THE LEAGUE 0F ARAB STATES 1947-1967: AN EXAMBNATION OF THE PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL lNTEGRATlON Thesis for the Degree of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY GEORGE ELL, JR.. 1970 LIBRARY IHESIS Michigan State University #- 7 l y ‘ amoma av " "(MB &'SBNS‘ 800K BINDERY INC. LIBRARY an {as ‘ sump; n l | 5N3 9'" Wm ABSTRACT THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES 191+? - 1967: AN EXAMINA'I' ION OF THE PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL INTEGRAT ION By George Ell. Jr. The evolution of the international political system in the 20th century has emphasised the role of the international organisation in the resolution of conflict. Because of the bi-polar nature of the international system and the development of positive neutralist bloc power. regional organizations hold a position of special interest in the world today. In this regard the Middle East is of immediate importance. Much of the literature and ideology concerning regionalism points to functional cooperation among nation states as being essential.to progress toward lasting peace. The topic of this thesis is, therefore, concerned with the role of the League of Arab States in its attempts to coordinate the Arab countries' efforts in dealing with internal as well as external problems. we were concerned with two basic questions: (1) Does coordination and cooperation in internal affairs affect the ability to transcend in- ternal political problems and produce a solidarity capable of providing a unified front vis a.vis external pressures! (2) In what way do collective security measures relate to efforts to achieve internal integration and external solidarity? In order to provide a sufficiently comprehensive background, George Ell. Jr. for analysis it was necessary to collect events data for the 21-year period which included the three wars with Israel in l9u8. 1956. and 196?. The data were gathered after an examination of all chronological sources of events dealing with the Arab League. The Middle East Journal and M. Khalil's The Le e of Arab States, Volumes I and II, were established as primary sources. All events were categorised according to issue relatedness as either internal: (1) Economic. social and cultural cooperation: (2) Military coordination and collective security measures: or external: (1) AfquAsian solidarity} (2) Problems with Israel; (3) Relations with the United Nations; (b) Freedom for Arab peoples. Each internal and external event was then examined for elements of integration and solidarity. respectively. An integrative event was defined as 3 (1) Expanding to include a national or international governmental agencyw (2) Increasing in task specificity. An external event ex- hibiting solidarity was defined as: (l) A statement of agreement: (2) An act of cooperation: (3) An Arab League declaration of unanimity. A statistical analysis of the frequency distribution of all events found a significant relationship between the Arab countries' ability to function effectively internally and their ability to coordinate action externally. He have also found that military cooperation alone. in the absence of functionally integrative development. cannot provide for a solid front vis a vis external issues. A close examination of the events themselves supports these con- tentions and points to certain specific regional economic and political problems which have acted in the past to frustrate the aims of the Arab League. THE LEAGUE 0F ARAB SI‘ATES 1947 - 1967: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROBLEMS OF REGIONAL mrmaxr ION By George Ell. Jr. A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements fer the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of'Social.Science 1970 For Tony ee ACKNOWLEDGMENT I am forever indebted to Professor Edward E. Azar for his encouragement. intellectual stimulation and patience which enabled me to engage in this research openly and freely. I wish also to express gratitude to my student colleagues. especially Craig Polite whose willingness and enthusiasm provided immeasurable support. It is most difficult to attempt to acknowledge the contributions of’my wife. Marilou. With infinite patience and understanding she acted as critic. editor and research assistant. It would not have been possible without her. Finally I must offer a word of thanks to my parents, who never lost hope. -iii- TABLE UP CONTENIS D ED ICAIP 10“ O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O ACKNOW MENT O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 LIST OF Chapter I. II. III. IV. TABLES O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 THE THEORETICAL BASIS r-OR THE STUDY or REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . Introduction................. International Integration . . . . . . . . . . Contributions of Organisational Theory to the Study of Regional Organisations . . . . SWeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee HYPOEHESES AND DATA ANALISIS e e e e e e . . HmthOSOSeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee D‘t. Sourca8e e e e e e e e e e e e e D‘t. COding Procedmse ’e e e e e e e St‘t ”to 10‘]. Procmr. e e e e e e e e REILVANIF DM|A C O O O C O O O O O O O 0 0 O MYSIS AND CONCwSIONSO O O O O O O O O I O COHChSionseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee BIBLImB-APHYeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee .137. Page 0 O 0 ii . . .iii 0 O O 1 . . . 19 eee23 O 0 I60 0 0 O 68 eee69 LIST OF TABLES Table Page I. Frequency Distribution of Events Data by Category . . . . . . 25 -v- CHAPTER I THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE STUDY OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Introduction Most scholars agree that the formation of numerous regional organizations has been a significant development in international relations since World war II. Although the framers of the U.N. Charter were aware of. and limitedly dealt with the concept of regionalism, they did not expect. nor did they adequately prepare for the extensive development of regional organisations; their character. structure. and relationship in the world today. Obviously developments in the structure of the international system have had a great impact on the nature and function of all regional entities . Although there is little definitive infor- mation on which to base a scientific investigation of this phe- nomenon. a knowledge of its historical development is important to an understanding of the problem. It is obvious that after World War II most nations recognised the need for an international structure which would and could prevent another such conflict. 1A universal organisation was considered es- sential for such a system to be effective. To a lesser degree, and with far less certain interpretation. regional organisations were supposed to complement and facilitate world developments for peace. The theoretical bases underlying the structure and formation of regional organisations. however. were not completely a result of _ 2 - the specific experiences and immediate problems produced by World War II. Beginning with the "Hague System" in 1899 and 1907. the en- suing developments through WOrld War 1, and the creation of the League of Nations. it is possible to recognize the liberal tradition which nurtured the evolution of the dogma of universality and elevated the organisational approach to its fundamental status in the doctrinal formula for peace.1 war was regarded simply as a product of misconception and mis- calculation resulting from a lack of understanding among nation states: an understanding which could be achieved through increased mutual contacts. 'That man was not basically "evil" in nature, that he in fact had. and could certainly. still construct and reconstruct the mechanisms and instruments of human relations, became despite the failures of the past more and more basic to the collective approach in creating new and workable solutions for achieving world harmony.2 It has become increasingly evident that nation states were not in the past as closely associated as has been the case in the conten- porary period. Furthermore. factors such as the advancement in communications technology have been the major (albeit not the only) catalyst in changing the interaction patterns in international re- lations. Governments either chose to be involved or were enveloped by 1Claude. Inis L.. Swords Into Plowshares. (New York: Random House. 1%0). P. 82c 2Waltz, Kenneth N.. Man the State and War (New York: Co- lumbia University Press. 1 . p. . -3- a changing, extremely delicate complex of inter-relations which defied traditional explanations in terms of obvious national interest, and which, at times. included several highly unexpected reactions and associations among nation states.3 Firm and united in the opinion so rigidly entrenched in western liberalism that it was possible for mankind to guide and improve its destiny. world leaders again solemnly proclaimed. at the end of World war II. that every nation should be and was dedicated to the maintenance of peace above all. They also advocated that individually and collec- tively they would avOid disastrous conflicts such as those of the first two world wars. In brief, the framers of the new world order believed that all nations basically desire peace and that they should live together har- moniously: that a universal organisation comprised of all "peace loving" nations would be able to achieve this end. The new organisation had to be created and developed to coordinate unprecedented and exhaustively comprehensive mechanisms for promoting and increasing cooperation which would prevent the mistakes of the past. This forthright and unchallengeable principle was. however. met with extensive disagreement. The development of the specific structure, functional scope. and procedural format of the new United Nations Organisation precipitated significant debate which was complicated further by the differences in opinion reflected in regards to representation, participation, the roles of nation states. and the form of recognition. In practical 3Haas. Ernst. Tangle of’Hopg. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 1969). P. 79. -14.. terms. the universal organisation was thought by some to be too abstract to function, without some intermediate support. in a world comprised of so many nations. There were many who considered economic and social disequilib- rium highly correlated to or even causally related to the outbreak of war. It was also argued that international cooperation in economic, social. cultural and scientific affairs would reduce and eventually eliminate the political frictions which directly resulted in conflict. It followed that an emphasis on this type of functional integration would be the most logical and least difficult point of beginning. Thus it was envisioned that functional integration on a re- gional basis would transcend politics and inevitably stOp physical violence. It was also argued by those who preferred worlddwide organ- isations that regional integration leads to the creation of isolated subsystems and ultimately to further international quarrels. Inter- estingly enough, those who thought themselves "regionalists" in cir- cumstance. as well as philosophy, were most active in the debate. The Arab countries. for example, argued that regional awareness and regional problems dictate to them the view that they should formulate a tight regional arrangement and simultaneously associate themselves with a world organisation. In 1945, Arab recognition of the need for cooperation with the U.N. was certain but with equal emphasis on the internal (i.e. regional)nature of the responsibility for settling disputes. while emphasising functional integration regionally and on a world-wide basis. the Arab -5- position clearly stated that the fear of great-power hegemony demanded that primary responsibility for regional affairs be retained by the regional membership itself. This argument was further elaborated by stating that the Arab League serves their regional purposes and links them to the U.N. Obviously. the Arabs argued for more regional organ- isations a la the Arab League. The Arab regionalists argued that mechanisms for regional defense should aim at maintaining internal harmony and not at repelling non- regional threats. In effect. the Arabs argued that regional organ- izations view the containment of the great powers as best being~ achieved through intensive coordination with the universal organization in functionally integrative areas. They stressed the reliance on the collective security apparatus of the world organization for overall international security.“ The major powers did not support the Arab position and as pointed out earlier the decisions which were made as a result of this debate did not adequately provide for future developments. It is. therefore. important to outline some of the terms eventually advanced for regional arrangements in the U,N. Charter which have displayed major significance. Chapter VIII (Articles 52 to 54) of the charter is concerned with regional organization. Article 52 emphasizes "appropriate" regional action in maintaining peace and implies a regional role in international functional integration through the U.N. in keeping with universal principles. It further provides. however. that no “Yalem. Ronald J.. Re ionalism and World Order. (Washington, p.U.: Public Affairs Press. 1965 . p. 25:i -6— "enforcement action" will be taken by regional organizations without prior Security Council approval. and then only under its authority. However. Article 51 of the Charter which does not deal with regional arrangements insures for all nations the individual and col- lective right of self defense but does not define aggression as it relates to self defense. The contradiction that results is that in order to preserve the fundamental premise of all regional organizations -- the right to settle internal disputes themselves, without Security Council interference. regional organizations must be based on Article 51 which is clearly concerned with external aggression. In sum, the U.N. Charter. as formulated at the end of the San Francisco conference. recognises the existence of regional organizations and interprets their role in the international system; a recognition and role which regional organizations themselves do not accept. The Arab League. therefbre. has continued to act on the basis of the Arab view of regionalism and the functional role which they see as necessary to preserve their integrity; The United Nations is not designed to effectively cope with the difficulties that result, and any study of the league must presuppose an awareness of this contradiction. International Intggration What precisely do we mean. however. when we refer to the term integration? The answer is not a simple one. A review of the literature concerned with international political communities will in general -7- result in an understanding that the desired goal of international activity is. or at least should be a relatively stable ability to prevent war and to settle disputes reasonably and peaceably. Karl Deutsch defines a ”security community" as an integrated political entity. In other words a geographical unit in which a sense of community. complete with necessary institutions. provides for. over time. expectations of peaceful change.5 Integration is a condition of behavior in which all involved are agreed that the use of physical force is an inappropriate measure for the resolution of problems. Security communities need not. according to Deutsch. be in- tegrated in the sense that governmental merger be accomplished. 0n the contrary it is possible to achieve a "pluralistic security com- munity"6 in which separate governments are integrated (i.e. seek and expect peaceful solutions.) His example is Norway and Sweden today. But it is. of course. possible as in the United States to develop an integrated 29g amalgamated security community (i.e. a political unit ruled by one government.) 0n the other hand amalgamation is not a guarantee of integration and Deutsch points to the Hapsburg Empire in 191# in which unitary government did not provide for peaceful change.7 In short. Deutsch explains that historically integration has been recognizable as a state of being: 5Deutsch. Karl. "Political Community and North Atlantic Area". in Internationgl Political Communities an Antholo . (New York: Anchor Books. Doubleday & Co.. Inc.. . p. . 6Ibid.. p. 3. VIbid. -8... "characterised by important thresholds...the kind of sense of community that... turned out to be a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties: of 'we feeling'. trust and mutual consideration; of partial identi- fication in terms of self-images and interests: of mutually successful predictions of behavior. and of cooperative action in accordance with it.... This. however. cannot suffice as a complete definition. It is difficult to understand in Deutsch's approach at what point one can consider any level of integrative behavior as having passed beyond a "threshold". If this state of existence is what ultimately can be achieved. how are we to know what processes do and do not work toward this end? How should we attempt. in the case of the Middle East. to measure the success or failure of the Arab League? What are and what should be the interim goals of the Arab States if they are in search of peace? In sum. what processes are we to look for in examining progress toward integration? Part of the answer can be found in viewing integration as a dynamic process in and of itself. As Ernst Haas points out there must exist a vehicle which provides a format and opportunity for political mediation in order to achieve inter-nationicooperation. 'Fhis is par- ticularly true because it is necessary to include those interested and involved members who may not be parties to specific dispute but whose concern and aid may resolve the particular problem for the betterment of all concerned. thus providing a new platform of inter— action and perhaps new incentive for continued development.9 81bid.. PP. 17-180 9Haas. Ernst. "International Integration in the European and Universal Process". in International Political Communities an Antholo . (New'York: Anchor Books. Doubleday & Co.. Inc.. 19665. p. 58. - 9 - This is further elaborated by Haas when he says that conflict reso- lution can be achieved in three basic ways: 1. Classic diplomatic negotiation - i.e. equal exchange concession. 2. Accommodation by "splitting the difference”. 3. "Upgrading" - i.e. re-defining the conflict or elevating the solution to a higher level.10 It is the "upgrading" ferm of conflict resolution which results in the compromises demanded by expanding activity which in turn encourages political actors to be persuaded to "shift their loyalties". Ultim- ately this process leads to broader and more significant avenues of cooperation. Haas envisions therefore. that the process of integration is an ongoing phenomenon which leads to a "terminal condition called polit- ical community".11 According to Haas: ”The process of attaining this condition among nation- states we call integration. the process whereby polit- ical actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties. expectations and political activities toward a new and larger center. whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pro-existing national states... that the objective economic. social and communications 'factors' often identified with 'integration' . . . are conditions typ- ical of an ongoing political community... They may serve as indicators to help us assess the progress of integration." 1° L213... pp. 95-96. 11Ibid.. p. 9“. 12Ibid. - 10 - Thus. Haas argues. that a: "redefinition of conflict so as to work out a solution at a higher level. which almost invariably implies the expansion of the mandate or task of an inter- national or national governmental agency... maximises the 'spill-over' effect."13 It is this spill-over process which is the integrative catalyst which makes the achievement of the political community possible. Through this process of integration nation states come to learn the value of these joint activities. learn to build new organisations and to cooperate in new areas. The ultimate aim of this activity would seem to be the political community of which Haas speaks. The Arab world has not yet achieved a stable community which expects peaceful change. We feel. however. that we should focus our attention on those elements of international behavior which might serve as indicators of the integration process. Thus. if we employ Haas' or Deutsch's formulations. we find ourselves in a difficult position. In order to solve our difficulties we turn to Edward E. Azar's sug- gestion that the learning experience which nation states go through provides the link between Haas' propositions concerning process and Deutsch's construct which depends on a difficult-to-operationalize threshold.1u furthermore. the logical extension of Azar's explanation concludes that we may regard the integrated condition as one in which there is one government at any point in time capable of exercising 131nm. , p. 96. 1“Azar. Edward E.. International Political Inte ration: the Case of the U.A.R.. Ph.D. Cissertation for Stanford University. 1968, Chapter N, p. 65. - 11 - control and in fact doing so. Thus the ill-fated United Arab Republic formed between Egypt and Syria provides a good example. It is therefore appropriate that this thesis be confined to an analysis of the integration process itself with no unwarranted insis- tence that a definable level of integration. short of Azar's definition. be considered essential. What then can be isolated as theoretically relevant and methodologically appropriate are categories which can be examined in reference to the phenomenon of integration as a process. In his book The League of Arab States Robert W. MacDonald dis— cusses the problems of internal dynamics within the Arab League struc- ture. He defines. according to issue relatedness. processes which are integrative -- defined as opinion consensus and collective action -- and categorizes issues according to their internal and external focus. A straightforward distillation of MacDonald's analytic framework isolates the following categories appropriate for this thesis. All processes which hold a potentially integrative value are defined as either of internal or external concern. Thus we have the internal factors: (1) Economic. social and cultural development. and (2) col- lective security (including military cooperation): and the external: (1) Cooperation with the United Nations: (2) political independence for all Arab peoples: (3) AfrOeAsian solidarity: and (h) relations with Israel.15 The above provides an operationally definable construct in keeping with the theoretical propositions of both Haas and Deutsch. in that they each recognize as factors distinct functional contexts. such as 15MacDonald. Robert W.. The Leggge of Arab States. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1965). pp. 82 - 85. - 12 - the economic and military. which have certain integrative potential. One theoretical problem remains. What special consequences can be expected in a study concerned with a regional organisation in its formal role? What can organization theory provide in helping to better understand the nature of the behavior we are examining? Since the purpose of this thesis is to examine the League of Arab States. and to test some hypotheses about integration within the context of a regional organization. let us make certain issues explicit. In this thesis. we assume: 1. 'Phe Arab League. as any other regional organization. has been and is influenced by universal developments and that it is not isolated from the rest of the world but responds to and elicits response from the total international complex. 2. A reason which inspires the formation of a regional organiza- tigg is often explained in the literature simply in terms of some underlying complex arrangement of cultural. economic. and political factors giving rise to a regional establish- ment which results in the formation of visible institutions. The second assumption. more than any otherr seems to be most frequently made and. perhaps therefore. is the most essential to any discussion of regionalism. Because of the ease with which it lends itself to "common sense" acceptance. without rigorous examination. it can be most misleading. bor this reason it is important to discuss the limitations of such an assumption and to describe what we mean by regional ogganization and what we therefore can and cannot say about it. - 13 - Contributions of Organizational‘fheory to the Studygof Regional Organ— izations It must be recognized that significant questions about the be- havior we are attempting to analyse arise when we consider the cultural. economic. social. and political complexities involved and how the dynamics referred to differ by reason of the definition of the word regional. and the word organization. taken separately. and what meaning and implications result in forming the conceptual term regional organization. In other words we must explain exactly what behavior we are examining within the organization. One may begin with a dictionary definition of the word regional. Consistently. such a definition is exclusively spatial or geographical. Commonly. the literature in International Relations modifies this geographical basis to include non-contiguous geographical areas of com- mon interest made possible or necessitated by advancement in communi- cations technology. Several other factors have also been suggested to supplement this definition. such as a similar historical tradition. linguistic relationship. common culture (norms. goals. values). econ- omic interdependence. and social concomitance or compatibility. It is generally agreed that a combination of one or all of these factors results in some basic justification for at least a minimal "we" feeling. The specific dynamics are. no doubt. uncertain but for the purposes of this paper the foregoing will be considered a sufficiently inclusive enumeration of the relevant factors used to describe the word regional. A discussion of its significance will follow in this chapter in relation to other considerations. - 14 - Attempts at defining the word organization introduce other more argumentative aspects to the meaning of the term regional organization. Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott. in their study of formal organizations make the following assertions: "Phe most general definition of the concept of an organ- ization is a number of men who have purposely formed a social unit for achieving certain goals or a social organization not deliberately planned which takes form among men who are living together." 16 At the next less abstract level of definition Blau and Scott out- line three different organizational categories: - 1. "Social orggnization refers to the ways in which human con- duct becomes socially organized... to the observed regularities in the behavior of peOple that are due to the social conditions in which they find themselves...."17 A network of social relations refers. then. to group structure. large or small. and the shared beliefs and orientations which unite the membership. 2. Formal organization. ‘fhis second subgroup of organizations, which by definition is related to and is generated by the underlying social organization. is distinguished in character from the social by reason of its deliberate establishment for the explicit purpose of achieving certain goals and the voluntagy and controlled agreement on the part of the membership to relinquish certain rights of individual- ity in order to maintain association with the organization. 'rhe specific form is a tangible institutional structure. expectedly 168nm. Peter M. and Scott. at. Richard. Formal Organizations. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co.. 1962). pp. 27 - no. 17Ibideo PP. 89 - 1000 - 15 - permanent. created with a definite set of responsibilities and rules to guide operative functions. participant behavior, and internal and external policy determination. 3. Within the structure of the formal organization, and intrin- sically related to it in terms of particular organizational tasks. is the informal organization. Briefly. this is explained as the separate, non-formal and perhaps non-deliberate development of values. norms, practices. and social relations (work related and otherwise) which are a result of the personal contacts within the membership of the formal organization. The impact of sociological and psychological influences is apparent. These informal aspects do not necessarily differ. on every level. from the formal dictates. but it is important to note that they often do. While it is not necessary for the informal and formal processes to be identical. it is essential that they are at least compatible. in order to achieve organizational goals. In summary. we can note the following essentials relative to regional organization: 1. The word regional is used to refer to primarily cultural and traditional ties among social units which are. by implication. non- formal. This also includes such relationships as the economic and the political which may be formal or non-formal. The aggregate effect of these factors is a recognizable feeling of at least minimal reciprocal identity. 2. Social organization is comprised of values. norms. and standards identifiable in regular behavior patterns which emerge from -16- the social conditions and entire existential complex. Both the struc- ture and orientation characterizing member unity are non-formal. 3. Formal organizations are distinct in that they occur within the total structure but have been deliberately and purposefully created with visible institutions to achieve specific goals in prescribed ways. h. Informal organizations are created through individual and group contact among the formal organization membership. The values. norms. and practices formed informally are done so on the basis of organizational tasks. The foregoing distinctions are important because the conceptual term regional orggnization as often used when referring to a given regional entity suggests several implications. Commonly a "we" feeling is thought to exist based on certain observations. formal and other- wise. An exhaustive list of possible or probable conjunctions. covering the complete range of human behavior frequently is used as additional evidence to support and explain the contention initially supposed in considering the organization in question as a regional entity. ‘rhe word organization provides the institutional and prescriptive elements of the term regional organization. Obviously. the word regional is used to include two related. but analytically distinct types of organization, the social and formal. The word 233223553322 as it commonly applies in the conceptual definition regional gggggggggggg makes no reference to the influence of informal organization on formal organization function. Returning to the original assumption that an underlying complex of factors. resulting in a "we" feeling substructs the formation of -17- regional organizations. we can still be satisfied. despite the criticism above. that there is no contradiction with Blau's statement. Formal organizations do develop within the context of social organizations. The informal operations of the organization develop within the formal of that organization. But in the analysis of social. formal. and in- formal organizations. it is. obviously. often imperative by necessity of definition to utilize different sets of theoretical concepts and methodological tools in order to justifiably anticipate appropriate measurement of the phenomenon in question. Clearly then. any analysis or conclusion derived from the study of one or more regional organiz- ations to be relevant must be supported by an appropriate theoretical and methodological framework. If. for example. the data can validly measure only the formal aspects of the organization. the interpretations must be confined to that area. If other hypotheses are generated. or speculative conclusions are presented, which exceed the boundaries of the study in question, they should be identified as such. The obvious limitations of this thesis. in regards to the above. are recognized. Every effort has been made to avoid conclusions which. because of those limitations. are not warranted. The Arab League, as a regional organization, is ideal for this type of analysis. In a sense the formal organization can be treated as a capsulized form of the total regional entity which if we can under- stand it more fully may contribute to a more general understanding of political and social behavior. -18- Summagy It is in the 20th century western political tradition to look to the international organization for an answer to the problems of conflict. The nature of the bi-polarity in the international system and the numerous regional involvements accentuate the importance of regional organizations. Problems of cooperation. integration and external threat have made the Middle East an especially interesting area of the world in this regard. Much of the literature and ideology concerning regionalism points to functional cooperation among nation-states as being essential to progress toward lasting peaceful solutions. Some of the most impor- tant factors in the Middle East are of an internal nature: Collective security. economic and social development. Still other issues are primarily external concerns: Israel. AfroeAsian solidarity. freedom of Arab peoples (e.g. Palestine). relations with the United Nations. The League of.Arab States. a regional organization very much a part of its social and cultural milieu reflects in its behavior the temper of the Middle East situation. For this reason an examination of the League as it relates to the process of integration in the Middle East is important. CHAPTER II HYPOTHESES AND DATA ANALYSIS Hypotheses Basic to the theory of regional organizations is the concept that Functional Integration. i.e. coordination and cooperation in internal affairs will result in the ability to transcend internal polit- ical problems and produce a solidarity capable of providing a unified front vis a vis external pressures. Therefore we might expect that the Arab League, if it is able to effect such cooperation in its internal affairs. will be able also to exhibit agreement of opinion and conformity of action among its membership in matters of an external nature. The first hypothesis says that an increase in integrative be- havger of an internal (i.e. regional) nature will be reflected in increased solidarity in regard to external issueg. Among the tasks which are internal (i.e. regional in nature) are military coordination and collective security measures. One may question whether cooperation in this issue area (i.e. defense measures) might distort what appears on the surface to be significant integrative be- havior of a Functional (i.e. non-military) nature. We have depended primarily on Haas' formulations and feel that this is adequate. Haas suggests that despite military coordination. in the absence of non-mil- itary avenues of collaboration. solidarity will decrease proportionally with decreasing external threat.18 18Haas. gp. g_i_t_._.. p. 102. - 20 - Therefore we can expect that if non-military (functionally Integrative) avenues of cooperation are developed. solidarity should not decrease with a decrease in external threat. We should. then. attempt to determine whether or not solidarity is maintained among the Arab League membership in matters of external importance exclusive of a dependence on collective security measures. Such a determination should provide a view of cooperative activity in non-military cooperative ventures as well as external solidarity during periods of relative international calm. Therefore our second hypothesis says that if integrative beha- ‘gigr of an internal. non-militagygcategogy (i.e. economic. social._cul- tural) declines. despite continuing and established military cooperation. solidarity on externaliissues will likewise decline in the absence of thg_pressure of external threat. Data Sources Because there has been much criticism of the Arab League which points to its failure to achieve peace in the Middle East we must be especially mindful that we are concerned here not with any final solu- tion but rather with the process of achieving a workable solution. Ernst Haas explains that the Arab League has not reached the point wherin it provides the parliamentary function which it must in order to provide the broad base of effectiveness for widespread integrative activity.19 19Ibid., p. 113. - 21 - We must then look more closely at Haas' suggestion that there are certain characteristics of cooperative behavior which are more indic- ative of the integrative process. According to Haas integrative be- havior: 1. Almost invariably expands to include an international or national governmental agency. 2. The nature of the task becomes more specific by reason of its being allocated to that agency.20 The data source must be compatible with this construct if we are to develop workable concepts. The topic of this thesis is confined to an examination of the League of Arab States. Surrounded as it is by myriad regional and world developments the problem of isolating events sufficiently specific to League concerns is. at first glance. staggering. It was the first task of this research to determine from what source the data should be derived and having done so to select those events which could be considered relevant. Having become aware of the importance of investigating the adequacy of data coverage. we decided to locate those sources which publish data on the Arab League.21i The gigglg.§g§t Journal (MEJ) was selected from a number of possible sources because it includes an adequate chronology of events data for the entire time period to be examined in this thesis and particularly for the Arab League activities. 2°Ib1d.. p. 96. ZlAaar. Edward E. 23 g;.. "Methodological Developments in the Quantification of Events Data". (Michigan State University: April. 1970). - 22 - Other sources were consulted in order to provide as adequate a data population base as possible for our data compilation. M. Khalil's two volume work The A;;b_$tates and the Arab League is a documentary record which specializes in the Arab League and as such is an excellent source of information. Both the New York Timesglgdex and R.W. MacDonald's work. which has been cited previously also provide additional sources of data important to the problem. It was decided that the MEJ. as it is used here. in conjunction with other sources. was of sufficient con- tent for the purposes of this thesis. Data CodingFProcedures All events listed in the data source were assigned according to their issue relatedness to the following categories: I. Internal Issues A. Economic. social. cultural developnent B. Collective security and military cooperation II. External Issues A. AfquAsian solidarity B. Relations with Israel C. Relations with the U,N. D. Freedom for all Arab peoples Qperationaliaing Conceptg The final task of this chapter will be to provide workable meanings for the terms used in the hypotheses such that the events data can be appropriately coded. - 23 - The term integration as it applies to the internal behavior re- ferred to in the first hypothesis is operationally defined as any event which fulfills the two criteria which Haas considers significant of the integrative process. They are the following: Internal events considered to be integrative must: A. expand to include an internal or national governmental &SOHCYI B. become more specific in task orientation. External issues are examined to determine whether or not they are indicative of solidarity among the Arab League membership. For the purposes of this thesis external behavior indicative of solidarity is an event which is one of the following: A. a statement of agreement; B. an act of cooperation: C. official League statement indicating member unanimity. §pppi§tical Procedure Frequency data which compares the effects of two variables and in which there are two groups on both variables is well suited to the phi coefficient. The phi coefficient can be computed to show the degree of the relationship»between the two variables. A chi-square can then be computed from the ppi_coefficient. The chi-square will establish whether variables are related. A significant chi square is interpreted as showing the relationship between the two variables. A level of significance of .05 is. in a two tailed test of this nature. well withir acceptable limits . - 2a - A contingency table is constructed from the data in this manner: The following formula is used to determine phi: 213;: AD - BC V (kl-Bf Fla-DY (AM?) (B+’D) The chi-square is then calculated as follows: chi2 = N phiz. where N is the sample number. Each datum event was analyzed in accordance with the criteria dis- cussed earlier and the results were recorded by frequency in Table I. The first hypothesis was designed to examine the relationship between integrative behavior of an internal nature and the solidarity factor as it applied to external issues. A contingency table derived from Table I was constructed 1n the following manner. The median frequency level was determined for Internal-Integrative behavior and for External~Solidarity events. In both cases 8 events was the median figure. A frequency of 1 through 8 was therefore considered to be low and 9 and above of high incidence. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF EVENTS DATA BY CATEGORY TABLE I. - 25 - zwgmmommmmmmmmmam—4-ma... sauna; [CUJlea go~::—oo_o_.—o—tpom_ooo— euqmo p l 3 p—¢>—-O\O\—-"\huO\DATChUNO\nIN\—-«hithétcw zmw—N—MJSmNMMQNNmm-‘ZNO: sine/:3 o 000 [IUJOJUI a o_.-:-o true we 3N poumwoa hum—w—msoo—ma—mmm—JNJQ :2r3-<:.s-—<3c:c>c>:rc:—-c>c>c>c>c: mopeeJJ QEJV Ham—JJNommom—mmommumoo SUOQIEN paigun goomoooo—ooooooooooooo OmJ’MM—s-J'NI-NN-NM—OOOOO g§c>c>euc>c>c>c>c>c>—-—-c>c>e:c>e:—-c>c>c>—- :eeas. HamMNMOJm—NN—monmm—NJN zooooooooooooooo—ooooo Aagaopnlos ueusvboa;v uogicJGaiu| OOOOOOOOJ’NOO—J-J’O—ONN [900113.803 a“ In .‘rtn om — Aiganoeg PUB ——O—OOOOI\NO—JNON\DNONO Aaealllw p—vaO—mm—armmxo——mdmm—m\om~ cgmsaaasasssa°-~Msmw~ mu 3. smmmmmsssaasas NS - Non-solidarity event Integrative event D 8 Di T - Total frequency N - Net total -26.. Thus: EXTERNAL EV LNTS l - 8 9 + 7—; :2 1o 1 11 2 m > U ._l 35 3‘. u 6 10 5 ll: 7 Calculation of the E; coefficient and chi-square: $36.0-“ ai zi = .539 ‘V’Z11) (10) (in) (7) 16786" 16378’ 212:.2909 ch12 = N Egg? = (21) (.2909) = 6.10 The results can therefore be considered as significant ( chi2 = 6.10; dfl: p .05) that internal integration and external solidarity are held to be in some relationship. It was thought after achieving this result that if there was a pos itix e correlation between the frequency of integrative-solidar ity behavior. that the same should hold true of the fmquency level of dis - integrative-non solidarity behavior. This would provide an addit ional test of our results since the relation of the two tests would in effect - 27 - provide a check of percentage changes in integrative and solidarity behavior. Again a contingency table was constructed from Table I by finding the median frequency values of dis integrative internal events and non- solidarity external events. :3 External-( non-sol idarity) P E C: 17 o 17 o :5 .2 8 __ 3 l 1+ I“ C L. 3 -5 20 1 Calculation of the m; coefficient and chi-square was as follows: Ehi.= 12_r 0 =_lZ. =_l2_ = -u61 V117) (4) (201(1) 1360 ~87 29;? = .2125 ch12 = N 29;? = (21) (.2125) = u.u6 Thus tne relationship is significant (91132 = 4&6: df l: p J6) betwee 1 disintegrative-internal and non solidarity-external even! 5 . The second hypothesis required that the relationship between fre- quency of integrative events of an internal non-military nature 1e compared with the frequency of external events exhibiting solidarity during those years where external threat was comparatively low. 1‘ he ..28 - periods of the three major conflicts with Israel -- l9h8. 1956. 1967 -- were therefore excluded. The contingency table was derived from‘Pable I using the median frequency of functionally integrative internal events and external events reflecting solidarity. N for this table was 18 because of the aforementioned exclusion of war years. External - Solidarity .§ __11:§ 9* U Q L 31 11 1 12 H .5 3? g 2 L: 6 .5 8 :2 13 5 phi_coefficient and chi-square were calculated as follows: E = 44-2 =_l_}_2__ = #2 = .613 V02) (6) (13) (5) Tao 38-41 2222 = 0376 211? = N 221? = (18) (.376) = 6.76 The results are significant (phi? = 6.76: df l: p .01) indicattng that there is a relationship between the level of internal Functional y inte- grative behavior reflecting solidarity for the given time periods. CHAPTER III RELEVANT DATA The following data is a complete summary of all actions insti- tuted By the membership of the league of Arab States. which appear in the data sources and which could be appropriately related to the analytical categories outlined in Chapter II. All elements of the data were taken from the chronology portion of the hihhig East Journal. Every issue published was examined. inclu- sively. beginning with the publication in the fall of 19“? and ending in the summer of 1967. Following is an explanation of the citations which appear in the data listing. I * Occurances within the League structure which reflect some element of non-integration or disintegration. ** Actions deliberately taken by some or all of the members outside the League framework. among themselves or in relation to foreign powers. ***Actions which have both an internal and external application. Any action. cited by one or more of the above. that holds partiCLlar significance will be evaluated in other sections of this'thesiS. as appropriate . £932 Sept. Oct. Dec. 12% Jan. Feb. tilt -30- Internal lst Cultural Conference convened. Conference of engineers held in Damascus. (2) Established special fund committee for Arab de- fense. 13* An investigating team was sent to Yemen prior to that state's admission to the League Council decided on with- olding economic priorities from any Arab state voting for Palestinian partition. External Political Committee of Arab League denounced U.N. Security Jouncil report on Palestine and further threatened military action. Arab League Council opened: (1) Palestine independence and/or military preparation. league fixes Arab boycott of Jewish goods and determines fur- ther economic action to combat Zionism. Council action on Palestine par- tition called for "immediate measures”. Arab military leaders conferred in Cairo. All members except‘fransjordan and Saudi Arabia agreed on need for guerilla recruiting centers. Decided to withold military action pending military inter- vention of U.S. or Britain. According to the treaty provisions with Britain: Egypt (1936). Iraq(l932) and.Transjordan (l9h6) are receiving arms from that government. League council recommended an "Arab Liberation Army" formed by all member states to "police" Palestine. The Council was advised by the military to forcefully oppose any U.N. force sent to Palestine. -31.. ighh Internal External Feb. League Political Committee recommended that no member sign any pact: military. economic. or other. with a foreign government prior to League approval. League established news agency. Mar. Because of U.S. policy change in regards to Palestine partition. E the League declares its wil- I lingness for a truce and period ! of trusteeship if Jews agree and reciprocate. Arab League Political Council insists on London Proposals: (1) Temporary trusteeship (2) Democratic government pro- viding minority rights for Jews. (3) Acceptance of Cyprus Jews in Arab countries. Apr. Arab League Political Committee to decide to send Arab army reg- ulars to Palestine at end of British mandate. The committee would remain in constant session in Cairo. May Arab League decided on reed for an Arab civil administration in Palestine at end of British mandate. Announcement of closing of Arab office in U.S. The seven Arab states reject U.N. appeal for cease fire. Jun League Council accepted cease fire. Jul League Council rejects 1.N. set- tlement proposal. League Council refused I'.N. appeal for a truce extension. ..32 Early part of year Mar. Apr. lgh§ Internal Jul. Aug. Sept. League announced forma- tion of an Arab govern- ment for Palestine. * Transjordan refused to rec- ognise any government set up within its government security zone. Dec. League supported India's Nehru on plan for Asian con- ference to discuss Dutch aggression. 1212 External League Council agreed to dis- cuss demilitarisation of Haifa and cease fire in holy places. Council rejected second cease. fire appeal of U.N. Arab League Political Council agreed on cease fire with Israel. League accepted the demilitar- isation of Jerusalem. League requests International Refugee Organization to assume equal responsibilities for Arabs and Jews. League came to some agreement with U.N. mediator on refugee problems. League Secretary General requested joint military action because of U.N. truce violation by Israel. Lebanon and Jordan had direct talks with Israel about armi- stice. Arab states requested U.N. to return Arab refugees to their homes a League members met with U.N. Conciliation Commission. All League members except Iraq agreed to continue exchange of views with U.N. commission. -33.. i222 Internal External Oct. League Political Commit— tee adopted formation of Collective Security and Com- mon Defense Council and ap- proved terms of Collective Security Pact. ** Syria agreed. through U.N. organ- isation. on armistice with Israel. Mar. * Jordan boycotted.League Council meeting but recon- sidered following day. Apr. *** All members of League ag- *** League Political Committee Action: reed to expel any member (l).Approved collective security making separate peace with pact. Israel and to empower (2) Agreed to settle internal League to take punitive disputes peacefully. measures. (3) Agreed that aggression against one would be considered aggression against all and met with armed force after notifying U.N. Security Council and Arab League CO‘mcj-la (4) Decided on establishment of Defense Council of toreign Ministers. (5) Establishment of permanent committee of Chiefs of Staff responsible to Economic Com— mittee. Way * Jordan left Council meeting over discussion of Jordan annexation of Arab Palestine. ‘ League Council held Jordan in violation of charter and debated expulsion. Jun. ' Egypt demanded Jordan's ex- pulsion. * Iraq declined collective se- curity pact because Jordan was not represented. 1250 Sept. Oct. .122 Jan. 1** tilt - 3a - Internal League Cultural Conference called for cultural rein- forcement through day to day usage of colloquial Arabic. tit Egypt declared desire to consider all League members in talks with Britain in Suez. League Political Committee met with all Prime Ministers of Arab states attending. Iraq suggested to League an alliance with the West. Syria submitted collective security expansion plan to include Saudi.Arabia. Lebanon and Yemen. Jordan supported it. *** *** External League Secretary General was invited by U.N. to attend sessions of General Assembly as an observer. Arab economists and other ex- perts in Cairo with U.N. to discuss social welfare and poverty. Political Committee rejected Libyan National Constitutional Assembly as a qualified sover- eign body. Political Committee declared intention to solidify rela- tions with U.N.. emphasizing the military and economic means necessary for realisation of Arab states' national aspir- ations and agreed to work for permanent settlement of refu- gees. $2.5; Apr. Jun. Aug. Sept. ass Oct. #** Nov. .122 Mar. Aug. Sept. *fi* -35- Internal External Lebanon proposed Arab Cus- League sent note to U.S.. Brit- toms Union to League Secre- ain. and U.N. Palestine Com- tariat. mittee asking for release of funds for refugees. Council met to implement League Secretary General and IntereArab Security Pact Jordanian king discussed pos- for joint military action. sible closer relations with Turkey. Further tightening of Israel boycott planned. Cultural Committee reconvened. Political Committee met. League reported a project study— (1) League supports Egypt's ing Palestinian mobilization restrictions on Suez and armament in Gaza Strip. shipping. (2) Accepted with reserva- tion U.N. committee invi- tation to Palestine talks between Arabs and Jews. (3) Accepted with reservation invitation to Japanese Peace Treaty talks. Syria suggested possible amendment to charter to in- clude all Muslim states. League established budget for refugee operation. League discussed further tight- ening of Israel boycott and blockade. League Council decided to remain "open" to facilitate reassembly without delay. Security Pact put into force after Iraq ratification. Political Committee: League Council established sep- (I) Supported Lebanon for arate office for Palestine vacant U.N. Security problem. Council seat 1251 Dec. 252 Jan. Mar. Apr. Jul. Aug. Sept. Internal (2) Approved plan to fa- cilitate refugee movement in Arab countries. League Council agreed on criminal extradition and attorney reciprocity among members and discussed: (1) Reorganization of Sec- retariat (2) Charter amendments (3) Cultural cooperation Political Committee dis— cussed ArabeAsian confer- ence agenda. League Communications Committee passed reso- lutions on PanqArab rail. highway. air. and sea transport. Appointed tech- nical committee. Made plans for unification of civil aviation laws. Libya membership appli- cation approved. Chiefs of Staff conferred to mobilize and coordin- ate Arab forces. First meeting of League Scientific Conference. External U.S. made overture to strengthen U.S.eArab League relations. League opposed Israel's entry into East Mediterranean region of N.H.O. League protested to U.N. es- tablishment of Israel boreipn Ministry in Jerusalem. League Secretary General de- nounced Libya-Britain friend- ship treaty made without noti- fying League. in violation of Arab League provisions. -37... 125} Internal External Sept. Political Committee meeting: (1) Allocated funds for Jordan National Guard. (2) Reaffirmed continued political efforts in support of Morocco and Tunisia. (3) Approved commercial ex- change measures. (4) Made provisions for transfer and investment of capital among members into immediate effect. (5) Allocated funds for Jor- danians near ”front line". Kuwait indicated intention to join League after "internal renaissance". A permanent military com- mission was established in Cairo. Oct. League Chambers of Commerce. Industry and Agriculture asked Secretariat to expedite for- mation of Economic Council. Dec. Economic Council established Political Committee discussed study of Economic Development U.N. request for direct Jordan- Bank. Israel peace talks. Ministers of Education agreed to standardize ed- ucation and emphasize Arab culture. $221 Jan. Iraq proposed Arab unifi- *** Political Committee rejected U.N. cation of Ministers of For- request for Israel-Jordan eign Affairs. War. Educa- direct talks. tion. Finance and Economy. Council dOCidOd on special League Council assured total fund for North Africa. support of Yemen in Aden Pro- tectorate dispute with iritain. .122 Jan. Feb. Ear. Apr. *Ihk #** *** -38 - Internal External Council approved Political committee decision to strengthen ArabeAsian econ- omic and cultural relations through diplomacy. Recom- mended inclusion of Latin America. Political Committee: (1) Referred Iraq unity proposal to members (2) Requested rapid ratifi- cation of financial and economic agreements. (3) Reaffirmed position against Israel. (A) Military Secretary of the League announced study to stop arms and food ship- ment from Cyprus to Is- rael. (5) Issued note on Arab In- ternational Police Or- ganization. (6) Cancelled separate per- manent Palestine commit- tee and transferred that jurisdiction to Pales- tine Affairs Administra- tione Technical committee set up to study use of Jordan waters. Economic Council recom- mended establishment of Arab fund for unified army. League Social Seminar opened. Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs position created. Permanent Communications Committee approved Arab Civil Aviation Council. 252 May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. -39... Internal Communication Committee made final plans for Arab Shipping Company. League Council approved financial support for re- ligious institute . Permanent committee of External Economic and Financial Af- fairs studied joint eco- nomic development. *** Supreme Economic Council: *** (l) Considered Mercantile Company. (2) Studied mineral deposits in Dead Sea. (3) Discussed unified Arab action against Israeli smuggling. Economic Experts Commit- tee recommended tariff re- ductions up to 50% for in- dustrial products customs duty 0 Arab Nationality.Agreement *** League Secretary General cabled U.N. calling attention to Mor- occan situation. Political Committee decided: (I) Support Arab position con- cerning Morocco in U.N. (2) Reject U.N. proposal to shift responsibility for refugees to Arab states. (3) Maintain peaceful means to Yemen-Aden dispute. Arab bureaus submitted resolution on Israel boycott. *** Secretariat urged France to of April. 195” signing star- change attitude toward North ted by members. Political Committee recom- African independence movement. Foreign Ministers discussed League MODdOd ‘t 01°51n8' Strength- posture in regards to the Nest. ening collective security and measures against Israel. - no - 1255 Jan. * Emergency conference of League Council over Iraq- Turkey alliance in Baghdad Pact. ‘ Iraq asserted to the League its (Iraq's) sovereign right to conclude military pacts outside of Arab Collective Security Pact. Egypt re- jected this assertion. Feb. * Egypt threatened to withdraw from the Collective Security Pact if Iraq signed Baghdad Pact. but stated its willing- ness to discuss within terms of Arab unity. Syria rejected Baghdad Pact. ** Egypt and Syria agreed to establish new Arab alliance excluding Iraq. Mar. ** Egypt. Syria. and Saudi Arabia announced proposal. with Yemen agreeing to join. for: (l) Unified armed force (2) Arab bank (3) Customs reduction (h) Joint capital investment in agriculture. industry. and transportation. (5) Establishment of a new Economic Council League Council announced plans to question U.N. on Israel's treatment of resident Arabs. Jun. ** Egypt. Syria. and Saudi Arabia announced continued steps in tripartite pact. Aug. Secretariat of League pro- posed closer coordination be- tween League Council and League General Assembly. 1251 Sept. Oct. Nov. Mar. Apr. Jun. Aug. - bl - Internal *** Foreign Ministers agreed *Itt 13* *1 *# *** on: (1) Assignment of technical committee for Jordan River development. (2) Arab League Flag (3) Refugee problems League Oil Committee opened industrial meeting. Political Committee decided to defend Oman against outside dangers. Tripartite members discussed problems of peace and war. Jordan refused to join dis- cussion in holdout for total Arab unity. Syria and Jordan met on Jordan River dispute with Israel. External Political Committee focused on agenda for U.N. General Assembly. League ignored British note challenging sovereign right of Oman to apply for League ad- mission. Egypt. Saudi Arabia. and "* League approached by RIF F leader Yemen signed five-year military alliance. Egypt. Syria. Jordan. Saudi Arabia. Iran and Lebanon joined in capital invest- ment in potash company through Arab bank. to economically. politically. and culturally boycott Trance in support of North African independence. League agreed to vote on Egyptian nationalization of Suez. Iraq and Lebanon indicated support. Economic Experts Committee cited need for complete Arab economic unity. - 42 - ifljé Internal Aug. *** Political Committee issued support of Egypt in Suez and declared all for one including any necessary military action. Oct. League reaffirmed support of Egypt. NOV. *IIHII .1251 Feb. Aug. * League Secretary General *** met with Jordanian Foreign Mini-Stare Sept. *Iht Nov. Announced in Cairo: #0 Asian and African countries invited to AfrOQAsian Soli- darity Conference in.Dec. League approves new budget. Dec. External League agreed to act indepen- dently of U.N. Security Council against France. Britain. and Israel (re: Collective Security Pact Article #2) League forbade Arab air lanes to Air France. League Secretary General encour- aged Arab-West (i.e. U.S.) rela- tions on basis of Eisenhower talks with Saudi Arabia. League agreed to ask U.I. Se- curity Council action on British suppression in Oman. (lis- cussion was delayed. waiting for Iraqi.and Syrian approval). Ten Arab states call for Security Council on Britain-Oman question. Arab Confederation of Labor threatened action if U... moved against Syria. League Secretary General warned the West against interference in Middle East or North Africa. League blacklisted British tanker for violation of Israel boycott. me Jan. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 1.222 Jan. Feb. Mar. *** *‘ki ¥** *1. -u3- Internal League consulted members ** regarding joint effort to dissuade Ghana in economic and diplomatic relations with Israel. Political Committee decided to contact member U.N. dele- gates to raise Oman question in General Assembly. Tunisia and Worocco join Arab League. League Council postponed budget for Algerian nation- alists because of absence of Tunisia. League attempted to mediate UAR-Tunisia dispute: rejected Tunisia's accuation of UAR domination of the League, Tunisia broke diplomatic re- lations with UAR. Possible Aid-East Common Market rumored. Common Market possibility discussed in Cairo. League Economic Council recommended Arab ownership of oil pipelines Egypt made public a possible UAR-Iebanon bed- eration similar to that of UAR-Yemen. External Iraq stressed U.S. support in development of Baghdad Pact. League Secretary General con- ferred with U.N. Secretary General. League Secretary General declared Jewish migration to Israel greatest peril since Israel ffl'fld e 1252 Apr. * g a: t at It"?! Aug. * Sept. *** - 44 - Internal League Secretary General announced "no response” from Iraq in regards to the League Political meeting in April. UAR urged action by League against communism in Iraq. League non-commital regarding the UAR-Iraq dispute on com- munism. Political Committee started bargaining over UAR—Iraq air space violation accu- sation. Iraq shunned oil confer- ence because of UAR "hostile attitude". Oil conference insisted on need to correct oil exploit- ation by gaining fair share for Arab states. Also pro- posed bank for oil develop- ment. Tunisia, Iraq. and Jordan absented League Council inauguration of UAR citizen as Assistant Secretary Gen- eral for military affairs. League Council of Foreign Ministers supported Algerian independence struggle. UAR and Jordan disagree- ment blocks League mention of proposed Palestinian gové ernment and army. League meeting at Casa- blanca reported as ram- pant with disagreement. External Political, financial, and economic councils reported that LAR car— ried out League decisiors for military units among Palestin- ians - a recognition of sepa- rate existence of Palestine. League Economic Committee banned actors With Zionist connections or sympathies. League with approval of polit- ical committee amended U.N. sug- gestion for international organ- ization to supervise and invest Arab property revenue for refugee programs. .1252 Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. War. Apr. *** iii *** tilt ##Ik *** #** - 45 - Internal Economic Council met to coordinate economic and social policies of Arab states. League Council allocated funds for Algeria. Arab Chambers of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry held in Kuwait (for the first time in the Persian Gulf emirate). Iraq at- tended! Secretary General held con- ference regarding anti-Jew outbreaks in Arab countries. Petroleum Conference in- vited South American countries. League Council postponed because Palestine problem created difficulty with the agenda. League shelved oil revenue reserve because of its rejection by Saudi Arabia. Economic council established plans for an Arab pipeline Company. Lebanon rejected League recommendation of economic boycott of France. External Spain reassured the League of their desire for good relations with the Arab countries. Israel Boycott Office of the League blacklisted British vessel for violation of regulations. League Council met: (1) Priority given to Syria- Israel border dispute. (2) Considered diversion of Jor- dan River before water reaches Israel. League warned Israel that inter- ference with the Jordan River would result in war. League denounced French atomic testing in the Sahara. -46- 12§0 Internal External Apr. **‘ League reported a UAR. Jordan. and Saudi Arabia suggestion of economic boy- cott to freeze French assets. * Morocco and Lebanon oppose the boycott plan. Arab unions begin shipping boy- cott of U.S. ships in retaliation of’New York picketing. Jun. *** Boycott conference attended by all Arab countries. Jul. * League requested members ban Iran's attendance at oil conference because of Iran's recognition of Israel. An Iran-Israel conspiracy is suspected . League reported an agri- cultural lag as opposed to industrial and economic progress a League Secretariat held an urgent conference on Iran's recognition of Is- rael. Aug. * Arab Foreign Ministers con- League Council encouraged Arab ferred on Palestine question. volunteers in Algerian war. Tunisia absent. Urged U.N. Assembly to push Algerian independence. Foreign dinisters urged cessation of press and radio campaigns among Arab states which enhance friction. Encouraged working for Arab solidarity and cooperation. * League reported Jordanian opposition to discussion of Palestine. Failed to pro- vide solution . 1% Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. - 47 - internal *** Economic Council advised League Council to act for good of all combined re: Palestine, without consul- ting individual countries involved. League con— curred. *** League session ended with: (1) Extension of refugee open passports l to 2 years. (2) Intention to stop West German loan to Israel. (3) League agreement signed with Arab postal author- ity. Secretary General asserted priority of Algerian ques- tion for General Assembly. *** Petroleum Congress. absent. (1) Continued coordination (2) Asked oil companies to consult producing states before a price change. League sub-committee focus on oil question and rela- ted industry. *** Economic Council estab- lished following commit- tees: 1 Financial g2 Economic 3 Petroleum (h- Israel Boycott ( 5) Commun icat ions Tunisia External Executive Committee of the Afro- Asian Solidarity Conference resolved: . (l) Denounce NATO and SLATO mem- bers interfering in liber- ation movements. (2) Advocate recognition of Algerian provisional govern- ment. (3) Ask all nations to re-examine Israel and its role "in ser- ving imperialism" -- to judge on facts rather thar Zionist propaganda- League and U.N. concluded "agree- ment of cooperation": also League status as a regional organization made official. Jan. Feb. Mar. May *** tit -ua- Internal Economic Council also called for strong economic measures against France for their role in Algeria. Tunisia absent from Foreign Ministers' Conference. Reported statistics showed new petroleum record. Foreign Ministers reported as deciding that Iraq handle the problem of Israel-Iran relations. Iraq and Jordan suggested high-level hand- ling within League Council. League Communications Com- mittee announced road pro- ject and Aqaba ferry to bypass Israel. UAR suggested unified economic system and common market. External Foreign Ministers resolved: (1) Arab delegate to U.N. to cooperate with AfrOnAsian bloc support of U.N. reso- 1ution on Algeria. Increase financial and material aid to AlgeriA. (3) Permission for Arab volun- teers to Algeria. (4) Encourage support of others for Algeria. (5) Recognise Algerian integrity. (6) Support Algerian offer to France for negotiations for self-determination. (7) Reconsider economic and political relations with France if war continued. (2) Secretary General called meeting on Palestine and reported Israeli atomic test attempts. Political Committee agreed to approach U.N. concerning pro- perty rights of Palestinian refugees in Israel. is; Jun. Jul. Aug. Sept. aux:- 4:9- Internal External Economic Council met with *** Saudi Arabia assured members of observers from neighboring countries. Agenda included: (1) UAR proposed economic union (2) Common market (3) Trade restrictions and tariffs (h) Exemption of Arab companies from local national regulations (5) Iraq's proposal for economic cooperation. Supreme Council of Col- lective Security Pact rumored to have considered joint Arab military com- mand. Economic Councils referred decision on UAR and Iraq economic proposals to League Council. an" Collective Security Pact of use of oil as a political weapon against abuse of Arabs in Palestine. Sought support of all. Collective Security meeting agreed on Jordan.River diver- sion measures. Arab League and W.H.O cooper- ation announced in New York. Arab Chambers of Commerce. Agri- culture and Industry tour Africa : (1) Expand trade relations (2) Offer technical assistance. Secretary General signed W.H.O. agreement. ***League joined New York Worlds Secretary General assembled more experts on Arab pipe- line plans. League Council referred de- cision of common market and economic relations to Economic Council. Iraq absent. Secretary General announced world representation of Petroleum Congress to dis- cuss economic and technical problems of oil market. Fair. League Council planned counter moves against Zionism. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. *IMI *** - 50 - Internal Oil Congress stressed: (1) Arab involvement in oil company finances and management. (2) Israel oil ban. (3) Support Algeria by means of oil resources. Middle East Airline in- crease reported. Communications Committee discussed road. rail. air and sea projects. *** League Secretary General discussed Jordan River diversion effort against Israel with Jordan. Jordan asked heads of state to Council meeting. First Arab Medical Union planned an Arab model of w.H.O. UAR urged Arab privacy at next Council meeting. Israel Boycott Conference held in secret. Iraq absent. Lebanon warned League of USSR price threat in oil market. League Council determined to support the League in face of the proposal by Iraq that Syria hold all Arab meetings outside the League framework. External UAR. Libya. Tunisia. and Morocco boycott African Congress to protest failure to unite Algeria. League Council discussed emer- gency meeting on Jordan iiver- Israel problem. League Council recommended joint diplomatic efforts with Germany to prevent Israel from joining the European Common Market. Arab Information Conference announced propaganda acceler- ation for Arab causes 1: Africa and Asia. is; Apr. May Jun. Aug. Sept. ** Iii - 51 - Internal Secretary General reported to have probed members to try to settle the "Arab atmosphere". Lebanon and Morocco offer to mediate UAR-Saudi Arabia- Jordan tensions. Council "secretly resolved" to urge all members to intervene to improve relations. Economic Council urged ef- forts to strengthen economic ties among members. Iraq absent. UAR. Syria. Jordan. Morocco and Kuwait delegates to Economic Council signed 10-year agreement of econ- omic unity. including Open travel. free capital trans- fer. and reciprocal customs exemptions. Algeria joined Arab League. Syria complained to League Council of UAR interference. and accused UAR of secret talks with US to "liquidate the Palestine question". Iraq was absent. UAR walked out. Secretary General (a UAR citizen) announced term-end retirement but Council urged reconsideration and voted a 5-year re-election. Secretary General reported a League financial crisis in the face of UAR threat to stop payment of dues (25% of total). UAR announced willingness for talks outside of League structure. External Petroleum Congress invitations rejected by US. accepted by USSR. Arab Palestine Committee recon- sidered relations with U.N. be- cause of US rocket sale ;o Israel. .1162 Nov. l2é2 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. * ** fit. - 52 - Internal External Syria suggested to Iraq *** Arab Chamber of Commerce planned that League Council mediate Yemen problem. Tunisia and Lebanon agreed. Iraq in favor. but at a later date. Kuwait Emergency Force Committee requested re- duction of forces in report to League Secretary General. League members refused to ** provide replacements for Kuwait force. League required to ask for members' late dues. League members started Kuwait troop withdrawal. League announced dissolve- ment of Kuwait Force on basis of improvement of order situation. Iraq attended League meet- ing as an observer. UAR declared unity of aims With I?“ 0 Iraq announced that the meeting with UAR would result in basis for Arab unity. UAR ended League boycott. Syria proposed a UAR-Syria- Iraq Federal Union. League opened with all present to discuss aid to Oman. and boycott progress. League approved budget. meeting with E.C.M. chamber through League Secretariat arrangements. Syrian Israel Boycott offiice asserted its independence of League Secretariat because of "Egyptianisation" of League . .1222 Apr. May. Jun. Jul. Sept. Oct. - 53 - Internal ** UARkIraq-Syria agreement on constitutional charter for unity with plans for Sept . plebecite . Oil Experts opened con- ference. ' UAR and League ratified economic unity agreement. * Lebanon announced that the projected Arab Repub- lic was abandoned because of plots. with suspected pro-Nasir backing in Syria and Iraq. Syria and Iraq urged UAR to confer over differences obstructing formation of Arab‘Republic. Arab Petroleum Workers Federation urged legis- lation for uniform labor and social insurance standards. League-sponsored mission discussed with Lebanon preparations for Petro- leum Congress. League Secretariat con- vened Joint Arab Defense Council over Jordan River plans. First Economic Develop- ment Planning Conference stressed need for: (1) Economic planning (2) Ultimate Arab unity (3) Assistance to Yemen League requested fighting halt on AlgeriaeMorocco border: appointed a mediation committee. External *** Political Committee discussed Israel's relations with noneArab Middle East countries; resolved to confirm Palestinian Arabs' rights to exercise self-deter- mination and national rights. Also referred Iraq proposal on Palestine to Foreign Ministers meeting. Boycott Offices recommend measures against non-cooperating foreign companies. 1&2 Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. -514- Internal *** Petroleum Congress em- phasised: (1) Companies initiate positive action or face possible future diffi- C‘llties e (2) Reiteration of Israel oil ban. (3) E.C.M. warned against accepting Israel in my way. (4) Training oil special- ists. (5) Project on status of Arab oil workers. *** Jordan suggested common flag. League Economic Mission toured to implement pro- gflss 0 Syria and Iraq agreed to a United Arab Air Company. Shipping Company. and Oil Tanker Company. and sug- gested all members share capital investment in Tanker Company. First Conference of Arab Women University Graduates called for: (l) Emancipation. (2) Participation of women in political. social. and economic affairs. (3) Job opportunities. External Economic Council warned Britain of "economic consequences" of boycott interference: proposed common market project. League conferred on "British aggression" against Yemen. IE May Jun. Aug. Sept. Dec. tit -55.. Internal Commercial Congress agenda included: (1) "Arabisation" of technical terms in communications. (2) Unified road and rail St‘m‘rds e (3) Creation of a civil aviation council. Arab Council for Econ- omic Unity inaugurated. Oil Expert Committee urged ratification of 1959 coordination agreement signed only by Jordan and Saudi.Arabia. Arab heads of state dis- cussed: (1) Jordan River diversion (2) Arab.Developnent Bank (3) ”Arab Unity” Secretary General held private conference with Saudi Arabia on Yemen problem. Summit meeting called for. in closing: (1) Removal of bases in Aden and Cyprus (2) Council on peaceful use of atomic energy. Secretary General disclosed Arab readiness for Makheiba Dam construction bids. Arab Pharmeceutical Con- ference urged establish- ment of permanent office. External *** Chiefs of Staff outlined Arab defense plans against Israel and suggested strength increase and provisions for forces in Syria. Jordan. and Lebanon. Lebanon and Syria objected to the report. Permanent Information Commit- tee spoke for large scale "enlightenment" campaign on a worlddwide scale concerning Palestinian liberation. *** Economic Council dealt with: (1) Israel boycott office need to prevent Iranian oil from reaching Israel. Dec. Jan. Mar. Apr. Jun. Sept. *## nu: Internal Oil Congress called a shipping halt of oil to countries posing an economic threat to Arab interests. Oil Expert Committee met on: (1) Research Institute (2) Petroleum Company (3) Unified Petroleum laws. Solidarity Pact signed to stop interqArab propaganda campaign: included pledges: United Arab participation in Palestine. international law. codes. and ethics. discour- age rebels in Arab states. air support for Jordan River diversion. External (2) Proposal on Economic Develop- ment -Capital Investment ram. (3) Formation of Arab block within I.M.P. and World Bank. (h) Permanent office to observe European economic develop- ments. (5) Joint fund for economic aid to Africa and Asia. Arab League heads announced agreement on measures against foreign countries establishing new relations with Israel or assisting Israeli military efforts. Also considered warning west Germany against formal ties uith Israel. Nepal agreed to Arab League of- fice in that country. Arab Chiefs discussed: (1) Jordan River diversion (2) Palestine (3) Political. military and economic development (b) Information Center Fund for African. Asian and Latin American operations (5) Appeal for India-Pakistan cease fire. I995 Nov. 226 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jul. Oct. - 57 - Internal *** Arab Lawyers Conference: (1) Supported Palestine Liberation Organis- ation (2) Denounced Britain in Southern Arabia (3) Called for Arab unity. Arab chiefs of state sent representatives to con- ference. Industrial development conference held in Kuwait. Arab‘rourist Conference met. Arab Medical Conference held. Arab Pharmaceutical Con- ference held. Arab Education and Econ- omic Planning ministers held conference. Arab Chemistry conference held a Oil Expert Committee rat- ified unified petroleum laws. * UAR asked for postponement of Summit Conference. Arab Engineers Association studied possible unified Arab "power grid”. * Cairo press accused Jordan. Saudi Arabia of plotting with US C.I.A. External Arab Ministers denounced US arms sale to Israel. Foreign Ministers conference held to discuss: (1) Jordan River problem (2) West Germany. liéé Nov. Dec. m Feb. Mar. Apr. Jun . Aug. -58- Internal Economic Unity Council resolved to free some commodities from trade restrictions. Arab Telecommunications Union conference had only partial attendance. League Defense Council planned urgent meeting for December. Civil.Aviation Conference held with only partial attendance. Tourist and Trade con- ference discussed fare reduct ions on inter-Arab flights. Petroleum Conference had only partial attendance. Arab Foreign Ministers conferred . and issued a statement describing talks as characterised by a "spirit of Arab sol- idarity". and that their "resolutions were unam- imous". External Boycott conference banned Ford and Coca Cola. League Secretary General failed to come to an agreement with west Germany on a formula to resume diplomatic relations. Israel Boycott Conference postponed. Arab League announced boycott of all US.British goods and companies. Arab Ministers of Oil and Finance agreed to gradual nationalization of US and British oil companies. - 59 - 12§z Internal External Aug. * Arab chiefs of state met: (1) Established a fund to aid Jordan and UAR (2) Decided that the indi- vidual Arab states would be at liberty to separately handle oil embargos and other economic matters. CHAPIER IV ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS Our statistical analysis has indicated that a relationship exists between the capacity to function internally and the ability of the Arab League membership to deal effectively with external matters. “This analysis has also suggested that the failure to establish Iunctionally integrative avenues of cooperation has. in its own right. a particular influence on the ability to achieve coordinated action in external affairs. Let us now turn to the actual events for a closer look at the specific problems of the Arab League. It is our hope here to be able to provide a cogent outline of the process of Middle East affairs as they pertain to the League from 1947 to 1967. It is not our pur- pose. in the ensuing commentary. to take sides in the various issues. Any attempt at scientific investigation must strive for objectivity. But it is important to note that this is a study of the Arab League and as such events should be examined within the framework of the Arab view. Only in this way can we expect to achieve a comprehensive perspective of our topic. Perhaps the most useful way to do this is in terms of associ- ating specific internal issues with the external problems which are closely related to them. Obviously it is useful to begin with the Arab countries' behavior toward Israel. The Arab League itself owes its existence. at least in part. to Arab efforts to halt the progress of Zionism since post World -51- War 1. Even earlier the British had by the Balfour Declaration declared themselves in support of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. 'Phe establishment of Israel in l9U8 was achieved by these Zionist efforts but with the support of much of the Western world which was greatly moved by the atrocities committed against the Jews of Europe during the second World War. 'fo the noneArab world these cir- cumstances might appear to present an irrefutable argument - the historical fact that Israel Egg been established. supported by the moral and ethical concerns generated by the barbarity of Hitler. The Arab view. however. is quite different. stemming as it does from the facts of having been an integral part of these developments with con- crete personal as well as national interests at stake. Thus the Arab outlook sees the establishment of Israel as a product of a prolonged violent struggle in which almost three quarters of a million Arabs were deprived of their Palestinian homeland. there is and has been a fear. not without justification. that the intent of Israel is to achieve further expansion by armed ferce. An examination of the events of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-19h9 shows clearly that Arab efforts to coordinate military and collective security measures were specifically designed to counteract Israel's behavior in Palestine. Obviously the Arab countries failed in their attempts to prevent the establishment of the state of Israel. None— theless they have continued to refuse to recognize its official exist- ence more. I think. as a symbol of unified Arab resistance than a product of international naivete. -52- In general an examination of events indicates that the Arab countries have worked. within the framework of the Arab League. coopera- tively if not effectively. against Israeli efforts in the Middle East. In this regard we can observe throughout the events of the period 19h?- 1967 extensive economic sanctions coordinated against Israel by tre Arab League. Foreign economic interests such as the Coca Cola company have also been the target of such action. A broad application of this approach has resulted in diverse actions such as the Egyptian denial to Israel of access to the Suez. the boycott of international meetings attended by Israel and demands to the United Nations for rectification of grievances through the establishment of international regulation of Jerusalem. There is no doubt that military cooperation and collective security action have as primary motivation the containment of Israel. The 1950 Collective Security Pact and the Joint Arab Command formed in 1964 have survived. for all practical purposes. as a consensus action on the part of the League membership. However. it is highly improb- able that we can infer from this that the Arab countries feel suf- ficiently secure in their defensive posture. Although our events data do not include the 1967 War with Israel and the ensuing period it is safe to conclude in light of the results of that war and th( contemporary situation that the Arab countries are well aware of Western support for Israel and the consequences of that circumstarce. The importance of the Middle East situation has a direct impact in world affairs. This impact is most certainly of primary sign I- icance to the neutralist Afroquian bloc. We examined as a specific category in our data. events relating to this problem. Intimately - 63 - related to this issue is the Arab League posture in terms of freedom for all Arab peoples and League activities with the United Nations. Events indicate quite clearly that the Arab League has effect- ively promoted a position of independence for all Arab areas in the Widdle East. There is direct encouragement on the part of the League for these areas to look to the League for countenance and reassurance in support of nationalist actions. The League has made direct approaches to France and Britain on behalf of Libya. Tunisia and independent sheikdoms. The League has also acted through international diplomacy to exert pressures on behalf of other Arabs. In the United Nations the Arab League has attempted to gain support for nonaArab members of the AfquAsian bloc powers aimed at achieving solidarity among neutralist powers. Actions of this type are obviously not without self interest. A reasonable clear pattern of consistency in these related issues points to Arab attempts at strengthening their own position of regional inde- pendence. No doubt the League states have not refused assistance from the Soviet Union but apparently not at the expense'of their own free- dom and independence. Recent events in the Middle East and increased Soviet support in military operations will prove of great interest in the future. Despite this the Arab League has been consistent in its fight for the independence of Arabs. A review of our events data produced only one incident to the contrary -- Iraq's opposition in 1961 to Kuwait's move for independence. A remarkable example of this contin- uity of action is found in the pattern of relations between Egypt and -5L... Iraq during the period of 1955-1960 when these two countries were con- tinually at odds. Nevertheless both powers unfailingly supported the Algerian struggle. 'Phis posture of independence and support of neutrality to which the Arab League is so dedicated is best observed in League behavior in the United Nations. Arab League relations with the United Nations are apparently part of the overall philosophy and intentions of the Arab states. At the core of Arab concerns is the problem of dealing w.th Israel and clearly the League seeks the support of the neutralist blocs in its efforts to achieve significant action against Israel. This effort includes attempts to win the support for economic boycott measures. In turn the Arab League has given its support to various measures of the AfroeAsian bloc countries. It is most interesting that this policy has encouraged the League to adopt the role of mediator in several disputes. Among these are the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. the Korean conflict in 1951. and Cyprus in 1955. In December of 1952 an AfquAsian bloc meeting was held in Cairo on the North Africa situation in which several delegates were nonqArab. On several occasions the League Council called for increased relations on the part of the membership among the AfquAsian bloc countries. These efforts have not often been successful since it appears that the Arab countries feel a greater concern for the dif- ficulties constantly confronting them at home. It must be admitted. however.that regional cooperation in Functionally integrative areas often detracts from effective ..65 - cooperation elsewhere. The overshadowing priority of the situation with Israel is apparently a universal distraction. Because of this the League has not been able to establish effective relations with the United Nations. Although a number of economic. social and cultural projects have been developed. there is apparently a strong desire on the part of the Arab League membership to protect individual nation sovereignty. Strong divergent internal economic policies have often acted to prevent significant gains in these areas of endeavor. It would seem that a great deal of the difficulty among the Arab countries in establishing and fortifying Functionally integrative activity stems from this combination of circumstances. Indeed the one fact of regional coopera- tion - established collective security measures - depends so heavily on the issue of the external threat of Israel. common to all the membership. that its significance is severely challenged as a valid indicator of the ability of.Arab nations to achieve integrative behavior. One of the declared major purposes of the Arab League is runctional integration. Arab member countries. according to the Arab League Pact. are expected to encourage cooperation in economic. social and cultural affairs. This aim has not been altogether successful. Basically this has been a result. as before. of the inability to provide non—political solutions for these problems. The League. however. has not been without its successes. The Arab League has been a major force in designing cultural. educational and social activity through the creation of various agencies which are responsible for developing improvement programs. Examples of -66- these are the several measures directed to these problems in the areas of literature. science and art exchange programs. dissemination of Arab culture through libraries and museums. and various coordinated social programs such as public health and job training. Cooperation in these areas has led also Arab League association with world-wide organizations: a notable relationship of this sort is to be found in Arab activities with the World Health Organization and the International Labor Organiza- tion. Perhaps the least difficult area of cooperation is in the field of culture. Arab Cultural Conferences were held in 1947. 1957. 1959. and 1963. The results of these efforts provided for en- couraging developments in teaching. law. dentistry. medicine and many other areas which have direct impact on Arab life. It is this type of expensive "spill-over" activity which is so obviously lacking in the other areas of behavior we have examined. Iinally. let us point out what happened in the area of economic development. Proposals for economic development programs appear in our events data as early as 1952. In 1953 the League began a study of the finances and economic structure of the Middle East in cooperation with the world Bank. ~It was not until 195?. however. that the Arab Development Bank was established. Its purpose is to provide support for individual and cooperative projects aimed at expanding economic development. It is especially noteworthy since this was achieved in cooperation with world-wide institutions. namely the aforementioned World Bank. the International Finance Corporation and the International Development.Association. The success of this operation is. however. debatable. As .3 -67- consistently the case other considerations have taken precedence and Arab leaders have not followed through with needed support. The events data show little activity following 1958 which could be considered of specific relevance. 'fhis is most disappointing in light of the United Nations willingness to coordinate further’development on a regional basis. Another aspect of this topic is the Arab Common Market. The League Economic Council has not been excluded from political pressures. Until 1960 representatives of that body came only from member countries adhering to the 1950 treaty. The effect of this political relation has limited the Council to questions of boycotts of Israel and other economic sanctions against western countries. Efforts at achieving a basis for common market activity hinge on the ability to provide a regional market and the existing economic structure does not provide for coordination of this type. Again and again our events data reflect the fact that the needs of the individual economic Arab States are oriented to markets outside of the Middle East. Thus the political implications of regional cooperation result in a failure to achieve progress. Ultimately an Arab Common Market is weighed in terms of questions of national economic independence and sovereignty. Although a great deal of tariff and customs regulation has been achieved in conjunction with communications and transporta- tion. measures of the problem cannot be thought of exclusive of a movement towards more central regulation. It is this mixture of Functionally integrative activity with political considerations viewed by the Arab states in light of the resistance to federal government that hampers regional progress in these matters. -68- Conclusions In this thesis. we have found statistically significant re- lationships between the Arab countries' ability (and the lack of it) to function effectively internally. We have also found a significant statistical relationship in their abilities to coordinate action exter- nally. A close examination of the events themselves supported this contention. The overriding issue is almost invariably Israel. The Arab states are certainly hampered by their economic idiosyncrasies as well as intense nationalism. But the real issue is that the war with Israel is not over: it has been going on since the creation of that state and probably the Arabs will continue to do the same for some time to come. 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