

IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE AND NATION:
CHILEAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1950

By

Cristián Alberto Doña Reveco

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation deals with how Chilean emigrants who have migrated to the US since the 1950s remember and define their migration decision in connection to changing historical processes in both the country of origin and that of destination. Using mainly oral histories collected from 30 Chileans I compare the processes that led to their migration; their memories of Chile at the time of migration; the arrival to the United States, as well as their intermediate migrations to other countries; their memories of Chile during the visits to the country of origin; and their self identifications with the countries of origin and destination. I also use census data and migration entry data to characterize and analyze the different waves of Chilean migration to the United States. I separate each wave by a major historical moment. The first wave commences at the end of World War II and the beginnings of the Cold War; the second with the military coup of September 11, 1973; the third with the economic crisis of 1982; and the fourth with the return to democratic governments in 1990. Connecting the oral histories, migration data and historiographies to current approaches to migration decision-making, the study of social memory, and the construction of migrant identities, this dissertation explores the interplay of these multiple factors in the social constructions underlying the decisions to migrate.

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*For Cata, Emilia and Camila; any achievements
are only worth it with you by my side.*

*And for my parents, Fernando and Helia, I hope to
be able to provide my daughters the same support
and encouragement you have always given me.*

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East Lansing, December 2012

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Donde quiera que me encuentre
donde quiera que me encuentre
seré siempre pasajera.

Ni toda la tierra entera, Isabel Parra

Solo le pido a Dios
Que el futuro no me sea indiferente
Desahuciado está el que tiene que marchar
A vivir una cultura diferente

Sólo le pido a Dios, Leon Gieco

Volver no tiene sentido
Tampoco vivir allí
El que se fue no es tan vivo
El que se fue no es tan gil
Por eso si alguien se borra
Qué le podemos decir
No te olvides de nosotros
Y que seas muy feliz

Los Olímpicos, Jaime Roos

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

International migration is a process; a series of biographically and historically situated actions, shaped by multiple forces and conditions operating at all social levels, through which the social actor attempts to positively change his or her life chances. As the migrant decides to migrate, his or her action is influenced by structural forces in the country of origin and destination that induce and attract migration, by biographical conditions of the actors who respond to these forces by migrating, and by the social and economic structures that connect places of origin and destination (Massey et al 1998; Massey 1999). These forces, conditions and structures should be considered within the historical relations between nation-states as components of the international system. Analyzing international migration from a process perspective places the migration experience within a particular spatial structure embedded in a changing social context. As Massey suggested, migration occurs through multiple dimensions of space while resting “on a dynamic social process that develops over time” (Massey 1987: 1503). In this dissertation I analyze the decision to migrate by Chilean migrants residing in the US in connection to historical changes and specific political, economic, social and biographical conditions at the time of their migration. At its most basic I answer the question of why people migrate at the (historical) moment they migrate.

Periodization

Post World War II Chilean migration to the United States presents an ideal opportunity to analyze a complex migration flow that changes over time and where the historical and structural relations between both countries have had a relevant impact on the personal decisions to migrate.

This migration flow originates in the changes to the international system of the late 1940s. The second half of the twentieth century in Chile was defined by the rise of social movements, the increased participation of women and workers in politics (although this continued a momentum that had begun with the turn of the century), the confrontation between opposing models of development, processes of democratic breakdown and transitions, as well as debates on the nation construction, history and memory among others.

This era can be divided into three specific socio-historical periods. All three periods are shaped by political changes in Chile under the influence of the U.S. foreign policy. Beginning in the late 1940s and ending in 1973, the first period is marked by the application of modernization paradigms in Chile and the first stage of the Cold War. The development of industrialization through a program of import substitution, major social and demographic changes and the polarization of the Chilean political party system dominate this period. During these years the U.S. enacted several Cold War policies, (e.g. the Alliance for Progress, the involvement of the CIA in Chilean political affairs, and the embargo against Allende between 1970 and 1973) that influenced the out-migration of Chilean workers to countries that were in demand of workers due to economic growth (United States), open migration policies (Canada and Australia) and/or industrialization programs (Venezuela and Argentina). Chilean migration to the United States, as recorded by the number of immigrant visas awarded, amounted to about 19,000 between 1953 and 1973. This represents about 21% of all the immigrants from Chile in the post World War II era.

The second period is encompassed by the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1989) and can be divided into two sub-periods. The first sub-period (1973 to 1982) began with the coup of September 11, 1973. It is in this sub-period when most of the human rights

abuses by the dictatorship occurred. This was also a time of internal political struggle within the Junta, fully settled by 1978 with the resignation of Air Force General Leigh. It was during these years that the dictatorship consolidated its regime in political, economic and social terms; although it ended with one of the deepest economic crises in Chilean history in 1982. Support for the dictatorship from the U.S. government changed from full support in 1973 to open criticism in 1978, including a series of commercial and military boycotts. Additionally, during this period, University of Chicago's economics professors continued to participate as advisors of the Junta. The second sub-period of the dictatorship (1983-1989) is marked by the application of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) economic recipes to confront the economic crisis of 1982, with and the wide effects it had across Chilean society. These economic policies had a huge effect on the social structure of the country as well as on the political system that succeeded the dictatorship. It is also during this period that the democratization process began, which culminated with the 1988 plebiscite, the 1989 elections, and the return of democracy in 1990. The United States foreign policy influenced Chile by largely applauding its economic policy, and eventually criticizing the dictatorship's human rights policies and granting certain support to the opposition to the Junta. Throughout both periods U.S. based and transnational human rights organizations and civil society groups criticized human rights violations in the country and developed ties with organizations of exiles to criticize the government. While the first sub-period is marked by political exile, in the second there was a mix of political and economic exile. More than 34,000 Chileans entered the U.S. with immigrant visas between 1974 and 1989. This represents close to a 38% of the visas awarded to Chileans since 1953.

The third period began in 1990 with the first democratic government elected in Chile since 1970. This government maintained the macroeconomic development model first applied

during the dictatorship with some changes which enlarged social protection networks. Chile grew economically but levels of social and economic inequality increased. Several authoritarian enclaves remained, left by the Junta to protect its policies and legacy, while at the same time there were some advances in human rights justice. The United States, having Chile as a model, developed the Washington Consensus, thus defining political and economic relations at the international level. Economic migrants characterized this period; in particular two types: international investors, business people and transnational executives, as well as those impoverished by the application of a neoliberal economic model. Beginning in 1990 and up to 2008 more than 37,000 Chileans entered the United States with an immigrant visa; making this period the largest in terms of proportion of incoming Chileans to the U.S. (with a visa) with 41% of the total immigrants for the 1953-2008 period.

My analysis of post World War II Chilean migration to the United States, centers particularly on the intersection of biographical accounts with historical changes and social structures in each of the periods mentioned. I accomplish this by studying migration processes within migration systems at three levels of analysis: The macro level of the state and interstate relations in the international system; the meso level of institutions and organizations; and the micro level of migrants' biographies. Migration occurs in the shadows of the relations between nations and within the social and political processes that are a result of these relations. While concentrating on the critical decision to migrate, I also examine the role of memory in the migration process from an interdisciplinary social science perspective.

Research Question

The main question that I answer in this dissertation is: what are the effects of historical conditions and processes in the decision to migrate? I apply this question to Chilean migration to the United States between 1950 and 2010. I propose that this question is best answered through analyses of the oral histories of migrants and the memories of their migration decision.

I answer four specific questions:

1. What are the main conditions that explain the migration decision for Chilean emigrants who left Chile between 1950 and 2010?
2. What are the particular characteristics of each migratory wave?
3. How do migrants remember recent visits to the home country?
4. Does the reason to migrate influence the connections that migrants want to keep with their home country?

While I answer the first two questions in chapters three to seven of this dissertation, I address question number three in chapter eight addresses, where I present a preliminary answer to question four in the conclusion to the dissertation.

Research Objectives

Derived from the research questions, this dissertation has one main objective and four secondary objectives.

Main objective:

To explain the decision to migrate among Chilean emigrants to the US between 1950 and 2010 under changing historical processes.

Secondary Objectives

- a. To analyze the main conditions that explain the migration decision for Chilean emigrants that left Chile between 1950 and 2010
- b. To describe the particularities of each migration wave.
- c. To study the memories of home country visits among Chilean emigrants.
- d. To explore whether the reasons to migrate influence the connections that migrants want to keep with their home country

Relevance of Research

This dissertation contributes to and complements the existing literature on migration by proposing an interdisciplinary and multi-level theoretical model to analyze the decision to migrate in changing socio-historical contexts. This model locates the individual at the center of the migration experience while maintaining the relevance of macro structures. This research also provides a more nuanced approach to the discussion of state formation and to the relation between states, in this case between the US and Chile. First, the debate over cultural and social aspects of empire are described here from the perspective of migrants and from the effects that these structures of domination have on their decision to migrate and on their incorporation to receiving society in the United States. This research also reinforces the role of the individual in

the discussion about relationships between states by addressing the role of migration and migrants.

This research also comports with the literature on memory and recent Chilean history by adding the role of migrants and exiles into this history. Incorporating an external understanding of social and historical changes in Chile during the second half of the 20th century is a novel approach since the existing literature includes predominantly accounts from within the country. As importantly, while there are well developed examinations of Chilean exile in the United States and in other countries, there is almost no research on the connections or comparisons between the process of exile and other migratory movements around the same period; this dissertation attempts to fill this gap in the literature. Finally, by studying the reasons why migrants would like or not to have connections with the home country, this research provides information for the development of a national policy towards Chilean emigrants; a topic that has been constantly in the public discussion in the home country since the early 1990s.

Structure of the dissertation

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters, including this introduction, and a conclusion. In the next chapter, chapter II, I develop the interdisciplinary framework that provides background for the analysis of the Chilean emigration to the US. I argue there that migration does not occur in a vacuum and that a thorough understanding of migration processes must include the conditions of the decision to migrate. While there have been important interdisciplinary approaches to migration that contribute to a holistically defined migration process (see for example Brettell 2003), this understanding of migrations processes can be studied in more depth. I also describe and explain the methods and data sources I use in this

dissertation. In chapter three I characterize the flows and stocks of Chilean migrants to the US since 1950 from the perspective of the receiving country. I study the changes in migration patterns considering the changes in migration policies in the US. I also compare the main characteristics of this migration to that of other countries in the Southern Cone of America as well as other sending regions.

In the next four chapters I analyze the reasons for migrating across four waves of Chilean emigrants to the US. In chapter IV, I look at emigration between 1950 and September 11 1973. I analyze this migration using mainly as a background the Cold War and the influences of Modernization theory in social change in Latin American and Chile, and the consolidation of the middle class in Chile and its ideology. I also briefly look at the memories of the military coup of September 11, 1973 as seen by Chileans residing in the US and their reaction to the arrival of exiles. In chapter V, I analyze the conditions under which exile, forced migrants and other migrants left Chile in the first 8 years of the dictatorship. I use as a background the concept of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes because the need to expel ‘undesirable’ citizens in Chile and other countries originates from the particularities of this type of government. In chapter VI, I look at the migration patterns and decisions in the second half of the Chilean dictatorship. The economic crisis and the recrudescence of the repression and the changes in the social and economic conditions generate a particular type of migrants. While they are not exiles anymore, their migration decisions are forced by the changes in Chile. In chapter VII, I analyze the most recent migration, that between 1990 and 2010. This migration occurs under democratic rule and is influenced by a new reality: in which the new Chile is successful on a macro-economic level and has a broad image as modern, but at the same time this ‘modernity’ only reaches some of its citizens.

Finally in chapter VIII, I reverse the lenses and I look at the memories Chilean emigrants have of visiting Chile. I focus on three main themes; the memory of everyday life, the paradoxes of modernization and the fear of former exiles about returning to Chile. This leads to an exploration of what it means for emigrants to be Chilean. The analysis of the four different waves and of the memories of visits ‘home’ leads to the dissertation’s concluding discussion on the links between the reasons for migrating and the connections migrants seek to maintain with their home country and the effects of this on the development of emigrant citizenship.

CHAPTER II

MIGRATION: THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE DECISION TO MIGRATE

Men[sic] make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. (Marx 2000: 329)

I. Introduction

Why do people migrate? The first scientific approach to understand this phenomena, proposed by Ravenstein (1885) argued that there were structural aspects such as size and characteristics of rural and urban populations, economic and spatial conditions that defined migration processes. Some 80 years later, Everett Lee (1966) reformulated Ravenstein's argument by proposing that the factors existent in the sending and receiving areas of migration were not the only ones that define the migration process. Lee proposed that there were also intervening obstacles and personal factors that defined as much as the conditions in the areas of origin and destination the propensity, reasons and in general the entire migration experience. Lee's argument allowed incorporating the migrant in the process. Migrants were not anymore at the mercy of structural changes that simply obliged them to stay in the area of residence or push them and pull them from one country to the other; they had some decision in the process. Ten years later, in 1978, Sune Åkerman (1978) analyzing the reasons behind Scandinavian

emigration to the United States in the late 19th century incorporated the migrant's biography¹ as a key condition, along with what he called "social control", in the decision to migrate.

The following years, however, the discussion of what Massey and his colleagues termed the "determinants of migration" (1998) expanded to other disciplines in the social sciences and a broad set of competing paradigms that attempted to explain the reasons for migrating co-opted the core of migration studies. These different theoretical approaches share three main characteristics, albeit with some specific differences. First, they are strongly static and a-historical. With the exception of the world-systems approach, they do not incorporate historical change in the analysis of migration. Second, they have a firm disciplinary focus. The analysis of migration is embedded within the structure of the discipline where the conceptual perspective originates. Finally, these approaches have constructed a sort of migration without migrants. Although these perspectives have attempted to maintain the role of the migrant in the decision making process that leads to migration, they are usually unspecific and do not explain why only a small percentage of humanity migrates.

In this chapter, I present the theoretical and methodological framework within which I analyze the decision to migrate from Chile to the US since the 1950s. I do not seek to prove or disprove the theories I present here. Rather this section is more a theoretical conceptualization than a review of the literature. In this sense, here I introduce the definitions that are woven throughout the dissertation. First, I present a description of the notion of levels of analysis in sociology, complemented by a brief presentation of the agency-structure debate and the role of

¹ In this dissertation I use biography when referring to aspects of the everyday life of migrants as retold by them. I use it as a synonym of personal narratives, life course, and personal memories. These make reference to episodes within the oral histories that I collected for this research.

rationality in this debate. This is the epistemological and meta-theoretical approach that I use in this dissertation.

Elaborating on the relevance of multi-level analyses of international migration, I then develop an approach to migration decision-making that incorporates macro analysis by locating this decision within a conceptualization of migration-systems connecting it to the studies on migration decision by, among others, Åkerman, DeJong, and Bilborrow. While criticizing the rational choice imperative that lies behind these approaches, they are an appropriate analytical starting point as well as allowing me to construct my own mode of migration decision making. I complement this discussion by introducing theories of social memory and its importance for the analysis of migration decisions as well as that of the social construction of biographies. While the biographical component of migration is presented both as a level of analysis and within the theoretical analysis of migration decision, I argue that it is the connection between memory and migration where this concept acquires its most useful explanatory power.

Finally, I present a critical description of the methods used on this dissertation. I conclude by re-enforcing the argument that migration does not occur in a vacuum and that a thorough analysis of migration processes must incorporate the multiple aspects that connects sending and receiving countries and that influence possible migration decisions.

II. Setting the stage: Levels of analysis, agency-structure integration and rational action

Levels of sociological analysis

The problem of levels of analysis has been an important component of sociological thought since the early conceptualizations of this discipline. Despite being present in the works

of some of the most renowned theoreticians between the 1850s to the 1910, such as Marx, Weber, Simmel and Durkheim, the debate over the loci of sociological analysis disappeared from the discipline for at least forty years after the end of World War I (Alexander and Giesen 1984). The growing interests for integrative or multiparadigmatic approaches in the late 1960s and early 1970 gave the discussion of levels of analysis a new relevance (Giddens 1984; Alexander and Giesen 1987; Ritzer and Gindoff 1994). Social and political changes in the world—among other factors, the process of de-colonization, the social movements of the 1960s, and the rise of the New Left—influenced the development of new theoretical constructions which moved “away from micro-macro extremism and toward a broad consensus that *the* focus instead should be on *the integration (or linkages) of micro and macro theories and/or levels or social analysis*” (Ritzer 1990: 350; emphasis in the original). The epistemological argument behind this call to integration of levels of analysis is that social reality is complex and occurs at different social spaces; therefore, one level of analysis cannot grasp its full complexity.


The argument before the 1960s was that there were at least two opposing approaches in sociological analysis: one characterized by the study of societies—macrosociology—and another by the study of personal interactions—microsociology. In terms of schools, for example, scholars defined functionalism as a theory that deals with macro aspects of social reality and symbolic interactionism one that deals with micro aspects. This separation into two opposing poles, however, is problematic. Probably the most relevant problems are: a) the idea that everything can be explained from either a macro or micro perspective—what Kemeny calls micro and macro chauvinisms (Kemeny, 1976); b) that using any theory defined specifically at one level to analyze a different would be to fall into what Wagner called the “fallacy of displaced scope” (Wagner, 1964: 583; Kemeny, 1976). However, macro and micro are two poles on a

continuum, and not two separate entities and there have been successful approaches to develop at least micro applications of macro theories (Münch and Smelser, 1987).

According to Ritzer (1990), sociologists that use the notion of levels of social analysis broadly agree that the micro is empirically associated with the aspects of everyday life and the macro with the social reality or social world. He goes on to argue, “there is also a very attractive *general conception* that argues that micro and macro do not describe empirical realities, but are rather analytic concepts that can be used to analyze any empirical realities” (Ritzer, 1990: 348). Despite this general agreement, scholars define micro and macro levels differently. Münch and Smelser (1987: 356) cite at least seven pairs of uses for micro and macro. This includes micro as dealing with the individual, small social units, limited scope interactions, social processes among individuals, and psychological propositions; while macro engages with population, large social units, societal scope, and repeated experiences of large numbers of people in time and space, among others. Micro and macro, therefore, are terms that are relative to each other and define each other; they theoretically coexist in a continuum of levels of analysis, and have empirical correspondences in the social world.

The integration of levels of analysis, therefore, can be used as a methodological tool in the sociological analysis. Ritzer, following Gurvitch, argues that to engage correctly in this integration of levels of analysis, it is important to consider two dimensions. The first dimension, shown in Figure 1, corresponds to the objective-subjective continuum a vertical level that relates to the depth or difficulty of direct external observation (Ritzer 1981; 1990; 1991). The objective end includes those types that are easier to observe such as the state; while the subjective end includes types that are relatively subjective such as the development of norms and values. The

problem with this vertical continuum is that both subjective and objective components constitute most social phenomena (Ritzer 1981).




Ritzer 1981: 26

In addition to this subjective-objective continuum, Ritzer (1981; 1990; 1991) argues that Gurvitch developed another hierarchy; a vertical relationship that defines a continuum from micro-sociology to macro-sociology. As we observe in figure 2, the micro level begins with the individual thoughts and actions, passing by interaction, groups, organizations and societies—called by Ritzer the mesoscopic level—while the macro level leans more towards World-systems.

Figure 2

The macroscopic-microscopic continuum with the identification of some key points on the continuum




Ritzer 1981: 25

Ritzer's Integrated Sociological paradigm is formed by the intersection of these two levels of analysis. This paradigm and its levels is a heuristic device that has as its objective to help the sociologist grasp the growing complexity of the social world (Ritzer, 1981). From the intersection of the two continua, he delineates four dimensions or major levels of social analysis: a macro objective and subjective and micro objective and subjective (Ritzer, 1981; 1990; 1991). I present Ritzer's four major levels of social analysis in figure 3 below.

Analyzing society using this perspective, he argues, is also an inherently dynamic approach that has a historical orientation and it is rooted in a temporal framework based on the past but that projects to the future. Ritzer argues that a good starting point for the analysis of social reality through time is using the notion of personal biography because "it not only attunes us 'upward' to the relationship of the actor to the larger structure of society, but also 'downward' to the actor's thoughts and actions over the course of the life cycle" (Ritzer, 1981: 210).

Figure 3
Ritzer's Major Levels of Social Analysis



Source: Ritzer 1990: 52

This is the conceptualization of my epistemological approach. When collecting and analyzing oral histories and other data sources, in a process that that expands through time, I observe the interactions of individuals in each of these four intersection and how they pertain to the decision to migrate. Thus, and following Alexander (1987), the micro-macro link is a relationship between the social action and the environments where the action takes place. The terms involved—micro and macro—however, are thoroughly relativistic terms and are constructed in the relation to the descriptions of part and whole at every level of social organization (Alexander, 1998: 182). This continuum, therefore, is an analytic distinction and not a concrete one (Alexander and Giesen, 1987: 1). This is why my use of levels will be epistemological and methodological and I do not intend through it to express social realities since it does not deal, necessarily, with the ontological aspects of the migration decision.

Agency-structure debates

At about the same time that within the US sociological theorists were pursuing micro-macro integration efforts, in Europe the debate was about the relationship of agency and structure. These debates did not only take place within sociology but widely within the social sciences. In other words, and following the epigraph of this chapter, what is the impact of history and social structures in the possibilities that individuals have of constructing their own lives.

As with many foundational concepts in sociology, the notions of agency and structure are extremely elusive (Sewell, 2005); there is, however, some consensus on what sociologists mean when we talk of structure. In basic terms, structure is characterized as the constitutive elements of the social world, akin to the frames of a building or the skeleton of a body. The structure is formed by “the more fixed and enduring aspects of the social landscape” (Stones, 2007).

Agency, on the other hand, not only has lacked a proper definition, it has also been used interchangeably with the concept of action. In this case there are multiple definitions, beginning with Weber’s definition of action and of social action.² Giddens (1979), for example, begins his theory of structuration from the absence of a theory of action in social sciences. For this author, “action or agency...does not refer to a series of discrete acts combined together, but to *a continuous flow of conduct*...involving a stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events in the world” (Giddens 1979: 55; emphasis in the original). It is interesting to note that Giddens uses the same definition for both concepts. His

² “By ‘action’ in this definition is meant human behavior when and to the extent that the agent or agents see it as subjectively meaningful...By ‘social’ action is meant an action in which the meaning intended by the agent or agents involves a relation to another person’s behavior and in which that relation determines the way in which the action proceeds” (Weber 1978: 4).

argument is that the only way of understanding agency/action is in a mutual relationship with structure; and thus, there is so far no theory that deals with both concepts simultaneously (Giddens 1979).

Taking this idea further, and influenced by the theoretical developments of Bourdieu, Emirbayer and Mische (1998) have intended to reconceptualize human agency adding the notion of temporality into their first definition; a key aspect of the difference between micro-macro and agency-structure debates. For these authors, human agency is a “temporally embedded process of social engagement informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment)” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 963). Later in the same article, these authors present a more developed definition that not only includes the temporality effect; but also the relationship with an existent structure and the transformative capacities of the agent. This definition includes the theoretical developments of Giddens and Bourdieu. Thus, human agency is (Emirbayer and Mische 1998: 970; emphasis in the original):

The temporally constructed engagement by actors of different structural environments—the temporal relational contexts of action—which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical situations.


If this is human agency, how does it interplay with structure? Here I will present three general approaches to the relationship between agency and structure, those of Giddens, Bourdieu and Habermas, as well as the definitions of rational action. Following this I return to Weber’s

definitions of rational action and through that, critic rational choice theory and thus establish what will be used in this dissertation for rational action.

According to Giddens, structuration theory centers on the role of “practical consciousness” in social actions; defined as the “tacit stocks of knowledge which actors draw upon in the constitution of social activity” (1979: 5), this is an unconscious knowledge about how the society is reproduced. Actors, however, not only know this unconsciously but also “are able to express it on the level of discourse” (Giddens 1979: 5). This is discursive consciousness that allows the individual to respond to changing structures and to propose changes in the structures. These two elements provide the basis for this author’s argument that human behavior is intentional and responds to specific purposes. The actor is capable of reflexively monitoring his or her its own actions; provide reason and an explanation for those reasons. This is what Giddens calls the ‘stratification model of action’ and that I present schematically in Figure 4 below.

This is the first level of analysis of structuration theory. As I mentioned above, because social action is intentional, the actor could have acted otherwise; this means that the actor could have changed his or her mind. For Giddens this implies that the actor is capable of intervening in the world or rationally decides not to intervene. This author conceives the rationalization of this action as “the capability competent actors have of ‘keeping in touch’ with the grounds of what they do, as they do it, such that if asked by others, they can supply reasons for their activities (Giddens 1984: 376). This capacity of the actor presumes that the agent can ‘make a difference’; i.e.: the agent can deploy “a range of causal powers, including that of influencing those deployed by others” (Giddens 1984: 14). The agent ceases being an agent if she loses the capacity of making a difference.

Figure 4
A 'stratification model' of action



Source: Giddens, 1979:56

This capacity is what takes us to the second level in Giddens' analysis and to the core of structuration theory. The core of this theory is composed of three concepts: structure, system, and the duality of structure. For Giddens, structure can be conceived as a characteristic of social systems. It is a "recursively organized set of rules and resources, is out of time and space, save in its instantiations and co-ordination as memory traces, and is marked by an 'absence of the subject'" (Giddens 1984: 25). Unlike the structure, social practices constitute the system and this has a tempo-spatial existence. Here is where "reproduced relations between actors or collectivities are organized as regular social practices" (Giddens 1984: 25). Finally it is in the concept of *duality of structure* where Giddens builds the continuous interaction between structure and agency. He refers to the "essential recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and social practices, and 'exists' in the generation moment of its constitution" (Giddens 1979: 5).

In sum, Giddens' theory of structuration is a conceptual scheme that allows us to understand that action and structure presuppose each other and how "actors are at the same time the creators of social systems yet created by them" (Giddens 1991: 204).

A second approach to the agency-structure debate is that of Bourdieu who seeks to overcome the subjective-objective dichotomy. In order to do that, he argues, two epistemological breaks must be followed. The first break is the move from phenomenological knowledge to objective knowledge. This break takes us from the primary experience and conception of the world—the doxa—to the construction of “objective relations which structure practice and representations of practice” (Bourdieu 1977: 3). The second takes us from objective knowledge to a dialectical relationship between the structures and the structured dispositions. By following these two breaks Bourdieu attempts to build a theory of practice, which is defined by a cognitive operation that constructs systems of classifications “which organize perception and structure practice” (Bourdieu 1977: 97). For his theory, practice is an organized activity that mediates between individual and collective interests and between social structure and culture; it is a dialectical outcome of agency and structure; the “activity by which human individuals produce and reproduce society in its cultural, social and economic dimensions” (Münch 1994: 139). It is in this relationship that personality and social structure are reproduced.

Bourdieu uses three major concepts to develop his theory: habitus, field and capital. Habitus is a “system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures” (Bourdieu 1977: 72). We, as social actors, internalize the habitus and through this internalization, we generate meaningful practices, perceptions and classifications (Bourdieu 1984). Field is the “locus of confrontation” (Bourdieu 1977: 168). It is in the field where society is produced and reproduced; each field has its own laws and these laws affect the manner in which actors ‘play’ on it. Bourdieu develops three major fields; economic, social and cultural, to which is associated a corresponding type of capital. Later he develops the notion of field of power corresponding symbolic capital to this field (Bourdieu 1984; 1998). To

each actor corresponds a specific habitus that structures its living conditions and possibilities of action. It is this element that represents the power structure of a society since it is the primary form of classification as well as a classifier (Bourdieu 1984). The field is the arena of social struggle. It is there that actors compete for accumulation of capital and for changes in the evaluation of a specific capital. A change in volume and or evaluation of capital might imply a change in class position and since to each class of positions corresponds a class of habitus, then eventually this could produce a change in habitus (Bourdieu, 1998). Capital is a two-folded concept. It is a “force inscribed in objective or subjective structures [and is] the principle underlying the immanent regularities of the social world” (Bourdieu 1986: 46). Finally, two other concepts derive from these three: social class and social space. He defines social class by the interrelations of habitus, field and capital. Each of these properties has a specific ‘value’ and the impact that this interrelation has on social practices. Social space is an abstract representation of three dimensions; volume of capital, composition of capital and the change of this two dimensions over time (Bourdieu 1984).

It is in this framework that practice (or praxis) occurs. For Bourdieu, social action occurs because agents are active and are endowed with a *practical sense*. This is “an acquired system of preferences, of principles of vision and division and also a system of durable cognitive structures and of schemes of action which orient the perception of the situation and the appropriate response” (1998: 25). This is his conceptualization of rational action, although he did not directly use the term. The social actor acts according to her or his habitus in a field that she or he knows or that can be experienced through previous knowledge. In this sense Bourdieu is both critical of a Marxist approach to rational action and of rational choice theories. Concerning the first, individuals are not prisoner of mechanical forces that constrain them to act in a particular way.

About the second, actors are never in full knowledge of the facts. I return to this when I present the Weberian theory of rational action.

Bourdieu's theory is an integrative approach not only for using the epistemological dialectical approach as a method, but also for its preoccupation with the influence of historical time and for the capacity of actors to change the structuring structures.

Finally, Habermas has developed a more in-depth theory of rationalization. He begins his argument by analyzing the problem of rationality in social action, picking up from where Weber left off; incorporating from Mead the role of communication as a meaning construction process (Habermas 1984a). In his theoretical construction Habermas also incorporates Parsons' differentiation between three systems of action; personality, social and cultural. From this starting point, Habermas develops three ideal rationalities. The first, instrumental rationality, focuses "in the solution of technical tasks and in the construction of effective means" (Habermas 1984a: 173). The second, a rationality of choice, centers "in the consistent choice among alternative lines of action" (Habermas 1984a: 173). The third, a normative rationality that relates to the "solution of moral-practical tasks within the framework of and ethic principle" (Habermas 1984a: 173).

For Habermas, this multidimensional aspect of rationality can be expressed through cognitive-instrumental rationality—utilizing a descriptive knowledge—or through a communicative rationality—consensus bringing force of argumentative speech. He calls the first 'realist' and the second 'phenomenological' (Habermas 1984a: 11). While the first centers of the analysis of the conditions that must be satisfied by the agent in order to realize ends; the second inquires "into the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the

members of a community” (Habermas 1984a: 12). It is through the communicative practice that the intersubjectively shared life-world is constructed.

This socially constructed life-world is an interpretation of the concrete world where our life takes place. It is a material, personal and social world. The life-world is not a tool but an interpretative process that is in permanent reproduction. The process of reproduction links the conditions already in existence with new situations. This is done in a semantic dimension of meanings, in the social space and historical time. According to Habermas, “corresponding to these processes of *cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization* are the structural components of the life world: culture, society, person (1984b: 138). Social actors participate and recreate the life-world through these structural domains. From culture they receive the stock of knowledge required to interpret and understand the world; from society they learn the legitimate orders so they can regulate their participation; and from personality the individuals obtain the competences that allow social action.

The life-world, however, is only one component of social life. It is the half where communicative action occurs. The other component is the system, the external component, a construction of the life-world when communication becomes structured and creates the economy, the law and the bureaucratic state. As the life-world is the place of communicative rationality, the system is that of purposive rationality, a means-end type of rationality. In Habermas’ theoretical corpus the agency-structure debate is focused upon the concepts of social integration, system integration and the colonization of the life-world by the system. The integrations refer to the capacities that each of the components have to reproduce themselves. Colonization of the life-world is the process through which purposive rationality overcomes communicative rationality thus the system dominates the life-world.

Rational action

The authors presented up to this point construct their approaches to rational action from a reading of Max Weber's theory of social action complemented by other sources in the social sciences. The social actor acts (or reacts) to other actors and/or the structure through particular sets of social actions which can be *interpreted* and therefore have a particular *meaning* in Weberian terms. For Weber social action can be classified by their orientation in four types. All of the types of social action are rational actions—although some more so than others—because individuals have particular intentions, have a potential to influence their surroundings and make sense—attach meaning—of their realities (Kalberg 2004). Weber (1978: 24-25) defines the four types of social action in relation to their motives:

(1) In terms of rational orientation to a system of discrete individual ends (zweckrational), that is through expectations as to the behavior of objects in the external situation and of other human individual, making use of these expectations as 'conditions' or 'means' for the successful attainment of the actor's own rationally chosen ends; (2) in terms of rational orientation to an absolute values (wertrational); involving a conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of behavior, entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospects of external success; (3) in terms of affectual orientation, especially emotional, determined by the specific affects and states of feeling of the actor; (4) traditionally oriented, through the habituation of long practice.

Before explaining the role of these definitions, in this dissertation I present three caveats to this conceptualization of rational action. First, these are ideal-types; theoretical constructions that do not necessarily exist in these absolute terms in the real world. Second and connected to the previous caveat, only as theoretical constructions do these definitions exist by themselves. In most cases they all coexist in one social situation, however, one might be more prominent in

particular cases. Last, Weber centers his work on the first two types, since the other two are, for him, borderline in what can be considered non-rational actions.

Of the remaining two types of rational actions only the first one is the base of rational-choice as defined by Coleman and others (Ritzer 2011). This is defined from a starting point of neoclassical economics and the theories of marginal utility and opportunity costs (Weber 1947; Ritzer 2011). According to Coleman and Fararo (1992: xi), Rational Choice Theory:

compares actions according to their expected outcomes for the actor and postulates that the actor will choose the action with the best outcome. At its most explicit, it requires that benefits and costs of all course of action be specified, the postulating that the action takes the “optimal” action, the action that maximizes the differences between benefits and costs

Rational Choice theory, a theory that also attempts to bridge micro and macro levels of analysis, has been critiqued thoroughly from many perspectives in sociology. Scott, for example, argues that the difference between rational choice theory and other sociological theories that explain social action is that rational choice theory “denies the existence of any kinds of actions other than the purely rational and calculative” (2000: 126). A more important criticisms, at least for my research, is that of Cherkaoui (2005). This author critiques Coleman’s analysis of Weber’s *Protestant ethic* by arguing that value rationality cannot be analyzed in terms of maximization of utilities. When actors act according to their faith, as Puritans did for Weber, it only seems irrational if we do not look at their actions from the perspective of who is carrying out the action. In this case the actor does not have a complete knowledge of the situation and does not chooses the action with the best outcome due to a maximization of benefits; but because the actor has an internalized set of values—or ideologies I would add—that leads him or her to act in accordance to the principles of those values. In conclusion, any analysis of migration as a

rational social action must move beyond the postulates of rational choice theory and use a more complete conceptualization of rational action as that presented by Weber.

Levels of analysis, the agency-structure debate and the rationality of social action allows me to present a set of premises that I will use in the analysis of Chilean emigration to the US since the 1950s. The first premise is that the decision to migrate is a rational social action and thus can be explained in reference to the four types of rational action proposed by Max Weber. This action is only feasible by assuming that the physical world will remain the same and influenced by our biographically determined situations (Schütz 1976). A second premise is that this social action is taken by an individual with varying degrees of agency within a social structure that is constantly changing through time. I add to this premise the idea that individuals have a *historical consciousness* derived from our understanding of our own temporality (Heller 1982; Schütz and Luckmann 1974) which allows them to interpret and comprehend historical change and relate it to our existence and social memory. The third premise is that any analyses of migration as a social action within the interactions of agency and structure must be studied at the multiple levels that influence the motives (Schütz 1976) around which emigrants construct their decision to migrate. These motives can be studied through retrospective glances to actions; these are the contemporary interpretations that individuals provide to their motives because it will tell us why they (emigrants in this case) acted in a particular way (Luckmann 1996). In this sense the use of oral histories provides me with the information to analyze the decision to migrate.

I turn now to an analysis of the theoretical developments from international migration theory that will guide my analysis.

III. The migration decision in migration studies

International migration theories can be broadly divided into two types, those that deal with the study of the conditions that induce individuals, families or groups to leave their area of origin; and those that deal with the possible forms of incorporating to a host society. Massey and his colleagues called the first type the “determinants of migration” and the second “immigrant assimilation” understood as “the means, mechanisms, and policies by which immigrants adapt to and are incorporated within receiving societies” (Massey et al 1998: 3). Now, the determinants of migration can also be divided into two categories; those theories that explain the initiation of international migration and those that explain the perpetuation of international movements. In this dissertation, I focus on the determinants of migration; in particular on those analytical approaches that explain initiation of international migration through the decision to migrate.

Most of the theories that attempt to explain the initiation of migration movements, have been developed from the field of economics and thus have as a starting point the interactions between markets and individual or familial needs. The first economic model has its origins in neoclassical economics. According to this theory, there is an international “immigration market” (Borjas 1989: 460). In this market, individuals from any country of origin would analyze their migration possibilities to a number of receiving countries based on what is more convenient for them and the financial and legal aspects of the process. This theory originates from two assumptions of neoclassical economics; first, that individuals try to maximize their well-being, and second that exchanges lead to equilibrium in the marketplace. According to Borjas (1989: 482), these assumptions permit economic theory to answer three questions: What determines the

size and composition of migration to any particular host country; how do migrants adapt to that country and what are their impacts on the host country.

Neoclassical economics as applied to migration is usually divided into macro and micro approaches. In its macro perspective, it takes the form, for example, of the rural-urban migration model developed by Harris and Todaro that “recognizes existence of a politically determined minimum urban wage at level substantially higher the agricultural earnings” (1970: 126). Thus, migration would occur between geographical areas that present difference in expected earnings (Todaro 1969). This theory has two important policy corollaries. The first is that if wage differential between nations disappears, the migration flow will end. The second is that international commerce—and trade agreements—can act as an income equalizer, therefore reducing or eliminating migration in the long term. In its micro approach, neoclassical economics considers migration as a “means of promoting efficient resource allocation” (Sjaastad 1962: 80). Therefore, the decision making process is individualistic and relies on an analysis between private and social costs, from differentials in earnings and unemployment levels, individual human capital characteristics (such as age and skills), and from psychological characteristics that might hinder the possibility or maximizing benefits (e.g.: homesickness).

A second economic theory, the *Segmented Labour Market Theory*, has Piore and Bonacich as its principal proponents. Piore argues that migration is caused by a “chronic and unavoidable need for foreign workers” (Massey et al 1998: 28) in the area of destination. This demand for foreign workers originates in the existence of a secondary employment sector characterized by underemployment and subsistence-level wages. Structural inflation, occupational hierarchies and economic dualism between labor and capital would produce

conditions for native workers to seek employment in an industrial and higher service sector where there are better salaries and more probability of achieving a raise.

This theory relies on the negative qualities of some low-wage jobs, as well as on the modernization of labor markets. This modernization has implied, among other factors, that there are more (and better) opportunities for women; there are job opportunities in rural areas (due to rural-urban migration), and a higher participation of youth in education. The effect is a higher demand for workers who would consider traveling to a different country to get a higher wage even if the job is below the qualifications of the worker. This theory is not directly based on personal decisions or in state roles in other countries. Rather, it is based on the structural needs of local economies and has been used to explain the rise of ethnic enclaves, comprising a third labor market.

A third theory with its roots in economics is *The New Economics of Migration* (Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark and Taylor 1989; Taylor 1999). Unlike the previous theories, this considers the conditions in multiple markets and not only in the labor market. In addition, it locates the decision to migrate within the family or household who sends one of its members abroad to minimize risks and maximize expected income. The decision to migrate would also be influenced by the expectative of remittances. Thus, this theory relies heavily on “network and kinship capital” (Stark and Bloom 1985: 175). An important corollary of this theory is the concept of relative deprivation. For Stark and Taylor (1989: 2) “relative deprivation is concerned with the feelings raised by intragroup inequalities”. This means that the decision to send a household member abroad is influenced by a comparison with its reference group. Therefore, it is not only important the household’s initial total income but also how much lower or higher is that income in relation to other community members. Households more relatively deprived are

more likely to send migrants abroad than those less relatively deprived (Stark and Taylor 1989: 4).

For some scholars these theories have explained the reasons behind migratory flows. For others, “the proclivity of these theories to the *post hoc* recitation of ‘obvious’ causes makes them incapable of predicting the two principal differences in the origin of migrations” (Portes and Böröcz 1989: 607). These differences are in the size and directionality of international migration among communities; and in migratory propensity between individuals of the same region or country. A second critique is that in most cases they do not consider levels of analysis. Finally, these theories depend heavily on the migrant as a rational choice actor, while this specific form of rationality might not necessarily have been used in the decision-making process. For example, migrants who leave their area of origin because ‘everyone does it’ would not be following a rational analysis but a ritualistic approach; which by some theorists is considered an irrational act. Alternatively, could follow a different kind of rationality; migrants who migrate for religious reasons actually follow a value based rationality and not an instrumental rationality. Finally, these theories are a-historical, they do not consider the role of historical change over existing structures and its influence on international migration flows.

Migration systems

In a seminal work published in 1998, Massey and his colleagues conclude that:

any satisfactory account of immigration must consider four basic facts of international movement: the structural forces of developing societies that promote emigration; the structural forces in developed societies that attract immigrants; the motivations, goals, and aspirations of the actors who respond to these forces by migrating internationally; and the social and economic structures that arise to connect areas of out- and in-migration (Massey 1999: 303-304).

One approach to explain the initiation of migration flows that also attempts to broaden the scope of migration flows is the migration systems approach. This theoretical approach derives from the works of Wallerstein and the development of the world-system and is based on the argument that capitalism is a system that defines exchanges between economies of the world.³ Its application to international migration starts with the idea that in “this scheme, the penetration of capitalist economic relations into peripheral, non-capitalist societies creates a mobile population that is prone to migrate abroad” (Massey et al 1998: 37). It explicates why certain relations between countries produce migration flows in both directions. According to Arango, migration stems from unequal relations between countries in the world-system but “contrary to equilibrium models, it reinforces the inequality instead of leading to its reduction” (2000: 290); in this sense international migration is a counter flow to foreign capital in the peripheral world (Massey et. al 1993).

Migration systems theory⁴ begins by analyzing migration as one of many exchanges that does not occur randomly but take place usually between countries that have close historical,

³ World-system is an important and complex epistemological and theoretical corpus within the social sciences that cannot be presented in a few sentences. For a more complete explanation of this theory and its development see, among many others, Wallerstein 2000; 2004 2011; Shannon 1989; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1982. Among the many critics see Sewell 2005 and Featherstone 1990.

⁴ As in world-system or in the concept of international system, the theoretical background on migration system is the concept of system. This is a concept originally developed in the natural sciences, particularly in biology, that makes reference to living bodies and their functioning. It arrived to social sciences from the study of cybernetics and social organization (Ritzer 2011). As a general definition the first generation of systems theory assumes that the social world is a system that has boundaries, interactions, members, rules of legitimating, and coherence (Wallerstein 2011). A second generation, as developed by Luhman, includes a synthesis between systems theory and Parsonian functionalism constructed around the idea of *autopoiesis*. According to this, systems are closed, with no connection to the environment; are able to produce its basic constitutive elements; organize their own boundaries and elements; and are


cultural, or economic ties (Kritz and Zlotnick 1992); in this setting migration becomes a complex process that incorporates ongoing interactions at all levels (O'Reilly 2012). By doing so, it goes beyond the question about “the actual processes whereby macro conditions and policies connect to potential migrants” (Kritz and Zlotnick 1992: 6) and proposes a change in the unit and level of analysis. The level of analysis is no longer the state or the world system (a macro perspective) and the relations between and within states; nor a micro level described by economically rational individuals that seek a maximization of its revenues. The level of analysis is a dialectical solution, a meso level that should “examines how the interaction between macro structural forces and micro social networks shaped emigration and adaptation patterns” (Moya, 1998: 4).

As presented in Figure 5, migration systems approach proposes to study all the transactions and interactions among nations. In this setting migration is one of them, which is also influenced and affected by the others (Kritz and Zlotnick 1992; Jennissen 2007). Migration occurs, therefore, between countries that have historical connections that produce and reproduce exchanges. The Migration systems theory attempts to consider the whole spectrum of population flows, but argues that not all flows explain the reasons why people migrate. This approach emphasizes the level of the networks that connects the macro structures and policies and which “operating at and between macro and micro levels...link the various countries together into a coherent system” (Kritz and Zlotnik 1992: 6; see also O'Reilly 2012).

self-referential (Ritzer 2011). The use of system in these three approaches refer originally to first generation systems theory—an important criticism (see Bakewell et al 2011)—although they could be expanded and explained using Luhman's systems theory. This, however, will not be attempted on this dissertation.

Figure 5

A systems framework of international migration



Source: Kritz and Zlotnik 1992: 3

While these networks might explain why it becomes easier for some to migrate, it still does not explain the decision to migrate. Another criticism is that this theory does not explain how these systems came to be (Bakewell et al 2011); a problem that it shares with world-system theory. Bakewell and his colleagues (2011) and Morawska (2011) have attempted to bridge this gap by using the concept of pioneers based on cumulative causation theory. According to this idea, it would be due to the efforts of first immigrants, for whom the migration would be most difficult, that the network would originate and later expand.

Another criticism is that, within the current process of increasing global interconnection, at the world-system level there would be only a one large migration system. This would be the US as the core country and all the other countries as major sending nations, since the US is by far

the largest receiver of international migration in the world and arguably the only one that receives migrants from all other countries. This, however, does not debunk the theory. Above all because Kritz and her colleagues (1992) continuously talk about the relevance of regional migration systems; such as the US-Mexico, Argentina and its neighbors, Germany and Turkey, among many others. It does require replacing the world-system background for the idea of an international system as developed from the field of international relations. The concept of an international system is an application of the domestic political system to the relations between states (Harrison 2004). The international system is a conglomerate of all the interdependent and interacting units that exist in the world; these can be states, international or intergovernmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, other collectives and in some cases even individuals (Buzan and Little 2000). Acting units participate in this system according to their relative power to each other based on different interests and strategies. The system, therefore, is, at its inception, decentralized and anarchic—in a very *Hobbesian* way—until it reaches an equilibrium in the balance of power (Harrison 2004; Kaplan 1957). What is important in this system is that the notion of equilibrium of power does not imply that all states actually have the same power but that there are superpowers, or better named hegemons, that control most of the exchanges—economic, cultural, ideological, etc. This or these hegemons would affect—even as an unintended consequences—migration flows through their influences in the sending countries.

In conclusion, migration systems is an interdisciplinary and multi-level approach that attempts to solve the shortcomings of neo-classical economical theories (Castles and Miller 2003). This approach is a top-down explanation of how migration movements are the result of interacting macro- and micro-structures linked by a intermediate mechanisms known as meso-

structures. These three levels of structures “are intertwined in the migratory process, and there are no clear dividing lines between them...no single cause is ever sufficient to explain why people decide to leave their country and settle un another” (Castles and Miller 2003: 28). I use migration systems theory as a top-down perspective that that creates and reproduces migration flows and provides the historical, economic, political and social constrains and possibilities that could incite a family or an individual to migrate. I turn now to a much more bottom-up approach; the decision to migrate from the perspective of the emigrant.

The decision to migrate

Factors explaining the decision to migrate were originally developed by Ravenstein in his *Laws of Migration* (1885) and expanded later by Lee (1966). The decision to migrate involves a positive and negative calculus of four factors; those associated with the area of origin (push); those associated with the area of destination (pull); intervening obstacles; and personal factors. The final decision has to go beyond this calculus of positive and negative aspects, but the “balance in favor of the move must be enough to overcome the natural inertia which always exists” (Lee 1966: 50-51). Despite its elegant simplicity, Lee’s theory of decision-making has lost currency (Demuth, 2000: Massey et al., 1998). According to Richmond, for example, there is no proof that social actors are naturally inclined to inertia or to wanderlust (Richmond, 1993).

The relevance of Lee’s theory is that it lies at the core of most economic-based theories of migration. Massey and his colleagues argue, however, that this theory has become obsolete since “thinking has moved away from reified, mechanical models towards more dynamic formulations that allow micro-level decisions to affect macro-level processes and vice versa” (Massey et al 1998: 15). Lee’s approach, however, is important to understand the incorporation

of micro decisions and macro processes by integrating factors that are external to the migrant, such as wage differentials, with personal factors, as risk-seeking personalities, in the analysis of migration decision. In this section I critique three approaches that attempt to explain the migration decision process. Two of these approaches, those of DeJong and his colleagues and of Bilsborrow and his colleagues originate from an analysis of internal migration that, albeit useful, is less complex because it does not imply the crossing of political boundaries between states. The third approach, that of Åkerman deals with migration from Sweden to the US in the late nineteenth century.

De Jong's model of migration decision making starts from the premise that migrants decide to migrate due to the "fundamental motive to maintain or improve the quality of life for the individual or family" (De Jong and Gardner 1981: 4). Their classical text, *Migration Decision Making*, propose that migrants decide to migrate in a rational manner. This, they argue, is a basic assumption that should be common to all the research on this topic, however, since it lies at the core of this area of research they do not engage with it critically. They do equate rational manner with motives based on a cost-benefit calculation ratios, levels of stress, values and expectancies.

De Jong and Garner argue as well that while motives are crucial, they are not the only important component. The other is the degree of information that allows the migrants to find different alternatives and to decide which would be the most beneficial. Their model connects micro and macro levels of analysis. In their words, it is a value-expectancy model because it analyzes how personally valued goals could be achieved by moving and the expectation that those values goals will be attained somewhere else (De Jong and Fawcett 1981). The macro level defines and constructs the values and the micro level defines the expectations (Gardner 1981).


Most likely because this is a model originally developed for internal migration, there is nothing on the macro level factors that assumes that the international system has any influence on the decision making. Even more, the state itself has very little influence on the definition of values. Values are likely formed at the village or family, a meso level for other scholars, with no direct influence from outside. At the micro level the decision, albeit still thought of as a means-to-end rationality, does involve the “attraction of the city lights” for the rural urban migration and the “desire to get away from everything” for the urban rural migration (Da Vanzo 1981).

This general migration model was originally designed because scientific literature then could not explain the reasons for migrating and even more crucial the reasons for not migrating. I argue that it still does not answer this question. Interestingly De Jong and Fawcett (1981) argue that asking the question about the decision to migrate indirectly—through surveys in their case—is a more adequate way of investigating the decision to migrate. Using a more direct approach, they argue, could bias the narrative since “dramatic event may stand out...rather than the cumulative effects of hopes and fears which are probably the real causes pushing a man [sic] to leave his home for another (De Jong and Fawcett 1981: 44).

Their model (Figure 6) incorporates a “macro” level, the community characteristics, meso level, the household characteristics and resources, the networks, norms and gender roles. These are all subjectively mediated through the outcomes (De Jong 2000). Oddly enough, it locates other macro- and meso-level conditions at the behavioral level, which should be a micro-level perspective. Hence, for example, labor contacts that could facilitate the migration are at the micro-level because—according to this model—are used by the migrant-to-be to calculate the expectation that the result of the migration would be positive.

Figure 6


General model of migration decision-making



Source: De Jong 2000: 310

Bilsborrow and his colleagues (1984) also developed a migration-decision model using data from surveys applied in several low-income countries. Their model assumes that all migrants make their decision based on complete or almost complete information and choose to migrate attempting to maximize the calculated benefits of that migration. Unlike the previous model, Bilsborrow and his colleagues give relevance to the characteristics of the migrant-to-be and the characteristics of the possible destination area. I present this model graphically in Figure 7 below:

Figure 7
Factors Influencing Migration Decision



Source: Bilsborrow et al 1985: 412

The decision to migrate, then, would happen most likely due to the differential between personal characteristics and those of the receiving area. While the household and community characteristics could influence the decision according to the levels of social integration. Higher social integration would have a negative impact on the decision to migrate and lower social integration would be the opposite. A simpler model than that of De Jong, it is also constructed from the analysis of internal migration. It does not consider at all the role of the state or the international system or even of networks of migrants in the area of destination. As with the De Jong's model, it does not consider the impact of the country of origin in terms of influences in the decision to migrate.

The major criticism of this model is that they start from rigid premises that are not realistic. According to Fischer and his colleagues:


Not surprisingly, the most classical economic model is hardly able to explain the details and dynamics of migration flows, basing its explanations of migration on wage differences and assuming *the* homogenous economic person to make decisions under conditions of perfect certainty, no costs, perfect information and the absence of risk. Also, the most classical economic migration model fails to explain why world-wide roughly 98 per cent of mankind remain immobile despite large locational difference. (Fischer et al 1997: 88)

While Fischer and his colleagues do argue that the analysis of migration includes an economic component, they observed that this should be incorporated after or with other analysis at the same time, such as political and social aspects. A final criticism of these two models of migration decision is that they do not consider history; in fact Bilsborrow argues that historical analysis only creates false recurrences that do not have a real impact on the decision to migrate. This is a key point for the analysis of the decision to migrate from a historical sociology perspective. Sewell argues that this field should be concerned with what he calls “eventful temporality” (Sewell 2005). An “eventful temporality” has three characteristics. The first is that events are normally ‘path dependent’. This means that if an event happened at an earlier moment in time, then it will influence all the other events that come after that; at the same time that the event is a result of previous contexts and other events. A second characteristic is that events are causal structures that are heterogeneous through time. This means that when events change they change “not only the balance of causal forces by the very logic by which consequences follow from occurrences or circumstances” (Sewell 2005: 101). Finally, this conceptualization of event assumes that contingency is global; events can change even the most stable structures. According to Sewell this is the relevance of proposing an analysis that centers on the analysis of historical events. These events are transformations of preexisting structures, which are not constantly changing but are not immune to change at some point.

Åkerman (1978) develops a clear process of migration decision-making that goes beyond the econometric aspects of migration and includes the importance of events (Figure 8). At the same time, he does not mention that the decision to migrate is part of a rational choice decision; however, he does not argue the opposite either. In his analysis of migration patterns in small villages and parishes in Sweden he discovered that, despite the existence of a structural force that promotes migration, and what he calls “willingness to migrate” (Åkerman 1978: 300) only a small percentage of people migrated. According to his analysis the decision to migrate only occurs when a particular situation, an event in terms of Sewell, *triggers* the move. At any moment, in any particular society there are continuous structural stresses that might not lead to migration at all. Only when individuals recognize this stress as such and there is a migration offer, then the possibility to migrate exists. Two conditions, however, must be fulfilled. Åkerman mentions that the possible migrant has to be of a particular personality type—a risk taker, for example—and the structure of social control allows for such migration. The individual or family decides to migrate only when all these conditions are met and a particular event occurs.

This model succeeds in establishing differences between historical and macro-structures that affect all the individuals within a society (village, city, nation) and the particular conditions that lead someone to decide to migrate. The problem is that it does not explain clearly what type of trigger effects produce migration and which do not, and what happens between the trigger and the actual migration. I propose a model of migration that attempts to answer these concerns.

Figure 8
Åkerman's model of migration decision



Source: Åkerman 1978: 301

An integrated model of migration decision

To analyze the emigration from Chile to the US since 1950, I propose a model of migration-decision that integrates Ritzer's levels of analysis, the agency-structure connections with the Weberian ideal types of social action and Åkerman's model of migration decision. While levels of analysis have been a constant concern for migrations scholars, as I demonstrated with the migration systems approach and De Jong's migration decision model, only recently have migration scholars have begun to use the agency-structure argument in their analysis (Bakewell 2010). The exception to this is the case of Richmond and his work on refugees. Using Giddens' structuration theory as a background, Richmond (1988; 1993) argues that the distribution of economic and political power at every level of analysis limits the degree of choice


in the migration decision process. Hence, migration decisions occur in a multilayered space and ranges from absolute rational choice (proactive: voluntary migration) to absolute constrained circumstances (reactive: involuntary migration). Most recently, Bakewell and his colleagues (2010; 2011) have criticized the structuration theory for bracketing the levels of analysis and have begun using Archer's Critical Realist approach to study migration to Europe.⁵ Morawska (2011) is interested in reconciling Giddens' structuration with Archer's approach to explain historical Polish migration within Europe and to the US. O'Reilly (2012) uses "practice theory"; a development using Bourdieu's theoretical corpus to explain different types of migration, from refugee movements to lifestyle migration in Europe. Finally, Favell (2012) expands Richmond approach—mentioned above—to incorporate a temporal perspective in the construction of a theory of migratory "volition" and the prospective decision to migrate. This last, however, is the only approach that engages directly on the decision to migrate.

My framework, depicted in Figure 9, begins with the premise that international migration does not occur in a vacuum. It is a product and a component of the inter-state relations that occur in a historically defined interdependent international system that can be described using the migration systems approach as presented by Kritz and Zlotnik. I refer to this as the "supra environment" of migration flows.

⁵ Margaret Archer's Critical Realist or Morphogenesis approach is an agency-structure theory that arises in the late 1970s as a critique to the lack of flexibility of structuration theory with regards to the actual role of agents in changing the structure as well as the need to incorporate culture in the analysis.

Figure 9

An integrated model of migration decision



Now, within the home country—the nation-state—there are two macro levels, an objective and a subjective, that influence every member of that social group regardless whether they intend to migrate or not. The macro-objective is formed by structural stresses, such as changes in government and politics, economic crises, strikes, and military coups. The macro-subjective is formed by the cultural characteristics of the nation; social norms, gender structures, ideologies, values. These two levels are neither static nor entirely uncontested. Changes in the macro-objective level influence changes in macro-subjective level and vice versa.

At the micro level, I also propose an objective and a subjective level. The objective level includes the social position of the social actor, education, demographic characteristics. These characteristics are influenced by the macro-objective level in terms of life chances and by the

macro-subjective with relation to the “social worth” of the agent’s biography. At the micro-subjective level, I propose the stress triggers used by Åkerman defined as the perceptions, beliefs and motives that influence everyday life decision, in this context directly connected to migration. These stress triggers interact with the macro-subjective because they are culturally defined and at the same time inform cultural changes. With the macro-objective level interact because structural stresses influence future decisions and conversely—although collectively—everyday actions influence social change. The micro-objective level influences decisions in terms of educational prospects, investment, and is influenced by biographically determined decisions. The connections between these four levels are mediated by social institutions and organizations such as family, business, schools, political parties; the meso level. Two caveats: these levels are fluid and relative to historical conditions and other changes.

It is under these changing and interacting conditions that a migration offer appears and the individual—or family—needs to decide whether to migrate or not. Following Weber, the decision to migrate is a social action is most likely rational and on it, the four types of social action interact. Means-to-ends rationality cannot solely explain this decision—as I will show in this dissertation. All the different types of rationality have a role in the decision to migrate as I argue in the model presented above. Once the decision is made, then migration is attempted.

The role of memory in migration research

While the study of memory has achieved a prominent role in the social sciences in the last two decades, it has not yet made its mark on migration studies. As a field of study it is possible to trace the lineage of memory studies to the Greeks (Olick and Robbins, 1998). The contemporary turn to memory, however, has been usually associated with trauma, place and

remembrance. The origins of this approach has been associated to the Jewish Holocaust, twentieth century-wars, the end of Communism in eastern Europe, and politics of victimization and regret in countries formerly govern by dictatorships (Olick and Robbins, 1998; Hamilton and Shopes, 2008; Mitzal, 2003). Not to dismiss the role of trauma and remembrance in international migration, the connections between memory and migration are closely associated to the memory of place (Creet 2011) and the work of Maurice Halbwachs.

Maurice Halbwachs analyzed the construction of locations of remembrance as well as the construction of memories by social groups. His main argument is that the process of recollection only happens through societal interactions (Halbwachs and Coser, 1992). We acquire our memories through living in a society, at the time that what we consider as the past is continuously reconstructed based on the present. He further argues that our identity is perpetuated by a continuous reproduction of the memories we have of each period in our lives. The individual and collective memory, however, are determined by social contexts and structures.

Migrants constantly reproduce the home country through memory that is mediated by cultural artifacts such as magazines, movies, literature and others. These artifacts continuously renew the memory of the country of origin, although some traits might remain stuck in the memory of the time they left. The country of origin will change, but some of its components might remain static in the emigrant, this then produces the paradox that the remembered country no longer exists, it has moved to the future, but for the emigrant remains in the moment of departure. As I show later, return visits also influence the memory of home. The memory of migration also connects to the dreams and fears of the moment to migrate, reconstruct identity and define the future relation with the country of origin.

I use memory as a medium to get to the decision to migrate. By intersecting the reason to migrate as expressed by the emigrants with their recollections of the conditions at the home country, I can adapt my proposed integrated model of migration for the different migrants. In this sense, the use of memory links the theory and the methods of this dissertation.

IV. Between narratives and number: A section on methods

A dissertation that intends to study the decision to migrate among emigrants and the influence on this of historical processes benefits from using a broad range of research methods. The objective of a broad research design is to analyze possible influences on the topic under study from multiple perspectives. In my research, and this dissertation as its outcome, I use oral histories as the core method to gather data and information about my topic of study. This is not, however, my only source of information. I also used immigration statistics from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Services and its successors, the US Citizenship and Immigration Services and the Office of Immigration Statistics both at the Department of Homeland Security. I also use census data on foreign-born and native born from the PUMS (Public Use Microdata Samples) data from the US census. I collected information on the Chilean Consulates in the US at the Archive of the *Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores* - Chile (Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs – MINREL) as well as using published sources on Chilean history as background for the historical components of the dissertation.

The used of multiple data sources in social sciences research is a fairly recent approach (Johnson et al 2007; Kelle 2005). It originates from the need to overcome the shortcomings of the two traditional methodologies and epistemologies of qualitative and quantitative methods. Since the core of the data used in this dissertation is oral histories, it would not be accurate to

define it as a mixed method approach (Johnson et al 2007). Hence, I define the immigration statistics, archival research and other sources as complementary to the analyses of oral histories. In this sense, these sources allow me to provide a broader picture of the biographical aspects given by the individual narratives. I now describe the use of each of these methods and their relevance on the dissertation.

Oral histories

The analysis that I present here derives from 30 oral histories I collected between September of 2010 and September of 2011 in the metropolitan areas of Chicago, Detroit and the Greater Lansing area. These oral histories are all of Chilean emigrants to the United States who left Chile between 1957 and 2010 (See Appendix A for details). Alongside the personal experiences that define their memories, very recent events in Chile influenced these interviews. Among them the earthquake that affected Chile in late February of 2010, by the inauguration of the first conservative president elected since 1958—with the exception of Pinochet’s dictatorship which also was conservative but he was not democratically elected—and the political and social struggles that have ensued, and by the crisis and successful rescue of 33 Chilean miners trapped in an underground mine in August of 2010.

Oral histories, personal narratives, personal testimonies, and life stories are key methods to understand the process of international migration (Thomson 1999). This method may not allow statistical inference but it is a “a powerful tool for discovering, exploring and evaluating the nature of the process of historical memory—how people make sense of their past, how they connect individual part of the present, and how people use it to interpret their lives and the world around them” (Frisch 1990 in Hamilton and Schopes 2008: ix). Research with oral histories

allows us insight into human agency that most likely is not possible through any other means. It connects the individual with structure through time. The social scientist becomes an aid to the process of establishing connections between the social actor and history (Maynes et al 2008).

From the perspective of the participant, oral histories allow us not only to engage with the description of the migration itself, but also with how the migrants felt about this process (Thomson 1999). By focusing on the migration experience we can observe to what extent migrants are “free actors shaping their own destinies, as opposed to pawns merely responding to constraints imposed upon them by their society” (Bretell 2003: 27). One of the criticisms of oral history techniques is a reliance on memories that are not necessarily dependable; especially in the case of older migrants. Bretell (2003) argues that the importance of migration is so relevant in the life of the individuals and families that its recollection remains more vivid and with more detail in comparison to other life events. A second argument—and based on the works of Portelli (1991)—is that “by listening to the myths, fantasies, errors and contradictions of memory, and paying heed to the subtleties of language and narrative form, we might better understand the subjective meaning of historical experience” (Thomson 1999: 33). In this sense, and as I have explained above in terms of the rationality of the migration decision, the subjective interpretation of historical processes is what in most cases—with the exception of extreme forced migration—leads someone to decide to migrate. Therefore, what is important here is not “*just the facts, ma’am*” but the reconstruction of those facts through memory in relation to historical change.

Oral histories are not gathered in a void. They require extensive fieldwork to gain entrance to communities, develop rapport with possible interviewees, and locate points in common with the interviewees. My fieldwork commenced in 2008 as I began to participate of in the activities of the “Club Chileno de Michigan” (Chilean Club of Michigan) and in 2009 of the

“Club Chileno de Chicago” (Chilean Club of Chicago). Chilean emigrants and their families created both these organizations and they have as a general objective to maintain and promote Chilean culture among immigrants and others who might be interested. Both organizations celebrate the Chilean Independence Day (September 18) and have, at least, one more social activity throughout the year. Not all immigrants participate in these organizations. As I develop later, political and socio-economic conditions in the country of origin influence the willingness to participate in organizations in the country of reception. During the years of Pinochet’s dictatorship there were at least two other organizations in Chicago and other areas of the US: Casa Chile and the Pablo Neruda Cultural Center. These organizations, formed by exiles and human rights activists, primarily sought to end of the dictatorship but disappeared shortly after (Navia 2005).

At my first meeting of the Michigan Chilean Club I met Alejandra, who became my *gatekeeper* for most of the narratives I collected in the Detroit Metropolitan Area. Through her, I contacted 14 people, seven of which agreed to participate in this research. In the case of Chicago I made use of three activities between June and September of 2009. In June I went to the only Chilean restaurant in Chicago to watch the 2010 Soccer World Cup Qualifiers, since I knew that it was a good place to meet Chileans. There I met the then Chilean Consul who also became an invaluable asset for this research. He not only provided me with interview contacts particularly on the Chilean political left, but he also gave some insights into the structure of the Chilean communities and groups in the Greater Chicago area. In late June I also attended a picnic of the Chilean Club in Chicago where I gathered contacts that increased my database of possible interviewees. Finally, in the celebration of Chilean National day in 2010 in Chicago I met

Josefina who also became a *gatekeeper* giving me information about Chileans who had arrived to Chicago in the pre 1973 period.

These three *gatekeepers* provided me with the largest share of possible participants. In total I contacted 74 Chilean immigrants in the metropolitan areas of Chicago, Detroit and Lansing. Thirty accepted to be interviewed; one more originally agreed and then stopped answering emails and phone calls. Five declined to be interviewed and the remaining did not answer my attempts to contact them or I could not find reliable information on how to contact them. I sent introductory letters and/or phone calls to 64 of the 74 possible interviewees. I carried out thirty interviews of 16 men and 14 Chilean women (See Appendix A). The earliest arrival was in 1957 and the latest in 2010. In total I gathered more than 47 hours of interviews, an average of about two hours and sixteen minutes per interviewee. The shortest interview lasted 22 minutes and the longest three hours and 40 minutes. Of these thirty interviewees, five had lived between a few months and a year in the US and returned to Chile before emigrating definitely to the US. Seven had lived in another country for more than one year before migrating to the US, being this one, at least their secondary migration. While half of these emigrants were residing in Santiago, the capital of Chile, immediately before their migration, the rest come from all over the country. Two came from small towns that in the 1980s became part of the metropolitan area of Santiago, three from Concepción and from the Valparaíso/Viña del Mar conurbation each; the second and third largest city in the country. The remaining seven come from smaller regional capitals and smaller towns in the north and south of Chile. In many cases there is a previous history of migration within Chile, but only four of those who left from Santiago migrated internally as adults and not as part of their parents migration.

A general content analysis of the reasons these emigrants use for explaining their migration shows that five left as exiles and seven can be classified as leaving for political reasons—five of these twelve lived elsewhere before migrating to the US. Five of the seven that left for political reasons also connect their migration with having family abroad, economic reasons, or wanting to study in the US. Three came as students and decided to stay in the US, six more came either to marry or because their partner—a US citizen—encouraged them to come to the US. Six mention their emigration as part of living an adventure. Five of them also connect this adventure to coming to work or to find a job as a reason for migrating, escaping from ‘bad’ situations in Chile or having family in the US. Finally one described her migration as an opportunity to forget a lost love; sentimental reasons was a secondary reason for another emigrant who came to study in the US.

From a different perspective, while access to the Chilean communities was not difficult, especially since I am Chilean and I know the cultural codes, two situations are relevant to mention. The first is my status as insider and the possible influences of this in my research. As a Chilean living and studying in the US, I share several histories with most of the emigrants. My everyday experience of these histories, my worldview, however, is generally different from that of my interviewees. My own social position—as a researcher, as a man, in terms of social class, etc.—and my relation with the particular circumstances under analysis mediates my understanding of these histories. I might share political ideologies with some, but I did not experience the same political situations as they did. Following Mannhein (1991: 71), I have relational knowledge, in the sense that my historical knowledge is defined in reference of my position (Erdmans 2004). I have lived in the same cities and even attended the same high school

as two of my interviewees. To avoid this influence I have chosen to let my interviewees speak for themselves as much as possible within the analysis of their migration decisions.

A second situation is related to the development of trust. While many interviewees accepted my request without any concerns and other rejected it at once, there were some cases where I had to ‘earn’ the trust. With the Chilean Consul it helped that we had acquaintances and friends in common who he could ‘ask for references’ about me. Although I have no information that he did, the fact that he had that possibility helped me build a relationship. This is very much connected to a Chilean construction in which belief of who you know and the social networks you have (high school, university, etc.) is as important as who you are in general. The opposite occurred with Pablo, one of my interviewees. A few minutes after sending him an introductory letter via e-mail he replied asking me my phone number. He called as soon as he got it. During the first thirty or so minutes of our conversation, he interrogated me about my position on voting rights for Chileans living abroad. Only once he was convinced that my ideas were similar to his ideas on the matter, he agreed to participate on this research.

As I mentioned above, I selected most of my interviewees through my participation on activities organized by the Chilean communities in Chicago and Michigan. I originally decided to collect 24 interviews divided by sex, period of emigration and socioeconomic status. After analyzing the characteristics of these waves of immigration, I concluded that socioeconomic status was not a required variable and it was not measurable. With that consideration in mind I decided to carry out a minimum of 24 interviews divided by sex and period of emigration. Here I followed Pedraza. She proposes using a “theoretical sampling”, which is “harnessed to making comparisons between and among those samples of populations, events or activities that the emerging theory points to, so as to shed light on them as it evolves” (2007: 21) with the

objectives of founding the *best exemplar* of the four different waves of migration to the US. Acknowledging that statistical significance and representation is not a valid component of personal narratives, my objective is to generate *sociological generalizations*. According to Maynes and her colleagues, these are “claims that a given personal narrative illuminates a particular social position or social-structural location in a society of institution or social process and that it illustrates how agency can operate in this locus” (Maynes et al 2008: 129).

The recorded conversations that became the central component of this dissertation took place in-person (22) or by-phone (8) at the time and place selected by the interviewee. In all but three of the cases the in-person interviews were done in their houses. For these interviews I followed a guide that would allow me to characterize the lives of these emigrants and the conditions that led to their decision to migrate (see Appendix B). I organized the transcriptions of these interviews⁶ and I coded the relevant parts into forty-nine minor codes that in turn I grouped in six major codes or themes (see Appendix C). While informed by my theoretical background and my research objectives, the themes reflect the major topics that came out of the interviews and I did not imposed directly on the narratives. In the coding process I followed three procedures as explained by Esterberg (2002: 158). I looked for relevant phenomena or discussions of these phenomena; I collected examples of each phenomena using relevant components of the narratives and finally, I analyzed the phenomena to find commonalities, patterns and structures. Of the six themes, four became relevant for the construction of the arguments around migration decisions. A first major theme that I observed in the oral histories is that of *historical consciousness*. I define this as the social and political participation of the

⁶ The interviewees were transcribed verbatim by native Spanish speakers, since they were all in Spanish, and revised by me.

interviewee in the context that such participation takes place, and how the participant makes reference to the historical events around the context. A second theme is that of *migration decision and memory*. I constructed this theme in reference to the remembrances of the process of migration and of Chile previous to migrating to the US. I also included the actual bureaucratic components of the emigration, such as the solicitation of visas, and their memories of the arrival to the US. A third theme that I developed is that of *remembering and relating to Chile*. In this theme I included all the mentions to connections to Chile, via groups, visits, memories of visits as well as their interest to continue participation in Chilean life through voting, being informed and sending remittances. A final major theme I constructed is that of *identity*. In this theme I made reference to conversations about identifying with reference groups, such as Chilean, *Latino* and gringo or *American*.

I developed as well two minor themes from the personal narratives that in particular cases helped provide background to the conversations. The first of these includes demographic data of the emigrants, particularly place and date of birth, current job and socioeconomic position of parents and activities, among others. The second theme, which I broadly define as *family theme* makes reference to having family in the US and or in Chile as well as bringing relatives to the US in a chain migration manner.

This process of data gathering and analysis is the core of my research in this dissertation. Is not, however, the only source. I complement the personal narratives with statistics and other sources that help provide a setting for my analysis and the conclusions that I reached.

Immigration Statistics and Census data

I use two data sources to describe and analyze quantitatively the characteristics and changes of the migration flows and stock to the US since 1950. To analyze the flows I use entrance and naturalization data from the annual yearbooks and annual reports statistical of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) until 2001 and of the Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) after 2001. The change has to do with a reconfiguration of the INS and other offices as a result of the 9/11 attacks. During 2002 the INS change name to USCIS and became part of the Department of Homeland Security as well as adding a specific office on immigration statistics. I spent a week at the USCIS Historical Library in July of 2010 requesting complementary information about characteristics of these migration flows. While there is information on age, education, and activities, among other from people entering the US, this data is not complete for the historical period I am analyzing. Also, since most of it is self-reported, it is not comparable through the years. I analyze migration flows from 1950 to 2011 inclusive. The data, however, is measured by fiscal year, therefore until 1976 a year was the period between 1 July 1 and 30 June. After 1976 is from 1 October to 30 September. The data for 1976 includes a “transitional” quarter from 1 July 1976 to 30 September 1976. This transitional quarter does influence the results for that year, making them look larger than in a regular year.

For the analysis of flows I use four variables on the type of entrance of the immigrant to the US and his or her awarding of citizenship. The most important category is that of Immigrant. These are defined as “persons lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States” (United States. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1950-2001/1998: 13). The INS/USCIS also uses the term Legal Permanent Resident which refers to people who “have been granted lawful permanent resident in the United States (United States. Office of Immigration Statistics

2002-to date/2011: 1). A note of caution. This data includes those that requested an immigrant's visa in their country of origin as well as those that changed their migratory status in the US. So it is possible that people had migrated to the US before they regularizes their situations and became a green card holder. With the exception of a couple of migratory amnesties that are described in chapter III, the number of status changes for Chilean immigrants, available as separate information in the INS/USCIS statistics was not relevant to required a separate analysis. From my observation of the original data available in the yearbooks and annual reports it was roughly less than 5% per fiscal year.

A second category is that of non-immigrant visitors. The INS/USCIS defines this category as “arrivals of persons who are authorized to stay in the United States for a limited period of time. Most non-immigrants enter the United States as tourists or business travelers, but some come to work, study, or engage in cultural exchange programs” (United States. Office of Immigration Statistics 2002-to date/2011: 1). These visitors are not allowed to have permanent residency, although some might apply for changes of status in the future. Until 2001 the INS provided specific data for country from a category called “temporary visitors”. This category refers to those that come to the US for business or pleasure (United States. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1950-2001/1998). I present data on this category for comparison purposes with the total of non-immigrant and to argue that permanent migration is just one of the many exchanges of people between nations.

Finally, the last category that I used from this source is that of naturalizations, which is “persons aged 18 and over who become citizens of the United States” (United States. Office of Immigration Statistics 2002-to date/2011: 1). This category considers that to opt for naturalization the immigrant had to be a legal resident for at least three or five years at least,

depending on the applicable migration law (see Zolberg 2006). Some of the problems of this data is that it does not express the connection between year of entry and year of naturalization. For example, someone could have been a legal resident since 1960 and the other since 1980 and if both became naturalized in 1990, both will appear in the 1991 yearbook or annual report. Another problem, related to this and mentioned by Irene Bloemraad, is that the data on naturalizations is not compared with total immigrants eligible for naturalization therefore is not possible to do major generalizations about political integration (Bloemraad 2012).

The second source of statistical data I use in this dissertation comes from the US decennial census for the decades of 1950 to 2000 and the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2010. This data comes for the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota. This data is available at the website of the IPUMS project (<http://usa.ipums.org/usa/index.shtml>). This microdata is comprised of individual records with demographic information on persons and households. These are samples from the US census that range from 1% sample (1950-1970) to 5% samples (1980-1990). The ACS is also a 1% random sample of the population but this already included on the original survey, therefore is the total sample of the ACS. I used weighted samples at the person level when appropriate to have a better representation of the total possible number of cases. The major limitation of this source is with the relations between sample size and total number of Chilean immigrants. Since the Chilean immigrant subpopulation is small, compared to other migrant groups, then the effect of the sample size is larger than, for example, the Mexican immigrant population. The objective of using this data is to provide a perspective on migration flows and stocks to characterize the migration and to introduce the four migration waves in comparative terms to other Southern Cone countries.

Consular information

I spent a few weeks doing exploratory field research in the Archivo Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Chile (Chilean Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) from now on Archivo MINREL. My goal was to find whether information existed about how the consulates abroad created linkages with the Chilean immigrants. The premise here is that the continuation of the relationships between a particular State and its citizens abroad is carried out by the Consulate; regardless of the particularities of the migration experience. According to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations the consulate has, among other things, to protect, assist and help its nationals.⁷ In particular I looked at the communications to and from the largest Chilean consulates in the US from 1950 till 1990; those of Miami, New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco. During a large part of this period the consulates in Chicago and Detroit were only Honorary Consulates.

A large portion of the documents available was related to the request of Chilean identity documents and other documentation such as renovation of passports and similar. Consular official communications that made reference to the interactions between the consulate as representative of the nation and the emigrant provided rich information on how the state saw the emigrants. During the period before 1973 the consulates usually sent information to Chile about the protection of Chilean citizens and activities the Chilean communities were doing to maintain and transmit Chilean culture and traditions. The period after 1973, however, show a consulate that is more attuned to the defense of the political objectives of the dictatorship. According to the documents, in this period the Chilean consulates became a key component in the public relations

⁷ See <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/vccr/vccr.html> (accessed Nov. 24, 2012)

effort of the dictatorship as were in forefront of the fight against exiles in the United States. The Chilean consuls in San Francisco and Los Angeles, for example, sent several urgent cables and official letters in the first few days after the coup to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Chile stating the need to counteract the bad press that the Junta was receiving in newspapers.

While this source is used here to complement the oral histories, in particular when these talk about the Chilean community, identity, and the presentation and representation of the nation, by itself this is a rich source of information to study the connections between emigrants and the home country and the perspective of developing linkages between both that deserve further exploration and study. I expect this will be a future research that derives from this dissertation.

Published Sources on Chilean History

One of the major concerns with the use of oral histories is whether the history presented by the narrator is in fact real; meaning it refers to episode that indeed happened when claimed and in the conditions that claimed. Scholars in this field have approached this topic from two perspectives (Thomson 1999). One option is to disregard most strict concerns about the veracity of the information; since what is important, as Portelli argues (1991: 52) is memory as an active process of creation of meaning. A second approach is to check for connections with written reports of the period being analyzed. Since, again following Portelli (1991) and Thomson (1999), these two approaches are not mutually exclusive I accepted the stories that my interviewees presented without worrying much about the construction of truth while at the same time I search for 'scientific' constructions of the periods I was studying. To complement the narratives with general histories of Chile I used mainly three books: Sofía Correa and her colleagues *Historia del Siglo XX chileno: Balance paradójico* (History of the Chilean Twentieth Century: A

paradoxical balance) published in 2001; Brian Loveman's *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism* published in 2001; Alan Angell's *Chile since 1958*, published in 1993 as part of Leslie Bethell's massive work on Latin American history.

I chose these three books based on their particular approaches to Chilean history. Correa et al was written following the example of Eric Hobsbawns *The Age of Extremes*, therefore it approaches Chilean history from multiple fields informing on changes in culture, politics, and social conditions during this period. Loveman's book not only is a classic in its third edition since 1979, but also provides a social and political approach to Chilean history, very useful to complement from a more macro perspective the analysis of historical change occurring in Chile between 1950 and 2010. Finally, Angell's piece is a more "traditional" political and economic history that presents the history of Chile using official governmental statistics and from a field that excludes the everyday actions of individuals to center in the process in the political sphere.

Obviously, these were not the only sources I used to inform the narratives. Throughout the dissertation I reference other more specific secondary sources from all the social sciences and journalism. Beyond this literature, I relied on Internet archival work to complement or inform asseverations made in the interviews. I was not always successful and the information when necessary I left information out of the dissertation when the doubts about the factuality of the narratives overweighed their utility in the argument about the decision to migrate. Two examples of this come in fact from the same oral history. Josefina mentioned several times the relevance of a strike in 1950 in her joining the labor force and eventually emigrating to the US. This was a very short—two months—but relevant strike of state workers of which there was no information in English, and the main books on Chilean history in Spanish did not cover. I reference a book

written by the leader of the strike and published in a worker's movement printing that provided a first person account of the situation. The second example is Josefina's story about a fire that destroyed the house where she had worked as a nanny in her first year in the US. In this fire the entire family died with the exception of the father. While I did an extensive search using Internet databases of US periodical I could not find any reference on when this happened and why—Josefina argued that the dog became alight from the chimney and had spread the fire to the rest of the house. Since this story, although very relevant to her life, did not influence her narrative of migration, I did not incorporate it into my analysis. Finally, when needed, I also used blogs, literary pieces, records of the Chilean parliament and other factual information available on web archives to complement and/or contrast the narratives in the analysis. The integration of these sources have allowed me to present a deep analysis of the decision to migrate of Chilean emigrants since the 1950s.

V. Conclusion

This is an interdisciplinary dissertation on the reasons that make migrants decide to leave their place of birth and move to another country. Using a model of migration decision based on defining migration as a social act that occurs at the interconnections of agency and structure and within different levels of analysis, in a migration system that is embedded on a changing international system I compare four waves of migration from Chile to the US in four different historical periods. Following Favell I propose that “migration studies need a simultaneously top-down as well as a bottom-up approach, and it needs history to temper the overwhelming topicality of the present” (2009: 260).

The migration decision is important to analyze because, as Demuth argues “it is important to keep in mind that no one will move light heartedly and without a cause...Most people prefer their home countries and will stay if conditions are even barely tolerable” (2000: 26). Migration, therefore, is a process that happens with external influence and under different conditions of constraints.

This decision to migrate is evoked through the memories of the participants of the study in reference to their pre migration period, during their life abroad and through the influence of home visits in the reconstruction of the memory of the nation. To achieve this I argue that the best method is the recollection of personal narratives as oral histories. I do not rely on this method alone. I relate these results to macro historical processes—official histories—official documents and statistical data. I begin the analysis of the decision to migrate of Chilean emigrants to the US since 1950 by presenting the migration as seen from the country of destination and through the analysis and comparison of large flows through time.

CHAPTER III

CHILEAN MIGRATION TO THE US SINCE THE 1950S: A LOOK FROM THE RECEIVING COUNTRY

I. Introduction

According to the US Census Bureau in June, 1950, 2,987 people born in Chile were living in the US. This was, at the time, the largest number of Chileans ever counted in a US census and represented a growth of more than 57% from the previous decade. Although Chileans represented a very small percentage of those in the US who were born in South America (6.17%) and even smaller proportions in regards to the entire Latin-Americans (5.1‰), foreign-born (2.6 per every 10,000) and total US population (0.2 per every 10,000), the population residing in the US and born in Chile had, between 1940 and 1950, a larger growth than any of these populations (Table 3 and Table 4). The increase in the Chilean-born population continued in the next decades. By the 1960 census the Chilean-born population had more than doubled to a total of 6,266 people. By the 1970 census it doubled again to about 13,800 people, grew three times in the next ten years, and then grew by 20,000 Chileans every decade until the latest data available in 2010 (see Figure 10, Table 3 and Table 4). This growth occurs concurrently with an increase in migration from South America and from Latin America to the US.

In this chapter I describe and analyze the changes in the flows and stocks of the Chilean-born population residing in the US between 1950 and 2010. I do this by comparing the changes in the flows—measured through immigrants visas awarded by the US—and the stocks—using census data—with major policy changes in the US, and to a lesser extent in Chile, that might have influenced an increase or decrease in migration flows from Chile to the US. This chapter is

divided into four sections. The first section presents a brief historical overview of the migration flows from Chile to the US up to 1950. The following three sections mostly mirror the structure of the dissertation. The second section deals with the migration between 1950 and 1973. In the third second I analyze the migration during the dictatorship (1973-1990). And in the fourth section I present the changes in the migration flows and stocks since 1990. For each section I present the main characteristics of the Chilean migrant stock during that era. I conclude by highlighting the characteristics that differentiate the Chilean migrants from other countries and regions in the Americas since the 1950s.


II. A brief history of the Chilean migration to the US to 1950

Migration from Chile to the US has been a permanent component of the relationship between the two countries. There have been Chileans migrants and visitors to this country since early 1800s but the first mass migration to the US would only occur in the late 1840s and was associated to the California Gold Rush (Nasatir 1974; Monaghan 1973). In 1850, shortly after the onset of the Gold Rush, close to 600 Chileans were enumerated in California. According to the US census, this was the only region of the US where there were Chileans. This group accounted for close to 60% of all the Southern Cone migrants and a third of all South Americans and Latin Americans in the entire country.¹ Ten years later the number of Chileans in the US and in California had almost doubled to 1,153, representing 94% of all Southern Cone immigrants in

¹ The category “Southern Cone” countries include Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay; the category South America includes the Southern Cone plus all the other countries in South America; and Latin America includes all Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries in the Americas.

the US, close to 60% of all South Americans and more than a third of all Latin Americans (Figure 10 and Table 3).

Figure 10
United States (1850-ACS2010): Total Population born in Chile and proportion of those born on Chile over total Southern Cone and South American born people.



Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

The Chilean migrant population had an important impact in California (Marki 2006). The “War of the Calaveras” or “Chilean War” was fought between Anglo and European and Chilean miners over the control of a mining zone. While many Chileans miners returned to Chile, some

stayed and quickly assimilated to the Californian Society. Currently only a few historical markers remain of that first Chilean migration to the US.²


The preeminence of the Chilean migration in California, compared to other Latin Americans, and in the US began to decline in the 1880s, reaching its lowest points in the second decade of the 20th century (Figure 10). In 1930 only 11% of Southern Cone migrants to the US were from Chile. Twenty years before, the 1910 Census reported the lowest proportion of Chileans among any foreign-born with less than one per every 10,000 immigrants. While this can be explained by the large overall amount of immigrants to the US in those years, it is also explained by the intercensal growth of the Chilean population (Figure 11).

Between 1880 and 1900 the Chilean-born population decreased by close to 25% and between 1900 and 1910 by almost 50% reaching the total of 612 people, only eleven people more than those counted in the 1850 census. Besides the large growth of the 1910-1920 decade, most likely due to the small comparison base, the Chilean-born population in the US continued reducing its participation among other immigrant groups until 1950. This and the following decades show both a qualitative and quantitative change in the Chilean migration to the US.

² For a brief introduction on the Chilean 49ers see Marki 2006 or López, Carlos, *Chilenos in the California Gold Rush, 1848-49*, at the Historical Text Archive, <http://www.historicaltextarchive.com/sections.php?action=readandartid=257> (accessed August 18, 2012). While the historical literature about this episode is limited, the stories about the Chilean 49ers have promoted an interesting national myth. According to this myth, the famous bandit Joaquín Murieta was Chilean. Murieta was the central character of Pablo Neruda's only play *Fulgor y Muerte de Joaquín Murieta* (1967) and more recently of Ariel Dorfman's novel *Americanos: Los pasos de Murieta* (2009).

Figure 11

United States (1850-ACS2010): Inter census growth of the population born in Chile.



Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

In the next sixty years (1950-2010), the stock of Chilean migration would increase reaching almost to 100,000 people; a 32 fold growth in sixty years. It would never again reach, however, the high proportion among Southern Cone, South American and Latin American immigrants as it had in the late 1800s. At its highest point (1980), the proportion of Chilean-born people among Southern Cone immigrants was 22.9%, the largest since 1910; 7% among South Americans, the largest since 1920; 9.7 per every 10,000 among Latin Americans, the largest since 1900; and 28.8 per every 10,000 among all foreign-born; the largest ever (Table 3). The levels of growth would also rival other regions of origin of foreign-born. Between 1950-1960 and 1970-1980, the Chilean-born population had higher growths than any other migrant group by region. These growth patterns remained very high (above 50% per decade) until 1990. Beginning


this decade, however, the growth rate began to decrease and was significantly lower (thirty points or more) than the growth of other migrant groups (Table 4).

Compared to the other countries of the Southern Cone, Chile had some of the highest emigrant to total population ratios in 1910 and in the 1950 to 2010 period (Figure 12 and Table 5). This measure compares the total number of emigrants to the US from each of the countries to their own populations of origin; giving a number of emigrants in the US per every 1,000 inhabitants residing in the home country during a particular census decade. This is not a measure of the total number of emigrants of any of these countries. Any of these countries could have more emigrants to anywhere else in the world; it only compares those emigrants that are residing in the US in a specific census decade.

Compared to the other countries of the Southern Cone, Chile has been since 1950 an important sender of migrants to the US. The ratio of emigrants to total population is higher for Chileans than for any other country in the Southern Cone in 1910 and 1960. While the population of Argentina and Brazil were significantly larger than the Chilean,³ the proportion of emigrant population to the population of origin in 1950 and 1960 was larger in Chile (0.50‰ and 0.85‰ respectively) than in Brazil (0.21‰ and 0.50‰) and only slightly smaller than that of Argentina (0.53‰ and 0.84‰). In 1970, the ratio for Chile was 4 times larger than the Brazilian ratio and two thirds that the Argentinean ratio during this time span (1950-2010).

³ The population of Brazil is roughly ten times larger and that of Argentina is 2.5 times larger than in Chile throughout the 1950-2010 period.

Figure 12
Proportion of emigrants residing in the US to total population of country of origin.
Southern Cone



Source: Ruggles et al. 2010; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas Chile (website <http://www.ine.cl>); Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (website <http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/>); Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos Argentina (website <http://www.indec.mecon.ar/>); and Instituto Nacional de Estadística Uruguay (website <http://www.ine.gub.uy/>).

Beginning in 1980, however, Chile had the highest ratio of emigrants to total country population of all the Southern Cone countries, with 3.43‰ Chileans in the US to 0.37‰ Brazilians and 2.53‰ Argentineans during this census round. This relationship stayed constant for the next three census rounds. By 2010 the ratio for all the countries was the largest of the

1950-2010 period. Still, Chile had the highest ratios, except for Uruguay,⁴ with 5.7‰ compared to 1.91‰ for Brazil and 4.46‰ for Argentina (Figure 3 and Table 5). Despite this, the total number of immigrants from Argentina and Brazil to the US is larger than that of the Chilean immigrants by factors that go from 1.52 times to 3.78 times during this period.

In sum, the Chilean emigration to the US since 1850 had shown three basic moments. The first, between 1850 and 1900, shows a strong numerical participation among immigrants from the Americas located mainly in California and associated to a particular set of conditions; the Gold Rush. The second period, between 1900 and 1950, shows a decrease in the total number of Chilean migrants and the relative participation in the total number of immigrants to the US. The third begins in 1950 and is connected to the larger changes in the relationship between the two countries, the development of new migration policies in the US and in general the new set of relationships in the international system.

III. Between two turning points: Chilean migration flows to the US between 1950 and 1973


The census of 1950 shows a moment of inflexion in the stock of Chilean-born population in the US. In 1950, 95% of Chileans in the US had been residing in the same house for a year or more (Table 4). Until this census the growth of this population had been continuous but small. Ten years later this percentage decreased to 27% and a third of the Chileans had arrived from abroad in the previous five years prior. In the 1960 census the stock of Chilean immigrants grew

⁴ The case of Uruguay is very particular. Although this country is the smallest of the four, with its population being between a third and a fifth of Chile, its emigration to the US ratio is the highest of all since 1970. This is due to a particular mix of political and economic problems in Uruguay that has close to one in every sex Uruguayans living abroad (Pellegrino and Vigorito 2005). This has meant that since 1970 Uruguay has by far the largest ratio of emigrants than any of the other Southern Cone countries, reaching its highest point in 2010 with 16.41‰.

by 50% to almost 3,000 people. This is the largest growth since the 1860 census, with the exception of 1920. In this census, this population represented almost 13% of all the immigrants from the Southern Cone and about 6% from South America. Within this group, males were about two thirds of the total and the sex ratio was highly skewed towards the male side with 179 males per each women (Figure 13 and see Table 7).

The sex ratio of the Chilean-born population was the highest when compared to the Southern Cone as a total and when compared to any other regions. Only Eastern and South East Asian immigrant have higher sex ratios in this census. The high sex ratio in the Chilean case may be due to a dual structure of mostly family migration headed by men and individual migrations of women. While close to 51% of the males were married and had their wives with them, only about 20% of the women did. Conversely, about a third of the women were married and were in the US without their husbands and more than 40% were single and had never married. These percentages for the males are only of 4.3% and 15.6% respectively (Table 8). This suggests that women were more prone to migrate by themselves; although they did not do it in numbers high enough to compensate the number of male-headed households (Table 9). The modernization of social structures in Chile and the increasing participation of women in the labor market might explain the migratory differences between males and females.

Figure 13
United States (1950-ACS2010): Population born in Chile and living in the United States by sex and sex ratio



Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

The 1950s showed a steady increase in Chilean immigration to the US, attributable, at least in part, to the changes in migration policy in the US in 1952. The conservative and restrictive Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, the McCarran-Walter Act, reinforced the existence of migration quotas, discriminating against immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, Asia and the Pacific, and Africa (Zolberg 2006). It included a strong plan of action against unauthorized migration, as well as the grounds for exclusion of immigrants based on whether they were ‘immoral’ or ‘subversive’, as well as being used as a tool for fighting the Cold War. It had at least two unanticipated consequences. First, it helped construct definitions and


legislation that allowed for the development of a refugee policy concerning refugees from ‘Communist’ nations (Zolberg 2006; Tichenor 2002). Second, it changed the characteristics of the migration stock from the Americas. Before this law, the majority of immigration to the US from the Americas was Canadian, most of whom were of European ancestry. Between 1952 and 1965, years in which this law was in action, Latin American and Caribbean comprised two thirds of the immigration from the ‘New World’ (Daniels 2004). The impact of this law on migration volumes might explain, as is seen in 1950 and 1960 census, the growth of the stock of immigrants from Latin America by 40% and those from South America by 84%; while the total foreign-born population decreased by almost 13% (see Table 4).

Data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (1953-1959) shows that the average growth per year among Chilean immigrants—i.e. people who entered the US with an immigrant visa—was 505 people (Table 9). The largest growth was in the years 1953 to 1954 and 1956 to 1957 when the number of immigrants grew by about 63%. The average yearly growth for this period was 21%, similar to the average growth of other visitors from Chile to the US; non-immigrants grew by an average of 18% and temporary visitors by 23%. In term of total numbers, the amount of non-immigrants—i.e. people that entered the US as students, diplomats, or other non-immigrant visas—almost triples; from slightly over 2,000 in 1953 to more than 5,500 in 1959 (see Figure 14 and Table 30). The Temporary visitors follow a similar pattern, while the naturalizations only double. It is important to consider that an individual can live his or her entire life in the US as a permanent resident without ever applying for naturalization and that an immigrant has to be a permanent resident for at least five years before being able to naturalize (United States. Immigration and Naturalization Service 1997).

The census of 1960 demonstrates the enormous change in the stock of Chilean immigrants in the US as the population born in Chile, resident in the US more than doubles its size. This growth was fueled mostly by a growth of Chilean women. While immigrant men grew by a 71%, immigrant women grew by almost 185% lowering the sex ratio to close to 110 men for every 100 women. This growth is associated by an increase in the number of women who came as married with their spouses present (Table 8 and Table 9). This percentage grew from the 20% mentioned above to a 63%; with the total number increasing almost nine times to 1,892 women. There is also a relative decrease in the participation of never married and single women; this percentage decreases to 23% although the total number increases from 426 to 695 women. It is important to note that the percentage of women married but without their spouses present and residing in the US is 0. This means that the number for this group of women decreased from 330 in 1950 to 0 in 1960. At the same time the number of widowed women increased from 0 in 1950 to 397 in 1960. Considering that those Chilean immigrants enumerated ten years earlier are part of an older migration flow is possible to argue that many of those spouses might have died. It is also possible that some of them might have been able to bring their spouses or remarried in the US. This is supported by the fact that the number of women spouses increased from 130 in 1950 (12% of the total) to 1,793 in 1960 accounting for 60% of all Chilean women residing in the US (Table 9). As in the previous decade, the ratio between the Chilean residing in the US compared to the population of origin (Table 5) is larger than the Brazilian (0.85‰ vs. 0.20‰), the Uruguayan (0.54‰) and about the same that the Argentinean (0.84‰).

Figure 14

United States (1950-1973): Population born in Chile by immigrant status and naturalization



Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service 1958-1974; table 14 and table 39.

This decade also shows an important growth among those who enter using an immigrant's visa. The yearly average inflow of immigrants more than doubles the previous period at 1,164 immigrants per year, as do the naturalization with 176 per year (Table 30). With the establishment of the Fulbright program, as well as other student and scholar exchange programs, connections between religious organizations and other governmental and non-governmental connections the US became more relevant not only as a receiving country for immigrants, but also for tourists, students and other visitors. In the 1960s, the yearly average of entrances of non-immigrants grew three-fold. Most of this growth took place before the signing of the 1965 "Hart-Celler" Immigration and Nationality Act. While these set of amendments to the 1953 Immigration and Nationality Act, abolished the national quotas and was conceived as a

more humanitarian migration legislation compared to that of 1953, it also placed a cap on migration from the Western Hemisphere (Tichenor, 2002; Daniels 2004).

The 1965 legislation also changed the sources of immigration from North and West Europe to East and Central Europe, largely increased the number of immigrants from Asia, reduced the number of immigrants from South America and Canada, and increased those from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean (Keely 1971). In Chile, and following Keely's analysis (1971) this meant close to a 30% reduction in the yearly immigrants received between 1965 and 1967. The annual number of Chilean immigrants would decrease to less than 1,000 each year between 1967 and 1972; while the number of non-immigrants would continue growing by a minimum of 11% (1969-1970) to a maximum of 28% in 1965-1967. The yearly average growth of the immigrant population between 1960 and 1965 was of close to 16%, while that of 1966 to 1970 was about -13%; for a total close to 2% for the entire decade. After the enactment of the 1965 law the ratio of non-immigrants to immigrants would increase more than 20 non-immigrants per each immigrant when between 1960 and 1965 was not higher than 7 non-immigrants per each immigrant. Similar changes occurred in the other countries of the Southern Cone.

Between 1960 and 1970 the number of Chileans living in the US more than doubled again to a total of 13,800 immigrants and, as in the previous decade, this growth mostly due to female migration. During this decade the male migration grew by 85% and the female grew by 158% bringing down the sex ratio to 79 men for every 100 women. Most of this growth can be associated to an increase in family migrations. The number and proportion of children among Chilean immigrants increased to a total of 1,900; 14% of the total (Table 9). These are the highest number and proportion ever registered. For women, while there is a decrease in the

proportion of married with spouses present relative to 1960, the total number grew by 1,200 women (Table 9). There are also relative increases in the proportion of separated and divorced (5.2% each) and never married or single (31.2%). The percentage of widows remains almost the same, although the absolute number tripled. Finally, there is also an increase in the number of women who came as other relatives (parents, in-laws, siblings), which more than doubles compared to the previous measure, although its proportion remained similar with close to a 14% of all women.

The ratio of emigrants to total population for Chileans in the US was still higher than that of Brazilians (1.55‰ to 0.37‰). Once again, a greater proportion of Argentines immigrated to the US (2.17‰) and most surprisingly by the Uruguayan; prefacing the huge emigration that this country is going to suffer beginning in the late 1960s; 2.19 of every 1,000 Uruguayans living in the US.

The four years before the Chilean coup of September 11, 1973⁵ show a steady increase of the people entering with immigration visas when compared with the last years of the 1960s (Table 30). Between 1970 and 1973 an average of 946 people entered yearly with an immigrant visa. Although this is smaller than the average for the previous decade; the yearly average growth is higher; with an 8.6% growth compared to a 5.1% growth. The number of visitors also peaked in 1971 to almost 34,000 people in that year only to have negative growths of -14% and -6% the following two years. After reaching a maximum in 1971 with 35.6 non-immigrants for every immigrant, this value begins to slowly decrease reaching 24.1 in 1970, a similar level to 1968.


⁵ Actually until June 30 of that year which is the end of the fiscal year for immigration statistics.

With regards to citizenship, two sources are key to understand the Chilean migrants in the United States. The first is the census question on citizenship status—only available for the census line⁶ in 1950—; and the second are the naturalizations recorded by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service between 1953 and 1973. According to the 1950 census (Table 31), Chile had a higher percentage of non-citizens (38.2%) than any other migrant group, except all the Latin Americans combined (60.6%). Consequently, the percentage of citizens was also the second smallest; less than 40% had acquired the citizenship. In the case of Chile, the period between 1953 and 1973 shows that the percentage of naturalizations over the total number of people that immigrated the same year fluctuates from a minimum of 8.4% in 1962 to a maximum of 56% in 1972.

The most salient data of this period is the growing number of naturalizations, with an average of 410 per year. This is much higher than the decade of the 1960s with only 176 per year. In fact, the total number of naturalizations between 1970 and 1973 is only slightly smaller than that of the entire 1960s (1,641 cases vs. 1,759 cases). The ratio of naturalizations reaches its highest proportion in 1972 when is more than half of the immigrants. The naturalization exceeded a third of the immigrants visa. This means that, although the groups are not the same, for every Chilean that was naturalized about three entered the US with an immigrant visa. This ratio is higher for Chile than for any country in the Southern Cone, all of South America and North America, except Argentina (Figure 15).

⁶ Census line refers to a particular sample used in the 1940 and 1950 through one member of the household, not necessarily the head of household, had to answer an extended set of questions. (<http://usa.ipums.org/usa/intro.shtml#sampleline> accessed October 25, 2012)

Figure 15
United States (1953-1973): Percentage of naturalizations over total immigrants admitted.
Southern Cone countries and total South America.



Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service 1953-1973


The number of naturalization grew continuously, year by year. While the minimum and maximum percentages, and therefore the ranges of variation are different for all the countries of the Southern Cone and South America, the variations occurred at roughly the same years (Figure 15). The processes and decisions over nationalizations have more to do with what is happening in the country of reception than in the country of origin. There is a time gap between the time of arrival and the date of naturalization. In general age, sex, distance from country of origin (similar to all Southern Cone countries), occupation and income, and reasons for migrating are variables that define the decisions to naturalize (DeSipio 1987; Woodrow-Lafield et al 2004).

In 1950 almost 40% of Chilean immigrants lived in the Western region of the US (Table 32), although New York was the individual state with the highest percentage of Chileans (31.8% - Table 33). The age structure of this population is very segmented; about 23% had between 25 and 34 years of age, about 23% had between 50 and 59, and 11% were over age 80 (Table 34). It had, however, a low dependency ratio⁷ (18.3 - table 13) which indicates a migration concentrated at working ages. In terms of their social characteristics, most had between nine and twelve years of education, but had not received a high school diploma, or less years of education (76% - Table 36); were working as service workers—not household related—(22.3% Table 37), in industries of personal services (30.8% - Table 38), and the self reported income of the largest percentage was at the third decile (32% - Table 39). Although slightly more than 40% were above the seventh decile.

In terms of geographical residence, men were most likely to live in the Northeast (49%) and women in the West (68%). While the largest percentage of men have between 50 and 54 years of age (16.3% - Figure 16), women are much younger; the largest percentage for this group has between 15 and 19 years of age (11%).

⁷ The dependency ratio relates the number of children (0-14 years old) and older persons (65 years or over) to the working-age population (15-64 years old). The ratio indicates the potential effects of changes in population age structures for social and economic development, or how many working age people are required to maintain the non-working population.


Figure 16
Age-sex structure population born in Chile and residing in the US, 1950



Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

With eight years of education or less, men (65%) were less educated than women who have between nine and twelve years of education (87%). While the largest percentage of migrants worked on service related occupations (37.7%), men were more prone to do it on retail and non-household related services (33.8%), while women worked in private households (45%). Men were also prevalent in craftsmen (27%) and managerial and similar (22%) occupations, and women in clerical occupations (34%). In general Chilean migrants were mostly in personal services industries (31%). Men had, relative to women, a higher personal income, with a majority of them in the fifth decile (65%) compared to the third decile (53%) of women.

Figure 17
Age-sex structure population born in Chile and residing in the US, 1960




Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

The changes in the stock of migrants during the 1950s are clear in the characteristics of the Chilean-born population present in the 1960 census. Both men and women now are more prevalent in the Northeast (49%) with New York still as the main receiver of Chilean immigrants (37%). The age groups more similar as well. In case of men the most representative age group is now the 30 to 34 years of age (14.3% - Figure 17), twenty years younger than in the previous census. In the case of women, it increased by five years to 20 to 24 years (12.7%). The dependency ratio is even lower; only 8.6. This is representative of a population without many dependents as is observed in Figure 8.

In 1960 men have more years of education as compared with the previous census; most of them having a Bachelor's degree or five years of college or more (33%), although 46% do not have a high school diploma. Despite the increase of education, the largest percentage of men work as service workers (23%), or as craftsmen (23%) in industries that manufacture durable goods (23%) or in retail trade (20%). Their level of income has increased with 60% at the seventh decile or higher. Women, on the other hand, have less years of education than 10 years before; 47% have only eight years of education or less and another 37% do not have a diploma. Their occupation, however, has improved. While a majority is not in the labor force (68% - Table 40), of those who are working the largest percentage do so in clerical occupations (24%) and not in household service (24%); mostly in professional services industries (30%).occupations of private households, they also work in clerical occupations and on professional services. Their income decile, however, has decreased; the largest percentage (47%) is only at the 2nd decile and three quarters of them below the sixth decile

There are very small changes between 1960 and 1970. The West is now the main receiving region (45%) and California is the main state (37%). The most representative age group for men is between 25 and 29 years (10%), 5 years younger than in the previous census. For women the age group remains the same (7.2%) but the age group of 50 to 54 years is as important (Figure 18). The dependency ratio is now slightly over 30%, which implies a large proportion of Chileans over 65 or under 15 not in the labor force. This could represent a larger percentage of families.

Figure 18
Age-sex structure population born in Chile and residing in the US, 1970



Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

A large majority of this immigrant group arrived after 1950 (72% - Table 41). The educational level for men decreased to nine to twelve years, no diploma (53%) with 13% more with less than 8 years of education. Regardless of this, the work sector improved. The largest percentage worked as craftsmen (38%), or in professional and technical occupations (17%), in industries that manufacture durable goods (26%) and in retail trade (26%). Over 72% have an income level equal or higher than the seventh decile. Women, increase their educational level to nine to twelve years of education, no diploma (47%) while 20% still have less than eight years of education. Although a majority is still not in the labor force (54.9%), the occupation of those who are has improved to clerical (34%), and professional and technical (26%) in professional

and related industries (46%). This did not have, however, an impact on the income levels; 53% are still at or below the fourth decile.


IV. Migration flows in dictatorial times, 1973-1990

Pinochet's dictatorship played a central role in the changes of Chilean emigration to both the United States and to every country in the world. While the US was not a main receiver of exiles, it did received 500 parolees in 1978 and many other individuals and families that decided to leave Chile for political and economic reasons. The changes in the flows of this migration are traceable through an analysis of immigrants' visa (Figure 15 and Table 9).

Between mid June of 1973 and mid June of 1980 a yearly average of 2,093 people from Chile entered the US with immigrant visas: this is the highest recorded amount in the twentieth century and totaled 14,653 people in the 1973-1980 period. The average yearly growth was close to 16%, the second highest of all the period between 1953 and 2011. While the first three years (1974-1976) show a similar pattern to the migration flows of the early to mid 1960s, after 1977 the Chilean yearly migration surpasses for the first time the 2,000 immigrants per year. The peak of Chilean immigration, measured through the entrance with an immigrant visas, occurs in 1978. The following year the number of immigrants declined to close to 2,300; a number closer to the real immigration pattern during the 1970s (Figure 19).

The number of Chileans entering the US as non-immigrants continues to increase in the 1974-1980 period, although the yearly average growth (9.21%) was smaller than the average until 1970. Despite this smaller increase, still an average of 34,788 non-immigrants and 24,368 temporary visitors from Chile entered the US until 1980. The reinsertion of Chile within the non-

socialist countries allied with the US in the Cold War did not produce a large increase in the population exchange between the two countries. It did, however, signal a recovery from the 3.9% yearly average growth of Chilean non-immigrants and the 1.3% of temporary visitors yearly average growth in the 1970-1973 period.



Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service 1958-1974; table 14 and table 39.

This immigration to the US meant that the stock of Chilean foreign-born population had grown 180%, according to the 1980 Census, to a total of 38,640 people (Figure 11 and Table 4). This, the largest growth ever recorded, was three times larger than the growth of the Southern Cone immigrants (60.2%), and larger than the growth of South American (115.3%), Latin American (124.7%) and whole foreign-born population (38.5%). This is also the largest

intercensal net growth of the Chilean-born population with an increase of 24,840 people in ten years. Considering that the number of immigrant visas awarded in the same period was close to 18,500; then at least 6,400 non-immigrants had stayed in the US and became part of the Chilean immigrant stock. Of the 38,640 Chileans in the 1980 census 48.4% were males and the sex ratio was close to 93.8 males per every 100 women. This sex ratio is more representative of a common distribution among sexes in a population in fact, in 1980 the total sex ratio for Chile was 97.3 males per every 100 women and for the United States was 94.5 males per every 100 women (United Nations et al 2011).


About half of Chilean men and women were married and living with their spouses present in 1980. This percentage is 4 and 10 points respectively higher than ten years before. At the same time, about a third of both men (38%) and women (31%) were single and had never been married (Table 8). This migration was still, however, largely family and male dominated. As in the previous census, 62.5 % of the men defined themselves as head of households and only 2% as spouses; conversely 16.6% of the women were head of households—a reduction of 5.5 points in ten years—and 48% defined themselves as spouses. Women are also more represented than men in the categories of parent, parent-in-law and siblings when asked to their relation with the head of household (4.9% vs. 1.7%). Although these percentages are small they suggest an increase extended family migration with a man as a head for the Chilean stock of migrants in the 1980 census.

The 1980s is known as the “lost decade” in Latin American development (Correa et al 2001). Starting with the debt crisis in 1982, the entire region suffered during this decade a decline in 7% in average GDP per capita and a 15% decline in domestic expenditure; wages fell 6% as percentage of the GDP; poor and indigent population grew between two and three percent,

particularly in urban areas where it grew by 6 percent (French-Davis et al 1998). This major economic crisis led to a major growth in the South American immigration to the US (Marrow 2007). Chilean immigration to the US also continued to grow during the 1980s. This migration was directly influenced by Pinochet's dictatorship, who remained in power until 1990, and the debt crisis that began in 1982. Between 1982 and 1983, the Chilean GDP fell 14.4%; industry and commerce grew negatively by -21% and -23% respectively; and the change in real salaries fell by -10.9% (Meller 1996: 233-236). This was the largest and most severe economic crisis in Chile for over fifty years (Meller 1996). At the same time and directly connected with the economic crisis there was an increase in popular dissent against Pinochet that led to the first street protests and to an increase in the repression of these opponents to levels not seen since the late 1970s. These two situations produced a new increase in the immigration from Chile.

The average yearly growth of immigrant visas was, however, smaller in this period than in the previous decade (6.1%), but the average number of Chileans entering the US with an immigrant visa is the largest ever on record (2,344 people per year). Between 1981 and 1985 the number of Chileans entering the country remains roughly at about 2,000 per year. With the passing of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 the numbers began to grow as the ceiling for immigrant rose as well (Thichenor 2002; Daniels 2004). Between 1986 and 1988 the Chilean migration surpassed the 2,100 immigrants per year for the first time since 1980, the year the 1980 Refugee Act was passed, allowing Chileans who entered before 1981 as parolees to remain in the US (Reimers 1985: 189). By 1989, however, Chilean migration had grown by 42% to a yearly total of 3,037 immigrants and in 1990 to 4,049 immigrants; most likely fueled by the Legalization Program of IRCA (Yang 1995).

Figure 20
United States (1950-ACS2010): Citizenship status of Chilean-born population living in the US.



Source: Ruggles et al. 2010


In relation to the processes of naturalization, the 1980 census claims that two thirds of the Chilean-born population residing in the US were not citizens and only a bit less than 28% were naturalized citizens (Figure 20 and Table 31). The proportion of Chileans that became citizen of the US in the 1980-1990 period increases, according to the 1990 census, 4 percent points to 32% with still close to 59% not being citizens.

The proportion of Chileans that were naturalized citizens in 1980 (28%) was lower than those of other Southern Cone countries (34.6%) but was comparable to other South Americans (25.3%) and other Latin Americans (27%). These percentages were significantly smaller than the

naturalization rates for other countries of the world (54.8%) and of the total foreign-born (47%). By 1990 and most likely due to the regularization efforts of IRCA (Tichenor 2002), the proportions of naturalized citizens became similar and there are almost no differences between the percentage of naturalized citizens from Chile (32%) from those from other South American countries (31.4%) or other South American countries (28%). While the percentage of Chilean naturalized is similar to that of the total foreign-born (37%) is much smaller than those from other regions in the world (44.1%).

Figure 21

United States (1953-1973): Percentage of naturalizations over total immigrants admitted.
Southern Cone countries and total South America.




Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service 1953-1973

Looking at the rate of naturalizations per year compared to the entrance of immigrants (Figure 21), the number of naturalizations remains fairly flat with numbers of about 400 to 600 per year between 1974 to 1982. In 1983 this number increased to 760 and from 1984 to 1990 will remain between 860 and 1,213 per year with an average of close to 870 per year. In terms of its relation to the number of immigrants, there are significant changes in the 1974 to 1990 period.

From 1983 to 1990 there was an increase in the number of naturalizations and in the percentage of naturalizations over number of immigrants per year. The average percentage of naturalizations was close to 42% with a minimum of 21% in 1990 and a maximum of 61% in 1985. First, those who immigrated to the US in the 1970s and early 1980s had reached the number of years that would allow them to naturalized. They percentage increased due to their higher numbers. Second, the changes in immigration policies allowed a larger number to become naturalized. The rate of naturalization of Chilean immigrants during the 1974-1982 period was smaller than that of other Southern Cone countries and South America in general (Figure 21).

By 1980 the largest percentage of Chilean migrants resided in the West region (33%), while another third lived in the Northeast (31%). California remained the main receiving state. At the same time the population had gotten slightly older. The largest proportions of men were now those between 35 and 39 years (6.5%), between 25 to 29 years (6.4%), and those between 30 to 34 age group (6.2%). Divided almost equal in these three age groups, almost 19% of women had between 25 and 39 years of age (Figure 22).

Figure 22
Age-sex structure population born in Chile and residing in the US, 1980




Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

The educational level for men increased; a majority of them had at least a high school degree (57%). Women's most representative level of education remains the same, with the largest percentage having nine to twelve years of education, no diploma (46%), but in this census more than a quarter of them have a high school diploma or some college. The occupations of Chilean men improved to professional and technical occupations (24%), working on professional and related industries (17%) and retail trade (16%). This most likely impacted their income levels with one-fifth of the men at the tenth decile and 40% between the seventh and ninth decile. In the case of women, a majority were then in the labor force (54%), and although their occupations have not changed, their income levels decreased significantly to the first decile

(32%). The income inequality between men and women is interesting. While almost 60% of men are above the seventh decile, 55% of women are below the fourth decile.

Figure 23

Age-sex structure population born in Chile and residing in the US, 1990



Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

By 1990 there is another important geographical change in the Chilean-born population. In that census this population was almost equally divided by thirds in terms of their regional locations; 32% lived in the West, 31% in the South and 30% in the Northeast. The Midwest completely lost its relevance as a receiving region and continued to decrease in the next census. One quarter of all Chileans live in California. In 1990 men were younger than ten years earlier with the largest percentage between 30 and 34 years of age (6.3%), although the age structure

began to resemble the structure of a working age population with more than a third of the population between 20 and 60 years (Figure 23). The age structure of women was also very similar. The largest percentage of women had between 30 and 34 years of age and between 35 and 39 (6% each). The dependency ratio was 22.5 per 100 Chilean in working ages, one of the lowest all migrant groups during this census.


In everything else the characteristics remained similar as ten years earlier. In the case of women, the differences were that in this census close to 83% had at least a high school diploma. Also the largest concentration of women were clerical occupations (26%) and professional and related services (24%) in professional and related industries (31%). The personal income level remained also at the first decile.

The 1990 US census coincided with the end of the dictatorship in Chile. The next seven years were years of macro-economic, political and social stability for Chile. While this did not reduce the level of migration, it certainly changed the composition of this migration once again.

V. Migration flows in a neoliberal democracy, 1990 to 2011

By 1990 the growth in immigration visas and other visitors had pushed the Chilean migration stock up to a total of 62,029 people, 48% of which were males with a very similar sex ratio (92.3 men for every 100 women) to ten years earlier (Figure 13 and Table 7). The marital characteristics of this population are almost equal to that of the 1980 census; 52% of males and 51% were married with their spouses present and a third of each were single and never married. With regards to the relation to the head of household the percentages are also very similar; 63% of men were head of household compared to 19% of women, while 3% of men were spouses

compared to 47% of females. Also in 1990 the percentage of women (8.6%) who are part of the extended family surpasses by 3 points the percentage of men (5.6%).



Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service 1958-1974; table 14 and table 39.

The next ten years, the first decade of democratic rule in Chile since 1973, show a decrease in the number of immigrants to the US. After the regularization process of 1990 the number of Chileans that entered the US with an immigrant's visa fell by 30% each year in 1991 and 1992. With the exception of a small recovery in 1996, the decrease will continued throughout the 1990s to reach its lower point in 1999, year in which only 1,092 Chilean immigrants entered the US (Figure 24 and Table 30). This number, the lowest since 1972, among

other reasons, can be explained by home country factors. Besides the political change, the 1990-1998 GDP average growth was, according to the International Monetary Fund, 7.3% with an average inflation of 11.5% in the same period, marking the best economic moment in the history of the country, at least according to one source (Anitat 2000).

By 2000 the Chilean-born population residing in the US had increased by 18,000 people (Table 3). The intercensal growth, however, had declined to 36% almost half the growth of the previous intercensal period and smaller than the growth of all the other groups of foreign born. The proportion of Chileans over Southern Cone and South American immigrants had also declined to less than one-fifth and about 4% respectively. The proportion of Chileans over every other migrant group also declined during this period. The only increase is in the proportion that Chileans are over the total US population. While minimal, it grew from 2.7 per every 10,000 people in 1990 to 3.4 per 10,000 people. This increase has more to do with the diminution of natural growth (births minus deaths) among the native born US population and the increase in all migrant groups than any real change in the Chilean population. As in the previous census, the ratio of Chilean immigrants in the US compared to their population of origin (5.57‰) is again higher than the ratio for Argentina (3.61‰) and for Brazil (1.31‰), despite the differences in total population of these countries (Table 5).

The proportion of women over the total population decreased slightly in the 2000 census when compared to ten years earlier and the sex ratio reached 98 men per every 100 women. This is the closest that this proportion will get to having the same number of women and men in the 1950-2011 period. This implies a larger migration of men than women, an increase in the death rate of women compared to that of men, or an increased in the return of women in the previous ten years. There is no information in the census to sustain any analysis regarding this last point.

The percentage of widowed men, however, did increase slightly between 1990 and 2000. The percentage of men that identified as spouses of women heads of household also increased but by 4 points. On the flip side, the percentage of widowed women and of women “spouses” decreased in the same period (Table 7 and Table 8). These small changes, might imply that the Chilean migration is slowly becoming more egalitarian; not only are the men migrating with their family but also women are migrating as head of household. The changes, however, are still small. The percentage of men that came as head of household is still high (57%), but six points smaller than in the previous decade. The proportion of women that defined themselves as heads of household in the census is still low (23.7%), but more than 3 points higher than in 1990.

The economic crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s in Chile influenced the pace of migration. In the first year of the millennium the number of Chileans that entered the US with an immigrant visa increased by close to 57% and slightly over 14% by April 2001. The migratory restrictions placed by the US after the terrorists attacks of 9/11/2001 impacted the migration flows from every country and Chile was no exception to this. In the next two years the migration flows are going to fall by almost 6% in 2002 and then by 30% in 2003. Chilean immigration resumes its growth and is increases between 30% and 40% between 2004 and 2005.

The recovery of the Chilean economy by the second half of the decade and the beginnings of the current economic crisis in the US may explain the somewhat erratic migration flows from Chile to the US in the second half of the 2000s, this especially considering that there are no major changes in the migration laws in the US, and the political scene is stable both in Chile and between Chile and the US. One significant event was the signing of the free trade agreement between Chile and the US in 2004, which created a new visa category for Chilean professionals, but since it does not allow permanent immigration, it does not influence the flow

of immigrants—measured through immigrant’s visas. In this period the Chilean migration increased by 15% in 2006 to fall the following years by 18% and then by 11%, only to increase again by 12% in 2009, and finally to decrease again by 13% in 2010.


The most recent information available through the American Community Survey of 2010 shows the number of Chileans in the US close to 100,000 people, specifically at 96,444 people, a 52% of which were women. The sex ratio was the lowest of the last thirty years with only 92 men for every 100 women. A previous measurement in 2004 by the Chilean Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE – National Statistical Institute) and the Dirección para las Comunidades Chilenas en el Exterior (DICOEX – Chilean Communities Abroad Office) through a survey in the countries of reception had estimated the total number of Chileans in the US to be 113,934 both born in Chile (80,805) and born abroad of Chilean parents and living in the US (33,129). This makes the US the second largest receiving country of Chilean population after Argentina (Chile. MINREL. DICOEX and INE 2005).

The first ten years of this era (1991-2000) show mostly an increase in the naturalizations of Chilean immigrants. Indeed the average per year in the 1990s is larger than the previous decade by almost 200 cases which represent an average growth of 18% each year. Despite this increase in naturalizations the yearly growth fluctuates ‘wildly’. For example, in 1991-1992 it decreased by 23%, only increase the following two years by 21% and 40%, then to increase again by 114% in 1996 to fall the next two years by 53% and 22%, to increase again in 1999 by 88%. As Martin suggests, the increase in naturalizations, in particular during 1996 reflected the increase in migration in the later years on the 1980s, the Green Card Replacement Program, and the “enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, which made some legal immigrants ineligible for federal welfare programs, creating and

incentive to naturalize” among other reasons (Martin 2004:73). The other Southern Cone countries and South America share a similar pattern. The ratio of naturalization to total number of immigrants for Chile during in this period is smaller than the ratio of Argentina and Uruguay and similar to that of other South American countries (Figure 25).

Figure 25

United States (1991-2011): Percentage of naturalizations over total immigrants admitted.
Southern Cone countries and total South America.




Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service 1953-1973

While a majority of those enumerated in the 1980 and 1990 census had arrived between 1975 and 1990 (60%), by 2000 one-third of Chileans had arrived to the US only ten years earlier, since 1991. This shows a generational change in the stock of migrants in the US. This means, for example that—assuming that these migrants came directly from Chile—at least one-third of

Chilean-born living in the US grew up in Chile during the dictatorship. Ten years earlier that was not the case; a large percentage (40%) had never lived in Chile during Pinochet's regime and about 60% had left the country during the dictatorship. Geographically now most Chilean migrants, regardless of sex, lived in the South (37%). In particular, Florida becomes the largest received (20%). In terms of age both men and women are five years older than in the previous census, being the most representative age group that of 35 to 39 years (6% for each men and women - Figure 26). The dependency ratio of 27.8 per 100 Chileans in the labor force continuous to be one of the lowest of all migrant groups.


Figure 26
Age-sex structure population born in Chile and residing in the US, 2000



Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

A large majority of both groups, as well, have at least a high school degree or some college (close to 83% for each group) and they work on similar occupations: Professional and technical occupations (25%) and in industries categorized as professional and related services (23%). As in previous census, the inequalities in personal income are large; more than 50% of men are within the top four deciles, while for women is the opposite; 50% of them are within the lowest three deciles.

Figure 27
Age-sex structure population born in Chile and residing in the US, 2010



Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

The American Community survey of 2010, the most recently available measure, shows that there are no relevant changes since the 2000 census. Two fifths of all Chileans now live in

the South and Florida increased its share slightly to 22%. Men, particularly, remain exactly the same as in the previous census. There are, however two interesting changes for women. First, they are older. The largest age group of Chilean-born women was between 40 and 44 years of age (7.3% - Figure 27). Second, and unlike men, the largest proportion of women have arrived since 2001. As in the case of men, however, the difference between those who arrived between 1991 and 2000 and since 2001 is less than 2%. In general, almost 50% of Chilean arrived since 1991, compared to one-fifth that arrived before 1974. In both male and females the education levels continued to increase; 90% had a high school degree or higher. This did not have, however, impacts on the income inequalities; 60% of women were in the bottom five quintiles and 60% of men were in the top five quintiles.

VI. Conclusion

The Chilean-born population in the US is a highly educated migrant group that share activities and income characteristics with other Southern Cone migrants and yet is distinct from other Latin American migrants. Census data suggests that their integration to the US socioeconomic system does not parallel their educational levels directly. The comparatively small number of Chileans entering the US, however, complicates the analysis from the perspective of migration policies in the receiving country. The relatively small number of Chileans in relation to other migrant groups make it difficult for this country's immigrant particularities to be considered when immigration policies are discussed. Most migration policies are defined in terms needs and characteristics of the larger immigrant groups, Mexicans or Chinese, for example.

When compared to other migrant groups, in the 1950 census, Chilean immigrants rank among the highest educated. The next two censuses present dramatic change in the educational composition of the Chilean foreign-born population. By 1960 the percentage of Chileans with bachelor's degree is the highest compared to any other region of origin of migrant and higher than the population born in the US. The census of 1970 shows a continuation of historical trend; making the Chilean foreign-born one of the most educated of the migrant in the US. The census of 1980 showed an increase in the general level of education of the Chilean-born population and in most of the variables used to identify migrants with a socio-economic position (income, occupation and industry). With some small fluctuations this improvement will continue for the next ten years and even after. When compared to other regions of the world, the census information present the Chilean-born immigrants as similar to those of the Southern Cone and better than immigrants from other American nations. For example in 1980 the percentage of those with less than eight years of education was 27 points higher for the Americas and 21 points higher for the total foreign-born that in Chile. At the opposite end of the education levels, those with a bachelor's degree where 10 percent points less in the case of the Americas and six percent points for the total foreign-born when compared to the Chilean population. While when compared country by country (some East and South East Asian countries for example) the general level of education of the Chilean-born will be most likely not as high, these percentages position this migrant group as a highly educated population.

The 1990 census reinforces the findings of previous censuses that Chilean immigrants are more educated. When compared to other regions, the Chilean-born population presents lower percentages than any other native born or migration group among those that have eight or less years of education. With regards to those with a tertiary education, other Latin American

immigrants have the lowest percentage (11%) likely influenced by the large amount of Mexican workers who work on primary sector industries. The Chilean-born percentage (33.4%) is one of the highest, only comparable to that of other foreign-born (36%) and other Southern Cone (35.6%). For all the other groups the proportion of immigrants with higher degrees of education is closer to one quarter of their populations, as it is for the population born in the US. There are some interesting differences at the different types of tertiary degrees. While Chilean-born and other South American immigrants have higher percentages of people with an associate's degree (about 8%), the percentages of people with Bachelor's degrees and post graduate studies are slightly higher for other Southern Cone and other foreign-born. By the year 2000, 30% of Chileans had a tertiary degree, a percentage slightly smaller than that of Other Southern Cone immigrants, but much higher than other Latin Americans (less than 8%). By 2010 this difference increased by two points.

The Chilean-born population age 14 and over in the labor force were by 1950 in occupations that theoretically should come with higher salaries. About 11% of them are in professional and technical occupations while 14% are managers or officials. These percentages are also similar higher than any other group except other South Americans which as 18% are professional and technical. As a point in comparison of the total foreign-born population in 1950, a 6.3% are in professional and technical occupations and 12% are managers or officials. The difference between Chileans (and people from the Southern Cone in general) and those immigrants from other regions is the participation in low skilled occupations. Less than 1% of Chileans are operatives there are no farmed laborers and only 5.6% of laborers. The percentages in the other groups are as high as an average of one fifth of operatives between 4% and 8% of

farm laborers (being the outlier those immigrants from other Latin America with 24%) and between 6% and 8% of laborers.

In terms of the industries where Chilean immigrants work, throughout his sixty year period, they are mostly in the tertiary sector as are most immigrants and natives, except for other Latin Americans. This group, clearly influenced by the Mexican foreign-born, is in primary sector industries particularly in 1950 and 1960, before the end of the Bracero program.⁸ The percentage of Chileans in the secondary sector (an average of 25%) is similar to that of other countries of origin, which reflects the beginnings of the passing from an industrial economy to post-industrial economy in the United States.

In terms of median income, at the 1950 census the personal income was very similar to that of other Latin Americans and lower than any other migrant and people born in the US (non-migrants - Table 42). By 1960 the median personal income became higher than any other immigrant regional group in the US. It was almost \$2,000 higher than that of other Latin Americans and \$400 higher than other Southern Cone immigrants. This trend continued in the following census, the median income of the Chilean immigrants was still among the highest of the immigrant regional groups, equal to that of other Southern Cone immigrants and almost \$6,000 higher than that of other Latin American immigrants. With regards to family in 1950 was consistently higher than any other group, but in the coming decades would become lower than other Southern Cone immigrants but higher than the rest of the Americas. Since 1990, it becomes higher than any other group except for those immigrants not from the Americas.

⁸ The Bracero Program was a temporary worker established between the US and Mexico during World War II to help supplement the number of agricultural workers needed in the US food industry. Ended in 1964 (Reimers 1985).

An analysis based solely on the census or in other types of migration data does not allow us to understand the reasons why these people decided to migrate to the US. Or even if the conditions which existed during the Cold War had any effect on the migration patterns and flows from Chile to the US. In order to understand this we need to listen (and read) the personal narratives of why some of these people came to the US when they did it. It is to this that I now turn.

CHAPTER IV
YO ME VINE DE AVENTURERO (I CAME AS AN ADVENTURER):
COLD WAR MODERNIZATION, MIDDLE-CLASS IDEOLOGY, AND MIGRATION

I. Introduction

In the previous chapter I presented the changes in the patterns of Chilean immigration to the US since 1950. I argue there that there are multiple changes in the country of destination that influence immigration patterns. There are at the same time multiple changes in the home country of origin that also impact emigration. In this chapter I begin intersecting the connections between the two by analyzing the oral histories of the emigrants who left Chile between 1950 and the September 11 of 1973.¹ I argue that ideas of modernity play a pivotal role in the decision to migrate among Chilean migrants in the US and the conceptualization of migration as an adventure. In this chapter I discuss two concatenated arguments. The first is that the continuous construction of the US as a center of modernity, reinforced by Modernization theory as developed during the Cold War, served—unintentionally—to attract migrants to the US. The second argument is that patterns of capitalist development in Chile, which led to the rise of an economically, socially and politically relevant and active middle class in this country, resulted in a segment of the country's population being prone to migrate abroad. I argue here that these two contexts characterize a migration based on the idea of migration as an adventure, not directly and not necessarily connected with changes in employment, income or security but as the intersection of the relations between empire and nation, ideologies, and life histories.

¹ As I explain in the methodological section of Chapter II, the analysis that I present here is based on the oral histories of seven Chilean emigrants in the US. This four women and three men arrived from 1957 to 1961; 1967 to 1969; and 1970 to 1973.

In the traditional Harris-Todaro model of migration these two development economists criticized the idea of “rather amorphous explanations such as the ‘bright lights’ of the city acting as a magnet to lure peasants into urban areas” (Harris and Todaro 1970: 126). They argue that migrants do not migrate only due to changes in income or unemployment levels but on the “expectations” of positive income and unemployment differentials. Against their argument I propose here that the “bright lights of the city”—i.e. the US as a center of modernity—are not as amorphous. They are part of a more complex exchange of social relations and ideologies,² of which personal and familial economics is only one component and not necessarily the most relevant. These social relations do occur in the context of capitalist development, which was the pattern of development that Chile was following during the twentieth century, and within a particular set of relations in the international system. As Massey and his colleagues argue, migration flows are an outcome of “disruptions and dislocations that inevitably occur in the process of capitalist development” (1998: 37). This capitalist development after World War II not only meant commercial relations, but also “social relations, property patterns, ideologies, political institutions” (O’Reilly 2012: 45). Despite the fact that Chile was—and still is—a capitalist country. At mid-century, the changes in the world’s political economy brought with it a particular ideology; that of Modernization in a context of Cold War. Modernization was constructed not only as a process of attempting to raise so-called backwards countries and societies from traditionalism and to push them towards capitalist development. It was also an

² Following Therborn I will understand ideology here as the “human condition under which human beings live their lives as conscious actor in a world that makes sense to them to carrying degrees. Ideology is the medium through which this consciousness and meaningfulness operates” (1980: 2). This conceptualization of ideology includes complex political and intellectual thoughts as well as everyday notions and experiences. Ideology operates as discourse and is part of the embodied culture of the subjects; it defines their subjectivities (Theborn 1980; Zizek 1994).

ideology that needed to be transmitted in order to gain adepts for a particular form of development; that proposed by the US during the Cold War.

Since the early Cold War several state-owned private and public-private efforts served as cultural vehicles of ideological transmission from the United States—or for the Soviet Union for that matter. As with Walt Disney and Hollywood in general during the World War II years and the Cold War (Franco 2002; Dorfman and Mattelart 1975), the *Reader's Digest* magazine was an emblematic example of the ways a cultural product influenced the construction of Communism as the “other”. This magazine, with broad circulation in Latin America and Chile (Mattelart 1970; Grafflin 1941), had an enormous relevance in propagating the ideal of the US as a modern free nation in opposition to the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Sharp 2000) as it spread capitalist culture and consumerism (Rosenberg 1998: 502). Another emblematic example, also from a cultural perspective, were the bi-national cultural institutes, like the *Instituto Chileno Norteamericano de Cultura* (Chilean-North American Cultural Institute – colloquially know as the *Norteamericano*),³ which played a role as diffusers of the US cultural foreign policy.

While these two were private or semi-private entities, the US governments participated overtly and covertly through several institutions in the cultural component of fighting the Cold War on a cultural front. Among others the CIA funded “Congress for Cultural Freedom”, the

³ The *Instituto Chileno Norteamericano de Cultura*, was founded in 1938 as a way of increasing the cultural cooperation between the US and Chile. The creation of this *Instituto* was part of an international effort by the International Commission on Intellectual Cooperation, one of the predecessors of UNESCO, which through the development of national commissions helped created bi-national cultural institutes in 45 countries (Poblete Troncoso 1958). These commissions created cultural centers for the US, France, Britain, and Switzerland, among others, to teach culture, language, have libraries and in some cases manage educational fellowships and exchange. Since then these institutes have been supported on their cultural aspects by the corresponding embassies as a component of cultural diplomacy efforts and cultural foreign policy definitions (Ninkovich 1981: 45).

State Department's Division of Cultural Affairs, later part of the Office for Public information, which managed the Voice of America during this period (Ninkovich 1981; Saunders 2000). Through these organizations, as well as through education programs and development initiatives created in the late 1950s and early 1960s the US government participated directly in the promotion of its society as an ideal future.⁴ Student exchange programs such as the Fulbright program, where intended to change the idea and image of the US abroad (Snow 2008) and at the same time representing a particular image of the US; that of a 'free'; democratic nation with respect of private property and individual development. A similar argument can be made in the case of the Peace Corps volunteers, who by working in development programs became embodiments of modernization in a context of Cold War. While the ideological and cultural struggle of the Cold War involved all these organizations and more, in this chapter I will focus on those that my informants present as relevant components in their decision to migrate. The argument here is that the 'closeness' of a magazine, of being taught a language and culture, of meeting an exchange student and a development worker are better depictions of the idea of the US as the center of modernity than the intellectually elite *Congress of Cultural Freedom*—and its literary magazines—and the Voice of America which did not have a permanent broadcasting in Chile.⁵

⁴ In this sense the Cold War can also be defined as a competition between two teleologies. On one side Communism proposed the idea that history ends with the rise of a Communist society. Capitalism, on the other proposes the argument that history transits towards a perfectly free market society. Hence when the Soviet Union fell, Fukuyama proposed that the end of history had arrived and with it the triumph of capitalism and western style democracy.

⁵ As with Radio Moscow during Pinochet's dictatorship or Radio Habana Cuba, the Voice of America could only be followed through short wave which made it difficult to constantly tune in.

As I introduce the US as a center of modernity, I also analyze of the political and economic changes in Chile that led to the development of a middle class interested in migrating abroad between the end of WWII and the military coup of 1973. The role of the state as a promoter of development and educator after the 1930s economic crisis changed the social structure of the country, instilling a ‘middle class’ ideology. This ideology, with origins in the early 20th century, coalesces in the 1938-1959 period according to Salazar (1986). It promoted among small merchant-bankers, teachers and other state workers the ideas of democracy and capitalist economic progress. This middle class was an important component in the political process that began after the recession of the 1930s, aiding in the defeat of the Radical party in 1952, being part of the Ibañez government from 1952 to 1958, being the government with Frei and the Christian Democrats in 1964 to 1970 and finally splitting up in the late 1960s; one segment favoring Allende and the other favoring Alessandri in 1970 (Pike 1963).

The intersection between the cultural impacts of the Cold War, social change in Chile and the consolidation of the middle class is relevant because this is the world where the immigrants I spoke with for this study come from. In my analysis, for example, it is possible to observe several what were seemingly “out of the blue” migration decisions. These migrants or their families, however, had recently become “middle class”, had been taking classes at the *Norteamericano*, and had participated on exchange programs or married at the time Peace Corps volunteers.

In terms of migration in the region, World War II had an enormous impact in the migration flows to South America, beginning in the early 1940s and through the early post war period. Except for a brief increase connected with the arrival of European refugees in the late 1940s; migration flows to this region decreased considerably beginning in the late 1930s and in

some place they stopped altogether (Pellegrino 1995; 2003). In turn, the South American countries went through an increase in their emigration flows beyond the more traditional migration to neighboring countries like Argentina. From a demographic perspective, these countries were rapidly increasing their total population as well as becoming more urbanized and industrialized. This is even clearer in the case of the countries of the Southern Cone (Brea, 2003). These countries began to become more industrialized and urbanized in the first decades of the twentieth century and by the late 1940s they were at the forefront in the region in moving towards lower fertility and mortality rates. These demographic changes increased the total population during this period impacting the size of families and social classes. In particular, the largest population growth occurred in the cities and largely due to births, not to international immigration as had happened until the 1930s (Bethell 1998). This growth in the cities, higher levels of educations, changes in the possible countries of destination and increase in information influenced a generation that became more prone to migrate abroad.

This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section I describe the social and political changes in Chile between the late 1940s and the early 1970s, focusing mainly on how these relationships fit into Chilean-US relations. I present here the macro conditions that might have influenced the emigration to the US. I focus on the concept of modernization and its uses to pressure capitalist development in Chile. I also present the different levels of acceptance that this conceptualization during the different Chilean governments of this period. Following this, I present two sections that describe the decision to migrate, first from the perspective of the influence of the Cold War ideologies, and second from the impact of the development of the middle class in the migration decision as well as the political ties of these ‘middle class’ migrants. The decision to migrate constructed from the intersection of this two components

created a particular wave of Chilean migrants to the US, different to that of the coming years. One way of characterizing this wave is through the form through which they reacted to the military coup of 1973 and the arrival of exiles. I close this chapter with two short sections on the perceptions this wave of immigrants had on the military coup of 1973 and their position towards the arrival of the first exiles from Chile. These perceptions help reinforce the analysis of the decision to migrate as a result of the intersection between Cold War and Middle class ideologies promoted by the relations between hegemonic empire and nation.

II. The United States and Chile at the onset of the Cold War

The first five years after the end of World War II were marked by a new composition of alliances, the development of a body of new international organizations, the collapse of old empires and the beginning of the Cold War. This was mostly an ideological confrontation between two main superpowers and their allies, where military actions were usually fought by proxies.⁶ In order to confront the communist “menace”, the United States created and strengthened institutions and organizations with the objective of promoting the virtues of capitalist development. Among these institutions were the US Cultural Institutes and libraries abroad, students exchange programs—as the Fulbright program for example—in the 1950s, and the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s (Mulcahy 1999, Woods 1994, Bartley 2001, Prieto 2011). Beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s the theoretical backbone of these institutions was Modernization theory. The application of this theory to the “underdeveloped”

⁶ For different approaches to the origins and impacts of the Cold War in Latin America see Brands 2010; Ekbladh 2010; Grandin 2010; Joseph 2010 and Joseph 2008, among others.

South attempted to create the conditions for the formation of western values of democracy and liberal economics.

Chile came out of World War II a very different country than the one that had suffered the effects of the 1930s economic crisis. The Popular Front and the center left coalition governments that led the country between 1938 and 1946 deepened an industrialization program that had began in the late 1800s. This process in turn increased the urbanization of the largest cities and the urban proletariat (Meller 1996; Drake 1993; Correa 2001). This growth in industrialization came from the direct participation of the state in the development of manufacturing units and inward development policies under the argument of what from the 1950s on was known as Import-Substituting Industrialization.⁷ This meant an increase in the role of the public sector in the economy which allowed the middle urban class to consolidate its cultural, economic and political power (Barr-Melej 2000; Meller 1996).

In terms of international relations, Chile was the third largest receiver of wartime military aid from the US as well as loans and other benefits. In spite of this, the country only declared war on the Axis in 1945 just in time to be allowed to participate in the creation of the United Nations, since the Soviet Union argued that only those countries that had in fact declared war on

⁷ Import-Substituting Industrialization was a development program influenced by the Latin American Structuralist School under Raúl Prebisch and the Economic Commission for Latin America. The main argument is that peripheral countries suffer structural imbalances marked and continuous deterioration in terms of trade and exchange with the core nations. This because under *Ricardian* international trade theories, countries should only export what they have comparative advantage. Peripheral nations due to colonialism and other maladies are doomed to always produce goods that have less value than those of core countries. In order to solve this, peripheral countries should put in place protectionist policies and create its own industrialism even if the cost is higher than the international price. This because otherwise the production factors involved in developing the industries would not be used or used to export commodities furthering the imbalance in terms of trade (Kay 1989).

the Axis could join this organization (Sater 1990). In the first few postwar years, the government would also follow closely the lead of the US by signing a military assistance treaty, signing the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and joining the Organization of American States. This closeness with the US in the war against communism would have its most development in 1948 when the government of Gabriel González Videla passed the “Law for the Permanent Defense of the Democracy” (la *Ley Maldita*; the *Cursed Law* or *Damned Law*). For ten years, the law made the Communist Party illegal, making Chile a firm ally of the United States in the Cold War (Hunneus, 2009). Despite that, it is still unclear whether the banning of the communist party was suggested or requested by the US (Sater 1990). It was clearly an attempt by the Chilean government to define its position in the new international conflict influencing Chilean politics for the next forty years (Pieper Mooney 2009; Hunneus 2009).

The influence of the *Ley Maldita* in Chilean politics is not only connected to the banning of the Communist party. Hunneus (2009) argues that this law and its outcomes weakened democracy in Chile and served as an early warning of what was going to happen in 1973.⁸ It also engaged other state institutions in providing information about the opposition and coercing the government’s political adversaries. In 1948, for example, the military was given the role of persecuting and incarcerating the members of the communist party, influencing the doctrine of the Chilean Army and increasing its anticommunist stance. A case in point is that of Pinochet. Before being known worldwide as the Chilean dictator, during the early days of the *Ley Maldita*, he was in charge of rounding up and transferring members of the Communist Party to a detention center in the Humberstone office, a former nitrate production center in the middle of the

⁸ An analysis of the role of anti-communism in the violence in Chile in the 1970s and 1980s can be found in Palacios 2009.

Atacama desert, and then to the Pisagua concentration camp where he was a captain in 1947 (Frazier 2007: 167). Another example that points to the involvement of every institution of the state in this anti-communist “crusade” was the role played by the consular service. In a confidential cable dated March 8 of 1951, the Chilean consul in San Francisco narrates the visit and anonymous denunciation of a person who informs the consul that three crew members of a Norwegian ship have been smuggling communist propaganda printed in Cuba into Chile.⁹

From a different perspective, the end of the government of González Videla in 1952 marks the beginning of a political transformation in Chile. The political crisis that contributed to the end of the last of the Radical Party’s governments had enormous and disastrous effects on the evolution of the Chilean political system. Among other things, for Hunneus the long term effect of this crisis, “weakened the quality of democracy by restricting political participation and competition, limiting as well, political liberty and freedom” (2009: 356). The presidential election of 1952 also marks the beginning of a series of impressive and broad political experiments by the Chilean electorate; which for the first time allowed women to vote for president and parliament (women had achieved the right to vote in municipal elections in 1935). Between 1952 and 1973 the country experience four democratically elected governments, each representing a different ideological perspective. First was the turn of the old general and former dictator Ibañez (1953-1958), now self defined as apolitical; followed by what has been called to the “three thirds” of the Chilean political system. These “three thirds” refer to the relative political participation of each of the three ideological sectors of the political spectrum. During this time the left, the center and the right all had more or less 33% of the electorate. A president came from each sector: the right governed from 1958 to 1964 with Jorge Alessandri, the center

⁹ Archivo MINREL. Consulado General en San Francisco, 8 de Marzo de 1951.

from 1964 to 1970 with Eduardo Frei, and the left from 1970 to 1973 with Salvador Allende. Each of these four governments had their own complex relations with the United States under the conditions set by the Cold.

Modernization theory: the ideological and theoretical corpus of the Cold War

Modernization theory is a social scientific model developed in the United States largely between the 1950s and 1970s that attempted to change the structure of government, society, economics and even the system of social values of countries deemed traditional or backward. Latham indicates that the theory understood modernization as a “process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man’s knowledge, permitting control over his environment” (Latham 2000: 4). As a broad interdisciplinary approach it attempted to influence “technological advancement, urbanization, rising income, increased literacy, and the amplification of mass media” (Gilman 2003: 5) in so-called traditional societies.

By the early 1950s the changes that World War II produced were becoming more and more visible. The world was divided into two ideological opposing ways of understating politics, economy, and society.¹⁰ At the same time, the old European empires were rapidly disappearing and the former colonies were becoming independent nation-states. It is in within this context that an interdisciplinary group of social scientists began discussing the differences between

¹⁰ In strict sense there is a third group of countries; the Non-Aligned Movement officially founded in 1961. This group of nations, most of them recently independent nations from Asia and Africa agreed in 1955 to oppose imperialism regardless of its origin. Internal conflicts, lack of internal trade and cooperation, and the closeness of some of its members to either the US or the Soviet Union hinder in reality the possibility of becoming a third way within the Cold War (Westad 2005:99-109)

traditional and modern societies. This meant for these scientists to create a unified theory that could explain the transit from a newly independent nation-state until recently dominated by a European power to a modern society resembling the United States. According to the Modernization theorists the passage from transition to modern societies was always disruptive. These disruptions made nations vulnerable to foreign influences and could lead to Marxist revolutions. Unlike these kind of revolutions, Modernization proposed “the right kind of revolution” (Latham 2011; Gilman 2003). The opposition to Communism went beyond the simple idea of a liberal and democratic revolution. To the soviet idea of creating a ‘New Man’, Modernization ideologues proposed the ‘Modern Man’ as well as representing a “very American effort to persuade the developing countries to base their revolutions on Locke rather than on Marx” (Gilman 2003: 10).

From an economic perspective the objective was to prove that modernization and development could be achieved faster through capitalism and democratic means than through communism. One of the leading theorists of modernization theory, W.W. Rostow, argued that nations followed a three stage process to achieve development—understood as the then current economic state of the US and Western Europe. These three stages involved a first stage where nations were developing their political and social infrastructure, followed by an industrialization stage which in a short period of time—about a decade or two—would lead to capitalist development or take-off (Haeefe 2003). The construction of foreign policy as aid for development derived from this perspective. To achieve capitalist development and modernization the United States had to provide aid only for a short period of time; that of take-off so that third world nations would become “inoculated against communism (Haeefe 2003: 86).

Concluding, Modernization theory was a theoretical construction defined to help in the war against the Soviet Union. Not in the war of weapons, but one centered on winning the “hearts and minds of peoples desperate to share in the economic growth, political democracy, and achievement-oriented social ethos that an enlightened and benevolent West had attained long before” (Latham 2000: 7).

Modernization theory in Latin America

One of the first areas of the world where the United States government applied Modernization theory was Latin America (Brands 2010; Latham 2000). For the ideologues of this theory, the physical and even racial closeness to the United States, the advances in industrialization and education that many of these countries were going through as well as the higher relative levels of education (compared to other ‘underdeveloped’ nations) made these nations the perfect laboratory for the application of their program. New levels of economic development, according to modernization theorists would also open Latin America to the US products incrementing trade (Haeefe 2003). During the decade of the 1950s the United States involvement in Latin America was more focus on the idea of communist containment than on developing active foreign policy proposals for the region. Except for the political and military involvement in the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 and the support to dictators like Rojas Pinilla in Venezuela and Trujillo in Dominican Republic, in Latin America most of the activities were in the area of cultural programs under the auspices of the Rockefeller foundation. It is only at the end of this decade that the Eisenhower government will commence providing economic aid to the region and creating the bases for the Alliance for Progress (Latham 2000).

Two of the most relevant institutions associated with Modernization theory, the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps, began to be applied in Latin America in the early 1960s during Kennedy's government.¹¹ The Alliance for Progress was a program developed to counteract the effects of Marxism and Guevara's *foco* theory in rural areas of Latin America. In particular, this program is a response to Castro and the Cuban Revolution. In the words of Argentina's former president Frondizzi; "what is required is a basic attack on the conditions that produced Castro" (Brands 2010: 45). In this sense, the US government developed the Alliance for Progress with the objective of reversing poverty and political oppression. It attempted to provide funds for agricultural conversion and infrastructural improvements in exchange for tax reform, the promotion of land redistribution and political reform by Latin American governments (Taffet 2010) at the time that "aimed to undermine revolutionary change through democratization and modernization" (Pieper Mooney 2009: 74). The Peace Corps, while not defined originally as an instrument of US foreign policy, also acted indirectly as a promoter of the virtues of US capitalism under the concepts developed by Modernization theory.

By choosing to exemplify the virtues of the US society and its youth "through their humanitarian deeds and democratic values" (Latham 2000: 110), the Peace Corp volunteers were the ideal transmitters of Modernization as ideology at the same time that they helped accelerate the process of becoming modern. The construction of schools, the improvement of English classes, advances in land distribution, and above all an increasing cultural impact associated with the image of President Kennedy through the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corp attempted to reduce the ideological impact of Marxism in Latin America (Rabe 1999). It did not prevent the rise of leftist or socialist movements or governments, but it helped fight the Cold War in the

¹¹ The third was the Hamlet program in Vietnam (Latham 2000; Brands 2010)

1960s. By the end of the decade the lack of support of the Alliance for Progress and the involvement in Vietnam, among other reasons, led the US to discontinue this program and to encourage the application of what is known as the Kennan corollary of the Monroe Doctrine; that “harsh governmental measures of repression may be the only answer; that these measures may have to proceed from regimes whose origins and methods would not stand the test if American concepts of democratic procedure; and that such regimes and such methods may be preferable alternatives, to further communist successes (Rabe 2012 :24; Smith 1994). The move to the use of the stick instead of the carrot, while still within the ideas of modernization theory, influenced the rise of right wing military governments in most South American countries in the late 1960s and 1970s.

Modernization theory in Chile

In the case of Chile, the relation between this country and the United States between 1950 and 1990 are particularly defined by the Cold War and the theory of Modernization. According to US strategists, the length of the Chilean coast and the many islands in the south of the country, as well as the position in the Straits of Magellan made Chile a necessary ally in the early years of the Cold War. Geopolitics, among other things, led to signing the creation of a military assistance pact in 1952 (Sater 1990). Former general and dictator Ibañez, now a democratically elected president in 1952, criticized this pact which led to some concerns in the US government regarding his political leanings. During his term, however, Ibañez became a close ally to the US. In exchange for large amounts of foreign aid from the US, his government did not sign diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and supported the overthrow of Arbenz. Ibañez was strongly anti-communist, although this was most likely due to his admiration for Franco than for

any pressure from the United States. At the end of his term, however, he eventually revoked the *Ley Maldita*, allowing the Communist Party to regain its legality and to participate in Chilean politics.

In 1958, Jorge Alessandri from the rightist Liberal-Conservative Coalition was elected. This election marks the beginning of the direct involvement of the United States' CIA in Chilean politics. With the Communist party legal again and a new law that established secret voting, the 1958 election presented a good opportunity for the left to win the election for the first time in its history. In fact in this election, Alessandri won with a 31.5% of the votes, followed closely by Salvador Allende who obtained 28.9% of the votes (Correa et al 2001). The CIA helped finance Alessandri's election (Smith 1994) as they realized that it was possible that the left coalition, the FRAP (Front of Popular Action) could win. Sater (1990) and Correa and her colleagues (2001) argue that the financing and encouragement of the United States led Antonio Zamorano, a former priest and National Congress Representative for the FRAP to run for president in 1958. He got slightly over 41,000 votes which was more than the difference between Alessandri and Allende (31,897 votes). Had he not run for president most likely Allende would have been elected president in 1958.

In international relations, the Cuban revolution and the beginnings of the Alliance for Progress had a strong influence on Alessandri's presidency. At first the Chilean government took an independent position towards the Cuban revolution based on the argument that the country supported the right of free determination of people. This argument had more to do with the low support that the government had, considering that the other two thirds either supported Castro (the Left) or reacted ambivalently (the Christian Democrats), than with a defined foreign policy. The possibility of losing financial support from the United States, in a context of economic crisis

and high inflation, led Chile to support Kennedy's quarantine in 1962 and to eventually break diplomatic relations with Cuba (Sater 1990).

Alessandri's government was against the application of the Alliance for Progress in Chile (Taffet 2007). After all, he was a member of the oligarchy and his constituents were some of the largest owners of land holdings in the country (Loveman 2001:225). The economic crisis and the devastation of the 1960 earthquake led the government to require direct financial aid from the United States in exchange for the promise of structural reforms under the logic of the Alliance for Progress. While the government took steps to change not only the land structure but also the property of the copper mines—then in the hands of US companies—that would in the following years lead to huge social changes in the country; the slow pace and general irrelevancy of those changes exasperated the US State Department. Although the Chilean government had received large amounts of aid from the Alliance for Progress, evaluators of this program from the United States argued that the Chilean government was the “poorest performer” in the region (Taffet 2007: 73) and in this condition the US “should provide only the minimum of assistance to the present government” (Taffet 2007: 71).

By the end of Alessandri's government, the United States government had realized that it was not possible to achieve the necessary reforms that would obstruct the country from electing a socialist government or survive a Cuban style revolution; especially with the support that the left and Allende had in 1958. During the 1964 presidential election, therefore, the US decided to throw its support to Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democrat who was running against Allende and Durán, the candidate of a center right coalition. With the right assuming its defeat and scared of the possibility of that Allende would win, they reluctantly also decided to support Frei. During the election, the US provided financial funding and technical support to the Christian Democrats.

The CIA spent more than US\$2.6 million in supporting Frei and over half of his party's parliamentary campaigns (Angell 1993; Sater 1990).

Frei, who defined himself as Kennedy's "heir," was elected with almost 57% of the votes, against the close to 39% of Allende (Angell 1993; Taffet 2007). Unlike the previous government, during Frei's term (1964-1970) the US became more and more involved in Chilean politics. Despite Frei's attempt to distance himself from what he considered US imperialism, his government continued to receive funding and aid from the US (Taffet 2007; Sater 1990). In terms of the Alliance for Progress, Chile became the third largest receiver of foreign aid in Latin America, after Brazil and Colombia and the largest receiver of aid per capita in the hemisphere (Angell 1993). During the same period the US sent military aid for over US\$91 million as a way of gaining the confidence of Chile's military, although the US had been providing military aid to the Chilean armed forces at least since World War II (Kornbluh 2003). At the same time that the US government used Chile as an experiment by the Alliance for Progress, it attempted as well to use the country as a testing ground for some of Modernization theory's most disparate ideas.

One of the concerns of the social scientists behind Modernization theory was not only how to convert traditional societies into modern societies, but also how to transform the "communist mind" of workers and other laborers into "modern men" in the style of the United States of the 1950s and 1960s. In order to research this they developed a research program to study revolutionary movements and counter-insurgency. Chile was chosen to be one of the first countries studied under what was codenamed "project Camelot". This project was supposed to be a binational effort in which social scientists from both countries would participate. At a total cost of more than US\$ 6 million, this was the largest social science research program ever attempted. This project, however, was deemed an intrusion into the internal affairs of other countries and a

number of Chilean social scientists—and a Norwegian academic Johan Galtung—refused to participate and denounced this project to the Chilean government which led to the cancelation of project Camelot before it even started (Stater 1990; Solovey 2001).

During Frei's government the US government continued to consider him the last best hope at the time that the CIA continued providing funds to political parties to influence the results of local and regional elections in Chile (Kornbluh 2003). Internally Frei's government had to follow "a moderate pattern of sociopolitical and economic modernization in the midst of more radical quests for change" (Piper Mooney 2009:74). This concession to the left, due to the internal political pressures, and Frei's objective of following a foreign policy independent to that of the US government, led the United States to stop considering him a good option. With the rise of militant anticommunist governments in Argentina and Brazil at the end of the decade, the United States government felt that Chile was no longer an example for hemispheric political development and diverted foreign aid to Brazil and Argentina instead of Chile (Stater 1990).

In the election of 1970 Allende confronted Alessandri again, as in 1958. The Christian Democrat candidate was Radomiro Tomic, former Chilean ambassador in the US and representative of the most leftist wing of this party. Despite the millions of dollars spent by the CIA as well as funds from private companies, Allende won the election with 36% of the votes. According to Chilean electoral law, any candidate that obtained less than 50% of the votes had to be ratified by Congress. That ratification was on September 4 of 1970, on that day a right wing terrorist organization known as *Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland and Freedom), financed by the CIA, attempted to kidnap the Commander in Chief of the Army who was killed in the process. Against the objectives of the kidnappers, this event coalesced the Christian Democrats around Chile's constitutional and democratic tradition which helped secure the ratification of Allende as

president by the Chilean Congress and opened the door for a strong involvement of the US in activities against Allende (Correa et al 2001; Angel 1993; Kornbluh 2003).

President Nixon and his inner circle reacted harshly to the Allende's election. Nixon swore to make the Chilean economy 'scream' and Kissinger famously remarked that the US should not let a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people (Stater 1990; Kornbluh 2003; Smith 1994). During Allende's term, Chile established or renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba and the Eastern Bloc and nationalized the Copper industry as well as other US own companies. All of this, obviously, made the split between Chile and the US deeper. In order to prevent the success of the Chilean path to socialism, Nixon's government through the CIA and the 40 Committee¹² developed a program to destabilize Allende and to orchestrate a coup with the backing of the US military.

In conclusion, modernization theory with the Alliance for progress and the Peace Corps, the cultural institutes for language acquisition and student and scholar exchange programs such as the Fulbright program mark the involvement of the United States—from a civilian perspective—in Latin America between the 1950s and 1970s. The ideas and ideology behind the theory of Modernization attempted to win the hearts and minds of Latin Americans as well as changing the minds to become supporters of the US in the war against Soviet communism. Indeed as an Argentinean general asserted, "a terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb...but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization (Brands 2010: 73).

¹² "The 40 Committee is a sub-Cabinet level body of the Executive Branch whose mandate is to review proposed major covert actions". Footnote 2, Church Report: Cover Action in Chile 1963-1973, US Department of State, Freedom of Information Act. Available at <http://foia.state.gov/reports/ChurchReport.asp> November 3, 2012

While the impacts of the Cold War were occurring at the macro level, at the individual level its effects could be seen in political participation and access to music, literature and other cultural activities, just to name a few. I argue here—consistently with a migration systems approach—that it also strongly influenced migration decisions. In the following section I demonstrate that the ideological underpinnings of modernization theory and the Cold War influenced the migration decisions of Chilean emigrants who left Chile between 1950 and September 11 of 1973. Ideology worked by presenting the US as a locus of desired development with was attractive to migrants who due to their newly achieved class position were sufficiently empowered to follow an adventure. .

III. Towards the beacon of modernity: deciding to migrate

Coming to the United States was not Luciana's first migration. Born in 1932, raised by her widowed father and brother since she was 8 years old, Luciana finished high school and moved to Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1949 following her friend Mario who had invited her. While she had not liked Buenos Aires she decided to stay in Argentina and go to a University in Paraná in the province of Entre Ríos to study nursing. This was an unusual choice, as few Chileans went to Paraná as immigrants.¹³ Remembering this, Luciana expressed her disbelief of

¹³ Although Paraná had been an important political center in the early years of the Argentine Republic, and by the 1947 census was still a major capital city of a large population province (787,363 habitants), this city of 83,824 habitants at the time and located 780 miles from Buenos Aires was a very minor receiving center for migrants from neighboring countries. According to the same census, while there were 51,563 people born in Chile living in Argentina, which represented 16.5% of the immigrants from neighboring countries and 2.1% of total immigrants, there were in the Province of Entre Ríos 98 Chileans, which represented 0.1% of the foreign born population in that province (Mármora 1973; Reina 1973).

how daring she was, by being a woman traveling by herself and leaving her father and brother back in Chile; “It seems that I already had a sort of adventurous spirit”.¹⁴

Luciana’ adventures did not end in Argentina. Shortly after beginning college, her friend Mario was offered a position as a translator for a publishing company connected to the Adventist Church in Brookfield, Illinois and left for the United States promising Luciana that he would take her to the US. While in college Luciana received a letter from Mario with a job application to work as a nurse in a hospital in Hinsdale—near Chicago—, which she filled out, sent and, at least according to her retelling, forgot completely about it for a few years. Luciana continuously talks about what she refers as the other adventures of her life. Upon graduation, for example, she was offered two jobs; one as a nurse in a hospital ship that would travel up and down the Paraná River between Paraguay and Argentina and the other as a head of an Operation’s room in a Hospital in Lima, Peru. Despite all these offers she decided to go back to Chile in 1955 to take her care of her father who was by then living alone.¹⁵ It is while in Chile and dating a man her father did not approve of that Luciana receives a plane ticket from the hospital in Hinsdale, Illinois, where she had applied years earlier and that had finally hired her.

Despite the actual final reason used as their argument for coming to the United States, Chilean migrants interviewed in my research, and who arrived before September 11 of 1973, construct their emigration as an adventure. Following Stern, emigration as an adventure becomes an *emblematic memory*, “a framework that organizes meaning, selectivity, and counter memory”

¹⁴ “Y yo ya tenía el espíritu aventurero, parece que dentro de sí...Ahora me doy cuenta que, era lo que en aquellos años tal vez dirían, era, medio patuda para, porque siendo sola, teniendo a mi padre en Chile, a mi hermano...”

¹⁵ Luciana’ brother had married her college roommate and was living in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

(2004: 105) of the migratory experiences of this group of migrants. This emblematic memory is a representation of the way that emigrants retell their lives before migrating and is constructed at the intersection of a middle class generation involved in the social and economic changes that are taking place in Chile and the idea of the United States as a center of modernity.

Luciana states that her decision to leave Chile was not an easy one. She was working,¹⁶ dating a man she liked a lot and was not sure that he would follow her to the US. Key in her decision to migrate was the arguments of Edgardo, then boyfriend and future husband. He promised to follow her a year later, assuring the continuation of the relationship as well as framing the possibility of coming to live in the US as a once in a lifetime opportunity. Edgardo, who was an accountant at the company where she was working, was, according to Luciana, “a man unlike many Chileans in those years; he was a great visionary”.¹⁷ He convinced Luciana with an argument of the dream of an advanced society:

‘Look’, he would say, ‘I read in a *Reader’s Digest* once that there will be a computing system; that all accounting will be done by computers. To me he was speaking in another language. He told me, ‘there will be machines that will be doing all of this’, he said ‘it would be neat to learn all of that’... That seduced me of only thinking about that. ‘Imagine’, he would said, ‘all construction workers go to working sites in their own cars! Imagine, when would we have cars here?’¹⁸

¹⁶ While the total female participation labor participation for her age group in 1957 (closest data available) was close to 43% of women, the female labor participation for the particular sector where she was working (commerce) was less than 14% of the total female labor force (Contreras et al 2000).

¹⁷ “Edgardo era muy...era un hombre como pocos chilenos en aquellos años, muy visionario”

¹⁸ “Mira,” me decía, “yo, leí en un *Reader’s Digest* una vez, que va a haber un sistema de computación que la contabilidad la van a computarizar.” Yo, para mí me estaba hablando chino. Me dijo, “van a haber unas máquinas que van a hacer todo esto,” me dijo, “que lindo sería poder aprender todo eso.” Porque, él era, contador. Eso, me, me, me seducía de solo pensar en eso.

The choice of the *Reader's Digest* as a source of information is not arbitrary. According to Sharp this magazine was “the most important voice in the creation of popular geopolitics in America in the twentieth century” (2000:ix). While this is clearly not the only magazine that used commonplace and even cartoons to make representations of a particular ideology,¹⁹ to its middle class readership the construction of the US was presented as an heroic narrative (Sharp 1993), in which the construction of knowledge and the constitution of its readers’ subjectivity are an inherently interrelated process (Sharp 1996). In this sense the magazine helped create an US identity during the Cold War by defining and constructing the enemy (Sharp 2000). By constructing a narrative of its readers’ identity associated to the concepts of democracy, individual liberty and progress and presenting the problems of Soviet collectivism and lack of personal freedom, the magazine became a useful tool against the Eastern bloc. Not only in the US, but also in every other country where it was published. Its international editions were used by its editors as a weapon against communism (Sharp 1996), in which “because the magnitude of the condensation of articles, the editorial decision was an intensely political act” (Sharp 1993: 495); thus encouraging the reader to make a choice between the values promoted by the US and those of the Soviet Union. It is obvious that not everyone who read the *Reader's Digest* ended up migrating to the US, however, the narration of Luciana serves as an emblematic example of the influence of Cold War ideology in influencing the decision to migrate.²⁰

“Imagínate,” me decía, “dicen que todos los trabajadores de construcción van a la construcción en sus propios autos. Imagínate, aquí ¿cuándo vamos a tener autos?”

¹⁹ Other examples of this are Dorfman and Mattelart classic *How to read Donald Duck* (1975) and Dorfman’s *The Empire’s old clothes* (2010).

²⁰ The notion of the *Reader's Digest* as a vehicle of ideological transmittance, while shared by many people, was not accepted as face value. Among its detractors, particularly on the left, there

Luciana arrived in New York, where her friend Mario²¹ was living, in January 1st of 1957 and 21 days later she arrived in Hinsdale where Mario's brother, a doctor was working in the same hospital where Luciana would work at for 40 years. Edgardo arrived in 1959 sponsored by a Chilean friend that Luciana had made in those two years and they married shortly after.

Luciana's decision to migrate is not an exception to the constructions of migration decisions of Chileans around that time. The intersection of personal adventure and modernity clearly influenced her decision to migrate. In other words, her biography; that of an educated women, with friends outside her family, and who has experienced earlier travels; connects with the ideological influence of the existence of a center of Modernity thus easing her decision to migrate. Other interviewees also define their migration as part of a larger adventure, connecting this adventure as well with the existence of institutions that reinforce ideological constructions of the US as a center for modernity.

Scholars of migration give large importance to the roles of social institutions and organizations in the process of migrating, the perpetuation of migration and in the incorporation to a new society. These organizations and institutions constitute the meso-level of migration: social networks formed by social ties and social capital that allow migrants to develop safety nets in the places of origin and the destination that lower the financial and emotional cost of migrating (Faist 2000). In this sense, the most developed of these networks is the enlarged

was the concept of "Reader's Digest knowledge" when someone explains a social or political event through platitudes and trite.

²¹ Mario Collins, Luciana's friend is also an interesting character in this period. He was an Adventist pastor who very young was transferred to Buenos Aires, then to Chicago and then to the Bronx. While in the US he helped his brother and Luciana migrate to the US. He lived in several other places in the US and finally moved to Montemorelos in Mexico where he died in 2007. Internet research also provides information of a sister who lived, and recently passed away, in the US.

family. Other authors (Pries 2008) add transnational organizations such as NGOs in lower income regions which facilitate the legal and bureaucratic processes that facilitate migration. Based on Kritz and her colleagues (1992), I argue that this research leaves out national institutions, programs and organizations that link places of origin and destination with ideological purposes—not necessarily related to migration—and which unintentionally encourage or facilitate migrations within multiple spheres of exchange between nations. During the early Cold War these institutions were the already mentioned Alliance for Progress, and *Reader's Digest*; as well as the Fulbright Program, the cultural institutes, and the Peace Corps.

This was the case of Amanda, an English teacher who came to pursue a Masters degree at Northwestern University in 1967. She constantly defines herself and her entire life as a big adventure; and coming to the US was for her just another adventure. Coming from very strict familial background, with a stern father she secretly applied for a Fulbright fellowship to come to study in the US. In effect, her decision to migrate integrates her personal desire to live an adventure with the possibility given by an institution that encourages a particular understanding of the world; the construction of her life as a huge adventure. It is relevant to note that there is nothing in her biography that would lead one to conclude that without this fellowship she would have continued her adventure abroad. While doing her professional training was part of her fellowship she dated and married a Vista volunteer and stayed in the US.

The Fulbright program, founded by Senator William J. Fulbright in 1946 was designed, among other objectives, “to eradicate the nationalism and xenophobia that made internationalism unworkable” (Woods, 1994: 546). While the core values behind this objective are based on Fulbright’s support for a *Wilsonian* internationalism, it was also constructed from a particular Western view of democracy and development. While not necessarily Senator Fulbright’s

objective, who warned against educational programs being used as propaganda mechanisms due to short sighted political agendas (Johnson and Colligan²² 1956), this particular program became an instrument for particular social change and information in the countries where they existed. By exchanging knowledge and through the personal interactions between educated and intellectual elites of the US and the receiving nation, this program “presented to the rest of the world the dynamic quality of our open society...to significant molders of opinion and shapers of policy” (Johnson and Colligan 1956: 9).

As the early years of the Cold War became hot with the rise of Communist China and the Korean War and as the program became part of the Information and Educational Exchange Program of the Department of State in the early 1950s, the objectives of the program became more and more in line with the development of a strong anticommunist ideology. Some of these objectives were (Johnson and Colligan 1956: 69):

1. To demonstrate to other people, by every possible means, the evidence of our own moral, spiritual, and material strength, our determination to support the free nations of the world so that we may gain and hold the confidence of all free peoples in our efforts to halt Soviet aggression and Communist infiltration.
2. To assist, by every possible means, the free peoples of the world to strengthen those attitudes and institutions which are part of the fabric of a free society and a bulwark against Communist encroachments.
3. To develop, by every possible means, an awareness on the part of the free peoples of the worlds, of their common interests in defense of their freedoms and of the necessity for common and united effort.

²² These two authors had a long relationship with the Fulbright program. Walter Johnson “was a member of the Board of Foreign Scholarships from 1947 to 1954 and chairman of the board from 1950 to 1953” (Rosenzweig 1966: 277) and Francis J. Colligan “was executive secretary of the Board from 1948 to 1957” (*loc. cit.*). He was, at the time of writing his book, working at the State Department on Educational and Cultural Affairs directly connected to the Program.

All the Fulbright Commissions in the receiving countries had to develop their programs attuned to the current world situation and their US *grantees* had to help fulfill the objectives, while the foreign had to understand the “elements of US democratic strength” (Johnson and Colligan 1956: 69). The Fulbright program came to Latin America in 1955: Chile and Colombia were the first countries to participate. With similar objectives as the Alliance for Progress that came six years later, but more quietly, the program intended in its earlier years to develop human capital and to bring these countries closer to modernization and the sphere of the United States (Johnson and Colligan 1956: 73 and 172-180).

Similar to Amanda’s case are those of José and Alejandra. While both came to the US for love, they also explicitly made connections to the role of cultural institutions and to the idea that their generation was open to migrate abroad. José was an undergraduate student in Valparaíso in 1967 where he met his future wife, a Chilean woman who had emigrated with her parents to the US in 1953 and who was back to do some of her college studies at the Universidad Católica de Valparaíso. He was also studying English at the *Norteamericano*. While the reason for migrating that José mentions is directly associated to the idea of marrying and forming a family he argues that coming to the US was a shared objective with his friends. He told me:

...In general, I had thought of coming to the US because we had a group of friends in the Valparaíso street in Viña del Mar, and most of them, about twenty classmates of the thirty that got together in the *Samoiedo* come to the US one way or another. Later some of them went back [to Chile] and some stayed. Some are still in California; all relocated to California...Then in that time, we are talking of the years eh, the second half of the sixties, *there was a wish among the youth, of the males, of seeing how things were here.*²³

²³ Emphasis added. “[e]n general, yo pensaba venir a EE.UU. porque teníamos un grupo de chilenos en la calle Valparaíso en Viña del Mar, y eh, la mayoría, eran como veinte compañeros

English classes at this center—as in other language and cultural institutes (the Chilean British Institute, the Goethe Institute and the Chilean French Institute, for example—are usually accompanied by classes on the culture of the country, food, movie presentations and other activities that highlight ideological transference of knowledge. In the general case of Latin America, the objective of these cultural centers was to teach about the benefits of US’s political, social, and economic system especially between young people; as this was a key component of “long-term regional integration and in the spread of democratic governments” (Prieto, 2012).

Alejandra was an undergraduate student at the Universidad de Concepción in the early to mid 1960s when she met her future husband; a Physics doctoral student who was working for the Peace Corps at the same university. Regardless of the particular political allegiances of the volunteers,²⁴ the US government used the Peace Corps as an ideological tool to show life and modernity in the free world. Alejandra had studied English since she was in the equivalent of junior high school, which probably helped her meet her future husband; but later she would also study at the *Norteamericano* as José did. While the main reason that Alejandra states for migrating is marrying a US citizen and following him back to his country of origin, she argues that:

...had I not married him, I would have most likely also ended up in a country such as the United States, England or Spain, because I always, always read in the newspapers: this one is studying, that one is going to a postgraduate school in

que nos juntábamos en el Samoyedo, eh veinte de los treinta llegaron a EE.UU. de una manera u otra. Y después eh, algunos volvieron, algunos se quedaron. Algunos todavía están en California, todos ellos se ubicaron en California...Entonces en ese tiempo, estamos hablando de los años eh, la segunda mitad de los sesentas, había un deseo de la juventud *male* (sic), de los hombres, de darse una vuelta por acá.

²⁴ In fact, Alejandra’s first husband quit his doctoral studies in Physics because he was against the strong militarization that his field of studies was going through and decided to be a community college teacher in Michigan and not do more research.

such university, of that city. *That is what I am going to do* [I told myself]; *I am going to study* [abroad]. But I never thought that I was going to marry a North American.²⁵

Alejandra also makes clear that this is the sole reason for migrating. She vehemently stated: “I wasn’t running away from anything, from the political situation, or anything. Thanks God I did not have to go through what other people—that you have already met—had to go through”.²⁶ With this argument she is bridging her own decision to migrate, a ‘personal’ decision, to that of the exiles that came in the following years. In this part of her narrative she is embodying the different waves of Chilean migrants to the US. In her case, as in others that I present here, there is the belief that they were part of a generation that was free to do as they pleased; indeed to migrate to the US was part of those privileged circumstances. Her experience of decision to migrate, as that of my other interviewees, is different to the more traditional Chilean emigration to Argentina (historically the main receiver of Chilean emigrants) around the same years. The latter was mostly an economic due to lack of labor opportunities in the country of origin and the increasing opportunities in the extraction of oil, mining and agricultural sectors (Jensen and Perret 2011; Mármora 1984; Balán 1992).

This idea of their migration experiences as voluntary and part of an adventurous lifestyle from those exiles which came after the 1973 military coup is also a common characteristic among this generation of migrants to the United States. Julián, arrived in March of 1972 and

²⁵ My emphasis. “..., pero si no me hubiera casado con él, yo seguramente también habría terminado en algún país como Estados Unidos o Inglaterra o España que se yo, porque siempre, siempre que yo leía en el diario decía, está estudiando, se va a estudiar en la escuela graduada de tal país, de tal ciudad, eso es lo que voy a hacer yo, voy a estudiar. Pero nunca pensé que me iba a casar con un norteamericano.”

²⁶ “no estaba arrancando de nada, de la situación política, ni nada gracias a Dios no tuve que pasar por lo que pasar otras personas que tu ya has conocido”

overstayed his tourist visa, also makes a similar clarification. He argues that he neither had problems with Allende (before he came) nor Pinochet (when he went back visiting); he says “I came as an adventurer, I tell you; I did not come to make money, it was just that one day it came to me, I am out of here, the same I could have been anywhere else and in this, luck has had a lot to do with it.”²⁷ Although this is how Julián narrates his migration on adventure terms, he also mentions taking English classes at the *Norteamericano* and noticing political changes in the country that he did not agree with. Earlier in 1972 he had run into a friend who had been living in the US and was back in Chile after his divorce and from this encounter he made his mind to leave Chile. So, when the opportunity to go to a conference on labor law in Spain arose, he decided to use it as a spring board to migrate to the US, and to stay in this country where the flight to Spain had to make a stopover. He only fixed his migratory status through a work permit ten years later.

While the emblematic memory of this group of migrants is clearly defined by the idea of adventure and an ideological construction of modernity, there is another memory relevant to mention. This memory is a construction of migration as an escape. For some, this meant escaping from a particularly difficult personal circumstance, such as the end of a romantic relationship. For others, more significantly and more specific to a particular group of migrants, it was an escape from Chile due to the economic and political situation of the early 1970s. While the first year of Allende’s government had been successful in reducing unemployment and advancing in the nationalization of the copper industry and other companies, by 1972 the external pressure led by the United States and the internal economic problems led to an increase in inflation from 28%

²⁷ “Yo me vine de aventurero, le digo, no me vine a hacer dinero, sino que se me ocurrió de repente a ya y me voy así como podría haber estado en cualquier otra parte y en todo esto ha jugado mucho la suerte”.

in the first half of 1972 to 100% in the following months to an average of 353% monthly in 1973. The complex political, economic and social scenario of 1972 and 1973 paved the road to the military coup of September 11 1973 (Correa et al 2001).²⁸

Josefina arrived in Chicago in 1961 encouraged by a friend who knew other Chileans living in the area. She mentions that her decision to migrate was one that she took from one day to the next and connects it to a feeling of absolute despair from losing her boyfriend to her sister. She told me:

As I was telling you before, among the friends that I had in the School of Medicine, one of them was in the administration of I do not know which department. One day he told me, do you want to go to the United States? Are you, are you being serious? [Josefina replied] Of course I am being serious [the friend replied]; so I told him really? Really? And since I had recently had a sentimental disappointment... I fell in love when I was 19 years old over there in Chile and one day my sister, the number four, tried to take him away from me. As I would leave for my work in the telephone company, they would stay behind playing “corre el anillo”²⁹ and the tokens were always to kiss my love. And I would see as they stayed locked in a kiss as I walked to my job at the night shift. My sister set me up, I do not know what did she said to him, my relationship was on the way to becoming a marriage; I had been with him for five years, and one day out of the blue he told that he would not marry even if I was covered in money. After I learned all of this, for Christmas I was walking, shopping, I, I would be crying in the streets, buying things, the presents that my mom ask me to, and I would stay in the middle of the street waiting for a trolley to run me over, anything that would kill me at one, that was the only thing that I wanted, you see, that someone

²⁸ Among these emigrants, also the father of Juan Pablo another of my interviewees, who migrated to Spain in 1971, and returned to Chile in the late 1970s. Juan Pablo left Chile in the late 1990s to come to the US (see chapter VII).

²⁹ “Corre el anillo” or Pass the Ring is a traditional game where a person hides a token (a ring) in the hands of one of the players. The players are sitting on a semicircle and do not know who was given the ring. One player is asked to guess where the ring is. If the player guesses correctly, then s/he becomes the one the one who hides the ring. If s/he guesses incorrectly needs to deposit a token and later ‘pay’ a ‘penance’ for it. Cf. Plath, Oreste 1998. *Origen y folclor de los juegos en Chile: ritos, mitos y tradiciones*. Santiago: Grijalbo.

would run me over. It was in that moment that the opportunity to leave came around and I left.³⁰

There seems to be some chronological disconnections in Josefina's narrative. She began working for the telephone company in 1950 at the age of 19 as a replacement for a public employee's strike (the telephone company was at the time state-owned) that took place in January and February of 1950 (Pizarro Navea 1950; Rojas Flores, nd). This is the same age where she mentions that she fell in love with this boyfriend with whom she stayed for five years but she only came to the United States in December of 1961, about five years later than the "break-up". There is no information in her narrative about what happened in these five years. Regardless of this temporal lapse, for Josefina, her work in the telephone company which began as a replacement for public employees in a strike is an event that is constructed as a sort of *leit-motif* of this early part of her life and that ultimately would define her decision to migrate. Her narrative is an example of cases not considered by rational choice approaches to the decision to migrate. There is nothing "rational" in her act; in fact as I described in Chapter II, it is more a type of *affectual* rationality as described by Weber (Weber 1968).

³⁰ "Como te decía *denantes* de los amigos que yo tenía en la escuela de medicina, él estaba en la administración de no sé qué departamento. Entonces me dijo ¿te *querís* ir para Estados Unidos? Me, ¿me estás hablando en serio? Claro que te estoy hablando en serio, ya *po* le digo yo, en serio, en serio. Y como yo había tenido una desilusión amorosa... yo me enamoré a los 19 años allá en Chile y de repente mi hermana, la número cuatro, trató de quitármelo. Como yo trabajaba en la compañía de teléfonos ellos se quedaban jugando "corre el anillo" y las prendas siempre eran besos con mi amor. Y yo los veía como se quedaban pegados en un beso y yo me tenía que ir a trabajar en el turno de noche. Mi hermana me hizo la cama, no sé que le habrá dicho a él, la cuestión era *pa'* casarse, yo anduve cinco años con él y de repente él me dijo "ni forrada en billete me caso contigo. Cuando supe todas esas cosas, para una Pascua andaba hacienda las compras yo, y yo oye llorando en la calle, comprando las cosas, los regalos que mi mami me mandaba y en el medio de la calle esperando que un *trole* me atropellara, cualquier cosa que me matara *al tiro* eso era lo único que quería yo fíjate, que alguien me atropellara ahí, así es que a todo esto salió eso de venirse y me vine".

While formal institutions are relevant, family relations as social networks are also important; as the more traditional migration theories suggest (Massey et al 1998). This is the case of Mario, who used her family in Chicago to escape from Chile. Mario left Chile in 1971 for economic reasons that he associates to the political situation of the country. Mario had an aunt in Chicago with whom he lived for a year in 1964 at the age of twenty. He used that opportunity to learn English. Seven years later and due to a lack of economic opportunities he decides to come back to the US. He remembers the situation in Chile to be very bad; he states that:

We had a restaurant, a small café in the Recoleta street and we had to sell it because we had nothing to sell; yes there was nothing left, there was no meat, no hamburgers, no chicken; there was nothing, nothing at all...I lived, I had a condominium in the Gálvez street and a Peugeot 404 that I remember, I sold everything for...in the black market for something like US\$15,000³¹...frankly I gave it away.³²

This economic and political emigration, albeit very small compared to the exile post September 11 1973, was a somewhat common strategy among the Chilean higher class who left Chile for the United States, Canada, Venezuela and Europe during Allende's government (1971-1973). The rationale behind this "self-exile" was among other reasons their position against a left wing government which, according to them, was going to take away their properties and even their lives following the example of the Cuban Revolution. A secondary reason was the social and economic conditions in Chile in the early 1970s. In fact the Chilean consulate in Los Angeles mentions in two cables the future deportation of four Chilean citizens who have

³¹ Roughly equivalent to US\$80,000 of 2012.

³² "nosotros teníamos un, un restaurante, un café por decirte en la calle Recoleta y ya tuvimos que venderlo porque no había que vender, si no había, no había carne, no habían hamburguesas, no había pollo, no había nada, no había nada de nada...y yo vivía, tenía un condominio ahí en la calle Gálvez y un Peugeot 404 que me acuerdo, lo vendí todo por... en el *black market* algo así como por US\$15,000...francamente lo regale"

requested political asylum in the US.³³ This was a numerically small emigration and also was limited in time since most of these emigrants returned to Chile after the fall of Allende (Del Pozo 2004).³⁴

These memories of migration referred to the constructions that emigrants make of the decisions they took and the context in which these decisions take place. Also they are influenced by the social positions of the emigrants at the time of migration; the self identified class status, political position and education. These social positions are important because they help understand the social contexts and *life-worlds* in which the decision to migrate and the emigration takes place. In the following section I will analyze how these emigrants constructed and defined their social contexts. I center my analysis in the development of a ‘middle class’ consciousness and its connections to the role of education and political participation.

IV. Middle class ideology and migration

The concept of a middle class is difficult to define sociologically and historically. While the literature provides information on who were middle class in distinct periods, in general there is no clear definition of what made them middle class (Barr-Melej 2001). Candida (2009) argues that middle class is defined by its own members as having enough to survive but not enough to maybe have savings or to have any luxury. In her study of state workers she argues that all white collar workers define themselves as middle class; regardless if they were a low level

³³ Archivo MINREL, Consulado General en Los Angeles, 3 de mayo, 8 de mayo and 22 de mayo de 1973. In one of these cases, one of the Chileans was detained as he attempted to buy a weapon to kill Allende and his representatives in the US.

³⁴ Sadly there are no studies on this migration flow and there is no real information about its size.

administrator with a college degree, a public school teacher or the doorman at State offices. What both these authors agree for the Chilean case, following E.P. Thomson, is that class is a cultural historical concept that is closely attached to the development of an identity and of a class consciousness (Thompson 1964). As such, for Barr-Melej (2001) argues this class was constructed based on a strong correspondence with a *chilenidad*, a notion of being Chilean given to them by a mesocratic public school education. For Candida, they have been called “the bastion of republican values, the base of democratic development and hope for a future of equal opportunities” (2011: 16). The middle class has a particular identity of achieving things through personal effort, of being a foundation of the nation, and in the center of the political spectrum (Petrás 1969).

Unlike the Gold Rush migration from the 1840s and 1850s and the migration waves in the first half of the twentieth century, is the increasing size and relevance of the Chilean middle class that influences Chilean migration to the US between 1950 and 1973. The milieu of this middle class has suffered several changes since the mid 1850s, when the increase in income in the mine owners and small shopkeepers led to development of a buffer class located between the old Chilean-Spanish aristocracy and the *bajo pueblo* or “low peoples” (Parker, 2012). A second generation or cohort of this middle class developed in the late 1890s to early 1900s. This group, key to the consolidation of the role of the middle class in the Chilean society (Barr-Melej 2001), was composed by an increase in (mostly) male university graduates in liberal professions and medicine, as well as public sector workers (Candida 2009). Finally, there is a third generation or cohort of middle class children and youth. These are people who, being born between 1930 and 1950, benefited from the increase in public instruction in the middle part of the century. To this group belong all the participants in this study who having arrived before 1973, construct their

narratives as belonging to a middle class.³⁵ Besides the occupations—public workers, small to medium shoppers, some liberal professions, public teachers—their places of residence and patterns of consumption, this middle class has as a correlate a particular political position and a particular construction of the importance of education (Cerdeira Albarracín 1998).

Amanda, for example, narrates that her father grew up very poor. Her grandfather abandoned her father when he was eight after the death of her grandmother. Amanda's father and his sister were left in the care of two unmarried aunts who are described in the interview as not involved and particularly mean.³⁶ Despite all this, Amanda's father started from nothing and ended up having an upper middle class position in Valparaíso as the owner of an insurance company. This reflects in the stern upbringing and even 'stinginess' of her father. In terms of her education, however, she had a personal instructor of reading, math and writing before attending grade school, and her family moved from the Quilpué to downtown Viña del Mar³⁷ for her to attend elementary and high school. She was also encouraged to go to university, but there she could only follow a career appropriate to her gender. According to Amanda when she told her

³⁵ This is a self identification that comes from their narratives; they were never asked for this and do not presume to be generalizable to all Chilean migrants in the US at the time. Analyzing class of origin through census data, however, is not a task without complication since we cannot be certain whether the occupation is the same in both origin and destination and if the income or education stated in the census (traditional proxies for a general class analysis) were obtained in the country of origin or in the destination.

³⁶ Amanda's aunt died of a pulmonary infection two years after arriving to live at her grandaunts home (approximately at the age of 7) because, according to the story told by Amanda's dad, the grandaunts would leave her naked in a cold basement for hours if she would wet her bed.

³⁷ Quilpué is a city located about 15 miles from Viña del Mar that in 1960 had 40,951 inhabitants, compared to 386,009 of the Viña del Mar-Valparaíso conurbation. It took between 20 minutes and half an hour to get to downtown Viña del Mar by train. While it was not remote, it was challenging for a young girl to make that trip every day. For more sociodemographic comparisons between these two urban centers see Mattelart 1965: 40-42.

father that she wanted to be a doctor—something she dreamed her entire life—he replied; “you are not going to go to the school of medicine...I am not going to put all that money for you to go to the school of medicine when you are a woman, you are going to get married, have children and will not practice again”.³⁸ Then in the last six months of high school she had to rethink what to study and ended up studying to become an English teacher, approved by her father, although Amanda argues that in her decision the comment of a friend weighed heavily who argued that that school had the best parties.

Amanda’s relationship with her father was not uncommon for young women in early 1960s Chile or the US for that matter. Social, political and economic changes that were taking place in Chile, which originated in the early part of the twentieth century but continued until 1973, created several contradictions in the roles society defined for women (Pieper Mooney 2009). As in this case she was encouraged to go to university, but only to study something appropriate to her gender. While Alejandra, Amanda and many other middle class women had been able to vote and participated actively in politics or other social activities, the “Christian Democratic reformist project [of the 1960s] fashioned a modernity that buttressed patriarchal structures and depended on the execution of male professional authority to guide or control women’s reproductive behavior” (Pieper Mooney 2009: 73). Considered a core component of what it meant to be a woman in Chile of the 1950s and 1960s, the reproductive behavior within a ‘well constituted family’ defined all the other realms of a women’s life. As Miller argues citing Chaney, “this does not mean that women lack all influence. Rather, certain boundaries have been established designating women’s legitimate professional and political activity. They are confined

³⁸ “Tú no vas a ir a la escuela de medicina...yo no voy a poner todo ese dinero, esa plata para que vayas tu a la escuela de medicina cuando tu eres mujer, te vas a casar, vas a tener *guaguas* y ya no vas a practicar.

in profession and public office to tasks analogous to those they perform in the home” (Chaney 1979: 337 as cited by Miller 1991: 180). In fact, while Frei’s government encouraged the participation of women, it did it mainly through their participation in *Centros de Madres*; which were neighborhood associations of housewives (Deutsch 1991).

Beyond this particular rag to riches story, other migrant narratives are framed in a similar way. Luciana argues that the middle class was prevalent in Chile. In remembering Chile at the time of her emigration she told me: “Eh... there was plenty of, there was the middle class; you could see the middle class...I could say that my family was middle class...you didn’t see...if there was poverty people carried it well”.³⁹ This narrative conflicts with the actual jobs that their parents had. First, the mothers of these migrants were not working in the formal sector of employment, and when they did it was solely because they were widows. Second, most of the parents had, at the time, jobs that could be defined as qualified manual labor (Torche and Wormald 2004) such as newspaper photographer, rail machinist, seaman, or marble sculptor and only in two cases they were part of the small business bourgeoisie. Regardless of this conflict, there was a belief in the role of meritocracy to achieve social mobility and education had a central role in this, regardless of gender.

Julián argues that despite coming from a very poor family whose father was an always absent seaman, he took education in his own hands because if he studied “he could do better”.⁴⁰ By doing this he was accepted in a renowned public school in Valparaíso and due to a mix of

³⁹ “Eh... mucha, había la clase media, se notaba la clase media...Yo podía decir que mi familia era de la clase media. Eh... No se notaba... si había pobreza la sobrellevaban bastante bien.”

⁴⁰ “Si estudiaba podía irle mejor”

effort, wits and luck, he then received a scholarship to go to law school. For Alejandra, on the other hand, education was a familial imperative. According to her

But for my dad it was always very important that I, that I had an education, because my mom married him when he was 19 and he could not finish high school. I believe he only finish up to junior year...then this was always very important to him and because of that...when I finished my high school and failed on my first attempt to [pass] the [university] entrance exam...so I took everything I had with me and went home and told my mom: I am going to Concepción. And I admire myself that at that age, I was 17 or 18 years old I was very independent and I knew that I could live with my grandmother in Concepción and eventually be accepted at the Universidad de Concepción.⁴¹

While education, and in particular post secondary education, was an important tool to achieve social mobility, not all the participants in this study succeeded in completing a university degree or even beginning one. Alejandra, mentioned above, began studying social work and then changed to nursing. She did not finish because she migrated to the US and only after her divorce from her first husband was able to go back to college and complete a degree in arts and a master's program in library sciences. Julián completed all his courses in the law program but never graduated because he began working and earning money which deterred him from finishing. Mario spent three years in the Air Force Academy but had to leave for medical reasons, took some college classes but never completed a degree and ended up studying in a culinary and hospitality school in Switzerland after he migrated to the US. Josefina, finally, after

⁴¹ Pero para mi papá era siempre muy importante que yo, yo tuviera una educación, porque mi mamá se caso con él cuando ella tenía 19 años entonces y no termino su secundaria quedo creo que en el 5° de humanidades...entonces siempre le fue muy importante eso y por eso cuando... y yo cuando termine el *high school* (sic) el liceo y y fallé mi primer intento del bachillerato,...ah así que yo tome todo lo que venía conmigo y me fui a casa y le dije a mi mamá, me voy a Concepción y me admiro yo que a esa edad, tenía 17 o 18 años todavía yo fui muy independiente y sé que yo sabía que yo podía estar con mi abuelita en Concepción y eventualmente ir a la universidad de Concepción.

finishing high school applied to a vocational school but was not accepted and shortly after began working for the telephone company.

For many in Chile of the 1950s and 1960s, this self identification, with the middle class with its ties to meritocracy and the role of education in social mobility, came attached to a particular political position. The political changes at the end of the presidency of Gabriel González Videla produced a split in the Radical Party, the core of the center in the Chilean political spectrum for over thirty years and gave rise to a new core; the Christian Democrats. This party, born out of a split of the Conservative Party in the late 1930s, achieved preeminence in 1955 by winning the Federación de Estudiantes de Chile (FECH),⁴² although some of its members had already been elected to the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies and had been cabinet members during the *Radical* governments. While this party only behaved as a centrist party in relation to the existent political system in Chile at the time, its cadres comprised by a technocratic elite with a strong catholic inspiration with ideological roots in social Christianity (de Liz 1986), resounded enormously with the middle classes and young high school and university graduates (Petras 1976). This rise in power of the Christian Democrat Party leads Eduardo Frei, one of the early party founders and a Senator, to be elected President in 1964. In fact, the platform the Frei used was based on a social movement named “La Marcha de la Patria Joven” that called on the youth to be the new founders of the Chilean Republic under the banner

⁴² The FECH, Federation of Chilean Students is the elected government of the students of the Universidad de Chile, the Chilean public university. The body has traditionally been an active and relevant participant in Chilean politics through the 20th century and now (Correa et al. 2001).

of a “revolution in liberty” (Juventud Demócrata Cristiana 1965).⁴³ In the election itself Frei received the support of the female vote, influenced by the Catholic church, that of the two largest urban centers (Santiago and Valparaíso), and a “multi-class coalition of urban middle-class political independents” (Petras 1967: 7) together with those aspiring to be middle class as the “low-paid urban workers in the service sector” (loc. cit) and medium size farmers; as well as poor farmers that saw in the Christian Democracy a way to reduce power of conservative landowners.

Amanda, Alejandra and José were the most politically active among my participants of this period. The three of them got involved in politics in the university, although they mention that their political consciousness is something that they got from their home. José’s father was a member of the Radical Party and although he himself participated in a couple of meetings he never became a member. While he was in college and as president of the students in his department he was in conversation to enter the Christian Democrat Party but he again decided against becoming a member. He argues that “politics was interesting in Chile, but no, my interest was completely different, eh, it was global, it was to move forward and leave”.⁴⁴

Amanda and Alejandra had a more active involvement with the Christian Democrats. Both argue that very early in life they developed, in their own words, a “social consciousness” that derives from within the family and more specifically from their mothers. This social

⁴³ As opposed to a socialist and/or communist revolution which, according to the Christian Democrat thinking of those years would be authoritarian.

⁴⁴ “...la política era interesante en Chile pero, no, el interés mío era completamente diferente, eh, era global, era avanzar y salir”.

consciousness implies assisting and “helping the poor”⁴⁵ according to Amanda. Alejandra elaborates more on the origin of this conscience, something that in her words “all catholic university students”⁴⁶ were involved:

...well I believe that one, sometimes one brings this from the family, even if is not made vocal formally, isn't it that? But in Chile, I do not know how it was in the times that you grew up there, but when I grew up almost always there was poor people, that came to the door of your house to ask for clothes, food, whatever one would had then, everything. I was always very conscious that there were people in need and that, that doesn't stop when one moves to a different house, it still happens here and a lot in these times...⁴⁷

A similar conceptualization made Amanda participate in the development of workers' schools, the Centro de Estudios y Capacitación Laboral (CESCLA)⁴⁸ during her tenure as student in the Universidad Católica de Valparaíso.

⁴⁵ “Ayudabamos a los pobres”.

⁴⁶ “...como todos los estudiantes católicos...”. This is part of a longer reference that she makes to Arturo Hillerns, a young doctor member of the MIR who was made disappear on September 15 of 1973 by the police as part of the political repression during the dictatorship. The complete part in Spanish is: “...como todos los estudiantes católicos, con conciencia social, él (Hillerns) estaba envuelto en el policlínico, yo también con otros amigos enfermeras y de medicina”.

⁴⁷ “...bueno yo creo que uno, a veces uno trae eso de la familia, aunque no sea vocalizado bien formalmente no cierto? Pero en Chile, no sé cómo es en estos tiempos cuando tú creciste, pero cuando cuando yo crecí siempre había gente pobre, que venía a la puerta de tu casa a pedir ropa, comida, lo que uno tuviera entonces todo. Yo siempre estuve muy consciente de que había gente necesitada y eso eso no para al cambiarse uno de casa, todavía pasa aquí y mucho en estos tiempos...”.

⁴⁸ There is very little information bibliographic and/or online about this program, most of it tied to remembrances of Father Miguel Woodward, a British-Chilean who was a teacher in that program and died of a heart attack under torture in a Navy ship in the days after September 11, 1973. Renato González, currently a Chilean Representative and the first director of the CESCLA in 1965 mentions that this was an academic unit of the Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, first on its kind which pursue to promote the studies of actives workers in the most important companies in Valparaíso. Its objective was to encourage workers to complete their high school education and then continue into the college of engineering to complete technical degrees

For these two women, politics was part of their milieu, something that is constructed to the personal connections with well known politicians. Through this construction they make the argument that although they were middle class they were participants of the changes that were occurring in Chile. Amanda emphasizes that Eduardo Frei was a personal friend of her father, and since her father was a Christian Democrat then she also was one. Alejandra also mentions meeting Eduardo Frei. She told me:

I didn't have, I was too young to vote in that time, I didn't have the opportunity to vote for anyone [in Chile], but when I was 15 I met Eduardo Frei through one of my uncles...and he introduced me to him and [later] I went to campaign meetings, but I couldn't vote for him.⁴⁹

Amanda and Alejandra transplanted their experience with the Christian Democrats to their political participation here in the US. Both define themselves as Democrats. Amanda has been more involved in local party activities and eventually she decided to become a US citizen solely because she wanted to be able to vote and participate in politics. Alejandra took a different route; she participated in the Clinton campaign and eventually became part of a group of followers of Hillary Rodham Clinton. As part of this group, Alejandra even travelled to Chile and to her home city of Temuco at the same time that Hillary Clinton visited the city to inaugurate a children's school; occasion in which Alejandra introduced her mother to the then First Lady.

(Cámara de Diputados, Legislatura 356^a, Sesión 31^a lunes 19 de mayo de 2008 at <http://www.camara.cl/pdf.aspx?prmID=3208andprmTIPO=TEXTOSESION>.

⁴⁹ “yo no tuve, era muy joven para votar en ese tiempo, no tuve la oportunidad de votar por nadie, pero a los 15 años conocí a Eduardo Frei que uno de mis tíos era muy muy apasionado sobre la política y él me lo presento y que se yo andaba en demostraciones antes de la elección, pero no pude votar por él”.

The political participation of the remaining participants, although not so active as in the previous three cases, it also impacted their understandings of the world which were in turn defined by the conditions in Chile during the late 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s. While Julián currently defines himself as apolitical, he mentions that he voted for Allende in 1970 but unlike one of his brothers, never really engaged in politics and by 1972 he had become disillusioned with the government which made his decision to migrate easier. Josefina defines herself as a *pinochetista*, a follower of Pinochet, and that in her house her father was a Christian Democrat and her mother was from the right and that all her family supported right wing parties. Despite this she remembers that at some point (not during the 1973 coup) one of her aunts protected and hid Luis Corvalán, a prominent member of the communist party, in her house.⁵⁰ Finally Mario also defines himself as apolitical and has never voted but he says that he “used to like to say that I was democratic, a Christian democrat, due to [his] mother’s influence”,⁵¹ reinforcing the role of family in the political position of the interviewees.

The particular class location, the reasons for migrating and the political allegiances that are mostly shared by this group of participants, places them in a very interesting position to analyze the view of the military coup of September 11, 1973. Salazar argues (1986), that by the second half of the 1960s most of the Chilean middle class had moved away from its support of the proletariat becoming more conservative. In fact while there are splits in the Christian Democrat Party towards the left that give origin to the *Izquierda Guillerma* (Christian Left) and

⁵⁰ While she does not give exact dates of this it was most likely between 1948 and 1958 time when the Communist Party was proscribed in Chile due to the *Ley Maldita* (see above) and Corvalán was persecuted by the government.

⁵¹ “totalmente apolítico, me gustaba decir que era democrático, Christian democrático (sic), porque la influencia de mi mamá.”

the *Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria* (MAPU Popular Unitary Action Movement) parties, the Christian Democrats remained a strongly Catholic, anti-Communist party which would lead them to be allied with the rightist National Party and oppose Allende's Government and support the coup of 1973. What is most interesting is that despite living abroad for several years, my eight interviewees for this section maintained their political allegiances to political parties in Chile. They supported as well, at least initially, the military coup of 1973.

V. The coup from abroad: September 11, 1973 and its aftermath

The coup d'état that overthrew Allende on September 11, 1973 is a defining moment in the contemporary history of Chile. Not only did it change the political system and certain social, cultural and economic aspects of the nation; it also touched the lives of everyone in the country. It has also been commonly suggested in Chile that in every family there were people who suffered the repression during Pinochet and others who supported the overthrow of Allende.⁵² This seems to be the case in most interviewees of this group. Despite living thousands of miles away from Chile, and clearly without the access to globalized information through Internet available, these emigrants felt the coup very closely. Their memories and connections to one of

⁵² Alejandra told me: "well, the family was very divided, I believe all the families were divided in Chile because, for example, there were families that were more on the side of the military and did not want to believe the other side. One of my very aunts was married to a very nice guy, right, my uncle, but his father was a *Carabinero* (policeman), ah then he was on that side, so in the parties we couldn't talk politics. ("bueno la familia estaba muy dividida, yo creo que todas las familias estaban divididas en Chile porque por ejemplo habían familias que eran más por el lado de los militares y no querían creer al otro lado, una de mis tías misma, hermana menor de mi mamá, estaba casada con una persona muy querida, no cierto, mi tío pero el papá de él era carabinero ahhh entonces él estaba por ese lado, así que en las fiestas no se podía hablar de política"). See also Josefina's story *supra* note 32.

the most important dates in the Chilean twentieth century and to the arrival of exiles can be explained by the reasons behind their migrations and the context of the Cold War.

At the time of the coup there were already several Chilean associations in the United States that worked closely related with the consulates. While until 1973 the Chilean consulates attempted to be representative of the nation and not of the government, in the event of a traumatic change in government as that of September 11, 1973, loyalties changed as dramatically within the consulates. Before 1973 there were already signs that the associations were divided between those who supported Allende and those who were against him. An official letter dated May 29 of 1973 from the Chilean consul in Los Angeles states that the “the two groups in which the Chilean community is divided commemorated Naval Combat of Iquique...The Club Chileno did a great formal party, while the Centro Lautaro did a folkloric party...the Centro Lautaro sponsored a ‘Chilean week’, to which I did not attend since I wasn’t invited”.⁵³ Alejandra also remembers that the Chilean Club in Detroit was much divided and because of this people did not talk much about the coup.

The official documents of the Chilean consulates in the United States show a gap in communications that begins on September 10 and that was only reestablished several days later. Once the communications were reestablished it is possible to observe two reactions. Some consular officials, mostly members of the professional Chilean diplomatic corps would write to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating their loyalty to the new government, while others would be replaced by a new consul as they resigned or were deposed from their posts. Although there is not much information on what Allende supporters living abroad did at the time of the coup, from

⁵³ Archivo MINREL, Consulado General de Chile en Los Angeles, 29 de Mayo de 1973.

the consular communications it is possible to observe the activities of those that supported the coup.

Cables and official letters from the Chilean Consulate in San Francisco, Los Angeles and New York, show a rapid change in policy. The Consul in San Francisco offers the help of Chilean emigrants and local citizens to send food and clothes to Chilean babies. Also, and as part of a fund raising drive for the “Fund of National Restoration” of Chile began by the *Junta*,⁵⁴ Chilean emigrants sent money through the Consulates. In Chile men and women from different classes, but particularly from higher classes would donate money and jewelry to support the current work of the dictatorial government (Stern 2006). The Chilean consul in Los Angeles writes of the sending of a check for US\$5,000 which “corresponds to the generous donation made by our compatriot Mrs. Julieta Valverde de Burden for the reconstruction of Chile”.⁵⁵ The Chilean consul in New York writes, during the same period, about the sending of food and medical instruments by “Chileans who want to cooperate with the reconstruction of our country”.⁵⁶ In the same official note the consul mentions that this shipment will be sent in a ship

⁵⁴ The *Junta de Gobierno* was the collegiate body of the superior officers that governed Chile between September 11 1973 and December of 1974. During this period the *Junta* embodied the executive and legislative powers and was presided by Augusto Pinochet because he was commander in chief of the army, the oldest of the four military bodies in Chile (Army, Navy, Air Force and *Carabineros* or national police). After December 1974 Pinochet became president as chosen by the *Junta* and this became the legislative body formed by the higher ranking officers of all four military bodies until 1990.

⁵⁵ Archivo MINREL, Consulado General de Chile en Los Angeles, 15 de Octubre de 1973.

⁵⁶ Archivo MINREL, Consulado General de Chile en Nueva York, 12 de Noviembre de 1973.

of the “Compañía Sudamericana de Vapores” who, as aid to the reconstruction, will do it for free.⁵⁷

The memories of the reactions among the Chileans interviewed here is mostly of support to the military coup. Mario, for example, remembers that among the Chilean community in Chicago “it was...well we weren’t jumping up and down, but we were very pleased and it was a change in Chile because the situation was very bad for all our families...”⁵⁸ Amanda was able to visit shortly after the coup and remembers seeing her father and family very thin for the lack of food during Allende’s period; he was, according to her, “in his bones”. She argues that for her family Pinochet was a hero at the time, because he saved the Country at a moment that there were food shortages; but “what came after changed everything”,⁵⁹ referring to the disappearances and other human rights abuses. Using a somewhat typical argument of many Christian Democrats at the time; “if Pinochet had stayed only three years he would have been a hero”,⁶⁰. She argues that one of her extended family members was in the military in charge of Allende’s security detail and that after the coup her relatives showed pictures of the expensive

⁵⁷ Ships of this company owned by Chilean businesspeople where used as detention centers and torture centers by the Chilean Navy in the days after the coup (Chile. Comisión Nacional Sobre la Prisión Política y Tortura 2005; Fontaine Talavera 2005).

⁵⁸ “fue muy... así no que saltábamos en el aire, pero estábamos muy contentos y es un cambio en Chile porque la situación estaba muy mal para toda la familia de nosotros acá”.

⁵⁹ “Lo que vino después cambio todo”.

⁶⁰ “Si Pinochet se hubiera ido a los tres años sería un héroe”. A short but clear analysis of the position of the Christian Democrats during the first days after the coup can be found on Correa et al 2001: 287-288 and in Ensalaco 2000: 15-16. This position is also clear in a letter that Eduardo Frei Montalva, former Christian Democrat President and Senate President at the time of the coup, wrote to the Italian Prime Minister Mariano Rumor, also a Christian Democrat, in November of 1973 cited in Correa et al 2001: 288. The entire letter can be found in Documentos Históricos, Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, Chile: <http://www.bicentenariochile.cl/> accessed on May 23rd, 2012.

liquor, food and other goods; all considered excesses of the deposed President at the time the country was in a food crisis.⁶¹ She also had other relatives who were exiled.

Although there were plenty of suggestions that a coup was about to happen nobody knew the brutality of the dictatorship or that it was going to last for seventeen years. Information from Chilean newspapers hinted that the coup had been a righteous, and above all legal, outcome for a country that was going on the way to a disastrous communist revolution. Alejandra recalls the disbelief that a coup would happen in Chile. She also remembers the misinformation set up in the Chilean newspapers and how that influenced her response to the coup:

I never thought that was going to happen in Chile. I have always been very proud of Chile. Chile is not a “Banana Republic,” right? Well all that changed suddenly and at the beginning when they sent me the newspapers from Temuco, the people did not know what had happened...I believe everything was staged, the *Diario Austral* made believe that the socialists were preparing a revolution themselves and that the government [she refers to the military government] came and saved us from it. So they published pictures of rifles, weapons and everything; and then I would read a letter that mentioned that there were lists with people that [the

⁶¹ During the coup the military raided Allende’s house as well as the houses of other politicians and showed the press large amounts of boxes with weapons, whisky, expensive food and other supplies out of reach for the population. This was used as a way of discrediting the government arguing that while there was lack of food in the country the Socialist president could and in fact did have luxurious items (Stern 2006). A ‘list’ of the excesses can be found in two very opposing websites. The first is an online archive that contains documents by and about Salvador Allende. There in a document entitled *24 horas*, written by the reputed journalists Ascanio Cavallo and Magdalena Serrano in 2003 (<http://www.salvador-allende.cl/Golpe/el11/24%20HORAS.pdf> accessed May 23, 2012), they argue that: “*Su conducta privada será denostada con invenciones morales—disipación, alcohol, pornografía, lujo—como si el depuesto fuese un sátrapa y no un político*” (page 80). The second website is the blog of a former military officer, currently serving 120 years of prison for tortures, disappearances and assassinations during the Chilean dictatorship. There he argues “[L]a tercera gran sorpresa, que impactó especialmente a los cadetes y a cuantos ingresaron a la casa presidencial, fue la gran cantidad de material y elementos pornográficos que encontraron en su interior. Esa era la casa del, hasta entonces, Presidente de la República de Chile.” (at <http://miguelkrassnoff.blogspot.com/2010/10/biografia-37.html> accessed on May 23, 2012).

socialists] were going to kill and among them was some of my relatives and I was glad [the coup had occurred].⁶²

Luciana had been preparing a trip to Chile for a while when the coup occurred. Despite the political situation, she and her husband decided to travel to Chile anyway. Her memories of Chile after the coup are of fear but also of not too much change. People, she argues, were still friendly, in particular if they were in charge. She told me:

[We went] right after the fall of Allende. We had our tickets paid and so we went. And we stayed in a hotel in downtown Santiago...It was an amazing experience because there were tanks right in front, there were also soldiers with machine guns in front of the hotel...and the for Dayana, my oldest, it was all a novelty, because it was something out of the movies, the soldiers with machine guns. I remember that that year we went out of Santiago and in the roads [the military] would stop the bus and they would take everyone down and put the men on one side and the women on the other. For what reason? I do not know. We were so very afraid that only later we realized that was due to the revolution that had occurred in Chile. That same year we decided to have a small dinner with family...and Edgardo was told he had to get permission from the military to do it...It was very hard to get permission but at the end the lieutenant, a very nice kid, understood our point that we were coming from abroad and everything and he said 'I'll give you permission, but very few lights'; then we did the dinner on the backyard. Then Dayana would always tell me, 'that was exiting'. I used to tell her, yes very exciting. Imagine that we went right after the fall of Allende and all that mess and we could, and we never had major problems with the justice, that it wasn't...ah I went to get my id card, I remember, and as well there were machine guns, [people] had machine guns in their back...on the hallways, I was very

⁶² “Porque imagínate que que eso pasar en Chile, que yo siempre estaba muy orgullosa de ah Chile no es una banana republic [sic], ¿no cierto? Bueno todo eso cambio de repente y al principio cuando me mandaron a diarios de Temuco, cuando la gente no sabía exactamente qué había pasado... creo que se stage, se pusieron las cosas de cierta manera, para hacer ver que pareciera que los socialistas están, estaban planeando un golpe ellos mismos, entonces el gobierno vino y salvo a Chile de esto, así es como lo puso el diario austral mostrando las fotos de, de los rifles, de las armas y todo eso, entonces yo leía una carta y decía ah me agrada que hoy habían listas de personas que se iban a matar y entre ellas estaban los Ugartes, que es mi familia”.

uncomfortable...but that went away. People are [were] still always very nice, very good people.⁶³

As within Chilean society, emigrants that arrived to the US before 1973 differ in their current evaluations of the coup and the dictatorship. As I mentioned before, Amanda's initial support for the military stopped as she learned of the human rights abuses. Something similar happened to Alejandra. Shortly after the coup, and based on the newspapers sent by her parents, she told me that she wrote a letter to the editor remarking, among other things, "thank you, I appreciate that my parents sent me this newspapers because from here things look very different, but you are telling me the truth".⁶⁴ That letter was published by the newspaper and used as proof of the support of the coup by Chileans living abroad. Alejandra remembers that her family and

⁶³ "...justamente cuando había caído, el presidente Allende?...Ya. Fuimos, teníamos pasajes comprados ya, y fuimos. Y nos alojamos en un Hotel Internacional, creo que se llamaba, en el centro. ...Fue una experiencia bárbara porque—, acaba de su—acababa de...del golpe. Porque estaban las, habían tanques frente a ahí, frente al hotel estaban los soldados con ametralladoras... y entonces para, para Dayana que era la, la mayor, eso fue todo una, una novedad porque no había nada más que en películas, los soldados con ametralladoras, me acuerdo que, fuimos, ese año fuimos fuera de Santiago, y en el camino, paraban la, el bus, el Pullman, hicieron bajar a todos, la gente, a las mujeres todas nos pusieron en un lado, y a los hombres en otro. ...Cual fue la razón? No sé. Estábamos tan asustados que no, después nos dimos cuenta que había sido por el punto adherido, justamente cuando acaba, de haber una revolución ahí en Chile. Así fue. Y ese mismo año decidimos, tomar un, hacer una, una pequeña cena, con familiares cercanos, y no...Así que bueno, le dijeron a Edgardo que tenía que ir a, a la policía, carabineros, a pedir un permiso. Le costó, una barbaridad que le dieran permiso para que pudiéramos tener, íbamos a tener como 15 o 20 personas. Al final el, el lieutenant [sic], muy buena gente el muchacho, vio el punto de vista, que veníamos de, del extranjero, y todo el día, las intenciones, dijo, "bueno, les voy a dar permiso, pero si," dijo, "las menos luces posibles..." "Oh." No había problema, que quiere—nos fuimos todos afuera, al patio, en vez de estar en el comedor, nos fuimos todos al patio, para que no prendieran luces. Entonces, siempre Dayana me decía, "oye que, que emocionante que fue eso, ah?" Le digo, "sí, muy emocionante," le digo yo. Cachai que fuimos en ese tiempo cuando acababa de, de venir la, había caído Allende y todo el lio que había... y que, nos dejaron... nunca tuvimos problema mayor con la justicia, que no hubiera sido—ah, yo fui a sacar carnet, me acuerdo, y también. Con ametralladoras en, ametralladoras en la espalda... por el ca—pasillo, me sentía muy incómoda... pero eso paso. La gente sigue siempre cariñosa, muy buena."

⁶⁴ "muchas gracias, me agradezco que mis papás me hayan mandado este periódico, porque ah desde aquí, las cosas se ven muy diferentes, pero ustedes me están diciendo la verdad".

other acquaintances told that she did not know what was really happening. Only later and during one of her visits to Chile she began to realize the extent of the repression and censorship. Her father would tell her: “you know one has to be very careful, because you never know...you never know when someone can be listening and you can be betrayed”; she told me that “this is how fears communicates to you...I didn’t know how that was, that was my first time”.⁶⁵

It is also through her father, who worked as a photographer in the local newspaper in Temuco, and her uncle in Concepción is that Alejandra began to hear directly about the atrocities of the dictatorship and the need to maintain the memory of those who were killed. They told her:

He [her father] would tell me ‘I saw the bodies on the Cautín river’, ah and it was chilling to hear my dad because he saw with his own eyes; and I say what if I talk, no I can’t because I wouldn’t be here anymore, I couldn’t talk. And my uncle in Concepción would tell me, he was always very involved in all this, ‘look we are, [her uncle would tell her] we have been organizing, no we can’t do anything, but we have memorized, each person has memorized so many names, of all the disappeared so that they will not disappear from our memory’.⁶⁶

Finally, her opposition to the dictatorship, as most of her political beliefs, would be constructed through the personal knowledge those who suffered detentions or were killed. This is seen in relation to the death of Arturo Hillerns with whom she had done volunteer work and that

⁶⁵ “era, entonces cuando estuve allá, mi papá me estaba contando esto en la cocina, estábamos en la cocina que tenia salida al patio en Temuco y el, él me decía “sabes que hay que tener mucho cuidado porque uno nunca sabe” y ahí el miedo se le comunica a uno, por primera vez “uno nunca sabe si alguien puede escuchar y la pueden delatar” wow dije, no tenía idea como era esto, esa fue la primera vez, ah”.

⁶⁶ “Y me decía...yo vi los cadáveres por el rio Cautín ah y fue pero, daban escalofríos escuchar a mi papá porque él lo vio con sus propios ojos y digo y si yo hablara, no no puedo hablar porque ya no no estaría aquí, no podía hablar. Y mi tío en Concepción, me decía, el siempre muy envuelto en todo esto, me decía mira estamos nosotros nos hemos organizado, no no podemos hacer nada, pero hemos aprendido de memoria, cada persona se ha aprendido de memoria tantos nombres, de desaparecidos para que ellos no desaparezcan de nuestra memoria”.

later she learned that “he had been killed, shot in the back during the coup, and well those things remain forever in the memory, because those names became famous later”.⁶⁷ She also makes reference to other classmates that she never heard from again and she questions whether they have been killed or disappeared, as well as to one of her professors Edgardo Enríquez, about whom she said: “I respected that professor a lot, he was a gentleman...I saw [in TV] that they showed Isla Negra, and they showed people, some of the prisoners were interviewed and there was my professor; and I couldn’t find anyone to tell that he was my anatomy professor at the Universidad de Concepción, cult, educated people, and excellent individual, but was from *the wrong political side*”.⁶⁸

The political ideologies of my interviewees resembled closely during this time those of the center and center right in Chile. The changes that some of them went through later can be explained in terms of the horror that something like what was happening in Chile could actually happen there. It is the argument of the impossibility that an advanced social and political society

⁶⁷ “lo habían matado, disparado por la espalda durante el el golpe militar, eh y bueno esas esas cosas quedan para siempre en la memoria, porque esos nombres se convirtieron en nombres famosos después ¿no?” See also note 29 above. Besides Arturo Hillners she makes reference to Miguel Enríquez the leader of the MIR, also a medicine student at the Universidad de Concepción at the time and who was killed in 1974 in an attack by the DINA (the dictatorship’s secret police) to the safe house where he was hiding (Castillo 2008).

⁶⁸ “...Pero este profesor yo lo respetaba mucho, era un caballero..., vi que mostraban a Isla Negra y mostraban a gente, los entrevistaron a algunos prisioneros y ahí estaba mi profesor y yo no hallaba a quien decirle: ese es mi profesor de anatomía en la universidad de Concepción, gente culta bien educada excelente persona, pero era del *the wrong political side*”(sic). Edgardo Enriquez was a well know socialist doctor and professor of medicine at the Universidad de Concepción. He was president of this university, a large public university in the second largest city in Chile, between 1969 and 1972 and was Health Minister (equivalent to Surgeon General in the United States) during Allende’s presidency. He was also the father of Miguel and Edgardo Enriquez founding members and leaders of the MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement). Miguel was killed and Edgardo made disappeared during the early years of the Chilean military dictatorship.

would use these crimes to legitimize political change (Stern 2006). It is not an argument about the horror itself. It is a more complex argument. It is a conjunction between the ideas of the coup as a “necessary evil”, the Chilean myth of democratic exceptionalism, and the notion that those who were killed or were exiled brought this destiny upon themselves because they did something wrong.

The initial response to the military coup among Chilean emigrants was mostly of support. Institutionally, the Chilean consulates became a conduit for sending monetary support to the “reconstruction” of the country. My interviewees remember receiving the news of the coup with relief if not happiness. While some of them later changed their allegiance (as many in Chile also did), others maintained their support. The arrival of exiles will test the notion of a shared nationality. After all in their minds they, the victims had done something wrong.

VI. The arrival of the exiles

The military coup and the seventeen year dictatorship that ensued produced the largest movement of population in the history of Chilean history. While sources vary, a minimum of 200,000 Chileans (2% of the population) had to leave the country for political reasons or for economic reasons influenced by the dictatorship between 1973 and 1988; between 20,000 and 30,000 left as political exiles in the first three years of the dictatorship (Wright and Oñate, 1998: 8). Here I present how the older Chilean emigrant groups received those exiles.

As of 1973, the Chilean communities in the US were very divided by the coup, as was the country. Maybe for the role of the United States in the fall of Allende or because most Chilean emigrants in this country were originally against the parties of the *Unidad Popular*, the

communities in Michigan and Chicago had a distrust for Chilean exiles and refugees. This was not the case in other parts of the US. Anti-Pinochet groups were active in California among earlier migrants and there were solidarity groups organized by Chilean students (Eastmond 1997; Muñoz 2008).

Until recently there was no relationship between the old emigrants, those who came before 1973, and the exiles who came in the early years of the dictatorship. When I asked Mario if he remembered the arrival of political refugees he strongly replied “the communists arrived...or refugees [he added in a calmer tone]; it was a group that; we didn’t mingle with them a lot because they were very, very leftist; they were communists really...and we were all in the club, but they had their own group.”⁶⁹ Josefina also has a strong opinion about this group arguing that they were all corrupt: “those refugees would have been better to stay in Chile” she told me, “they can’t stand us, they can’t stand us because we are snobs, they had formed another Chilean Club but it didn’t work out...they recollected money for the poor children in Chile, they all own houses with that money, and huge cars...”⁷⁰ Alejandra also remembers the reaction to an exile family by the Chilean Club in Michigan. In this case, of it was a writer and his wife who

⁶⁹ “...eh llegaron los comunistas...o refugiados, que era un grupo que, no nos juntábamos mucho con ellos, porque ellos eran muy muy de izquierda, eran comunistas, realmente...todos estábamos en el club, pero ellos tenían su propio grupo”. As we will see in the coming chapters, in fact the US government did not accept members of the Chilean Communist party. Instead those who arrived were mainly socialists or even from the MIR.

⁷⁰ “esos refugiados, mejor se hubieran quedado en Chile...a nosotros no nos pueden ver, todavía no nos pueden ver porque somos los *pitucos*...ellos habían formado otro club chileno que no les resulto...ellos hacían desayunos para los niños pobres de Chile; todos tienen casa con la plata que recolectaban para los niños pobres, tremendos autos tienen...”

wanted to attend an activity of the club to which “a lady, one of the old ones, replied to him ‘yes, but...not really because you have to be a member’”.⁷¹

The problem between the groups was represented not only by the fact that the older emigrants did not allow the newer to participate; but also by the protests that the exiles carried against the activities of the clubs. José remembers that in 1977 the club was having a party to commemorate the Combate Naval de Iquique and “they came to protest in front, in the street, because to them we represented the *Junta* because we were Chileans who had been living in the United States”. To which I asked José whether the Club supported the Junta he told me that “no, no, nothing...we have never supported any political group, because that will be the end for the club...”⁷² Finally, Luciana’ memories about the relationships between the club and the refugees reinforce the idea of an apolitical club, as well as the notion that the earlier emigrants were confronted by these newcomers. She refers to the exiles as strangers who were so different to them that even lived in a different part of Chicago—those who live in the north, she would tell me. And only recently she has been able to meet them:

...it came, the revolution in Chile, the...the coup in Chile. And they arrived here to Chicago, the refugees. And they arrived with their own mentality, which I cannot blame, because I didn’t live through that. I had no idea about politics. But they came bitter, wounded, poor, resentful. Then they look at this little, little

⁷¹ “una señora de esas antiguas, “si pero hay que... oye no pero tienes que ser socia”

⁷² JV: Y vinieron a hacernos protesta al frente en la, en la calle, en contra de nosotros porque para nosot—para ellos, nosotros representábamos la junta, entonces—por ser chilenos que habíamos estado aquí en EE.UU.

CD: Y era tan así? Había apoyo de la comunidad chilena a la junta en esa época?

JV: No. No, nada. Porque yo estaba, eh yo siempre he estado en la directiva del club chileno y no, nunca hemos apoyado a ningún eh grupo político, eh, se acaba, se acaba el club.

group that was here as the *momios*.⁷³ There we learned of the expression “*momios*” because they would call us that, those of us who lived here then we didn’t know who the *momios* were. That group that I mention, almost all of them in the north [of Chicago], when you interview them, were all refugees. They came through churches, through friends, what would I know. But there was never a way to make them join us. Never. They would protest, if we were going to have a party anywhere, they would protest in the street, against us. Totally uncalled for because we had nothing, nothing to do with the fall of the government...we had been here for so long...you understand? If you would like, now with this consul, I have become aware of the existence of people...imagine living in this side, all the picnics were in this side. And the parties were somewhere central, nice. Then there wasn’t any contact with them.⁷⁴

The relationship between supporters and detractors of the dictatorship has changed since 1973, there is still, however, resentment between the two groups. It was only the day after the earthquake in Chile in February 27 of 2010, however, that these two groups came together, and maybe only momentarily, to help their country of origin.⁷⁵

⁷³ *Momios*, literally mummies, was the nickname the left gave to the members of conservative parties because their ideas were old and reactionary; they were as old as a mummy.

⁷⁴ vino, la revolución en Chile, el... el *coup* de Chile, todo ese lio. Y llegaron aquí, a Chicago, los refugiados. Y ellos llegaron con su propia mentalidad, que yo no los puedo culpar, porque yo no lo viví. Yo no tenía ni idea de política. Pero ellos llegaron amargados, heridos, pobres, resentidos. Entonces, miraron a este poco, pequeño grupo que había acá, como los momios. Ahí aprendimos la expresión “momios,” porque nos decían así, los que vivíamos aquí en aquel entonces, no sabíamos de que, quienes eran los momios. Este grupo que digo, que son casi todos los del norte, cuando tú los entrevistaste o —eran todos refugiados. Llegaron por las iglesias, por los a—amistades, que se yo. Pero nunca hubo manera de, unirlos. Nunca. Hacían demostraciones—si nosotros íbamos a tener una fiesta en alguna parte—hacían demostraciones en la calle, contra uno. Innecesario, porque nosotros no, no teníamos nada que ver con la, con la caída del gobierno... nosotros llevábamos aquí tantos años... entiende? Pero nunca se pudieron unir, nunca. Si se quiere, ahora con este cónsul, yo he venido a saber de la existencia de la gente de... imagínate, viviendo en este costado de acá, todos los picnics eran para el lado de acá. Y... las fiestas, en algún lugar central, bonito. Entonces, no había contacto con ellos.

⁷⁵ This was referred to me as an anecdote experienced by the then General Consul of Chile in Chicago.

VII. Conclusion

Modernization theory with its objective to transform ‘traditional’ societies into modern, liberal democratic and capitalist societies was the leading ideology of the Cold War until the 1970s. While being defined originally as a process between nations, rapidly were developed within this context practical and on the ground policies that would impact the lives of individuals in peripheral countries thus winning their hearts and minds and changing them one community at a time.

Almost as an unanticipated consequence of Modernization theory, I have shown here that this ideology reinforce the perception of the US as the beacon of modernity and indirectly influenced migration decisions of Chilean migrants currently in the US. Their memories of the migration decisions, the construction of their migration processes are clearly ingrained in the cultural changes brought upon by the historical context of the Cold War and the impact of the meso level institutions and organization developed within Modernization theory.

The question that remains is since the entire country was influenced by the Cold War why did such a relatively small number immigrate. Two answers are relevant. Before explaining these answers it is important to note that ideologies are not projected into *tabulas rasas*, but are contested and reshaped by other competing ideologies and social contexts. In this sense Chilean emigrants that I interviewed for this period constructed a class position, even a class consciousness, of themselves as middle class. The first answer then has to do with the “crucial meso level” as Faist (1997) calls it. While everyone was influenced by the Cold War, albeit differentially, those that were involved or had connections with institutions and organizations that made a more direct ideological transmission were those who migrated. The second answer

has to do with the middle class. As I described above, the Chilean middle class of the 1950 and 1960 felt that they were destined to change the country. The coalescing of the ideology of a middle class upon whose shoulders rested the future of the country, made it easier for them to leave. Not that they were escaping, in the contrary, it is their development as a class that makes them believe that they can succeed anywhere.

In my next chapter I will analyze the impact of Pinochet's military dictatorship in the exile of Chilean citizens. This occurs in a second stage of Cold War. At least in South America (and in fact beginning in 1964), the US government moved from a cultural impact of ideology, as shown by the *Trojan horses* of the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress to a more indirect military effort to contain socialist influence governments. This inclusion of the use of force created a large Diaspora from most of the Southern Cone countries; one that continues even forty years after the military dictatorship began and at least more than twenty years after they ended in South America.

CHAPTER V THE CENTRALITY OF EXILE IN CHILEAN MIGRATION

I. Introduction

The military coup and all the period of the military government was a very traumatic thing for my generation, for Chile, but for my generation...[it] affected us in a very direct manner...that marked my life, so it is hard for me to know how my life would have been if I had stayed there.¹

José Miguel Ceppi told me when I asked him to evaluate how different his life would have been had he stayed in Chile. The military coup of September 11, 1973 that deposed President Allende and his coalition government of the *Unidad Popular* (UP) is arguably the most important date in the Chilean twentieth century. Among Allende's supporters, the *once* (eleventh), as it is commonly known, destroyed the dreams of a generation among Allende's supporters. For those in the opposition, who supported and expected the coup, September 11 1973 was a day to celebrate. It meant a return to the normalcy of traditional class relations; where the structures and institutions of traditional Chile were back on their natural course. Almost forty years later many of the cleavages that were opened that day are still visible throughout Chilean society and beyond (Constable and Valenzuela 1991; Stern 2010).

This chapter focuses on the impact of the military coup and the first nine years of Pinochet dictatorship's on migration trajectories. While not dealing directly with the causes of the military dictatorship, I describe the intellectual trajectory of the literature on Chilean exile. I

¹ "El golpe militar y, y todo el periodo del régimen militar fue como una cosa tan traumática para mi generación, para Chile pero para mi generación...[que] nos afectó de manera muy directa...eso marcó mi vida, es difícil saber cómo hubiera sido si me hubiera quedado allá".

also describe the memories of Chile during the Allende years and the relevance of this period for the life of exiles and other migrants. I analyze the memories of the coup and the conditions under which these people had to decide to migrate and became exiles. I also explore their life as exiles and migrants and tie this into what was happening in Chile. Finally I describe life in exile from the perspective of those who were still children and left accompanying their parents in this ordeal.

By focusing on the memories of the period surrounding their exile, in this chapter I analyze the conditions under which these forced migrants decided to leave Chile as well as the conditions under which that migration took place. First, I argue here that the development of particular types of authoritarian governments created the conditions for the occurrence of mass exiles in a manner that was different to any other historical period in the Southern Cone and in particular in Chile. Second, I argue that the process of exile was not an identical experience for everyone involved, the differences have to do with the way biographical aspects intersect with the processes of historical change. Third, I argue that although this is a forced migration there are still spaces for agency, even if they bring unintended consequences. Finally, I conclude by restating the need to analyze exile from a perspective that includes personal and family decision in the context of larger historical processes.

The dictatorship forced the majority of the participants interviewed for this chapter, or their parents, into exiles after imprisoning and torturing them. A few others left Chile in a self imposed exile after the possibilities of working or studying were reduced or out of fear because they defined themselves as part of the opposition to the dictatorship. Only one of my interviewees for this period left Chile as a ‘traditional migrant’. Not all of them came directly to

the United States; some of these exiles lived years in Panama, Mexico, Mozambique, Belgium, Switzerland and France before reaching the United States.²

II. A new type of dictatorship: Transforming societies through Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes

The decade of the 1950s was a decade of transition between the Chilean “ancient regime” and the revolutionary moment. In the words of Jocelyn-Holt (1998: 30) was “the prelude of what was going to come, although it was still unannounced, and the epilogue of a past that refuses to leave”. The 1960s, on the other hand, meant rupture and the revolutions. As I described in the previous chapter, this decade sees in Chile the rise of the “revolution in liberty”—Frei and the Christian-Democrats in 1964—and the “revolution with empanadas and red wine”—Allende and the Unidad Popular in 1970. The process of social change that occurs in the 1960s ended violently with the military coup of September 11 1973. This coup put into power a military dictatorship of a kind unseen in Chile and in Latin America. In this section I describe the theoretical conceptualizations of this new kind of dictatorships. My argument is that by understanding the forms the Southern Cone dictatorships took—and the influence the US had in them—it is possible to understand the reasons behind the mass exiles and the manners through which exiles and other migrants decided—under different degrees of forcefulness—to leave Chile between 1973 and 1982.

² This chapter includes the analysis of the oral histories of nine Chileans. Of this group, one did not leave as an exile but on an economic migration. Of the other eight, three came as humanitarian parolees directly from Chile to the US, two left with their families as exiles to Panama and Belgium. One left as a self-exile with his wife who is a US citizen. One left as a self-exile with his mom to Mexico and after living in Africa came to the university in the US. This interviewee was a US citizen on his deceased father’s side. Finally one came as an self-exile to the US where his father was working at the Organization of American States.

The United States' role in the political processes that led to the military coups in South America, and in particular in Chile, has been well documented.³ In general terms, the objective of the participation of the United States in these countries was to block leftist parties from the government in order to avoid a second Cuba. In particular, the participation of the United States can be divided into two major actions: the funding of center and right wing political parties as a way of preventing the left from gaining and maintaining the presidency and the training of military officers who become the leaders of military coups (Huggins 1998). Military support through educational exchange between military schools and equipment sales, for example, had been an important policy since the nineteenth century but it increased from the 1950s onwards with the creation of the School of the Americas, a U.S. military training base for Latin American officers first based in Panama and later in Georgia (Loveman 1999; Gill 2004). Although the impact of this program was not the same in every Latin American country, its objective was to train officers from the armies of these countries in counter-insurgency, antiterrorism and anticommunist ideologies. This indoctrination had deep consequences for Chile since a good number of the School's alumni were going to participate in the DINA (Dirección Nacional de Investigaciones—National Directorate of Intelligence), the first intelligence police of Pinochet's dictatorship and later in the CNI (Central Nacional de Informaciones—National Information Center), the intelligence body that replaced the DINA after 1978, and other intelligence and repressive organizations. The School of the Americas was much more successful in preventing the rise of social and military leftist revolutions than the Alliance for Progress.

³ For different perspectives on the role of the US in Latin America see Whitaker 1976; Kornbluh 2004; Green 2010; Gustafson 2004; Sigmund, 1977; Sigmund 1993; and Brands 2010 among others.

The Southern Cone dictatorships, beginning with the Brazilian in 1964, were able to succeed because they emerged in the more industrialized Latin American societies. Second, they were characterized by an institutionalized military rule. Third, these dictatorships had a “historical project” through which they attempted to transform their societies as a whole; in their social, economic, cultural and political characteristics (Garretón 1989: 50). This explains their length and the reason why unlike previous military regimes—as that in 1924—militaries did not transfer back the power to civilians soon after the coup. Fourth, they were supported by a group of transnationalized technocrats who followed an ideology that linked national security and economic development. Finally, the rise of these regimes is in part a product of the internationalizing of U.S. security doctrines through foreign police and military assistance since the 1950s (Huggins 1998).

These dictatorships are what Guillermo O’Donnell and others have called Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes (O’Donnell 1979; Linz and Stepan 1978; Stepan and Linz 1978; Linz and Stepan 1996; Valenzuela 1985; Garretón 1989).⁴ These authors use a systemic or structural approach to understand these processes of political change and the reasons behind the high levels of violence. For O’Donnell (1979) and Garretón (1989), the military governments in power in the Southern Cone felt that they had to fulfill a specific historical project; to free their countries from Marxism and moral decadence. Because of this, the members of the ruling *juntas* compared themselves with the founding fathers and liberators of these nations (Garretón 1989). These new

⁴ As a general analysis of the democratic breakdowns that lead to bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, the Linz-Stepan school (of which Valenzuela was also part) argues that the democratic breakdown is a result of failures in the power relationship in the party system. For these authors political systems remain in equilibrium by having a strong center party that is able to answer the systemic requirements of the extremes through processes of negotiation. Once that center is no longer capable of maintaining this equilibrium and there is a displacement of the political participation to the left and right of the party system, a democratic breakdown occurs.

military governments were different from other military governments that had ruled these countries in other historical periods. These new dictatorships were qualitatively different from any other that had come before; they put into action a military structure that was to change the political culture and the system of government; thus creating what a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (O'Donnell 1979).

The concept of bureaucratic-authoritarianism intends to characterize a state that has the following characteristics. First, the higher echelons of government are usually occupied by individuals after successful careers in highly bureaucratized and complex organizations such as the army or big companies. Second, these are systems of political exclusion; they attempt to block the access to the state to the popular sector and its political allies. Third, these are also systems of economic exclusion in the sense that they reduce and postpone to an unspecified future the economic aspirations of the popular classes. Fourth, these regimes attempt to break the political requirements of the civil society. To achieve this they reduce the social questions and public policies to technical problems that have to be solved through arrangements in the higher echelons of state organizations. Finally, these regimes correspond to a stage of profound transformations in the processes of accumulation in their societies; which are in turn a component of the process of consolidation of a peripheral industrial capitalism (O'Donnell 1979). The rise of these regimes is a response to fast processes of mass mobilization and political consciousness among the popular classes. This is perceived by the other sectors as a threat to the continuation of defined socio-economic structures in the societies, which eventually end in the dominant sector imposing this regime using the armed forces as the moral reserve of societies.

While all the in the Southern Cone have similar origins and general characteristics they have singularities that defined their duration and impact in their societies. In the case of Chile the

figure of Pinochet is one of the main reasons that explain the consolidation of the regime and its duration for seventeen years (Huneus 2007). Unlike the dictatorships in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil where there was a rotation among the “presidents” of the *juntas* and even within which component of the armed forces held the presidency, in Chile the power was co-opted very quickly by Pinochet and the army. By late 1973 he had been named “Supreme Chief of the Nation” and by June of 1974 he had been given the title of President (Correa et al 2001). During the same period he increased his influence within the Army by replacing any and every superior officer that could compete against him.

For Huneus (2007) this is one of the characteristics that define the Chilean dictatorship and that differentiates it from the other sub-regional dictatorships. The other particular identity was the implementation, under authoritarian conditions, of a set of ultra-orthodox capitalist reforms that changed the structure of the Chilean economy and the relationships between the economy, society and cultural systems (Garretón 1989). These economic changes, that have two major waves of crises and recuperation during the dictatorship (in 1978 and in 1982), have an important impact of the emigration flows from Chile to the US after 1982 and then again after 1990. This economic identity cannot be understood as separate from the violence and physical coercion. This violence is the third identity, shared in this case with the other dictatorships, through which the Chilean dictatorship of 1973 to 1990 can be explained.

Besides being regimes of torture, disappearance and killing, these dictatorships were also responsible for the largest political and economic induced exile process in the history of the continent. The estimated number of exiles and other associated mass emigration processes from the Southern Cone during this period are as high as half a million Uruguayans between 1973 and 1984, equivalent to about 17% of the total population of this country in 1980 (Sznajder and

Roniger 2012). At least 200,000 Chileans political exiles (about 2% of the country's population in 1973) and up to one million including economic exiles (Wright and Oñate 2012) left the country between 1973 and 1990. The most accepted number for Argentina is around half a million people leaving between 1976 and 1984, although other estimates put the number up to 2 million Argentineans of a population of 28 millions in 1980 (Jensen and Yankelevich 2007). Finally, about 5,000 to 15,000 Brazilians had to leave their country during military rule between 1964 and 1985 (Sznajder and Roniger 2012)⁵. As my own interviewees can attest, a significant number of these exiles never returned to their countries of origin (Correa S. et al 2001; Rebolledo 2006). The physical expulsion of those against the regimes was a central component of the politics of fear and the destruction of internal political opposition. The propaganda of the dictatorships presented exile as part of a benevolent solution where, instead of jailing subversives the state allowed to leave the country. After all, the dictatorships argued, in most cases these people were leaving because they wanted, not because they had to (Wright and Oñate 2012; Rebolledo 2006).

The impact of exile in the case of Chile was immediate. Not only was fear that lead many to opt for diplomatic asylum. It was the end of a dream that lead thousands to leave Chile in the first two years of dictatorship. Exile has had an important effect in the literature, social sciences and arts in Chile in the last forty years. In the next section I introduce some of the literary and scientific creations that came out of exile and their transformation between 1973 and 1990.

⁵ The total estimations of populations are drawn from ECLAC's Demographic Bulletin, January 2004 at <http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/7/14347/lcg2225.pdf> (accessed August 2, 2012).

III. Exile in Chilean memory, literature and scholarship

Although there is a vast literature on the violations of human rights during the period of military dictatorships this literature has centered mostly on the *desaparecidos* and on torture, only recently has a systematic reference to exile emerged. As Loreto Rebolledo (2006: 16) has argued in the case of Chile, while exile was a theme of constant concern among those who fought against the dictatorship both inside Chile and abroad; once this ended and every exile was allowed to return this theme was no longer relevant. The process of exile has not been an important part of the two official Truth Commissions in post-dictatorship Chile: the Rettig Report, and the Valech Report.⁶ Currently there do not exist any memory sites dedicated to exiles, such as the Monument to the Disappeared.⁷ Even the literature on the dictatorship has been devoted mostly to the origins of the dictatorship and the transition to democracy as in the works of Garretón and others cited above, and on the cases of executions and torture, than to the cases of exile. As I present in this section, the literature and scholarship on exile since the return to democracy and particularly in the last decade there has been a renewed interest on studying and understanding the conditions and characteristics of exile.

⁶ The Rettig report was the final document produced by the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación). This commission and its report, commonly known as the Rettig Commission for the last name of its president Raúl Rettig, was the first truth commission established in Chile in April of 1990. Its objective was to learn and inform the government about human rights abuses (which ended in death) that occurred during Pinochet's Dictatorship. The Valech Report was the final document produced by the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura). Nicknamed after its president, Bishop Sergio Valech, was created in 2003 with the objective of supplement the work of the Rettig Commission and deal with human rights abuses, mainly prison and torture that did not end in death.

⁷ The *Memorial del Detenido Desaparecido y del Ejecutado Político* is a monument with the names of all the known victims (executions and disappeared) of Pinochet's dictatorship. It is located in Santiago inside the *Cementerio General*, the largest public-non religious cemetery in the country.

The reason for this lack of public interest and scholarship, mostly within Chile, towards the process of exile in the years after the end of the dictatorship is two-folded. On the one hand during the military government there was a constant propaganda against those who left the country for political reasons. The military dictatorship continuously presented them as traitors and turncoats to the fatherland who were constantly plotting against the nation and its main values. The exiles were living a “golden exile” (Rebolledo 2006: 16), as part of “jet set” (Wright and Oñate 2012: 149) travelling in Europe with funds from their political parties.

On the other hand, some within the left that remained in Chile considered them as cowards, those who saved themselves and abandoned the struggle, while people inside Chile suffered most directly the repression by the forces of the dictatorship (Rebolledo 2006; Wright and Oñate 2012). For those who returned, *los retornados*, in the early 1990s after the return to democracy, the government set up the National Office for Return through which former exiles were given fiscal benefits and tax exemptions to help them reintegrate to Chile. Many of them came with degrees from European or US universities and with new customs, different from those that could not leave Chile during the ‘cultural blackout’ of the dictatorship (Correa et al 2001: 312). These benefits only helped fueled resentment toward *los retornados* up to a point that it was not acceptable to mention in public that one had been an exile and even their extended families avoided mentioning the time of exile. For many relatives of former exiles and even for the public, particularly in the early 1990s, those who left as exiles had to leave most likely because they had done something bad (Rebolledo 2006).⁸

⁸ The idea that if someone was detained, killed or exiled during the Southern Cone dictatorships it was because they had done something wrong (or illegal) became a normal approach by many common citizens in these countries as a sort of denial against the obvious human rights abuses.

Despite this general process of social amnesia of exile there is a limited but growing cultural production, narrative, historiography and scholarship of exile. This literature in general can be divided into three temporally defined sources: a testimonial and personally influenced literature and cinema; collections and recollections of oral histories and interviews; and comparative and macro oriented studies of exiles. These three sources or generations of scholarship also correlate to particular moments of the dictatorship and post-dictatorial Chile. The testimonial occurs immediately after the coup, collections of oral histories and interviews begin to be published in the late 1980s, and the more social scientific studies in the late 1990s.

The testimonial literature about the dictatorship and its horrors began to be published soon after the coup. All of it was published abroad since the restrictions and censorship to any form of art that was deemed to be socialist was strict. The first testimonial book was Hernán Valdés' *Tejas Verdes: Diario de un Campo de Concentración en Chile*. This piece, like many others published subsequently, attempts not only to narrate the conditions of the lives of those incarcerated, but most importantly to broadly announce and denounce to everyone and any who is willing to hear the realities of the concentration camps in Chile and help coalesce international solidarity towards Chile (Mouesca 1998; Peris Blanes 2008).⁹

For many it was not possible to believe that the same organizations built to protect the citizens—the state, the police, for example—were guilty of such horrendous crimes. Therefore in a way, for many still in these countries, the exile and to a lesser extent those killed, got what they deserved because most likely were doing something illegal or against the values of the nation. At the same time a commonplace argument still used in Internet newspaper fora when there is a piece of news about the *disappeared* is that this is an invention from the left and that they know someone who saw one of those *disappeared* leaving the big life in a different country. See for example Salerno 2009 and Marcelo Piñeyro's film *La Historia Oficial* (The Official Story – 1985).

⁹ The Chilean socialist experience had attracted plenty of interest among the parties of the left in Europe and the US (Kushner and Knox 1999; Shayne 2009; Power 2009; Green 2010). An

Cinema also plays an important role in the denouncement of the executions and other human rights abuses, mainly through documentaries being the most well known of this Patricio Guzmán's *The Battle of Chile* about Allende's government (Guzmán 1973). Among fiction movies, one of the most representatives was *Dialogue of exiles*,¹⁰ produced in France in 1974 by Raúl Ruiz. This movie deals with the topic of exiles from the perspective of Chilean exiles in France shortly after the coup of 1973 and was filmed using mostly exiles with little or no acting experience. It includes discussions about everyday life in France; arguments about the defeat and the possibility and dream of a short exile; and even the kidnapping of a pro Pinochet artist on tour in France. In total 178 films were made by and about Chilean and exiles between 1973 and 1983, the largest number of films made by Chileans in any similar time frame up to that moment (Mouesca 1988). There is also Chilean theater, music, and painters that participated in the cultural life of exile, helping in the attempt to overthrow Pinochet, or at least provide support for the opposition to the dictatorship (Mouesca 1988).

The topic of exile also becomes central in the literary production abroad there has been a growing concern on this topic, both among well known and up and coming authors who themselves were exiles. The short stories and novels developed in exile are fiction, but a fiction strongly influenced by the experiences of those who were suffering the exile. Some of these authors have also dealt with the return to their countries after the end of the dictatorship. Important examples are José Donoso with *The garden next door* ("El jardín de al lado", 1981);

important number of members and sympathizers of the left did travel to Chile to help and to participate of the Chilean 'revolution' between 1970 and 1973. It was the "the Mecca of the World's Left" (Rabêlo and Rabêlo 2001). This certainly helped the development of a solidarity movement towards Chile which aided in the integration of exiles to European nations. A beautiful take on this from the perspective of a French nine year old is presented in the movie "Blame it on Fidel" (Faute à Fidel!) by Julie Gravas (2006).

¹⁰ *Diálogo de exiliados*, 1974.

Carlos Cerda with *To die in Berlin* (“Morir en Berlín”, 1993) and *Escrito con L* (2001); Antonio Skármeta with “No pasó nada” (1980), and the collection by Ernesto Alegría (1982) *Chilean writers in exile: eight short novels* (Kaminsky 1999; López-Calvo 2001). As important as the literary creations themselves were journals and magazines created by those abroad and where the different parties within the left and center expressed political ideas and artistic creations. Among these the journal *Literatura Chilena en el exilio* edited by Ernesto Alegría in San Francisco, California, the political journal *Chile Democrático* published by the Christian Democracy in Rome and above all the Magazine *Araucaria de Chile* (Rebolledo 2006, da Silva 2009).

This last magazine is where the first life histories and narratives of exile began to be published. Led by Volodia Teitelboim, a writer and former senator for the Communist Party, *Araucaria de Chile* was published in Paris and Madrid and sent to through subscription to the Chilean exile communities around the world. Published between 1978 and 1990 it helped not only showcase the artistic creation in exile, but also to spread the political ideas of the different parties in the opposition to Pinochet (da Silva 2009).

While there are plenty of personal narratives within the magazine *Araucaria de Chile*, it is only in the late 1980s that across the world and particularly in those areas with larger concentrations of Chilean exiles that a new literature of exile emerges. This literature is formed by collections of life histories and interviews from well known politicians and common citizens; most of them done as well by exiles and former exiles (Rebolledo 2006; Dorfman 1998; Wright and Oñate 1998; Sznajder and Roniger 2009; Zerán 1991). This literature, published in multiple countries of exile and therefore in multiple languages, not only describes the original plight of the exiles, but also describes the conformation of communities and their activities towards the return to democracy in Chile (Kay 1987; Eastmond 1997; Wright 1995).

These accounts provide interesting perspectives of individual suffering in exile and they locate the individual at the intersection of history and biography providing rich contextual information about the reasons for exile, the paths of leaving and the conditions in the country of reception. However they do not analyze the macro impacts of exile such as the role of exile in the changes in the ideologies of the former UP parties or in the conformation of new polities (Sznajder and Roniger 2009). Until the late 1990s it seemed that exile, as numerically relevant as it was, was irrelevant to the writing of large scale national histories and the nation's historians left it out of the books published at the end of century. Books like *Historia del siglo XX chileno* (Correa et al 2001); Loveman's *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism* (2001); and Bethell's *Chile since independence* (1993) barely touch on the topic of exile. The process and life experiences of exiles had almost been forgotten and hidden (Cancino 2003) because the study of exile yields unpleasantness of the past it has not been well received in societies in the process of reconciliation.¹¹ However, as historical and sociological research shows, exile is not an experience separate from the nation; instead, the personal and social experiences of exile and national oppression are inextricably linked (Norambuena 2000; Vásquez-Bronfman and Araújo 1990). In sum, personal narrative histories of exile are important; they present an everyday perspective and humanize the fears, dangers, failures and successes of those who were compelled to leave. The sole narratives do not explain the entire complexities of exile and the connections to larger historical processes. These narratives needed to be complemented with comparative studies between the different countries of reception; to study the process of return; and the multiple effects that exile has had on Chile (del Pozo 2006).

¹¹ This has not only been the case of Chile; it is a constant in the countries of the Southern Cone as Rollemberg argues for Brazil (2004).

Beginning in the late 1990s many authors have sought to develop a more theoretically informed understanding of Chilean exile. This new 'generation' of scholarship attempts to provide interdisciplinary macro explanations to the process of exile using personal narratives, governmental documents and archives as well as other sources (Snajder and Roniger 2009; Roniger et al 2012). Most of the new works have attempted to develop larger narratives of exile where multiple personal experiences are contrasted with changes in the nation, the relations between countries and on society in. This literature centers more on the collective, and the individual voices and memories begin to recede in prominence. The salient topics are the political impact of exile and of return in the transition to democracy (Angell and Carstair 1987¹²; Hite 2000); the complexities of return (Jedlicki 2003; Askeland and Sonneland 2011); the impact of exile on gender relations (Shayne 2009; Muñoz 2000; Kay 1988; Eastmond 1993; Association Participa (Lille) 2008); and family relations (Norambuena, 2000; Rebolledo 2005); integration to new societies (Bolzman 1994; Landolt and Goldring 2010; Olson 2009); cultural impacts of exile (Simalchik 2006, da Silva 2009, Norambuena 2008); the solidarity movement with Chilean exiles (Power 2009; Kushner and Knox 1999); and comparison between the exile and other migrations processes from Chile (del Pozo 2009; Jensen and Perret 2011).

Still, the process of recuperating the memory of exile, its impacts on countries of origin and reception, the process of return, and above all its location within the human rights abuses of the dictatorships of the second part of the twentieth century in the Southern Cone is still lacking (Roniger et al 2012) as are more comparative analyses that deal with the multiple realities of

¹² This piece published in 1987 is the first analysis that goes beyond the personal narratives and provides a more thorough comprehension of the phenomenon. Although it does not temporally belong to the period in discussion, it is relevant because is the first and has hence become a classic on this topic.

exiles and the multiple South American nations that have suffered from this experience. While there has been some cross country comparative efforts, this literature is also scarce (del Pozo 2006; Sáenz Carrete 1995; Yankelevich and Tarrés 1998; Sznajder and Roniger 2007). These analyses are critical to the construction of future societies in both countries and to the reconstruction of nations that have suffered political and social traumas.

One of the national myths of Chile is its willingness to receive foreigners under political persecution. This myth is even included in the national anthem.¹³ In part due to its short anarchy period after then independence and the fairly quick consolidation of the nation-state, Chile did receive exiles from Argentina, Peru and Bolivia in the first half of the nineteenth century. It also received Spanish exiles escaping from the Civil War; together with Mexico and the Dominican Republic Chile was the largest receiver of Spanish exiles in the Americas (Sánchez-Albornoz 2012). Chile also received a qualitatively relevant Brazilian exile between 1964 and 1973. In contrast, Chile had never suffered mass exile movements in its history. The most recent experience had been the exile of members of the communist party during the *Ley Maldita* but even that was only a few people while most communist detainees were either sent to concentration camps or to internal exile; *relegación*. Hence there was not a historical memory of this process—although the experience of the 1964 Brazilian exiles could account for the closest shared experience. The unexpected brutality of the coup and the particularities of the dictatorial regime broke down with a tradition of political tranquility where political disagreements were dealt in a ‘civilized’ way. Those who were involved in Allende’s government, therefore never expected that their dreams would be so violently shattered.

¹³ In its choir the Chilean national anthem says: Either the tomb of the free you will be // Or the refuge against oppression. The second verse is also the title of one of the first recompilations or memories about exile published in Chile after the return to democracy (Zerán 1991).

This idea of political tranquility needs to be qualified. When compared to other nations in the region Chile has had less episodes of military regimes, but this hides the fact that before 1973 the last military regime had been as recent as 1933. That between 1947 and 1970 there were several episodes of political violence including mass shootings of workers and squatters in 1966 and 1969. That as it was mention in the previous chapter the communist party was precluded from being in the political system during 10 years, that until 1952 women had not voting rights during presidential election and that those illiterate were not allowed political rights until 1970 (Salazar 2006; Correa et al 2001).

IV. *Fue una experiencia muy linda:*¹⁴ Remembering the dream; Life before the coup

For those who supported Allende, his triumph on September 4 of 1970 marked the beginning of a new era. In the midst of strong political and social polarization, the road that Allende had began in 1952 when he first ran for president, had reached its highest point. Finally the *Chilean road to Socialism* was a reality; the moment of the *revolution with empanadas and red wine* had arrived. For many Chilean youth the decade of the 1960s was a time for political participation and to become engaged in the construction of a new society. In this section I analyze the memories that exiles had of the life before the coup and their actions for or against Allende's government and how that political participation impacted their decision to leave the country.

The *Marcha de la Patria Joven* (see previous chapter) through which Frei invited the youth to participate in politics prior to his election in 1964, the university reform movement

¹⁴ "It was a beautiful experience".

which began in Chile in 1967, and the New Chilean Song represented a break from older forms of politics.¹⁵ These movements, however, involved mostly middle and upper class youths. Those in the urban lower classes and the rural poor also became active participants of the political change. Their participation, however, was tied to the enactment of a more radical agrarian reform in 1967, the unionizing of agrarian workers, the implementation of the Program of Popular Promotion (Pograma de Promoción Popular) as well as the concentration of public expenditures on the improvement of the social conditions of the poor allowed an increase in the participation of the lower classes in politics (Correa et al 2001: 254). On the extreme left the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR - Left Revolutionary Movement), created in 1965 in Concepción and with a strong influence from Guevara and the theory of *foquismo*, moved to the rural areas to develop a support base to lead a socialist revolution and carried out bank robberies to finance their movement and the revolution (Correa et al 2001; Castillo 2008).

For many historians and other social scientists these mobilizations led to party polarization and eventually to the military coup of 1973 (Correa et al 2001). Those of my interviewees who had an active participation in politics during this period, particularly between 1964 and 1973, argue that it was a time where politics not only was central to every individual

¹⁵ The New Chilean Song (Nueva Canción Chilena), was a musical movement that began in the mid 1960s and that had its origins in the recuperation of the folklore of the rural oral tradition as opposed to the folklore of the wealthy *terratenientes* (landowners). While keeping these folkloric roots it developed further, “articulating a unique musical language, different, using popular every day expressions” (Correa et al 2001: 231). It became associated with the left and its most important representatives participated actively in Allende’s and the UP’s presidential campaign. Among its most recognizable names is that of Violeta Parra (died in 1967) and her children Angel e Isabel, Victor Jara (assassinated by the dictatorship in September of 1973) and the musical groups Inti-Illimani and Quilapayún. Many members of this movement became exiles themselves and actively participated in the activities to create international solidarity towards Chile.

act, but also a time to construct a new Chile. José Miguel, for example, began participating in politics in 1971, at the beginnings of the government of the UP when he was in the equivalent to his junior year in a public high school. Although he had been in private schools all his education and his family was an upper middle class family, he decided to change to a public school to see how Chile really was. He defined himself as a sympathizer of the Socialist Party. He remembers that time as a highly politicized moment. He told me: “I was very involved in the political situation because it was very much a part of the environment; it was a very different life to that which is lived now...Politics permeated everything.”¹⁶

In Punta Arenas, in the far south of Chile, Álvaro, the grandchild of a Spanish sailor who had decided to leave Spain when Franco won the Civil War, had a similar understanding of the political life in Chile. He was 24 years old when Allende won. He had been an active participant of the youth of the Socialist Party and during the UP government was the executive director of a Tourism company for workers in his natal Punta Arenas. This company used state funds to finance vacations for working class families on *estancias* (large farm houses) that had been appropriated by the government during the land reform process. Regarding the time just before the election of Allende and his government, he told me:

I remember that we had lots of dreams, being young people of, of, I mean you have to put yourself in what it meant to the rebellious youth,¹⁷ it was natural, right and then that [someone] offers you a, a dream, a chance to change everything, to turn everything, everything upside down, right? Back then we were

¹⁶ “Yo estaba bastante pendiente de la situación política porque eso era algo que era muy parte del medio, era una vida muy distinta a la que se vive ahora. La política era algo que permeaba todo.”

¹⁷ The role of the youth in the construction of democratic socialism was very important for Allende. He would refer to it as the “revolutionary and anti-imperialist youth...[that] youth is the only one that can exist” (Moraga 2006: 369)

very, eh enthusiastic, there were lots of participation, lots of internal arguments, the youth rejecting the old [calling them] reactionaries, I mean the youth always taking the things beyond sometimes of what is logic, right? So, during the *Unidad Popular*, we had a program that if we look at it today was very impressive in some areas, right? I mean that of the agrarian reform was an absolute necessity, all of us were conscious of that, right?¹⁸

Edgardo, born in 1954, also shares similar memories of active youth, participating in politics and helping create, in their ideas, a new Chile. Until shortly before leaving Chile he lived in the cities of El Salvador, Vallenar and Copiapo. Located in the Southern part of the Atacama Desert in what is known as the *Near North* (Norte Chico), this is an area of mining and vineyards where the Socialist and Communists parties have always had strong representation. El Salvador, a copper mine owned until 1971 by the Ander Copper Mining Company, a subsidiary of Anaconda Copper,¹⁹ was at the center of the struggle for political and economic rights of workers as well as the debates over the nationalization of the Chilean copper mines during the 1960s (Vergara 2008).

Edgardo's political influence comes from his father, a white collar worker of the copper mines who was an active political union leader. From very early in his childhood he actively participated in politics and political life surrounded him; he told me that "the leftist political

¹⁸ "Pero me acuerdo nosotros teníamos mucha ilusión, siendo jóvenes de de o sea, tienes que ponerte en el caso lo que significa la juventud rebelde, natural verdad y que, que te ofrezcan una, una ilusión, una posibilidad de cambiar todo, todo patas pa' arriba no? Entonces éramos muy este entusiastas, había muchísima participación, muchas peleas internas, los jóvenes rechazando a los más viejos que, reaccionarios o sea la juventud siempre llevando la cosa mucho mas allá a veces hasta de la lógica, ¿no? Así que pero en la unidad popular era, teníamos un programa que si, si lo vemos hoy día es impresionante en algunas aéreas no? O sea eso de la reforma agraria era una necesidad pero absoluta, eso lo teníamos totalmente consiente todos no?"

¹⁹ Anaconda Copper was a privately owned US transnational mining company that owned through its subsidiary Andes Copper the copper mines of Chuquicamata, El Salvador and Potrerillos, in the north of Chile; making it between 1917 and 1971 one of the three largest copper mining companies in the world (Vergara 2008).

influence in my house was very strong, I was always in that environment”.²⁰ He proudly recalls that he spent one winter vacation in a jail in Chañaral accompanying his father who had been detained for his political activities. He also mentions his participation in Allende’s presidential campaign in 1964 distributing political propaganda throughout the company town in El Salvador, and that Allende himself visited his house frequently. Another powerful memory he related to me is how after the killings in El Salvador by military troops, following the occupation of a union’s office, during a three month strike (Vergara 2008), Laura Allende, Salvador Allende’s sister and prominent member of the Socialist Party slept in his house.

For Edgardo, it was therefore normal to become politically active once he was an adolescent. He joined the Socialist Party but was also a member of the *Frente de Estudiantes Revolucionarios* (FER – Front of Revolutionary Students), the MIR’s high school group, “in a very combative, let’s say, and idealist way to work for the big achievements that the UP had offered...Not the great achievement, the great promises”.²¹ His work during the UP was both political and social. As a member of the FER he engaged in confrontations with right wing groups as well as in the election on high school governments around party lines and the seizing of schools when there were protests. What he recalls more proudly, however, is his participation in doing the groundwork for the accomplishment of the social components of Allende’s program. Allende had vowed, as one of the first forty policies of his government,²² to deliver half a liter of

²⁰ “la influencia política de izquierda en mi casa era muy fuerte, siempre estuve en ese ambiente.”

²¹ “Entonces después, cuando fui adolescente me integré de una forma muy combativa digamos e idealista a trabajar por, tú sabes, los grandes logros que la Unidad Popular había ofrecido. No los grandes logros, las grandes promesas”.

²² Cf. “Las primeras 40 medidas del gobierno popular” available online at http://www.salvador-allende.cl/Unidad_Popular/40%20medidas.pdf accessed August 1st, 2012

milk a day free for all the children in the country (Corvalán 2003). It was not an easy task, since some areas were too remote for the state to reach. According to Edgardo:

...[there was a] half liter of milk that was promised in those years but it did not reach every community, because to the children of the high mountains, they never got it.... because nobody was concerned with delivering it to them. Then a group of us got organized, with the support of the Socialist party...they provided us vehicles and contacts for us to carry the milk to them, to carry the boxes of milk and everything that they needed for a year. And we did it around Christmas so we could spend time with them. And we gave them toys, all kind of stuff, and we were a group of four or five friends on mules...thirty, forty mules with the boxes of milk, presents and all the stuff for two days until we reached the [farthest] communities, I mean in the high mountains, practically on the border with Argentina.²³

Álvaro's participation in politics during the UP was an experience that assured his banishment from the country. He remembers it, however, as "a beautiful experience".²⁴

The role of the family in the development of political convictions is extraordinarily important for my interviewees of this period. Pablo, who was born in 1937, was a member of the *Partido Radical* since he was fifteen years old. According to him it was a family tradition, his father and grandfathers all were members of this party. Also from the north, from a mining town called El Salado, he was offered several political posts during Allende's government. He refused

²³ "Como era el medio litro de leche que en esos años se prometió pero no llegaba a todas las comunidades porque a los niños de la cordillera, a ellos nunca les llegaba porque nadie se preocupaba por ir a dejársela. Entonces nosotros con un grupo de amigos nos organizamos, junto con la gente del partido socialista que nos apoyó...nos facilitaron los vehículos y los contactos para nosotros ir a acarrearle a ellos, llevar, todo lo que fuera las cajas de leche y todo lo que les correspondía por un año. Y lo hacíamos justamente en Navidad para ir con ellos a compartir. Le dábamos juguetes, de todo tipo de cosas y nosotros nos íbamos con un grupo de cuatro o cinco amigos montando mulas...30, 40 mulas cargadas con las cajas de leches, regalos y todas las cosas por dos días hasta llegar a las comunidades más, o sea la cordillera hasta prácticamente con la frontera con la Argentina".

²⁴ Exacto, fue una experiencia muy linda.

to have a direct political participation because he felt that this could gain him enemies; which being the town's shopkeeper, was something he preferred to avoid. Regardless of that he was (and is) a strong supporter of Allende.

Aida's political consciousness also comes from her family. Her maternal grandmother was important communist leader in Lo Espejo in the south side of Santiago. She had suffered internal exile, also known in Chile as *relegación*,²⁵ during, in Aida's words "*La Traición*"; the betrayal. This was, as explained in the previous chapter, the period during which the Communist party had been outlawed in the government of González Videla through the enactment of the *Ley Maldita*. She ties the origins of her political consciousness to the politics leaning within her house as well as to seeing poverty when she was young:

I remember people ringing the bell to our house, children my age ringing the bell asking for food. Also when I was of age to enter school...I went to the neighborhood school. It was a conscious decision of my parents that I would go to the local school, which was a really bad school, and there I was really confronted with the misery of the people. And of course I saw the privileges that we had for simply living in a house with food and with some comfort, nothing special but it was middle class. That is my memory. And how in my house we fought for everyone to have a better life and social level...If people came to work to my house [my grandmother] would start by getting them their identity cards, [my grandmother] would tell them all the right they had and that is a very difficult memory. And from living, when I was little, the [political] campaign of Allende, I saw all of that from afar but of course I felt very identified by all that.²⁶

²⁵ This was military judicial sentence through which an individual and his family were sent to live to remote places or to places far away from her residence. They had to present themselves every day in the nearest police station, which impeded their chances of escaping.

²⁶ "Yo me recuerdo de la gente que te pasaba tocando el timbre, niños de mi edad que tocaban el timbre pidiendo para comer. Además, yo cuando tuve edad de ir a la escuela...entonces yo fui a la escuela del barrio. Fue una opción que tomaron mis padres de que fuera a la escuela local que era una muy mala escuela y ahí realmente yo estaba confrontada con la miseria del pueblo. Y claro, yo veía los privilegios que teníamos nosotros por vivir simplemente en una casa con

Aida's father was a young economist recently graduated from college when he was hired by the state to work in the administration of a copper mine after the nationalization²⁷ at the beginning of Allende's government. There, in Potrerillos, Aida's family came to live in "a very luxurious",²⁸ neighborhood that until recently was inhabited by the US administrators of the mine. The most beautiful house of all, she remembers, "was the house that used to be for the main manager, that was the house that had been named 'the House of the people' during Allende and it was a house for meetings and things".²⁹ When the *gringos* were still the owners of the mine, she told me, only the servants could enter the houses in the US neighborhood; "with Allende all of that ended and everyone could enter".³⁰ For some of her school friends; in particular those who were the children of miners and lower level workers, it was still difficult to overcome the historical barriers customs and would not visit friend who lived in the neighborhood formerly owned by the *gringos*.

comida y con cierto confort, pero no era nada del otro mundo pero era clase media. Eso era el recuerdo... Y después de como en mi casa se luchaba porque todo el mundo tuviera una mejor vida y nivel social... Si venían a trabajar a mi casa se empezaban por hacerles el cartel de identidad, se les decía todos los derechos que tenían y ese es un recuerdo fuerte. Y de haber vivido de chica, bueno, las campañas de Allende, todo eso lo veía yo de lejos pero claro me sentía completamente identificada con eso."

²⁷ On the process of the nationalization of copper companies and its relevance see among others Vergara 2008; Correa et al 2001, Bethell 1993; Loveman 2001.

²⁸ "un barrio bien lujoso".

²⁹ "Y la casa, me acuerdo, la más linda de todas que era la del gerente, esa era la que se llamaba "la casa del pueblo" en la época de Allende y era una casa que se usaba para hacer reuniones y eso."

³⁰ "antes que fue un barrio prohibido, el barrio donde yo llegué porque los gringos no dejaban entrar nomás que a la servidumbre, con Allende todo eso se acabó y podía entrar todo el mundo."

The strong political participation, while not unanimous in the youth of the country in that period, was also not a characteristic solely of the left.³¹ Miguel, born in Ovalle in 1948, began to participate actively in politics in 1964 with the election of Frei although he argues that he had earlier interests in politics. Similarly to Alejandra's and Amanda's experiences, as explained in the previous chapter, during Frei's campaign. He remembers with fear the period of Allende, especially at the beginning. Regardless of his fears he and other followers of the Christian Democratic Party were absolutely certain sure that Allende had won the election and that Congress had to ratify him as president; as had been the democratic tradition of Chile. This was something that was not shared by members of the right wing parties within the Chilean political system; some of which attempted to influence the process by trying to kidnap the Commander in Chief of the Army General Schneider who was killed in the process (Correa et al 2001, Loveman 2001).

For him those fears were confirmed later. In that sense, he argues that the country was being pushed toward a socialist or communist dictatorship. While there were many things that contributed to the breakdown of democracy, among them the flight of capital and the support of the US government to Allende's opposition, he argues that "they [the UP government] took the country to a inescapable level of hate...they destroyed families, that did not stop later, but in that moment they destroyed families, destroyed friendships of many years. I think there was no way

³¹ Javiera, another of my participants for this period vehemently states in her interview that she was never involved in politics and that no one in her family was ever involved in politics during before she came to the United States.

out, although many helped actively, the main causers were themselves, simply it was not what we wanted.”³²

During the late 1960s and 1970s the possibility of constructing a new Chile and the clashes with the socially and politically conservative right wing parties led many people to participate in politics, in particular in the Christian Democracy and the parties of the left. For these people their participation in politics led to their exile; to many others it meant assassination and disappearance. Within my interviewees the reasons for leaving Chile are varied and encompass different levels of forcefulness that depends on their level of engagement with the government of Allende. In the following section I analyze the different forms through which these emigrants left Chile between 1973 and 1982.

V. The military coup and the path to exile

Although there was some sense that a military coup was being prepared and that it was going to happen soon, the Chilean government under Allende was never prepared to defend itself. Allende, in his last speech on the morning of September 11, 1973, mentions that he will not surrender, but he never calls for an armed defense of the government. It seems that there was hope that the strong constitutional doctrine of the Chilean armed forces was by itself going to stop a military coup. The coup, however, was extremely well orchestrated—especially by the Navy where the detentions and tortures of leftists sailors began as early as 1972—, presenting no

³² “Pienso que llevaron al país al estado de odiosidad del cual no había salida... destruyeron familias, eso no paró después, pero en ese momento destruyeron familias, destruyeron amistades de muchos años... Pienso que no había salida, aunque muchos ayudaron activamente, la causa central de esto fueron ellos mismos, simplemente no era lo que queríamos.”

option to possible counterattacks by ill-armed factory workers. On a similar note, the strong vertical command structure of the Chilean armed forces prevented any possibility of opposition from within (Correa et al 2001; Steenland 1974; Constable and Valenzuela 1991; Loveman 2001; Bethell 1993).

An important sector of the Christian Democrats actively supported and aided the coup. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, their hope was that this was going to be a short military government and that after a couple of years political power was going to be handed back to politicians. The Christian Democrats believed that power would be restored to them, based on negotiations carried with right wing parties between 1970 and 1973. There were some among Christian Democrats who immediately reacted against the coup, while others participated as Ministers during the first years of the dictatorship (Bethell 1993; Correa et al 2001). This duality in confronting the dictatorship, at least in the few years is clearly explained by Miguel who told me:

We always said—I said—the *milicos*³³ will save us from Allende, but who will save us from the *milicos*? As in fact happened. Those were difficult days, I was very active in a small scale I contributed, I was active in the failure [of Allende's government]. In that time I did not see it as helping to the failure...I organized the takeover of a girls high school in Ovalle...Afterwards I was very concerned, because as I told you as I was very involved, I began receiving information from many friends, from some [former] Representatives, [former] Senators...of what was coming.³⁴

³³ *Milicos* is a somewhat derogatory term to refer to the military.

³⁴ Siempre decíamos—yo decía—“de Allende nos salvan los milicos, ¿quién nos salva de los milicos?”, como de hecho pasó. Fueron días difíciles, yo fui bastante activo, de hecho yo debería decir en una escala mucho menor en lo que contribuí, porque fue activo en el fracaso. En ese tiempo no lo veía como ayudar al fracaso sino como ayudar a tenerlo... más jóvenes, no tenía muy mala pinta, a organizar los colegios. Me acuerdo organicé una toma de un colegio de niñas

The repression of the supporters of Allende's government began immediately and was severe. The entire country became a jail; international borders were closed and international flights were suspended for ten days. A strict curfew that lasted two days was put in place. Congress was suspended indefinitely. Military barracks, stadiums, ships and other buildings quickly became detention centers. Besides those killed 'in combat' during the coup itself, tortures, summary killings and disappearances began the same September 11; with the great majority (close to 80%) happening between 1973 and 1976. The estimates for the first two years are of between 20,000 to 30,000 exiles; 80,000 political prisoners; and the number of deaths range from a conservative estimate of 3,000 to a high estimate of 30,000 (Correa et al 2001: 287; Angel 1993). The National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation, created by the Rettig Commission concluded in 1991, however, that the probable number of victims of Human Rights abuses and of political violence between 1973 and 1990 was 3,197 people. Of this total more than 96% were civilians and only 8 people belonged to parties that supported the dictatorship (Huneus 1998: 5-8). The governing bodies of the political parties that formed the governing coalition under Allende, namely the Socialist, Communist and other smaller parties were largely disarticulated and their members were either dead, disappeared or exiled. Only six months after the coup, in March of 1974, the military government declared that "the armed forces do not set timetables for their management of the government, because the task of rebuilding the country morally, institutionally, and economically requires prolonged and profound actions" (Wright and Oñate 1998: 5). According to Wright and Oñate, this rebuilding involved the "extirpation of Marxism and its doctrine of class struggle and their replacement with the values of conservative Catholicism, class harmony, and Chilean nationalism" (Wright and Oñate 1998: 5).

en Ovalle...Después temeroso porque, como te decía, estaba bien involucrado, recibía información de bastantes amigos, de algunos diputados, de algunos senadores...de lo que venía.

In the words of José Zalaquett, the well known human rights lawyer and former member of the Rettig commission (2002: 7):

Both in Chile and abroad, political killings, "disappearances," and torture came to be considered as the worst abuses of the military regime. It certainly committed many other human rights violations, including massive arbitrary imprisonment and exile, as well as attacks on other civil liberties. But, notwithstanding the seriousness of these transgressions, the facts were known and the military government did not deny them. Rather, it attempted to justify them on the grounds that the emergency the country faced permitted the suspension of certain individual rights.

The Chilean exile followed several paths abroad. First, during the first month after the coup a relevant number of Chileans, composed mostly of the political elite of the government that had survived the coup and avoided the first waves of detentions, asked for diplomatic asylum in embassies. They were joined there by middle level political activists and by foreigners who were in Chile to participate of the government of Allende. The years that followed the coup many other Chileans that had been detained in concentration camps were expelled from the country (Rebolledo 2006; Norambuena 2000). The best estimates indicate that close to 76 percent of the exiles left the country with their families; 52 percent left Chile between 1973 and 1976; 16.3 percent between 1977 and 1980; and close to 10 percent between 1980 and 1984 (Norambuena 2000: 177-178; see also Rebolledo 2005). This last group was comprised also of economic exiles that due to their political beliefs had no opportunity of getting a job in Chile. Norambuena (2000) also stresses that psychological problems were common among the exiles with higher than normal proportions of alcoholism and depression as well as several cases of exiles committing suicide due to being in exile (see also Vásquez-Bronfman and Araújo 1990).

The day of the coup, several lists with names of the national and regional leaders, politicians and administrators of the UP were published by the military. Those listed were requested to present themselves at their closest police station for questioning.³⁵ Álvaro remembers that at 9 in the morning the first military edicts with the lists were broadcast and as a governmental administrator; his name was on one of them.

Well I was in doubt [about surrendering or escape to Argentina], right...I was in Puerto Natales³⁶ so I said, you know we have to present ourselves, they were all presenting themselves, all of them were surrendering themselves, what was I going to do... I was in the police station for 24 to 48 hours and the next day or the following they sent me to Punta Arenas, where I stayed...in the regiment, then, and obviously with tortures as you know what happened to everyone...I mean nobody was safe, it was by last name following the alphabet, really; I mean there were both, first very well picked [the leaders], then beatings to everyone, by the alphabet...you would know when they were going to call you, right? So, and then court martial, that was dangerous because they would ask for firing squad for some, dammit, and we had done nothing wrong, we were more or less within legality, right?³⁷

³⁵ A similar thing occurred in Brazil in 1964 (Green 2010; Rabêlo and Rabêlo 2001). Most UP members did not present themselves to the authorities fearing tortures and executions. I argue that the experience of having Brazilian exiles living in Chile between 1964 and 1973 ‘taught’ left leaning Chileans what to do in case of a coup. This, however, was mostly in Santiago and some in the other areas of the country were detained and indeed suffered tortures and executions.

³⁶ A medium size city, the second largest of the region, about 4.5 hours from the largest city and regional capital Punta Arenas.

³⁷ y entonces bueno yo estuve en la en la duda no?...estaba en Puerto Natales, así que finalmente dije yo sabe que hay que presentarse, se estaban presentando todos no mas, todos se entregaron, que iba a hacer?...estuve como 24-48 horas en una comisaría y al día al otro día o a los 2 días me mandaron a a Punta Arenas...al regimiento, entonces y obviamente con torturas, con tu sabes todo lo que le paso a todos, o sea no, no nadie se salvo, fue por orden alfabético, en serio, o sea fue de los dos, fue primero muy bien elegido y después ya una paliza a todos hueón, por orden alfabético, tú los sentías cuando iban llamando no? Así que, y consejo de guerra que eso era peligroso, porque eso pedían fusilamiento pa’ algunos, puta y no habíamos hecho nada de malo nosotros estábamos más o menos dentro de la legalidad no?

After spending four months as a prisoner in the regiment, he was sent to the concentration camp of Dawson Island in the middle of the Strait of Magellan. Later he was transferred to the public jail of Punta Arenas from where he was freed. Eight months later he was detained again and set to stand trial. Álvaro was convicted to 5 years of *relegación*, and he left two years later to Chicago.

Edgardo was in his last year of high school in 1973. He was getting dressed to go to his school in El Salvador when the coup happened. He reached his school, but his teacher told him to go back home. The same thing happened to Aida. By the time she returned home, her house was in turmoil. Her grandmother, who was visiting, was crying, while her father preparing to go into hiding. Her memories of the moment are of panic and nervousness. She told me:

My dad had to go, and it was a good thing that he was told to go into hiding. There were other families living close by and he organized a group with other [mine] executives to go to the mountains. They intended to go to Argentina, but they couldn't reach it because they were not prepared. I mean, it was something... They left with someone who had a hip problem, I think, and another who was very chubby. They only reached halfway because the one with the hip problem could not go on walking anymore... And that was horrible, his wife was pregnant and she came to live with us... And the group left him [the one with a hip problem] covered to get help, and they left and well when they got back they found he had died. He had wanted to go on walking, instead of walking and he died. He froze to death, I don't know. At that moment a police patrol found them and took them prisoners.³⁸

³⁸ Mi papá tuvo que irse, porque era una buena cosa que le hayan dicho que se tuviera que pasar a la clandestinidad. Había otras familias cerca nuestro y él yo sé que se organizó con un pequeños grupo de toda gente de ejecutivos que se fueron a las montaña. Ellos tenían la intención creo que de pasar a la Argentina pero no alcanzaron porque no estaban preparados. O sea, era una cosa... Se fueron con uno que tenía un problema a la cadera creo y con otro que era bien gordito. En fin, llegaron a la mitad hasta que el que tenía problemas en la cadera no pudo seguir más caminando... Y eso fue un horror, porque la mujer estaba embarazada en la casa nuestra, se vino a vivir con nosotros... el grupo decidió dejarlo cobijado para ir en búsqueda de ayuda. Y entonces se fueron, lo dejaron ahí y cuando volvieron lo encontraron muerto. Él se

With her father in prison, Aida returned to Santiago to live in her maternal grandmother's house. Her house had been raided and ransacked. She was going to live there for about two years until leaving Chile; all this time her father was in prison. Edgardo's father, who worked until the day of the coup in the sanitary services in Vallenar, was detained that same day under charges of wanting to poison the water. He eventually spent two years in prison and *relegación*. Edgardo was himself jail under charges of being a member of the MIR and of participating in volunteer work during the UP; there he, told me, that he was made to watch others being tortured. He, his father and Aida's father in different occasions were lucky to survive executions attempts, although they were tortured by being in fake executions. They also survived, by random chance, the infamous *Caravana de la muerte*;³⁹ Aida's father was not yet in prison and Edgardo's father was being tortured at that moment.

Magdalena's family decided to leave Santiago and travel south to the house of relatives shortly after the coup. Both her parents were active members of a Catholic leftist group called *Guillermoos por el Socialismo* (Christians for socialism) and members of the Communist party. She remembers that in order to get her parents, the military took her grandparents prisoner until they went back to Santiago to surrender themselves. As with other exiles, her father was also heavily tortured and spent two years in prison and in concentration camps until they left Chile for Panama.

había querido seguir caminando. En vez de esperarlos y murió. Murió de frío, anda a saber, no sé bien y en eso, estaban en eso cuando hubo una patrulla de policías que los encontró y entonces ahí los tomaron presos

³⁹ This was a military detachment that travelled through several towns in October of 1973 in a helicopter killing 97 former government workers and sympathizers of the *Unidad Popular*. Cf Verdugo 2001.

These interviewees or their family members left from prison or *relegación* to a foreign country. While they did not have a choice about which country they were going to, they, often with help from family members and outside organizations, actively sought to leave Chile. In this process, as it will be the case of Pablo, they were helped by international institutions and organizations. As I presented in the previous chapter, the meso level is comprised of a particular institutions that facilitates the emigration process. These interviewees mention the help of the *Fondo de Ayuda Social de Iglesias Cristianas* (Christian Churches Fund for Social Aid – FASIC), an inter-Christian church organization funded by the Lutheran Pastor Helmut Frenz in April of 1975 with the objective of protecting the human rights of those detained for political reasons and helping those going into exile (Chile. Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación 1993). They also mention the CIME, the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, currently the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The *Vicaria de la Solidaridad*, an official component of the Catholic Church in charge of defending the imprisoned, the disappeared and their families (Lowden 1996; Valenzuela 1991; Fruhling 1992). Amnesty International, the International Red Cross as well as Jewish groups in the United States (Wright and Oñate 1998) also helped them in their process of exile.

While people seeking asylum in embassies and others leaving the country had become normal in the first days after the coup, by the end of that year the dictatorship developed a legal framework to give itself the right to expel Chileans from the country (Wright and Oñate 2012; Rebolledo 2006). The November, 1973 Decree Law 89 legally permitted the government to expel Chileans, to prohibit the return of those expelled and to sentence to jail or to death those that attempted to re-enter Chile (Rebolledo 2006). A year later two more measures empowered the dictatorship to expel Chileans considered undesirables. These allowed the dictatorship to

reduce the number of prisoners without having to let them go free within Chile. The first allowed those detained under the state of siege but yet without a sentence to petition to be freed in exchange of their expulsion of the country; the second measure did the same to those already in prison or in internal exile. This was the April, 1975 Decree Law 504 (DL 504) and it helped close most of the concentration camps—albeit not the torture centers—and attempted to improve the international image of the dictatorship (Wright and Oñate 1998: 40). Edgardo, Álvaro, Aida and Magdalena and their families left Chile under this Decree Law.

Edgardo told me that it was with the help of the Catholic Church and the FASIC that they were able to leave Chile. Monsignor Bernardino Piñera, the Bishop of Temuco in the south of Chile, where Edgardo's father was in internal exile, helped him change the sentence to one that would allow them to 'participate' in the DL 504. With the help of FASIC they were able to obtain an interview at the consulate of the US to apply for a visa. This process, remembers Edgardo, took them about two weeks. They went to Santiago from Vallenar on March 15 of 1977 and left for Chicago on March 31. During these two weeks, FASIC provided them a place to sleep, food and all the logistic necessities for the travel abroad. This institution also helped them find a sponsor in Chicago. Their sponsors were three Lutheran churches who, upon arrival, gave his father a job in a factory and provided them with temporary housing. None of the exiles came to the US with refugee status; they came as humanitarian parolees.⁴⁰ The US did, however,

⁴⁰ Unlike refugees who have to demonstrate that there are persecuted or have fear of persecution in their countries of origins, parolees "is used sparingly to bring someone who is otherwise inadmissible into the United States for a temporary period of time due to a compelling emergency" (USCIS definitions available from <http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/> accessed November 4, 2012). While refugees receive support from the government parolees need to be sponsored and do not receive any help from the government and must leave the country once the situation that gave origin to their status has been solved.

receive about 500 families in this program helped mainly by Senator Edward Kennedy (Muñoz 2008).⁴¹

Álvaro had been living for close to two years in Quellón island of Chiloé after his *relegación* sentence when the DL 504 became law. He remembers his time in *relegación* as a very hard time. He recalls that while he was free the entire town was his jail and at any opportunity the police would take him in for questioning. He told me: “We had no other option...when the [possibility] came to exchange our sentences for exile, we had to do it, economic conditions were very harsh for us, we had no job or anything, and so for that reason in 76 we came here to Chicago”.⁴² In the process of leaving, FASIC also helped him and his family are also helped by the FASIC. The process of choosing a country, however, was something done through other exiles. All this process, he recalls, took about three or four months. He remembers that other *relegados* as they began to move out here “putting his name”,⁴³ in the different embassies. He wanted to go to Cuba, but Cuba was not accepting *relegados*, only prisoners. Canada was the first to accept his request for a refugee visa, but he was not allowed to go to the interview. He almost went to Switzerland. A few weeks later he was picked up by the police with orders to present himself to the police station where he had an interview with an officer from the US Embassy who offered him the chance to go to the US. He told me:

⁴¹ In return for his aid to the protection to human rights in Chile and towards exiles, the Chilean government presented him in 2008 with the Order of Merit, the highest civil Chilean award.

⁴² “Así que no nos quedo otra alternativa que, que salir cuando se produjo esta [oportunidad]...la de permutar las penas por, por exilio, nosotros tuvimos que hacerlo, las condiciones económicas eran muy duras para nosotros, no teníamos trabajo ni nada, así que por esa razón en el año 76 eh nos vinimos aquí a Chicago.”

⁴³ “Alguien puso nuestro nombre en la embajada”

The *gringa* told me that she had come to offer us the visa to the United States, I took the decision right there, without talking to my wife or anything, we were set on leaving, right? So they did, they filled up all the papers, everything that was needed was not to be a communist, if you were socialist or MIR, welcome! These gringos have no idea!⁴⁴ Two months later we were here [Chicago].⁴⁵

The idea that politicians and bureaucrats in the US did not understand the complexities of Chilean politics and the particularities of the socialist and communist parties in the early 1970s is shared by all the exiles I interviewed (see also Muñoz 2008). During those two months he was allowed to visit Punta Arenas and say goodbye to his parents and brother. That was the last time he would see his parents. He thought that his time in the US was going to be for only three years, the remaining time left in his sentence; however he was not allowed to go back to Chile until 1988: “From Chiloé I got permission to go to Magallanes, my lawyer got me that, to say goodbye to my old folks, they gave me ten days, and from there to Santiago...my dad was old already, yes everything was...that, that was hard, but we thought that it was not going to be for all our life, I mean, we thought well we already had two years, I had three left, you know?”⁴⁶ In Santiago the FASIC put him in a house for the rest of the time. First in the upper side of Santiago; later close to downtown in a brothel, whose owner’s husband the dictatorship had

⁴⁴ Here he makes reference to the fact that during the UP government and until the late 1970s the Communist Party was a moderate pro democracy party, while the Socialists and the MIR were staunch proposers of the military way to revolution. So, for him it was odd that they would accept Socialists and MIR.

⁴⁵ “la gringa nos plantea que venimos a ofrecerles la la visa a Estados Unidos, entonces yo tome la decisión ahí mismo, así ni hablar con mi mujer ni nada, si pensábamos irnos no? Así que hicieron, llenaron los papeles que se yo, todo lo que se requería era no ser comunista, si eras socialista del MIR, bienvenido! Estos gringos! No la tienen clara hueón! Dos meses más ya estábamos acá.”

⁴⁶ “de Chiloé me dieron permiso para ir a Magallanes, eso me lo consiguió el abogado, para despedirme de mis viejos, me dieron 10 días, y de ahí ya a Santiago...mi papa era viejo ya sí, todo no... eso, eso fue duro hueón, pero nosotros pensábamos que no iba a ser para toda la vida o sea, pensábamos, habíamos bueno ya cumplido 2 años, me quedaban 3 no más, me entiendes?”

disappeared. He remembers it as a very frightful time even on the road to the airport; they were detained and searched at every single checkpoint.

Aida also left Chile with her family ‘thanks’ to the DL 504. She remembers that her father left directly from jail to the airport and they met with him there, although they were afraid that he was not going to make it. This would not have been the first time that someone being expelled would not make it to the airport. There are several cases where on the road between jail and the airport the DINA would kidnap the exile and made him or her “disappear”. There is also one documented case where the person was kidnapped between airport security and the plane and disappeared. There are other cases where the DINA took exiles down from the plane to carry them to torture houses and finally execute them (Chile. Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación 1993; Wright and Oñate 1998; Wright and Oñate 2012; Rebolledo 2006; Zerán 1991).

Aida’s mother had requested to be accepted as refugees in several embassies but until the day of the trip had no idea which it would be. She defines the moment of leaving as something ‘brutal’. Her mother had had their luggage ready for several days, and then “it was one day...they told her tomorrow morning at six you have to board the plane...It was like that, brutal...We knew [it was going to happen] but we did not know what day and the day that it happened it was horrible”.⁴⁷ In 1975 they left for Belgium. This country had accepted them after some friends from Potrerillos, who were studying in Louvain, helped from there to accelerate the visa process. As in the case of Álvaro, Aida also departed not knowing whether she would see her grandmother again. Although her family expected not to see her again alive because of her

⁴⁷ “Salió un día,...y le dijeron mañana a las seis de la mañana tomas el avión...Y fue así, brutal. Sabíamos pero no sabíamos que día y el día que fue, fue horrible”

age, two months later they received a telegram that stated that her grandmother had been killed by the dictatorship. The difficulties in Chile during her father's imprisonment, the complexities of their process of leaving Chile and the earlier months of exile, and the death of her grandmother, increased the differences between her parents. After two years in jail her dad only wanted to go out, while her mother tired after all the work and depression only wanted to stay at home. They divorced a few years later. About all this time and process she told me: "It was years, the memories, the exile, the arrival was very hard. Afterwards, of course, little by little time passes, the wound heals little by little, but indeed one lives with that".⁴⁸

Magdalena's family left for Panama in December of 1975. Her case is somewhat different to the cases presented above. After being detained a few weeks after the coup, her father spent the next two years in a concentration camp. During that time he had been offered to leave for France and other countries, but he decided against it because he could not take his family. In mid-1975, according to Magdalena, Pinochet made a deal with Omar Torrijos, then president of Panama. According to this deal Panama would receive Chilean exiles in exchange for Pinochet's supporting Panamanian sovereignty on the Panama Canal (Torrijos-Carter Treaties). Magdalena remembers that in September with one day's notice; the Chilean dictatorship put about 300 prisoners on a military plane and expelled them to Panama. This group was comprised of close to 300 former members of all the different parties that formed the UP. Magdalena's family was able to follow her father in December with the help of the United Nations, after her mother was detained by the dictatorship and was harassed by members of the DINA.

⁴⁸ "fueron años..., los recuerdo, el exilio, la llegada fue muy dura. Después, claro, poco apoco el tiempo va pasando, la herida se va un poco curando, pero claro, uno vive con eso."

Magdalena's father was expelled from the country and his passport was marked with a letter "L", meaning that the bearer of the passport had to request specific permission from the Ministry of Interior through the country's consulates if he or she wanted to re-enter the country.⁴⁹ Most times this permission was not granted since the dictatorship considered the person to be a danger to the nation. As the letters and reports of the Chilean consulates in the US attest, some exiles were being followed and this information was sent to Santiago when they requested a new passport or permission to enter the country.⁵⁰ All this is in blatant disregard of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country".⁵¹ Those who attempted to enter the country would be sent to jail or killed. This was used, however, as propaganda efforts by some opposition politicians to make the world pay attention to the human rights abuses of the Chilean dictatorship (Wright and Oñate 1998).

When Pablo was expelled from the country in 1976 he also had his passport marked with an "L" and was not allowed to return to Chile until 1990, the year the dictatorship ended. He was detained in 1975 in El Salvador accused of being involved in the "Plan Lobo Azul". This was a fictitious plan devised by the military commander of the Atacama Region according to which a group of university professors, miners, fishermen and harbor workers, among others of the area, where building a tunnel under the Andes to blow up the city of Copiapo, largest city and regional

⁴⁹ This is the reason behind the title of the books of short stories by Carlos Cerda *Escrito con L* (Written with L) I mentioned before.

⁵⁰ See for example Archivo MINREL, Consulado General de Chile en Nueva York, 22 de diciembre de 1975; Consulado General de Chile en San Francisco, 2 de abril de 1980 and 14 de abril de 1980.

⁵¹ Article 13(2); at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>. Accessed August 9, 2012.

capital.⁵² Pablo was detained and tortured in several concentration camps between May and December of 1975. While in captivity he was visited by the International Red Cross, who with the help of the *Vicaría de la Solidaridad* were able to inform his family where he was. He had been disappeared for over a month. During this time, he began applying to several embassies and finally in early January he receives an offer to leave for Chicago with the sponsorship of “The Jewish Family” association. According to him he was the second refugee⁵³ to arrive to Chicago with this association. They provided him with a place to stay upon arrival and several job opportunities during the first few months of his stay in the US.

The last memory that Pablo has of Chile on the day of his departure is one of fear. It was not uncommon for the military intelligence services to attempt to detain people in the airport. This was the case of Pablo, although the presence of the representative of the CIME prevented his detention. Pablo told me:

The most curious thing is that when I am in the airport someone from the DINE⁵⁴ comes to me. He asks me, ‘are you Pablo Gaete?’ Yes. ‘Come with me, you have to go to questioning’. No I told him, I am not going. ‘How come no’. I am in the hands of Amnesty International now and you have to talk with Mr. Varela, he is the representative. He closes in, what happens? [says Varela] Nothing, just this people want to take me and I have twenty minutes left to get on the plane. No, he is not going [says Varela]. He pulls out all his credentials, look I am a human rights representative and here is everything...You will take him? [says Varela]. Look I have enough; I am in telephone contact with the Human Rights

⁵² There is not a lot of available information about this plan. It is mentioned in the remarks of former senator Ricardo Nuñez during the Senate session of May 7, 2008 (pages 98-102) and in the website http://www.archivochile.com/Derechos_humanos/boletin_ddhh/ddhhbolet0090.pdf (accessed August 10, 2012).

⁵³ In strict sense he entered the US as a humanitarian parolee and not as a refugee. Because of the support the US government gave to the Chilean *Junta*, the US did not provide any Chilean exiles with a refugee status during this period.

⁵⁴ DINE: Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército; this is the Army Intelligence Unit.

Commission.⁵⁵ Any information he needs to give he can give it here...[Pablo] Because they had done that to a lot of people. [They would tell them] let's go to a questioning, they would pull them out of the plane and they would not arrive anywhere neither to their house in Santiago, nor to their destinations in the United States or Europe. It was that hard.⁵⁶

While political exile was the solution for many supporters of Allende and the UP, not all of them were expelled from the country or obtained asylum. There were a large number of people that decided to leave the country 'voluntarily'. The 'voluntariness' is defined against those who were expelled and not allowed to return. In many cases, however, it was a response to the fear of something happening, something that had happened to friends and relatives (Rebolledo 2006; Wright and Oñate 1998).

This was the case of Christian, José Miguel and to a lesser extent of Miguel. Christian was 9 years old at the time of the coup and he still remembers that his house was raided by the military that day. He recalls that his mother left in September of 1974 after getting a job in Mexico and he followed her later that year. In his own words: "I mean my mother left out fear of

⁵⁵ The United Nations Human Rights Commission is the predecessor of the current UN Human Rights Council.

⁵⁶ "Lo más curioso es que cuando yo estoy en el aeropuerto, se acerca el servicio de DINE Me dice ¿usted es Pablo Gaete? sí, acompáñeme, tiene que ir a un interrogatorio. No, le dije, yo no voy. ¿Cómo que no? Yo estoy en manos ahora de Amnistía Internacional y con quien tiene que hablar es con el señor Varela, él es el representante. Y se acerca, ¿qué pasa? No estos señores que me quieren llevar y le dice faltan 20 minutos para subirme al avión. No, no va. Saca todas sus credenciales, mire yo soy representante de los Derechos Humanos, y aquí está todo... ¿ustedes lo llevan? Ya, tengo bastante porque yo estoy en contacto telefónicamente con la Comisión de los Derechos Humanos. La información la puede dar aquí...Porque ya eso se lo venían de hacer a varios. No que vamos a un interrogatorio, lo sacaban del avión...y no llegaron a ningún destino, ni a la casa en Santiago ni al destino que tenía en Europa o Estados Unidos. Así de duro era la cosita".

what might happened to her, but she did not get proper asylum, I mean she left...voluntarily".⁵⁷

José Miguel's story is similar. He was 17 years old by the time of the coup, while he was only a UP sympathizer, two of his siblings had to go into hiding after the coup and later leave the country. After that he was left alone in Chile since the rest of his family was living in Washington DC where his father worked for the Organization of American States. He told me that "I was conscious that [to stay in Chile] was risky and my parents were not willing to let me stay in those circumstances. I felt I did not have a chance and I understood that the best thing I could do in that moment was to leave".⁵⁸ Thus, in November of 1973 he returned to the US.

This latent fear that something could happen to them was a common reason for many that chose 'self-exile'. Wright and Oñate (1998: 62) cite an interview with Ana Laura Cataldo where following the same reasoning as my interviewees she expresses:

We met at Lucho's apartment and began to talk about which of our friends were still free, which of our friends were already prisoners, and which of our friends were dead. Then we began to realize that the circle was closing in on us and that was the first time I thought I might leave the country

Since the military coup had received majority support from the Christian Democrats they did not suffer detentions and exiles as did the members of the UP parties. While some of the members of the Christian Democracy had lost their jobs in government, only a few of them had in fact suffered any direct problems with the dictatorship in its first year. It is only after June of

⁵⁷ "o sea mi mama salió por eh temor de lo que le pudiera pasar a ella, pero no fue asilada directamente, o sea ella salió... voluntariamente."

⁵⁸ "Entonces yo estaba consciente de que era riesgoso y a la vez mis padres no estaban dispuestos a que yo me quedara en esas circunstancias. Yo no sentí que tenía la opción y lo comprendí que era lo mejor en ese momento el salir."

1974 and with the decision by Pinochet, seconded by the other members of the Junta, to declare himself president, that the Christian Democrats became an active opponent to the dictatorship. Miguel's trajectory follows that of his party.

After the coup he continued working for a state-owned company, although not in his city of origin but in Coyhaique in the south of Chile about 1,600 miles from where he grew up. By 1974 he already was feeling very uncomfortable with the government and he decided to quit his job and go back to the northern part of Chile. While he attempted to take part in political activities at that point, he argues that he and his friends would get together but there were not any opportunities to do anything; "they knew everything we did".⁵⁹ His only political participation was openly talking to people in downtown Ovalle, his hometown, trying to try to convince them to vote no in the 1978 plebiscite. That was also one of the first public demonstrations of the Christian Democrats against the dictatorship (Cavallo et al 1997).

Pinochet designed the plebiscite that took place in January of 1978—one of the four that would take place during the dictatorship⁶⁰—as a show of support for the dictatorship. Only a few months before, the United Nations had strongly condemned the human rights violations in the country. To confront this, the dictatorship decided to call for a plebiscite where citizens were to vote yes or no to the following resolution (Loveman 2001: 275):

In the face of the international aggression unleashed against the government of the fatherland, I support [General] Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile, and

⁵⁹ "Nos tenían fichados"

⁶⁰ The other three were in 1980 to accept or reject the constitution design by the dictatorship, in 1988 to maintain or removed Pinochet from the presidency, and in 1989, to change some sections of the 1981 constitution.

I reaffirm the legitimate right of the republic to conduct the process of institutionalization in a manner befitting its sovereignty.

With political parties proscribed, no voter registry, and the military totally empowered, the yes vote won with 75% of the votes (Cavallo et al 1997).⁶¹

That was Miguel's last form of political participation in Chile and he remembers that that night he was afraid. Around that time, and although he was a successful small entrepreneur in La Serena, he and his wife had already decided to leave Chile. Miguel's wife is a US citizen whom he met in Ovalle as an exchange student in 1972. They got married in October of 1973. He argues that his decision to migrate were not economic; his business was doing well. He also did not base his decision on migrating for entirely political reasons: he disagreed with the dictatorship but he did not feel completely threatened. It was an opportunity to meet his wife's family, for her to see her family after four years, for his children to know something else, and originally it was only going to be for two years. The tickets were paid by his wife's grandmother. He remembers his decision in the following terms:

Everyone [his family] is there, I am the only one who came, the reason why I came—I had never planned on leaving Chile—it was that I got married and came to for a couple of years to meet my wife's family and her country; and that was thirty years ago! In fact, I have spent half of my life here...And I thought that we should take the opportunity and since I saw that financially from my side it was going to be hard to come on a trip of a month or so, I said OK, here [in Chile] things were not developing as well as I would like them and we took advantage of this opportunity, the kids are young. I think it was mostly that. I had already left

⁶¹ The ballot itself also was designed in a way that it induced to vote yes. Above that option it was drawn the Chilean flag. Next to it but lower in the page there was a black flag above the option no. A copy of this vote is at the *Museo de la Memoria* in Santiago, Chile and a picture is at Muñoz 2008.

Ovalle, because I do not know if things have changed but in those days to leave the [parents] house it was huge, because everyone is very close to their families.⁶²

Most of the research regarding Chilean emigration in the dictatorship period has been on exiles and political emigrants, but regular or ‘traditional’ forms of emigrating did not stop. This was the case of Javiera who arrived in 1976 to Chicago. In many ways her migration process resembles closely those who came to the US before 1973. Her family owned a printing shop in Santiago that was nationalized from the during Allende’s government. She also mentions not having enough to eat in those days as well as a strong resentment against protests and other political manifestations. She did not, however, agree with the military coup; she told me “how am I going to agree with the military coup; we suffered so much”.⁶³ Her family did not recover the printing shop during the dictatorship. Still she strongly asserts never having participated in politics and her decision to migrate was something completely out of the blue:

Nobody is going to believe me, but it was something...I woke up one day without ever thinking about it, I had had surgery recently, my husband came from work and I told him let’s go to the United States I do not know where that idea came from, because I didn’t even plan it for two minutes or an hour or a day before, I

⁶² “Todos están allá, yo soy el único que me vine, la razón por la que me vine, nunca tenía planeado vivir fuera de Chile, fue el hecho de haberme casado y haberme venido por un par de años a conocer a la familia de mi esposa y su país, ¡y eso fue hace 30 años! De hecho, llevo la mitad de mi vida aquí en Estados Unidos ya...Y por eso pensé de que deberíamos tomar la oportunidad y como lo veía financieramente de mi lado difícil de venir en un viaje, de un mes o algo así, dije bueno, aquí por el momento las cosas no estaban desarrollándose tan bien como quisiera y aprovechemos la oportunidad, los niños están chicos. Yo creo que fue más bien que eso. Yo ya había salido de Ovalle, porque no sé si habrán cambiado las cosas pero en ese tiempo salirse de la casa era una cuestión tremenda porque todos son muy apegados a la familias.”

⁶³ “cómo voy a estar de acuerdo con el golpe de estado, nosotros sufrimos tanto”.

didn't plan it, he just told me OK and a month and a half later we were in the United States, it sounds strange but that was what it happen to us.⁶⁴

They came in charter plane through the Chilean-US cultural institute where she had been studying and were received by her brother who had been living in the US for 15 years. He helped them with the tickets. Therefore, while her decision is remembered to be unrelated to any events of her life, is possible to see, as in other migrants, that there is an impact of ideological constructions (the English classes) and the knowledge of previous experiences (the brother living in the US) which directly influenced her decision to migrate.

VI. Living in exile: Trauma, solidarity, and danger

Life in exile was not easy. Not only had the Chileans to deal with everything that has to do with participating in a new society: from learning the language, getting a job, going to school and acclimating oneself to everyday life. They arrived defeated, hurt, without certainty in how long their exile was going to last, and with feelings of responsibility and desertion towards those left behind. The exile experience, therefore, can be categorized in terms of trauma, solidarity, and danger components.

It is a trite to mention that the tortures, assassination attempts and exile itself produced deep psychological traumas among the exile community (Vásquez-Bronfman and Araújo 1990; World University Service 1979; Norambuena 2000). On the one hand, those who suffered prison and torture had constant reminders of their experiences. Álvaro, for example remembers that

⁶⁴ “nadie va a creer la idea, pero fe una cosa... me levante un día sin haberlo pensado jamás en mi vida venirme a Estados Unidos, estaba recién operada, llego mi esposo del trabajo y le dije vamos a Estados Unidos pero no sé de donde salió esa idea, porque no lo planee 2 minutos o una hora antes o un día antes, no lo planee, solamente mi esposo me dijo bueno y al mes y medio estábamos en Estados Unidos, será algo extraño pero si así fue lo que nos paso.”

during his first night in Chicago, alone, he was woken up by lights outside of his window that he immediately associated with police cars coming to get him. Pablo told me that he even tried to kill himself, because every night he would have nightmares about the concentration camps and the torture. He indicated that all of this changed his personality. The only way for him of getting through this was with constant therapy, which he first underwent alone and then he later had with his wife and family. There were a number of support groups among political refugees; for example therapy groups where adults shared with the children of other exiles. To all of them, exiles and their children, the traumas provoked by the torture and exile have important effects on how they now relate with the notion of *Chilenidad*, or what it means to be Chilean.⁶⁵

A second traumatic effect of exile was the lack of knowledge about how long their exile would last. Based on their experience of previous democratic breakdowns in Chile, many exiles thought that this was going to be a short process and that soon they would return to Chile (Rebolledo 2006; Wright and Oñate 1998). This idea of a swift return was not only present in the Chilean case, but also in all the other Southern Cone exiles.⁶⁶ Álvaro thought that it was only for the remaining of his sentence, but he was not allowed to return for thirteen years. Aida's parents would constantly tell their children that the exile was going to last a year, maximum two and the following year they would return and "you would always think that the next year you will be

⁶⁵ The definitions of *chilenidad* are varied and are influenced by political participation, class and other variables. They indeed are a social construction based on a historical process and an ideology. I will deal with this topic at length in chapter VIII.

⁶⁶ Ernesto Henrique Cardoso, former president of Brazil and in the mid 1960s exiled in Chile remembers in his memoirs a conversation between two of his friends, the Journalist Samuel Wainer and the economist Celso Furtado: "My friend Celso Furtado leaned across the table trying to comfort him. 'Don't worry', Celso said. 'The dictatorship will last two years at most.' Wainer looked up at Celso, indignant. 'There is no way the military would hold to power *that* long!' he declared" (Cardoso 2006: 87).

there, returning”,⁶⁷ she told me. For her it was “at times a somewhat schizophrenic life, because all [around you] the life of Chileans that only think about Chile and to return”.⁶⁸ And while the parents lived always with their luggage ready behind the doors (Rebolledo 2006; Kay 1987), their children were trying to integrate to their host societies, learning the language and as José Miguel told me:

And I became more integrated into the *American* society. I think I had a wish of participating and to belong. Then I tried to work into improving my English, in getting good grades [in college], and after that I got in an sentimental relationship and I got married before finishing college with an *American* girl.⁶⁹

Aida’s, in her own words, ‘schizophrenic’ life not only referred to living in the country of exile and in Chile at the same time. But also to her work in the solidarity movements and her participation in the constant struggle to restore democracy in Chile. According to her, this was for many a labor that required all their constant energies. For some there was a point when they had to stop. Aida remembers living in a sort of closed community in Belgium, where although there were refugees from other countries life revolved around the next activity. Edgardo talks about a moment when they would only go to Chilean activities and date the daughters of Chilean refugees. For him, after being in jail and watching people being tortured, at some point he

⁶⁷ “y tu pensabas siempre que estabas allá el año próximo volviéndote”.

⁶⁸ “era una vida media esquizofrénica en un momento porque tienes toda la vida de chilenos que piensan nomás que en Chile y en volver”.

⁶⁹ “Y yo me integré más a la sociedad americana. Yo creo que tenía un deseo de, como, hacerme participe y de pertenecer. Entonces trate de trabajar en mejorar mi inglés, en que me fuera bien en los estudios y después finalmente me involucre en una relación emocional y me casé antes de terminar mis estudios universitarios con una muchacha americana”.

decided to stop: “I sort of left [politics] aside for a while and to devote more time to myself, to integrate into the society...I began to be dedicated to myself, to go out, to work”.⁷⁰

In the fight against the dictatorship from abroad, international solidarity played a key role. Since the beginning of Allende’s government there was a continuous support from the international left towards Chile (Power 2009). This support was based on the novelty and democratic characteristic of the Chilean Revolution against the totalitarian Soviet and Chinese revolutions (Powers 2009). On this topic, Álvaro told me: “the military coup in Chile was, was very, very famous, [about Allende’s government] we were a kind of laboratory, no? Everyone was going to observe, everyone, no? They were observing what was going on, I do not think that inside [of Chile] we were that conscious, until we went out and we began to see [all the support]”.⁷¹ The solidarity movement towards Chile began immediately after the coup and it took place mostly in the main receiving countries of exiles but also in countries such as England and the United States which did not receive large number of exiles (Kushner and Knox 1999; Eastmond 1997; Powers 2009). For Europe, as Aida remembers, “the Chilean political process left a mark in the European left”.⁷² In the US, the solidarity movement grew out of US left sympathizers that had been in Chile during the Allende government and seen the horrors of the

⁷⁰ “Yo como que dejé un poquito de lado y me dediqué más a *mí*, a integrarme yo a la sociedad ...Empecé un poquito a dedicarme a mí, salir, trabajar.”

⁷¹ “el golpe militar en Chile fue, fue, muy, muy famoso en el mundo hueón, es que éramos una especie de laboratorio no? Todos iban a observar,...todo todo el mundo no? Estaban viendo que pasaban, no creo que haya habido tanta consciencia nuestra estando dentro, hasta que salimos y empezamos a ver la...” see also footnote 11.

⁷² “El proceso chileno marcó mucho la izquierda europea.”

dictatorship and of exiles that were arriving to this country⁷³. While it existed in most cities, arguably the center for the solidarity movement was located in California (Eastmond 1997). While the Chilean solidarity movement allowed for the notions of human rights to enter the political arena in the US, although according to Green (2010) this was mostly thanks to the role of Brazilianists in the US, and for extensive manifestations in the US against Pinochet; the participation and coordination of Chilean exiles was not a simple thing. According to Rebolledo (2006) it all depended on the available funds that the sponsoring institution had.

This solidarity movement was followed closely by the Chilean officials abroad, in particular those in the consulates who worked to counteract any activity against the dictatorship either through participation in lectures, publishing newspapers articles or directly getting involved in manifestations. A case in point is shown on the confidential memorandum sent from the Chilean Honorary Consul in Los Angeles with regards to the visit of Allende's widow, Hortensia Bussi. On it reads:

I have the honor to communicate that [I]...by direct orders of the Ambassador Walter Heitmann, contacted groups of Cuban exiles and anti-communist Costa Ricans with the objective of doing counter-manifestations to Mrs. Hortensia Bussi. These groups promoted the disorders that are shown on the newspaper clippings that I attach.... With this action it was achieved a negative reaction to the visit of Mrs. Allende to Los Angeles and she even lost her temper insulting the one million Cubans that live in this country, by referring to them as "wretched worms". As you will understand, after expressing herself in this way she will

⁷³ An example of this is the experience of Sheila Cassidy who was detained and tortured in Chile and in 1978 published her memories of her ordeal entitled "Audacity to Believe". A different, albeit paradigmatic, case is that of Charles Horman who was killed in Chile after being tortured in the early days of the coup. His case was made famous by the movie *Missing* (1982) directed by Constatin Costa-Gravas.

surely confront counter manifestations in the remaining of the her tour on the US.⁷⁴

In the case of Chicago the main organizations were *Casa Chile* and the *Centro Cultural Pablo Neruda*. While the *Casa Chile* was in charge of organizing activities that would fund the activities of the internal resistance to the dictatorship, the *Centro* was in charge of the bringing Chilean artists to participate in the activities of the *Casa*. It is important to note that during the campaign and government of Allende culture had an enormous role. Not only did the UP government provide a broader access to literary publication through the Editorial Quimantú, but most relevantly through what was called *La Nueva Canción Chilena* (The New Chilean Song). While its most well known member, Victor Jara, was killed right after the coup, many other musicians and groups participated constantly in the solidarity movement. To Chicago, for example, the *Centro* brought some of the best known groups of the *Nueva Canción Chilena* such as Inti-Illimani and Quilapayún.⁷⁵ Álvaro remembers that “I had never seen ...for example Inti-Illimani in, in the music palaces, the best buildings in Chicago, full of people...Also famous

⁷⁴ Archivo MINREL, Consulado General de Chile en Los Angeles, 12 de diciembre de 1973. Worms was the name that Castro gave to Cubans who left the island and exile themselves in the US. The case of the confrontations between the Chilean embassy in Sweden and the Chilean exile community (one of the largest in Europe) see Camacho Padilla 2006.

⁷⁵ Inti-Illimani and Quilapayún are two Chilean musical ensembles of folkloric music that began their work during the late 1960s. They were strongly committed to Allende's campaign, for example Inti-Illimani musicalized the governmental program of Allende to make it available to larger groups of people. When the September 11 coup occurred both ensembles were in tour in Europe and were not allowed to return to the country, staying in exile until the later 1980s. Between 1973 and 1988 both ensembles toured constantly to the areas with larger communities of exiles to raise money for the movement of solidarity with Chile.

North-American singers [he is referring to people like Holly Near, for example] would participate and sing with them, we were really, really very popular”.⁷⁶

People from all the political parties that opposed Pinochet and that were part of the UP government participated in *Casa Chile*. That meant that there were ongoing, endless discussions about the political process during Allende’s government, ways to defeat the dictatorship and everything; the role of each party in the defeat, for example, as Álvaro and Magdalena remember. *Casa Chile* organized continuous activities, peñas, empanada sales (Shayne 2009; Eastmond 1997; Wright and Oñate 1998), to protest the dictatorship. Magdalena remembers that the Chilean government had to close the consulate after all the protests they did. “At every moment, I have pictures of marches and things we did. At every moment we went to make noise there. We would never get in because we they did not like us, but we didn’t mind. We were out there denouncing the dictator, so we were not interested in meeting them either”. Pablo also remembers participating in this protest, in addition to collecting money to send to the political prisoners. For him this was very meaningful; he proudly told me that “we were doing political work, but well done, not with personal interests”.⁷⁷

While these were the main organizations, the parties reorganized themselves abroad and began participating directly in the struggle against the dictatorship. Álvaro remembers that once he was asked to bring printed material from Chile to the US and he was detained in Canadian

⁷⁶ “Nunca había visto yo...por ejemplo Inti Illimani en en en los palacios acá de la música, los mejores edificios en Chicago hueón, lleno hueón. Después cantantes norteamericanos famosos, que se integraban y cantaban con ellos, éramos éramos realmente muy populares.”

⁷⁷ “A cada rato, tengo fotos de marchas y cosas que hacíamos. A cada rato íbamos a armar carrillo allí. Nunca entrábamos porque no nos querían, pero no nos importaba. Estábamos ahí afuera denunciando al dictador así que no teníamos ganas de conocerlos tampoco.”

customs. Because the material was politically sensitive and he was not a US citizen he thought that he was going to be deported. Edgardo also remembers participating in a small cell of the MIR in Chicago and that they wanted to send him back to Chile to participate in the urban guerrilla movement against Pinochet. This was not completely uncommon among the exiled youth. Friends of Aida in Belgium also left in the mid 1980s to participate in this movement and all the leaders of the movement had been in exile in Europe or Cuba. Some had participated in the Nicaraguan war against the Contras.

Being an active member of opposition had its dangers. Between 1974 and 1976 the DINA carried three attacks on high profile opposition leaders to Pinochet. In 1974, DINA agents assassinated General Carlos Prats and his wife in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Prats was the last commander in chief of the Army before Pinochet. In 1975 DINA agents carried a failed attempt to murder the Christian Democrat Bernardo Leighton and his wife in Italy. Finally in 1976 they murdered Orlando Letelier and his assistant Ronni Moffitt in Washington, DC. Letelier was Allende's former Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one of the most outspoken leaders of the opposition in exile. Every other exile even the less known were a possible target. According to the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, "the CNI likewise had a structure for gathering intelligence in other countries, including infiltrating Chilean exiles, and continually exercising surveillance over organizations and persons who were supporting the opposition" (Chile. Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación 1993: 832).

While most of the cases occurred in Argentina, and other countries that participated in the *Operación Condor*,⁷⁸ there are well documented cases of assassinations in Paris (Chile. Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación 1993) and Magdalena remembers also a similar case when she was still in Panama:

They [the dictatorship] tried to infiltrate us several times. From time to time some really odd looking Chileans that would appear out of nowhere and they would start asking questions about what we did, they killed a *compañero*, they went out fishing one day with these Chileans and it happens that for simple chance he was the only one that fell out of the boat and was eaten by the sharks.⁷⁹

So for Magdalena being part of the Chilean community in exile also meant protection and a strong work of solidarity towards Chile. Despite of this protection that the community would provide, the *Operación Condor* and the long arm of the intelligence groups of the dictatorship had many exiles constantly looking over their shoulder for many years (Rebolledo 2006).

The life of many Chilean exiles was a constant process of connection and disconnection with their home country and the receiving country. Many lived ready to return at the smallest opportunity. Many were immersed in the works of the solidarity movement with Chile. This work was influenced by the political ideologies and activities they had before becoming exiles

⁷⁸ *Operación Condor* was the secret coordination effort, established by Pinochet in 1975, by the secret polices of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and alter Peru to share information on subversive activities by members of left-wing parties in the Southern Cone. The information usually was gathered using torture and it was used to detain, assassinate and disappear political enemies (Cf. Dinges 2004). The CIA and the US government had knowledge of this operation and supported it until 1976 (Kornbluh 2004).

⁷⁹ “nos trataron de infiltrar varias veces. De repente llegaban unos chilenos súper raros, llegaron chilenos muy raros que aparecían de la nada y querían saber que hacíamos, mataron a un compañero, salieron de pesca con estos chilenos un día y resulta que por esas casualidades de la vida fue el único que cayó del bote y se lo comieron los tiburones.”

and by the reasons behind their migration decisions and contexts. In the case of those were children this affected their growing up, the relations they formed and will influence their relation with Chile.

VII. *Uno como que madura rápido*: The coming of age of exiled children

The mass exile from Chile also meant that a large majority of those ‘legally’ expelled from Chile left with their families. Current estimates indicate that about 76% of the exiles left with their families; most of them married. Close to 80% of these families consisted between two to four members (Norambuena 2000: 177). Unlike previous experiences of exile in Latin American scholars have been able to study the effects of this process of exile among the children of the exiles, at least from a psychological and social psychological perspective (Castillo and Piper-Shafir 1996; Vásquez-Bronfman and Araújo 1990; World University Service Chile 1979). These studies deal with the complexities of the psychological effects that fear, repression and exile have on the development of children and young people. Not only the rush to leave home, but also the torture and imprisonment that their parents suffered impacted their development. Exile also influenced the higher rate of family dissolutions (Shayne 2009), learning a new language and other complexities of integrating to a new culture.

While most of the research on this topic has been related to the mental health of exile adults and their children there has been some research on the socio-historical aspects of this phenomenon. Most of this research has been done, however, after the return to democracy in Chile on children that have returned from exile with their parents (Jedlicki 2003; Rebolledo 2006). In general children have not has an easy time integrating to their parents’ home country. Some of them left when they were very young and do not remember that “invented country” in

the words of Isabel Allende. A sort of Promised Land (Jedlicki 2003) reminiscent of that dream of socialism explained above where, until before the coup, democracy reigned and it was the most beautiful country in the world. There was, however, a permanent interest among the groups of exiles in different countries to maintain the idea of Chile alive. These “Sunday schools” were used to teach Spanish; the recent history of Chile, particularly before the coup; Chilean folklore and other cultural aspects of Chilean life. Regardless of this permanent relation with Chile, many of these children suffered a ‘second exile’, this time when the parents returned to Chile in the mid 1980s and 1990s (Castillo and Piper-Shafir 1996; Jedlicki 2003; Rebolledo 2006).

Three of my interviewees were children at the time of the military coup. Magdalena was 14 years old, Aida was 9 and Christian was 8. As I explained above, they left as family members; they “inherited” the exile from their parents using a term described by Vásquez-Bronfman and Araújo (1990). Despite their age, their narratives of the coup and their exile demonstrate the deep impact that this had on their growing up. In these three cases there are strong memories of fear as well as the need to participate in the Chilean communities.

Aida remembers that in the days after the coup her mother was incapable of hiding or masquerading what was happening from her oldest daughter:⁸⁰ “My mother was like a little girl and she did not hide anything from us. In reality I knew everything, everything, everything [that was happening]. I mean a girl cannot forget after that, you can really say that one sort of grows

⁸⁰ Aida compares this to the experience of her husband, the child of Uruguayan exiles who argues that his mother was like the character of Roberto Begnini in the movie *Life is beautiful*, always making something interesting out of the times when they have to leave a country.

really fast”.⁸¹ The imprisonment of her father and subsequent expulsion from the country led to serious trauma. Aida claims that she made this trauma visible in her drawings: “I remember that I use to draw horrible things. I drew people being tortured, I drew jails, because I remember that [media] was available to me, I could read everything, there were already in those years, in 1975, depositions of people of what they had suffered in jail and all that”.⁸² Magdalena also remembers with pain the last few months in Chile and first few in Panama. She told me: “For me, I had nightmares when we left to the exile in Panama. There were nights that I would cry because I dreamt that they were expelling us out back to Chile; that the Panamanians wanted to kick us back to Chile and I would cry in anguish. I mean, for me the last years in Chile were full of terror, as a child”.⁸³ Nightmares and fears were common among the children of the exiles. In an interview for Wright and Oñate (1998: 115), Viola Carrillo who left for the Soviet Union after her father was murdered, narrates that “[L]ater, when I got to Moscow and there was a different atmosphere, I slept better. Of course, it was hard because we saw my mother crying all day long”.

Christian’s experience was different. His mother did not suffer imprisonment or torture and while they left Chile for fear of persecution, their exile was self imposed as I explained

⁸¹ Mi mamá, ella era como una niña y ella no nos escondía nada. Realmente yo sabía todo, todo, todo. O sea, para una niña no te puedes olvidar después de eso, realmente se puede decir que uno como que madura muy rápido.

⁸² Yo me acuerdo que hacía dibujos horribles, yo hacía dibujos de gente que torturaban, de cárceles, porque me acuerdo que yo además tenía a mano, yo podía leer todo, habían ya en esa época, en el año 75 como declaraciones de gente que declaraba todo lo que había sufrido en las cárceles y eso.

⁸³ Para mí, yo tenía pesadillas cuando salimos al exilio en Panamá había noches que yo lloraba porque soñaba que nos estaban echando de regreso a Chile, que los panameños nos querían tirar de regreso a Chile y yo lloraba de angustia. O sea para mí, los últimos años en Chile fueron años de terror, como niña.

above. He argues that he had no problem in assimilating into Mexican society—where he still has friends after all these years—where and his family lived for five years before moving to the Mozambique. He still has childhood friends in Mexico. For him, moving to Mozambique with his mother at the age of fourteen was a completely different experience. He mentions that while he had many Chilean and foreign friends, he could never really integrate into Mozambiquen society. After a couple of years in Mozambique, he entered a British boarding school in Swaziland and after graduation he moved to the US to study at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, while his mother returned to Chile. Being more mature than the regular undergraduate students, he argued that it made it difficult to belong to any student group. He made friend with other Chileans, older students and participated in the Centro Cultural Pablo Neruda; a leftist cultural group. He left this group in 1990 because he: “thought that it was becoming fairly boring, too much, too much politics that to me it sounded too orthodox, old, that it did not belong in the process of change that was beginning to happen in Chile; in the changes that were already happening”.⁸⁴

Aida, after participating actively in the anti-dictatorship movements in Belgium and belonging to the Communist Party since an early age, also grows disenchanted from all these particular politics and decides to have a more normal teenager life:

I arrive there [the entire family moves from Amberes to Brussles] when I was fifteen. Which is a period...when you start making plans for your future. But in a moment, I remember that at that age I was living life like a [type of] Schizophrenia, really. Because I was active in the party, [thinking] that we have to go back, that we have to go clandestine, that we have to continue [the struggle];

⁸⁴ “[M]me pareció que se estaba convirtiendo en algo relativamente aburrido, demasiado, demasiada política que a mí ya me parecía ortodoxa ya, antigua, que no tenía mucha cabida en lo que estaba empezando a ocurrir eh en Chile, los cambios que estaban ocurriendo ya”.

and on the other side I was living my life as a teenager, and I was not so certain that I wanted to do all that. And when I turned 18 or 19 more or less, when I entered college, there I really stopped being a member of the Communist Party, because I felt it was too *Stalinist*...Anyway, I stopped being a member and psychologically it was good, I became more centered, it was a positive thing.⁸⁵

Unlike Christian and Aida, Magdalena's participation in politics and Chilean communities defined her future since the period she was in Panama. For her the experience of working in human rights in general during the late 1970s and 1980s led to her being involved in working with Comité Latino in Chicago and more recently in labor rights as the staff director of a union. In her own words:

We were very active with the church in Panama as well...and the church was very involved in the solidarity movement, not only with Chile, but also with Central America because everything was coalescing, a wonderful effervescence, that sometimes I do not know how to explain it to my children. Everything was, as the *gringos* like to say a *roller-coaster*, that runs, turns, such was the life of youth in those days; and it was so beautiful...It was above all a beautiful job and with very progressive priests, very lefty priests.⁸⁶

The second generation of exiles has a different experience with exiles which will influence their incorporation to the country of reception and to the possibilities of retouring to

⁸⁵ “Ahí llegue a los 15 años. Que fue un período más allá de ... vas haciendo proyectos para el futuro. Pero en un momento, yo me acuerdo que a esa edad lo vivía como una esquizofrenia, realmente. Porque yo militaba, hay que volver, meterse en la clandestinidad, hay que seguir y por otro lado, yo vivía mi vida de adolescente, y no estaba tan segura de querer hacer eso. Y a los más o menos 18 o 19 años cuando yo entré a la universidad, yo ahí realmente dejé de militar porque el partido comunista era, lo sentía como muy estaliniano... En todo caso, no quise seguir militando y psicológicamente me hizo mucho mejor, me afirmé más fue una cosa positiva”.

⁸⁶ “Nosotros fuimos muy activos con la iglesia también en Panamá...y la iglesia era muy metida en la solidaridad, no solamente con Chile pero también con Centroamérica porque estaba toda la cosa efervescente, pero una efervescencia bárbara, que yo a veces no sé cómo describírsela a mis hijos. Era todo, como dicen los *gringos* un “*roller-coaster*”, una montaña rusa, que corre, que da vueltas, así era la vida de los jóvenes en ese tiempo y fue tan bonito...Era un trabajo súper bonito de todas maneras, y con curas bien progres, bien de izquierda.”

Chile. Unlike those that were the exile, the first generation, the second generation did not long to return to the country. Their age at migration, however, will influence the connections that they seek to maintain with the home country mostly o their parents.

VIII. Conclusion

The military coup directly influenced the emigration patterns of Chileans in the 1970s. It also produced the largest emigration outflow in its history. While some of these emigrants returned to Chile with the end of the dictatorship, for many this return process was more complex and they eventually returned. For many, exile never ended. They were never able to return to live in Chile.

This mass movement of people was directly influenced by the US government's interventions in Chilean domestic politics and economy despite the fact that the set-up of the coup corresponds to the Chilean military. As the US Senator Church's Committee concluded in 1976 the US government with the help of transnational companies did participate in the overthrow of Allende. Despite unfavorable conditions, I observe that my interviewees used as maximum possible their options to have a choice on where to go. While for almost all my interviewees this was a forced migration there were occasions for agency. Exiles in some cases applied to different embassies and even rejected the visas when they could not take the families with them. There was also of agency in the country of origin. Although for many participating in the solidarity movement was a moral necessity and a political imperative there is growing questioning about the roles of the political parties and local leaderships. These conditions lead many to depart from the lines of the political party of origin and to follow their own paths.

In the decision process the “crucial meso level” participates again as in the previous chapter. First, families helped overcome the costs of migration. Second, there were organizations—different to those of the 1950-73 period—that help Chilean exiles remain in the US and even provided them food assistance during these years. While different, this is not unlike what happened in other Southern Cone countries. The process of exile from these other countries also included former detained and the role of the embassies to help exiles. They were also aided in their exile by institutions and organizations either in the home country or abroad different to families and groups of friends.

Finally the conditions of exile affected the everyday life and incorporation of these forced migrants. In the following section I will present the analysis of the other migrant wave group; that which migrates during the second half of the dictatorship.

CHAPTER VI BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND NEOLIBERALISM: MIGRATION IN THE 1980S

I. Introduction

In Latin America, the decade of the 1980s is known as the lost decade. The economic crisis of external debt plunged most of the countries into an economic recession only paralleled by the crisis of the 1930s (Lustig 1995). At the same time, the civil wars in Central America intensified during this decade as well as the internal conflict in Colombia. Throughout the 1980s Chile, still under Pinochet's dictatorship, suffered the effects of the debt crisis and an increase in political repression. The economic advances gained between the 1978 crisis and 1982 crisis were all but gone by 1983. This crisis led the dictatorship to assume as its own the structural adjustments policies proposed by the International Monetary fund (IMF), which led to structural reforms that changed completely the relationship between the state, the economy and the individuals.¹

The dictatorship also developed and approved its own political constitution in a plebiscite in 1980—plebiscite that has been deemed all but fair—which institutionalized the military government, gave Pinochet at least eight more years as president, criminalized certain political ideologies, and created a structure of dominance that would be extremely hard to dismantle. Concurrently, the economic crisis of the 1980s gave way to the first mass protests against

¹ Structural adjustment policies refers to a set of economic reforms that developing countries have to follow in order to be eligible for loans from the IMF or the World Bank. I explain the components for the case of Chile below.

Pinochet and to a rearticulating of the political opposition, which would eventually defeat Pinochet in a plebiscite in 1988 and win the presidency in late 1989. During this period three urban guerilla movements began to oppose the dictatorship through violent means. These were the MIR, that had regained a little of its old strength, the Frente Patriótico Miguel Rodríguez (FPMR – Miguel Rodríguez Patriotic Front), conceived as the armed side of the Chilean Communist Party, and the Movimiento Juvenil Lautaro (MJL – Youth Movement Lautaro), that armed side of the MAPU. Both the organized opposition with its call to peaceful protests and the guerilla movement were countered by a new wave of repression and human rights abuses from the regime.

It is within this context that I analyze the emigration flows from Chile to the US. The period between the economic crisis of 1982 and the end of the dictatorship can be seen as an intermission between two types of migration. First, there is a new wave of political emigration. Although they are not legally exiles, and they do not consider themselves as exiles, these emigrants left the country because they believed that their lives were in danger or they received hints or direct threats that made them fear for their lives. The second type of emigration is connected to the economic policies of the dictatorship. The economic crisis of 1982, the cultural changes imposed by the application of structural adjustments processes, and in general, the application of neoliberal policies created two types of migrations. One type is a survival migration: people that have lost their jobs and/or see that their future is endangered by these socio-economic policies. The other type is the migration of highly prepared professionals who leave to Chile to enhance their education or to invest abroad. These two waves of migrants are not mutually exclusive but, as I found in my interviews, they are extremes on a continuum.

This chapter is divided in three main sections. First I and overview of three stages that the dictatorship went through between 1973 and 1990 to contextualize the changes that occurred in the early 1980s. I also introduce three changing ideological structures in place in this period: The application of neoliberal approach to economy and society, the legal institutionalization of the dictatorship, and the foreign relations between Chile and the US. Second, I present and analyze the memories that my interviewees have of Chile in the 1980s.² Their migration is a response to two situations; the economic crisis of 1982 and the human rights abuses during the second part of the dictatorship. I argue that these memories were the bases of the decision to migrate. Third, I present and analyze the instant of migration and the arrival to the US or, in some cases, to other destination countries. I demonstrate that this migration is qualitatively different to both the exile and the pre 1973 migration in terms of the objectives of migration. I conclude this section with a comment on the process of transition to a democratic government that began in 1988.

II. Three periods of Pinochet's dictatorship

The military dictatorship that began in September 11 of 1973 can be divided in three periods. The first, beginning the day of the coup and ending roughly in 1978, was when the DINA and other intelligence units carried out most of the assassinations, tortures and disappearances. It is also a time of reorganization of the state and first changes to the economic model. This stage ends with the economic crisis of 1974 to 1976 and the loss of support from the US in 1976. The second period, between 1976 and 1982, is framed by two economic crises. This

² The analysis that I present here is based on the oral histories of six Chilean emigrants in the US. This three women and three men left Chile between 1982 and 1990. While all the men and one of the women migrated directly to the US, the other two remaining women emigrated to Europe for political reasons and only arrived to the US in the late 1990s.

period is characterized by a decrease in the amount of human right abuses and the first results of the implementation of the neoliberal economic program³ that will produce a short period of macro-economic success. During this period, the dictatorship and Pinochet will attempt to legitimize and institutionalize the dictatorship with the drafting of the Chilean constitution of 1980. The third period begins during the 1982 crisis and ends with the end of the dictatorship on March 11 of 1990. I center my analysis on the emigrants that left Chile between 1982 and 1990. I begin by commenting on three important processes of the mid to late 1970s: the consolidation of the ‘*Chicago boys*’, the process of institutionalization of the dictatorship and the changes in the relations between Chile and the US.

The military and social forces that carried out the military coup of September 11 in Chile were a very heterogeneous group. It was a mixed group of staunch nationalists, sworn anticommunists, *Opus Dei* Catholics and Franco followers, old land-based “aristocracy”, industrial elites, and free market fundamentalist economists, among others. These groups did not agree from the start on what should be the political and economic structure that the dictatorship should have. They had only a basic set of agreements to return Chilean society to its traditional structure.

³ The concept of neoliberalism can be understood as a economic and political doctrine that locates the market at the center of all decisions as a “natural” and inexorable state of humanity” which can always fix any problem caused by market itself. This market is an information process and every act within a society of possible of marketization. In this doctrine the state needs to be redefined in its shape and functions, and while democracy is the best possible political system, it cannot stand in the way of freedom. Democracy and political action needs to be treated “as if it were a market and promoting an economic theory of democracy”. For neoliberals, inequality serves as “necessary functional characteristic” of the market (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009: 433-440).

The first two years of the dictatorship, however, were marked by a double internal power struggle. On the side of the *Junta*, a power struggle between the ideas of having a collegiate body where the leadership rotated among the four superior officers of the armed forces, following the example of Brazil, or giving all the power to only one person for the entire process. The latter option, which had the support of the army, won out and Pinochet was appointed president. Additionally, at a more ideological level there was a power struggle between the ‘*Gremialistas*’ and the ‘*Chicago Boys*’.

The ‘*Gremialistas*’ were mostly *Opus Dei* Catholic lawyers educated at the “Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile” (PUC – Pontifical Catholic University) who originally favored to follow a Franco-type of political corporativism where power was channeled through workplace organized groups instead of political parties (Valenzuela 1995). This group was originally close to the Air Force but quickly moved towards Pinochet and the Army as the position of the Air Force lost power. The ‘*Chicago boys*’ were economists trained in the neoliberal, free market economics, at the PUC and at the University of Chicago and had the support of the Navy (Valdés 1995). The *Gremialistas* failed to sustain their economic views, and even before December 1973 their leader, Jaime Guzmán, changed his Thomistic philosophical views and became a strong supporter of the economic views of the *Chicago Boys*.

But who exactly were the *Chicago Boys*? In the mid 1950s the Economics Department of the PUC signed an agreement with the Economics Department of the University of Chicago to train Chilean economists. This program, called Project Chile, was conceived as a technical assistance and economic aid program to underdeveloped countries (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). By the end of the first stage of this program in 1964, financed through the US International Cooperation Administration, about 30 Chilean economists received postgraduate training in

Chicago. This program, which attracted students for the Universidad de Chile as well, had an enormous influence in the education of Chilean economists (Valdés 1995; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Silva 2008; Klein 2007). For Valdés, this program “constitutes a striking example of an organized transfer of ideology from the United States to a country within its direct sphere of influence” (1995: 13)

Most of these economists were disciples of Milton Friedman and of Arnold Harberger and upon returning to Chile they very quickly achieved positions of power at the PUC, financial conglomerates and government, even before 1973 (Silva 1991). Some of the early graduates participated in Alessandri’s government in the early 1960, joined the Central Bank (equivalent to the Federal Reserve) during Frei’s government in the mid to late 1960 and prepared the economic program for 1970 presidential campaign. By the mid 1980s, thirty years after the inception of the program, more than 150 Chilean economists had received their training at Chicago (Silva 2008).

The dictatorship did not change greatly the economic structure of the country during the first two years of their regime. This period was mostly a general reorganization of the economic processes marked by the privatization of the companies that were nationalized during the UP government and a general return to the mixed economy setting of before 1970. The initial assumption was that by simply returning to a previous stage the economy would grow again. This approach failed and since 1974 Chile was in a recession produced by, among other reasons, a fall in the price of copper—the country’s main commodity—and increase in the price of oil. Chilean inflation rate was 369% in 1974 and 343% the following year (Meller 1996:187).

This crisis was an opportunity for the *Chicago Boys* who quickly seized the reigns of the economy and began applying a neoliberal “shock treatment”. Friedman himself visited Chile and openly state that a “shock treatment” was the only solutions to the maladies of the nation (Meller 2000; Foxley 1998). The “Program of economic recovery” included massive budget cuts, a new round of privatization of public companies, monetary reform, and free trade; Chile also renounced the Andean Pact⁴. This moment marks the end of the import substitution regime and the beginning of the application of a new development model; neoliberalism. Several capitalist countries celebrated the results of this shock treatment policies. Even the United Nations, who had criticized Chile for its human rights abuses, celebrated the economic improvement. Between 1976 and 1981 Chile had an average annual growth rate of 7.9%, inflation reduced from 198% in 1976 to 9% in 1981, and net income grew 9% during the years of the economic ‘boom’; it was the Chilean miracle. The ‘boom’ collapsed in late 1981 (Meller 1996; 2000; Ffrench-Davis 2002; Oppenheim 1993).

If the *Gremialistas* lost the battle for the economic and social organizational soul of Chile, they won the political and legal battle. *Gremialistas* had also evolved. They left behind their corporatist views and quickly assumed as their own the economic postulates of neoliberalism. The most recognizable spiritual and technical leader of this group was Jaime Guzmán, a young *Opus Dei* lawyer. It was he and his group whom Pinochet put in charge of developing the legal institutionalization of the regime. This did not happened overnight. In early 1974 he was asked to prepare a document that would define the political program of the

⁴ The Andean Pact, currently the Andean Community of Nations—formed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru—was a regional integration process formed in 1969 with the objective of achieve economic and social cooperation and integration within the development paradigm of industrialization by import substitution. Chile withdrew from the pact in 1978 but continues to participate in some of the social components of the pact.

dictatorship. This document was the *Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile* (Declaration of Principles of the government of Chile).⁵ This document established, among other concepts, the need to change the mentality of Chileans in an environment of freedom—in the neoliberal sense—as well as to present the armed forces as the guarantors of the social life.⁶ It also states that men [sic] have natural rights which are beyond the state, a clear Thomistic view of the relation between rights given by [the Roman Catholic] God and those given by the state. A new document, *Objetivo Nacional de Chile* (Chile's National Objective), written in 1975 attempted to put into practice the Declaration of Principles. This Declaration of Principles was the basis on which the dictatorship created the new Chilean Constitution that legitimized—in Weberian terms, legally-rational—the dictatorship and that has defined Chilean Political life since 1973 (Arceneaux 2001; Huneeus 2007).

A second important moment is the *Chacarillas speech*, also drafted by Guzmán among others. In this speech, given in 1977 at the creation of the day of Chilean youth, Pinochet established for the first time a sort of timeline according to which the armed forces would call for elections for a new president in 1985. While these process were quickly dismissed, and according the Arceneaux, this was only a political move to appease the US (Arceneaux 2001), the importance of this speech is that for the first time the dictatorship proposes a timeline for general elections. This document, however, also defines the role of the military in a future 'democratic regime'. The military would not return to their barracks but be part of every

⁵ This document is available in Spanish at http://www.archivochile.com/Dictadura_militar/doc_jm_gob_pino8/DMdocjm0005.pdf Accessed November 30, 2012.

⁶ Although the neoliberal economic paradigm only becomes the central theoretical influence in the dictatorship in the mid 1970s there is previous experience with this paradigm in Chilean history. An earlier version of this economic development program was unsuccessfully applied at the beginnings of Alessandri's government in 1958.

government as a sort of moral reserve of the nation establishing in fact a “protected and authoritarian democracy” (Huneus 2007: 155). Some of these ideas would become part of Pinochet’s constitution.

Soon after the coup, the *Junta* formed a committee that was asked to draft a new constitution for Chile. For many on the right and in the military, the Constitution of 1925 was to blame for the crisis that led to the coup in 1973. This committee, known as the *Comisión Ortúzar* for the last name of its president, worked for about two years on a draft that was quickly abandoned by the *Junta*. After the *Chacarillas speech*, however, some of the ideas presented in that draft were used to prepare a new constitutional draft that was voted in the 1980 plebiscite.

In this constitutional document the dictatorship established and “institutional architecture of a protected and authoritarian democracy” (Huneus 2007: 160-161; see also Arceneaux 2001) along four components. It established an electoral system that took power from the political parties and that excluded Marxist parties from government. It gave the armed forces a supervisory role through the National Security Council. It protected the constitution; making it almost impossible to change the constitution by parliament. And, it set up a lengthy transition period with the objective of cementing the social, economic, political and cultural changes that the dictatorship was implementing. According to this timetable, eight years after the ratification of this Constitution—in 1988—there would be a plebiscite through which the armed forces would nominate a candidate for the position of President to the Chilean people who would approve or reject this proposal. The proposal further specified that nominee would be president for another eight years and there would be elections for parliament; most political power would accrue to the president. If the proposal was rejected there would be open elections for president, whose period would last four years, and for parliament; this option won in 1988 opening the way

for a democratic transition. In the period between 1980 and 1988 Pinochet would be president, thus legitimating his position. The plebiscite to approve or disprove this constitution took place in 1980 and the option to approve won with a 67% of the votes. There are witness accounts, however, that the plebiscite had been rigged (Carvallo et al 1997; Spooner 1994/1999).

For the US government, the coup that deposed Allende was a successful solution to a rather annoying situation. In fact, in a visit to Chile in 1976, Henry Kissinger, then secretary of state, told Pinochet “we welcomed the overthrow of the Communist-inclined government here. We are not out to weaken your position” (Kornbluh 2003:241). At the same time, however, the opposition to the dictatorship abroad and the solidarity movements towards Chile were increasing even in the US. There were protests in front of the Chilean consulates supporting Allende and opposing the assassinations and disappearances in Chile (Ensalaco 2000).

The US support of Chile would come to an abrupt end in September 21 1976, when day, Orlando Letelier, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Defense of Allende and one of Chile’s most outspoken exiles, was killed, along with his assistant Ronni Moffit, by a bomb hidden under his car in Washington DC only a few blocks from the White House. This assassination was planned and carried out by the DINA with the aid of anti-Castro Cubans (Carvallo et al 1997; Wright 2007). A few weeks later Jimmy Carter was elected president and part of his international platform was built on a strong defense of Human Rights (Wright 2007).

From the beginning of his presidency Carter worked with Congress to reduce support to Chile. A year before, in 1976, the US Congress passed the *International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976*, commonly known as the Kennedy Amendment, that banned the sale of weapons to Chile, showing a change in the tide of support from the US to the Chilean

dictatorship. Carter's government also reduced the US economic aid to Chile, voted against the country at UN on topics of human rights and in international lending agencies (Walker 2011: 121). Pinochet responded by closing the DINA—replaced by the CNI with the same attributions—and removing the main organizers of the attack against Letelier from the Army. There are doubts that this was actually to appease the US or simple that the DINA had run its course. By 1977 the DINA and other intelligence services had defeated the MIR, killed and disappeared two complete underground leaderships of the Communist party, dismantled the organization of the Socialist Party as well as killing some of its leaders, and created a regime of fear that would continue in the next decade (Wright 2007; Carvallo et al 2007). In fact human rights abuses would continue in the coming years now not to leaders of the emblematic members of the UP parties but also to political dissidents, union leaders, journalists, and teachers, among others (Spooner 1994/1999).

Carter's presidency was, however, only an intermission to the support of the US to Pinochet. The return of the Republican Party to power in 1981 meant a return to a politics of support to Pinochet's government. This support was not as strong as that of Nixon and Kissinger. Despite the highest concern about human rights in the world, the ascension to power of Ronald Reagan in the US and of Margaret Thatcher in the UK signaled a more benevolent attitude towards Chile and other capitalist authoritarian regimes (Portales 1995). In 1983, however, Reagan's government began to advocate for a gradual and negotiated transition that would allow for the neoliberal project to gain enough ground in Chile, so that it would excise the Communist party from the political system. This change in attitude by the US was signaled by the "abandonment of 'quiet diplomacy' and the issuance of public statements on human rights and democratic institutions" (Portales 1995: 257) and was part of a new international politics

approach by the US that sought to counter the Soviet Union's 'evil empire' through the strengthening of democracy worldwide.⁷

This background context of the 1980s spurred a new emigration wave in Chile.

III. The economic crisis and new forms of repression

The memories of Chile that my interviewees have before their emigration are defined by the economic crisis from late 1982 to early 1986, and by the increase in political repression during the third stage of Pinochet's dictatorship. My interviewees, however, give more importance to the economy and to the repression than to their own political ideologies as the conditions that prompted their decision to migrate.

Pamela left Chile to marry her US fiancée in 1985. She had studied to be a bilingual secretary and she was not involved at all in politics. She remember that in the years before her emigration there was "an economic recession, I remember that people...could not find jobs, or that engineers worked as taxi drivers, things like that I remember...that there were many professionals that could find a job and were doing other things...to provide for their families".⁸

Renato was an exchange student in the US during 1982 at the time the crisis began in Chile. Through information from his parents—his father owned a car repair shop—he

⁷ At the same time, and for the same reasons, however, the US was supporting Civil Wars in Central America and other regions in the world.

⁸ The concept of professional refers to people that have a university degree. In Chile if you complete all the university requirements you obtain a 'Professional degree in...' "de la recesión económica, me acuerdo que la gente no... no podía encontrar trabajo, o que los ingenieros trabajaban de taxistas, cosas así me acuerdo...que habían bastantes profesionales que no podían encontrar trabajo y hacían otras cosas...para mantener a la familia, eso me acuerdo".

remembers that the economic recession was hard and that was impacting his father's shop. He told me that "barely two or three cars would come in every week and that would hardly suffice [to survive]. My mother, who was an assistant nurse and helped a little [with her salary]".⁹

In 1982 the Chilean economic model collapsed; the miracle had ended. The growth in private borrowing during the second part of the 1970s together with an increase in the international interest rate and the reduction of available credit, along with a decrease in the Chilean terms of exchange produced the largest economic crisis in fifty years in Chile (Meller 1996; Ffrench-Davis 2002). The dictatorship's economic team also made several mistakes that deepened the impact of the crisis. The Chilean peso's exchange rate was fixed at \$39 pesos per dollar since 1979, a value much lower than its real value to promote imports. Most companies now had their debts in dollars because it was cheaper than to have it in pesos. Almost overnight, in June of 1982 the peso was devaluated 18%, from \$39 pesos to \$46 per dollar. During the next six months the peso would decrease its value to \$74 pesos per dollar by December of 1982 (Meller 1996; 2000; Ffrench-Davis 2002).

The impacts of this crisis were profound. Chilean GDP fell 14.4% in 1982 and by a further 1% in the following year. There were more than 800 bankruptcies and the unemployment rose to 26% in 1982 and to 31%. Close to 10% of the work force were hired under emergency employment programs created by the dictatorship. Chile's foreign debt tripled in a couple of years. The fiscal debt increased to 2.3% and to 3% of the GDP in 1982 and 1983 respectively and inflation increased as well. Real income decreased by 20% and purchasing power remained low for several years. Eight years after the crisis, in 1990 there were still close to 40% of the

⁹ "Mi padre era dueño de uno de esos garajes y apenas dos o tres coches entraban a la semana y eso apenas daba. Mi madre que era auxiliar de enfermera ayudaba un poco."

Chilean population living in poverty. The entire banking system was also nationalized (Meller 1996; 2000; Ffrench-Davis 2002; Lawson 2005: 187).

As a response to the crisis, the government applied a set of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) 'recommended' by the IMF and the World Bank to provide Chile with funds to solve the crisis which had large economic and social cost. This SAP was comprised of three main elements. First, a strict control of the fiscal deficit; second, a restriction of the amount of credit that could be channeled to the public sector; and third, a strong reduction of the salaries through a devaluation of the Peso and a reduction in collective bargaining (Meller 1996: 237). In the next few years the dictatorship would use the SAPs to dismantle the social services network present in Chile, privatizing social security and health services. The dictatorship also privatized most services and production industries still in its power. As this process took place under a mantle of fear, the dictatorship had the opportunity to apply these drastic adjustment measures. Despite this fear, early 1983 saw initial protests against Pinochet and the dictatorship, protests that eventually would empower the opposition and lead to the end of the dictatorship eight years later.

Renato's family and he were supporters of Pinochet, mainly as a response to what had happen during the Allende era. His argument was mainly economic. He told me that: "my family preferred to have Pinochet instead of what was before...It was a better alternative for me...while there was not freedom of press or of political parties it was better than what I had seen when I was seven or eight".¹⁰ In his narrative he ties his migration decision to the beginnings of the protests to the economic crisis and through that to the need to depose the dictatorship. He

¹⁰ "Mi familia prefería tener el régimen de Pinochet que la otra cosa antes de eso. ...Es una alternativa mejor para mí. Eso es lo que yo me puedo recordar cuando me vine todavía no había libertad de prensa o de partidos políticos, pero era tal vez mejor de lo que había yo crecido cuando tenía siete u ocho años."

remembers that before he came to the US people were complaining and had begun protesting against Pinochet's regime, but he says that "things got much worse after I left".¹¹

While the first mass protests against the dictatorship began in 1983, the opposition to Pinochet had become increasingly active at least since in 1979. From a political perspective the opposition, in particular the Christian Democracy campaigned against the approval of the new constitution. From a guerrilla perspective the MIR implemented in the late 1970s the *Operación Retorno* (Operation Return). The objective of this operation was to create guerrilla *focos* in rural areas and in Santiago to militarily defeat the dictatorship (Carvallo et al 1997; Huneeus 2007: 361). At the same time university students mobilized against the dictatorship.

Mónica, a student of the old *Universidad Técnica del Estado*¹² (UTE) in 1979, remembers that year as being incredibly active. Mónica had begun to participate in politics during her high school years and by the time she began college she was well involved with the opposition to the dictatorship. She told me that in those years:

I was very conscious of the Chilean political situation, tensions were present everywhere specially in the university that was the UTE...which was very strong in its opposition to the government we had then. So there were many cultural organizations, and political and I participated in every type of organizations...¹³

¹¹ "gente se estaban quejando por la cosa con el régimen de Pinochet y ahí comenzaron un poquito más las protestas, no hasta el punto cuando yo ya me había venido cuando las cosas se pusieron feas".

¹² The Universidad Técnica del Estado (Technical University of the State), now Universidad de Santiago, is the third largest university in Santiago. It began as a polytechnic and applied engineering program to provide a tertiary education for industrial workers.

¹³ "yo estaba muy consciente de la situación política chilena entonces las tensiones sobre todo en la universidad que era la ex UTE, Universidad Técnica del Estado...que era muy fuerte en términos de estar en contra del gobierno que teníamos en esos momentos. Así es que había

The first National Day of Protest was on May 11 of 1983, followed closely by large protests in June 14 and July 12. These protests were harshly repressed by the military. By the fourth National Day of Protest on August 11, the dictatorship put more than 18,000 soldiers in the streets of Santiago; more than 20% of the Chilean army (Ensalaco 2000). More than one thousand people were detained on July 12 alone. These protests produced an increase in repression by the military, particularly in the shanty towns a poorer areas of Santiago and other cities in the country (Loveman and Lira 2000). The MIR and in 1984 the FPMR began killing military people and police, robbing banks to finance themselves, among other activities. At the same time the dictatorship increased its violence against the Chilean population. In the three years between 1983 and 1986 detentions increases yearly from 1,789 in 1982 to 15,077; 39,440; 9,116; and 33,665 in the last year. For the same period the number of assassinations increased from 24 in 1982 to 96; 74; 66 ;and 58, *relegaciones* increased from 81 in 1982 to 171 in 1986 as did torture from 123 in 1982 to 434 the following year to 255 in 1986 (Correa et al 2001: 332).

This increase in violence and detentions impacted each of my interviewees differently. Mónica participated in many protests and was detained several times that led to her suspension from University for a year. During part of this time she studied journalism in Brazil. Vanessa remembers that because she came from an elite family she did not know much what was happening in Chile until she went to college in the mid 1970s. It is in the journalism school of the Universidad de Chile that she realized that people had been tortured and began to make friends with people in the opposition. She was living and working in Temuco, a city about eight hours away south of Santiago, in 1983 when the protests began. She remembers that during one of those protests:

montones de organizaciones de tipo culturales, y de tipo político y yo por ejemplo, personalmente participé en todo tipo de organización...”

I was there in a corner and I see [the police] taking a blind man who was protesting and I got, I got mad and I shout to the face... to the *pacos* I tell him son of a bitch, dammed bastard, taking someone who cannot see, I don't know and they tell me "we are going to take you" and they took me, they took me, but of course since I was...I was freed immediately, that same night, because of course I still belonged to an untouchable class, right?"¹⁴

This event change completely Vanessa's political beliefs and completed her conversion to become part of the opposition to the dictatorship. According to her, this changed her from being a "somewhat irresponsible girl from a rich family, from a family without political convictions, I went to the extremes".¹⁵ This would end up costing her dearly, a few months later she had to leave Chile (see below).

Guillermo had also finished college in the late 1970s and for him this period was one when it was harder and harder not to be involved in politics. His political activity included reading the few opposition magazines that existed at the time in Chile as a way of counteracting what he calls the "lies from television". He had become friends with the publishers and writers of a political magazine of the opposition to the dictatorship called *Revista Análisis* from where "I had lots of information that things were really, really difficult, the repression, the human rights abuses, were, were, real".¹⁶

¹⁴ By untouchable class she refers to being part of the elite. "en una esquina que se yo y se llevan a un tipo que era ciego que estaba protestando y yo me dio, me dio la rabia y le grito al al cara... a los pacos le digo, concha 'e tu madre, maricón desgraciado, llevándote a una persona que no puede ver, que se yo y me dicen " a vos te vamos a llevar" y me llevaron y me llevaron, pero claro como era...Salí inmediatamente, el mismo día en la noche, porque claro yo todavía pertenecía a la clase intocable, no?"

¹⁵ "de ser una niña un poco irresponsable, de una familia rica, de una familia sin cuestiones políticas, me fui yendo a los extremos."

¹⁶ "ahí tenia harta información de que la cosa estaba, estaba difícil, la represión, la violación a los derechos humanos era, era, era real."

These memories of Chile by emigrants who left Chile between 1982 and 1990 are the preamble of their decision to migrate. A decision that is influenced by the conditions in the country and their interactions with these conditions.

IV. A mix model of migration: Political and economic exile

Unlike previous migrations, those that leave after 1982 speak to more decisive particular personal events that lead to their decision to migrate. In the case of Pamela her decision to get married to a US citizen is pivotal. She leaves Chile, in opposition to her mother's wishes who wanted her to marry a Chilean, in 1985. She met her now husband in 1978 in the US on a blind date, then wrote each other for six years, he went to Chile for two months and then they got married. Renato, on the other hand describes his migration as a well thought out means-to-end rational decision. He had lived in the US as an exchange student in 1982 and was able to compare the possibilities that a junior college offered him in comparison to a Chilean university. His argument was that in a junior college he could transfer majors as long as he had good grades. With his high school grades and his admission test results he could only go to study to a language teacher or an engineer in a university far from Santiago. He told me:

I ask myself, well, what happens if I want to be a lawyer? What happened if I want to go into medical school? I would have to retake [the tests] and really spend a year and a half or two studying to pass the test and if did not do well enough, then decide what to do. There were not, in that time, I don't think there were systems such as here the Junior College, where you can at least study for two years and then can change major and that's it. That is the reason why I came here.¹⁷

¹⁷ This citation requires a short explanation. Culturally in Chile college students attempt as much as possible to live with their parents that is why Renato thinks that moving out of Santiago to go to college is not worth it. "Y dije bueno, además de eso, ¿qué pasa si yo quiero ser abogado? ¿Qué pasa si quiero ser médico? Tendría que retomar y realmente gastar un año y medio o dos

Another narrative related to emigration in the context of this economic crisis is the case of Thelma.¹⁸ He father was an accountant at Hucke, a traditional chocolate factory in Valparaíso, until the company went bankrupt in during the crisis of 1982. After that he was laid off as most of his coworkers. The next couple of years he tried to go into business by himself selling and delivering candy, chocolates and cookies to small corner shops in the Valparaíso/Viña del Mar area. The bad economic climate of that period prevented him from succeeding. The impossibility of providing a good education for his then only daughter—Thelma—in that economic crisis, made him and his wife decide to leave Chile and migrate to the US in 1985.

Besides these three narratives, all the other interviews for this period show different levels of a politically influenced forced migration. At the same time they clearly show the relevance of a galvanizing event and networks on facilitating the migration once the decision is made. I present the following narratives from the most voluntary to the least voluntary.

Martín's decision to migrate is influenced by his being temporarily detained by the military in 1981 for being out afterhours during one of the states of emergency declared by the dictatorship. According to him he was planning to leave Chile because “in those days to sing folklore was to be anti-Pinochet”.¹⁹ One night he was returning home after the beginning of the curfew hours and was detained by a military patrol in downtown Santiago. The military punched

años estudiando para tratar de superar la prueba y ahí si no me da ver que pasa. No hay, en ese tiempo, no creo que había sistemas como te digo acá en el “*Junior College*”, tú por lo menos puedes estudiar dos años y después puedes cambiarte de “*major*” y esa es la cosa. Por eso es la razón que me vine para acá.”

¹⁸ I did this interview in 2009 for an article on Chilean immigrants in the US. A summary of the interview is available at Doña-Reveco 2011.

¹⁹ “Bueno, ya había planeado irme de Chile porque en esos tiempos cantar folclore era ser anti pinochetista.”

him, called him a communist and broke his guitar. This event is what makes him decide to migrate. He leaves for Paraguay to work there but due to weather related road closings he has to return to Chile where a year later he runs into a friend who was living in Chicago where he had a music ensemble that played Latin American folklore. This friend invited him to join him in Chicago and to play with them. Martín left in 1983 only with a tourist visa. He remembered his decision to migrate with the following argument:

No, I was done, with this government I cannot go on, I want to leave. And I was not marked or being persecuted or anything, zero, zero. I was never searched search for or incriminated, no, but I needed to leave, I was exhausted, because I did not have the freedom to create anything, to write songs.²⁰

Guillermo, as I mentioned above, had been in close contact with the opposition for a couple of years after finishing college. He was working as a researcher in the school of chemistry of the Universidad de Chile where he received his degree in the late 1970 and he was increasingly tired with the political situation in Chile. He could not see that the political situation of the country would be solved and coming to study in the US was a good temporary solution. The galvanizing event for him was a visit he received in the house of his family. He told me:

I had...a cousin, you know how there is everything in Chilean families, eeh who worked for the DINA that I remember went to visit me to the house and told me, I am sure they had our phones controlled, because he told me that I should be very careful with the people that I was hanging out because they were not behaving very well, then there I said nom I have to get out of here, I stay here anymore.²¹

²⁰ “No, estoy podrido, con este gobierno yo no puedo seguir aquí, quiero irme. Y yo no estaba marcado, ni perseguido ni nada, cero, cero. Nunca me buscaron ni me incriminaron por algo, no, pero quería irme, estaba agotado porque estaba coartada la posibilidad de crear algo, de escribir canciones.”

²¹ “tenía un... un primo tu sabes como las familias en Chile hay de todo, eeeh un primo que trabajaba en la DINA que me me acuerdo que me fue a visitar a la casa y me dijo, seguro ya nos

He left for the US in 1984 to Case Western University where one of his teachers had received his PhD and he came to study with that teacher's advisor.

Vanessa reacted to her turn to the left by authoring an investigative journalistic report where she exposed the corruption of Julio Ponce Lerou, at the time a son-in-law of Pinochet who was doing 'shady' business in Temuco.²² Vanessa argues that she got involved in this out of political naivety and this was in fact a larger research in which people from different opposition parties participated. According to CIPER-Chile (see footnote 17) this was actually an intelligence operation financed by one of the richest men in Chile at the time and who wanted to get Ponce Lerou out of his area of business. While the original article had been written anonymously, Vanessa argues that she was reported to the authorities by her neighbor, a young woman who had been turned by the CNI after her father had been killed by the dictatorship.

She left Temuco and returned to Santiago, where her family still lives. Once there she realized that she was being followed, as there were always black cars parked in the corner of her house, she received threats at home and some of her friends got menacing phone calls. During this time, Ponce Lerou sued her for defamation and sent her notice to her family—whom he knew because Vanessa's brother was a close friend of Pinochet's younger son—that accused her of being a high ranking member of the MIR and she was going to have to be judged by the military tribunals. She remembers that the judge told her: "Look girl, he said, I have a nephew

tenían el teléfono controlado, porque me dijo que tuviera cuidado con la gente que me estaba juntando que no se estaban portando muy bien, entonces ahí ya ya dije no yo tengo que mandarme a cambiar de este país, ahí ya no puedo seguir aquí".

²² Recent journalistic pieces on this case can be found at <http://ciperchile.cl/2008/12/31/los-archivos-secretos-de-ricardo-claro-y-sus-actuaciones-en-las-sombras/> and on "Ponce Lerou: El perfil de Julio César", El Mercurio, May 17, 2002 at <http://diario.elmercurio.com/detalle/index.asp?id={1a4579af-5b07-46ee-8c9e-adce4b2c35a3}> both accessed November 28, 2012

who disappeared, so I am going to give you just one piece of advice, Monday you will have to go to the military tribunals, [Vanessa told me] this was a Friday, so leave”.²³

That weekend Vanessa left for Austria from where her father had escaped in the 1930s following the *Anschluss*. She was helped by an Austrian journalist who would later become her first husband. While in Europe she participated actively in the Chilean solidarity movement and in the organizations of exiles, although she does not consider herself an exile. From Austria she moved to the Netherlands where she met her current husband, a US citizen, in the late 1990s with whom she came to live in the US in 2000.

Mónica’s narrative presents a more extreme case of forced migration. After being suspended from college, she spent almost a year studying in Brazil from where she returned to Chile in 1985 for vacations. She told me that:

I went on vacation to Chile for two weeks, what I thought it was going to be two weeks. [There] I met with my boyfriend, the father of my [oldest] daughter, and the truth is that I stayed in Santiago more than I had thought...Our plans was to meet in Brazil at the end of the year and so I went on vacations [to Chile] to visit my family and him. And while I was in Santiago the thing is that he disappeared and I had to leave for Sweden....So in 1985, if course, after he disappeared I did not have much left... I mean I did not feel. What happens is that in those days people reached to the conclusion that if there was someone who was involved evidently if you were the spouse, or the boyfriend or someone very close, you were going to be doing the same things. Therefore the tension was so big that people did not have many options. And the truth is that in my case it was very obvious. It was super obvious that I was being persecuted that it would be hard for me to keep myself [safe]. I couldn’t be alone because I was being followed, things like that that are hard to remember [from] that time. The truth is that I didn’t want to leave but I didn’t have much alternative and [two people] from the *Vicaría de*

²³ “mire niña, me dijo yo tengo un sobrino que desapareció, as que te voy a dar un solo concejo, el lunes tu pasas a justicia militar, esto era un viernes, así que ándate”.

la Solidaridad called me one day and told me, ‘you have to go. There is no way that you can stay’... I had to leave.²⁴

Mónica left 24 hours after people from the *Vicaría de la solidaridad* made the necessary arrangements to leave Chile. Her *compañero*, a well known leader of the student organization at the Universidad de Santiago, had been killed around September 20, 1985.²⁵ She was pregnant and her daughter was born early 1986 in Sweden where she was helped by other exiles. Mónica was very active in the Chilean exile movement, although as Vanessa she does not consider herself an exile. In the late 1980s Mónica married a US citizen living in Sweden. In 1995 they went to live in Chile for a year but they were not able to integrate to the Chilean culture and, after a year, they left Chile.

V. Conclusion

These Chileans left the country as this was still under the rule of Pinochet. The reasons for leaving show the transitions that the country was going through and the internal and external

²⁴ “me fui de vacaciones a Chile por dos semanas, por lo que yo pensaba que iban a ser dos semanas. Y me encontré con mi novio, que es el papá de mi hija, y la verdad es que me quedé en Santiago más de lo que había pensado... entonces nuestros planes eran encontrarnos en Brasil a finales de año y entonces yo me fui de vacaciones para visitar a mi familia y verlo a él. Y estando en Santiago la cosa es que él desapareció y yo me tuve que ir a Suecia. Haciéndolo corto.... Así es que en el 85, claro, después que él desapareció no me quedo mucho a mí. ...O sea, no sentía. Lo que pasa que en esa época la gente saltaba a la conclusión que si había otra persona que estaba mezclaba evidentemente si tú eras la esposa o el novio o alguien muy cercano también ibas a estar en lo mismo. Entonces había una tensión tan grande de que las personas no tenían muchas opciones. Y la verdad es que en mi caso era súper obvio. Era súper obvio que tenía toda esta persecución que era difícil para mí mantenerme. No podía estar sola porque me seguían, una cantidad de cosas así que son difíciles de recordar en esa época. La verdad es que yo no me quería ir pero no me quedó como mucha alternativa [y dos personas] en la Vicaría de la Solidaridad me llaman un día y me dicen, te tienes que ir. No hay forma de que te puedas quedar. ... , me tuve que ir

²⁵ There is a memorial with his name at the school of electrical engineering of the Universidad de Santiago (Hoppe 2007).

influence of these transitions. In this sense the narratives presented show a clear connection between the macro situation, the biographical aspects, the events, and the networks. Reading (and listening) to their stories helps understand the rationale of the process of migration decision making.

The imposition of a particular model of development produces a crisis that does influence migration. Migrants do not necessarily define their migration in the same discursive level that the economic level. They do not use an absolute instrumental rational choice rationality to respond to a rational; choice approach to economics. As I presented in the case of Thelma's father the response is described mostly from a value perspective. The value here is that of education; he left Chile because of the impossibility to secure a good education for her daughter, not because he was not able to find a job. This is not the case of only economic migration, political migrants do also take decisions where ethical or values are more important than a 'good job' to migrate. Both Martín and Guillermo migrate because they were ethically against what was happening in Chile.

A forced migrant does not have the time to respond to a migration offer. Neither Vanessa nor Mónica wanted to leave. They are force to leave for their political involvement. Vanessa realies in her tradition; she is returning to the place where originally her father is from. Mónica's case is more extreme, there is no decision by herself at all. In Gidden's terminology, is there an intention? It is possible that in strict forced migrations, when is either migration or almost certain death the decision to migrate is no longer a social action. With just one case, is only possible to speculate on this theme.

The next wave of migrations will not be compelled by political or security reasons, but the political processes that began in the 1980s will affect them directly. As Pinochet's own

constitution had mandated, he was the government's candidate for the 1988 plebiscite and he lost. The option no (against Pinochet) won with almost 56% of the votes. This meant that the government called for general elections—president and parliament—for December of the following year. With this election the dictatorship ends, but the political, cultural, social and above all economic effects will continue to influence Chilean society and emigration patterns to the US.

CHAPTER VII
THE MIGRATION OUTCOMES OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL:
MIGRATION IN A NEOLIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

I. Introduction

Chile, la alegría ya viene (Chile, happiness is coming) was the motto and central theme of the political campaign that defeated Pinochet in the 1998 plebiscite. This motto represented the dreams of two generations; that which was defeated in September 11 of 1973 and that which grew up in a dictatorship. Despite the massive offer of a new society Chile will spend the next twenty years administrating an inherited society. There were changes, no doubt, but the dictatorship had succeeded in changing Chilean society. The application of a neoliberal model of development achieved its goal of changing the relationship between citizens and the state, proposing a new social contract, this time between the consumer and the market.

The twenty years that follow the end of Pinochet's dictatorship are marked by a strong desire by the state to construct a new Chile. A Chile that while maintaining the so-called economic progress of the last third of the 1980s would at the same time move to the future without paying (much) attention to the past. At the same time politicians and diplomats were busy reinserting Chile in the international system as a prosperous, dynamic and democratic nation, in this process they also proposed the argument that Chile was more similar to Europe than to Latin America.¹

¹ In 1992 at the World Expo in Seville, Spain the Chilean Pavilion attempted to introduce this new Chile to Europe. Eugenio García, the general director of the project argued then at a Chilean

Only until recently Chile lived in a sort of denial, much as Spain did it in the 1970s and 1980s, where only glimpses of other social contracts were possible. The last twenty years of Chilean history, and part of this successful transition, were constructed around ideas of social peace, market capitalism somewhat regulated by the government, and a discourse that proposed a gradual forgetting in exchange for personal economic success. In sum, a state led proposal for a dismissal of most ideologies structured around a change from social and political citizenship to market citizenship, but unlike what happen during dictatorship, this was “freely” accepted by all individuals.

In this chapter I analyze the emigration from Chile to the US between 1990 and 2010. I argue here that the decisions to migrate are made in a context influenced by the democratic transition in Chile, the permanence of a neoliberal model of society, and the economic crisis of the late 1990s all within a post Cold War structure of international relations. The new type of society in Chile, constructed in adherence to a formal and practical rationality (Kalberg 2012)—or in *Habermasian* terms instrumental rationality (Habermas 1984a; 1984b)—, locates the market and the economy at the center of social relations. Hence any social action, the decision to migrate in this case, is pursued and interpreted by the actors in relation to that frame of reference.

My analysis is centered on two flows that I have called the “winners” and the “losers” of the economic model.² In the first case the migration to the US is made up individuals who

magazine that “we form part of an imprecise thing that is called Latin America, and there are negative judgments about that...we are trying to shed that image”. Cited in The Seattle Times’s article “Chile’s Iceberg Message: We’re both cool and efficient”, April 26, 1992, at <http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19920426&slug=1488603> accessed December 5, 2012.

² The analysis that I present here is based on the oral histories of eight Chilean emigrants in the US. These three women and five men left Chile between 1990 and 2010. For all but one of these

embody the “new Chilean”; highly educated comes to invest or work as executives for a transnational company. The “losers” are individuals who, regardless of their education, do not have a job in Chile and have been left out of the developments of the economic paradigm. These waves take place at the time that the country of origin is growingly interested in developing and maintaining connections with its nationals abroad and is, at the same time, receiving the largest influx of immigrants of its history.

This chapter is divided in three sections. In the first section I develop the changes in Chilean society in the last twenty years, focusing mostly on the economic changes. In the second section I present the analysis of the “winners” of the economic model, while in the third I present the “losers” of the economic model

II. Keeping the “model”: The end of the dictatorship and the transition to democracy

There is arguably nothing better than an iceberg to promote a country from the end of the world. It seems that this is what the group in charge of building the Chilean Pavilion at the 1992 World Exposition in Seville, Spain thought. Beside the Chilean food, music, crafts, the Chilean Pavilion included a twenty-eight-foot tall installation made of 60 tons of Antarctic ice (Korowin 2010; Gómez-Barris 2009; Richard 2004³). This image of the iceberg represented not only a country from the end of the world, but was used to create a particular image of Chile. The iceberg symbolized seriousness and coldness, both so opposed to the Latin American warmth

emigrants this is their first migration. One of the men lived in Spain for about six years as a child in the early 1970s.

³ Richard states that the iceberg weighted 100 tons. The difference might be an argumentative tool, or the difference between weights in the place of origin—as one piece of ice—or in Seville after was reassembled or both. Korowin states that originally was split in to seven twenty ton pieces.

and disorganization. It symbolized technical pride. If Chile could take an iceberg from Antarctica, keep it during the six summer months—obviously refrigerated—in Andalusia, then it could transport its primary goods anywhere in the world. According to Korowin, Ernesto Léniz, the president of the Chile-Seville Commission observed that the iceberg, and the pavilion in general, conveyed:

a country basically without conflict, honest, hard-working, efficient, with many natural resources, with a very special, remote geographical location. Léniz also wanted to the exhibits to send a message that the country was a democratic nation and a viable trading partner due to its stabilized economy (Korowin 2010: 51).

According to Moulian (2002), the iceberg was the societal debut of a new Chile. His analysis is very critical. In the iceberg there is no connection to Pinochet: no blood, no images of the disappeared, no past. It is only an image of the future, as Carlos Tironi in an interview for the *Guardian* stated: “We wanted something universal and spectacular, which would break the cliché of Chile as the country of Pinochet and earthquakes” (Korowin 2010: 55). Among other examples Moulian connects his thesis of what is contemporary Chile and its founding myth (2002), to this iceberg. It is a component of a Chile that began in 1980 with the institutionalization of the dictatorship. Garretón also uses the metaphor of the iceberg. In his book *La Faz Sumergida del Iceberg* (The Sunken Side of the Iceberg, 1993) he argues that in the visible side are the economic changes, while in the sunken side are the cultural, moral and social changes that the dictatorship produced.

Agreeing with Moulian, Garretón and Gómez-Barris, I argue that the iceberg was the best representation of Chile in Seville as it is the best metaphor of a country transitioning to democracy that wanted to leave behind its past fast and that had chosen neoliberalism as its

economic and social path. In this section I present the major political, social and economic characteristics of the 1990s and 2000s in Chile.

The 1990s are marked by two processes derived from the dictatorship: the transition to a democratic government and the acceptance of neoliberalism as a valid model of development for Chile. These two processes have occurred under four governments of the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (from now on the Concertación), the conglomerate of center-left parties formed in the mid 1990s to oppose Pinochet via the plebiscite. With some small changes the Concertación has been formed by the Christian Democracy, the Socialist Party, the *Partido por la Democracia* (Party for Democracy – PPD) and the Radical Social Democracy.

The plebiscite of 1988 marks, according to Garretón (2010) the end of the dictatorship. This election began the process of democratic transition that for him would end with the inauguration of Patricio Aylwin in March of 1990. After that, he observes, the country has followed a slow process of democratization. The acceptance of this plebiscite was, according to Peter Winn, a “devil’s bargain” (2004: 49). To return to democratic governments the Concertación had to accept a series of ‘authoritarian enclaves’ (Garretón 1995; Moulian 2002; Winn 2004). While this did not represent the extent of the protected democracy that Pinochet and the *Gremialistas* wanted, it did curtail the political power of the president vis-à-vis the military. Among other enclaves, the president had no legal right to dismiss the commander in chief of any of the armed forces. Between 1990 and 2006 there were nine senators in the Chilean senate that were selected by the president, the armed forces or the judiciary. These senators, equivalent to almost 20% of the entire senate—were not democratically elected. The four commanders in chief of the armed forces, for example, selected four senators, the same amount that were elected for the entire metropolitan area of Santiago where more than 5 million people live. The most relevant

authoritarian enclave is the electoral system itself. This system, called the binomial system, was developed by the dictatorship to stabilize the political system. According to this system the conglomerate that has majority will have a similar number of parliamentary representation than the second conglomerate and a third conglomerate will have no representation.

It took more than fifteen years to dismantle these authoritarian enclaves and some, such as the binomial system, still remain. The political problem of the last twenty years, therefore, has been how to strengthen democracy and increase democratic participation. Not an easy task considering that the focus of social participation has displaced to the market. In this sense and at least until 2011, Chilean democracy has been a democracy without citizens. As I present in the next section, this influenced migration decisions since migrants locate the reasons for migrating within an economic framework even if the reasons to migrate are related to other aspects of social life.

The decade of the 1990s was the most prosperous decade in Chilean history. This is not due to the democratic governments implementing their own development model, but because they assume as their own the economic model inherited from the dictatorship. In fact, Aylwin's government is the first in almost fifty years in keeping with the economic policies of his predecessor and not attempting to completely restructure the development model (Ffrench-Davis, 1999: 36). This model, with some cosmetic changes, has remained the same for the last twenty-two years even in presence of large international crisis.

The main arguments given by the Concertación to maintain the model was that it had worked macro-economically for the last five years. In fact with the exception of 1990 when the Chilean economic growth was 'only' 3% due to an international comic crisis the period between

1986 and 1997 show constantly growths in the economy higher than 6%. The second relevant reason was the concern not to alienate the economic elite by changing the rules, something that could have impacted the political stability of the democracy. The role of the economic elite in the fall of Allende was still too fresh in the memory of the Concertación politicians. In this setting the new government did not question or even investigate the shady privatizations of the mid 1980s, the open market policies, the structural deficit rules or any of the compromises that made Chile become the poster child of the Washington consensus (Muñoz, 2000).

During the 1990s the country achieved a large reduction in inflation, reaching single digits in 1993 and remaining in that range since. This is a major economic triumph considering that since 1950s economist from most tendencies had argued that the main problem of the Chilean and Latin American economies has been a chronic high inflation that influenced all the other areas of the economy (Bethell 1993). This pushed up real wages in the lower income groups, as well as producing a small but constant increase in public social expending. The most relevant result of this is the reduction in poverty levels from 38.6% in 1990, to 21.7% in 1998, to about 11.5% in 2009 (CEPAL 2011: 214).

This period of success of the Chilean economy ended abruptly in November of 1998 as the economic crisis in Asia, produced in part by the requirement of the IMF that the newly industrialized nations in Southeast Asia applied neoliberal adjustment policies (Stiglitz 2002), impacted Chile by reducing the demand of copper, the country's main export. During this year the GDP fell by 1.5% impacting as well the unemployment rate that increase to 10% the following year (Ffrench-Davis, 1999). Public expenditure fell as well as all most other areas of the economy with the exception of mining. The GDP's decreasing tendency lasted for about a year and a half; and while this crisis was not as deep as the 1982 crisis it did unmask the

vulnerabilities of the Chilean economy to external shocks. In this sense it was a learning experience that allowed the country to better face the world economic crisis of the late 2000s.

The intrinsic characteristics of the neoliberal development model have implied for the case of Chile a large concentration of wealth among a small sector of the society. In the late 1980s, for example, the highest 10% of the population received 47.4% of the income while the lowest 20% only received 3.2%. That situation has remained almost inalterable in the last 20 years. In 2006 the highest 10% received 44.7% and the lowest 20 quintile received 3.4% of the total income. Chile is the twelfth most unequal country in the world and fifth in Latin American with regards to income concentration (Solimano and Torche 2008).

Although the Concertación government have attempted to influence changes in income distribution through focalized fiscal spending—an anathema to neoliberalism—the approach have been milquetoast. In fact the social spending has remained low, close to 14% of the GDP even under socialist governments and in times of crisis such as that of the late 2000s (Solimano 2012). The massive income distribution inequality and the unequal distribution of opportunities have become a popular critique in the last two years since 2010, although the malaise can be traced to 1998 as I developed in the next chapter. This has produced a crisis in the way the political system responds to social to social pressures. The last two years have seen the largest protests and demonstrations against the development model since the 1982 protests against Pinochet.

The post-Cold War era presented Chile with the opportunity to rebrand itself. This was done through a mostly peaceful transition to democracy and the permanence of an accepted economic development model. This model, closely based on neoliberalism, change the focus of

the relationship between individual and society increasing the role of the market in the lives of Chileans. The neoliberal market permeated every aspect of individual life. In particular for my research here it even influences their decisions to migrate, even though the reasons for migrating are not directly related to economics; at least among those that I have termed the winners of the economic model.

III. *Íbamos a ser los líderes del mañana*: The winners of the economic model⁴

Chilean emigrants in the US who left Chile in the 1990s and 2000s remember the first part of this period much in the same lines that the democratic governments had presented it. It was a moment of optimism for the future. Daniela, who left Chile in 1990 remembers that “it was all the energy of the NO, all the energy blowing out of the oppression we had been living in”.⁵ Patricio, who arrived in early 2001, complements this opinion locating the origins of the Chilean miracle in Pinochet’s dictatorship. He does so by placing this history onto himself and equating his high school education during the 1980s to the progress of the country as he compares Chile to other Latin American nations. As I develop in more detail below, Patricio is the, almost stereotypically, the representative of successful Chileans of the 1990s. He told me:

If I had not had the military discipline on my back that would allow me to do what I wanted to do, and I recognized that [the governments] attempted three or four economic models before getting it right, but it worked and the discipline in Chile, force discipline let’s call it, due to fear and some can tell you that the model of the military regime worked in the sense that there was order, there was civic order. Then I would go to Peru, and it was still a mess, and I would go to

⁴ “We were going to be the leaders of tomorrow”.

⁵ With the NO she refers to the political campaign to revoke Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite. “Chile, yo veía cuando que cuando yo salí yo lo encontraba entretenido porque estaba toda la energía del NO, estaba toda la energía como saliendo de esta opresión en que se había vivido “

Argentina and you would not see the same social forms that exist now. Now, the Argentina that I knew in the 80s was kind of a European nation, they came down really fast. The Chile by 2001 it was positioning itself as a very competitive option.⁶

Patricio's opinion is not mediated by political position. In the last 10 or so years there has been a growing consensus, what Moulian calls the superior state of forgetting (Moulian 2000: 42), that current Chilean economic success is due to economic reforms of the dictatorship, inherited and administered by the Concertación. This consensus develops on a different argumentative level than the human rights concerns. Indeed, many see this as a nuisance that has to be dealt with but through the appropriate institutions not in public (Stern 2004). In the opposite area is the economy where the more an individual shows that s/he belongs, the most successful is in this context (Moulian 2003; FLACSO 1997). In fact this triumphalism is shared in general even by those that, as I present in the next section, had become the losers of the economic model.

Daniel, for example, remembers that in the close to ten years he lived in Santiago—from 1994 to 2005—he saw a very dynamic nation, with good opportunities, although he added that these opportunities were not for everyone. He goes on to present a view of the country by other nations. This is a continuous argument by many Chileans. The narrative of how Chile is seen from abroad is a statement of truth of how the country is. In a sense it is a fallacy of authority; if the rest of the world—or at least Western Europe and the US—state that the country is doing

⁶ “si no hubiera tenido la disciplina militar en mi espalda que me hubiese permitido hacer lo que yo quería y yo reconozco que hicieron tres o cuatro modelos económicos antes de darle con el palo al gato pero funcionó y la disciplina en Chile, la disciplina forzada digámoslo así, por el temor y algunos te pueden decir al modelo del gobierno militar funcionó en el sentido de que había orden, había orden cívico. Entonces yo iba a Perú y estaba todavía el desorden e iba Argentina y no se veía las mismas formas sociales que como está ahora. Ahora si bien Argentina yo lo conocí en los 80 y era un país como más europeo, se vinieron abajo súper rápido. Entonces Chile en el 2001 ya se posicionaba como agente de la competencia.”

well, then the country is doing well even if one feels that that success is not reaching you personally. Daniel states:

Outside there is a really good opinion of the country in relation to its society, in relation to the government, in relation to, mmm, to the industrial and business part of Chile, there is a really good opinion, of course I do not think that in these years the [economic] conditions have improved a lot for people in my area [industrial design], but in general from abroad I perceive that Chile is seen as a really good country.⁷

While the macro picture of the economy presents a successful nation, this has not been achieved without casualties. One of the hardest hits productive areas was the production of fabric and clothing, once an important component of Chilean economy. One of my interviewees lived as a child in a company town owned by a fabric company. She remembers that after the crisis of the late 1990s the company had to close and what used to be, in her words, a beautiful town “now the town is horrible...the town and its surroundings, you realized it has been decaying, how horrible...there are a lot of drug problems”.⁸

Migration decisions by this group of interviewees are made through the intermediation of the economic system, even though the rationality that defines it is not strictly related to an economic gain. The same interviewee that spoke about the decaying of her old home town mentions that her migration was because she decided to marry a US citizen. She decided to come to the US because that was the place he worked and he would have not moved to Chile permanently.

⁷ “afuera hay una muy buena opinión del país en relación a la sociedad, en relación al gobierno, en relación a mmm a a la parte industrial y de negocios de Chile, hay una muy buena opinión, por su puesto yo no creo que en estos años hayan mejora mucho las condiciones para gente en mi área, pero en general de afuera yo percibo que Chile se ve como un muy buen país.”

⁸ “Ahora el pueblo está pero horrible ¡Aj! El pueblo está y sus alrededores ...te das cuenta que ha ido decayendo, ¡que horror! Esta pero hay muchos problemas de drogadicción.”

Daniela had been very successful as a student in Chile, had married very young while she was still in college. She had her two daughters and eventually split with her husband before she was thirty. By the late 1980s she was in a romantic relationship with a US citizen who had been working in Chile for a few years. When this person decided to return to the US, she decided to migrate with him. She told me:

I came with one purpose. My purpose was, I was in this relationship and it was to this relationship that I wanted to give all the possibilities; I wanted to give everything that I could to see if the relationship worked.⁹

Indeed, Daniela left a good paying job at a fruit-export company to pursue a Master's program in the US as her way to enter the US and keep this relationship. She ended up staying in the US even after the relationship ended in the mid 1990s. When I asked her if her position in the labor market in Chile and the possibility of working in the US had any impact in her decision to migrate, she responded:

No, Chile was doing well. The truth is that I left, to begin with, without a concrete plan. I am going to go and in the worst case scenario I will finish raising [my daughters], the girls will be bilingual and we will return. We will go easy two or three years and I will return. I did not leave with a preconceived plan. It was a bit like that. And well, but Chile was doing well at that time, it was beginning to get out of an error [the dictatorship].¹⁰

Patricio's narrative is the one that closest connects the individual to the neoliberal concept of society installed during the 1980s. He is a successful engineer and businessman that

⁹ “yo me vine con una intención. Mi intención era, yo estaba en esta relación y esto era lo que yo quería darle a esta relación todas las posibilidades, yo quería entregar todo lo que sentía que le podía entregar para ver si funcionaba.

¹⁰ “No, Chile estaba bien, yo la verdad salí, de partida yo salí sin un plan concreto, voy a ir y en el peor de los casos voy a terminar de criar, los niñitas van a ser bilingües y vamos a volver. Vamos dos o tres años y tranquilos, voy a volver. No salí con un plan preconcebido. Fue un poco así. Y bueno, pero Chile estaba en ese momento bien, estaba empezando a salir de un error”.

studied at one of the top universities in the country. Patricio arrived in the US in 2001 a few months before the terrorist attacks of that year against the US. He describes his generation, in particular as engineers as leaders of the future Chile, people that had to look beyond the country to the world.¹¹ He continues his narrative restating the conditions of Chile in the late 1990s and his generation as the bright future of the nation:

Chile, as a country it was a very active economy, very interesting, I was doing very good business. I was looking in general at the future of my generation, which was the generation of the late 1960s, entering a very attractive stage of the development of the country..., I would say that when I left in 2001, it was a generation completely less defined by politics, more modern, that was more concerned about the future and not so much about the past.¹²

Patricio met a US engineer in the late 1990s that came to Chile to work in a project that he was developing for a technological company. They fell in love and decided to come to the US. He vehemently states that “I did not come for the concept of the American dream which is to search for opportunities here; I was doing well in Chile”.¹³ Despite all the mentions to the economic importance of this position as a leader in the country, he defines his migration decision from a different perspective. He told me:

I came practically for family reasons. If you ask me for the values that *drive* [sic] my life, well family has been number one...I took the decision to leave everything

¹¹ “Pero bueno, nos veían como ingenieros que íbamos a ser los líderes del mañana y todo ese tema...nos metió en la cabeza, que nosotros íbamos a ser los líderes y teníamos que mirar al mundo”.

¹² “Que Chile, como país estaba en una economía muy activa, muy interesante yo estaba haciendo muy buenos negocios. Yo veía el futuro en general de toda la generación mía, que era la generación de fines de los 60, entrando en una etapa del país de desarrollo muy atractiva..., yo diría que en 2001 cuando salí ya venía una generación completamente menos política, más modernizada, que estaba más preocupada del futuro ya no tanto del pasado.”

¹³ “yo no me vine por el concepto de sueño americano que es buscar más oportunidades acá y yo estaba bien en Chile”.

I had achieved because my family project I envisioned with who is currently my wife, and that is what I have.¹⁴

Despite his qualifications, Patricio had a hard time getting a job in the US. He arrived shortly before the US economy began a process of slowing down as a response to the terrorist attacks of 2001 and took him about five years to recuperate a solid economic position.

All my interviews for this section locate their migration decision within a favorable macroeconomic context. Regardless of this, their decision to migrate has more to do with an effectual or value-based action than with an economic mean-ends rationality. In the next section I present the decision to migrate of those that did not succeed during the booming 1990s and 2000s in Chile.

IV. *Yo estaba luchando por mantenerme con trabajo*: The losers of the economic model¹⁵

Unlike the previous group of emigrants, the losers of the economic model are more prone to migrate for economic reasons. As with the previous group, they contextualize the decision to migrate in a macro-economically successful Chile. This success, however, has not reached them. This group of emigrants explains their decision to migrate more from a means-end rational, although this is not the only consideration that they have when they decide to migrate.

Daniel studied industrial design at a top university in Santiago. He graduated as the country was recovering from the late 1990s crisis. He recalls that while the economy was improving he was not able to secure a job in his area or the salaries were too small for a

¹⁴ “Yo me vine prácticamente por el tema familiar. Si tú me preguntas los valores que “drive” mi vida, bueno ha sido número uno la familia...pero tomé la decisión de dejar todo lo que yo tenía porque el proyecto de familia lo vi con mi actual señora y es lo que tengo.”

¹⁵ “I was fighting to keep a job”.

university graduate. This problem is closely related to the changes in university policies in 1981 under the dictatorship. That year the government passed a law that transformed the university system, opening it up to private universities. The main argument was to transform a closed system in an open market where anyone could sell educational services and anyone, with enough money, could buy them. At the same time this policy reclassified fields of study stating that four year degrees, such as industrial design, could be given by technical school as well as for universities. Fields of study that required longer than four years, medicine, law, engineering, could only be pursued at a university. This process increased the number of people with degrees such as design and industrial design, pressing down wages in certain sectors. This context influenced Daniel's decision to migrate.

Between his graduation and his emigration to the US he held several different jobs, freelance designer, or mountain guide, which did not give him, in his own words, enough funds to survive. He remembers that about the time of his decision to migrate there was in Chile “a lot of happiness in some sectors because the economy was doing well, it was booming again and everything, but it wasn't for me, I was struggling to keep a job and to sustain myself making some money”.¹⁶ It is in this context that he is offered a job at a warehouse in New Orleans for a year that he immediately accepts. This was through a company that would recruit workers from different parts of the world to work in the reconstruction process and other areas of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. At the time of this offer, he told me, he was unemployed.

¹⁶ “había mucha ee mucha alegría en algunos sectores de la sociedad por que la economía estaba bastante bien, estaba resurgiendo y todo, pero no era así para mí, yo estaba luchando por mantenerme con trabajo y por mantenerme ganando algo de dinero”.

Although the economic condition plays a larger role in his migration decision is not the only part. He argues that if he could have complete decision to migrate he would have not chosen the US but instead have gone to Australia, France or Italy. Migration, however, for him has been an important component of how he sees his future life:

One of my life objective had always been to travel and learn new languages and as much as possible to study abroad, keep improving my skills in my area or in any new area that could arise...and in fact [this job] made me decide quickly that in that moment this was the best option that I had to leave and learn English, travel of course, know a little more and see the options to develop [myself], to keep developing myself abroad.¹⁷

Ernesto graduated from college in the mid 1990s and left for the US in 2000, in his analysis of his migration he also points to the difficulties of obtaining a job. Unlike Daniel, he consciously decides to try his luck in the US. He argues that it was not only the economic problem that influences his unemployment. Mostly this has to do with a culture of *pitutos*. This is the norm of favoring who you know, and where they are from over other people in a job search, to get out of a fine or any other social interaction that involves an exchange. In his case his networks were stronger. He had a sister already living in the US, his mother travelled constantly between the US and Chile, and his father had died recently. He, therefore had not much left that would tie him to Chile. His only attachment was his daughter but he did not have a relationship with the mother, regardless he needed money to support his daughter. He told me:

Above all [I came] for the possibilities that this country would give me compared to Chile...I had recently graduated from college, doing my internship, working in

¹⁷ “uno de mis objetivos de vida siempre había sido viajar y aprender otros idiomas y en lo posible estudiar afuera, seguir perfeccionándome en mi área o en algún nueva área que pudiera surgir...y de hecho me hizo decidirme muy rápidamente que era en ese momento era la mejor opción que yo tenía de salir aprender inglés, viajar por supuesto conocer un poco mas y ver las opciones para desarrollarme, para seguir desarrollándome afuera.”

my theses, but I had my five year old daughter and there were no jobs, I mean I could have stayed at the university, working as a teaching assistant and staff like that, but the situation didn't held anymore...everything in the [year] 2000 my dad died, en February and my mother travels constantly here and told me, well let's go then, to test our lucks here and in June we were already here, that was about one semester.¹⁸

For Fernanda this was also an opportunity to send money to support her children. Her husband is a US citizen who went to Chile in the early 1980s, they married there and remained living in Chile for the next twenty or so years. He decided to return to the US to take care of his mother and to work to send money to Chile where he had been a teacher and school principal. The main value for them is not the money on itself, but the education of their children. Fernanda feels that in a sense she is a forced migrant, she had very little volition in her decision to migrate. She argues that she decided to migrate pressured by her children and society that she shouldn't leave her husband alone. During the interview Fernanda constantly evaluated her migration not in terms of monetary gain but in terms of what she lost. In her closing of the interview she told me: [I am not sure] "if it is worth so much to come here to have a higher economic standard and go through so much pain. Because more than suffering is pain".¹⁹

Unlike the other migrants, Juan Pablo, my last interviewee, did not decided to migrate for economic reasons. He presents his migration as an escape. He lived as a Child with his family in Spain during Allende's government. His parents believe then that Allende was taking the country

¹⁸ "más que nada las posibilidades que me daba este país comparado con Chile... había salido, recién había salido de la U, estaba haciendo mi práctica profesional, estaba trabajando en mi tesis, pero tenía mi hija de 5 años y no no había trabajo, o sea podía quedarme dando vueltas en la U, trabajando haciendo ayudantías y cosas así, pero la situación ya como que no daba para más....todo en el 2000 murió mi papá, en febrero y mi mamá viaja constantemente para acá y me dijo bueno vámonos entonces, a probar suerte pa' acá y ya en junio estábamos aquí, eso fue como un un... menos de un semestre".

¹⁹ "Si vale la pena tanto venirse aquí para tener un cierto estándar económico y pasar tanto dolor. Porque más que sufrimiento es dolor."

to become a socialist republic and they decided to go into a self exile. They only returned to Chile in the late 1970s. Juan Pablo's dad died a couple of years after they returned and at that time, coming from a Catholic family, Juan Pablo decided to become a priest. During his time in the seminary, however, he was constantly and continuously molested by an older priest, Ernesto Karadima.²⁰ This led to his resignation from the church and the beginning of his emigration. He began working as a flight attendant for a major US airline and eventually was transferred to the US. He defined his migration in the following terms:

It was then that I decided to come to live here, and due to the situation that I was living, due to my fears to the molestations of father Karadima, eh because I did not want to deal with that in Chile, because he had threatened me that he was going to tell that I am gay and my family is super conservative and I was horrified, and I was young, then I saw coming to live here as an escape.²¹

Even if the migration is due to economic reasons, there migrants construct their decision migrate from several perspective in which multiple rationalities interact. At the same time, however, macro-objective influences do not influence every migration decision in the same way. In most of the cases, of the losers of the economic model show a connection to economic times. Juan Pablo, my serendipitous case, however, attests that power gained by other social organizations, the church, is as relevant to influence macro-subjective components of social action and influence migration decision processes.

²⁰ For information about this case in English see:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/19/world/americas/19chile.html> Accessed December 6 2012

²¹ “entonces entonces pa mi fue cuando vi como se vivía acá, y por la situación que estaba viviendo, por el miedo que tenia de los abusos del cura Karadima, eh porque no quería lidiar con eso en Chile, porque eh el me había hecho amenazas que iba a contar que yo era gay, y mi familia era súper conservadora y yo tenía horror y era chico, entonces vi como un escapar venirme a vivir acá”.

V. Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented the decision making process of those emigrants that left Chile after 1990. My main argument here has been that in a neoliberal democracy where all the areas of social life are co-opted by the economic subsystem the decision to migrate is contextualized, as well, within the economic subsystem. While in this present the migration with the objective of finding a job seems to be a central component in the decision to migrate, a more exhaustive analysis proposes that, as Weber has suggested, there are more rationalities at play than a simply instrumental rationality.

The cases analyzed here speak of family values, adventure, love and education as central reasons that help attach meaning to the rationalities of the social action. In this cases, therefore, the context is a country in a democratization process administrating a neoliberal model of development. The changes that this neoliberal model produced in the social and political relations also influences the context in which the decision to migrate takes place. As with other migration flows migration networks do play a role, but only in facilitating the emigration, not in the decision to migrate.

CHAPTER VIII
CUANDO ME ACUERDO DE MI PAÍS (AS I REMEMBER MY COUNTRY):
REMEMBRANCES OF CHILE BY CHILEAN MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES
1950-2010

I. Introduction

Minutes after returning from interviewing Aida I received an email from her in which she wanted to explain in more detail some of what, in her interview with me, she called ‘contradictions’ regarding her memory of Chile, her considering herself Chilean, and the rights of her children to be Chilean. In her email she argued:

I kept thinking about my contradictions. Because in spite that I declare that I do not want to go back to live in Chile, I have kept my nationality, I state that I feel Chilean, and I am doing everything I can for my children to obtain that nationality.

The answer is more profound than a simple “it is always good to have several passports because you never know what can happen, they are always useful” which is what I always say...

At the core there are two more elements. I believe that Chile “owes me”. Although Pinochet “took” the right to the Chilean nationality from my children, they have to be able to benefit from those rights and now that is possible, I take the time to do it [to get the nationality for her children] (even though the process is a drag).

From a more personal perspective, I feel that I and my family history which I carry must be part of what is Chile today. I do not want the “I don’t want to know anything about that country that hurt me so much” (which is my mom’s position). I want the Chile of today to assume my case, which is the case of many Chileans. If my country made me live a calvary, which killed my grandmother (an exemplar woman), destroyed my future in that land, etc.... well, it must make me a place today in its collective memory. I want to be part of the official story of the country. I want the country to acknowledge that when I was just a little girl I lived a terrible injustice because of the military coup. That is the reason why I visited,

and gave me so much pleasure to know, that the memorial Villa Grimaldi, the Salvador Allende Museum and Museo de la Memoria exist.¹

Aida's words exemplify the intersection between the migrant's biography and the history and future of Chile, present in all the life experiences of the Chilean migrants interviewed. This intersection, however, is based on the reasons for leaving the country, on the memories at the time of migration and also deeply influenced by the subsequent visits to the home country. In this chapter I compare the visions and memories of Chile held by Chilean emigrants in relation to the different migration periods. Using the concept of memory as a coalescing argument, I argue that emigrants' individual and collective memories of the home country influence their feelings of national belonging.

The reason for emigrating has an important influence on the memories that Chilean emigrants have of their country at the moment of leaving. These memories reflect the social and political participation of the emigrants, their family relations, the historical processes that the country were going through as well as the influence of the first recollections that these migrants have of their arrival to the United States. These memories also influence the memories that they have of visiting Chile years after their original migration, as well as also how that remembrance is projected into the future as a way of describing the personal projects and the utopias for the

¹ Aida Ramírez, email to the author, June 14, 2011. My translation, the original in Spanish is in the annex. The Memorial Villa Grimaldi or Parque de la Paz (Park of Peace) Villa Grimaldi is a site of memory constructed in the place where during Pinochet's dictatorship stood a center of detention, torture and murder in Santiago, Chile (<http://villagrimaldi.cl/> accessed October 10, 2012). The Salvador Allende Museum (Museo de la Solidaridad Salvador Allende) is a Contemporary Art museum located in Santiago, Chile. It belongs to the Fundación Salvador Allende (<http://www.mssa.cl/> accessed October 10, 2012). The Museo de la Memoria y de los Derechos Humanos (Museum of Memory and Human Rights) is a museum and research archive located in Santiago, Chile whose objective is to "provide visibility to the human rights violations by the Chilean state between 1973 and 1990" (<http://www.museodelamemoria.cl/> accessed October 10, 2012).

country of origin and destination. It also relates to the concept of *la chilenidad*, which refers to what it means to be Chilean. In this chapter I focus on the idea of memory and its connections with the conceptualization of the future of the nation. I center my analysis on the narratives of what is remembered of Chile after a recent visit.

This chapter is divided into five sections. First, I develop the connection between memory and the re-construction of the nation for the case of Chile. Then I connect the memories of the migrants along three main ideas; quotidian thoughts and memories, the paradox of modernization, and the everlasting memory of fear of the state. The memory of the quotidian, relates to memories of everyday life activities. It is nostalgia for what is known or a struggle with that nostalgia in the process of home-building. The memory of social disintegration as a result of modernization captures the idea that the country has become modern but, at the same time, it is “not what it used to be.” For example, while there are many new buildings and Chile is a paradigm of progress, there are at the same time concerns concerning delinquency, inequality, and cultural changes. Finally, the memory of fear and disarray is the memory of those who were exiled or left Chile under duress. They remember with fear the first return, but they are also not sure if this is their country or what to make of it. I develop the contrasting visions among emigrants of *la chilenidad*, that condition of being Chilean, and the personal utopias and their relation to the future of the nation. I conclude by stating the importance of analyzing the relationship between the reasons for leaving with the connections that migrants have with their home country and its possible effects.

II. Memory and the nation

The final years of the 1990s was a moment of growing interest for the recuperation of a historical memory related to the years of Pinochet's dictatorship (1973-1990). Almost an entire decade had passed since the return of democracy and the fear, or at least the uncertainties, that had marked Aylwin's government had dissipated. The two military 'exercises' through which the military attempted to incite fear in his government and protect Pinochet had little effect on the people—although they succeeded in 'protecting' the former dictator and his family from justice (Barahona 2001:135). In terms of human rights reparations, Aylwin's government (1990-1994) had brought, in his own words "justice within reasonable possibilities" (Aylwin 1990: 325). As Stern argues that first government of the *Concertación* had run its course through impasses and negotiations between reinstating rights, bringing some judicial light to human rights abuse, protecting the nation from a return to dictatorship and a commitment to truth (Stern 2006; see also Cavallo 1998).

The second government of the *Concertación* came in 1993 with the election of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle by 57.98%; with the highest percentage of votes in the history of Chile. Between Frei's inauguration (March 11, 1994) and 1998 Chile was a country with a dual personality. One of these personalities was that of a Latin American economic 'jaguar'; drawing a parallel to the South East Asian economic 'tigers'. There was an atmosphere that normality had settled and the country had become paradigm of economic development, with peace and security where political and public institutions worked. The economic elites of the country, benefiting from this normality, argued that any attempts to recuperate the memory of the human rights abuses meant to remain stuck in a painful past and that the memory box should be left closed; an argument that

was successfully installed in the nation. According to Stern (2008: 159), this “did not translate into practical reality”. The other personality was constantly struggling to construct a collective memory of the dictatorship and of human rights. Besides protests on certain emblematic dates, or memory knots as Stern calls them—for example September 11, the day of the coup or March 29, the day of the “Joven Combatiente”²—there were continuous and severe struggles for memory in Chile (Stern 2010). During this period we observe the first inaugurations of spaces of memory, new trials against military officers—active and retired—for cases of human rights abuses, the detention and incarceration of Miguel Contreras, the leader of the DINA, and finally the detention of Pinochet in London due to human rights abuses during his government (Stern 2010; Barahona de Brito 2001).

Memory erupts over in Chile on October 16, 1998 when Chileans wake up to the news of the detention of Pinochet in a hospital in London (Lechner and Güell 2006; Stern, 2010). Pinochet, still a senator for life and thus immune from arrest in Chile, had been detained for the death and disappearances of Spanish citizens during the dictatorship through a judicial request that came from the Spanish Judge Baltazar Garzón. This episode brought not only the topic of memory of human rights to the forefront of discussion in the everyday life of Chileans but also gave preeminence to a debate that up to then had had very little space within the democratic transition.

Until that moment the process of democratic transition had been more of a *Byzantine* discussion of when had the transition ended; in fact even in 2011 there were still some politicians

² The day of the *Joven combatiente* (Day of the young combatant or revolutionary) commemorates the assassination of two brothers—Rafael and Edgardo Vergara Toledo—by the Chilean Police in 1985 during Pinochet’s dictatorship (Chile. Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación 1993).

and scholars arguing about this. The answers were mainly based on constructions of political events that were supposedly representative of such changes. The transition therefore ended for some with the inauguration of Aylwin on March 11 of 1990; others located it with the presentation of the Rettig report in 1991, others with the end of Aylwin's period in 1994; Pinochet leaving the army in 1998 and becoming a senator is another date given. Even Lagos election, the first socialist president since Allende in 2000; the changes to Pinochet's constitution carried out during Lagos' presidency in 2005; and the election of Michelle Bachelet in 2006; are some of the other dates given (Dammert 2012). Most recently Piñera's election in January of 2010, the first democratically elected right wing president since 1958, is the last date given so far for the end of the democratic transition. All these cases ignore the impact that the so-called 'transition' has had on 'bottom up' perceptions or a view of the reconstruction of the nation from the perspective of everyday life.

The detention of Pinochet in London in 1998 opened up a Pandora's Box of memory (Stern 2010). The questions on the future of the nation, which until then had only been vaguely considered by the political system began to be addressed by civil society in general. Before 1998 there had been only a few attempts to address the reconstruction of the nation from a cultural perspective, one example is the staging in 1991 of Ariel Dorfman's play "Death and the Maiden" and the screening in 1995 of the film version of this play directed by Roman Polanski. Although the play had been extraordinarily well received abroad, in Chile it was not well received and the associated movie did not do much better (Roniger and Sznadjer 1999). Consequently it failed to lead to a discussion on the future of the nation. The opening of the memorial to the disappeared in Santiago in 1993 had a similar effect. It seemed that although a majority of the country, according to different polls, supported some sort of retributive justice on human rights cases, the

idea of physically representing memory and discussing about the future of the nation was considered divisive and was not to be discussed (Lechner and Güell 2006: 29).

After 1998 the idea, relevance and effects of memory become visible. In the last 14 years the country has seen the trials of Pinochet, his return to the country, resignation from the senate and death in 2006, the commemoration of the 30 years of the fall of Allende, the screening of “Machuca” (Sorensen 2009: 83), the publication of several books of memoirs and academic analysis on memory, the inauguration of the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos and the Parque de la Paz Villa Grimaldi, the screening of the sitcom “Los Ochenta” and most recently the television program “Los Archivos del Cardenal” which deals with the role of the Catholic Church during the dictatorship.³ The time is ripe, then to elaborate on the role of memory in the (re) construction of Chile after the dictatorship.

In the opening of *Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma*, Alexander writes:

Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group

³ *Machuca* is film by Andrés Wood screened in 2004 that presents the last months of Allende’s government from the perspective of two children, one from the high class and the other from a shanty town. It is a fictionalized account of an social integration educational project at an elite school through which poor children from the surrounding shanty towns were given full scholarships to this elite school. *Los Ochenta* (“The 80s”) is a sitcom already in its fifth season (2012) which follows the life of a middle/lower middle class family in Santiago during the 1980s decade. It intersects the daily life of this family with economic, social and political processes as well as with the rise and fall of cultural icons during this period. *Los Archivos del Cardenal* (The Cardinal’s files) is a semi fictionalized account of the activities of the Vicaria de la Solidaridad, an organization of the Catholic Church that was created to defend the human rights of Chileans during the dictatorship regardless of their religion. The release of this mini-series was accompanied by the creation of a website (<http://www.casosvicaria.udp.cl/>) with the real cases and with a book (Insunza and Ortega. 2011). Both television shows have been highly successful winning most of the highest awards for Chilean television since 2009 (online at <http://www.premioaltazor.cl/> accessed October 19, 2012).

consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways (Alexander 2004: 1).

There is no doubt that the military coup of September 11 1973 is a pivotal point in the history of Chile as a state, as a nation and as a society.⁴ This event created what Alexander defined as a cultural trauma. One of those moments that everyone who was alive remember where she or he were (Hahn 1997) and that created a “particular day” for the state, nation and society (Joignant 2007). While one could argue that this is true only for those that were living in Chile during the government of Allende and at least part of Pinochet’s dictatorship, this was a memorable day even for those emigrants who had left years before the coup (see Chapter IV). I argue, therefore, that the coup and ensuing dictatorship was a cultural trauma, in Alexander’s term, for most Chileans regardless where they were when it happened. It even affected those who came of age in the later years of the dictatorship. The cleavages created in the mid to late 1960s and that deepened during the dictatorship continued permeating the memories of Chilean emigrants to the US. The questions are, how the reasons for migrating have influenced the memories of visiting the home country? How do they affect the development of a Chilean identity abroad? How are these memories tied to the future of the nation?

The conceptualization of memory in the social sciences is of extraordinary relevance to understand the construction of the future of the nation. Nations, following Smith, are “historical

⁴ Could we say the same about another moment in Chilean history? The only remotely similar moment is that of the Civil War of 1891. In fact Allende himself created an narrative that related to the Civil War and the death of President Balmaceda. The context, a coup supported by an informal empire is also similar. There are also major differences. One is the elite context in which the 1891 Civil War takes place. Regardless the participation of thousands of soldiers, the political problem involved people from similar backgrounds and social positions. Political power was also quickly restored to elected officials after 1891, even if democracy was very incomplete. Also there was no political persecution as the one that occurred after the September 11 1973 coup.

phenomena [because]...they embody shared memories, traditions, and hope of the populations designated as parts of the nation” (1999: 10). They are also an “imagined political community” (Anderson 1991) in the sense that in each member of the nation there is the idea of living in a community of “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1991: 7). Nations are comprised of traditions and collective memories and identities (Guibernau 2007) that are shared by a majority of the members of the nation and its accompanying concepts of state and society. The nation reproduces itself by the continuous reproduction of the traditions and collective memories which have as an objective to reproduce social cohesion and the meaning of a shared identity (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992). Then, what happens when the invented traditions and collective memories are given different meanings or no longer reproduce social cohesion?

Memory here is not the chronology of things of the past, but the meaning that certain past occurrences have (or are given) in the present (Lechner and Güell 2006). In this sense, and following Augustine, memory is the dimension of time that deals with the present of things past (Ricouer 1984). To this dimension Augustine adds two more that are key to understand the role of memory in the (re) construction of the nation. Time also includes the present of things present and the present of this future. It is based on the intersection of these three dimensions that the members of the nation—regardless where they live—construct the notion of social order and, by forming collective memories, define the type of nation that will be constructed in the future. In the case of post-dictatorial Chile, the creation of this collective memory is still part of a struggle that will define the future of the nation, state and society. Following Lechner and Güell (2006: 34), memory is more than administering the past; is the way we relate to this past frames the possibilities of the future.

Hence, the collective memories of migrants have an important impact of the developing of the nation and the maintenance and reproduction of identity. In the following sections I describe the memories of recent visits to the home country and how they are tied to particular reasons for migrating. I will use this as a frame to understand the conceptualizations of a Chilean identity constructed by these emigrants.

III. Quotidian thoughts: Family, friends and food

Regardless of the time of arrival to the US and the reasons why they left Chile, one of the stronger memories that emigrants have from their visits to the home country are connected to regaining contact with those things that were part of their everyday life. What is important for the emigrants is to regain that which was lost or that they are missing by living abroad (Rosinska 2011). The visit home is, in the words of Baldassar, “a secular pilgrimage” (2001: 3) another stage in the migration process; one that is directly connected to the construction of a migrant identity. Here I analyze the memories that Chilean emigrants have of recent visits to Chile in particular with relation to everyday constructions of identities.

Current literature that deals with home country visits argue that these are an intrinsic component of transnationalism used to participate in political elections, to prepare returns or to carry remittances (Baldassar 2001; Basch et al 1994). When analyzed from a memory perspective, however, home visits that are not connected to participation in political acts, engaging in cultural exchanges, or in business and labor activities—classic components of transnationalism (Portes et al 1999)—are connected directly to the recuperation and maintenance of a national identity and/or to a “kind of spiritual renewal” (Baldassar 2001: 44). In the receiving country an emigrant engages in acts that are representative of attempting to maintain

that identity or feeling of belonging to the country of origin. While abroad, these feelings are reinforced by the participation in national groups and, above all, by cooking national foods (Herbert 2006; Hage 2010). When remembering the visits to Chile, Chilean emigrants construct the memories in relation to aspects of their everyday-life that are connected to how long they have been living abroad and to the reasons for leaving Chile.

The narratives of Chilean emigrants related with remembering visits to Chile connect three main themes: family; friends and familiar places; and food. One other narrative is tied to the recuperation of identity through history and place, while a final memory is that of refusal to visit the country of origin.

Fernanda and Pablo give preeminence to going to the cemetery among their memories of their first visit to Chile. Pablo was exiled from Chile in 1975 and was not allowed into the country until 1989, a few years after the death of his mother. About his first trip to Chile he remembers: “I went back after fifteen years...and the terrible thing is to arrive to Chile and go to a cemetery and see in a tombstone the name of your mother.”⁵ While this was not an uncommon experience for emigrants, exiles had the added component of not being legally allowed back in the country during Pinochet’s dictatorship. Both of Álvaro’s parents died during his exile as did Aida’s grandmother. Josefina’s recollection of her first visit, thirty-eight years after leaving Chile, is also tied to a visit to the tomb of her father who died when she was young. She remembers that “the first thing I did was to go to the cemetery...I went straight to the cemetery

⁵ “Yo fui después de quince años...Y lo tremendo es llegar a Chile e ir a un cementerio y ver en una lápida el nombre de tu mamá.”

to see my dad, his tomb. And I remember, after all those years, I remembered exactly where was the family's tomb.”⁶

Enrique stresses the idea that, for him, visiting Chile is the possibility of traveling to Concepcion—the city where he lived until college—and getting together with people he knew in the past. His intentions always are to visit his family, then his friends and later to visit familiar places. He told me:

my main objective is first to visit my family, second to see my friends, and third to do nostalgic things that I used to do when I lived in Chile. Go to restaurants that I liked, to a park that I liked, or to my university. To see what has happened in the last ten years in the places I remember...it has changed a lot. The places where I hanged out disappear and well, houses are torn down.⁷

For him, however, “it is becoming harder, at the beginning it was easy but each time my friends become more and more dispersed throughout the country”.⁸ For several of my interviewees the visit to familiar places and friends is hindered by changes in the country of origin and by new relationships with Chileans in the US. Guillermo married in the US a fellow graduate student from Chile. After that every time they returned they have had to split their time between Santiago where his family is and Talca—about 4 hours south of Santiago by car—where

⁶ “Lo primero que hice yo fue ir al cementerio...fue ir directo al cementerio a ver a mi padre, la tumba de él. Y me acordaba fíjate después de tantos años, me acordaba exactamente adonde estaba la tumba familiar.”

⁷ “[s]iempre el objetivo mío es ver a mi familia número uno, número dos ver a mis amigos y número tres hacer cosas nostálgicas que hacía cuando vivía en Chile, ir a los restaurantes que me gustaba ir o ir a ver un parque que me gustaba o la universidad. A ver qué ha pasado en los últimos diez años en los lugares que me acuerdo...Ha cambiado bastante. Desaparecen los locales adonde yo iba y bueno votan casas.”

⁸ “Es cada vez más difícil, al principio era muy fácil pero cada vez se empiezan a dispersar más por el país las amistades.”

his wife's family lives. This complicates the trip, not leaving enough time to spend with other friends.

Martín's story is probably the one that best interconnects the three themes. After arriving in 1984, he had not been able to return to Chile because he had overstayed his visa and had not been able to regularize his migratory status. He recalls that in 1989, the day he renewed his visa, he bought a ticket to Chile. His memories of that trip are full of nostalgia. In them he tells the need to recuperate time with his parents as well as the recent death of a friend and mentor from his time in Chilean theater; a death he learned as he was boarding the plane.⁹ He also remembers eating and going to traditional places in Santiago:

I was three days in Chile. I mean, I only wanted to hug my mother and I saw the sadness in my mother. But there was nothing else I was interested on. I did go out, I went on Sunday to eat a *completo*, to *El Rápido* to eat an empanada, I walked through the *Plaza de Armas* where we used to get together with Mino and with all the people, in the *Café Paula*, and also elsewhere where we use to meet with the people from the TV and theater and that was all.¹⁰

⁹ "I remember that I was bringing a present for Mino Valdés who was my mentor in theater and I was bringing something for him that and in the LAN Chile airplane I am offered a newspaper, *La Tercera*, I take it and on its headline I read 'Enormous funeral of Mino Valdés'. It was a huge blow, in the plane coming to Chile." ("me acuerdo que llevaba un regalo a Mino Valdés que era mi maestro del teatro y yo le llevaba algo y en el avión de LAN Chile me ofrecen un periódico, *La Tercera*, lo tomo y veo un titular de *La Tercera* que dice 'apoteótico funeral de Mino Valdés', fue un golpe tremendo, en el avión, viniendo a Chile.")

¹⁰ Because it is full of local references this quote requires contextualization. A *completo* is similar to a hot-dog but in its most common version, besides the bread and the hot-dog, includes tomato, mayonnaise, sauerkraut and/or a sauce with pickles. The *Rápido* is a traditional and well know place to eat empanadas and sandwiches in downtown Santiago. Its name, than can be translated as *The Fast*, comes from serving empanadas in the time that it takes from walking from the door to the bar (a six feet distance). The Plaza de Armas is the central square/park in Santiago where the city was founded. Following Spanish urbanism, Santiago was originally developed following a grid plan that had at the center a square that measures one block and constructing around it the Catholic cathedral and buildings of local government. The Café Paula was a traditional café in downtown Santiago; opened in 1946 and closed in 2003. ("Estuve tres

Family and friends, places and food—as the case of Martín attest—are central component of all these memories. For Guillermo it is something that he likes to do every time he visits; he told me: “I like above all Chilean food, I have always liked Chilean sandwiches, they are very good, every time I go [to a restaurant] and I eat”.¹¹ Pablo also mentions the memories of food, in particular fruit as something that reconnects him with Chile and with being Chilean. Having arrived recently, after 2001, for Ernesto food and family are an important component of his last memories of Chile before migrating to the US. He remembers “my daughter, my father [who died shortly before his migration] the food...shit men, a fried *reineta* (a white fish)! There is nothing like that here”.¹²

While family, friends and place are important components or remembering and reconnecting with and identity based on the everyday life of migrants, among some migrants visiting has more to do with connecting with personal histories in relation to the history of the country. This is the case of Aida who was only able to return to Chile more than fifteen years after leaving. She remembers that:

I went to my old house. I have the impression of looking around for my things. It was what I wanted, it was my project to go to my house, to try to find my friends. I went to the house and took pictures, for example. At that time the house of Lo Espejo was empty and I found the house all run down but still standing. And yes, is a return to retake...I found it smaller. Yes to do that a little, *to find yourself a*

días en Chile. O sea que lo único que quería era abrazar a mi mamá y me tocó ver esa tristeza de mi madre. Pero no hubo ninguna otra cosa que me interesara. Si salí, fui el domingo a comer completo, al Rápido a comerme una empanada, caminé por la Plaza de Armas donde nos juntábamos con Mino y con toda la gente, en el café Paula, y también en otro punto donde nos juntábamos ahí con toda la gente de la televisión y el teatro, y es todo.”)

¹¹ “me gusta, sobre todo la comida chilena, siempre me ha gustado los sandwich chilenos son muy buenos siempre voy y como”.

¹² “mmm mi hija, mi papá, la comida... puta hue’ón, una reineta frita! Eso, eso aquí no hay” A reineta is a type of fish endemic to Chile.

little. It was something very intimate, the first year, to try and meet that friend, for example with whom we had a date I never went to... people were struggling to move forward. It was not easy [for] the people that had just arrived. For my father it was not easy as well, and yes for me it was more an *encounter with my history*.¹³

That search for an individually shared identity, an identity that has similar components among several individuals, is not uncommon among those who left Chile young and as a result of exile. For some, as in the case of Christian, this in fact opens the possibility of feeling “at home” in Chile regardless of having lost their spaces due to their force migration. He recalls that every time he returned to Chile he felt like a foreigner; out of place. It was not until his visit in 1995—almost twenty years after his migration—that in his words “I found a very open group of people that lived aboard and returned, the well known *retornados*...I discovered that there was an entire social space that I could belong to if I lived in Chile and that space was something very knew to me which I liked...a space where I had a place.”¹⁴

¹³ My Emphasis. Lo Espejo is a municipality in the southwest of Santiago. With “people that had just arrived”, she is referring to the former exiles that had return in the late 1980s and early 1990s to Chile. “[f]ui a mi antigua casa. Tengo la impresión de haber buscado mis cosas. Era lo que yo quería, era mi proyecto ir a mi casa, ir a tratar de buscar a mis amigos. Yo fui a la casa y le hice fotos, por ejemplo. Estaba vacía en ese momento la casa de Lo Espejo y fue encontrar esa casa completamente venida abajo pero todavía en pie. Y si, es volver a retomar..., la encontré más pequeña. Sí a hacer eso un poco, encontrarte un poco con ti misma. Fue una cosa muy íntima, el primer año, tratar de encontrarme con esa amiga por ejemplo con la que teníamos la cita que yo nunca fui. ... La gente estaba luchando por salir adelante. No era fácil, [para] la gente que había recién llegado. Para mi papá tampoco era fácil y sí fue para mi más bien un encuentro con mi historia.”

¹⁴ Christian uses a particular term in his narrative; that of the *retornados*. This term that was applied to all of those that returned from exile and above all those that returned using the Law of Return of 1991 which validated studies done abroad and allowed for these people to enter certain types of durable goods without paying custom taxes. Sometimes used pejoratively, this term is now part of everyday lexicon in Chile. “[m]e encontré con un grupo muy amplio de personas que vivieron en el extranjero y volvieron, los, los famosos retornados...descubrí que había todo un ambiente social al cual yo podría pertenecer si viviera en Chile y ese nuevo ambiente me pareció algo muy novedoso que me gusto mucho... que yo tenía cierta cabida”.

Finally, the last memory of visiting is that of not having the possibility to stay, a sort of myth of return; a “key metaphor which orients the lives and desires of those who foster it” (Baldassar 2001: 4). Fernanda arrived in 2010 to the US and has never been back to Chile. Beyond the financial cost of traveling, something that prevents Ernesto, for example, from going more often, for Fernanda is the increased nostalgia that traveling to Chile would entail. In particular leaving her children again. Because she understands the need for her and her husband to stay in the US and support their children, she has consciously decided to stay and has avoided going back. She knows that a visit would imply an end to her marriage and the impossibility to help her family. She told me: “I have not returned because I have told everyone that if I go I would not want to return [to the US]. I do not want to go through again of having to say goodbye and to disconnect from them [her children] I do not want to, if I go I am definitely going to stay, whatever it costs, I stay”.¹⁵ Mónica has not returned since she arrived in the US in 1998. She told me that when she was young she could not go to Argentina on vacation without longing for the return to Chile. For her, having to live exiled in Sweden and then with her family in the US has made her decide that she will only go to Chile to stay; something that she cannot do yet.

The reason is very simple, I am very stubborn, *it is my way or no way* [sic]. I do not criticize, I do not have the...I could not criticize anyone who goes to Chile for vacation or as a tourist. I would love to be able to do that...I cannot live under those conditions because I find that it has been as one of destiny’s foul plays, do you understand. Then for many people, for example do not have any problems in being away from Chile for many years and returning as a tourist in summer. I

¹⁵ “Yo no he vuelto porque yo he dicho a todos que si yo voy yo no voy a regresar. No quiero pasar de nuevo por tener que despedirme y desconectarme de ellos no quiero, si yo voy de verdad me quedo, lo que me cueste, me quedo.”

cannot, I do not want to be a tourist. So then...but as Donoso said, everyone has his hour so I will have mine at some point.¹⁶

These memories of return, which respond to questions about recent visits to the home country while in the US, can be described within the dual concepts of nostalgia and identity. Hage (2010) argues that nostalgia is a settlement strategy, not a feeling that impairs adjustment to the receiving culture. As such this feeling is connected to the construction of the future; a future in the receiving country. The development of a “homely place” (Hage 2010: 420) helps migrants build a home in the new country. Their settlement, then, is influenced by the possibility of developing positive feelings of nostalgia, which in turn define the type of life that they want to maintain abroad. The return visits to the home country and engagement with the nation at a micro level help reinforce ethnic identity by renovating the feelings of a shared identity.

For these Chileans, encounters with family, friends, visiting known places, and eating the food—food that is also prepared in the country of reception—is a way of ‘recharging the batteries’ of *Chilenidad*, of becoming Chilean again, of “being completely there” as Amanda told me. While there is a constant feeling of maintenance and renewal of this identity, the country itself has not remained the same. There are changes, changes that are readily noticed by the emigrants and which clash with the ideas that emigrants have of the nation. In certain terms, it is when visiting that the memory of the place itself is renewed from that utopian land they

¹⁶ By Donoso she is referring to José Donoso, the Chilean writer who lived exiled in Spain and in the US. “La razón es bien sencilla, yo soy súper porfiada, “*is my way or no way*”. Yo no critico, no tengo la... no podría criticar a nadie que va a Chile de vacaciones o como turista. Me encantaría poder ... no puedo vivir con esas condiciones porque encuentro que ha sido como una de esas malas jugadas del destino, me entiendes. Entonces en muchas personas por ejemplo no tienen ningún problema por estar afuera de Chile por tanto tiempo, y volver como turista en el verano. Yo no puedo, no quiero ser turista. Así es que... pero como el Donoso dijo, a todos le llega la hora así que a mí me va a llegar en algún momento.”:

remember from before leaving to a more contemporary reconstruction of the nation and thus a new utopian land; a new possible future. I turn now to how emigrants interpret the changes that the country has gone through since they left, as remembered from visiting Chile.

IV. Paradoxes of modernization

In 1998, the United Nations Development Program office in Chile (UNDP-Chile) published its second report on Human Development. In this report they attempted to analyze as objectively as possible what Chileans felt, lived and thought in relation to the changes that the country had been going through since the return to democracy in 1990 (PNUD, 1998). This report, entitled “The Paradoxes of Modernization” argued that although there are relevant advances in Chilean development, there is within the society a growing discomfort because the “model of modernization” that has been applied is clearly insufficient or at least inefficient (PNUD, 1998). Above all, and beyond the good macroeconomic results that led Chile to define itself as the Latin American Tiger, the advances were not equally distributed among the entire population.¹⁷

¹⁷ It is very interesting to be writing about this more than 12 years after the publication of this report. Two years after its publication, the country suffered the effects of the ‘Asian economic crisis’ which resulted in the worst economic crisis in the country since 1982. Since then, the subjective effects of the crisis within Chilean society have only increased. There has been a continuous growth to the idea that the political system is not representative anymore, that within the economic system there are inequalities in the access to possibilities and that a culture of moneymaking has permeated every activity in particular access to health, education and environmental protection. This has produced the largest protests against the government since the dictatorship, has influenced policy development during the current government and will surely influence future governments. Thus, 1998 has become an *annus mirabilis* in terms of political and social change in Chile.

The report based its conclusion on the argument that, at the time, Chile was suffering from an unresolved tension between the process of modernization and the individual's subjectivity. This is a tension between the co-opting of spaces of social life by a means-end rationality, central to the modernization paradigm, against the everyday construction of social interactions. A second tension was between social differentiation and social integration. This is a component of the uncoupling of the life-world and the system; also known as the colonization of the life-world by the system (Habermas 1984; Habermas 1975; see also Chapter II). According to this, one component of the social system becomes more important and subdues the other subsystems. In the Chilean case the economic subsystem achieves preeminence over the other subsystems; these means an "unequal access to functional systems...people's possibilities of gaining access to basic living condition (education, health or social security) are strongly conditioned by their socioeconomic level" (Lechner 1998: 187). These two tensions led, according to the report's empirical results, to a threat to human security. This threat was constructed along three axes; a fear of others, a fear of social exclusion, and a 'senseless' fear.

The fear of others is defined by a subjective feeling of personal insecurity manifested in the possibility of being the subject of a crime. The report argues that this fear does not have a correlate in empirical data (crime rate), but more on a 'metaphorical and omnipresent criminal' and is more likely a proxy for an insecurity caused by the deterioration of social networks and of community life. The second fear is based on the notion that social relations in Chile seem to be disintegrating and that there is an increase in individuality. Finally, the 'senseless fear' argues the report, is constructed by an excess of new experiences; stress, pollution, drugs, anything that is seen as increasing chaos in everyday life. Chileans then would withdraw from society in order to

feel more secure; thus reducing solidarity and social integration. All these fears have constructed a distrust in the systems that should protect the individual; particularly the State (Lechner 1998).

Already in 1998, most Chileans did not trust that their basic needs were going to be met in the long run, particularly in regards to access to retirement funds, health and education. The report argues that the authorities of the time recognized the existence of this distrust, or ‘social malaise’ and that the discussion could be defined in terms of two approaches: a ‘technocratic’ answer and a ‘nostalgic’ answer. While the first suggests extending and expanding the process of modernization, and thus solving social integration; the second denounces the forgetting of history and traditions while renouncing the role of modernity in the Chilean development.

This paradox of modernization is also a strong memory among those who left the country before 1973, and through different analysis, those who left Chile during Pinochet’s dictatorship. Despite living abroad for many years and only visiting sporadically, Chilean emigrants used many of the same arguments as presented in the UNDP report to express the changes in Chile. When asked about what changes they have observed in Chile, Miguel told me:

It [change] was dramatic. I always say that if they would have taken me blindfolded to La Serena and they would have left me in the *Avenida del Mar* I would have recognized the lighthouse, no, I would have not known where I was...they built nice buildings, 10 stories, 12 stories...everything very pretty, nice restaurants, they modernized the Casino, it is unrecognizable...¹⁸

¹⁸ La Serena is a mid size city about 293 miles north of Santiago, the region where this city is located had the second largest intercensal growth between 2002 and 2012. Most of this growth was fueled by the growth in the La Serena-Coquimbo conurbation (INE 2012). “[f]ue dramático. Yo siempre digo si me hubieran llevado un día vendado a La Serena y me hubieran dejado en la Avenida del Mar, habría reconocido el faro, no, no sabría donde estaba... construyeron edificios lindos, de 10 pisos, 12 pisos, todo alrededor de eso, todo muy bonito, restaurantes bonitos, al casino lo modernizaron, es irreconocible”.

Several of the interviewees notice changes in infrastructure, Renato mentions the new highways in Santiago as well as Patricio and Juan Pablo. They also argue that Santiago seems cleaner and more organized. In general they argue that Chile seems much better than in the past. These laudatory comments are always accompanied, however, by criticisms of safety in terms of delinquency, in the disappearance of the middle class and in terms of happiness. Remembering her visit in 1994—the first in more than thirty years—Josefina told me that Chile “was an unknown country, a new country, very pretty, lots of [new] constructions but I did not like the ambience...so much evil, too many robbers, if you do not walk with your purse tight around your neck and squashed in front of you they will take it away”.¹⁹ For Luciana the impossibility of using jewelry due to the delinquency has negatively affected the status of Chilean women. She mentions that this is something hard to accept for her that Chilean women cannot display their elegance. Javiera has a similar opinion:

I think that Chile is a very insecure country...you cannot wear jewelry...Being Chile such an advanced country and with so much prestige around the world and one of the most advanced countries in South America, the truth is that I feel it very insecure, this thing of people robbing, that here, here [Chicago] we are not use to...to go to Chile is to be afraid.²⁰

According to the UNDP Report, however, this fear is mostly a perception of fear fueled by mass media in particular when “the image of the delinquent act is introduced, via television, inside the home” (1998: 132) and not an increase in actual delinquent acts. The survey data used

¹⁹ “para mí fue un país desconocido, un país nuevo, muy bonito, mucha construcción pero lo que no me gusto el ambiente...tanta maldad, tanto ladronazo que hay, si no andas con la cartera aferrada y colgada del cuello y apretada aquí adelante contigo te la sacan.”

²⁰ “yo creo que es un país muy inseguro...en Chile tú no puedes andar con joyas...Siendo Chile un país tan avanzado y tan bien prestigiado en el mundo como uno de los países más avanzados que de sur América, lo cierto es que lo siento inseguro, esto de la gente que roba, que que aquí no estamos acostumbrados...ir a Chile es tener miedo...”

by UNDP report mentions that in 1998, 78% of the people thought that was highly probable or very probable to be a victim of a robbery in the street and a 62% victims inside their homes. Despite these feelings, only 17% of those surveyed mention that they or a family member have been victims of a non-violent robbery in the streets; a percentage that decreases to 6% with regards to a violent robbery in the street or a non-violent robbery at home. Similar results are present in the *Latinobarómetro* survey. While an average of 86.7% of people surveyed between 1995 and 2005 argue that the delinquency has increased some or a lot, two thirds of those surveyed or their families have not been victims of crime.²¹

Luciana also criticized some of the changes, this time in terms of the middle class she told me that the changes “have not been for the best...Because I noticed that the middle class is over...I noticed that some of our family members went up, but most of them went down...there is a huge social difference”.²² Following a similar argument, Guillermo told me that for him in this process of modernization Chile has received the good and the bad things from other countries Among those things are growing inequality and a more aggressive city. José and Daniela echo his comments. While the former states that he does not know how poor Chilean people do it, but to him it is noticeable that people “do not have fun”²³; the latter argue that

²¹ Base on online analysis of survey data available at the *Latinobarómetro* website (<http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/latinobarometro.jsp> accessed October 23, 2012).

²² “Eh, no creo que para mejor, ah? No sé. Porque veo que la clase media se, se acabo...Note que, la fa, algunos familiares nuestros se fueron, arriba, pero la mayoría se fueron pa’ abajo, entiende? No... no los veo yo, en tan buena situación como, o antes no veía esas cosas? No sé, pero... hay una tremenda diferencia social”.

²³ “No gozan, no gozan se nota”.

“although one could see the changes in structures, the same poverty still existed, I mean the discordance could still be felt, such a large disparity [between advances and poverty]”.²⁴

For migrants who left before 1973 the reason for these changes is the loss of a provincial, or small town feeling in Chile (Lechner and Güell 2006: 38-39; See also Pinedo Castro 1999b: 346). Josefina remembers how people used to say ‘hi’ constantly as you were walking on the streets. For those who left as part of the exile process, the reason is the dictatorship and the social and economic changes that brought with it. When commenting on the changes that he had seen in Chile, in particular the poverty and delinquency in his home town Edgardo told me:

My opinion is that Chile was screwed with the military coup. The Chilean lost the solidarity, how things were in the old days, those seventeen years of dictatorship changed how we were. From then on we became other people. In the old days, before the coup you could walk on the streets, nobody would do anything to you.²⁵

Previously in the interview he had mentioned that:

What I have seen grow in Chile is the delinquency, while us the youth of the 70s were doing voluntary services, were doing positive things, now the youth, what do they do? They rob, steal, the younger ones...Chile has grown, but in a bad quality...The opportunities and the development arrived for only a few but not for the large majority of Chileans, even less to the youth...Chile went to hell with the military coup, it changed our lives radically...your way of life, everything you knew from before as you were growing up...the way we would engage with other

²⁴ “se notaba el cambio en la estructura, pero seguía habiendo la misma pobreza, o se seguía sintiendo esa discordancia, esa disparidad que es tan grande.”

²⁵ “Chile cagó con el golpe militar a mi entender. El chileno perdió la solidaridad como eran las cosas antiguamente, nos cambió esos 17 años de dictadura nos cambió nuestra forma de ser. De ahí para adelante empezamos a ser otra gente. Antiguamente, antes del golpe tú caminabas por las calles, nadie absolutamente nadie te hacía a nada”.

people because it created distrust from everyone...I mean, solidarity was lost completely.²⁶

Álvaro, also a former exile, also argues about the loss of solidarity as part of the implementation of neoliberal economic policies. For him another great loss is the lack of political discussion and the ‘old small country’ where everyone was like “little brothers” and where you could have a heated ideological argument and then play soccer together.²⁷ Finally, neoliberalism has impacted class consciousness. For him, everyone thinks of themselves as middle class due to the influence of credit cards who have “killed the soul of Chile”.²⁸

The impact of the credit cards and the consumerism of Chileans is one of the cultural changes mentioned most often by the older emigrants and former exiles. Amanda remembers that in a trip she was asked if she wanted to use a deferred credit card. Baffled by the negative answer of Amanda, the salesperson replied “here the plastic is king, everyone buys with deferred payment and they do not have any money”.²⁹ Pablo made a similar commentary; “the bad thing, I agree with the analysis done four years ago...Chileans are indebted three times [their worth]

²⁶ “Lo que yo he visto crecer en Chile es la delincuencia, mientras nosotros los jóvenes del 70 andábamos haciendo servicio voluntario, andábamos haciendo cosas positivas, ahora la juventud ¿que hace? Robar, asaltar, los más jóvenes...Entonces Chile ha crecido en una muy mala calidad...La oportunidad y el desarrollo llegó para unos pocos pero no para la gran mayoría del chileno, menos para la juventud...Chile pienso que cago con el golpe militar, nos cambió la vida radicalmente...Tu forma de vivir, tu forma de todo lo que tu conocías antiguamente cuando te desarrollabas...la forma de relacionarte con la gente cagó porque desconfiaban de todos...o sea la solidaridad se perdió totalmente”.

²⁷ This is obviously an ideal construction, while not being as violent as other Latin American countries in the same period, Chile did suffer of manifest and latent political violence. See for example Salazar 2006 or Loveman and Lira 2000.

²⁸ “la tarjeta maldita de crédito...eso mata el alma en Chile”.

²⁹ “Si aquí el plástico es rey, todo el mundo compra a cuota y no tienen plata”.

due to the plastic money. I think that is ridiculous”.³⁰ This cultural change also makes reference to an ideal past, before the implementation of neoliberal economic policies that changed Chile in the 1980s and 1990s and created a society where the construction of a social compromise of the 1960s was replaced by the individualism that defines neoliberalism (Tijoux 2008).

While this new idea of Chile and its transformations clearly bothers the memories of the migrants—who in most cases do not make comparisons to the US—they consciously decide to focus on the success of the Chilean economy and, as the Chilean society has done, throw a “thick veil over our stigmas, exclusions and mirages, but also to protect the achievements that we have conquered” (Garretón 1993: 135). As I discussed in chapter VII, the macroeconomic data for Chile in the 1990s and 2000s show a country with a bipolar image; a continuous economic growth with an increased inequality which characterize the paradoxes of modernization. José embodies this “thick veil” about Chile. When I asked whether he would return to live in Chile he answered the following:

One of the things that has impressed me when I have been back to Chile, especially as of lately, not in this government or in the previous, ehm, I do not make differences between governments, but, is how well Chile is...Chile is a country that is so advanced, economically is...They are at the same level than here, even a little bit better in things of social benefits, benefits for the people, eh health, for example, here are trying to get it pass in a completely developed country, in Chile they have all that...*one is happy that continuously, what do you call them, the friends from other Latin-American countries mention how well is Chile and one feels a bit proud.*³¹

³⁰ “Lo otro, lo malo, que yo estoy muy de acuerdo con el análisis que hicieron cuatro años atrás, que el chileno está endeudado tres veces por el billete plástico. Porque yo encuentro ridículo.”

³¹ My emphasis. “una de las cosas que me, que me ha impresionado cuando yo he ido a Chile, especialmente ahora ultimo, no en este gobierno ni el anterior, ehm, no hago diferencias de gobierno, pero, lo bien que esta Chile...De que Chile es un país que, que esta pero muy

The paradoxes of modernization reflect a growing sense of fear in a post-dictatorial nation. This fear is particular to this historical setting and is shared even by those who live abroad and only visit Chile for short periods of time. This fear is inherent to the construction of a nation that has become ‘modern’ through the application of neoliberal economic policies in a dictatorial setting. The fears of the 1990s and 2000s are not the same as the fears during Pinochet’s dictatorship. After all, the fears of the post-dictatorial period did not imply the possibility—directly at least—of torture, death or disappearance by the state. Those who stayed in the country overcame those fears through a process of social exorcism (Garretón 1992). The propaganda against the dictatorship during the month before plebiscite of 1988, and its central theme of “without hate, without violence, and without fear” was one of the ways to create this exorcism. Another was a ceremony at the National Stadium—used as a prisoner camp and torture center during the first months of the dictatorship—on March 12, 1990; the day after Pinochet left the presidency. Indeed, Heraldo Muñoz, who worked with Allende and after the dictatorship occupied high positions in every *Concertación* government, remembers in his memoirs that the act in the Stadium was “a kind of ‘exorcism’ of the evils perpetrated at that place” (Muñoz 2008: 218-219). Exiles who were not allowed to return to Chile did not go through this process with the rest of the nation and many times felt that they had been left aside by the nation, as Aida argues in the introduction to this chapter. Due to this and to their experiences before leaving, their first visits to Chile were surrounded by fear; a fear that in some cases still resides within them.

avanzando, está muy, económicamente... Pero están al mismo nivel que están—quizás un poquitito superior—de aquí en cosas de, de beneficios familiares, beneficios para la gente, eh, la salud por ejemplo, que aquí están tratando de sacarla, recién en un país totalmente desarrollado, allá en Chile tienen todo eso...*uno está contento de que continuamente, los, como se llama esto, eh los compañeros de otros países latinos nos dicen lo bien que esta Chile, y uno se siente un poco orgulloso.*”

V. The everlasting memory of fear

Almost at the end of my interview with Magdalena, as she was evaluating her exile and posterior migration to the US and telling me about her wonderful job as a union organizer, she began mentioning her fears. She told me:

I am very afraid. I am very afraid that things would change in a second and I will not go [again] through a situation like that [referring to the September 11 1973 coup in Chile]. I will be very..., I do not think that actually I have told this to anyone, as clear as I am telling you now, but I am afraid. And these are my fears. Not others. I am not afraid of earthquakes, I am not afraid of anything of the sort, these are my fears. I am afraid of the political earthquake. That suddenly all changes again and one would end up again on the, according to them, losing side, and that abuse, I do not think that I could handle it. Psychological and physical in a way, I could not handle it. I am terrified of that. To put my family through something like that, no. Here, however, I am very brave. Here I am not afraid. In Chile I panic and here I am not afraid.³²

Magdalena's fears are strongly connected with her forced migration in the context of the dictatorship. She, like my other participants who were exiles, did not leave immediately after the coup. They lived in Chile for about two years, the years with the highest violence and human rights abuse of the dictatorship. For Magdalena this violence is connected to a memory of sadness that has impacted her visits to Chile. She remembers her last days in Chile as "sad, they are sad and that is why it took me so long to go back to Chile. I mean I remember bleakness, to

³² "Tengo mucho miedo. Tengo miedo de que las cosas cambien de repente y yo no voy a volver a pasar una situación como esa. Te voy a ser bien ..., yo creo que nunca se lo he dicho a nadie en realidad, tan claro como te lo estoy diciendo a ti ahora, pero tengo miedo. Y esos son mis miedos. No son otros. No les tengo miedo a los terremotos, no le tengo miedo a nada de eso, esos son mis miedos. Al terremoto político, de que de repente cambie de nuevo y uno termine otra vez en el lado de los perdedores, según ellos y ese maltrato yo no creo que lo podría resistir. Psicológicamente y físico de alguna forma, yo no lo podría resistir. Tengo terror de eso. Poner a mi familia en una cosa como esa, no. Sin embargo aquí soy súper aventada. Aquí no tengo miedo. En Chile me da pánico y aquí no tengo miedo."

wait for so many that my father would come around the corner to visits us, the terror of not knowing what was going to happen to him, our terror...I lived in a state of terror and despair.”³³

Magdalena is not the only one with these feelings of fear. The last memory that Edgardo has of Chile before leaving for the United States is of fear. He tells of wanting to crawl under a car every time he saw the police or the military in his native Vallenar. He thought that they were going to detain him again. Pablo also shared a memory of fear and confronting it; this time at the airport minutes before leaving the country. Two members of the secret police came and asked him to go with them to be interrogated. He knew, from stories told by family members of people now disappeared, that this was another method used by the DINA to prevent former political prisoners from leaving the country.

These feelings of fear do not stop after they arrived in the US. Pablo remembers that “here, after we arrived into Chicago, it was very hard for me, because I had the ‘hard drive’—as I call it—I would wake up with nightmares at night, everything would repeat itself, that the following day I would be sent back to the concentration camps, the tortures...”³⁴ Finally, Álvaro’s remembrances of fear are located in the first nights in Chicago. He mentions the sirens of ambulances and police cars that awakened him at night and that he thought were coming for him. Although these four stories of fear can be tied to a possible post traumatic stress disorder due to being subject to illegal detentions, tortures, and *relegación* they also refer to a more

³³ “Tristes, es que son tristes por eso me costó tanto regresar a Chile. O sea, recuerdo desolación, recuerdo esperar tantas veces a que mi papá doblara la esquina para llegar a vernos, el terror de no saber que le iba a pasar, el terror nuestro...viví en un estado de terror y de rechazo.”

³⁴ “Acá cuando después llegamos a Chicago para mí fue bien duro, porque tenía “el disco duro” que le digo yo, despertaba con pesadillas a la noche, volvía otra vez a repetirse la misma cuestión, que mañana echan los campos de concentraciones, las torturas...”.

general policy imprinted by the military regimes of the Southern Cone; that of a “culture of fear”. This term, as defined by O’Donnell (1983), refers to a “wholesale, everyday experience of human rights abuse” (Lechner, 1992: 26).

The particular characteristics of military regimes as bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (see chapter V), their efforts to dismantle an existent political system, their interests of becoming the new “fathers” on the nation included the construction of “institutionalized systems that deliberately produced and spread fear” (Garretón 1992: 23). Since the first day of the Chilean dictatorship, its leaders developed the image of being the saviors of the nation from communist domination. According to the dictatorship the surgery to eliminate the ‘Marxist cancer’ would not, could not, be done overnight. The government had to eliminate the thousands of foreign extremists that were ready to take over the country and lead it to the communist dictatorship. According to the “Libro Blanco del Cambio de Gobierno en Chile” (Chile. Secretaría General de Gobierno 1974), a book prepared by the *Junta* that attempted to justify the need for a military coup in Chile, Allende was preparing a coup to perpetuate himself in power. This, known as the Plan Z, included the assassination of the highest commanders of the armed forces to be replaced by revolutionary officers. This Plan was a propaganda effort to justify the creation of a climate of terror and the maintenance of the country under a state of war for one year, a national state of siege for two years as well as curfews in several of the largest cities throughout the duration of the dictatorship (Silva 1999; Loveman 2001; Chile. Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura 2005).

According to Garretón (1992) the fears produced by the dictatorship can be explained by two metaphors. The first is the fear of “the dog that bites”. This is the fear of what is known marked by the tortures, disappearances and overall all physical repression by and omnipresent

state. The second fear is that of “the dark room”. This is connected to disinformation, omission and the “absence of spaces where people could meet and acknowledge the presence of one another” (Garretón 1992: 23). The relevance of the construction of these fears is that they mediate our relationship with the state. According to Lechner, “no real democratization can take place unless we take responsibility for fear” (1992: 33). Hence, one of the problems that exiles have in relation to recuperating their ties with the nation and the state is the need to overcome these fears.

The memories of the first visits to Chile by these exiles, however, remain filled with the fear of what could have happened. It is a mixture of the fear of the known, related to the memory of suffering tortures either directly or through a loved one, with the fear of the unknown, connected to the quotidian disinformation of the changes in the country (Garretón 1992: 23). This fear is felt from the moment that these exiles arrive at the airport in Chile. Regarding his first visit to Chile in 1989—in the last years of the dictatorship—Pablo remembers that when he arrived to the country and was waiting to pass immigration and customs, he heard over the airport speakers:

‘The citizen Pablo Gaete Aguirre is required in the office of International Police, pass immediately to the office of International Police’. Damn, this is where it ends Pablo [he told himself]. Luckily in Miami I met some guys who were coming from Europe...and we began exchanging addresses... [I told them] ‘Call this number after 4PM if I am not there or I do not answer is because I was sent back to the US or I am in a concentration camp’...Then, two *milicos* show up with their machine guns across their chests. And they say, who is Pablo Gaete? I am, I told then, what do you want? Then he told me, can you come with us? ‘Yes, but for what? I ask them, what’s going on? Nothing, it is only that your niece want to talk to you. And why doesn’t she come? I am not going anywhere with you *milicos*...No, I do not have the fear that I use to have. Now I am a *gringo* [US citizen]. Then [his niece shows up], why do you do this to me? Remember that I was in a concentration camp and I was tortured by these people, and is not the best way of welcoming me. ‘Sorry uncle [the niece says] it is just that I wanted to

inform you that my dad will be late to pick you up’...[I told her] ‘sorry *m’hijita* but I have not forgotten.”³⁵

Pablo’ story touches several important points. One of them has to do with the memory of repression. While for Chileans who did not suffer the tortures directly, as Pablo niece, the police and the army—although feared as a body—where still the representatives of order and therefore where not feared at the individual level by regular citizens (Lechner 1992). Contrary to this, those that had been tortured could not forget. The second interesting point is the expressed security of now belonging to a different polity. His argument of being a US citizen is presented as a way of protecting him against the possibility of being taken by the military, something that almost happened in 1975 as he was boarding the plane to the US. Although he mentions that he is not afraid anymore, the exchange of phone numbers with fellow travelers and the argument with his niece show that the fears are still there.

The impact of these fears begins at the arrival moment in Chile; at the airport. Visiting in the early 1980s while the dictatorship was still in power Edgardo remembers that as he would go down from the bus that took him from the plane to the terminal there were lines of people with dark sunglasses looking at everyone that was getting down. For him visiting Chile in those years

³⁵ “se necesita en la oficina de policía internacional al ciudadano Pablo Gaete Aguirre, que pase inmediatamente hacia la avenida de policía internacional”. Pucha madre, hasta aquí llegaste Pablo. Afortunadamente venían unos compadres de Europa que nos encontramos en Miami...y nos empezamos a dar direcciones...Después de las 4 de la tarde llama a este teléfono y si no llego o no contesto es porque me devolvieron a Estados Unidos o estoy en un campo de concentración compadre...Entonces llegan dos milicos con la metralleta cruzada. Y dice, ¿quien es Pablo Gaete? Yo, le digo ¿que quieres? Entonces me dice ¿Nos puede acompañar? Si, pero ¿pa’ que? Le digo ¿que pasa? No, es que su sobrina quiere hablar. ¿Y porque no viene ella? Yo con los milicos no voy...No, si ya no tengo el miedo que tenía antes. Ahora soy gringo. Entonces ahí, ya, (a mi sobrina) ¿pa’ que me hacen esto?, acuérdense que yo estuve en un campo de concentración y fui torturado por estos señores y no es la mejor manera de recibirme. Ah perdón tío es que le vengo a avisar que mi papá se va a demorar en llegar...Perdóname m’hijita pero a mí todavía no se me olvida”.

was “an enormous pleasure to return and [at the same time] extreme fear”.³⁶ Álvaro who also returned for the first time in 1987, has a similar memory about his arrival at the airport in Santiago, he remembers that as he was walking through international police he flinched and attempted not to enter the country, because of his fear that he would be detained again. He then traveled to Punta Arenas where he was received by his friends and family in the airport with “flags and banners, [I thought] oh here is where they get me, how can they [expose me]!”³⁷ He also recalls that on his trip to Puerto Natales, his home city, he was pull over by a police officer with a list in his hand who asked directly for him and for his identity documents.³⁸ For him this meant that “[they – the dictatorship] still had enormous control”.³⁹ He concluded telling me that he did not have a good time on his first visit, he was always “a little nervous, [every night I] slept a little worried”.⁴⁰ His evaluation of this trip coincides with the idea that Chileans who stayed in the country were going through an internal process of exorcism that allowed them to regain control of their lives and confront fear. He told me “it seems that all of them, many of those who

³⁶ “Entonces, todos esos años mientras estuvo la dictadura, para mí fue de mucho placer volver y de mucho temor”.

³⁷ “banderas, pancartas, uh hasta aquí llegue yo, cague, como pueden!”

³⁸ Álvaro is not the only exile among my interviewees that told me an anecdote of being followed. Pablo remembers seeing the same people repeatedly everywhere he went, he even remembers how they were dressed (“Is typical, the blue suit, the blue tie, the white shirt with black buttons”). Edgardo remembers being followed in the south of Chile where he was vacationing, so that he cut his vacations short. Vanessa remembers seeing the same car parked near her house and receiving threatening calls so that she also decided to return to Austria where she was leaving. These activities are other forms of reinforcing fear among those who were exiles or had to leave for political reasons.

³⁹ “tenían un control increíble”.

⁴⁰ “Así que llegue a Puerto Natales y fe otra fiesta, no lo pase bien hueón! Bien, bien, bien, un poquito nerviosito, dormía un poquito preocupado.”

had been in prison, had already, had normalized their lives, I don't know, [they were] speaking loudly, you know...they had overcome fear".⁴¹

While it could be argued that returning during the dictatorship would increase the memory of fear among those who suffered human rights abuses, the experience of these exiles attest that a continuous re-encounter with the nation is required to engage in the same process of exorcism. This process is two-fold. As the nation and society are recuperating from fear and the exiles return to engage with this society, then the fears on both sides subsume. The narratives of Aida and Magdalena are good examples of this. Aida returned for the first time in 1990 and for her, this was a time that the fear of the dictatorship was still apparent.⁴² She remembers that people on the streets would ask her where she was from and "I would say I am the daughter of exiles and [people] would be afraid...I mentioned the word exile and [people] would not want to talk to you again".⁴³ As she returned in the mid 1990s, she felt that things were loosening up, until finally the last time she went back in 2010—she had not traveled to Chile in fifteen years—Aida in her own words, "discovered a much nicer country, the people [are] more open...now you can talk about everything without sensing that fear".⁴⁴

Magdalena has a similar, albeit more personal, encounter with Chile. She returned the first time in 1995, five years after the end of the dictatorship. She remembers that she "almost

⁴¹ "parece ya todos, mucho de los que estaban presos, que ya habían, habían normalizado sus vidas, que se yo, hablando fuerte, tu sabes... ya se les había pasado el miedo".

⁴² "volví en una época en que todavía se sentía como el miedo de la dictadura".

⁴³ "y yo decía, ah, yo soy hija de exiliados, les daba miedo. Yo pronunciaba la palabra exiliado y no te querían hablar más"

⁴⁴ "descubrí un país mucho más agradable, la gente más abierta. Ahora se puede hablar de todo sin que haya ese miedo..."

died...it was very hard. I got off the plane and I saw the *pacos* and I almost died. I almost died, I had a panic attack, luckily I was with my mom, my dad and my brother, it was the four of us, they held me because I had a huge panic attack.”⁴⁵ She mentions that she had to go twice to Chile to “close chapters”. Her visit in 2005 was when she was able to reengage with Chile, a process that she ties to changes in the home country. That time, Magdalena told me, “the newspapers mentioned what happen in 1973 [the coup] under a different light...I mean in 1995 I saw a small, very small news piece about a grave in the countryside and it mentioned that it could be of the disappeared. In 2005 there is more debate on this topic, it is more on the newspapers, there was a sort of opening on this matter”.⁴⁶

For many reasons exile is a human rights abuse, one that has not been dealt with through the truth and reparation commissions set up by the Chilean Government in early 1990s and early 2000s. One of the reasons is that in the process of exile the dictatorship produced a physical separation between the exile and the nation-state; a separation that for many has become permanent. Due to this they have been left out of the social process of “catharsis and exorcism of the transition period” (Garretón 1992: 24); a key process to deal with the “legacy of fear” (Garretón 1992: 24; Lechner 1992) of the dictatorship. As such migrants have to create their own

⁴⁵ *Pacos* is a colloquial somewhat demeaning way of referring to the Chilean police, the *Carabineros*. “casi me morí. Pero lo que te decía cuando volví en el 95 para mí fue tan difícil. Me baje del avión y vi los “pacos” y casi me muero. Casi me muero, me dio un ataque de pánico, menos mal que iba con mi mamá y mi papá y con mi hermano, íbamos los cuatro pero me agarraron porque me dio un ataque de pánico tremendo”.

⁴⁶ “Los periódicos; se hablaba de lo que sucedió en el 73 pero con otra luz. O sea, vi un artículo en el 2005 [sic, se refiere a 1995] chiquitito, chiquitito de una tumba que habían encontrado en el campo y se pensaba que podía ser de detenidos desaparecidos. Todavía era una cosa pequeñita. Cuando voy en el 2005 no, ya hay debate sobre el asunto, está más en los periódicos, había como una apertura de eso.”

exorcisms. The ‘making peace’ process influences the forms they construct their identities and the connections they want to keep with the home country.

VI. Contrasting visions of *la chilenidad*

The concept of identity is critical in the social sciences. It distinguishes the individual from others at the same time that it assimilates the very same individual to a particular group (Lawler 2008). In its most basic sense, identity is a recursive definition of an individual in relation to social structures, institutions and historical processes. In the words of Castells, identity is “the process of construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or a related set of cultural attribute, that is given priority over other sources of meaning” (Castells 2004: 6). The construction of identities uses “building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations” (Castells 2004: 7). While identity is continuously constructed and reconstructed at the individual, collective and national level, here I focus on the process of national identity construction for Chilean individuals. Framing the analysis on the identity development of Chileans, as studied in Chile, I extrapolate this process of identity construction to Chilean emigrants. The reason is fairly simple. All the emigrants included in my research spent at least some of their formative years in Chile, thus they were socialized within Chilean institutions. They were socialized in the subjective reality of what it means to be Chilean in a particular social structure influenced by the different periods this socialization processes took place (Berger and Luckman 1966; Larraín 2000). I follow Larraín’s argument that the construction and reconstruction of identity has a dual condition. It modifies with changing historical contexts and situations and it never settles. At the same time identity is

more than a constitution of multiple public discourses; it also includes “the practices and meanings accumulated in the daily life of people” (Larraín 2000: 38).

The Chilean nation has been constructed and reconstructed several times. It has been invented and reinvented depending on the political projects of the elites and of national intellectuals (Larraín 2001; Pinedo Castro 1999a see also Radcliffe and Westwood 1996; Wodak et al 2009 for a more general analysis). The comparatively quick formation of the state in Chile has meant that for some historians, the Chilean identity derives directly from the state. As such, during the nineteenth century, Chile was the land of war and order (Krebs 2008). A nation that was meant to become similar to European nations in its democracy and economy. For some it even was meant to be the “Switzerland of America” (Krebs 2008: 21). The first half of the twentieth century was marked by the proliferation of pseudo-scientific studies which attempt to racially tie the *Raza Chilena*, as Palacios called it, is an attempt to create and identification of Chileans with a mixed between Gothic northern European and the Mapuche from the south of Chile making every Chilean white (Barr-Melej 2001). Other historians argued that the increased identification with foreign ideas brought from Europe was producing a ‘moral crisis’ which was affecting the Chilean identity (Larraín 2001).

The second half of the twentieth century gives way to a critical analysis of the “Chilean character”. Between the late 1940s until the early 1970s research and other writings on Chilean identity becomes strongly split by class. While the higher classes were ‘modern’, well dressed and cultured, the lower classes were dirty and lazy (Krebs 2008). At the same time Chile was a beautiful country with a stern character built from the lack of riches—as compared with Peru, for example—and from the survival of earthquakes and other natural disasters (Pinedo Castro 1999a). The 1970s and the Allende government influenced a new change in the definitions of

national identity, at least from above, giving preeminence to the popular world and the workers. Pinochet's dictatorship created in turn a new narrative of Chilean identity, one tied to the centrality military values in the construction of the nation. The construction of monuments to freedom in downtown Santiago and the creation of a day that commemorates the military sacrifice of the youth from the hundred-year anniversary in 1982 of the Battle of La Concepción during the Chilean-Peru war are examples of this identity creation (Cavallo et al 1997). Finally in the post dictatorship the Chilean identity has morphed into a modern (Pinedo Castro 1999b) or postmodern (Larraín 1991) identity concerned with business success and tied more with core economic countries, strongly nationalist which is economically developing against its neighbors. Examples of this are the Chilean iceberg presented in the World Fair of Sevilla in 1992, the political objective of reaching commercial agreements with Europe and the US and not with other Latin American nations and the recent participation in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Besides this chronological representation of a changing Chilean identity, Larraín (2001: 145-210) argues that there are four specific type of *chilenidad* and two traditional types that have been built and structured since the beginning of the Chilean republic. All of these, he argues, coexist in contemporary Chile and each gives preeminence to a particular characteristic of current Chilean identity. The first identity is the military-racial identity. This identity is tied to the notions of a superior military characteristic of Chile. According to this since the Chilean army has never been defeated, in reference to the wars against Peru and Bolivia in the eighteenth century, then Chileans are better than other Latin American countries. This argument also is tied to being racially superior, the only way of defeating the other nations is because Chileans are racially better, stronger, and more capable. The racial superiority comes as well from the idea of

Chile as an island, separated from the rest of the world the desert, mountains and oceans which makes Chileans less prone to negative influences from abroad.

The second type is based on psychosocial research began in the mid 1960. Although Larraín criticizes the methodological models applied in this research and the application of individual characteristics to the collective, he notes that the description correctly represents many individuals in Chile. According to this research the Chilean national identity can be described as based on “political order and the respect of law, political stability and historical continuity, a selfless sense of authority and governmental honesty, peaceful civic engagement and openness to dialogue” (Larraín 2001: 160). At the same time, among several others, this research concludes that the most important negative characteristics are those of jealousy, obsequiousness, “lack of imagination, and an overall down tone and grey personality” (Larraín 2001: 160).

The third type of personality is a result of the dictatorship and originates in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Its core ideas are represented by three concepts used in promoting Chile abroad. These are: Chile a different nation; Chile a winning nation; and Chile a modern nation. The first idea references a country that is more similar to Europe and the US—the developed world—than to Latin America, hence more trustworthy. The second showed a dynamic and triumph country that had achieved a high economic progress. The third idea represented an efficient and rapidly developing nation. This construction of a Chilean identity has been criticized because it represents a one dimensional Chile based on relative economic success and is sustained on consumption (Larraín 2001; Moulain 2002). It has also been criticized in several journalistic essays and commentaries, particularly from the elite, as a *nouveau-riche* country.

A fourth type is that constructed from the idea of role of the populace, the people, as the motor of history. This idea, according to Larraín (2001), has not achieved a strong following among Chileans. While is constructed in opposition to the successful entrepreneurial and military identities, it has not succeeded in achieving preeminence among the conceptualizations of Chilean identity. Two other traditional identities also coexists but with little current development, although they were more prominent in the 1800s and in the early twentieth century. The first recognizes and centers on the role of the Spanish culture in the development of Chilean and Latin American identity. This Hispanicist approach highlights the benefits of being conquered by Spain in the coalescing of an American culture. Similar to this approach, the second traditional identity centers on the role of Catholicism in the development of Chilean identity as religious and cultural fastening.

At least three of the identities defined here since the 1950s are represented in the Chilean emigrants interviewed for this research. While these definitions of identity can be observed throughout their narratives as presented in previous chapters and above, they become more evident when I asked the interviewees what does it mean for them to be Chilean.

First a Chilean identity attached to the physical beauty of the nation and the goodness of its people. This is the case of Luciana, for example. For her to be Chilean is “to look at the mountains [The Andes], feel the warmth of the people, know that you are loved by them, the quick joke, the humor”.⁴⁷ Similarly for Alejandra is the sense of an imagined community “when I am with other Chileans [in the US] is a little bit as if we had known each other our entire

⁴⁷ “Para mi ser chilena es... mirar la montaña, sentir el calor de la gente, saberse querida por ellos, la talla, el humor.”

lives”.⁴⁸ Alejandra’s story about identity goes further to narrate that the day she became a citizen she did it having a traditional Chilean pastry in her pocket, that she baked herself, so as to never stop being Chilean. For José it was his yearly participation in an international fair in Chicago showing national dances, and other Chilean artifacts as well as selling *empanadas*. Finally for Pablo is tied to his origins in a specific region of Chile. He told me that for him “to be Chilean is first my northern tradition...being from the region that gives the economy, the economic strength to Chile which is the cooper. After that comes the food, the Chilean tradition”.⁴⁹

The second is the identity attached to military success. This is best exemplified by Renato’s argument. He lived in Chile until the early 1980s and left to come to college in the US. He told me: “I am proud to be Chilean. I have always read books on the War of the Pacific and I always boast how our army was capable of defeating two nations with larger population than ours. I am always proud of that.”⁵⁰ He also connects that historical feeling of gloriousness to more recent events such as the rescue of miners in 2010, he continues:

When the miners were trapped there were people that called me...I am proud because we take care of our people, we have that proudness, that tenacity. Yes, I think of myself as Chilean in that sense, I am thankful that I was born there and I

⁴⁸ “cuando estoy con otros chilenos es como así todo un poco nos hubiéramos conocido toda la vida”

⁴⁹ “para mí ser chileno en primer lugar es mi tradición nortina...Ser de la parte de la que le da la economía, el esfuerzo económico a Chile que es el cobre. Después viene esto, la tradición del chileno, la comida.”

⁵⁰ With the ‘War of the Pacific’ he refers to the military confrontation between Chile, Peru and Bolivia that took place between 1879 and 1884. “tengo el orgullo de ser chileno. Siempre he leído tomos de la guerra del Pacífico y siempre me jacto de como nuestro ejército fue capaz de vencer a dos naciones con más gente que nosotros. Siempre me enorgullece eso.”

have that culture that I was taught. Of surviving for yourself, not because someone gave it to you.⁵¹

As in the case of Renato, the episode of the 33 miners trapped in a mine in northern Chile in 2010 deeply influenced the answers that these interviewees gave regarding their identity. Miguel mentions that he is “Chilean for everything that it means, I was very proud with everything we did with the miners...”⁵² Another influence in the recent construction of a “superior” identity is the earthquake in Chile of February of 2010. Miguel, who was visiting Chile during the earthquake, continues his narrative stating that:

I felt very proud of being Chilean, of walking out of the building the day after the earthquake and to see that the entire country was intact, not all the country, but to see how where I was it was intact. Unfortunately there were damages in many areas because there are cheap constructions and that people died that is regrettable, but with the magnitude of the catastrophe that there were less than 500 dead, half of them in the Tsunami and that really there was [only] one building that collapsed, really it was only one, a dozen more had to be demolished, but people could escape, then those are the things that make me feel proud of being Chilean even if I do not have major connections there anymore.⁵³

The use of the rescue of the miners and the earthquake as examples of superiority are also constructed from the perspective of successful nation; the third type of identity present among

⁵¹ “Cuando los mineros estaban enterrados había la gente me llamaba, como esta, que te parece. Estoy orgulloso porque nosotros nos preocupamos de nuestra gente, nosotros tenemos ese orgullo, esa garra. Yo me considero chileno en ese sentido sí, porque doy gracias que nací allá y tengo esa cultura como me enseñaron. De sobrevivir por ti solo no porque alguien te lo regale.”

⁵² “Chileno de corazón, chileno por todo lo que significa, me sentí muy orgulloso por todo lo que hicimos en el caso de los mineros...”

⁵³ “me sentí muy orgulloso de ser chileno, de salir de ese edificio el día después del terremoto y ver como todo el país estaba intacto, no todo el país, pero ver cómo donde yo estaba intacto, donde hubo daños lamentables en muchas partes porque hay construcciones baratas y que hubo muertos y eso es lamentable pero con la magnitud de la catástrofe que haya menos de 500 muertos, la mitad de ellos en el maremoto y que realmente hubo un edificio que se vino abajo, realmente fue uno solo, una docena tuvieron que echar abajo después, pero la gente pudo salir, entonces esas son cosas que me hacen sentir muy orgulloso de ser chileno aunque no tenga grandes relaciones ya allá.”

Chilean emigrants. Using these two events, Mario compares Chile with the rest of the world specially Latin America and states that being Chilean is a privilege. For Javiera, Chile is country “well placed in the world...a very advanced country, a country with and extraordinary culture, that is open to the world...I think that for everyone in the world Chile is a great country”,⁵⁴. Finally for Mónica, Chile is a country that has an “enormous capacity to do so many good things. We are good in literature, we are good in technology, we are an ambitious nation that has very few resources...”⁵⁵

There is an important counter argument based on the critics to the dictatorship’s creation of an individualist economically based identity and the human rights abuses in this period. Mónica continues her narrative stating that “at the same time I am very afraid of this space that opened in our history, that we are capable of...there is a very dark side in our culture...”⁵⁶ For Edgardo, for example, his detention and exile mark his Chilean identity. He argues that the third of his life that he lived in Chile ended badly, for this he states that:

To be sincere, I am not very fond of Chile. If you read my narratives you will find that my reasons are strong and if I invoke memories of Chile; what did I get from Chile? Kicking, jail, persecution...I do not have beautiful memories. Then it is not easy for me to identify with Chile...despite the fact that yes, I do love it [Chile], it moves me but I also have, not anger but contradiction and I am not moved by many Chilean things ...I am Chilean, I was born in Chile...To me, the worst quality of life and the biggest humiliations were done by Chileans, you understand. The humiliations, my [human rights] violations, and everything were

⁵⁴ “muy ahm un país muy bien puesto en el mundo...un país muy adelantado, un país muy extraordinariamente cultural, se ha abierto mucho más al mundo, eh bueno yo considero de que Chile para todo el mundo en este momento es un gran país”.

⁵⁵ “tenemos una capacidad enorme de hacer tantas cosas buenas. Somos buenos en la literatura somos buenos en la tecnología, somos un país ambicioso que tiene pocos recursos...”

⁵⁶ “pero al mismo tiempo me da mucho miedo este espacio que se abrió en nuestra historia de que somos capaces de... hay un lado muy oscuro también en nuestra cultura...”

done by Chilean. Then is very difficult to me to interpret or of being able to feel 'hey how beautiful are the mountains [The Andes] and *Si vas para Chile*, I do not feel them with the same proudness because I can't.⁵⁷

This anger with the nation and criticism to what the country has become is also shared by other exiles. Aida, while considering herself Chilean and having her early years in Chile, she criticizes the racism and classism of the middle class connected to the focus on economic growth of Chile. As Edgardo, she also connects her general disengagement and critique to Chile to her sufferings during the dictatorship. Magdalena while feeling, in her words, "deeply Chilean" she has some mixed feelings about the symbols of her identity. The national hymn, the flag, have for her a double meaning that is hard to reconcile. They are at the same time the symbols of her identity and her nation, but also the symbols of the dictatorship historically she still feels "a lot of resentment for what happened and I am angry that many things are not recognized",⁵⁸ in particular the tortures, exile and fears.

Beyond the distance, the definitions of identity of Chilean emigrants to the US remain very similar to the identities developed in Chile. These identities originate from the time of migration and are connected by the reasons of migrating. Changes and particularities of the

⁵⁷ With *Si vas para Chile* (If you go to Chile) Edgardo is referring to a traditional song that speaks of how well Chile receives and treats foreigners. It is a staple in the construction of Chilean identity as a welcoming country. "Yo no tengo mucho cariño por Chile te voy a ser muy sincero. Si vas a los relatos míos te vas a dar cuenta que tengo una razón muy fuerte y si yo invoco recuerdos de Chile ¿a mí que me dio Chile? Patadas, cárcel, tortura, persecución vieja. Yo no tengo lindos recuerdos. Entonces, me cuesta identificarme muchas veces..., a pesar de que sí, lo quiero, me remece, pero también tengo mucha, no rabia, tengo muchas contradicciones de que muchas veces no me emocionan cosas... Soy chileno, nací en Chile... Entonces a mí la peor calidad de vida y las humillaciones más grandes me las dieron los chilenos, entiendes. Las humillaciones, mis violaciones y todo me las dieron los chilenos. Entonces es muy difícil para mí viejo poderme interpretar o poderme yo sentirme "oye que lindo, la cordillera y si vas para Chile", no la siento con el mismo orgullo que las puedas sentiré tú porque no me llegan"

⁵⁸ "tengo mucho resentimiento todavía por lo que pasó, y tengo enojo de que muchas cosas no se reconozcan..."

constructions of identities are influenced by the visits to the home country. Therefore it is not inaccurate to conclude that the constant construction of identities will continue during the lifetime of the emigrant and will influence the prospective analysis of the future of the nation and their participation on it.

VII. Conclusion

According to Lechner and Güell collective memory does not only makes reference to the past but to a possible future. This “memory of the future” is the memory of that that could have happen (Lechner and Güell 2006: 36). This memory of the future is influenced by the memory of the present, or how the future would be if we constructed with the influence of our memories and our expectations. These last two are the present of things future and the present of things present as I mentioned above with reference to Augustine. The memories of the future, the construction of return plans, visits, and utopias for the nation are directly influenced by the memories that emigrants have of the country of origin after visiting.

These memories influence the participation of emigrants in helping the nation. For Julián this means his interest in going to Chile—or back home as he calls it even after not returning for twenty years—to teach Children how to build and repair violins; for Martín to give back some things that he has learned in the US. Pablo told me a lengthy experience trying to donate an ambulance to the volunteer fire company of Chañaral. It took him more than a year including an overnight road trip from Chicago to New York to embark the ambulance in a cargo ship bound for Chile. His reward: seeing that ‘his’ ambulance was the first to arrive to the site where the 33 miners were trapped and later rescued alive in 2010.

Beyond travels and remittances, all these emigrants remain attached to their country of origin in love, hate, fear or a mixed set of emotions. They define themselves as Chilean regardless of their time abroad and even in spite of being tortured and expelled in the worst case. Their identities, fluid as most social identities are, remain attached to their country of origin regardless of their active integration to the US culture. As Daniela, a successful executive of a US company, told me: “I mean I am Chilean and I will always will be Chilean, that is my identity, That is... is who I am. Everyone knows, obviously; I speak English very well, but I have an accent so when they ask me where I am from, I say from Chile, I speak about Chile”.⁵⁹ Regardless as well of the social position, education, reasons and period of migration, these emigrants continuously identify with Chile.

Their memories and definitions of Chile, however, vary and they are critical about the present and the future of the country. The arguments behind the criticism are influenced by the reasons behind the migrations, as the narratives presented in this chapter attest. Should the home country disregard them simply because they are made from abroad? The experience of other nations (Fitzgerald 2009) shows that the emigrants and their communities have an extraordinary importance in promoting ideas and ‘development’ in the home country. I would argue that in the case of Chile where each wave of migration to the US has its own social, political and economic characteristics, the type of participation is influenced by the reasons for migrating. If the nation wants to incorporate its emigrants—as the Chilean political interest attests—it requires to understand this connection; between the reason to migrate, the evolution of identity and the type

⁵⁹ “O sea yo soy chilena y siempre voy a ser chilena, esa es mi identidad. Esa es mi... es quién soy. Todo el mundo sabe, obviamente yo hablo inglés bastante bien pero tengo acento así que cuando me preguntas de dónde eres yo digo de Chile, cuento de Chile.”

of participation. Otherwise the reincorporation of emigrants will not be inclusive and many Chilean identities will remain without a connection and participation with the nation.

CHAPTER IX CONCLUSION

I. Concluding thoughts

In this dissertation I address the effects of historical conditions and processes in the decision to migrate from Chile to the US. My overall premise is that there are continuous interactions between the life course of an individual who decides to migrate and the historical conditions that influence those biographical aspects and vice versa. Historical processes and events not only define the biographical aspects of individuals but also the economic, political and social conditions within which people interact. Theoretically understanding these interactions facilitates the creation of a model to explain migration decision making.

Within this model, I describe interactions along a continuum from the micro, meso, and macro levels. I ask how the individual, as a social actor, acts within constraining and facilitating structures. I argue that a key component of this action is the notion of rational action, adopting the four types that Weber identifies: instrumental, value oriented, affectual and traditional. Two important caveats: first, Weber argues that only the first two are strictly rational and the latter two other are borderline with non-rational actions; second, these are ideal types that coexist in the everyday world as one action, although one might prevail over the others.

I also discuss migration scholars' conceptualization of migration decision making. I argue that migration systems theory is an appropriate analytical tool within which to consider migrations as components of multiple flows within an international system that changes over time. I criticize approaches that attempt to explain migration from a solely rational choice

approach, arguing instead that in the decision to migrate there are multiple rationalities at play, such as the more emotive rationales Weber makes allowances for.

I propose an integrative model within which to analyze migration decisions that connects migration systems, a multiple level analysis of migration, with migration as a social action. My model does not discount the roles of networks; they are important components located at the meso level that connect macro and micro levels and facilitate decisions to migrate. This meso level also reduces the costs associated with migration. In my model the decision to migrate is an outcome of a host of influences and precipitating events. Of foremost concern is how relations between nations at the international level influence the decision to migrate. In the migration relationship between the United States and Chile, I have explored an imperial relationship, in which the policies and actions of the US government, in addition to a host of socioeconomic and cultural interactions have had a strong influence within Chile. Individuals, in turn, react to the constructions of the nation and the state derived from the relations between the US and Chile. I center my analysis on those that respond to the changes in the relations between these two nations, and the effects that these relations produce, by leaving Chile.

I apply my integrative model of decision-making to Chilean emigration since 1950. My argument throughout this dissertation is that migration occurs in the shadows of the relations between empire and nation and within the realm of interactions connecting the state and potential migrants. Relations between the United State and Chile since the 1950s have been dominated by flows of hegemonic influence and counter-hegemonic contestation that have influenced social, economic and political development mainly in Chile but also in the US. I use oral histories and focus on the migrant's memories of Chile at the time of emigration. My use of the concept of memory to explain the decision to migrate and its interconnection with historical changes in the

Chile and the US is also a critical component of this dissertation. By remembering the moments surrounding their migration, Chileans currently living in the US explain, in their own words, the processes of political, social and economic change that influence their migration and in turn they present a personal evaluation of the conditions at that time. This, the migrants' *historical consciousness*—a notion not considered by theories of migration decision making—explains the processes through which the decision to migrate was made. Memory, therefore, is not only a methodological tool but also a central component that connects the individual's perspective, the nation-state in the international system, and the processes of social change through time.

My model of migration decision-making leads to new findings and explanations of the migration flows from Chile to the US since the 1950s. Migration from Chile, while being an individual—or family—decision, occurs within the realm of the international relations between Chile and the United States. These relations are constantly changing, which in turn produces changes in Chile. Emigration in the period between 1950 and 1973 occurs within the context of Cold War and Modernization ideologies. Working in subtle ways, ideological constructions create mental images of progress and modernity to which potential migrants respond by attempting to migrate. I interview those who succeeded in migrating. Some conceptualized their emigration mainly as an adventure of a particular class; the middle class.

Emigration during 1973 to 1982, the 'classical' exile from Chile, occurred as the US responded to Chile having elected a socialist president by influencing political change in Chile. Pinochet's right wing dictatorship produced a mass movement of people unlike any other in the history of the nation. While exile is a type of forced migration, and Chile's military regime expelled citizens from their country, most emigrants—even those that were not allowed to return to the country—had some decision making power over where they wanted to go and some

limited volition about whether they wanted to leave or not. The consequences of staying, however, might have implied employment restrictions, limited access to the political sphere, or imprisonment. While this was the most common type of migration, it coexists with migrations for other reasons similar to those of the period before the military coup of 1973.

The 1980s and particularly the economic crisis of 1982 provided the setting for a new emigration wave from Chile. The context under which this migration occurred were the legal-bureaucratic institutionalization of the Chilean dictatorship, neoliberal economics as the model of development, and changes in the international relations between Chile and the US. This context frames two types of emigration. One is a consequence of the largest economic crisis since 1930 in Chile. The memory of migration connects the reason to migrate to an environment not conducive for achieving personal human development. The second is a response to an increase in dictatorship-led political repression as a result of social unrest caused by the economic crisis.

The last migration wave occurs within a very different political setting. Pinochet's dictatorship ended in 1990 and the new decade was one of general economic growth in Chile. The political coalition in government—to govern for twenty years—proposed and exposed its goal of achieving a socially conscious market economy where economic development would reach a large majority of citizens. In this context the state delegated the construction of a memory of the dictatorship and of human rights abuses to the judicial apparatus. At the same time the country was reinserting itself into the world as the 'good student' of the region; a nation respectful of treaties, with open borders and the poster child for acceptance of the so-called Washington consensus. At least from an economic perspective Chile was doing everything the US, the IMF and World Bank proposed and expected. Emigration during this period was a response to this neoliberal economic paradigm. With the triumph of neoliberalism the market had

become the loci of social action. This context generated multiple social situations that triggered migration offers. These migration offers are taken up by potential migrants within a set of preexisting life objectives, values, traditions and feelings that construct the decision to migrate. This context influences two types of migration, regardless of the reasons for the final decision to migrate. One is the migration of those who have benefited from the neoliberal model and who see their migration as an extension of the rights given by economic neoliberalism. The other, the opposite, is the migration of those left behind by the model, potential migrants that have no access to labor or a future in Chile. The conditions of each of these migrations are defined by the inequalities attached to the implementation of neoliberal economic policies in Chile.

The decision to migrate is only one component of the migration process. A second component key to this dissertation is the return visits to the home country by emigrants. Home country visits serve to renovate emotional ties with the nation. These visits allow emigrants to renew their knowledge of the home society and culture. This process is complicated. Emigrants assume that Chile has remained fairly similar to what it was like when they left, while it has indeed changed. Emigrants must adapt to the new Chile even if it is only for a short time. In this adaptation process there is a constant negotiation and renegotiation between the ‘ideal’ nation of when they left or when they last visited, and the ‘real’ nation they are currently visiting.

This process produces an ‘alter-transnationalism’; that is different from traditional concepts of transnationalism where the transmigrants belong to several social spaces continuously. In this alter-transnationalism the emigrant feels that s/he does not really belong to either the home country or the destination country situation, and has to invent their own space and place. Three epigraphs at the beginning of this dissertation attest to this. Isabel Parra, well known exiled Chilean folk singer, sings that wherever she may be she will always be transient.

Leon Gieco, an Argentinean singer, in arguably his most famous composition, proposes that despondency awaits s/he who needs to travel to live in a different culture. Finally, Jaime Ross—somewhat more optimistically—proposes that to return is worthless but living abroad is equally so. He sings that it is neither astute for the one who leaves nor is the one who stays a fool; he suggests that those who leave should not to forget their home country and to endeavor to be happy.

My interviewees share these positions. Álvaro states, “it is a thing that I have to return, I have to return, my life is divided as such”.¹ Aida concludes by saying “I believe we are condemned, sadly, to never remain in a place...I see our future as retirees living between two worlds, the world of Latin America, of Uruguay and Chile, and Europe...I see myself between two worlds”.² Guillermo states that at the end, one is left without a country, which for him is not necessarily a bad thing.³ For Magdalena it is a bad thing; for her is hard to return to Chile and feel like a foreigner. Magdalena expresses that this is to be stripped of your identity.⁴ For

¹ “Pero es una cosa que tengo que volver, tengo que volver y tengo que volver, mi vida está dividida así.”

² “yo creo que estamos condenados, lamentablemente, a no instalarnos nunca en un lugar así...Yo veo nuestro futuro de pensionado viviendo entre dos mundos, el mundo de América Latina, de Uruguay y Chile y Europa...y me veo entre dos mundos.”

³ “entonces uno que se va quedando como sin país, en el fondo...claro se se se va quedando uno sin país...se te va medio evaporando la la cosa rígida que que uno tenía antes, de pertenecer a un país no más”

⁴ “Es difícil cuando tu vuelves y te sientes extranjero en tu propia tierra, es muy difícil. Es un golpe psicológico porque es lo que te queda, es tu raíz. Volver aquí y sentirme extranjera, pues es que ya no me siento, me da lo mismo... Pero ir a tu país y sentirte extranjero en tu país es como una cuestión que te quitan tu identidad, tu raíz...”

Vanessa this has led her to form her own sense of belonging, to invent family, communities for her children, to give them a home and a place of origin.⁵

Any policy that attempts to connect emigrants with the home country for whatever reasons—nationalism, economic development, human rights, cultural beliefs—must consider this duality of feelings about the home country and the nation. I argue that this is a consequence of the events that created the conditions for a migratory offer, a migration decision, and the actual emigration. This is something not considered or included in current approaches to the relationship between the state and its citizens abroad.

The permanent interest of national governments in connecting with its emigrants is an important response to transnationalism, in particular in relation to arguments related to the decrease in relevance of the state in the connections that transmigrants produce between two places of residence. The classical definition of transnationalism as the “process by which immigrants forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Schiller et al 1995:48) focus on the connections at the individual level mostly forgetting or disregarding the role of the state in these interactions (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). I argue that influences of an imperial or hegemonic state on states within its orbit of influence sets conditions that increase the propensity to migrate among members of the sending nation. While not everyone migrates, these influences create social, political and economic conditions that affect the life course, which may trigger a certain group of

⁵ “he formado mis comunidades propias, he inventado mi vida, he inventado familia, o sea mis amigas, mis amigos son mi familia digamos. He inventado...la he inventado yo...les he tenido que inventar a mis hijos, ¿verdad? Comunidades que son...que no son familia para hacerlos sentir en familia y eso ha sido un trabajo muy fuerte, muy muy fuerte, para darles calor de hogar, para darles raíces, ¿verdad?”

people to migrate. These conditions come attached with a migration offer that incites the individual or family to make a decision about migration. This decision is comprised of a set of interacting rationalities that define the social act of migration. Once the decision is made, the individual attempts a migration.

My final critique of current approaches to the study of migration decision making and to migration studies in general rests on the fact that we as scholars assume that—except for refugee flows—migrants mostly migrate in pursuit of a job that would improve social and economic conditions of the migrant and his or her families at destination and origin. This is, however, largely a post hoc fallacy. Migrants do not necessarily migrate to get a job; they get a job to survive in the country of destination because that is how the current relation between labor and capitalism works. They migrate for many reasons; these reasons influence the conditions through which migrants participate in the country of immigration. Incorporation into the host society, therefore, does not revolve only around the context of reception but is also about the context of leaving. My model allows me to propose answers to the conditions that produce migration in the sending areas and that can be incorporated into analysis of incorporation. We need, however, to develop further research and models that allows to understand the meaning that emigrants attach to their emigration and to the condition under which these emigrations take place, conditions that are influenced deeply by the relations between states in the international system.

II. Future Research

Following Nancy Green (2005) I will develop a research program centered on reversing what she calls “the immigration paradigm” and focus on the emigrant. My research program is composed of four main components: the application of my migration decision-making model to

other migrant groups and the exploration of *historical consciousness* among migrants; the question on the development of an emigrant citizenship and other connections between the emigrant and its state of origin, the study of migration propensity, and the constructions of minority migrant identities within majority-minority migrant groups.

The application of my model to migration decision-making in the case of Chilean migration is facilitated by the clear historical demarcations between different periods, as well as for an historiography that support these clear cut moments in Chilean history. Two sets of questions arise from this proposition. The first set is connected to Chile. Do emigrants conform to the continuities within Chilean history, or their emigration is a sign of contestation to this continuities? The issue here is whether through the analysis of the memories of Chilean emigrants I can observe the development of a *historical consciousness*. This informs the perceptions, contestations and attachment of meanings to changes and continuities in historical processes in Chile by the emigrants.

A second set of question is connected to the generalization of my migration model. This model works for Chile because of the clear-cut temporalities in Chile that influence particular migration waves. Would this model work similarly to other migrant groups or to other receiving nations? Argentina and Uruguay while being culturally similar to Chile have very different historical temporalities. The objective is to apply this model within a comparative analysis between the emigrants of the three Southern Cone nations and thus evaluate whether the new results influence changes in the model. A similar analysis is possible by analyzing Chile emigrants to other important receiving areas, such as Argentina, Australia or Spain where the histories of migration are not equal to the migration to the United States.

Another component of my future research program is to advance our understanding of the connections between the state and its emigrants. Following the work of Fitzgerald (2009) and his concept of *citizenship à la carte* concerning the ‘desire’ the emigrants have to maintain connections with the state of origin, I will seek to explain the reasons why emigrants maintain these connections and the ways in which the state can develop an *emigrant citizenship*. The focus of this research is on the relations between emigrants and their state of origin. This is a key component of development programs and the impacts of emigration in the country of origin. Not only remittances, but emigrants also can participate through brain exchange programs and other programs that focus on technology exchange using highly educated expatriates.

Yet another component is centered on the idea of migration propensity. The main idea here is to study the conditions at the national and international level that might influence social actors to attempt a migration. With data comprised of perceptions of democracy and economics it is possible to measure the conditions that might lead potential migrants to seriously consider emigration as a response to particular social conditions.

Last, but not least is the analysis of the construction of identities by minority-minority migrant groups within minority-majority groups. Specifically I refer to the construction of being Chilean (or Argentinean, or Uruguayan) in the context of *latinidad*. Migrants from the Americas—with the exception of Canadians—have consistently being defined by the receiving state as *Latinos* or *Hispanic*. These imposed identifications do not necessarily represent migrants from less numerically relevant countries from the American. The main idea here is that these migrants constantly contest and redefine these imposed definitions by assuming an identification with the mainstream identity of the receiving nation, by reinforcing their own identity of origin or by doing both.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
Oral Histories

Table 1

List of Oral Histories participants with pseudonyms and basic information.

Period of emigration	Males	Year of arrival US	City of origin	Main reason leaving Chile	Previous migration	Main reason migration US
1950 to 1973	Javier Mario	1969 1971	Viña del Mar Santiago	Marriage Economic / Political	Lived in the US for one year in 1964	
1973 to 1982	Julián José Miguel Edgardo Álvaro Pablo Miguel Christian	1972 1973 1977 1976 1976 1978 1984	Valparaíso Santiago Vallenar Punta Arenas El Salado Ovalle, La Serena	Adventure Family / political Exile Exile Exile Family / political Family / political	Lived in the US for one year in 1971 Yes (Mexico, Mozambique)	Studies
1982 to 1990	Martín Renato	1983 1983	Santiago Santiago	Political Studies / Opportunities	Lived in the US for one year in 1982	
1990 to date	Guillermo Juan Pablo Ernesto Patricio Enrique Daniel	1984 1995 2000 2001 2001 2006	Santiago Santiago La Serena Santiago / Rancagua Concepción Santiago	Studies / Political Work / Escape Work / Family Marriage Marriage Work / Adventure	Yes (Spain as a child); Lived in the US for one year in 1993	

Table 1(cont'd)

Period of emigration	Females	Year of arrival US	City of origin	Main reason leaving Chile	Previous migration	Main reason migrating US
1950 to 1973	Luciana	1957	Santiago	Work / Adventure	Yes (Argentina)	
	Josefina	1961	Santiago	Lost love		
	Alejandra	1966	Temuco	Marriage		
	Amanda	1967	Valparaíso	Studies		
1973 to 1982	Javiera	1976	Santiago	Work / Family	No	Marriage Spouse's work
	Magdalena	1983	Puente Alto,	Exile	Yes (Panama)	
	Aida	2010	Lo Espejo, Santiago	Exile	Yes (Belgium, Swizerland, France)	
1982 to 1990	Pamela	1985	Santiago	Marriage	Lived in the US for two	Spouse's work Marriage
	Mónica	1998	Santiago	Political	Yes (Brazil 1 year, Sweden)	
	Vanessa	2000	Temuco / Santiago	Political	Yes (Austria, Netherlands)	
1990 to date	Daniela	1990	Santiago	Studies / Sentimental		
	Francisca	1996	Concepción	Marriage		
	Fernanda	2009	Concepción	Family /		

Oral History Guide

The topics that will guide the oral history are as follows:

- Social and demographic characteristics of the respondents: age, level of education current and before migration, place of origin in Chile, area of first migration in the U.S., time living in current place of residence, marital status, gender, year of arrival to the U.S. Participation in social organizations in Chile and the U.S.
- Year they decided to migrate; length of time between decision and migration; the discussion around the decision to migrate (how was it made); reasons for migrating, memories of Chile at the time of migration; impact of current events in Chile and the U.S. in the migration decision.
- The moment they migrated and the last weeks in Chile; current events in Chile at the time of migration; thought at the time of migration regarding Chile and the U.S.
- Arrival to the U.S.; first thoughts. Description of first few months; incorporation to the new place; contact with Chile; memories of Chile at this time; current events in both countries.
- Current and past connections with Chile. Since when, how often; travel; media; others. Plans for the future (return or not, burial). Evaluation of migration process.
- Temporary returns (vacations, visits, etc.). Recognizing changes in the cities. Also social and cultural changes in the country of origin.
- Identity questions. Being Chilean, *American*, Latino. Relation to other groups (Latino, immigrant, U.S.).

Table 2
Oral History Codes

Macro codes	Codes	
Demographic information and related topics	▪ Current work of interviewee	▪ Place of birth
	▪ Date of interview	▪ SES Parents
	▪ Education of Interviewee	▪ Work and education of father
	▪ Knowledge of English	▪ Work before migration
	▪ Origin of family (migration)	▪ Year or date of Birth
Family themes	▪ Brings siblings or parents to the US	▪ Family in Chile
	▪ Death and Burial	▪ Nationality of Spouse
	▪ Family	▪ Spouse's job or activities
Historical consciousness	▪ Community vs. refugees	▪ Political position interviewee
	▪ Connection to Chilean history	▪ Political position relatives
	▪ Connection to recent events in Chile	▪ September 11, 1973
	▪ Insite	▪ Feelings about the US
	▪ Exile	▪ Refugee groups
Migration decision and memory	▪ Decision to migrate	▪ Memories of arrival
	▪ Evaluation of migration	▪ Migrations - Not US
	▪ Experiences in the US - related to migration decision	▪ Visas
	▪ INACH - Peace corps and similar	▪ Decision to stay
	▪ Memories of Chile before migrating	▪ Time of migration
Remembering and relating to Chile	▪ Communication with Chile	▪ Return to Chile
	▪ Feelings about Chile	▪ Visits to Chile
	▪ Memories of Chile - Return trips	▪ Voting in Chile
	▪ Participation in Chilean communities	▪ Helping Chile
	▪ Remittances	
Identity	▪ Being Chilean	▪ Being Latino
	▪ Being Gringo	▪ Questioning latinidad

APPENDIX B
Census Data and Statistical Tables

Table 3

United States (1850-ACS2010): Total foreign born population by place of origin and proportion of Chilean-born population over total population. Selected regions.

Census Year	Chile	Southern Cone		South America		Latin America		Foreign Born		United States	
		% Chileans	Total	% Chileans	Total	% Chileans	Total	Proportion over 10,000	Total	Proportion over 10,000	Total
1850	601	59.0	1,018	34.1	1,760	30.8	19,512	2.7	2,253,380	0.3	17,731,808
1860	1,153	93.8	1,229	59.5	1,939	34.8	33,133	2.8	4,166,198	0.5	23,176,996
1870	1,085	74.1	1,465	39.0	2,783	22.5	48,138	2.0	5,554,330	0.3	32,853,797
1880	1,541	61.8	2,494	35.1	4,394	19.4	79,522	2.3	6,696,987	0.4	43,488,310
1900	1,150	44.9	2,561	20.8	5,541	9.4	121,869	1.1	10,534,193	0.2	65,786,760
1910	612	26.4	2,316	10.3	5,923	2.4	254,740	0.4	13,692,331	0.1	78,557,648
1920	1,403	13.1	10,690	7.1	19,886	2.6	539,406	1.0	14,196,547	0.2	91,823,784
1930	1,724	11.2	15,392	5.6	30,788	2.5	694,860	1.2	14,357,054	0.2	108,445,216
1940	1,900	12.3	15,418	5.1	37,031	4.1	459,550	1.5	12,510,890	0.2	117,832,948
1950	2,987	12.8	23,413	6.2	48,439	5.1	587,195	2.6	11,594,104	0.2	140,611,865
1960	6,266	16.2	38,649	7.0	88,889	7.6	819,286	6.2	10,127,690	0.4	169,165,042
1970	13,800	13.1	105,200	5.0	276,400	7.7	1,780,700	12.6	10,935,800	0.7	192,027,500
1980	38,640	22.9	168,500	6.5	596,820	9.7	4,000,340	25.5	15,142,700	1.8	211,719,700
1990	62,092	22.2	279,329	5.6	1,103,644	8.0	7,779,005	28.8	21,538,296	2.7	226,569,332
2000	84,242	18.2	463,164	4.2	1,986,923	5.6	14,943,348	25.5	33,045,175	3.4	248,366,444
ACS 2010	96,444	13.9	693,962	3.4	2,843,425	4.8	19,910,307	22.7	42,428,246	3.1	309,349,689

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Southern Cone includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay

Table 4

United States (1850-2010): Intercensal growth of foreign born population by place of origin.
Selected regions.

Census Year	Chile	Southern Cone	South America	Latin America	Foreign Born	United States Population
1850-1860	91.85	20.73	10.17	69.81	84.89	30.71
1860-1870	-5.90	19.20	43.53	45.29	33.32	41.75
1870-1880	42.03	70.24	57.89	65.20	20.57	32.37
1880-1900	-25.37	2.69	26.10	53.25	57.30	51.27
1900-1910	-46.78	-9.57	6.89	109.03	29.98	19.41
1910-1920	129.25	361.57	235.74	111.75	3.68	16.89
1920-1930	22.88	43.99	54.82	28.82	1.13	18.10
1930-1940	10.21	0.17	20.28	-33.86	-12.86	8.66
1940-1950	57.21	51.85	30.81	27.78	-7.33	19.33
1950-1960	109.78	65.07	83.51	39.53	-12.65	20.31
1960-1970	120.24	172.19	210.95	117.35	7.98	13.51
1970-1980	180.00	60.17	115.93	124.65	38.47	10.25
1980-1990	60.69	65.77	84.92	94.46	42.24	7.01
1990-2000	35.67	65.81	80.03	92.10	53.43	9.62
2000- ACS2010	14.48	49.83	43.11	33.24	28.39	24.55

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Southern Cone includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay

Table 5

Proportion of emigrants residing in the US to total population of country of origin

Census circa	Total to emigrant population ratio (per 1,000)			
	Chile	Brazil	Argentina	Uruguay
1910	0.19	0.01	0.17	0.14
1950	0.50	0.21	0.53	N/D
1960	0.85	0.20	0.84	0.54
1970	1.55	0.37	2.17	2.19
1980	3.43	0.37	2.53	4.82
1990	4.65	0.64	3.05	7.31
2000	5.57	1.31	3.61	7.72
2010	5.70	1.91	4.46	16.41

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010; Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas Chile (website <http://www.ine.cl>); Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (website <http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/>); Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos Argentina (website <http://www.indec.mecon.ar/>); and Instituto Nacional de Estadística Uruguay (website <http://www.ine.gub.uy/>).

Table 6

United States (1950-ACS 2010): Migration status of Chilean-born population, ages 5 and older,
living in the U.S. by sex.

Census year		Migration Status			Total	
		Same house	Moved within the US	Abroad		
Total	1950	95.08	4.92	0.00	1,342	100.00
	1960	27.45	40.34	32.20	6,167	100.00
	1970	21.17	56.93	21.90	13,700	100.00
	1980	25.96	44.33	29.70	18,180	100.00
	1990	39.46	41.65	18.88	60,425	100.00
	2000	41.74	40.82	17.44	82,884	100.00
	ACS 2010	84.08	12.01	3.91	96,357	100.00
Male	1950	100.00	0.00	0.00	506	100.00
	1960	34.40	40.65	24.95	3,183	100.00
	1970	18.33	66.67	15.00	6,000	100.00
	1980	22.25	48.01	29.74	8,540	100.00
	1990	37.04	45.28	17.68	29,011	100.00
	2000	41.45	41.70	16.85	41,179	100.00
	ACS 2010	84.92	12.16	2.93	46,045	100.00
Female	1950	92.11	7.89	0.00	836	100.00
	1960	20.04	40.01	39.95	2,984	100.00
	1970	23.38	49.35	27.27	7,700	100.00
	1980	29.25	41.08	29.67	9,640	100.00
	1990	41.70	38.30	20.00	31,414	100.00
	2000	42.02	39.96	18.02	41,705	100.00
	ACS 2010	83.31	11.88	4.81	50,312	100.00

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 7

United States (1950-ACS2010): Population born in Chile and living in the U.S. by sex and sex ratio

Census year		Sex		Total	Sex ratio
		Male	Female		
1950	No.	1,917	1,070	2,987	179.16
	%	64.18	35.82	100.00	
1960	No.	3,282	2,984	6,266	109.99
	%	52.38	47.62	100.00	
1970	No.	6,100	7,700	13,800	79.22
	%	44.20	55.80	100.00	
1980	No.	18,700	19,940	38,640	93.78
	%	48.40	51.60	100.00	
1990	No.	29,807	32,285	62,092	92.32
	%	48.00	52.00	100.00	
2000	No.	41,705	42,537	84,242	98.04
	%	49.51	50.49	100.00	
ACS 2010	No.	46,132	50,312	96,444	91.69
	%	47.83	52.17	100.00	

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 8

United States (1950-ACS2010): Marital Status of the population born in Chile and living in the
U.S. by sex.

Marital status / Sex		1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	ACS2010
Males	Married, spouse present	50.8	75.8	47.5	50.8	52.0	51.7	55.0
	Married, spouse absent	4.3	3.0	1.6	3.2	3.9	4.2	4.6
	Separated	20.7	0.0	4.9	2.7	3.8	3.7	1.6
	Divorced	0.0	0.0	3.3	4.4	6.0	6.7	12.3
	Widowed	8.6	0.0	4.9	1.0	0.9	1.3	0.5
	Never married/single	15.6	21.2	37.7	38.0	33.3	32.4	26.0
	Total	1,917	3,282	6,100	18,700	29,807	41,705	46,132
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Females	Married, spouse present	19.8	63.4	41.6	51.4	51.4	52.0	43.2
	Married, spouse absent	30.8	0.0	2.6	1.5	1.9	2.2	4.2
	Separated	6.2	0.0	5.2	4.2	3.8	3.3	2.8
	Divorced	0.0	0.0	5.2	6.7	8.9	10.4	17.1
	Widowed	0.0	13.3	14.3	5.3	7.0	6.8	10.4
	Never married/single	43.2	23.3	31.2	30.9	27.1	25.2	22.3
	Total	1,070	2,984	7,700	19,940	32,285	42,537	50,312
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 9

United States (1950-ACS2010): Relationship to householder of the population born in Chile and living in the U.S. by sex.

Relationship to Householder		1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	ACS2010
Male	Head/Householder	48.7	81.8	62.3	62.5	63.1	57.9	47.3
	Spouse	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	3.3	7.4	18.7
	Child	5.5	6.0	18.0	24.0	20.3	18.3	15.3
	Child-in-law	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.8
	Parent	8.6	0.0	4.9	0.3	1.0	1.0	1.4
	Parent-in-Law	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.6
	Sibling	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2	1.9	1.9	2.0
	Sibling-in-Law	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.4	0.6	0.1
	Grandchild	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.6	1.1
	Other relatives	0.0	0.0	1.6	1.1	1.7	1.4	1.4
	Partner, friend, visitor	0.0	0.0	1.6	2.8	4.6	5.5	6.4
	Other non-relatives	33.8	9.1	9.8	4.2	2.8	4.4	3.5
	Institutional inmates	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.6	0.5
	Total	1,917	3,282	6,100	18,700	29,807	41,705	46,132
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Female	Head/Householder	15.4	10.0	22.1	16.6	19.2	23.7	37.0
	Spouse	12.1	60.1	41.6	48.0	46.5	45.2	30.8
	Child	27.8	6.6	10.4	20.0	16.8	15.3	11.4
	Child-in-law	0.0	3.3	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.2
	Parent	0.0	6.6	5.2	2.6	3.4	3.6	6.9
	Parent-in-Law	0.0	3.3	2.6	1.1	1.1	1.1	3.1
	Sibling	0.0	3.4	3.9	1.2	1.4	1.6	1.4
	Sibling-in-Law	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.2
	Grandchild	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.6
	Other relatives	7.7	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.9	1.0	1.8
	Partner, friend, visitor	0.0	0.0	2.6	2.8	4.7	3.6	5.1
	Other non-relatives	37.0	6.6	10.4	5.5	4.0	3.1	1.3
	Institutional inmates	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3
	Total	1,070	2,984	7,700	19,940	32,285	42,537	50,312
		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 10

United States (1953-2011): Chilean-born entering the US by year of immigration and
type of entrance.

Year / Type of entrance	Immigrants	Non-immigrants	Temporary Visitors	Naturalizations
1953	269	2,091	1,236	41
1954	436	2,186	1,150	68
1955	355	2,770	1,687	100
1956	436	3,324	2,113	101
1957	715	4,093	2,931	89
1958	636	4,880	3,595	65
1959	689	5,508	3,997	103
1960	924	7,045	5,197	105
1961	1,120	6,012	4,457	117
1962	1,137	8,010	5,760	96
1963	1,153	7,317	5,048	149
1964	1,509	9,772	7,255	224
1965	1,872	12,369	9,365	179
1966	1,260	15,849	12,621	200
1967	836	18,146	13,637	204
1968	965	21,571	16,624	224
1969	860	24,530	18,595	261
1970	832	27,231	20,427	334
1971	956	33,989	25,316	436
1972	857	29,219	20,614	481
1973	1,139	27,394	18,537	390
1974	1,285	26,239	16,298	441
1975	1,111	27,026	18,011	390
1976	1,681	37,261	24,532	551
1977	2,596	38,762	27,633	539
1978	3,122	32,000	21,000	636
1979	2,289	35,910	27,100	551
1980	2,569	46,318	36,002	586
1981	2,048	62,000	48,000	549
1982	1,911	55,363	47,907	529
1983	1,970	53,780	45,500	760
1984	1,912	45,000	32,000	915
1985	1,992	40,000	28,000	1,213

Table 10 (cont'd)

1986	2,243	44,000	28,000	1,031
1987	2,140	48,000	31,000	955
1988	2,137	61,000	43,000	1,040
1989	3,037	77,000	57,000	887
1990	4,049	75,000	54,000	866
1991	2,842	89,000	65,000	920
1992	1,937	104,156	79,000	713
1993	1,778	122,000	91,000	862
1994	1,640	130,624	95,859	1,203
1995	1,534	153,946	116,899	1,295
1996	1,706	163,540	120,837	2,775
1997	1,443	176,765	131,049	1,291
1998	1,240	195,653	143,587	1,002
1999	1,092	193,920	142,871	1,892
2000	1,712	209,410	194,096	1,888
2001	1,947	188,377	173,172	1,205
2002	1,839	154,783		1,148
2003	1,310	139,394		1,073
2004	1,810	139,261		1,142
2005	2,404	134,593		1,183
2006	2,774	141,658		1,549
2007	2,274	157,973		1,346
2008	2,017	169,166		2,851
2009	2,250	152,676		1,585
2010	1,950	174,645		1,249
2011	1,853	203,206		1,527

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service 1958-2011, Table 36, Table 37a and 15b and Table 59.

Table 11

United States (1950, 1980 - ACS2010): Citizenship status of Chilean-born population living in the U.S. by sex.

Census year		Citizenship status				Total
		Born abroad of American parents	Naturalized citizen	Not a citizen		
Total	1950	22.06	39.71	38.23	2,987	100.00
	1980	5.07	28.26	66.67	38,640	100.00
	1990	9.03	32.05	58.92	62,092	100.00
	2000	4.31	40.37	55.32	84,242	100.00
	ACS 2010	5.75	47.64	46.62	96,444	100.00
Male	1950	27.49	30.15	42.36	1,917	100.00
	1980	5.45	26.42	68.13	18,700	100.00
	1990	9.29	31.68	59.03	29,807	100.00
	2000	4.16	38.81	57.03	41,705	100.00
	ACS 2010	4.77	49.16	46.07	46,132	100.00
Female	1950	12.34	56.82	30.84	1,070	100.00
	1980	4.71	29.99	65.30	19,940	100.00
	1990	8.78	32.40	58.82	32,285	100.00
	2000	4.45	41.90	53.65	42,537	100.00
	ACS 2010	6.64	46.24	47.12	50,312	100.00

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

1950 census asked this question only to sample line

Data not available for the 1960 and 1970 census

Table 12

United States (1950-ACS 2010): Census region of residence of population born in Chile and living in the U.S. by sex. Percentage

Census year	US Census Regions					Total
	Northeast Region	Midwest Region	South Region	West Region		
Total	1950	35.49	15.33	9.98	39.20	2,987 100.00
	1960	49.17	9.56	14.25	27.02	6,266 100.00
	1970	23.19	11.59	20.29	44.93	13,800 100.00
	1980	30.49	8.54	28.42	32.56	38,640 100.00
	1990	29.95	7.11	30.91	32.03	62,092 100.00
	2000	30.01	6.91	36.52	26.56	84,242 100.00
	ACS 2010	25.80	5.39	40.30	28.51	96,444 100.00
Males	1950	48.51	19.61	8.66	23.21	1,917 100.00
	1960	54.51	12.16	12.10	21.24	3,282 100.00
	1970	22.95	13.11	16.39	47.54	6,100 100.00
	1980	31.23	8.45	27.27	33.05	18,700 100.00
	1990	29.60	6.90	32.30	31.19	29,807 100.00
	2000	33.27	6.75	34.84	25.14	41,705 100.00
	ACS 2010	28.56	5.33	38.72	27.39	46,132 100.00
Females	1950	12.15	7.66	12.34	67.85	1,070 100.00
	1960	43.30	6.70	16.62	33.38	2,984 100.00
	1970	23.38	10.39	23.38	42.86	7,700 100.00
	1980	29.79	8.63	29.49	32.10	19,940 100.00
	1990	30.27	7.30	29.62	32.80	32,285 100.00
	2000	26.82	7.07	38.16	27.95	42,537 100.00
	ACS 2010	23.27	5.44	41.75	29.53	50,312 100.00

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 13

United States (1950-ACS 2010). Population born in Chile and living in the US by state of residence (10 largest concentrations).

State of Residence	Census 1950 No.	%	State of Residence	Census 1960 No.	%	State of Residence	Census 1970 No.	%
New York	950	31.8	New York	2,286	36.5	California	5,100	37.0
California	709	23.7	California	1,393	22.2	New York	2,300	16.7
Montana	330	11.0	Florida	495	7.9	Florida	900	6.5
Illinois	192	6.4	New Jersey	398	6.4	D.C.	500	3.6
Michigan	164	5.5	Oregon	300	4.8	Michigan	500	3.6
Mass.	110	3.7	Indiana	200	3.2	Oregon	500	3.6
D.C.	83	2.8	Michigan	199	3.2	Virginia	500	3.6
Florida	83	2.8	Pennsylvania	199	3.2	Illinois	400	2.9
Colorado	66	2.2	Virginia	198	3.2	Maryland	300	2.2
Maryland	66	2.2	Illinois	100	1.6	Mass.	300	2.2
Other states	234	7.8	Other states	498	7.9	Other states	2,500	18.1
Total	2,987	100.0	Total	6,266	100.0	Total	13,800	100.0

State of Residence	Census 1980 No.	%	State of Residence	Census 1990 No.	%	State of Residence	Census 2000 No.	%
California	10,100	26.1	California	15,898	25.6	Florida	16,573	19.7
New York	6,300	16.3	New York	10,469	16.9	California	15,062	17.9
Florida	4,600	11.9	Florida	9,935	16.0	New York	13,542	16.1
New Jersey	3,120	8.1	New Jersey	4,466	7.2	New Jersey	6,318	7.5
Maryland	1,640	4.2	Texas	2,580	4.2	Texas	4,396	5.2
Virginia	1,400	3.6	Virginia	2,172	3.5	Maryland	2,672	3.2
Texas	1,160	3.0	Maryland	2,073	3.3	Virginia	2,535	3.0
Illinois	1,020	2.6	Mass.	1,395	2.2	Mass.	2,067	2.5
Connecticut	800	2.1	Illinois	1,194	1.9	Connecticut	1,951	2.3
Mass.	760	2.0	Connecticut	921	1.5	Utah	1,615	1.9
Other states	7,740	20.0	Other states	10,989	17.7	Other states	17,511	20.8
Total	38,640	100.0	Total	62,092	100.0	Total	84,242	100.0

Table 13 (cont'd)

State of Residence	ACS 2010	
	No.	%
Florida	21,530	22.3
California	19,124	19.8
New York	12,234	12.7
New Jersey	5,886	6.1
Maryland	5,057	5.2
Texas	3,862	4.0
Mass.	3,038	3.2
Illinois	2,410	2.5
Connecticut	2,141	2.2
Georgia	1,893	2.0
Other states	19,269	20.0
Total	96,444	100.0

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 14

United States (1950-ACS 2010): Age of population born in Chile and living in the U.S. by sex, 5 year groups.

Age	Census year						
	1950	1960	1973	1980	1990	2000	ACS 2010
0-4	0.0	1.6	0.7	2.7	2.7	1.6	0.8
5-9	2.2	4.7	4.3	3.4	2.9	2.9	1.8
10-14	0.0	0.0	3.6	6.1	3.5	4.8	1.6
14-19	11.0	0.0	10.1	7.9	5.1	4.6	4.1
20-24	7.8	14.3	8.7	8.9	8.0	5.5	5.7
25-29	10.5	12.7	17.4	12.5	9.8	8.6	5.9
30-34	13.9	20.6	10.1	12.7	12.4	10.3	6.3
35-39	0.0	7.9	5.8	12.6	11.3	12.1	10.3
40-44	5.0	6.4	6.5	7.7	10.3	10.3	12.9
45-49	4.4	3.2	7.2	7.2	10.2	9.2	10.4
50-54	16.3	9.5	7.2	6.1	7.6	8.9	11.8
55-59	7.2	7.9	3.6	4.4	5.3	6.8	6.4
60-64	6.5	9.5	5.1	2.7	4.2	4.0	6.0
65-69	1.8	1.6	4.3	2.0	2.7	3.6	7.3
70-74	0.0	0.0	2.2	1.2	1.6	3.2	4.0
75-79	0.0	0.0	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.6	2.0
80-84	11.0	0.0	1.4	0.4	0.6	1.2	1.4
85-89	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.6
90+	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.7
Total	2,987	6,266	13,800	38,640	62,092	84,242	96,444
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 15

United States (1950-ACS 2010): Dependency ratio of population born in Chile

Census year	Dependency ratio		
	Child dependency ratio	Aged dependency ratio	Total dependency ratio
1950	5.23	13.07	18.30
1960	6.86	1.72	8.58
1970	19.81	10.38	30.19
1980	21.53	5.66	27.19
1990	14.92	7.55	22.47
2000	15.51	12.25	27.76
ACS 2010	7.84	18.29	26.13

Table 16

United States (1950-ACS2010): Educational attainment of Chilean-born population 25 years and older living in the U.S. by sex.

Census year / Sex		Educational Attainment						Total	
		Eight years of education or less	Nine to twelve years of education no diploma	HS graduate, GED or some college	Associate's degree	Bachelor's degree or 5+ years of college	Post graduate studies		
1950	Total	32.6	43.5	17.4	0.0	6.5	...	1,012	100.0
	Male	65.2	0.0	21.7	0.0	13.0	...	506	100.0
	Female	0.0	87.0	13.0	0.0	0.0	...	506	100.0
1960	Total	30.7	30.6	6.1	6.1	26.5	...	4,874	100.0
	Male	20.0	26.6	10.0	10.0	33.3	...	2,984	100.0
	Female	47.5	36.8	0.0	0.0	15.7	...	1,890	100.0
1970	Total	16.8	49.5	12.6	7.4	13.7	...	9,500	100.0
	Male	12.5	52.5	17.5	2.5	15.0	...	4,000	100.0
	Female	20.0	47.3	9.1	10.9	12.7	...	5,500	100.0
1980	Total	11.9	39.8	31.6	...	16.7	...	26,660	100.0
	Male	10.0	32.9	35.1	...	22.0	...	12,360	100.0
	Female	13.6	45.9	28.5	...	12.0	...	14,300	100.0
1990	Total	6.5	15.0	45.1	8.7	12.3	12.4	46,683	100.0
	Male	4.5	15.5	43.3	9.4	12.4	14.9	21,999	100.0
	Female	8.2	14.6	46.7	8.1	12.2	10.1	24,684	100.0
2000	Total	5.4	11.5	44.7	7.8	16.2	14.5	65,730	100.0
	Male	4.8	11.4	42.3	7.3	17.7	16.6	31,991	100.0
	Female	5.9	11.6	46.9	8.2	14.9	12.5	33,739	100.0
ACS 2010	Total	4.0	6.3	46.2	10.4	19.7	13.3	80,798	100.0
	Male	3.9	4.3	48.7	10.3	18.7	14.1	39,516	100.0
	Female	4.1	8.3	43.9	10.5	20.7	12.5	41,282	100.0

1950 census asked this question only to sample line

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 17

United States (1950-ACS2010): Known occupations of Chilean-born population age 14 and over
and in the labor force living in the U.S. by sex.

Census year / Occupation	1950			1960		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Professional and technical	11.0	7.3	18.1	19.1	20.0	17.6
Farmers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Managers, Officials, and Proprietors	14.4	21.8	0.0	4.3	6.7	0.0
Clerical and Kindred	11.5	0.0	33.9	12.8	6.7	23.6
Sales workers	0.9	1.4	0.0	6.4	3.3	11.8
Craftsmen	18.0	27.2	0.0	14.9	23.4	0.0
Operatives	0.9	0.0	2.7	14.9	16.6	11.7
Service Workers (private HH)	15.4	0.0	45.3	4.2	0.0	11.7
Service Workers (not HH)	22.3	33.8	0.0	23.4	23.4	23.6
Farm Laborers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Laborers	5.6	8.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	2,144	1,415	729	4,677	2,985	1,692
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Census year / Occupation	1970			1980		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Professional and technical	21.9	17.4	26.0	23.1	23.6	22.5
Farmers	1.0	2.2	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.2
Managers, Officials, and Proprietors	5.2	4.3	6.0	9.7	13.2	5.8
Clerical and Kindred	20.8	6.5	34.0	16.2	9.0	24.3
Sales workers	7.3	10.9	4.0	6.6	6.1	7.1
Craftsmen	15.6	28.3	4.0	9.7	16.4	2.0
Operatives	8.3	10.9	6.0	15.0	14.8	15.3
Service Workers (private HH)	2.1	0.0	4.0	3.0	0.1	6.3
Service Workers (not HH)	15.6	15.2	16.0	14.0	12.5	15.7
Farm Laborers	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.2
Laborers	2.1	4.3	0.0	2.3	3.7	0.6
Total	9,600	4,600	5,000	27,120	14,420	12,700
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 17 (cont'd)

Census year / Occupation	1990			2000		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Professional and technical	23.4	22.9	23.9	24.8	22.8	27.3
Farmers	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0
Managers, Officials, and Proprietors	12.0	14.9	8.6	13.0	15.2	10.2
Clerical and Kindred	15.9	7.6	25.5	13.8	6.5	23.1
Sales workers	4.0	3.8	4.2	6.2	6.4	6.0
Craftsmen	12.1	20.0	2.8	10.2	17.0	1.6
Operatives	11.1	12.6	9.2	10.0	12.3	6.9
Service Workers (private HH)	2.9	0.0	6.3	...	...	...
Service Workers (not HH)	15.2	12.4	18.6	16.8	11.8	23.2
Farm Laborers	0.4	0.6	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.3
Laborers	3.0	5.0	0.7	4.7	7.2	1.5
Total	46,283	24,976	21,307	61,151	34,283	26,868
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Census year / Occupation	ACS 2010		
	Total	Male	Female
Professional and technical	29.1	27.8	30.6
Farmers	0.0	0.0	0.0
Managers, Officials, and Proprietors	12.5	14.7	10.0
Clerical and Kindred	12.1	6.7	18.2
Sales workers	6.8	3.9	10.1
Craftsmen	10.1	17.7	1.3
Operatives	8.3	10.7	5.5
Service Workers (private HH)	...	...	...
Service Workers (not HH)	17.8	12.9	23.3
Farm Laborers	0.2	0.3	0.0
Laborers	3.3	5.2	1.1
Total	70,956	37,901	33,055
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 18

United States (1950-ACS2010): Reported industry of Chilean-born population age 14 and over
in the labor force living in the U.S. by sex.

Census year / Industry	1950			1960		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Mining	3.8	5.8	0.0	2.1	3.4	0.0
Construction	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Manufacturing - Durable Goods	3.1	4.7	0.0	17.0	23.4	5.9
Manufacturing - Nondurable Goods	6.4	3.9	11.2	12.8	13.3	11.8
Transportation and telecomm.	11.2	3.9	25.4	6.4	6.7	5.9
Utilities and Sanitary Services	7.7	11.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wholesale Trade	3.1	4.7	0.0	6.4	6.7	5.9
Retail Trade	14.9	22.6	0.0	19.2	20.0	17.7
Finance, Ins. and Real Estate	5.1	7.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Business and Repair Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3	6.7	0.0
Personal services	30.8	23.3	45.3	4.2	0.0	11.7
Entert. and Recreation Services	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Professional and Related Services	10.0	5.8	18.1	14.9	6.6	29.5
Public administration	3.9	5.9	0.0	12.7	13.3	11.7
Total	2,144	1,415	729	4,677	2,985	1,692
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Census year / Industry	1970			1980		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	1.0	2.2	0.0	0.8	1.1	0.5
Mining	2.1	2.2	2.0	0.5	0.6	0.5
Construction	2.1	4.3	0.0	3.5	5.7	0.9
Manufacturing - Durable Goods	15.6	26.1	6.0	12.9	16.8	8.5
Manufacturing - Nondurable Goods	2.1	2.2	2.0	8.3	7.9	8.7
Transportation and telecomm.	2.1	4.3	0.0	5.3	7.5	2.8
Utilities and Sanitary Services	1.0	0.0	2.0	0.2	0.3	0.2
Wholesale Trade	2.1	2.2	2.0	3.7	4.7	2.5
Retail Trade	17.7	26.1	10.0	15.8	16.1	15.4
Finance, Ins. and Real Estate	10.4	2.2	18.0	6.6	5.8	7.4
Business and Repair Services	2.1	2.2	2.0	6.3	7.6	4.9
Personal services	7.3	8.7	6.0	7.2	3.5	11.3
Entert. and Recreation Services	3.1	4.3	2.0	2.0	2.1	1.9
Professional and Related Services	28.1	8.7	46.0	24.3	17.2	32.3
Public administration	3.1	4.3	2.0	2.7	3.2	2.2
Total	9,600	4,600	5,000	27,120	14,420	12,700
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 18 (cont'd)

Census year / Industry	1990			2000		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	1.2	1.8	0.4	1.5	2.0	0.8
Mining	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.2
Construction	6.3	10.7	1.2	7.4	12.1	1.4
Manufacturing - Durable Goods	8.2	9.9	6.2	6.4	8.1	4.2
Manufacturing - Nondurable Goods	7.0	6.4	7.7	4.7	5.4	3.8
Transportation and telecomm.	6.0	8.4	3.2	7.0	8.9	4.6
Utilities and Sanitary Services	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.4
Wholesale Trade	4.2	5.1	3.1	3.6	4.6	2.2
Retail Trade	15.0	14.0	16.1	16.8	15.4	18.5
Finance, Ins. and Real Estate	7.1	6.5	7.9	6.9	6.5	7.5
Business and Repair Services	7.4	9.2	5.3	9.5	10.9	7.8
Personal services	8.0	3.8	12.8	6.3	2.5	11.0
Entert. and Recreation Services	2.4	2.9	1.7	2.7	3.1	2.3
Professional and Related Services	22.8	16.0	30.8	23.0	15.7	32.3
Public administration	3.4	4.1	2.6	3.3	3.7	2.8
Total	46,283	24,976	21,307	61,151	34,283	26,868
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Census year / Industry	ACS 2010		
	Total	Male	Female
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	0.8	1.5	0.0
Mining	0.0	0.0	0.0
Construction	8.6	15.7	0.4
Manufacturing - Durable Goods	4.2	5.6	2.6
Manufacturing - Nondurable Goods	4.5	5.8	3.1
Transportation and telecomm.	7.1	9.1	4.7
Utilities and Sanitary Services	0.2	0.0	0.4
Wholesale Trade	2.2	2.0	2.5
Retail Trade	15.8	14.5	17.2
Finance, Ins. and Real Estate	6.0	5.2	6.9
Business and Repair Services	12.7	14.3	10.8
Personal services	6.6	3.6	10.0
Entert. and Recreation Services	1.0	0.1	1.9
Professional and Related Services	26.6	18.3	36.1
Public administration	3.7	4.1	3.3
Total	70,956	37,901	33,055
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 19

United States (1950-ACS 2010): Total personal income by decile of Chilean-born population
living in the U.S. by sex.

Census year / Income Decile	1950			1960		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
1st Decile	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2nd Decile	0.00	0.00	0.00	25.43	6.45	46.45
3rd Decile	32.79	0.00	52.63	0.00	0.00	0.00
4th Decile	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.14	3.21	17.80
5th Decile	24.59	65.22	0.00	5.09	6.45	3.59
6th Decile	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.19	6.45	14.32
7th Decile	12.30	0.00	19.74	6.76	6.42	7.14
8th Decile	0.00	0.00	0.00	15.26	22.60	7.14
9th Decile	17.21	0.00	27.63	18.65	32.30	3.55
10th Decile	13.11	34.78	0.00	8.47	16.12	0.00
Total	1,342	506	836	5,870	3,084	2,786
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Census year / Income Decile	1970			1980		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
1st Decile	0.00	0.00	0.00	21.47	10.59	31.48
2nd Decile	25.40	12.73	35.21	3.13	1.72	4.42
3rd Decile	4.76	1.82	7.04	7.67	5.30	9.85
4th Decile	8.73	5.45	11.27	6.90	3.94	9.63
5th Decile	7.14	9.09	5.63	9.68	8.50	10.76
6th Decile	8.73	7.27	9.86	9.38	9.98	8.83
7th Decile	8.73	14.55	4.23	11.09	12.93	9.40
8th Decile	20.63	25.45	16.90	10.21	12.81	7.81
9th Decile	9.52	10.91	8.45	9.32	14.66	4.42
10th Decile	6.35	12.73	1.41	11.15	19.58	3.40
Total	12,600	5,500	7,100	33,900	16,240	17,660
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 19 (cont'd)

Census year / Income Decile	1990			2000		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
1st Decile	16.38	7.33	24.77	17.83	9.52	25.99
2nd Decile	6.63	3.88	9.17	5.61	4.27	6.92
3rd Decile	7.31	4.07	10.33	8.57	5.50	11.58
4th Decile	8.41	6.57	10.12	10.00	8.81	11.16
5th Decile	10.81	9.18	12.32	8.56	7.99	9.12
6th Decile	8.51	10.09	7.04	10.32	11.29	9.37
7th Decile	10.95	13.09	8.97	9.94	12.75	7.17
8th Decile	10.32	13.89	7.01	10.37	11.69	9.06
9th Decile	10.18	14.54	6.13	8.19	11.25	5.18
10th Decile	10.50	17.36	4.14	10.62	16.92	4.44
Total	55,915	26,905	29,010	76,398	37,845	38,553
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Census year / Income Decile	ACS 2010		
	Total	Male	Female
1st Decile	16.48	8.31	23.88
2nd Decile	5.92	4.97	6.77
3rd Decile	9.37	9.00	9.71
4th Decile	10.25	8.45	11.87
5th Decile	9.78	8.75	10.72
6th Decile	9.64	7.39	11.68
7th Decile	12.13	13.47	10.91
8th Decile	9.95	13.47	6.77
9th Decile	8.29	13.42	3.65
10th Decile	8.19	12.77	4.04
Total	92,449	43,920	48,529
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 20

United States (1950-1970): Employment status of Chilean-born population ages 14 or 16 and older living in the U.S. by sex.

Census year		Employment status				Total	
		At work	Armed Forces	Unemployed	Not in Labor Force		
1950	Total	75.1	0.0	0.0	24.9	2,855	100.00
	Male	76.4	0.0	0.0	23.6	1,851	100.00
	Female	72.6	0.0	0.0	27.4	1,004	100.00
1960	Total	61.0	1.7	0.0	37.3	5,870	100.00
	Male	87.1	3.2	0.0	9.7	3,084	100.00
	Female	32.1	0.0	0.0	67.9	2,786	100.00
1970	Total	56.3	0.0	2.4	41.3	12,600	100.00
	Male	70.9	0.0	5.5	23.6	5,500	100.00
	Female	45.1	0.0	0.0	54.9	7,100	100.00
1980	Total	65.9	0.2	3.5	30.3	33,280	100.00
	Male	78.9	0.4	3.0	17.7	15,900	100.00
	Female	54.0	0.1	4.0	41.9	17,380	100.00
1990	Total	69.0	0.6	3.2	27.3	55,915	100.00
	Male	82.2	0.9	3.3	13.6	26,905	100.00
	Female	56.7	0.3	3.0	40.0	29,010	100.00
2000	Total	61.6	0.3	3.4	34.7	75,740	100.00
	Male	74.1	0.5	2.8	22.6	37,610	100.00
	Female	49.2	0.1	4.0	46.7	38,130	100.00
ACS 2010	Total	64.0	0.1	5.0	30.9	91,516	100.00
	Male	75.9	0.3	5.2	18.6	43,367	100.00
	Female	53.2	0.0	4.9	41.9	48,149	100.00

The 1950 and 1960 census uses 14 and older; 1970 and the following, 16 and older

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 21

United States (1970 - ACS2010): Year of arrival of Chilean-born population in the U.S. by sex.

Census / Sex		Year of arrival						Total	
		Before 1950	1950 to 1974	1975 to 1981	1982 to 1990	1991 to 2000	Since 2001		
Total	1970	71.43	28.57	...	...	...	...	700	100.00
	1980	4.31	60.85	34.84	...	...	...	36,680	100.00
	1990	2.51	37.97	27.27	32.24	...	...	62,092	100.00
	2000	1.50	24.71	17.13	22.91	33.75	...	84,242	100.00
	ACS 2010	0.44	19.79	12.53	18.65	24.20	24.38	96,444	100.00
Male	1970	66.67	33.33	...	...	...	...	300	100.00
	1980	4.07	59.50	36.43	...	...	...	17,680	100.00
	1990	2.06	37.83	29.37	30.74	...	...	29,807	100.00
	2000	1.18	23.16	18.17	24.75	32.73	...	41,705	100.00
	ACS 2010	0.76	20.19	12.48	18.25	24.87	23.45	46,132	100.00
Female	1970	75.00	25.00	...	...	...	...	400	100.00
	1980	4.53	62.11	33.37	...	...	...	19,000	100.00
	1990	2.93	38.10	25.33	33.63	...	...	32,285	100.00
	2000	1.81	26.23	16.10	21.12	34.74	...	42,537	100.00
	ACS 2010	0.15	19.43	12.59	19.01	23.59	25.24	50,312	100.00

The 1950 and 1960 census did not ask for year of arrival

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

Table 22

United States (1950-ACS 2010): Median Personal and Family total Income of Foreign and U.S. born population by selected region or country of birth

		Region or country of birth						
Census/	Income	Chile	Other Southern Cone	Other South America	Other Latin America	Non-Hispanic Americas	Other Foreign Born	United States
1950	Personal Income	550.0	950.0	0.0	550.0	850.0	650.0	750.0
	Family Income	5,050.0	3,650.0	1,750.0	1,850.0	3,050.0	2,650.0	2,850.0
1960	Personal Income	2,250.0	2,050.0	1,050.0	850.0	1,550.0	1,350.0	1,250.0
	Family Income	4,550.0	5,850.0	5,050.0	4,050.0	6,050.0	5,350.0	5,550.0
1970	Personal Income	3,000.0	3,050.0	2,750.0	1,950.0	2,750.0	2,150.0	2,250.0
	Family Income	9,300.0	10,550.0	8,650.0	7,150.0	9,750.0	8,750.0	9,450.0
1980	Personal Income	6,430.0	6,005.0	5,120.0	4,605.0	6,005.0	5,250.0	6,005.0
	Family Income	17,670.0	20,005.0	16,840.0	14,005.0	18,010.0	18,005.0	19,110.0
1990	Personal Income	15,000.0	15,000.0	13,000.0	9,200.0	15,000.0	13,700.0	20,000.0
	Family Income	34,921.0	33,557.0	31,000.0	22,784.0	33,014.0	36,000.0	33,925.0
2000	Personal Income	17,000.0	15,000.0	14,000.0	11,000.0	18,200.0	17,130.0	18,500.0
	Family Income	45,000.0	40,180.0	40,270.0	30,700.0	44,100.0	50,000.0	46,000.0
ACS	Personal Income	20,000.0	19,800.0	18,000.0	14,000.0	21,700.0	20,000.0	20,000.0
2010	Family Income	55,000.0	49,000.0	51,000.0	35,200.0	54,750.0	62,600.0	54,000.0

Source: Ruggles et al. 2010

APPENDIX C
Aida's email

From: Aida
Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2011 5:20 PM
To: Cristián Doña
Subject: me quede pensando

Cristián,

Me quedé pensando en mis contradicciones, porque a pesar de que yo declaro que no quiero volver a vivir a Chile especialmente, guardé mi nacionalidad, yo digo que me siento chilena y estoy haciendo todo para que mis hijos obtengan la nacionalidad.

La respuesta es algo más profundo que “siempre es bueno tener varios pasaportes, porque uno nunca sabe lo que puede pasar, siempre son útiles”, que es lo que yo siempre digo...

En el fondo hay dos elementos más, siento que Chile me lo “debe”, que si bien Pinochet le “quito” el derecho a la nacionalidad a mis hijos, ellos tienen que poder beneficiar de ese derecho y ahora que se puede me tomo el tiempo de hacerlo (que es una lata).

De manera más personal mía, siento que yo y la historia familiar que acarreo debe formar parte de lo que es el Chile de hoy, no quiero “no saber más nada de ese país que me hizo daño”(que es en el fondo la posición de mi mamá), quiero que el Chile de hoy asuma mi caso, que es el caso de muchos chilenos, si mi país me hizo vivir un calvario, me mato a mi abuela (una mujer ejemplar) , me destruyo mi futuro en esa tierra, etc....pues tiene que hacerme un espacio hoy en su memoria colectiva, yo quiero ser parte de la historia oficial del país, quiero que el país reconozca que yo, cuando fui solo una niña, viví una terrible injusticia a causa del golpe de Estado. Es por eso que visité y me hizo tanto placer saber que existían el memorial de villa Grimaldi, el museo de la Fundación Salvador Allende, y el museo de la memoria.

Bueno, acá te mando la carta de Ángel Parra que creo te puede interesar.

Hasta el Viernes, un abrazote, Aida

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