

THE ORIGIN AND THE SCOPE
OF THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1831-1834

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
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1974

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ABSTRACT

THE ORIGIN AND THE SCOPE OF THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1831-1834

By

Habib Wada'a El-Hesnawi

The purpose of this study is to follow the reasons and factors that changed the conflict between Mohamed Ali and the Sublime Porte from an internal domestic problem into a problem of international scope capturing the interest of most of the Big Powers, who then took the stand that suited best their political and economic aims with the Ottoman empire, Egypt, and each other.

The conflict between Mohamed Ali and the Sultan, or the so-called Egyptian question [1831-1834], was one of the important issues that faced European diplomacy at the time, and almost led to very dangerous consequences. To explore and analyze all the various conflicts of interest and personalities involved in this issue is impossible in a paper of this size. Therefore it is important to mention at this point that the study will concentrate on the combined factors that created the problem in its early stage [1831-1834] and led to later developments which ended with the Treaty of London (July 1840).

In Chapter I, we will try to follow the historical background of the Egyptian question in international politics since the French expedition to Egypt. The French expedition shows the importance of the Egyptian strategy, especially to England and French interests in the area. The French expedition also led to the emergence on the Egyptian stage of Mohamed Ali, who tried to take advantage of the international and Turkish situation in order to build a strong modern state in which the army would be the essential factor in determining his policies and furthering his power.

In Chapter I, too, I touch on the situation in the Ottoman Empire and the policies of Sultan Mahmud II for reform and suppression of the separationist movements within the Empire. Then, I discuss the stand of the Big Powers concerning the Ottoman empire, by which I conclude that the internal situation in Turkey and the external situation did not allow Mohamed Ali to obtain his goals in expanding his power in Syria and gaining independence without serious confrontations.

Chapter II explains how Mohamed Ali utilized the international situation as well as the domestic difficulties encountering Sultan Mahmud for the occupation of Syria. These conditions affected the development of events which led to the temporary solution of the problem with the Kutahiah agreement between the Sublime Porte and Mohamed Ali and the Treaty of Unkiar-skelessi between the Porte and Russia--

that agreement had an important role in bringing the crisis into international politics.

Chapter III deals with the idea of the Arab Empire and whether or not Mohamed Ali attempted to base his dreamed-of empire on Arab nationalism. Also it deals with the local and international development of the crisis following the Kutahiah settlement and the signature of Unkian-skelessi until the end of 1834. In this short period the problem took its final shape as an international one. Preserving the status quo became not only desirable but became an essential element in upholding the international balance. In this chapter I discuss, too, the many efforts that Mohamed Ali made to gain the European countries' friendship and recognition of independence. I gave much space to the development of the French and English policies in the Levant in this period; especially the English, who took a clear-cut position against Mohamed Ali and insisted more than ever on upholding her traditional policy of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the British policies towards the Egyptian question after Unkiar-skelessi were to improve her relationship with the Porte and to further her interests in the area as well as depriving Mohamed Ali of his gains in Syria, Anatolia, and Arabia. Mohamed Ali's occupation of Syria and the Hejar threatened Britain's growing interests in those areas and the Gulf. In concluding this part of the research,

I touch on the fact that a new round of conflict was due any moment especially after the European powers rejected Mohamed Ali's claim of independence and his direct negotiation with the Porte to solve the pending problems came to naught.

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A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1974

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is with much appreciation and gratitude that I acknowledge those who have helped make this research a success. The greatest thanks are due to my committee chairman, Dr. Paul R. Sweet, whose guidance and patience were gratefully felt throughout the project. I also wish to thank Dr. William J. Brazill, the Graduate Program Director, for his encouragement and advice.

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INTRODUCTION: APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

The relations between the East and West were and still are one of the most important questions which has stimulated the concern of the Western as well as the Eastern historians. This is due to the fact that this subject has a great importance and very much relevance to the relationship that existed between the East and the West in various periods of history.

Although this relationship ranges over many historical periods, in this paper we shall discuss only the historical evolutions of the problem which had baffled the minds of European diplomatists in the thirties of the last century and had far-reaching results, not only on the relations between the Great Powers themselves or between them and Turkey, but also on the political and social development of the Levant. In this period the relations entered a new phase; Egypt, more than ever, burst, like a flaming comet, into the field of European politics, to the utter disorganization of the political system of the day. The force which Egypt represented puzzled Western diplomatists and broke up the European alliance. It caused a rupture in the Anglo-French entente and the fall of

M. Thiers. Thus, Egypt, or the Egyptian Question, was in the heart of European diplomacy.

To what force are we to attribute the upheaval caused by the Egyptian expansion? What was the attitude of the European Powers toward this event? and above all, what was the attitude of Mohamed Ali toward the European Powers on one hand and toward Turkey on the other? What were the strategies and tactics by which he planned to achieve his goals? Why did he not succeed in achieving his goals? What were the factors behind that? . . . etc.

To understand the events of this period and find answers to all these questions, a short explanation of what "Eastern Question" meant at the time would be necessary, as well as presenting the items of the problem as they appeared to European diplomatists, which will help in the understanding of the policies adopted by different European Powers to deal with this problem.

These factors determined the problem: the growing weakness of the Ottoman Empire at Constantinople; the desire of some provinces to detach themselves from that decadent Empire and become independent states; and the effect of all these on the policy of the Great Powers, some of which believed that the time had come for the apportionment of Turkey.

The Greek crisis ended by giving Greece her independence under the guard of the three Powers: Britain, France, and Russia. But

another province, which had already been practically detached, suddenly assumed the position of a domineering, conquering Power against its overlord. This province was Egypt under its able Pasha Mohamed Ali. Egypt became a new focus of attention for the Powers concerned with the Eastern Question, occupying the center of the European stage for the period 1831 to 1841. Once again European foreign offices had to ask whether it was necessary to preserve the Ottoman Empire and protect her from decadence? Or was it time to suffocate the "sick man" and distribute his spoils? Were the European Powers obligated to recognize the separationist trends within the Ottoman Empire and accept the provinces seeking independence as members in the family of States? Or did the nature of the international balance demand opposition to these separationist movements and maintenance of the Ottoman Empire in its existing boundaries? In other words, the center of European politics was revolving around the principles that protected the interests of European Powers and which would safeguard the European peace at the same time it would serve as a guide for those countries to determine their relationship among themselves as well as with Turkey. This was not an easy task, for, none of the Great Powers adopted quite the same attitude toward these questions. Therefore, there was no specific definition of the so-called Eastern Question which was agreeable to all partners. Perhaps the most acceptable definition of the Eastern Question was that of the French minister,

Guizot, who answered the above questions in a speech before the
Chambre de Deputes on July 2, 1839, as follows: The proper policy is

to maintain the Ottoman Empire in order to maintain
the European equilibrium and when, by the force of
circumstances, by the natural cause of events, some
dismemberment takes place, when some province detaches
itself from that decadent Empire, the right policy is
to favor the transformation of that province into a
new and independent sovereignty, to take a place in
the family of States, and to serve one day in the new
European equilibrium, the equilibrium destined to re-
place that of the ancient elements when they are no
longer in existence.¹

According to some historians, the previous explanation of
the Eastern Question is the best² and it served as a measure against
which the policies of British and French statesmen in the last hun-
dred years become intelligible and sound.³

From the French point of view, Guizot's explanation of the
Eastern Question had two aspects: a general aspect of the Question
concerned the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, described as the
Question of Constantinople; the particular aspect was the Question
of Egypt or Alexandria; it was concerned with the apportionment of

¹F. Guizot, Memoirs to Illustrate the History of My Time
(Vol. IV; London), pp. 328-29.

²R. B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy, 1815-1914
(London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1927), p. 54.

³Ibid., p. 54.

the Ottoman Empire.⁴ So, for the French there were two meanings of the Eastern Question: the Question of Constantinople and the Question of Alexandria, which was connected directly with the Mediterranean and the Northern African coasts which were felt to be vital to French interests.

Therefore, the period from 1831 to 1841 was considered a new era in the Eastern Question. During this period the complete Eastern Question (Constantinople and Alexandria) became sharply defined, and vitally influenced the mutual relations of the Powers. The problem reached its peak in the period of 1839-40, the time of the so-called Egyptian Question. In this period, Egypt occupied the first priority of the French diplomacy and Constantinople the second. This policy produced the crisis of 1839-40 when a European war, with France on one side and England on the other, was avoided by a hair's breadth.⁵

It is of great importance to point out in this connection that the conflict of interest in the Levant was not only of a political nature when the British and French rivalries reached their peak in 1839-40, but it was also of an economic and strategic nature, as well, by which other European Powers were involved in all the phases of the Eastern Question. It is needless to say that by this time Europe was on the doors of take-off of the Industrial Revolution which started in

⁴The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy (Vol. II; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923), p. 162.

⁵Mowat, op. cit., p. 55.

England years ago. So, looking the desire for markets, raw materials and spheres of influence had become a significant factor in shaping the foreign policy of most of the Big Powers. By 1830, the French, British, and Russian interests clashed decisively in the Ottoman Empire. When France won a foothold in Algeria, Great Britain made plans to experiment with the Near Eastern route for mail to India, and Russia secured guarantees from Turkey for the freedom of her commerce in the Black Sea, in the Straits, and in the Lower Danube. Thus, the problem was more complicated for economic imperialism when the commercial intercourse of the Levant with western Europeans was accelerated by new international political rivalries, principally the Anglo-Russian.⁶

The Ottoman Empire was in control of all the Near Eastern routes between Europe and the East and was also on the only ice-free route between European Russia and the markets of Southern and Western Europe. Thus, the strategic and geographical interests of Great Britain in the Ottoman Empire were associated with the necessity of defending, whether by controlled routes or by buffer states, the approach to India. These were bound up intimately with the naval predominance of Great Britain in the Mediterranean, and with her rapidly developing world commercial hegemony. Therefore, the strategic and

⁶For more details about the strategic and economic involvement of the conflict see: Vernon J. Puryear, International Economies and Diplomacy in the Near East (Archon Books, 1969), pp. 1-10.

geographical, as well as commercial interests of England in the Levant were one of the principal reasons for the British policy of maintenance of the Ottoman Empire.

The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, so important strategically for the defense of Russian southern shores and her access to warm waters, presented intricate diplomatic and strategic problems, especially after 1833 when Russia received a free hand over the Straits (the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi). Britain, therefore, adopted a clear-cut policy aimed to prevent the fall of the Straits under any Power and to suppress elements such as Mohamed Ali who tried to expand their power over the Sultan's territories, especially in areas of great importance on the British route to India. The British naval supremacy enhanced the British strategic position, which was based on the possession of Gibraltar, a predominant role in the entrance of the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf. The converging point of three continents could be blocked by the strongest naval power. The British position not only controlled Russia's ultimate outlet to world seas, but might also, under favorable conditions of European diplomacy, have been even used effectively against the Ottoman Empire as well.

In brief, all the European colonial, imperial, economic, and strategic problems which in any way touched the Levant seemed to add to the complications of the Eastern Question and the difficulties confronting the "sick man" Turkey.

Our study, however, will be directly concerned with the imperial ambition of Mohamed Ali in the Ottoman Empire which contrasts to the interests of some European Powers. Also, this study will attempt to show the development of these interests which indeed involved all of the principal powers of Europe.

The problem was of major concern to different elements: statesmen, politicians, and merchants who had attempted either to solve, or to retard a solution of it in its larger significance. By the signature of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, the Eastern Question became acute: this is due to the fact that Turkey, first had become decrepit, as shown by the victories of Mohamed Ali and her dependence upon Russia; second, the quite natural jealousies of the Great Powers precluded the formation of an equitable solution of the principal problem--agreeable solution to separationist trends within the Ottoman Empire.

CHAPTER I

THE ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM

I

To understand the events which occurred in the Levant during the period from 1832 to 1834, it is necessary to go back to the original causes of that conflict between Mohamed Ali and the Sublime Porte which had reached its peak in 1839/40. We do not exaggerate if we say that the Egyptian Question had begun to appear on the international stage at the beginning of the century. Three interrelated factors were inevitably responsible for the conflict between Mohamed Ali and the Sultan. These were: the effect of the French expedition of Egypt [1798-1801] in promoting the interests of England as well as of France in the Levant; the state of the Ottoman Empire with the reform policy of the Sultan Mahmud II, and finally the rise of Mohamed Ali and his expansive policy which was contrary to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the interests of some of the Powers.

From a military point of view, the French occupation of Egypt came to an inglorious end. Politically, however, it had indeed been

far from fruitless locally as well as internationally. Locally, it had shaken the Mameluke's¹ power which paved the way for the rise of Mohamed Ali. Internationally, it had fully awakened English minds as well as the French, to the strategic importance of Egypt.² Marriott has written:

It was Napoleon who first concentrated the attention of the French people on the high significance of the problem of the Near East. The acquisition of the Ionian Isles, the Expedition to Egypt and Syria; the grandiose schemes for an attack on British India; the agreement with the Tsar Alexander for a partition of the Ottoman Empire--all combined to stir the imagination alike of traders and diplomatists in France.

And not in France only. If Napoleon was a great educator of the French, still more was he an educator of the English. For some two hundred years English merchants had been keenly alive to the commercial value of the Levant. The politicians, however, were curiously but characteristically tardy in awakening

¹ Mameluke: The Arabic word *mamluk* means "owned." The name given to the white male slaves chiefly Turks and Circassians, from Russia and Caucasus and central Asia. They were brought into the Islamic state by the late Abasiat Caliphs to be their guards and soldiers. They progressively encroached upon the government until they became masters of the state and formed a military ruling caste. They were introduced in Egypt by the Fatimid Caliphs [969-1171]. Saladin, who succeeded the Fatimids, and his successors employed the Mamelukes who were to form the spearhead of the Muslim resistance to Crusaders. The Mameluke dynasties [the Bahri 1250-1382] and the Burgi [1382-1517] were overthrown by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I in 1517. Under the Ottoman government the Mamelukes were retained as local governors, and by the 18th century they had recovered much of their former power and had overawed the Ottoman governors general. They were finally destroyed by Mohamed Ali Pasha in a massacre in 1811.

² Desmond Stewart, Young Egypt (Allan Wingate, 1958), p. 26.

to the fact that the development of events in the Ottoman Empire possessed any political significance for England.³

"Really to conquer England," said Napoleon, "we must make ourselves masters of Egypt."

Hence, one realizes the importance attached by General Bonaparte, at the very outset of his political career, to the acquisition of the Ionian Isles. Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia were, he declared in 1797, more important for France than the whole of Italy. They were the stepping-stone to Egypt; Egypt was a state on the high road to India.⁴ To Egypt, therefore, the thoughts of Frenchmen naturally turned not only as affording a guarantee for the maintenance of French commercial interests in the Near East, but also as a means for threatening the position so recently acquired by England in the Far East.⁵

Therefore, it was not strange to see that British diplomacy, upon hearing of Napoleon's landing in Egypt, had gone into action on two levels: diplomatically and militarily. At least one of three factors influenced Britain's involvement in the Egyptian question during that earlier period. These were (1) as an application of her new policy which had been already adopted by Pitt which was the

³ J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question on Historical Study in European Diplomacy (3rd ed.; Oxford, 1924), p. 7.

⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

⁵ Ibid., p. 8.

maintenance of the integrity of Turkey as an instrument in keeping the balance in Europe--that policy which became traditional in British Foreign Policy during the last century; (2) it was as a part of the grand strategy of war against France; (3) as a specific desire to prevent the French from establishing themselves in Egypt. Whatever the purpose of the British engagement in the Egyptian Question in that earlier phase, it is apparent, as J. Marlowe puts it "that at least one member of the British Cabinet had already appreciated the strategic importance of Egypt."⁶ Dundas, the Minister of War, in a memorandum to Lord Grenville, the Foreign Secretary, wrote: "The possession of Egypt by any independent Power would be a fatal circumstance to the interests of this country." This is probably the first explicit and official statement of the policy which has governed British relations with Egypt for the last 150 years.⁷

Thus, Napoleon's plan to defeat the English, making himself master of Egypt, not only attracted the attention of the English because of the importance of that region, but also opened their minds to the desirability of acquiring it for themselves.⁸ As we will see, the

⁶ John Marlowe, Englo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1956 (2nd ed.; Frankclass and Co., 1965), p. 15.

⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

⁸ Desmond Stewart, op. cit., p. 25.

expansion of Mohamed Ali's power in Arabia and the Sudan was observed carefully by the English. They thought that his actions in those areas had affected three regions in which they were interested, i.e., the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and Abyssinia which were of great importance to their commercial and navy routes to India.

II

By the end of the eighteenth century, the Turkish menace to Europe was dissipated forever and their advance in Europe had been arrested a long time ago mainly as a result of the growing power of Russia and Austria, and the continuing decline of the military institutions of the Empire. This had led the Empire to suffer several military defeats from Russia and Austria and to sign with them several treaties by which Turkey lost some of its territories in Europe.⁹ In addition, this opened the way for further developments from within and outside the Empire which would threaten her unity and integrity, and also to weakening the center of the government's authority over the provinces, especially the remote ones. These had encouraged the

⁹See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 36-39.

rebellious, adventurous Pashas and officers to practice independent rule in their provinces.

Under these critical conditions of the Empire, plus the international effects of the French Revolution, the need arose to renew the reforms of the Empire.¹⁰ The Sultan Selim III [1789-1807] who observed this fact had started a program of reform. Modernization of the armed forces was the corner-stone of reform to meet the challenge of Europe.¹¹ Such a plan was, however, not pleasant to the Janisseries, the Military Institution of the Empire, and reactionary religious caste who led a revolt against him which resulted in Selim being ousted from the throne and Mustafa IV being placed on the throne. The latter remained in office for only a few months.

Mahmud II [1808-1839] who succeeded Mustafa, understood that any reform could not be achieved if the central government remained weak. So from the beginning, he was determined to suppress all the powers and privileges in the provinces and restore the authority of the central government in those regions. In his view, no real progress toward reforms could be achieved unless all power other than that

¹⁰ In fact the need for reform in the Empire had been realized since 1630's in the memorandum presented to Morad IV by KocuBey. See Bernard Lewis, ibid., pp. 21-129.

¹¹ Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 6.

emanating from his throne had been eliminated, and the Sultan's will made the sole source of authority in the provinces as well as in the capital.¹² Perhaps this central policy which was adopted by Mahmud II was, therefore, an important factor in the rebellion of Dawoud Pasha wali of Baghdad in 1830 and Mohamed Ali Pasha of Egypt in 1831-1840, and made the conflict with the latter, in particular, inevitable. In fact, since his accession, Mahmud had made his decision to oust Mohamed Ali from the government of the Pashalic of Egypt. His purpose was similar to that of the late Selim who tried to oust Mohamed Ali by delaying his recognition as a wali of Egypt, and not sending him the firman or trying to remove him from that province to another.¹³ The failure of Selim in doing so, led Mahmud to adopt another policy which, if successful, would not only restore Egypt to the effective control of the Sultan, but other important provinces as well, by inducing Mohamed Ali to exhaust his resources and using up his troops in destroying the rebellious movements in other regions.¹⁴

¹² Bernard Lewis, op. cit., p. 78. Walter A. Philips, "Mehemet Ali," Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X, p. 548. Harold Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (Archon Books, 1964), pp. 5-42.

¹³ See el-Rafii, Abd-el-Rahman, Asar Mohamed Ali (3rd ed.; Cairo: Maktabata el Nahda el Masaria, 1951), pp. 16-45.

¹⁴ Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt A Study of Muhammed Ali (Cambridge: The University Press, 1967), p. 43.

Mohamed Ali, aware of the Sultan's determination, appeared to be a loyal vassal very concerned about the integrity of the Empire and its restoration. This was in order to find persuasive excuses to build a modern force by which he could carry out his plans for expansion and independence. Thus, the Sultan and the Pasha were at last united (though for the most different reasons in the world) in a common desire to reconquer the cradle of Islam,¹⁵ and suppress the Greek insurrection. The Sultan's policy failed in reaching its expectations or even in carrying Mohamed Ali to come to terms with the Sultan; on the contrary, it had helped Mohamed Ali to emerge from each operation much stronger and more determined to establish himself as an independent dynasty from his suzerain. Mutual suspicions had governed the relations between the vassal and his suzerain through all of Mahmud's reign. Such a policy carried within itself the possibility of an outbreak of hostility between the concerned parties at any moment. But, as we will see, internal and external conditions had helped in prolonging that moment until the autumn of 1831, when Mohamed Ali's army had invaded Syria.

The opening of Acre to Mohamed Ali, and the successive defeats of Turkish troops in the first Syrian War (1831-1832), led the Sultan to express his passionate hatred of Mohamed Ali and to offer

¹⁵Ibid., p. 43.

Constantinople and the Empire to anyone who would bring him the head of Mohamed Ali. After failing to get English and French assistance, the Sultan resolved on the momentous step--almost equivalent, in Mowat's judgment to losing Constantinople and the Empire of inviting Russian armed support rather than coming to terms with Mohamed Ali.¹⁶ Although the Russian intervention had hastened the settlement of Kutahiah by May, 1833, by which the crisis had ended in its first phase, it was responsible to some degree for bringing on the crisis of 1839-40, by causing the other European countries, especially England, to adopt a clear-cut policy toward the Sultan and his vassal. The aim of this policy was to preserve the integrity of the Empire by depriving Mohamed Ali of his earnings in Syria and Anatolia. Thus the problem had changed from an internal problem as Mohamed Ali and some official Turks wanted it, to one of an international character of great importance in determining the balance of power in Europe.

III

The French were no sooner gone than the various political parties in Egypt began to struggle for power. These parties were

¹⁶The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, p. 165.

the Mamelukes, backed by the English; the Turks; and Mohamed Ali. It would not be worthwhile to unravel in detail the intricate intrigues by which Mohamed Ali made himself sole ruler of Egypt. Mohamed Ali came to Egypt in 1799 as an officer with the Albanian detachment in the Turkish expeditionary force against the French; had been born at Kavalla in 1769. He was a son of Ibrahim Agha, head of local town watchmen. After the death of his father he was adopted by his uncle Tussun and after the death of the latter, the governor of Kavalla took care of him. As a young man, Mohamed Ali entered the tobacco trade, with a French merchant, an occupation which introduced him to a wider world than was normally open to a Turk, and this probably explains his ability to understand and live on easy terms with non-Muslims. In 1801, he was chosen to be one of the two officers commanding the Albanian formation in Egypt. Soon after the departure of the French from Egypt, Mohamed Ali made himself a figure of importance in the political life of Cairo, supporting first one side and then the other in the struggle for power between the Mamelukes and the Turks. At the same time he tried with success to gain the support of the leaders of local inhabitants by siding their cause and showing his indifference to governorship of the country. By 1805 he was chosen by the Shiekhs of Cairo to be a pasha. His authority as viceroy was confirmed by an imperial Turkish edict 1806. In a matter of a few years [1805-11]

Mohamed Ali rid himself of all his enemies: the British, Turks, and Mamelukes had all been cleared out of Egypt.¹⁷

We can name the history of Egypt in the period 1805-1848 the age of Mohamed Ali. From the withdrawal of the French, Mohamed Ali played an important role in the Egyptian stage until the end of the first half of the 19th century. He was contemporary with two great revolutions: The French Bourgeois Revolution and the Industrial Revolution; each of them had great effects upon Europe as well as the world. They had led to changes in the balance of Power within the single nation as well as among the nations. These developments were not hidden from the enlightened minority in Egypt which was in contact with Europeans since the French expedition. Mohamed Ali was deeply concerned about European developments and realized thoroughly the role of advanced technology in developing Western countries in the fields of industry, commerce, and arts of war. Mohamed Ali was a bourgeois by his background and career; he was a trader before he became a soldier. So we can say that his policy was a policy of a merchant ruling Egypt, from which he made a large farm and exploited it according to the most advanced scientific methods in agriculture, industry, and commerce. In his political and economic monopoly, he had depended upon a modern aggressive military force.

¹⁷ George Young, Egypt (London: Ernest Benn, 1927), pp. 36-41.

From the beginning, Mohamed Ali recognized that the Turkish force represented a backward army raised and equipped by a declining power, the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, he observed that both the British and French armies were technically superior to the Turkish forces, and represented two advanced, but rival, powers competing for the control of Egypt at the crossroads of East and West. This kind of perception backed by several years' experience of the reform program introduced into the Empire by Sultan Selim III, influenced Mohamed Ali's understanding of politics and guided his diplomacy throughout his long reign in Egypt, from 1805 to 1848.¹⁸ He was determined to keep Egypt for himself, whatever the cost might be. That can be seen in his resistance to the Sultan's firman transferring him to Salonica, and in his demand for French military and financial aid to expel the English expedition (1807),¹⁹ and his practical policies to rid himself of the Mamelukes and his own Albanian soldiers which were the biggest obstacle in the way of his new policy, which he called the New Order. The New Order became the basic framework, for his country's drive toward modernity for the next hundred years. It aimed first at the organization of a modern army, and required reform and innovation in

¹⁸ P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 49.

¹⁹ M. Bey Rifaat, The Awakening of Modern Egypt (Lahore, 1484), p. 31.

several areas of State activities: agriculture, administration, education, and industry.²⁰ Mohamed Ali's first concern was to build an aggressive military force to secure his power and buttress his rule. So his newly developed agricultural, economic, educational, and administrative plans were contingent upon the attainment of this goal, and were designed to meet primarily the needs of the armed forces.²¹ Thus, the army became the basis for all reforms in the country.

For the Egyptian historian, A. Rafii, the army was the fundamental basis on which Mohamed Ali depended for establishing an independent and modern Egypt; without that army, Egypt would be merely a vassal province of the Ottoman Empire.²² Therefore, the wars in which Egyptian armies were engaged were to confirm Egypt's independence and define its interests. In creating a strong army, equipped and trained along European lines with French help, Mohamed Ali had two goals: a) to meet the challenge of the Sultan, who was eager to bring Egypt under his direct control as he had done to other areas, and b) to oppose any efforts of European powers, especially Britain and France to annex the country. But the new army was used also as a means to get rid of Mohamed Ali's enemy number one, the Mamelukes as well as

²⁰ Ibid., p. 56.

²¹ Ibid., p. 60; I. Rafii, op. cit., p. 372.

²² El-Rafii, ibid., p. 373.

the Albanians and other elements of which the Pasha's army consisted, and who opposed modernization, and mutinied and proceeded to pillage and plunder the local inhabitants and their commercial establishments. This army was also used to expand Mohamed Ali's territories in order to find new markets for his new manufactured goods and secure the raw materials for his new industries.

Mohamed Ali's policy in the period 1805-31 was characterized by his attempts to compromise between the work of his ultimate goal of independence and the fulfillment of his obligations as a loyal vassal to the Sultan. During these years, he failed as early as 1810-12, first to make an alliance with both England and France to gain recognition as the ruler of Cairo, and second, to obtain the Sublime Porte's recognition of his being on the same footing as the North Africa States.²³ These rebuffs in no way changed his views, but they did lead to their concealment for a while. The lack of the European alliance which he sought prevented any open breach with the Porte, and although he seldom obeyed orders which could not be diverted to his own aggrandisement, his public language was always that of the loyal and devoted vassal. Throughout this period there was an ever piquant contrast between the professed object and the real purpose of the conduct.²⁴ That can be seen in his expedition to Arabia.

²³ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 39.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 39-40.

Even while he had been struggling with the Mamelukes for the mastery of Egypt, Mohamed Ali had been repeatedly called upon by the Porte to undertake the suppression of the seat of Wahabi in Arabia. The Wahabis' movement was both religious and political and was founded by Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab [1703-1791/2] in Arabia about the middle of the eighteenth century. He traveled to Hejar, Bagdad, and Damascus for religious study. Convinced that innovation and immorality had corrupted Islam, Ibn Abdul Wahab confirmed the belief that Islam should be restored to its purity and simplicity. He insisted that the Quran was the only source of authority; and he began to preach against paint worship and veneration of tombs and all the superstitions and miracles which had attached themselves to Islamic monotheism. His movement found in Mohamed Ibn Saud, amir of Najd a great political and military support. With Ibn Saud's support the Wahabis' movement spread between 1770 and 1811 from Najd to a considerable portion of the peninsula, including the Holy Cities of Mecca and Madina, and led Ibn Saud to renounce the Turkish Caliphate and to defy the neighboring pashas of the Empire. The enfeebled condition of the state made the movement, for some time, met little effective opposition, and it was able to display its impartial hatred of both Shiah and Sunni by packing the most sacred shrines of either sect at Karbela, Mecca, and Madina.²⁵

²⁵Ibid., p. 42.

The Wahabis' occupation of the Hejar resulted in interrupting the annual pilgrimage to the Holy Cities, in which the Sultan Mahmud, as a Muslim Caliph who was considered to be the defender of the holy shrines of Islam, appeared unable to be at his very responsibilities and then restore his repute in Muslim world back. Anyhow, his efforts to march sufficient forces to attack the Wahabis or compel the pashas of Syria and Bagdad to carry out the imperial orders to destroy them came to naught. Therefore, the Porte turned to the rising Pasha of Egypt, Mohamed Ali. By 1811 Mohamed Ali carried out his suzerain's orders on the ground that this war was a chance for him to confirm his rule and augment his repute in the world of Islam if he drove the here-tics from the Holy Cities where Turkey herself failed. In that point, Turkey would never think of firing him or moving him to another pashalic other than Egypt, or treat him as any other wali in the Empire. But the development of events might compel her to treat him as an ally if not as an equal, and then his position would change from a vassal to an independent governor. In addition, if he did not carry out that order, he might give an excuse to the Porte to fire him, at a time when he still believed himself unable to meet the challenge. So it was wise for him to avoid any conflict with the Porte in this period. Mohamed Ali also saw in the expedition a chance to build up a new naval and land force without provoking Ottoman authorities, and he appeared to show that his military mobilization was to serve his

suzerain's purposes. He also saw in the expedition a chance to keep busy those turbulent soldiers who had fired upon him even when the Mamelukes were still unsubdued and living, and who might be yet more turbulent when no force remained in Egypt capable of resisting them.²⁶

It was also a chance to levying more taxes upon the inhabitants to meet his financial problem, on the ground that this money was necessary to spend on a holy war to restore the Holy Cities and secure the annual pilgrimage.²⁷ Finally, it was a golden chance to control the eastern Red Sea coasts in order to secure the Egyptian trade in those waters. On the part of the Sultan, if this war did not bring him back the control of the Holy Cities and restore his reputé as a protector of the sacred Places in the eyes of Muslims, as an essential element to be kept under his control as a Kaliphate, it might exhaust the resources of two of his bitter enemies: Mohamed Ali and the Wahabis, and then enable him to overcome all of them.

We are not interested in the details of the conflict between Mohamed Ali and the Wahabis,²⁸ but we are concerned about the results which the war brought to the front and which have far-reaching consequences in the conflict between Mohamed Ali and his suzerain. The

²⁶ Ibid., p. 41.

²⁷ El-Rafii, op. cit., pp. 125-27.

²⁸ Details of the war in El-Rafii, ibid., pp. 123-166.

triumph of Mohamed Ali in that war raised high his repute in the world of Islam and brought him into touch with the pulse of the Arab world, and he received gifts and congratulations from several elements all over the world of Islam on the great work he had done and Ibrahim was appointed governor of Arabia. Perhaps from that time, Mohamed Ali convinced himself more than ever of the possibility of independence²⁹ and the establishment of a state consisting of the Arabic speaking people.³⁰ Perhaps it was also the effective way to defeat the Porte's attempts to remove him from the pashalic of Egypt, especially since it had tried to do so at least once when he was absent in Arabia fighting the Wahabis.³¹ To establish his control of the western Red Sea coasts, and to suppress the remaining number of the Mamelukes who fled to Upper Egypt, and to look for the gold and monopolize the slave trade and the possibility of using the Sudanese in his new army, Mohamed Ali sent a great expedition to the Sudan (1820-22).

The expansion of Mohamed Ali's power in Arabia and the Sudan had produced important results. The French had remained mere

²⁹ Ibid., p. 127; Hussein Monis, El-Shark el-Eslami fi el Asar el Hadith (Cairo: Commercial Library, 1938), p. 195; RiFa'at, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

³⁰ Monis, ibid., p. 145. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), p. 23.

³¹ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 46; El-Rafii, op. cit., pp. 149-151; RiFa'at, op. cit., p. 34.

spectators, but the English were more directly interested, and to this point, 1811-22 may be traced the origin of their distrust of Mohamed Ali's policy.³² Mohamed Ali's enterprises in those areas affected the growing interests of the British in those places and had far-reaching results in the political development of the area and in causing the future conflict between Mohamed Ali and his suzerain to take an international character.

For Mohamed Ali, the Greek War was a chance to be recognized as a figure in international affairs. The successful intervention in Arabia and the Sudan had led to the reorganization of Mohamed Ali's army, to the foundation of a naval force, and to a considerable extension of the Pasha's authority. But so far his progress had not brought him into collision with any European Power.³³ Until that moment, England and France had refused several of Mohamed Ali's proposals to form a cooperation or alliance. The Sultan had also refused to hear many projects submitted to him by Mohamed Ali after he put them in a framework of the interests of the Ottoman empire; projects such as: changing Egypt into a strong fortress to defend the Empire against the West; in which he could have a special position to sustain the Muslim's position if the feared European attempts to annex Muslim territory took

³² Dodwell, ibid., pp. 55-61.

³³ Ibid., p. 68.

place; uniting Syria and Egypt or the military leadership of Cairo, Baghdad, and Damascus under his own leadership or recognizing him as the governor of the North African provinces.³⁴ The Sultan understood what all these proposals meant--simply that they meant putting an end to the unity of the Empire.

After a long bargaining ended by the agreement of the Sultan to give Mohamed Ali the rule of Crete and the Morea, Mohamed Ali sent his forces to suppress the Greek rebellion. He thought that it would be a good chance to introduce himself to international affairs. His main purpose had been to strengthen his position either inside or outside the Ottoman Empire, with a decided preference for the second alternative if circumstances should permit. Throughout the Greek War, Mohamed Ali had entered into a series of conversations with the British government through her representatives in Cairo and Constantinople or through special missions,³⁵ aiming at his withdrawal from the war. In return, if he could not win the alliance of Britain, he could gain "some general assurance of sanction to his independence."³⁶

³⁴ Subhi Wahida, Fi Osul el Masala el Masaria (Englo-Egyptian Library, 1950), pp. 139-40.

³⁵ Dodwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-93. Frederick S. Rodkey, "The Attempts of Briggs and Company to Guide British Policy in the Levant in the Interests of Mohamed Ali Pasha 1621-41," Journal of Modern History, V, 1933. A. Stern, "Colonel Cradock's Mission to Egypt," English Historical Review, Vol. XV, 1900.

³⁶ F.O. 78/147 Salt., Oct. 1, 1826, cited in Dodwell, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

The development of events in the Greek crisis brought Mohamed Ali's forces in direct conflict, where he almost lost his naval forces in Navarino to a British, French, and Russian allied squadron (November, 1827). He blamed the "Pig-headed Sultan" and "ass-like Viziers" for these misfortunes. He had withdrawn from the struggle by an agreement with Britain--his first formal recognition. At the time, the Russians had been daily expected at the very gates of Constantinople. He was justly filled with contempt for the impotence and malice of the Sublime Porte, and resolved more than ever to establish his complete freedom from its blighting influence. The Greek War was a turning point in the relations of Mohamed Ali with his suzerain.

As we have seen already, Mohamed Ali through the last twenty-five years had tried, and with great success, to make of Egypt a "Modern" State at the same time he tried to expand his territorial authority within the Empire. These two factors can not be separated from what he had done in Egypt; all changes he had made in Egypt were aimed to give him the means of "the policy of power" by which he could carry on his policies. His agricultural and industrial programs were designed to meet the needs of military and naval forces of the Pasha and to serve as exports. He became "the sole titular landlord, the sole tax farmer, and the sole foreign trader of Egypt."³⁷ This policy of monopoly was one of the practices of Mohamed Ali, as we will see,

³⁷ Dodwell, op. cit.

that brought him into direct collision with British commercial interests in Ottoman Empire.

In spite of the final defeat of the Morean expedition, Mohamed Ali, by 1830 emerged with a considerable "Egyptian force" which arrested the attention of the Europeans. And it was observed that Mohamed Ali had succeeded in his efforts for reform where other rulers in the Islamic world had failed, and he had become the predominant figure in the Levant and the Ottoman Empire. He was helped or hindered by an Oriental aristocracy, called for convenience "Turks," recruited from a middle-class of Armenians, Jews, and Copts.

The important question was, for what purpose would Mohamed Ali want to use this power? In fact, he did not conceal from his European friends his intentions of many enterprises. His main goal was to establish the right of hereditary rule in Egypt. By 1830, Mohamed Ali was 61 years old and he wanted to leave the State he had created to his sons. He wanted to obtain de jure recognition for his de facto independence. But he was looking far beyond the securing of hereditary rights of his family in an independent Egypt. He wanted to add Syria to his dominion. Thus, he might have changed the East Mediterranean into an "Egyptian Lake," and if circumstances allowed him, what could prevent him from putting himself in the place of the Sultan? and achieve the renewal of the entire Empire?

The imperial ambition of the Pasha raises important questions in the field of international relations: Was it possible for the Mediterranean States to allow the Suez route to fall into hands of a strong modern nation, especially after the increase of European trade toward India and Southeast Asia in spite of the difficulties of discharging and reloading at the Suez Isthmus? Was it better to keep that "gate" of Mediterranean gates under the control of the weak Ottoman Empire? Was not the fate of the Sultan the concern of all the Great Powers? Mohamed Ali's attacks on the decadent Turkish Empire threatened the partitioning of the Empire which would upset the balance of power. Also, the reform of the Empire by Mohamed Ali would make changes in international policy.³⁸

As we have seen earlier, the Sultan from the beginning of his reign directed his policy toward crushing the various separatist forces within the Empire which hampered the omnipotence of the central power, but he failed in his attempts to crush Mohamed Ali, due to the rapidly increasing strength of the Pasha. Under the circumstances, a clash between the Pasha and the Sublime Porte was inevitable,³⁹ and it

³⁸ Pierre Renouvin, *D'histoire des relations internationales 1814-1914*, trans. to the Arabic by Jalal Yahia, 2nd ed., Dar el Maarif, Cairo, 1971, p. 128.

³⁹ Frederick S. Rodkey, *The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832-1841* (Urbana: Univ. of Ill., 1923), p. 13.

was bound to have international repercussions because of the rival interests in the Empire of the Big Three Powers.

Of all the Big Powers, traditionally friendly to Turkey, France had a strong influence in Egypt; her officers had trained Mohamed Ali's new army, her experts and technicians had played a fundamental role in economic revolution, her educational mission helped in opening the schools which were attended by about 9000 students.⁴⁰ France had thought of exploiting this position in strengthening her policy in the Mediterranean. Through her understanding with the Pasha, she could find in Egypt a stepping-stone in her fighting against British interests and confirm her ambitions on the Mediterranean coast of Africa. This policy was not consistent with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and culminated in the conquest of Algiers.⁴¹

England desired to keep the Suez route open, but there was no serious danger threatening it, so what could push Mohamed Ali to oppose transporting goods through the Suez? Relying on her superior sea

⁴⁰ Renouvin, op. cit., p. 128. George Young, op. cit., argues that technical schools only had at least nine thousand pupils, p. 46.

⁴¹ Walter Philips, op. cit., p.

power, could not Britain be able to protect her transportation in the East Mediterranean and the Red Sea?⁴²

England was very afraid of Egyptian rule expanding to Syria, which would be a beginning to Egyptian expansion towards the Gulf, which was a serious threat to India's security. Therefore, Britain seemed to maintain the unbroken tradition of her policy in the East: that of upholding the integrity of Turkey as a barrier against Russian designs on India. Also, it would prevent any adventurer, such as Mohamed Ali, from establishing a strong dynasty within the Empire, and who might come to terms with the Russians. The Peace of Adrianople and its consequences had made this policy all the more urgent, since Russia with new prestige was intriguing in Persia, stretching out feelers through Armenia, Kurdistan and south of Baghdad, and threatening to cut off the trade-route to India by the Euphrates Valley just

⁴²In a letter about the security in the Red Sea, and that Mohamed Ali should have a preponderating influence there than that such pirates as the Wahabees should have possession of the sea." Salt, the British Consular in Cairo, wrote "With regard to Egypt the Pasha has become so complete a merchant that he has placed himself entirely at our mercy, his revenue now so vitally dependent upon commerce . . . that he could not support his government many months without it. The admiral commanding in the Mediterranean might in my opinion at any time bring him to our own terms; in the event of a rupture, without any additional force than that always under his command, by simply anchoring at Abaukir and blockading the coast. The same thing might be done in the Red Sea, as two frigates stationed between Jedda and Suez would cut off all their communication by sea and soon reduce him to terms." F.O. 24-6, June 15, 1816, cited by Dodwell, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

when the invention of steam power had given to this route a new prospective value for British commerce.⁴³ For these reasons, Britain would not agree to let the Sultan lose part of his dominion in the interest of Mohamed Ali. But here, we might raise a question: Would not the Ottoman Empire, in case Mohamed Ali replaced the Sultan, be strong and vigorous, and then a more active barrier against Russian ambitions? It could be, but Britain was not interested in such a solution. It was in contrast with the British economic interests. The Sultan had guaranteed Britain a commercial treaty by which the whole Empire became an important market for British exported goods. The British Consul General in Damascus had noticed that Britain would lose this privilege if Mohamed Ali controlled the Empire and applied his monopolistic system of external trade. So all Mohamed Ali's enterprises of "economic independence" were in direct contrast with the British interests.⁴⁴

Austria, whose zeal in support of the Sultan's legitimate authority had, after all, been no more than the sudden establishment of Russian influence on the Lower Danube, was showing a disposition to second the Tsar's ambitions in the East, unaccountable to those who were as yet ignorant of Russian new policy in the East after 1829.

⁴³ Walter A. Phillips, op. cit., p. 545.

⁴⁴ Renouvin, op. cit., p. 129.

"It was this ignorance that made the diplomatic discussion of the years that followed so largely a game of cross questions and crooked answers."⁴⁵ England and France were convinced that the Russian activities in the East were guided by the traditional policy of Peter the Great and Catherine. It was apparent that the Russian establishments on the Black Sea littoral, and the recent victories of her armies over the Turks, were aimed at holding the key to the only gate by which her commerce and her fleets could pass from the Empire to the outside world. The conquest of Constantinople, which meant the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and then the upset of the whole balance of power in the Mediterranean seemed to be not only a natural ambition but, as Lord Ponsonby pointed out, "the duty" of the Tsar.⁴⁶ But when this goal seemed to be at hand, a fundamental change in Russian policy towards the East took place after the peace of Adrianople. As far back as the year 1802, the minister, Kotchuby, taking as his text Montesquieu's doctrine that no Power can have a better neighbor than a weak State, had written a memorandum in which he argued that the preservation, not the destruction, of Turkey should be the object of Russian policy. These views were endorsed by the committee of statesmen appointed by the Emperor Nicholas I at the close of 1829 to

⁴⁵Walter A. Philips, op. cit., p. 546.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 545.

inquire into the attitude to be taken by Russia in the case of the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. The committee, therefore, reported in favor of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, and the Emperor Nicholas had reluctantly accepted their conclusion.⁴⁷ This policy became the basis of Russian policy for the next few years. "Had this attitude been frankly explained to the other powers interested in the Eastern Question," as Philips points out, "it might have set bounds to a whole sea of trouble."⁴⁸

Such, broadly speaking, was the internal condition in the Ottoman Empire, and the international situation, on the eve of the eruption of hostility between Mohamed Ali and his overlord. It was obvious that a point had been reached at which the Sultan considered that Mohamed Ali had achieved the maximum of power compatible with continued subordination to Turkey. In other words, loyalty to the Sultan had exhausted its usefulness.⁴⁹ It was time for Mohamed Ali to lift the veil and deal a long-awaited blow to his suzerain.

⁴⁷S. Goriainow, *Le Bosphore et les dardanelles*, pp. 27, 48-49, cited by John Hall, England and Orlean Monarchy, p. 156.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 547.

⁴⁹Marlowe, op. cit., p. 39.

CHAPTER II

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

The Internal Scope

In the previous chapter, we have mentioned that the Greek War was a turning point in Mohamed Ali's relations with the Sultan. The problem developed from the Sultan's refusal to give rule over Syria to Mohamed Ali as the price of his assistance in Greece. Mohamed Ali had realized the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, especially in its military institutions, and thought the time was ripe for a successful rebellion against the Sultan in order to acquire Syria. The Sultan Mahmud II had just exterminated the Janissaries, who had long played in the Empire the same role as the Mamelukes had played in Egypt. This step was a necessity on the way to reorganizing the Ottoman army on more modern lines, but caused, for the time being, a severe weakening of Turkish military power. In addition to that, the defeat of the Turkish armies in the recent Turco-Russian War and the revolt of Dawoud Pasha, the governor of Baghdad in 1830, and his declaration of independence from the Ottoman Empire, made Mohamed Ali believe

that the time was ripe to revolt against the Sultan and invade Syria in the autumn of 1831. His excuse for that was the refusal of Abdullah Pasha of Acre to send him back the Egyptian feelahim refugees who fled to Syria as a result of Mohamed Ali's agricultural policy. Also, the international situation was favorable for Mohamed Ali to start his expedition. The European States were occupied with their own interior problems. It would be remembered that, on the eve of the Egyptian expedition into Syria, the question of Parliamentary reform was still of major importance in British politics. Moreover, as Lord Palmerston pointed out later, when the English "were embarking on naval operations in the North Sea, and on the coast of Holland, and were under the necessity of keeping up another naval force on the coast of Portugal, it would have been impossible to have sent to the Mediterranean such a squadron as would have served the purpose of the Porte, and at the same time have comported with the naval dignity" of Britain.¹

Metternich, the champion of preserving the status quo in Europe, was occupied, in particular, by the reflection of the second French Revolution in Italy and Germany. Also, the Polish question and the Polish revolt against the Russian rule was of great concern to Emperor Nicholas I. In France, public opinion was sympathetic to Mohamed

¹Par. Deb., XX, p. 900 cited by Frederick R. Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832-1841 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois, 1923), p. 15.

Ali. Therefore, no alarm seems to have been occasioned by the Egyptian expansion in Syria.²

With these considerations in mind, Mohamed Ali placed his son Ibrahim Pasha at the head of some 40,000 men, which sent out across Sinai for the invasion of Syria in the autumn of 1831. After the Capture of Acre, the Egyptian forces had seized all Syria without difficulty. If Mohamed Ali's forces had stopped there, it is unlikely that any serious opposition would have been encountered from the Powers.³ But the advance of Ibrahim Pasha in Asia Minor and his defeat of the Turkish army at Konieh, opened the way before him to Constantinople. He continued to advance westward as far as Prusa. These serious developments had alarmed the Powers. The Ottoman Empire seemed on the point of dissolution.

Before discussing the problem from an international point of view, I would like to discuss its interior scope--the official and real causes of the Egyptian Expedition to Syria. Through these causes, Mohamed Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha tried to give the conflict between them and the Porte an interior character. Most of the recent works⁴ on the conflict between Mohamed Ali and the Sublime

² Ibid., p. 15.

³ Marlowe, op. cit., p. 40.

⁴ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 109; Rafii, op. cit., pp. 244-250.

Porte show that the case of Abdullah Pasha served as the pretext for the war of 1831. In fact there is enough in the Egyptian archives to verify this fact, but to stop at this point is to leave the truth half told. The case of Abdullah Pasha seemed to be more than a pretext for war and its original causes go back several years previous. As early as 1821, Abdullah Pasha had naturally fallen into trouble with the Sublime Porte. He had almost lost his territories. In dire distress, he had begged for assistance from Cairo.⁵ As a result of Mohamed Ali's mediation between Abdullah Pasha and his suzerain, the Sublime Porte had not only forgiven Abdullah Pasha for his acts of treason but had reinstated him in his office.⁶ In return for these valuable services Abdullah Pasha seems to have made promises to put his political and military powers in Mohamed Ali's services. In several of his letters, he referred to these promises and declared that he was "Mohamed Ali's creature," that his provinces were Mohamed Ali's also, and that the fortress of Acre was the stronghold of the Pasha of Egypt.⁷

⁵ Abdullah Pasha to Mohamed Ali Abdin (BahrBarr VIII, 46 Shawwal 8, 1232 and 54, 55 Dhu-l-Qida, 18 and 23, 1237 cited by A. Rustum, The Royal Archives of Egypt and the Origins of the Egyptian Expedition to Syria 1831-1841 (Beirut: American Press, 1936), p. 19.

⁶ Ibid., p. 20.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 20-21.

These vague but important references to the understanding between Mohamed Ali and the Pasha of Acre were not examined by the consuls of the period except the British Consul John Farren.⁸ Farren, who mediated between Abdullah Pasha and Ibrahim Pasha after the siege of Acre, says: "Mehemet Ali Pasha had for several years been laying measures for rendering the Pachalic of Acre subservient to his ultimate designs and frontier policy" and in his advocating the cause of Abdullah Pasha and Amir Bashir at the Porte, he regarded that "as consummated in the bonds of gratitude and service by which he bound their influence to his interests."⁹

Abdullah Pasha himself seems to have had "too vain and erroneous a conception of his own power and station to submit, when not under an obvious and impending necessity, to the dictates of one whose rank in the scale of official dignity was not higher than his own."¹⁰ His connection with the family of the Prophet on his mother's side, led Abdullah Pasha to believe that he was the right person for the Caliphate and requested the learned theologians of his town to proclaim

⁸ John W. Farren, The Prospects and Present State of Syria, annexed to Lord Lindsay, Letters on E. G. Edom and the Holy Land (London, 1838), Vol. II, pp. 257-258, cited Ibid., p. 22.

⁹ Ibid., p. 34; cited ibid., p. 22.

¹⁰ Lord Lindsay, op. cit., II, 259; cited in Rustum, ibid., p. 22.

him as such.¹¹ These proclamations seemed to be nurtured and aided by the Sublime Porte, which encouraged Abdullah Pasha to work against the interests of Egypt. Thus it became apparent that as long as Abdullah Pasha could continue to count on the good will of the Porte, he could entertain no fear of Mohamed Ali Pasha.¹² Abdullah Pasha changed very quickly from the "creature" of Mohamed Ali to the Pasha's equal. In his refusal to send the refugees back to Mohamed Ali, Abdullah Pasha seems to have broken a very serious military and political engagement with the Pasha of Egypt.

Consul Farren would add that Abdullah Pasha had actually secured possession of some intercepted correspondence of a treasonable nature between Mohamed Ali and the Greek chiefs, which he transmitted to the Porte. The Porte then reproached the Pasha of Egypt with the new information it had acquired. These developments in the relations between Mohamed Ali Pasha and Abdullah Pasha caused the two men to become implacable enemies. Mohamed Ali to punish his enemy insisted on using as an excuse the injustice which Abdullah Pasha had inflicted on the Egyptian merchants, and the fact that he

¹¹Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, p. 23.

¹²Qaim-magam of Grand Vizier (Ahmed Khulusi) to Wali of Damascus, Abd., Case No. 231, doc-2 Rabi I, 3, 1247, cited by Rustum, ibid., p. 25.

had been insolent and disrespectful, and had thus "insulted his [M. Ali] white beard."¹³

From this argument and some other evidence,¹⁴ it would seem that, in Rustum's words:

the whole Turkish Empire had been rapidly ranging itself into two hostile camps--the partisans of Mehemet Ali Pasha and the supporters of Sultan Mahmud and Khusrev Pasha. By failing to support the engagement into which he had entered out of his own free accord in 1821, Abdullah Pasha was ipso facto defending the cause of Khusrev and the Sultan. The case of Abdullah Pasha was, thus, inextricably bound up with the real causes of the war.¹⁵

The Egyptian National Archives yield light on another official cause of war. In the course of the conflict, the Sublime Porte had declared Mohamed Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha lawless and struck out their names from the list of the Pashas of the Empire published annually during the Feast of Bairam, which in 1832 fell at the moment of conflict.¹⁶ These measures were taken against Mohamed Ali to deprive him of the support of the Muslims. Also, they would make Mohamed Ali appear as a rebel against the caliph in the eyes of the Muslims, thus

¹³ Lord Lindsay, op. cit., 11, p. 259. See also Abd. BahrBarr, XVII, 2, cited in Rustum, ibid., p. 27; Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 13.

¹⁴ See Rustum, ibid., pp. 23-29.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁶ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 110.

making his military operations against the Islamic Brotherhood illegal. Therefore, the Muslims had to stop him immediately, if not oust him and declare him an infidel. It is true that a feeling of unrest spread through Cairo and Alexandria, and people began to murmur against the Pasha, but the Pasha took bitter measures against such rumors. In March several men were found exposed by the Bab-Zewella at Cairo with labels on their chests saying, "This is the fate which awaits those who cannot govern their tongues."¹⁷ And on April 7 two new corpses were exposed, with the grim warning, "This is the punishment that awaits those who speak against the government in secret."¹⁸

In spite of these stringent measures against his people, Mohamed Ali took another course to deal with the problem on the Islamic world scale. He assumed the pious duty of reform and proclaimed his determination to rectify the mistakes and abuses of the Sultan and his government. Mohamed Ali had asked his son Ibrahim Pasha to address himself in such terms to some Pashas in the hope of winning them over to the side of Egypt.¹⁹ Taking advantage of his victories at Hims and

¹⁷ F.O. 78/213 Barker to Stratford Canning, March 24, 1832, cited Ibid., p. 110.

¹⁸ F.O. 78/213 Barker to Stratford Canning, April 11, 1832, cited Ibid., p. 110.

¹⁹ Mohamed Ali to Ibrahim Pasha, Abd., Case 3 doc. 185, Muharram 4, 1248, cited in Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, p. 33.

Aleppo, Ibrahim Pasha wrote to Allash Pasha of Latakiah "urging him to join the Orthodox Moslems who were anxious to free Islam from the Christian practices which had been imposed upon it by Sultan Mahmud."²⁰ In a letter to Mohamed Pasha of Aleppo, Ibrahim Pasha pressed "upon his attention the need for cooperation to rescue the nation from the evils with which it had been afflicted."²¹

After the battle of Beylan, Ibrahim Pasha expressed himself more officially and publicly. In an order (buyulurdu) to the Judge of Knadim, in Southern Asia Minor, he said,

In as much as the Ottoman Government has, in the course of the past few years, gone astray by establishing unsound observances, baseless innovations, excessive impositions, and unprecedented taxes; and in as much as the same government aims to reject Moslem customs and traditions and to embrace European forms and practices, which action would lead to the loss of its Moslem identity and its incorporation into European circles; and in as much as the Ottoman Government has also been ill disposed toward Egypt and has been working for its deceit; in view of all this, Almighty Wisdom has elected our benefactor [Mohamed Ali Pasha] to shake off these injustices, support our faith, and purify it from treacherous deceit.²²

²⁰ [Ibrahim Pasha] to Allush Pasha, Abd. Case 236, doc. 66, an undated preliminary draft cited in Ibid., p. 33.

²¹ Army bulletin, prepared by Wahid Effendi, and dated Safer 20, 1248, abd. case 236, doc. 119, cited Ibid., p. 34.

²² Al-Sayyid Ahmed (Mula-Khilafa of Khadim) to [Ibrahim Pasha], Abd. case 240, doc. 112, Jumada II, 15, 1248, cited in Ibid., pp. 34-35.

Thus, Mohamed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha tried to convince the Muslims, that their war against the Sublime Porte was to purge the Empire of the evil practices of the Sublime Porte and to help regenerate the leading Muslim State of the world.²³

The question which might impose itself in this connection is, were these claims only a pretext for war or were they one of the real causes of the conflict? One native historian, who has had access to the Abdin's Archives, seems to think that it was more than a mere pretext.²⁴ His evidence of that is the famous declaration of Mohamed Ali Pasha to Shaykh Effendi at Constantinople.²⁵ In this declaration, Mohamed Ali discussed the reasons of the Muslim nation's weakness and how fundamental reforms, in which he was willing to participate effectively, should be started in the Empire. That was the only way to meet the European challenge. A. Rustum, who has also had access to the archives of Abdin, comes to a conclusion which revises M. Sabry's view of the matter.²⁶ His argument relies on certain facts; in reply to Ibrahim Pasha's declaration that he had gone to war to

²³Ibid., p. 35.

²⁴M. Sabry, L'Empire Egyptian Sour Mohamed-Ali et la Question d'Orient (1811-1849).

²⁵This declaration is published in Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, pp. 40-41.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 41-44.

uplift his nation, the Grand Vizier said, "if this is really your object then we have nothing to say about it." The current report, however, is different. It is believed that "Mehemet Ali Pasha aims to control the Sultanate, and to hold it independently of others."

Ibrahim Pasha then repeated to the Grand Vizier his previous view that "his sole aim and that of his father were to put an end to the Sultan's folly, injustice, and disregard of the interests of the nation."²⁷ Wahid Effendi, who was an official and confidential recorder at the General Headquarters of Ibrahim's army, had a conversation with the Grand Vizier about the same matter. The Grand Vizier pretended to be ignorant of the inner aspects of the struggle and of the fact that both parties acted from hidden motives. When cornered by the Grand Vizier, Wahid Effendi admitted that the Egyptians were fighting in self-defense.²⁸ Then talking about negotiation of peace, and the political tricks of the Sublime Porte, Ibrahim Pasha in a confidential letter to his father, aiming, as it would seem, to outwit the Sublime Porte, advised his father "to deny all material gains and to speak in terms of reform regeneration."²⁹

²⁷ Army bulletin, prepared by Wahid Effendi, Abd. case 242, doc. 248, cited in Ibid., p. 42.

²⁸ Abd. case 242, doc. 41, Shaban 4, 1248, cited in ibid., p. 42.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 42.

In addition to all this, it must be remembered that the famous declaration of Mohamed Ali Pasha to Shaykh Effendi was made four years before the outbreak of hostilities. Also, it was made when Mohamed Ali was excused to leave his suzerain in a moment of need (the Greek and Russian Wars). We have seen how Mohamed Ali withdrew from the Greek War. He had advised the Sublime Porte to come to terms with the Greeks on the basis of the Powers' mediation. He was misunderstood at Constantinople. Therefore, he

determined to write again on the same subject explaining his position and assuring all parties concerned that he had been, and would continue to be, the most faithful servant of the Sultan, and that the best interests of the Empire dictated a temporary acceptance of the terms which the Powers offered and an immediate attention to internal reform and regeneration.³⁰

In order to show his good will, Mohamed Ali expressed his determination to participate effectively in such a movement for reform. Mohamed Ali was also aware of the religious scope of the conflict. Islam was the focal point of society. People looked upon the Caliph with great respect because he was the successor of the Prophet in society. Therefore, it was not easy for a Muslim governor to declare war against the Caliph.

To this point, Mohamed Ali remarked to the English Consul-General in Cairo: "Such are the religious prejudices of these people

³⁰ Ibid., p. 43.

that they all desert a pasha when once under interdiction of the head of the Church." To oppose the Sultan with effect, he added, a pasha "must be strong enough to command public opinion and that is not an easy matter." He supported his view by the example of a rebel pasha in Kurdistan, whose troops fell from him "like sand from a pilgrim's feet."³¹ Thus, to insure himself against public censure and possible revolt against his rule, Mohamed Ali Pasha had to find valid religious reasons for open war against the Sultan.³² Therefore, his declaration to Consul Parker in June of 1832 that

he remained at heart a humble servant of the Turkish Empire, that he was acting only for the advantage and glory of the Sublime Porte, that he had no views of independence, and that he was conquering Syria merely in order to consolidate Turkish Power

cease to be paradoxical as Dodwell sees them, and become official causes of the struggle with the Sublime Porte.³³ Although the Egyptian Archives seem to be silent, it is obvious that Mohamed Ali, in acting this way, tried to make his aggrandisement less alarming in western eyes.³⁴

³¹ F. O. 78/160 Salt Memorandum, January 20, 1827 encindespatch of February 10, 1827, cited in Dodwell, op. cit., p. 107.

³² Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, p. 45.

³³ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 113.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 113. Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, p. 46.

From the above discussion, we realize that the official causes of the war hid other important causes. The Archives preserve many of them. In the previous chapter we have mentioned that mutual suspicions governed the relation between Mohamed Ali and the Sublime Porte;³⁵ therefore, the evil intentions of the Sublime Porte were one of the real causes of the war, as the Egyptian Archives state repeatedly.³⁶ Mohamed Ali and his son were convinced that no hope existed for real peace "as long as the accursed Sultan Mahmud continued to exist."³⁷ To this point, the addition of Syria to Egypt was a necessity to Mohamed Ali, serving as a barrier against any Turkish offensive attack upon Egypt,³⁸ as well as a battlefield of the awaited-battle against the Sultan outside Egypt.

In fact, the strategic importance of Syria was realized by Mohamed Ali as early as 1810, when he expressed his hope of getting it by the agreement of the Sultan. In 1811, M. Drovetti, the French Consul in Cairo who was one of Mohamed Ali's aids, wrote to his

³⁵ See pages 13-16.

³⁶ Ibrahim Pasha to Mohamed Ali Pasha, Abd. case 232, doc. 58, Ramaden 23, 1247, Mohamed Ali Pasha to Kapudan Pasha Abd. case 3, doc. 9-10, Rabii, 25 and Jumadn I 2, 1248 cited in Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, p. 47.

³⁷ Ibrahim Pasha to Mohamed Ali Pasha, Abd. case 242, doc. 155, Shaban 19, 1248 cited in Ibid., p. 48.

³⁸ El-Rafii, op. cit., p. 244.

government that Mohamed Ali told him that he hoped to acquire Syria in return for seven or eight million piastres paid to the treasury of the Sultan, and the idea of independence began to increase in his mind since he had overrun his enemies, suppressed the revolt of the soldiers, and solved his financial problems.³⁹ Also, in 1812, the Pasha had spoken to the English Consul of his intention to conquer Palestine as soon as circumstances should permit.⁴⁰ On the eve of the expedition to Hijar, Drovetti wrote that the destination of the Pasha's military monopolization was still secret and might be directed to Syria.⁴¹ Syria therefore was in the mind of Mohamed Ali since the earliest period of his reign, and he recognized as much as those who governed Egypt before him--Ibn Tulun, the Fatimids, Saladin, and Bonaparte--its strategic importance. From time immemorial, Egypt except for the invasions of the Fatimids and Bonaparte, has received all foreign expeditions from the East.

The Syrian dominions, in addition to their strategic value, would give Mohamed Ali certain economic, military, and moral advantages. They were a potential source of conscription for the Pasha's

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 245-246.

⁴⁰ F.O. 24/4 Missett, June 20, 1812, cited in Dodwell, op. cit., p. 107.

⁴¹ El-Rafii, op. cit., p. 246.

army, a lucrative area of agricultural wealth, a source of raw materials such as minerals and timber from their forests for a demanding naval arsenal in Alexandria, a rich commercial entrepot; and an additional export centre.⁴² Also, they would give him the rule of Jerusalem, another of the Holy Cities of Islam, and so enhance his prestige in the Muslim world, and it would give him Damascus, one of the leading centers of Islamic culture.⁴³

Finally, Mohamed Ali's fighting for Syria was a struggle for independence. The Egyptian National Archives in Cairo, preserve for us many documents dealing with this subject, either in the intercepted correspondence of the Sublime Porte with its officials in Syria, or in the confidential letters of Ibrahim Pasha, who was the most outspoken on the subject, with his father.⁴⁴ El-Rafii argues that Mohamed Ali foresaw the incipient movement among his subjects for national independence, and that he designed much of his policy on the basis of this perception.⁴⁵ These views were shared with some other historians, who

⁴² Dodwell, op. cit., p. 106; Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 72; for more details see Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, pp. 63-76.

⁴³ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 106.

⁴⁴ Qaim-magam of Grand-Vizier to Wali of Damascus, Abd. case 231, doc. 2, Rabi I 3, 1247 Army bulletin prepared by Wahid Effendi Abd. case 236, doc. 119, Safar 20, 1248, case 237, doc. 4, Rabi I 1, 1248. Abd. case 238, doc. 72, Rabi II 9, 1248, case 240, doc. 190, Jumada II, 27, 1248, case 242, doc. 155, Shaban 19, 1948, cited by Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, pp. 51-57.

⁴⁵ El-Rafii, op. cit., p. 246.

come to the conclusion, on the basis of his Syrian Campaigns, that Mohamed Ali was leading an "Arab national movement" against the Turks.⁴⁶ The educational as well as the economic and social conditions in the Islamic world, at that time, plus, the strong religious ties which bind the Muslims together regardless of color or race, placed the concept of nationality far beyond the comprehension of the people of Egypt and Syria.⁴⁷ It was also unknown to the Pasha. His main concern was an enfeebled Ottoman Empire and the "possibility of extracting ever greater concessions from the Sultan; or simply the extension of his power and authority as the governor of an Ottoman province at the expense of his master in Istanbul."⁴⁸ The attraction for Mohamed Ali of the territories occupied by the speakers of the Arab tongue "lay in his just sense of their strategic importance rather than in any anticipation of conditions which in his day were scarcely conceivable."⁴⁹

Even though, the National Archives of Egypt yield light on nationality as a factor in the struggle. Ibrahim Pasha, in several

⁴⁶ M. Sabry, *op. cit.*; George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, The Story of Arab National Movement (4th ed.; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946).

⁴⁷ Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, pp. 83-92.

⁴⁸ Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 71-72.

⁴⁹ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 128.

confidential letters to his father and in his conversations with some Europeans, emphasized that the war with Constantinople was "a national and racial struggle in which the individual must sacrifice his life for his people."⁵⁰ On another occasion, he wrote that "he thanked God because his patriotic hopes for the independence of his family and for the freedom of Egypt had begun to be realized."⁵¹ The Baron Baisle-comte states that Ibrahim had told him that his blood was completely Arab, and that the army had been spurred on with visions of a new Arab nation during the Syrian campaign expansion was to continue until all the Arabic-speaking people were under the rule of Mohamed Ali. Also, in the Archives are several letters written by Ibrahim emphasizing the ability of the Arabs to function well in the higher army ranks.

The fact may well be that Mohamed Ali's plans to rule the Arab-speaking world were not motivated by nationalistic feelings in the various areas, rather, the interpretation of his activities as "unifying" may be only the reflection in French and English statesmen of issues which were then currently important in Europe.

⁵⁰ Abd. case 236, doc. 144, Safar 23, 1248, cited in Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, p. 94.

⁵¹ Abd. Case 236, doc. 65, Safar 12, 1248, cited in Ibid., p. 94.

The International Scope

In spite of Mohamed Ali's determination to have the whole of Syria, in the beginning he tried to show his ultimate goal as Acre.

"In a few days Acca will be mine" said Mohamed to the Turkish envoy who had been sent to Alexandria before the climax of the war was reached.

If the Sultan consents that I keep it, I will stop there; if not, I will take Damascus. There again, if Damascus be granted me, I will stop there, but if not, I will take Aleppo. And if the Sultan will not consent, well, who knows? Allahkerim! (God is bountiful!)⁵²

But the defiant attitude of the Sultan emboldened Mohamed Ali to proceed farther and farther until the road to Constantinople was reached. Then the relation between Mohamed Ali and the Sublime Porte reached its lowest level, each was accused of acting to dethrone the other. Mohamed Ali also was accused of having schemed to proclaim himself Caliph at Constantinople. A firman deposing the insurgent viceroy and nominating Hussain Pasha, the commander of the invading Turkish army, in his place, was issued. The ulema of Constantinople published a Fetwa outlawing Mohamed Ali and his son Ibrahim. In order to reciprocate the firman of outlawing him and to annul the claims of the Sublime Porte of acting to dethrone the Sultan, Mohamed Ali saw fit

⁵²Rifaat, op. cit., p. 56.

to excommunicate the Pontifex himself by ordering the Sheriff of Mecca to deliver a sentence to that effect.⁵³ And he also tried to convince the Muslims that his war against the Sultan was to purge the Empire of evil practices of the Sublime Porte and to help regenerate the leading Muslim state of the world.⁵⁴ All efforts for peace between the Porte and Mohamed Ali came to nought. The only means remaining to determine the conflict was the military power, by which Mohamed Ali's son, Ibrahim Pasha, won a final victory over the Turkish army at Koneih (Dec. 1832), by which the way to Constantinople was opened to him.

The success of the Egyptian armies roused the apprehension of the Sublime Porte as well as the Big Powers, who were keenly interested in the developments of the conflict. In fact, before the fall of Acre the Sublime Porte made repeated advances to the British Ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, who was sent to Constantinople on a special mission to secure the agreement of the Porte to the conditions under which it was proposed that Greece should be separated from Turkey,⁵⁵ to secure a close and intimate alliance between England and Turkey.⁵⁶

⁵³ Ibid., p. 56.

⁵⁴ Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, p. 35.

⁵⁵ Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 14, footnote 8; John Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchy (London, 1912), p. 153.

⁵⁶ F.O. Turkey 211, 212 Canning to Palmerston, May 17, Aug. 7, 1832 cited by Hall, Ibid., p. 153. Cambridge History of British

But the rapid development of events, in which Turkey lost every important position south of the Taurus Mountains, forced the Sultan to send out Namie Pasha, a major general of the Empire Guard, to England "with a letter from His Highness to King William IV, praying, for naval assistance on the coast of Syria."⁵⁷ Such a help, if granted, would have paralyzed Mohamed Ali's military activities.⁵⁸ The British government, preoccupied with other affairs and underestimating the seriousness of the situation in the Levant, rejected the Turkish demand on the ground that "naval assistance was a matter of greater difficulty than at first sight it would appear to be." Nevertheless, the request was regarded as a striking proof of the Sultan's confidence in British friendship, and His Majesty's government would at once convey to Mohamed Ali "an expression of regret that he should so far have forgotten what was due to his Sovereign."⁵⁹ A similar unsuccessful appeal was

Foreign Policy, II, p. 164. Canning was in favor of guaranteeing the demanded assistance by the Porte and at the same time urged Palmerston to send a naval force to the Levant, ibid. (footnote).

⁵⁷ F.O. Turkey 213 Mandeville to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1832, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 153.

⁵⁸ Rifaat, op. cit., p. 57.

⁵⁹ F.O. Turkey 213 Palmerston to Mandeville, Dec. 5, 1832, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 154; on July 11, 1833, Lord Palmerston admitted in the House of Commons that the British Government had not thought it fit to afford assistance to the Porte at the particular time when it had been requested. "No doubt," he added, "if England had thought fit to interfere, the progress of the invading army would

made to France at about the same time.⁶⁰ The English and French refusals of assistance came at the moment when the news of the battle of Koneih had reached Constantinople and that the Grand Vizier, who was the Commander-in-chief of the Imperial forces was himself prisoner in Egyptian hands, and in the words of Reis Effendi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, "the Turkish army existed no longer."⁶¹ Therefore, the remaining possibility before the Sublime Porte was to knock at the Russian door, his inveterate enemies, who were eager to offer at any cost the desired assistance since England would not give it.⁶² Russia guided by her new policy in the East⁶³ was watching the developments in the Ottoman Empire with keen interest. "The Emperor," Nessebrode declared on November 9, 1882, in a dispatch to Boutenieff, the Minister of Russia at the Porte--S' est pénétré de l'idée of putting an end

have been stopped . . . ; but although it was easy to say, after events had happened, that they were to be expected, yet certainly no one could anticipate the rapidity with which they had succeeded each other in the East." Par. Deb. XIX, p. 579, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 14, footnote 11.

⁶⁰ The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, II, p. 164.

⁶¹ F.O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, Dec. 28, 1832, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 154.

⁶² Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, Foundation of British Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 1938), p. 118.

⁶³ See pages 34-36 of this paper.

to the insurrection in the Orient; with this in view he has resolved to exert all of his moral influence upon the Viceroy of Egypt."⁶⁴

According to the Russians' new policy, Mohamed Ali represented an enemy force, opposing her policy which aimed at maintaining Turkey in her present "stationary conditions." Therefore, Russia would not allow Mohamed Ali to reach Constantinople and to overthrow the feeble regime of the Porte and build up in its place his own strong and victorious power which would carry with it the augmentation of the influence of France.⁶⁵ Accordingly, Russia regarded the situation as one of real and immediate concern. She had dispatched General Muravieff to Constantinople on a mission to offer Russian military assistance to the Porte.⁶⁶ And he proceeded to Alexandria to overawe Mohamed Ali with the wrath of Nicholas I if he refused the terms of peace offered by the Sultan.⁶⁷

In fact, M. de Varennes, the French chargé d'affairs, became so alarmed at the possibility of a Russian armed intervention, that

⁶⁴Par. Deb., XX, p. 400, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 15.

⁶⁵S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, pp. 29-30, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 157.

⁶⁶F.O. Turkey 212, 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Dec. 31, 1832, Jan. 8, 1833. F.O. France 463, Granivie to Palmerston, Jan. 21, 28, 1833. Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 30-31, cited by Hall, op. cit., pp. 155-6.

⁶⁷Hall, op. cit., p. 154.

with the aid of some of the members of the Diwan he exercised his influence to prevent it.⁶⁸ Afraid of being lowered in the estimation of Europe and, most important of all, of his own subjects, the Sultan with profuse expressions of gratitude rejected at first Boutenieff's offer of the Black Sea fleet being placed at the Sultan's disposal.⁶⁹ The rejection by the Porte of the Russian assistance did not prevent Muravieff from setting out upon his mission to Alexandria. Also, the Sultan, by refusing Russian aid, intended to solve the problem through direct negotiation with his rebellious vassal, so he too sent Khalil Pasha to Alexandria.

It would be worthwhile to mention here that England, since Mohamed Ali came to power, had a strong suspicion regarding French relations with Egypt. This feeling of distrust had been increased by the French acquisition of Algiers, by which they had gained a footing upon the North African coasts.⁷⁰ During the course of Ibrahim's campaign in Syria, both Stratford Canning and Mandeville had looked

⁶⁸ D. Mouriez, Histoire de Mehemet-Ali, Vice-roid, Egypte, 4 Vols., III, p. 219; L. Blanc, Histoire de Sixam 1830-40, IV, pp. 145-416, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 17.

⁶⁹ Hall, op. cit., p. 155.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 155. In many of his letters, Barker, the British Consul General talks about Mohamed Ali's friendship to France and its danger upon the British interests in the area. F.O. 78/214 Barker to Palmerston, June 4, 21, 23, 1823, Aug. 12, 1832. F.O. 78/213 Barker to S. Canning, Jan. 8, 1832, Feb. 14, 23, 1832. Copies of these letters I found in Egyptian National Archives.

with sour disapproval upon Varenne's efforts to persuade the Porte to allow France to mediate between the Sultan and the Pasha.⁷¹ The fear of an isolated Russian action brought England and France together to work on the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, and prevent the Porte's falling under the complete influence of Russia.⁷² To counteract the Russians' efforts to be of assistance, the Duc de Broglie, the French Foreign Affairs Minister, suggested the joint mediation of France and England in the Turco-Egyptian dispute, and was greatly disappointed when he did not receive a response from London.⁷³

Though the chief center of diplomatic activities was transferred from Constantinople to Alexandria, Mandeville and Varennes continued their efforts to secure a peace and prevent Russian armed intervention. Letters were forwarded to Ibrahim urging him not to march upon Constantinople. To Colonel Duhamel, Muravieff's aide-de-camp, and to M. de Varennes' dispatch, Ibrahim returned the same answer: "He was a soldier and must obey his orders, his father alone could

⁷¹F.O. Turkey 211, 212, 213, S. Canning to Palmerston, May 17, 22, 1832. Mandeville to Palmerston, Sept. 26, Oct. 26, 1832, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 155.

⁷²Ibid., p. 156.

⁷³Ibid., p. 156.

decide upon his movements. He should be sorry to displease the Emperor Nicholas, but he must abide by instructions."⁷⁴

The Egyptian army's breaking camp at Konieh and advance in the direction of Constantinople, combined with Ibrahim's uncompromising attitude, greatly alarmed the Sultan, who lost hope in the pending negotiations and decided to accept the Russian aid which had been rejected before. Boutenieff was informed of the Sultan's decision, and a land and naval force of about 30,000 troops was landed on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus to defend the Sultan's capital. To remonstrances of both England and France, the Turkish Minister replied that "a drowning man will clutch at a serpent." What signifies the Empire to me?" exclaimed Mahmud in his rage, "what signifies Constantinople? I would give both to the man who brought me the head of Mohamed Ali."⁷⁵

The Russian military intervention formed a direct threat to the English and French interests in the Empire; therefore, to protect their interests, England and France were in agreement upon the necessity of ending the Syrian war, disposing of the Russians as soon as possible, protecting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and arresting Ibrahim's advances in order to quiet the extraordinary alarm which

⁷⁴ F.O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Jan. 13, 26, 1833, cited by ibid., p. 157.

⁷⁵ Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 5.

had seized the Porte.⁷⁶ In order to protect French influence in the Ottoman Empire and oppose the Russian activities at Constantinople, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent Admiral Roussin with the rank of ambassador to Constantinople. Barker, the British Consul General in Cairo, who by no means represented the view of the Foreign Office, disapproved of Ibrahim's victories, refused to pay Mohamed Ali a visit of congratulation on the fall of Acre, and was delighted by Mohamed Ali's removal from the office by the Porte. He referred to him as "ex viceroy" or the rebel.⁷⁷ He was not only given a sharp rebuke for thus venturing to take for granted the decision of his Majesty's government, but was also replaced by Colonel Patrick Campbell.⁷⁸ With respect to Mohamed Ali, Campbell was "to assure him of those sentiments of personal respect and esteem which His Majesty, the King, entertains for His Highness . . . and to cultivate and maintain the friendship which now so happily exists between the two countries."⁷⁹ Also, he was instructed to communicate "freely and

⁷⁶ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 121.

⁷⁷ F.O. 78/214 From Barker to Palmerston, June 13, 23, 28, Oct. 13, Nov. 10, 20, 1832.

⁷⁸ F.O. 78/214 Foreign Office to Barker, Oct. 3, 1832. To Campbell, Jan. 7, 1833 (F.O. 78-226) cited by Dodwell, op. cit., pp. 112-113.

⁷⁹ Rifaat, op. cit., p. 60.

confidentially" with the French and Austrian consuls at Alexandria. Three months later, Palmerston wrote to the newly appointed British ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby, that "the matter of the greatest interest and importance after the restoration of peace in the Levant, will be the complete evacuation of the Ottoman Territory by the Russian Land and Sea Force."⁸⁰

As I have mentioned already, the center of diplomatic activities was moved to Alexandria; Muravieff, who must have realized that the success of his mission depended upon the projected negotiations with the Pasha, reached Alexandria on January 13. Throughout his negotiations with the Pasha, he did not present written documents to the Viceroy; and it was announced that he had come as a mediator of peace. "But it was generally believed that his mission was to call upon Mohamed Ali to retire from Caramania and Syria, to give up his fleet to the Sultan, and to reduce his army to 20,000 men."⁸¹ Of course Mohamed Ali, whose forces were at the gate of Constantinople, would not be able to accept such terms, but under the circumstances, he promised his visitor to submit to the Sultan, and as a pledge of

⁸⁰ F.O. France, 463, Granville to Palmerston. Jan. 21, 28, Feb. 7, 1833. F.O. Turkey 227, Palmerston to Campbell, Feb. 4, 1833 cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 156. F.O. 78-220 Palmerston to Ponsonby, May 10, 1833.

⁸¹ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 115.

good faith, to suspend hostilities.⁸² That Mohamed Ali remained determined to extend his rule over all of Syria and that his promises to Muravieff were more a diplomatic courtesy, can be seen in his rejection of Khalil Pasha's offers to confer upon him the government of the districts of Acre, Naples, Jerusalem, and Tripoli. Mohamed Ali's demands went far beyond Syria. He hoped to secure independence first of all, as Ibrahim suggested to him in a list of demands; it was a vital question, for without it all other efforts "will go to naught." Second, the districts of Adalia, Alaia, and Itchili and Cyprus were to be annexed to Egypt, for the sake of the timber they might have--an article which Egypt must obtain from abroad. Lastly, Cyprus was to be obtained as a base for the fleet and "it will aid in bringing to an end the strong bond that unites that island with the Turkish Government." Baghdad was believed to be of small import; it was too distant and too poor.⁸³

Ibrahim's views, which were in full agreement with his father's, were completely incompatible with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the general interests of Europe. In an instructive contrast to Ibrahim's view, Palmerston informed Colonel Campbell almost at the same time that:

⁸² F.O. 78-213 Barker to Palmerston, Jan. 17 and 14, 1833 cited by ibid., p. 114.

⁸³ Abd. case 243, doc. 85, Ramadan, 13, 1248 cited by Rustum, The Egyptian Expedition to Syria, pp. 57-59.

His Majesty's Government attaches great importance to the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, considering that state to be a material element in the general balance of power in Europe, and they are of opinion that any considerable encroachment upon the Asiatic territories of the Sultan, and any consequent defalcation from the resources which he might bring to bear for the defense of his European dominions, must operate in a corresponding degree upon his relative position with respect to neighboring powers, and must thereby have injurious bearings upon the general interests of Europe. His Majesty's Government therefore deem it of importance to prevent not only a dissolution but even a partial dismemberment of the Turkish Empire.

But in the circumstances, the best solution was to assign Syria to Mohamed Ali on such terms of tribute and military aid as would leave the Porte's revenues and resources undiminished.⁸⁴

The French ambassador, Admiral Roussin, immediately considered the presence of a Russian squadron in the Bosphorus a serious blow to Anglo-French interests. Therefore, when he learned of the arrival of the Russian fleet, he at once instructed his dragoman to warn the Porte that unless the Russian fleet were requested to depart within twenty-four hours, he would consider his mission at an end. At the same time he unsuccessfully tried to induce the British charge d'affairs to make a similar request on the grounds that the British government had given him no authority "to hold language of so high and energetic a

⁸⁴ F.O. 78-226 to Campbell, Feb. 4, 1833, cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 117.

character."⁸⁵ After having had time for reflection, Admiral Roussin must have realized that his withdrawal would not secure the departure of the Russian ships. He understood very well that unless peace between the Sublime Porte and the Pasha was settled, the withdrawal of the Russian force would not be possible. On February 21st, he affixed his signature to a document that made him responsible for concluding peace between Mohamed Ali and the Sultan upon the terms proposed by Khalil Pasha, which had already been rejected. In return, the Porte was to refuse "foreign succor" of any kind in the future.⁸⁶

Therefore, he sent his first aid-de-camp with a letter to Mohamed Ali urging him to accept the Sultan's terms. Roussin's letter amounted to a threat of war against the Viceroy

a persistence in the pretensions which have been put forth will call down upon your head consequences, the disastrous nature of which will, I hope, excite your apprehension. France will keep the engagements which I have entered into, she has the power and I am the guarantee of her will. It only remains for me to hope that you will not force us to the cruel necessity of attacking a power partly created by ourselves, and tarnishing a glory of which I am the sincere admirer.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Hall, op. cit., p. 158.

⁸⁶ F.O. Turkey, 212, Mandeville to Palmerston, Feb. 23, 1833 cited by ibid., p. 159.

⁸⁷ Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 46; Rifaat, op. cit., p. 60.

Mohamed Ali was aware of the difficulties of the Sultan's position, and he was well-informed about the rivalries of the Powers.⁸⁸ He also believed that he had the power not only to enforce his demands over territories which he was occupying, but also to bring about a general European conflagration by seizing Constantinople. Therefore, he was convinced that this was his most favorable opportunity for pressing his demands upon the Porte.⁸⁹ Accordingly, on March 23, an envoy arrived at Constantinople carrying a prompt rejection of Roussin's proposal. In that letter, Mohamed Ali wrote,

Pray, Monsieur l'ambassadeur, how have you the right to call on me to sacrifice myself thus? I have in my favor the whole nation. It only rests with me to raise up Rumelia and Anatolia. United with my nation I could effect much. To demand of me the abandonment of the countries which I occupy is pronouncing against me a sentence of political death. But I feel confident that France and England will not deny me justice.⁹⁰

At the same time, Mohamed Ali dispatched several regiments to Syria and directed Ibrahim to march on Constantinople if the Porte had not

⁸⁸ F.O. Turkey, 228, Campbell to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 159.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 159.

⁹⁰ Mohamed Ali to Roussin, March 8, 1833, quoted by Cadalvene et Barrault, Histoire de la guerre de Mehmed-Ali Contre la Porte Ottomane, pp. 375-377, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, pp. 22-23; Rifaat, op. cit., p. 61.

complied with his terms within a few days.⁹¹ Under these critical circumstances, the Sublime Porte directed Reis Effendi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to confer with the representatives of the three great Powers "in order to ascertain from them their private opinions with respect to the best means of averting the dangers."⁹² Because of the urgency of the situation, it was decided that a diplomatic delegation from Constantinople should proceed to Ibrahim's headquarters at Kutahiah to concede all Syria. In order to guarantee the success of the step about to be taken, political pressures were exerted upon Mohamed Ali and Ibrahim; Admiral Roussin ordered M. de Varennes to accompany the Ottoman plenipotentiary on his mission, and to inform Ibrahim Pasha that he could never expect France to acquiesce in the cession of the pashalics of Adana and Itcheli.⁹³ Also, for the same purpose. Mandeville dispatched a letter to Mohamed Ali in which he pointed out that, with respect to Great Britain, the sentiments of His Majesty's government were already too well known to leave any doubt of the sensation which refusal of the Ottoman terms would cause to the

⁹¹ F.O. Turkey 223, Mandeville to Palmerston, March 26, 27, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 159.

⁹² F.O. Turkey, Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 23.

⁹³ F.O. Turkey, Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, cited by ibid., p. 23.

British government, "and of the consequences which would inevitably ensue from it."⁹⁴ In spite of the pressure brought to bear upon him, Ibrahim insisted on the cession of Adana as a preliminary to his retreat to Tourus. The Sultan reluctantly consented, and on April 8, 1833, the convention of Kutahiah was agreed upon.⁹⁵ On hearing the news, the Pasha "started up with tears of joy in his eyes, and, laying aside anything like Turkish gravity, burst into a sort of hysterick laugh."⁹⁶ However, with the approbation of Admiral Roussin,⁹⁷ plus the protest of Ibrahim and his threat to stop his retreat, as well as the fear of further development, made the Sultan yield and give away the valuable district of Adana as well.

⁹⁴ Mandeville to Ibrahim, March 29, 1833, cited by ibid., p. 23.

⁹⁵ Since the days of E. Cadalvene and E. Barrant, many historians assume that the peace of 1833 was actually "signed" in the treaty of Kutahiah. The European and Eastern archives contain no copy of such a treaty. The whole arrangement of Kutahiah was verbal from beginning to end, and that the Sultan made no written assurance of any kind to the Pasha. The Egyptian archives contain nothing beyond a "simple" firman assigning the governments of Egypt, Arabia, Syria, and Crete, to the Pasha. See A. Rustum, The Royal Archives of Egypt and the Distrubances in Palestine, 1834 (American Univ. of Beirut, 1938).

⁹⁶ F.O. 78/227 Campbell, April 17, 1833, cited by Dodwell, op. cit., pp. 121-122.

⁹⁷ F.O. Turkey 223, Mandeville to Palmerston, April 14, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 16.

Thus, the various points had now all been settled, except the problem of tribute to be paid to the Porte for the ceded provinces. That question was solved the next September, with the decision of a tribute of 30,000 purses⁹⁸ a year for the governments of Egypt, Syria, Adana, and Tarsus.⁹⁹ But the Syrian War ended without solving the main problems; therefore, none of the concerned parties was satisfied. The Sultan's plans not only failed to restore Egypt to the direct control of his central government, but caused him to suffer a bitter defeat by his too-strong vassal Mohamed Ali and lost to him two rich and important regions, Syria and Adana; Mohamed Ali, although he gained his dreams in Syria and Adana, did not secure the independent status or a controlling influence at Constantinople; England and France were annoyed at the opening which Ibrahim's victories had offered to Russia, while the Russians were disappointed at having been unable to entrench themselves more securely at Constantinople.¹⁰⁰ However, they did not intend to save Turkey for nothing, and Turkey, who considered that the French favored Mohamed Ali and that English refusal to offer assistance in their hour of need, was ready to pay

⁹⁸ In Turkey 500 piasters make a purse of silver and 10,000 a purse of gold.

⁹⁹ F.O. 78/228 Campbell, September 13, 1833, cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 122.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 123.

a definite price for the service rendered.¹⁰¹ Count Orloff, the Tsar's representative, induced the Porte to sign the celebrated Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi on July 8, 1833. It provided for a mutual alliance between Russia and Turkey and the defense of each other's territories.

The importance of the treaty lies in a secret article which stated that Russia would not ask Turkey for armed aid in case of war; she would only require Turkey to close the Dardanelles to ships of war.¹⁰² The treaty was interpreted in Paris and London as placing Turkey in a state of vassalage to Russia. In London it meant, too, dividing the Empire between Russia and Mohamed Ali, which would be strongly opposed. In fact the treaty was well utilized in London to promote Britian interests in the Levant and to oppose the Russian plans in the area. It was not the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi that was the source of Palmerston's unconquerable distrust of the policy of Mohamed Ali, however.¹⁰³ Even before the conclusion of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, Palmerston showed his opposition to Mohamed Ali's plans. "His real design," he wrote on March 21, 1833,

¹⁰¹Temperley and Penson, op. cit., p. 119.

¹⁰²See full discussion of the article in Philip E. Mosely, Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question, 1838 and 1839 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1934).

¹⁰³Dodwell, op. cit., p. 123.

is to establish an Arabian Kingdom, including all the countries of which Arabic is the language. There might be no harm in such a thing in itself, but as it would necessarily imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we would not agree to it. Besides Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign would be.¹⁰⁴

Thus it is not surprising that Mohamed Ali did not secure any kind of cooperation or alliance with England. Indeed, the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi had convinced Palmerston that because of Mohamed Ali's inordinate ambition, the Russians had almost established themselves in the dominant position at the Bosphorus.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Bulwer, Life of Palmerston, II, pp. 144-5, cited by Ibid., p. 123.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 124.

CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM 1833-1834

I

The agreement of Kutahiah resulted in creating a new state. The Sultan's firman issued according to that agreement gave Mohamed Ali the rule of Egypt, Crete, and the pashalics of Syria. Ibrahim Pasha was confirmed as the chief of El-Haramain [Mecca and Madina] and as a collector of Adana. Thus it was a large state; its territories were more than one hundred thousand square parasangs,¹ its population was about seven million.² Thus Mohamed Ali seemed to have achieved his goal of creating a large and strong state.

Indeed, Mohamed Ali's plan for setting up an Empire became a matter of public concern. He had cherished the dream for many years to acquire an empire with himself and his descendants for its dynasty, and the conquest of Syria gave him the opportunity to

¹ A parasang is about 4 miles.

² René et George Cattaui, Mohamed-Aly et l'Europe (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste, Paul Geuthner, 1950), p. 105.

translate that dream into reality. He was now in actual, if not titular, possession of an important portion of the Arab world; he controlled and protected Mecca and Madina where the Sultan's nominal authority no longer existed. As Ibrahim wrote to his father, the Sultan could no longer be prayed for in the mosques as the Servant of the Holy Places.³ Even before the Syrian war it had been common talk in Egypt that the charif of Mecca was about to publish a declaration "that he who is the possessor and defender of the Kaba is the true head of the Mahometan Church."⁴

Besides Mecca and Madina, Mohamed Ali governed Jerusalem, the third Holy City, and the two leading centers of Islamic culture; Cairo and Damascus. This gave him great weight in the Muslim world. Also, the conditions in the Ottoman Empire were suitable for such a move, the Porte was weak, the Sultan himself was unpopular with his Muslim as well as his Christian subjects, and as far as the Turkish forces, they were in comparison with the reorganized Egyptian army contemptible.⁵

³ Sabry, op. cit., p. 281. F.O. 78/360 cf. Ponsonby, No. 305, Nov. 7, 1839 cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 126.

⁴ F.O. 78/213 Barker to S. Canning, Feb. 23, 1832 cited by ibid., p. 126.

⁵ Antonius, op. cit., p. 26.

Perhaps the spread of national movements in Europe led the European agents in the Levant, particularly the British, to interpret the conflict between Mohamed Ali and the Porte as having a national basis. As early as January 1832, M. Barker, the British-Consul General at Alexandria reported that Mohamed Ali's "immediate object is to establish his authority firmly in the Pashaliks of Acre and Damascus, after which to extend his dominion to Aleppo and Baghdad, throughout the provinces, where Arabic is the language of the people" ⁶ Thus Barker, who, as well as other British agents, were known for their unfriendly attitude toward Mohamed Ali, convinced the British government that the real design of Mohamed Ali was to establish "an Arab Kingdom" embracing all the countries in which Arabic is the language of the people.

It is true that the conquest of Syria, together with the previous conquest of Egypt, of El-Hijaz and of the Sudan, left Mohamed Ali with only a few steps further to be taken in order to bring all Arabic-speaking countries within his authority. There remained only Iraq, the Arabian Gulf, southern Arabia, and the North African states, in order to complete such a territorial expansion. North Africa was of little importance to Mohamed Ali because he was primarily concerned with the areas such as Syria, Arabia, and Iraq that controlled the

⁶F.O. 78/213, cited by ibid., p. 25.

route to the East. Particularly Iraq would bring the Pasha's territories into touch with Persia and through Persia with Central Asia. Southern Arabia would put under his control those two great inlets of the sea, the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. Such an achievement would increase Mohamed Ali's political weight and influence and put the use of these inlets by British Squadrons in the East under his mercy.⁷ The question which might be raised in this connection is whether Mohamed Ali really intended to be a caliph of an empire based on Arab nationalism?

Nationalism, as a factor in international realtions was loudly heard in Europe and the national motive was behind many events in Europe at the time, such as the Greek, the Polish, and Italian revolts in the twenties and early thirties. These developments, it seems to me, had their effect on European statesmen in their interpretation of the conflict between Mohamed Ali and his suzerain. They tried to utilize that conflict in promoting the idea of nationalism according to their vital interests in the Ottoman Empire. It was a period when the conflict between the rival interests of the Big Powers in the Ottoman Empire reached its peak. Generally speaking, the French were in favor of establishing an independent state headed by Mohamed Ali to include Syria, Egypt, and Arabia. And it was notorious that

⁷ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 125.

M. Mimaut, Consul General of France in Egypt, and almost all French travelers took every opportunity of comparing Mehemet to Napoleon Bonaparte, and citing the coincidence of their having been born in the same year.⁸ Therefore, the French encouraged Mohamed Ali to believe that a declaration of his independence would meet with much support and sympathy. In the French Chamber of Deputies, where Mohamed Ali had some supporters, one speaker even thought it would, perhaps, be fortunate if Mohamed Ali's army should take possession of Constantinople. He believed the Arab race to be better disposed towards civilization, more active, and more intelligent than the "Tartar race; it would be able to rejuvenate the Empire, worn out and languishing, that Empire upon which even the spirit of innovation has exerted in vain its electric virtue." Then, too, he maintained, that Mohamed Ali would form a powerful barrier against Russia if he should establish his power throughout Turkey.⁹

Perhaps the most concrete suggestions about the chaliphate and the Arab Empire placed before Mohamed Ali were those of Colonel Prokesch-Osten of Austria, who came to Cairo on a special mission

⁸ F.O. 78/343 Col. Campbell, No. 69, Oct. 1, cited by Temperley, The Crimea, p. 420.

⁹ Extract from speech delivered by M. Jay, May 21, 1833. Archives Parl. LXXXIV, p. 92, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 37.

on April 2, 1833. In a note dated May 17, 1833, Prokesch-Osten outlined his suggestions in some detail. It provided for Mohamed Ali's assumption of the caliphate and "La construction de l'Empire Arabe, l'Egypte, La Nubie, le Senaar, Darfour et Cordofan en Afrique, toute l'Arabic jusqu'au Golfe Persique et le long de la rive droite de l'Euphrate, y compris toute la Syrie, devraient en faire part."¹⁰

This note could give the impression that the Austrian government was backing the enterprise, but as the matter was cleared up later, it appeared that the whole scheme did not represent the view of the Austrian government. Milbanke, the English chargé d'affaires at Vienna said that he had interviewed Prince Metternich on the subject of the Caliphate. The Prince stated that Colonel Prokesch-Osten had not been charged with any mission to the Pasha in this connection and that his views were his own, not those of the Austrian government.¹¹ And in a letter to Esterchazy, the Austrian representative in London, Metternich stated that he demanded explanations of Prokesch-Osten, enclosing his letter (Dec. 27, 1840) in which he regretted the whole affair.¹²

¹⁰ F.O. 78/343 endo. Campbell, No. 69, Oct. 1, 1838, cited by Temperley, The Crimea, footnote 142 remarks, pp. 420-1.

¹¹ F.O. 7/280 Milbanke, No. 30, March 23, 1839, cited by ibid., footnote No. 142 remarks, p. 421.

¹² W. S. A. Weisungen nach England. To Esterhazy, Res. ad. No. 2, Feb. 3, 1841, cited by ibid., footnote no. 142 remarks, p. 421.

Fearing the spread of Russian influence in the Empire, the English agents in the East, considered for a while, using Mohamed Ali to disconcert the designs of Russia. In 1833, Ponsonby wrote to Campbell

If Russia should look to selfish ends, it is to be hoped that the strength of Mehemet Ali may be found efficient where it seems certain it must be his interest to exert it, viz in driving from Asia and the Ottoman territory a power, which, if allowed to spread its roots there, will easily ere long be great enough to destroy the new-born energies of his Egyptian and Arab population.¹³

On November 8, he solemnly warned Palmerston against a threatened revolution which would give Turkey to Russia unless Mohamed Ali seized the capital in the name of Mahmud's son.¹⁴ A year later, Campbell thought

that so far as regards the resistance to Russian encroachments and aggrandizement on the side of Asia, perhaps the establishment of an Arab Caliphate under Mehemet Ali would be a better barrier and more likely to afford effectual opposition to Russia than the Porte could now ever be expected to offer, and in case of need Mehemet Ali could give great assistance to Persia (supposing him to rule over Baghdad, etc.) in any struggle of Persia against Russia.¹⁵

¹³ F.O. 78/227 Ponsonby to Campbell, May 24, 1833, cited by Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 130. See also F.O. 78/223 and 78/224 Pons. to Palm., May 24, 1833, No. 6, Aug. 27, 1833, cited by G. H. Bolsover, "Lord Ponsonby and the Eastern Question (1833-1839), Slavonic Review, Vol. XIII, 1934-5, p. 101.

¹⁴ F.O. 78/225 Pons. to Palm., Nov. 8, 1833, No. 87, cited by *ibid.*, p. 101.

¹⁵ F.O. 78/246, Campbell to Pons., Aug. 21, 1834, cited by Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

Palmerston himself, warning the Porte of the consequences of the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, said that Britain, while determined to maintain the integrity and independence of Turkey, would prefer to see Mohamed Ali at Constantinople rather than a Sultan controlled from St. Petersburg.¹⁶

There seems to be no evidence that the idea of Arab nationalism had made any impression on Mohamed Ali. However, he realized that in order to establish an empire, he would have to proceed warily, and he sought to improve the prospects of his scheme by gaining the Syrians over to an open espousal of it.¹⁷ This idea was perhaps seconded by Ibrahim Pasha who unlike his father was an enthusiast for Arab nationalism. Taking advantage of the Turkish misrule in Syria, Ibrahim Pasha tried to show that an Egyptian conquest would bring freedom to the Arabs.

It is true that all creeds and sects among the Arabs, both Muslim and Christian, had common language, customs, and racial kinship; above all they shared hatred of Turkish rule. But in their aspiration toward freedom they were moved by different impulses and their motives in welcoming Ibrahim's advance were selfish and divergent. The Muslims welcomed Ibrahim in order to get rid of the Turks

¹⁶ F.O. 78/220 Palm. to Pons., Dec. 6, 1833, No. 23, cited by Bolsover, op. cit., p. 102.

¹⁷ Antonius, op. cit., p. 26.

and restore the caliphate to the Arab hands, which would strengthen their position. The Christians seeing the fair treatment that Christians enjoyed under Mohamed Ali's rule in Egypt, thought the conquest of Syria would bring the same blessings to them.¹⁸

It must be remembered that Islam was the focal point of society, and the Muslim majority were very much aware of religion as a common factor among them. This was more important than any other of the components of nationalism such as community of language. As we have mentioned elsewhere, Mohamed Ali remarked to the English Consul-General in Cairo "such are the religious prejudices of these people that they all desert a Pasha when once under interdiction of the head of the Church." Mohamed Ali thus found himself obliged to pose as the champion of the Muslim "nation" not of an Arab nation.¹⁹ It must be mentioned, too, that Mohamed Ali and his son were not Arabs and had not mastered Arabic, although Ibrahim had learned to speak it with a certain fluency. So the attraction of the territories inhabited by the Arabic-speaking language sprang primarily from their desire to acquire an empire with themselves and their descendants for its dynasty,²⁰ as

¹⁸ Antonius, op. cit., p. 33.

¹⁹ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 127.

²⁰ Antonius, op. cit., p. 27.

well as for the strategic importance of these countries.²¹ The question which was raised at the time was what could be the role of the Arab in the future empire. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Ibrahim Pasha was of the opinion that the Arabs were capable of functioning in high official positions, and the empire dreamed of by his father would rest on a more lasting foundation if its groundwork were to be the regeneration of the Arab race. That is because he came to Egypt as a young man and had grown in an Arabian environment. He always spoke of himself as an Arab. "I came to Egypt as a child," he once said, "and my blood has since been colored completely Arab by the Egyptian sun."²² His acquaintance with Arab history and culture gave him the first rudiments of knowledge. His stay in Arabia had brought him into direct contact with the Arabs in their pure state and he saw their virtues and defects in their true light. All these had touched his imagination and awakened his sympathies.

Although Mohamed Ali did not share Ibrahim's feeling for the Arabs, he nevertheless realized that the independent kingdom he was striving for would consist mainly of an Arab population. Therefore, in order to achieve this goal, he recognized the need for the good

²¹Dodwell, op. cit., p. 128.

²²G. Douin, La mission du baron de Boislecote (Cairo, 1927), cited by Antonius, op. cit., p. 28.

will and the active support of the Arabs. But he had no real sympathy with them, did not speak Arabic, and did not share Ibrahim's opinion of their high talents.²³ In his empire-to-be, he would have preferred a perpetuation of the existing ruling class consisting mainly of Turks and Albanians with some recruits from Armenian, Jewish, and Coptic middle class. Mohamed Ali's idea was not to create an Arab empire within the circle of Islam, but to become, and be acclaimed by all, the foremost leader of Islam itself. Such a goal, however, would mean either the overthrow of the Sultan and the partition of the Empire or the overthrow of the Divan at Constantinople and the substitution of Mohamed Ali's for Khusrev Pasha's influence.²⁴ But the position of Mohamed Ali on this matter was anomalous, especially after the Syrian war and the victories of his troops. "He is," wrote Campbell,

dejure a vassal and de facto he is independent; and although he makes professions of his being a vassal and subject of the Sultan; it is in such a manner as to lead me to think that he would not wish anyone else to suppose so.²⁵

But the ill-will displayed toward him by the Porte made him think strongly about independence. About this point, a week later, Campbell wrote:

²³ Antonius, ibid., p. 28.

²⁴ Dodwell, op. cit., p. 128.

²⁵ F.O. 78/246, Campbell, Aug. 15, 1834, cited by ibid., p. 128.

These late menaces and hostile demonstrations of the Porte will doubtless tend to confirm Mehemet Ali in his desire of independence and in the object which I feel almost certain that he contemplates eventually, of forming an Arab Caliphate He is naturally very ambitious of power and glory, and unlike the generality of Mussulmans he is actuated by the strong desire of handing down his name to posterity in the page of history. Success has ever attended him.²⁶

The Sultan's policy in calling in Russian aid in the later war with Mohamed Ali had introduced an unexpected element into the game. The Russian intervention did not only upset the international balance, but also it violated Muslim sentiment and threatened Muslim unity. Many Muslims saw in Mohamed Ali the true champion of Islam and not the Sultan who sought the help of the infidels against soldiers of Islam. In Constantinople itself, Mohamed Ali was informed that there were many of the chief people who looked to him "as the chief support of the empire in the event of any future war with Russia."²⁷

Perhaps the idea attracted Mohamed Ali and he wished to carry it out. He also tried to take advantage of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi and its implications for international relations to win international recognition of his project. Therefore, on September 3, 1834, an important memorandum was given to the English and Austrian

²⁶F.O. 78/246, Campbell to Pons., Aug. 21, 1834, cited by ibid., pp. 128-9.

²⁷F.O. 78/227, Campbell, June 25, 1833, cited by ibid., p. 129.

Consul-Generals at Cairo for transmission to their governments. In this memorandum, Mohamed Ali's first object was to root Russian influence out of Turkey and to organize such a force as would compel the Russians to respect the independence of Turkey. In return the Big Powers should recognize his independence. Mohamed Ali also promised to remain a concerned ally and good friend to the Sultan. In the copy sent to London, Mohamed Ali showed deep concern not only about the fate of Turkey but of Persia as well.

The viceroy's desire of possessing Syria was inspired by that single purpose; and after the battle of Koniah he had hoped to bring about such a change in the government and policy at Constantinople as with the help of England and France would have speedily disconcerted the designs of Russia.

The memorandum continued that the Pasha would soon have an army of 150,000 men ready to cooperate with England in the glorious task of delivering Turkey and Persia from the Russian yoke. Meanwhile he asked the British whether he would not be justified in declaring at once his independence, as he had resolved on doing should the Porte's hostility continue.²⁸

It must be mentioned here, that Colonel Campbell told Boghus Bey, Mohamed Ali's foreign Minister, that the memorandum would not be placed before the British government unless a copy of it was sent to

²⁸ F.O. 78/246, Boghos Bay to Campbell, Sept. 3, 1834, cited by ibid., p. 130.

Monsieur Mimaut, the French Consul General, on the grounds that both the French and Britain governments were cooperating in the affairs of the East. Therefore, anything concerning this matter as forwarded to me or to H. Prokes, the Austrian Consul should be given to the French Consul as well, or the British government would find herself in an embarrassed position before her ally, France, who would accuse us of encouraging Mohamed Ali's enterprises secretly. Boghos therefore agreed to send a copy of the memorandum to M. Mimunt. In his letter, Campbell described Mohamed Ali's memorandum as of great importance, and he expressed his belief that Mohamed Ali was quite ready to declare his independence and there was nothing preventing him from doing so.²⁹

II

Mohamed Ali's plan to declare his intention to proclaim independence was determined by two factors: domestic and international.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Mohamed Ali went to war against the Sultan because of the fear of the evil intention of the Sultan, and because of his desire to acquire some form or another of independence. For Mohamed Ali this would give the safeguards he

²⁹ AEMD Egypte, 4 (1834).

wanted for himself and would provide for the preservation and happiness of his descendants. The peace of Kutahiah guaranteed neither of these. Nor was it satisfactory to the Sultan. The Sultan Mahmud was afraid of being Syria, Egypt and Arabia under the permanent rule of Mohamed Ali. He was repeatedly heard saying, "Je mourrais plutôt que de ne point d'etruire un vassal rebelle." So the agreement was a temporary armistice and was accepted by the Sultan so he could take breath and prepare for another round to regain Syria at any cost. The grand vizier Khusrev Pasha was also dreaming of humiliating his bitter enemy, Mohamed Ali. On the other hand, Mohamed Ali repeatedly says, "Je ruis vieux. Je dois me hater."³⁰ Although he had been reinstated in the governments which he had held before the outbreak of hostilities, Mohamed Ali's new gains in Syria and Anatolia were subject to annual renewal. He knew that he would at once be deprived of them, and of his life, so soon as this should be in the Sultan's power. His family would be persecuted in revenge for his conduct. The pashalics to which he devoted his life and energy in order to improve their administration and to spread knowledge would be given to pashas of the old school whose only object would be to shear the people as closely as possible before they were recalled. His reforms

³⁰Cattaui, op. cit., p. 105.

would no longer survive their founder. Therefore he believed that his achievement was still completely insecure against future events.³¹

For the time being, Mohamed Ali was concerned about two important questions: the question of the tribute and the question of Khusrev Pasha. These two issues showed how hollow had been the reconciliation of Mohamed Ali and the Sultan. Although the question of the tribute was settled in September 1833 as a part of Kutahiah agreement, the Sultan still claimed arrears which Mohamed Ali absolutely refused to pay. In the course of the year 1834 the question of the tribute was at last arranged on the basis of the customary rates without arrears. Khusrev Pasha, from Mohamed Ali's point of view was the main obstacle in the way of permanent peace. Until the outbreak of hostilities between him and the Sultan in 1839, he and Ibrahim Pasha continued their efforts to remove him from office as Grand Vazir.³² Taking an advantage of the marriage of a princess of the Sultan's family he sent a

³¹ Dodwell, op. cit., pp. 154-5.

³² Abd. Case 258. Ibrahim Pasha to Mohamed Ali Pasha, doc. 8, Jumada II 3, 1255, El. Sayed Ottoman to Mohamed Ali Pasha, doc. 22, Jumada II 11, Ibrahim Pasha to Mohamed Ali Pasha, doc. 24, Jamada II, 13, Ibrahim Pasha to Mohamed Ali Pasha, doc. 34, Jumada II, 14, Ali Pasha to Mohamed Ali Pasha, doc. 48, Jumada II, 23. Ibrahim Pasha to Mohamed Ali Pasha, doc. 53, Jumada II, 24. Mohamed Pasha to Mohamed Ali Pasha, doc. 56, Jumada II, 25, Ali Pasha to Mohamed Ali Pasha, doc. 59, Jamada II, 23, Ibrahim Pasha to Mohamed Ali Pasha, doc. 78, Rajab 7, 1255.

special envoy to the Capital, ostensibly on a mission of congratulation, but in fact with a much more serious object. He was to demonstrate to Mahmud that so long as Khusrev continued in the Divan, he would always be seeking to misrepresent the Pasha's conduct, and that

if the Sultan would only consent to remove the seraskier from his councils, he [the pasha] would not only pay the tribute regularly . . . , but he would also pay a great part of what the Sultan demanded as arrears.

It was expected that various influential enemies of Khusrev would be gathered together at Constantinople for the marriage, so that the opportunity appeared promising.³³ But the mission completely failed, and Ibrahim Pasha finally tried to convince his father that their interests lay in European hands and there was no use to write to Ali Pasha of Koniah about the removal of Khusrev.³⁴

What was worse for Mohamed Ali than the annual renewal of his tenure by the Sublime Porte, was the absence of any signed agreement containing the conditions of Kutahiah agreement. Since the days of the two famous historians, Edourd de Cadalvene and Emile Barrault, students are accustomed to assume that the peace of Kutahiah was

³³F.O. 78/245, Campbell, May 10, 1834, cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 155.

³⁴Abd. Case 258, Ibrahim Pasha to Mohamed Ali Pasha, doc. 34, Jumada II, 14, 1255. A.H.

actually "signed" in a treaty."³⁵ Later historians continued to assume the same belief. The truth of the matter is that the whole arrangement of Kutahiah was verbal from beginning to end, and that the Sultan made no written assurance of any kind to the Pasha.³⁶ The Egyptian Archives contain nothing beyond a simple firman assigning the governments of Egypt, Arabia, Syria, and Crete to the Pasha. The Sultan did not begin again to grace the Pasha of Egypt with his royal handwriting on the margin of the firmans of appointment to office until the year 1254 A.H. (1838-39).³⁷

In addition to all this, the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, from an Egyptian point of view, was directed against Egypt, a fact of prime interest in Egyptian diplomacy until the whole question was reopened in 1839. Putting in mind the words of Ponsonby regarding the settlement of Kutahiah, "The presumed settlement of Kutahiah never existed,"³⁸ we should understand something of the feeling of political instability which continued to dominate the mind of Mohamed Ali from the settlement

³⁵ Histoire de la Guerre de Méhémed-Ali etc., p. 398, cited by A. Rustum, The Royal Archives of Egypt and The Distrubances in Palestine, 1834, p. 49.

³⁶ Rustum, ibid., p. 49.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 49.

³⁸ F.O. Pons. to Palm. (London, 1841), 11, No. 44, cited by ibid., p. 50.

of Kutahia in 1833 to the convention of London in 1840,³⁹ and why he tried to gain the support of Britain, France, and Austria in order to gain their recognition for his independence in the name of fighting the Russian influence in the Empire. But was the international situation allowing such a move on the part of Mohamed Ali to declare his independence?

III

To answer this question, it would be of great importance to analyze the position of the Powers as developed during the course of the conflict between the Sultan and Mohamed Ali and its aftermath. As we have seen in the previous chapters, Turkey appeared to be on the brink of ruin when the armies of Mohamed Ali were in the heart of Asia Minor early in 1833, but the four Powers, for different reasons, reached the decision to uphold her. Yet none of them included in their policy the maintenance of all of the Empire. In fact Turkey was forced to surrender Greece in 1829 which became independent under the protection of England, France, and Russia. France and England agreed in 1833 for different reasons to assign Syria to Mohamed Ali.

³⁹Ibid., p. 50.

It was at this point that Russia hurried to offer her physical support to the Sultan against Mohamed Ali to save at least his capital. Then Russia proceeded to give that same policy of support a treaty basis for the future. Thus, it was the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi⁴⁰ which gave the Turco-Egyptian dispute an international scope and threatened the international balance. The Treaty was destined to play "a great part in the political vicissitudes of the Eastern Question,"⁴¹ until 1840 and the Russian policy was connected with the fate of Egypt.⁴²

It must be remembered here that Western representatives in Constantinople especially the French, even before the signature of the Treaty, tried to prevent any kind of understanding between Turkey and Russia, and their efforts were directed entirely to solve the problem in order to prevent Russia from finding any excuse to intervene. Therefore, it was natural when the terms of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi became known, that the French and English governments instructed their representatives at Constantinople to urge the Sublime Porte not to ratify the treaty. But if the Sultan confirmed the signatures of his plenipotentionaries, they were to warn him that, in case

⁴⁰ See pages 70-1 above.

⁴¹ C. Phillipson and N. Buxton, The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, p. 62, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 29.

⁴² Cattau, op. cit., p. 111.

of armed intervention in Turkish internal affairs, France and England were resolved to act as the circumstances might appear to require, "equally as if the treaty above mentioned were not in existence."⁴³

England, it seems, was particularly aroused by the treaty. Palmerston regarded Russia as the only European power with which England was likely to quarrel seriously, and he complained of her system of universal aggression, inspired alike by the personal character of the Emperor and by the permanent character of her government.⁴⁴ The English agents in the Levant, report the Russian policy in the Levant was aiming to strengthen their position in the critical area of the region. Once their influence was established at Baghdad, Tylor, the British agent in Baghdad, wrote

its central position and its navigable streams and natural resources will afford the highest advantages to future advances . . . or the establishment and continuation of intrigue more fatal than war.⁴⁵

Even before the conclusion of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, Palmerston, on May 7, 1833, writing to Sir William Temple at Naplis, said that he thought France likely to declare war upon Russia, and

⁴³ F.O. Turkey, 221, Palm. to Pons., Aug. 27, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 165.

⁴⁴ Bulwer, op. cit., 11, 176, cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 131.

⁴⁵ F.O. 78/245 Taylor to the India Board, March 14, 1834, cited by ibid., p. 131.

accordingly the British government was sending Sir Pulteney Malcolm to the Mediterranean with a strong squadron.⁴⁶ The King's speech in the Parliament on August 24 contained the significant declaration,

The hostilities which had disturbed the peace of Turkey have been terminated; and you may be assured that my attention will be carefully directed to any events which may affect the present state or the future independence of that Empire.⁴⁷

And as he said this, the King "looked round at Lieven [the Russian Ambassador to England] to see how he took it."⁴⁸

As events went rapidly, a new development arose which was destined to have an important influence upon the British and the French attitude regarding the Eastern Question. A meeting took place in September at Munchengrätz between the Tsar Nicholas with Nesselrode, the Emperor Francis II with Metternich and the Crown Prince of Prussia. The result of that meeting was the signing of a convention which affirmed the right of any sovereign to appeal for assistance to any other sovereign. On September 18, 1833, Nesselrode and Metternich signed a convention which pledged Russia and Austria to maintain the existence

⁴⁶ R. B. Mowat, "The Near East and France," The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, II, p. 167.

⁴⁷ Parl. Deb. XX, p. 903, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 31.

⁴⁸ Palm. to Temple, Sept. 3, 1833, cited by Mowat, op. cit., p. 167 and Rodkey, ibid., p. 31.

of the Ottoman Empire under the existing regime. They specifically undertook to oppose any extension of Mohamed Ali's authority over the European provinces of the Empire. Finally if they failed to maintain the integrity of the Empire, they would act in accord on everything concerning the establishment of new order of affairs.⁴⁹

The Russo-Austrian entente was of particular value to Austria. Fearing the spread of revolutionary ideas in Europe, Vienna was eager to keep a close alliance with St. Petersburg. At the same time it was eager to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁰ Therefore, according to a statement made by Palmerston on October 8, 1833, Metternich declared to him through the medium of a charge d' affairs, "that if Russia attempted to appropriate to herself one inch of Turkish territory, it would be war with Austria."⁵¹ Thus, the position of Austria was in many respects similar to that of England about the Turco Egyptian conflict. As Guizot pointed out they had a simple idea; they were anxious only to support the Ottoman Empire and to defend it against its enemies.⁵²

⁴⁹ S. Goriainow, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, pp. 51-52, cited by Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

⁵⁰ Rodkey, *The Turco-Egyptian Question*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁵¹ Bulwer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 170, cited by *ibid.*, p. 32.

⁵² Guizot, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 43, cited by *ibid.*, p. 32.

The French government was also aroused by the conference of Munchengrätz. It was anxious not to act alone in a way that might lead to war.⁵³ But it was willing to join with England to transmit, through their representatives at St. Petersburg, a copy of the protest which the two western powers had made a few weeks ago to the Porte against the conclusion of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.

In fact, the main issue was not the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, although it continued to be a primary topic in European cabinets, in determining their policy toward the Levant and the East in general, until the end of the Egyptian question in 1840, but the main issue was the power of Mohamed Ali and its reflection on the interests of the Big Powers, particularly France and England in the Levant. The question might be asked in this connection is what is the reflection of Mohamed Ali's power on international relations? Does it affect the interests of England and France in the region? and if so to what extent?

As we have seen already, England and France were able to unite in objecting to the terms of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi; they were, however, by no means agreed upon the whole question of the Levant. They were different in their attitudes toward the growing power of

⁵³ E. Driault, *La question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'à nos jours*, Paris, 1898, p. 143, cited by *ibid.*, p. 33.

Mohamed Ali.⁵⁴ Mohamed Ali, himself, throughout his career, tried to employ the device of playing off London against Paris. As early as 1810 he tried to offer alliance to France and in 1812 to England if either of them would recognize him as ruler of Cairo.⁵⁵ As events developed, he recognized that he could not reach his ultimate goal unless he could arrive at an understanding with Great Britain and obtain English cooperation⁵⁶ as well as maintain the French friendship. While France gave its encouragement to Mohamed Ali, England gave him less encouragement.

French policy in the Levant was connected with the recovery of the French position as an equal member in the European state's system, and her return to the area would restore her traditional role in the Mediterranean by making Egypt the pivot of that policy. The Levant was seen as one of the chief avenues to the economic recovery that was a fundamental policy of the Restoration.⁵⁷ By 1824, France began to turn again to Egypt reversing her traditional policy centering in Turkey by sending a military mission in order to instruct the

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 36.

⁵⁵ Driault, L'Empire de Mohamed Ali (1814-23), p. 93, cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 39.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 77-89.

⁵⁷ Vernon J. Puryear, France and the Levant From the Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah (Univ. of Calif. Press, 1941), p. 214.

Pasha's army on European lines. There was also a plan to build for him several naval vessels in the shipyards of Marseille. The increased production of desirable Egyptian cotton added "an economic incentive to the political speculation which envisaged Egypt as the powerful lieutenant of France in the Eastern Mediterranean." The French engineers rebuilt the Egyptian navy after the battle of Navarino,⁵⁸ and Mohamed Ali was considered, a contemporary writer pointed out, as a continuation of the work begun on the banks of the Nile by Napoleon.⁵⁹ That could explain why some French officials supported the idea of creating an Arab Kingdom under Mohamed Ali. But now the international situation did not allow an open support to the Pasha; even before the peace of Kutahiah was concluded, a tactical change in French Levant policy occurred. Fearing that if the peace were not immediately concluded between the Porte and Mohamed Ali, Russia would profit by the situation in furthering her aggressive schemes against Turkey, France decided to exercise political pressure upon Mohamed Ali to come to terms with the Sultan.⁶⁰ A French envoy was sent to Cairo on March 1, 1833 to state to Mohamed Ali that he would lose the good

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 215.

⁵⁹ Louis Blanc, Histoire de dix ans, 1830-1840, 5 Vols. (Paris, 1849), IV, p. 128, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 36.

⁶⁰ See pages 66-69 above.

will which every Frenchman, following the lead of the government, bore him if he did not now come to terms with Turkey.⁶¹ Although Mohamed Ali refused to yield to the French pressure, he continued to express his willingness to concert with France on general policy. In his conversation with Boisilecomet, the French envoy, Mohamed Ali said,

Vous [the French] n'avez pas à Constantinople le moyen de balancer l'influence de la Russie, je vous en offri un qui pourra avoir cet effet, je mets à votre disposition les forces dont je dispose; rendons notre union de plus en plus intime; quand on saura à Constantinople qu 'it dépend de vous de m'exciter ou de me retenir, croyez que vorte considération et votre influence n'en diminueront pas.⁶²

Boisilecomte recommended consideration of the obvious advantages which the aid of the powerful Egyptian army and navy could render in the event of a general war involving France.⁶³ He added in his report to Broglie, the French Foreign Minister, the famous statement said in 1825 by General Guilleminat, the French Ambassador at Constantinople at the time, "Le retour de notre influence politique et commerciale dans le Levant tient à non rapports avec Mohamed-Aly."

⁶¹ Puryear, France and the Levant, pp. 201-3.

⁶² Cattai, op. cit., p. 103.

⁶³ AEMD Turquie 73-78, cited by Puryear, France and the Levant, pp. 201-3.

Since the peace of Kutahiah, French policy with respect to Turco-Egyptian question had been encouraging the maintenance of the status quo and opposing any change in the peace of Kutahiah. This policy was formally pronounced by Broglie on June 26, 1833, in his letter to Boisilecomte, answering Mohamed Ali's suggestion of alliance with France:

Now that peace . . . has ceased to be a question, now that the concessions of the Porte to Mehemet Ali must have satisfied his ambition, we believe we are again acting in conformity with his real interests by giving him a new proof of friendship through our advice to him to use wisely his position which, because it may be a subject of inquietude and watchfulness for Europe, thus imposing upon him additional prudence and circumspection, inclines us to the belief that he will put aside every new enterprise on his part against the Porte, every new plan of aggrandizement beyond the Taurus, which would put the Powers, and France first, under the necessity of opposing him with energy.

Mimout was directed, Broglie added, to caution Mohamed Ali against certain illusions which those around him were showing themselves to be quite disposed to entertain regarding him, and in which he would be considered as called to regenerate the Ottoman Empire and serve as a barrier against Russia encroachments.

Doubtless the position to which Mohamed Ali had been raised might contribute, because of the weakness and dependence of the Ottoman Empire, a salutary counterpoise in certain circumstances against the preponderant action of Russia over the Porte, Broglie was "far from denying the part which it would be proper for him to take" in that

event. That factor might even form a part of the contingent French policy in the Levant, said Broglie, and was to be kept in mind. But "France thought that, for the time being, it would be premature, and until the time came for a new order, prudence dictated the duty of avoidance of everything which might indicate a system of entente between France and the Pasha as against Russia." Mimaüt would place these ideas before Mohamed Ali in his own way and try to dissipate the Pasha's projects, "or rather illusions."⁶⁴

A fresh quarrel between Mohamed Ali and the Porte would offer Russia a good excuse for applying the terms of Unkiar-Skelessi, therefore, the whole influence of France as well as England must be directed to prevent the Pasha from committing any renewed act of aggression.⁶⁵ Broglie wrote on September 16, 1833,

It is important that Mehemet Ali remain with care within the limits of his duties toward the Porte; that in his attitudes and in his language he prudently avoid giving the Sultan any inquietude or wounding of pride . . . , and I insist more especially on this point because of reports from Syria that Ibrahim Pasha, less circumspect than his father, has not put aside the intention to utilize the first occasion for renewing the war with the

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 209; Cattau, op. cit., p. 103.

⁶⁵ F.O. Turkey 221, Palm. to Pons., Dec. 6, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 170.

Porte to reverse the Empire and overthrow the Sultan.⁶⁶

Such in general was the trend of French policy of maintenance of the status quo of Kutahiah.

On the other hand, in England, the ambitious policy of Mohamed Ali was regarded with considerable suspicion. Indeed, since the early years of Mohamed Ali's career, the English observed carefully the expansion of Mohamed Ali's power in Arabia and the Sudan. They thought that his actions in those areas had affected three regions in which they were interested, i.e., the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and Abyssinia, which were of great importance to their commercial and naval routes to India. This led Mohamed Ali to seek a close friendship with England. He had made several overtures to the British government for intimate relations and protection,⁶⁷ to which no answer had been returned "except equally vague and general assurances of good will."⁶⁸ The British government's attitude toward the Levant crisis of 1831-33 has been a major topic of discussion among historians.⁶⁹ But it was

⁶⁶ AE Egypt 3. Broglie to Mimaut, Sept. 18, 1833, cited by Puryear, France and the Levant, p. 210.

⁶⁷ F.O. 78/202 Barker to Palm., June 8, 1831, cited by M. Verete, "Palmerston and the Levant Crisis, 1832," Journal of Modern History, Vol. XXIV (1952), p. 145.

⁶⁸ Palmerston was probably referring to Aberdeen's dispatch to Barker of Apr. 26, 1830. F.O. 78/192, cited by ibid., p. 145.

⁶⁹ F. S. Rodkey, "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41," I, 1830-39, Journal of Modern History, I, 1929 and

obvious that from the beginning of the conflict, Palmerston held the belief that British interests might be jeopardized through the establishment of Mohamed Ali's rule in Syria,⁷⁰ and he appeared to have had neither sympathy for the cause of the Pasha nor the intention of backing him. Although England refused the Porte's demand for naval support against Mohamed Ali, it was during that conflict that British policy in the Levant took its final shape. This policy might explain the British activities in the area for the next 125 years.

As events proceeded, Palmerston was gradually acquiring information, all of which strengthened his original suspicion. Among these sources of information was Sir Stratford Canning, the late ambassador at Constantinople and his successor Lord Ponsonby.⁷¹ Canning was of the opinion that the independence and the integrity of Turkey lay in the Porte being able to effect the needed reforms in the internal administration of her empire, by which she could convert her rich

"The Attempts of Briggs Company to Guide British Policy in the Levant in Interests of Mehemet Ali Pasha, 1821-41," Ibid., V (1933). H. Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea (Archon Books, 1964). V. J. Puryear, France and the Levant, From the Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah (Univ. of Calif. Press, 1941).

⁷⁰F.O. 78/218 Briggs to Backhouse, Dec. 14 and enclosures, cited by Rodkey, "The Attempts of Briggs . . . etc.," p. 339, and Verete, op. cit., p. 146.

⁷¹G. H. Bolsaver, "Lord Ponsonby and the Eastern Question (1833-1839)," Slavonic Review, Vol. XIII, 1934-5.

resources into "means of national defense." This program could not be achieved unless the Empire enjoyed several years of continuous peace. Therefore Mohamed Ali's revolt was most inopportune. Russia, Canning thought, wanted to keep Turkey a weak neighbor; therefore, she might be viewing with satisfaction the disturbed state of affairs in Syria. Even if the Porte would defeat the Pasha, this war would leave the Porte most exhausted. This would give Turkey little chance of carrying out any reforms, her dependence on Russia would be increased, and she would eventually fall prey to Russian schemes. But England had a vital interest in preserving the Ottoman Empire, which was a bulwark against Russian expansion to the south, and she therefore, should support the Sultan against Mohamed Ali.⁷² "The acquisition of Syria," Canning on another occasion argued, "carries with it the command of Bagdad." Moreover, he was afraid that "the success of Mehemet Ali might be assisted by Russia." He also thought that the pasha was not likely to succeed in effecting reform outside Egypt and that on his ground, too, the Sultan should be preferred to him.⁷³

⁷² F.O. 78/209 Canning to Palm., No. 12, Mar. 7, 78/210 same to same, No. 29, Apr. 30 and No. 40 of June 9, 78/211 same to same, No. 49 of July 22 and "separate and secret" (in cipher) of Aug. 9, 78/217 memorandum of S. Briggs on "Mehemet Ali, Syria and Turkey," communicated to F.O. Mar. 28, cited by Verete, op. cit., p. 148.

⁷³ F.O. 78/217 Briggs to Palm., Oct. 8--enclosure, cited by ibid., p. 148, was forwarded to Canning for comments and observations.

These arguments supported Palmerston's views. The suspicion now aroused, that Russia might be attempting to enter into a secret understanding with Mohamed Ali, never left him until 1840. He also began to entertain "the greatest doubt whether the success of the Pasha would be favorable to our security in India."⁷⁴ This new consideration was amplified in a memorandum submitted by Henry Ellis, who had had long experience in Indian and Persian affairs and in 1832 was a member of the board of control.⁷⁵ Briggs and others, Ellis observed, were contending that the British government had "a common interest" with Mohamed Ali "in extending his dominions" to Syria and Bagdad. He, however, was "inclined to question whether the Asiatic interests of Great Britain" would thus be promoted. "I would lay it down as a principle that it is not the interest of the European Sovereign of India, that a powerful Mohammedan state should be placed at the mouth of the Euphrate." The reasons for that are that

it is quite . . . possible that such a government should unite with Russia in a partition of Persia A Mohammedan Government so placed would undoubtedly soon spread its influence throughout Arabia and might at no longer time become a maritime power of importance. The absence of such a

⁷⁴G. D. 29/413, Palm. to Granville, Dec. 11, and 78/218 endorsement of Palm. on Briggs to Backhouse of Dec. 14, cited by ibid., p. 149.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 149.

power is at present a complete security against any attack upon our Indian possessions from the Southern parts of the Indus.

Another reason was that a vigorous state placed at the Arabian Gulf and "wielded by an ambitious sovereign," might form "a Mohammedan League," comprising all the Moslem rulers of central Asia "for the purpose of driving out a Christian Government from India." His conclusion was

that the political and commercial interests of Great Britain taken together will be best consulted by having these provinces placed as they now are under a Government to whom relations with India are matters of secondary, rather than primary importance.⁷⁶

Thus, by the beginning of 1833, the outlines of the English policy took their full shape. Needless to say that in the coming years some additional facts gave support to these views such as the Euphrates Road, the military importance of Diarbekir, or the Egyptian monopolies. But when these views took their final shape, the Turkish defeats as well as the Russian intervention and the French leading role in mediation between the conflicting parties, led London at the time to join Paris and exercise their political influence to force the concerned parties to reach an agreement as we have seen in the last chapter. The subject was brought before the British Cabinet

⁷⁶ F.O. 78/233 Ellis to Palmerston, Jan. 9, 1833, cited by ibid., p. 149,

several times and in a long letter to Granville Palmerston expressed his views supported by ample arguments, most of which bore the mark of those put by Canning and Ellis. In his letter, Palmerston points out that "For English interests . . . it seems highly desirable that the Pasha should retire back to Egypt, and that the Sultan's authority should remain paramount in Syria."⁷⁷

The application of steam-power to shipping, brought the over-land routes to India by the Euphrates and by Suez into high political and strategic importance. The rise of Mohamed Ali's power in Egypt gave him the Suez route, but the Euphrates still remained under the nominal authority of the Sultan. From the English point of view, it would have been an act of great folly to have assisted in placing both under Mohamed Ali's command.⁷⁸

The idea of establishing a direct line of communication, to be operated by means of steamers between England and India had been suggested as early as 1823, but did not receive serious consideration from British government until some ten years later,⁷⁹ when a select

⁷⁷ G.D. 29/415, Palm. to Granville, Jan. 29, 1833, cited by Verete, op. cit., p. 151.

⁷⁸ Palm. to W. Temple, Mar. 21, 1833 (Bulwer, op. cit., 11, 146), cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 134.

⁷⁹ For more details see H. L. Hoskins, British Routes to India (Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1966), pp. 80-241.

committee was appointed to "inquire into the best means of promoting the communication with India by steam." The committee made a detailed study of the project involved and on July 14, 1834, presented in the House of Commons their conclusions and recommendations.⁸⁰ With respect to the Egyptian route, the committee suggested its usage by the Red Sea. But it was not the only possible route, an alternative being the Euphrates river and the Arabian Gulf. The latter route was of particular interest to Lieutenant-Colonel Chesney. In 1830-1 this route was being simultaneously surveyed by Chesney from Syria and from a party of the East India Company's officers from India. When he was sent again in 1834 with an expedition, Chesney met with serious obstacles and the region appeared to be an area of rival interest of the British as well as the Russians and Mohamed Ali, on the ground that the Russians did not want the British to establish their influence on the Euphrates and Mohamed Ali feared that it might lead to the building of forts and the occupation of the river.⁸¹ Perhaps, too, Mohamed Ali's opposition was aimed to render the British more amenable to his suggestions of independence. While Ibrahim in Syria employed all his

⁸⁰ Parl. Deb., XXIV, p. 142, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 40.

⁸¹ Sabry, op. cit., p. 299, cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 138.

offers to hinder Chesney's progress,⁸² Mohamed Ali declined to send any orders to his son, until he should have received express orders from the Sultan.⁸³ Palmerston reacted to such opposition stiffly. In one of his dispatches to Campbell he wrote, "His Majesty's government are determined that the undertaking . . . shall not fail in consequence of the obstacles which bad faith in any quarter may oppose to it."⁸⁴

Mohamed Ali's occupation of Diar Baker in 1835 was viewed by the British government as an attempt to control Chesney's expedition more effectively; also his expansion in Arabia led to a further and sharper clash of Anglo-Egyptian interests. It might extend on to the Arabian Gulf. "Great Britain," Palmerston wrote, "would . . . think her interests directly concerned in preventing the authority of the Sultan from being shaken or interfered with at Baghdad," and again, with regard to any movement towards Bagdad or the Gulf, "You will state frankly to the Pasha the British government could not see with indifference the execution of such intentions."⁸⁵ Therefore, the Red

⁸² Abd. Case 249 docs. 103, 104; Case 250 docs. 359, 380, 398, 409, 453, 488, 498, 502, 503, 508, 510, 516, 518, 523, 524; Case 251 docs. 30, 40, 41, 42, 65, 82, 87, 95, 97, 113, 208.

⁸³ F.O. 78/258 Campbell, Sept. 28, 1835, cited by Dodwell, op. cit., p. 138.

⁸⁴ F.O. 78/257 and 258 to Campbell, July [n.d.] and Nov. 2, 1835, cited by ibid., p. 139.

⁸⁵ F.O. 78/318 to Campbell, Nos. 23, 25, Dec. 8, 1837, cited by ibid., p. 139.

Sea and the Arabian Gulf formed direct avenues to India which England was resolved to oppose any growing power in these areas.

As we have mentioned elsewhere, England did not only view Mohamed Ali's growing power with considerable suspicion but also his relation with France. But neither of the two western powers were willing to bring such suspicion in each other ahead. The July Monarchy, as The Time points out since its rising on intimate understanding with England was essential not only to guarantee its own safety but also to meet the challenge of the northern coalition.⁸⁶ On May 20, 1833, M. Guizot, who was then the Minister of Public Instruction, described the alliance with England as "un fait important" in the French political situation. Because, he continued, "that alliance is fortunate, favorable to the progress, to the good order, to the prosperity of the two countries."⁸⁷ At the same time the British government thought it was necessary to meet the Russian designs, to secure the support of France. These facts explain why during the Egyptian crisis of 1833 France and England were so anxious to make it appear that they were in perfect accord concerning all questions of foreign policy.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ The Time, Dec. 6, 1833, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 41.

⁸⁷ Archives Parl., LXXXIV, p. 42, cited by ibid., p. 41.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 42.

By the beginning of 1834, it became apparent that any change in the status quo in the Levant would involve the rival interests of the Powers in the region as well as their respective relations with each other. As we have seen, the Syrians received Ibrahim Pasha in 1832 as their deliverer from Turkish misrule. But no sooner had they become the subject of the Pasha, than their disenchantment began. The central policy which Ibrahim adopted was in contrast with the non-central authorities of feudalism, also his attempts to disarm the feudal potentates, led the latter to revolt in 1834. Ibrahim's military and economic policies as well as the introducing of the Egyptian system of conscription and taxation led the inhabitants to gather around their old leaderships against the Egyptian authority,⁸⁹ especially in Palestine. The revolt was so strong that it required the coming of Mohamed Ali himself to Syria and there ensued sixteen months of arduous operations, with much blood shed before Ibrahim Pasha could disarm the tribes and restore order in the revolting districts. The insurrection was a golden chance for the Sultan to restore the dominion which he had lost in the last year. Accordingly, he prepared to renew the struggle by sending considerable reinforcements to the army of Reshied Pasha in

⁸⁹ A. A. Paton, A History of the Egyptian Revolution From the Period of the Mamelukes to the Death of Mohammed Ali, 2nd ed., Vol. 11 (London, 1870), pp. 102-124. Rafii, op. cit., pp. 300-309, Rustum, The Royal Archives of Egypt and the Disturbances in Palestine, 1834.

Asia Minor.⁹⁰ It appeared, as a correspondent of The Times wrote from Constantinople on May 27, 1834, "A rupture between the Porte and Egypt appears inevitable."⁹¹

But as we have seen the Big Powers were all determined to prevent a renewal of the conflict in the Levant. The French wanted peace by preserving the status quo; the English, in spite of their desire to see Mohamed Ali out of Syria and Arabia, thought the renewal of the war would bring another defeat to the Turkish troops, therefore, they advised the Porte not to renew the war.⁹² The Russians were also interested in preserving the status quo. The Tsar's charge d'affairs at Constantinople, declared in a letter to the Porte, that the Treaty of .kiar-Skelessi was strictly defensive and could not apply to an aggressive war taken by the Porte.⁹³ The Russians realized that England and France would never peacefully submit to a second active intervention, on the part of its army and navy, in the internal affairs of the Ottoman

⁹⁰ Annual Register, 1834, p. 465, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 44.

⁹¹ See also Annual Register, 1834, p. 465, cited by ibid., p. 45.

⁹² F.O. 78/337, Pons. to Palm., 25, July 13, No. 99 (enclosing Pons. to Pisani, 24 July/34), same to same, 16 Aug./34, No. 115, cited by Bolsover, op. cit., p. 104.

⁹³ Letter from Constantinople, May 23, 1834, The Time, June 24, 1834. See also Annual Register, 1834, p. 465, cited by Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 45. Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands, III, pp. 279-80, cited by Bolsover, op. cit., p. 104.

Empire.⁹⁴ Consequently, the Porte was restrained from carrying out its hostile intentions. At the same time the consuls at Alexandria insisted that Mohamed Ali must strictly comply with the conditions of the Kutahiah agreement, and afford Mahmud no pretext for beginning hostilities.⁹⁵ Nevertheless, Mohamed Ali on September 3, 1834, submitted his famous letter to the consuls of England, Austria, and France,⁹⁶ at Alexandria asking their respective courts to recognize his independence in return for the corporation of his army and navy against Russian designs in Turkey. The three Powers combined to check the schemes of Mohamed Ali and informed him that he must abandon "a project which the policy of Europe could not allow him to realize."⁹⁷

Thus, the Big Powers, for different reasons, made Mohamed Ali understand that the status quo was an essential element in the international balance, and if he tried to declare his independence, these powers would submit their assistance to the Sultan. Mohamed Ali realized that he could not depend on the aid of any power in achieving his goals. Therefore, he decided to solve his problems with the Porte

⁹⁴ Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question, p. 45.

⁹⁵ Hall, op. cit., p. 220.

⁹⁶ See pages 84-86 above.

⁹⁷ F.O. Turkey 244 Palm. to Campbell, Oct. 26, 1834. F.O. France 488, Granville to Palm., Oct. 27, 1834, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 220.

through direct negotiation. The mutual suspicions that had prevailed during the entire relations between Mohamed Ali and the Porte throughout Mohamed Ali's reign continued during the negotiations. In such a situation the possibility of an outbreak of hostility between the parties was always present. But, as we have seen, the internal and external conditions had helped to prolong the moment until 1838 when Mohamed Ali repeated his intention to proclaim his independence after the negotiation came to naught. The Porte thought the time was ripe for successful campaign against Mohamed Ali not only to restore Syria and Arabia but to deprive him from Egypt as well as a consequence of the Porte aggression and European interference, it became necessary for Mohamed Ali to use force in defending his gains, which he had taken by force. The European intervention deprived him of his gains (The Treaty of London, 1840), however, and forced him to retreat to Egypt.

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