A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS CONCERNING
THE INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC SAFETY
ELEMENTS WITHIN THE USAF

Thesis for the Degree of M. S.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
TIMM GRAY ENGH
1969

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS
CONCERNING THE INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC

SAFETY ELEMENTS WITHIN THE USAF

BY

Timm Gray Engh

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

School of Police Administration and Public Safety

1969

ABSTRACT
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS
CONCERNING THE INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC

SAFETY ELEMENTS WITHIN THE USAF

I by

Timm Gray Engh

Integration within the public safety elements of
small communities has attracted the attention of municipal
administrators since the early history of mankind. This
paper is concerned with problems found to exist within
five separate public safety elements of the United States
Air Force. These agencies were found to be working at
cross-purposes with each other, while being concerned
with a common problem: The prevention of, and protection
from, loss of life and property in the U. S. Air Force.

To meet the challenge of this dual problem in a
more effective manner is the basic premise of this research.

A review of the literature available within the
field of public safety integration revealed three models
which have effectively met this challenge: police-fire
integration, internal police coordination and cooperation,
and thirdly, the integrated industrial security program
used by private industry. Arguments for and against these

models are discussed.

Timm G. Hngh

The present organization and responsibilities oi
five U.S. Air Force agencies are explored: Security
Police, Disaster Control, Fire Department, Ground Safety
Division, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The activity
of these agencies was investigated at four specifically
selected Air ForCe installations. Public safety admin-
istrators were interviewed, reports analyzed, and obser-
vations were made of a number of public safety incidents
at all four installations.

A series of organizational changes are proposed
which could eliminate or limit the problems found as a
result of the library research and the field study. The
models drawn from these changes resulted in a program of
integration for the U.S. Air Force public safety elements.
This program consists of:

First, the administrative designation of the senior
public safety administrator as Director of Public Safety;

Second, the administrative integration of all five
staff agencies beginning at Department of the Air Force
level and programmed to the smallest installation;

Third, the cross-training of officers and senior
non-commissioned officers into the various functions; and,

Fourth, the complete integration of all five agen-
cies under one Director of Public Safety throughout the

United States Air Force.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS
CONCERNING THE INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC

SAFETY ELEMENTS WITHIN THE USAF

BY

Timm Gray Engh

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

School of Police Administration and Public Safety

1969

Approved:

 

 

PREFACE

This paper concerns the integration of the
public safety elements of the United States Air Force. I
would be remiss if those dedicated officers and supervisors
at the four installations visited in the course of this
research were not memtioned. All of these individuals,
only they know who they are, helped this project by willingly
giving of time and talent. This paper is dedicated to those
men and the coming generation of professional United States
Air Force public safety supervisors. In their hands lies
the proof of this paper.

I wish to express my sincere thanks to the United
States Air Force for supporting me these last four years.
Without the scholarship this paper would never have been
written. I firmly believe that the best scholarship program
in the world exists within the United States Air Force.

Finally, I want to express my sincere appreciation
to my wife and family for putting up, for many years, with

the work necessary for this education.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . 3
Definitions . .w. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1O
Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Plan of Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

II. HISTORY OF INTEGRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Vigiles of Ancient Rome . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The Middle Ages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

The Peelian Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

The Age of Experimentation . . . . . . . . . 31
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

III. THE POLICE-FIRE INTEGRATION CONCEPT . . . . . . 42
Compatability of Firemen and Policemen . . . 43

Types of Integrated Departments . . . . . . . 47

The Small Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Arguments in Favor of Integration . . . . . . 52
Arguments in Disagreement with Integration . 56

Cost Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

IV. INTERNAL POLICE CONSOLIDATION . . . . . . . . . 72
Metropolitan Municipal Government . . . . . . 73

Contract Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . 80

iv
CHAPTER PAGE
Other Consolidation Arrangements . . . . . . 83
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
V. THE INTEGRATED INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MODEL . . . 90
The Concept and Literature . . . . . . . . . 90
Evaluation . .~. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . 99
VI. PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES AIR
FORCE PUBLIC SAFETY ELEMENTS . . . . . . . . 102
General Organizational Philosophy . . . . . . 102
Security Police Organization . . . . . . . . 110
Fire Department Organization . . . . . . . . 118
Organization of other Public Safety Elements. 124
Grounds For Public Safety-~Or Not? . . . . . 132
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Present Organization Expanded . . . . . . . . 152
Formal Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Complete Integration of All Elements . . . . 168
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
VIII.I CONCLUSIONS AND A PROGRAM FOR ACTION . . . . . 175
BIBLIOGRAPHY . .'. . . . . . . . . . . . .’. . . . . . . 183
APPENDIX A: MUNICIPALITIES WITH INTEGRATED POLICE-FIRE
SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

APPENDIX B: CITIES ABANDONING POLICE-FIRE INTEGRATION . 196

V

CHAPTER PAGE
APPENDIX C: RESPONSIBILITIES OF A BASE COMMANDER . . . 197
APPENDIX D: RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMANDER'S FIRE

PROTECTION COUNCIL . . . . . . . . . . . 199

TABLE

1.
2.

LIST OF TABLES

Security Police Activities 1968 . . . . . . . . .
Fire Department Incidents 1968 . . . . . . . . .

Comparison Between Firemen and Security Policemen

PAGE
116
123

148

LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
1. Wing/Group Organization Structure Single Wing/
Group Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

2. Organizational Structure Air Base Wing/Group . . 107

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

"MAYDAY--MAYDAY--MAYDAY, THIS IS AIR FORCE 1059
TWO MILES SOUTHEAST OF YOUR BASE ON FINAL APPROACH. I
HAVE FLAMED . . . . ." This call, heard infrequently

1 bases throughout the world,

at United States Air Force
means that an Air Force aircraft is in trouble and has
lost radio contact with the ground control tower. The ob-
served events following this 'cry for help' would make an
experienced public safety officer think that this is
surely mass confusion on a grand and inexcusable style.
Fire trucks roar to life, an ambulance appears, Security
Police beacons begin to rotate, and everyone starts moving
in three different directions at once. The best example
of what actually happens in an emergency of this nature
was expressed by a young recruit, fresh from basic train-
ing, first day on the job, and scared: "What do I do?"
Luckly, an experienced non—commissioned officer is able to
take the recruit in tow and direct his efforts toward

attempting to recover this pilot and his aircraft. The

same NCO cannot find out where the convoy is suppose to

 

1The terms United States Air Force, U.S. Air Force,
USAF, and Air Force are used interchangeably throughout
this paper.

form. He, unlike the Fire Chief or the Security Police
officer, is not concerned with the route, people, or en-
suring that all the proper equipment is present; his
only concern is to get to the crash scene as quickly as
possible. However, because the officer or the Chief
failed to get together on a starting point, valuable time
is lost. This project will explore these problems in an
effort to find a method which can be applied to end the
confusion which arose from this incident.

The prospect of public safety integration, co-
ordination, consolidation, and internal liaison has been
discussed in the past to great length. Wise arguments
appear on both sides of the issue.2 The integration of
the emergency elements within the industrial security
program has been an organizational standard since the
start of hostilities in World War II.3 The theory in
administration literature which has concerned itself with
internal governmental consolidation and coordination has
been directed at a dual program--cost reduction while

improving the service.

 

, 2For a discussion of these arguments see Dale E.

McNeil, "An Inquiry into the Feasibility of Integrating the
Police and Fire Services of an American Municipality"
(unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University,
1960), pp. 60-93.

3Gordon Wayne Kettler, "A Comparative Study of the
Effectiveness and Efficiency of Integrated and Non-Integ-
rated Industrial Security Organization" (unpublished
Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1964), p. 1.

I. THE PROBLEM

The term public safety, which includes the police,
fire, safety, and disaster control, has been a subject for
several controversies within the realm of public admin-
istration. The continual debate is caused by adminis-
trations first having to provide a necessary service and
second by having to also incur a tremendous budget expense
by providing this service. Administrators are thus caught
in the revolving door of increased citizen demands for
service and lower taxes, while on the other side one finds
the employees of the public safety agencies demanding
shorter work weeks and higher pay. The dilemma of the
city administrator forces some to consider the attractive
concept of combining one or several municipal services
in an effort to balance the already strained budget.
Insight into the administratofis dilemma can be gained
when it is realized that almost twenty per cent of the
municipal budget goes to providing police and fire pro-
tection for the city.4 When safety and disaster control
(or civil defense) are added to this figure, the total

is bound to increase.

m--

 

4Allen H. Andrews, Jr. "A Study of the Unification
of Police and Fire Protection Services of Michigan State
University" (unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State
University, 1964), p. 1.

Focus 2£.EE2§ report.

This paper will explore the public safety field of
the United States Air Force by focusing on:

1. Whether or not an efficient organizational
method is being used to meet the demands of the public
safety challenge.

2. A definition of the administrative and organiza-
tional models which have been attempted by the civilian
communities concerning the public safety problem (police-
fire integration, metropolitan government, etc.), and
examining the same organizational structure from the stand
point of a military public safety operation.

3. Investigating the benefits and disadvantages
of the civilian communities experience at reducing public
safety costs through integration, and applying those
experiences to the military public safety setting.

4. Establishing a conceptual model from which
the public safety service can be optimized and expenses

reduced, within the framework of the U.S. Air Force.

Importance 2£_this study.

 

Recent administrative theory has provided the De-
partment of Defense with a method which evaluates all
effort within the military establishment by the reduction
of that effort to a dollar and cents base. This method has

been called the "Cost Reduction Program." Defense

U1

Secretary Robert McNamara declared that the American people
require of their government a dollar worth of service for
every dollar spent.5 The program not only implies a positive
effort being made to justify every dollar budgeted, but also
that energetic effort would be extended to insure that
efficiency and effectiveness become the prime motives for
administrative and bureaucratic organization. This re-

port is prepared with this philosophy in mind. It is to
greater effectiveness within the U.S. Air Force public
safety operation without sacrificing service that this
report is directed.

Today, the military—industrial complex has been
criticized from draining money from much needed national
social programs. The merits or the arguments of this de-
bate will not be discussed in this paper, however, the
professional military administrator would be remiss if he
did not consider the future years and the future national
administrations will be watching the internal organization
of the defense establishment with a sharper eye. Within the
next decade, the manpower, finances, and facilities of the
military will be sharply reduced or at the very least re-

quire extensive re-justification. Positive steps taken at

 

. 5Robert L- McNamara, "The Cost Reduction Program,"
Air University Review, XXXVI (Summer, 1963), p. 46.

 

the present time, before the reduction fever becomes an
epidemic, should put the military leader in a favorable
position, from a bargaining standpoint, with the budgetary
critics. This study will investigate only one facet of
that recommended reduction of effort--the alternatives to
overlapping and multi—agency involvement in the public
safety field.

Public safety logically involves the well being
of human life. Public safety involves the attempt to re-
duce the extent of injury to the human being, as well as
attempting to reduce the amount of damage to public and
private property. Public safety is, therefore, in the
business of dealing with emotions and with emotional
people. Ineffectiveness within the public safety enter—
prise can and often does result in greater property damage
and causes greater sacrifice of life. This twofold problem
is of major concern to the military establishment because
its prime mission is not the loss of life in accidents,
not the loss of man-hours by injury resulting from a con-
flagration, and not the loss of operational equipment as
a result of either carelessness or accident. The military
objective, the military dollar, and the military profess—
ion are dedicated to the protection of life, and to the
safeguarding of the national security. Therefore, any

loss of effectiveness within the military public safety

enterprise is felt in diminished operational effectiveness
and by a failure to meet the stipulated goals. When one
life is left in the balance because of bureaucratic
fumbling, when one man is taken from his operational duty
because of organizational problems, the military profess-

ion must be vitally concerned.

Major premise.

The most important aspect of this paper is the
relationship between the loss of duty time and service,
to the fractionalized organizational structure of the
Air Force public safety elements. The Air Force recognizes
this problem because under extreme emergency public safety
conditions, (public safety as differentiated from combat
situations), the various agencies are brought hurriedly to—
gether in the hope of quickly establishing some type of
coordination and control. This concept seems to be con-
trary to good administrative and public safety theory. The
time for coordination and cooperation is not when the
emergency is at hand but during the routine slack time,
the time before the emergency. That proper coordination
is theoretically assumed to take place prior to the actual
event is recognized. The fact remains that coordination
does not just happen, it takes extensive work by all levels

of administrators to see that units having similar response

8
missions act together. Coordination must be conscientious
effort by highly motivated individuals. Words must have
appropriate thought and preparation behind them before they
are put to the test of the actual emergency or placed within
a plan to be followed at some later date. This study will
attempt to reveal that this is in fact not the case. This
study will attempt to draw workable administrative and
organizational changes and modifications to the existing
structure. This study will further attempt to show that the
recommended changes and modifications to an already existing
bureaucracy will provide an effective tool geared to the
elimination of administrative overlaps, clarification of
communication lines, and proper utilization of personnel at
a time when a critical shortage exists within the personnel
field.

It is visualized that in some cases these problems
have existed in civilian public safety departments. These
problems will be alluded to in the discussion of literature
available in the field. A survey of police-fire integra-
tion attempts, and other public safety consolidation efforts

will be examined to meet this challenge.

Limiting characteristics 9: this study.

 

 

This paper is limited in its application to the

military setting. The conclusions reached in Chapter VII

can only be applied to that setting, The reason for this
restriction lies in the centralized character of the milit-
ary organization and not the local nature of the civilian
communities.

This study is also limited and must be held to the
boundaries of the Zone of Interior (the continental limits
of the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii). By
this is meant that the unique problems of the United
States Air Force in foreign countries will not be ex-
plored. This is specifically done for a variety of rea-
sons, not the least of which is the fact that every
political setting is quite different and would entail more
research than the scope of this project intends. The
integration of public safety elements within the Air Force
might have some application to foreign involvement but
the separate considerations of that country and its pol-
itical setting must be taken into consideration before an
across the board proposal could be or would be suggested.

A third limitation of this study emerges from the
fact that the situation and setting of the United States
Air Force in forward areas (within or near to combat
situations), dictates local exceptions to already establ-
ished rules and procedures. These exceptions are such
that to require or to attempt to apply the recommendations

of this paper would be seriously misleading. The individual

10
commanders must possess the ability and the authority to
make changes to any and all plans to meet the requirements
of local circumstances especially when their concern is the
national security.

A final limitation to this study is the fact that
the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), whose mission
is threefold (criminal investigation, security investig—
ation, and counter intelligence), has not been considered
in any of the research or in consolidation models recom-
mended. OSI is a unique organization within the United
States Air Force because it has its own bureaucratic
structure, separate and independent from total Air Force
organizational philosophy. It is an organizational
structure similar to that of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation. OSI investigative mission requires that an in-
dependent role be played. The importance placed upon this
structure by the demands of the mission and the advantages
received by the total Air Force effort require that this
agency be removed from the public safety consolidation

theory expressed by this paper.
II. DEFINITIONS

The military language is, in some respects, diff-
erent from the language commonly used in academic and civil-

ian circles. An attempt will not be made to define all of

11
these differences, but definitions are offered for certain
words and phraes which will be used extensively in this
paper. The public safety enterprise also has evolved a
language separate and distinct from the normal civilian
situations and once again an attempt will not be made to
define all of these differences but only those which have

relevance to this paper.

Public safety: The enterprise, business, or the

 

agency which deals in the area of providing emergency
and preventive services to the public. These services
might not be thought of as being of an emergency nature
to the people actually employed by the agency, but are
generally thought of as being an emergency by the clientele
of the agency. This concept or term includes call-for-
services, i.e., getting a cat out of a tree, or helping
a child out of the locked bathroom, as well as fire,
crime and accident prevention.

The phrase, when used in conjunction with the United
States Air Force and as used in this paper includes the
following agencies: Security Police, Fire Department,
Safety Officer (limited to the Ground Safety Branch only),
the Disaster Control Officer, and the Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) branch of the Material Division. The in—

clusion of the Disaster Control Officer and his related

12
function, differentiates this term from the commonly held
civilian concept. The reason for this inclusion will be

explained later in this paper.

Integration: This term denotes bringing together

 

various departments of the public safety enterprise under
one bureaucratic system. Whether this system is an organic
whole or in fractionalized parts is not an important dis-
tinction to the context of this paper. Research will
attempt to establish an ideal model from which alternatives
can be developed in order to provide a realistic set of
models for organizational and administrative change. This
definition will be refined later to include the various
definitions taken from the literature. This refinement
will enable the reader to better understand the concept and
to place in proper perspective the realization that a
definitional problem does exist. For the purposes of this
study, the term consolidation, while carrying a different
meaning in some academic circles, will be used interchange-

ably with integration.

Metropolitan: The integration of separate govern-
mental entities under the management of one governing body.
This term and the concept it implies does not apply to the.
military structure_because that structure is already a

centralized agency responsive (in varying degrees), to the

13
central government. The term is used within this paper to
define and illustrate certain administrative changes recent-
ly undertaken within the civilian community. The concept
relates to the experience of the Canadian government,
specifically Toronto, Ontario, and to attempts made in Bos-
ton, Denver, Nashville, and Baton Rouge. As will be shown
later in this paper, the two systems of government are of
a different nature and as a result different consequences
have resulted. The difference is important to the research
in this project. The organizational components of the
Toronto experiment (a Federal entity) and the centrally
directed organization of the United States Air Force are
very similar. This will also be emphasized and explained

in a later chapter.

Major Command: A subdivision of the Air Force that

 

is assigned a major segment of the United States Air Force
mission. A major command is directly subordinate to Head—

quarters, United States Air Force.

Operational Command: A major command that is

 

composed, in whole or in part, of strategic, tactical,
or defense forces, or flying forces directly in support

of such forces.

Support Command: Any command which is not an

14
operational command. Support cOmmands provide supplies,
weapon systems, support systems, operational support equip-
ment, combat material, maintenance, surface transportation,
administration, personnel testing, advanced education,
communications,and special services to the Air Force and

other supported organizations.6
III . ' HYPOTHESES

This research was undertaken for a variety of
reasons, some of which have already been enumerated
earlier in this chapter. The major emphasis of this paper
will be on the following contentions:

1. That the current organizational philosophy of
the United States Air Force public safety agencies in
effect creates a multi—responsibility structure which
does not provide efficient and effective service to its
clientele.

2. The integration theory, historically and current—
ly being used by civilian public safety agencies, results
in more effective and efficient service to its clientele.

3. The advantages of integration within the civilian

public safety agencies, when applied to the military

 

6Air Force Manual 26-2, "Organization Policy and
Guidance" (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 15
March 1966), pp. 10-11.

15
structure, outweigh the disadvantages experienced by several
civilian agencies.

4. That the personnel who make-up the departments
of police and fire prevention are sufficiently compatable
in general military selection criteria to allow for at
least some consideration of total police-fire integration.

5. That the philosophy of public safety integration
and previous consolidation experiments do yield a viable
series of organizational models which can be identified
and applied to the public safety elements of the U.S. Air
Force. Sufficient positive management and administrative
benefits should exist so that a betterment in service can
be realized by the public safety elements and their client—

ele.

Discussion.

 

While these appear to be a long list of possible
contentions to be empirically studied, the end result should
yield a significant set of problems and alternative solutions-
-the objective being the integration or consolidation of
functional areas within the overall organization of the
U. S. Air Force.

The immediate criticism is that the work done in
civilian communities has not been shown to be completely
effective and as a result has largely been abandoned.

While there will be sufficient material presented later

16

in this paper in an attempt to refute this contention, it
is important that attention be directed to this statement
at this time. The subsequent chapters point out that
significant differences, organizationally and politically,
not to say anything about socially, exist within the
military setting, and specifically within the Air Force,
that enables a separation of the prior work as being
largely meaningless to the military public safety agencies.

The military enterprise is a large organization
that is very similar to a pool of liquid--one wave can
start a rippling effect. In this characteristic alone,
without the political and social considerations entering
the picture, the differences between the major work done
in the police-fire integration sphere must be re-eval-
uated and re-structured to fit the military model. Two
separate and distinct organizations exist in our political
system (the locally controlled community fire/police depart-
ments, and the highly centralized military police systan). That
these different organizations can be and have been designed
to operate within the area of public safety, in functionally

different manners, will be shown.
IV. METHODOLOGY

The prime concern of this report is given and em-

phasized in the above section. The method of studying

17
those contentions was basically one of extensive review of
the available literature, both formal written reports of
agencies attempting, already undergoing, or considering
integration of some form of their public safety respon—
sibility. Theoretical studies undertaken by administrators
at various governmental levels were also studied. This
library research was supplemented by the knowledge gained
from systematic observations at four United States Air
Force bases. The installations selected have different
missions and different populations, therefore, different
public safety problems. This latter method was adopted
as an attempt to allow the conclusions of this study to
be generalized and made applicable to the overall mission
of the United States Air Force and not restricted to the
specific bases studied.

An important part of this research was the exam-
ination of formal reports of governmental entities that
have undergone some form of unification or integration
and have either failed to achieve the stated goals or have
modified those goals dueto political pressure. Failure in
this area was the most difficult problem to answer. Know-
ledge of failure by integrated departments seems to have
stopped many a progressive public administrator from initi-
ating the integrated public safety concept. As will be

shown later, failure generally resulted from the

18
administrators lack of attention to political considerations.
This area was considered early in the research, however,
it was not regarded as being completely applicable to the
military setting. Political considerations are not at this
time the prime motive for attempting change: efficiency
and solution of internal problems should be foremost in the
professional military executive's mind. This does not pre—
clude the aspect of cost reduction referred to earlier, but
only lends support to the line of distinction that is drawn
between the civilian entities and the military situation.

The above methodology is supported by an examination,
in some detail, of those organizations and enterprises where
integration and metropolitan organization have been success—
ful. The concept initiated within the industrial security
area provides some useful insights into the entire integ-
ration problem and has proven useful to, at least, one
civilian community (Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish,
Lousiana). Whether the industrial security model was used
accidentally or by design is a matter of conjecture at this
point. The organization of the Metropolitan Toronto area,
along with some metropolitan attempts in Boston, Nashville,
and Denver, are examined in an attempt to establish
corollaries with the military setting.

The experiences of several members of the United

States Air Force were analyzed in the hope that personal

I.")
experience with emergency conditions would establish
criteria for the entire public safety enterprise within
the military organization. Data was gathered from several
United States Air Force bases which will be used to Show
the degree of public safety problems existent on the various
installations. This data is not intended to be extensive
in nature, but because the military is fairly standardized
among its installations, a certain degree of generalization
can be attempted.

Material on equipment and personnel was gained from
interviews held in an operational setting with various
Air Force officers. Personnel records of Security Police-
men and firemen were reviewed from comparisons of age,
education, and geographical background. From an analysis
of this information limited conclusions can be derived con-
cerning the typical military public safety enlisted man.

All of these factors will be detailed later in this paper.
V. PLAN OF PROCEDURE

Chapters II, III, IV, and V will concentrate on
the various concepts pursued by the civilian public safety
agencies. Chapter II deals with the historical development
and Chapter III, IV, and V study the various organizational
plans which have been developed, i.e., police-fire integ—

ration, internal police consolidation, and the intregrated

20
industrial security model. The literature within the
field will be reviewed at this time to enable the reader
to come to a clear understanding of exactly what work has
been done and what experiences are applicable to the milit-
ary setting. The differences in the theory and :ibs advan—
tages to a bureaucratic military structure will be explored
in an attempt to establish a foundation from which alter—
native suggestions can be proposed.

The main emphasis of this report is on effecting
organizational change within a large bureaucratic organ-
ization, the United States Air Force. Therefore, the
existing organization must be examined in some detail be—
fore any proposals for organizational change and adminis-
trative re-alignment can be presented. This organization is
defined in Chapter VI. The reader should then be throughly
introducted to two settings which exist simultaneously and
harmoniously within one political system. Also included
in this chapter is a report on the information received
from the experiences of the Air Force installations studied,
and an evaluation of the personal interviews conducted. The
data concerning the rate of public safety incidents and
common characteristics of military police and fire personnel
is also presented in this chapter.- From this data will be
inferred certain recommendations for structural experi—

mentation and functional change.

21

The research from Chapter's II through VI will be
brought together in Chapter VII. The various models pro—
posed for an integration of the Air Force public safety
agencies comprise the major emphasis of this chapter.
These models are arranged in a long—term program cumulating
in the adoption of the total integration concept by the
Air Force.

The paper will conclude with a summation of the

generalized concepts gathered from the above sources.

CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF INTEGRATION

The literature in the field of integrated public
safety elements, is voluminous. Although the literature
deals mainly with the positive benefits realized by
bringing together various agencies under one administra-
tive department, an interesting development was found
in the history of the various integration theories. This
part of the paper will trace that history and review the
literature available within the field. The literature
review in this chapter and the following chapters, will be
included with a research analysis of the many integration
theories: police-fire integration (Chapter III), internal
police consolidation (Chapter IV), and finally, the

integrated industrial security program (Chapter V).
I. EARLY HISTORY

The research in this field reveals several dis—
tinct phases in police—fire and public safety integration.
The starting phase would be the period of man's envolve-
ment on earth--the cave man. Cave drawings reveal that
man, when he first considered joining with other men to
form a community, designated one of the members to stand

guard over the community during the hours of darkness.

23
Historians tell that this sentry's responsibilities were
mainly to protect the overall community from predatory
animals and to sound the alarm if the community came under
attack.

This placement of a sentry by the cave men denotes
the first stage in the history of public safety integra—
tion. Advancement within the field had to wait until the
time of Augustus and his creation of the Vigiles of ancient
Rome. This second phase was followed by the Middle Ages.
During this third stage, people were concerned with pro—
tection against the invasions of barbaric tribes and as a
result, turned inward to themselves. The security sentry
was placed back into effeCt and the security of the community
remained within his care until the fourth stage, the Peelian
reform era. It was during this latter stage that the police
officer was established as a professional. A separate,
independent agency was initiated by the reformers in the
hope of providing the community with a safe place within
which to reside.

Since those days some administrators have attempted
to gather the police and other elements of the public
safety enterprise under one organizational structure. The
last stage in this evolution of integration with municipal
service, will be called the age of experimentation. During

this period, which has its foundation laid at the turn of

24
the century, various attempts have been made to draw to-
getherthe many agencies involved with the public safety
(or governmental) problem;

One author, in dealing with the historical approach
to police service, separates the evolution of the emergency
response required to meet any type of public safety problem
into three stages, each dealing with the common problem
of manpower. Historically, he found that this problem
was eliminated by recruitment on the spot. Next, full-
time employees were especially trained in emergency duties
and were required to respond when necessary, were housed in
a specific location so that they would be able to respond
to an emergency. The last stage was the employment of full
time people who "regularly engage in routine prevention
tasks from which they may be recalled at will and assigned
to emergencies:."1

Early attempts at this second area will be explored
in the following discussion. The first era has never ended
as the problem of public safety, when it concerns the
individual personally, usually demands immediate manpower
regardless of the source. The last era will be analyzed

in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

 

1Charles S. James, "Concepts of Fire-Police Integ-
ration," Public Management, XXXVII, No. 9 (September,
1955), p. 197. ' I

25

II. VIGILES OF ANCIENT ROME

During the period between man's first encounters
on earth and the reign of Augustus, first Emperor of Rome,
man was happy with the sentry on duty for his community's
protection. However, forced by crime in the streets and
devastating fires, Augustus, after thirty years of hesita-
tion and vacillation, finally acted decisively in the matter
of public safety and created the Vigiles in 6 A.D.

The conditions which called for this innovation in
public safety are eloquently enumerated by one historian:

During the last one hundred fifty years ... . the in-
creasing corruption of the official classes, the
incompetence of the magistrates and the ever-growing
bitterness of the party politics lead to more and
more frequent and finally to almost continuous civil
riots and blood shed with which the existing police
services were utterly insufficient to deal, even if
they had wanted to do so, and which the government
could not . . . restore order. The political parties
employed organized gangs of roughs to drive opposition
voters from the polls or to attack houses of the lead-
ers of the rival parties; the personal hatreds of the
professional leaders of these gangs led to frequent
pitched battles in the streets between their support-
ers, and the life of the ordinary citizen became in—
tolerable. The responsible authorities did little

to stop it; if their own supporters were successful,
they had no cause to complain; if their rivals won,
they had no force with which to coerce tEem other than
bands of the same type in their own pay.

With this type of civil strife rampant, Augustus

 

2P.K. Baillie-Reynolds, The Vigiles of Imperial
Rome (London: Oxford University Press, 19267} p. 15.

26

initiated a force which was eventually composed of freed
men (slaves were tried earlier as members of private fire
companies and then as part of the municipal force, but did
not prove to be effective). This force was divorced from
the military and it stayed that way as it was funded by a
taxation on the gladiator shows and on the sale of slaves.3

The Vigiles were first engaged in the fire-fighting
aspect of public safety. Shortly after this 'top-down'
agency was formed it was given the task of "policing at
night."4 The policing power was originally concerned only
with the problem of fire prevention. Shortly this concern
grew to an added responsibility of apprehending the possible
arsonist which directly involved the political parties of
the day. That function then broadened to include the arrest
power for burglary and robbery at night, the apprehension and
prevention of crimes committed during the daylight hours,
and finally, the involvement of crimes of all classifica—
tions-—from petty pilfering of the cloakrooms to larceny
of safe deposit boxes.5

The pressure of the time and the rivalry of the

political parties lead to specialization within the force

 

3Roy E. Hollady, "The Vigiles of Ancient Rome"
(unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University,

4Ibid. 5Ibid., pp. 61-62.

 

27
of men trained exclusively for catching run—away slaves,
investigating larcenies and petty thefts from the public
baths, traffic control, and for lighting the lamps at
night.6

This first highly organized, well-disciplined,
tough and efficient unit was evaluated as having "attained
dimensions which are probably unequalled in any modern
city."7 Perhaps, this is too much of a glamorization,
what remains is the fact that during the Imperial Roman
civilization, an integrated agency existed which was con-
cerned with the dual function of fire prevention and police
protection.

The Vigiles date of demise is unknown but histor-
ians have speculated that it disappeared along with the
other vestiges of ancient Rome when the powerful and ener-
getic German tribes invaded and sacked the whole of Italy.8
Sinnigen believes that the Vigiles disappeared during the

reign of Constantine, "perhaps during some kind of munici-

pal reform in 318 A. D.," and transferred to the guilds

 

6Ibid., pp. 72—77.

7Baillie-Reynolds, pp. cit., p. 163. See also
G.H. Stevenson, The Augustan Empire (Vol. X of The Cambridge
Ancient Histor , ed. S.A. Cook. 12 vols.; New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1934), p. 202.

 

8Stevenson, pp, cit., p. 214.

28

composed of private citizens.

Evaluation of the effect of this concept was sum—

marized by Hollady when he said:

. . . civilized men two thousand years ago were
willing to experiment and that their administrative
and operational concepts~were, in some respects pre-
cursors of what is often thought to be relatively
new today--not only in the area of police-fire con-
solidation but in specific areas of police adminis-
tration such as resource and manpower distributiogO
and the development of the concept of prevention.

The authors which have overlooked this important

phase in police history reads like the roster of import—

ant people in police academic circles. Melville,11

12 Leonard,13 and Wall (editor, International

14

Fosdick,
City Managers' Association), have all ignored the admin-
istrative and manpower concepts attempted by the Vigiles.

Perhaps, they cannot be faulted, however, as Reith

 

9William G. Sinnigen, The Officium pf Urban
Perfecture During the Later Roman Empire (Rome: The
American Academy, 19577, p. 100.

10Hollady, pp, cit., pp. 1-2.

11H.W. Melville, é Police History (London:

lMethuen Company, 1902), pp. 10-12.

. 12Raymond Fosdick, European and American Police
Systems (New York: McGraw Hill, 1919), p. 21.

13V.A. Leonard, Police Organization and Management
(second edition; Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc.,

1964), p. 4.

14Ned L. Wall, "Police Administration: Past and
liresent," Municipal Police Administration (fifth edition;
(fliicago: International City Managers' Association, 1961),

Ch. 1: pp° 1‘80

 

29
discovered in his historical analysis of the English Police
system. Fieldings, who spoke for police prevention function
prior to the Peelian Reforms in 1828, Charles Rowan and
Richard Mayne (the first co—commissioners of the London
Metropolitan Police), contained in their writings the belief
that the English originated these new and original ideas in

15

police administration. These writings seem to have set the

stage for the later and more recent police historians.
III. THE MIDDLE AGES

The fire department's evolution along with the
history of the police tradition, is devoid of research when
the years between 318 A.D. to 1750 are discussed. Specula-
tion and historical accounts led to the conclusion that this
was the period of regression--the use of the sentry, or
lamplighters, and the growth of the guilds. In England,
where most authorities start tracing the development of
the police service, one finds the growth of the "hue-and-

cry," the shire-reeve, and the posse comitatus.16

 

15Charles Reith, A New History of the Police (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, —1956) pp. 10-11.—

16A.C. Germann, Frank D. Day, and Robert R. J.
Gallati, Introduction to Law Enforcement (Springfield,
Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Inc., 1963), pp. 38- 39. See
also the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, Task Force: The Police (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 3_ 4.

 

 

30

IV. THE PEELIAN REFORMS

The next phase in the developing police and fire
history appears with the advent of the Peelian reforms in
the English concept of law enforcement. During this period,
which starts approximately the time of Fielding'(p$£pp 1750),
and ends after the death of Sir Robert Peel (pippp 1880),
the total separation of the police service from all other
elements of the public safety enterprise became reality.
The reason for this separation appears to be a desire on
the part of the citizens of Great Britain for a profession-
alized agency capable of maintaining peace and harmony in
the towns and cities, especially in the larger cities.17
At about this time of the adoption of the formal
Peelian reforms (1820's and 30's), the fire function also
became an organized agency. Prior to this period, "Watch—
Boys" or "Water-Men" had formed into guilds and private
companies in order to reduce the monetary loss due to
fire damage. These companies were then formed into the
London Fire Establishment and continued to operate as a
private enterprise until 1865, when the municipalities

assumed control.18

 

17For a discussion of the contribution of Sir Robert
Peel to the police tradition see Germann, pp, cit., pp. 37—55.

18McNeil, pp, cit., p. 17.

31

However, this consolidation of fire companies and
the attempts by Peel at professionalization and separation
of the police, only received attention in the larger towns
and cities. The small communities and in the rural areas
the town watchman or constable worked in the dual capacity
of police officer and fire inspector.

. . . in small communities which never had an organized
fire department . . . the police force has always handl-
ed the fire function, supplemented by a volunteer fire
department or by other city employees acting as call
firemen. The police force is Egained to fight fires

and to Operate fire equipment.

Recently, many authors connected with the profess-
ionalization of the police forces, have supported the
principle of separate police and fire forces. Their

discussion, generally, has concentrated on the larger de—

partments and the urban areas of the country.

V. THE AGE OF EXPERIMENTATION

The Peelian reforms and the combining of fire com-
panies started the era of professional (though separate)
public safety officers in the European countries. These
ideas and concepts were transported to the American settle-
ments and incorporated into the emerging national concept

of public safety throughout the various states. This period

 

19Municipal Police Administration, pp, cit., p. 63.

 

 

32
of time, 1820-1900, is noted for the settling of the Ameri-
can countryside by the pioneers. This settling process
demanded a certain amount of public control over the settl-
ers, a response to emergency situations in the slap-together

towns, and a growing concern for local autonomy.

Early American Development.

The prevailing philosophy of the American develop-
er, when faced with the problems of public safety, seems
to have been the English examples. The local sheriff
became an entity of its own during this period. The vol-
unteer fire department was the primary means utilized for
manpower response to the numerous destructive fires. The
SOphistication of the public safety business and of ad-
ministration was growing along with the community. This
sophistication did not, as of yet, have as part of its
structure the safety officer or the person whose sole duty
was disaster control (civil defense). These were functions
generally dealt with by the police officer or chief, which
is still the case in much of the rural areas of America
today.

However, in the larger cities and states (establish-
ed before or during the American Revolution), some signs of
combining the public safety effort can be found. Elected

officials (commissioners) were designated as the spokesmen

33
for the combined fire and police problems on the cities'
governing body (city councils, town halls, etc.). A report
issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1904, dealing
with the use of electric fire alarm systems in the cities,
stated that in 1902 it found 14 cities whose.police depart-
ments were governed by a Board of Public Safety and six
police-fire departments governed by Police—Fire Comm-
issioners.20 Faced with waves of new people and expanding
growth (plus other related problems), the established
communities were realizing that some form of consolidation
of effort, at least at the municipal administrative level

was necessary.

The 1900's;

 

The age of experimentation begins about the end of
the Peelian reforms or around the turn of the century. This
is the age when the communities all across the country were
experimenting with different forms of local government.
Included in these various proposals were various organ-
izations: agencies necessary for the communities'survival
as an independent entity. This is the period when the Mayor
and the City Council concept of community development came

into its own. It is the period when the City Manager

 

2OBureau of Census, "Municipal Electric Fire Alarms

and Police Patrol Systems: Bulletin No. 11" (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1904), p. 23.

34
concept of municipal government started, and it is the
period when the prevailing political philosophy was "the
best government is the least government."21

The concept of combining the policemen with the
firemen did not hit its peak, however, until the late
1950's and early 1960's. An argument has been put forth
that this period is separate and distinct from the ex—
perimental changes that were being attempted earlier in
municipal affairs.22 However, later history (the 1960's)

seems to indicate that this important concept was only a

phase in the total age of experimentation.

Police-Fire Integration ip_Mid-Century.

 

The integration of police and fire functions started
with several articles in the professional municipal ad-
ministrators periodicals. From this conceptual begin-
ning, several departments attempted some form of integ—
ration. However, the history of integration, as has been
shown, was not new. Dating from the early Roman days

and contininuing until the Peelian reforms, some form of

 

21Samuel E. Morison, The Oxford History p£_The
American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965),
p. 888.

22Charles 5. James, Police and Fire Integration pp
the Small City (Chicago: Public Administration SerVICe,

pp. 3-40

 

 

integration can be found. The most significant early
attempts at complete integration were in 1836 in England:
Liverpool, Birmingham, and Manchester. During World War II,
because of the extra duties involved in both services, inte-
gration was abandoned. Today, no integrated departments
exist in England.23

The first city in America to attempt complete inte-
gration was the City of Huntington Woods, Michigan. This
city combined its fire and police personnel into and under
a Director of Public Safety in 1935. The city has a pop-
ulation of 9,000 so requires a small number of public safety
officers. As a suburb of a larger metropolitan area
(Detroit), it is not susceptable to a large amount of crime.
However, the integration concept has been successful in this
municipality for the last thirty years.24

This attempt, along with some consolidation attempts
during the Second World War, lead administrators to believe
that, perhaps, something along these lines could be under-
taken in cities of less than 10,000 population. With the
increases in population in the urban areas before and

during World War II, other means of consolidation were

 

23McNeil, pp, cit., p. 23.

24James, pp, cit., p. 5.

36
also taking place in municipal government: water systems
were allowed to cross jurisdictional lines, sewer systems
were being built that serviced several communities, the
port authorities were created so several separate govern-
mental entities could use a common facility, transit
authorities were established to enable several communities
to pool their resources together in order to form one
common transportation web, etc.25 The importance of these
efforts lies in the fact that consolidation of effort was
being undertaken thereby allowing the focus of adminis-
trators, to be directed toward a dual objective: cut costs
while providing a necessary service.

In the 1950's and up to 1961, "73 cities-—44 in the
United States and 29 in Canada--had formed and were op-
erating some type of integrated fire and police system,"
(see Appendix A). The most populous city that attempted
this form of public safety consolidation was Dearborn,
Michigan, whose population at the time of integration was
112,007. However, one-half of all the integrated cities

were under 14,500, with the average size being 24,000 in

 

25Gordon B. Misner, "Recent Developments in
Metropolitan Law Enforcement," Journal p£_Criminal
Law, Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 51, No. 2
’TMarch-April, 19607, p. 267.

37
the United States and 18,000 in Canada.26 McNeil,27 James,28
and Andrews29 have studied all of the American integrated
cities in depth and have concluded that in the over-whelm-
ing majority of cases the attempts at integration have
been successful. .

It is during this era that the International City
Managers' Association came out in strong suppert of in-
tegration in the smaller municipality and allocated re-
search money to study these projects. James has written
extensively in support of the total integration theory in
both his books: POlice and Fire Integration gg_§pguggg;;
gipy, and A_Frontier p£_Municipal Safety.30

In the former text, James goes to great length to
argue for a seemingly logical base just why a small city
should consider the integration of its fire and police
service. He spells out the manpower allocations (even by
time of day) and equipment necessary to accomplish the

task of public safety protection. The main emphasis of

his argument is that integration must be established in the

 

26Leonard, pp, cit., p. 83.

27For a listing of successfully integrated cities
and a discussion of the reasons why they are successful,
see McNeil, pp, cit., pp. 35-58.

28 29

James, pp, cit., p. 13. Andrews, pp, cit., p. 54.

30Charles S. James, A Frontier of Municipal Safety

(Chicago: Public AdministrEIion ServiEE, 1955).

38

small city to relieve the constant budgetary stress and
strain. His reasoning for the success of the integrated
operation lies in the prevention and combined patrol
activity of the public safety officer.3

James is confident that this concept can also be
instituted in the larger city, and therefore, published
a second book on the subject. ALFrontier pf_MuniCipal
Safety is concerned with the city whose population is over
100,000, but under one million. This latter argument does
not stretch the integration concept to the maximum extreme
but rather addresses the question from the standpoint of
many precinct level, integrated departments operating under
one department chief.

However, the picture is not all success as failures
have occured. Each community, as stated by James and
McNeil, must consider the current political and social
setting before attempting to integrate its public safety
services. Approximately fifteen cities (see Appendix B),
have attempted an integrated department and failed because
they did not consider those settings. As a result, these
cities have had to revert back to separate police and fire
departments after spending a considerable amount of money

on the consolidation attempt. Such a step as this must be

 

31James, Police . . . City, pp, Cit., p. 62.

39
approached only after thoughful study and a considerable
amount of research; research not only into the theory but

research into the existing community.32

Present Status pf ppp COncept.

The hey-day of the integration concept seems to have
passed. Since the integration attempts of the fifties, the
theory has been replaced, and the experimentation has
continued. Many different attempts are currently under
consideration by police agencies in an attempt to pull to-
gether the various jurisdictional problems. Regional crime
laboratories have been established so several police agenc-
ies can bring evidence to one location for scientific inves—
tigation. One facility, therefore, has the capability of
servicing many agencies. The concept of unifying several
police agencies under one jurisdiction (the county police
force and the metropolitan concept), has been attempted
in Dade County Florida, and Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Con-
tract arrangements have been attempted in Los Angeles
County and in Connecticut. Various other organizational
changes are being attempted by administrators at the local,
state, and federal level in an attempt to solve the re-

volving door dilemma—-rising wages and shorter hours on the

 

32Gordon B. Misner and Virgil W. Peterson, "Issues.
and Problems of Metropolitan Area Police Servfl:e," Journal
p£_Criminal E23, Criminology, and Police Science, Vbl. 48,
No. 4 (July-August, 1957), p. 132.

40
one side with taxpayer demands to keep the budgets down on
the other.

Integration or consolidation attempts are most
generally fought by the fire departments. The rise in
labor negotiations and arbitration, along with the increase
in the use of employment practices has lead to bitter de-
bates between the fire and the administrative agencies
about integration. Their arguments will be examined in the
following chapter.

The widespread use of the automobile and the con-
stant pressure of international war, lead to the develop-
ment of the professional safety and disaster control officer.
The safety officer is generally assigned the responsibility
for vehicle safety and pedestrian safety. He is concerned
with the gathering of accident information for the con-
struction of better roads and the development of better
driving habits. He generally is a member of the adminis-
tration of the city and works directly out of the City
Manager's office, particularly in the smaller community.33

The Director of Civil Defense (or disaster control
officer), has come into being since the end of World War
II. The office has received renewed emphasis since the

Kennedy Administration and is concerned with bomb shelters,

 

33"The Responsibilities of the Director of Safety,"
(Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962).

41
natural disasters, and chemical/nuclear/biological warfare.
The office in a smaller city is usually staffed by a vol-
unteer, public minded citizen, usually with some military
experience. Once again, the office is directly responsible
(in an advisory capacity), to the City Manager, and seldom
is the position even remotely connected with the police or

fire department.34

VI. SUMMARY

Police and fire integration then is not a new con—
cept. The Romans were the first to institute the idea and
then the English separated the two functions. Still within
the small community, up to the 1940's, the public safety
integration concept has been kept intact. During the last
two decades, many small communities have successfully inte—
grated their police and fire departments. However, the
public concern over vehicle safety and civil defense has

lead to the creation of separate agencies for these problems.

 

34Office of Civil Defense, "The Civil Defense
Director" (Washington: Department of Defense, 1964), p. 3.

CHAPTER III
THE POLICE—FIRE INTEGRATION CONCEPT

The research in the field of police and fire inte-
gration seems to be one sided. The majority of theoritical
studies reviewed (the written literature), and the written
empirical research available (the successfully integrated
department) have concerned the positive side of integra-
tion, i.e., in support of the concept. This is not to say
that literature is not available that speaks for the anti-
integration side, however, this literature is mostly a
product of un-informed citizens whose antagonism against
change of any sort prejudices their writings.1

The concentration of research and literature in this
field has been directed toward the municipal police and
fire agencies. Reference has already been made to the
work of James which strongly supports the argument that
police and fire services are amenable to integration, at
least within the smaller community. The seemingly large
amount of money spent by these smaller communities for
public safety services is, perhaps, the major reason why

these two agencies have been selected for administrative

 

1Much of the negative aspects of the argument can
be found in two publications of the International Associ-
ation of Fire Fighters: "Fight Back! The Case Against the

43
experimentation.

The integration arguments will be examined in this
chapter. However, before that examination is attempted,
some effort must be made to answer the theoretical question
of compatability between fire and police officers. The
essential question, from a research point of view, concerns
the finding of similar characteristics between the profess—
ions. This problem will be explored, model types of inte-
gration, and the small community will be defined before an
investigation can be conducted into the arguments for and

against police-fire integration.
I. COMPATABILITY OF FIREMEN AND POLICEMEN

Several articles and books have dealt with the
quality of recruitment and selection procedures utilized
throughout this country by the police and fire services.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice has gone into extensive detail
about recruitment and selection standards for the police

officer.2 McNamara undertook an extensive study of the

 

Merger of Fire and Police Services" (Washington: Inter-
national Association of Fire Fighters, 1959), p. 11; and
"Why We Are Opposed to Integration of Fire and Police De-
partments" (Washington: International Association of Fire
Fighters, 1957), p. 30.

2Task Force: The Police, pp, cit., chapter 5.

 

44
standards employed by the New York City Police Department in
its recruitment of police personnel.3 The emphasis of this
study, much like the work undertaken by the police-community
relations experts, is on the aspect of prior environmental
effect on the police recruit and experienced patrol officer.

One study undertaken by two social psychologists
concerned the assessment of firemen applicants, however,
this study found only scant evidence of previous published
work.4 However, a certain amount of limited data has been
collected on firemen and police officers together with
other civil service positions.5

A recent study completed by four psychiatrists at
the University of Oregon Medical School explored for the
establishment of a base of comparison between police and

fire applicants.6 The study concentrated on 243 success-

 

3John H. McNamara, "Uncertainties in Police Work:

The Relevance of Police Recruits' Background and Train-
ing," The Police: Six Sociological Essays, D. J. Bordua,
editor (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 163-
252.

4A.N. Anikeef and J.L. Bryan, "Kuder Interest Pattern
Analysis of Fire Protection Students and Graduates," Journal
p: Social Psychology, Vol. 48 (1958), pp. 195-198.

5R.L. Thorndike and E. Hagan, Ten Thousand Careers,
(New York: John L. Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 241-246.

6J.D. Matarazzo, B.V. Allen, G. Saslow, and A.N.
Wiens, "Characteristics of Successful.Policemen and Fire-
men Applicants," Journal pf Applied Psychology, Vol. 48,
No. 2 (1964), pp. 123-132.

 

 

45
ful applicants for the positions of either police officer
or fireman with the City of Portland, Oregon. These appli—
cants were placed on the eligibility lists between 1959-1962.
The authors used many measurements in an attempt to scale
the personality of the individual applicants. The re-
sults of this study indicated that:7

1. The applicants in both fields possessed sur-
prisingly high intelligence. In fact, the author's state
that they could have gone to college but for a variety of
reasons, most of which were socio-economic, they did not.
The applicants actually did better on the scales than
graduates of the medical school.

2. The applicants were approximately the same age
(the mean for the policemen was 25.7 years old, and the
firemen, 24.6 years old).

3. The applicants were better adjusted than the
average person his age.

4. Both groups show strong needs to excell or
achieve, be the center of attention, understand and dom—
inate others, stick to a job until it is one, and "be one
of the boys." Along with this, their lower than average
personal needs suggest that both groups of men like to work

with others, rather than autonomously, while needing little

 

7Ibid., pp. 126-132.

46
kindness from others.
5. In clinical interviews:

. . . the policeman applicant chose this line of work
because his interests were in working with juveniles
or with men on probation, etc., while the firemen
often stated they chose firefighting because the 24-
hour-on, 48—hour-off work schedule permitted them to
farm, hunt, fish, buy, renovate, and sell old homes
for profit, wogk as real estate salesmen on their
days off, etc.

6. Both groups compare with the enlisted man of
the Armed Forces based upon the results of the MMPI. The
common characteristics were: manipulating others to gain
their own ends, opportunistic, unable to delay gratification,
impulsive, and showing some tendencies toward over-indul-
gence in sex and-drinking.

7. Young police applicants were more concerned
with helping others, while the firemen applicants were in—
terested in working with their hands, or in business
occupations.

The authors conclude:

. . . as a group, they represent men who are endowed
with good intellectual abilities which they have not
fully developed or tested, often in their own words
turn to police work and firefighting as career choices
next best to the business and other professions for
which they qualify but for which their educational
limitations, lack of knowledge, or lack of opportunity

prevent them from entering. The result is that fire-

fighting and police work are recruitipg men of superior
intelligence into their ranks . . . .

 

8 9

Ibid., p. 129. Ibid., p. 132.

47
The significance of this study lies in the fact that
there are similar individual personality characteristics
which the public safety administrator can explore. Based
on this study, and the other referenced work, perhaps, the
personnel within the two separated departments have a similar

outlook on the public safety challenge.
II. TYPES OF INTEGRATED DEPARTMENTS

Basically, three types of integrated public safety
departments are defined in the literature: administrative,

partial, and complete.

Administrative integratiOn:

This is a form of organizational re-alignment whereby
the divisions of the police and fire departments are placed
for administrative purposes under one director. His title is
usually Director of Public Safety. The two departments,
police and fire, have their own independent forces and or—
ganization. They may or may not, be housed in the same
building, and they may, or may not, be subject to the same
common facilities, i.e., test range, communications, files,

10

alarm panels, etc. An example of this would be the

Commissioner of Public Safety who sits on the city council,

 

10Gordon E. Misner, "Recent Developments in..-
Metropolitan Law Enforcement," Journal p£_Criminal Law,
Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 50, No. 2 TUan—Feb,
1960), p. 500.

 

48
the Department of Public Safety at Michigan State Univer—

sity, and the Texas State Department of Public Safety.

Partial integration:

 

This is a form of integration that combines the
operation of the police and fire departments but retains

11 The officers are trained

them as separate departments.
in both police and fire service, but separate divisions

are maintained to which personnel are assigned. The de-
partment is usually headed by a Director of Public Safety
who acts as a coordinator between the two systems. Public
safety officers assigned primarly to the police division

are first patrolmen, but will also assist and cooperate in
fire fighting. Public safety officers assigned to the fire
department carry the primary responsibility of manning the
fire apparatus. The ability to cross departmental lines
during periods of emergency, of either a police or fire
nature, is maintained by possessing the central authority to
draw inactive public safety officers from the patrol force.

The Dade County Department of Public Safety is an example

of this type integration.

Complete integration:

Under this concept, the separate departments as such

 

11
62-630

Municipal Police Administration, pp, cit., pp.

49
are eliminated. The personnel in the public safety depart-
ment are known as public safety officers who are capable of
performing either police or fire duties. Specialization is
kept to a minimum, although there will be a need for certain
technicians, investigators, fire apparatus operators, and
others. This division is usually headed by a Director of
Public Safety whose primary duty is to coordinate all police-
fire activity. The most noteworthy examples of this
category are the Oak Park Department of Public Safety,
Michigan, and the Sunnyvale, California, Department of

public Safety.12

III. THE SMALL COMMUNITY

The small municipality usually refers to an incorpo—
rated town or village under 10,000 population. Roughly
one American in ten lives in this type of community. Two-
thirds of America's communities and over nine—tenths of its
municipalities have a population of under 10,000.’13
Problems such as fire, crimes, accidents, and dis-
turbances (especially of a student or racial nature) plague

these small governmental entities.

A city of 5,000 . . . might reasonably expect a building
fire about once in every three weeks, a traffic accident

 

1ZIbId.

13James, Police . . . City, pp, cit., p. ii.

50

about once a week, and perhaps, twp arrests a week, one
of which will be for drunkenness.

Therefore, the public safety problem, in proporation to size,
is not greatly different between the larger and the smaller
community.

The estimate of the crime control and fire threat to
the small community by James, might be slightly exaggerated
to the negative side. McNamara, in his report on the state
of the American police enterprise to the Association of
Public Administrators in 1950, referred to the problem in
a different way when he said:

In 2,200 urban communities with less than 25,000 pop-
ulation, the average police strength is 8 men; in the
10,000-25,000 bracket, moig than a score of cities have
fewer than ten policemen.

The police enterprise diversity is equally evident
when one considers that there are in existence approximately
40,000 separate police agencies in the United States on the
federal, state, and local level. Statistics reveal that
fifty agencies are on the federal level, 200 departments are

on the state level, and the remaining "39,750 agencies are

dispersed throughout the many counties, cities, towns, and

 

14James, "Concepts of Fire-Police Integration, pp,
cit., pp. 194-195.

15Donal E. J. MacNamara, "American Police Admin-
istration at Mid-Century," Public Administration Review,
Vol. X, No. 3 (Summer, 1950), p. 184.

 

51

villages that form our local government."16

Of this diversity MacNamara states:

. . . the least efficient and therefore most expensive

police agencies are the small ones. There are notable

exceptions, but in general these minuscule units of five,

fifteen, or fifty-odd officers cannot afford the ser-

vices of top administrators, cannot provide adequate

training facilities, and must allot so large a share of

personnel to administration and house-keeping tasks that

they reduce effective police strength to the vanishing

point.

A survey of ninety-seven small cities conducted in

1955 by James revealed a ratio of 1.48 firemen per thou-
sand population in contrast to median ratios ranging from
1.09 to 1.60 for cities in larger population groups. The
same cities, however, have police strength almost pro-
portionate to the larger municipalities, reporting 1.33
policemen per thousand population.18 Integration of
public safety services in these small cities, therefore,
holds much promise to the fire administrator. Most small
cities are designed to take only remedial action against
fire hazards, such as with a volunteer fire department.

Under integration, the small cities can use their limited

resources to prevent incidents as well as concentrate

 

16Task Force: The Police, pp, cit., p. 7.

17MacNamara, pp, cit., p. 184.

18James, "Concepts of Fire-Police Integration,"
92. cit., pp. 194-195.

52

available manpower when those incidents occur.
The Safety officer and the Civil Defense director

who are involved with the small community's problem must
be added to these diversity problems. While these officials
might conceivably be the same individual, a study by the
International City Managers' Association found that in over
seventy percent of the cases, these two individuals were
separate and distinct from one another. In a majority of
cases, these agencies are also separate and organizational-

ly independent from either the fire or police departments.19
IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF INTEGRATION

The debate raged in the 1950's on whether or not an
integrated police and fire department could handle the
emergency situations of each other. The professional
organizations of the firemen (the International Associa-
tion of Fire Chiefs), in 1954, formally went on record as
being opposed to the integration of the police and fire
departments. Its companion association, the International
20

Association of Fire Fighters, in 1956, likewise passed a

resolution opposing such integration. However, the

 

19Statement by Mr. Harry Pollack, Research and
Training Associate, the International City Managers'
Association, in a letter to the author, dated June 6, 1969.

20"Why . . . Departments," pp, cit., p. 30.

53
National Board of Fire Underwriters is not opposed to the
idea of integration itself. John Neale, Chief Engineer of
the Board, stated in a speech in 1956:

Any arrangement or organization that will provide good
fire protection to a community must necessarily be
acceptable to us, and if such an arrangement can cut
the increasing costs of lggal government at the same
time, so much the better.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP), has taken no official position on the subject.
Integration has been discussed at its national conventions
but according to Mr. Horace S. Webb, Supervisor, The Center,
Research, DevelOpment, and Planning Division, no official

resolution has been passed either in support nor in dis-

agreement with the concept.22

The steadily rising costs of government, the inade-
quacy of volunteer fire forces, the insistant demands
on the part of policemen and full-time paid firemen
for a reduction in the work week, the recent tech-
nological developments in communications, transporta—
tion and other equipment, and the increased attention
to the importance of organizing to prevent fires and
crimes--all have tended to give municipal administrat-
ors reason to contemplate the feasibility of employing
""public safety officers"" who wouldzpe trained to per-
form both police and fire functions.

 

21As reported in McNeil, pp, cit., p. 61.

22Reported in a letter to the author, dated
February 26, 1969.

23International City Managers' Association,
Municipal Fire Administration (Chicago: International
City Managers' Association, 1961), p. 61.

54

Briefly, the arguments in favor of an integrated
force, other than those mentioned above, are:

1. That a certain portion of the 99 per cent of
the firemen's time not fighting fires will be put to pro-
ductive uses outside the fire station.24

2. Provide the opportunity of a challenging, stim-
ulating occupation to both police and firemen by replacing
some of the tedium of the job with worthwhile activity,
especially, in the smaller community.

3. The existence of a larger pool of personnel
adaptable to whatever the current public safety urgency
may be, rather than limited to the more infrequent major
problems of the fire or police service alone.

4. Present an opportunity to increase police pro-
tection by use of the time of the firemen for the minor
cost of retraining, equipment, and salary increases.

5. Provide for the relocation of the ground safety
director of function to aflbwer paid member of an overall
public safety orientated department.

6. Providing one central department whose sole con-
cern is the public safety of the citizens and is not con-
cerned with the internal warfare and minor disagreements

of the separated agencies.

 

4Municipal Police Administration, pp, cit., p. 64.

55

7. Thromfllpayment of higher salaries to fewer men,
it would be possible to attract a better caliber of per-
sonnel who could provide a more enlightened, imaginative
and competent service to the public.

8. Provide the opportunity for firemen to work a
schedule more favorably comparable and perhaps, healthful,
to the prevailing work weeks and conditions of other public.
employees.

9. Provide a flexible assignment base for the
public safety administrator. This would enable a certain
amount of internal assignment and provide somewhat differ-
ent experience for the employees.25

This summary of arguments in favor of an integrated
police and fire department are mainly geared to the concept
of complete integration. In order to be applicable to the
theory of partial integration, some modifications are re-
quired. However, the position is stated in the extreme,
in the attempt to allow any less degree of integration

proportionally the same advantages.

 

25These arguments have been summarized from James,
Police . . . City, pp, pip., p. 12; and McNeil, pp, pip,,
p. 91; Municipal Police Administration, pp, cit., pp. 62—
63; and, O.W. Wilson, Police Administration-Tgecond edition;

New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 254.

 

 

56

V. ARGUMENTS IN DISAGREEMENT WITH INTEGRATION

The arguments against any type of police-fire in-
tegration, as stated earlier, have been emotional and
mainly based on a traditionally orientated base. The
police, after being told that integration will probably in-
crease salaries, add very little additional work, and might
improve their public image, have still generally been
opposed to the idea, but have ppp fought integration with
the energy and bitterness of the fire service personnel.26

Firemen have done everything in their power to stop
integration in almost every city where it has been pro-
posed. The International Association of Fire Fighters pro-
vides financial and legal support to its locals fighting
integration. The issue is a real one for the firemen, for
they see in integration, the end of their profession in
its' 175 year traditional form.

The following material will be limited to those
arguments which appear to have some logical basis, or

which appear to have some significance for the military

public safety models presented in Chapter VII.

"Integpation has not worked!"

This argument is true. Leonard and dhers have

 

26"Police-Fire Integration in Michigan" (Ann Arbor:
Michigan Municipal League Information Bulletin No. 95,
December, 1960), p. 4.

57
pointed to several towns and villages that have attempted
total integration and have had to revert back to separate
departments.27 He lists approximately sixteen such comm-
unities, (see Appendix B). However, in the discussion of
these failures, he states:

It is the general consensus of opinion that the neg-
ligible number of failures maybe traced to faulty
administration and lack of an adequate appraisal

of physical and social factors, as well as other
conditégns in the community, rather than the system.

Bruce demonstrates that a number of the supposed
failures of the unified operational concept did not really
happen because the cities were never actually operating an
integrated organization. He concludes:

Where integration has failed the causes can be readily
observed: poor operational politics, inadequate pre—
paration, poor personal relationships, strong political
and union pressures, and above all, weak administration.
These particular problems are not indigenous to just
integration b29 can be observed under any form of
organization.

It seems obvious that where "integration has not
worked," a major factor has been an unstable political

atmosphere which could not ensure an adequate trial of the

plan due to weak or unwilling administrators, or the

 

27Leonard, pp, cit., p. 87.

28Ibid., p. 88.

29Howard I. Bruce, PFI, 2 Survey: Police—Fire
Integration ip the United States and Canada (Cleveland:
Cleveland Bureau of Governmental Research, 1961), pp. 74-82.

 

58
inability to maintain control of the police and fire em-
ployees involved. However, this problem has grown over
the last ten years. The increase growth in both police and
fire unions, the collective bargaining for pay increases
and shorter work weeks, coupled with the tendencies of
these two groups to call "sick" strikes in order to achieve
their demands, makes the administrator's job even that
more difficult. The solution is a difficult one at best,
and the only way the integrationist can overcome this
problem is by utilizing proper change of attitude concepts,
i.e., having the employees help with planning the change,
meetings with the employee groups and representatives, etc.

The important point to remember is that where in-
tegration has been a failure, the blame cannot be laid to
holders of the concept, but should be placed on the men who
administered the change. Experience of twenty years success
in a majority of integrated departments, provides a clue

to the solution of this problem.

 

"Response LETS.EQ fires ip increased."

. Opponents of integration argue that a fire department
must be in constant readiness to answer an alarm. A cor-
responding argument runs along the lines that the fire
apparatus must be manned at all times with enough personnel

to respond to an alarm quickly. These arguments are

59
potentially serious if the objective of integration is
improved service. It‘s validity rests on whether there are
enough patrolmen-fire fighters in relation to the total
number of police and fire incidents, the location and time
of their occurence, distributed throughout the community
to provide adequate assurance of prompt response by the
necessary number of fire fighters.

McNeil and Andrews pay particular attention to this
argument. Their research has proven that the argument has
not been supported in those communities that approach the
integration problem with a positive attitude. When the
administrators had properly planned the operations, dis-
persal of forces, and deployment of equipment, response time
was actually cut. The experiences of Winstom-Salem, North
Carolina, Oak Park, Michigan, and Glencoe, Illinois, has
shown that the public safety patrol officer arrives at the
scene either ahead or at the same time as the fire apparatus.

The placement of people and the size of the comm-
unity must also be considered in response to this argument.
Most integrated communities still maintain the volunteer
fire departments composed of people located all over the
geographical area of the community. This geographical
area is usually small--or at least significantly different
than from a huge metropolitan area. The integrationist

argument does not, and has never precluded the use of these

60
volunteer fire fighters, even the most highly organized
police force depends and often almost demands volunteer
help from the citizens of the community.30

Another portion of the answer to this argument is
the importance placed on prevention within the integrated
department. The public safety officer, through his pre-
vention role, is more aware of the dangers or potential
dangers of crime, fire, and safety hazards.. As a result,
it can be anticipated that more fires will be prevented, or
at least, detected earlier than with the non-integrated
department. Little information is available on the actual
fire loss figures from these communities. However, a
reasonable assumption can be made that the fire loss
monetary figu es have not shown an appreciable increase with
the integrated department as opposed tothe non-integrated
department.31 Aside from this argument, in the small comm—
unity where fire damage is significantly less than the larger
city but when a major fire does occur it can be proportion-
ally more disruptive. In this case, however, the whole
community would become involved with the disaster. Whether
the department was integrated or not would make little

difference.

 

30James, "Concepts . . . Integration," pp, cit., p. 196.

31Bruce, pp, cit., p. 78.

61

The final answer to this argument centers around the
common dispatching and dispersal of the public safety equip—
ment. Instead of two separate command centers (common in
the non—integrated department), the integrated department's
equipment is centrally controlled. One facility keeps track
of all men and equipment. In the case of multiple emergenc-
ies occuring at the same time, one person is able to exercise
command supervision of all resources, thereby dispatching

available units to the additional emergency.

"Overall public safety will pp neglected."

The basis for this argument rests in the fact that the
integrated department is usually headed by a police officer
who allows the fire service to deteriorate. This argument
is based on a valid assumption and must be dealt with by
a highly competent and capable public safety administrator.
The argument is further supported when the opponents to
integration point out that the high degree of proficiency
required for a public safety officer cannot be substained
over a long period of time.32

The experience of a Citizen's Research Council of
Oak Park, Michigan is relevant. In a survey of the Oak

Park Department of Public Safety, the council concluded:

It is the opinion of the Research Council, as the
result of this survey, that the citizens of Oak

 

~32McNeil, pp, cit., p. 75.

62
Park receive a substantially higher level of service
from the integrated public safety department than
would be possible for the same cost under the t d—
itionally separate police and fire departments.

Once again, the answer to the argument lies in the
employment by the integrated city of a highly professional
man who is committed to the overall objectives of the
integrated concept. This is the case in Oak Park, but has
not been the case in other cities. The difference between
the cities seems to be the reason why integration is still
working in Oak Park (and other cities), and has failed in
sixteen cities. Emphasis on training, proper internal
organization, self—inspection, and maintaining the constant

high morale of the men, seems to answer this problem.34

"Police gpp fire duties are dissimilar."

The whole concept of integration eventually must
confront this argument. It is usually the first argument to
be presented to the researcher and is usually the underlying
basis for the anti—integration argument. Glenford Leonard,

a leading proponent to the integration theory and Director

 

33Citizens Research Council of Michigan, "Public
Safety Services in Oak Park, Michigan" (Detroit: Citizens
Research Council of Michigan, May, 1956), p. 3 (mimeographed)

34Andrews, pp, cit., pp. 42-43; And McNeil, pp, 333,,
pp. 74-76. See also James, Police . . . City, pp, EiE°2 pp.
14—40, for an in depth administrative study of an inte-
grated department on the level of a small community. James
sets an administrative standard that is of interest to the
integrationist.

 

63

of Public Safety at Oak Park, has stated:
. . . the argument that police and fire services are
essentially different is purely academic; The gif-
ference is one of dynamics only. Both Lin parp/ are
emergency services, and in any3§mergency some type of
positive action must be taken.

McNeil and Andrews address this contention directly
and both reach the conclusion that sufficient benefits can
be achieved by a combination of the two services to out—
weigh the slight dissimilarities between the two.36 Ad—
ministrators interested in solving the integration task
can relocate those individuals not inclined to adapt to
both functions.

This is not meant to down play the argument, but
when the rapid rise of costs for the smaller departments is
considered, sufficient, similar grounds could conceivably
be found to justify, at least, partial integration of these
services. The answer to the National Board of Fire Under-
writers' contention that:

The real test of an integrated organization should be
whether or not the fire and police function have enough
similarity so that the use of the same men is practical.

The amount of similarity needed to make this type of 37
organizational structure feasible does not exist. . .

 

35G.S. Leonard, "A Report on the Integration of Police
and Fire Services in the City of Oak Park, Michigan," 1962,
p. 1. (mimeographed)

36McNeil, pp, cit., pp. 63-68; Andrews, pp, cit., p.
45.

37"Combining of Fire and Police DepartmentS,"

64
lies in the International City Managers' Association ap-
praisal of the integrated department:

The key to the successful operation of any police or
fire department is prevention . . . . It is exactly
here in the field of prevention, that the opportunities
for improving public safety through integration are
greatest. . . . integration3§oses no new problems to
the munICIpal administrator.

It can be readily admitted that there is a differ-
ence between the operation of a complicated piece of fire
apparatus and a patrol vehicle, between knowing the chem-
ical that fits the fire and dealing with people in face-to—
face relationships. But it must also be admitted that
there are similarities between getting a person Out of a
burning building, automobile, or airplane, and going in
after a wanted felon. A few of the similarities between
the two departments are dispatching, purchasing, personnel
administration, and vehicle maintenance. The list could
go on to some length, but the important point to be remem-
bered is that there are in existence many areas of common
interest which require common experience. Therefore, valid
arguments exist on both dises of the issue. The solution

appears to lie in thoughful planning, complete preparation,

and responsible administration.

 

Special Bulletin No. 300 (New York: National Board of Fire
Underwriters, November, 1953), p. 2.

38

Municipal Police Administration, pp, cit., p. 63.

 

65

Other contentions.

 

As stated earlier, neither the police nor the fire
services have spoken strongly in favor of the total integra-
tion theory. Police disagreement centers around the argu-
ments put forth by Leonard:

1. Policemen do not relish the idea of becoming
firemen and vice versa.

2. Patrolmen are already overloaded and the addi—
tional fire-fighting responsibilities would neutralize his
efficiency in both areas.

3. Consolidation is incompatible with sound ad-
ministrative practice and procedure.39

The first argument is probably true and can be over-
come through a variety of methods available to the public
safety administrator, i.e., retaining, education, or re-
placement. The second argument has been answered earlier in
the discussion of prevention, and the third argument does
not hold to recent administrative theory or practice on the
federal, state, or local level.40 Perhaps, this latter
argument was true ten years ago, but today with the heavy

demands on governmental activity at all levels, more and more

 

39Leonard, Police . . . Management, pp, cit., p. 85.

40Robert A. Earle,."Personnel Implications of Police-
Fire Integration," Public Personnel Review, Vol. 19, No.
3 (July, 1958), pp. 193-196.

 

66
consolidation is taking place, i.e., transit authorities,
water agencies, etc.

The other arguments usually originating with the
fire service, are:

1. Police and public safety responsibilities are.
beyond the capabilities of the firemen.

2. Specialization demands separate departments.

3. Idle time is an illusion.

4. Pensions and civil service are different.41

The research completed on the compatability of police
and firemen in Portland, Oregon, effectively answers the
first argument. The preceding discussion concerning the
similarities between the two services is in answer to the
second argument, and the third argument is not supported by
studies completed of duties on fire fighting allocation of
manhours by the International City Manager's Association.42

The fourth argument would require some legislative
amendments to present law. While this contention applies

to the entire field of governmental organizational change,

it is not an insurmountable obstacle to be erected in the

 

41See James, Police . . . City, pp, cit., pp. 5-6;
and Andrews, pp, cit., pp. 84-87.

42"Utilization of Fireman's Time," Management
Information Service Report No. 164 (Chicago: International
City Managers' Association, September, 1957), p. 2.

67
path of integration and could be included in the total
proposed integration legislative package.

Bruce sums up these arguments very well in his
evaluation of the integrated concept:

Experience in both the United States and Canada has
not borne out the contentions of the anti-integra-
tionists. Crime and fire have not run rampant.

Fire losses, insurance premiums, and crimfi3losses have
not increased as a result of unification.

A word of caution is added by Earle, when he states:

. . . integration . . . should not be undertaken hast-
ily even though the technical personnel aspects are
easily worked out. The real job . . . is going to be
acceptance to change. . . . Police-fire integration is
a departure from the customs and traditions derived
from a long history of separate police and fire depart-
ments. These customs and traditions pan be overcome
but only by an effective selling job.

Once again, the researcher is faced with the problem
of proper administration. The solution to this problem
seems to be thoughtful people interested in increasing
functional agencies while consolidating requied services.
The customs and traditions of both the police and fire de-
partments must be squarely met by the integrationist and

neutralized by thoughful research, argument, and experi—

mentation.

VI. COST FACTOR

Only two arguments, both pro and con, remain in this

 

43Bruce, pp, cit., p. 64. 44Earle, pp, cit., p. 197.

68

area of police-fire integration: reduced manpower and a
reduction in operational expenses. The discussion of the
civilian integration experiences (as opposed to military
integration), Centers around the anticipated reduction in
operational expenses, however, this reduction has not been
what the early proponents had forecasted. The reasons
for this lack of cost reduction appears to lie in a series
of reasons: first, pressure applied to public safety ad-
ministrators for pay increases; second, City Managers have
offered higher salaries to the newly hired integrated public
safety administrator; and third, the forcasted reduction in
police and fire manpower has not necessarily taken place.
The main reason for this latter failure is strong labor
negotiations with the separated departments and an increase
in unanticipated services emitting from the public safety
department. ‘3

However, these deficiencies in the integrationist
argument are met with cost reductions in fields that are
not strongly felt by the city budget: conversion of cars
for administrators, reduction in fire insurance premiums,
adoption of a single uniform, and consolidation of facilities.
These are long term benefits that must be taken into con-
sideration by the department planning to integrate and
currently maintaining two or more facilities. The like-

lihood that these separate facilities will continue to be

69

manned until new facilities are built--as a result of
normal depreciation--is very high. This short time diffi-
culty should not detour from the anticipated long range
benefits.45

The City of Sunnyvale, California (integrated in
1950), has estimated its savings to be approximately twenty
per cent in the operational field, ten per cent in fire
insurance premiums on private dwellings, and between six
to twenty-two per cent in fire insurance premiums on in-
dustrial buildings. The city is still maintaining two
separate police and fire stations, but they have consolid-
ated the communications, desk, records, administrative
offices, classrooms, and kitchens. This consolidation has
enabled more sworn police officers to be placed in the public
safety uniform along with previously ill-utilized firemen.
As a result, Sunnyvale has not had a recruitment problem in
either field, whereas, previously they were constantly under-

manned.46

 

45R. Bruce Holmgren, "Fire and Police Integration:
Improvement or Impairment?," Mayors and Manager's Magazine,
(April, 1958), p. 5. See also, H.G. Pope, "Organization
of Fire and Police Service in Small Cities," Public Man-
agement, XXXIII, No. 5 (May, 1951), p. 103.

46H.K.'Hunter,. "An Integrated Public Safety Depart-
ment," Public Management, XXXIII, No. 5 (May, 1951), pp.
105-107; and "Begins Fourth Year of Combined Fire and
Police Service," Public Management, XXXV, No. 8 (August,
1953), p. 207.

 

Mr. Jessup, City Manager of Sunnyvale, listed the
following as goals for the integrated department:

1. A 20 to 25% saving in personnel and equipment
costs.

2. Shorter working hours and better pay for better

trained men.

3. A saving in having one headquarters building
instead of two.

4. Greater efficiency through a single adminis-
tration.

5. Elimination of wasteful competition and jealosy

of the two departments.
6. A greater pool of tiained manpower for any
emergency--police or fire.

As can be easily seen, with shorter work weeks,

70

higher pay, more money offered to administrators, and better

equipment, the cost factor will tend to remain the same in
proportion to the population growth of the community. The
importance of the cost factor is that the reverse did not
happen-~costs for public safety did not increase. Herein
lies the key to the administrator. He is able to keep his

budget in line with previous budgets, while other depart-

ments are asking for an increase. This factor becomes

increasingly important when the military problems are dis-

cussed and will be dealt with more extensively at that time.

VII. SUMMARY

The concept of police-fire integration has been

 

47Jacob A. Jessup, "The Sunnyvale Public Safety

Department: A Study in Integration," Police, Vol. 1
(November-December, 1956), pp. 36-40.

71
discussed in this chapter with the emphasis placed on the
arguments for and against the concept. Three theoretical
organizational models were defined--administrative integration,
partial integration, and complete integration. By studying
the political, social, and economic setting of the public
safety clientele, the adminiStrator is given a choice from
which to adopt the consolidation needed or necessary for the
community. Successfully integrated communities illustrated

these theoretical models.

CHAPTER IV
INTERNAL POLICE CONSOLIDATION

The preceding chapter dealt with the major move-
ment of the 1900's in the realm of public safety consolida-
tion theory. The emphasis of this chapter concerns other
movements which have gained the attention of administrators
during this century, especially during the last two decades.
These movements have crossed the public safety spectrum:
from attempts to consolidate regional communications, to
attempts to bring outlying populated areas under a central
government body. The last chapter isolated three models
of police-fire integration, from which advantages and dis-
advantages were discussed. The complete integration model
was used in the arguments to insure any less attempts at
public safety consolidation would result in an effective
compromise.

The same format will be used in this chapter, only
the types of movements surveyed will be varied. First, an
overview of the metropolitan concept adopted by the Toronto
area for governing its huge population center will be exam-
ined. Second, the contract arrangements undertaken by the
Los Angeles Sheriff's Department and the Connecticut State
Police will be examined. Finally, other types of regional

and multi-county attempts at public safety integration will

73

be discussed.
I. METROPOLITAN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

The concept of joining together several govern-
mental entities under one centralized body has appealed
to administrators since the turn of the century. Such men
as Virgil W. Peterson, Gordon E. Misner, and Thomas Reed,
have given their total life to this concept. The reason
for this dedication is very simple: these men believe that
one government in a geographical area will be able to pro—
vide better service for less tax dollar.

Misner points out that in our 174 Standard Metropolit-
an Areas (as defined by the U.S. Bureau of Census in 1950),
there are apprOximately 15,658 separate units of local
government. Of these fifteen thousand plus units, approxi-
mately 3,600 are involved with at least a portion of the
police business. Therefore, in each metropolitan area
there are an average of more than twenty police agencies,
all engaged in the same quest or goal (protection of life
and property and prevention of crime), and, for the most
part, overlapping each other in various ways.’1

Peterson, summarized the arguments for metropolitan

 

1Misner, "Recent Developments in the Metropolitan
Law Enforcement," Vol. 50, No. 2, op. cit., p. 500.

74
government or metropolitan police agencies, when he spoke
about the Cook County, Illinois, situation:

The presence of hundreds of autonomous local police
agencies with personnel totaling several thousands
within a relatively small geographic area naturally
results in gross duplication of effort and equipment
as well as frequent conflict of authority and con-
fusion . . . . It prevents intelligent administration
and direction of available manpower engaged in law
enforcement in the community. It miliEates against
efficiency and is extremely expensive.

Thomas Reed, another pioneer in the metropolitan
concept, has given further reason for the local adminis-
trator to be interested in this type of municipal con-
solidation concept. Reed lays the blame for the problems
faced by the urban core areas at the feet of the old upper
and new middle classes when he stated:

. . . brains and leadership of many a city have dis-
qualified themselves from doing anything for the good
government of the city by moving into the suburbs so
that the city is threaten d not only with financial
but political bankruptcy.

The arguments for the integration of several closely
gathered governmental agencies or entities under one

centralized unit, centers around efficiency, effectiveness,

and subsequently, better service. These arguments closely

 

2Virgil W. Peterson, "Issues and Problems in Metro-
politan Area Police Service," Journal of Criminal Law, Crim-
inolo , ppp Police Science, Vol. 48, N37 2 (July-August,
1957), p. 128. '

 

 

3Thomas H. Reed, "Progress in Metropolitan Integ-
ration," Public Administration Review, Vol. 9, No. 1

(Winter, 1949), p. 2.

75
resemble those put forth in favor of police—fire integration

within the smaller governmental entities.

Early_attempts.

The first attempt to consolidate into the metropolitan
form of government was in Altanta, Georgia, in 1912. How-
ever, this attempt was not successful until 1949. At that
time the City of Altanta and Fulton County combined forces
into the Metropolitan City of Altanta. The police forces
were never completely consolidated as there still exists
two separate police forces servicing the area: the metro-
politan force and Fulton Sheriff's Department. However,
these are the only two forces today as compared with six-
teen separate agencies before consolidation.4

The next attempt at a metropolitan system for gov-
ernment in the United States took place in the City and
County of Alameda, California, in 1916. This attempt has
been frustrated, however, by the voters' reluctance to pass
the enabling legislation.

Reed, slightly disturbed by the failure of the
Greater Boston area, in 1930, to create a metropolitan gov-
ernment, stated:

No Republican legislature was willing to risk the en-
largement of a city which it believed would continue

 

4Peterson, pp, cit., p. 130.

76

to be dominated by Mayor Curley with whose political
arts no ""Proper Bostonian""has been able to compete.

While this argument might be somewhat emotionally
based, attempts prior to 1949 at metropolitan government
failed because of political considerations. One method
that seems to have worked is the system employed by the
State of Virginia. In this scheme, still metropolitan
in philosophy, the state has delegated the power of annexa-
tion to a panel of three judges. This power enables the
annexation of land adjacent to a larger urban center. Of
course, many legal guarantees are preserved, but the benefit
is still the same: the smaller community is brought under
the jurisdiction of the larger community. This is completed
without the political in-fighting and back stabbing that

occurs in bitter metropolitan referendums.6

Baton Rou e, Lousiana attempt and concept.

 

The municipality and county of Baton Rouge, Lousiana,
underwent a unique form of metropolitan government in 1949.
The city, a large urban labor town, is situated in a bowl
surrounded by valleys and hills. Its growth and ability

to expand is, thereby severly limited by natural obstructions.

 

5Reed, pp, cit., p. 3.

6Ibid., pp. 6-8. Also, Chester.W..Bain, "Annexation:
Virginia's Not-So-Judicial System," Public Administration
Review, Vol. XV, No. 4 (Autumn, 1955), pp. 251-262,

77
After World War II, the city underwent many changes: mass
emigration, maSs exodus of the wealthier people to the
outlying areas, and an increase in industrial construction.
Ruse and exploitation of a lax political situation, according
to Reed, permitted planners to achieve passage of both a
resolution and a constitutional amendment allowing the city-
county consolidation scheme. Under this plan, three separate
areas were established: the urban area with its own police
and fire departments, the rural area with its sheriff, and the
industrial area with its own hired industrial security
personnel. All of these areas are centrally controlled
and administered by the metropolitan government. Reed is
of the opinion that no other community has attempted a

plan so radical.7

Metropolitan Toronto Concept.

As a reSult of a study conducted in the early 1950's,
thirteen municipalities joined with the City of Toronto.
and formed the leading example of a metropolitan government
that exists today. This consolidation of effort was under-
taken because of a failure on the part of the separate
governments to provide certain public safety services for
their people, and partly because of deficiencies found in

the inter-municipal agreements.

 

7Reed, pp, cit., p. 5.

78

The created metropolitan government is directly
responsible to the Ontario Provincial Legislature. An
appointed five man board of Police Commissioners oversee
the police operation and are a part of the metropolitan
government. Of course, not all the communities have ex-
pressed agreement with this arrangement, but improved
police service since the consolidation has pacified almost
all the dissenters.8 The President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, in its
report, states the following:

Staff and auxiliary service are now provided by the
metropolitan police department in a degree that would
have been impossible even under partial merger. A
14-week recruit-training program is provided where
prior to amalgamation only two departments had recruit
training programs. Centralized communications is a
reality. Records are centralized and central investig-
ation is provided for all jurisdictions.

One measure of the effectiveness of the consolidated
police department is the rate of crime clearances. In
1957, the clearance rate for major offenses was 39.5
per cent; in 1965, it was 46.2 per cent . . . . the
police budget has risen from $11.6 million in 1956 to
27.7 million in 1966, or approximately 140 per cent.
Total expenditures for fire protection, still a municipgl
function, have risen, however, by a greater percentage.

 

8Misner, pp, cit., "Recent Developments in Metro-
politan Law Enforcement, Vol. 51, No. 2, p. 267. See also,
Winston W. Crouch, "Metropolitan Government in Toronto,"
Public Administration Review, XIV, No. 2 (Spring, 1954),
pp. 85-95, for a list of positive and negative considera—
tions of the Toronto experiement.

9Task Force: The Police, pp, cit., pp. 102—103.

79

The success of the experiment in Toronto and the
failure of American cities to attain such a record (Metro-
politan Dade County and the Metropolitan Nashville—Davidson
County forces),10 seems to be that the federalized concept
of Canadian government created a 'top-down' administrative
structure. In other words, the direction of the department
comes from outside the local community.

The federated form of government in the Toronto area
provides some possible approaches to achievement of com-
prehensive reorganization in this country, and the suc-
cess of the consolidated law enforcement program de-
monstrates that a total system approach is possible.

It should be borne in mind, however, that comprehensive
reorganization in the United States depends upon local
participation in the decisions to change the structure
of government, whereas it is agcomplished by the pro-
vincial government in Canada.

In other words, this success is very similar to the
success story of the State of Virginia: success can usually
be achieved providing the conxxfizis put into the hands of
an authority divorced from the local pressures and con-
flicts of the concerned community. In answer to the critics
of metropolitan success (mainly, those who are also support-
ers of the home-rule theory), Reed stated one of the greatest

enemies of the right to "self-governments is the pertetua-

tion of situations in which political units are unable to

 

iosee Ibid., pp. 102-103; and Reed, pp, cit., p. 4;
for a discussion of the failure within these two agencies.

“Lise Ew_c_e_=. Iie__Police. 22- _c.1.' t., p. 103.

80
supply the services and facilities essential to modern
living."12 These authors would then support, at a time when
this condition seems eminent, the involvement of a higher
authority, as in the Canadian and Virginia examples.

The advantages and benefits derived from a metro-
politan form of goverment, or at least a consolidated metro—
politan police force seems, therefore, to be increased law
enforcement effectiveness (reduction in the crime problem)
by: 1) the elimination of overlapping, duplicating, and
conflicting police agencies through merger or consolidation,
2) holding local police departments accountable to the
State for the maintenance of proper standards, 3) vesting
primary control over the police in a board established at
a higher governmental level, but responsive to the local
level through the city council and citizen committees, and
4) integration and coordination of the efforts of police

and prosecuting agencies.
II. CONTRACT LAW ENFORCEMENT

Briefly, this is a system whereby a larger entity,
either a city, sheriff's, or state police agency, will reach
an agreement with the local town or village government to

provide law enforcement service. The obligations of the

 

12Reed, pp, cit., p. 7.

 

81
town are to pay a specified price for law enforcement
personnel contracted from the larger department. There are
in existence today several forms of contract law enforcement.
Two agreements of special note are the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department (which received authorization to con-
tract with the smaller towns in Los Angeles County for such
services), and the Connecticut State Police, which has
instituted a program they call the Connecticut Resident
Police System. Under this latter program, officers are

hired and reside permanently in the contracting town.

Resident Police System.

Under this plan, forty-six towns in Connecticut,
ranging in size from 1,000 to 17,000, have entered into an
agreement with the Connecticut State Police for law enforce-
ment service. The state legislature controls the program
in two ways: first, by establishing a criteria for the
municipality wishing to enter into the contract, and
second, by limiting the number of cities which might enter
into the contractual agreement by budgetary controls. The
State Police resident patrol officer is given complete law
enforcement jurisdiction in the town and maintains a post
in the community. He is responsible for all criminal matters
that occur in the town, and is usually the only law enforce-

ment agent in the community.13

 

13Leonard, pp, cit., pp. 89-90, 322-326.

82
Leonard reports that the citizens of the contractual
communities like the system and agree that it is working
very well. He also reports that "towns people involved are
impressed with the fact that for a nominal sum, the services
of the professionally trained and well equipped Connecticut

State Police are readily available."14

ceunty §p_pggy,centracts.
The most notable success in this area has been the

contract law enforcement system of Los Angeles County. It
began in 1954, with the incorporation of the City of Lake—
wood, and is the largest application of city—county police
cooperation in the United States. In theory, it represents
-all of the positive benefits that can filter to the law
enforcement enterprise from the metropolitan government
scheme. This is pointedly brought to mind when it is con-
sidered that today one out of every three persons receiving
law enforcement services from the Sheriff of Los Angeles
County is a resident of an incorporated city.’15

The greatest single advantage of the contractual

agreement is that the larger organization is able to pro-

 

141pm.

15Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department,
"Contractual Law Enforcement," (Los Angeles: Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department, 1968), p. 1. (mimeographed)

83

vide professional-specialized services, administering to
the overall area crime situation, and yet is flexible
enough to meet the needs of the local community. The arr—
angement calls for the community wishing to contract with
the Sheriff's Department to disband its own police force
(if it has one), and specify the number of patrols it wants.
The contracting city must pay all the expenses of the patrol
force. The basic patrol unit is one-man car for daylight
hours and a two-man car for the hours of darkness. In
1967, each unit cost $119,486.

Leonard reports that a majority of officials in
the Los Angeles metropolitan area support the present
contract law enforcement agreement. Basically, they see the
following benefits: 1) economy, 2) professionally trained
personnel on the job, 3) immediate availability of emerg-
ency re-enforcements, 4) completely equipped radio patrol
cars, 5) unbiased, non-partisan service, 6) ready access-
ibility to specialized law enforcement services, 7) no

personnel problems, and 8) no capital outlay.16

III. OTHER CONSOLIDATION ARRANGEMENTS

Many attempts have been made by administrators at

the local level to consolidate municipal services within

 

4..

16Leonard, pp, cit., pp. 88-89.

 

84
limited geographical areas. The early history of the
development of the western states is replete with examples;
the school districts that cross local jurisdictional lines.
The folklore of the "Western" suggests an early effort at
internal cooperation between the sheriff and the U.S.
Marshal.

This latter example, even though glamorized in the
motion picture industry, was the first attempt made by the
Federal Government to eliminate the problems of the 'mobile
criminal'. This mobility concern has lead to the develop-
ment within the law enforcement system of many different
means of consolidation of effort. Some striking examples
would be the Interstate Compact, where drivers from agreeing
states are listed on a master file by license and violation;
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's fingerprint file and
related requirements; and, the recent intra-and-inter-
state agreements concerning the exchange of criminal in-
vestigative information and parole agreements.

However, of more concern to this study are the
arrangements currently being instituted on the local level
with the explicit purpose of increasing the effectiveness
of the police forces while reducing the costs of law en-
forcement services to the community. These internal attempts
at consolidation fall into two categories: auxiliary

services, and staff services.

Auxiliary Services.

Record systems, communication systems, crime labor-
atories, and detention facilities and manpower, are law
enforcement functions included in this category. The
detention problem is included even though the correctional
problems are not part of this project, because many small
departments find themselves maintaining at least some type
of temporary detention facility as part of their normal
day-to-day task.

The attraction of having a centralized records
bureau, at least on the county level, has the appeal of re-
ducing the overall administrative costs involved with
managing any government agency. As a result, several de-
partments have successfully attempted some form of records
consolidation during the past five years. EEEE Force: 222.
Police, details an extensive study of those departments
and the systems they employ.’17

The advent of the computer and the high cost of its
operation has facilitated the consolidation movement and
hindered the local control argument. The technological
advances made within the last ten years in the area of
overall administrative practices, has enabled the easy

consolidation of law enforcement records by local

 

“Term 282221122, 22- _c_it.. pp. 82-86.

86

governments long opposed to such movements. An example
would be the city and county of Denver, Colorado, where the
metropolitan concept of government has gone down to defeat
three times in the last fifteen years. However, this area
has adopted a centralized criminal records system that is
an example used by other Western states.18

A consolidated records system has considerable
attraction to the public safety administrator, but the
arrangement must be approached with considerable caution
and thoughtful planning.’19

This same generalization holds true for any con-
solidation attempt in the area of communications, criminal-
istics, or detention facilities. All of these areas have
been explored in detail in the President's Commission re—
ports, so will not be examined in this report. The import-
ance to the administrator who is interested in increasing
law enforcement effectiveness, while attempting to reduce
total operational costs, is that with the rising cost of
auxiliary services, some thought must be given to the

consolidation concept. This thought, however, must include

sufficient planning and administrative preparation to

 

18Reed, pp, cit., p. 9.

19O. W. Wilson, "Police Records: Their Installation
and Use," (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1942),
p. 8-10; for a discussion of the cautions involved in ad-
ministrative consolidation.

87
enable the eventual consolidation effort to prove workable.
Staff Services.

The commonly thought of definition and listing for
staff services of law enforcement agencies will be followed
in this discussion: personnel'management, purchasing, train-
ing, planning and programming, internal security and
intelligence, and finally, information or public relations.

The discussion in the President's Commission report
details arguments for and against the consolidation of these
agencies within the same governmental agency (some police
precincts or districts enjoy having their own staff agencies),
and between contiguous governmental jurisdictions.20 These
arguments will not be detailed in this report because
their basis has already been established: through careful
planning and proper preparation, a considerable savings
in money and manpower can be achieved, while allowing an
increase in service to the local taxpayer.

However, some staff services are amenable to con-
solidation and some are not. Services such as intelligence,
training, personnel selection and recruitment should be
considered as fertile areas for consolidation.

Services such as planning and programming,

 

20For the reader who is interested in a detailed
report on the entire field of administrative consolidation
see, Task Force: The Police, op. cit., pp. 73-82.

88
information or public relations, internal security, and
personnel management are not as amenable to consolidation.
This is not to say that some of the tasks from each of
these functions cannot be done in combination with other
departments, but only to imply that all of these areas are
usually the special concern of the police chief or the
police executive. In the area of information or public
relations, the chief desires that his own agency be put
constantly before the public--image making. Attempts to
consolidate this function at a level above the local police
executive would only result in a dissatisfied department
and public because the chief would lose control of this
publicity or public relations function.

Of course, internal security or staff inspections
can easily be consolidated above the level of the local
police chief. This, however, would not provide the chief
with the benefical information as it would probably be
controlled by an outside administrator. Positive advant-
ages for consolidation of the functions, i.e., having
independent personnel, unknown to the concerned department,
inspecting the internal security or workings of the de-
partment, are felt to be outweighed by the lack of co-
operation and degree of hostility that the inspectors would
meet within the department.

When the integration of staff services is undertaken

89
utilizing several separate law enforcement agencies, the
probability of success for the integrationist would seem
to exist only if he first considers the local political
climate,thoroughly prepares and documents his case, and

establishes realistic limitations on his designs.
IV . SUMMARY

Metropolitan municipal government, contract law
enforcement, and other internal police consolidation
attempts have been examined in this chapter. This analysis
revealed that whatever method to reduce operational costs
while maintaining or increasing the operational effective-
ness of the agency, is selected by the public safety ad-
ministrator, thoughful consideration must be given to the
political, social, and economic spheres of the community.
The importance of these attempts at internal police con-
solidation lies in the fact that they have, for the most
part, been undertaken during the decline of the police-fire
integration concept and the increasing emigration to the
central urban areas. Successful attempts to internally
consolidate police services illustrated the theoretical

concept.

CHAPTER V
THE INTEGRATED INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MODEL

The final organizational structure to be examined
in the attempt to determine a model from which the military
public safety enterprise might benefit, is the integrated
industrial security program. While this program is limited
in size and is usually controlled by the business side of
the public safety economy, it is considered applicable to the
current discussion because it pulls together all facets of
the public safety definition: safety, disaster control,
fire, police, and explosive ordnance disposal (usually only

in the larger plants).
I. THE CONCEPT AND THE LITERATURE

Usually, when the discussion turns to industrial
security, the observer is confronted with the idea of a
pipe-smoking, semi-conscious, almost retired guard, station-
ed at a gate or at the beginning of a long corridor with his
feet propped on a desk. While this was the case prior to
the beginning of the Second World War, interest and motiva-
tion have been inputed into this image since. With the
increase in war production, industrial security demands
have skyrocketed. The industrial security program has

evolved during the last two decades into an effective

91
enterprise which has cleared the path for technological
advancement.1 The old guard is replaced with closed—circuit
television monitors and cameras; the gate is replaced with
identification cards sensitized to electrcial current; and,
the desk has been replaced with a complex console from
which the controller can observe and monitor all public

safety phases of the company.

Transition pp pp Integrated Concept.

 

This transition has not been without its share of
critics or opponents. However, the transition has success-
fully lead the way for the experimentation of personal
control devices, the advance of alarm systems of all types,
and the influx of young and eager men into a field pre-
viously held by an older age group. Healy, a leader in
this technological adaption to the industrial security

program, in his recent book, Design for Security, details

 

an integrated design for the entire public safety respon-
sibility of a company, plant, or factory. Healy assumes
that the public safety responsibility will be delegated to
a director of public safety and that the employees be memb-
ers of this one department. He makes this assumption be-
cause technology has taken much of the routine and tedious

tasks away from the security guard, thereby, allowing him to

 

1"Tightening Up Industrial Security," Business Week,
(October 15, 1960), p. 183.

92

be trained in a multi-functional position.

A vast majority of the literature available deals
extensively with the kinds of equipment and procedures to
be employed in the industrial security setting. However,
Buckley, a total integrationist, has done considerable
writing on the question of integration within industrial
security. He has expressed a strong belief that the answer
to the question of how to provide a higher quality industrial
security organization is the integration of fire, police,
and other closely related functions under the direction of
one man, a security director. "Only an integrated organiza-
tion with a defined area of responsibility can do the total

job with any degree of efficiency."3

Dollar Epppp
The importance placed on this field--the reason for
the technological advances and adaption of the total inte-
gration concept--has been the prevention of a dollar loss
to the company. Buckley supports this, when he says:
What is urgently needed is an integrated approach to

loss prevention by encouraging management to consolidate
the various functions under a professional industrial

 

2Richard J. Healy, Desi n For Security (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968), pp. —3- 4.
. 3John L. Buckley, "The High Cost of Pilferage, "
Law and Order, XI (October, 1963), p. 35.

 

93
security manager.

In addition to the normally integrated functions,
Buckley would have added the following: safety, control of
proprietory information, insurance, industrial salvage,
emergency planning, and mutual aid.

From the organizational point of view it is very dif—
ficult to separate the duties of the plant protection
officer from the duties of the fire prevention special-
ist, security or safety specialists. All of these
people strive toward Ehe same objective-~the prevention
of loss In all forms.

Norton has expressed the thought that perhaps the
question of integrated security functions is being over-
looked. According to him, although conditions may dictate
the desirability and necessity of having a separate fire
department, in other cases it is no longer necessary.

Though a company may have had a fire department for years,
perhaps, it would do well to look at the overall problem,
asking, "Do we really need a company fire department?" Just
because a company, a plant, or a factory has had a fire
department for a long period of time, does not seem to be
sufficient reason for stating that it currently requires one.

Perhaps, the entire department could be replaced with one

well-trained fire inspector.

 

.4John L-.Buckley,."Industrial.Security," Best in:

surance News Fire and Casualty Edition, LXXX (January,

i§E§77"T‘T667"‘

SIbid.

94
A careful review of our industrial situations could
well reveal that one well—trained fire inspector or
marshal would suffice to étay abreast of all hazardous
SItuatIons In our plants.

Ideally, with the adoption of this plan by the non-
integrated company, firemen would be freed to perform other
public safety tasks. However, this might not always be the
case. The individual situation must be examined in detail
for special hazards within the plant, and the absence of a
close, well-trained, and well-equipped fire (municipal)
department to the company. In either case, the situation
might demand the maintenance of a separate force directed
by the director of security.

An actual economic gain for the company being pro-
tected is the basis for the writing by Heinlein. He stated
that an evaluation will show a close relationship exists
between fire, accident, and other losses, and the rising
costs of insurance, downtime, and other financial drains
which the company must meet. It is simply good business,

Heinlein states, for the company to take a fresh look at

the integrated plant security program.7

Same Purpose.

 

 

6John J. Norton, "The Security Executive Must
be a Businessman, Tool," Industrial Security, V (April,
1961), p. 20.

7

Karl W. Heinlein, "Why We Think Professional Guards
Cut Security Costs," Pulp and Paper, XXXV (April 3, 1961),
p. 35.

95
The National Fire Protection Association has dis-
played a vieWpoint which favors the non-integrated fire and
police function in industry, however, they do recognize
that their purposes are the same; namely, the prevention
of all forms of loss to the company which they service.
Their argument in favor of the non-integrated'program is
more moderate than the argument put forth by other fire
associations concerning police—fire integration on a
municipal level. According to the N.F.P.A. the key deter-
minant in selecting the degree of specialization needed in
industrial security, especially with regard to fire pro-
tection and prevention, is the size of the establishment
being protected.
The larger the plant or multi-plant organization is,
naturally the more elaborate will be its organizational
structure, and probably the more need there will be for
particular expertness ig such specialists as the
Manager of Fire Safety.
When speaking of the functions of the plant guard,
the NFPA expresses the principle that the guard's most
important job is the detection of fire. However, they do

not support the contention that this concern should be

combined with the actual role of the fireman in fighting a

 

. 8National Fire P rotection Association, Portable,
and Manual Fire Control Equipment (vol. VIII of National
FIre Codes. 10 vols.; Boston: National Fire Protection
Association, 1963), p. 6M-2. ’

 

96

fire:

In the average industrial plant, the greatest import-

ance of the guard's (or watchman's) rounds is his

service to fire protection rather than plant security

as such.

Job requirements must be developed for plant guards

who must be fully trained in all the required techniques.

It should be noted that these job requirements, while

necessarily including prompt notificati n, in many

cases should not include fire fighting.

The question of integration or non-integration of

the public safety responsibilities is left up to the part-
icular organization by the National Industrial Conference
Board. To them, the fact that one security organhation is
integrated, while another is not, does not provide an example
of either a bad or a good situation. However, they indicat-
ed that in those industrial security organizations which
are not integrated, the guards find it necessary to share
some of the responsibility of fire protection and pre-
vention.

While many companies do not incorporate fire pro-

tection and prevention under the plant protection

chief, partically all companies emphasize these

functions of plant protection and provide spesial
training and instruction in fire prevention.

 

9Ibid., p. 6M—13.

loNational Industrial Conference Board, Industrial
Security, 2;, Plant Guard Handbook (Studies in Business
Policy No. 64. New York: National Industrial Conference
Board, 1953), p. 27-. See.also, National Industrial
Conference.Board, Industrial Security';, Combating Sub-
version and Sabotage (Studies in Business Policy No. 60.
New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1952).

 

 

97

Examples p£_Integrated and Non-Integrated Plants.

 

 

The General Electric Everdale plant is an example of
a non-integrated industrial security organization, detail-
ed by Davis. .He states that the operation of this plant is
so specialized that they had two complete separate patrol
forces; one for police functions and the other for fire

11 An example of the integrated

protection and prevention.
department can be found in Healy's book or in an article

by Jahn, who, as security manager for the Westinghouse De-
fense Center, brought together under one security manager:
visitor control, classified documents control, security
education, security policies, practices and procedures,
police, and fire protection. No separate fire department
is maintained as such, however, the company does employ two

fire specialists on a force composed of mostly general

patrolmen and supervisors.12
II . EVALUAT ION

The argument for or against the integration of the
public safety agencies within the industrial security pro-
gram seems to stop whenever costs enter the picture. The

main thrust of the argument against integration lies in the

 

 

. ~ 11James A. Davis, "Plant Security," Industrial
Security, V (July, 1962), p. 10.
12

Francis X. Jahn, "Industrial Security Planning
a Total Protection Concept," Industrial Security, VII
(October, 1963), p. 28.

98
contention by the fire protection associations that only
firemen should be allowed to fight fires. Nothing is
said, or was found, which disagrees with the administration
consolidation concept-—the creation of a director of sec-
urity whose responsibilities include the fire protection
people.

Kettler completed a study five years ago based upon
the evaluation of two industrial security organizations.
In one company the public safety agencies were all inte-
grated under one director (complete integration), with one
man being both security guard and fire protection special-
ist. In the second company, the personnel were specialized
into the separate fields but, placed under the direction of
the Chief, Plant Protection. He concluded from this limited
study, that more research was needed but that the figures
indicate a noticable depreciation in costs-~both dollar loss
and operational expenses--in the integrated department.13

The attraction of the industrial security model to
the public safety integrationist is limited by the actual
size of the working organizations and the involvement of

private business in the concern for efficiency of operation.

 

13Gordon W. Kettler, "A Comparative Study of the
Effectiveness and Efficiency of Integrated and Non-Inte-
grated Industrial Security Organizations" (unpublished
Master's thesis, Michigan State University, East Lansing,
Michigan, 1964), pp. 120-121.

99
However, the theory that elements of public safety can be
consolidated effectively under a central direction is still
valid. Perhaps, time is at hand to experiment with this
type of an organization on a much larger scale—~a scale
that is faced with day-to-day, "normal" public safety

emergencies.
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The preceding three chapters have discussed three
conceptual models for public safety integration: police-
fire integration within a small community, internal con-
solidation within police agencies, and the integrated in-
dustrial security operation of private industry. Con-
clusions reached from this research are:

1. Within the realm of police-fire integration,
some form of consolidation ofeffort seems to be supported
by the experience of cities and towns within which the
concept has proven successful. Two very important pre—
requisites must be adhered to, however, before any attempt
is made to integrated these two agencies:—

a. The integrationist, or the committee re-
commeding the consolidation attempt, must conduct an ex—
tensive study of the community. This research must include
the political, social, and economic base of the community,

coupled with an in depth personnel study of the separate

100

departments.

b. The theory, concept, and philosophy, must
be introducted to the community and the departments through
proper administrative means. In other words, the community
must be prepared to acknowledge the benefits as well as
the disadvantages to consolidation. The personnel in the
departments must be throughly briefed, trained, and
tested on their new function before the final changes to the
organization structure are completed.

2. The administrator hired to oversee the oper-
ations of the consolidated force must be a man of high-
integrity, not necessarily from the police enterprise, who
understands and supports the integration concept.

3. The individual community must decide the type
of integration that is necessary for its public safety
agencies. The choice in organizational models should be
made between either administrative, partial, or complete
integration. The community must also determine what con-
trols it will exercise over the agency.

Essentially, the community between 1,000 and 100,000
is faced with a choice of whether they desire the same type
of public safety efficiency or whether they desire an
agency which is highly-trained, effective, capable, and
structured to provide a better service for the same

amount of money expended.

101

The following chapter describes the organization of
the various public safety elements of the United States Air
Force and their internal organizational structure. Inter-
views and statistics were gathered from four Air Force bases
which indicate problems which confront Air Force public
safety administrators. These probhems will be analyzed to
determine whether or not the research completed in this
present chapter has any applicability. Alternative models
for integration of some form of public safety integration
can then be established which will meet the criteria defined
earlier: reduction in costs while providing an improved

service.

CHAPTER VI

PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES

AIR FORCE PUBLIC SAFETY ELEMENTS

The major emphasis of this paper up to this point
has been a concentration on those models which have been
successful in civilian public safety integration. This
chapter will leave that area and explore the organization-
al structure of the United States Air Force public safety
elements. Emphasis has been placed on those public safety
elements defined earlier in this paper: Security Police,
Fire Department, Disaster Control, Ground Safety, and
Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The following chapter will
draw this organization into alternative models taken from

the civilian experience.
I. GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

The United States Air Force is basically divided
into two different types of commands: combat and support.
Strategic Air Command (SAC), Tactical Air Command (TAC),

and Aerospace Defense Command (ADC), are examples of the

 

1This discussion uses as it's basis Air Force Manual
26-2, "Organization Policy and Guidance" (Washington:
Department of the Air Force, 15 March 1966), pp. 1-32; and
includes, for matters of simplicity, the "separate operating
commands and other agencies" under the general title of
support commands.

103
combat commands. Other related functions, such as Air
Weather Service, Air Force Communications Service, Air

Force Academy, etc., are generally referred to as support

 

commands.

Each of the combat commands contain some elements of
support, i.e., a SAC bomb wing will contain personnel and
equipment necessary for the wing to accomplish its mission.
The wing's primary home is usually an Air Force installation.
The installation contains the facilities and personnel
necessary to support the wing. While these people and
facilities are not directly under the bomb wing '5 command-
er, they are controlled by a base commander, who is respon-
sible to the wing commander and sits in a co-equal position
with various other commanders on the wing staff. The wing
commander is responsible to the next higher organizational

element--often the air division commander.

Dual DeputyOrganization.

The dual deputy system is the current organizational
philosophy followed by all Air Force organizations. The
structure consists of a wing (or higher) commander who has
two deputies--one for the operations of the unit (mission)
and one for the material (mission support). Figure 1
illustrates this organizational structure. The base com-
mander might also have a staff organized along these guide-

lines.

COMMANDER '
VICE COMMANDER

104

 

 

 

 

rINFORMATIONj

 

g

“‘DEPUTY COMMANDER 1

 

FOR OPERATIONS
(Mission Element)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SAFETY

1 ,
DEPUTY COMMANDER
FOR MATERIAL

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

' INTELLIGENCE COMMS & LOGISTICAL‘
I I ELCTS I W PLANS
E 1
STAN & EVAL OPERATIONS
PLANS
_ [IS - I1 I
SUPPLY ' I MAINT l
.0 0. -
. f _L
lpOPERATIONS TRAINING
*MISSI N
SQUADRONS
. [I L
HOSPITAL/ SUPPORT GROUP/
DISPENSARY SOUADRON

 

 

 

 

 

‘Includes base engine management function

"Functional squadrons as required

FIGURE 1

WING/GROUP ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

SINGLE WING/GROUP BASE

105

The informal structure of a combat wing delegates
the base commander, even though he is a co-equal to the
deputy commanders, to a lower position than the deputy
commanders. While this lower position is only one of
speculation, the fact is evident when the mission and the
primary responsibility of the wing commander is considered:
The flying (or missile) mission has first priority in the
Air Force for personnel and equipment, therefore, the
emphasis is on the whole-hearted support to that mission
from the base commander.

The organization becomes further complicated when
there are two or more wings, with combat missions, assign—
ed to one installation. This in effect, creates several
commanders, each responsible to a higher commander in equal
status. In other words, the combat commanders and the base
commander are responsible to their respective wing or air
division commanders. In the informal setting, the air
division commander, being responsible for the total combat
mission, is more concerned with his wing commanders and their

problems than with the host base commanders problem's.

The Base Commander.
This paper is concerned with those divisions re-
sponsible to the base commander which are involved with

the public safety of the installation. As has been shown,

106
the base commander is responsible for the overall mainten-
ance of the installation regardless of mission. He is also
responsible for the supplies necessary to sustain the various
units on the installation, whether they be combat or sup-
port, the common facilities of an installation (Clubs,
commissary, exchanges, theater, housing, recreational
services, etc.), and complete coordination with the wing
commander. One installation studied in this paper had the
base commander responsible for sixteen separate functions
and their corresponding officers. Figure 2 depicts the
Air Base Group system followed by most Air Force installa-
tions and those installations without a combat mission
(with some noted changes for the multi-wing base). Appendix
C lists the various functions assigned to the base commander.
From these references, it becomes evident that the base
commander has to be diversified in both experience and
organizational operation. Further, he must possess the
capability to assemble his staff quickly in time of disaster
or in case of an emergency. This staff must have current
information in their possession and be able to respond
quickly to any situation--aircraft accident, missile acci-
dent, or riot.

This single manager concept of responsibility (or the
host base commander), allows for a simplified organizational

structure which holds duplication of effort to a minimum.

107

 

 

 

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108
Though the operation of this concept, the base commander
supports and provides an installation for the combat wing
and it's primary mission. The concern of this report is
with those elements of the base commanders staff which deal
with the public safety of the installation. Therefore, a
cursory examination must be made of the role played by
higher headquarter's organization and staff in dictating

this public safety mission.

Echelon 2: Command.

These commands, support or combat, at all levels have
separate staff agencies and headquarters. All major air
commands are tied into the Chief of Staff for the Air Force,
at Washington, D.C., and are responsible to his staff-~the
Air Staff. He is reSponsible, as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense and the Pre-
sident.

The next lower echelon, under the Chief of Staff,
is the major air command. All major air commands might be
involved with owning and possessing Air Force installations.
Under the direction of the major air command commander, is
the numbered air force commander, then the air division
commander, and so on down the organizational line. This
descending organizational structure is, therefore, composed
of several commanders, each in turn responsible for differ-

ent levels of activity. This structure provides a flexible

109
and speedy flow of information from the bottom of the ladder
to the top. It also provides for delineation of respon-
sibility to the area of particular need or specialized
problems--the major air command is nation-wide, while the
numbered air force command might only encompass a parti-
cular geographical area, as is the case in the Aerospace
Defense Command.

The staff of these commanders are composed of those
elements which have a responsibility to support the mission
of the lower command. They may issue guidance and direction
to the lower command in the name of the commander. These
guidelines thus become, in effect, the respective commander's
orders.

The public safety elements are represented on the
staff of most Air Force commanders regardless of their
position in the echelon of command. However, the higher
in command, the more consolidation one finds, i.e., at Air
Staff level (directly responsible to the Chief of Staff),
an Inspector General exercises staff responsibility for all
Air Force investigations and inspection functions.

The following sections will deal with the individual
staff-—public safety elements--structure through this echelon
of command. Interspersed within these sections will be
figures accumulated from the four Air Force installations

visited. These figures establish the amount of public

110
safety problems faced by organizational commanders. Each
of the four installations were chosen because they represent
(not in a statistical sampling manner but in a public safety
manner), different base sizes: Grand Forks Air Force Base,
North Dakota, is a large installation; Selfridge Air Force
Base, Michigan, is a medium-to-large installation with a
support and combat mission; Niagara Falls International
Airport, New York, is a small-to-medium installation with
mainly a support mission; and, Custer Air Force Station,
Michigan, is a small installation supporting an Air Division

combat mission.
II. SECURITY POLICE ORGANIZATION

Closely paralleling the organizational philosophy
of the preceding section but differing in some respects,
is one of the largest military elements of the the public
safety enterprise within the United States Air Force-~the
Security Police. Examining that agency's responsibilities

and organization is the emphasis of this section.

Responsibilities.

The nature of the work of the Security Police varies
with the mission of each installation. The generalized
mission of this diversified staff agency is detailed in

basic Air Force regulations. In defining the responsibilities

111
of the Security Police,2 Lieutenant Colonel's Newnam and
Fleek defined it as:

Begin with a force of more than 45,000 men. Assign
it responsibilities for all the normal law enforce-
ment duties plus prison administration.

_ Add all the duties normally performed by special
police or contract guard or private protective
agencies.

Develop, on top of that, a capability for actual
ground combat operations against an armed enemy.

Station your men from Alaska to Panama and from
Bangkok to Berlin. Assign them to the direct opera-
tional control of a variety of ""mayors""and ""chiefs
of police.""

At the same time, require that they work in close
coordination and cooperation with other local and
national police agencies all around the world.

Next, to further complicate the operation from the
personnel standpoint, assume that about 25 per cent of
your men will have to be replaced each year. Annually,
you will have about 10,000 rookies to train, equip, and
assign. At the same time, every three to four years
you will have a complete reshuffle of all your personnel,
from patrolmen to chiefs, not only from one assignment
to anoth r, but also from one city and country to
another.

This, then in a slightly dramatic fashion, is the
area of responsibility that the 44,000 enlisted men and
approximately 900 officers engaged in the Security Police
function find themselves. The field extends from normal
day—to-day law enforcement and correctional tasks, to com—
bat security training, to actual protection of USAF re-

sources in war-torn countries. The Security Policeman,

 

2Air Force Regulation 125-1, "Functions and Organiza-
tion of the USAF Security Police Activities" (Washington:
Department of the Air Force, May 1967), p. 1.

3T.J. Newnam and T.A. Fleek, "The Air Force Approach

112
to meet these responsibilities, is given a variety of equip-
ment and facilities--from shotguns to highly trained sentry
dogs, and from pick-up trucks to 'half—tracks'.

The image of the Security Policeman, as seen by the
base resident or the civilian visitor, starts with the
guard stationed at the entrance gate to control traffic
coming on to the installation. He is in a similar uniform
to that of the civilian police officer. From this first
impression, the resident or visitor sees the law enforcement
patrol in action or pays a visit to the base pass and regis-
tration section. Rarely, does the resident or visitor see
the sentry on duty at the far flung corners of the base.
Rarely, does he comprehend that these two functions, law
enforcement and security, come under the direction of the
Base Chief of Security Police. Bailey, in his survey of
Directors/Chiefs of Security Police, found that less than
one-third of the 44,900 members of the total Security Police
operation are engaged in law enforcement activities.4 The

remainder of the personnel, facilities, and equipment are

 

to Professional Police Management: .Refining and Reorganiz-
ing the Function," The Police Chief, (May, 1967), p. 32.

4Charles H. Bailey, "National Survey of United
States Air Force Directors/Chiefs of Security Police
Attitudes Pertaining to USAF Security Police-Community
Relations" (unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State
University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1968), p. 111.

 

113
engaged in the protection of USAF resources and installation

security.

Organization.

 

Each installation or base has a Chief or Director of
Security Police. This director or chief usually wears two
hats, one as a member of the Base Commander's staff, and the
other as the commander of his men. The determination of
whether or not he is in this dual function resides in the
physical size, population, and mission of the particular
base. Of the four bases visited, two (Custer AFS and
Niagara Falls International Airport), did not also exercise
squadron command responsibility.

As a member of the base commander's staff, the Chief
of Security Police supports the operational mission of the
installation, by providing security personnel and facilities.
He also attempts to maintain the internal discipline and
control of the installation. Usually, under the single-
manager concept and because of a deficiency in personnel,
the base chief of Security Police will also function as the
tactical commander's advisor on security and law enforce-
ment matters--or is usually not represented at the air
division level by a separate staff agency.

At the next higher level, either the numbered air
force or major air command, a staff agency responsible for

inspections and advising the commander on Security Police

114
activities is found. This agency is organizationally under
the InSpector General who advises the commander mainly about
the tactical evaluations of his mission squadrons/groups/
wings. At this level, then the Security Police are tied to
the overall control and standardization of the United
States Air Force.

This organizational concept is maintained intact all
the way up the ladder of command to the Department of the
Air Force. At this upper level, the Security Police are
combined with the Directorate of the Office of Special
Inspections (OSI), under a Deputy Inspector General, who
is responsible to the Inspector General, USAF---a member of
the Air Staff.

The Security Police then are at least one level
removed from the commander at all levels of command except
at the installation level. To Fleek and Newnam this
leveling does not restrict the flow of information between
agencies, but actually eases this flow:

For the military force, the traditional military

chain-of-command structure simplifies this problem.

The Chief of Staff has technical channels available

to him for the regulation of the Air Force. In the

case of the Security Police organization, this chain

for professional guidance is from the Directorate at

Air Force Headquarters, located in Washington, D.C.,

to the Director of Security Police at major command
level and thence to the wing staff officers and command-
ers of Security Police Squadrons at base level. Air
Force regulations, manuals, letters and similar direct-

ives originated with the Directorate of Security Police
--thus are issued in the name of the Chief of Staff.

115

In this way, they become matters not only of profegs-
ional direction, but of command direction as well.

Activity.

 

The level of activity for the four installations
visited is presented in Table 1 below. This table is
divided into the separate categories of incidents and act—
ivity as taken from the quarterly report submitted from
all USAF Security Police units, through channels, to Head—
quarters USAF. The visited bases all questioned the validity
of this report, however, it was adopted for this paper be-
cause it is the only standardized report which must be
submitted by all the bases.

As can be readily seen, the amount of law enforce—
ment activity, when compared with the Uniform Crime Reports,
is appreciably less. One reason for this decreased level
of law enforcement activity is the military control situa-
tion on every installation. In other words, the Security
Police are operational in a setting that is control orient—
ated, therefore, they do not get as extensively involved
in the type of activity that civilian law enforcement finds
itself. One other reason for this reduction in activity
is the small amount of personnel deployed to the law en-

forcement function by the Chief of Security Police. As

 

5Newnam and Fleek, pp, cit., p. 40.

TABLE 1

SECURITY POLICE ACTIVITIES

116

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1968,
INSTALLATION
CAFS NFIA SAFB GFAFB
AWOL'S 6 2 3 40
BASE POPULATION‘ 1,009 1,783 2,602 5,575
SCTY POLICE STRENGTH 32 127 132 824
(authorized)
CITATIONS ISSUED:
Military 325 241 323 893
Civilian ”'38' 49 56 118
INCIDENTS:*‘
Carrying penalty of
over 1 year 0 0 2.0 18
Carrying penalty of
under 1 year 2 11.3 29.4 50
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY LOSS:‘
Cases 2 6 12 40
Dollar Value $351 430 1210 2383
Recovered $ 32 112 26 204
POV'S REGISTERED 1304 2353 3509 5237
SECURITY CLEARANCES
PROCESSED 146 312 464 1177

 

 

*average for the year by quarter

117
stipulated earlier, less than one-third of the total
Security Police strength and equipment is devoted to law
enforcement activity. The remainder of the force is allocat-
ed to base and resource security.

Experience has shown that the informal organization
of the Security Police supports and complements the
formal structure. The formal role played by higher head-
quarters staff agencies is usually limited to advice, re-
commendations, and inspection. The informal structure
operates through friendships established through these
formal procedures. In interviews with four Chiefs of
Security Police, they discussed the role played by the
higher headquarters and their professional disappointment
that this role was not larger. They also dISplayed an
interest in having the Security Police organization struct-
ured in such a manner that the base organization would come
under the direct control of the staff officer at higher
headquarters--in other words, organized as a separate and
distinct body from the local base commander. This would
place the evaluation of the base Security Police activities
on the shoulders of the Security Police agency itself,
but at a higher level. By removing the Chief, Security
Police, from the base commander, who is a general admin-
istrator, into the channels of the police enterprise would,

in the minds of those interviewed, build a more professional

118
service.
summary.

The world's largest police force, the USAF Security
Police, are members of a diversified chain-of-command within
the structure of the United States Air Force. Those inter-
viewed officers, representing a very small percentage of
the total officer strength, were favorable to a structur—
ally independent agency controlled through Security Police
channels.

The present allocation of resources within the
Security Police career field reveals that less than one—
third of the members are engaged in law enforcement ac—
tivities. This research also revealed that the Security
Police, as now organized, are involved in the inspection
and control elements of the total USAF organization, and
as a result do not possess the direct communication lines
necessary to maintain a centralized or highly coordinated

organization.
III. FIRE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION

The activities of the fire department on any Air
Force installation come under the direction and control of
the Base Civil Engineer, who sits in the dual capacity as

a member of the base commander's staff and usually as the

119
squadron commander. The size, geography, or mission of
the installationdoes not effect this organizational struct-
ure. This section will explore this structure and relate
that concept to the activity of the four departments

visited during the course of this research.

Responsibilities.

 

The logical responsibilities of the Fire Department
are the same on the USAF installations as in civilian
communities. Air Force directives, in describing those
responsibilities, list six separate categories: 1) Super-
vision of installation fire protection and aircraft crash
rescue; 2) Supervision of fire protection and aircraft
rescue shift operations; 3) Fire protection and aircraft
rescue operations; 4) Observation tower-communications and
dispatch control center; 5) HeliCOpter fire—fighting crash
and rescue; and, 6) Fire prevention and inspection.6

Thus, the fire departments on USAF installations,
have the same responsibilities as civilian departments with
the added duties of aircraft crash and rescue operations.
They are supported in meeting these responsibilities by
unit fire marshals (military supervisors appointed as an

additional duty to monitor the fire prevention program and

 

6Air Force Manual 26-3, "Criteria and Standards"
(Washington: Department of the Air Force, October 1965),
Code 4405, p. 1.

120
procedures for an entire unit), and building fire marshals
(military members appointed for the same purpose in each

USAF facility/building).

Organization.

 

The Fire Department iS'composed of a mix between
civilian and military employees. The department is usually
headed by a professional civilian fire chief who is part
of the Base Civil Engineer's staff. This latter staff
agency is responsible for all the facilities, from con-
struction to maintenance and repair, or the normal house—
keeping functions of each USAF installation. Therefore,
because the two fields are primarly concerned with the
same problem, the fire department is placed within this
area of responsibility. The Civil Engineer exercises all
command and control over both the civilian and military
people of the department. This organizational structure
is standardized throughout the Air Force at each level of
command.

In the area of aircraft rescue, the fire department,
while having prime responsibility, is supported by the Air
Rescue Service (ARS), a separate operating agency with
units at all flying USAF installations. I

Headquarters, USAF Group for Fire Protection, under

the Director of Civil Engineering, is responsible for staff

121
supervision for fire protection throughout the Air Force.
The field representatives of the Directorate, are the
Air Force Regional Civil Engineers (AFRCE), who serve as
Air Force liaison with the other branches of the armed
forces involved with the construction program of the
Department of Defense.7

At the lower organizational level, fire protection
is the individual responsibility of each major commander.
The program for fire protection of an installation is super-
vised by the installation commander and a council appointed
by him. Thus, through his staff agencies, the installation
commander insures that funds, manpower, equipment, training,
and administration are available for fire protection. The
responsibilities of the Fire Council are detailed in Appendix
D.

The base civil engineer is the focal point for
coordination of fire protection both within the parent
organization and with off-base activities. Fire prevention
is the responsibility of each person who is a member or
employed by the Department of the Air Force: "Everyone
must share in the responsibility in order to maintain fire

prevention consciousness and safe practices, to eliminate

 

7Air Force Manual 92-1, "Fire Protection Program
Operational Procedures" (Washington: Department of the Air
Force, October 1968), p. 1-1.

122

fire hazards, and to control and extinguish fire."8

Activity.

 

The fire chiefs at three of the installations visit;
ed were satisfied with this organizational structure. The
other chief would have preferred to sit as a member, in-
dependent of the base civil engineer, of the base com—
mander's staff. All four chiefs stated they had a good
to fine working relationship with the other members of the
public safety agencies. One chief, however, admitted that
problems concerning a lack of coordination do arise but have
not been very serious. The chiefs stated that the Fire
Council usually meets once each year, just prior to Fire
Prevention Week, and they consider the meeting just a matter
of complying with a requirement in the regulation. The
chiefs did not support the idea of a public safety agency,
however, they did all agree that it mighthmake organizational
sense and provide some flexibility for the officers. However,
they all would like to see the present shift arrangements
followed.

Table 2 represents the degree of activity which
took place during the last calendar year (1968) at the
four U.S. Air Force installations studied. The small
percentage of calls and property damage due to fire can

be explained by the tight control over fire protection and

 

8Ibid.

123
prevention exerted by every level of command within the
Air Force. Fire, a concern of all commanders because it
draws money and manpower away from the primary USAF mission

capability, carries severe penalties for the careless.

TABLE 2

FIRE DEPARTMENT INCIDENTS

 

 

1968
CAPS NFIA SAFB GFAFB
Calls received request-
ing Fire Dept assist-
ance 3 7 17 121
Calls received involving
actual fire 0 3 9 12
Reportable loss due to
fire 0 $1753 $3700 $9000

 

 

Calls received by the fire department requesting
assistance includes calls because smoke is smelled or
perhqnsbecause steam was sighted coming from the top of
a building. Calls received involving actual fire usually
(81 per cent of the cases) were mattress fires in the air-
men's (or NCO's) barracks. The percentage climbs to 94 when

government housing incidents are added.

Summary.

The organization of the USAF fire protection program

124
is very diversified, but with responsibility delegated to
each level of command. Therefore, this program carries some
characteristics of a centralized program. The facilities,
people, and equipment of the fire departments within the
overall Air Force organization are delegated to a position
within the Civil Engineering staff agencies at each level
of command. Their chief is, therefore, separated at least
one level, like the Security Police, from the commander.
Fire damage, like law enforcement incidents, were found to
be small in comparison to the large amount of traffic and
high concentration of people, coupled with the type of

structures of most buildings, at all installations visited.
IV. ORGANIZATION OF OTHER PUBLIC SAFETY ELEMENTS

The organization and responsibilities of the two
largest agencies engaged with the concern of public safety
within the U.S. Air Force has been explored in some depth.
This section is concerned with the organizational structure
of the remaining three agencies: the safety division,
disaster control, and explosive ordnance disposal. These
agencies will be researched simultaneously utilizing the
same format as the preceding sections. Following this
discussion, the common interests and functions of the five
agencies will be detailed along with the observed duplication

of effort discovered during the site visits and interviews

125

at the four installations.

Safety Division.

 

The Director of Safety at each USAF installation is
delegated staff responsibility for flying, ground, and
nuclear safety for the organization to which he is assigned.
The overall responsibility for safety, like fire preven—
tion, is further delegated to each and every member or
employee of the United States Air Force.

The various functions of this division require spec-
ialized personnel to perform the preventive role in a
qualified manner. This report is limited to the role played
by the ground safety officer at each USAF installation--
flying and nuclear safety are the concerns of the combat
commands or units and not of primary concern to the in-
stallation or base commander. Ground safety involves the
prevention and inspection of base facilities in the over—
all attempt to reduce vehicle, pedestrian, work, and recrea-
tional hazards or accidents throughout the installation.

Organizationally, the ground safety officer sits as
part of the Director of Safety's staff (one of three).
However, a variation from the concept of organization
earlier explained was found. The ground safety officer,
sits not only as part of the Director of Safety's staff,
but usually on an advisory position to the staff of the

base commander. The Director of Safety, being mainly

126
concerned with mission essential requirements, is usually
a member of and advisor to the wing commander's own staff
thereby leaving the ground safety office a free agent.

This same organizational concept is employed through—
out the structure of the Air Force up to the level of the
Department of the Air Force. Here the structure changes.
The entire Safety division is placed under the Inspector
General's office with a Deputy Inspector General appointed
to represent all three areas of the safety concern. At
this level, coordination takes place between the Deputy
Inspector General for Safety, and the Deputy InSpector
General for Inspections (Security Police and OSI). The
Inspector General, USAF, is therefore, not only responsible
for the Security Police, OSI, but also for the Safety
Division on the Air Staff level.

The ground safety officer is responsible for the
investigation of all mishaps or accidents occuring on or
involving Air Force personnel and property. To enable this
function to be performed in a smooth and efficient manner,
the safety officer conducts inspections of all facilities
(for safety hazards), conducts a monthly safety meeting
which investigates and discusses safety hazards existent
on the installation, and renders reports to the commanders
at all levels concerning traffic accidents, safety conditions,

and safety education.

127

The safety officer, though closely aligned with his
police counterpart at Air Staff level, is completely separat-
ed from that agency at the installation level. The safety
officer, through a program of education and prevention,
attempts to limit or reduce the level of accidents at each
USAF installation. The visitations found that the ground
safety officer at all bases was a civilian with extensive
experience in the field and with a record of lengthy
service within his profession. Safety incidents reported
from the four installations were not made available to the

9
researcher.

Disaster Control.

The Disaster Control officer at the installation
level within the Air Force is responsible for an education
and coordination program designed to meet emergency condi-
tions such as civil disturbance, tornado, chemical/nuclear/
biological accident or warfare, and other emergency condi—
tions which migflzexist at any installation.

Organizationally, the disaster control officer is
usually a position which exists within each level of com-
mand. At the unit level (squadron, group, or sometimes

wing), this position is an additional duty imposed on an

 

9Aerospace Defense Command Manual 26—3, "Manpower
Authorizations by Functional Code" (Colorado Springs:
Aerospace Defense Command, March 1967), PC 106x, p. 5.

128
officer whose primary interest is a full time position in
another field. In other words, at the squadron level, the
disaster control officer responsibilities are often delegat—
ed to the administrative officer or some other staff position.
At smaller installations, this is generally the case while
at larger installations separate disaster control officers
can be found.10

The largest task of the disaster control officer is
the preparation and coordination of the BaseDisaster Pre-
paredness Plan. This is written annually and details the
responsibilities of each staff agency and assures the
commander of "an in-being capability for effective response

11 The disaster pre-

to disaster situations in peace or war."
paredness plan covers all phases of the disaster control
officers responsibility. The guidance from Headquarters,
USAF, indicates that this plan must be realistic and be
constantly revised. In other words, the plan must be work-

able and kept current.

The disaster control function is organizationally

 

10Air Force Manual 26-3, pp, SEE}: Code 4751C, p. 2.
This manual calls for one officer to be appointed on each
installation of more than 1,000 population up to over
10,000. Various enlisted personnel are required at all
installations over 1,000.

11Air Force Manual 355-1, "Disaster Preparedness:
Planning and Operations" (Washington: Department of the
Air Force, February 1966), p. 1-1.

129
located on the operations staff of the commander and usually
under the deputy commander for operations. From this major
division, at higher headquarters, separate officers and
enlisted personnel are found to devote full time to dis-
aster planning. The Air Staff member who is responsible
for USAF Operations, represents the concept and planning
which are part of the disaster control function.

A full—time disaster control officer was found at
only one of the four installations visited. The other
three bases had a disaster control officer as an additional
duty for either the administration officer or another
junior ranking officer. Simulated disaster control exercises
were being conducted at all installations at least quarterly.
All facets of the Disaster Preparedness Plan were not being
exercised at three of the installations. The three officers
who carry this function as an additional duty were favor—
able to any organizational design which would place this
responsibility under an experienced public safety director.
The disaster control officer and function was found
to be delegated to a subordinate position within the
public safety agencies of the Air Force. While attention
of the commanders at all levels is directed to planning for
a disaster, insufficient emphasis seems to be placed on this
field at the very area where it is needed--the installation

level. The fact that it is an additional duty seems to

130
restrict the planning and preparation which must go into

the development of plans for any emergency.

Explosive Ordnance DiSpOsal.

This is the final area of concern in the elements
which comprise the public safety enterprise of the United
States Air Force. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) is the
Air Force terminology for what the Civilian law enforcement
departments call the "Bomb Squad." Their functions and
responsibilities are very similar except for the involve-
ment of nuclear weapons.

The EOD function is found on every Air Force installa-
tion which has a flying mission or supports flying missions
or missile operations. The EOD section is placed under the
Deputy Commander for Material, and is responsible through
him to the tactical commander. The rationale for this
function being organizationally placed under the same divis-
ion which handles supplies, materials, and maintenance, could
not be found in the formal Air Force directives. However,
it must be specified that most of the directives pertaining
to this field are of a classified nature and unavailable to
the researcher.

The manning criteria for EOD lists its responsib-
ilities as:

Providing at least two persons for 24-hour emer-

gency support capability, on duty and/or standby status,
for the detection, identification, rendering safe,

131
recovering and/or destruction of United States and
foreign explosives, incendiary, toxic, and nuclear
munipions. ._

AAdditionally/ the BOD specialist provides tech-
nical guidance and assistance to the disaster control
officer on evacuation of personnel, detection, monitor-
ing, evaluation, and decontamination of radioactive,
chemical, or biological hazards.

The organization of the BOD function is found to
exist as a separate part of the Material Directorate at
higher headquarters, and is represented by the Directorate
of Material at Air Staff level. Although usually manned
by highly trained professional enlisted personnel, officers
could be found at higher headquarters level whose primary
concern is the BOD function.

In summary, therefore, while the BOD function can
be found at most USAF installations, it has been placed
organizationally under a division whose concern is with the
procurement and logistics of supplies and not with public
safety. EOD works in close coordination with the disaster
control officer, the fire department, and with the security
forces in supporting the Operational elements on each USAF
installation and shares very few common problems with the
Material Division. Explosive control during logistical

movement and non-operational storage seems to be the only

related function connecting the two divisions responsibilities.

 

12Aerospace Defense Command Manual 26-3, pp, cit.,
FC 2530, p. 1.

132
Summary.

This section examined the responsibilities and organ-
ization of the safety division, disaster control, and the
explosive ordnance disposal section. These agencies, along
with the Security Police and Fire Department, comprise those
elements of the public safety concern which were investigat-
ed by this project. The research revealed that these
elements are also separated from direct representation on
the Air Staff by at least one organizational level and that
the responsible agency for the public safety element is
usually concerned with matters not relating to the public
safety responsibilities of the installation commander.

The following section will examine the similarities
and differences between the various public safety agencies
with a concentration on the items, functions, and concepts

which are shared equally by all agencies.

V. GROUNDS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY--OR NOT?

The first two major contentions of this research
were concerned with the identification of a common ground
for the establishment of a Division of Public Safety within
the United States Air Force, and the fact that the multi-
responsibility structure of the present public safety
organization does not provide for an effective service for

its clientele. The preceding sections of this chapter have

133
explored the organization and responsibilities of five
separate agencies within the U.S. Air Force whichere con-
cerned with what has been defined as the public safety.

This section will explore those aspects of common interest
and investigate certain arguments relevant to consolidation
of these agencies. The exact form that this consolidation

will take will be the topic for the following chapter.

 

Areas of "Uncommon" Interest.

Traditional argument. The biggest argument against
any consolidation effort on the part of municipal adminis-
trators has been tradition. The argument runs, that tradi-
tionally, each agency has been separate and has not en-
countered any problems, so therefore (it is supposed),
should not be changed. It is this argument thatihe most
enlightened and aggressive administrator finds to be a
major stumbling block against integration attempts.

The traditionalist argument has been directed usually
at the concept of total integration of people and equipment
into one common organization--firemen are sometime police-
men and vice versa. The basis for this argument is that
the functions of the separate departments are entirely
different—-putting out fires and catching criminals. While
this argument has been answered earlier in this paper, it

has not been related to the military establishment.

134

The military installation is a controlled setting.
Certain discipline and social maintenance procedures exist
which do not exist in the civilian community. The military
installation is very similar to the small rural community.
In the latter, certain more informal control measures are
in evidence, while in the former, these control measures
are a matter of regulation, and command authority. The
chain-of-command and the maintenance of discipline are
constant facets of the military community. To ensure that
this community is protected, the U.S. Air Force has created
five separate public safety agencies, diversified from each
other in responsibility and control. The traditionalist
argument of uncommonality of function must be viewed in
this context.

An examination of the argument against complete
integration does merit sufficient basis for the considera-
tion of another form of integration. Basically, the argu-
ment centers on a lack of problems and the seemingly suffici-
ent service given by the agency to its clientele. However,
the traditionalist ignores the fact that under the diversity
of functions, the scope of the problems confronting the
agencies can never be discovered nor handled properly. With
each agency represented at the command level by a staff
agency concerned with operational mission requirements,

how can the problems of the public safety agencies be

135
investigated or explored? The answer to this question
raises the spector of why have not more mistakes been made
(or reported)?

The research necessary for this paper resulted in
the reviewing of several practice disasters or emergencies
(a total of 49 experiences; 37 practice training exercises
and 12 actual emergencies). In each case either some lack
of coordination occured or the various elements were ob-
served working at cross-purposes from one another. Dis-
cussions held with Security Police Chiefs, Fire Chiefs,
Safety Officers, and Disaster Control officers, revealed
that in some area (usually an area of primary concern to
that particular chief), disagreement as to their individual
function or task was evident. One example concerned an
emergency convoy called for an aircraft crash which occured
off-base. At this one incident (outlined in the introduct-
ory chapter), the Security Police responded to the Main
Gate, while the Fire Department waited at the fire station.
(It was the function of the Security Police to direct the
convoy and provide security at the accident scene--they
followed the Disaster Preparedness Plan. The function of
the fire department was to save what it could of the crew
and aircraft at the scene). The resulting mix-up in convoy
formation resulted in a delay of ppp minutes after announce-

ment of the aircraft crash. At this same incident, it was

136
observed that the medical ambulance was dispatched to the
accident scene with two enlisted medical airmen and no
qualified doctor on board.

Another case in this same area was the observation
of fourteen Broken Arrow (simulated peace-time nuclear
accidents) exercises. A single satisfactory training
exercise was not observed. (Satisfactory meaning that the
exercise was conducted following the Disaster Preparedness
Plan, or directions from higher headquarters.) If the fire
department does not break security, if the Security Police
do not establish the entry control point in the wrong wind
direction; the Disaster Control people violate the radiation
path. Other problems noted were: base personnel breaking
the cordon (2,000 foot) around the disaster site, lack of
facilities for proper wash-down of contaminated personnel,
and failure to coordinate with civilian authorities.

These examples are only listed to question the
traditionalist argument concerning the lack of problems
encountered under the current organizational structure.
While the creation of some form of public safety consolida-
tion cannot guarantee to the Air Force administrator that
a successful Broken Arrow exercise will occur, or that no
discripencies will be noted in an actual emergency operation,
sufficiently fertile ground appears to warrant experimentation

with some form of public safety integration.

137

Losing pp_empire. Another fear by administrators
(who are not concerned with the day-to-day problems of
the public safety executive like the Director of Material
or the Director of Operations), is the fear of losing an
empire already established. Administrators seem to have
a certain fear that by removing an agency from their control,
they have lost some of their responsibility. This argument
rests on some grains of truth but should not be used to
refuse to institute change that from all appearances implies
an improvement in service at a reduction in confusion and
costs.

The facilities, especially the equipment, are not
the same for the various organizations. Fire equipment
cannot be used for Security Police duties, radiation
monitoring equipment.from the disaster control teams cannot
be used for either fire or police operations, and special-
ized equipment for the disarming of a weapon can not be
used for any other purpose than that function. However,
this argument does not detract from the consolidation
concept; it only lends to it. The one administrator, inter-
ested in all phases of public safety, would seem to devote
more time to the acquisition and maintenance of that equip-
ment than would the disinterested or unconcerned administrator.
Therefore, though identifying those areas that are differ-

ent, the administrator will be able to concentrate time and

138

talent on the specialized problems which exist.

Standardization. The last argument against inte-
gration of any diversified function within the Armed Forces
is the debate over standardization. The basis of this
argument lies in the adOption of a system or an organ-
izational structure that must be applicable to units of all
size and located within the various diversified areas
where the Air Force mission is found. The integration of
public safety elements has enjoyed success at the small
community level, although, the integration theorist would
like to see it adopted wthin larger cities, the fact remains
that successful integrated departments are usually in com—
munities of about 14,000 population. The data presented in
this chapter indicated that most Air Force installations
fall below that figure. Therefore, it seems rational that
some form of integration would be successful within the
standardized Air Force organizational concept.

However, an attraction to this theory is the fact
that it could be instituted by general guidelines from the
Department of the Air Force; or from a 'top-down' structure.
Local conditions could then be considered in establishing
the best form the consolidation effort could take for be
separate installations and their problems. In other words,
the concept of identifying unique characteristics of the

several bases would come again into Air Force organizational

139
philosophy.

There do not seem to exist sufficient reasons (common
to all the five agencies) to prevent some exploration of
those common areas. Perhaps, further research and experi-
mentation will reveal significant differences between the

five agencies.

'Apppp_pf_Common Interest.

Areas of common interest were found to exist within
and between the five agencies investigated. These areas
are: 1) A common concern for the safety and protection of
people and property; 2) Similar types of equipment and
facilities used by all agencies; 3) Similar reports and
administrative details between the various agencies; 4)
Approximately the same class of people being used within at
least two of the five agencies; and, 5) Patrol aid preven-

tion; and finally, 6) Administrative flexibility.

Common Concern. The formal descriptions of the
various agencies concern the problem of prevention, protection
education, and loss reduction of United States Air Force
personnel and/or property. The fire department is concerned
about this problem and has a council of fire marshals which
is required to meet at the call of the installation commander.
Similar councils are found to exist within the Security

Police Division (the Base Security Council), the Safety

”I40
Division (the Accident Prevention Council), and the Dis-
aster Control Division (Disaster Control Council). If all
of these councils could be combined into one general council
whose concern was the public safety of the base or installa-
tion, much time and effort could be saved.

The purpose of these councils is basically to identify
those areas or hazards which exist and to educate the part-
icipants in the concern of the particular council. Experi-
ence and discussion with administrators at the four installa-
tions reveal that between seven to fifteen hours are spent
in these councils with the same participating peOple every
month. While this might be important to the public safety
administrator from an educational standpoint, it must be
realized that the participants in these councils have other
primary responsibilities--responsibilities which may or may
not involve the public safety of the installation.

A content analysis of the minutes of the last twelve
safety meetings at a major U.S. Air Force installation,
revealed that the most discussed item was the placement of
traffic signs (an area probably best left to the traffic
engineer and the police officer), 42 per cent of the items;
the painting of SAFETY HAZARD stripes on exposed stairwells
(a matter probably best left to the safety officer and the
civil engineer), 21 per cent of the items; and, the monthly

report of reportable accidents (probably best accomplished

141
through the circulation of a newsletter), 9 per cent of the
items. Next in order or frequency was a discussion of areas
of controversy between the separate agencies--usually between
the safety director and the civil engineer. Even though
this research was limited in time and scope, the experience
of this writer points to the fact that most safety, disaster
control, and fire meetings are concerned with similar sub-
jects. The importance of these examples, much like the
internal police consolidation efforts, is that they are
time consuming items which could be settled within a very
short time between members using a common forum--the public
safety staff meeting or consolidated services. This forum
could be used within on agency so that the concern of a
general meeting called to discuss public safety business
could be devoted to the general problem-~saving lives and

property from careless or accidental destruction.

Equipment and facilities. Presently, the separate

 

staff agencies operate several similar pieces of equipment
and function out of similar facilities. Of course, the
specialized pieces of equipment are of no concern here:
the fire apparatus, disaster control monitoring devices,
and correctional cells. The argument is expressed only in
the direction of common pieces of equipment or facilities.
Presently, the Security Police and the Fire Depart—

ment operate a command and control center for their respective

142
agencies around the clock every day. Contained within the
Security Police control center is a dispatching non—commiss—
ioned officer who monitors and controls the security and
(in some instances), the law enforcement patrols of the
installation. Also, alarm systems may be incorporated
into the center along with the normal and emergency tele-
phone systems. Often, however, a separate law enforcement
dispatch center is maintained for the separate law enforce-
ment and corrections function of the Security Police.

Likewise, the fire department maintains a control
center on each USAF installation which is concerned with
telephone answering, alarm monitoring, and equipment dis~
patching. In addition to these two or three separate
command centers, the operational (combat) units of the base
will also maintain a control center every day, all year
around in case of national emergency. The consolidation
concern here is with the form, amount, and number of
command centers maintained by the various public safety
agencies.

The administrator, looking for areas to gain peOple
and possibly save money, must be attracted to this duplica-
tion of effort which exists on each USAF installation. The
incident rate has shown to be along the same lines as that
of a small community, perhaps, even less because of the

military control aspect of a military installation.

143
Consolidation of command centers has proven effective in
communities faced with larger problems than those which
exist on most USAF installations. Therefore, the elim—
ination of one or two command centers and the consolidation
of functions should be considered feasible within the public
safety elements of the Air Force.

Investigation and experience reveals that the Fire
Department, the Security Police, the Disaster Control teams,
and the BOD unit maintain their own separate supply rooms--
rooms from which emergency supplies are maintained and
accounted for by a custodian. In the Security Police,
one man is usually employed full time for this purpose.

This is not the case of any of the other agencies investiga-
ted as the custodian task was normally an assigned addition-
al duty. However, the separation of this equipment is

bound to result in some duplication of ordering and pro-
curing, in some duplication of time and effort at inventory
inspections, not to mention the duplication of floor space
and house—keeping tasks. It is therefore, feasible that the
consolidation of these storage facilities into one large
emergency public safety facility would result in personnel
and monetary savings plus release valuable floor space for
other mission related facilities. The consolidation of

this facility would not seem to depreciate from the emerg—

ency nature of its use or from a reduction in service to the

144
using agency, however, only actual experience under field
conditions (demonstration programs), would enable valid
conclusions to be reached.

All of the agencies enjoy the centralized procure-
ment for all matters and especially the installation of
communications equipment. Several years ago the Air Force
placed this responsibility under the Communications Officer
at the installation level--the contract with the producer of
communications equipment is written world wide, however.

No complaints were given at the four installations visited
concerning this service. Seven Secuirty Police administra-
tors responded that the down-time for repair was, in their
opinion,excessive. However, the overall operation of the
communications contract was deemed satisfactory by all
twelve interviewed administrators.

It was observed that administrative vehicles in use
by the Security Police and the fire department, prevention
and inspection people, could be consolidated into a common
pool and thereby eliminate the necessity of having separate
vehicles for both similar functions. Presently, the Base
Civil Engineer is authorized a vehicle because of his
additional duty as Base Fire Marshal. The Chief, Security
Police, is not authorized a vehicle but at each of the
bases visited, it was noted that a vehicle was always stand—

ing waiting for his use, or if the vehicle was in use at the

145
time, little trouble was experienced in getting a replace—
ment vehicle. The consolidation theory seems to imply, in
this incidence, at least one of these vehicles could be
eliminated without severely affecting the overall mission
of either agency.

Other areas which are held in common by the separate
agencies and which are concerned with equipment and facilit—
ies are: administrative offices, classroom space and equip-
ment, training sections and related responsibilities, tele-
phones, supervisors, etc. Sufficient areas appear to be
similar in scope and content to, again, warrant consideration

being given to the consolidation concept.

Administrative reports. Some consolidation of effort

 

has taken place within the area of administrative reports
concerning emergency situations at Air Force installations.
The base commander, being vitally concerned about this area,
is the coordinating point for all administrative notifica-
tion reports to higher headquarters involving the existence
of emergency conditions: base under attack, accidental
explosion of armament, civil disturbance in the area,
natural disaster, etc. However, routine reports--serious
law enforcement incidents and fires, to automobile accidents
and security violations--are reported through the various

staff agencies responsible to higher headquarters. For

146
example, the Safety Director is responsible for reporting
automobile accidents to his next higher authority. Under
certain circumstances, the Chief, Security Police, also has
the responsibility for reporting automobile accidents (if a
law has been broken). This area is in a state of change
at the present time so that only one staff agency will
report accidents. The investigation of automobile accidents
is the dual responsibility of the Security Police and the
Safety Director. The latter investigative record or report,
because it is taken for reasons not involving responsibility,
is not available to the Security Police or to the base legal
staff. This seems to be a duplication of effort, or at
least a redundancy not in the best interests of the individu-
al or the Air Force.

Another example of duplication of administrative re-
porting is the case of an actual law enforcement incident
involving a member of the Air Force. In this case, as
many as five separate reports from as many agencies might
be sent to higher headquarters. These reports are usually
not coordinated within the installation and are usually in
conflict with one another to such extent that clarification
follow-up messages or telephone calls are necessary.

The various divisions which have a public safety
responsibility require that their subordinate units submit

periodic routine reports. When taken togehter, these reports

147
could reveal the degree of so-called public safety incidents
within an installation, a major air command or within the
entire United States Air Force. The diversity of respons-
ibility of the various control agencies at higher head-
quarters prevents this type of consolidation. Today, if
the investigator asked for a public safety incident rate
USAF-wide, it would take the combined talents of five
different agencies to acquire this information (plus others
not investigated by this project). Consolidation of ad-

. ministrative reporting then would seem to provide more
information, at less actual manpower and costs than the

present system permits.

The public safety officer. An analysis of the

 

separated fire and police personnel records controlled by one
personnel center was conducted. The results of that analysis
revealed that the lower four grade airmen (basic airman
through sergeant) were from essentially the same social
class, had completed high school in an overwhelming majority
of cases, and were from a urban area. The results of this
survey are detailed in Table 3 below. As can be seen from
these results, there seems to be certain common character—
istics between the members of the two largest public safety
agencies to lend some limited compatability to assignment and

flexibility in the administrative operation of the agencies.

148

TABLE 3

COMPARISON BETWEEN FIREMEN AND SECURITY POLICEMEN

 

Firemen Policemen
(percentage)

 

Education:

 

 

 

 

 

Less than High School 4.2 3.8
High School graduate 93.3 93.1
Some college 2.1 2.4
College degree .3 .6
Graduate .1 .1
Age:
18-21 60.0 55.5
21-25 22.7 24.5
Above 25 17.3 20.0
Geographical Backgrounds:
Rural 27.0 34.0
Urban 73.0 66.0
N = 463 512
Socio-Economic Background: .
Lower class 32.8 37.4
Middle class 66.9 62.3
Upper class .3 1.2
N = 93 127

 

 

 

Patrol and prevention. The minor points held in
common by all five agencies have been discussed, but how
about the basic reason for a police or fire force--pre—
vention and patrol? The role of prevention was emphasized
in the latter discussion but more in line with the education—
al aspects of prevention than actual patrol prevention.

James has listed two objectives of the police and fire

149
departments-~prevention and emergency services. He states
that if these two functions can be fullfilled then the
integrated system, at least in theory, should also work.13

The observations conducted at the four USAF in-
stallations revealed thazthe Security Police have routine
patrol activity on each base, the fire department conducts
fire inspections on a monthly basis in every facility,
the Safety Officer conducts semi-annual inspections of
each office, and the Disaster Control Officer checks the
shelters and emergency first aid kits at least once every
month. In addition to this, the Security Police have cert-
ain security checks that must be completed at least twice a
night on several facilities (any facility that has money on
hand), and the Fire Department (on at least one installation)
was required to monitor and inspect the closing of the var-
ious clubs on base (officer's, NCO's, and Airmen's) each
night. It was observed that frequently, several (or at
least two) patrols would be at the same facility at the
same time. The investigator began to wonder who was check-
ing whom?

The consolidation of these functions, especially the
routine fire prevention, security, safety of government and
non-government funds, safety prevention, and disaster
control equipment, seems to bear some consideration. It

seems conceivable that one office, concerned with public

 

13James, Police . . . City, pp, cit., p. 62.

 

150
safety inspections could and would do a more comprehensive
and thorough job of insuring all facilities were meeting
Air Force standards. This would also relieve personnel
and time for other needed functions, such as training and

job experience.

Flexibility. A recurring problem with routine

 

functions, such as fire house waiting and security partol-
ing, is the fatigue factor. A man is placed within a fire
station for a period of waiting as long as 24 hours straight,
he cannot leave and must make himself busy within the
confines of the station. A security guard posted around a
missile or aircraft is usually left at that post for a
full eight hour shift. He will get some relief, but is
usually returned to either that same post or similar post
until the end of his shift. The administrator faced with
the related personal problems--motivation, interest, job
attractiveness (not to ignore the health problem of the
fireman's lax time and physical exertion in actual emerg-
encies)—-must find ways and means which will decrease this
boredom (fatigue) factor.

A suggested method would be the total integration
of the services to allow the rotation of the men between
fire house waiting and security patrolling. This would,

of course, entail some form of the integration concept being

151
instituted. It could conceivably reduce the efficiency of
the enlisted member but it is the thesis of this paper that
with this type of diversity, the airman will increase his
effectiveness on the job, be better motivated, and possibly
be more interested in chosing the Air Force as his career.
The proof of this statement will have to wait until an
integration plan is attempted and concrete results obtain-
ed. However, the concept seems to be based on logical
rationale and supported in the literature previously dis-

cussed.
VI. SUMMARY

The investigation into the areas of common interest
between the five public safety agencies within the United
States Air Force revealed that several areas exist and
sufficient problems were discovered to justify attempts at
consolidation of the public safety function at the installa-
tion level. The areas which were not held in common by any
of the agencies were found to be not sufficiently sign-
ificant to all phases of the consolidation efforts as est-
ablished in civilian public safety integration theory.

The next chapter will investigate alternative pro-
posals which need to be conscientiously exploited before the
formal adoption of the integration theory by the U.S. Air

Force.

CHAPTER VII
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE

With the introduction of the integration theory for
public safety elements and the detailing of the present
structure of the United States Air Force public safety
agencies, the only area left for consideration is the
structuring of organizational changes which comply with the
principles of the theory and the actuality of the organ-
ization. This chapter will suggest and explore several
organizational methods and a program which might be under-
taken to relate those two areas. The format of this
chapter leads from suggestions which will require very
little organizational restructuring to the complex re-
organization of the entire public safety structure into a

totally integrated division.
I. PRESENT ORGANIZATION EXPANDED

The traditionalist argument against integration
could be taken into consideration by the administrative
and organizational personnel who are in charge of total
Air Force organization by leaving the system as it is
now organized. The theme of this paper is that organ—
izational change will prove necessary for the dual purpose

of improving services while decreasing the cost figure.

153
This purpose can be adhered to by the adoption of at least
part of the integrationist argument: the formal and in-
formal coordination of all elements of the public safety

enterprise within the Air Force.

Mutual Aid Agreements.

 

Increased time and effort spent at drafting and pre-
paring operational plans affecting public safety could make
these plans more meaningful and operational. This is mainly
a matter of coordination. Currently, these plans are drafted
by men whose major concern is usually another field, at
least on the smaller installation. The appointment of an
officer or high ranking enlisted man, on a full-time basis,
on each installation as public safety planner, would be a
step toward the elimination of this problem.

However, this is only one area within which coordina-
tion would be helpful. The problem of police and fire igno-
rance of each other's problems and procedures can lead to
extensive property damage and grave loss of life. These
problems could be decreased by having formal and informal
conferences between the respective chiefs, operation
officers, and shift employees and supervisors. As part of
the formal arrangements, the two agencies could commit to
writing agreements dealing with all types of emergency

conditions. These agreements would have to be realistic

154
and frequently tested. The agencies, through their respect-
ive chiefs, would therefore, be required to work together
for the common public safety purpose.

The training field is an_attractive field for mutual
aid agreements. Men from each Section could train men from
the other section in their respective duties and functions.
This training would not be concentrated on drawing the men
from one field to the other but would be concerned with
strictly orientation purposes. The training, to be effect-
ive, should start at the top of the organizational structure
and extend to the bottom level. The inclusion of guest
speakers, or instructors, in this required training would
possibly decrease the possibility of unknown or untested

emergencies from getting into a state of confusion or panic.

Public Safety Council.

A public safety council could be established, much
along the lines of the Accident Prevention Council of the
Safety Division, and composed of representatives from all
public safety elements. This council could formally ratify
these mutual-aid agreements and could possibly solve inter—
related public safety problems. This would consume al-
ready precious time from the administrators, but would
begin the process for decreasing costs and confusion.

Many other forms of administrative changes could be

155
attempted at installation and higher headquarters level
that would not require massive organizational changes.
These changes could be based and geared toward the elim-
ination of problems which concern all agencies--problems
from normal day—to-day routine on the one hand, to prob-
lems encountered during actual emergencies or simulated
training exercises. These problems, which are known to
exist and have been referred to in the previous chapter,
must be conscientiously explored by dedicated people and
solutions realistically sought and frequently tested.
The council, or the agreements, must be willing to experi-
ment and use equipment available, other wise, the procedures

will become stale and unworkable.

Additional Duty--Director pf PublicSafety.

A final proposal, which would not require any organ-
izational changes, would be the appointment of the senior
officer from the various public safety agencies to the
additional duty as Director of Public Safety. This
appointment would carry the added responsibility of co—
ordination of all reports, messages, and plans that are
written on an installation and forwarded to higher head—
quarters. He would also act in the capacity of liaison
officer between the separate agencies. This would add an

additional administrative load on the senior officer and

156
his staff, but would insure to the commander that a senior
public safety officer had reviewed and approved all corres-
pondance to higher headquarters. This suggestion could
possibly increase services and decrease costs, but would
definitely establish the review by a professional on
public safety matters. This change would require very

minor modifications to existing procedures and regulations.

Evaluation.

 

The proposals brought forth in this section deal
with making minor changes within the existing organizational
structure of the Air Force. All of the proposals depend on
the establishment of the concept that public safety is a
total business and not just part of another function.

The proposals, resting on this basis, can be evaluat-
ed, from a theoretical standpoint, as being a first step
toward integrating the agencies under one organization.
Realistically, experience indicates that these proposals
rest on the ability of one administrator to adapt to the
personality of the other (or in common sense terminology--

a personality contest). If this is true, then the individual
agencies are not better off, and the customers will ex-
perience no increase in service, under the new methods

than they did under the old procedures. The danger of

administrative confusion still exists.

157

The initiation of another committee or more agree—
ments, into a system already based on committee management,
cannot be seen as a positive step toward solving the problems
which exist within and between the public safety agencies.
To be effective, a requirement must exist within Air Force
regulations which stipulates that these agreements must be
written, conferences held, and the provisions tested.
However, for this requirement to be in the form of a written
regulation some aspects of integration and cooperation have
been lost. The compliance with a requirement, just be—
cause it is a requirement, takes away from the concept
of professional management of common problems. It further
limits the effectiveness of the informal structure and the
realization that inter-agency cooperation can be more
readily accepted when accomplished when it means some-
thing personal to the participants.

A written agreement is worthless unless the members
are willing to comply with its provisions. In the area
of public safety--because of its concern for loss of life,
injury to the person, destruction of property, or a com-
bination of all of them-~should be taken out of the hands
of the non-professionals (administrative agency involved
with another major function), and left to the decisions of
the professionals (exclusively trained public safety ad-

ministrators). The adoption of mutual-aid agreements,

158
either though personal consultations or through public
safety councils, would seek this removal and would be
grounds for a common understanding between various units,
or agencies, on each U.S. Air Force installation.

The requirement for the senior officer to also
act as the Director of Public Safety is not seen as a
realistic goal for the long term. This would place an
additional responsibility on a position already overburd-
ened with responsibility. While it would establish a
check for the base commander, no tanagable results for
the man appointed to that position can be seen.

Overall, the minor administrative changes recommend-
ed in this section cannot be clearly evaluated as being
a positive approach to the public safety problems. More
must be done along the lines of administrative and organ-
izational changes before these results are increased. The
proposals, as brought forth, would only create an additional

workload for the agencies.

II. FORMAL REORGANIZATION

The adoption by the Air Force of the preceding pro-
posals was determined to not solve the problems which were
discovered in the field research. Examination is necessary
of the models provided by the civilian public safety agencies

for this result. Those models include administrative

159
designation, administrative integration, and partial
integration. The integrationist's model or ideal, complete

integration, will be examined in the following section.

Administrative Designation.

The last proposal was a form of administrative de-
signation--the title of the senior public safety official
changed to Director of Public Safety. This would enable
him to coordinate on all matters affecting the public safety
of an installtion before those matters were submitted to
review or action by a higher headquarters. The evaluation
of this proposal was mainly negative but certain features
proved attractive as a starting point for further integra-
tion of the various agencies.

Administrative designation has been attempted at
several levels in the civilian public safety agencies, i.e.,
Michigan State University has designated it's Chief of
Campus Police, as the Director of Public Safety but has
not integrated any other agencies with that organization.
Several state police organizations, or state highway patrols,
have also been designated as public safety agencies with-
out integrating with other agencies. The rationale behind
this re-designation of titles seems to be to remove the
term "Police" from the official title of the agency and the

negative connotations that title implies to those 'home-rule'

160
advocates possessing a fear of a national or state police
system. If this example were to be followed in the Air
Force organization, all that would have to be changed would
be the title of the Chief, Security Police. This change in
title would not reflect any change to the underlying problems
discovered by this research project, however.

The change in title could be of some benefit to the
overall aspects of the public safety profession if accom-
paning regulations are published making the Security Police
responsible for the coordination of all public safety
affairs on an installation. The change in title would
also increase the professionalization of the Security
Police officer without incurring the costs of a reorganiza-
tional plan.

In the final analysis, the tactic of simply changing
a man's title cannot be favorably considered as materially

improving the service while reducing the costs.

Administrative Integration.

As stipulated in Chapter III, administrative integra-
tion consists of bringing all, or some, of the agencies
involved in public safety matters under one director. This
administrative integration model can take two forms: first,
the consolidation of administrativekstaffs' under a de-

signated Director of Public Safety; and second, by the

161
reorganization of all, or part, of the agencies in the public

safety enterprise under one organization.

Consolidation of administrative Staffs'. As pointed
out earlier, each of the five agencies have separate ad—
ministrative staffs- for their respective office functions.
The staff of the fire department is under and consolidated
with that of the Civil Engineering staff, and the staff of
the Disaster Control Officer on a small installation is
the same as his primary position responsibilities. Other
than this, the Security Police, the Safety Division, and
EOD, along with-~on larger installations—-the Disaster
Control Officer have separate administrative staff personnel.
All have separate reporting Channels.

The reorganization of these agencies under one
Director of Public Safety would consolidate these
functions under one office. This would be mainly an ad-
ministrative office, not exercising any operational control
over the various functions, but only operating a secret-
arial pool and a central filing point.

The director of this division should be the senior
public safety officer on the installation and act as the
coordination point for all matters affecting the various
agencies. In other words, it is recommended that if this
concept is adOpted, it must be combined with the concept

of administrative designation and the appointment of a

162
Director of Public Safety as an additional duty.

This model then requires that all agencies pool tleir
respective administrative personnel and records under one
central direction. The benefits to be received from this
type of integration would conceivably result in a reduction
of administrative equipment costs, clerical assistance, and
increase the operational time for the other public safety
administrators.

The negative aspects of this concept center mainly
on the fact that by the consolidation of administrative
tasks, it would be very hard for the Director of Public
Safety to not influence Operational policy or procedures.
This concept would not be adaptable to the unity of command,
or chain-of-command concept practiced by the Armed Forces.
The concept would create an administrative agency respons-
ible only to the base commander and not responsible for
operations. Therefore, this model could not be recommended
by the integrationist as a long run operation, however,
the model could be used as a trial attempt at integration.
The ultimate result which should be kept in mind would be

the creation of one administrative, integrated, organization.

One administrative organization. Under this organ-
ization, all five agencies would be removed from their

present divisions and placed under one Director of Public

163
Safety. He would, therefore, become responsible for all
agencies and would be the base commander's representative on
public safety matters.

Almost all of the positive benefits of the integra—
tionist theory are realized in this type of organization.
One agency or division responsible for all elements, a
reduction in administrative costs, a consolidation of train-
ing effort, and better facility utilization are only some
of the advantages. This division would not allow the
flexibility concept to be fully realized because the separ—
ate elements would still be maintained intact, except they
would be removed from the divisions presently responsible
for them. The Fire Department, Security Police, Safety
Division, Disaster Control, and EOD would still have a
separate centralized job training schools (initial basic
technical training), and separate job classifications.

Men would still be maintained in their separate Air Force
Specialties (AFS) and under the specialized supervision of
non-commissioned officers with experience in the operational
field.

Increased professionalization on the part of the
officers placed in charge of this organization is seen as
a positive benefit. However, to enable the officer corps
to be highly trained and knowledgable about their function,

they would have to be required to either study the separate

164
fields or attend the technical training schools of the
various elements. This organization would have to be
basically administrative in nature. The Director of Public
Safety would be a man possessing general administrative
abilities rather than a specific ability in one field.

This type of an organization would solve the administrative
confusion of the separate agencies and would be a positive

forward step toward an in-house attempt at reducing opera-

tional costs while maintaining or increasing services.

The reorganization effort should be established
first at Department of the Air Force level. A separate
Directorate of Public Safety should be established within
the Air Staff to coordinate and direct all efforts in the
public safety area. The same model would then be applied
to the major air commands and so forth down the chain—of—
command to the smallest installation. This reorganization
would not require additional personnel than already employed
in the separated functions but would be an attempt at re-
ducing those already employed. The placement of this
Directorate on the Air Staff level would increase the
officer grade structure within the total Air Force and
provide a smooth career progression for those truly inter-
ested in the public safety challenge.

This conceptual model also allows for the develop-

ment of the professional public safety officer at the

165
enlisted level by providing opportunity for a generalist
administrator/superintendent to emerge. The concept of
lateral training (cross-training to another related job
classification) could be extended to the entire public
safety field instead of the presently established separated
ladders.

The negative arguments against this type of an
organizational change would center on the traditionalist
and 'lose an empire' rationale. These arguments have been
answered earlier as being not applicable when cost re-
duction and increased effectiveness are considered.

The concept as put forth holds considerable attraction
to the interested public safety officer. While this con—
cept does not maximize all the benefits put forth by the
integrationist, it comes closer to the concept of clarify-
ing administrative confusion and increasing service than
the preceding model. Therefore, it is recommended that
this model be given favorable consideration for adoption

by the Air Force.

Partial Integration.

 

The final model is the partial integration of all
elements of the public safety enterprise within the Air
Force. The partial integration model is very similar to

the administrative integration model except that under

166
this concept men receive training in the functions of
policemen, firemen, bomb disposal specialists, disaster
control, and safety. The public safety officer is created
as a distinct job classification but the separate divisions
are maintained within the Directorate of Public Safety.

This model, along with the administrative inte-
gration model, has proven to be the most successful model
employed or attempted by industrial security and police-
fire integrated agencies. Considering the direction and
command that comes from sources outside the local installa-
tion (like the Toronto metropolitan concept and the Virginia
annexation plan), the chances of this model succeeding are
very high. However, the concept does not remove the
Director of Public Safety from the control of the local base
commander, but only establishes a staff position within
higher headquarters to supervise and oversee the operations
of the division from a position outside the local community
(base).

The aspect of having men trained in a variety of
functions, each being able to rotate with the other, max—
imizes part of the disagreement with the administrative
integration model. This organization would allow the
public safety administrator a certain measure of diver-
sity of work and rotation of assignment for his men.

Therefore, increased benefits though correspondingly

167
increases in job motivation, knowledge, and retention
could be results of the adoption of this model.

Further, the reduction in administrative staff,
increases in facility and equipment utilization, and career
professionalization are considered positive benefits to be
received from this model. The aspect of having men trained
in a variety of functions would enable the consolidation
of the various patrols into one section thereby eliminating
this over-lapping function. Generally, this plan can be
a conceivable attempt on the part of public safety ad-
ministrator's to save money while increasing the effect—
iveness of the men and equipment.

The only drawback to this model, except for the
arguments presented previously, would be the increase in
field training and class room training. More men would
have to be delegated this responsibility than are presently
engaged in training. The men in the field would have to
be retrained into the various other functions before the
concept could be evaluated. This should not present a
significant problem, however, considering the anticipated
benefits to be received from the consolidation model.

Considering the benefits that can be anticipated,
and the insignificant disadvantages, this model should be
favorably considered as a second step toward the entire

or complete integration of the various agencies.

168
Summary.

Four public safety integration models have been
considered in this section of which two were suggested as
being workable and worthy of further consideration and
possible adoption by the Air Force. Under the first two
models considered inthis section, organizational changes
were not necessary to implement the integrated concept,
whereas, under the latter two extensive reorganization
would be necessary starting at the Department of the Air
Force level and extending to the smallest installation.

The hypothesis that costs could be reduced while services
increased was supported by all four models and maximized by

the latter two models.
III. COMPLETE INTEGRATION OF ALL ELEMENTS

The final model and the cumulation of the integra-
tionist theory, is the complete integration of all agencies
engaged in the public safety enterprise under one admin-
istrative director. The separate agencies would lose their
identity. Instead, each separate division would be com—
posed of men trained in every speciality. This section will
examine th arguments for and against this type of model

being established within the U.S. Air Force.

Arguments ip Favor.

 

The main support for this model comes from the

169
success it has enjoyed in the smaller communities in the
United States and Canada (police-fire integration), in the
integrated industrial security program, and within the
internal police consolidation attempts. Several comm—
unities have completely consolidated their departments of
police and fire successfully and realized a reduction in
public safety costs and increased services. All of the
benefits detailed in the preceding section can be realized
under this model, especially the reduction in administrative
effort and management time and talent. One man can be
placed in any capacity within the division without re-
ducing his effectiveness. I

A distinCtion should be drawn between the larger
U.S. Air Force installations and the smaller bases. On the
larger installations flying, missile, and general operational
units led the mission of the base. While on the smaller
stations, support is the prime concern. This difference
in mission must be reflected in the integration model
adopted for public safety agencies. On thalarger base,
aircraft rescue, missile safety, and operational security
must receive emphasis. Therefore, a degree of specialization
should probably be maintained within the totally integrated
model. This separation of emphasis is allowed by the de-
finition.

The discussion concerning the administrative integrated

170
and partially integrated models touched on the total or
complete integration of the administrators. The common
ground established for all the elements must be stipulated
to the administrator, therefore, schooling and experience
is necessary in all facets of the public safety concern.
Officers (the administrators) should be required to attend
special schools for the various functions, either before
they go into the field, or after they have been in the
field a short time. This will enable them to have a div-
ersified but well-rounded philosophy concerning the challenge
which exists within the public safety career field.

Could a totally integrated public safety agency in-
crease service and reduce costs? The answer to this ques-
tion lies in actual field experimentation of the concept,
however, speculation and experience indicated that the

answer would be positive.

Arguments Against.

The character and diversity of the mission through-
out the Air Force restricts the adoption of any organiza-
tional model without trial and evaluation. Before this
step is undertaken, certain disadvantages to the totally

integrated concept must be examined and illustrated.

Loss pf specialization. Under the completely in-

tegrated department, a loss in individual specialization

171
will, most probably, occur. This loss should not be as
significant on the smaller or support installation as it
would be on the larger, mission orientated, base. While the
theory allows for the maintenance of specialized divisions
within the totally integrated department, i.e., investigations,
fire apparatus personnel, etc., some lose of service and
proficiency can be anticipated.

Authors have commented on the social character of
the firehouse and the people related to this function.
A study examined earlier pointed out that there are differ—
ences between applicants for fire fighting positions and
police positions. This study also indicated that the fire-
men enjoy the standard shift arrangement, whereby, they are
able to pursue outside activity. Under the totally integra-
ted department, these separate characteristics would be
lost. The re—orientation process necessary could con-

ceivably be successful due to these social forces.

Training. The decrease in specialization would
require an increase in the training function. Experience
and research revealed that this is not an insurmountable
problem but a problem which must never-the-less be under—
taken on a long range basis. Included in this disadvant-
age would be not only an increase in on-the-job training
and simulated field exercises. Two levels and two separ-

ate problems would, therefore, present themselves to the

172

administrator.

These problems are not necessarily problems which
can be overcome with intensive effort and professional-
ism. Attention must be paid to proper assignment and.
scheduling of the personnel for these training sessions.
This would not be a problem for the totally integrated
concept, as it also exists for the non-integrated agency.
However, experience has shown, that because of the military
exercises of command and control, there are times when the
interests of the men are not always taken into consideration
by the administrator. This must not be allowed to happen
under this integrated concept, or if it does then the total

idea and theory will fail in practice.

SectiOn Conclusion.

The organizational model which is the ideal structure
for the public safety integrationist, conceivably could be
applied to the diversified mission of the U.S. Air Force.
The model should be the final step in the adoption of the
consolidation philosophy but only after extensive field
experimentation with the other models recommended in the
preceding section. Certain disadvantages were found to
exist within the totally integrated concept which must be
also tested under actual field experimentation. If these

problems prove to be a basic weakness to the concept then

173
the failure to reach the ideal structure should not be
considered as failure of the whole theory but as failure
of a portion of it. Therefore, the total integration con—
cept cannot be recommended for adoption as a first stage
measure but rather should be attempted on a selective and

experimental basis.
IV. SUMMARY

Several consolidation theories, adopted from the
experiences within civilian public safety agencies, were
explored and examined in this section. From this research,
it is clear that some form of integration must be under—
taken to enable the dual benefits of administrative change
to be realized: increase effectiveness and cost reduction.

A series of steps were defined through which it
was recommended that the Air Force attempt, or at least
experiment with, the integration concept. These steps
should be followed in the order listed:

First, an attempt should be made to integrated the
administrative staff personnel and facilities of the various
public safety elements.

Second, the integration of administrative function
should be expanded, to the inclusion of Operational control
of the various elements under one director. This organ-

ization should be adopted at the Department of the Air

174
Force level first, and then slowly changed throughout the
various levels of command.

Third, after the organizations have been aligned the
Departments of Public Safety should start cross-training
their personnel into each of the functions within the agency.
At this same time, the administrative officials should be
sent to the various technical schools for these functions.

Fourth, after sufficient time has been allowed for
this cross-training, attempts on a highly selective and an
experimentation basis should be made at eliminating the
various elements within the Department of Public Safety.

The recent experiments using demonstration projects can be
used as an example of this experimentation. The results
from these programs must be closely analyzed and if

the loss from failure to specialize is significant then this
last attempt should abandoned, at least for the larger
installation.

Following this plan of attack, it can be anticipated
that the problems and confusion uncovered in Chapter VI
will be eliminated, thereby, increasing the overall service
of the various agencies and decreasing the incurred opera-

tional expenses.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND A PROGRAM FOR ACTION

The major objective of this research has been to
investigate the feasibility of integrating the public
safety elements of the United States Air Force under one
organizational department. These elements, or agencies,
were purposely limited to five separate organizations: the
Security Police, the Fire Department, the Safety Division,
the Disaster Control Officer, and the Explosive Ordnance
Disposal section. These organizations hold bureaucratic
responsibilities to administrative directors interested in
fields other than public safety. The research investigated
the benefits which might be realized from a public safety
consolidation of effort directed toward a reduction in

costs and an improvement of service.

Review p£_the project. The association of Alcohol-

 

ic's Anonymous have a prayer that provides a summary of
this research:
God grant me the serenity to accept the things I
cannot change,
Courage to change the things I can, and
Wisdom to know the difference.
It is acknowledged that the various public safety

agencies within the United States Air Force are doing a

task that is necessary. Experience has shown that they

176

are doing the task at tremendous personal sacrifice and
dedication. That the public safety elements within the
U.S. Air Force are manned by highly dedicated and well-
motivated individuals is emphasized. The main purpose of
this research, and this report, is that the personal
dedication, and motivation, of these men could be more
justly directed through an integrated department-—a depart-
ment geared toward total involvement in the public safety
philosophy-—a department which is organized under its
own command structure!

To accomplish this idealistic task, the problem,
as experienced by the investigator after two years as
a public safety administrator, were identified and as
observed at four separate installations. Additionally,
library research established the basis that some effort
should be made at consolidation. Of course, the experiences
encountered colored the observations of the investigator
and this fact cannot be overlooked by the reader. This
defect, however, must not distract from the overall
evaluation of the report as some effort at consolidation
or integration is necessary if service is to be improved
and money saved.

The four separate installations visitied were chosen
by population and involvement in public safety concerns.

Public safety administrators were interviewed, practice

177

training exercises were observed and critiqued, and enlisted
men were queried for their opinions concerning the overall
aspects of the public safety challenge at each installation.
In addition to this, actual emergencies were observed at
each of the installations. _This latter aspect of the pro-
ject was accomplished without the knowledge of the admin-
istrator personally involved. These observations afforded
an opportunity for certain conclusions to be made.

The existance of the problem is acknowledged early
in the report. The impoftance of this problem did not
appear until after the research was intensively analyzed.

At this time, it was evident that some method had to be
devised which would bring together the various, and div-
ergent, elements of the U.S. Air Force public safety enter-
prise. But, as is the case of many good ideas, much re—
search had still to be completed before a comprehensive
plan could be devised which would establish clear-cut

solutions to the problems.

 

istrative confusion, job knowledge and experience, individual
motivation, and over-lapping functions) do exist within the
public safety elements throughout the world, at least
throughout the United States. These same problems exist

within the structure of the United States Air Force. This

178

paper illustrated many of those problems. How can a plan

be initiated which would provide at least a partial solution
to those problems? Five separate hypotheses were investigat—
ed in response to this question. That investigation was
based upon a historical overview of public safety inte-
gration and an examination of the examples and the experi-
mentation which has been undertaken within the context of

the civilian public safety agencies. These hypotheses were

found to be:

First, that the United States Air Force does not
provide for an efficient or effective solution to the
public safety problem. This contention was supported.
Specific examples were identified which illustrated the

problems of these agencies.

Second, that civilian agencies can and have pro—
vided examples within the area of public safety for the
military to follow. This contention was definitely est-
ablished and a modified form of those experiments was re-
commended for consideration by the planners and organiza—
tional experts within the Air Force. Additionally, the
recommendations put forth by this paper are based exclusive-
ly on the results of the successful and unsuccessful attempts
at integration of the public safety agencies by the civil-

ian organizations.

179

Third, that the advantages of an integrated public
safety agency within the U.S. Air Force far outweigh the
disadvantages or arguments against integration. The in-
vestigation of the civilian experiences within the area of
concern conclusively proved that, theoretically, integration
of the various elements is not only practical but necessary.
This latter contention is true because the increased pres-
sure on the Armed Forces to reduce manpower and subsequ-
ently costs has created an atmosphere for internal change.
The aspect of reducing property loss and the careless waste
of human manpower and life adds to this necessity. Small
public safety organizations (industrial security, integrated
police—fire departments), have proven this to be a fact,
however, the area of a nationally applied standard accept-
able to a world-wide mission must be considered. The
contention will not be completely answered until sufficient

empirical research is completed under actual field conditions.

Fourth, that a certain level of compatability exists
between selected members of the investigated U.S. Air Force
public safety elements to warrant consideration of mixing
or integrating the personnel. Data was presented from both
a experimental research basis and a field basis to support
this contention. The intervening variable not tested con—
cerns the role and capability of the public safety admin-

istrator. This variable requires field testing to determine

180

the actual compatability. Differences in the social and
physical tasks are acknowledged and must also be subjected

to a program of field tests.

Fifth, that a systematized standard could be estab-
lished, based upon the experiences and research, which
would provide a long range program for public safety inte-
gration within the U.S. Air Force. The library research
coupled with the observations from the field established
such a program. The starting point was the integration of
the administrative functions, then the cross-training of
selected personnel, from there to a restructuring of organ—
izational lines, and finally to the total integration of
the various agencies under one direction without specific
reference to the separate functions. A caution was issued
at this point: If this long range program is found to be
unworkable at a specific level then a lower level should
be instituted. The whole concept should not be ignored

based upon it's failure at a higher level.

Call for research and experimentation. This paper
revealed that not every aspect of public safety integration
can be investigated at the library or within four installa—
tions. It is recommended that critical evaluations (test-
able solutions) must be attempted under actual field

conditions (much like the demonstration projects now being

181
used by the Federal Government in it's grant-in-aid programs).
Can the recommendations of this report, of this

research, be instituted? The answer to this question lies
only in the employment of personnel truly concerned with

the public safety challenge, allowed to investigate solutions
on their own, and granted incentives for improving the
clientele service, the mens' morale, and the United States
Air Force's history of administrative innovation and leader-
ship. Public safety is of major concern to administrators

of operational and support units, of municipalities, and of
dedicated young men--to ensure that this task is accomplished
efficiently and at a reduction of manpower and cost depends

on the conscienteous adoption of the integration argument.

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"Why We Are Opposed to Integration of Fire and Police
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

MUNICIPALITIES WITH INTEGRATED

 

 

 

POLICE-FIRE SERVICE1
Municipality and State/Province Population
Aiken, South Carolina 11,243
Asbestos, Quebec 8,969
Augusta, Kansas' 6,434
Beverly Hills, Michigan 8,633
Boyne City, Michigan 2,797
Cap-de-la-Madeline, Quebec 22,943
Center Line, Michigan 10,164
Champaign, Illinois 49,583
Chicago Heights, Illinois 34,331
Chicoutimi, Quebec 24,878
Danville, Virginia 46,577
Dearborn, Michigan 112,007
Drummondville, Quebec 26,284
East Kildonan, Manitoba 18,718
Edgewood, Pennsylvania 5,124
Edina, Minnesota 28,501
Elgin, Illinois 49,447
Essexville, Michigan 4,590
Evanston, Illinois 79,283
Farmington, Michigan 6,881
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 83,648
Fox Point, Wisconsin 7,315
Garden City, Michigan 38,017
Giberalter, Michigan 2,196
Glencoe, Illinois 10,472
27,095

Granby, Quebec

 

. 1V. A. Leonard, Police Organization and Manage-
ment (second edition; Brooklyn: The Foundation Press,
Inc., 1964), pp. 85-87.

 

Municipality, and State/Province

Grand'Mere, Quebec
Grosse Pointe Shores, Michigan
Grosse Pointe Woods, Michigan

Highland Park, Illinois
Huntington Woods, Michigan

Joliette, Quebec
Kenogami, Quebec

Lake Alfred, Florida
Lapeer, Michigan
Larami, Wyoming

La Tuque, Quebec
Levis, Quebec
Longueuil, Quebec

Mastinique, Michigan
Milton-Freewater, Oregon
Montreal-East, Quebec
Montreal-North, Quebec
Mount Royal, QUebec

Nome, Alaska
North Augusta, South Carolina

Oak Park, Michigan
Oakwood, Ohio

Palmer, Alaska
Park Forest, Illinois

Rimouski, Quebec

River Hills, Wisconsin
Riviere-du-Loup, Quebec
Rock Falls, Illinois

St. James, Manitoba

St. Jean, Quebec

St. Joseph-d'Alma, Quebec

St. Lambert, Quebec

St. Laurent, Manitoba

St. Laurent, Quebec

Ste. Agatha-des—Monts, Quebec
Ste. Foy, Quebec

Sewickley Heights, Pennsylvania

ngulation

 

14,023
2,301
18,580

25,532
8,746

16,940
11,309

2,191
6,160
17,520
11,098
13,644
14,332

4,875
4,110
4,607

25,407

16,990

2,316
10,348

36,632
10,493

29,993

14,630
1,257
9,964

10,261

26,502
24,367
10,822
12,224
300
38,291
5,173
14,615
931

(est)

194

Municipality, and State/Province

Shawinigan Falls, Quebec
Shorewood, Wisconsin

Sorel, Quebec

Spartanburg, South Carolina
Sunnyvale, California

Thetford Mines, Quebec
Transcona, Manitoba
Trois-Rivieres, Quebec

Valleyfield (Salaberry), Quebec

Winston-Salem, North Carolina

Population

 

28,597
15,990
16,476
44,352
52,898

19,511

8,312
50,483
23,584

111,135

195

APPENDIX B

CITIES ABANDONING POLICE-FIRE INTEGRATION1

 

 

City, and State/Province Population
Buena Park, California 46,401
Chico, California 14,757
Fremont, California 43,790
Hawthorne, California 33,035
Hollywood, Florida 35,237
Lincoln, Nebraska 128,521
Melvindale, Michigan 13,089
Monterey Park, California - 37,821
Oregon City, Oregon 7,996
St. Jerome, Quebec 24,546
Sanger, California 9,627
San Marino, California 13,658
Sherbrooke, Quebec 66,554
Waukegan, Illinois 55,719
West Miami, Florida 5,296

Average population: 35,602

 

1V. A. Leonard, Police Organization and Manage-
ment (second edition; Brooklyn: The Foundation Press,
Inc., 1964), p. 87.

 

APPENDIX C

RESPONSIBILITIES OF A BASE COMMANDER1

Responsibilities for service. The support group/
squadronVTbase) commander's mission is designated to
advance the concept that the wing commander and deputy
commander for operations (or mission) and material should
be free to devote the maximum time on areas that are
"key" to the achievement of the primary mission of the
wing/group. It does this by relieving the wing command
section of the problems of a multitude of subordinates.
It also recognizes that certain functions should be per-
formed on a consolidated basis, and when these functions
are related they should be grouped under one individual
to provide optimum efficiency. Thus, the support group/
squadron (base) commander has under him all of the
functions essential to managing the base and providing
base support and services to the mission and material
elements of the wing/group. He is responsible for and
is given the functional means for:

 

a. Clothing, housing, and feeding all personnel,
and providing recreational, athletic, and social activities.

b. Protecting equipment supplies, and station
property; maintaining discipline; administering justice;
and providing legal assistance.

c. Providing a chaplain program of religious and
related activities.

d. Prescribing administrative practices and pro-
viding administrative services that will enable the wing/
group base to accomplish its mission.

e. Insuring assignment control and use of sound
personnel management practices throughout the wing/group
base. . . . developing high morale and job efficiency by
conducting an education services program and a personnel
services program; and providing civilian personnel ser-
vices by operating a central personnel office (CCPO).

 

1Air Force Manual 26-2, "Organization Policy and
Guidance" (Washington: Department of the Air Force,
15 March 1966), pp. 23-24.

198

f. Statistical and progress reporting; manage-
ment analysis as required; reviewing, monitoring, and
approving all financial statements, budgets, and audits
for both appropriated and nonappropriated funds; and
for performing financial accounting, disbursing, and
financial reporting for all Air Force appropriations,
funds, and financial resources under the custody of
the wing/group commander and himself.

g. Procuring supplies and services under a cen-
tralized procurement concept for the wing/group base
through methods prescribed by law.

h. Conducting base Operations and training
functions . . . .

i. Maintaining installation buildings, grounds,
airfields, railroad lines, and other facilities; per-
forming custodial, janitorial, and sanitary functions;
and providing fire-fighting and aircraft crash rescue
facilities, equipment, and services.

j. Supporting tenant units in accordance with
pertinent support agreements.

APPENDIX D

RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMANDER'S

FIRE PROTECTION COUNCIL1

The Commander's Fire Protection Council is appoint-
ed to assist the commander in executing the program of
fire protection for the installation. It consists of the
base fire marshal (chairman), base fire chief (technical)
advisor), base safety officer, and at least three other
senior staff officers. It will meet periodically at the
call of the commander to:

 

 

(1) Resolve current and long-term problems affect-
ing all units, activities, and functions.

(2) Review fire losses and take necessary correct-
ive action.

(3) Insure compliance with higher headquarters
directives, criteria, and policy.

(4) Promote coordination and support of all organ-
izations and staff heads.

(5) Provide manning, training, and funding.

(6) Review fire risk in projects of new con-
struction, alteration, and repair.

(7) Promote fire prevention among all personnel.

(8) Review program for effective utilization of
assigned career personnel, AFSC 571X0.

(9) Sponsor a quarterly inspection of base area
and facilities by area and unit fire marshals and require
them to report the results in writing.

(10) Inspect the base annually and report the re-
sults to the base commander.

 

1Air Force Manual 92-1, "Fire Protection Program
Operational Procedures" (Washington: Department of the
Air Force, 17 October 1968), p. 1-2.

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