does his functional concern for validity temper his confidence in his theories? (4) Do Littlefair's theories about what he believes display a high degree of differentiation, with low differentiation in his theories about what he disbelieves? (5) Does Littlefair evaluate authorities on the basis of their ability to mete out reward and punishment? and (6) Does Littlefair evaluate people on the basis of their theories, and the authorities the people line up with?

The answers to these questions are seen in an interview held with Littlefair December 15, 1967. The questions we pose about his theories are not easily seen separately, but rather some of the answers he expressed in this interview aid in answering more than one of the above questions. The interview was concerned at this point with theories, or

---

[52]This is discussed on page 80 of this chapter.

order, and the questions were asked to determine the source of Littlefair's theories.

> Question: You gave a sermon at one time that man brings order to his world. Is that the only order?
>
> Littlefair: Yes.
>
> Question: How do you relate this, then, to the chemical nature of a given set of objects? Is the order that you bring to it the only order there is, or is there some kind of order in itself?
>
> Littlefair: I don't think there is any order in itself. Order is a logical relationship. It's something that we create, and stipulate. Logic is the only way in which this brain works, but is the logic we give to it. Our world is differently organized for us than it is for the animal. But he doesn't know how to organize it, as far as we know. He doesn't organize his world, and he doesn't order it, but he knows that certain things are related, and so there is a primitive order. Ours is a little more highly developed. You can look at the world from any one of a number of views or perspectives, and it will be the same world and look different, and you could operate on the basis of that ordering equally as well from one order as another. It's like the language.

In relation to the hypotheses we have offered, and the specific questions we have asked on theories, we could note that Littlefair believes the source of theories is not in some authority, but rather is in each man who theorizes about that world. More evidence of this can be seen in later responses to questions. It is also interesting to note that validity for order, or theory, is not in who holds it, but rather in the functional sense of prediction and control. The following question was asked immediately after the previous response just stated in this paper:

Question: If this be true, then why is one order that a person brings, which is superstitious, less worthy than the order that another brings who is less superstitious?

Littlefair: Because when he says this is the way the world is, and he goes out to find the world he says is there, it isn't there. So he's led astray. He's misled. If this is true, then that ought to be. And he goes to find out if it is. If it isn't there, he says there is something wrong with my predictions. He has to find a different explanation. To prove whether his understanding is right or not, he has to go out and test it. But I don't know how many orders could be. Even superstitious thinking can lead you through the world, but not as effectively and efficiently as thinking that is tested and confirmed. One can live very well with facts that are wrong. And maybe they live more rich lives than the guy who has the whole thing categorized. The world does respond to their superstition, but it is not as good, or as adequate, or as effective. The more complicated the world gets, the less room there is for error in your understanding of it. But any fact can be understood from any number of ways.

Question: What about the order that comes from an authority, that is its own certification for validity of that order?

Littlefair: There is no such authority. That is superstition.

Question: Would it be a true statement that you are more sure of what you don't believe than what you believe?

Littlefair: No. My believing or not believing is only a tentative beginning. I don't believe such and such, and then I've got to find out about it. And to find out about it, I have to determine something that is right. Because what I don't believe might turn out to be true, and therefore I have to change my mind. And I've done it many times. I know many things I do believe, but what I don't believe is the opposite, or in contradiction to what I do believe. I don't say I don't believe something unless I have something I believe better. It is stupid to say you don't believe something else. It's like the devil; he can't exist without God.

It is more explicitly in this part of the interview that Littlefair rejects authority as self-validating, and that the real test of a theory is its ability to control. Further, he does not reject people whose theories are not the same as his, for he apparently believes many theories can be derived to control adequately, though not as efficiently, as others. The question of differentiation between beliefs and disbeliefs seems to be a semantical one. The important note to make is that he does not hold his beliefs as unchangeable, nor his disbeliefs as unchangeable. Littlefair's views about theories are amplified by a statement of S. I. Hayakawa:

> The scientific test of "truth," like the social test, is strictly practical, except for the fact that the "desired results" are more severely limited. The results by society may be irrational, superstitious, selfish or humane, but the results desired by scientists are only that our systems of classification produce predictable results. Classifications, as amply indicated already, determine our attitudes and behaviour toward the object or event classified. When lightning was classified as "evidence of divine wrath," no courses of action other than prayer were suggested to prevent one's being struck by lightning. As seen, however, as it was classified as "electricity," Benjamin Franklin achieved a measure of control over it by his invention of the lightning rod. Certain physical disorders were formerly classified as "demonic possession," and this suggested that we "drive the demons out" by whatever spells or incantations we could think of. The results were uncertain. But when these disorders were classified as "bacillus infections," courses of action were suggested that led to more predictable results.
>
> Science seeks only the most generally useful systems of classification; these it regards for the time being,

until more useful classifications are invented, as "true."[53]

Hayakawa's view is analogous to that of Littlefair, and illustrates the question of control over the environment. Littlefair's "true" statements are true only so long as they aid in control, and when a better control is possible through the use of other classifications, or theories, then he is willing to adopt them. Superstition, he says, is when people trust an authority for its own sake as a means of control and prediction. Such an authority, sooner or later, fails to control. Thus, for Littlefair, superstition has a "fixing" effect on truth, and is antithetical to the man who checks his theories, not against authority, but against their ability to control.

Littlefair was asked a question concerning extra-sensory perception. This question helps illuminate his method for establishing a valid theory.

> Question: Suppose that someone says he believes in extra-sensory perception. What steps are you going to go through to validate that person's statement?
>
> Littlefair: I've got to go on logical relevance. I do it almost entirely on logical grounds. He makes a statement, and the statement may be in contradiction to other statements. Or he asserts something and I say I've got to have some evidence for it. I'm willing to accept the fact that you feel there are certain skills, but until the skills can be demonstrated, I think it's nonsense to assert positively that they are there. So, neither he nor I am qualified to pass a judgement. I simply pull him up and say, "Don't be

---

[53]S. I. Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964), p. 223.

> so damn sure! You haven't established it, and so far as I know, none of the experts in the field have, although they sense there may be. Thus, why don't you say it looks like there may be such and such. If you want to build your life on it, fine. But that's private. Don't assert it publicly where it can be challenged. Who cares what you assert privately?"

Our conclusions regarding Littlefair and theories are these: (1) Littlefair derives his theories about the world of events from empirical observations, rather than from positive authorities; (2) Littlefair validates his theories about the world functionally rather than by his authority; (3) Littlefair has equal confidence in his beliefs and disbeliefs, but qualifies both in terms of their being subject to change when better classifications come along; (4) Littlefair's relating of disbeliefs to beliefs makes it difficult to come up with a conclusion about the methodological differences present in this hypothesis. It may mean the hypothesis is poorly worded, or that the hypothesis is inappropriate; (5) Littlefair evaluates authorities on the basis of cognitive correctness, accuracy, and consistency with other information he already possesses, rather than on the basis of the authority's ability to mete out reward and punishment, and (6) Littlefair seems to evaluate other people separate from their beliefs and authorities. These results bring us to conclude that regarding theories, Littlefair uses the scientific method rather than the religious method.

Claim

Claims and theories are difficult to separate in invention. They can be more easily separated in a specific speech, with claims understood as the specific proposition offered to the audience, and theories as the reasoning that the speaker used to arrive at the claim. Theories relate evidence in speeches as invention, but theories lead to a conclusion or claim in a specific speech. The evidence offered here from Littlefair's thought processes, and conclusions about how he derives theories, force the same critical estimate that Littlefair uses the scientific methodology as specified by the hypotheses categorized under claim in Chapter III.

Proof

There are three questions important to the discussion of proof. They include observations about the validity of authority, motivation, and what is classified here as functional validity. The critical hypotheses are that the religious methodology places more trust in the validity of authority and tradition, while the scientist places more trust in functional validity, or the ability to predict events. The evidence offered under theories in this chapter is sufficient to conclude that Littlefair places little validity in authority, and is interested in the ability of a theory to control events. However, motivational proof

for Littlefair is not necessarily irrelevant as would be implied by our critical hypotheses that the scientific methodology places less trust in motivational proof. The following taped interview was conducted:

> Question: To what extent do you feel concerned about emotions as it relates to the validity of things? You have talked about the importance of empirical evidence.
>
> Littlefair: The validity of empirical knowledge is in something that is limited. It's utterly necessary in science. I think it's terribly important, and has been, should have been more important in religion just to eliminate the crap, and to cut out superstition, and to relieve us of the burden of beliefs that were ungrounded and false, and misleading. This is the great emphasis on empirical things for me; to clarify religion. Then, when you get it clear, forget about it. This is the validity of the emotions. This is why I have the kind of service I do. I work on developing emotional reactions. I want an emotional relationship.
>
> Question: How valid are these emotions?
>
> Littlefair: Oh, what good is the mind except to steer you so that you can enjoy your feelings. The idea is valid only in so far as it leads to an enrichment of your life. And your life is a feeling thing. And if you don't feel your logic, if you don't feel the thing your logic leads you to, what is the good of getting there? And this goes back to the old point of the scientist. Harrick (I used to argue this out all the time. He's a great biologist) C. Johnson Harrick, a famous biologist who was head of the department at the University of Chicago, always used to argue in behalf of the emotion of the scientist, the feeling tones. He was a strict anatomist, the dissection of the brains of rats was one of his great contributions. The salamander--he was one of the world's greatest experts on the nervous system of the salamander--he insisted on the emotional necessity of the scientist's emotions, the feelings, the involvement and the concern over what he was doing. That's what I mean. You've got to feel about it. Otherwise your logic and your brain is [sic.] sterile and mechanical. You won't even get to the right kind of truth, and when you get to it, it will be empty. This is the validity of poetry. After you've established something scientifically, then you want to

sing songs about it. What's wrong with singing songs about something that is good? This is why Unitarians brought up as Unitarians are so damnably dull.

I just had a fun funeral service, only five people there. I talked about the validity of the spirit. The reality of the spirit. You talk about feeling tones, but when somebody has touched my life and I am different because I have known them, and they continue to be an influence on me, motivating the way I see things, what I see, and how I see, then they continue to operate with me. They are as real with me as though they were sitting here. And there are a lot who are more real to me than some people who could be sitting there, because they are in my life. How do you want to describe it? As influence? Okay! As a modification of my being that continues to be modified? Memory? Alright! Spirit may be equated with memory.

I think, however, I like to speculate the world is actually changed by attitudes. I can't prove this. It would be a foolish thing to stipulate it. Nor is it necessary to hypothesize a ghostly being, a spectral being. That's nonsense, because there is no evidence for it, and you should not stipulate it. But you can go on, if you like, to wonder and say I have a feeling that such and such occurs, but I can't prove it yet. But maybe someday it will be. Some now are talking of every body emanating molecules as the odor of that body, and probably they are as identifiable as fingerprints. It isn't nothing; it's molecular change. You can hypothesize, and it's fun. It's possible that things are different because an experience has been.

This interview suggests that for Littlefair there is an important place for motivational proof or validity. However, the place of motivational proof is restricted for him. It is not the means for discovery. He notes that the ability of a theory to predict and control is the test of the scientific method, and is necessary in religion. However, the choice of what to discover, and what to do with that discovery once it is made, is considered by Littlefair as a motivational kind of validity. He states his case,

referring to the biologist, that motivations are important in the scientific method. Littlefair uses motivation in a different sense than what we have hypothesized as the difference between the religious and scientific method. It is viewed here that motivational validity in the religious method is the act of saying something is true or false on the basis of motivational need. This clearly is not the case with Littlefair. Rather, he considers motivations in the restricted sense of determining what truths already established or that might be established by the scientific method are "good" or "bad." His criteria for measuring scientific truth are the motivational factors within man, but motivations are not the basis for validating truth. The context of this taped interview just presented seems to support this statement.

Earlier in this chapter, we stated that the apparent motivation of Littlefair to escape entrapment would be discussed again.[54] At that point we were concerned with Littlefair's view of evidence, and we stated that we suspected that much of the evidence Littlefair would use was held in the demonstration of certain motivational factors. There is no reason to conclude differently here. However, great care must be taken in interpretation of this observation. Littlefair does make the difference between evidence for the creation of scientific truth, and he emphasizes the importance

---

[54]This was brought up on page 71 of this chapter.

of functional validity for that truth. Motivation seems important in a narrow sense of evaluation of truth after you once have established it. This is not the same as we would suggest for those using the religious methodology. An example of the religious methodology and its use of motivation as validity can be seen in Trueblood's book, in which he places experience on the same level with empirical evidence. He notes:

> The important consideration in all this is that the validating process, whether in religious experience or in sense experience, is identical. If Tennant's [F. R. Tennant] contention about the necessary privacy of an experience is an absolute barrier to validation in one field, it is an absolute barrier in another. . . . Tennant accepts validation by agreement in sense experience; therefore, he ought not to reject it in religious experience.[55]

Trueblood applies the tests of validity to religious experience subjectively held, and concludes that those feelings validate the existence of God, or at least help corroborate it. For Littlefair, this is obviously not true. Only science, and its tools, can establish the existence of anything that is true. It is man, Littlefair says, who "writes poetry" about what science establishes. Motivation, with its own tests for validity, tells a human being what he does with truth already established, or what hypotheses are worthy of empirical testing. We can conclude, then, that Littlefair is characterized by scientific methodology in

---

[55]Trueblood, Op. cit., p. 153.

proof, rather than the religious methodology, and that he does have a place for motivations, but not the same as in religion. His statement that "feelings don't prove one damn thing!" can be accepted, and his basic need to escape entrapment does not control (in terms of the religious method) what he accepts as true, but rather tells him what truths he needs and would write poetry about.

Immediate Speech Preparation

A common statement heard by this writer concerning the speeches of Duncan Littlefair is that he gives his speeches with no apparent reference to notes. Many have been amazed at the logical clarity of his sermons. Before analyzing the sermons, we asked Littlefair how he specifically prepared for his sermons. We could not get dependable evidence on the specific preparation of the sermons being studied in this paper, but we can conclude that the method is not different from his general means of preparation. The interview is as follows:

> Question: What are the major sources of your sermon ideas? How do you germinate these things? What process do you go through?
>
> Littlefair: I like to think of this. Conversation! Somebody raises a question, or I may raise it myself. I'll say, "What are you trying to prove?" And somebody will say, "That's a good question." And I say, "Gee, that is a good question." And I salt this away. And that kind of thing that pops at me I usually get right at it. [It may be] remarks in the newspaper, or a quotation from Joe Louis, or somebody like that. It excites me, a simple quotation like that. Like when he [Louis] says that after somebody asked him why

he got into the Army, Louis said, "Man! There ain't nothing wrong with this country that Hitler can fix." That's marvelous. Or in reading a book, a discussion will leap out at me. The whole thing is loaded with a personal approach to a modern dilemma. A guy in a flash of genius captures it, and they do it. For me it is to enlarge it, and ground it [in truth already established], and it's dramatized to begin with. And I love that. I just love that. And that sermon is made. It's done.

Question: Do you deliberately spend your summers doing this kind of thing? [Littlefair does not stay in his church from about June 15th to the second Sunday in September each year.]

Littlefair: Yeah! Well, no I don't. I just read. I don't try to do this. I just read. As ideas come like that, I make notes of them and put them away and never develop them at the time. Partly because I don't want to, and partly because I feel I don't need to, and when the time comes--if the idea doesn't appeal to me again--well, I throw it away, or I don't want it worn out. As I read these books, I see these little ideas, little subjects, and I write them down. But generally my reading in the summer is to make sure that I'm semi-keeping up with what's going on.

Question: Suppose one of these ideas does leap out at you. What process do you go through in the preparation of your sermon?

Littlefair: I write notes. I take the idea, and I say: What's good about it? Why do you like it? What's the basis for your liking it? What does this mean about your approach? I will ask such questions as--always the same questions: Why is it a good idea? How would it work? What's wrong with it? What would work against it? What's needed by the individual concerned to put such an idea into practice? How does this apply to life? To whom does it apply? I'll ask these questions, and make notes of them. I just go down, maybe a dozen sheets or more. Why? What's wrong? How come? How is it related? What's good? What's the religious viewpoint of it? And then, halfway through or more--I may take that long before I ask myself the question, but I will always answer it--what's the point of the sermon? If I can't come up with something I want to achieve, I throw it away. But if I've been intrigued with it, I know there is something there I want, and my asking the question is simply to cut through to what is the emphasis I really like here.

Question: Do you go through any immediate preparation? I notice when you get up to speak, there isn't one note. It seems completely extemporaneous.

Littlefair: I always come up with a plan. I've never preached a sermon without a plan. The plan is there. I may change it Sunday morning, but that doesn't make any difference, because I know my stuff so well by then, and I know what I want to say. I'm so in that subject that I can change it around, and it doesn't bother me [whether] this come[s] first or second. Sometimes I turn the whole thing backward. I just start over again, but I'm just re-arranging to suit my mind better, but that doesn't change the thinking any. I always have that outline, and I have gone through a change on this thing. It is interesting. As a high school speaker, I one time forgot a speech, and I said never again. Never again will I ever get caught forgetting. So, I then never wrote anything. Just notes. For many, many years I would never take a note in the pulpit except quotations, which I also likewise would refuse to memorize. I didn't want to get caught; I didn't want to have to be thinking about it. I wanted to be thinking, not remembering. Then, about five or six years ago, a couple of times I got so involved in an aspect of the sermon as to temporarily forget the sermon I was preaching, what point I was dealing with, the whole works. I'd have to tread for 15 seconds. The terror of it, it was like forgetting. And I said to myself, what in the hell are you trying to prove? You know you can do it without the notes. What's wrong with your having the outline there, so that if you need it, all you have to do is glance at it and your off again? Am I proving my gymnastics, or what in the hell is the point of it?

Question: What's the typical length of time that you use in preparation? How far along would you be by Thursday for a Sunday sermon?

Littlefair: I might not have even spent a minute on it. But if I had some questions about it, I would have. And I might start preparing Monday morning. No urgency or pressure, but just what am I going to do with this. If I'm sure, I've got it natural and it's only a question of my organization, then I will go until Friday. Or better still, because I stay home on Thursday, I will work on it Thursday. Just enough, because I try to get a little reading done that day, or something else further ahead, just enough so I'm on the way. It's not going to be a Saturday problem. And then,

Friday morning, I will come back to it again, spend some time with it, but I won't organize it finally. Saturday I will try to make my outline.

Question: What choices do you consider when you make a choice of a topic? What audience considerations do you make?

Littlefair: The only thing I consider is my own provocation. It's got to interest me.

Question: I have a tape of one of the debates you had with Dr. John Vandenberg [academic dean at Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan]. It seemed you were adjusting it [the speech] to some degree [to the Christian Reformed audience regarding state aid to non-public schools]. I don't mean in compromise, but I mean adjusting in the sense that you were not there to persuade Christian Reformed to support your position in theology. You recognized you had different theological positions. At least you took into consideration that they were probably of that religious persuasion. You made the argument [in opposition to public aid to private schools, a position Christian Reformed generally support] on their theological grounds, not your own. This is an audience consideration. To what degree do you do this in your pulpit?

Littlefair: Only from that standpoint. I would say to really be popularly successful, I don't do it enough. I don't do it nearly enough. I'm aware of my own audience [Fountain Street Church], and when I go out I'm usually speaking from my standpoint without any care, sufficient care, for them. I've been a little nicer about it in the last few years. I'm not effective for this reason. I do not take them into sufficient consideration. I do not lead. I do not meet them half way. I just give, and the hell with it. I don't like it; it's not good. But, it's part of my rebelliousness. It's not nice.

The questions asked in this part of the taped interview were to establish some of the more traditional considerations in speech criticism, such as the audience considerations, the means of preparation and delivery, and the attitude Littlefair has toward his audience. His delivery is

extemporaneous, with very few notes which are rarely observable to the listener.[56] His speaker role as he defines it is as a stimulater, and not as a speaker seeking some definite course of action. He made a statement in his pulpit December 31, 1967, just before his sermon:

> I consider it my place, not to dispense truth, but to stimulate inquiry.

There are other important general observations that can be made of Littlefair's immediate preparation. In many seminary homiletics courses, the source of sermon ideas is in the Bible. For Littlefair, this is obviously not true, according to his own statements. This fits what we would expect of a minister who does not find the source of his sermon ideas in a positive authority such as the Bible, or the denominational literature. Further, he apparently does not seek immediate acceptance of his claim, as noted in his self-defined role. His own provocation as a source of ideas, and his role as a stimulater rather than a dispenser of truth, is in keeping with functional validity as described in this chapter.

With these considerations about the speaker and invention, it is appropriate to consider the two audiences--the Fountain Street Church, and the larger community of Grand Rapids--as receivers. This is done in Chapter V.

---

[56]Evidence for this assertion is based on this writer's observation of Littlefair's preaching on about 20 occasions.

CHAPTER V

THE TWO AUDIENCES

Some of the most intriguing questions about the receivers in the communication event with Littlefair as the source cannot be answered in this paper. However, it is believed there are tools available to answer some of these questions. The most intriguing questions surround the means by which the two audiences validate claims presented to them by sources. The naive observer might conclude up to this point that, since Littlefair's thought processes have been generally considered as scientific in methodology, the congregation of Fountain Street Church would also be scientific in methodology. However, this might not be true. In fact, this writer suspects that the audience at Fountain Street Church is not significantly different from the larger, more conservative community's method of validating claims. Littlefair's assertiveness and strong, pulpit personality is no doubt an authority figure for many in his congregation, and people respond to him as some other church members do to their positive authorities. Nevertheless, it is important to make at least certain general observations

about the community and the congregation, and to present some evidence about the nature of each of these audiences.

Audience 1--The Community

Grand Rapids, Michigan, is a community of approximately 200,000 people. The larger metropolitan area, which includes Kent and Ottawa Counties, has about 465,000 inhabitants. This city is commonly described as "squaresville" by non-church goers, who rightly note the city's many churches, and its highly religious atmosphere in politics and community affairs. YOUTH FOR CHRIST's Saturday night events are better attended than many movie houses. The Grand Rapids Civic Auditorium, which seats 5,000 people, is filled two and three times in one day for such programs as Aunt Bertha's Children's Bible Hour Anniversary, or for concerts of Gospel Quartets. Big-name bands such as Duke Ellington have been brought in by some civic groups, and have lost money. And yet, Rev. Carl McIntire, radio minister of the Twentieth Century Reformation Hour radio program, and a nationally known political right-winger, held one meeting in the Grand Rapids Civic Auditorium in 1964, and raised more than $10,000 in about 30 minutes.[57]

There are few dependable statistics on church membership in Grand Rapids, but unofficial estimates, from church

---

[57]This figure is unofficial, but was told to this writer by Mr. Bernard Passage, manager of the auditorium.

leaders in the community, place Roman Catholic membership at about 19,000 families, Christian Reformed at about 23,000 individual members, Reformed Church in America at about 15,000 members, Regular Baptists at about 12,000 members, Congregationalists at 10,000, and Methodists at 8,000. Church attendance is commonly a twice-a-Sunday occurrence for most Protestant churches.

The national headquarters for the Christian Reformed and Regular Baptist congregations are in Grand Rapids, as are three seminaries: St. Joseph's (Roman Catholic), Calvin Theological Seminary (Christian Reformed), and Grand Rapids Baptist College and Seminary (Regular Baptist). The Reformed Church has a seminary in nearby Holland, Michigan. The headquarters for the National Association of Christian Schools (private, but religious oriented) is in Grand Rapids. In addition, there are Calvin College, Grace Bible College, and Grand Rapids School of the Bible and Music. Numerous national church groups, conservative in nature, have held annual conventions in Grand Rapids because of its so called "friendly attitude" toward Christianity. The National Association of Evangelicals, the National Holiness Association, the United Pentecostal Churches, Inc., and others have all held meetings in Grand Rapids within the past seven years.

Mel Trotter, a turn-of-the-century fundamentalist who came from the City Rescue Mission in Chicago, began his work in Grand Rapids, which has since expanded into more

than 60 missions throughout the state. In addition to the Children's Bible Hour, the Radio Bible Class is a program which also originates from Grand Rapids. Many out-of-towners have labeled Grand Rapids as "Little Jerusalem" when referring to the highly religious atmosphere that seems so prevalent. Based on estimates by this writer, the total of new church construction reported to the daily newspaper in Grand Rapids was more than $20,000,000 spent between 1962 and 1967. A newspaper writer for the Grand Rapids Press, who specializes in writing about real estate and new construction, estimated that there is more than $130,000,000 in church-owned property in Grand Rapids.

Added to all of this evidence about the religious nature of the community, there is the presence of three Protestant publishing houses which operate independently from any denominational sponsorship, but which serve the Protestant, conservative community of Grand Rapids and of the nation. These companies include William B. Eerdmann's Publishers, Zondervan Publishing Company, and Baker Book House. Further, of the two state senators to the Michigan Legislature, both are Christian Reformed. With this kind of picture, it is unusual that Fountain Street Church which sells itself as the "Voice of the Liberal" should exist.

Audience 2--Fountain Street Church

Fountain Street Church had its last energetic supporter of fundamentalism in 1890. However, the first

consistent and strong liberal preacher was not in the pulpit until John Herman Randall took the post in 1897, and held it until 1906. In a sermon delivered by Randall on May 14, 1905, the church's liberal stance became clear. This is true, not because Randall said it, but because he was kept as a minister, and others were hired after him who made similar assertions so shocking to the rest of the community. Randall stated:

> And I say frankly [regarding the existence of Hell] for myself this morning, that I am not such a craven coward as to worship a God like that. If there is such a God, be he imaginary or be he real, I will deny him through all eternity; and if he wants to torture me eternally he can; but just as long as I am consciously intelligent, such a being as that can never, never conquer me.[58]

This statement did not go unnoticed, as Randall was characterized as the one who "threw out the Bible." Alfred Wishart, Randall's successor, fared no better as is indicated in a story which appeared in the Grand Rapids newspaper, August 24, 1906:

> The Fountain Street Church has extended a call to Rev. Alfred J. Wishart of Trenton, N. J., the younger members of the church exercising their own free will in the selection of a successor to Rev. J. Herman Randall. The older members asked if Mr. Wishart was a liberal preacher, intending to veto the call, but they were silenced.

---

[58]This quotation was attributed by Lorence E. Asman to Randall in Asman's book The Tragic Fall of the First Baptist Church (Grand Rapids: Asman Tract Publishers, 1956), p. 17. The quotation authenticity is testified to by the fact Fountain Street Church ordered 500 copies.

> Mr. Randall ran an institutional church, preferring ethical to Biblical subjects for his sermons. One Sunday morning Col. Rose, now deceased, father of Henry M. Rose, jumped to his feet in the midst of a sermon and shouted: "For the Lord's sake, Rev. Randall, say one word for the Lord God Almighty." "Just a moment, Col. Rose," Rev. Randall replied. Col. Rose's spectacular request mirrored the sentiments of the older members of the congregation.[59]

Fountain Street Church was first organized in 1837, and helped to form the other Baptist congregations of the community. However, by 1910 the other Baptist Churches generally found themselves unable to tolerate Fountain Street Church, and they withdrew from formal organization with it. The Grand Rapids Association of Regular Baptist Churches, led by Wealthy Street Baptist Church, is a denomination that formed essentially over the conflict between them and Fountain Street Church.[60]

Littlefair made his first appearance at Fountain Street Church as minister on September 10, 1944. Different from his predecessors, Littlefair was not willing to accept even the remote belief that God was a supernatural being. Philip Buchen, an attorney and former vice president of Grand Valley State College, notes in his three-volume history of Fountain Street Church:

> The earlier liberal ministers--Randall, Wishart, and McGorrill--had all preached with the word "Christ"

---

[59] Ibid., p. 22.

[60] Philip Buchen, The Only Church With a History Like This (Grand Rapids: Fountain Street Church, 1959, 3 vols.), Vol. III. In this book, Buchen relates this story on pp. 27-36.

> very much on their tongues. With Littlefair the word became an archaism, and he avoided using it because of the implications that Jesus as the Messiah had established for all men, in all times, religious truths that were absolute, exclusive, and beyond being questioned or tested. He preached strongly against the artificial build-up of Jesus as the Christ and used in his argument the Jesus of likely history, without the glowing embellishments that others had put upon the story: "Jesus said, 'Here it is! You test it and prove to yourself whether it be of God or not! Don't accept it because I say so. Test it! Prove it!'."[61]

What had begun in 1910 as a disaffiliation by other Baptist Churches from Fountain Street Church was completed in 1962. The Board of Managers of the Michigan Baptist Convention ended nearly 57 years of efforts by local or state associations to terminate Fountain Street's association with the organization. Randall was censored in 1905, but the MBC in February, 1962, cited Fountain Street Church as "disaffiliating itself from the MBC" by its noncooperative behavior according to the constitution. The constitution had been changed the year before to make this action possible. Littlefair's response to this act was: "It's understandable and justified. We haven't cooperated, we are so different. We appreciate their not wanting to be identified with us."

Thus far, this chapter has dealt with the general characteristics of the community, and the history of the church. At this point, we shall reconsider the two audiences, with specific concern about the response of the community to the advocacy of Littlefair, and the nature of the congregation today.

---

[61] Ibid., p. 75.

Audience 1--The Community

There have been many antagonisms directed by the community toward Littlefair and Fountain Street Church. They have ranged from the relatively mild criticism of Msgr. Charles W. Popell, pastor of St. Andrew's Roman Catholic Cathedral, to Rev. David Otis Fuller, pastor since 1938 of Wealthy Street Baptist Church. Msgr. Popell described Littlefair to this writer as a humanist, and expressed doubt that Fountain Street Church should really be called a church. Other clergymen have labeled, with a curious kind of high emotionalism, the church and minister as sensationalists. It is not uncommon to see students from Calvin Theological Seminary, or from Grand Rapids Baptist Seminary, attending the church service on Sunday morning, marching in with Bibles under arm, and cornering Littlefair--when possible--after his sermon.

Some of the most robust and colorful counter-advocacy has been expressed by David Otis Fuller. He has linked Littlefair with Marxism, Leninism, and atheism. In one pamphlet, published by Fuller's organization, The Baptist Testimony, Littlefair's name appeared in the title: "Is Jesus God: An Answer to the Blasphemies of Duncan Littlefair!" A typical attack is seen in Fuller's following statement:

> I would ask and answer two questions this afternoon: "Is there a Personal God, and is Jesus Christ the Eternal Son of God--God in Human Form?" This is an

> answer to the blasphemies spoken over the radio in past weeks by Duncan Littlefair, "Pastor" of Fountain Street "Church."
>
> What is your authority? Well, we've know some men to say, "I make MYSELF my authority. I will decide what's right or wrong, true or false." If YOU should say that to ME, I HOPE you would pardon me if I laughed in your face. I just couldn't help it. YOU--your authority? That's a joke. Little two-by-four you setting yourself up as final judge of right and wrong. No my friend we must have something higher, greater, more certain and lasting than any church or individual or minister or priest. There IS ONE authority which outlasts, our-ranks and outshines all others put together. And THAT if the Bible, God's Holy Word. [Lorence E. Asman, The Tragic Fall of the First Baptist Church (Grand Rapids: Asman Tract Publishers, 1956), p. 35, is the source of this quotation.]

This statement by Fuller represents one of the differences we would expect in the use of the two methodologies described in Chapters III and IV. It also gives evidence of the statement made in the previous chapter that Littlefair does use scientific methodology, and in fact does refuse to accept truths on the basis of authority.

To expand our knowledge of the community's attitude toward the advocacy of Littlefair, we asked in a taped interview what Littlefair thought was the community's attitude:

> Question: How do you think Fountain Street Church, and yourself have been viewed by the general community?
>
> Littlefair: Well, that's changed in some degree. Of course, for many years--the first seven or eight I was here--they thought it would fold. And they scoffed at it, and then attacked it, but they never thought it would last. And then, as time went on, like 10 or 12 years, they began to realize that this thing was sort of here. It wasn't going to fold. They knew that for sure. They began to say, "Well, it's good for the community. They do some things." And that's pretty much where it still is.

Fuller's attacks are not characteristic in degree of the community's attitude toward Littlefair, but it is doubtful that the kind or direction of his attitudes is too different from the many other churchmen in the community.

Audience 2--The Fountain Street Church

The congregation of Fountain Street Church appears in some areas as fiercely loyal. Many members and friends have commented: "With Littlefair, you either hate him or love him; there's rarely a middle ground." More specific descriptions of the nature of the congregation come from Rev. Verdi Ruesser, parish minister for the church. From him we learned of the kind of people who are representative of the congregation. After surveying the membership files, Ruesser estimated that the congregation included salesmen, junior executives, executives, attorneys and other professional men, and probably not more than 3 percent of the congregation comprised of factory or blue-collar workers. Of the 25 current [1967] members of the church's Governing Board of Trustees, one is a college instructor, three public school teachers, one medical doctor, four attorneys, one real estate salesman, one manufacturer, three insurance men, one banker, one newspaper editor, one city official, six housewives, and two private businessmen. Of the two attorneys, one is Paul Goebell who is a regent for the University of Michigan, and the other is A. Robert Kleiner, a prominent

West Michigan Democratic Party activist. The congregation includes active Republicans such as John Martin, who is National Committeeman from Michigan to the National Republican organization, and numerous members of the Democratic Party.

Asked whether more women than men attended church, Ruesser replied that the church had no sex over-represented, and that most attenders were young couples. Of the new members of the church who joined between January 1, 1967, and April 17, 1967 (the date of the interview with Ruesser), six joined through attendance at the Character School, five were former Methodists, four Congregationalists, four Presbyterians, three Christian Scientists, two Episcopalians, two Roman Catholics, two Unitarians, two Lutherans, one Unity, one Christian Reformed, and one who was non-affiliated.

To aid in a description of Audience 2, a document entitled "What is Fountain Street Church" approved by the Governing Board, and distributed by the Communications Committee of that Board in March, 1960, was used as a source of information. The document contained the following nine principles:

1. All truth is relative.
2. Religion is universal and all religions have equal validity though, of course, not all religions are on the same level.
3. Religion is man's quest for a rich and abundant life.

4. Religion is valid chiefly only on the personal level, for every individual must search for himself and make his own discoveries.

5. There are principles of direction and there are personal discoveries and conclusions, but there are no final and absolute answers to any questions.

6. There is no magic, and there is no supernatural.

7. We believe in the necessity of growth. The infinite goodness of God can never be completely understood or appreciated by any individual.

8. We believe in the value of differences, and the importance of creative conflict as a basic condition of growth.

9. We believe in the local church as a community of those who need each other and seek to share with each other in the common quest for a rich and abundant life.

These principles reflect little in terms of what the congregation might believe about validity. It is obvious the statement does resist authoritative validity, but the exact nature of motivational and functional validity is not shown in this statement. Further, even if the statement should the statement might not have any meaningful relationship to how the audience views Littlefair as an advocate, and how they validate his claims.

We can see from the listing of those who joined the church over a specified period of time that many religious backgrounds are represented, but we still don't know why they came to this church, and what effect Littlefair's advocacy had on them. This appropriately belongs to another study.

However, there are at least two general conclusions we would make about the evidence presented in this chapter: (1) The Fountain Street Church congregation holds similar beliefs to Littlefair, though we know very little about the methodology the congregation uses to reach those beliefs; (2) The community holds different beliefs from those of Littlefair, and we have a glimpse of the methodology as represented in the attacks of Fuller against Littlefair. The religious beliefs of the community generally are based on authority, and others--including Littlefair--are measured on the basis of how well they match those positive authorities. With this chapter, the communication event in which the sermons are presented is more clearly seen. The church building itself is of Byzantine and Romanesque architecture. The building seats about 1,800 attenders, 800 in a balcony that covers three sides of an oblong sanctuary. The pulpit is six-feet off the main floor, and has a eagle crest. On a table at the center of the rostrum there is kept a spray of flowers. No cross appears there as in other churches.

The stained glass windows are of the style which are in the 13th Century Chartres Cathedral in France. On one of the windows, Charles Darwin's figure appears along with Erasmus, Leonardo de Vinci, Roger Williams, Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and--of course--Jesus.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF THE MESSAGES

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the speeches delivered by Duncan Littlefair, using the hypotheses developed in Chapter III as referents for the analysis. Three speeches delivered by Littlefair are "Valid and Invalid Claims for Religion," delivered September 30, 1962; "Is a Non-Authoritarian Religion Possible?" delivered January 27, 1963; and "The Function of Religion," delivered February 5, 1967. Littlefair has delivered more than 800 sermons while minister of Fountain Street Church, but these three sermons were chosen for analysis because they illustrate best some of the considerations about the religious and scientific methodologies important to this paper.

In addition to verbatim manuscripts located for all three sermons studied, a tape recording of the "Function" sermon was also obtained. The degree of discrepancy between the verbatim copy of the "Function" sermon was noted, and is included in the Appendix. The printed sermons apparently have had little editing done to them from the way they were delivered. The major editing elements were paragraphing, and the leaving out of words improperly articulated. To add

to the validity of the written copies of the sermons, we interviewed three typists who worked from the tape recordings of the sermons, and Rev. Verdi Reusser, associate minister of the church and the man who has been in charge of the sermon editing since 1948.[62] It seems safe to conclude that the printed sermons are nearly accurate as delivered. Certainly any differences will not represent serious problems for the analysis undertaken in this study.

The sermons chosen are not representative of the entire public speaking career of Littlefair. However, generalizations about the topics discussed in the sermons studied can be made. Such generalizations were arrived at by random reading of 50 sermons on similar issues presented since 1945.

The procedure for the analysis of the sermons was through preparation of logical substance outlines of each sermon, with additional flow charts made on the basis of the dimensions presented in Chapter IV. Thus, emphasis was placed on the evidence used, the general claim of the speech, the reasoning, the world of events, and proof. Critical hypotheses were applied to each of these dimensions. The procedure for reporting the results of this study will be as follows: claim, reasoning, evidence, proof, and world of events. It is believed that this presents the most adequate and comprehensive means to understand the sermons delivered.

---

[62]Mr. Reusser made a statement to this writer that "the sermons were not edited for literary style, but were printed as delivered except for words improperly used."

Claim

The general claims of the speeches were isolated as follows: The "Function" sermon had as its claim: "We have to make a new religion;" the "Authoritarian" sermon: "I do not believe that the church has to be authoritarian . . . and I believe that we are in the process of proving . . . it . . . ," and the "Valid" sermon: "Legitimate religion never offers you power any other place but over yourself."

The critical hypotheses we have offered state that a speaker using the religious methodology would display more confidence in the validity of his claim, and that he would seek immediate acceptance of his claim by his audience. There is no direct evidence from the messages to substantiate what was Littlefair's purpose regarding the claim. However, previous to a sermon delivered December 31, 1967, Littlefair commented on his role as a sermon deliverer: "I consider it my place, not to dispense truth, but to stimulate inquiry."

There is other indirect evidence found in the sermons under study, particularly in a statement he makes with respect to truth. In the "Authority" sermon, Littlefair criticizes the authoritarian nature of most religion:

> They started very early to determine what was truth. This was not a matter to be investigated by the ordinary person or by the scientists or to be allowed to develop and prove itself. They had to determine from the top what was really the truth. So they would sit [church councils] for long sessions and then finally come out with the truth, the truth, what was now the

> truth of the Christian church and it was to be accepted by all peoples.

These comments were stated in the framework of what he believed to be invalid claims for the church, and it might be logically assumed that if Littlefair attacked this means of establishing truth, he would also reject it on his own part. The evidence, however, for Littlefair's stance about offered claims is indirect. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Littlefair did not make any specific statement in any of the speeches studied that would indicate direct answers to the questions of the hypothesis. Yet, since the audience has heard him many times, and since he has made his role clear in previous sermons, and he has an attitude about how truth is acquired, it would seem less than fair not to conclude that Littlefair does offer his claims for critical examination by his audience. Further, the language style used by Littlefair when stating his claim has less "absoluteness" and detail in it than when he describes what he doesn't believe. Therefore, we conclude Littlefair is scientific in methodology with respect to the general claim of the speeches.

Reasoning

In Chapter III there were three types of reasoning presented. They included: (1) definition--classification, which refers to assertions about the parameters of a given symbol; (2) correlation, or statements about the relationship

between symbols such as is commonly seen in reasoning by sign or analogy, and (3) causation, or statements about the relationship between symbols that are primarily causative in nature, or where one causes the other.

It should be noted that while messages are generally verbal expressions in the form of symbols, there is a syntactical, semantical and pragmatical nature about the presentation of those symbols. It is an act of reasoning when the parameters of a symbol are shown by pointing to an object--this is semantics--even though the symbol is not present in the message itself. This situation suggests that the relationship between a symbol and the evidence used for its support is an act of correlation reasoning, and it may be pragmatical (the use of authoritative evidence), or semantical (the use of empirical evidence).

The "Function" sermon gives an excellent example of the use of definition-classification reasoning:

1. The church has presumed there is a plan for the whole world.
2. The church has posited a personal planner.
3. The church has assumed a personal concern on the part of that planner for his individual creatures.
4. The church has assumed that man had a special creation.
5. The church has attempted to meet fundamental needs of man by asserting a supernatural knowledge, and the church knows what it is.

6. The church has demanded faith and obedience from people.

7. The church has asserted everything that happens in the world is right and true, whether man sees it or not.

8. The church has guaranteed success to people.

9. The church has promised salvation if you accept its authority and control.

10. The church has sought to dominate individuals and society.

The definition-classification reasoning is seen here in the defining of the parameters of the symbol "church." It is interesting to note the past tense of the verbs used in these definition-classifications.[63] It will be noted later that this past-tense distinction leads to the assertion that the church as it once was in time is the cause of certain conditions in the present. This is seen in a statement he makes later in the same sermon:

> The ways of the church (the way it was defined earlier in the sermon) were adequate to another day, to other people, under other conditions, but not now. . . . We cannot answer the question of who we are on the basis of knowledge prior to 1860.[64]

The definition-classification act of reasoning regarding the parameters of the symbol "church" and how it operated in the past is the cause, according to Littlefair, of the needed change of attitude for a modern religion. It (the

---

[63]See p. 107.

[64]This is a possible referent to Charles Darwin's impact on the church. His book, Origin of the Species, was published in 1859. A stained-glass window in Fountain Street Church is dedicated to Darwin.

old religion) is at least an antecedent condition to an outdated church.

Correlations are drawn by Littlefair to the definitions he presented in the "Function" sermon, and are established between the definitions and the evidence, or assertions about the lack of evidence. To each of the 10 above stated definitions, he made the following correlations, respectively:

1. A sheer presumption without evidence to justify it.

2. No evidence or proof of any kind that there was a person who created the world and created this man to occupy it and in some degree run it and govern it.

3. We are no longer willing to base our sense of dignity and worth on a presupposition that is so completely foundationless.

4. And it will no longer do.

5. But that claim is no longer valid, no longer meaningful, no longer acceptable.

6. Men were willing in those days of superstition to accept these presumptious claims and assertions and to follow out the logic of them.

7. But is it not clear that this method is no longer valid? We are not prepared to accept such assertions simply because they are made. We are no longer willing to accept such claims without any evidence to justify them.

8. We're not so blindly accepting such claims. We want to know, and we look with critical eye. We appraise and survey. We are doubtful of the morality of it to begin with, and we do not see such claims can be justifiably asserted on the basis of evidence and life as we see it to be. Good people do not always get good.

9. It has worked wonderfully, but it is not working any more. The grounds for it are no longer there, and you cannot really find comfort in something that doesn't make sense to you.

10. But less and less and less. That will no longer work. It can no longer be on the basis of something supernatural or magical, without which we could not find our way.

A similar technique is used in the "Authority" sermon. The definition-classification reasoning is used in defining the parameters of the symbol religion. The assertions are as follows:

1. Religion has always been authoritarian.

2. [In religion] all decisions . . . originate from the same central source, and are not subject to censure, criticism or revision on the part of the people to whom the orders are given.

3. The church has ruled with very rigid discipline. It has never been a democratic institution or process. It has never been a place where the laws of reason and evidence come into play.

And one can note the causative implication by the use of past tense verbs in these assertions. Littlefair describes the people of that day who brought about these conditions just described:

1. It [authority] has been possible because of the ignorance of people in these days gone by when only a few men had the ingenuity or the knowledge or the intuition to know a few things about the world and about the nature of man and they were able to utilize that information to secure control.

2. It has been possible because of superstition.

3. It has been possible because there is some kind of supernatural truth.

4. It has given unity because it has had discipline.

And all of these statements in the "Authority" sermon are causal statements, or antecedent conditions, for the following statement he makes:

> I do not believe that religion will vanish because the power of authority is gone. I do not believe that men will go on in their superstition, but I believe men will go on living, and that they will demand more and more dignity for their life.

And elsewhere, he states:

> This (these prior conditions) is why the church is in trouble. The problem for our day is that the bases for the authoritarian church are gone. Out of our knowledge we have been banishing a great deal of fear and superstition.

The same situations described in the "Function" and the "Authority" sermons are also found in the "Valid" sermon. Littlefair discusses how religion has been confused with magic and the concept of the "Great Provider." Then, by definition-classification reasoning, he makes assertions about the parameters of magic and/or magician, and the "Great Provider" concept. He notes:

1. Magic is an attempt to control the powers of the world or of the universe.

2. Magic is a device by means of which you get these powers into your hands so that you can direct them and manipulate them to achieve what you want to achieve.

3. Magic is always a secret operation.

4. The magician is always someone who has special powers, special access, special information and knowledge, or special relationship.

In contrast, Littlefair defines religion:

1. A religious person does not gain control of the supernatural powers.

2. He is never able to manipulate them.

3. He does not attempt to organize the world to suit his ends and his purposes.

4. He does not ever have secret knowledge that he will share with you for a price or for some other value in return.

The Great Provider concept is then described:

1. If you want something you come to religion and you get it.

2. Religions compete on the basis of how much we have to offer you, how much we have to offer you to get you to come in to buy our product.

The sermon then attempts to define what are valid claims and invalid claims for religion, and finally concludes that religion essentially is neither magic nor a concept of a "Great Provider." This is definition-classification reasoning. He draws correlations to evidence, or the lack of it, as he does in the other sermons. He notes:

> It is invalid to promise supernatural powers to anyone who comes seeking for help. I believe it is invalid for religion to offer man any kind of control over his world. These supernatural powers are always dangled before us, and they are never quite achieved.

With this description of the reasoning in the three sermons analyzed, it is important to make some conclusions about the critical hypotheses offered in Chapter IV. The first hypothesis states that a speaker using the religious methodology will derive his theories about the world of

events and from positive authorities, while the speaker using the scientific methodology will derive his theories about the world of events from empirical observations of that world of events.

In the "Authority" sermon, Littlefair asserted that because of man's growing knowledge the validity of supernatural truth has been vanishing. He then appealed to certain empirical observations, not authority:

> We cannot pray away a tornado. We know that you cannot pray away a pestilence disease. We know that you cannot pray yourself into old age and into health and into the success of your children or your own. Out of our knowledge we have been banishing a great deal of fear and superstition.

The "Function" sermon presented earlier in this chapter made the same essential point. One assertion was that the church has posited a personal planner. He then stated that there was no evidence (empirical, and an implicit rejection of authorities who have posited such a planner) or proof of any kind that there was a person who created the world. This is an appeal to empirical observation, and a conclusion based on the lack of empirical evidence for those who who have made assertions of a personal planner. Thus, we conclude that Littlefair is scientific in methodology with respect to this hypothesis.

The second hypothesis states: A speaker using the religious methodology will validate his theories about the world of events by his authority, while the speaker using

the scientific methodology will validate his theories about the world of events by functional means. The functional concern is primarily surrounding that of prediction. It is obvious from one of his sermons that he is concerned about this issue. In the "Function" sermon, he notes:

> They started very early to determine what was truth. This was not a matter to be investigated by the ordinary person or by the scientists or to be allowed to develop and prove itself.

It is further noted in the "Valid" sermon that Littlefair is concerned with the functional. He states:

> When a religion gets men to do something today on the basis that some other time they will be rewarded, you are involved in the field of magical lure, and promise and manipulation. For the future has never yet offered the things that religion has been promising for so many centuries. Religion has not delivered yet. And any kind of promise that keeps getting put off further and further away must of its very essence be an invalid promise.

There is abundant evidence that Littlefair is scientific in terms of his means for validating theories.

The third hypothesis states: A speaker using the religious methodology will be more sure of his theories, and have them highly defined syntactically, while the speaker using the scientific methodology will be less sure of his theories because of his functional concern for validity. Throughout Littlefair's sermons, he is concerned about the empirical evidence or the lack of it as he tests certain assumptions or assertions. If we limit this hypothesis to theories about Littlefair's beliefs rather than theories

about disbeliefs, we can see fewer syntactical relationships about his beliefs than his disbeliefs.[65] Evidence for this is seen best when the fourth hypothesis is seen in relationship to the third. The fourth hypothesis states: A speaker using the religious methodology will have a high differentiation between his beliefs and disbeliefs, with his disbeliefs less defined syntactically, while the speaker using the scientific methodology will have less differentiation between his beliefs and his disbeliefs, with high syntactical differentiation between disbeliefs. In all three sermons analyzed, about 90 percent of the sermons were devoted to assertions the speaker did not accept, and they were highly defined. This could lead to the wrong assumption that Littlefair is religious in methodology with respect to the third hypothesis. However, a look at the statements of what Littlefair believes were less defined. This can be seen in the following statement from the "Function" sermon. He first notes what he doesn't believe:

> If you grant that there is such a thing as superior or supernatural knowledge, then you must grant that somebody understands this or is in possession of it. And if you grant that, then you must grant their right to govern, direct, and control. You as an ordinary human mortal have no right to be making up your own mind or making your own decisions about the things that are true and good, just and right, and pure. You give them over, and in the giving up of them, you find strength and security and confidence. You go to

---

[65]This point was also raised on page 103 regarding the language style of Littlefair when stating his claim.

> Father--and everyone knows the temptation to go Father or to Mother--and the Church in its Catholic form has accentuated this when it talks of "Mother Church," when it talks of the priests as Fathers and the nuns as Sisters. This is "come unto me," and everyone likes it and we all accept it and enjoy it. . . . But is it not clear that this method is no longer valid?

These statements are rigidly defined syntactically, and logically interrelated. This stands in strong contrast to a statement of what Littlefair accepts as true in the same sermon:

> Surely these are the fundamental questions of religion [Who am I? How am I related? and What is good?]. And we are about to find new answers. We are about to meet our human needs, through new ways of fulfilling our necessities, new functions of religion. There is more than enough here to challenge the intelligence and the skill of the world's greatest minds. There is more than enough here for you and for me.

However, exactly what this new religion and new relationships are have not been defined. Thus, it seems there is evidence that Littlefair does use the scientific methodology in both the third and fourth hypotheses.

The fifth hypothesis states: A speaker using the religious methodology will evaluate authorities on the basis of their meting out reward and punishment, while the speaker using the scientific methodology will evaluate authorities on the basis of cognitive correctness, accuracy, and consistency with other information he already possesses. Evidence for Littlefair's scientific methodology is available in all three sermons analyzed. In the "Valid" sermon, he notes that religion is invalid when

> it makes promises for the future because no religion can make such promises. When religion gets men to do something today on the basis that some other time they will be rewarded, you are involved in the field of magical lure and promise and manipulation.

He further notes:

> It is invalid to promise supernatural powers to anyone who comes seeking for help. . . . It is invalid for religion to promise men triumph or victory over their enemies or over their competitors. . . . It is invalid to promise people that they will escape from the natural hazards of physical sickness and disruptions, decay in our world.

In every case, Littlefair criticizes acceptance of a belief on the basis of reward or punishment. In the "Function" sermon, Littlefair speaks of the rewards for a belief in a promised salvation. He states:

> And of course millions reach for it, going through the routine of suppressing their questions and their intelligence, to move on the basis of their faith to take what the Church has said and to be assured that this in the end will mean an eternal life for them--even though they do not see it now, even though it means nothing much right now, even though they are miserable and depressed and persecuted now--they have accepted this promise of a salvation to come. It has worked wonderfully, but it is not working any more. I have met so many people who say, "I wish I could accept it. What a comfort it must be." And I say, "What a comfort it could be, what a comfort it has been, but it cannot be now." The grounds for it are no longer there, and you cannot really find comfort in something that does not make sense to you.

Thus, we would conclude that with respect to the fifth hypothesis, Littlefair is scientific in methodology.

The sixth hypothesis states: A speaker using the religious methodology will evaluate people and their theories on the basis of authorities they line up with, while a

speaker using the scientific methodology will hold people in isolation from their theories and from the authorities they line up with.

Very little reference to authority is found in any of Littlefair's sermons. In the three sermons analyzed, one reference was made to Jesus in the "Valid" sermon. However, Jesus was invoked as an illustration, and not as an authority. Further, no evaluation was made of other individuals as they measure in relationship to Jesus. He refers to Jesus as an example of one who was in the Temptation Story[66] facing the issue of power over the world. Littlefair had just noted that religion does not offer power over the world, and he concluded that Jesus as well as other leaders in the world's religions at least on this occasion did not seek power over the world. Our conclusion, then, is that Littlefair is scientific in methodology with respect to the sixth hypothesis.

Evidence

There are two hypotheses presented concerning evidence. First, a speaker using the religious methodology will place more trust in authoritarian evidence than in empirical evidence, while the speaker using the scientific methodology will place more trust in empirical evidence. The second

---

[66]The Temptation Story is told in the New Testament--Matt. 4, and Luke 4.

hypothesis states that a speaker using the religious methodology will use empirical evidence in the demonstration sense in that the evidence is unified by a preconceived set of First Principles or authority-based theory, while the speaker using the scientific methodology will use empirical evidence in the inductive sense, in that the data is held in isolation until some theory explains it in its own empirical terms, and is validated.

The latter hypothesis is apparently not relevant to speech making, for there is no evidence in the speeches to make any conclusion on this issue. However, it was possible to reach certain conclusions on this regarding Littlefair's thought processes, and these were presented in Chapter IV.

The first hypothesis, however, is relevant. Throughout all three sermons analyzed, Littlefair rejects authority as the basis for the acceptance of evidence. In fact, we might note the relationships drawn earlier in this chapter regarding the "Function" sermon where Littlefair pointed out assertions made by the church, and the lack of empirical evidence to justify the conclusions made by the church.[67] Thus, it is appropriate to conclude Littlefair is scientific in methodology with respect to the fact he does place more trust in empirical evidence than in authoritarian evidence.

---

[67]See page 106.

Proof

Three hypotheses were presented with respect to proof, or validity. Since proof or validity is both the speaker's prior determining of truth with the message as the output event of a previous process of validating, and the receiver's determination of the truth or falsity of the message, the message must be understood in two ways: (1) How does the audience validate the message, and (2) how does the message reflect the speaker's validation of events from the world? The first question--an audience question--was discussed in the previous chapter. However, the second question is the concern here. Our hypotheses state: (1) A speaker using the religious methodology will consider his authority and tradition as the validation of a theory, while the speaker using the scientific methodology will consider the functional as the validation of a theory; (2) A speaker using the religious methodology will consider motivation as validation of a theory for a given audience, while the speaker using the scientific methodology will consider motivational proof as irrelevant, and (3) a speaker using the religious methodology will present his theories to confirm the remote future, while a speaker using the scientific methodology will have his theories held in isolation awaiting validation in the immediate future.

At no point in any of the analyzed speeches does Littlefair appeal to authority or a tradition as a validation

of his own assertions. Indeed, he attacks theories that do appeal to authority or tradition. There is an abundance of evidence already presented with respect to the source of theories and evidence that confirms this statement. Further, we analyzed in Chapter IV Littlefair's notions of validity, and authority was rejected by him.[68]

The hypothesis regarding motivational proof is less clear.[69] Nevertheless, the appeal is to reason, and to the necessity of scientific inquiry as a basis for validity. Empirical evidence is continually invoked as a missing element in the religion he attacks. His trust in theories that predict has already been pointed out.[70]

The third hypothesis is primarily a statement about causative assertions. It is concerned with present conditions that would imply certain dependent conditions in the future. A religious speaker will find his assertions about present relationships confirm what he knows will happen. A scientific speaker will present his assertions about present relationships, and ascertain in the future whether they

---

[68]This was pointed out in Littlefair's statement referred to on page 111, where religion and "magical lure" have not "delivered yet."

[69]This issue was explored in Chapter IV, page 79 concluding that Littlefair finds an important place for motivational proof. There is a difference between motivational proof in each methodology, but at this writing there is no reliable means of analyizing the message in discreet categories.

[70]This point was made in a Littlefair statement (page 111) regarding the inability of religion to produce.

predict or do not predict. Littlefair's concern is continually based on the need for drawing more realistic relationships, and that these relationships must be predictable. His messages reflect a criticism of those in religion who have "posited a personal planner" without any results. Our conclusion is that Littlefair is scientific in methodology regarding this hypothesis.

World of Events

Our hypothesis states that a speaker using the religious methodology would view the world as more unfriendly than a speaker using the scientific methodology. Littlefair's personal attitude about this is presented in Chapter IV.[71] However, his scientific orientation is also seen in his sermons. In the "Function" sermon, he states:

> You can no longer go on regarding the world in the way you did--if you assumed once that it was the temporary home of no significance and now you believe it to be, on the basis of your new knowledge, your one and only home--then your relationship to this earth and world and universe is going to be completely different. . . . there will be new meaning to tenderness, new meanings to justice, new meanings to kindness, new meanings for reverence, new meaning for faith, new meaning for appreciation.

There is no evidence in any of the sermons that the world is a place religious people must tolerate, or protect themselves from its (the world's) evils. Indeed, Littlefair continually seems to consider the world the only place where

---

[71]His attitudes are discussed in Chapter IV, pp. 62-64.

goodness can be validated. His confidence in man's ability to cope with the world is reflected in the "Authoritarian" sermon:

> I do not believe that the church has to be authoritarian today because it has always been so. I believe that men will rouse themselves from their submission to hierarchical authoritarian churches and that they will build religions of free men in a free world. And that this will give religion a new meaning and a new significance and that through the new religion men will rise to new heights.

These conditions are quite different from statements we might expect of one using the religious methodology, where the world is often considered a place to tolerate at best, or even to be feared. Thus, we conclude that with respect to the world of events, Littlefair is scientific in methodology.

In this chapter, we have analyzed three sermons by Duncan Littlefair for evidence concerning his attitudes expressed in messages and reflected in the five categories of claim, evidence, reasoning, proof and/or validity, and the world of events. Under these five categories, a total of fourteen hypotheses have been used as criteria. In twelve of these hypotheses we have concluded Littlefair is scientific in methodology. A thirteenth hypotheses, that of the place of motivation in proof, was considered inconclusive. Another hypothesis regarding evidence and its isolation was considered as irrelevant in the study of messages.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, EVALUATION, SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The purpose of this final chapter is to summarize some of the conclusions reached by this study, to evaluate the meaning of those conclusions, and to suggest some areas for further study.

In the introduction to this study, five questions were asked: (1) What is the relationship between the religious and scientific methodologies; (2) How are the Rokeach predictions of open and closed mindedness related to these two methods; (3) How would the two methodologies, and the open and closed systems, be expressed in invention and argumentation; (4) Can the speech-making of Dr. Duncan Littlefair be characterized in meaningful ways to illustrate the contrasting methodologies, and (5) What can be said critically of the audience.

In Chapter I, this writer sought to show the contrasts between the religious and scientific methodologies by discussing the contrasting epistemological assumptions and means of discovering truth, and how Aristotle and Francis Bacon represent intellectual forefathers to the methodologies

under study. It was understood in this study that theory construction and/or reasoning is present in both methodologies, but that the religious methodology operates from certain First Principles, or prior assumptions, i.e. belief in some kind of uncaused cause that when assumed explains all that exists. This contrasts with the scientific methodology, which begins with what can be observed, and is more willing to adjust its generalizations to fit what is observed. It was pointed out that the methodologies may be differentiated in terms of deductive and inductive reasoning, or in the way the methodologies look differently at authority as a basis for theory and/or reasoning. Thus, religion was seen in this study as primarily ex post facto in its explanation, while science was described as interested in the predictability of a theory. Our first question--What is the relationship between the religious and scientific methodologies?--was answered in terms of certain fundamental differences, both philosophical and in theory construction.

In a search for meaningful categories to make these methodological differences more concrete and useful in analyzing the speech event, this writer turned to the theory of the open and closed mind as articulated by Dr. Milton Rokeach of Michigan State University. It was found that there was a critical relationship between the open mind and the scientific methodology, and the closed mind and the religious methodology. Thus, our second question--How are the

predictions of open and closed mindedness related to these two methods?--was answered in Chapter II.

Most rhetorical studies have dwelt on the five classical canons of rhetoric. In this study, the writer sought to deal primarily with invention and argument. Questions of style, memory, and delivery--although considered as potentially of value for a study--were discussed only incidentally, and then only if they were important to the questions surrounding the man, and how he conceived his messages, or where it was important in the logical analysis of the message. Audience considerations were included in this study because it was believed too narrow to make a rhetorical study without some consideration of the message effect on receivers. More appropriate methods for studying these effects than were used in this study will be suggested later in this chapter.

Beyond the methodologies and the open and closed systems, it was necessary to develop a theory of speech criticism which would enable this researcher to make meaningful statements about the speaker and the message. Thus, Chapter III dealt with the third question--How would the two methodologies, and the open and closed systems, be expressed in invention and argumentation? Five categories were developed: (1) Evidence; (2) reasoning; (3) proof, or validity; (4) the world of events, and (5) claim. It should be noted that positions taken in the defining of evidence, reasoning,

proof, and claim--though different from most rhetorical theorists--was necessary to understand the speaker in terms of the methodologies discussed.

Based on these five categories, fourteen critical hypotheses were developed, each of which was applied to Dr. Littlefair (Chapter IV), and to the messages (Chapter VI). Evidence was presented, showing that under twelve of these hypotheses, Littlefair was scientific in orientation and/or methodology. Littlefair expressed more friendliness to the world, placed more trust in empirical evidence, obtained his theories about the world of events from empirical observations, validated his information about the world of events by functional means, was less sure of his beliefs because of his functional concern for validity, had a low differentiation between his beliefs and disbeliefs, but high syntactical differentiation between disbeliefs, evaluated authorities on the basis of cognitive correctness, accuracy, and consistency with other information he already possessed, held beliefs and disbeliefs in isolation from people, and the authorities they line up with, displayed limited confidence in the validity of his claim, sought examination and criticism of his claim by his audience, and considered the functional as the validation of a theory. Two remaining hypotheses were considered as either inconclusive or not satisfactory for use in analysis. One hypothesis dealt with evidence, and was termed in this study as unsatisfactory.

The hypothesis stated: A speaker using the religious methodology would use empirical evidence in the demonstration sense in that the evidence is unified by a preconceived set of First Principles of authority-based theory, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would use empirical evidence in the inductive sense in that data is held in isolation until some theory explains it in its own empirical terms, and is validated. This hypothesis was relevant when analyzing Littlefair in the social context (Chapter IV), but irrelevant or non-operative when analyzing the messages (Chapter VI). It is conceived here that this may be an issue that is irrelevant in message analysis by the very nature of messages, which is to present assertions and/or conclusions on the part of the speaker. It was only possible to use this hypothesis when attempting to understand what the speaker did before presentation of the message.

Another hypothesis which was found to be inconclusive was: A speaker using the religious methodology would consider motivation as validation of a theory for a given audience, while the speaker using the scientific methodology would consider motivational proof as irrelevant. The role of motivation in both authoritative and functional proof is not clear. The speaker undoubtedly considered motivation as essential to both the religionist and the scientist. The problem of delineation between motivational proof and

functional or authoritative proof is probably as difficult as the differentiation between persuasion and argumentation, or between logic and emotions. Considerable evidence seems to suggest that emotions play a part in what a scientist decides he will or will not study, as well as what a religionist will or will not believe. It may be that the differentiating role of motivational proof in both methodologies is essentially what a scientist determines what he will study, but not what he will believe, on the basis of certain motivations while a religionist determines both what he will study and what he will believe on the basis of certain motivations. Nevertheless, the hypothesis as stated was not adequately formed to make any conclusive statement about Littlefair's messages, and to some extent, how he thinks. Our answer to the fourth question--Can the speech-making of Dr. Duncan Littlefair be characterized in meaningful ways to illustrate the contrasting categories?--is positive regarding twelve critical hypotheses, but qualified regarding the remaining two.

The fifth and final question was: What can be critically said of the audience? This question was discussed in Chapter V, in which this writer considered two audiences--the church, and the community. The differences between these two audiences were developed, and it was concluded that the Fountain Street Church congregation holds similar beliefs to Littlefair, although we know very little

about the method of proof the congregation uses to reach these beliefs. Also, we concluded that the community holds quite different beliefs from those of Littlefair, with only limited evidence suggesting that the community validates its beliefs using the religious methodology rather than the scientific methodology.

There are at least three general observations that can be made about this study, and the contribution it might make to speech criticism. First, within the context of speech criticism this study used a predictive theory to explain the past, rather than the after-the-fact methods used by some in explaining speech events. Critical studies often can do no more than draw correlations in describing a speech event. Such attempts have dealt with establishment of certain facts, such as certain biographical information about the speaker, an analysis of the period as understood by some historian or writer, the message delivered, and the audience that listened. The study presented here, however, sought to go beyond certain descriptive information, and to understand causative relationships in a speech event in terms of the psychological exchanges between a speaker and his audience. To do this, Rokeach's theory of the open and closed mind was used, with that theory's ability to predict assumed. The result is that within the limits of criticism and of Rokeach's theory, open and closed mindedness helps to explain more completely, and perhaps somewhat more

accurately, what took place in the speech event under study. Such a method as used in this study represents an attempt to control the researcher's bias by means of criteria based on predictive theory.

Second, this study has shown certain important relationships between Aristotle, deductive logic, closed mindedness, and religious explanation, and between Bacon, inductive logic, open mindedness, and scientific explanation. Not only are these comparisons and contrasts important in themselves for rhetorical theory, but such efforts produce a broader set of categories in analyzing the communication event. Much of speech criticism has been source oriented, and termed in ways that would describe argumentation by the intent of the source. This study has brought together a method of analysis which can understand the communication event both in terms of the source and the receiver. For example, it has been commonly understood that evidence plus reasoning equals proof--proof for the source, however, but not necessarily proof for the receiver. Evidence has largely been described in categories that are deductive in nature, utilizing deductive reasoning to explain evidence. Evidence and reasoning have generally been understood as something the source uses to prove a claim, but what the receiver does to that evidence and reasoning has generally not been incorporated into a model of argumentation. The categories presented in this study delineate in such a way that they can show the source-receiver, and deductive-inductive contrasts made in this study. Many of the categories of reasoning have sought to

use terms such as evidential proof, or logical proof, meaning that the use of evidence is proof of a given assertion, or certain types of reasoning are proof of a given assertion. Such categories are insufficient to understand communications. The deductive nature of this is revealed when proof or validity is conceptually separated from evidence and reasoning, and is placed in separate categories. Such an arrangement adds to our ability to understand how the speaker chooses his evidence, and reasons, and how the receiver perceives the evidence and the reasoning. This seems more realistic, and more generalizable if we would understand the communication event as larger than the source's intent. Perhaps our experimental predictions might become more reliable with more careful conceptualization.

Finally, this study analyzed not only a speaker who had not been studied, but who represented an ideal subject for a research effort into the contrast between scientific and religious methodologies. Dr. Littlefair is an anomaly to many in society, since he is professionally involved in religion, and yet is scientific in his method for establishing validity. Since only one speaker was studied, this fact adds some validity to the project.

There are many studies that would appear valuable as a result of this paper. First, it would seem that such a study would be of greater value if two speakers, not one, were subjected to the same analysis as used in this study.

Thus, it would be possible to say something about comparative use of the methodologies described. Perhaps a study comparing Dr. Littlefair, and a Protestant fundamentalist would be of value.

Second, Rokeach has shown not only the importance of open and closed mindedness in religion, but also in politics.[72] While the theory was used here in terms of religious and scientific methodologies, it seems that the categories would be of use in understanding political speakers in terms of authority-reliance versus empirical-reliance message variables.

Third, a more complete critical study of such a speaker as Littlefair ought to include an analysis of the audiences using a specially developed scale that might reveal how the audience validates its messages, particularly those coming from Dr. Littlefair. For example, it would be worth while to know whether Fountain Street Church congregation is closed-minded, using Dr. Littlefair as a positive authority, and evaluating others in terms of how they line up with Dr. Littlefair. It is conceivable that an open-minded speaker, whose message is filled with assertions based on his own observations, would attract closed-minded receivers. Such information would be worth knowing, for it would add to our understanding of the effectiveness

---

[72]Rokeach, op. cit., pp. 109-131.

of speakers, whether open or closed-minded, and the kind of audiences they attract, and persuade.

Fourth, Rokeach's theory of open and closed systems brings together certain motivational variables with authority-ethos factors, and suggests forms for the establishment of truth or falsity by receivers. Much of our theory at this point dwells on source variables, such as ethos, and to a much lesser extent, message variables from the source's point of view. Consideration of receiver variables as primary might make drastic changes, and indeed might be seen as intervening variables on the effectiveness of ethos and/or source credibility. Certainly one of those personality variables--open and closed-mindedness--has built into it a type of authority-proneness, which might increase predictability concerning the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of source credibility.

Finally, we do not know the differential effect of open and closed minded messages on open and closed minded subjects. This study suggests some possible means of developing such messages that might be used in experimental studies, such as the types of reasoning, evidence, and claims offered in this study and their posited effect on open and closed minded receivers.

While this study has sought to describe the rhetoric of religion, the rhetoric of science, and how they differ, it is by no means isolated to religion and science. One

might well use the terms experimentally and non-experimentally derived beliefs. Nevertheless, the differentiations made in this study are concerned with how people decide what they will believe, and what they will not believe. Both concerns belong to sources and receivers; both must be understood if we would understand and enlarge our theory of speech criticism.

APPENDIX A

THE FUNCTION OF RELIGION*

by Dr. Duncan E. Littlefair

The function of religion is to make sense out of life,[1] to make sense out of a senseless world, for the sense in the world is the sense that we find there or give it. It is to find meaning in the world, to find meaning in a meaingless world, for the only meaning is the meaning that we discover. The function of religion is to develop purposes that will satisfy, justify man, making his life rich, deep, fruitful, and meaningful, in a purposeless world. For the only purposes in the world are the purposes that we create.

The function of religion is to bring order out of chaos, to find through our meanings and our sensitivities and our purposes, that which gives order, for there will be no meaning, no significance, and no values without our ordering. And the orders that we find in the world are the orders that we create.

This is the function of religion. It is not to educate people, though religion has done a great deal of

---

*In this sermon, the lines underlined and noted sequentially are presented as they were taken from a tape of the sermon.

education, and at times has made this its chief purpose and end. Education is incidental to these primary and fundamental tasks. The function of religion is not to direct and control the individual and society, though religion has done this in the past. The function of religion is not to guarantee success, although it has based its claim to importance on its assumed capacity to[2] guarantee success. The function of religion[3] is not to promise salvation, although men may through the process of satisfying the functions of religion, find real rewards and have a feeling of justification. The function of religion is[4] not to inspire, though religion may and should and does inspire. The function of religion is not to console and comfort,[5] although religion does and always has and perhaps always should comfort and console.[6]

But these aspects are secondary results of the primary function, which is to make[7] sense out of life. And if the making of sense out of life is inspiring and comforting and rewarding and productive of what could be called "salvation," then we are gratified; but finding and making of sense is the primary[8] function and purpose that we and all other religious people have pursued, and we have pursued it by seeking answers to three fundamental questions (perhaps some others, but these three fundamental ones throughout all the history of man's endeavors on this planet). One; to find an answer to the question, "Who are you? How are you made? What are your components? How did you come to be?

What is your history? What was your origin? How does your mind relate to your so-called body? Who indeed are you, individually (for this must be known)? Who are you as a group? Who are you now in relationship to all that has ever been? Who are you in relationship to the events of yesterday? Who are you in relationship to the group of which you are a member now[9] and to the groups which preceded you? Who are you in this universe?"

Secondly: "How are you related?" If[10] you know who you are, you must know how you are related, and you cannot know who you are until you know how you are related. How do you relate to the earth? What is your relationship, your true, functional empirical relationship to the universe? Do the far-off stars have any impact and influence on you? What contact do you have with the other animals of this planet? What is the real relationship between you and the animals? Sentimental or real? Concrete and impressive or emotional, ethereal, and mystical? It's the same[11] thing with the earth--how are you related to your mother and father and brothers? How are you related to the community? How is your group related to the other groups in the world? What's your relationship to people who look different, who are different and who live differently?

These are important, fundamental[12] religious questions, leading to the third one: "What is the good?" Men have always sought these answers. You cannot know what is

good until you know who you are. You cannot know what is good until you know your proper relationships, and if you make a mistake on your proper relationships, you're going to make a mistake on that which you consider to be good. You may find[13] yourself treasuring something that you think is good, but which is ultimately and[14] actually destructive, unless you understand properly who you are and how you are related. So I say so frequently in my calls to worship that we will seek and reverence and treasure those things which[15] in the words of Paul, are true--true of[16] this creature, which are pure and just--just having to do with his relationships, which are kindly and generous and open and forgiving and tender and loving. For these are qualities that men have decided are good qualities. It is the function of religion to find out what is good, and we will only do this (and this is an important statement, simple and obvious though it be), I repeat,[17] if we know who we are, and if we know how we are related.

Now how has religion been answering these questions? If we will understand the health and the maturity and the validity[18] of religion, we must know how it has been answering these questions. We must know how we have been trying to make sense out of the world. We must know how we have attributing value to things and relationships and achievements. And as we look at our religion we discover the reasons why religion as we have known it cannot possibly

suffice, will not speak to a modern man--because we have not properly understood who we are. In all the history of the world with all of its genius and people of intuition who have sensed things centuries before they came to be, we have not yet properly understood who we are, and what we are, and how we are related.

How has religion done it? It has done it in the first place by presuming[19] that there is a plan for the whole world,[20] a plan that was there in the mind of someone before the world began, and that that plan is working itself out. A sheer presumption without evidence to justify it. This was man's way of giving meaning and purpose to himself. That kind of method will not any longer work. Religion has[21] been doing it by positing a personal Planner, not merely a plan for the world, but assuming that if there is a plan, it[22] has to be given by a person who can plan, and this was another way of giving dignity and meaning and purpose to man, for you posit without evidence or proof of any kind, that there was a person who created the world and created this man to occupy it and in some degree run it and govern it.

We have been assuming thirdly that[23] there is a personal concern on the part of that planner for his individual creatures. And of course this has been of the utmost[24] comfort, solace, encouragement, and inspiration to people through the centuries. But we can no longer justify it. It no longer stands as adequate for us. We no longer

are able to accept such presumptions without proof. We are no longer willing[25] to base our sense of dignity and worth on a presupposition that is so completely foundationless, except in our need to find some way to justify ourselves. And our need for justification, great as it is, does not justify such presumptions.

Fourthly, we have assumed that man had a special creation, that he was not somehow or other a natural product of a natural world, but that he was designed to be exactly as he is, long before time began itself--that man was put here by the personal planner, personally instructed and personally constructed in order to[26] do what he had to do. This of course is the basis upon which all of the Western world has been conducting itself, the basis of its philosophy, the way in which we justify ourselves in our sinfulness and in our achievements as well. And it will no longer do. It is only in recent years, recent years, that we have really come to understand who we are, and we know now that that's not what we are and who we are; that it was not the way of things at all; that the foundation for our pride and self-confidence and dignity is foundationless--it is insubstantial, it is false and untrue. So we cannot really expect to go on finding dignity on such lack of foundation or untrue presumptions and assertions.

Five: Religion has been attempting to meet these fundamental needs of men by asserting a supernatural

knowledge; that the church is the repository of God's[27] wisdom and understanding; that He has given His understanding to the Church, and the Church knows, over and above what any ordinary man is able to know, they know in a way that is beyond any kind of question, they know absolutely for they know with[28] the knowledge and wisdom of God which is not the wisdom of man, and the two are not[29] the same; and you cannot go from the wisdom of man to the knowledge of God; the Church has the rights and is custodian of a supernatural knowledge. This of course has given a great deal of strength and courage to the individual who is seeking for security, confidence, and that which is unshakable in a very shakable, confused, chaotic, uncertain world. So the Church has succeeded in comforting, solacing, inspiring, directing, and guiding because of its claim to this kind of knowledge. But that claim is no longer worthy, no longer valid, no longer meaningful, no longer acceptable.

We have been fulfilling our function religiously by demanding faith and obedience from people, and we like to obey. We like to give over responsibility. And because the Church has had its claim to this superior knowledge, then we are of course forced to give our obedience to the church. We must do it not on the basis of our reason and logic, because the logic and reason of man has nothing to[30] do with the logic of God. You accept what[31] the Church maintains and claims on the basis of faith which is not to be questioned.

So man in his infancy gives over his self-responsibility to the Church, and finds thereby a comfort and a solace. Millions upon millions of Christians today find their meaning and their dignity through such an act of confession, through such an act of renunciation, through giving over the control of their own life to others and the Church has assumed responsibility for people. It has been able to do this because of the claims that it has made, because men were willing in those days of superstition to accept those presumptuous claims and assertions and to follow out the logic of them.

If you grant that there is such a thing as superior or supernatural knowledge, then you must grant that somebody understands this or is in possession of it. And if you grant that, then you must grant their right to govern, direct, and control.[32] You as an ordinary human mortal have no right to be making up your own mind or making your own decisions about the things that are true and good, just and right,[33] and pure. You give them over, and in the giving up of them, you find strength and security and confidence. You go to Father--and everyone knows the temptation to go to Father or to Mother--and the Church in its Catholic form has accentuated this when it talks of "Mother Church," when it talks of the priests as Fathers and the nuns as[34] Sisters. This is "come unto me," and everyone likes it and we all accept it and enjoy it.

The Church has further attempted to fulfill its functions by asserting that everything that happens in the world is right and true, whether you see it as such or not, because not having access to supernatural or superior Godly knowledge, you have no way of knowing how things really are related. So this event which looks to you like an absurdity is really not an absurdity on a higher level of logic. These things that look to you like senseless catastrophes and tragedies are not really so, because if you knew what God knows, you would find that they are really part of His plan. So all the horrors of life have been able to be swept away because we accepted the presumptions and assumptions of the Church and they lead logically to this conclusion: If there is a plan and it is a Godly plan, this is known only to God, and man only as God vouchsafes to let him see a little of it. But obviously man cannot understand the plan of God, so he must accept what happens, assuming that it is all for the good, and that though it looks bad now, it[35] will come to be seen as good, that all will come out right in the end. So do not worry over much about the apparent evils of the world, for they are transitory and insubstantial and not important;[36] the essential thing is that those who are last now will be first in the world to come, that those who are abused and punished now will be rewarded and glorified. It does not take much historical knowledge[37] or observation to realize the enormous influence of such a concept and view--millions

upon millions of Christians today find their solace in such an assertion and claim. It is comforting, it is rewarding, it is satisfying, it gives them a feeling of worth and dignity and meaning. It finds a purpose for them.

But is it not clear that this method is no longer valid? We are not prepared to accept such assertions simply because they are made. We are no longer willing to accept such claims without any evidence to justify them. We are no longer willing to allow this day to go, on some kind of an assumption that the future will rectify it and make it automatically good. We are no longer willing in this modern day to <u>give up our responsibilities, comforting</u>[38] though it is and appealing though it may be. Much as we want to run to Mother and to Father, much as we want to give up our responsibility, much as we want to be assured and reassured that everything is good and that it will come out all right, we cannot accept it any more.

The Church has attempted to fulfill its functions by guaranteeing success to people. And you know the appeal of a man like Mr. Norman Vincent Peale now in our current society, purveying this kind of pseudo-promise; that you will be assured of success if only you do certain things and listen, that God will then reward you and what you want will come to be. Centuries and centuries of observation until the scientific age have allowed this to go on being reasonable to people, but no more, no more. We're not so blindly

accepting such claims. We want to know, and we look with critical eye. We appraise and survey. We are doubtful of the morality of it to begin with, and we do not see that such claims can be justifiably asserted on the basis of evidence and life as we see it to be. Good people do not always get good. The pious and the clean and the lovely and the open and the innocent are not always protected.

And of course the Church has assured[39] your salvation, promised salvation if you accept their authority and control, their superior knowledge, their possession of the means of grace--that God comes through them and that they know what ordinary human beings do not know--they promise you salvation.[40] And of course millions reach for it, going through the routine of suppressing their questions and their intelligence, to move on the basis of their faith to take what the Church has said and to be assured that this in the end will mean an eternal life for them--even though they do not see it now, even though it means nothing much right now, even though they are miserable and depressed and persecuted now--they have accepted this promise of a salvation to come. It has worked wonderfully, but it is not working any more. I have met so many people who say, "I wish I could accept it. What a comfort it must be." And I say, "What a comfort it could be, what a comfort it has been, but it cannot be now." The grounds for it are no longer there, and you cannot really find comfort in something[41] that does not make sense to you.

You are no longer able in a modern world to accept things blindly on somebody's assertion. You are no longer willing to accept someone who says, "I am the law and the truth; do[42] not question it," for no single aspect of our life can possibly survive on such an approach. We live in a scientific age, and we cannot buy the old ways any more. They have worked, but they are not working now.

The Church has sought to fulfill its[43] function of making sense out of life and giving meaning and purpose to it by dominating the individual and society, dominating him as I have indicated in[44] many ways, and dominating the society in the sort of way that Calvin did Geneva, and the Popes have done in Italy, and churches have done in various communities--taking over all the aspects of the individual's life, even dominating in the environment with its steeple which speaks to all the surrounding territory. It has moved in on the individual's life, and is there at birth, and is there at marriage and is there at death and is there at all the various celebrations. It has[45] organized the community; the holidays of the community were the holidays prescribed by the Church. And the Church has moved from this with its powerful assumed knowledge,[46] into control of government. Even until today, the Church is able to demand respect and obedience from secular powers on the basis of its superior sacred knowledge. But less and less and less. That way will no longer work, and while we may subscribe to the Church's

relationship to the events of our life it will have to be on a new basis of understanding. It can no longer be done on the basis of something supernatural or magical, without which we could not find our way. It will have to be a new[47] context, a new relationship, and a new understanding.

The ways of the Church and the ways of religion were adequate to another day, to other people, under other conditions--but not now. The function of religion is still the same; we have to make sense out of the world. We have to find some meaning and purpose in the world. And we have to do it by answering the questions of who[48] we are, and how we're related, and therefore, what is good. But we cannot answer the question of who we are on the basis of knowledge prior to 1860. We have to answer who we are on the basis of what we know now. And this is not the province of the[49] religion or the Church, to find these answers; the answers are produced by scientific investigation and inquiry and patient research. And these experts come to us with the evidence of how we have come to be, of how we are put together, and we have to understand that so that we gain an appreciation of who we are.[50]

And then we have a whole new world of relationship, because we see ourselves as different. You can no longer relate to the animals the way a person in the fifteenth century did, if you know how we have come to be. You can no longer go on regarding the world in the way you did--if you

assumed once that it was the temporary home of no significance[51] and now you believe it to be, on the basis of your new knowledge, your one and only home--then your relationship to this earth and world and universe is[52] going to be completely different.

If you have different ideas of who[53] you are and understand and can establish on the basis of evidence, new relationships--obviously you're going to have new appreciations of what is good. Oh, the same old qualities from Micah and Isaiah[54] and Jesus on, will still be there to[55] treasure--but there will be new meanings to tenderness, new meanings to justice, new meanings to kindness, new meanings for reverence, new meaning for faith, new meaning for appreciation. There will[56] be a new understanding of values, new ideas of comfort, new appreciations of what solaces, new ways of being inspired, new basis for inspiration, new basis for[57] faith, new basis for hope.

So this is the task that we face: We[58] have to make a new religion. We have to answer the old questions, the old fundamental questions. We have to answer them in new ways, for religion must be renewed with every generation or it becomes archaic, meaningless and destructive. The shunting aside of religion today because religion has fulfilled its function in inadequate[59] ways is the utmost of stupidity. For the needs are still there, are they not? The necessity of understanding is still there. The need to find meaning for

yourself is still there. And we must go on answering these questions.

It is impossible, you see, impossible, to live intelligently without living religiously, if the religious questions be:[60] Who am I? How am I related? and What is good? Surely these are the fundamental[61] questions of religion. And we are about to find new answers. We are about to meet our human needs, through new ways of[62] fulfilling our necessities, new functions[63] of religion. There is more than enough[64] here to challenge the intelligence and the skill of the world's greatest minds. There is more than enough here for you and[65] for me. We will formulate our own religion in our own way for our own day, and our children will have to do the same thing for themselves.

LINE CHANGES IN THE MANUSCRIPT AS

FOUND IN A TAPE RECORDING OF

THE SERMON AS ORIGINALLY DELIVERED:

1. The function of religion is such as these: It
2. to importance on its assumed and presumed capacity to
3. guarantee success. Function of re-
4. fication. Function of religion is
5. religion is not to console and to comfort,
6. perhaps always should comfort and inspire.
7. of the primary function, to make
8. but that finding and making of sense is the primary
9. to the group in which you are a member now
10. Secondly: "And What are you? or How are you related?" If
11. ethereal, and mystical? And the same
12. Important, fundamental
13. you consider to be good. And you may find
14. think is good, is ultimately and
15. reverence and treasure those things
16. in the words of Paul, which are true--true of
17. simple and obvious though it is), and I repeate,
18. the health and maturity and the validity
19. done by in the first place by presuming, I say presuming
20. there is a plan for the whole world,
21. will not any longer work. We have
22. but assuming that if there is a plan, then that

Three: We have been assuming that

And of course this has been of the utmost of

without evidence and proof. We are no longer willing

and personally constructed to

the church is the residuary of God's

they know absolutely for they know

not the knowledge and wisdom of man, and the two are not

the logic of man has nothing to

do with the logic and reason of God. You accept what

right to govern, direct, and control. And

that are true and good, and just and right,

of the Fathers, the priests as Fathers, and the nuns as

and that though it be bad now, it

and insubstantial and non important;

And it does not take much historical knowledge

give up our responsibilities, comfortable

And of course this is another way in which the church has done this, it has insured

beings do not know--and they promise you salvation.

you cannot really find comfort on something

who says, "I am the law and what I say is the truth; do

The Church has fulfilled or sought to fulfill its

dominating him as I have indicated, in in

for all the various celebrations. It has

from this with its powerful knowledge, or assumed knowledge

find our way. It will be a new

do it by answering the question of who
now. And this is not a province of the
we gain a appreciation of who we are.
a temporary home of no real significance
this wearth earth and world and universe is
And if you have different ideas of who
same old qualities from Micah on and Isaiah
and Jesus, will still be there to
new meaning for appreciations. There will
new bases for inspiration, new basis for
And this is the task that we face: We
has fulfilled its functions in inadequate
religiously, if the religious question be:
good? And surely these are the fundamental
our human needs, through new functions of religion, new ways of
fulfilling our necessities.
There is more than enough
And there is more than enough here for you and

APPENDIX B

VALID AND INVALID CLAIMS FOR RELIGION

There are many confusions about religion and in and through it there are two major confusions that I would like to mention rather briefly this morning. The first is the confusion between religion and magic. I have alluded to this in the responsive reading. It is an old, old conflict that stems from the very beginning days of our religion and it is still a pertinent problem, for I believe even today most people confuse religion with magic and they approach religion as they would approach a magical realm and they attempt to use it magically.

There are some very important distinctions. Magic is an attempt to control the powers of the world or of the universe. Magic is a device by means of which you get these powers into your hands so that you can direct them and manipulate them to achieve what you want to achieve. Magic is always a secret operation. The magician is always someone who has special powers, special access, special information and knowledge, or special relationship. He may share this with you under certain conditions, whereby you then come into control through him and you too become a magician.

There is none of this in religion itself at its best or in religion proper. The religious person does not gain control of the supernatural powers. He is never able to manipulate them. Or if he has the power to manipulate them he never does manipulate them. Rather than being in control the religious person is always submissive. He submits to the power of God. "Not my will but Thine be done." He does not attempt to organize the world to suit his ends and his purposes. And he does not ever have secret knowledge that he will share with you for a price or for some other value in return. Whenever you see the word secret attached to spiritual matters you beware and be on your guard. For this is the approach to the occult, to the cultist leader who has some special "in," and you are in the realm of magic or very close to it.

There is no wonder that religion and magic have been very closely identified, for you see the realm of magic offers so much that men and women have always wanted, and offers it at apparently such low cost. Everyone likes to know something that someone else doesn't. It is the nature and basis of gossip. And to have power is to know something that someone else does not know and there is no one who does not like to have the chance to manipulate others and to organize his world. But this is not a part of religion even though religion has sold itself to the people on the basis of these magical powers and capacities, and even though

people have continued to come looking for this. Jesus faced this at one point in His life in a very classic illustration called "The Temptation," when He had an opportunity offered by the Devil, mind you, to demonstrate His power and control of the forces of the world. For if He were to give such miraculous magical demonstrations then obviously the world would be His. And He turned it down as all men of spirit have and must because this was not of the spirit and this was not the way of the Lord and it was not the way of His religion.

This has been true, as I have indicated, not only through all of our great traditions but through all other great religious traditions. We hear much of the power of the men of the East, the Hindus with their yoga exercises and their capacity for phenomenal demonstration. This has been most attractive to the people of the West, and we have made fools of ourselves in seeking for it and pretending to gain the secret knowledge whereby such power is achieved. I know of no reputable Eastern leader who will even begin to countenance such miraculous, magical use of power. They have unusual and amazing power but they will not use it, they will not demonstrate it and usually they will not even speak about it.

The second major confusion that is attached to our religion is part of this and it is the concept of the "Great Provider." If you want anything you come to religion and

you get it. If you have any desires the church is there to give you what you ask for. And religions, as I have indicated, compete, it appears, on the basis of how much we have to offer you, how much we have to offer you to get you to come in to buy our product. Almost as though we have double stamps days or we give you twice as much sometimes. And all the time we believe we are on a better level and we have more, because God is more with us. We have more resources, we have more strength, we have more wealth, we have more knowledge and understanding and we will give it to you if only you will come and buy it from us. So I am led to the valid and invalid claims of religion, a religion that is so often confused with magic and with the great storehouse of the Great Provider, feeding, clothing, housing and comforting His children. There are some very invalid claims for religion and strangely enough they are the claims that are most attractive. Religion is invalid when it makes promises for the future because no religion can make such promises. At the best it can only hold up a hope or a faith. But when a religion gets men to do something today on the basis that some other time they will be rewarded you are involved in the field of magical lure and promise and manipulation. For the future has never yet offered the things that religion has been promising for so many hundreds of centuries. Religion has not delivered yet. And any kind

of promise that keeps getting put off further and further away must of its very essence be an invalid promise.

It is a lure to entice, too often, as Mr. Marx said, the downtrodden and the beaten. It is a way of soothing and satisfying the unhappy and the dissident. It is a very convenient device for avoiding the problem of meeting these aspects of our society that are so destructive, to avoid meeting them in any positive, constructive way now by making a promise for sometime in the future. And neither you nor I will have anything to do with it and it will not be our problem. So each generation has proceeded upon the same beautiful device, promising it for some other time and some other place. I believe that it is very invalid to do this.

I believe furthermore that it is invalid to promise supernatural powers to anyone who comes seeking for help. I believe that it is invalid for religion to offer man any kind of control over his world. I believe that it is wrong for religion to promise man that he will be able to circumvent the natural laws of his world whereby crops are produced upon the basis of lawful action of the natural world. Or that a man will be able to evade any of the responsibilities that he has and any of the restrictions and conditions that govern him in all forms of life. I believe it is invalid to separate out any individual or any group of people and to promise them that they will have more power than others. I believe it is invalid because just like the future promise

there is no demonstration that it can be done. It has never been done. It is not likely to be done.

These supernatural powers are always dangled before us, and they are never quite achieved. There are always reasons why it cannot be now but the promise is always kept there. And the people who cannot find power within themselves or within natural means come flocking, in the hope that one day they will be made as kings or as gods.

Thirdly, I believe it is invalid to promise people that they will escape from the natural hazards of physical sickness and disruption, decay in our world. It is an enormous appeal, and anyone who sees week after week the horrible miseries of physical existence in so many cases is naturally lured to find a way out of it for himself and for those he loves. No appeal has more power than the promise that you will escape these hazards if only you are good enough, if only you think cleanly enough, if only you belong to the right group, if only you submit yourself to God, if only you understand God. And here again there is no sufficient basis for extending such a promise, other than in hope or again the constantly receding promise of some other time.

Fourthly, I believe it is invalid for religion to promise men triumph or victory over their enemies or over their competitors. I have referred to this a number of times in the past few years. The fad it appears is gone. But we

have (it is more than a fad because it is recurrent and it is always here) gone through a phase when some of the most educated and cultured people in this land of ours and some of the most spiritually devoted have fallen into the gray pit of believing that if only they do certain things and accept certain beliefs that God will reward them in a special way by giving them a power that their enemies do not have. It is inconceivable, but there it is. And I dare say that there are numbers in this church this morning who secretly believe that this could come to be; that if you only accede to God you will sell more jewelry than the other jewelers in the city. I have seen that promise made by an outstanding clergyman in this country, a man whose name is probably respected or known over all other names in my profession.

This point of view holds that if you believe you will sell more insurance. Or that if only we belong to God our enemies shall not prevail against us. How can you describe the utter poverty (and that is a mild term) for such promises? It is no wonder that the non-religious are so antagonistic to religion when they look at us and they see us making such offers to people and holding up such promises. It is no wonder that people become more and more antagonistic to religion, for more and more evidence has been accumulating. There is more and more knowledge and understanding of our world and there is less and less respect, I trust, for any kind of supernatural claim.

And finally again I hold out as an invalid promise any assurance that you and I will share some secret knowledge between us. God has no favorites that can be established and proven. There is no way in which God tells something to someone that He does not tell to another. There is no way in which the understanding and knowledge of God can be hidden. There is no way in which men can build fences around this knowledge and keep it for themselves. There is no way in which some people can hand it out at will to those to whom they wish to give it. There is no knowledge of God that is not revealed. And it is there equally, for you or for me. And our positions of privilege whether they be academic, political, social or physical do not guarantee that this knowledge belongs to us.

For there is a real profound observation in our religion. When Paul had to deal with these magical, mystery religions and said that all of these mysteries would be revealed to the children and hidden from those who were powerful, he was simply saying that there is no way in which any man can govern and control it.

Now, then, what are the valid promises of religion? One, comfort. Religion can promise you comfort and can help you to find it. I'm not talking now about the level of comfort, it may be a very poor sort of comfort, a very bad comfort, a very evil, destructive, very limiting comfort, but religion can give you comfort. It can help you, if you will,

to ignore the present and the look ahead to the future. It will enable you to escape from your problems today if you will accept enough of what is told to you on this level. Religion can be a very comforting thing insofar as it removes you from the hurly-burly of existence. It can be comforting just by virtue of its music and its dim light and its religious tones and its ceremonials. There is no question about it, religion has a great deal of comfort to offer, both high level and low level.

Secondly, religion can offer men peace of mind and offer it legitimately, and can help them to find it. The peace of mind I use is something that is a little higher than the pacifying notion of being comforted or being comfortable. And by a peace of mind I mean a man who is able to look strong and straight at the horror of his life and still find it good. Not by virtue that some other day it will all be made better and I will be rewarded, but rather on the basis that there is a good here that he did not create. A good in which he was born. A good which actually created him and in which he lives and moves and has his being, that it was here before him, it will be here long after him, he belongs to more than himself and more than just his time.

The good he serves is more than the good he sees. It is an eternal and universal good. But this need not be accepted merely on faith. The evidence is there, an overwhelming amount of evidence for anyone to find who cares to

look. And so religion has legitimately offered men and women a peace of mind that transcends all of their disturbances without taking them away from it.

Religion can legitimately offer you and promise you disturbance. A disturbance that will not allow you to be comfortable or a disturbance that will go along with your peace of mind and if it does not offer the disturbance along with the peace of mind it is an invalid, magical kind of religion. So when religion says, "You come here and you will be bothered," or "if you become religious you will then have to take on some of the problems of the eternal and the infinite and there will be no distress that is foreign to you, there will be no good that is foreign to you and there will be no evil that is alien to you," it is making a legitimate promise. A promise of disturbance along with peace of mind.

But even further than disturbance, religion makes a valid promise when it offers to help you to find strength, patience and endurance. These are the fruits of the spirit. Strength to do what you have to do. Strength to face whatever you have to face. The endurance to see you through whatever problems belong to you and your generation without losing your heart and without losing your dignity, without losing your faith and your vision and your confidence, and the patience to work with yourself after your many failures, and

and the patience to continue to believe in the good after you have seen it destroyed and trampled on so many times.

Religion has nothing greater to offer in a promise to people than it will help them find strength, strength that they will mount up with wings as eagles sometimes, and that they would be able to run and endure and faint not and that they would be able to walk, when they have to walk, and not become so weary that they have to stop. There is no promise greater than this. It is a valid promise of religion. For these are based upon the promise of religion that if you come seeking you will find a vision, you will see the vision and you will have faith in it. The fundamental area of religion is this faith, that you can find it, that you can see the world transformed, that you can see a light in the midst of the greatest darkness, that you can see the world lit up with the glory of God, and that you can see the power of God even in the weakness of men and in the horrors of any human situation.

This is the vision that man may find and this is the legitimate promise of religion. How is this to be done? How are men to find these things? They will find them by getting power, not power over the world, not power over the forces of the world, not power over their enemies and not power over their friends, but power over themselves. Legitimate religion never offers you power any other place but over yourself.

It is true that when a man has sufficient power and control of himself, in his submission and in his antagonisms and revolts as well that he sometimes seems to have a magical power over other people and even over events. But this comes, if it comes, only because he has a power over himself. His religion is within. His insights and his understanding are his and God speaks to him and through him, never through anybody else.

How do you get this power? You get it through understanding. Understanding is the key. Seek ye understanding and then you will have everything else. If you understand yourself and you understand the good and the evil and you understand in some degree the conflicts and you understand the limitations of your vision and you understand as well the limitations of your strength and your endurance and your patience, then you will be able to find this power. For this power does not come only to the powerful, it comes to those who are weak and even to children. This is part of its mystery but it is not a hidden mystery.

How do you get it? This power over yourself. Through understanding, but it is nothing that religion can give you. I have been saying that religion can make these valid promises but religion cannot promise to give any of these valid qualities to you. These are not gifts to be given, they are gifts to be received. You cannot demand them. You cannot buy them. And there is no church so strong and so rich that

it can hand them out to you. At the most religion will promise that if you come seeking for them you will find them. And what could religion offer anymore than that? What in the end more valid promise, more hopeful, more encouraging, and more glorified could religion offer to you or to anyone, than this: If you seek you will find; if you knock the door will be opened to you. There is a great treasure, a treasure hid in a field, or a treasure hid in the world and the secret to that treasure is not reserved to anyone or to any few. It is there, God says it is there. He says if you want it you can find it. And it is worth everything else in the world, to you or to me or to any of us.

APPENDIX C

IS A NON-AUTHORITARIAN RELIGION POSSIBLE?

Religion has always been authoritarian. By authoritarian I mean it has been organized from the top down. It is a centrally-dominated institution. The orders come from the top and are given to the people. The structure of the religion has always been that of a hierarchy whereby order came from one person or a small group, (almost always from one to a small group), to a larger group, to a larger group, and there was almost never any way back from the people to whom the orders were issued to the person who had originally given them. Or, if there is any way back it is a long circuitous process. Very few things are arrived at democratically. Truth is not a matter for the individual or for the people to decide. Truth is decided centrally. It is decided by the authority. It is then dispensed and given to the people.

All decisions, virtually all decisions, originate from the same central source and are not subject to censure, criticism or revision on the part of the people to whom the orders are given. In other words, religion has traditionally been a military type of organization. It has been so from the very beginning. It was so with shaman, with the magician who

ruled the tribe with an iron hand, who decided what customs should be obeyed and what customs should not, who decided when certain things should be done. He decided what were the good times for hunting and whether war should be made or not. He decided, indeed, who should live and who should die and there was almost no recourse from him.

This has come on down and any school child is now thoroughly acquainted with the pictures of the high priest with a knife poised about to sacrifice his victim on the altar. This is true of not only the Indians of this continent and of South America but this has been true of all religions everywhere, whether it is the priest in the high Andes with the knife or whether it is Abraham with a knife about to slay his own son in response to the call of God, or whether it is the high priest of Egypt, or whether it is the high Pope, the first and chief bishop of the Roman Catholic church, demanding the subservience of the king and emperor of all of Europe. It is a persistent pattern of authority coming from the top and being dispensed, and even kings coming under the authority.

The church has ruled with very rigid discipline. It has never been a democratic institution or process. It has never been a place where the majority decided. It has never been a place where the laws of reason and evidence came into play. It has been an institution where one or two or a small group of people have ruled authoritatively and firmly and with enormous power. Why has this been so? How has this been true?

It has been possible because of the ignorance of people in these days gone by when only a few men had the ingenuity or the knowledge or the intuition to know a few things about the world and about the nature of man and they were able to utilize that information to secure control. And along with the ignorance came, of course, fear. For when men did not know how things really operated in the world around them, and there was one who appeared to know or took on the powers of one who knew, the others who did not know were afraid, they were afraid for themselves. In their ignorance and their fear they gave power to the man who seemed to have the knowledge.

Along with this, of course, is superstition. And the superstition was true, not only of men in the high Andes and in the empires of Egypt and elsewhere, it has been true of all life down through Europe and into America as well. This superstition is based upon fear and an ignorance and the feeling that somehow or other this world is a mysterious place, which it is, but that it is run mysteriously and that there are no real laws of science, that things do not happen one for one, that if you know the right person, if you know how to dress, if you say the right word, if you subscribe to the right belief, if you submit yourself to the right power then things will be made good for you.

In addition to this, and as a part of it, has been this prevailing concept throughout all ages down to and including our own: that there is some kind of supernatural truth,

that the world is not self-contained, that no man, given the opportunity, is able to discover truth for himself. Or, that no group of men, given the opportunity, and no matter how much skill and ingenuity and technique they have, will be able to discover truth, for truth essentially is something beyond evidence. It is something beyond the capacity of ordinary men using ordinary intelligence and skills to discover. This truth, and this is the superstitious aspect of religion again, is given to only a few qualified people; these qualified people, of course, being the spiritual leaders. So, the truth being given to one is then passed on in the secret society to a few others and then to a few others and then it is watered down and dispensed at the will and the whim really of the spiritual leaders to the common folk. And the common folk have no way of determining the real validity of the truths of the world and they have no real access to supernatural truths so the whole process starts in again of ignorance and fear and superstition and back on up to supernatural truth and down again. And this is the sort of justification why religion has been all these centuries a very strictly authoritarian discipline.

Now, obviously it would not have gone on this way if it had not had and served many important values. It has, indeed served many important values, for this kind of authoritarianism in our society throughout most of our career as a human race has given strength because it has given unity. It has given unity because it has had discipline. And those

who got out of line, who appeared to be moving too far away from the norm were immediately cracked down upon in the name of the supernatural truth or the higher power or the authority with or without any other justification than the desire of the power to do so. This only accentuated the fear of the people but it did give unity. It gave unity through discipline and it gave strength and it gave efficiency. All authoritarian societies have prided themselves upon their efficiency and rightly so. Because through this kind of strict mass action, complete and tight control, the military organism is able to translate its demands on a more strictly one-for-one basis with less seepage and loss on the way and without the variation that would come if people were free to think for themselves and to decide for themselves and to go off on their own individual paths creating the anarchy that always comes when discipline from the top is weakened.

I suggest to you that not only has religion always been authoritarian but that the Christian church would never have been able to endure to this day without it and this is not the radical remark of a liberal who is semi-outside the church in the eyes of many people. This would be confirmed by even the most staunch of historians of our culture and the Christian church. Christianity survived because it was authoritarian, because they knew in the beginning that they could not allow variation. For if you begin by allowing variation then there is more and more and more of it and soon you do not even

know the central core from which you have varied. So right from the beginning Paul had his arguments. He had his arguments with his own disciples because some of the people were believing in Apollos and some in Timothy and some in Titus and some in Paul himself. Paul knew that this could not be and he tried to whip his churches into line. Then there was the conflict that I have mentioned to you before between Paul and the group at Jerusalem when they knew they had to have some centralized governmental agency that could determine what was legitimate and illegitimate and orthodox and unorthodox and acceptable and unacceptable. And the hierarchy began in the Christian church.

Then we knew that we had to have bishops and Paul discussed how the communities were to be organized with deacons and bishops. They knew that each community had to be organized in relationship to a larger community, so there were overseers and bishops over the bishops. Then as it grew larger and larger they knew that they had to have somebody controlling all these supervisors and overseers, so came the chief bishop, the first bishop, the Bishop of Rome who in turn became known as the Pope of the Christian church.

But this wasn't enough; for in spite of all this order and this hierarchical structure it began to break down, not only on the outskirts but in the middle as well. So they called councils together, councils of the whole church, one of which is now in session. They started very early to

determine what was truth. This was not a matter to be investigated by the ordinary person or by the scientists or to be allowed to develop and prove itself. They had to determine from the top what was really the truth. So they would sit for long sessions and then finally come out with the truth. THE TRUTH, that was now the truth of the Christian church and it was to be accepted by all peoples. Only in this way were they able to develop this gigantic structure of a holy Catholic church or of a Christian church.

But in spite of all their efforts churches began to break away. So there is the Eastern church and the Russian church and the Coptic church and the Syrian church and the Egyptian church and all of the various heresies. But each of the churches that broke away was in turn an authoritarian church, not breaking away in freedom but breaking away as another branch proclaiming for itself the only real truth and instituting its repressive measures, and governing and controlling its people in the same way they had been governed and controlled in the beginning. Christianity depended upon this centralization for its "theological integrity" and for its power and for its efficiency and for its worldly strength. And even today it is very clear, I trust, to you that the strongest churches are the most authoritarian churches. The ones who have the most efficiency are the ones who are most centrally organized and controlled. They are the ones where discipline is in order. They are the churches in this city

where from on high comes the order, "You do it or else." And where still, even in Protestant churches, exclusion is one of the weapons and techniques of maintaining discipline and control in the same way that in primitive tribes the individual who had violated the law was frequently not immediately put to death but dismissed from the tribe where they knew that he would die of guilt or die because he was alone and unprotected.

This is the way churches today still govern themselves in some degree. I'm not talking just on aberrational levels, I'm talking about the fundamentally strongest churches which carry the most weight in society, which are the most impressive, which have the greatest financial resources, which can bring their power to bear at any one time and in a concentrated way because the leader or the group of leaders is able to say, "It shall be done" and it is done. I'm referring to the fact that the Episcopal church is able to operate much more effectively and efficiently than this loose conglomeration of churches of God or Baptist churches. The Calvinistic church has been able to exercise its continuing dominance in a very impressive way and the Lutheran churches with their more centralized power than others have been able to maintain themselves and to carry themselves with much more dignity, much more strength, and are much more effective in society than individual churches like this one, for instance. The strongest churches are the most centrally organized, the most hierarchically structured and they are the most effective

because they have a power that comes down instead of a power that is diffused in the base.

I am suggesting to you that people like and want this still, in spite of the fact that this is 1963 years after the birth of Jesus. People like order and efficiency. As a matter of fact it is amazing to discover how many people find it utterly incomprehensible, not just interesting, that a church like this can exist. For they say, "If you have no power over you, how can you be? You mean you just exist by yourselves? Where do you get your authority? Who decides what is truth for you? You have no creed, how can you be a church unless there is a truth? You don't believe in the supernatural. It is impossible to have a church if you do not believe in the supernatural, if you do not believe that there is a truth that is given once and for all. It is impossible to have any kind of real church if you do not have the organization that comes from the priestly group who exercises discipline."

You have run into it yourself over and over again. You have discovered too that people still cannot stand the idea that they are on their own, that they themselves must reason with God. Like the comforters of Job they believe that somehow or other there has to be an answer and that you and Job and the rest of us have no business in questioning the rules and the decisions and the judgments. And if they face up to the fact that it is there they are horrified

by the prospect of such anarchy and such dissolution of religion, and so they go so far as to make pronouncements on fairly large levels that this is not a church and that we have no religion because the traditional hierarchical authority is lacking here as is the supernatural truth.

But, you see, the problem for our day is that the bases for the authoritarian church are gone. The bases that made this kind of a religious institution possible have been washed away. This is why the church today is in trouble because it has been failing to recognize this although it is seeing the results of the changes that have taken place in our knowledge and in our way of living. We are no longer an ignorant people. No matter how much we cover up our knowledge on Sunday, no matter how much we hide our learning when we read religious literature, we are no longer an ignorant people and our knowledge keeps breaking through and the questions arise increasingly. For if we are no longer ignorant there are no longer so many of those things to be afraid of that led to the creation and structure of religion in its early forms. We know that you cannot pray away a tornado. We know that you cannot pray away a pestilential disease. We know that you cannot pray yourself into old age and into health and into the success of your children or your own. So that out of our knowledge we have been banishing a great deal of fear and superstition. However, much of it still remains.

Now we are a little embarrassed over our common superstitions and our children and grandchildren will find them almost nonexistent. And as a result of this growing knowledge the validity of the socalled supernatural truth has been vanishing too. And so has the structure of the hierarchy or a man's willingness to accept something as true because it came from the top, for he knows that the "top" is a man, too, and that sometimes all men are in error and he was not so willing to accept the infallible declarations that are made or the claims for their infallibility. He is there with an open mind, and like Job, he refuses to be pushed around by his comforters who say, "Believe, believe, do not question. Follow the orders and the rules." And he is standing up again and he is saying, "But I am a man and I will reason with God. I will ask my questions and I will demand answers. And the answer must be one that touches me for I am the one who will decide."

This is the glory of man's freedom and this is the magnificence of that man Job.

Now, what is going to happen to religion? I gave as my title "Is a Non-authoritarian Religion Possible?". I took it from a book, "A Critique of Religion and Philosophy," by a prominent philosopher named Mr. Walter Kaufman who has a very high position of respect in the philosophic and religious world for his knowledge and his insights and his critical analyses. And he comes out very flatly to say

that a non-authoritarian religion is impossible. He says there never has been one and anyone who assumes that there has is deceiving himself; that at the very best throughout our history there have only been little side lights of freedom in religion. There have been, here and there, free men or poetic figures or statements that happened to be there to pay tribute to a man's dignity to decide for himself and to stand on his own. But, he says, throughout history there has never been a religion that was not authoritarian and he believes that a non-authoritarian religion cannot possibly exist. He says, "Poetry, yes. Mysticism to some degree, yes. Perhaps even you may preserve a religiousness, a religious quality but you will not be able to preserve religion for religion rests on authority. You take away the authority and you take away the religion."

I do not believe that this is so. I do not believe that religion will vanish because the power of authority is gone. I do not believe that men and women will go on much longer submitting themselves to irrational authority, bowing down in fear and trepidation for the ecclesiastic. I do not believe that men will go on living in their superstitions but I believe that men must go on living and that they will demand more and more dignity for their life. And I believe that they cannot have this dignity unless they have a religion.

I believe that it becomes more and more important that you know who you are and that you know how you are

related and that you find a way through the amazing complexity and perplexity of life. That you find a light that will be a guide for you in the midst of darkness. That you have an over all philosophy that will give a sense of oneness and of purpose and of direction and of hope and aspiration to yourself and to your children and for you and your community and for your people and for the race of man. And as long as anyone is seeking for this kind of light, for this kind of meaning and vision and hope, as long as man carries in his heart this kind of aspiration he will be religious and he will want to come together with his fellowmen who are seeking the same ends and ideals and standing in the same hope and reverencing the same tradition even as they look forward into a whole new universe of existence.

I do not believe that the church has to be authoritarian today because it has always been so. I believe that men will rouse themselves from their submission to hierarchical authoritarian churches and that they will build religions of free men in a free world. And that this will give religion a new meaning and a new significance and that through the new religion men will rise to new heights. This is our motivation in this church and I believe that we are in the process of proving that it can be so.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbot, Walter M. (ed.). The Documents of Vatican II. New York: The American Press, 1966.

Asman, Lorence E. The Tragic Fall of the First Baptist Church. Grand Rapids: Asman Tract Publishers, 1956.

Borman, Ernest G. Theory and Research in the Communicative Arts. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965.

Braithwaite, R. B. Scientific Explanation. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1960.

Buchen, Philip. The Only Church With a History Like This. Grand Rapids: Privately printed, 1959.

Caws, Peter. The Philosophy of Science. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965.

Durant, Will. The Story of Philosophy. New York: Washington Square Press, 1964.

Ehninger, Douglas, and Brockriede, Wayne. Decision by Debate. New York: Dodd, Meade, and Company, 1966.

Eliot, Charles W. (ed.). Famous Prefaces: Harvard Classics. Vol. XXXIX. New York: P. F. Collier & Son, Corp., 1910.

Glock, Charles Y., and Stark, Rodney. Religion and Society in Tension. N. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965.

Hall, A. Rupert. The Scientific Revolution: 1500-1800. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962.

Hance, Kenneth G., Ralph, David R., and Wiksell, Milton J. Principles of Public Speaking. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1962.

Hayakawa, S. I. Language in Thought and Action. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964.

Hordern, William. The Case for a New Reformation Theology. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959.

Magill, Frank N. (ed.). Masterpieces of Christian Literature. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1963.

Miller, Gerald R., and Nilsen, Thomas R. (eds.) Perspectives on Argumentation. Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1966.

Rokeach, Milton. The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1960.

Salmon, Wesley C. Logic. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

Smith, Nelson B. (ed.). The Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942.

Trueblood, Elton. The Philosophy of Religion. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1957.