

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS CONCERNING
THE INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC SAFETY
ELEMENTS WITHIN THE USAF

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By
Timm Gray Engh

AN ABSTRACT OF A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

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Integration within the public safety elements of small communities has attracted the attention of municipal administrators since the early history of mankind. This paper is concerned with problems found to exist within five separate public safety elements of the United States Air Force. These agencies were found to be working at cross-purposes with each other, while being concerned with a common problem: The prevention of, and protection from, loss of life and property in the U. S. Air Force.

To meet the challenge of this dual problem in a more effective manner is the basic premise of this research.

A review of the literature available within the field of public safety integration revealed three models which have effectively met this challenge: police-fire integration, internal police coordination and cooperation, and thirdly, the integrated industrial security program used by private industry. Arguments for and against these models are discussed.

The present organization and responsibilities of five U.S. Air Force agencies are explored: Security Police, Disaster Control, Fire Department, Ground Safety Division, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The activity of these agencies was investigated at four specifically selected Air Force installations. Public safety administrators were interviewed, reports analyzed, and observations were made of a number of public safety incidents at all four installations.

A series of organizational changes are proposed which could eliminate or limit the problems found as a result of the library research and the field study. The models drawn from these changes resulted in a program of integration for the U.S. Air Force public safety elements. This program consists of:

First, the administrative designation of the senior public safety administrator as Director of Public Safety;

Second, the administrative integration of all five staff agencies beginning at Department of the Air Force level and programmed to the smallest installation;

Third, the cross-training of officers and senior non-commissioned officers into the various functions; and,

Fourth, the complete integration of all five agencies under one Director of Public Safety throughout the United States Air Force.

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


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PREFACE

This paper concerns the integration of the public safety elements of the United States Air Force. I would be remiss if those dedicated officers and supervisors at the four installations visited in the course of this research were not mentioned. All of these individuals, only they know who they are, helped this project by willingly giving of time and talent. This paper is dedicated to those men and the coming generation of professional United States Air Force public safety supervisors. In their hands lies the proof of this paper.

I wish to express my sincere thanks to the United States Air Force for supporting me these last four years. Without the scholarship this paper would never have been written. I firmly believe that the best scholarship program in the world exists within the United States Air Force.

Finally, I want to express my sincere appreciation to my wife and family for putting up, for many years, with the work necessary for this education.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"MAYDAY--MAYDAY--MAYDAY, THIS IS AIR FORCE 1059 TWO MILES SOUTHEAST OF YOUR BASE ON FINAL APPROACH. I HAVE FLAMED" This call, heard infrequently at United States Air Force¹ bases throughout the world, means that an Air Force aircraft is in trouble and has lost radio contact with the ground control tower. The observed events following this 'cry for help' would make an experienced public safety officer think that this is surely mass confusion on a grand and inexcusable style. Fire trucks roar to life, an ambulance appears, Security Police beacons begin to rotate, and everyone starts moving in three different directions at once. The best example of what actually happens in an emergency of this nature was expressed by a young recruit, fresh from basic training, first day on the job, and scared: "What do I do?" Luckily, an experienced non-commissioned officer is able to take the recruit in tow and direct his efforts toward attempting to recover this pilot and his aircraft. The same NCO cannot find out where the convoy is suppose to

¹The terms United States Air Force, U.S. Air Force, USAF, and Air Force are used interchangeably throughout this paper.

form. He, unlike the Fire Chief or the Security Police officer, is not concerned with the route, people, or ensuring that all the proper equipment is present; his only concern is to get to the crash scene as quickly as possible. However, because the officer or the Chief failed to get together on a starting point, valuable time is lost. This project will explore these problems in an effort to find a method which can be applied to end the confusion which arose from this incident.

The prospect of public safety integration, coordination, consolidation, and internal liaison has been discussed in the past to great length. Wise arguments appear on both sides of the issue.² The integration of the emergency elements within the industrial security program has been an organizational standard since the start of hostilities in World War II.³ The theory in administration literature which has concerned itself with internal governmental consolidation and coordination has been directed at a dual program--cost reduction while improving the service.

²For a discussion of these arguments see Dale E. McNeil, "An Inquiry into the Feasibility of Integrating the Police and Fire Services of an American Municipality" (unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1960), pp. 60-93.

³Gordon Wayne Kettler, "A Comparative Study of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Integrated and Non-Integrated Industrial Security Organization" (unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1964), p. 1.

I. THE PROBLEM

The term public safety, which includes the police, fire, safety, and disaster control, has been a subject for several controversies within the realm of public administration. The continual debate is caused by administrations first having to provide a necessary service and second by having to also incur a tremendous budget expense by providing this service. Administrators are thus caught in the revolving door of increased citizen demands for service and lower taxes, while on the other side one finds the employees of the public safety agencies demanding shorter work weeks and higher pay. The dilemma of the city administrator forces some to consider the attractive concept of combining one or several municipal services in an effort to balance the already strained budget. Insight into the administrator's dilemma can be gained when it is realized that almost twenty per cent of the municipal budget goes to providing police and fire protection for the city.⁴ When safety and disaster control (or civil defense) are added to this figure, the total is bound to increase.

⁴Allen H. Andrews, Jr. "A Study of the Unification of Police and Fire Protection Services of Michigan State University" (unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1964), p. 1.

Focus of this report.

This paper will explore the public safety field of the United States Air Force by focusing on:

1. Whether or not an efficient organizational method is being used to meet the demands of the public safety challenge.
2. A definition of the administrative and organizational models which have been attempted by the civilian communities concerning the public safety problem (police-fire integration, metropolitan government, etc.), and examining the same organizational structure from the stand point of a military public safety operation.
3. Investigating the benefits and disadvantages of the civilian communities experience at reducing public safety costs through integration, and applying those experiences to the military public safety setting.
4. Establishing a conceptual model from which the public safety service can be optimized and expenses reduced, within the framework of the U.S. Air Force.

Importance of this study.

Recent administrative theory has provided the Department of Defense with a method which evaluates all effort within the military establishment by the reduction of that effort to a dollar and cents base. This method has been called the "Cost Reduction Program." Defense

Secretary Robert McNamara declared that the American people require of their government a dollar worth of service for every dollar spent.⁵ The program not only implies a positive effort being made to justify every dollar budgeted, but also that energetic effort would be extended to insure that efficiency and effectiveness become the prime motives for administrative and bureaucratic organization. This report is prepared with this philosophy in mind. It is to greater effectiveness within the U.S. Air Force public safety operation without sacrificing service that this report is directed.

Today, the military-industrial complex has been criticized from draining money from much needed national social programs. The merits or the arguments of this debate will not be discussed in this paper, however, the professional military administrator would be remiss if he did not consider the future years and the future national administrations will be watching the internal organization of the defense establishment with a sharper eye. Within the next decade, the manpower, finances, and facilities of the military will be sharply reduced or at the very least require extensive re-justification. Positive steps taken at

⁵Robert L. McNamara, "The Cost Reduction Program," Air University Review, XXXVI (Summer, 1963), p. 46.

the present time, before the reduction fever becomes an epidemic, should put the military leader in a favorable position, from a bargaining standpoint, with the budgetary critics. This study will investigate only one facet of that recommended reduction of effort--the alternatives to overlapping and multi-agency involvement in the public safety field.

Public safety logically involves the well being of human life. Public safety involves the attempt to reduce the extent of injury to the human being, as well as attempting to reduce the amount of damage to public and private property. Public safety is, therefore, in the business of dealing with emotions and with emotional people. Ineffectiveness within the public safety enterprise can and often does result in greater property damage and causes greater sacrifice of life. This twofold problem is of major concern to the military establishment because its prime mission is not the loss of life in accidents, not the loss of man-hours by injury resulting from a conflagration, and not the loss of operational equipment as a result of either carelessness or accident. The military objective, the military dollar, and the military profession are dedicated to the protection of life, and to the safeguarding of the national security. Therefore, any loss of effectiveness within the military public safety

enterprise is felt in diminished operational effectiveness and by a failure to meet the stipulated goals. When one life is left in the balance because of bureaucratic fumbling, when one man is taken from his operational duty because of organizational problems, the military profession must be vitally concerned.

Major premise.

The most important aspect of this paper is the relationship between the loss of duty time and service, to the fractionalized organizational structure of the Air Force public safety elements. The Air Force recognizes this problem because under extreme emergency public safety conditions, (public safety as differentiated from combat situations), the various agencies are brought hurriedly together in the hope of quickly establishing some type of coordination and control. This concept seems to be contrary to good administrative and public safety theory. The time for coordination and cooperation is not when the emergency is at hand but during the routine slack time, the time before the emergency. That proper coordination is theoretically assumed to take place prior to the actual event is recognized. The fact remains that coordination does not just happen, it takes extensive work by all levels of administrators to see that units having similar response

missions act together. Coordination must be conscientious effort by highly motivated individuals. Words must have appropriate thought and preparation behind them before they are put to the test of the actual emergency or placed within a plan to be followed at some later date. This study will attempt to reveal that this is in fact not the case. This study will attempt to draw workable administrative and organizational changes and modifications to the existing structure. This study will further attempt to show that the recommended changes and modifications to an already existing bureaucracy will provide an effective tool geared to the elimination of administrative overlaps, clarification of communication lines, and proper utilization of personnel at a time when a critical shortage exists within the personnel field.

It is visualized that in some cases these problems have existed in civilian public safety departments. These problems will be alluded to in the discussion of literature available in the field. A survey of police-fire integration attempts, and other public safety consolidation efforts will be examined to meet this challenge.

Limiting characteristics of this study.

This paper is limited in its application to the military setting. The conclusions reached in Chapter VII

can only be applied to that setting, The reason for this restriction lies in the centralized character of the military organization and not the local nature of the civilian communities.

This study is also limited and must be held to the boundaries of the Zone of Interior (the continental limits of the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii). By this is meant that the unique problems of the United States Air Force in foreign countries will not be explored. This is specifically done for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that every political setting is quite different and would entail more research than the scope of this project intends. The integration of public safety elements within the Air Force might have some application to foreign involvement but the separate considerations of that country and its political setting must be taken into consideration before an across the board proposal could be or would be suggested.

A third limitation of this study emerges from the fact that the situation and setting of the United States Air Force in forward areas (within or near to combat situations), dictates local exceptions to already established rules and procedures. These exceptions are such that to require or to attempt to apply the recommendations of this paper would be seriously misleading. The individual

commanders must possess the ability and the authority to make changes to any and all plans to meet the requirements of local circumstances especially when their concern is the national security.

A final limitation to this study is the fact that the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), whose mission is threefold (criminal investigation, security investigation, and counter intelligence), has not been considered in any of the research or in consolidation models recommended. OSI is a unique organization within the United States Air Force because it has its own bureaucratic structure, separate and independent from total Air Force organizational philosophy. It is an organizational structure similar to that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. OSI investigative mission requires that an independent role be played. The importance placed upon this structure by the demands of the mission and the advantages received by the total Air Force effort require that this agency be removed from the public safety consolidation theory expressed by this paper.

II. DEFINITIONS

The military language is, in some respects, different from the language commonly used in academic and civilian circles. An attempt will not be made to define all of

these differences, but definitions are offered for certain words and ~~phrases~~ which will be used extensively in this paper. The public safety enterprise also has evolved a language separate and distinct from the normal civilian situations and once again an attempt will not be made to define all of these differences but only those which have relevance to this paper.

Public safety: The enterprise, business, or the agency which deals in the area of providing emergency and preventive services to the public. These services might not be thought of as being of an emergency nature to the people actually employed by the agency, but are generally thought of as being an emergency by the clientele of the agency. This concept or term includes call-for-services, i.e., getting a cat out of a tree, or helping a child out of the locked bathroom, as well as fire, crime and accident prevention.

The phrase, when used in conjunction with the United States Air Force and as used in this paper includes the following agencies: Security Police, Fire Department, Safety Officer (limited to the Ground Safety Branch only), the Disaster Control Officer, and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) branch of the Material Division. The inclusion of the Disaster Control Officer and his related

function, differentiates this term from the commonly held civilian concept. The reason for this inclusion will be explained later in this paper.

Integration: This term denotes bringing together various departments of the public safety enterprise under one bureaucratic system. Whether this system is an organic whole or in fractionalized parts is not an important distinction to the context of this paper. Research will attempt to establish an ideal model from which alternatives can be developed in order to provide a realistic set of models for organizational and administrative change. This definition will be refined later to include the various definitions taken from the literature. This refinement will enable the reader to better understand the concept and to place in proper perspective the realization that a definitional problem does exist. For the purposes of this study, the term consolidation, while carrying a different meaning in some academic circles, will be used interchangeably with integration.

Metropolitan: The integration of separate governmental entities under the management of one governing body. This term and the concept it implies does not apply to the military structure because that structure is already a centralized agency responsive (in varying degrees), to the

central government. The term is used within this paper to define and illustrate certain administrative changes recently undertaken within the civilian community. The concept relates to the experience of the Canadian government, specifically Toronto, Ontario, and to attempts made in Boston, Denver, Nashville, and Baton Rouge. As will be shown later in this paper, the two systems of government are of a different nature and as a result different consequences have resulted. The difference is important to the research in this project. The organizational components of the Toronto experiment (a Federal entity) and the centrally directed organization of the United States Air Force are very similar. This will also be emphasized and explained in a later chapter.

Major Command: A subdivision of the Air Force that is assigned a major segment of the United States Air Force mission. A major command is directly subordinate to Headquarters, United States Air Force.

Operational Command: A major command that is composed, in whole or in part, of strategic, tactical, or defense forces, or flying forces directly in support of such forces.

Support Command: Any command which is not an

operational command. Support commands provide supplies, weapon systems, support systems, operational support equipment, combat material, maintenance, surface transportation, administration, personnel testing, advanced education, communications, and special services to the Air Force and other supported organizations.⁶

III. HYPOTHESES

This research was undertaken for a variety of reasons, some of which have already been enumerated earlier in this chapter. The major emphasis of this paper will be on the following contentions:

1. That the current organizational philosophy of the United States Air Force public safety agencies in effect creates a multi-responsibility structure which does not provide efficient and effective service to its clientele.
2. The integration theory, historically and currently being used by civilian public safety agencies, results in more effective and efficient service to its clientele.
3. The advantages of integration within the civilian public safety agencies, when applied to the military

⁶Air Force Manual 26-2, "Organization Policy and Guidance" (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 15 March 1966), pp. 10-11.

structure, outweigh the disadvantages experienced by several civilian agencies.

4. That the personnel who make-up the departments of police and fire prevention are sufficiently compatible in general military selection criteria to allow for at least some consideration of total police-fire integration.

5. That the philosophy of public safety integration and previous consolidation experiments do yield a viable series of organizational models which can be identified and applied to the public safety elements of the U.S. Air Force. Sufficient positive management and administrative benefits should exist so that a betterment in service can be realized by the public safety elements and their clientele.

Discussion.

While these appear to be a long list of possible contentions to be empirically studied, the end result should yield a significant set of problems and alternative solutions--the objective being the integration or consolidation of functional areas within the overall organization of the U. S. Air Force.

The immediate criticism is that the work done in civilian communities has not been shown to be completely effective and as a result has largely been abandoned. While there will be sufficient material presented later

in this paper in an attempt to refute this contention, it is important that attention be directed to this statement at this time. The subsequent chapters point out that significant differences, organizationally and politically, not to say anything about socially, exist within the military setting, and specifically within the Air Force, that enables a separation of the prior work as being largely meaningless to the military public safety agencies.

The military enterprise is a large organization that is very similar to a pool of liquid--one wave can start a rippling effect. In this characteristic alone, without the political and social considerations entering the picture, the differences between the major work done in the police-fire integration sphere must be re-evaluated and re-structured to fit the military model. Two separate and distinct organizations exist in our political system (the locally controlled community fire/police departments, and the highly centralized military police system). That these different organizations can be and have been designed to operate within the area of public safety, in functionally different manners, will be shown.

IV. METHODOLOGY

The prime concern of this report is given and emphasized in the above section. The method of studying

those contentions was basically one of extensive review of the available literature, both formal written reports of agencies attempting, already undergoing, or considering integration of some form of their public safety responsibility. Theoretical studies undertaken by administrators at various governmental levels were also studied. This library research was supplemented by the knowledge gained from systematic observations at four United States Air Force bases. The installations selected have different missions and different populations, therefore, different public safety problems. This latter method was adopted as an attempt to allow the conclusions of this study to be generalized and made applicable to the overall mission of the United States Air Force and not restricted to the specific bases studied.

An important part of this research was the examination of formal reports of governmental entities that have undergone some form of unification or integration and have either failed to achieve the stated goals or have modified those goals due to political pressure. Failure in this area was the most difficult problem to answer. Knowledge of failure by integrated departments seems to have stopped many a progressive public administrator from initiating the integrated public safety concept. As will be shown later, failure generally resulted from the

administrators' lack of attention to political considerations. This area was considered early in the research, however, it was not regarded as being completely applicable to the military setting. Political considerations are not at this time the prime motive for attempting change: efficiency and solution of internal problems should be foremost in the professional military executive's mind. This does not preclude the aspect of cost reduction referred to earlier, but only lends support to the line of distinction that is drawn between the civilian entities and the military situation.

The above methodology is supported by an examination, in some detail, of those organizations and enterprises where integration and metropolitan organization have been successful. The concept initiated within the industrial security area provides some useful insights into the entire integration problem and has proven useful to, at least, one civilian community (Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana). Whether the industrial security model was used accidentally or by design is a matter of conjecture at this point. The organization of the Metropolitan Toronto area, along with some metropolitan attempts in Boston, Nashville, and Denver, are examined in an attempt to establish corollaries with the military setting.

The experiences of several members of the United States Air Force were analyzed in the hope that personal

experience with emergency conditions would establish criteria for the entire public safety enterprise within the military organization. Data was gathered from several United States Air Force bases which will be used to show the degree of public safety problems existent on the various installations. This data is not intended to be extensive in nature, but because the military is fairly standardized among its installations, a certain degree of generalization can be attempted.

Material on equipment and personnel was gained from interviews held in an operational setting with various Air Force officers. Personnel records of Security Policemen and firemen were reviewed from comparisons of age, education, and geographical background. From an analysis of this information limited conclusions can be derived concerning the typical military public safety enlisted man. All of these factors will be detailed later in this paper.

V. PLAN OF PROCEDURE

Chapters II, III, IV, and V will concentrate on the various concepts pursued by the civilian public safety agencies. Chapter II deals with the historical development and Chapter III, IV, and V study the various organizational plans which have been developed, i.e., police-fire integration, internal police consolidation, and the integrated

industrial security model. The literature within the field will be reviewed at this time to enable the reader to come to a clear understanding of exactly what work has been done and what experiences are applicable to the military setting. The differences in the theory and its advantages to a bureaucratic military structure will be explored in an attempt to establish a foundation from which alternative suggestions can be proposed.

The main emphasis of this report is on effecting organizational change within a large bureaucratic organization, the United States Air Force. Therefore, the existing organization must be examined in some detail before any proposals for organizational change and administrative re-alignment can be presented. This organization is defined in Chapter VI. The reader should then be thoroughly introduced to two settings which exist simultaneously and harmoniously within one political system. Also included in this chapter is a report on the information received from the experiences of the Air Force installations studied, and an evaluation of the personal interviews conducted. The data concerning the rate of public safety incidents and common characteristics of military police and fire personnel is also presented in this chapter. From this data will be inferred certain recommendations for structural experimentation and functional change.

The research from Chapter's II through VI will be brought together in Chapter VII. The various models proposed for an integration of the Air Force public safety agencies comprise the major emphasis of this chapter. These models are arranged in a long-term program cumulating in the adoption of the total integration concept by the Air Force.

The paper will conclude with a summation of the generalized concepts gathered from the above sources.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF INTEGRATION

The literature in the field of integrated public safety elements, is voluminous. Although the literature deals mainly with the positive benefits realized by bringing together various agencies under one administrative department, an interesting development was found in the history of the various integration theories. This part of the paper will trace that history and review the literature available within the field. The literature review in this chapter and the following chapters, will be included with a research analysis of the many integration theories: police-fire integration (Chapter III), internal police consolidation (Chapter IV), and finally, the integrated industrial security program (Chapter V).

I. EARLY HISTORY

The research in this field reveals several distinct phases in police-fire and public safety integration. The starting phase would be the period of man's involvement on earth--the cave man. Cave drawings reveal that man, when he first considered joining with other men to form a community, designated one of the members to stand guard over the community during the hours of darkness.

Historians tell that this sentry's responsibilities were mainly to protect the overall community from predatory animals and to sound the alarm if the community came under attack.

This placement of a sentry by the cave men denotes the first stage in the history of public safety integration. Advancement within the field had to wait until the time of Augustus and his creation of the Vigiles of ancient Rome. This second phase was followed by the Middle Ages. During this third stage, people were concerned with protection against the invasions of barbaric tribes and as a result, turned inward to themselves. The security sentry was placed back into effect and the security of the community remained within his care until the fourth stage, the Peelian reform era. It was during this latter stage that the police officer was established as a professional. A separate, independent agency was initiated by the reformers in the hope of providing the community with a safe place within which to reside.

Since those days some administrators have attempted to gather the police and other elements of the public safety enterprise under one organizational structure. The last stage in this evolution of integration with municipal service, will be called the age of experimentation. During this period, which has its foundation laid at the turn of

the century, various attempts have been made to draw together the many agencies involved with the public safety (or governmental) problem;

One author, in dealing with the historical approach to police service, separates the evolution of the emergency response required to meet any type of public safety problem into three stages, each dealing with the common problem of manpower. Historically, he found that this problem was eliminated by recruitment on the spot. Next, full-time employees were especially trained in emergency duties and were required to respond when necessary, were housed in a specific location so that they would be able to respond to an emergency. The last stage was the employment of full time people who "regularly engage in routine prevention tasks from which they may be recalled at will and assigned to emergencies :." ¹

Early attempts at this second area will be explored in the following discussion. The first era has never ended as the problem of public safety, when it concerns the individual personally, usually demands immediate manpower regardless of the source. The last era will be analyzed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

¹Charles S. James, "Concepts of Fire-Police Integration," Public Management, XXXVII, No. 9 (September, 1955), p. 197.

II. VIGILES OF ANCIENT ROME

During the period between man's first encounters on earth and the reign of Augustus, first Emperor of Rome, man was happy with the sentry on duty for his community's protection. However, forced by crime in the streets and devastating fires, Augustus, after thirty years of hesitation and vacillation, finally acted decisively in the matter of public safety and created the Vigiles in 6 A.D.

The conditions which called for this innovation in public safety are eloquently enumerated by one historian:

During the last one hundred fifty years . . . the increasing corruption of the official classes, the incompetence of the magistrates and the ever-growing bitterness of the party politics lead to more and more frequent and finally to almost continuous civil riots and blood shed with which the existing police services were utterly insufficient to deal, even if they had wanted to do so, and which the government could not . . . restore order. The political parties employed organized gangs of roughs to drive opposition voters from the polls or to attack houses of the leaders of the rival parties; the personal hatreds of the professional leaders of these gangs led to frequent pitched battles in the streets between their supporters, and the life of the ordinary citizen became intolerable. The responsible authorities did little to stop it; if their own supporters were successful, they had no cause to complain; if their rivals won, they had no force with which to coerce them other than bands of the same type in their own pay.²

With this type of civil strife rampant, Augustus

²P.K. Baillie-Reynolds, The Vigiles of Imperial Rome (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 15.

initiated a force which was eventually composed of freed men (slaves were tried earlier as members of private fire companies and then as part of the municipal force, but did not prove to be effective). This force was divorced from the military and it stayed that way as it was funded by a taxation on the gladiator shows and on the sale of slaves.³

The Vigiles were first engaged in the fire-fighting aspect of public safety. Shortly after this 'top-down' agency was formed it was given the task of "policing at night."⁴ The policing power was originally concerned only with the problem of fire prevention. Shortly this concern grew to an added responsibility of apprehending the possible arsonist which directly involved the political parties of the day. That function then broadened to include the arrest power for burglary and robbery at night, the apprehension and prevention of crimes committed during the daylight hours, and finally, the involvement of crimes of all classifications--from petty pilfering of the cloakrooms to larceny of safe deposit boxes.⁵

The pressure of the time and the rivalry of the political parties lead to specialization within the force

³Roy E. Hollady, "The Vigiles of Ancient Rome" (unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1962), pp. 45-48.

⁴Ibid. ⁵Ibid., pp. 61-62.

of men trained exclusively for catching run-away slaves, investigating larcenies and petty thefts from the public baths, traffic control, and for lighting the lamps at night.⁶

This first highly organized, well-disciplined, tough and efficient unit was evaluated as having "attained dimensions which are probably unequalled in any modern city."⁷ Perhaps, this is too much of a glamorization, what remains is the fact that during the Imperial Roman civilization, an integrated agency existed which was concerned with the dual function of fire prevention and police protection.

The Vigiles date of demise is unknown but historians have speculated that it disappeared along with the other vestiges of ancient Rome when the powerful and energetic German tribes invaded and sacked the whole of Italy.⁸ Sinnigen believes that the Vigiles disappeared during the reign of Constantine, "perhaps, during some kind of municipal reform in 318 A. D.," and transferred to the guilds

⁶Ibid., pp. 72-77.

⁷Baillie-Reynolds, op. cit., p. 163. See also G.H. Stevenson, The Augustan Empire (Vol. X of The Cambridge Ancient History, ed. S.A. Cook. 12 vols.; New York: The MacMillan Company, 1934), p. 202.

⁸Stevenson, op. cit., p. 214.

composed of private citizens.⁹

Evaluation of the effect of this concept was summarized by Hollady when he said:

. . . civilized men two thousand years ago were willing to experiment and that their administrative and operational concepts were, in some respects precursors of what is often thought to be relatively new today--not only in the area of police-fire consolidation but in specific areas of police administration such as resource and manpower distribution and the development of the concept of prevention.¹⁰

The authors which have overlooked this important phase in police history reads like the roster of important people in police academic circles. Melville,¹¹ Fosdick,¹² Leonard,¹³ and Wall (editor, International City Managers' Association),¹⁴ have all ignored the administrative and manpower concepts attempted by the Vigiles. Perhaps, they cannot be faulted, however, as Reith

⁹William G. Sinnigen, The Officium of Urban Prefecture During the Later Roman Empire (Rome: The American Academy, 1957), p. 100.

¹⁰Hollady, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

¹¹H.W. Melville, A Police History (London: Methuen Company, 1902), pp. 10-12.

¹²Raymond Fosdick, European and American Police Systems (New York: McGraw Hill, 1919), p. 21.

¹³V.A. Leonard, Police Organization and Management (second edition; Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1964), p. 4.

¹⁴Ned L. Wall, "Police Administration: Past and Present," Municipal Police Administration (fifth edition; Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1961), Ch. 1, pp. 1-8.

discovered in his historical analysis of the English Police system. Fieldings, who spoke for police prevention function prior to the Peelian Reforms in 1828, Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne (the first co-commissioners of the London Metropolitan Police), contained in their writings the belief that the English originated these new and original ideas in police administration.¹⁵ These writings seem to have set the stage for the later and more recent police historians.

III. THE MIDDLE AGES

The fire department's evolution along with the history of the police tradition, is devoid of research when the years between 318 A.D. to 1750 are discussed. Speculation and historical accounts led to the conclusion that this was the period of regression--the use of the sentry, or lamplighters, and the growth of the guilds. In England, where most authorities start tracing the development of the police service, one finds the growth of the "hue-and-cry," the shire-reeve, and the posse comitatus.¹⁶

¹⁵ Charles Reith, A New History of the Police (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956) pp. 10-11.

¹⁶ A.C. Germann, Frank D. Day, and Robert R.J. Gallati, Introduction to Law Enforcement (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Inc., 1963), pp. 38-39. See also the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force: The Police (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 3-4.

IV. THE PEELIAN REFORMS

The next phase in the developing police and fire history appears with the advent of the Peelian reforms in the English concept of law enforcement. During this period, which starts approximately the time of Fielding (circa 1750), and ends after the death of Sir Robert Peel (circa 1880), the total separation of the police service from all other elements of the public safety enterprise became reality. The reason for this separation appears to be a desire on the part of the citizens of Great Britain for a professionalized agency capable of maintaining peace and harmony in the towns and cities, especially in the larger cities.¹⁷

At about this time of the adoption of the formal Peelian reforms (1820's and 30's), the fire function also became an organized agency. Prior to this period, "Watch-Boys" or "Water-Men" had formed into guilds and private companies in order to reduce the monetary loss due to fire damage. These companies were then formed into the London Fire Establishment and continued to operate as a private enterprise until 1865, when the municipalities assumed control.¹⁸

¹⁷For a discussion of the contribution of Sir Robert Peel to the police tradition see Germann, op. cit., pp. 37-55.

¹⁸McNeil, op. cit., p. 17.

However, this consolidation of fire companies and the attempts by Peel at professionalization and separation of the police, only received attention in the larger towns and cities. The small communities and in the rural areas the town watchman or constable worked in the dual capacity of police officer and fire inspector.

. . . in small communities which never had an organized fire department . . . the police force has always handled the fire function, supplemented by a volunteer fire department or by other city employees acting as call firemen. The police force is trained to fight fires and to operate fire equipment.¹⁹

Recently, many authors connected with the professionalization of the police forces, have supported the principle of separate police and fire forces. Their discussion, generally, has concentrated on the larger departments and the urban areas of the country.

V. THE AGE OF EXPERIMENTATION

The Peelian reforms and the combining of fire companies started the era of professional (though separate) public safety officers in the European countries. These ideas and concepts were transported to the American settlements and incorporated into the emerging national concept of public safety throughout the various states. This period

¹⁹Municipal Police Administration, op. cit., p. 63.

of time, 1820-1900, is noted for the settling of the American countryside by the pioneers. This settling process demanded a certain amount of public control over the settlers, a response to emergency situations in the slap-together towns, and a growing concern for local autonomy.

Early American Development.

The prevailing philosophy of the American developer, when faced with the problems of public safety, seems to have been the English examples. The local sheriff became an entity of its own during this period. The volunteer fire department was the primary means utilized for manpower response to the numerous destructive fires. The sophistication of the public safety business and of administration was growing along with the community. This sophistication did not, as of yet, have as part of its structure the safety officer or the person whose sole duty was disaster control (civil defense). These were functions generally dealt with by the police officer or chief, which is still the case in much of the rural areas of America today.

However, in the larger cities and states (established before or during the American Revolution), some signs of combining the public safety effort can be found. Elected officials (commissioners) were designated as the spokesmen

for the combined fire and police problems on the cities' governing body (city councils, town halls, etc.). A report issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 1904, dealing with the use of electric fire alarm systems in the cities, stated that in 1902 it found 14 cities whose police departments were governed by a Board of Public Safety and six police-fire departments governed by Police-Fire Commissioners.²⁰ Faced with waves of new people and expanding growth (plus other related problems), the established communities were realizing that some form of consolidation of effort, at least at the municipal administrative level was necessary.

The 1900's.

The age of experimentation begins about the end of the Peelian reforms or around the turn of the century. This is the age when the communities all across the country were experimenting with different forms of local government. Included in these various proposals were various organizations: agencies necessary for the communities' survival as an independent entity. This is the period when the Mayor and the City Council concept of community development came into its own. It is the period when the City Manager

²⁰ Bureau of Census, "Municipal Electric Fire Alarms and Police Patrol Systems: Bulletin No. 11" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), p. 23.

concept of municipal government started, and it is the period when the prevailing political philosophy was "the best government is the least government."²¹

The concept of combining the policemen with the firemen did not hit its peak, however, until the late 1950's and early 1960's. An argument has been put forth that this period is separate and distinct from the experimental changes that were being attempted earlier in municipal affairs.²² However, later history (the 1960's) seems to indicate that this important concept was only a phase in the total age of experimentation.

Police-Fire Integration in Mid-Century.

The integration of police and fire functions started with several articles in the professional municipal administrator's periodicals. From this conceptual beginning, several departments attempted some form of integration. However, the history of integration, as has been shown, was not new. Dating from the early Roman days and continuing until the Peelian reforms, some form of

²¹Samuel E. Morison, The Oxford History of The American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 888.

²²Charles S. James, Police and Fire Integration in the Small City (Chicago: Public Administration Service, pp. 3-4.

integration can be found. The most significant early attempts at complete integration were in 1836 in England: Liverpool, Birmingham, and Manchester. During World War II, because of the extra duties involved in both services, integration was abandoned. Today, no integrated departments exist in England.²³

The first city in America to attempt complete integration was the City of Huntington Woods, Michigan. This city combined its fire and police personnel into and under a Director of Public Safety in 1935. The city has a population of 9,000 so requires a small number of public safety officers. As a suburb of a larger metropolitan area (Detroit), it is not susceptible to a large amount of crime. However, the integration concept has been successful in this municipality for the last thirty years.²⁴

This attempt, along with some consolidation attempts during the Second World War, lead administrators to believe that, perhaps, something along these lines could be undertaken in cities of less than 10,000 population. With the increases in population in the urban areas before and during World War II, other means of consolidation were

²³McNeil, op. cit., p. 23.

²⁴James, op. cit., p. 5.

also taking place in municipal government: water systems were allowed to cross jurisdictional lines, sewer systems were being built that serviced several communities, the port authorities were created so several separate governmental entities could use a common facility, transit authorities were established to enable several communities to pool their resources together in order to form one common transportation web, etc.²⁵ The importance of these efforts lies in the fact that consolidation of effort was being undertaken thereby allowing the focus of administrators, to be directed toward a dual objective: cut costs while providing a necessary service.

In the 1950's and up to 1961, "73 cities--44 in the United States and 29 in Canada--had formed and were operating some type of integrated fire and police system," (see Appendix A). The most populous city that attempted this form of public safety consolidation was Dearborn, Michigan, whose population at the time of integration was 112,007. However, one-half of all the integrated cities were under 14,500, with the average size being 24,000 in

²⁵Gordon E. Misner, "Recent Developments in Metropolitan Law Enforcement," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 51, No. 2 (March-April, 1960), p. 267.

the United States and 18,000 in Canada.²⁶ McNeil,²⁷ James,²⁸ and Andrews²⁹ have studied all of the American integrated cities in depth and have concluded that in the over-whelming majority of cases the attempts at integration have been successful.

It is during this era that the International City Managers' Association came out in strong support of integration in the smaller municipality and allocated research money to study these projects. James has written extensively in support of the total integration theory in both his books: Police and Fire Integration in the Small City, and A Frontier of Municipal Safety.³⁰

In the former text, James goes to great length to argue for a seemingly logical base just why a small city should consider the integration of its fire and police service. He spells out the manpower allocations (even by time of day) and equipment necessary to accomplish the task of public safety protection. The main emphasis of his argument is that integration must be established in the

²⁶Leonard, op. cit., p. 83.

²⁷For a listing of successfully integrated cities and a discussion of the reasons why they are successful, see McNeil, op. cit., pp. 35-58.

²⁸James, op. cit., p. 13. ²⁹Andrews, op. cit., p. 54.

³⁰Charles S. James, A Frontier of Municipal Safety (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1955).

small city to relieve the constant budgetary stress and strain. His reasoning for the success of the integrated operation lies in the prevention and combined patrol activity of the public safety officer.³¹

James is confident that this concept can also be instituted in the larger city, and therefore, published a second book on the subject. A Frontier of Municipal Safety is concerned with the city whose population is over 100,000, but under one million. This latter argument does not stretch the integration concept to the maximum extreme but rather addresses the question from the standpoint of many precinct level, integrated departments operating under one department chief.

However, the picture is not all success as failures have occurred. Each community, as stated by James and McNeil, must consider the current political and social setting before attempting to integrate its public safety services. Approximately fifteen cities (see Appendix B), have attempted an integrated department and failed because they did not consider those settings. As a result, these cities have had to revert back to separate police and fire departments after spending a considerable amount of money on the consolidation attempt. Such a step as this must be

³¹James, Police . . . City, op. cit., p. 62.

approached only after thoughtful study and a considerable amount of research; research not only into the theory but research into the existing community.³²

Present Status of the Concept.

The hey-day of the integration concept seems to have passed. Since the integration attempts of the fifties, the theory has been replaced, and the experimentation has continued. Many different attempts are currently under consideration by police agencies in an attempt to pull together the various jurisdictional problems. Regional crime laboratories have been established so several police agencies can bring evidence to one location for scientific investigation. One facility, therefore, has the capability of servicing many agencies. The concept of unifying several police agencies under one jurisdiction (the county police force and the metropolitan concept), has been attempted in Dade County Florida, and Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Contract arrangements have been attempted in Los Angeles County and in Connecticut. Various other organizational changes are being attempted by administrators at the local, state, and federal level in an attempt to solve the revolving door dilemma--rising wages and shorter hours on the

³²Gordon E. Misner and Virgil W. Peterson, "Issues and Problems of Metropolitan Area Police Service," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 48, No. 4 (July-August, 1957), p. 132.

one side with taxpayer demands to keep the budgets down on the other.

Integration or consolidation attempts are most generally fought by the fire departments. The rise in labor negotiations and arbitration, along with the increase in the use of employment practices has lead to bitter debates between the fire and the administrative agencies about integration. Their arguments will be examined in the following chapter.

The widespread use of the automobile and the constant pressure of international war, lead to the development of the professional safety and disaster control officer. The safety officer is generally assigned the responsibility for vehicle safety and pedestrian safety. He is concerned with the gathering of accident information for the construction of better roads and the development of better driving habits. He generally is a member of the administration of the city and works directly out of the City Manager's office, particularly in the smaller community.³³

The Director of Civil Defense (or disaster control officer), has come into being since the end of World War II. The office has received renewed emphasis since the Kennedy Administration and is concerned with bomb shelters,

³³"The Responsibilities of the Director of Safety," (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1962).

natural disasters, and chemical/nuclear/biological warfare. The office in a smaller city is usually staffed by a volunteer, public minded citizen, usually with some military experience. Once again, the office is directly responsible (in an advisory capacity), to the City Manager, and seldom is the position even remotely connected with the police or fire department.³⁴

VI. SUMMARY

Police and fire integration then is not a new concept. The Romans were the first to institute the idea and then the English separated the two functions. Still within the small community, up to the 1940's, the public safety integration concept has been kept intact. During the last two decades, many small communities have successfully integrated their police and fire departments. However, the public concern over vehicle safety and civil defense has lead to the creation of separate agencies for these problems.

³⁴Office of Civil Defense, "The Civil Defense Director" (Washington: Department of Defense, 1964), p. 3.

CHAPTER III

THE POLICE-FIRE INTEGRATION CONCEPT

The research in the field of police and fire integration seems to be one sided. The majority of theoritical studies reviewed (the written literature), and the written empirical research available (the successfully integrated department) have concerned the positive side of integration, i.e., in support of the concept. This is not to say that literature is not available that speaks for the anti-integration side, however, this literature is mostly a product of un-informed citizens whose antagonism against change of any sort prejudices their writings.¹

The concentration of research and literature in this field has been directed toward the municipal police and fire agencies. Reference has already been made to the work of James which strongly supports the argument that police and fire services are amenable to integration, at least within the smaller community. The seemingly large amount of money spent by these smaller communities for public safety services is, perhaps, the major reason why these two agencies have been selected for administrative

¹Much of the negative aspects of the argument can be found in two publications of the International Association of Fire Fighters: "Fight Back! The Case Against the

experimentation.

The integration arguments will be examined in this chapter. However, before that examination is attempted, some effort must be made to answer the theoretical question of compatability between fire and police officers. The essential question, from a research point of view, concerns the finding of similar characteristics between the professions. This problem will be explored, model types of integration, and the small community will be defined before an investigation can be conducted into the arguments for and against police-fire integration.

I. COMPATABILITY OF FIREMEN AND POLICEMEN

Several articles and books have dealt with the quality of recruitment and selection procedures utilized throughout this country by the police and fire services. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice has gone into extensive detail about recruitment and selection standards for the police officer.² McNamara undertook an extensive study of the

Merger of Fire and Police Services" (Washington: International Association of Fire Fighters, 1959), p. 11; and "Why We Are Opposed to Integration of Fire and Police Departments" (Washington: International Association of Fire Fighters, 1957), p. 30.

²Task Force: The Police, op. cit., chapter 5.

standards employed by the New York City Police Department in its recruitment of police personnel.³ The emphasis of this study, much like the work undertaken by the police-community relations experts, is on the aspect of prior environmental effect on the police recruit and experienced patrol officer.

One study undertaken by two social psychologists concerned the assessment of firemen applicants, however, this study found only scant evidence of previous published work.⁴ However, a certain amount of limited data has been collected on firemen and police officers together with other civil service positions.⁵

A recent study completed by four psychiatrists at the University of Oregon Medical School explored for the establishment of a base of comparison between police and fire applicants.⁶ The study concentrated on 243 success-

³John H. McNamara, "Uncertainties in Police Work: The Relevance of Police Recruits' Background and Training," The Police: Six Sociological Essays, D. J. Bordua, editor (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 163-252.

⁴A.M. Anikeef and J.L. Bryan, "Kuder Interest Pattern Analysis of Fire Protection Students and Graduates," Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 48 (1958), pp. 195-198.

⁵R.L. Thorndike and E. Hagan, Ten Thousand Careers, (New York: John L. Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 241-246.

⁶J.D. Matarazzo, B.V. Allen, G. Saslow, and A.N. Wiens, "Characteristics of Successful Policemen and Firemen Applicants," Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1964), pp. 123-132.

ful applicants for the positions of either police officer or fireman with the City of Portland, Oregon. These applicants were placed on the eligibility lists between 1959-1962. The authors used many measurements in an attempt to scale the personality of the individual applicants. The results of this study indicated that:⁷

1. The applicants in both fields possessed surprisingly high intelligence. In fact, the author's state that they could have gone to college but for a variety of reasons, most of which were socio-economic, they did not. The applicants actually did better on the scales than graduates of the medical school.

2. The applicants were approximately the same age (the mean for the policemen was 25.7 years old, and the firemen, 24.6 years old).

3. The applicants were better adjusted than the average person his age.

4. Both groups show strong needs to excell or achieve, be the center of attention, understand and dominate others, stick to a job until it is one, and "be one of the boys." Along with this, their lower than average personal needs suggest that both groups of men like to work with others, rather than autonomously, while needing little

⁷Ibid., pp. 126-132.

kindness from others.

5. In clinical interviews:

. . . the policeman applicant chose this line of work because his interests were in working with juveniles or with men on probation, etc., while the firemen often stated they chose firefighting because the 24-hour-on, 48-hour-off work schedule permitted them to farm, hunt, fish, buy, renovate, and sell old homes for profit, work as real estate salesmen on their days off, etc.⁸

6. Both groups compare with the enlisted man of the Armed Forces based upon the results of the MMPI. The common characteristics were: manipulating others to gain their own ends, opportunistic, unable to delay gratification, impulsive, and showing some tendencies toward over-indulgence in sex and drinking.

7. Young police applicants were more concerned with helping others, while the firemen applicants were interested in working with their hands, or in business occupations.

The authors conclude:

. . . as a group, they represent men who are endowed with good intellectual abilities which they have not fully developed or tested, often in their own words turn to police work and firefighting as career choices next best to the business and other professions for which they qualify but for which their educational limitations, lack of knowledge, or lack of opportunity prevent them from entering. The result is that firefighting and police work are recruiting men of superior intelligence into their ranks

⁸Ibid., p. 129. ⁹Ibid., p. 132.

The significance of this study lies in the fact that there are similar individual personality characteristics which the public safety administrator can explore. Based on this study, and the other referenced work, perhaps, the personnel within the two separated departments have a similar outlook on the public safety challenge.

II. TYPES OF INTEGRATED DEPARTMENTS

Basically, three types of integrated public safety departments are defined in the literature: administrative, partial, and complete.

Administrative integration:

This is a form of organizational re-alignment whereby the divisions of the police and fire departments are placed for administrative purposes under one director. His title is usually Director of Public Safety. The two departments, police and fire, have their own independent forces and organization. They may or may not, be housed in the same building, and they may, or may not, be subject to the same common facilities, i.e., test range, communications, files, alarm panels, etc.¹⁰ An example of this would be the Commissioner of Public Safety who sits on the city council,

¹⁰Gordon E. Misner, "Recent Developments in Metropolitan Law Enforcement," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Jan-Feb, 1960), p. 500.

the Department of Public Safety at Michigan State University, and the Texas State Department of Public Safety.

Partial integration:

This is a form of integration that combines the operation of the police and fire departments but retains them as separate departments.¹¹ The officers are trained in both police and fire service, but separate divisions are maintained to which personnel are assigned. The department is usually headed by a Director of Public Safety who acts as a coordinator between the two systems. Public safety officers assigned primarily to the police division are first patrolmen, but will also assist and cooperate in fire fighting. Public safety officers assigned to the fire department carry the primary responsibility of manning the fire apparatus. The ability to cross departmental lines during periods of emergency, of either a police or fire nature, is maintained by possessing the central authority to draw inactive public safety officers from the patrol force. The Dade County Department of Public Safety is an example of this type integration.

Complete integration:

Under this concept, the separate departments as such

¹¹Municipal Police Administration, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

are eliminated. The personnel in the public safety department are known as public safety officers who are capable of performing either police or fire duties. Specialization is kept to a minimum, although there will be a need for certain technicians, investigators, fire apparatus operators, and others. This division is usually headed by a Director of Public Safety whose primary duty is to coordinate all police-fire activity. The most noteworthy examples of this category are the Oak Park Department of Public Safety, Michigan, and the Sunnyvale, California, Department of Public Safety.¹²

III. THE SMALL COMMUNITY

The small municipality usually refers to an incorporated town or village under 10,000 population. Roughly one American in ten lives in this type of community. Two-thirds of America's communities and over nine-tenths of its municipalities have a population of under 10,000.¹³

Problems such as fire, crimes, accidents, and disturbances (especially of a student or racial nature) plague these small governmental entities.

A city of 5,000 . . . might reasonably expect a building fire about once in every three weeks, a traffic accident

¹²Ibid.

¹³James, Police . . . City, op. cit., p. ii.

about once a week, and perhaps, two arrests a week, one of which will be for drunkenness.¹⁴

Therefore, the public safety problem, in proportion to size, is not greatly different between the larger and the smaller community.

The estimate of the crime control and fire threat to the small community by James, might be slightly exaggerated to the negative side. McNamara, in his report on the state of the American police enterprise to the Association of Public Administrators in 1950, referred to the problem in a different way when he said:

In 2,200 urban communities with less than 25,000 population, the average police strength is 8 men; in the 10,000-25,000 bracket, more than a score of cities have fewer than ten policemen.¹⁵

The police enterprise diversity is equally evident when one considers that there are in existence approximately 40,000 separate police agencies in the United States on the federal, state, and local level. Statistics reveal that fifty agencies are on the federal level, 200 departments are on the state level, and the remaining "39,750 agencies are dispersed throughout the many counties, cities, towns, and

¹⁴James, "Concepts of Fire-Police Integration, op. cit., pp. 194-195.

¹⁵Donal E. J. MacNamara, "American Police Administration at Mid-Century," Public Administration Review, Vol. X, No. 3 (Summer, 1950), p. 184.

villages that form our local government."¹⁶

Of this diversity MacNamara states:

. . . the least efficient and therefore most expensive police agencies are the small ones. There are notable exceptions, but in general these minuscule units of five, fifteen, or fifty-odd officers cannot afford the services of top administrators, cannot provide adequate training facilities, and must allot so large a share of personnel to administration and house-keeping tasks that they reduce effective police strength to the vanishing point.¹⁷

A survey of ninety-seven small cities conducted in 1955 by James revealed a ratio of 1.48 firemen per thousand population in contrast to median ratios ranging from 1.09 to 1.60 for cities in larger population groups. The same cities, however, have police strength almost proportionate to the larger municipalities, reporting 1.33 policemen per thousand population.¹⁸ Integration of public safety services in these small cities, therefore, holds much promise to the fire administrator. Most small cities are designed to take only remedial action against fire hazards, such as with a volunteer fire department. Under integration, the small cities can use their limited resources to prevent incidents as well as concentrate

¹⁶Task Force: The Police, op. cit., p. 7.

¹⁷MacNamara, op. cit., p. 184.

¹⁸James, "Concepts of Fire-Police Integration," op. cit., pp. 194-195.

available manpower when those incidents occur.

The Safety officer and the Civil Defense director who are involved with the small community's problem must be added to these diversity problems. While these officials might conceivably be the same individual, a study by the International City Managers' Association found that in over seventy percent of the cases, these two individuals were separate and distinct from one another. In a majority of cases, these agencies are also separate and organizationally independent from either the fire or police departments.¹⁹

IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF INTEGRATION

The debate raged in the 1950's on whether or not an integrated police and fire department could handle the emergency situations of each other. The professional organizations of the firemen (the International Association of Fire Chiefs), in 1954, formally went on record as being opposed to the integration of the police and fire departments. Its companion association, the International Association of Fire Fighters, in 1956, likewise passed a²⁰ resolution opposing such integration. However, the

¹⁹Statement by Mr. Harry Pollack, Research and Training Associate, the International City Managers' Association, in a letter to the author, dated June 6, 1969.

²⁰"Why . . . Departments," op. cit., p. 30.

National Board of Fire Underwriters is not opposed to the idea of integration itself. John Neale, Chief Engineer of the Board, stated in a speech in 1956:

Any arrangement or organization that will provide good fire protection to a community must necessarily be acceptable to us, and if such an arrangement can cut the increasing costs of local government at the same time, so much the better.²¹

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), has taken no official position on the subject. Integration has been discussed at its national conventions but according to Mr. Horace S. Webb, Supervisor, The Center, Research, Development, and Planning Division, no official resolution has been passed either in support nor in disagreement with the concept.²²

The steadily rising costs of government, the inadequacy of volunteer fire forces, the insistent demands on the part of policemen and full-time paid firemen for a reduction in the work week, the recent technological developments in communications, transportation and other equipment, and the increased attention to the importance of organizing to prevent fires and crimes--all have tended to give municipal administrators reason to contemplate the feasibility of employing ""public safety officers"" who would be trained to perform both police and fire functions.²³

²¹As reported in McNeil, op. cit., p. 61.

²²Reported in a letter to the author, dated February 26, 1969.

²³International City Managers' Association, Municipal Fire Administration (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1961), p. 61.

Briefly, the arguments in favor of an integrated force, other than those mentioned above, are:

1. That a certain portion of the 99 per cent of the firemen's time not fighting fires will be put to productive uses outside the fire station.²⁴

2. Provide the opportunity of a challenging, stimulating occupation to both police and firemen by replacing some of the tedium of the job with worthwhile activity, especially, in the smaller community.

3. The existence of a larger pool of personnel adaptable to whatever the current public safety urgency may be, rather than limited to the more infrequent major problems of the fire or police service alone.

4. Present an opportunity to increase police protection by use of the time of the firemen for the minor cost of retraining, equipment, and salary increases.

5. Provide for the relocation of the ground safety director of function to a lower paid member of an overall public safety orientated department.

6. Providing one central department whose sole concern is the public safety of the citizens and is not concerned with the internal warfare and minor disagreements of the separated agencies.

²⁴Municipal Police Administration, op. cit., p. 64.

7. Through payment of higher salaries to fewer men, it would be possible to attract a better caliber of personnel who could provide a more enlightened, imaginative and competent service to the public.

8. Provide the opportunity for firemen to work a schedule more favorably comparable and perhaps, healthful, to the prevailing work weeks and conditions of other public employees.

9. Provide a flexible assignment base for the public safety administrator. This would enable a certain amount of internal assignment and provide somewhat different experience for the employees.²⁵

This summary of arguments in favor of an integrated police and fire department are mainly geared to the concept of complete integration. In order to be applicable to the theory of partial integration, some modifications are required. However, the position is stated in the extreme, in the attempt to allow any less degree of integration proportionally the same advantages.

²⁵These arguments have been summarized from James, Police . . . City, op. cit., p. 12; and McNeil, op. cit., p. 91; Municipal Police Administration, op. cit., pp. 62-63; and, O.W. Wilson, Police Administration (second edition; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 254.

V. ARGUMENTS IN DISAGREEMENT WITH INTEGRATION

The arguments against any type of police-fire integration, as stated earlier, have been emotional and mainly based on a traditionally orientated base. The police, after being told that integration will probably increase salaries, add very little additional work, and might improve their public image, have still generally been opposed to the idea, but have not fought integration with the energy and bitterness of the fire service personnel.²⁶

Firemen have done everything in their power to stop integration in almost every city where it has been proposed. The International Association of Fire Fighters provides financial and legal support to its locals fighting integration. The issue is a real one for the firemen, for they see in integration, the end of their profession in its' 175 year traditional form.

The following material will be limited to those arguments which appear to have some logical basis, or which appear to have some significance for the military public safety models presented in Chapter VII.

"Integration has not worked!"

This argument is true. Leonard and others have

²⁶"Police-Fire Integration in Michigan" (Ann Arbor: Michigan Municipal League Information Bulletin No. 95, December, 1960), p. 4.

pointed to several towns and villages that have attempted total integration and have had to revert back to separate departments.²⁷ He lists approximately sixteen such communities, (see Appendix B). However, in the discussion of these failures, he states:

It is the general consensus of opinion that the negligible number of failures maybe traced to faulty administration and lack of an adequate appraisal of physical and social factors, as well as other conditions in the community, rather than the system.
²⁸

Bruce demonstrates that a number of the supposed failures of the unified operational concept did not really happen because the cities were never actually operating an integrated organization. He concludes:

Where integration has failed the causes can be readily observed: poor operational politics, inadequate preparation, poor personal relationships, strong political and union pressures, and above all, weak administration. These particular problems are not indigenous to just integration but can be observed under any form of organization.²⁹

It seems obvious that where "integration has not worked," a major factor has been an unstable political atmosphere which could not ensure an adequate trial of the plan due to weak or unwilling administrators, or the

²⁷Leonard, op. cit., p. 87.

²⁸Ibid., p. 88.

²⁹Howard I. Bruce, PFI, a Survey: Police-Fire Integration in the United States and Canada (Cleveland: Cleveland Bureau of Governmental Research, 1961), pp. 74-82.

inability to maintain control of the police and fire employees involved. However, this problem has grown over the last ten years. The increase growth in both police and fire unions, the collective bargaining for pay increases and shorter work weeks, coupled with the tendencies of these two groups to call "sick" strikes in order to achieve their demands, makes the administrator's job even that more difficult. The solution is a difficult one at best, and the only way the integrationist can overcome this problem is by utilizing proper change of attitude concepts, i.e., having the employees help with planning the change, meetings with the employee groups and representatives, etc.

The important point to remember is that where integration has been a failure, the blame cannot be laid to holders of the concept, but should be placed on the men who administered the change. Experience of twenty years success in a majority of integrated departments, provides a clue to the solution of this problem.

"Response time to fires is increased."

Opponents of integration argue that a fire department must be in constant readiness to answer an alarm. A corresponding argument runs along the lines that the fire apparatus must be manned at all times with enough personnel to respond to an alarm quickly. These arguments are

potentially serious if the objective of integration is improved service. It's validity rests on whether there are enough patrolmen-fire fighters in relation to the total number of police and fire incidents, the location and time of their occurrence, distributed throughout the community to provide adequate assurance of prompt response by the necessary number of fire fighters.

McNeil and Andrews pay particular attention to this argument. Their research has proven that the argument has not been supported in those communities that approach the integration problem with a positive attitude. When the administrators had properly planned the operations, dispersal of forces, and deployment of equipment, response time was actually cut. The experiences of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Oak Park, Michigan, and Glencoe, Illinois, has shown that the public safety patrol officer arrives at the scene either ahead or at the same time as the fire apparatus.

The placement of people and the size of the community must also be considered in response to this argument. Most integrated communities still maintain the volunteer fire departments composed of people located all over the geographical area of the community. This geographical area is usually small--or at least significantly different than from a huge metropolitan area. The integrationist argument does not, and has never precluded the use of these

volunteer fire fighters, even the most highly organized police force depends and often almost demands volunteer help from the citizens of the community.³⁰

Another portion of the answer to this argument is the importance placed on prevention within the integrated department. The public safety officer, through his prevention role, is more aware of the dangers or potential dangers of crime, fire, and safety hazards. As a result, it can be anticipated that more fires will be prevented, or at least, detected earlier than with the non-integrated department. Little information is available on the actual fire loss figures from these communities. However, a reasonable assumption can be made that the fire loss monetary figures have not shown an appreciable increase with the integrated department as opposed to the non-integrated department.³¹ Aside from this argument, in the small community where fire damage is significantly less than the larger city but when a major fire does occur it can be proportionally more disruptive. In this case, however, the whole community would become involved with the disaster. Whether the department was integrated or not would make little difference.

³⁰James, "Concepts . . . Integration," op. cit., p. 196.

³¹Bruce, op. cit., p. 78.

The final answer to this argument centers around the common dispatching and dispersal of the public safety equipment. Instead of two separate command centers (common in the non-integrated department), the integrated department's equipment is centrally controlled. One facility keeps track of all men and equipment. In the case of multiple emergencies occurring at the same time, one person is able to exercise command supervision of all resources, thereby dispatching available units to the additional emergency.

"Overall public safety will be neglected."

The basis for this argument rests in the fact that the integrated department is usually headed by a police officer who allows the fire service to deteriorate. This argument is based on a valid assumption and must be dealt with by a highly competent and capable public safety administrator. The argument is further supported when the opponents to integration point out that the high degree of proficiency required for a public safety officer cannot be sustained over a long period of time.³²

The experience of a Citizen's Research Council of Oak Park, Michigan is relevant. In a survey of the Oak Park Department of Public Safety, the council concluded:

It is the opinion of the Research Council, as the result of this survey, that the citizens of Oak

³²McNeil, op. cit., p. 75.

Park receive a substantially higher level of service from the integrated public safety department than would be possible for the same cost under the traditionally separate police and fire departments.³³

Once again, the answer to the argument lies in the employment by the integrated city of a highly professional man who is committed to the overall objectives of the integrated concept. This is the case in Oak Park, but has not been the case in other cities. The difference between the cities seems to be the reason why integration is still working in Oak Park (and other cities), and has failed in sixteen cities. Emphasis on training, proper internal organization, self-inspection, and maintaining the constant high morale of the men, seems to answer this problem.³⁴

"Police and fire duties are dissimilar."

The whole concept of integration eventually must confront this argument. It is usually the first argument to be presented to the researcher and is usually the underlying basis for the anti-integration argument. Glenford Leonard, a leading proponent to the integration theory and Director

³³Citizens Research Council of Michigan, "Public Safety Services in Oak Park, Michigan" (Detroit: Citizens Research Council of Michigan, May, 1956), p. 3 (mimeographed)

³⁴Andrews, op. cit., pp. 42-43; And McNeil, op. cit., pp. 74-76. See also James, Police . . . City, op. cit., pp. 14-40, for an in depth administrative study of an integrated department on the level of a small community. James sets an administrative standard that is of interest to the integrationist.

of Public Safety at Oak Park, has stated:

. . . the argument that police and fire services are essentially different is purely academic. The difference is one of dynamics only. Both /in part/ are emergency services, and in any emergency some type of positive action must be taken.³⁵

McNeil and Andrews address this contention directly and both reach the conclusion that sufficient benefits can be achieved by a combination of the two services to outweigh the slight dissimilarities between the two.³⁶ Administrators interested in solving the integration task can relocate those individuals not inclined to adapt to both functions.

This is not meant to down play the argument, but when the rapid rise of costs for the smaller departments is considered, sufficient, similar grounds could conceivably be found to justify, at least, partial integration of these services. The answer to the National Board of Fire Underwriters' contention that:

The real test of an integrated organization should be whether or not the fire and police function have enough similarity so that the use of the same men is practical. The amount of similarity needed to make this type of organizational structure feasible does not exist. . .³⁷

³⁵G.S. Leonard, "A Report on the Integration of Police and Fire Services in the City of Oak Park, Michigan," 1962, p. 1. (mimeographed)

³⁶McNeil, op. cit., pp. 63-68; Andrews, op. cit., p. 45.

³⁷"Combining of Fire and Police Departments,"

lies in the International City Managers' Association appraisal of the integrated department:

The key to the successful operation of any police or fire department is prevention It is exactly here in the field of prevention, that the opportunities for improving public safety through integration are greatest. . . . integration³⁸ poses no new problems to the municipal administrator.

It can be readily admitted that there is a difference between the operation of a complicated piece of fire apparatus and a patrol vehicle, between knowing the chemical that fits the fire and dealing with people in face-to-face relationships. But it must also be admitted that there are similarities between getting a person out of a burning building, automobile, or airplane, and going in after a wanted felon. A few of the similarities between the two departments are dispatching, purchasing, personnel administration, and vehicle maintenance. The list could go on to some length, but the important point to be remembered is that there are in existence many areas of common interest which require common experience. Therefore, valid arguments exist on both sides of the issue. The solution appears to lie in thoughtful planning, complete preparation, and responsible administration.

Special Bulletin No. 300 (New York: National Board of Fire Underwriters, November, 1953), p. 2.

³⁸Municipal Police Administration, op. cit., p. 63.

Other contentions.

As stated earlier, neither the police nor the fire services have spoken strongly in favor of the total integration theory. Police disagreement centers around the arguments put forth by Leonard:

1. Policemen do not relish the idea of becoming firemen and vice versa.

2. Patrolmen are already overloaded and the additional fire-fighting responsibilities would neutralize his efficiency in both areas.

3. Consolidation is incompatible with sound administrative practice and procedure.³⁹

The first argument is probably true and can be overcome through a variety of methods available to the public safety administrator, i.e., retaining, education, or replacement. The second argument has been answered earlier in the discussion of prevention, and the third argument does not hold to recent administrative theory or practice on the federal, state, or local level.⁴⁰ Perhaps, this latter argument was true ten years ago, but today with the heavy demands on governmental activity at all levels, more and more

³⁹ Leonard, Police . . . Management, op. cit., p. 85.

⁴⁰ Robert A. Earle, "Personnel Implications of Police-Fire Integration," Public Personnel Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July, 1958), pp. 193-196.

consolidation is taking place, i.e., transit authorities, water agencies, etc.

The other arguments usually originating with the fire service, are:

1. Police and public safety responsibilities are beyond the capabilities of the firemen.
2. Specialization demands separate departments.
3. Idle time is an illusion.
4. Pensions and civil service are different.⁴¹

The research completed on the compatability of police and firemen in Portland, Oregon, effectively answers the first argument. The preceding discussion concerning the similarities between the two services is in answer to the second argument, and the third argument is not supported by studies completed of duties on fire fighting allocation of manhours by the International City Manager's Association.⁴²

The fourth argument would require some legislative amendments to present law. While this contention applies to the entire field of governmental organizational change, it is not an insurmountable obstacle to be erected in the

⁴¹See James, Police . . . City, op. cit., pp. 5-6; and Andrews, op. cit., pp. 84-87.

⁴²"Utilization of Fireman's Time," Management Information Service Report No. 164 (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, September, 1957), p. 2.

path of integration and could be included in the total proposed integration legislative package.

Bruce sums up these arguments very well in his evaluation of the integrated concept:

Experience in both the United States and Canada has not borne out the contentions of the anti-integrationists. Crime and fire have not run rampant. Fire losses, insurance premiums, and crime losses have not increased as a result of unification.⁴³

A word of caution is added by Earle, when he states:

. . . integration . . . should not be undertaken hastily even though the technical personnel aspects are easily worked out. The real job . . . is going to be acceptance to change. . . . Police-fire integration is a departure from the customs and traditions derived from a long history of separate police and fire departments. These customs and traditions can be overcome but only by an effective selling job.⁴⁴

Once again, the researcher is faced with the problem of proper administration. The solution to this problem seems to be thoughtful people interested in increasing functional agencies while consolidating required services. The customs and traditions of both the police and fire departments must be squarely met by the integrationist and neutralized by thoughtful research, argument, and experimentation.

VI. COST FACTOR

Only two arguments, both pro and con, remain in this

⁴³Bruce, op. cit., p. 64. ⁴⁴Earle, op. cit., p. 197.

area of police-fire integration: reduced manpower and a reduction in operational expenses. The discussion of the civilian integration experiences (as opposed to military integration), centers around the anticipated reduction in operational expenses, however, this reduction has not been what the early proponents had forecasted. The reasons for this lack of cost reduction appears to lie in a series of reasons: first, pressure applied to public safety administrators for pay increases; second, City Managers have offered higher salaries to the newly hired integrated public safety administrator; and third, the forecasted reduction in police and fire manpower has not necessarily taken place. The main reason for this latter failure is strong labor negotiations with the separated departments and an increase in unanticipated services emitting from the public safety department.

However, these deficiencies in the integrationist argument are met with cost reductions in fields that are not strongly felt by the city budget: conversion of cars for administrators, reduction in fire insurance premiums, adoption of a single uniform, and consolidation of facilities. These are long term benefits that must be taken into consideration by the department planning to integrate and currently maintaining two or more facilities. The likelihood that these separate facilities will continue to be

manned until new facilities are built--as a result of normal depreciation--is very high. This short time difficulty should not detour from the anticipated long range benefits.⁴⁵

The City of Sunnyvale, California (integrated in 1950), has estimated its savings to be approximately twenty per cent in the operational field, ten per cent in fire insurance premiums on private dwellings, and between six to twenty-two per cent in fire insurance premiums on industrial buildings. The city is still maintaining two separate police and fire stations, but they have consolidated the communications, desk, records, administrative offices, classrooms, and kitchens. This consolidation has enabled more sworn police officers to be placed in the public safety uniform along with previously ill-utilized firemen. As a result, Sunnyvale has not had a recruitment problem in either field, whereas, previously they were constantly undermanned.⁴⁶

⁴⁵R. Bruce Holmgren, "Fire and Police Integration: Improvement or Impairment?," Mayors and Manager's Magazine, (April, 1958), p. 5. See also, H.G. Pope, "Organization of Fire and Police Service in Small Cities," Public Management, XXXIII, No. 5 (May, 1951), p. 103.

⁴⁶H.K. Hunter, "An Integrated Public Safety Department," Public Management, XXXIII, No. 5 (May, 1951), pp. 105-107; and "Begins Fourth Year of Combined Fire and Police Service," Public Management, XXXV, No. 8 (August, 1953), p. 207.

Mr. Jessup, City Manager of Sunnyvale, listed the following as goals for the integrated department:

1. A 20 to 25% saving in personnel and equipment costs.
2. Shorter working hours and better pay for better trained men.
3. A saving in having one headquarters building instead of two.
4. Greater efficiency through a single administration.
5. Elimination of wasteful competition and jealousy of the two departments.
6. A greater pool of trained manpower for any emergency--police or fire.⁴⁷

As can be easily seen, with shorter work weeks, higher pay, more money offered to administrators, and better equipment, the cost factor will tend to remain the same in proportion to the population growth of the community. The importance of the cost factor is that the reverse did not happen--costs for public safety did not increase. Herein lies the key to the administrator. He is able to keep his budget in line with previous budgets, while other departments are asking for an increase. This factor becomes increasingly important when the military problems are discussed and will be dealt with more extensively at that time.

VII. SUMMARY

The concept of police-fire integration has been

⁴⁷Jacob A. Jessup, "The Sunnyvale Public Safety Department: A Study in Integration," Police, Vol. 1 (November-December, 1956), pp. 36-40.

discussed in this chapter with the emphasis placed on the arguments for and against the concept. Three theoretical organizational models were defined--administrative integration, partial integration, and complete integration. By studying the political, social, and economic setting of the public safety clientele, the administrator is given a choice from which to adopt the consolidation needed or necessary for the community. Successfully integrated communities illustrated these theoretical models.

CHAPTER IV

INTERNAL POLICE CONSOLIDATION

The preceding chapter dealt with the major movement of the 1900's in the realm of public safety consolidation theory. The emphasis of this chapter concerns other movements which have gained the attention of administrators during this century, especially during the last two decades. These movements have crossed the public safety spectrum: from attempts to consolidate regional communications, to attempts to bring outlying populated areas under a central government body. The last chapter isolated three models of police-fire integration, from which advantages and disadvantages were discussed. The complete integration model was used in the arguments to insure any less attempts at public safety consolidation would result in an effective compromise.

The same format will be used in this chapter, only the types of movements surveyed will be varied. First, an overview of the metropolitan concept adopted by the Toronto area for governing its huge population center will be examined. Second, the contract arrangements undertaken by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department and the Connecticut State Police will be examined. Finally, other types of regional and multi-county attempts at public safety integration will

be discussed.

I. METROPOLITAN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

The concept of joining together several governmental entities under one centralized body has appealed to administrators since the turn of the century. Such men as Virgil W. Peterson, Gordon E. Misner, and Thomas Reed, have given their total life to this concept. The reason for this dedication is very simple: these men believe that one government in a geographical area will be able to provide better service for less tax dollar.

Misner points out that in our 174 Standard Metropolitan Areas (as defined by the U.S. Bureau of Census in 1950), there are approximately 15,658 separate units of local government. Of these fifteen thousand plus units, approximately 3,600 are involved with at least a portion of the police business. Therefore, in each metropolitan area there are an average of more than twenty police agencies, all engaged in the same quest or goal (protection of life and property and prevention of crime), and, for the most part, overlapping each other in various ways.¹

Peterson, summarized the arguments for metropolitan

¹Misner, "Recent Developments in the Metropolitan Law Enforcement," Vol. 50, No. 2, op. cit., p. 500.

government or metropolitan police agencies, when he spoke about the Cook County, Illinois, situation:

The presence of hundreds of autonomous local police agencies with personnel totaling several thousands within a relatively small geographic area naturally results in gross duplication of effort and equipment as well as frequent conflict of authority and confusion It prevents intelligent administration and direction of available manpower engaged in law enforcement in the community. It militates against efficiency and is extremely expensive.²

Thomas Reed, another pioneer in the metropolitan concept, has given further reason for the local administrator to be interested in this type of municipal consolidation concept. Reed lays the blame for the problems faced by the urban core areas at the feet of the old upper and new middle classes when he stated:

. . . brains and leadership of many a city have disqualified themselves from doing anything for the good government of the city by moving into the suburbs so that the city is threatened not only with financial but political bankruptcy.³

The arguments for the integration of several closely gathered governmental agencies or entities under one centralized unit, centers around efficiency, effectiveness, and subsequently, better service. These arguments closely

²Virgil W. Peterson, "Issues and Problems in Metropolitan Area Police Service," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, Vol. 48, No. 2 (July-August, 1957), p. 128.

³Thomas H. Reed, "Progress in Metropolitan Integration," Public Administration Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter, 1949), p. 2.

resemble those put forth in favor of police-fire integration within the smaller governmental entities.

Early attempts.

The first attempt to consolidate into the metropolitan form of government was in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1912. However, this attempt was not successful until 1949. At that time the City of Atlanta and Fulton County combined forces into the Metropolitan City of Atlanta. The police forces were never completely consolidated as there still exists two separate police forces servicing the area: the metropolitan force and Fulton Sheriff's Department. However, these are the only two forces today as compared with sixteen separate agencies before consolidation.⁴

The next attempt at a metropolitan system for government in the United States took place in the City and County of Alameda, California, in 1916. This attempt has been frustrated, however, by the voters' reluctance to pass the enabling legislation.

Reed, slightly disturbed by the failure of the Greater Boston area, in 1930, to create a metropolitan government, stated:

No Republican legislature was willing to risk the enlargement of a city which it believed would continue

⁴Peterson, op. cit., p. 130.

to be dominated by Mayor Curley with whose political arts no "'Proper Bostonian'"has been able to compete.⁵

While this argument might be somewhat emotionally based, attempts prior to 1949 at metropolitan government failed because of political considerations. One method that seems to have worked is the system employed by the State of Virginia. In this scheme, still metropolitan in philosophy, the state has delegated the power of annexation to a panel of three judges. This power enables the annexation of land adjacent to a larger urban center. Of course, many legal guarantees are preserved, but the benefit is still the same: the smaller community is brought under the jurisdiction of the larger community. This is completed without the political in-fighting and back stabbing that occurs in bitter metropolitan referendums.⁶

Baton Rouge, Louisiana attempt and concept.

The municipality and county of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, underwent a unique form of metropolitan government in 1949. The city, a large urban labor town, is situated in a bowl surrounded by valleys and hills. Its growth and ability to expand is, thereby severely limited by natural obstructions.

⁵Reed, op. cit., p. 3.

⁶Ibid., pp. 6-8. Also, Chester W. Bain, "Annexation: Virginia's Not-So-Judicial System," Public Administration Review, Vol. XV, No. 4 (Autumn, 1955), pp. 251-262.

After World War II, the city underwent many changes: mass emigration, mass exodus of the wealthier people to the outlying areas, and an increase in industrial construction. Ruse and exploitation of a lax political situation, according to Reed, permitted planners to achieve passage of both a resolution and a constitutional amendment allowing the city-county consolidation scheme. Under this plan, three separate areas were established: the urban area with its own police and fire departments, the rural area with its sheriff, and the industrial area with its own hired industrial security personnel. All of these areas are centrally controlled and administered by the metropolitan government. Reed is of the opinion that no other community has attempted a plan so radical.⁷

Metropolitan Toronto concept.

As a result of a study conducted in the early 1950's, thirteen municipalities joined with the City of Toronto and formed the leading example of a metropolitan government that exists today. This consolidation of effort was undertaken because of a failure on the part of the separate governments to provide certain public safety services for their people, and partly because of deficiencies found in the inter-municipal agreements.

⁷Reed, op. cit., p. 5.

The created metropolitan government is directly responsible to the Ontario Provincial Legislature. An appointed five man board of Police Commissioners oversee the police operation and are a part of the metropolitan government. Of course, not all the communities have expressed agreement with this arrangement, but improved police service since the consolidation has pacified almost all the dissenters.⁸ The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, in its report, states the following:

Staff and auxiliary service are now provided by the metropolitan police department in a degree that would have been impossible even under partial merger. A 14-week recruit-training program is provided where prior to amalgamation only two departments had recruit training programs. Centralized communications is a reality. Records are centralized and central investigation is provided for all jurisdictions.

One measure of the effectiveness of the consolidated police department is the rate of crime clearances. In 1957, the clearance rate for major offenses was 39.5 per cent; in 1965, it was 46.2 per cent the police budget has risen from \$11.6 million in 1956 to 27.7 million in 1966, or approximately 140 per cent. Total expenditures for fire protection, still a municipal function, have risen, however, by a greater percentage.

⁸ Misner, op. cit., "Recent Developments in Metropolitan Law Enforcement, Vol. 51, No. 2, p. 267. See also, Winston W. Crouch, "Metropolitan Government in Toronto," Public Administration Review, XIV, No. 2 (Spring, 1954), pp. 85-95, for a list of positive and negative considerations of the Toronto experiment.

⁹ Task Force: The Police, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

The success of the experiment in Toronto and the failure of American cities to attain such a record (Metropolitan Dade County and the Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County forces),¹⁰ seems to be that the federalized concept of Canadian government created a 'top-down' administrative structure. In other words, the direction of the department comes from outside the local community.

The federated form of government in the Toronto area provides some possible approaches to achievement of comprehensive reorganization in this country, and the success of the consolidated law enforcement program demonstrates that a total system approach is possible. It should be borne in mind, however, that comprehensive reorganization in the United States depends upon local participation in the decisions to change the structure of government, whereas it is accomplished by the provincial government in Canada.¹¹

In other words, this success is very similar to the success story of the State of Virginia: success can usually be achieved providing the concept is put into the hands of an authority divorced from the local pressures and conflicts of the concerned community. In answer to the critics of metropolitan success (mainly, those who are also supporters of the home-rule theory), Reed stated one of the greatest enemies of the right to "self-governments is the perpetuation of situations in which political units are unable to

¹⁰See Ibid., pp. 102-103; and Reed, op. cit., p. 4; for a discussion of the failure within these two agencies.

¹¹Task Force: The Police, op. cit., p. 103.

supply the services and facilities essential to modern living."¹² These authors would then support, at a time when this condition seems eminent, the involvement of a higher authority, as in the Canadian and Virginia examples.

The advantages and benefits derived from a metropolitan form of government, or at least a consolidated metropolitan police force seems, therefore, to be increased law enforcement effectiveness (reduction in the crime problem) by: 1) the elimination of overlapping, duplicating, and conflicting police agencies through merger or consolidation, 2) holding local police departments accountable to the State for the maintenance of proper standards, 3) vesting primary control over the police in a board established at a higher governmental level, but responsive to the local level through the city council and citizen committees, and 4) integration and coordination of the efforts of police and prosecuting agencies.

II. CONTRACT LAW ENFORCEMENT

Briefly, this is a system whereby a larger entity, either a city, sheriff's, or state police agency, will reach an agreement with the local town or village government to provide law enforcement service. The obligations of the

¹²Reed, op. cit., p. 7.

town are to pay a specified price for law enforcement personnel contracted from the larger department. There are in existence today several forms of contract law enforcement. Two agreements of special note are the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (which received authorization to contract with the smaller towns in Los Angeles County for such services), and the Connecticut State Police, which has instituted a program they call the Connecticut Resident Police System. Under this latter program, officers are hired and reside permanently in the contracting town.

Resident Police System.

Under this plan, forty-six towns in Connecticut, ranging in size from 1,000 to 17,000, have entered into an agreement with the Connecticut State Police for law enforcement service. The state legislature controls the program in two ways: first, by establishing a criteria for the municipality wishing to enter into the contract, and second, by limiting the number of cities which might enter into the contractual agreement by budgetary controls. The State Police resident patrol officer is given complete law enforcement jurisdiction in the town and maintains a post in the community. He is responsible for all criminal matters that occur in the town, and is usually the only law enforcement agent in the community.¹³

¹³Leonard, op. cit., pp. 89-90, 322-326.

Leonard reports that the citizens of the contractual communities like the system and agree that it is working very well. He also reports that "towns people involved are impressed with the fact that for a nominal sum, the services of the professionally trained and well equipped Connecticut State Police are readily available."¹⁴

County to City Contracts.

The most notable success in this area has been the contract law enforcement system of Los Angeles County. It began in 1954, with the incorporation of the City of Lakewood, and is the largest application of city-county police cooperation in the United States. In theory, it represents all of the positive benefits that can filter to the law enforcement enterprise from the metropolitan government scheme. This is pointedly brought to mind when it is considered that today one out of every three persons receiving law enforcement services from the Sheriff of Los Angeles County is a resident of an incorporated city.¹⁵

The greatest single advantage of the contractual agreement is that the larger organization is able to pro-

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, "Contractual Law Enforcement," (Los Angeles: Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, 1968), p. 1. (mimeographed)

vide professional-specialized services, administering to the overall area crime situation, and yet is flexible enough to meet the needs of the local community. The arrangement calls for the community wishing to contract with the Sheriff's Department to disband its own police force (if it has one), and specify the number of patrols it wants. The contracting city must pay all the expenses of the patrol force. The basic patrol unit is one-man car for daylight hours and a two-man car for the hours of darkness. In 1967, each unit cost \$119,486.

Leonard reports that a majority of officials in the Los Angeles metropolitan area support the present contract law enforcement agreement. Basically, they see the following benefits: 1) economy, 2) professionally trained personnel on the job, 3) immediate availability of emergency re-enforcements, 4) completely equipped radio patrol cars, 5) unbiased, non-partisan service, 6) ready accessibility to specialized law enforcement services, 7) no personnel problems, and 8) no capital outlay.¹⁶

III. OTHER CONSOLIDATION ARRANGEMENTS

Many attempts have been made by administrators at the local level to consolidate municipal services within

¹⁶Leonard, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

limited geographical areas. The early history of the development of the western states is replete with examples; the school districts that cross local jurisdictional lines. The folklore of the "Western" suggests an early effort at internal cooperation between the sheriff and the U.S. Marshal.

This latter example, even though glamorized in the motion picture industry, was the first attempt made by the Federal Government to eliminate the problems of the 'mobile criminal'. This mobility concern has lead to the development within the law enforcement system of many different means of consolidation of effort. Some striking examples would be the Interstate Compact, where drivers from agreeing states are listed on a master file by license and violation; the Federal Bureau of Investigation's fingerprint file and related requirements; and, the recent intra-and-inter-state agreements concerning the exchange of criminal investigative information and parole agreements.

However, of more concern to this study are the arrangements currently being instituted on the local level with the explicit purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the police forces while reducing the costs of law enforcement services to the community. These internal attempts at consolidation fall into two categories: auxiliary services, and staff services.

Auxiliary Services.

Record systems, communication systems, crime laboratories, and detention facilities and manpower, are law enforcement functions included in this category. The detention problem is included even though the correctional problems are not part of this project, because many small departments find themselves maintaining at least some type of temporary detention facility as part of their normal day-to-day task.

The attraction of having a centralized records bureau, at least on the county level, has the appeal of reducing the overall administrative costs involved with managing any government agency. As a result, several departments have successfully attempted some form of records consolidation during the past five years. Task Force: The Police, details an extensive study of those departments and the systems they employ.¹⁷

The advent of the computer and the high cost of its operation has facilitated the consolidation movement and hindered the local control argument. The technological advances made within the last ten years in the area of overall administrative practices, has enabled the easy consolidation of law enforcement records by local

¹⁷Task Force: The Police, op. cit., pp. 82-86.

governments long opposed to such movements. An example would be the city and county of Denver, Colorado, where the metropolitan concept of government has gone down to defeat three times in the last fifteen years. However, this area has adopted a centralized criminal records system that is an example used by other Western states.¹⁸

A consolidated records system has considerable attraction to the public safety administrator, but the arrangement must be approached with considerable caution and thoughtful planning.¹⁹

This same generalization holds true for any consolidation attempt in the area of communications, criminalistics, or detention facilities. All of these areas have been explored in detail in the President's Commission reports, so will not be examined in this report. The importance to the administrator who is interested in increasing law enforcement effectiveness, while attempting to reduce total operational costs, is that with the rising cost of auxiliary services, some thought must be given to the consolidation concept. This thought, however, must include sufficient planning and administrative preparation to

¹⁸Reed, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁹O. W. Wilson, "Police Records: Their Installation and Use," (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1942), p. 8-10; for a discussion of the cautions involved in administrative consolidation.

enable the eventual consolidation effort to prove workable.

Staff Services.

The commonly thought of definition and listing for staff services of law enforcement agencies will be followed in this discussion: personnel management, purchasing, training, planning and programming, internal security and intelligence, and finally, information or public relations.

The discussion in the President's Commission report details arguments for and against the consolidation of these agencies within the same governmental agency (some police precincts or districts enjoy having their own staff agencies), and between contiguous governmental jurisdictions.²⁰ These arguments will not be detailed in this report because their basis has already been established: through careful planning and proper preparation, a considerable savings in money and manpower can be achieved, while allowing an increase in service to the local taxpayer.

However, some staff services are amenable to consolidation and some are not. Services such as intelligence, training, personnel selection and recruitment should be considered as fertile areas for consolidation.

Services such as planning and programming,

²⁰For the reader who is interested in a detailed report on the entire field of administrative consolidation see, Task Force: The Police, op. cit., pp. 73-82.

information or public relations, internal security, and personnel management are not as amenable to consolidation. This is not to say that some of the tasks from each of these functions cannot be done in combination with other departments, but only to imply that all of these areas are usually the special concern of the police chief or the police executive. In the area of information or public relations, the chief desires that his own agency be put constantly before the public--image making. Attempts to consolidate this function at a level above the local police executive would only result in a dissatisfied department and public because the chief would lose control of this publicity or public relations function.

Of course, internal security or staff inspections can easily be consolidated above the level of the local police chief. This, however, would not provide the chief with the beneficial information as it would probably be controlled by an outside administrator. Positive advantages for consolidation of the functions, i.e., having independent personnel, unknown to the concerned department, inspecting the internal security or workings of the department, are felt to be outweighed by the lack of cooperation and degree of hostility that the inspectors would meet within the department.

When the integration of staff services is undertaken

utilizing several separate law enforcement agencies, the probability of success for the integrationist would seem to exist only if he first considers the local political climate, thoroughly prepares and documents his case, and establishes realistic limitations on his designs.

IV. SUMMARY

Metropolitan municipal government, contract law enforcement, and other internal police consolidation attempts have been examined in this chapter. This analysis revealed that whatever method to reduce operational costs while maintaining or increasing the operational effectiveness of the agency, is selected by the public safety administrator, thoughtful consideration must be given to the political, social, and economic spheres of the community. The importance of these attempts at internal police consolidation lies in the fact that they have, for the most part, been undertaken during the decline of the police-fire integration concept and the increasing emigration to the central urban areas. Successful attempts to internally consolidate police services illustrated the theoretical concept.

CHAPTER V

THE INTEGRATED INDUSTRIAL SECURITY MODEL

The final organizational structure to be examined in the attempt to determine a model from which the military public safety enterprise might benefit, is the integrated industrial security program. While this program is limited in size and is usually controlled by the business side of the public safety economy, it is considered applicable to the current discussion because it pulls together all facets of the public safety definition: safety, disaster control, fire, police, and explosive ordnance disposal (usually only in the larger plants).

I. THE CONCEPT AND THE LITERATURE

Usually, when the discussion turns to industrial security, the observer is confronted with the idea of a pipe-smoking, semi-conscious, almost retired guard, stationed at a gate or at the beginning of a long corridor with his feet propped on a desk. While this was the case prior to the beginning of the Second World War, interest and motivation have been inputted into this image since. With the increase in war production, industrial security demands have skyrocketed. The industrial security program has evolved during the last two decades into an effective

enterprise which has cleared the path for technological advancement.¹ The old guard is replaced with closed-circuit television monitors and cameras; the gate is replaced with identification cards sensitized to electrical current; and, the desk has been replaced with a complex console from which the controller can observe and monitor all public safety phases of the company.

Transition to an Integrated Concept.

This transition has not been without its share of critics or opponents. However, the transition has successfully lead the way for the experimentation of personal control devices, the advance of alarm systems of all types, and the influx of young and eager men into a field previously held by an older age group. Healy, a leader in this technological adaption to the industrial security program, in his recent book, Design for Security, details an integrated design for the entire public safety responsibility of a company, plant, or factory. Healy assumes that the public safety responsibility will be delegated to a director of public safety and that the employees be members of this one department. He makes this assumption because technology has taken much of the routine and tedious tasks away from the security guard, thereby, allowing him to

¹"Tightening Up Industrial Security," Business Week, (October 15, 1960), p. 183.

be trained in a multi-functional position.²

A vast majority of the literature available deals extensively with the kinds of equipment and procedures to be employed in the industrial security setting. However, Buckley, a total integrationist, has done considerable writing on the question of integration within industrial security. He has expressed a strong belief that the answer to the question of how to provide a higher quality industrial security organization is the integration of fire, police, and other closely related functions under the direction of one man, a security director. "Only an integrated organization with a defined area of responsibility can do the total job with any degree of efficiency."³

Dollar Loss.

The importance placed on this field--the reason for the technological advances and adaption of the total integration concept--has been the prevention of a dollar loss to the company. Buckley supports this, when he says:

What is urgently needed is an integrated approach to loss prevention by encouraging management to consolidate the various functions under a professional industrial

²Richard J. Healy, Design For Security (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968), pp. 3-4.

³John L. Buckley, "The High Cost of Pilferage," Law and Order, XI (October, 1963), p. 35.

security manager.⁴

In addition to the normally integrated functions, Buckley would have added the following: safety, control of proprietary information, insurance, industrial salvage, emergency planning, and mutual aid.

From the organizational point of view it is very difficult to separate the duties of the plant protection officer from the duties of the fire prevention specialist, security or safety specialists. All of these people strive toward the same objective--the prevention of loss in all forms.⁵

Norton has expressed the thought that perhaps the question of integrated security functions is being overlooked. According to him, although conditions may dictate the desirability and necessity of having a separate fire department, in other cases it is no longer necessary. Though a company may have had a fire department for years, perhaps, it would do well to look at the overall problem, asking, "Do we really need a company fire department?" Just because a company, a plant, or a factory has had a fire department for a long period of time, does not seem to be sufficient reason for stating that it currently requires one. Perhaps, the entire department could be replaced with one well-trained fire inspector.

⁴John L. Buckley, "Industrial Security," Best Insurance News Fire and Casualty Edition, LXXX (January, 1962), p. 106.

⁵Ibid.

A careful review of our industrial situations could well reveal that one well-trained fire inspector or marshal would suffice to stay abreast of all hazardous situations in our plants.⁶

Ideally, with the adoption of this plan by the non-integrated company, firemen would be freed to perform other public safety tasks. However, this might not always be the case. The individual situation must be examined in detail for special hazards within the plant, and the absence of a close, well-trained, and well-equipped fire (municipal) department to the company. In either case, the situation might demand the maintenance of a separate force directed by the director of security.

An actual economic gain for the company being protected is the basis for the writing by Heinlein. He stated that an evaluation will show a close relationship exists between fire, accident, and other losses, and the rising costs of insurance, downtime, and other financial drains which the company must meet. It is simply good business, Heinlein states, for the company to take a fresh look at the integrated plant security program.⁷

Same Purpose.

⁶John J. Norton, "The Security Executive Must be a Businessman, Too!," *Industrial Security*, V (April, 1961), p. 20.

⁷Karl W. Heinlein, "Why We Think Professional Guards Cut Security Costs," Pulp and Paper, XXXV (April 3, 1961), p. 35.

The National Fire Protection Association has displayed a viewpoint which favors the non-integrated fire and police function in industry, however, they do recognize that their purposes are the same; namely, the prevention of all forms of loss to the company which they service. Their argument in favor of the non-integrated program is more moderate than the argument put forth by other fire associations concerning police-fire integration on a municipal level. According to the N.F.P.A. the key determinant in selecting the degree of specialization needed in industrial security, especially with regard to fire protection and prevention, is the size of the establishment being protected.

The larger the plant or multi-plant organization is, naturally the more elaborate will be its organizational structure, and probably the more need there will be for particular expertness in such specialists as the Manager of Fire Safety.

When speaking of the functions of the plant guard, the NFPA expresses the principle that the guard's most important job is the detection of fire. However, they do not support the contention that this concern should be combined with the actual role of the fireman in fighting a

⁸ National Fire Protection Association, Portable, and Manual Fire Control Equipment (Vol. VIII of National Fire Codes. 10 vols.; Boston: National Fire Protection Association, 1963), p. 6M-2.

fire:

In the average industrial plant, the greatest importance of the guard's (or watchman's) rounds is his service to fire protection rather than plant security as such.

Job requirements must be developed for plant guards who must be fully trained in all the required techniques. It should be noted that these job requirements, while necessarily including prompt notification, in many cases should not include fire fighting.

The question of integration or non-integration of the public safety responsibilities is left up to the particular organization by the National Industrial Conference Board. To them, the fact that one security organization is integrated, while another is not, does not provide an example of either a bad or a good situation. However, they indicated that in those industrial security organizations which are not integrated, the guards find it necessary to share some of the responsibility of fire protection and prevention.

While many companies do not incorporate fire protection and prevention under the plant protection chief, partially all companies emphasize these functions of plant protection and provide special training and instruction in fire prevention.¹⁰

⁹ Ibid., p. 6M-13.

¹⁰ National Industrial Conference Board, Industrial Security, II. Plant Guard Handbook (Studies in Business Policy No. 64. New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1953), p. 27. See also, National Industrial Conference Board, Industrial Security I. Combating Subversion and Sabotage (Studies in Business Policy No. 60. New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1952).

Examples of Integrated and Non-Integrated Plants.

The General Electric Everdale plant is an example of a non-integrated industrial security organization, detailed by Davis. He states that the operation of this plant is so specialized that they had two complete separate patrol forces; one for police functions and the other for fire protection and prevention.¹¹ An example of the integrated department can be found in Healy's book or in an article by Jahn, who, as security manager for the Westinghouse Defense Center, brought together under one security manager: visitor control, classified documents control, security education, security policies, practices and procedures, police, and fire protection. No separate fire department is maintained as such, however, the company does employ two fire specialists on a force composed of mostly general patrolmen and supervisors.¹²

II. EVALUATION

The argument for or against the integration of the public safety agencies within the industrial security program seems to stop whenever costs enter the picture. The main thrust of the argument against integration lies in the

¹¹James A. Davis, "Plant Security," Industrial Security, V (July, 1962), p. 10.

¹²Francis X. Jahn, "Industrial Security Planning a Total Protection Concept," Industrial Security, VII (October, 1963), p. 28.

contention by the fire protection associations that only firemen should be allowed to fight fires. Nothing is said, or was found, which disagrees with the administration consolidation concept--the creation of a director of security whose responsibilities include the fire protection people.

Kettler completed a study five years ago based upon the evaluation of two industrial security organizations. In one company the public safety agencies were all integrated under one director (complete integration), with one man being both security guard and fire protection specialist. In the second company, the personnel were specialized into the separate fields but, placed under the direction of the Chief, Plant Protection. He concluded from this limited study, that more research was needed but that the figures indicate a noticable depreciation in costs--both dollar loss and operational expenses--in the integrated department.¹³

The attraction of the industrial security model to the public safety integrationist is limited by the actual size of the working organizations and the involvement of private business in the concern for efficiency of operation.

¹³Gordon W. Kettler, "A Comparative Study of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Integrated and Non-Integrated Industrial Security Organizations" (unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1964), pp. 120-121.

However, the theory that elements of public safety can be consolidated effectively under a central direction is still valid. Perhaps, time is at hand to experiment with this type of an organization on a much larger scale--a scale that is faced with day-to-day, "normal" public safety emergencies.

III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The preceding three chapters have discussed three conceptual models for public safety integration: police-fire integration within a small community, internal consolidation within police agencies, and the integrated industrial security operation of private industry. Conclusions reached from this research are:

1. Within the realm of police-fire integration, some form of consolidation of effort seems to be supported by the experience of cities and towns within which the concept has proven successful. Two very important prerequisites must be adhered to, however, before any attempt is made to integrated these two agencies:

- a. The integrationist, or the committee recommending the consolidation attempt, must conduct an extensive study of the community. This research must include the political, social, and economic base of the community, coupled with an in depth personnel study of the separate

departments.

b. The theory, concept, and philosophy, must be introduced to the community and the departments through proper administrative means. In other words, the community must be prepared to acknowledge the benefits as well as the disadvantages to consolidation. The personnel in the departments must be thoroughly briefed, trained, and tested on their new function before the final changes to the organization structure are completed.

2. The administrator hired to oversee the operations of the consolidated force must be a man of high-integrity, not necessarily from the police enterprise, who understands and supports the integration concept.

3. The individual community must decide the type of integration that is necessary for its public safety agencies. The choice in organizational models should be made between either administrative, partial, or complete integration. The community must also determine what controls it will exercise over the agency.

Essentially, the community between 1,000 and 100,000 is faced with a choice of whether they desire the same type of public safety efficiency or whether they desire an agency which is highly-trained, effective, capable, and structured to provide a better service for the same amount of money expended.

The following chapter describes the organization of the various public safety elements of the United States Air Force and their internal organizational structure. Interviews and statistics were gathered from four Air Force bases which indicate problems which confront Air Force public safety administrators. These problems will be analyzed to determine whether or not the research completed in this present chapter has any applicability. Alternative models for integration of some form of public safety integration can then be established which will meet the criteria defined earlier: reduction in costs while providing an improved service.

CHAPTER VI

PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES

AIR FORCE PUBLIC SAFETY ELEMENTS

The major emphasis of this paper up to this point has been a concentration on those models which have been successful in civilian public safety integration. This chapter will leave that area and explore the organizational structure of the United States Air Force public safety elements. Emphasis has been placed on those public safety elements defined earlier in this paper: Security Police, Fire Department, Disaster Control, Ground Safety, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The following chapter will draw this organization into alternative models taken from the civilian experience.

I. GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

The United States Air Force is basically divided into two different types of commands: combat and support.¹ Strategic Air Command (SAC), Tactical Air Command (TAC), and Aerospace Defense Command (ADC), are examples of the


¹This discussion uses as it's basis Air Force Manual 26-2, "Organization Policy and Guidance" (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 15 March 1966), pp. 1-32; and includes, for matters of simplicity, the "separate operating commands and other agencies" under the general title of support commands.

combat commands. Other related functions, such as Air Weather Service, Air Force Communications Service, Air Force Academy, etc., are generally referred to as support commands.

Each of the combat commands contain some elements of support, i.e., a SAC bomb wing will contain personnel and equipment necessary for the wing to accomplish its mission. The wing's primary home is usually an Air Force installation. The installation contains the facilities and personnel necessary to support the wing. While these people and facilities are not directly under the bomb wing's commander, they are controlled by a base commander, who is responsible to the wing commander and sits in a co-equal position with various other commanders on the wing staff. The wing commander is responsible to the next higher organizational element--often the air division commander.

Dual Deputy Organization.

The dual deputy system is the current organizational philosophy followed by all Air Force organizations. The structure consists of a wing (or higher) commander who has two deputies--one for the operations of the unit (mission) and one for the material (mission support). Figure 1 illustrates this organizational structure. The base commander might also have a staff organized along these guidelines.



*Includes base engine management function

**Functional squadrons as required

FIGURE 1

WING/GROUP ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

SINGLE WING/GROUP BASE

The informal structure of a combat wing delegates the base commander, even though he is a co-equal to the deputy commanders, to a lower position than the deputy commanders. While this lower position is only one of speculation, the fact is evident when the mission and the primary responsibility of the wing commander is considered: The flying (or missile) mission has first priority in the Air Force for personnel and equipment, therefore, the emphasis is on the whole-hearted support to that mission from the base commander.


The organization becomes further complicated when there are two or more wings, with combat missions, assigned to one installation. This in effect, creates several commanders, each responsible to a higher commander in equal status. In other words, the combat commanders and the base commander are responsible to their respective wing or air division commanders. In the informal setting, the air division commander, being responsible for the total combat mission, is more concerned with his wing commanders and their problems than with the host base commanders problem's.

The Base Commander.

This paper is concerned with those divisions responsible to the base commander which are involved with the public safety of the installation. As has been shown,

the base commander is responsible for the overall maintenance of the installation regardless of mission. He is also responsible for the supplies necessary to sustain the various units on the installation, whether they be combat or support, the common facilities of an installation (clubs, commissary, exchanges, theater, housing, recreational services, etc.), and complete coordination with the wing commander. One installation studied in this paper had the base commander responsible for sixteen separate functions and their corresponding officers. Figure 2 depicts the Air Base Group system followed by most Air Force installations and those installations without a combat mission (with some noted changes for the multi-wing base). Appendix C lists the various functions assigned to the base commander. From these references, it becomes evident that the base commander has to be diversified in both experience and organizational operation. Further, he must possess the capability to assemble his staff quickly in time of disaster or in case of an emergency. This staff must have current information in their possession and be able to respond quickly to any situation--aircraft accident, missile accident, or riot.

This single manager concept of responsibility (or the host base commander), allows for a simplified organizational structure which holds duplication of effort to a minimum.



* Functional squadrons as appropriate

FIGURE 2

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

AIR BASE WING/GROUP

Though the operation of this concept, the base commander supports and provides an installation for the combat wing and it's primary mission. The concern of this report is with those elements of the base commander's staff which deal with the public safety of the installation. Therefore, a cursory examination must be made of the role played by higher headquarter's organization and staff in dictating this public safety mission.

Echelon of Command.

These commands, support or combat, at all levels have separate staff agencies and headquarters. All major air commands are tied into the Chief of Staff for the Air Force, at Washington, D.C., and are responsible to his staff--the Air Staff. He is responsible, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense and the President.

The next lower echelon, under the Chief of Staff, is the major air command. All major air commands might be involved with owning and possessing Air Force installations. Under the direction of the major air command commander, is the numbered air force commander, then the air division commander, and so on down the organizational line. This descending organizational structure is, therefore, composed of several commanders, each in turn responsible for different levels of activity. This structure provides a flexible

and speedy flow of information from the bottom of the ladder to the top. It also provides for delineation of responsibility to the area of particular need or specialized problems--the major air command is nation-wide, while the numbered air force command might only encompass a particular geographical area, as is the case in the Aerospace Defense Command.

The staff of these commanders are composed of those elements which have a responsibility to support the mission of the lower command. They may issue guidance and direction to the lower command in the name of the commander. These guidelines thus become, in effect, the respective commander's orders.

The public safety elements are represented on the staff of most Air Force commanders regardless of their position in the echelon of command. However, the higher in command, the more consolidation one finds, i.e., at Air Staff level (directly responsible to the Chief of Staff), an Inspector General exercises staff responsibility for all Air Force investigations and inspection functions.

The following sections will deal with the individual staff--public safety elements--structure through this echelon of command. Interspersed within these sections will be figures accumulated from the four Air Force installations visited. These figures establish the amount of public

safety problems faced by organizational commanders. Each of the four installations were chosen because they represent (not in a statistical sampling manner but in a public safety manner), different base sizes: Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, is a large installation; Selfridge Air Force Base, Michigan, is a medium-to-large installation with a support and combat mission; Niagara Falls International Airport, New York, is a small-to-medium installation with mainly a support mission; and, Custer Air Force Station, Michigan, is a small installation supporting an Air Division combat mission.

II. SECURITY POLICE ORGANIZATION

Closely paralleling the organizational philosophy of the preceding section but differing in some respects, is one of the largest military elements of the the public safety enterprise within the United States Air Force--the Security Police. Examining that agency's responsibilities and organization is the emphasis of this section.

Responsibilities.

The nature of the work of the Security Police varies with the mission of each installation. The generalized mission of this diversified staff agency is detailed in basic Air Force regulations. In defining the responsibilities

of the Security Police,² Lieutenant Colonel's Newnam and Fleek defined it as:

Begin with a force of more than 45,000 men. Assign it responsibilities for all the normal law enforcement duties plus prison administration.

Add all the duties normally performed by special police or contract guard or private protective agencies.

Develop, on top of that, a capability for actual ground combat operations against an armed enemy.

Station your men from Alaska to Panama and from Bangkok to Berlin. Assign them to the direct operational control of a variety of "mayors" and "chiefs of police."

At the same time, require that they work in close coordination and cooperation with other local and national police agencies all around the world.

Next, to further complicate the operation from the personnel standpoint, assume that about 25 per cent of your men will have to be replaced each year. Annually, you will have about 10,000 rookies to train, equip, and assign. At the same time, every three to four years you will have a complete reshuffle of all your personnel, from patrolmen to chiefs, not only from one assignment to another,³ but also from one city and country to another.

This, then in a slightly dramatic fashion, is the area of responsibility that the 44,000 enlisted men and approximately 900 officers engaged in the Security Police function find themselves. The field extends from normal day-to-day law enforcement and correctional tasks, to combat security training, to actual protection of USAF resources in war-torn countries. The Security Policeman,

²Air Force Regulation 125-1, "Functions and Organization of the USAF Security Police Activities" (Washington: Department of the Air Force, May 1967), p. 1.

³T.J. Newnam and T.A. Fleek, "The Air Force Approach

to meet these responsibilities, is given a variety of equipment and facilities--from shotguns to highly trained sentry dogs, and from pick-up trucks to 'half-tracks'.

The image of the Security Policeman, as seen by the base resident or the civilian visitor, starts with the guard stationed at the entrance gate to control traffic coming on to the installation. He is in a similar uniform to that of the civilian police officer. From this first impression, the resident or visitor sees the law enforcement patrol in action or pays a visit to the base pass and registration section. Rarely, does the resident or visitor see the sentry on duty at the far flung corners of the base. Rarely, does he comprehend that these two functions, law enforcement and security, come under the direction of the Base Chief of Security Police. Bailey, in his survey of Directors/Chiefs of Security Police, found that less than one-third of the 44,900 members of the total Security Police operation are engaged in law enforcement activities.⁴ The remainder of the personnel, facilities, and equipment are

to Professional Police Management: Refining and Reorganizing the Function," The Police Chief, (May, 1967), p. 32.

⁴Charles H. Bailey, "National Survey of United States Air Force Directors/Chiefs of Security Police Attitudes Pertaining to USAF Security Police-Community Relations" (unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1968), p. 111.

engaged in the protection of USAF resources and installation security.

Organization.

Each installation or base has a Chief or Director of Security Police. This director or chief usually wears two hats, one as a member of the Base Commander's staff, and the other as the commander of his men. The determination of whether or not he is in this dual function resides in the physical size, population, and mission of the particular base. Of the four bases visited, two (Custer AFS and Niagara Falls International Airport), did not also exercise squadron command responsibility.

As a member of the base commander's staff, the Chief of Security Police supports the operational mission of the installation, by providing security personnel and facilities. He also attempts to maintain the internal discipline and control of the installation. Usually, under the single-manager concept and because of a deficiency in personnel, the base chief of Security Police will also function as the tactical commander's advisor on security and law enforcement matters--or is usually not represented at the air division level by a separate staff agency.

At the next higher level, either the numbered air force or major air command, a staff agency responsible for inspections and advising the commander on Security Police

activities is found. This agency is organizationally under the Inspector General who advises the commander mainly about the tactical evaluations of his mission squadrons/groups/wings. At this level, then the Security Police are tied to the overall control and standardization of the United States Air Force.

This organizational concept is maintained intact all the way up the ladder of command to the Department of the Air Force. At this upper level, the Security Police are combined with the Directorate of the Office of Special Inspections (OSI), under a Deputy Inspector General, who is responsible to the Inspector General, USAF---a member of the Air Staff.

The Security Police then are at least one level removed from the commander at all levels of command except at the installation level. To Fleek and Newnam this leveling does not restrict the flow of information between agencies, but actually eases this flow:

For the military force, the traditional military chain-of-command structure simplifies this problem. The Chief of Staff has technical channels available to him for the regulation of the Air Force. In the case of the Security Police organization, this chain for professional guidance is from the Directorate at Air Force Headquarters, located in Washington, D.C., to the Director of Security Police at major command level and thence to the wing staff officers and commanders of Security Police Squadrons at base level. Air Force regulations, manuals, letters and similar directives originated with the Directorate of Security Police --thus are issued in the name of the Chief of Staff.

In this way, they become matters not only of professional direction, but of command direction as well.⁵

Activity.

The level of activity for the four installations visited is presented in Table 1 below. This table is divided into the separate categories of incidents and activity as taken from the quarterly report submitted from all USAF Security Police units, through channels, to Headquarters USAF. The visited bases all questioned the validity of this report, however, it was adopted for this paper because it is the only standardized report which must be submitted by all the bases.

As can be readily seen, the amount of law enforcement activity, when compared with the Uniform Crime Reports, is appreciably less. One reason for this decreased level of law enforcement activity is the military control situation on every installation. In other words, the Security Police are operational in a setting that is control oriented, therefore, they do not get as extensively involved in the type of activity that civilian law enforcement finds itself. One other reason for this reduction in activity is the small amount of personnel deployed to the law enforcement function by the Chief of Security Police. As

⁵Newnam and Fleek, op. cit., p. 40.

TABLE 1

SECURITY POLICE ACTIVITIES

1968

	CAFS	INSTALLATION		
		NFIA	SAFB	GFAFB
AWOL'S	6	2	3	40
BASE POPULATION*	1,009	1,783	2,602	5,575
SCTY POLICE STRENGTH (authorized)	32	127	132	824
CITATIONS ISSUED:				
Military	325	241	323	893
Civilian	38	49	56	118
INCIDENTS:*				
Carrying penalty of over 1 year	0	0	2.0	18
Carrying penalty of under 1 year	2	11.3	29.4	50
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY LOSS:*				
Cases	2	6	12	40
Dollar Value	\$351	430	1210	2383
Recovered	\$ 32	112	26	204
POV'S REGISTERED	1304	2353	3509	5237
SECURITY CLEARANCES PROCESSED	146	312	464	1177

*average for the year by quarter

stipulated earlier, less than one-third of the total Security Police strength and equipment is devoted to law enforcement activity. The remainder of the force is allocated to base and resource security.

Experience has shown that the informal organization of the Security Police supports and complements the formal structure. The formal role played by higher headquarters staff agencies is usually limited to advice, recommendations, and inspection. The informal structure operates through friendships established through these formal procedures. In interviews with four Chiefs of Security Police, they discussed the role played by the higher headquarters and their professional disappointment that this role was not larger. They also displayed an interest in having the Security Police organization structured in such a manner that the base organization would come under the direct control of the staff officer at higher headquarters--in other words, organized as a separate and distinct body from the local base commander. This would place the evaluation of the base Security Police activities on the shoulders of the Security Police agency itself, but at a higher level. By removing the Chief, Security Police, from the base commander, who is a general administrator, into the channels of the police enterprise would, in the minds of those interviewed, build a more professional

service.

Summary.

The world's largest police force, the USAF Security Police, are members of a diversified chain-of-command within the structure of the United States Air Force. Those interviewed officers, representing a very small percentage of the total officer strength, were favorable to a structurally independent agency controlled through Security Police channels.

The present allocation of resources within the Security Police career field reveals that less than one-third of the members are engaged in law enforcement activities. This research also revealed that the Security Police, as now organized, are involved in the inspection and control elements of the total USAF organization, and as a result do not possess the direct communication lines necessary to maintain a centralized or highly coordinated organization.

III. FIRE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION

The activities of the fire department on any Air Force installation come under the direction and control of the Base Civil Engineer, who sits in the dual capacity as a member of the base commander's staff and usually as the

squadron commander. The size, geography, or mission of the installation does not effect this organizational structure. This section will explore this structure and relate that concept to the activity of the four departments visited during the course of this research.

Responsibilities.

The logical responsibilities of the Fire Department are the same on the USAF installations as in civilian communities. Air Force directives, in describing those responsibilities, list six separate categories: 1) Supervision of installation fire protection and aircraft crash rescue; 2) Supervision of fire protection and aircraft rescue shift operations; 3) Fire protection and aircraft rescue operations; 4) Observation tower-communications and dispatch control center; 5) Helicopter fire-fighting crash and rescue; and, 6) Fire prevention and inspection.⁶

Thus, the fire departments on USAF installations, have the same responsibilities as civilian departments with the added duties of aircraft crash and rescue operations. They are supported in meeting these responsibilities by unit fire marshals (military supervisors appointed as an additional duty to monitor the fire prevention program and

⁶Air Force Manual 26-3, "Criteria and Standards" (Washington: Department of the Air Force, October 1965), Code 440S, p. 1.

procedures for an entire unit), and building fire marshals (military members appointed for the same purpose in each USAF facility/building).

Organization.

The Fire Department is composed of a mix between civilian and military employees. The department is usually headed by a professional civilian fire chief who is part of the Base Civil Engineer's staff. This latter staff agency is responsible for all the facilities, from construction to maintenance and repair, or the normal house-keeping functions of each USAF installation. Therefore, because the two fields are primarily concerned with the same problem, the fire department is placed within this area of responsibility. The Civil Engineer exercises all command and control over both the civilian and military people of the department. This organizational structure is standardized throughout the Air Force at each level of command.

In the area of aircraft rescue, the fire department, while having prime responsibility, is supported by the Air Rescue Service (ARS), a separate operating agency with units at all flying USAF installations.

Headquarters, USAF Group for Fire Protection, under the Director of Civil Engineering, is responsible for staff

supervision for fire protection throughout the Air Force. The field representatives of the Directorate, are the Air Force Regional Civil Engineers (AFRCE), who serve as Air Force liaison with the other branches of the armed forces involved with the construction program of the Department of Defense.⁷

At the lower organizational level, fire protection is the individual responsibility of each major commander. The program for fire protection of an installation is supervised by the installation commander and a council appointed by him. Thus, through his staff agencies, the installation commander insures that funds, manpower, equipment, training, and administration are available for fire protection. The responsibilities of the Fire Council are detailed in Appendix D.

The base civil engineer is the focal point for coordination of fire protection both within the parent organization and with off-base activities. Fire prevention is the responsibility of each person who is a member or employed by the Department of the Air Force: "Everyone must share in the responsibility in order to maintain fire prevention consciousness and safe practices, to eliminate

⁷Air Force Manual 92-1, "Fire Protection Program Operational Procedures" (Washington: Department of the Air Force, October 1968), p. 1-1.

fire hazards, and to control and extinguish fire."⁸

Activity.

The fire chiefs at three of the installations visited were satisfied with this organizational structure. The other chief would have preferred to sit as a member, independent of the base civil engineer, of the base commander's staff. All four chiefs stated they had a good to fine working relationship with the other members of the public safety agencies. One chief, however, admitted that problems concerning a lack of coordination do arise but have not been very serious. The chiefs stated that the Fire Council usually meets once each year, just prior to Fire Prevention Week, and they consider the meeting just a matter of complying with a requirement in the regulation. The chiefs did not support the idea of a public safety agency, however, they did all agree that it might make organizational sense and provide some flexibility for the officers. However, they all would like to see the present shift arrangements followed.

Table 2 represents the degree of activity which took place during the last calendar year (1968) at the four U.S. Air Force installations studied. The small percentage of calls and property damage due to fire can be explained by the tight control over fire protection and

⁸Ibid.

prevention exerted by every level of command within the Air Force. Fire, a concern of all commanders because it draws money and manpower away from the primary USAF mission capability, carries severe penalties for the careless.

TABLE 2

FIRE DEPARTMENT INCIDENTS

1968

	CAFS	NFIA	SAFB	GFAFB
Calls received requesting Fire Dept assistance	3	7	17	121
Calls received involving actual fire	0	3	9	12
Reportable loss due to fire	0	\$1753	\$3700	\$9000

Calls received by the fire department requesting assistance includes calls because smoke is smelled or perhaps because steam was sighted coming from the top of a building. Calls received involving actual fire usually (81 per cent of the cases) were mattress fires in the air-men's (or NCO's) barracks. The percentage climbs to 94 when government housing incidents are added.

Summary.

The organization of the USAF fire protection program

is very diversified, but with responsibility delegated to each level of command. Therefore, this program carries some characteristics of a centralized program. The facilities, people, and equipment of the fire departments within the overall Air Force organization are delegated to a position within the Civil Engineering staff agencies at each level of command. Their chief is, therefore, separated at least one level, like the Security Police, from the commander. Fire damage, like law enforcement incidents, were found to be small in comparison to the large amount of traffic and high concentration of people, coupled with the type of structures of most buildings, at all installations visited.

IV. ORGANIZATION OF OTHER PUBLIC SAFETY ELEMENTS

The organization and responsibilities of the two largest agencies engaged with the concern of public safety within the U.S. Air Force has been explored in some depth. This section is concerned with the organizational structure of the remaining three agencies: the safety division, disaster control, and explosive ordnance disposal. These agencies will be researched simultaneously utilizing the same format as the preceding sections. Following this discussion, the common interests and functions of the five agencies will be detailed along with the observed duplication of effort discovered during the site visits and interviews

at the four installations.

Safety Division.

The Director of Safety at each USAF installation is delegated staff responsibility for flying, ground, and nuclear safety for the organization to which he is assigned. The overall responsibility for safety, like fire prevention, is further delegated to each and every member or employee of the United States Air Force.

The various functions of this division require specialized personnel to perform the preventive role in a qualified manner. This report is limited to the role played by the ground safety officer at each USAF installation--flying and nuclear safety are the concerns of the combat commands or units and not of primary concern to the installation or base commander. Ground safety involves the prevention and inspection of base facilities in the overall attempt to reduce vehicle, pedestrian, work, and recreational hazards or accidents throughout the installation.

Organizationally, the ground safety officer sits as part of the Director of Safety's staff (one of three). However, a variation from the concept of organization earlier explained was found. The ground safety officer, sits not only as part of the Director of Safety's staff, but usually on an advisory position to the staff of the base commander. The Director of Safety, being mainly

concerned with mission essential requirements, is usually a member of and advisor to the wing commander's own staff thereby leaving the ground safety office a free agent.

This same organizational concept is employed throughout the structure of the Air Force up to the level of the Department of the Air Force. Here the structure changes. The entire Safety division is placed under the Inspector General's office with a Deputy Inspector General appointed to represent all three areas of the safety concern. At this level, coordination takes place between the Deputy Inspector General for Safety, and the Deputy Inspector General for Inspections (Security Police and OSI). The Inspector General, USAF, is therefore, not only responsible for the Security Police, OSI, but also for the Safety Division on the Air Staff level.

The ground safety officer is responsible for the investigation of all mishaps or accidents occurring on or involving Air Force personnel and property. To enable this function to be performed in a smooth and efficient manner, the safety officer conducts inspections of all facilities (for safety hazards), conducts a monthly safety meeting which investigates and discusses safety hazards existent on the installation, and renders reports to the commanders at all levels concerning traffic accidents, safety conditions, and safety education.

The safety officer, though closely aligned with his police counterpart at Air Staff level, is completely separated from that agency at the installation level. The safety officer, through a program of education and prevention, attempts to limit or reduce the level of accidents at each USAF installation. The visitations found that the ground safety officer at all bases was a civilian with extensive experience in the field and with a record of lengthy service within his profession. Safety incidents reported from the four installations were not made available to the researcher.⁹

Disaster Control.

The Disaster Control officer at the installation level within the Air Force is responsible for an education and coordination program designed to meet emergency conditions such as civil disturbance, tornado, chemical/nuclear/biological accident or warfare, and other emergency conditions which might exist at any installation.

Organizationally, the disaster control officer is usually a position which exists within each level of command. At the unit level (squadron, group, or sometimes wing), this position is an additional duty imposed on an

⁹ Aerospace Defense Command Manual 26-3, "Manpower Authorizations by Functional Code" (Colorado Springs: Aerospace Defense Command, March 1967), FC 106X, p. 5.

officer whose primary interest is a full time position in another field. In other words, at the squadron level, the disaster control officer responsibilities are often delegated to the administrative officer or some other staff position. At smaller installations, this is generally the case while at larger installations separate disaster control officers can be found.¹⁰

The largest task of the disaster control officer is the preparation and coordination of the Base Disaster Preparedness Plan. This is written annually and details the responsibilities of each staff agency and assures the commander of "an in-being capability for effective response to disaster situations in peace or war."¹¹ The disaster preparedness plan covers all phases of the disaster control officers responsibility. The guidance from Headquarters, USAF, indicates that this plan must be realistic and be constantly revised. In other words, the plan must be workable and kept current.

The disaster control function is organizationally

¹⁰ Air Force Manual 26-3, op. cit., Code 4751C, p. 2. This manual calls for one officer to be appointed on each installation of more than 1,000 population up to over 10,000. Various enlisted personnel are required at all installations over 1,000.

¹¹ Air Force Manual 355-1, "Disaster Preparedness: Planning and Operations" (Washington: Department of the Air Force, February 1966), p. 1-1.

located on the operations staff of the commander and usually under the deputy commander for operations. From this major division, at higher headquarters, separate officers and enlisted personnel are found to devote full time to disaster planning. The Air Staff member who is responsible for USAF Operations, represents the concept and planning which are part of the disaster control function.

A full-time disaster control officer was found at only one of the four installations visited. The other three bases had a disaster control officer as an additional duty for either the administration officer or another junior ranking officer. Simulated disaster control exercises were being conducted at all installations at least quarterly. All facets of the Disaster Preparedness Plan were not being exercised at three of the installations. The three officers who carry this function as an additional duty were favorable to any organizational design which would place this responsibility under an experienced public safety director.

The disaster control officer and function was found to be delegated to a subordinate position within the public safety agencies of the Air Force. While attention of the commanders at all levels is directed to planning for a disaster, insufficient emphasis seems to be placed on this field at the very area where it is needed--the installation level. The fact that it is an additional duty seems to

restrict the planning and preparation which must go into the development of plans for any emergency.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal.

This is the final area of concern in the elements which comprise the public safety enterprise of the United States Air Force. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) is the Air Force terminology for what the civilian law enforcement departments call the "Bomb Squad." Their functions and responsibilities are very similar except for the involvement of nuclear weapons.

The EOD function is found on every Air Force installation which has a flying mission or supports flying missions or missile operations. The EOD section is placed under the Deputy Commander for Material, and is responsible through him to the tactical commander. The rationale for this function being organizationally placed under the same division which handles supplies, materials, and maintenance, could not be found in the formal Air Force directives. However, it must be specified that most of the directives pertaining to this field are of a classified nature and unavailable to the researcher.

The manning criteria for EOD lists its responsibilities as:

Providing at least two persons for 24-hour emergency support capability, on duty and/or standby status, for the detection, identification, rendering safe,

recovering and/or destruction of United States and foreign explosives, incendiary, toxic, and nuclear munitions.

/Additionally the EOD specialist provides technical guidance and assistance to the disaster control officer on evacuation of personnel, detection, monitoring, evaluation, and decontamination of radioactive, chemical, or biological hazards.¹²

The organization of the EOD function is found to exist as a separate part of the Material Directorate at higher headquarters, and is represented by the Directorate of Material at Air Staff level. Although usually manned by highly trained professional enlisted personnel, officers could be found at higher headquarters level whose primary concern is the EOD function.

In summary, therefore, while the EOD function can be found at most USAF installations, it has been placed organizationally under a division whose concern is with the procurement and logistics of supplies and not with public safety. EOD works in close coordination with the disaster control officer, the fire department, and with the security forces in supporting the operational elements on each USAF installation and shares very few common problems with the Material Division. Explosive control during logistical movement and non-operational storage seems to be the only related function connecting the two divisions responsibilities.

¹²Aerospace Defense Command Manual 26-3, op. cit., FC 2530, p. 1.

Summary.

This section examined the responsibilities and organization of the safety division, disaster control, and the explosive ordnance disposal section. These agencies, along with the Security Police and Fire Department, comprise those elements of the public safety concern which were investigated by this project. The research revealed that these elements are also separated from direct representation on the Air Staff by at least one organizational level and that the responsible agency for the public safety element is usually concerned with matters not relating to the public safety responsibilities of the installation commander.

The following section will examine the similarities and differences between the various public safety agencies with a concentration on the items, functions, and concepts which are shared equally by all agencies.

V. GROUNDS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY--OR NOT?

The first two major contentions of this research were concerned with the identification of a common ground for the establishment of a Division of Public Safety within the United States Air Force, and the fact that the multi-responsibility structure of the present public safety organization does not provide for an effective service for its clientele. The preceding sections of this chapter have

explored the organization and responsibilities of five separate agencies within the U.S. Air Force which are concerned with what has been defined as the public safety. This section will explore those aspects of common interest and investigate certain arguments relevant to consolidation of these agencies. The exact form that this consolidation will take will be the topic for the following chapter.

Areas of "Uncommon" Interest.

Traditional argument. The biggest argument against any consolidation effort on the part of municipal administrators has been tradition. The argument runs, that traditionally, each agency has been separate and has not encountered any problems, so therefore (it is supposed), should not be changed. It is this argument that the most enlightened and aggressive administrator finds to be a major stumbling block against integration attempts.

The traditionalist argument has been directed usually at the concept of total integration of people and equipment into one common organization--firemen are sometime policemen and vice versa. The basis for this argument is that the functions of the separate departments are entirely different--putting out fires and catching criminals. While this argument has been answered earlier in this paper, it has not been related to the military establishment.

The military installation is a controlled setting. Certain discipline and social maintenance procedures exist which do not exist in the civilian community. The military installation is very similar to the small rural community. In the latter, certain more informal control measures are in evidence, while in the former, these control measures are a matter of regulation, and command authority. The chain-of-command and the maintenance of discipline are constant facets of the military community. To ensure that this community is protected, the U.S. Air Force has created five separate public safety agencies, diversified from each other in responsibility and control. The traditionalist argument of uncommonality of function must be viewed in this context.

An examination of the argument against complete integration does merit sufficient basis for the consideration of another form of integration. Basically, the argument centers on a lack of problems and the seemingly sufficient service given by the agency to its clientele. However, the traditionalist ignores the fact that under the diversity of functions, the scope of the problems confronting the agencies can never be discovered nor handled properly. With each agency represented at the command level by a staff agency concerned with operational mission requirements, how can the problems of the public safety agencies be

investigated or explored? The answer to this question raises the spector of why have not more mistakes been made (or reported)?

The research necessary for this paper resulted in the reviewing of several practice disasters or emergencies (a total of 49 experiences; 37 practice training exercises and 12 actual emergencies). In each case either some lack of coordination occurred or the various elements were observed working at cross-purposes from one another. Discussions held with Security Police Chiefs, Fire Chiefs, Safety Officers, and Disaster Control officers, revealed that in some area (usually an area of primary concern to that particular chief), disagreement as to their individual function or task was evident. One example concerned an emergency convoy called for an aircraft crash which occurred off-base. At this one incident (outlined in the introductory chapter), the Security Police responded to the Main Gate, while the Fire Department waited at the fire station. (It was the function of the Security Police to direct the convoy and provide security at the accident scene--they followed the Disaster Preparedness Plan. The function of the fire department was to save what it could of the crew and aircraft at the scene). The resulting mix-up in convoy formation resulted in a delay of ten minutes after announcement of the aircraft crash. At this same incident, it was

observed that the medical ambulance was dispatched to the accident scene with two enlisted medical airmen and no qualified doctor on board.

Another case in this same area was the observation of fourteen Broken Arrow (simulated peace-time nuclear accidents) exercises. A single satisfactory training exercise was not observed. (Satisfactory meaning that the exercise was conducted following the Disaster Preparedness Plan, or directions from higher headquarters.) If the fire department does not break security, if the Security Police do not establish the entry control point in the wrong wind direction; the Disaster Control people violate the radiation path. Other problems noted were: base personnel breaking the cordon (2,000 foot) around the disaster site, lack of facilities for proper wash-down of contaminated personnel, and failure to coordinate with civilian authorities.

These examples are only listed to question the traditionalist argument concerning the lack of problems encountered under the current organizational structure. While the creation of some form of public safety consolidation cannot guarantee to the Air Force administrator that a successful Broken Arrow exercise will occur, or that no discrepancies will be noted in an actual emergency operation, sufficiently fertile ground appears to warrant experimentation with some form of public safety integration.

Losing an empire. Another fear by administrators (who are not concerned with the day-to-day problems of the public safety executive like the Director of Material or the Director of Operations), is the fear of losing an empire already established. Administrators seem to have a certain fear that by removing an agency from their control, they have lost some of their responsibility. This argument rests on some grains of truth but should not be used to refuse to institute change that from all appearances implies an improvement in service at a reduction in confusion and costs.

The facilities, especially the equipment, are not the same for the various organizations. Fire equipment cannot be used for Security Police duties, radiation monitoring equipment from the disaster control teams cannot be used for either fire or police operations, and specialized equipment for the disarming of a weapon can not be used for any other purpose than that function. However, this argument does not detract from the consolidation concept; it only lends to it. The one administrator, interested in all phases of public safety, would seem to devote more time to the acquisition and maintenance of that equipment than would the disinterested or unconcerned administrator. Therefore, though identifying those areas that are different, the administrator will be able to concentrate time and

talent on the specialized problems which exist.

Standardization. The last argument against integration of any diversified function within the Armed Forces is the debate over standardization. The basis of this argument lies in the adoption of a system or an organizational structure that must be applicable to units of all size and located within the various diversified areas where the Air Force mission is found. The integration of public safety elements has enjoyed success at the small community level, although, the integration theorist would like to see it adopted within larger cities, the fact remains that successful integrated departments are usually in communities of about 14,000 population. The data presented in this chapter indicated that most Air Force installations fall below that figure. Therefore, it seems rational that some form of integration would be successful within the standardized Air Force organizational concept.

However, an attraction to this theory is the fact that it could be instituted by general guidelines from the Department of the Air Force; or from a 'top-down' structure. Local conditions could then be considered in establishing the best form the consolidation effort could take for the separate installations and their problems. In other words, the concept of identifying unique characteristics of the several bases would come again into Air Force organizational

philosophy.

There do not seem to exist sufficient reasons (common to all the five agencies) to prevent some exploration of those common areas. Perhaps, further research and experimentation will reveal significant differences between the five agencies.

Areas of Common Interest.

Areas of common interest were found to exist within and between the five agencies investigated. These areas are: 1) A common concern for the safety and protection of people and property; 2) Similar types of equipment and facilities used by all agencies; 3) Similar reports and administrative details between the various agencies; 4) Approximately the same class of people being used within at least two of the five agencies; and, 5) Patrol and prevention; and finally, 6) Administrative flexibility.

Common concern. The formal descriptions of the various agencies concern the problem of prevention, protection education, and loss reduction of United States Air Force personnel and/or property. The fire department is concerned about this problem and has a council of fire marshals which is required to meet at the call of the installation commander. Similar councils are found to exist within the Security Police Division (the Base Security Council), the Safety

Division (the Accident Prevention Council), and the Disaster Control Division (Disaster Control Council). If all of these councils could be combined into one general council whose concern was the public safety of the base or installation, much time and effort could be saved.

The purpose of these councils is basically to identify those areas or hazards which exist and to educate the participants in the concern of the particular council. Experience and discussion with administrators at the four installations reveal that between seven to fifteen hours are spent in these councils with the same participating people every month. While this might be important to the public safety administrator from an educational standpoint, it must be realized that the participants in these councils have other primary responsibilities--responsibilities which may or may not involve the public safety of the installation.

A content analysis of the minutes of the last twelve safety meetings at a major U.S. Air Force installation, revealed that the most discussed item was the placement of traffic signs (an area probably best left to the traffic engineer and the police officer), 42 per cent of the items; the painting of SAFETY HAZARD stripes on exposed stairwells (a matter probably best left to the safety officer and the civil engineer), 21 per cent of the items; and, the monthly report of reportable accidents (probably best accomplished

through the circulation of a newsletter), 9 per cent of the items. Next in order of frequency was a discussion of areas of controversy between the separate agencies--usually between the safety director and the civil engineer. Even though this research was limited in time and scope, the experience of this writer points to the fact that most safety, disaster control, and fire meetings are concerned with similar subjects. The importance of these examples, much like the internal police consolidation efforts, is that they are time consuming items which could be settled within a very short time between members using a common forum--the public safety staff meeting or consolidated services. This forum could be used within an agency so that the concern of a general meeting called to discuss public safety business could be devoted to the general problem--saving lives and property from careless or accidental destruction.

Equipment and facilities. Presently, the separate staff agencies operate several similar pieces of equipment and function out of similar facilities. Of course, the specialized pieces of equipment are of no concern here: the fire apparatus, disaster control monitoring devices, and correctional cells. The argument is expressed only in the direction of common pieces of equipment or facilities.

Presently, the Security Police and the Fire Department operate a command and control center for their respective

agencies around the clock every day. Contained within the Security Police control center is a dispatching non-commissioned officer who monitors and controls the security and (in some instances), the law enforcement patrols of the installation. Also, alarm systems may be incorporated into the center along with the normal and emergency telephone systems. Often, however, a separate law enforcement dispatch center is maintained for the separate law enforcement and corrections function of the Security Police.

Likewise, the fire department maintains a control center on each USAF installation which is concerned with telephone answering, alarm monitoring, and equipment dispatching. In addition to these two or three separate command centers, the operational (combat) units of the base will also maintain a control center every day, all year around in case of national emergency. The consolidation concern here is with the form, amount, and number of command centers maintained by the various public safety agencies.

The administrator, looking for areas to gain people and possibly save money, must be attracted to this duplication of effort which exists on each USAF installation. The incident rate has shown to be along the same lines as that of a small community, perhaps, even less because of the military control aspect of a military installation.

Consolidation of command centers has proven effective in communities faced with larger problems than those which exist on most USAF installations. Therefore, the elimination of one or two command centers and the consolidation of functions should be considered feasible within the public safety elements of the Air Force.

Investigation and experience reveals that the Fire Department, the Security Police, the Disaster Control teams, and the EOD unit maintain their own separate supply rooms--rooms from which emergency supplies are maintained and accounted for by a custodian. In the Security Police, one man is usually employed full time for this purpose. This is not the case of any of the other agencies investigated as the custodian task was normally an assigned additional duty. However, the separation of this equipment is bound to result in some duplication of ordering and procuring, in some duplication of time and effort at inventory inspections, not to mention the duplication of floor space and house-keeping tasks. It is therefore, feasible that the consolidation of these storage facilities into one large emergency public safety facility would result in personnel and monetary savings plus release valuable floor space for other mission related facilities. The consolidation of this facility would not seem to depreciate from the emergency nature of its use or from a reduction in service to the

using agency, however, only actual experience under field conditions (demonstration programs), would enable valid conclusions to be reached.

All of the agencies enjoy the centralized procurement for all matters and especially the installation of communications equipment. Several years ago the Air Force placed this responsibility under the Communications Officer at the installation level--the contract with the producer of communications equipment is written world wide, however. No complaints were given at the four installations visited concerning this service. Seven Security Police administrators responded that the down-time for repair was, in their opinion, excessive. However, the overall operation of the communications contract was deemed satisfactory by all twelve interviewed administrators.

It was observed that administrative vehicles in use by the Security Police and the fire department, prevention and inspection people, could be consolidated into a common pool and thereby eliminate the necessity of having separate vehicles for both similar functions. Presently, the Base Civil Engineer is authorized a vehicle because of his additional duty as Base Fire Marshal. The Chief, Security Police, is not authorized a vehicle but at each of the bases visited, it was noted that a vehicle was always standing waiting for his use, or if the vehicle was in use at the

time, little trouble was experienced in getting a replacement vehicle. The consolidation theory seems to imply, in this incidence, at least one of these vehicles could be eliminated without severely affecting the overall mission of either agency.

Other areas which are held in common by the separate agencies and which are concerned with equipment and facilities are: administrative offices, classroom space and equipment, training sections and related responsibilities, telephones, supervisors, etc. Sufficient areas appear to be similar in scope and content to, again, warrant consideration being given to the consolidation concept.

Administrative reports. Some consolidation of effort has taken place within the area of administrative reports concerning emergency situations at Air Force installations. The base commander, being vitally concerned about this area, is the coordinating point for all administrative notification reports to higher headquarters involving the existence of emergency conditions: base under attack, accidental explosion of armament, civil disturbance in the area, natural disaster, etc. However, routine reports--serious law enforcement incidents and fires, to automobile accidents and security violations--are reported through the various staff agencies responsible to higher headquarters. For

example, the Safety Director is responsible for reporting automobile accidents to his next higher authority. Under certain circumstances, the Chief, Security Police, also has the responsibility for reporting automobile accidents (if a law has been broken). This area is in a state of change at the present time so that only one staff agency will report accidents. The investigation of automobile accidents is the dual responsibility of the Security Police and the Safety Director. The latter investigative record or report, because it is taken for reasons not involving responsibility, is not available to the Security Police or to the base legal staff. This seems to be a duplication of effort, or at least a redundancy not in the best interests of the individual or the Air Force.

Another example of duplication of administrative reporting is the case of an actual law enforcement incident involving a member of the Air Force. In this case, as many as five separate reports from as many agencies might be sent to higher headquarters. These reports are usually not coordinated within the installation and are usually in conflict with one another to such extent that clarification follow-up messages or telephone calls are necessary.

The various divisions which have a public safety responsibility require that their subordinate units submit periodic routine reports. When taken together, these reports

could reveal the degree of so-called public safety incidents within an installation, a major air command or within the entire United States Air Force. The diversity of responsibility of the various control agencies at higher headquarters prevents this type of consolidation. Today, if the investigator asked for a public safety incident rate USAF-wide, it would take the combined talents of five different agencies to acquire this information (plus others not investigated by this project). Consolidation of administrative reporting then would seem to provide more information, at less actual manpower and costs than the present system permits.

The public safety officer. An analysis of the separated fire and police personnel records controlled by one personnel center was conducted. The results of that analysis revealed that the lower four grade airmen (basic airman through sergeant) were from essentially the same social class, had completed high school in an overwhelming majority of cases, and were from a urban area. The results of this survey are detailed in Table 3 below. As can be seen from these results, there seems to be certain common characteristics between the members of the two largest public safety agencies to lend some limited compatability to assignment and flexibility in the administrative operation of the agencies.

TABLE 3

COMPARISON BETWEEN FIREMEN AND SECURITY POLICEMEN

	Firemen	Policemen
	(percentage)	
Education:		
Less than High School	4.2	3.8
High School graduate	93.3	93.1
Some college	2.1	2.4
College degree	.3	.6
Graduate	.1	.1
Age:		
18-21	60.0	55.5
21-25	22.7	24.5
Above 25	17.3	20.0
Geographical Backgrounds:		
Rural	27.0	34.0
Urban	73.0	66.0
N =	463	512
Socio-Economic Background:		
Lower class	32.8	37.4
Middle class	66.9	62.3
Upper class	.3	1.2
N =	93	127

Patrol and prevention. The minor points held in common by all five agencies have been discussed, but how about the basic reason for a police or fire force--prevention and patrol? The role of prevention was emphasized in the latter discussion but more in line with the educational aspects of prevention than actual patrol prevention. James has listed two objectives of the police and fire

departments--prevention and emergency services. He states that if these two functions can be fullfilled then the integrated system, at least in theory, should also work.¹³

The observations conducted at the four USAF installations revealed that the Security Police have routine patrol activity on each base, the fire department conducts fire inspections on a monthly basis in every facility, the Safety Officer conducts semi-annual inspections of each office, and the Disaster Control Officer checks the shelters and emergency first aid kits at least once every month. In addition to this, the Security Police have certain security checks that must be completed at least twice a night on several facilities (any facility that has money on hand), and the Fire Department (on at least one installation) was required to monitor and inspect the closing of the various clubs on base (officer's, NCO's, and Airmen's) each night. It was observed that frequently, several (or at least two) patrols would be at the same facility at the same time. The investigator began to wonder who was checking whom?

The consolidation of these functions, especially the routine fire prevention, security, safety of government and non-government funds, safety prevention, and disaster control equipment, seems to bear some consideration. It seems conceivable that one office, concerned with public

¹³James, Police . . . City, op. cit., p. 62.

safety inspections could and would do a more comprehensive and thorough job of insuring all facilities were meeting Air Force standards. This would also relieve personnel and time for other needed functions, such as training and job experience.

Flexibility. A recurring problem with routine functions, such as fire house waiting and security partolling, is the fatigue factor. A man is placed within a fire station for a period of waiting as long as 24 hours straight, he cannot leave and must make himself busy within the confines of the station. A security guard posted around a missile or aircraft is usually left at that post for a full eight hour shift. He will get some relief, but is usually returned to either that same post or similar post until the end of his shift. The administrator faced with the related personal problems--motivation, interest, job attractiveness (not to ignore the health problem of the fireman's lax time and physical exertion in actual emergencies)--must find ways and means which will decrease this boredom (fatigue) factor.

A suggested method would be the total integration of the services to allow the rotation of the men between fire house waiting and security patrolling. This would, of course, entail some form of the integration concept being

instituted. It could conceivably reduce the efficiency of the enlisted member but it is the thesis of this paper that with this type of diversity, the airman will increase his effectiveness on the job, be better motivated, and possibly be more interested in choosing the Air Force as his career. The proof of this statement will have to wait until an integration plan is attempted and concrete results obtained. However, the concept seems to be based on logical rationale and supported in the literature previously discussed.

VI. SUMMARY

The investigation into the areas of common interest between the five public safety agencies within the United States Air Force revealed that several areas exist and sufficient problems were discovered to justify attempts at consolidation of the public safety function at the installation level. The areas which were not held in common by any of the agencies were found to be not sufficiently significant to all phases of the consolidation efforts as established in civilian public safety integration theory.

The next chapter will investigate alternative proposals which need to be conscientiously exploited before the formal adoption of the integration theory by the U.S. Air Force.

CHAPTER VII

A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE

With the introduction of the integration theory for public safety elements and the detailing of the present structure of the United States Air Force public safety agencies, the only area left for consideration is the structuring of organizational changes which comply with the principles of the theory and the actuality of the organization. This chapter will suggest and explore several organizational methods and a program which might be undertaken to relate those two areas. The format of this chapter leads from suggestions which will require very little organizational restructuring to the complex reorganization of the entire public safety structure into a totally integrated division.

I. PRESENT ORGANIZATION EXPANDED

The traditionalist argument against integration could be taken into consideration by the administrative and organizational personnel who are in charge of total Air Force organization by leaving the system as it is now organized. The theme of this paper is that organizational change will prove necessary for the dual purpose of improving services while decreasing the cost figure.

This purpose can be adhered to by the adoption of at least part of the integrationist argument: the formal and informal coordination of all elements of the public safety enterprise within the Air Force.

Mutual Aid Agreements.

Increased time and effort spent at drafting and preparing operational plans affecting public safety could make these plans more meaningful and operational. This is mainly a matter of coordination. Currently, these plans are drafted by men whose major concern is usually another field, at least on the smaller installation. The appointment of an officer or high ranking enlisted man, on a full-time basis, on each installation as public safety planner, would be a step toward the elimination of this problem.

However, this is only one area within which coordination would be helpful. The problem of police and fire ignorance of each other's problems and procedures can lead to extensive property damage and grave loss of life. These problems could be decreased by having formal and informal conferences between the respective chiefs, operation officers, and shift employees and supervisors. As part of the formal arrangements, the two agencies could commit to writing agreements dealing with all types of emergency conditions. These agreements would have to be realistic

and frequently tested. The agencies, through their respective chiefs, would therefore, be required to work together for the common public safety purpose.

The training field is an attractive field for mutual aid agreements. Men from each section could train men from the other section in their respective duties and functions. This training would not be concentrated on drawing the men from one field to the other but would be concerned with strictly orientation purposes. The training, to be effective, should start at the top of the organizational structure and extend to the bottom level. The inclusion of guest speakers, or instructors, in this required training would possibly decrease the possibility of unknown or untested emergencies from getting into a state of confusion or panic.

Public Safety Council.

A public safety council could be established, much along the lines of the Accident Prevention Council of the Safety Division, and composed of representatives from all public safety elements. This council could formally ratify these mutual-aid agreements and could possibly solve inter-related public safety problems. This would consume already precious time from the administrators, but would begin the process for decreasing costs and confusion.

Many other forms of administrative changes could be

attempted at installation and higher headquarters level that would not require massive organizational changes. These changes could be based and geared toward the elimination of problems which concern all agencies--problems from normal day-to-day routine on the one hand, to problems encountered during actual emergencies or simulated training exercises. These problems, which are known to exist and have been referred to in the previous chapter, must be conscientiously explored by dedicated people and solutions realistically sought and frequently tested. The council, or the agreements, must be willing to experiment and use equipment available, other wise, the procedures will become stale and unworkable.

Additional Duty--Director of Public Safety.

A final proposal, which would not require any organizational changes, would be the appointment of the senior officer from the various public safety agencies to the additional duty as Director of Public Safety. This appointment would carry the added responsibility of coordination of all reports, messages, and plans that are written on an installation and forwarded to higher headquarters. He would also act in the capacity of liaison officer between the separate agencies. This would add an additional administrative load on the senior officer and

his staff, but would insure to the commander that a senior public safety officer had reviewed and approved all correspondence to higher headquarters. This suggestion could possibly increase services and decrease costs, but would definitely establish the review by a professional on public safety matters. This change would require very minor modifications to existing procedures and regulations.

Evaluation.

The proposals brought forth in this section deal with making minor changes within the existing organizational structure of the Air Force. All of the proposals depend on the establishment of the concept that public safety is a total business and not just part of another function.

The proposals, resting on this basis, can be evaluated, from a theoretical standpoint, as being a first step toward integrating the agencies under one organization. Realistically, experience indicates that these proposals rest on the ability of one administrator to adapt to the personality of the other (or in common ~~sense~~ terminology-- a personality contest). If this is true, then the individual agencies are not better off, and the customers will experience no increase in service, under the new methods than they did under the old procedures. The danger of administrative confusion still exists.

The initiation of another committee or more agreements, into a system already based on committee management, cannot be seen as a positive step toward solving the problems which exist within and between the public safety agencies. To be effective, a requirement must exist within Air Force regulations which stipulates that these agreements must be written, conferences held, and the provisions tested. However, for this requirement to be in the form of a written regulation some aspects of integration and cooperation have been lost. The compliance with a requirement, just because it is a requirement, takes away from the concept of professional management of common problems. It further limits the effectiveness of the informal structure and the realization that inter-agency cooperation can be more readily accepted when accomplished when it means something personal to the participants.

A written agreement is worthless unless the members are willing to comply with its provisions. In the area of public safety--because of its concern for loss of life, injury to the person, destruction of property, or a combination of all of them--should be taken out of the hands of the non-professionals (administrative agency involved with another major function), and left to the decisions of the professionals (exclusively trained public safety administrators). The adoption of mutual-aid agreements,

either through personal consultations or through public safety councils, would seek this removal and would be grounds for a common understanding between various units, or agencies, on each U.S. Air Force installation.

The requirement for the senior officer to also act as the Director of Public Safety is not seen as a realistic goal for the long term. This would place an additional responsibility on a position already overburdened with responsibility. While it would establish a check for the base commander, no tanagable results for the man appointed to that position can be seen.

Overall, the minor administrative changes recommended in this section cannot be clearly evaluated as being a positive approach to the public safety problems. More must be done along the lines of administrative and organizational changes before these results are increased. The proposals, as brought forth, would only create an additional workload for the agencies.

II. FORMAL REORGANIZATION

The adoption by the Air Force of the preceding proposals was determined to not solve the problems which were discovered in the field research. Examination is necessary of the models provided by the civilian public safety agencies for this result. Those models include administrative

designation, administrative integration, and partial integration. The integrationist's model or ideal, complete integration, will be examined in the following section.

Administrative Designation.

The last proposal was a form of administrative designation--the title of the senior public safety official changed to Director of Public Safety. This would enable him to coordinate on all matters affecting the public safety of an installation before those matters were submitted to review or action by a higher headquarters. The evaluation of this proposal was mainly negative but certain features proved attractive as a starting point for further integration of the various agencies.

Administrative designation has been attempted at several levels in the civilian public safety agencies, i.e., Michigan State University has designated its Chief of Campus Police, as the Director of Public Safety but has not integrated any other agencies with that organization. Several state police organizations, or state highway patrols, have also been designated as public safety agencies without integrating with other agencies. The rationale behind this re-designation of titles seems to be to remove the term "Police" from the official title of the agency and the negative connotations that title implies to those 'home-rule'

advocates possessing a fear of a national or state police system. If this example were to be followed in the Air Force organization, all that would have to be changed would be the title of the Chief, Security Police. This change in title would not reflect any change to the underlying problems discovered by this research project, however.

The change in title could be of some benefit to the overall aspects of the public safety profession if accompanying regulations are published making the Security Police responsible for the coordination of all public safety affairs on an installation. The change in title would also increase the professionalization of the Security Police officer without incurring the costs of a reorganizational plan.

In the final analysis, the tactic of simply changing a man's title cannot be favorably considered as materially improving the service while reducing the costs.

Administrative Integration.

As stipulated in Chapter III, administrative integration consists of bringing all, or some, of the agencies involved in public safety matters under one director. This administrative integration model can take two forms: first, the consolidation of administrative staffs' under a designated Director of Public Safety; and second, by the

reorganization of all, or part, of the agencies in the public safety enterprise under one organization.

Consolidation of administrative staffs. As pointed out earlier, each of the five agencies have separate administrative staffs for their respective office functions. The staff of the fire department is under and consolidated with that of the Civil Engineering staff, and the staff of the Disaster Control Officer on a small installation is the same as his primary position responsibilities. Other than this, the Security Police, the Safety Division, and EOD, along with--on larger installations--the Disaster Control Officer have separate administrative staff personnel. All have separate reporting channels.

The reorganization of these agencies under one Director of Public Safety would consolidate these functions under one office. This would be mainly an administrative office, not exercising any operational control over the various functions, but only operating a secretarial pool and a central filing point.

The director of this division should be the senior public safety officer on the installation and act as the coordination point for all matters affecting the various agencies. In other words, it is recommended that if this concept is adopted, it must be combined with the concept of administrative designation and the appointment of a

Director of Public Safety as an additional duty.

This model then requires that all agencies pool their respective administrative personnel and records under one central direction. The benefits to be received from this type of integration would conceivably result in a reduction of administrative equipment costs, clerical assistance, and increase the operational time for the other public safety administrators.

The negative aspects of this concept center mainly on the fact that by the consolidation of administrative tasks, it would be very hard for the Director of Public Safety to not influence operational policy or procedures. This concept would not be adaptable to the unity of command, or chain-of-command concept practiced by the Armed Forces. The concept would create an administrative agency responsible only to the base commander and not responsible for operations. Therefore, this model could not be recommended by the integrationist as a long run operation, however, the model could be used as a trial attempt at integration. The ultimate result which should be kept in mind would be the creation of one administrative, integrated, organization.

One administrative organization. Under this organization, all five agencies would be removed from their present divisions and placed under one Director of Public

Safety. He would, therefore, become responsible for all agencies and would be the base commander's representative on public safety matters.

Almost all of the positive benefits of the integrationist theory are realized in this type of organization. One agency or division responsible for all elements, a reduction in administrative costs, a consolidation of training effort, and better facility utilization are only some of the advantages. This division would not allow the flexibility concept to be fully realized because the separate elements would still be maintained intact, except they would be removed from the divisions presently responsible for them. The Fire Department, Security Police, Safety Division, Disaster Control, and EOD would still have a separate centralized job training schools (initial basic technical training), and separate job classifications. Men would still be maintained in their separate Air Force Specialties (AFS) and under the specialized supervision of non-commissioned officers with experience in the operational field.

Increased professionalization on the part of the officers placed in charge of this organization is seen as a positive benefit. However, to enable the officer corps to be highly trained and knowledgeable about their function, they would have to be required to either study the separate

fields or attend the technical training schools of the various elements. This organization would have to be basically administrative in nature. The Director of Public Safety would be a man possessing general administrative abilities rather than a specific ability in one field. This type of an organization would solve the administrative confusion of the separate agencies and would be a positive forward step toward an in-house attempt at reducing operational costs while maintaining or increasing services.

The reorganization effort should be established first at Department of the Air Force level. A separate Directorate of Public Safety should be established within the Air Staff to coordinate and direct all efforts in the public safety area. The same model would then be applied to the major air commands and so forth down the chain-of-command to the smallest installation. This reorganization would not require additional personnel than already employed in the separated functions but would be an attempt at reducing those already employed. The placement of this Directorate on the Air Staff level would increase the officer grade structure within the total Air Force and provide a smooth career progression for those truly interested in the public safety challenge.

This conceptual model also allows for the development of the professional public safety officer at the

enlisted level by providing opportunity for a generalist administrator/superintendent to emerge. The concept of lateral training (cross-training to another related job classification) could be extended to the entire public safety field instead of the presently established separated ladders.

The negative arguments against this type of an organizational change would center on the traditionalist and 'lose an empire' rationale. These arguments have been answered earlier as being not applicable when cost reduction and increased effectiveness are considered.

The concept as put forth holds considerable attraction to the interested public safety officer. While this concept does not maximize all the benefits put forth by the integrationist, it comes closer to the concept of clarifying administrative confusion and increasing service than the preceding model. Therefore, it is recommended that this model be given favorable consideration for adoption by the Air Force.

Partial Integration.

The final model is the partial integration of all elements of the public safety enterprise within the Air Force. The partial integration model is very similar to the administrative integration model except that under

this concept men receive training in the functions of policemen, firemen, bomb disposal specialists, disaster control, and safety. The public safety officer is created as a distinct job classification but the separate divisions are maintained within the Directorate of Public Safety.

This model, along with the administrative integration model, has proven to be the most successful model employed or attempted by industrial security and police-fire integrated agencies. Considering the direction and command that comes from sources outside the local installation (like the Toronto metropolitan concept and the Virginia annexation plan), the chances of this model succeeding are very high. However, the concept does not remove the Director of Public Safety from the control of the local base commander, but only establishes a staff position within higher headquarters to supervise and oversee the operations of the division from a position outside the local community (base).

The aspect of having men trained in a variety of functions, each being able to rotate with the other, maximizes part of the disagreement with the administrative integration model. This organization would allow the public safety administrator a certain measure of diversity of work and rotation of assignment for his men. Therefore, increased benefits though correspondingly

increases in job motivation, knowledge, and retention could be results of the adoption of this model.

Further, the reduction in administrative staff, increases in facility and equipment utilization, and career professionalization are considered positive benefits to be received from this model. The aspect of having men trained in a variety of functions would enable the consolidation of the various patrols into one section thereby eliminating this over-lapping function. Generally, this plan can be a conceivable attempt on the part of public safety administrator's to save money while increasing the effectiveness of the men and equipment.

The only drawback to this model, except for the arguments presented previously, would be the increase in field training and class room training. More men would have to be delegated this responsibility than are presently engaged in training. The men in the field would have to be retrained into the various other functions before the concept could be evaluated. This should not present a significant problem, however, considering the anticipated benefits to be received from the consolidation model.

Considering the benefits that can be anticipated, and the insignificant disadvantages, this model should be favorably considered as a second step toward the entire or complete integration of the various agencies.

Summary.

Four public safety integration models have been considered in this section of which two were suggested as being workable and worthy of further consideration and possible adoption by the Air Force. Under the first two models considered in this section, organizational changes were not necessary to implement the integrated concept, whereas, under the latter two extensive reorganization would be necessary starting at the Department of the Air Force level and extending to the smallest installation. The hypothesis that costs could be reduced while services increased was supported by all four models and maximized by the latter two models.

III. COMPLETE INTEGRATION OF ALL ELEMENTS

The final model and the cumulation of the integrationist theory, is the complete integration of all agencies engaged in the public safety enterprise under one administrative director. The separate agencies would lose their identity. Instead, each separate division would be composed of men trained in every speciality. This section will examine the arguments for and against this type of model being established within the U.S. Air Force.

Arguments in Favor.

The main support for this model comes from the

success it has enjoyed in the smaller communities in the United States and Canada (police-fire integration), in the integrated industrial security program, and within the internal police consolidation attempts. Several communities have completely consolidated their departments of police and fire successfully and realized a reduction in public safety costs and increased services. All of the benefits detailed in the preceding section can be realized under this model, especially the reduction in administrative effort and management time and talent. One man can be placed in any capacity within the division without reducing his effectiveness.

A distinction should be drawn between the larger U.S. Air Force installations and the smaller bases. On the larger installations flying, missile, and general operational units led the mission of the base. While on the smaller stations, support is the prime concern. This difference in mission must be reflected in the integration model adopted for public safety agencies. On the larger base, aircraft rescue, missile safety, and operational security must receive emphasis. Therefore, a degree of specialization should probably be maintained within the totally integrated model. This separation of emphasis is allowed by the definition.

The discussion concerning the administrative integrated

and partially integrated models touched on the total or complete integration of the administrators. The common ground established for all the elements must be stipulated to the administrator, therefore, schooling and experience is necessary in all facets of the public safety concern. Officers (the administrators) should be required to attend special schools for the various functions, either before they go into the field, or after they have been in the field a short time. This will enable them to have a diversified but well-rounded philosophy concerning the challenge which exists within the public safety career field.

Could a totally integrated public safety agency increase service and reduce costs? The answer to this question lies in actual field experimentation of the concept, however, speculation and experience indicated that the answer would be positive.

Arguments Against.

The character and diversity of the mission throughout the Air Force restricts the adoption of any organizational model without trial and evaluation. Before this step is undertaken, certain disadvantages to the totally integrated concept must be examined and illustrated.

Loss of specialization. Under the completely integrated department, a loss in individual specialization

will, most probably, occur. This loss should not be as significant on the smaller or support installation as it would be on the larger, mission orientated, base. While the theory allows for the maintenance of specialized divisions within the totally integrated department, i.e., investigations, fire apparatus personnel, etc., some loss of service and proficiency can be anticipated.

Authors have commented on the social character of the firehouse and the people related to this function. A study examined earlier pointed out that there are differences between applicants for fire fighting positions and police positions. This study also indicated that the firemen enjoy the standard shift arrangement, whereby, they are able to pursue outside activity. Under the totally integrated department, these separate characteristics would be lost. The re-orientation process necessary could conceivably be successful due to these social forces.

Training. The decrease in specialization would require an increase in the training function. Experience and research revealed that this is not an insurmountable problem but a problem which must never-the-less be undertaken on a long range basis. Included in this disadvantage would be not only an increase in on-the-job training and simulated field exercises. Two levels and two separate problems would, therefore, present themselves to the

administrator.

These problems are not necessarily problems which can be overcome with intensive effort and professionalism. Attention must be paid to proper assignment and scheduling of the personnel for these training sessions. This would not be a problem for the totally integrated concept, as it also exists for the non-integrated agency. However, experience has shown, that because of the military exercises of command and control, there are times when the interests of the men are not always taken into consideration by the administrator. This must not be allowed to happen under this integrated concept, or if it does then the total idea and theory will fail in practice.

Section Conclusion.

The organizational model which is the ideal structure for the public safety integrationist, conceivably could be applied to the diversified mission of the U.S. Air Force. The model should be the final step in the adoption of the consolidation philosophy but only after extensive field experimentation with the other models recommended in the preceding section. Certain disadvantages were found to exist within the totally integrated concept which must be also tested under actual field experimentation. If these problems prove to be a basic weakness to the concept then

the failure to reach the ideal structure should not be considered as failure of the whole theory but as failure of a portion of it. Therefore, the total integration concept cannot be recommended for adoption as a first stage measure but rather should be attempted on a selective and experimental basis.

IV. SUMMARY

Several consolidation theories, adopted from the experiences within civilian public safety agencies, were explored and examined in this section. From this research, it is clear that some form of integration must be undertaken to enable the dual benefits of administrative change to be realized: increase effectiveness and cost reduction.

A series of steps were defined through which it was recommended that the Air Force attempt, or at least experiment with, the integration concept. These steps should be followed in the order listed:

First, an attempt should be made to integrated the administrative staff personnel and facilities of the various public safety elements.

Second, the integration of administrative function should be expanded, to the inclusion of operational control of the various elements under one director. This organization should be adopted at the Department of the Air

Force level first, and then slowly changed throughout the various levels of command.

Third, after the organizations have been aligned the Departments of Public Safety should start cross-training their personnel into each of the functions within the agency. At this same time, the administrative officials should be sent to the various technical schools for these functions.

Fourth, after sufficient time has been allowed for this cross-training, attempts on a highly selective and an experimentation basis should be made at eliminating the various elements within the Department of Public Safety. The recent experiments using demonstration projects can be used as an example of this experimentation. The results from these programs must be closely analyzed and if the loss from failure to specialize is significant then this last attempt should be abandoned, at least for the larger installation.

Following this plan of attack, it can be anticipated that the problems and confusion uncovered in Chapter VI will be eliminated, thereby, increasing the overall service of the various agencies and decreasing the incurred operational expenses.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND A PROGRAM FOR ACTION

The major objective of this research has been to investigate the feasibility of integrating the public safety elements of the United States Air Force under one organizational department. These elements, or agencies, were purposely limited to five separate organizations: the Security Police, the Fire Department, the Safety Division, the Disaster Control Officer, and the Explosive Ordnance Disposal section. These organizations hold bureaucratic responsibilities to administrative directors interested in fields other than public safety. The research investigated the benefits which might be realized from a public safety consolidation of effort directed toward a reduction in costs and an improvement of service.

Review of the project. The association of Alcoholics Anonymous have a prayer that provides a summary of this research:

God grant me the serenity to accept the things I
cannot change,
Courage to change the things I can, and
Wisdom to know the difference.

It is acknowledged that the various public safety agencies within the United States Air Force are doing a task that is necessary. Experience has shown that they

are doing the task at tremendous personal sacrifice and dedication. That the public safety elements within the U.S. Air Force are manned by highly dedicated and well-motivated individuals is emphasized. The main purpose of this research, and this report, is that the personal dedication, and motivation, of these men could be more justly directed through an integrated department--a department geared toward total involvement in the public safety philosophy--a department which is organized under its own command structure!

To accomplish this idealistic task, the problem, as experienced by the investigator after two years as a public safety administrator, were identified and as observed at four separate installations. Additionally, library research established the basis that some effort should be made at consolidation. Of course, the experiences encountered colored the observations of the investigator and this fact cannot be overlooked by the reader. This defect, however, must not distract from the overall evaluation of the report as some effort at consolidation or integration is necessary if service is to be improved and money saved.

The four separate installations visitied were chosen by population and involvement in public safety concerns. Public safety administrators were interviewed, practice

training exercises were observed and critiqued, and enlisted men were queried for their opinions concerning the overall aspects of the public safety challenge at each installation. In addition to this, actual emergencies were observed at each of the installations. This latter aspect of the project was accomplished without the knowledge of the administrator personally involved. These observations afforded an opportunity for certain conclusions to be made.

The existence of the problem is acknowledged early in the report. The importance of this problem did not appear until after the research was intensively analyzed. At this time, it was evident that some method had to be devised which would bring together the various, and divergent, elements of the U.S. Air Force public safety enterprise. But, as is the case of many good ideas, much research had still to be completed before a comprehensive plan could be devised which would establish clear-cut solutions to the problems.

Application to the U.S. Air Force. Problems (administrative confusion, job knowledge and experience, individual motivation, and over-lapping functions) do exist within the public safety elements throughout the world, at least throughout the United States. These same problems exist within the structure of the United States Air Force. This

paper illustrated many of those problems. How can a plan be initiated which would provide at least a partial solution to those problems? Five separate hypotheses were investigated in response to this question. That investigation was based upon a historical overview of public safety integration and an examination of the examples and the experimentation which has been undertaken within the context of the civilian public safety agencies. These hypotheses were found to be:

First, that the United States Air Force does not provide for an efficient or effective solution to the public safety problem. This contention was supported. Specific examples were identified which illustrated the problems of these agencies.

Second, that civilian agencies can and have provided examples within the area of public safety for the military to follow. This contention was definitely established and a modified form of those experiments was recommended for consideration by the planners and organizational experts within the Air Force. Additionally, the recommendations put forth by this paper are based exclusively on the results of the successful and unsuccessful attempts at integration of the public safety agencies by the civilian organizations.

Third, that the advantages of an integrated public safety agency within the U.S. Air Force far outweigh the disadvantages or arguments against integration. The investigation of the civilian experiences within the area of concern conclusively proved that, theoretically, integration of the various elements is not only practical but necessary. This latter contention is true because the increased pressure on the Armed Forces to reduce manpower and subsequently costs has created an atmosphere for internal change. The aspect of reducing property loss and the careless waste of human manpower and life adds to this necessity. Small public safety organizations (industrial security, integrated police-fire departments), have proven this to be a fact, however, the area of a nationally applied standard acceptable to a world-wide mission must be considered. The contention will not be completely answered until sufficient empirical research is completed under actual field conditions.

Fourth, that a certain level of compatibility exists between selected members of the investigated U.S. Air Force public safety elements to warrant consideration of mixing or integrating the personnel. Data was presented from both a experimental research basis and a field basis to support this contention. The intervening variable not tested concerns the role and capability of the public safety administrator. This variable requires field testing to determine

the actual compatability. Differences in the social and physical tasks are acknowledged and must also be subjected to a program of field tests.

Fifth, that a systematized standard could be established, based upon the experiences and research, which would provide a long range program for public safety integration within the U.S. Air Force. The library research coupled with the observations from the field established such a program. The starting point was the integration of the administrative functions, then the cross-training of selected personnel, from there to a restructuring of organizational lines, and finally to the total integration of the various agencies under one direction without specific reference to the separate functions. A caution was issued at this point: If this long range program is found to be unworkable at a specific level then a lower level should be instituted. The whole concept should not be ignored based upon it's failure at a higher level.

Call for research and experimentation. This paper revealed that not every aspect of public safety integration can be investigated at the library or within four installations. It is recommended that critical evaluations (testable solutions) must be attempted under actual field conditions (much like the demonstration projects now being

used by the Federal Government in it's grant-in-aid programs).

Can the recommendations of this report, of this research, be instituted? The answer to this question lies only in the employment of personnel truly concerned with the public safety challenge, allowed to investigate solutions on their own, and granted incentives for improving the clientele service, the mens' morale, and the United States Air Force's history of administrative innovation and leadership. Public safety is of major concern to administrators of operational and support units, of municipalities, and of dedicated young men--to ensure that this task is accomplished efficiently and at a reduction of manpower and cost depends on the conscientious adoption of the integration argument.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

MUNICIPALITIES WITH INTEGRATED POLICE-FIRE SERVICE¹

<u>Municipality and State/Province</u>	<u>Population</u>
Aiken, South Carolina	11,243
Asbestos, Quebec	8,969
Augusta, Kansas	6,434
Beverly Hills, Michigan	8,633
Boyne City, Michigan	2,797
Cap-de-la-Madeline, Quebec	22,943
Center Line, Michigan	10,164
Champaign, Illinois	49,583
Chicago Heights, Illinois	34,331
Chicoutimi, Quebec	24,878
Danville, Virginia	46,577
Dearborn, Michigan	112,007
Drummondville, Quebec	26,284
East Kildonan, Manitoba	18,718
Edgewood, Pennsylvania	5,124
Edina, Minnesota	28,501
Elgin, Illinois	49,447
Essexville, Michigan	4,590
Evanston, Illinois	79,283
Farmington, Michigan	6,881
Fort Lauderdale, Florida	83,648
Fox Point, Wisconsin	7,315
Garden City, Michigan	38,017
Gibberalter, Michigan	2,196
Glencoe, Illinois	10,472
Granby, Quebec	27,095

¹V. A. Leonard, Police Organization and Management (second edition; Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1964), pp. 85-87.

<u>Municipality, and State/Province</u>	<u>Population</u>
Grand'Mere, Quebec	14,023
Grosse Pointe Shores, Michigan	2,301
Grosse Pointe Woods, Michigan	18,580
Highland Park, Illinois	25,532
Huntington Woods, Michigan	8,746
Joliette, Quebec	16,940
Kenogami, Quebec	11,309
Lake Alfred, Florida	2,191
Lapeer, Michigan	6,160
Larami, Wyoming	17,520
La Tuque, Quebec	11,098
Levis, Quebec	13,644
Longueuil, Quebec	14,332
Mastinique, Michigan	4,875
Milton-Freewater, Oregon	4,110
Montreal-East, Quebec	4,607
Montreal-North, Quebec	25,407
Mount Royal, Quebec	16,990
Nome, Alaska	2,316
North Augusta, South Carolina	10,348
Oak Park, Michigan	36,632
Oakwood, Ohio	10,493
Palmer, Alaska	1,181
Park Forest, Illinois	29,993
Rimouski, Quebec	14,630
River Hills, Wisconsin	1,257
Riviere-du-Loup, Quebec	9,964
Rock Falls, Illinois	10,261
St. James, Manitoba	26,502
St. Jean, Quebec	24,367
St. Joseph-d'Alma, Quebec	10,822
St. Lambert, Quebec	12,224
St. Laurent, Manitoba	300 (est)
St. Laurent, Quebec	38,291
Ste. Agatha-des-Monts, Quebec	5,173
Ste. Foy, Quebec	14,615
Sewickley Heights, Pennsylvania	931

<u>Municipality, and State/Province</u>	<u>Population</u>
Shawinigan Falls, Quebec	28,597
Shorewood, Wisconsin	15,990
Sorel, Quebec	16,476
Spartanburg, South Carolina	44,352
Sunnyvale, California	52,898
Thetford Mines, Quebec	19,511
Transcona, Manitoba	8,312
Trois-Rivieres, Quebec	50,483
Valleyfield (Salaberry), Quebec	23,584
Winston-Salem, North Carolina	111,135

APPENDIX B

CITIES ABANDONING POLICE-FIRE INTEGRATION¹

<u>City, and State/Province</u>	<u>Population</u>
Buena Park, California	46,401
Chico, California	14,757
Fremont, California	43,790
Hawthorne, California	33,035
Hollywood, Florida	35,237
Lincoln, Nebraska	128,521
Melvindale, Michigan	13,089
Monterey Park, California	37,821
Oregon City, Oregon	7,996
St. Jerome, Quebec	24,546
Sanger, California	9,627
San Marino, California	13,658
Sherbrooke, Quebec	66,554
Waukegan, Illinois	55,719
West Miami, Florida	5,296

Average population: 35,602

¹V. A. Leonard, Police Organization and Management (second edition; Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1964), p. 87.

APPENDIX C

RESPONSIBILITIES OF A BASE COMMANDER¹

Responsibilities for service. The support group/squadron (base) commander's mission is designated to advance the concept that the wing commander and deputy commander for operations (or mission) and material should be free to devote the maximum time on areas that are "key" to the achievement of the primary mission of the wing/group. It does this by relieving the wing command section of the problems of a multitude of subordinates. It also recognizes that certain functions should be performed on a consolidated basis, and when these functions are related they should be grouped under one individual to provide optimum efficiency. Thus, the support group/squadron (base) commander has under him all of the functions essential to managing the base and providing base support and services to the mission and material elements of the wing/group. He is responsible for and is given the functional means for:

- a. Clothing, housing, and feeding all personnel, and providing recreational, athletic, and social activities.
- b. Protecting equipment supplies, and station property; maintaining discipline; administering justice; and providing legal assistance.
- c. Providing a chaplain program of religious and related activities.
- d. Prescribing administrative practices and providing administrative services that will enable the wing/group base to accomplish its mission.
- e. Insuring assignment control and use of sound personnel management practices throughout the wing/group base. . . . developing high morale and job efficiency by conducting an education services program and a personnel services program; and providing civilian personnel services by operating a central personnel office (CCPO).

¹Air Force Manual 26-2, "Organization Policy and Guidance" (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 15 March 1966), pp. 23-24.

f. Statistical and progress reporting; management analysis as required; reviewing, monitoring, and approving all financial statements, budgets, and audits for both appropriated and nonappropriated funds; and for performing financial accounting, disbursing, and financial reporting for all Air Force appropriations, funds, and financial resources under the custody of the wing/group commander and himself.

g. Procuring supplies and services under a centralized procurement concept for the wing/group base through methods prescribed by law.

h. Conducting base operations and training functions

i. Maintaining installation buildings, grounds, airfields, railroad lines, and other facilities; performing custodial, janitorial, and sanitary functions; and providing fire-fighting and aircraft crash rescue facilities, equipment, and services.

j. Supporting tenant units in accordance with pertinent support agreements.

APPENDIX D

RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMANDER'S

FIRE PROTECTION COUNCIL¹

The Commander's Fire Protection Council is appointed to assist the commander in executing the program of fire protection for the installation. It consists of the base fire marshal (chairman), base fire chief (technical advisor), base safety officer, and at least three other senior staff officers. It will meet periodically at the call of the commander to:

(1) Resolve current and long-term problems affecting all units, activities, and functions.

(2) Review fire losses and take necessary corrective action.

(3) Insure compliance with higher headquarters directives, criteria, and policy.

(4) Promote coordination and support of all organizations and staff heads.

(5) Provide manning, training, and funding.

(6) Review fire risk in projects of new construction, alteration, and repair.

(7) Promote fire prevention among all personnel.

(8) Review program for effective utilization of assigned career personnel, AFSC 571X0.

(9) Sponsor a quarterly inspection of base area and facilities by area and unit fire marshals and require them to report the results in writing.

(10) Inspect the base annually and report the results to the base commander.

¹Air Force Manual 92-1, "Fire Protection Program Operational Procedures" (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 17 October 1968), p. 1-2.

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