w "(ta-Q"-fldr‘v‘OOoomflfifin-d.ouflum.g'p,.. '..‘~l'”.‘“”q“-.V-"~‘V‘P‘v'v'w"7"v n v . - THE BUREAUCRACY OF DESTRUCTION Thais far the Dogm a! M. A. MKHIGAN STIME UNIVERSITY James 3. Ford 1959 . 4 c - ........ LIBRARY Michigan Stan University -—-p.—.-_. , ‘4‘.-‘_- ._.__ . -e--—.A-. ‘.4 THE BUREAUCRACY OF DESTRUCTION JAMES J. FORD AN ABSTRACT Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Personnel and Production Administration 1959 \TQ '\ r I X \ \ .Approved H {L g/\_§/ ‘\ x . LA 4/\« g; Abstract ‘ James J. Ford ma BUREAUCRACY OF DESTRUCTION For generations, the attitude of the American p60ple toward the business executive, and toward the professional army officer was one of dis- favor and distrust. The business executive has begun to emerge from the doghouse of papular disapproval in recent years, but there is no recorded evidence of a change in attitude toward the career officer. If the survival of our national state depends upon the strength of our military, and many believe it does, then an examination of the values and attitudes of the officer corps should be worthwhile, and might lead to a better understanding of an important leadership group in our society. This thesis attempts to determine the officer's orientation toward his work, his concept of the organization he serves, and his attitudes toward morale, authority, efficiency, discipline and leadership. It ventures a comparison of some of the doctrines of the army with some of the doctrines of business administrators, and relates them to the Opinions of the professional officer himself. The study is based en a survey of the works of scholars and observers in the fields of business, military science, and the social sciences, and on the results of a questionnaire addressed to 72 professional officers, and 100 newly-commissioned reserve second lieutenants. The evidence accumulated appears to point toward a strong sense of identification to his work on the part of the professional officer, and through his work, to a sense of dedication to the state. Apparently the officer,almost unwittingly, has created a pervasive bureaucracy comparable to the bureaucracies in industry, and to the bureaucracies in the other great complexes of modern organization. He seems to be sharply aware of his dependence on morale, discipline, and authority, and to be convinced of the fundamental requirement for leadership in the military art. In 1959, it is possible to detect a trend toward a coming-tagether of soldier and civilian, a trend which affirms a need for greater mutual understanding. THE BUREAUCRACY OF DESTRUCTION JAMES J. FORD A THESIS Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 'HASTER OF ARTS Department of Personnel and Production Administration 1959 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The writer expresses his appreciation to Professor David G. Moore for instruction, guidance and scholarly criticism in the preparation of this paper. The assistance of Lt Colonel'William.E. Gibbons, major Douglas L. Behenna, and Major Edwin J. McCarren in administering a questionnaire to army officers is acknowledged with thanks. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I O mmm CTI ON 0 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C II. THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICERp-A PROBLEM IN ANALXSIS III. DEDICATION AND IDENTIFICATION AMONG OFFICERS IV. EUREAUCRACI IN THE ARMY . . . . . . . V. DISCIPLINE, MORALE, AND EFFICIENCY . . v1. mmuipm ms HUMAN RESOURCE VII. THE PLACE OF AUTHORITY . . . . . . . . . VIII. THE OFFICER IN AMERICAN SOCIETY APPENDIX.A. Questionnaire Submitted to.Army Officers APPENDIX B. Respondednts' Comments in Questionnaire mm mm 0 O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O 0 O O I 0 iii Page 11 21 36 51 70 92 111 128 136 153 TABIE 1. 2. 3. h. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.' 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. Active Army Officer Personnel by Rank Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions LIST OF TABLES First Statement . . Second Statement . Third Statement . . Fourth Statement . Fifth Statement . . Factors Most Important in a Military Career . . . Words Selected as Best Describing Anny Organization Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Words Selected as Best Describing Efficiency . . . . . . Opinions Opinions Opinions Sixth Statement . . Seventh Statement . Eighth Statement . Ninth Statement . . Tenth Statement . . Eleventh Statement . . . . . Twelfth Statement . . . . . ThirteenthStatement. . . . . . . . . . Fourteenth Statement . . . . . . . . . . Fifteenth Stat.ment O O O O O 0 0 O O O O Sixteenth Statement iv 0 O O O O 0 PAGE 17 28 29 30 31 31 33 “5 “7 5 61 61 62 63 63 TABLE 21. 23. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. no. 41. 1+2. 43. Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions TABLES (Cont . ) Seventeenth Statement . . . . . . . . . . Eighteenth Statement . . '. . . . . . . . Nineteenth Statement . . . . . . . . . . Twentieth Statement . . . . . . . . . . . Words Selected as Best Describing Discipline . . . . . . Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Twenty-First Statement . . . . . . . . . Twonty-Second Statement . . . . . . . . . Twenty-Third Statement 0 e e e e e e o e Twenty-Fourth Statement . . . . . . . . . Twenty-Fifth Statement . . . . Words Selected as Best Describing Leadership . Words Selected as Best Describing Authority . Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Class Groups Twenty-Sixth Statement . . . . Twenty-Seventh Statement . . . Twenty-Eighth Statement . . . Twenty-Ninth Statement . . . . Thirtieth Statement . . . . . Selected by ROTC Cadets . . . . . Income Groups, Families of ROTC Cadets . . . . The Officer's Place in Society . . . . . . . . Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Thirty-First Statement . . . . Thirty-Second Statement . . . . . . . . . Thirty-Third Statement 0 e e e o e e e :- Thirty-Fourth Statement . . . . . . . . . PAGE 65 66 67 67 85 86 87 88 88 105 105 106 107 108 108 115 1 15 116 1 17 118 119 119 51. Opinions Officers Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions Opinions TABLES (Cont.) Thirty-Fifth Statement . inaC1Vilian commty e e e e Thirty-Sixth Statement . Thirty-Seventh Statement Thirty-Eighth Statement . Thirty-Ninth Statement . Fortieth Statement . . . PAGE 120 121 122 122 123 124 121+ The State of war is a state of enmity and destruction; and therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate, settled design upon another man's life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an in- tention, and so has eXposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or anyone that joins With him in his defense and cepouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction. John Locke (1632-1704) CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In an automated factory, who activates the closed-100p feedback system? In push-button warfare, who does the button.pushing? There are no robots yet that can activate themselves, nor are there any self-pushing buttons. Business men believe that the most important resource available to industry is manpower. The army, in another segment of our society, believes tradi- ' tionally that the ultimate fate of the nation lies in the hands and minds of men. These convictions are held in the face of technological advances which appear to be relegating the individual to a role of everhdecreasing importance. The army denies this relegation. Evidence of the denial can be found in almost any issue of any army professional journal, and in the many boards, commissions, and research projects which have been financed by the army to investigate the human resource.1 General Patton once said, “wars may be fought'with weapons, but they are won by men.'2 Later, General Ridgway put it another way, man is and always will be the supreme element in combat ....n3 Industry, too, is more and more coming to realize that machines do not resolve the prOblem of dealing with men. Instead, the prOblem is complicated by the necessity for training and managing the technician who serves the machine engineered to do the work of men. One writer says, "The factory of the future is not making the human being Obsolete ... what it is really doing is making obsolete (his) misuse ... ..h In industry and in the army as well, a reduction of numbers in "productive" labor, and an increase in “non-pro- ductive" labor, (men to control, manipulate, and maintain automatic devices) have re-emphasized the importance of providing organization, training, inspiration, and leadership. AN HERITAGE OF RATIONAL,IGNORANCE The business executive for years was the subject of his countrymen's hostility. The image of the bloated capitalist with his fat cigar, his diamond ring, and.his tall silk hat is one that has just‘begun to dissolve, despite the fact that leadership in.American industry has been remarkably effective. The extraordinary material progress, and the high standards of living in the United States have been attributed to everything from the productivity of labor to the abundance of national resources. Nowhere has a business manager or administrator been anointed.with the legendary fame of a Paul Bunyan or a Davy Crockett; indeed, until recently the leader in industry'usually was cast as a villain. Outsiders have not been loath to toss a few bouquets at industrial leaders, however. Several such bouquets were noted in the magazine Nation's Business in 1952, in a report of European business men and their visits to American industries. A.Frenchman is quoted as saying, ... “it is management that makes the wheels go round;" a British group declares, "We are convinced that it is efficient management who (sic) set the pace of productivity in American industry ... .‘5 Closer to home, and.mere recently, at least one victim.of the hostility has noted a change. A.K.'Heber of the Radio Corporation of America said in 1958: "The experience of industry during the 1930's proved con- clusively that the philosOphy of economic gain for no other end did not meet the test of society. ... industry has recovered remarkably from this period and (has) emerged as a leader in present-day society because it has so well succeeded in broad. ening its vision and extending its purpose.”6 The professional officer, like his business contemporary, has not escaped disfavor. Part of the American liberal heritage is a horror of war in all its parts and contrivances. As Americans have shunned aggressive war, so have they ever been hostile to the idea of a peacetime military establishment, and to the idea of a professional officer.7 This dogma on the one hand is based on rationality, and on the other, ignorance. It is rational when it considers that our security as a nation was never threatened from abroad until the fourth decade of the Wentieth eentnry.8 But it is ignorant when it neglects the discipline or history-~since 1775 we have fought eight major wars, I'plus an untold number of minor campaigns, expeditions, pacifications, and other bickerings, including more than a century of almost continuous ware fare against the North American Indian.'9‘ It is ignorant when it overlooks the present fact of our treaty obligations to take military action in defense of 52 countries, aside from our commitment to the United Nations. ' Our heritage of "rational ignorance," then, must give way to something new, a new comprehension of historical fact, a new understanding of our posture among the nations of the world, and a new understanding of the place of the men who provide props for the posture-—the business executive, and the Iprofessional officer. There is much evidence of increasing maturity among our population in its appreciation of the international role of the United States. There is no doubt that the modern executive has begun to emerge from the doghouse of pepular disapproval. But there is little evidence of any change in basic attitude toward the professional officer. On the contrary, a 1955 survey indicates that civilians place him.low on the totem pole of professional prestige.10 h Why'the low position on the pole? There are three principal reasons. First there is the popular stereotype, the muddleheaded but amusing dolt of TV's Sergeant Bilko, of Broadway's "No Time for Sergeants," of Hollywood's II"Tea House of the August'Moon." Second, there is the belief which stereo- types the professional officer as a brass-hat, a martinet, an abuser of privilege. In most cases, this officer stereotype is based on the stories told by our millions of veterans, stories in the majority of cases about the temporary incumbents in the wartime officer corps-.men who served patriot- ically and courageously, but at a different level from the professional. While we recognize that there are deviates, the professional officer in the "ideal—type" is one who has, in Huntington's words, ”... an extrordinarily complex.intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training."11 An eminent sociologist says: "... the management of such a vast enterprise has also taken on new'features. Like a vast corporation a modern military enterprise demands not only increasing amounts of special knowledge and skill, but careful training and planning for its coordination ..."12 The professional in most cases differs from the temporary officer in moti— vation, orientation, and competence. Third, there is a more trenchant stereotype, one which lies deep in the minds of our peeple. The author of a standard text, Psychology and Leadership, wrote in 19h0: “... the articulate part of the American folk were mainly alike in their aversion ... to the Army. ... All of these people shuddered over the horrors of war, and rightly so. ... ‘Hany of them acquired a sense of inferiority which grew dis- tortedly and caused them to vent their spleen on the only symbol of war that confronted theme-the peacetime soldier. So it was often true that back of the intellectual opposition to the military lay, not cold reason, but hot emotion."13 Providing the knowledge on which cold reason can be based would serve, perhaps, to temper hot emotion in the "articulate," and so, eventually, temper the opinions of the American public. THE MANAGEMENT OF VIOLENCE Aside from‘what the public believes about him, if our culture stands or falls on the basis of what we do,militarily3 and many believe it does, it would appear that there should be some understanding of what the pro- fessional officer believes about himself, about his job, and about his place in society. Much has been written about civilians in times of peace, and soldiers in times of war, but little about soldiers in times of peace. One writer says: 'In the past, American sociology has shown little interest in analyzing military institutions and the social aspects of war. American sociologists have almost entirely devoted them- selves to studying society in times of peace." The book quoted, the book on which it is based, and similar books and studies by sociologists, psycholOgists and others, all ignore the peacetime army. This is not surprising in the light of the "heritage" mentioned earlier, but it is significant. It points up a gap in knowledge about the professional army generally, and about the professional officer particularly. The most important function of the professional officer is, in Harold Lasswell's words, "the management of violence,"15 or less colorfully, in the official precept: "The management of men in the practice of arms."16 This concept of management differs from the one generally accepted in industry. Every'book on business practices defines management; these definitions may be summedpup, if such a summing-up is possible, in Brown's sentence: “management is an omnibus term which has been used to denote many aspects of industrial administration, and probably is generally understood as being synonymous with the admin- istration of principal members."17 These two concepts are divergent, but they are not incompatible. In fact, the essential idea in both concerns the relationships of a person in authority with those other persons who are subordinate to the authority. The difference lies in the purpose for which the authority is exercised, and in the extent to which it may be sustained. There are other ways in which industry and the military are alike. Three of them will come to mind immediately. First, there are the obvious daybto-day'business activities of the technical services in military purchasing offices, arsenals, warehouses, shape, stores, utilities, hospitals, and transportation systems.18 Second, there are the tremendous amounts of money involved. The army's budget alone for the fiscal year 1958 exceeds the total expenditures of the entire federal government for any year prior to 19h1.19 The spending of these billions of dollars requires business structures organized more extensively than any enterprise outside the government. Third, many of the principles in industrial management have been drawn from the military. Even some of the terms fundamental in the study of business administration are military terms, for example: "line and staff," “chain of comnand,‘ "unity of command," "span of control.'. In recognizing the similarities, however, it is important to keep the differences clearly in mind. First of all, in industry "management" gen- erally is considered an end in itself, whether it be management of men, management of resources, or both. One of the tools of business management is leadership. The army takes a contrary view; holding management to be one of the fundamentals of leadership.20 The concepts supporting this distinction lie in.the officer's understanding of his basic function--the management of violence--and in his appreciation of his duty to his country and to the men entrusted to his command. The legal authority of an army officer is based on the commission.he holds from the President of the United States, a commission which declares: "And I do strictly charge and require all Officers and Soldiers under his command to be obediant to his orders... 3 The professional officer considers this pronouncement not as a license to strut or steal, but instead, a summons to grave responsibility. And let us not be deceived over the use of the word ”business." It would be well to disavow at once the droll idea that the army is really "big business," as has so often been said. The army is‘ggt|big business, it is the ultimate weapon of the state. In 195?, the writer administered a questionnaire to a group of pro— fessiOnal army officers to determine their attitudes toward the importance attached to various branches of the service. /It deve10ped that the infantry officer, a "fighting man," held status among his fellows greater than any of them. And just below him were the other combat officers, holding precedence over the rest, despite the technological and administrative training and skill of the people in the technical and administrative services./ This seemingly is an anomalous situation in the light of the statement often repeated that the army is primarily an instrument for peaceful purposes. A.samp1e: "The armed services join with all the God-fearing elements of government and society in directing their efforts not at the waging of war, but at the prevention thereof."21 Actually this situation is not anomalous when the basic responsibility of the officer is considered. Certainly a knowledge of logistics and tech- nology is necessary, but the officer fundamentally must lead and direct men. 8 Who is this person charged with leading and directing the arm's most important resource? What is his orientation toward his work? How does he visualize the organization of which he is a part? What are his attitudes toward morale, authority, efficiency, discipline, leadership-«the requisites of his task? This paper will attempt to answer these questions, and will venture a comparison of some of the values and beliefs of the army officer with some of the doctrines espoused by his friend in flanneluthe American business man. RHERENCES 1. Five recent issues of m, the magazine of the Association of the United States Am, selected at random, show eight articles stressing theimportance of men. (See David L. Edwards, "An invitation to war," w, v. 9, (Sept 1958), p. 25-27; EM. Flanagan, Jr., ”Squash on the rock," m, v. 9, (Sept 1958), p. 28-31; Don Balding, ”300,000 ambassadors," w, v. 9, (Aug 1958), p. 29-33; Reuben E. Jenkins, "The case of the dum parachutist,‘ M, v. 9, (Aug 1958), p. 45-49; Eben F. Swift, "Leave the troops alone," Am, v. 8, (Aug 1957), p. 27-29; ‘ John H. Cushman, “Keeping the current deterrent on its toes," E, v. 8, (Aug 1957), p. 39-30; Robert F. Enslin, Jr., "Number one shoot," M, v. 8, (Aug 1957), p. 30-35; John Dibble, Jr., "Training will be the pay-off," m, v. 6. (July 1956), p. “4—48; Louis w. Prentiss, "Trade secrets of leadership," Am, v. 6, (Mar 1956), p. 42-95. See also, the so-called "Womble Report, " Final Report-mid Hoc Committee on the Future of Military Science as a Career that Will Attract and Retain Gamble Career Personnel, (Washington, Dept of Defense, 1953). See also, Public Opinions Survey, Inc. , Princeton, Attitudes of Adult Civilians toward the Military Service as a Career, (Washington, Office of Armed Forces Infor- mation and Education, Dept of Defense, 1955). See also, HumRRO Research Bulletin ’4», What HumRRO is Doing, (Washington, The George Washington University Human Resources Research Office, 1957). 2. George S. Patton, Jr., quoted in Dept of Amy Pamphlet No. 360-1, Know Your Arm-4111c U.S. Army, a Key to Peace, (Washington, Dept of the Am, 1957). p. 22. 3. Matthew B. Ridgway, quoted in ibid., p. 22. lav. Harry Lee Waddell, "The factory of the future: completely automatic-ma technological dream come true," Advanced Management, v. 18, (Sept 1953). Po 12- 9 5. Peter F. Drucker, "Productivity is a state of mind,“ Nation's Business, v. 40, (Apr 1952), pp. 34-36, 66-67. 6. A.K.'Weber, "Managing Today's Technology," an address before the students of the U.S. Army Management School, Fort Belvoir, va., 1958. 7. The Right to Live, (Washington, Office of the Chief of Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, Dept of the Army, 1956), p. 25. 8. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge, Mass., The Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 3. 9. RE. Dupuy and T.N. Dupuy, Military Heritage of America, (New'IOrk, McGrawhHill Book Co., Inc., 1956), p. 1. 10. Public Opinions Survey, Inc., op. cit. 11. Huntington, 0p. cit., p. 13. 12. Kimball YOung, Sociology; A Study of Society and Culture, (New Yerk, American Book Co., 19E2), p. 697. 13. John M. Burns, "The American Professional Soldier,“ The Infantgy Journal Reader, Joseph I. Green, ed., (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, Doran.& Co., Inc., 1954), p. 3-4. 1#. Hans Speier, in Studies in the Scope and Method of "The American Soldier: Continuities in Social Research," Robert K. Merton and Paul A. Lazarsfeld, eds., (Glencoe, 111., The Free Press, 1950), p. 108. 15. Harold Lasswell, quoted in Huntington, op. cit., p. 11. 16. The Armed Forces Officer, (Washington, The United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 39. 17. Alvin Brown, Organization-—A Formulation of Principle, (New Yerk, Hibbert Printing Co., 19h5), p. 105: 18. There are 15 branches of the army in three categories-~the combat arms: armor, artillery, and infantry; the technical services: chemical, engineer, medical, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and trans- portation; the administrative services: adjutant general, chaplain, finance, judge advocate, and military police. See Dept of the Army Manual 145-70, Branches of the Army, (Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 1951+), p. 3.1+. 19. Harry Hanson, ed., The‘Wbrld Almanac, (New York, New Yerk ‘World Telegram Corporation, 1957), p. 757. 20. The Officer's Guide, (Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 1957), p. 310. 10 21. General Maxwall D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, United States Army, in an address before the general assembly of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, St. Louis, 140., Dec 6, 1957. CHAPTER II THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICER-~A PROBLEM IN ANALYSIS There are many equations in the problem of analyzing the orientation of the professional officer, and in examining his attitudes and values. A truly exhaustive solution to the problem would examine all of theme-it would determine the "image" the professional officer reflects in the classes, castes, and categories of North American culture; it would trace the change and develOpment the image has undergone during the past 180 years. The exhaustive solution would inquire into representations of the professional in our art and literature, and in the work of social scientists. It would survey the opinions officers have about themselves today, and contrast them with Opinions officers have held at the different stages in the deve10pment of our army since 1775. This paper does not pretend to any such exhaustive solution. It praposes only to explore current attitudes of army officers in a few limited areas, and to examine the results of the exploration in the light of certain army doctrines, and in the light of some of the doctrines accepted generally by business administrators. It is haped that this process will add to a scant but growing body of knowledge. This is not an apologia, but a statement of what the reader may expect to find, in the spirit of the quotation: "The scientist is not one who, wishing to Open a door, must once and for all choose from among a bunch of keys the 12 one key which alone is good. Scientific research is a series Of successive approaches to the truth, comparable to an exploration in an unknown land. Each explorer checks and adds to the findings of his predecessors, and facilitates for his successors the attainment of the goal they all have in common."1 METHODOLOGY In this "approach to the truth," the writer will survey "doctrine" as it is expressed in.the works Of scholars and observers in the fields of business, military science, and the social sciences. In addition, the paper will report an empirical investigation into the attitudes and values of pro- fessional army officers. There will be a conscientious effort to avoid the bias of the "fixed and preconceived ideas" described by Roethlisberger, but at the same time the writer will not hesitate to interpret, to emphasize, and to diagnose.2 ‘When personal opinion might tend to confuse or obscure the empirical evidence which has been collected, however, the opinion will be presented in a footnote. Since the method used in compiling this empir- ical evidence is considerably less Obvious than the method of ”library research," several of the pages following will be used to describe it. Given the accumulation of certain data it is necessary to determine how best to present it. The material in this paper may be of some interest to business men, to military men, to sociologists, and to some extent, to political scientists. Unfortunately, these groups have no common language. A terminology which would make sense to the business man, and perhaps to the military, would leave the social scientists in some doubt as to the authenticity of the thesis. On.the other hand, language which Tipg calls 'sociology's breadppudding prose“ might cause the soldier or the business man to be puzzled or indignant.3 In an attempt to resolve this conflict, business jargon, army gobbledegook, and the breadppudding of working social 13 scientists all will be excluded from these pages. Instead, only language which the average well-read person reasonably might be expected to have in his vocabulary will be used. It is hOped that the words chosen will be "guides to reality," not ”barriers between us and reality."u In describing the basis for the empirical investigations which form a part of this study, there will be no attempt at abstract conceptualization. This does not represent any disdain for the scientific method; it represents instead an appreciation of the limitations of the study, and a conscious decision in favor of sigpgficance over precision. The writer started with a number of ideas concerning the professional officer which, if correct, would aid in understanding his attitudes and values. These ideas were based on reading, on observing, on interviewing, and on the writer's own 16 years of experience in the army. There may be some who will take exception to these ideas on the ground that they are simply statements of self-evident facts.‘ The testing of real "self-evident facts" would be a waste of time, and prObably would brand the researcher as the sort of person described by the newspaper columnist who said: ”A social scientist is too Often a man who gets a $1,000,000 grant to question 10,000 persons in 1,000 towns and write a loo-page paper offering 10 possible explanations . for one prOblem that his grandmother could have answered without moving from her rocker."5 The reader is requested to hold his exceptions in abeyance until the returns are in. There will be a few surprises. The ideas that form the framework around which much of this study is built are called in breadppudding prose, "hypotheses stating the existence of empirical uniformities;' in translation, these words mean: "the scientific examination of common-sense propositionsfi6 The common-sense prepositions, then,which will be tested in this probe into 1“ the nature of the steward of our most important resource are these: 1. The professional officer is motivated by a sense of dedication to his country, and he holds an exceptionally strong belief in the importance Of his work. 2. The professional officer's experience, and his training in handling large groups of men, have made him an expert in organization. 3. Because the army is aimed at efficiency in war, the professional officer tends to overemphasize the outward manifestations of efficiency in peace. h. The professional Officer believes that discipline and morale are essential to the success of his work. 5. In Spite of the trend toward push-button warfare, the professional Officer perceives his basic role to be one of providing leadership, and he does not believe that leadership can be-taught. 6. The professional officer is inclined to confuse his authority with power. 7. Recognizing himself to be a member of a lowestatus group, the professional officer compensates by over-rating his importance in the social mystem. 8. The professional officer is unaware of a change in civilian attitude toward.him as a result of his closer relationship with the civilian community. TECHNIQUE OF THE METHODOLOGY It was determined at the outset that a questionnaire would be used to test the validity of the prOpositions from the professional Officer's point of view. First, a collection of some 150 statements which seemed to bear on 15 the problem at hand were extracted from books, journals, and unpublished manuscripts. These statements, by military officers, business men, soci- ologists, and political scientists, were then edited and typed on file cards. In order to eliminate ambiguities, biases, and lack of clarity, the cards were pretested in discussions with a small group of professional officers. Forty statements survived. The statements, all of them in fact "hypotheses" in themselves, were grouped in eight categories of five questions each, coinciding, with some overlapping, with the eight prepo- sitions stated earlier. Each respondent was given the opportunity of stating whether he "agreed," had "mixed feelings,I or "disagreed" with the statements. The process actually is a modification of the method preposed by the psychologist L.L. Thurstone, although the procedure devised for scoring is different, as will be seen.7 As a cross-check on the eight areas, eight more questions were designed, asking respondents to check a single word which best described their own attitudes, Opinions, and beliefs. A cOpy of the questionnaire is included as Appendix A. In determining by whom the questionnaire would be completed, it was obvious that the purpose of the study did not permit the sample to be structured strictly in accordance with the "population." If questionnaires were apportioned among all officers according to the distribution of ranks and components, a cross-section of army opinion would be obtained, but a cross-section of this kind would not be the representation sought. It was decided, therefore, to address the questionnaire to two groups: professional officers of considerable experience, and as a control, reserve second lieu- ‘ tenants with less than one year's service. Accordingly, replies to the questionnaire were obtained during the summer of 1958 from 60 career officers of all branches serving as instructors 16 at the Fort Bragg, North Carolina ROTC Summer Camp; from six.at Fort Lee, Virginia; and from six.at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. At the same time, 100 replies were obtained from newly-commissioned second lieutenants attending the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course at Fort Lee.8 It would appear that the 100 young officers (their average age was 21% years) might give the sample a "quartermaster bias." In fact, 95 of the respondents were recent Reserve Officer Training Corps' graduates from colleges and universities offering "general military science" programs. Only a few of them had had active duty experience, and their military instructors in the colleges, and at the Fort Lee school itself, were drawn from the combat arms as well as the technical and administrative services. Of the 95 ROTC graduates, 87 had been on duty less than nine weeks, none of the others longer than a year-- hardly enough time to develOp a "bias.” STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLE The sample representing the professional includes twice the proportion of regular army officers, 68 percent, as the total active army itself. The writer'was of the opinion that such a sample would more nearly typify the "professional" than would a sample structured strictly in accordance with the true proportions of regulars and career reservists (Table 1). Actually, a check of responses after the returns were in established that there was no significant difference between the two categories. Neither were there differences between officers of the combat arms and officers of the technical services, nor between field grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels) and company grade officers included in the sample (first lieutenants and captains). The sample, then, may be said to represent the professional with a considerable degree of accuracy. 17 TABLE 1 ACTIVE ARMY OFFICER PERSONNEL BY RANK (June 1958) Source: .AnmyiTimes, (washington, D.C.), may 28, 1958, p. 12 RANK REGULAR REEEXEE TOTAL PERCENT PERCENT OF ARMY & NAT. GRD. REGULAR TOTAL General 475 4 479 99.1 .50 Colonel 41?“ 398 #572 91.3 9.86 Lt Colonel 6509 5196 11700 55.6 12.44 Major 5607 10626 16233 34.5 17.26 Captain _ 6918 23062 29980 23.1 31.87 1st Lieutenant 6435 12565 19000 33.8 20.21 2nd Lieutenant 18h9' 10249 12093 15.2 12.86 TOTALS 31957 62100 9&057 33.9 100.00 Results of the questionnaire are shown in Tables 2 through 36, and 39 through 51. Part of the discussion which follows in succeeding pages will be‘based on these results. Because of the limited size of the sample, no numbers that differ less than five percent are considered to be signif- icant. The five percent figure was selected on the basis of judgment, after an analytical examination of all the responses to all of the items in the questionnaire. There is no statistical method for establishing the sub- stantive significance of the differences between the responses, although it is possible to determine mathematically whether the difference between two proportions is significant in itself, or whether it arises out of a sampling fluctuation. Heinz Eulau and his associates argue that the statistical method should be used I'whenever and wherever possible."9 The writer agrees, 18 and has, in all apprOpriate cases checked the actual proportional difference between responses with the standard deviation, in a table of probabilities which varies in accordance with the number of units of standard deviation. In Table 2, for example, there were 72 responses from professional officers, and 98 from reserve lieutenants, a total of 170. Of the 170 respondents, 134, or 79 percent, agreed with the statement, "Peace can be maintained only so long as the military is prepared to fight effectively and immediately." Applying a formula to determine the standard deviation of the difference in percentage, the following will occur: 6D¢~ =\/1pq<-+-2 )2 where d’ is the standard deviation D is the difference p is the total percentage of occurence 1-p .0 ll N1 = number in first sample N2 = number in second sample an¢= \/pq(1+-2)= XH79><21)(—+—> = .062 = 60% Among professional officers, 69 of the 72 respondents, or 96 percent, agreed with the statement; 65 of the 98 reserve lieutenants, or 66 percent, agreed. The actual difference between the two prOportions (96% - 66% = 30%) is 4.8 times 6.2%, the standard deviation. An examination of the table of probe- bilities will show that there is approximately one chance in 17,000 that the difference is a chance difference due to sampling.10 19 For the sake of clarity and understanding, the responses to the questionnaire are presented in the tables in percentages. The five percent figure chosen to establish the validity of the difference between the two groups tested is of necessity somewhat arbitrary. It does permit, however, extremely conservative analyses of the data. The comments which individual respondents chose to make concerning the various statements have been tabu- lated, and are included as Appendix B. The comments are sometimes enlightening, occasionally amusing, and add a certain savor to the more austere fare served in the statistical tables. REFERENCES 1. Gaetano Salvemini, Historians and Scientists, (Cambridge, Hass., The Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 112-113. 2. F.J. Roethlisberger, William J. Dickson, and Harold A.'Wright, Management and the worker, (Cambridge, Hass., The Harvard.University Press, 1950), p. 271. 3. Time, Oct 13, 1958, p. 46. h. 5.1. Hayakawa, Language in Action, (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1941), p. 218. 5. Sydney J. Harris, syndicated column, The Detroit Free Press, May 2, 1957, p. 8. 6. ‘William J. Goods and Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research, (New'Iork, MbGrawzHill Book Co., Inc., 1952), p. 59. 7. For a discussion of the work done with internal consistency scales by L.L. Thurstone, Gardner>Murphy, Rensis Likert and others, see Geode and Hatt, loc. cit., p. 270-285. 8. Upon entering active duty, each newly-commissioned second lieutenant is required to attend an officer basic course before joining a unit. Each branch of the army has its own school which presents some general training, but particularly specialized instruction planned to provide the knowledge essential to a junior officer of the branch concerned. Courses are from eight to sixteen weeks in duration, depending on the branch, and average about 600 hours of classroom work. 20 9. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, Bolitigal Behavior; A Reader in Theory and Research, (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1956), p. 3. 10. For a discussion of this statistical process, see Herbert Arkin and Raymond R. Colton, An Outline of Statistical Methods, (New York, Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1942), pp. 118, 122-123. CHAPTER III DEDICATION AND IDENTIFICATION AMONG OFFICERS Consider the standard of values which obtained among the American peeple during the years of World War II. Here we were able to sublimate our normal drives and ambitions, our fears and prejudices, our instincts and hungers, to the furtherance of the designs of the state. We saw our friends and brothers off to battle, and buried some of them. We saw our women in factories and shipyards, our children cared for by the community. We saw a whole segment of the population deported a thousand miles and dumped in a new environment, when citizens of Japanese ancestry were barred from the Pacific Coast. We controlled prices, restricted profits, allocated indus- trial capacity, rationed consumer goods, raised taxes, abolished strikes, went to church, and sang The Star Spangled Banner. The whole of our peeple f mnd fulfillment to the degree that they were able to sacrifice for the country. Consider the sense of dedication" which permitted each person so to conduct himself. It is to the point to remember that it all endured not quite four years. This is not to say that there is an absence of dedication during the years of non-war. Indeed, the dedication exists, but to a lesser degree. It ebbs and flows in the population of an organized state with the same irregular rhythm that characterizes the ebb and flow of peace and war. L * Dedication, as the term is used here, actually includes the idea of identification with the state as a larger self. 22 But it does not ebb and flow'in the professional officer corps. The career officer has a profound and uninterrupted sense of dedi- cation to his work. As he sees it, the dedication is not just to the profession of arms, but through the profession to the ideals and symbols of the state. "The character of the [officezfl corps is in a most direct sense a final safeguard of the character of the Nation," says an official pronouncement of the Department of Defense.1 This statement is intended to be inspirational, of course. But it is more-it represents quite ably the level of importance at which the officer places his service. The high- level placement of the task, and the professional's dedication through the task to the nation, is not a war-time phenomenon. The management of violence in combat is only a phase in his lifelong career, requiring no reorientation, no re-training, no profound change in patterns of thought and habit. This is fortunate and necessary, necessary to the survival of the society. Despite the tragic need for participation by the whole population in total war, a distinguished Englishman spoke truly when he said, "modern civilians in.general are much too self-conscious to conduct the grave tragedy of war with the high, preoccupied composure it demands."2 CONDITIONING AND IDENTIFICATION 'What causes the intense identification with, and dedication to the service evidenced in the army officer group? The factor of "commitment,” of course, is almost self-evident. Having entered the profession of arms, an officer is soon faced with the decision of adjustment-whether to accept, or whether to reject the values and goals of the group. Once a choice for acceptance is made, consciously or by default, the dynamics of the job, simple economic realities, and the inexorable course of the calendar all combine to toughen the bonds of the officer's commitment. A less obvious 23 answer to the question of the causes of group identification and dedication may be sought in the conditioning programs in.which the group participates, starting before the officer receives his commission, and continuing through- out the 20 or 30 years of his incumbency. This conditioning is based in the officer's formal education, in his reading, in lectures and indoctrinations which he hears and which he himself presents, and in the continuing example of his peers and his commanders. "The American officer is now subjected to more formal education than any other in the world," says Fortune} The editor might have added that this education, being periodic in nature, extends over a greater length of time than does the education of any other man in government, in business, or in the professions. Upon completion of his undergraduate training, the- officer attends the basic school of his branch, then after a period of duty, the company officer's course, and later the advanced officer's course. The extent of this training is roughly equivalent to two years of advanced professional study in a civilian college or university, and is completed while the officer is in his 30's. Before he is 40, an officer may be included in the 50 percent of the corps selected to attend the Command and General Staff College. During this time, and beyond, most officers will be assigned to additional specialized training in one or several of the hundreds of tedhnical courses offered, courses ranging in scope from "atomic employ- ment" to "wheel vehicle maintenance."u' During all of this formal schooling, officers participate in training designed to: "... prepare them to perform efficiently, in peace and war, in all positions concerned with leadership of trOOps and units, with application of doctrine, tactics and technique, with the employment of units, with strategic concept, planning and execution, and with national planning and policy." 29 The point here being stated is: the officer's formal education, continuing into his mature years, emphasizes the grave responsibility of his calling, reiterates its lofty ideals, and stresses the obligation for selfless devotion to duty. This indoctrination reinforces that presented in the ROTC programs of more than 200 colleges and universities, in the United States Military Academy, and in the Officer Candidate Schools, the three sources which provide the greatest number of career officers.6 Throughout his service in the army, the officer is encouraged to participate in reading programs planned to increase his general and pro- fessional knowledge. Such programs are prepared.by the various arms and services, by the faculties of army schools, and by the many army professional associations. They include works of a technical nature, but give considerable weight to books in the field of the social sciences, particularly in history, politics, and psychology. Mest career officers participate, at least to some extent, in the reading programs. In addition, most subscribe to one or more of the 26 journals published by the army professional associations. This reading, like his formal education, is another factor bearing on the officer's intense professional orientation. A knowledge of history, and most officers have a considerable knowledge of history, leaves room for no ingenuousness concerning the fact of war. 'What he has read in psychology constrains him to view men as they are, not as they ought to be. No one knows why men fight wars, but the officer is well aware of the fact that they do, and is ruefully certain that they will continue. This certainty reiterates the importance of his work in the consciousness of the professional. It is a clichJ in the Army that an officer spends "75 percent of his time either teaching or going to school." His teaching may be in one of the many service schools, in the ROTC program of a university, or in the day-to-day 25 training schedule of his unit. Every officer is trained in the techniques of teaching during his undergraduate days, and progressively increases his knowledge in his branch schools.7 The best way to learn a subject is to teach it. An important part of the officer's orientation toward his own profession is acquired from the instruction he presents. While instructing, inepiring, and molding others, he unquestionably strengthens his own con- cepts and ideals. Before world war II, the small number of officers in service, about 12,000 in 1939, enabled almost all to live isolated from the rest of the community in the ancient but comfortable quarters on the country's army posts. The young officer, and those not so young, were confronted constantly with the ideals, patterns and standards of their seniors, not only on the job, but in their social life and casual community contacts as well. This constant proximity to his work, plus the near quarantine, inevitably pro- duced an individual with strong conformist tendencies. The direction of tho conformity, of course, was toward the image of the dedicated soldier. Today, the officer population of the army is eight times greater than it was in 1939, and a significant number of officers must live in civilian communities. Nevertheless, Tables 2 through 6 in this chapter offer evidence that the degree of dedication has not lessened materially. Appar- ently, a considerable inward compulsion persists, and, as many psychologists have noted, changes in.well-rooted convictions do not come easy. Johns Hopkins' Professor Mergan says: ”Beliefs and attitudes tend to preserve themselves, because a person selectively perceives and remembers what fits in with his existing attitudes and beliefs."8 26 AN IDEOLOGICAL GAP The tendency of the officer to identify strongly with his work, to conform, to live a dedicated life, to subordinate self to duty, represent values which are held by the majority of civilians only in.wartime, and mark an “ideological gap between the military and civilian worlds."9 Both the civilian and the professional are aware of such a gap, but perhaps neither has considered the reasons for it, nor considered that it is probably a good thing. It permits the civilian to maintain the economic drive and self- interest which gets the work done, while the soldier guards the fort. It also encourages the officer to consider himself a member of a special class, for the same reasons noted by Gardner and Moore in their discussion of the class system in America: "The important thing about a class in society is that class members tend to participate socially only with those who are in their class. They see members of their class as 'peOple like us,' 'people who think and live like we do.”10 Snygg and Combs write of the principles on which an individual bases his relationship to a social group.“- Two of them are: ”Individuals tend to seek self-enhancement through identifying themselves with and winning the approval of groups or individuals they believe to be important. "Peeple tend to withdraw from groups whose approval they are unable to win and from groups which no longer satisfy their needs." The Messrs. Snygg and Combs might have found evidence of the validity of their principles in a survey of the professional officer group. Reflect on the first one, and try to call to mind any individual who has sought self—enhancement outside the officer group, while he has been a member of it. The writer can think of no army officers at all, although an 27 active naval officer, Admiral Daniel J. Gallery, may be the exception. Gallery has achieved success as an author of fiction; his stories appear frequently in the Saturday Evening Post under the signature "Dan Gallery." Of course, there are many who have sought recognition in other fields gftgg they have left the service. Simon, too, notes the tendency toward group identification, writing, ”It is characteristic of behavior that members of an organized group tend to identify with that group ... ."12 The "needs" cited in the second principle border on the area of motivation. Physiological needs may be passed by in this discussion, but a study of psychological needs in relation to the number of persons who withdraw from the army might prove worthwhile. That the military fails to retain sufficient men on a long-term basis seems to be a fact well but— tressed by evidence.* .Apparently all of the efforts at correcting this enervating turnpover are formulated around the idea that there is something "wrong" with the service. It is inexplicable that someone has not hypoth- esized that there is something "wrong" with the men. This is not to say that every eligible man who fails to accept a career in the service has some flaw in his character. It is suggested, however, that those officers who fail to find I'a home in the service" may be emotionally unsuited in the same way that other men are unsuited for the demands of other professions. Obviously, they do not sing Thomas Brigham BishOp's refrain, "Shoo, fly! don't bodder me! I belong to Company C, I feel like a morning star." THE EVIDENCE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE Responses to the first five statements in the questionnaire described in Chapter II, and to the "word game" in number 41, are presented in tables * A discussion of attrition in connection with leadership is included on pages 77-78. 28 two through seven. The reSponses have an interesting bearing on the subject of this chapter, and support the arguments presented. No less than 96 percent of the professionals believe that peace can be maintained only so long as the military is prepared to fight effectively and immediately. Only 66 percent of the reserve lieutenants believe it, although 24 percent have mixed feelings in the matter, and only 10 percent disbelieve it entirely (Table 2). TABLE 2 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FIRST STATEMENT "Peace can be maintained only so long as the military is prepared to fight effectively and immediately." PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals 96 V 3 1 Reserve Lieutenants 66 24 10 The difference between the professionals and the young officers in this matter is quite significant, and illustrates two points made earlier: (1) professional officers have a strong belief in the importance of their work, and (2) they are inclined to accept men as they are, and not as they ought to be. It might be reasoned, and with merit, that many of the young men are still possessed of the ideals brought with them from the country‘s campuses, despite the fact that a majority of 66 percent accept the statement as correct. Nevertheless, the import of the divergence in agreement, 30 percent, is of salient consequence. Both groups agree overwhelmingly that army officers are on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week; 83 percent of the professionals believe it, 7# 29 percent of the reserve lieutenants (Table 3). TABLE 3 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SECOND STATEMENT ”An army officer is on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week.“ PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE 1am FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals '83 12 5 Reserve Lieutenants 74 13 13 Again, however, there is a significant difference between the two in the direction of a stronger work orientation on the part of the professional. It is safe to speculate that the degree of dedication revealed here is at least as great as that among physicians and clergymen, and notably greater than that in other professions. It may be significant, too, that the four professionals who Commented on the statement all claimed "mixed feelings," and, in effect, appeared to be defending an unorthodox rationale (Appendix B). It is comforting to note the unanimous agreement shown in Table # with the statement, ”An officer is obligated by the code of his profession to keep himself and his troops in constant readiness." A subsidiary signif- icance lies in the implication that so many appear to know what the "code" of the profession is. It is not surprising that the professionals accept this amorphous noun, but the fact that the neophyte officers do is a tribute to the methods of indoctrination to which they have been exposed. Only one respondent, a reserve lieutenant, commented on the statement, asking, "What is the code of the profession?" A comprehensive answer to the lieutenant's question is beyond the sc0pe of this paper. Briefly, the code is embodied 30 in federal statutes, in executive orders of the president, in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in army regulations, and in the customs and traditions of the service.13 The substance of the code is summarized in the motto of the United States Military Academy: "Duty, Honor, Country." TABLE 4 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRD STATEMENT "An officer is obligated by the code of his profession to keep himself and his troops in constant readiness." PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals 100 - - Reserve Lieutenants 97 2 1 Statement number four in the questionnaire elicited more comments from officers, a total of 15, than any other (Appendix B). Again there appears a difference of real significance between the professionals and the reserve lieutenants. Only eight percent of the professionals believe that "bad assignments" are sufficient reason to get out of the army. An officer's "bad assignments" might include "hardship tours" to the Far East, the Middle East, or the fringe of the Artie, without the comfort of wife and children; duty at isolated posts with inadequate housing and facilities; service in monotonous tasks which offer no opportunity for professional advancement, or simply jobs in.which the officer has no real interest. Fiftyethree percent of the career officers feel that these are not sufficient reasons to leave the army, 39 percent are in doubt. The difference in work orientation can be seen readily by comparing Opinions of professionals and reserve lieutenants in Table 5. 31 TABLE 5 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOURTH STATEMENT fiAn officer who continually gets bad assignments should get out of the army." _: .1 “:—_—— i _ PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MDPED FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals 8 39 53 Reserve lieutenants 26 1+6 28 Eightybnine percent of the career officers believe that "the army is more than a career, it is a way of life." None disagree. The younger group shows a marked, although lesser, amount of agreement. One of the novice lieutenants added a whimisical touch in his comment, "It is a way of life, but not one that I care for particularly." One is inclined to speculate on how this young man will approach his first assignment with a unit. Once again, Table 6 reveals a unanimity of attitude toward a strong wofikcmientation. TABLE 6 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FIFTH STATEMENT ”The army is more than a career, it is a way of life." PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals 89 11 - Reserve Lieutenants 78 17 5 The editor of The Atlantic Monthly wrote in August of 1958: ”Security for the greatest number is a modern Shibboleth ... if we keep on trading independence and initiative for 32 security, I wonder what kind of American enterprise will be left fifty years from now."1 Others have noted and commented on the drive for security in the United States and elsewhere, in the post World War II decades. The University of Pennsylvania psychologist, Morris Viteles, calls "resistance to change" an "anxiety," and attributes this anxiety to the "deep-seated need for security in'terms both of the immediate situation and outlooks for the _f_u_t_gr_e_."15 William H. Whyte, Jr., in his best-seller, The Organization Man, discusses the impulse of college seniors toward security, and their "faith in the beneficence of the corporate salary.n16 Another sign of the times is the addition of a new member to the presidential cabinet, a director of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which heads the Social Security Administration, which heads the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors' Insurance. In industry, management in its search for employees emphasizes the security approach. For example, "career advancement, stock purchase plan, generous discount policy, group hOSpitalization plan, company paid pensions plan, company paid life insurance, summer and winter vacations" are inducements offered by a national retail organization.17 Big unions seek security for their members in a guaranteed annual wage, and "fringe benefits." The armr has not escaped the compulsion toward security, as may be discovered in any list of the advantages of an arm career. One man has even written a book on the aspects of security for service personnel.18 One would guess that this "modern shibboleth" would rank high as the most important factor in a military career in the selections made by pro- fessional officers and reserve lieutenants. Table 7 bears out this guess for the lieutenants, 41+ percent choosing "security,” with "patriotism” a poor second with 25 percent. These results confirm the findings of Whyte, 33 and the research reported by Viteles, in their discussions of the impulses and ambitions of the "younger generation." But not so the professional. Thirtthhree percent place "patriotism" in first place, trailed by 27 percent who went along with their not-so—much-younger brothers in naming security. The difference between 27 percent among professionals, and 44 percent among reserve lieutenants is impressive, and adds more evidence in support of the hypothesis: "The professional army officer is motivated by a sense of dedication to his country, and he has an exceptionally strong belief in the importance of his work." TABLE 7 FACTORS SELECTED AS MOST IMPORTANT IN A MILITARY CAREER . W , 3% PROFESSIONAL % RESERVE FACTORS OFFICERS LIEUTENANTS Patriotism. 33 25 Security 27 44 Dignity 17 7 Recognition 15 15 Adventure 8 Henry - 4 REFERENCES 1. Th; Armed Forces Officer, 0p. cit., p. 3. 2. ‘Wilfred Trotter, Ingtincts of the Herd in Peace and.War, (London, Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 115. 3. "The U.S. Military Mind," Fortune, Feb 1952, p. 91. 34 h. For detailed treatment of the educational system Of the army, see Pamphlet 20-21, The Army School Catalgg, (washington, Dept of the Army, 1957), and Army Regulations 350-5, Egucation and Training, (Washington, Dept of the Arm, 1952). 5. Army Regulations 350-5, Op. cit., p. 9. 6. For an idea Of the SCOpe of an Officer's undergraduate training, see the Catalpgue of the United States MilitarLAcademy, (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1958), particularly pp. 2-11; also, Am Training Program No. 145-60, General Military Science Curriculum for Civilian and Military Colleges, (Washington, Dept of the Army, 1957), particularly pp. 8-17. 7. The principles and techniques of military instruction are presented in Field Manual 21-5, @mmhamgg, (Washington, Dept of the Am, 1957) and in Field Manual 21-6, Techniques of Militia Instruction, (Washington, Dept of the Arm, 1954). 8. Clifford T. Morgan, Introduction to Psychology, (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1956), p. 352. 9. Huntington, Op. cit., p. 269. 10. Burleigh B. Gardner and David G. Moore, Human Relations in IndusEz, (Homewood, 111., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955), p. 41. 11. Donald Srwgg and Arthur W. Combs, Individual Behavior, (New York, Harper & Bros., 1949). PP. 187-189. 12. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1945), p. 13. 13. For discussions Of the code of the aruw see The Officer's Guide, Op. cit., pp. 236-251, 457-468; also, Huntington, Op. cit., pp. 55-79, 254-269; also, The Armad Forces Officer, Op. cit., pp. 1-31; also, John J. McCloy, "In defense Of the army mind," Harper's Magazine, v. 191+, (Apr 1947), pp. 341-344; also, Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Pate}; (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951), ch. 2. 14. Edward Weeks, ”How big is one," The Atlantic Monthly, V- 202. (A118 1958). PP- 25-30- 15. Morris 5. Viteles, Motivation and Morale in Industgz, (New York, W.W. Norton 8: Co., Inc., 1953), p. 302. Professor Viteles' chapter 16 reports a great amount Of empirical work by psychologists and others in the area of "security.” 16. William H. Whyte, Jr., The _O_rganization Man, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday 8: Co., Inc., 1956), p. 79. 17. Robert Hall Clothes help-wanted advertisement in The State Journal, (Lansing, Michigan), Oct 21, 1956, p. 71+. 35 18. Captain James M. Garrett, III, Principles of Insurance and Government Benefits for Service Personnel, (Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 1957), 213 pp. CHAPTER IV BUREAUCRACY IN THE.ARMY "The officer corps is both a bureaucratic profession and a bureaucratic organization.'1 Given an Opportunity to acknowledge their belief in the truth of this statement, 91 percent Of the professional officers who responded to the questionnaire declined to do so (Table 8). Officers do not seem to recognize the reality of bureaucracy in the army which they serve. It may be because bureaucracy is a nasty word. It conjures up visions of endless governmental red tape, of creaking administrative machinery, Of fusty Old civil servants surrounded by file cabinets and damp umbrellas, of frustrating delays, endless blank forms, and triumphant inefficiency; Actually, bureauc- racy need not be a nasty word, nor should it always evoke a nasty image. A 1956 unabridged dictionary interprets the word to mean: "A system of carrying on the business of government by means of departments or bureaus, each controlled by a chief, who is apt to place special emphasis upon routine and con- servative action; Officialism; also, government conducted on this system. Hence, in general, such a system which has become narrow, rigid, and formal, depends on precedent, and lacks initiative and resourcefulness."2 The nastiness has crept in. There is no doubt that the dictionary mirrors a pOpular concept, one sufficiently prevalent to impress the lexicographers. Nevertheless, there is a considerable number of persons, primarily students of business, political science, and sociology, who do not cry "nasty" on the appearance Of the word, but instead consider it merely to 37 be descriptive Of one form of organization, "The type of organization designed to accomplish large-scale administrative tasks by systematically coordinating the work Of many individuals ... ."3 Obviously, such an organization would function.not only in a system.of government, but also in the administration of an industry, a religious body like the Catholic church, an educational institution, or an army. Bureaucracy is not Pbad" per se, it is bad only to the extent that it is permitted to become bad, or as one critic says, "It is universally had only if complexity and size are inherently bad.“u WHAT IS BUREAUCRACI? The classical theoretical work on bureaucracy was done in Germany by the sociologist Max Weber about 50 years ago. Professor Weber's sociological perception enableth to pinpoint the characteristics of bureaucratic ' structure in what.he called an "ideal-type" concept. His writings have become the most quoted work on bureaucracy in the United States and Britian, as well as in his own country, and his theories are accepted as basic by both his adherents and his critics. The discussion of the characteristics of bureaucracy presented below is based on‘Weber. The ideas are his, the words are not; 'catchwords" have been invented to mark each item for identi- fication later in the chapter. The characteristics of a bureaucracy are: 1. EppgpionalpSpecializaE§gp. This criteria considers the division Of labor which makes it possible to emplcy experts in each of the areas of specialization which have come to be accepted as normal in industry, in government, and in non-profit institutions. Historically, the trend toward functional specialization began when enterprises grew to a size where the manager himself no longer had time to accomplish all the administrative tasks of the expanding organization.5 38 2. §3§pdardized Procedure. A bureaucracy functions in accordance with a system Of written regulations. These may vary from a mimeographed sheet of instructions handed a stenographer, to a considerable Operations manual furnished an executive. The regulations may be titled "Organization Mbnual,‘ or I'Personnel Regulations," or "welcome to Plant NO. 2," or some- thing else. Whatever the name, and wherever found, the purpose is to foster conmdiance with general rules of performance, and tO assure that any given action.will be performed without variation regardless Of who may perform the action.6 3. Pyramidal Responsibility. This criteria presupposes a "chain Of command" wherein each subordinate is answerable to a superior in a level of authority above him. The area Of control in each level is circumscribed by the nature of the reSponsibility vested in the subordinate, or more usually, in the position which is occupied by the subordinate. In the chain of command, each supervisor is reaponsible not only for his own performance, but for the performances Of his subordinates as well.7 A. Career Patternization. The tendency of a bureaucracy is to formulate personnel policies which will emphasize the advantages of a career pattern. These policies are motivated by a desire to build a stable, lcyal working force which will assure continuity in the Operation.8 5. Ippggsonal Objectivity. The various functionaries in a bureaucracy must conduct themselves without favoritism or prejudice, and seek an entirely impersonal posture vis a vis subordinates and clients of the organization. This characteristic is more evident in government bureaucracies than in industry or nonpprofit institutions. In industry, in particular, management strives continuously to promote an attitude of great interest and personal concern toward customers. This policy may be discerned in slogans: "The 39 - customer is always right," or "Our job is to serve," or "Treat every cus- tomer as a distingusihed guest." Actually, the intent is to establish a high level of impersonality. For an efficient bureaucratic Operation, rational standards must govern to assure equal disinterested treatment of all--subordinates and clients.9 6. Organizational Cohesiveness. The total effect of the character- istics of a bureaucracy is to promote an esprit de corps, a sense Of belonging, which gives maximum impetus to the striving for the impersonal success of "the organization." The bureaucrat who places his own interest before that of the group is shunned and disliked by his fellows, and usually is “found out." A football coach emphasizing teamwork is teaching "organi- zational cOhesiveness," or loyalty to an abstract entity--the whole. ‘Weber says that bureaucracy is the most rational administrative organization, because it is superior in precision, stability, strigency of discipline, and reliability, and he implies that organizational cohesiveness enhances this rationality.10 'Weber's "ideal-type" bureaucracy is entirely valid conceptually, but being I'ideal," actually does not exist in any form that can.be examined first-hand. In practice, a bureaucracy has characteristics other than those enumerated. At least two of them are of sufficient importance to add to the list. They are: 7. Adjustive Flgxibility. The rigidity of WOber's pure-form bureau- cratic structure makes it necessary to point out that bureaucracy must have mechanisms present which serve to permit adjustment--frequently rapid adjustment-to changing situations. A truly rational bureaucracy is indeed flexible, flexible however, within the framework Of the concept‘Weber postulates. 40 8. Unsanctioned Informalism. The nature of a bureaucratic organization requires the oil of informal organization to make the machine go. Blau points out that, "Informal relations and unofficial practices develop among the members of bureaucracies and assume an organized form without being Officially sanctioned."11 Blau uses the word "informal" in the Sense in which it is defined by Barnard: "By informal ... I mean the aggregate Of the personal contacts and interactions and associated groupings_of peOple ... ."12 BUREAUCRACY IN ARMY ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE The reader may have noticed in reviewing the foregoing characteristics that there are interesting comparisons with army organizational structure. Let us examine these comparisons step by step. A long time ago men learned that the successful waging of war required as great a degree Of organization as did the successful managing of trade or government. The first mOb Of Neanderthalers that set out to steal the women in a near-by cave prObably learned that a leader was required to concentrate the efforts of the mOb toward the common goal; succeeding races of men found that great numbers of warriors were required to defeat hostile invaders, or to seize the possessions of neighbors. One of the first movements toward bureaucratic organization came about when the warriors were grouped according to the weapons they carried-ethe beginning of fppgtional specialization. Specialization has progressed, until today in our army there are 15 branches of service, 386 enlisted occupational specialties, and 406 officer occu- pational specialties.13 Standardized_procedure had its footings in the armies of the ancients, starting, no doubt, with the first leader who taught a uniform method Of wielding a weapon. In this country, the great Prussian, Baron #1 Friedrick‘WkA. von Steuben, wrote in French the first standard regulations for our army; translated by‘washington's aides, the regulations were pub- lished in 1779 as figgulations for the Order and Discipline gfzthe Troops of the United States. In 1958, regulations, manuals, bulletins, memorandums, and other forms of written procedure fill a small library. About 500 B.C. Sun Tzu said, "The control of a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.'14 'We know from the writings of Vegetius that pyramidal responsibility existed in a highly develoPed form in the Roman legions before the time of Christ.15 The pyramidal organization chart is a fixture in every office and orderly room in our army of 1958, portraying the chain of command. Career patternization in armies finds its greatest develOpment in the modern army of the United States. Each of the 15 branches has its "career management section," staffed for the purpose of channeling the activities of officers and men in accordance with a "plan" worked out for each type- individual. The emphasis on protection against arbitrary dismissal, and the system of promotions noted by Weber form.only the basis for patterni- zation today. Evidence may be noted on any recruiting poster. One of the manifestations of impersonal objectivity in the United States army has been the traditional divorcement of the military from politics, or, as the President wrote in 1948, "... political estimates are the function of governments, not of soldiers."15 As the army's only "client," the gtgtg must be served without favoritism.or prejudice toward its political apparatuses. Further evidence of impersonal objectivity may be found in the custol.of social separation of the officer and his subordinates. George ‘Washington said, "Whilst men treat an officer as an equal, regard him as no #2 more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd, no order nor discipline can prevail." Organizational cohesiveness in the army, of all places, is not only a characteristic of bureaucracy, but a prerequisite for success. “Strength comes to men when they feel that they are grown up and as a body are in control and under control, since it amounts to the same thing; it is only when men unite toward a common purpose that control becomes possible. In this reapect, the servant is in fact the master of the situation, fully realizes it, and is not unprepared to accept proportionate responsibility."17 General Douglas MacArthur returned to the Philippines on October 20, 19h4. Because of the deteriorating Japanese situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered cancellation of projected Operations against Tap, Mindanao, and the islands of Talaud and Sangihe on September 15, and directed instead that an assault be mounted against Leyte two months in advance of the long-planned target date. Even as the project was being considered, the XXIV'Army Corps, an element destined to join the Philippine invasion, was loading in Hawaii for the Yap Operation. Just a month later, an immense amphibious force approached Leyte's east coast.18 A perceptive German general once said: "A mind that adheres rigidly and unalterably to original plans will never succed in war, for success goes only to the flexible mind which can conform at the prOper moment to a changing situation.'19 Adjustive flexibility, our first noneweberian characteristic, is the very essence of military operations, and is quite adequately summedpup in the soldier's phrase, "Stay loose." The informality of army command in combat is well known, and its applications have been told in books by the men who made it work.20 Any 43 officer who reads this will be able to recall instances when personal letters have been used to circumvent whole echelons of intermediate authority. In practice, the nature of administrative mechanisms in an army foster ug:_. sanctigged informalism. Wbber says that the bureaucratization of armies began when it became more efficient for "war lords" to supply equipment and provisions from their own'hagazines.'21 As armies grew in size, so did their bureaucratic organization grow in importance and complexity. Blau writes, "... a large and effective army did not cause bureaucracy; on the contrary, bureaucratic methods of operation produced an effective large army."22 For'many years students of business and the social sciences have acknowledged the fact of bureaucratic organization in governmental, industrial, ecclesiastical, educational, and militagy complexes of great size, and have studied its effect on society, on men, and on the organizations themselves. This paper has discussed the characteristics of bureaucracies at some length, and has described how the army fits the criteria, primarily for the benefit of army officers who may read it. ARM! ORGANIZATION AS OFFICERS SEE IT Only nine percent of career officers selected "bureaucracy" as the word best describing the army's organization.* Forty-three percent of the pro- fessionals selected I'pyramid" as best describing the army's organization, ten percent selected "hierarchy" (Table 8). Both of these words suggest one of thezmcst apparent characteristics of bureaucracy, pyramig§l_gg§pgnsibi1i_yy Another characteristic, Specialization, was named by 1? percent. It is quite a Actually, this is more likely a reaction to the "nasty word" bureaucracy than evidence of a lack of information. no, obvious that officers know enough about their own organizational entities to install systems and make them work, and it may well be that the matter of a name has never seemed to be of particular importance. It is disconcerting, however, to find that 17 percent of the professionals think that the word ”traditional" is descriptive of the army's organizationp-this in the face of "unification" in the 1940's, the "pantomic" reorganization of combat divisions in the 1950's, and constant changes, reorganizations, and rea- lignments in combat arms and technical services ever since 1775. TABLE 8 'WDRDS SELECTED AS BEST DESCRIBING THE ARMY'S ORGANIZATION at PROFESSIONAL % RESERVE FACTORS OFFICERS LIEUTENANTS Pyramid #3 27 Specialization 17 17 Traditional 17 a 13 Hierarclv 1o 11 Bureaucracy 9 13 SOP 4 19 Tables 9 through 13 shed more light on what officers believe about organization. In Table 9, we find that 17 percent of the professionals agree that the organization of the army is based on ”specialization," confirming the 17 percent figure which appears opposite "specialization" in Table 8. Among reserve lieutenants, however, 42 percent agree, a response which appears to invalidate the Opinions revealed in Table 8.* * An explanation of the discrepancy probably lies in the differences in wording in the two items in the questionnaire. , 1*5 It is significant that less than half, 41 percent, of the professionals dim with the statement, "The organization of the arm is based on specialisation. " TABLE 9 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SIXTH STATEMENT "The organization of the am is based on specialization.” T J PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGm MIXED MOS DISAGREE Professionals 17 1+2 1+1 Reserve lieutenants #2 30 28 In messing Opinions on span of control in statement number seven in the questionnaire, "An officer or non-com 93—3322 be emcted to supervise directly more than 11 men," 52 percent of the professionals awe, 69 per- cent of the reserve lieutenants agree. Significantly, the lieutenants gm more, and disag_rgg less, than do the older officers, 1&8 percent of whom either dieegreee or have mixed feelings about the statement.* Professor Koontz of UCLA uses the term ”span of management," and dis- cusses its employment in such diverse associatims as Hoses' Israelites (Exodus 18:13-26), department stores, railroads, and armies. He quotes the Graicunas" concept of the genetric increase in the complexities of managing as the number of subordinates increase , showing how twolve * Quite likely the variation reflects the greater experience of the professionals who have come to doubt that there is any set number of persons that can be supervised. This Opinion is borne out in the writings of modern students of management. " V.A. Graicunas, a French management consultant, established his much quoud concept in a paper written in 1933. ug subordinates will cause no less than 2#,708 relationships. (The formula: n62;- + n-i), where g is the number of persons supervised.) He nukes reference to other ”spans," namely the spans of time, attention, per- sonality, energy, and knowledge, as they interact and affect the span of control. He points out that these other "spans," vary from one individual to another, and.so preclude any particularization concerning the nunber of persons who nay be supervised. Koontz believes that the span of control Inst be calculated to fit the individual, and the situation in which he finds himself.23 Newman says, "The limits on.the number of people a nan can effectively supervise arise fundamentally fro. the physiological and :nental capacity of individuals." He, like Koontz, warns of the dangers in decreasing what he chooses to call “span of supervision' to the point of endangering cullunication, flexibility, speed, economy, and morale. He sets up a systoa of guides for'selecting the opthama span of each executive, as follows: (1) variety and importance of activities supervised, (2) other duties of the executive. (3) stability of operations, (4) capacity of sub- ordinates and degree of delegation, and (5) practicality of relieving the executive 1: overburdened?“ IABEE 10 OPINIOflS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SEVENTH STAIIHENT Qin officer or nonpcoa.cannot be expected to supervise directly more than 11 nen.‘ W PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals 52 18 30 Reserve Lieutenants 69 S I h, 27 it? In Table 11, there is almost total agreement with the idea that, “Standing operating procedures in the army are necessary and important.“ Since standardizedirocedure is one of the characteristics of bureaucracy, it appears that officers recognize the characteristics, even though they deny the nane. TABLE 11 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EIGHTH STATEMENT "Standing Operating procedures in the arm are necessary ‘ and important.” W PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE IEXED MOS DISAGREE Professionals 94 1 Reserve Lieutenants 88 _ 8 h In the nutter of security, discussed earlier in eomection with Table 7, it is possible to find in Table 12 a verification of the conclusions drawn. ‘ Only ‘00 percent of the career officers believe that, “An officer has security, if not of his life, then certainly of his livelihood," while 57 percent of the reserve lieutenants agree. Of equal significance are the figures showing that 60 percent of the professionals either disagree or have mixed feelings, while 43 percent of the younger Ien disagree. Both professionals and reserves agree in substantial majorities that, "there is a gap between formal procedure and the infoml realities of ‘ canand,‘ as shown in Table 13. This statenent has a bearing on another of the characteristics of bureaucracy, motioned MOM and adds more evideme that the characteristics, if not the name, are knOIm. TABLE 12 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE NINTH STATEMENT ”An officer has security, if not of his life, then certainly of his livelihood.’ PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals 1&0 36 21» Reserve Lieutenants 57 22 21 TABLE 13 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TENTH STATEMENT "There is a gap between fornal procedure and the infernal realities of comand. " mom moan menu mm m minus swam Professionals 72 1h 14 Reserve lieutenants ' 63 27 10 mass 1e mungtm. 22’ Ci 3. De 16e 2. Webster' New International Dicti 2nd. ed., (Springfield, Hass., G.&C. Merriam Co., Publishers, 1956 3. Peter H. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society, (New York, Random Hm0,1956)s Fe 11% 49 14. Marshall E. Dimock, "Bureaucracy Self-Examined," Reader in Bureaucragv, Robert K. Merton, et. al., eds., (Glencoe, 11.1., The Free Press, 1952), p. 398. 5. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociolog, trans, by H.H. Garth and C. Wright Mills, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 196. 6. Max Weber, The Theory of Social:and Economic Organization, trans. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 330. 7. Ibide, Pe 3310 8. Ibid., p. 334. 9. Ibid., p. 3150. 10. Ibid., p. 337; also, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, o . cit., p. 215. 11. Blau, op. cit., p. 35. 12. Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the_§xecutive, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 81. 13. Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations»0perations, (Washington, Dept of the Arm, 1954), p. 13; Amy Regulations 611-201, Manual of EnlListed Military Occupational Specialties, (Washington, Dept of the Arm, 1955), pp. 9-13; and Special Regulations 605-105-5, Commissioned and Warrant Officer Personnel MilitarLOOcupational Specialties, (Washington, Dept of the Arm, 195%). pp- 185-188. 14. Sun Tzu, "On the Art of War," trans. by Lionel Giles, Roots of Strategy, (Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 19555, p. 30. 15. Flavius Vegetius Renatus, "De Re Militari," trans. by John Clark, Roots of Strategy, Ibid., pp. 102-104. 16. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Eurom, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday 8: Co., Inc., 1948), p. 80. 17. The Armed Forces Officer, Op. cit“ p. 112. '18. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War--Triumph and Tragggz, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), pp. 178-180; also, Dupuy and Dupuy, gp. cit., PP. 600-601. 19. Major General Baron von Freytag-Loringhoven, The Power of Personality in War, trans. by Oliver L. Spaulding, (Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 1938), p. 91. 20. See particularly Eisenhower, op. cit., pp. 209-219; also, Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, (New York, Henry Holt 8: Co., 1951), We 266-285e 50 21. From.Max‘weber: Essays in Sociology, Op. cit., p. 221. 22. Blau, gp. cit., p. 38. 23.' Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of Management, (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1955). pp. 87-100. 24. 'William H. Newman, Administrative Action, (New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), pp. 257-277. CHAPTER V DISCIPLINE, MORALE, AND EFFICIENCY Which is the nest important leg On a three-legged stool? Which is the most important to the successful accomplishment of a group task, dis- cipline, morale, or efficiency? Remove one leg of the stool, and the milk- maid.falls flat on her’nilk bucket. Remove one division of the trichotomy, and the success of the group task, like the milk-maid, falls flat. Dis- cipline, morale, and efficiency are all legs of the same stool., This is no recent discovery. Students of the military art are familiar‘with the story of Caesar's siege and capture of nesie in 52 B.C. In this last of the Gallic campaigns, Caesar's force of some 50,000 prevailed over a third of a million Gallic tribesmen. Caesar, of course, had.something more than 50,000 legionaries: I'... he had also the genius of the great captain, the spirit and discipline of his men ... . His own courage, the high gggalg of his'nen--soldiers have never had any higher morale-and the splendid state of effectiveness to which he had finally brought his cavalry gave him.the victory."1"' In.the front rank among military writers of all time, after Julius Caesar, are de Saxe, Jomini, du Picq, and Clausewitz. All of these (and many others) have considered the essential coefficients: discipline, morale, and efficiency; In 1732 de Same wrote: * The underscoring has been added. 52 "After the organization of trOOps, military discipline is the first utter that presents itself. It is the soul of armies. If it is not established with wisdom and maintained with unshakable resolution you will have no soldiers. Regi- ments and armies will only be contemptible, armed mobs, more dangerous to their own country than to the enenw."2 De Same correctly placed the establishment of discipline as the first order of business. Whether it should be the first order of business in business, will be discussed later. Clausewitz has this to say: "War is a special business, and ... it always continues to be different and separate from the other pursuits which occupy the life of man. To be imbued with a sense of the spirit and nature of this business, to make use of, to reuse, to assimilate into the system the powers which should be active in it, to penetrate conpletely into the nature of the business with the understanding, through exercise to gain confidence and expertness in it, to be completely given up to it, to pass out of the man into the part which it is assigned to us to play in War, that is the military virtue of an Army in the individual. '3 Without using the words , Clausewitz ' involved German sentence even in translation neatly su-arizes the trichotcwudiscipline, morale, and efficiency. Once established, discipline may well lead to morale, to efficiency, and finally to the end product of the three--success. t DISCIPLINE IN ARMEES What of the nature of discipline? Joanni, whose genius served both Napoleon and Alexander I of Russia, taught that I'... discipline should enst in the sentiments and convictions rather than in external forms only. "I" Du Picq said, "Discipline must be a state of mind, a social institution based on the salient virtues and defects of the nation.'5 The nature of discipline, then, Inst vary according to the character of the persons to whom it will apply. We know that the "discipline of the Greeks was secured L. «e‘ (A‘- 53 by exercises and “wards; the discipline of the Romans was secured also by fear of death."6 m arlies, including our own, enforced a hard and punitive discipline with the lash until well into the nineteenth century.7 Today, the necessity for discipline in our am is no less acute, but "the salient virtues and defects of the nation" require that it be established with some-- thing more subtle than the lash. It nay be true that human nature does not change. If it is true, then the method of the lash should prove as effective for the armies of 1958 as for the aziies of 1758, or 1858. And it does. It does so for the am of Red China, and for the any of the Soviet Union. In the am of Red China, for maple: "... discipline takes grinner forms. Rope is wound and crossed over the alrem raw flesh of a pair of wrists. lhe bound figure kneels on the earth of a conpound, where the idle and curious watch the transition from life to death. Il'he Hauser's muzzle is held about one foot fro: the back of the kneeling figure's neck. This is punishment for disobedience to orders, degertion (in most cases), and a variety of lesser infractions.“ The discipline works with the coolie cannon fodder of the Comunist Chinese, as aw veteran of the Korean War can attest. In the am of Soviet Russia, "the institution of the 'penal battalion' Ins created. These units ... were used for the most dangerous tasks ... for clearing mine fields by advancing, for almost suicidal blows at the anew defense, and as initial echelon in areas of heavy enesw fire. ... In some cases, they were sent into battle unarmed .‘9 Thus discipline in the ranks of our World War II allies. Of course, this is not the end and substance of discipline in the mass levies of China and Russia. Indeed, doctrine and performance in both armies goes such further toward perquisites than does our own. Political emissars, too, are tireless in their efforts toward indoctrination and conditioning.“ The product: a good soldier. Still, we have met and won in combat with the Chinese, and we shall be able to prevail against the Russian when the time cues, given sufficient men and materiel. The plrpose of this paragraph, however, is not to dwell on atrocities, but to illustrate a fact which should be apparent: mores, motivations, and patterns of thought in war are different ammg modern Americans than among other men, and modern Americans mquire different treatment. mRALE AND FAITH I'Morale, for all thegreater purposes of war, is a state of faith ... ."11 In this sentence, an American philosopher has sumued-up the essence of every one of the manuals and publications ever printed by the Superintendent of Documents. For m, the faith is in the institutions of the country; for others, in their concepts of the nature of God; and for some, perhaps, in the brotherhood of arms which discipline has given then to accept. ‘nlat excellent book, Es Armed Forces Officer, has a most admirable chapter on morale which says in part, "morale does not come of discipline, but discipline of morale. '12 This statement puts the second before the first, but it is relieved somewhat by an earlier declaration in the same chapter, "The handiest beginning is to consider morale in con- Junction with discipline, since in the military service they are opposite sides of the same coin."13 It is fashionable, sometimes, to smile at any regulations and, manuals, and to consider them a set of dry-as-dust documents written, in all likelihood, by a little old gray-haired lady in the basement of a for- gotten red-brick building on an obscure side street in Washington. Let us 55 see what the gray-haired lady has to say about discipline: I'lfl.l:l.te.ry discipline is an outward manifestation of mental attitude and state of training which renders obedience and proper conduct instinctive under all con- ditions. It is founded upon respect for, and loyalty to, properly constituted authority." '1“ And let us see what can be learned from the gray-haired lady' 3 paragraph on morale: 'Horale can be defined as the individual's state of minds-how he feels about himself, his fellow soldiers, am life in general, and all the other things that seem important to him. It is closely related to his needs. ... High morale gives the soldier a feeling of confidence and well-being that enables him to face hardship with courage, endurance, and determination.”- ’ Thus it is not difficult to know how discipline and morale are envisioned in the any. It is a matter of long study and application, however, to know how discipline and morale are established. Training, of course, is vital, but the any must rely primarily on leadership-owe quality specifically in the province of the professional officer. In the any version, esprit de corps is not the same as morale, although the two terms are sometimes used interchangably by students of _ business. I'llor'ale" refers to the total emotional tone of an individual, while “esprit de corps“ is the esteem which members of a group have for the m. Esprit de corps in an any is very much the same quality as esprit de corps in an industrial organization, but the quality of morale is not, and the quality and degree of discipline is not. They cannot be same, because the purposes of the enterprises are different, and the purposes met be achieved in different rays. DISCIPLINE AND MORALE IN BUSINESS It will be profitable now to review the ideas of students of business. Professor Davis of (bio State writes: "Good discipline is closely allied to loyalty: it may be defined as a mental condition which leads individuals and groups to accept executive direction and supervision willingly. It induces them to conform voluntarily to policies, rules, and regulations which are set up to pro- note an effective accomplishment of objectives. Good discipline is a result of morale development."16 In this statement, Davis concurs with the snow/nous author of The Armed Forces Officer in considering discipline to be a product of morale. This is correct for a business, but not for a citizen m, where the vital factor of consent is lacking. Furthermore, the am officer conbines both executive and Judicial authority, while the business man's function is solely executive. In his discussion of I'equity," Urwick, a former director of the International Management Institute in Geneva, says that in business there is no Judicial process, a fact which throws a special responsibility for equitable conduct upon the administrator.” In a citizen arm, voluntary conformity and willing acceptance is the goal of leadership, but conformity and acceptance Inst be attained, willing or not, if the danger of de Saxe's 'arned mob" is to be avoided. A timely example of the armed nob in miniature is provided in the case of the era's special group of Enlisted Scientific and Professional Personnel" at the luv Chemical Center in Maryland in September 1958. y; reports: 'leedled unmercilessly for 'wasting' the nation's young scientific brains in routine basic training, the Amy ... had set up a policy of assigning draftees with some scientific education to special groups ... . Fresh from campuses 57 and freer academic life, the ESPP's kicked hard against regimentation, cut sloppy military figures, took to hissing non-cons and arguing with officers. Old Any types complained that the soldier-scientists were coddled with special barracks and mess halls, interviewed incessantly to make certain they were happy, chauffeured to their jobs instead of marched, allowed to lead an undisciplined 40-hour week consisting of 36 hours' laboratory work and four hours' Am duty."18 This attempt to develop morale in a segment of the non-consenting citizen any without first establishing discipline ended in a near-riot, and court martial for ten men. It might have been worse. Finding a usable definition of morale in the literature of psychology or business is a formidable task, because of the prediliction of writers in these fields to confuse morale with esprit de corps. One acceptable defi- nitim reads: "The term ml; refers to a condition of physical and emotional well-being in the individual that makes it possible for him to work and live hopefully and effectively, feeling that he shares the basic purposes of the groups of which he is a member: and that makes it possible for him to perform his tasks with energy, enthusiasm, and self-discipline, sustained by a conviction that, in spite of obstacles and calflict, his personal and social ideas are worth pursuing."19 The factor of "consent" has been mentioned earlier. Another particular reason for agreemnt with the consensus of business authorities in fixing the development of morale ahead of the establishment of discipline lies in the place of the union in industry. The same American impulse which resists discipline (call it fmedom or fecklessness, depending on your point of view) acts through the union as organized resistance. An employer would be fash-e ioning his own ruin if he were to build a factory, recruit a working force, 58 and inediately set about imposing discipline. He would find that his workers would not consent. He would be faced with high employee turn-over and ab- senteeism, his production chart would start to show red ink, his desk would be piled high with union grievances, and strike threats would echo in his sullen plant. PATTERNS OF EFFICIENCY In the any, then, it is (1) discipline, .(2) morale, and (3) efficiency; in hisiness, (1) morale, (2) discipline, and (3)cfficiency. what of effi- ciency, the third part of the trichotonw? The any officer uses the term in its cmonly accepted definition, "capacity to produce desired results." In economics and business the definition generally has a different emphasis: "the power of producing wealth." Strangely enough, there is a considerable controversy among students of business over Just what efficiency means. I Frederick W. Taylor, "the father of scientific management," said in 1903 that efficiency meant "the state of possessing adequate skill or knowledge for the performance of a task."20 Taylor believed that a man achieved efficiency by turning out the largest daily output of which he was capable, and a compalv achieved efficiency when the greatest possible productivity had been reached.21 He wrote that true efficiency would lead to more "surplus," higher profits, higher wages, and lower prices for the consumer. Since Taylor's time, three schools of thought and action have grown up in the approach to a science of business. These might be called, for want of better names, "conservative," "liberal," and "radical." The conservatives are followers of Taylor and the industrial engineers, emphasizing efficiency in the palpable job of production, brought about by observation and measure- ment of the work processes themselves. The liberal concept is embodied in 59 the writings exemplified by the Davis-Newman-Urwick faction, viewing manage- ment as the function of planning, organizing, and controlling people and resources through the use of logically based principles. The radicals follow the teachings of Elton Mayo, Roethlisberger, Likert and their apostles and disciples, toward the ideal of group cooperation through the application of psychology, sociology, and functional anthropology to "group dynamics." There are, of course, no clear-cut lines of demarcation between the "schools of thought and action." There are, instead, wide "gray areas" where the concepts overlap. Guidance and inepiration may be gained from all three. The theorist Chester I. Barnard (one of the "radicals") differentiates between "efficiency" and "effectiveness." He says that am given action may be "efficient" without being "effective," or, conversely, "effective" without being "efficient." He Justifies this distinction by recourse to definition, and nintains that "effectiveness" has reference to the attainment of a specific desired end. In this framework, "efficiency" becomes a by-prcduct: that is, "efficiency" results when the unsought consequences of an action are trivial and incidental.22 In Bernard's thinking, it is easy to see that an efficient operation might not result in Taylor's "greatest possible productivity." Barnard's logic, again, might well postulate an operation's greatest possible productivity, without efficiency. Simon makes a distinction between "adequacy" and "efficiency," and declares that ~... the ftmdanental criterion ... must be a criterion of efficiency rather than a criterion of adequacy. The task of the administrator is to maximize .-23 Among the best exponents of the liberal school are Koontz and O'Donnell, who write that ". . . as management quality improves, efficiency in the utili- zation of human, as well as material, resources will grow." This is presented in a discussion of the impact of management principles on society, considering 60 the well-known "lag hypothesis" (in modern civilizations, the social sciences have lagged far behind the physical and biological sciences.) Koontz and O'Donnell consider efficiency to be the power to produce wealth, the opposite of "inefficiency and waste in utilizing technical discoveries."2u' Whatever definition is accepted, producing wealth in business and producing results in the any require the pro-existence of discipline and morale . THE OFFICER'S REACTION Statement number 11 in the questionnaire, "Parades contribute to organizational pride and efficiency," was directed at discoverning whether officers really believed that an ancient ceremony like a parade had a A salutary effect on esprit de corps. Table 14 shows that 91 percent do. Reserve lieutenants show a lesser amount of agreement thando professionals, 74 percent, as might be expected. The number who disagree, however, is insignificant in both categories. TABLE 11} OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EIEV'ENTH STATElENT "Parades contribute to organizational pride and efficiency." T :—::— PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISAGRE Professionals 91 3 6 Reserve lieutenants 71} 21+ 2 Table 15 reveals that both careerists and young reservists are unanimous in agreeing that morale and efficiency can coexist. 61 TABLE 15 OPIEIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWELFTH STATEMENT "You canflt have high morale and efficiency at the same time." —‘ —‘-;___ PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals 3 1 96 Reserve Lieutenants - 1 99 The statement, "There is too’nnch time wasted in the army on non- essentials," was intended to investigate the orientation toward efficiency existing among officers. The response reflected in Table 16 indicates that both groups are substantially in agreement, 60 percent and 55 percent, and that the professionals, surprisingly enough, are in agreement more. Only 13 percent of both groups disagree. It is possible of course, that there might be efficiency despite "too much time wasted," but in the commonly accepted definition of the word, "waste" might be considered the antithesis of efficiency. TABLE 16 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTEENTH STATEHEHT "There is too such tine wasted in the army on.non-essentials." W PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISACREE Professionals 60 27 13 Reserve Lieutenants 55 22 13 62 Table 17 tends to verify the observation made in the preceding para- graph, showing that M percent of the career officers selected "productivity" as best describing efficiency, and 1H4- percent selected "competence." Reserve lieutenants were essentially in agreement. TABLE 17 WORDS SELECTED AS WT DESCRIBING EFFICIENCY h 7L morassxm at RESERVE FACTORS omcans LIEUTENANTS Competence an 3» Productivity 141+ #6 Ability 8 1+ Training 3 3 Skill 1 12 Speed - 1 The am places serious emphasis on the conservation of supplies; frequent campaigns are launched to encourage thrift, and one of the factors considered in an officer's annual fitness report is his performance in respect to "supply economy." For these reasons, attitudes toward discipline and efficiency both are involved in statement number 110-: "It is an officer's moral responsibility to go all the way in observing supply econosw." Again, substantial majorities in both groups agree, but a significantly greater percentage of reserves agree (Table 18). Neither reserves nor professionals are taken in by outward signs of efficiency, nor by "spit and polish," if the evidence of Table 19 is accepted. Eighty-six percent of the careerists dew that a clean desk is evidence of 63 efficiency, 71$ percent of the reservists deny it. One colonel cemented, "This is never so. Work always goes to the 'can do boys." The comment is true, of course, and not only in the any; the more a man proves he can do, the more he is likely to get to do. TABLE 18 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FWRTEENTH STATEMENT ‘ "It is an officer's moral responsibility to go all the way in observing supply economy." W PERCENT PERCENT ’ mesm- AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISAOREE Professionals 65 26 9 Reserve lieutenants 78 17 5 TABLE 19 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FIFTEENTH STATEMENT "A clean desk ('the Pentagon desk') is in fact evidence of an officer's efficiency." W PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT mm MIXED FEEIINGS DISAGREE Professionals 1 13 86 Reserve Lieutenants 5 21 71+ Nobody disagrees with the proposition, "Discipline is good for peeple." We met look to the remarks of the reserve lieutenants (Appendix B) for significance in response to statenent number 16. line saw fit to comment, sixoftheninefrmanong theninepercentofthe groupwhoreported "mu feelings." All. of the comments express concern that discipline might interfere with the development of imagination, initiative, and original thought." TABIE 20 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SIXTEENTH STATEMENT "Discipline is good for peeple." PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals 94 6 - Reserve lieutenants 91 9 .. Until the adoption of the "uniform code of military justice" about ten years ago, am officers had much more authority to take action in cases of infractions of discipline (and in cases involving moral turpitude) than they do now. Statement number 17, "The uniform code of military Justice is adequate under present-day circumstances," was designed to test Opinions concerning the current practices, when compared with those of the past. The responses of the professional officers, shown in Table 21, are inconclusive. Thirty-eight percent agree, 37 percent have mixed feelings, and 25 percent disagree. It sight be claimed, perhaps, that at least a majority do 923: disagree. There is a significant difference in the responses of the reserve lieutenants, a circumstance easy to understand when we realize that these men have no basis for comparison—Ahoy were only 11 years old when the changes were made. " It is likely that these opinions mirror a minority belief in the stultifying effect of discipline, a belief which fails to take account of the fact that all human progress has had its inception in situations of discipline-us fact confirmed by philosoPhers from Aristotle in his dis- cussions of "virtue," to John Dewey in his discussions of "conduct." It is encouraging to note that 91 percent of the younger men agree. 65 TABLE 21 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH STATEMENT "The uniform code of military justice is adequate under present-day circumstances." PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT ACME MIXED FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals 38 37 25 Reserve Lieutenants 57 27 16 Statement 18. and We others in the questionnaire, are based m a paper written by Professor Janowitz of the University of Michigan, who believes that the application of authority in military forces is changing from a pattern of "decimation" to one of "manipulation."25 Table 22 appears to validate Janowitz' hypothesis, although Table 36 (to be discussed in Chapter VII) does not. Seventy percent of the professionals agree that, "The any has modified its system from rigid discipline to more indirect forms of obtaining coop- eration," and significantly, only 52 percent of the reservists agree." A regular am major, a technical service officer, was inspired to write a most engaging comment on statement number 19. He declares, "Violently disagree. Discipline among the combat arms is a little easier to come by when the motivation is temork for survival on the battlefield. A man in the tech services as; be well-disciplined to work long arduous hours on the necessary but unglamorous and unexciting job of logistical support. Add to this a factor of less supervision, and the need for discipline becomes even " It is likely that the difference may be ascribed principally to two factors: (1) most of the second lieutenants are getting a first dose of any discipline themselves, and (2) again, there is no personal knowledge of what the system used to be. more acute." Table 23 discloses that a respectable majority Of the pro- fessionals concur in his disagreement, 59 percent, with only 34 percent holding the Opposite Opinion. There is no significant difference in the Opinions of the reserve lieutenants. TABLE 22 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EIGHTEENTH STATEMENT "The army has modified its system.from rigid discipline to more indirect forms of obtaining cooperation." W PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals 70 25 5 Reserve Lieutenants 52 35 15 TABLE 23 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE NINETEENTH STATEMENT "Officers of the combat arms must pay more attention to discipline than technical service Officers." PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE MIXED FEELINGS DISAGREE Professionals 34 7 59 Reserve Lieutenants 26 18 56 Statement number 20, "Military discipline is a state of order and Obedience existing within a command," is "right out or the book."25 There is near total agreement in both groups." *That agreement is stronger among the lieutenants, 90 percent to 79 percent, may be an implication that the reservists have either read "the book" more recently, or believe it more strongly; 67 TABLE 24 OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF m NENTIETH sum "Military discipline is a state of order and obedience existing within a command." PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT AGREE m FEEIINGS DISAGREE Professionals 79 16 5 Reserve lieutenants 9O 7 3 The results of the "word game"set up in statement number #4 disclose a significant difference in attitudes between professionals and reserve lieutenants. Table 25 shows that 39 Porcent of the former think that "response" best describes discipline, while only nine percent of the latter think so. TABLE 25 WORDS SELECTED AS BEST DESCRIBING DISCIPLINE +— W mm 1‘ mgm 3mm“, Response 39 9 Obedience ~ 21+ 41 Self-cultural 20 17 COOperation 16 30 Subordination 1 3 Punishment - - Twenty-four percent of the professionals selected "obedience" as the word which best described discipline, while a mapping 1&1 percent of the lieutenants 68 selected the word. The two groups approach parity in selecting "self-control," but there is another significant difference in the percentages selecting "cooperation," 16 percent of the career officers, and, 30 percent of the second lieutenants. A number of conclusions may be drawn from an evaluation of Table 25', in addition to the obvious one that the professionals are "right" and the reserve lieutenants are "wrong," and, therefor, more emphasis in training should be placed on eaqalaining what discipline really is. One of the less obvious conclusions, albeit a tentative one, might be that neither are "right," and a re-examination of doctrine is in order. MERENCES 1. 3.6. Brady, Caesar's Gallic Cam, (Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 1952), p. 172. 2. Maurice de Saxe, Reveries on the Art of War, trans. by Thggfias R. Phillips, (Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 1 )9 Po 77‘ 3. Carl von Clauswits, On War, vol. 1, trans. by J. J. Graham, (London, Routledge a. Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1949). p. 181. 1}. J .D. Hittle, Jenni and HisSuma Sumary of the Art of War, (Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 1952), p. 65. 5. Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies, trans. by John N. Greely and Robert C. Cotton, (Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 19%). p0 1110 Go Ibid., Fe 51. 7. Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday 5 Co., Inc., 1951+), pp. 31-33. 8. Robert B. Rigg, Red China's Fi h Hordes, (Harrisburg, Pa., The mitary Service Publishing Co., 1952), p. 1%%. 9. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine, (Glencoe, Ill... The Free Press, 1953), p. 238. 108 115 10. _Ib_i_._c_l_._, pp. 223-252; also Rigg, cp.cit., pp. 14, 23-2h, 67, 70-73, 69 11. William Earnest Hocking, Morale and Its Enemies, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1918), p. 23. 12. The Armed Forces Officer, op. cit., p. 149. 13. Ibid., p. 147e 11+. Arm Regulations 600-10, Personnel-Military Discipline, (Washington, Dept of the Arm, 1953), p. 1. 15. Field Manual 22-100, Command and Leadership for the Small Unit Leader, (Washington, Dept of the Arm, 1953), p. 50. 16. Ralph Currier Davis, Industrial Organijzration and Management, (New York, Harper 8: Bros., 1957), p. 717. 17. L. Urwick, The Elements of Administration, (New York, Harper and Bros. Publishers, 1943), p. 91. 18. Time, Nov 10, 1958, p. 32. 19. W.A. Gomberg, A Trade Union Analysis of Time Study, (Chicago, Science Research Associates, 191478), p. 393. 20. Frederick W. Taylor, Scientific Management-Abe Principles of Scientific Management, (New York, Harper & Bros., 191W), p. 9. 21. _I_bg_l_._, p. 11. 22. Barnard, Op. cit., pp. 19-20, ALB-141+. 23. Simon, 92. cit., p. 212. 2%. Koontz and O'Donnell, 92. cit., pp. 11-12. 25. Morris Janouitz, The Military Establishment as a Social System, (University of Michigan, unpublished manuscript, 1957) , 7K) pp. 26. Field Manual 22-10, Leadership, (Washington, Dept of the Arm, 1951). p. 60 CHAPTER VI LEADERSHIP AND THE HUMAN RESOURCE Leadership is some indeterminate force of personality. No one yet has discovered Just flhat the force is, nor has anyone described it adequately; If it is present in a man, the quality can be nurtured; if it is not, no amount of cultivation will bring it forth. Given intelligence and a rea- sonable amount of manual dexterity, a man can be taught the techniques of the piano, but he will never be an.artist unless he has within.himself*flhe spark that separates the pianists from the piano players. In the same‘way, teaching an'uninspired.man "leadership techniques" will never make him.any- thing more than an uninspired man with a knowledge of leadership techniques. Fortunately, modern society offers employment for both piano players and Journeyman leaders. The importance of leadership is as great today as it was when.Moses led his peeple out of Egypt and into the promised land. EVery promised land does not require a Mbses, however, nor is leadership vested solely in those ginspired of the gift of charisma. Leadership is a matter of degree; the great decisions of life and.nar require the energies of great charismatic leaders (although they are not often to be found), while the counter boys at MacDonald's hamburger stand need no such leader. {Any condition of lead- ership, then, requires the existence of three elements: the leader, those to be led, and a specific or continuing situation. These elements are dynamic, and.variations in the nature of the latter two will require variation in the 71 first. To borrow Urwick's'phrase, "One doesn't-use a steam hamer to crack nuts."1 Great shelves of books have been‘written on.the subject of leadership. The scholarly journals of the social sciences, and the professional Journals of business and the military are crammed with articles and reports of re- search. Hardly a volume on any subject, fact or fiction, will fail to be concerned with the existence or the want of leadership. The significant thing is not the volume of words that has been written, but the clear implication that of all the abstractions which concern our modern society, leadership is well up»in.the van. One military'writer, widely quoted outside his profession, says: "Leadership has gained recognition and prominence in.the military world far greater than the mere tactical and technical manipulation of trOOps in the field. The success of an anmy in peace or‘war, or the functioning of a great industrial estab- lishment, depends very largely on the human leadership ability of its superiors."2 Part of the force of leadership, whatever it may be in total, almost cer- tainly'is an inspirational quality, capable of stimulating the "faith" required for morale and.success. Only in.recent years has the idea of "born.leaders" been abandoned. It might'be more accurate to say "tentatively abandoned." Several scholars have concluded that leaders tend to perpetuate themselves. There seems to be reason to accept this conclusion, but there remains substantial doubt whether the contingency results from inherent qmalities, or from the social advantages most leaders are able to provide their children. One researcher has noted a correlation between physical measurements and leadership. The data accumlated appears to demonstrate that persons in positions of leadership tend to be taller and heavier than their subordinates.3 General Patton, 72 ‘writing of the Pasha of Marrakech, said,¢"I have never met a man in‘whomithe hereditary qualities of leadership are so apparent. The idea of his superi- ority is so inbred that he does not have to showit."l'l Davis writes, "The biological theory has a practical significance ... ."5 The accepted leadp ership of the upper social and economic classes in America is no antiquated concept, and.its tentative abandonment is quite recent, despite 182 years of our being born equal. David Riesman concludes that "The bullet that killed HcKinley marked the end of the days of explicit class leadership. *5 A good.niddle-oi-the-road summation is supplied.by*Macarow, "A.few'nen may be naturally'gifted.as leaders, but for most of us leadership consists of skills that can.be acquired ... ."7 Despite some dissent, the consensus of social scientists, and'business and military writers, favors the idea that at least some of the qualities of leadership are transferable, pre- supposing the existence of health and intelligence. Professor Newman says: "It pays to distinguish between those qualities that an easeative mnst‘bring with him to the Job and those he gets on the Job. For~our purposes the former'nay'be called 'innate' and the latter 'acquired.' It does not matter here whether the innate qualities are inborn or developed.during child- hood. As long as‘they'are characteristics that cannot be developed.hy an individual after~he hag been selected, they beIOng in the no-compromise category." lowlan.quotes‘lacy‘s executive appraisal chart which lists three values in the "reels of no colproeise," as character, intelligence, and.intuition, and in the "proper reel. of compromise," experience, adaptability, and special skills. ' TYPES OF LEADERS AND KINDS OF EEKDERSHIP If there is no confirmed idea of what leadership is, and if the idea 73 of leadership as sue inborn quality has been discarded, it might be prof- itable to try and find out something about the other two elements in any condition of leadership. The other two elements , as stated earlier, are: "those to be led," and "the situation." Psychologists have spent considerable time, thought, and money in research to determine the effects or different ‘ kinds of leadership on the- members of the groups which are led, and on the . achievement of goals. One of the best known experiments is the work of Kurt Levin and his colleagues in analysing ”authoritarian," "democratic," and 'laissez-taire' leadership.9 This research started with situational studies at children, and has been accepted not only in the field of education, but by industrial psychologists and business theorists as well. he researchers concluded that the groups led, and the goals achieved, both fared better under "democratic“ leadership. Despite its wide acclaim, and its contribution to theory, this writer chooses to be a member of what may well be a minority of one in mllowing this fare with a liberal sprinkling of salt. mum ilplies an admiration for the old-fashioned “hard-driving leaders“ in a chapter he calls 'Togetherness." With tongue in cheek he writes: aAs group MOS studies have proved, high group morale is the heart of production. This means that the ideal leader should not lead in the old sense-uthat is, focus his attention and that of the group on goals. He should instead concentrate almost wholly on the personality relationships within the group. If he attends to these and sees to it that the members get along, the goals will take care of themselves."10 It is surprising to realise how marw sane people have distorted the findings of researchers to the point where a statement like the one quoted can be accepted with perfect equaninity. The key word, of course, is I'goal." A 74 vital part of the leader's function must be the setting of a meaningful goal. It must be meaningful to the worker, and at the same time economically desirable to management. Gardner and Moore say: '. . . management which is not able to translate the prob- lems of doing business into broad, organizational goals which employees can understand, will find employees resistant and obstructive, for they will see the actions of management as threats against their own personal well-being.'11 One writer classifies the kinds of leaders as the "hunter-warrior type," I'the priest-leader type, " “the politician-leader type," and “the business-leader type."12 Of greater signification is the classification put tagether by the Brookings Institution's A. Mason Barlow, who declares, “The number-one man in any group imaginable has gained his position in one of three use: he has been elected, self-chosen, or twain” Harlow categorises methods of leadership as the method of mrsuasion, the dominant method, and the Lnstitutional method. The elected and the self-chosen use the methods of persuasion or dominance; the appointed leader uses the institutional method.“ It is the appointed leader and the institutional method which are of greatest concern to industry, and to the am, and it is here that the "journeyman leader" finds two fruitful fields of employment. It is not the Journeyman, however, who becomes a captain of industry, nor does he make the great decisions of life and war. It is on these levels that the ”indeterminate force of personality," and the "spark of inspiration“ have their effects, working within the framework of institutional leadership. LEADERSHIP IN IRDUSTRI As the country grows, the need for leaders grows. More and bigger business structures require more men who possess the ability to inspire morale 75 and success , more men capable of guiding a group toward a mutually desirable goal. In the last 30 years, this need has resulted in continuing efforts on the part of industry to discover, to develOp, or to train men in leadership. In order to do this readily, a system for recognizing leadership character- istics wéuld be most helpful. One approach is to list characteristics like ingredients in a pizza recipe, and follow with instructions explaining how to m. This approach is certainly the most popular. The characteristics are developed by some process of induction, no doubt, after observation of successful leaders in the field. As far as this writer lmows, the first to try the inductive method was Confucius , who said about 21400 years ago : "For everyone called to the government of nations and empires there are nine cardinal directions to be attended to.~15 Confucius' list of nine is really not too antiquated today. Sixteen characteristics are listed by Professors Craig and Charters, who explain, “In order to make possible a specific analysis, the sixteen abilities and traits which were found indispensable to successful personal leadership have been arranged ... in the form of a rating scale.w16 (master I. Barnard undertakes to list “five fundamental qualities."17 Maoerow lists "eight basic qualifications," and so on.18 Confucius' list is better than am of them. The striking thing about all of the inductionists is that no two of their lists of characteristics agree. It might be worth while to take, say, ten lists of characteristics, and select from the ten those characteristics that have been mentioned by four or five, or some other number of authors. Having done this, however, and having the list in hand, how does a man recognize a possessor of the characteristics when he sees him? This is where the psychologist comes in. Vance Paclcard's provocative book has this to say: 76 "Early in the fifties Fortune noted that 'nothing more important has happened to management since the war than the fact that many companies have begun to enqaeriment psychol- ogically on their supervisors and tap executives. ' .. . The psychological services provided by management-consulting fires grew apace."19 Everyone is familiar with the usual sorts of tests administered to applicants for employment, the simple work tests ("how fast can she type"), the tests which measure ability in tons of reaction time and reflex, and even apti- tude tests. But the psychological tests are something else again. These gens, including the Thematic Apperception Test, the Rorschach, the Szondi, variations and combinations of them, and even hypnosis, all have been used to probe into adjustment and leadership potential in executive personnel , and in applicants for executive jobs. It may well be that psychological testing is wholly sound in a clinical environment, but in the hands of charlatans, witch-doctors, and even well-intentioned laymen who learned their psychiatry in high school , this instrument is grotesque.20 The basic fallacies in using such do—it— yourself tests to identify leaders, or to select potential leaders , number at least four. They are: (1) there is no list of leadership characteristics which is councnly accepted as valid, (2) there are no tests which will measure value judgments, (3) a test which might work for a company in a given situation would not work for another company, or a different situation, and (it) regardless of what a test purports to reveal, ultimately the hiring, firing, or promoting mst be on saneone's subjective decision. Hr. We expresses his feeling in the matter by including an appendix in his book, titled, "How to Cheat on Personality Tests."21 Host of the larger businesses today look to the college campuses for their potential leaders. Once recruited, a young man usually embarks on one of several types of executive training programs. These will range from programs which are not training at all, but outright exploitation, to soundly constructed internships which develop whatever potential exists. During the course of training, the subject's promotability probably will be determined through ratings prepared by his superiors, and, in some cases by psychological testing. If the training program is sound, if the man does have potential, and if his raters are not too seriously influenced w hunch, guess, prejudice, psychological tests, and the man's wife, the trainee probably will move up to become a leader and a rater himself. The rating is of mch greater consequence than the testing, because the very essence of leadership is not what a man is, but what he 9.93s. LEADERSHIP IN THE ARM! Earlier in this chapter, Dr. Harlow's discussion of an "institutional leader was noted. Twelve years earlier, an am officer wrote: "Institutional leadership is a system of leadership. It substitutes prestige of position for prestige of personality. It permits frequent change of leaders without injury. There are no means in a peacetime any of selecting mass leaders, so a system of leadership must be depended upmd'zz These words, in the context of Harlow's statements concerning the appointed institutional leader, describe the basis for the professional officer's leadership. Some officers, of course, are much more. Much more is necessary in time of war, and in may of the crises of the years of non-war. The army demands leadership of its officers, recognising its essentiality in the management of our most important resource. Furthermore, the any provides the authority requisite to emand. A military psychologist writes: "The leader starts out with authority. The military and 78 naval forces give it to him. His uniform gives it to him. Authority is essential to discipline, It forms the back- ground of all. leadership. Yet most of the power that the leader needs in order to lead is not given him. "23 It is in the attempt to prove his fitness for leadership that the officer finds his greatest challenge, and his most crucial area of adjustment. It is likely that failure to adjust, failure to meet the challenge, accounts for a critical preportion of the attrition which plagues the peacetime officer corps. Graduates of the military academ leave their duties in alarming numbers: most of the men comrdssioned from Reserve Officer Training Corps programs in the colleges and universities count the days of their required service until they can be released. No doubt much of this may be attributed to "job-connected dissatisfactions,' including difficulty in finding decent places to live, the necessity for frequent moving from place to place, the prolonged absences from family, and the continuing requirement for assuming new tasks and new routines. But failure to measure up to the challenge of leadership must not be overlooked. One writer may have fixed on an underlying cause of the frustration which leads to rejection in his statement, ”The military leader, when he loses his influence on his command, loses all power to achieve resulted?" To this fight he added, “failure to gain influence produces the same frus- tration." One is obliged, also, to question the effects of some of the leadership the young officer is coutpelled to accept. let all fail to escape the constriction of institutional leadership, as history will attest. General Patton once wrote: "The history of war is the history of warriors; few in number, mighty in influence. Alexander, not Macedonia, con- quered the world. Scipio, not Rome, destroyed Carthage. Marlborough, not the Allies , defeated France., Cromwell, not the Roundheads, dethroned Charles.”25 79 To the roll might well be added the name of Patton himself. Somehow, persons of his unusual capabilities always have been ready when the flag came under fire. There are those who claim that society in 1958 is geared to produce "organisation men,‘ "organization scholars,‘ and, who knows, perhaps "organization soldiers.“ God grant that some flaw in the gearing will permit a few'more Pattons to come off the assembly line. This is not to say that there is any magic system that will apply across the board. On.the contrary, each man who is gifted.with the inspi- rational spark will find his own way to true leadership. General Gauss, Erwin.Rommel's chief of staff in Africa, wrote of our resPected'Wbrld'Whr II enemy, a truly inspired leader: 'In.Africa Rommel developed his methods of command unrestrictedly in consonance with his nature. These methods would be difficult to teach and can.hardly‘be applied.under general circumstances. In spite of uniform training every military commander develops his own particular methods consonant with his mentality.'26 Of course, Rommel survived the long years of institutional leadership in the bureaucracy of the'Wehrmacht, before the force of his nature placed his name in.the notebooks of historians-~and so did Patton, and Eisenhower, and Robert E. Lee. Of all the armies of the world, the army of the United States requires the highest order of leadership, for the American is the hardest individual to lead. The chief of staff of the army, speaking of recruits drawn from civil life into service, has this to say: I'Almost to a man, they will bring the national charac- teristic of resentment to discipline and authority'which, in my Opinion, presents the greatest obstacle we have to face in the creation of good troops. ... Americans as a nation are innately critical of constituted authority. ... It is 80 a phenomenon which we cannot and probably should not want to change because ... it is a necessary concomitant of the' vigorous martial virtues which are also inherent in most of our citizens.'27 A British sociologist, an observer of.kmerican society, seconds General Taylor's comments. He says: “... two major themes appear as characteristic of Americans: the emotional egalitarianism which maintains that all (white American) men are equal to the extent that the subordination of one man to another is repugnant ... and the belief that authority over peeple is morally detestable and should be resisted."28 He also declares that Americans do not hate violence and fighting, but are 'antimilitaristic because they detest authority;"29 ,Army'officers and ‘business leaders will concur in substance with what the two have to say; DISCOVERING POTENTIAL LEADERS IN THE ARMY A The prOblem of discovering potential leaders in the army is, primarily, the problem of selecting potential officers. The selected group, during its' pro-commissioning education, experiences the first program.of leadership training, a program.which is supplemented throughout the officer's career at post~graduate service schools, and of