THE BUREAUCRACY OF DESTRUCTION

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James J. Ford

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THE BUREAUCRACY OF DESTRUCTION

By

JAMES J. FORD

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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Abstract

James J. Ford THE BUREAUCRACY OF DESTRUCTION

For generations, the attitude of the American people toward the business executive, and toward the professional army officer was one of disfavor and distrust. The business executive has begun to emerge from the doghouse of popular disapproval in recent years, but there is no recorded evidence of a change in attitude toward the career officer. If the survival of our national state depends upon the strength of our military, and many believe it does, then an examination of the values and attitudes of the officer corps should be worthwhile, and might lead to a better understanding of an important leadership group in our society.

This thesis attempts to determine the officer's orientation toward his work, his concept of the organization he serves, and his attitudes toward morale, authority, efficiency, discipline and leadership. It ventures a comparison of some of the doctrines of the army with some of the doctrines of business administrators, and relates them to the opinions of the professional officer himself. The study is based on a survey of the works of scholars and observers in the fields of business, military science, and the social sciences, and on the results of a questionnaire addressed to 72 professional officers, and 100 newly-commissioned reserve second lieutenants.

The evidence accumulated appears to point toward a strong sense of identification to his work on the part of the professional officer, and

through his work, to a sense of dedication to the state. Apparently the officer, almost unwittingly, has created a pervasive bureaucracy comparable to the bureaucracies in industry, and to the bureaucracies in the other great complexes of modern organization. He seems to be sharply aware of his dependence on morale, discipline, and authority, and to be convinced of the fundamental requirement for leadership in the military art. In 1959, it is possible to detect a trend toward a coming-together of soldier and civilian, a trend which affirms a need for greater mutual understanding.

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The State of war is a state of enmity and destruction; and therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate, settled design upon another man's life, puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or anyone that joins with him in his defense and espouses his quarrel; it being reasonable and just I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction.

John Locke
(1632-1704)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In an automated factory, who activates the closed-loop feedback system? In push-button warfare, who does the button pushing? There are no robots yet that can activate themselves, nor are there any self-pushing buttons. Business men believe that the most important resource available to industry is manpower. The army, in another segment of our society, believes traditionally that the ultimate fate of the nation lies in the hands and minds of men. These convictions are held in the face of technological advances which appear to be relegating the individual to a role of ever-decreasing importance.

The army denies this relegation. Evidence of the denial can be found in almost any issue of any army professional journal, and in the many boards, commissions, and research projects which have been financed by the army to investigate the human resource.[1] General Patton once said, "Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men."[2] Later, General Ridgway put it another way, "Man is and always will be the supreme element in combat...."[3] Industry, too, is more and more coming to realize that machines do not resolve the problem of dealing with men. Instead, the problem is complicated by the necessity for training and managing the technician who serves the machine engineered to do the work of men. One writer says, "The factory of the future is not making the human being obsolete ... what it is really doing is making obsolete (his) misuse ... ."[4] In industry and in the army as well, a

reduction of numbers in "productive" labor, and an increase in "non-productive" labor, (men to control, manipulate, and maintain automatic devices) have re-emphasized the importance of providing organization, training, inspiration, and leadership.

AN HERITAGE OF RATIONAL IGNORANCE

The business executive for years was the subject of his countrymen's hostility. The image of the bloated capitalist with his fat cigar, his diamond ring, and his tall silk hat is one that has just begun to dissolve, despite the fact that leadership in American industry has been remarkably effective. The extraordinary material progress, and the high standards of living in the United States have been attributed to everything from the productivity of labor to the abundance of national resources. Nowhere has a business manager or administrator been anointed with the legendary fame of a Paul Bunyan or a Davy Crockett; indeed, until recently the leader in industry usually was cast as a villain. Outsiders have not been loath to toss a few bouquets at industrial leaders, however. Several such bouquets were noted in the magazine Nation's Business in 1952, in a report of European business men and their visits to American industries. A Frenchman is quoted as saying, ... "it is management that makes the wheels go round;" a British group declares, "We are convinced that it is efficient management who (sic) set the pace of productivity in American industry ... ."[5] Closer to home, and more recently, at least one victim of the hostility has noted a change. A.K. Weber of the Radio Corporation of America said in 1958:

> "The experience of industry during the 1930's proved conclusively that the philosophy of economic gain for no other end did not meet the test of society. ... industry has recovered

> remarkably from this period and (has) emerged as a leader in present-day society because it has so well succeeded in broadening its vision and extending its purpose."[6]

The professional officer, like his business contemporary, has not escaped disfavor. Part of the American liberal heritage is a horror of war in all its parts and contrivances. As Americans have shunned aggressive war, so have they ever been hostile to the idea of a peacetime military establishment, and to the idea of a professional officer.[7] This dogma on the one hand is based on rationality, and on the other, ignorance. It is rational when it considers that our security as a nation was never threatened from abroad until the fourth decade of the twentieth century.[8] But it is ignorant when it neglects the discipline of history--since 1775 we have fought eight major wars, "plus an untold number of minor campaigns, expeditions, pacifications, and other bickerings, including more than a century of almost continuous warfare against the North American Indian."[9] It is ignorant when it overlooks the present fact of our treaty obligations to take military action in defense of 52 countries, aside from our commitment to the United Nations.

Our heritage of "rational ignorance," then, must give way to something new, a new comprehension of historical fact, a new understanding of our posture among the nations of the world, and a new understanding of the place of the men who provide props for the posture--the business executive, and the professional officer. There is much evidence of increasing maturity among our population in its appreciation of the international role of the United States. There is no doubt that the modern executive has begun to emerge from the doghouse of popular disapproval. But there is little evidence of any change in basic attitude toward the professional officer. On the contrary, a 1955 survey indicates that civilians place him low on the totem pole of professional prestige.[10]

Why the low position on the pole? There are three principal reasons. First there is the popular stereotype, the muddleheaded but amusing dolt of TV's Sergeant Bilko, of Broadway's "No Time for Sergeants," of Hollywood's "Tea House of the August Moon." Second, there is the belief which stereotypes the professional officer as a brass-hat, a martinet, an abuser of privilege. In most cases, this officer stereotype is based on the stories told by our millions of veterans, stories in the majority of cases about the temporary incumbents in the wartime officer corps--men who served patriotically and courageously, but at a different level from the professional. While we recognize that there are deviates, the professional officer in the "ideal-type" is one who has, in Huntington's words, "... an extrordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training."[11] An eminent sociologist says:

> "... the management of such a vast enterprise has also taken on new features. Like a vast corporation a modern military enterprise demands not only increasing amounts of special knowledge and skill, but careful training and planning for its coordination ..."[12]

The professional in most cases differs from the temporary officer in motivation, orientation, and competence. Third, there is a more trenchant stereotype, one which lies deep in the minds of our people. The author of a standard text, Psychology and Leadership, wrote in 1940:

> "... the articulate part of the American folk were mainly alike in their aversion ... to the Army. ... All of these people shuddered over the horrors of war, and rightly so. ... Many of them acquired a sense of inferiority which grew distortedly and caused them to vent their spleen on the only symbol of war that confronted them--the peacetime soldier. So it was often true that back of the intellectual opposition to the military lay, not cold reason, but hot emotion."[13]

Providing the knowledge on which cold reason can be based would serve, perhaps,

to temper hot emotion in the "articulate," and so, eventually, temper the opinions of the American public.

THE MANAGEMENT OF VIOLENCE

Aside from what the public believes about him, if our culture stands or falls on the basis of what we do militarily, and many believe it does, it would appear that there should be some understanding of what the professional officer believes about himself, about his job, and about his place in society. Much has been written about civilians in times of peace, and soldiers in times of war, but little about soldiers in times of peace. One writer says:

> "In the past, American sociology has shown little interest in analyzing military institutions and the social aspects of war. American sociologists have almost entirely devoted themselves to studying society in times of peace."[14]

The book quoted, the book on which it is based, and similar books and studies by sociologists, psychologists and others, all ignore the peacetime army. This is not surprising in the light of the "heritage" mentioned earlier, but it is significant. It points up a gap in knowledge about the professional army generally, and about the professional officer particularly.

The most important function of the professional officer is, in Harold Lasswell's words, "the management of violence,"[15] or less colorfully, in the official precept: "The management of men in the practice of arms."[16] This concept of management differs from the one generally accepted in industry. Every book on business practices defines management; these definitions may be summed-up, if such a summing-up is possible, in Brown's sentence:

> "Management is an omnibus term which has been used to denote many aspects of industrial administration, and probably is generally understood as being synonymous with the administration of principal members."[17]

These two concepts are divergent, but they are not incompatible. In fact, the essential idea in both concerns the relationships of a person in authority with those other persons who are subordinate to the authority. The difference lies in the purpose for which the authority is exercised, and in the extent to which it may be sustained.

There are other ways in which industry and the military are alike. Three of them will come to mind immediately. First, there are the obvious day-to-day business activities of the technical services in military purchasing offices, arsenals, warehouses, shops, stores, utilities, hospitals, and transportation systems.[18] Second, there are the tremendous amounts of money involved. The army's budget alone for the fiscal year 1958 exceeds the total expenditures of the entire federal government for any year prior to 1941.[19] The spending of these billions of dollars requires business structures organized more extensively than any enterprise outside the government. Third, many of the principles in industrial management have been drawn from the military. Even some of the terms fundamental in the study of business administration are military terms, for example: "line and staff," "chain of command," "unity of command," "span of control."

In recognizing the similarities, however, it is important to keep the differences clearly in mind. First of all, in industry "management" generally is considered an end in itself, whether it be management of men, management of resources, or both. One of the tools of business <u>management</u> is leadership. The army takes a contrary view, holding management to be one of the fundamentals of <u>leadership</u>.[20] The concepts supporting this

distinction lie in the officer's understanding of his basic function--the management of violence--and in his appreciation of his duty to his country and to the men entrusted to his command. The legal authority of an army officer is based on the commission he holds from the President of the United States, a commission which declares: "And I do strictly charge and require all Officers and Soldiers under his command to be obediant to his orders . . . ." The professional officer considers this pronouncement not as a license to strut or steal, but instead, a summons to grave responsibility. And let us not be deceived over the use of the word "business." It would be well to disavow at once the droll idea that the army is really "big business," as has so often been said. The army is not big business, it is the ultimate weapon of the state.

In 1957, the writer administered a questionnaire to a group of professional army officers to determine their attitudes toward the importance attached to various branches of the service. /It developed that the infantry officer, a "fighting man," held status among his fellows greater than any of them. And just below him were the other combat officers, holding precedence over the rest, despite the technological and administrative training and skill of the people in the technical and administrative services./ This seemingly is an anomalous situation in the light of the statement often repeated that the army is primarily an instrument for peaceful purposes. A sample:

> "The armed services join with all the God-fearing elements of government and society in directing their efforts not at the waging of war, but at the prevention thereof."[21]

Actually this situation is not anomalous when the basic responsibility of the officer is considered. Certainly a knowledge of logistics and technology is necessary, but the officer fundamentally must lead and direct men.

Who is this person charged with leading and directing the army's most important resource? What is his orientation toward his work? How does he visualize the organization of which he is a part? What are his attitudes toward morale, authority, efficiency, discipline, leadership--the requisites of his task? This paper will attempt to answer these questions, and will venture a comparison of some of the values and beliefs of the army officer with some of the doctrines espoused by his friend in flannel--the American business man.

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16. The Armed Forces Officer, (Washington, The United States Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 39.

17. Alvin Brown, Organization--A Formulation of Principle, (New York, Hibbert Printing Co., 1945), p. 104.

18. There are 15 branches of the army in three categories--the combat arms: armor, artillery, and infantry; the technical services: chemical, engineer, medical, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and transportation; the administrative services: adjutant general, chaplain, finance, judge advocate, and military police. See Dept of the Army Manual 145-70, Branches of the Army, (Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 1954), p. 3-4.

19. Harry Hanson, ed., The World Almanac, (New York, New York World Telegram Corporation, 1957), p. 757.

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CHAPTER II

THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICER--A PROBLEM IN ANALYSIS

There are many equations in the problem of analyzing the orientation of the professional officer, and in examining his attitudes and values. A truly exhaustive solution to the problem would examine all of them--it would determine the "image" the professional officer reflects in the classes, castes, and categories of North American culture; it would trace the change and development the image has undergone during the past 180 years. The exhaustive solution would inquire into representations of the professional in our art and literature, and in the work of social scientists. It would survey the opinions officers have about themselves today, and contrast them with opinions officers have held at the different stages in the development of our army since 1775.

This paper does not pretend to any such exhaustive solution. It proposes only to explore current attitudes of army officers in a few limited areas, and to examine the results of the exploration in the light of certain army doctrines, and in the light of some of the doctrines accepted generally by business administrators. It is hoped that this process will add to a scant but growing body of knowledge. This is not an apologia, but a statement of what the reader may expect to find, in the spirit of the quotation:

> "The scientist is not one who, wishing to open a door, must once and for all choose from among a bunch of keys the

> one key which alone is good. Scientific research is a series of successive approaches to the truth, comparable to an exploration in an unknown land. Each explorer checks and adds to the findings of his predecessors, and facilitates for his successors the attainment of the goal they all have in common."[1]

METHODOLOGY

In this "approach to the truth," the writer will survey "doctrine" as it is expressed in the works of scholars and observers in the fields of business, military science, and the social sciences. In addition, the paper will report an empirical investigation into the attitudes and values of professional army officers. There will be a conscientious effort to avoid the bias of the "fixed and preconceived ideas" described by Roethlisberger, but at the same time the writer will not hesitate to interpret, to emphasize, and to diagnose.[2] When personal opinion might tend to confuse or obscure the empirical evidence which has been collected, however, the opinion will be presented in a footnote. Since the method used in compiling this empirical evidence is considerably less obvious than the method of "library research," several of the pages following will be used to describe it.

Given the accumulation of certain data it is necessary to determine how best to present it. The material in this paper may be of some interest to business men, to military men, to sociologists, and to some extent, to political scientists. Unfortunately, these groups have no common language. A terminology which would make sense to the business man, and perhaps to the military, would leave the social scientists in some doubt as to the authenticity of the thesis. On the other hand, language which Time calls "sociology's bread-pudding prose" might cause the soldier or the business man to be puzzled or indignant.[3] In an attempt to resolve this conflict, business jargon, army gobbledegook, and the bread-pudding of working social

scientists all will be excluded from these pages. Instead, only language which the average well-read person reasonably might be expected to have in his vocabulary will be used. It is hoped that the words chosen will be "guides to reality," not "barriers between us and reality."[4]

In describing the basis for the empirical investigations which form a part of this study, there will be no attempt at abstract conceptualization. This does not represent any disdain for the scientific method; it represents instead an appreciation of the limitations of the study, and a conscious decision in favor of significance over precision. The writer started with a number of ideas concerning the professional officer which, if correct, would aid in understanding his attitudes and values. These ideas were based on reading, on observing, on interviewing, and on the writer's own 16 years of experience in the army. There may be some who will take exception to these ideas on the ground that they are simply statements of self-evident facts. The testing of real "self-evident facts" would be a waste of time, and probably would brand the researcher as the sort of person described by the newspaper columnist who said:

> "A social scientist is too often a man who gets a $1,000,000 grant to question 10,000 persons in 1,000 towns and write a 100-page paper offering 10 possible explanations for one problem that his grandmother could have answered without moving from her rocker."[5]

The reader is requested to hold his exceptions in abeyance until the returns are in. There will be a few surprises. The ideas that form the framework around which much of this study is built are called in bread-pudding prose, "hypotheses stating the existence of empirical uniformities;" in translation, these words mean: "the scientific examination of common-sense propositions."[6] The common-sense propositions, then, which will be tested in this probe into

the nature of the steward of our most important resource are these:

1. The professional officer is motivated by a sense of dedication to his country, and he holds an exceptionally strong belief in the importance of his work.

2. The professional officer's experience, and his training in handling large groups of men, have made him an expert in organization.

3. Because the army is aimed at efficiency in war, the professional officer tends to overemphasize the outward manifestations of efficiency in peace.

4. The professional officer believes that discipline and morale are essential to the success of his work.

5. In spite of the trend toward push-button warfare, the professional officer perceives his basic role to be one of providing leadership, and he does not believe that leadership can be taught.

6. The professional officer is inclined to confuse his authority with power.

7. Recognizing himself to be a member of a low-status group, the professional officer compensates by over-rating his importance in the social system.

8. The professional officer is unaware of a change in civilian attitude toward him as a result of his closer relationship with the civilian community.

TECHNIQUE OF THE METHODOLOGY

It was determined at the outset that a questionnaire would be used to test the validity of the propositions from the professional officer's point of view. First, a collection of some 150 statements which seemed to bear on

the problem at hand were extracted from books, journals, and unpublished manuscripts. These statements, by military officers, business men, sociologists, and political scientists, were then edited and typed on file cards. In order to eliminate ambiguities, biases, and lack of clarity, the cards were pretested in discussions with a small group of professional officers. Forty statements survived. The statements, all of them in fact "hypotheses" in themselves, were grouped in eight categories of five questions each, coinciding, with some overlapping, with the eight propositions stated earlier. Each respondent was given the opportunity of stating whether he "agreed," had "mixed feelings," or "disagreed" with the statements. The process actually is a modification of the method proposed by the psychologist L.L. Thurstone, although the procedure devised for scoring is different, as will be seen.[7] As a cross-check on the eight areas, eight more questions were designed, asking respondents to check a single word which best described their own attitudes, opinions, and beliefs. A copy of the questionnaire is included as Appendix A.

In determining by whom the questionnaire would be completed, it was obvious that the purpose of the study did not permit the sample to be structured strictly in accordance with the "population." If questionnaires were apportioned among all officers according to the distribution of ranks and components, a cross-section of army opinion would be obtained, but a cross-section of this kind would not be the representation sought. It was decided, therefore, to address the questionnaire to two groups: professional officers of considerable experience, and as a control, reserve second lieutenants with less than one year's service.

Accordingly, replies to the questionnaire were obtained during the summer of 1958 from 60 career officers of all branches serving as instructors

at the Fort Bragg, North Carolina ROTC Summer Camp; from six at Fort Lee, Virginia; and from six at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. At the same time, 100 replies were obtained from newly-commissioned second lieutenants attending the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course at Fort Lee.[8] It would appear that the 100 young officers (their average age was 21½ years) might give the sample a "quartermaster bias." In fact, 95 of the respondents were recent Reserve Officer Training Corps' graduates from colleges and universities offering "general military science" programs. Only a few of them had had active duty experience, and their military instructors in the colleges, and at the Fort Lee school itself, were drawn from the combat arms as well as the technical and administrative services. Of the 95 ROTC graduates, 87 had been on duty less than nine weeks, none of the others longer than a year--hardly enough time to develop a "bias."

STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLE

The sample representing the professional includes twice the proportion of regular army officers, 68 percent, as the total active army itself. The writer was of the opinion that such a sample would more nearly typify the "professional" than would a sample structured strictly in accordance with the true proportions of regulars and career reservists (Table 1). Actually, a check of responses after the returns were in established that there was no significant difference between the two categories. Neither were there differences between officers of the combat arms and officers of the technical services, nor between field grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels) and company grade officers included in the sample (first lieutenants and captains). The sample, then, may be said to represent the professional with a considerable degree of accuracy.

TABLE 1

ACTIVE ARMY OFFICER PERSONNEL BY RANK
(June 1958)

Source: Army Times, (Washington, D.C.), May 28, 1958, p. 12

RANK	REGULAR ARMY	ACTIVE RESERVE & NAT. GRD.	TOTAL	PERCENT REGULAR	PERCENT OF TOTAL
General	475	4	479	99.1	.50
Colonel	4174	398	4572	91.3	4.86
Lt Colonel	6504	5196	11700	55.6	12.44
Major	5607	10626	16233	34.5	17.26
Captain	6918	23062	29980	23.1	31.87
1st Lieutenant	6435	12565	19000	33.8	20.21
2nd Lieutenant	1844	10249	12093	15.2	12.86
TOTALS	31957	62100	94057	33.9	100.00

Results of the questionnaire are shown in Tables 2 through 36, and 39 through 51. Part of the discussion which follows in succeeding pages will be based on these results. Because of the limited size of the sample, no numbers that differ less than five percent are considered to be significant. The five percent figure was selected on the basis of judgment, after an analytical examination of all the responses to all of the items in the questionnaire. There is no statistical method for establishing the substantive significance of the differences between the responses, although it is possible to determine mathematically whether the difference between two proportions is significant in itself, or whether it arises out of a sampling fluctuation. Heinz Eulau and his associates argue that the statistical method should be used "whenever and wherever possible."[9] The writer agrees,

and has, in all appropriate cases checked the actual proportional difference between responses with the standard deviation, in a table of probabilities which varies in accordance with the number of units of standard deviation. In Table 2, for example, there were 72 responses from professional officers, and 98 from reserve lieutenants, a total of 170. Of the 170 respondents, 134, or 79 percent, agreed with the statement, "Peace can be maintained only so long as the military is prepared to fight effectively and immediately." Applying a formula to determine the standard deviation of the difference in percentage, the following will occur:

$$\sigma D\% = \sqrt{pq\left(\frac{1}{N_1} + \frac{1}{N_2}\right)}$$

where

σ is the standard deviation

D is the difference

p is the total percentage of occurence

$q = 1-p$

N_1 = number in first sample

N_2 = number in second sample

$$\sigma D\% = \sqrt{pq\left(\frac{1}{N_1} + \frac{1}{N_2}\right)} = \sqrt{(.79)(.21)\left(\frac{1}{72} + \frac{1}{98}\right)}$$

$$= .062 = 6.2\%$$

Among professional officers, 69 of the 72 respondents, or 96 percent, agreed with the statement; 65 of the 98 reserve lieutenants, or 66 percent, agreed. The actual difference between the two proportions (96% - 66% = 30%) is 4.8 times 6.2%, the standard deviation. An examination of the table of probabilities will show that there is approximately one chance in 17,000 that the difference is a chance difference due to sampling.[10]

For the sake of clarity and understanding, the responses to the questionnaire are presented in the tables in percentages. The five percent figure chosen to establish the validity of the difference between the two groups tested is of necessity somewhat arbitrary. It does permit, however, extremely conservative analyses of the data. The comments which individual respondents chose to make concerning the various statements have been tabulated, and are included as Appendix B. The comments are sometimes enlightening, occasionally amusing, and add a certain savor to the more austere fare served in the statistical tables.

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6. William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research, (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1952), p. 59.

7. For a discussion of the work done with internal consistency scales by L.L. Thurstone, Gardner Murphy, Rensis Likert and others, see Goode and Hatt, loc. cit., p. 270-285.

8. Upon entering active duty, each newly-commissioned second lieutenant is required to attend an officer basic course before joining a unit. Each branch of the army has its own school which presents some general training, but particularly specialized instruction planned to provide the knowledge essential to a junior officer of the branch concerned. Courses are from eight to sixteen weeks in duration, depending on the branch, and average about 600 hours of classroom work.

9. Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, Political Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1956), p. 3.

10. For a discussion of this statistical process, see Herbert Arkin and Raymond R. Colton, An Outline of Statistical Methods, (New York, Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1942), pp. 118, 122-123.

CHAPTER III

DEDICATION AND IDENTIFICATION AMONG OFFICERS

Consider the standard of values which obtained among the American people during the years of World War II. Here we were able to sublimate our normal drives and ambitions, our fears and prejudices, our instincts and hungers, to the furtherance of the designs of the state. We saw our friends and brothers off to battle, and buried some of them. We saw our women in factories and shipyards, our children cared for by the community. We saw a whole segment of the population deported a thousand miles and dumped in a new environment, when citizens of Japanese ancestry were barred from the Pacific Coast. We controlled prices, restricted profits, allocated industrial capacity, rationed consumer goods, raised taxes, abolished strikes, went to church, and sang The Star Spangled Banner. The whole of our people found fulfillment to the degree that they were able to sacrifice for the country.

Consider the sense of dedication* which permitted each person so to conduct himself. It is to the point to remember that it all endured not quite four years. This is not to say that there is an absence of dedication during the years of non-war. Indeed, the dedication exists, but to a lesser degree. It ebbs and flows in the population of an organized state with the same irregular rhythm that characterizes the ebb and flow of peace and war.

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* Dedication, as the term is used here, actually includes the idea of identification with the state as a larger self.

But it does not ebb and flow in the professional officer corps.

The career officer has a profound and uninterrupted sense of dedication to his work. As he sees it, the dedication is not just to the profession of arms, but <u>through</u> the profession to the ideals and symbols of the state. "The character of the [officer] corps is in a most direct sense a final safeguard of the character of the Nation," says an official pronouncement of the Department of Defense.[1] This statement is intended to be inspirational, of course. But it is more--it represents quite ably the level of importance at which the officer places his service. The high-level placement of the task, and the professional's dedication through the task to the nation, is not a war-time phenomenon. The management of violence in combat is only a phase in his lifelong career, requiring no reorientation, no re-training, no profound change in patterns of thought and habit. This is fortunate and necessary, necessary to the survival of the society. Despite the tragic need for participation by the whole population in total war, a distinguished Englishman spoke truly when he said, "Modern civilians in general are much too self-conscious to conduct the grave tragedy of war with the high, preoccupied composure it demands."[2]

CONDITIONING AND IDENTIFICATION

What causes the intense identification with, and dedication to the service evidenced in the army officer group? The factor of "commitment," of course, is almost self-evident. Having entered the profession of arms, an officer is soon faced with the decision of adjustment--whether to accept, or whether to reject the values and goals of the group. Once a choice for acceptance is made, consciously or by default, the dynamics of the job, simple economic realities, and the inexorable course of the calendar all combine to toughen the bonds of the officer's commitment. A less obvious

answer to the question of the causes of group identification and dedication may be sought in the conditioning programs in which the group participates, starting before the officer receives his commission, and continuing throughout the 20 or 30 years of his incumbency. This conditioning is based in the officer's formal education, in his reading, in lectures and indoctrinations which he hears and which he himself presents, and in the continuing example of his peers and his commanders.

"The American officer is now subjected to more formal education than any other in the world," says Fortune.[3] The editor might have added that this education, being periodic in nature, extends over a greater length of time than does the education of any other man in government, in business, or in the professions. Upon completion of his undergraduate training, the officer attends the basic school of his branch, then after a period of duty, the company officer's course, and later the advanced officer's course. The extent of this training is roughly equivalent to two years of advanced professional study in a civilian college or university, and is completed while the officer is in his 30's. Before he is 40, an officer may be included in the 50 percent of the corps selected to attend the Command and General Staff College. During this time, and beyond, most officers will be assigned to additional specialized training in one or several of the hundreds of technical courses offered, courses ranging in scope from "atomic employment" to "wheel vehicle maintenance."[4] During all of this formal schooling, officers participate in training designed to:

> "... prepare them to perform efficiently, in peace and war, in all positions concerned with leadership of troops and units, with application of doctrine, tactics and technique, with the employment of units, with strategic concept, planning and execution, and with national planning and policy."[5]

The point here being stated is: the officer's formal education, continuing into his mature years, emphasizes the grave responsibility of his calling, reiterates its lofty ideals, and stresses the obligation for selfless devotion to duty. This indoctrination reinforces that presented in the ROTC programs of more than 200 colleges and universities, in the United States Military Academy, and in the Officer Candidate Schools, the three sources which provide the greatest number of career officers.[6]

Throughout his service in the army, the officer is encouraged to participate in reading programs planned to increase his general and professional knowledge. Such programs are prepared by the various arms and services, by the faculties of army schools, and by the many army professional associations. They include works of a technical nature, but give considerable weight to books in the field of the social sciences, particularly in history, politics, and psychology. Most career officers participate, at least to some extent, in the reading programs. In addition, most subscribe to one or more of the 26 journals published by the army professional associations. This reading, like his formal education, is another factor bearing on the officer's intense professional orientation. A knowledge of history, and most officers have a considerable knowledge of history, leaves room for no ingenuousness concerning the fact of war. What he has read in psychology constrains him to view men as they are, not as they ought to be. No one knows why men fight wars, but the officer is well aware of the fact that they do, and is ruefully certain that they will continue. This certainty reiterates the importance of his work in the consciousness of the professional.

It is a cliché in the Army that an officer spends "75 percent of his time either teaching or going to school." His teaching may be in one of the many service schools, in the ROTC program of a university, or in the day-to-day

training schedule of his unit. Every officer is trained in the techniques of teaching during his undergraduate days, and progressively increases his knowledge in his branch schools.[7] The best way to learn a subject is to teach it. An important part of the officer's orientation toward his own profession is acquired from the instruction he presents. While instructing, inspiring, and molding others, he unquestionably strengthens his own concepts and ideals.

Before World War II, the small number of officers in service, about 12,000 in 1939, enabled almost all to live isolated from the rest of the community in the ancient but comfortable quarters on the country's army posts. The young officer, and those not so young, were confronted constantly with the ideals, patterns and standards of their seniors, not only on the job, but in their social life and casual community contacts as well. This constant proximity to his work, plus the near quarantine, inevitably produced an individual with strong conformist tendencies. The direction of the conformity, of course, was toward the image of the dedicated soldier. Today, the officer population of the army is eight times greater than it was in 1939, and a significant number of officers must live in civilian communities. Nevertheless, Tables 2 through 6 in this chapter offer evidence that the degree of dedication has not lessened materially. Apparently, a considerable inward compulsion persists, and, as many psychologists have noted, changes in well-rooted convictions do not come easy. Johns Hopkins' Professor Morgan says:

> "Beliefs and attitudes tend to preserve themselves, because a person selectively perceives and remembers what fits in with his existing attitudes and beliefs."[8]

AN IDEOLOGICAL GAP

The tendency of the officer to identify strongly with his work, to conform, to live a dedicated life, to subordinate self to duty, represent values which are held by the majority of civilians only in wartime, and mark an "ideological gap between the military and civilian worlds."[9] Both the civilian and the professional are aware of such a gap, but perhaps neither has considered the reasons for it, nor considered that it is probably a good thing. It permits the civilian to maintain the economic drive and self-interest which gets the work done, while the soldier guards the fort. It also encourages the officer to consider himself a member of a special class, for the same reasons noted by Gardner and Moore in their discussion of the class system in America:

> "The important thing about a class in society is that class members tend to participate socially only with those who are in their class. They see members of their class as 'people like us,' 'people who think and live like we do.'"[10]

Snygg and Combs write of the principles on which an individual bases his relationship to a social group.[11] Two of them are:

> "Individuals tend to seek self-enhancement through identifying themselves with and winning the approval of groups or individuals they believe to be important.
>
> "People tend to withdraw from groups whose approval they are unable to win and from groups which no longer satisfy their needs."

The Messrs. Snygg and Combs might have found evidence of the validity of their principles in a survey of the professional officer group.

Reflect on the first one, and try to call to mind any individual who has sought self-enhancement <u>outside</u> the officer group, while he has been a member of it. The writer can think of no army officers at all, although an

active naval officer, Admiral Daniel J. Gallery, may be the exception. Gallery has achieved success as an author of fiction; his stories appear frequently in the Saturday Evening Post under the signature "Dan Gallery." Of course, there are many who have sought recognition in other fields after they have left the service. Simon, too, notes the tendency toward group identification, writing, "It is characteristic of behavior that members of an organized group tend to identify with that group ... ."[12]

The "needs" cited in the second principle border on the area of motivation. Physiological needs may be passed by in this discussion, but a study of psychological needs in relation to the number of persons who withdraw from the army might prove worthwhile. That the military fails to retain sufficient men on a long-term basis seems to be a fact well buttressed by evidence.* Apparently all of the efforts at correcting this enervating turn-over are formulated around the idea that there is something "wrong" with the service. It is inexplicable that someone has not hypothesized that there is something "wrong" with the men. This is not to say that every eligible man who fails to accept a career in the service has some flaw in his character. It is suggested, however, that those officers who fail to find "a home in the service" may be emotionally unsuited in the same way that other men are unsuited for the demands of other professions. Obviously, they do not sing Thomas Brigham Bishop's refrain, "Shoo, fly! don't bodder me! I belong to Company G, I feel like a morning star."

THE EVIDENCE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Responses to the first five statements in the questionnaire described in Chapter II, and to the "word game" in number 41, are presented in tables

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* A discussion of attrition in connection with leadership is included on pages 77-78.

two through seven. The responses have an interesting bearing on the subject of this chapter, and support the arguments presented.

No less than 96 percent of the professionals believe that peace can be maintained only so long as the military is prepared to fight effectively and immediately. Only 66 percent of the reserve lieutenants believe it, although 24 percent have mixed feelings in the matter, and only 10 percent disbelieve it entirely (Table 2).

TABLE 2

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FIRST STATEMENT

"Peace can be maintained only so long as the military is prepared to fight effectively and immediately."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	96	3	1
Reserve Lieutenants	66	24	10

The difference between the professionals and the young officers in this matter is quite significant, and illustrates two points made earlier: (1) professional officers have a strong belief in the importance of their work, and (2) they are inclined to accept men as they are, and not as they ought to be. It might be reasoned, and with merit, that many of the young men are still possessed of the ideals brought with them from the country's campuses, despite the fact that a majority of 66 percent accept the statement as correct. Nevertheless, the import of the divergence in agreement, 30 percent, is of salient consequence.

Both groups agree overwhelmingly that army officers are on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week; 83 percent of the professionals believe it, 74

percent of the reserve lieutenants (Table 3).

TABLE 3

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SECOND STATEMENT

"An army officer is on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	83	12	5
Reserve Lieutenants	74	13	13

Again, however, there is a significant difference between the two in the direction of a stronger work orientation on the part of the professional. It is safe to speculate that the degree of dedication revealed here is at least as great as that among physicians and clergymen, and notably greater than that in other professions. It may be significant, too, that the four professionals who commented on the statement all claimed "mixed feelings," and, in effect, appeared to be defending an unorthodox rationale (Appendix B).

It is comforting to note the unanimous agreement shown in Table 4 with the statement, "An officer is obligated by the code of his profession to keep himself and his troops in constant readiness." A subsidiary significance lies in the implication that so many appear to know what the "code" of the profession is. It is not surprising that the professionals accept this amorphous noun, but the fact that the neophyte officers do is a tribute to the methods of indoctrination to which they have been exposed. Only one respondent, a reserve lieutenant, commented on the statement, asking, "What is the code of the profession?" A comprehensive answer to the lieutenant's question is beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly, the code is embodied

in federal statutes, in executive orders of the president, in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in army regulations, and in the customs and traditions of the service.[13] The substance of the code is summarized in the motto of the United States Military Academy: "Duty, Honor, Country."

TABLE 4

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRD STATEMENT

"An officer is obligated by the code of his profession to keep himself and his troops in constant readiness."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	100	-	-
Reserve Lieutenants	97	2	1

Statement number four in the questionnaire elicited more comments from officers, a total of 15, than any other (Appendix B). Again there appears a difference of real significance between the professionals and the reserve lieutenants. Only eight percent of the professionals believe that "bad assignments" are sufficient reason to get out of the army. An officer's "bad assignments" might include "hardship tours" to the Far East, the Middle East, or the fringe of the Artic, without the comfort of wife and children; duty at isolated posts with inadequate housing and facilities; service in monotonous tasks which offer no opportunity for professional advancement, or simply jobs in which the officer has no real interest. Fifty-three percent of the career officers feel that these are not sufficient reasons to leave the army, 39 percent are in doubt. The difference in work orientation can be seen readily by comparing opinions of professionals and reserve lieutenants in Table 5.

TABLE 5

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOURTH STATEMENT

"An officer who continually gets bad assignments should get out of the army."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	8	39	53
Reserve Lieutenants	26	46	28

Eighty-nine percent of the career officers believe that "the army is more than a career, it is a way of life." None disagree. The younger group shows a marked, although lesser, amount of agreement. One of the novice lieutenants added a whimisical touch in his comment, "It is a way of life, but not one that I care for particularly." One is inclined to speculate on how this young man will approach his first assignment with a unit. Once again, Table 6 reveals a unanimity of attitude toward a strong work orientation.

TABLE 6

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FIFTH STATEMENT

"The army is more than a career, it is a way of life."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	89	11	-
Reserve Lieutenants	78	17	5

The editor of The Atlantic Monthly wrote in August of 1958:

"Security for the greatest number is a modern shibboleth ... if we keep on trading independence and initiative for

> security, I wonder what kind of American enterprise will be left fifty years from now."[14]

Others have noted and commented on the drive for security in the United States and elsewhere, in the post World War II decades. The University of Pennsylvania psychologist, Morris Viteles, calls "resistence to change" an "anxiety," and attributes this anxiety to the "deep-seated need for security in terms both of the immediate situation and outlooks for the future."[15] William H. Whyte, Jr., in his best-seller, The Organization Man, discusses the impulse of college seniors toward security, and their "faith in the beneficence of the corporate salary."[16] Another sign of the times is the addition of a new member to the presidential cabinet, a director of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which heads the Social Security Administration, which heads the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors' Insurance. In industry, management in its search for employees emphasizes the security approach. For example, "career advancement, stock purchase plan, generous discount policy, group hospitalization plan, company paid pensions plan, company paid life insurance, summer and winter vacations" are inducements offered by a national retail organization.[17] Big unions seek security for their members in a guaranteed annual wage, and "fringe benefits." The army has not escaped the compulsion toward security, as may be discovered in any list of the advantages of an army career. One man has even written a book on the aspects of security for service personnel.[18]

One would guess that this "modern shibboleth" would rank high as the most important factor in a military career in the selections made by professional officers and reserve lieutenants. Table 7 bears out this guess for the lieutenants, 44 percent choosing "security," with "patriotism" a poor second with 25 percent. These results confirm the findings of Whyte,

and the research reported by Viteles, in their discussions of the impulses and ambitions of the "younger generation." But not so the professional. Thirty-three percent place "patriotism" in first place, trailed by 27 percent who went along with their not-so-much-younger brothers in naming security. The difference between 27 percent among professionals, and 44 percent among reserve lieutenants is impressive, and adds more evidence in support of the hypothesis: "The professional army officer is motivated by a sense of dedication to his country, and he has an exceptionally strong belief in the importance of his work."

TABLE 7

FACTORS SELECTED AS MOST IMPORTANT IN A MILITARY CAREER

FACTORS	% PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS	% RESERVE LIEUTENANTS
Patriotism	33	25
Security	27	44
Dignity	17	7
Recognition	15	15
Adventure	8	5
Money	-	4

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2. Wilfred Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, (London, Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 115.

3. "The U.S. Military Mind," Fortune, Feb 1952, p. 91.

4. For detailed treatment of the educational system of the army, see Pamphlet 20-21, The Army School Catalog, (Washington, Dept of the Army, 1957), and Army Regulations 350-5, Education and Training, (Washington, Dept of the Army, 1952).

5. Army Regulations 350-5, op. cit., p. 9.

6. For an idea of the scope of an officer's undergraduate training, see the Catalogue of the United States Military Academy, (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1958), particularly pp. 2-11; also, Army Training Program No. 145-60, General Military Science Curriculum for Civilian and Military Colleges, (Washington, Dept of the Army, 1957), particularly pp. 8-17.

7. The principles and techniques of military instruction are presented in Field Manual 21-5, Military Training, (Washington, Dept of the Army, 1957) and in Field Manual 21-6, Techniques of Military Instruction, (Washington, Dept of the Army, 1954).

8. Clifford T. Morgan, Introduction to Psychology, (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1956), p. 352.

9. Huntington, op. cit., p. 269.

10. Burleigh B. Gardner and David G. Moore, Human Relations in Industry, (Homewood, Ill., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955), p. 41.

11. Donald Snygg and Arthur W. Combs, Individual Behavior, (New York, Harper & Bros., 1949), pp. 187-189.

12. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1945), p. 13.

13. For discussions of the code of the army see The Officer's Guide, op. cit., pp. 236-251, 457-468; also, Huntington, op. cit., pp. 55-79, 254-269; also, The Armed Forces Officer, op. cit., pp. 1-31; also, John J. McCloy, "In defense of the army mind," Harper's Magazine, v. 194, (Apr 1947), pp. 341-344; also, Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1951), ch. 2.

14. Edward Weeks, "How big is one," The Atlantic Monthly, v. 202, (Aug 1958), pp. 25-30.

15. Morris S. Viteles, Motivation and Morale in Industry, (New York, W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1953), p. 302. Professor Viteles' chapter 16 reports a great amount of empirical work by psychologists and others in the area of "security."

16. William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man, (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1956), p. 79.

17. Robert Hall Clothes help-wanted advertisement in The State Journal, (Lansing, Michigan), Oct 21, 1956, p. 74.

18. Captain James M. Garrett, III, Principles of Insurance and Government Benefits for Service Personnel, (Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 1957), 213 pp.

CHAPTER IV

BUREAUCRACY IN THE ARMY

"The officer corps is both a bureaucratic profession and a bureaucratic organization."[1] Given an opportunity to acknowledge their belief in the truth of this statement, 91 percent of the professional officers who responded to the questionnaire declined to do so (Table 8). Officers do not seem to recognize the reality of bureaucracy in the army which they serve. It may be because bureaucracy is a nasty word. It conjures up visions of endless governmental red tape, of creaking administrative machinery, of fusty old civil servants surrounded by file cabinets and damp umbrellas, of frustrating delays, endless blank forms, and triumphant inefficiency. Actually, bureaucracy need not be a nasty word, nor should it always evoke a nasty image. A 1956 unabridged dictionary interprets the word to mean:

> "A system of carrying on the business of government by means of departments or bureaus, each controlled by a chief, who is apt to place special emphasis upon routine and conservative action; officialism; also, government conducted on this system. Hence, in general, such a system which has become narrow, rigid, and formal, depends on precedent, and lacks initiative and resourcefulness."[2]

The nastiness has crept in. There is no doubt that the dictionary mirrors a popular concept, one sufficiently prevalent to impress the lexicographers.

Nevertheless, there is a considerable number of persons, primarily students of business, political science, and sociology, who do not cry "nasty" on the appearance of the word, but instead consider it merely to

be descriptive of one form of organization, "The type of organization designed to accomplish large-scale administrative tasks by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals ... ."[3] Obviously, such an organization would function not only in a system of government, but also in the administration of an industry, a religious body like the Catholic church, an educational institution, or an army. Bureaucracy is not "bad" per se, it is bad only to the extent that it is permitted to become bad, or as one critic says, "It is universally bad only if complexity and size are inherently bad."[4]

WHAT IS BUREAUCRACY?

The classical theoretical work on bureaucracy was done in Germany by the sociologist Max Weber about 50 years ago. Professor Weber's sociological perception enabled him to pinpoint the characteristics of bureaucratic structure in what he called an "ideal-type" concept. His writings have become the most quoted work on bureaucracy in the United States and Britian, as well as in his own country, and his theories are accepted as basic by both his adherents and his critics. The discussion of the characteristics of bureaucracy presented below is based on Weber. The ideas are his, the words are not; "catchwords" have been invented to mark each item for identification later in the chapter. The characteristics of a bureaucracy are:

1. Functional Specialization. This criteria considers the division of labor which makes it possible to employ experts in each of the areas of specialization which have come to be accepted as normal in industry, in government, and in non-profit institutions. Historically, the trend toward functional specialization began when enterprises grew to a size where the manager himself no longer had time to accomplish all the administrative tasks of the expanding organization.[5]

2. Standardized Procedure. A bureaucracy functions in accordance with a system of written regulations. These may vary from a mimeographed sheet of instructions handed a stenographer, to a considerable operations manual furnished an executive. The regulations may be titled "Organization Manual," or "Personnel Regulations," or "Welcome to Plant No. 2," or something else. Whatever the name, and wherever found, the purpose is to foster compliance with general rules of performance, and to assure that any given action will be performed without variation regardless of who may perform the action.[6]

3. Pyramidal Responsibility. This criteria presupposes a "chain of command" wherein each subordinate is answerable to a superior in a level of authority above him. The area of control in each level is circumscribed by the nature of the responsibility vested in the subordinate, or more usually, in the position which is occupied by the subordinate. In the chain of command, each supervisor is responsible not only for his own performance, but for the performances of his subordinates as well.[7]

4. Career Patternization. The tendency of a bureaucracy is to formulate personnel policies which will emphasize the advantages of a career pattern. These policies are motivated by a desire to build a stable, loyal working force which will assure continuity in the operation.[8]

5. Impersonal Objectivity. The various functionaries in a bureaucracy must conduct themselves without favoritism or prejudice, and seek an entirely impersonal posture vis a vis subordinates and clients of the organization. This characteristic is more evident in government bureaucracies than in industry or non-profit institutions. In industry, in particular, management strives continuously to promote an attitude of great interest and personal concern toward customers. This policy may be discerned in slogans: "The

customer is always right," or "Our job is to serve," or "Treat every customer as a distingusihed guest." Actually, the intent is to establish a high level of impersonality. For an efficient bureaucratic operation, rational standards must govern to assure equal disinterested treatment of all--subordinates and clients.[9]

6. Organizational Cohesiveness. The total effect of the characteristics of a bureaucracy is to promote an esprit de corps, a sense of belonging, which gives maximum impetus to the striving for the impersonal success of "the organization." The bureaucrat who places his own interest before that of the group is shunned and disliked by his fellows, and usually is "found out." A football coach emphasizing teamwork is teaching "organizational cohesiveness," or loyalty to an abstract entity--the whole. Weber says that bureaucracy is the most rational administrative organization, because it is superior in precision, stability, strigency of discipline, and reliability, and he implies that organizational cohesiveness enhances this rationality.[10]

Weber's "ideal-type" bureaucracy is entirely valid conceptually, but being "ideal," actually does not exist in any form that can be examined first-hand. In practice, a bureaucracy has characteristics other than those enumerated. At least two of them are of sufficient importance to add to the list. They are:

7. Adjustive Flexibility. The rigidity of Weber's pure-form bureaucratic structure makes it necessary to point out that bureaucracy must have mechanisms present which serve to permit adjustment--frequently rapid adjustment--to changing situations. A truly rational bureaucracy is indeed flexible, flexible however, within the framework of the concept Weber postulates.

8. Unsanctioned Informalism. The nature of a bureaucratic organization requires the oil of informal organization to make the machine go. Blau points out that, "Informal relations and unofficial practices develop among the members of bureaucracies and assume an organized form without being officially sanctioned."[11] Blau uses the word "informal" in the sense in which it is defined by Barnard: "By informal ..., I mean the aggregate of the personal contacts and interactions and associated groupings of people ... ."[12]

BUREAUCRACY IN ARMY ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

The reader may have noticed in reviewing the foregoing characteristics that there are interesting comparisons with army organizational structure. Let us examine these comparisons step by step.

A long time ago men learned that the successful waging of war required as great a degree of organization as did the successful managing of trade or government. The first mob of Neanderthalers that set out to steal the women in a near-by cave probably learned that a leader was required to concentrate the efforts of the mob toward the common goal; succeeding races of men found that great numbers of warriors were required to defeat hostile invaders, or to seize the possessions of neighbors. One of the first movements toward bureaucratic organization came about when the warriors were grouped according to the weapons they carried--the beginning of functional specialization. Specialization has progressed, until today in our army there are 15 branches of service, 386 enlisted occupational specialties, and 406 officer occupational specialties.[13]

Standardized procedure had its footings in the armies of the ancients, starting, no doubt, with the first leader who taught a uniform method of wielding a weapon. In this country, the great Prussian, Baron

Friedrick W.A. von Steuben, wrote in French the first standard regulations for our army; translated by Washington's aides, the regulations were published in 1779 as Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. In 1958, regulations, manuals, bulletins, memorandums, and other forms of written procedure fill a small library.

About 500 B.C. Sun Tzu said, "The control of a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers."[14] We know from the writings of Vegetius that pyramidal responsibility existed in a highly developed form in the Roman legions before the time of Christ.[15] The pyramidal organization chart is a fixture in every office and orderly room in our army of 1958, portraying the chain of command.

Career patternization in armies finds its greatest development in the modern army of the United States. Each of the 15 branches has its "career management section," staffed for the purpose of channeling the activities of officers and men in accordance with a "plan" worked out for each type-individual. The emphasis on protection against arbitrary dismissal, and the system of promotions noted by Weber form only the basis for patternization today. Evidence may be noted on any recruiting poster.

One of the manifestations of impersonal objectivity in the United States army has been the traditional divorcement of the military from politics, or, as the President wrote in 1948, "... political estimates are the function of governments, not of soldiers."[16] As the army's only "client," the state must be served without favoritism or prejudice toward its political apparatuses. Further evidence of impersonal objectivity may be found in the custom of social separation of the officer and his subordinates. George Washington said, "Whilst men treat an officer as an equal, regard him as no

more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd, no order nor discipline can prevail."

Organizational cohesiveness in the army, of all places, is not only a characteristic of bureaucracy, but a prerequisite for success.

> "Strength comes to men when they feel that they are grown up and as a body are in control and under control, since it amounts to the same thing; it is only when men unite toward a common purpose that control becomes possible. In this respect, the servant is in fact the master of the situation, fully realizes it, and is not unprepared to accept proportionate responsibility."[17]

General Douglas MacArthur returned to the Philippines on October 20, 1944. Because of the deteriorating Japanese situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered cancellation of projected operations against Yap, Mindanao, and the islands of Talaud and Sangihe on September 15, and directed instead that an assault be mounted against Leyte two months in advance of the long-planned target date. Even as the project was being considered, the XXIV Army Corps, an element destined to join the Philippine invasion, was loading in Hawaii for the Yap operation. Just a month later, an immense amphibious force approached Leyte's east coast.[18] A perceptive German general once said:

> "A mind that adheres rigidly and unalterably to original plans will never succed in war, for success goes only to the flexible mind which can conform at the proper moment to a changing situation."[19]

Adjustive flexibility, our first non-Weberian characteristic, is the very essence of military operations, and is quite adequately summed-up in the soldier's phrase, "Stay loose."

The informality of army command in combat is well known, and its applications have been told in books by the men who made it work.[20] Any

officer who reads this will be able to recall instances when personal letters have been used to circumvent whole echelons of intermediate authority. In practice, the nature of administrative mechanisms in an army foster unsanctioned informalism.

Weber says that the bureaucratization of armies began when it became more efficient for "war lords" to supply equipment and provisions from their own "magazines."[21] As armies grew in size, so did their bureaucratic organization grow in importance and complexity. Blau writes, "... a large and effective army did not cause bureaucracy; on the contrary, bureaucratic methods of operation produced an effective large army."[22] For many years students of business and the social sciences have acknowledged the fact of bureaucratic organization in governmental, industrial, ecclesiastical, educational, and military complexes of great size, and have studied its effect on society, on men, and on the organizations themselves. This paper has discussed the characteristics of bureaucracies at some length, and has described how the army fits the criteria, primarily for the benefit of army officers who may read it.

ARMY ORGANIZATION AS OFFICERS SEE IT

Only nine percent of career officers selected "bureaucracy" as the word best describing the army's organization.* Forty-three percent of the professionals selected "pyramid" as best describing the army's organization, ten percent selected "hierarchy" (Table 8). Both of these words suggest one of the most apparent characteristics of bureaucracy, pyramidal responsibility. Another characteristic, specialization, was named by 17 percent. It is quite

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* Actually, this is more likely a reaction to the "nasty word" bureaucracy than evidence of a lack of information.

obvious that officers know enough about their own organizational entities to install systems and make them work, and it may well be that the matter of a name has never seemed to be of particular importance. It is disconcerting, however, to find that 17 percent of the professionals think that the word "traditional" is descriptive of the army's organization--this in the face of "unification" in the 1940's, the "pentomic" reorganization of combat divisions in the 1950's, and constant changes, reorganizations, and realignments in combat arms and technical services ever since 1775.

TABLE 8

WORDS SELECTED AS BEST DESCRIBING THE ARMY'S ORGANIZATION

FACTORS	% PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS	% RESERVE LIEUTENANTS
Pyramid	43	27
Specialization	17	17
Traditional	17	13
Hierarchy	10	11
Bureaucracy	9	13
SOP	4	19

Tables 9 through 13 shed more light on what officers believe about organization. In Table 9, we find that 17 percent of the professionals agree that the organization of the army is based on "specialization," confirming the 17 percent figure which appears opposite "specialization" in Table 8. Among reserve lieutenants, however, 42 percent agree, a response which appears to invalidate the opinions revealed in Table 8.*

* An explanation of the discrepancy probably lies in the differences in wording in the two items in the questionnaire.

It is significant that less than half, 41 percent, of the professionals disagree with the statement, "The organization of the army is based on specialization."

TABLE 9

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SIXTH STATEMENT

"The organization of the army is based on specialization."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	17	42	41
Reserve Lieutenants	42	30	28

In expressing opinions on span of control in statement number seven in the questionnaire, "An officer or non-com cannot be expected to supervise directly more than 11 men," 52 percent of the professionals agree, 69 percent of the reserve lieutenants agree. Significantly, the lieutenants agree more, and disagree less, than do the older officers, 48 percent of whom either disagree or have mixed feelings about the statement.*

Professor Koontz of UCLA uses the term "span of management," and discusses its employment in such diverse associations as Moses' Israelites (Exodus 18:13-26), department stores, railroads, and armies. He quotes the Graicunas** concept of the geometric increase in the complexities of managing as the number of subordinates increase, showing how twelve

* Quite likely the variation reflects the greater experience of the professionals who have come to doubt that there is any set number of persons that can be supervised. This opinion is borne out in the writings of modern students of management.

** V.A. Graicunas, a French management consultant, established his much quoted concept in a paper written in 1933.

subordinates will cause no less than 24,708 relationships. (The formula: $n(\frac{2^n}{2} + n-1)$, where n is the number of persons supervised.) He makes reference to other "spans," namely the spans of time, attention, personality, energy, and knowledge, as they interact and affect the span of control. He points out that these other "spans," vary from one individual to another, and so preclude any particularization concerning the number of persons who may be supervised. Koontz believes that the span of control must be calculated to fit the individual, and the situation in which he finds himself.[23] Newman says, "The limits on the number of people a man can effectively supervise arise fundamentally from the physiological and mental capacity of individuals." He, like Koontz, warns of the dangers in decreasing what he chooses to call "span of supervision" to the point of endangering communication, flexibility, speed, economy, and morale. He sets up a system of guides for selecting the optimum span of each executive, as follows: (1) variety and importance of activities supervised, (2) other duties of the executive, (3) stability of operations, (4) capacity of subordinates and degree of delegation, and (5) practicality of relieving the executive if overburdened.[24]

TABLE 10

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SEVENTH STATEMENT

"An officer or non-com cannot be expected to supervise directly more than 11 men."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	52	18	30
Reserve Lieutenants	69	4	27

In Table 11, there is almost total agreement with the idea that, "Standing operating procedures in the army are necessary and important." Since standardized procedure is one of the characteristics of bureaucracy, it appears that officers recognize the characteristics, even though they deny the name.

TABLE 11

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EIGHTH STATEMENT

"Standing operating procedures in the army are necessary and important."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	94	1	5
Reserve Lieutenants	88	8	4

In the matter of security, discussed earlier in connection with Table 7, it is possible to find in Table 12 a verification of the conclusions drawn. Only 40 percent of the career officers believe that, "An officer has security, if not of his life, then certainly of his livelihood," while 57 percent of the reserve lieutenants agree. Of equal significance are the figures showing that 60 percent of the professionals either disagree or have mixed feelings, while 43 percent of the younger men disagree.

Both professionals and reserves agree in substantial majorities that, "There is a gap between formal procedure and the informal realities of command," as shown in Table 13. This statement has a bearing on another of the characteristics of bureaucracy, unsanctioned informalism, and adds more evidence that the characteristics, if not the name, are known.

TABLE 12

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE NINTH STATEMENT

"An officer has security, if not of his life, then certainly of his livelihood."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	40	36	24
Reserve Lieutenants	57	22	21

TABLE 13

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TENTH STATEMENT

"There is a gap between formal procedure and the informal realities of command."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	72	14	14
Reserve Lieutenants	63	27	10

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CHAPTER V

DISCIPLINE, MORALE, AND EFFICIENCY

Which is the most important leg on a three-legged stool? Which is the most important to the successful accomplishment of a group task, discipline, morale, or efficiency? Remove one leg of the stool, and the milk-maid falls flat on her milk bucket. Remove one division of the trichotomy, and the success of the group task, like the milk-maid, falls flat. Discipline, morale, and efficiency are all legs of the same stool. This is no recent discovery. Students of the military art are familiar with the story of Caesar's siege and capture of Alesia in 52 B.C. In this last of the Gallic campaigns, Caesar's force of some 50,000 prevailed over a third of a million Gallic tribesmen. Caesar, of course, had something more than 50,000 legionaries:

> "... he had also the genius of the great captain, the spirit and <u>discipline</u> of his men ... . His own courage, the high <u>morale</u> of his men--soldiers have never had any higher <u>morale</u>--and the splendid state of <u>effectiveness</u> to which he had finally brought his cavalry gave him the victory."[1]*

In the front rank among military writers of all time, after Julius Caesar, are de Saxe, Jomini, du Picq, and Clausewitz. All of these (and many others) have considered the essential coefficients: discipline, morale, and efficiency. In 1732 de Saxe wrote:

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* The underscoring has been added.

> "After the organization of troops, military discipline is the first matter that presents itself. It is the soul of armies. If it is not established with wisdom and maintained with unshakable resolution you will have no soldiers. Regiments and armies will only be contemptible, armed mobs, more dangerous to their own country than to the enemy."[2]

De Saxe correctly placed the establishment of discipline as the first order of business. Whether it should be the first order of business in <u>business</u>, will be discussed later. Clausewitz has this to say:

> "War is a special business, and ... it always continues to be different and separate from the other pursuits which occupy the life of man. To be imbued with a sense of the spirit and nature of this business, to make use of, to rouse, to assimilate into the system the powers which should be active in it, to penetrate completely into the nature of the business with the understanding, through exercise to gain confidence and expertness in it, to be completely given up to it, to pass out of the man into the part which it is assigned to us to play in War, that is the military virtue of an Army in the individual."[3]

Without using the words, Clausewitz' involved German sentence even in translation neatly summarizes the trichotomy--discipline, morale, and efficiency. Once established, discipline may well lead to morale, to efficiency, and finally to the end product of the three--success.

DISCIPLINE IN ARMIES

What of the nature of discipline? Jomini, whose genius served both Napoleon and Alexander I of Russia, taught that "... discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions rather than in external forms only."[4] Du Picq said, "Discipline must be a state of mind, a social institution based on the salient virtues and defects of the nation."[5] The nature of discipline, then, must vary according to the character of the persons to whom it will apply. We know that the "discipline of the Greeks was secured

by exercises and rewards; the discipline of the Romans was secured also by fear of death."[6] All armies, including our own, enforced a hard and punitive discipline with the lash until well into the nineteenth century.[7] Today, the necessity for discipline in our army is no less acute, but "the salient virtues and defects of the nation" require that it be established with something more subtle than the lash.

It may be true that human nature does not change. If it is true, then the method of the lash should prove as effective for the armies of 1958 as for the armies of 1758, or 1858. And it does. It does so for the army of Red China, and for the army of the Soviet Union. In the army of Red China, for example:

> "... discipline takes grimmer forms. Rope is wound and crossed over the already raw flesh of a pair of wrists. The bound figure kneels on the earth of a compound, where the idle and curious watch the transition from life to death. The Mauser's muzzle is held about one foot from the back of the kneeling figure's neck. This is punishment for disobedience to orders, desertion (in most cases), and a variety of lesser infractions."[8]

The discipline works with the coolie cannon fodder of the Communist Chinese, as any veteran of the Korean War can attest. In the army of Soviet Russia,

> "the institution of the 'penal battalion' was created. These units ... were used for the most dangerous tasks ... for clearing mine fields by advancing, for almost suicidal blows at the enemy defense, and as initial echelon in areas of heavy enemy fire. ... In some cases, they were sent into battle unarmed ... ."[9]

Thus discipline in the ranks of our World War II allies. Of course, this is not the end and substance of discipline in the mass levies of China and Russia. Indeed, doctrine and performance in both armies goes much further toward perquisites than does our own. Political commissars, too, are

tireless in their efforts toward indoctrination and conditioning.[10] The product: a good soldier. Still, we have met and won in combat with the Chinese, and we shall be able to prevail against the Russian when the time comes, given sufficient men and materiel. The purpose of this paragraph, however, is not to dwell on atrocities, but to illustrate a fact which should be apparent: mores, motivations, and patterns of thought in war are different among modern Americans than among other men, and modern Americans require different treatment.

MORALE AND FAITH

"Morale, for all the greater purposes of war, is a state of faith ... ."[11] In this sentence, an American philosopher has summed-up the essence of every one of the manuals and publications ever printed by the Superintendent of Documents. For many, the faith is in the institutions of the country; for others, in their concepts of the nature of God; and for some, perhaps, in the brotherhood of arms which discipline has given them to accept. That excellent book, The Armed Forces Officer, has a most admirable chapter on morale which says in part, "morale does not come of discipline, but discipline of morale."[12] This statement puts the second before the first, but it is relieved somewhat by an earlier declaration in the same chapter, "The handiest beginning is to consider morale in conjunction with discipline, since in the military service they are opposite sides of the same coin."[13]

It is fashionable, sometimes, to smile at army regulations and manuals, and to consider them a set of dry-as-dust documents written, in all likelihood, by a little old gray-haired lady in the basement of a forgotten red-brick building on an obscure side street in Washington. Let us

see what the gray-haired lady has to say about discipline:

> "Military discipline is an outward manifestation of mental attitude and state of training which renders obedience and proper conduct instinctive under all conditions. It is founded upon respect for, and loyalty to, properly constituted authority."[14]

And let us see what can be learned from the gray-haired lady's paragraph on morale:

> "Morale can be defined as the individual's state of mind--how he feels about himself, his fellow soldiers, army life in general, and all the other things that seem important to him. It is closely related to his needs. ... High morale gives the soldier a feeling of confidence and well-being that enables him to face hardship with courage, endurance, and determination."[15]

Thus it is not difficult to know how discipline and morale are envisioned in the army. It is a matter of long study and application, however, to know how discipline and morale are established. Training, of course, is vital, but the army must rely primarily on <u>leadership</u>--the quality specifically in the province of the professional officer.

In the army version, esprit de corps is <u>not</u> the same as morale, although the two terms are sometimes used interchangably by students of business. "Morale" refers to the total emotional tone of an <u>individual</u>, while "esprit de corps" is the esteem which members of a group have for the <u>group</u>. Esprit de corps in an army is very much the same quality as esprit de corps in an industrial organization, but the quality of morale is not, and the quality and degree of discipline is not. They cannot be same, because the purposes of the enterprises are different, and the purposes must be achieved in different ways.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE IN BUSINESS

It will be profitable now to review the ideas of students of business. Professor Davis of Ohio State writes:

> "Good discipline is closely allied to loyalty; it may be defined as a mental condition which leads individuals and groups to accept executive direction and supervision willingly. It induces them to conform voluntarily to policies, rules, and regulations which are set up to promote an effective accomplishment of objectives. Good discipline is a result of morale development."[16]

In this statement, Davis concurs with the anonymous author of The Armed Forces Officer in considering discipline to be a product of morale. This is correct for a business, but not for a citizen army, where the vital factor of consent is lacking. Furthermore, the army officer combines both executive and judicial authority, while the business man's function is solely executive. In his discussion of "equity," Urwick, a former director of the International Management Institute in Geneva, says that in business there is no judicial process, a fact which throws a special responsibility for equitable conduct upon the administrator.[17] In a citizen army, voluntary conformity and willing acceptance is the goal of leadership, but conformity and acceptance must be attained, willing or not, if the danger of de Saxe's "armed mob" is to be avoided.

A timely example of the armed mob in miniature is provided in the case of the army's special group of "Enlisted Scientific and Professional Personnel" at the Army Chemical Center in Maryland in September 1958. Time reports: "Needled unmercilessly for 'wasting' the nation's young scientific brains in routine basic training, the Army ... had set up a policy of assigning draftees with some scientific education to special groups ... . Fresh from campuses

and freer academic life, the ESPP's kicked hard against regimentation, cut sloppy military figures, took to hissing non-coms and arguing with officers. Old Army types complained that the soldier-scientists were coddled with special barracks and mess halls, interviewed incessantly to make certain they were happy, chauffeured to their jobs instead of marched, allowed to lead an undisciplined 40-hour week consisting of 36 hours' laboratory work and four hours' Army duty."[18] This attempt to develop morale in a segment of the non-consenting citizen army without first establishing discipline ended in a near-riot, and court martial for ten men. It might have been worse.

Finding a usable definition of morale in the literature of psychology or business is a formidable task, because of the predilliction of writers in these fields to confuse morale with esprit de corps. One acceptable definition reads:

> "The term morale refers to a condition of physical and emotional well-being in the individual that makes it possible for him to work and live hopefully and effectively, feeling that he shares the basic purposes of the groups of which he is a member; and that makes it possible for him to perform his tasks with energy, enthusiasm, and self-discipline, sustained by a conviction that, in spite of obstacles and conflict, his personal and social ideas are worth pursuing."[19]

The factor of "consent" has been mentioned earlier. Another particular reason for agreement with the consensus of business authorities in fixing the development of morale ahead of the establishment of discipline lies in the place of the union in industry. The same American impulse which resists discipline (call it freedom or fecklessness, depending on your point of view) acts through the union as organized resistance. An employer would be fashioning his own ruin if he were to build a factory, recruit a working force,

and immediately set about imposing discipline. He would find that his workers would not consent. He would be faced with high employee turn-over and absenteeism, his production chart would start to show red ink, his desk would be piled high with union grievances, and strike threats would echo in his sullen plant.

PATTERNS OF EFFICIENCY

In the army, then, it is (1) discipline, (2) morale, and (3) efficiency; in business, (1) morale, (2) discipline, and (3) efficiency. What of efficiency, the third part of the trichotomy? The army officer uses the term in its commonly accepted definition, "capacity to produce desired results." In economics and business the definition generally has a different emphasis: "the power of producing wealth." Strangely enough, there is a considerable controversy among students of business over just what efficiency means. Frederick W. Taylor, "the father of scientific management," said in 1903 that efficiency meant "the state of possessing adequate skill or knowledge for the performance of a task."[20] Taylor believed that a man achieved efficiency by turning out the largest daily output of which he was capable, and a company achieved efficiency when the greatest possible productivity had been reached.[21] He wrote that true efficiency would lead to more "surplus," higher profits, higher wages, and lower prices for the consumer.

Since Taylor's time, three schools of thought and action have grown up in the approach to a science of business. These might be called, for want of better names, "conservative," "liberal," and "radical." The conservatives are followers of Taylor and the industrial engineers, emphasizing efficiency in the palpable job of production, brought about by observation and measurement of the work processes themselves. The liberal concept is embodied in

the writings exemplified by the Davis-Newman-Urwick faction, viewing management as the function of planning, organizing, and controlling people and resources through the use of logically based principles. The radicals follow the teachings of Elton Mayo, Roethlisberger, Likert and their apostles and disciples, toward the ideal of group cooperation through the application of psychology, sociology, and functional anthropology to "group dynamics." There are, of course, no clear-cut lines of demarcation between the "schools of thought and action." There are, instead, wide "gray areas" where the concepts overlap. Guidance and inspiration may be gained from all three.

The theorist Chester I. Barnard (one of the "radicals") differentiates between "efficiency" and "effectiveness." He says that any given action may be "efficient" without being "effective," or, conversely, "effective" without being "efficient." He justifies this distinction by recourse to definition, and maintains that "effectiveness" has reference to the attainment of a specific desired end. In this framework, "efficiency" becomes a by-product; that is, "efficiency" results when the unsought consequences of an action are trivial and incidental.[22] In Barnard's thinking, it is easy to see that an efficient operation might not result in Taylor's "greatest possible productivity." Barnard's logic, again, might well postulate an operation's greatest possible productivity, without efficiency. Simon makes a distinction between "adequacy" and "efficiency," and declares that "... the fundamental criterion ... must be a criterion of <u>efficiency</u> rather than a criterion of adequacy. The task of the administrator is to maximize ... ."[23]

Among the best exponents of the liberal school are Koontz and O'Donnell, who write that "... as management quality improves, efficiency in the utilization of human, as well as material, resources will grow." This is presented in a discussion of the impact of management principles on society, considering

the well-known "lag hypothesis" (in modern civilizations, the social sciences have lagged far behind the physical and biological sciences.) Koontz and O'Donnell consider efficiency to be the power to produce wealth, the opposite of "inefficiency and waste in utilizing technical discoveries."[24]

Whatever definition is accepted, producing wealth in business and producing results in the army require the pre-existence of discipline and morale.

THE OFFICER'S REACTION

Statement number 11 in the questionnaire, "Parades contribute to organizational pride and efficiency," was directed at discoverning whether officers really believed that an ancient ceremony like a parade had a salutary effect on esprit de corps. Table 14 shows that 91 percent do. Reserve lieutenants show a lesser amount of agreement than do professionals, 74 percent, as might be expected. The number who disagree, however, is insignificant in both categories.

TABLE 14

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ELEVENTH STATEMENT

"Parades contribute to organizational pride and efficiency."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	91	3	6
Reserve Lieutenants	74	24	2

Table 15 reveals that both careerists and young reservists are unanimous in agreeing that morale and efficiency can coexist.

TABLE 15

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWELFTH STATEMENT

"You can't have high morale and efficiency at the same time."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	3	1	96
Reserve Lieutenants	-	1	99

The statement, "There is too much time wasted in the army on non-essentials," was intended to investigate the orientation toward efficiency existing among officers. The response reflected in Table 16 indicates that both groups are substantially in agreement, 60 percent and 55 percent, and that the professionals, surprisingly enough, are in agreement more. Only 13 percent of both groups disagree. It is possible of course, that there might be efficiency despite "too much time wasted," but in the commonly accepted definition of the word, "waste" might be considered the antithesis of efficiency.

TABLE 16

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTEENTH STATEMENT

"There is too much time wasted in the army on non-essentials."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	60	27	13
Reserve Lieutenants	55	22	13

Table 17 tends to verify the observation made in the preceding paragraph, showing that 44 percent of the career officers selected "productivity" as best describing efficiency, and 44 percent selected "competence." Reserve lieutenants were essentially in agreement.

TABLE 17

WORDS SELECTED AS BEST DESCRIBING EFFICIENCY

FACTORS	% PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS	% RESERVE LIEUTENANTS
Competence	44	34
Productivity	44	46
Ability	8	4
Training	3	3
Skill	1	12
Speed	-	1

The army places serious emphasis on the conservation of supplies; frequent campaigns are launched to encourage thrift, and one of the factors considered in an officer's annual fitness report is his performance in respect to "supply economy." For these reasons, attitudes toward discipline and efficiency both are involved in statement number 14: "It is an officer's moral responsibility to go all the way in observing supply economy." Again, substantial majorities in both groups agree, but a significantly greater percentage of reserves agree (Table 18).

Neither reserves nor professionals are taken in by outward signs of efficiency, nor by "spit and polish," if the evidence of Table 19 is accepted. Eighty-six percent of the careerists deny that a clean desk is evidence of

efficiency, 74 percent of the reservists deny it. One colonel commented, "This is never so. Work always goes to the 'can do boys.'" The comment is true, of course, and not only in the army; the more a man proves he can do, the more he is likely to get to do.

TABLE 18

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FOURTEENTH STATEMENT

"It is an officer's moral responsibility to go all the way in observing supply economy."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	65	26	9
Reserve Lieutenants	78	17	5

TABLE 19

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FIFTEENTH STATEMENT

"A clean desk ('the Pentagon desk') is in fact evidence of an officer's efficiency."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	1	13	86
Reserve Lieutenants	5	21	74

Nobody disagrees with the proposition, "Discipline is good for people." We must look to the remarks of the reserve lieutenants (Appendix B) for significance in response to statement number 16. Nine saw fit to comment, six of the nine from among the nine percent of the group who reported "mixed feelings." All of the comments express concern that discipline might interfere

with the development of imagination, initiative, and original thought.*

TABLE 20

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SIXTEENTH STATEMENT

"Discipline is good for people."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	94	6	-
Reserve Lieutenants	91	9	-

Until the adoption of the "uniform code of military justice" about ten years ago, army officers had much more authority to take action in cases of infractions of discipline (and in cases involving moral turpitude) than they do now. Statement number 17, "The uniform code of military justice is adequate under present-day circumstances," was designed to test opinions concerning the current practices, when compared with those of the past. The responses of the professional officers, shown in Table 21, are inconclusive. Thirty-eight percent agree, 37 percent have mixed feelings, and 25 percent disagree. It might be claimed, perhaps, that at least a majority do not disagree. There is a significant difference in the responses of the reserve lieutenants, a circumstance easy to understand when we realize that these men have no basis for comparison--they were only 11 years old when the changes were made.

* It is likely that these opinions mirror a minority belief in the stultifying effect of discipline, a belief which fails to take account of the fact that all human progress has had its inception in situations of discipline--a fact confirmed by philosophers from Aristotle in his discussions of "virtue," to John Dewey in his discussions of "conduct." It is encouraging to note that 91 percent of the younger men agree.

TABLE 21

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH STATEMENT

"The uniform code of military justice is adequate under present-day circumstances."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	38	37	25
Reserve Lieutenants	57	27	16

Statement 18, and two others in the questionnaire, are based on a paper written by Professor Janowitz of the University of Michigan, who believes that the application of authority in military forces is changing from a pattern of "domination" to one of "manipulation."[25] Table 22 appears to validate Janowitz' hypothesis, although Table 36 (to be discussed in Chapter VII) does not. Seventy percent of the professionals agree that, "The army has modified its system from rigid discipline to more indirect forms of obtaining cooperation," and significantly, only 52 percent of the reservists agree.*

A regular army major, a technical service officer, was inspired to write a most engaging comment on statement number 19. He declares, "Violently disagree. Discipline among the combat arms is a little easier to come by when the motivation is teamwork for survival on the battlefield. A man in the tech services must be well-disciplined to work long arduous hours on the necessary but unglamorous and unexciting job of logistical support. Add to this a factor of less supervision, and the need for discipline becomes even

* It is likely that the difference may be ascribed principally to two factors: (1) most of the second lieutenants are getting a first dose of army discipline themselves, and (2) again, there is no personal knowledge of what the system used to be.

more acute." Table 23 discloses that a respectable majority of the professionals concur in his disagreement, 59 percent, with only 34 percent holding the opposite opinion. There is no significant difference in the opinions of the reserve lieutenants.

TABLE 22

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE EIGHTEENTH STATEMENT

"The army has modified its system from rigid discipline to more indirect forms of obtaining cooperation."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	70	25	5
Reserve Lieutenants	52	35	15

TABLE 23

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE NINETEENTH STATEMENT

"Officers of the combat arms must pay more attention to discipline than technical service officers."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	34	7	59
Reserve Lieutenants	26	18	56

Statement number 20, "Military discipline is a state of order and obedience existing within a command," is "right out of the book."[26] There is near total agreement in both groups.*

*That agreement is stronger among the lieutenants, 90 percent to 79 percent, may be an implication that the reservists have either read "the book" more recently, or believe it more strongly.

TABLE 24

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWENTIETH STATEMENT

"Military discipline is a state of order and obedience existing within a command."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	79	16	5
Reserve Lieutenants	90	7	3

The results of the "word game"set up in statement number 44 disclose a significant difference in attitudes between professionals and reserve lieutenants. Table 25 shows that 39 percent of the former think that "response" best describes discipline, while only nine percent of the latter think so.

TABLE 25

WORDS SELECTED AS BEST DESCRIBING DISCIPLINE

FACTORS	% PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS	% RESERVE LIEUTENANTS
Response	39	9
Obedience	24	41
Self-control	20	17
Cooperation	16	30
Subordination	1	3
Punishment	-	-

Twenty-four percent of the professionals selected "obedience" as the word which best described discipline, while a whopping 41 percent of the lieutenants

selected the word. The two groups approach parity in selecting "self-control," but there is another significant difference in the percentages selecting "cooperation," 16 percent of the career officers, and 30 percent of the second lieutenants. A number of conclusions may be drawn from an evaluation of Table 25, in addition to the obvious one that the professionals are "right" and the reserve lieutenants are "wrong," and, therefor, more emphasis in training should be placed on explaining what discipline really is. One of the less obvious conclusions, albeit a tentative one, might be that neither are "right," and a re-examination of doctrine is in order.

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CHAPTER VI

LEADERSHIP AND THE HUMAN RESOURCE

Leadership is some indeterminate force of personality. No one yet has discovered just what the force is, nor has anyone described it adequately. If it is present in a man, the quality can be nurtured; if it is not, no amount of cultivation will bring it forth. Given intelligence and a reasonable amount of manual dexterity, a man can be taught the techniques of the piano, but he will never be an artist unless he has within himself the spark that separates the pianists from the piano players. In the same way, teaching an uninspired man "leadership techniques" will never make him anything more than an uninspired man with a knowledge of leadership techniques. Fortunately, modern society offers employment for both piano players and journeyman leaders.

The importance of leadership is as great today as it was when Moses led his people out of Egypt and into the promised land. Every promised land does not require a Moses, however, nor is leadership vested solely in those inspired of the gift of charisma. Leadership is a matter of degree; the great decisions of life and war require the energies of great charismatic leaders (although they are not often to be found), while the counter boys at MacDonald's hamburger stand need no such leader. Any condition of leadership, then, requires the existence of three elements: the leader, those to be led, and a specific or continuing situation. These elements are dynamic, and variations in the nature of the latter two will require variation in the

first. To borrow Urwick's phrase, "One doesn't use a steam hammer to crack nuts."[1]

Great shelves of books have been written on the subject of leadership. The scholarly journals of the social sciences, and the professional journals of business and the military are crammed with articles and reports of research. Hardly a volume on any subject, fact or fiction, will fail to be concerned with the existence or the want of leadership. The significant thing is not the volume of words that has been written, but the clear implication that of all the abstractions which concern our modern society, leadership is well up in the van. One military writer, widely quoted outside his profession, says:

> "Leadership has gained recognition and prominence in the military world far greater than the mere tactical and technical manipulation of troops in the field. The success of an army in peace or war, or the functioning of a great industrial establishment, depends very largely on the human leadership ability of its superiors."[2]

Part of the force of leadership, whatever it may be in total, almost certainly is an inspirational quality, capable of stimulating the "faith" required for morale and success.

Only in recent years has the idea of "born leaders" been abandoned. It might be more accurate to say "tentatively abandoned." Several scholars have concluded that leaders tend to perpetuate themselves. There seems to be reason to accept this conclusion, but there remains substantial doubt whether the contingency results from inherent qualities, or from the social advantages most leaders are able to provide their children. One researcher has noted a correlation between physical measurements and leadership. The data accumulated appears to demonstrate that persons in positions of leadership tend to be taller and heavier than their subordinates.[3] General Patton,

writing of the Pasha of Marrakech, said, "I have never met a man in whom the hereditary qualities of leadership are so apparent. The idea of his superiority is so inbred that he does not have to show it."[4] Davis writes, "The biological theory has a practical significance ... ."[5] The accepted leadership of the upper social and economic classes in America is no antiquated concept, and its tentative abandonment is quite recent, despite 182 years of our being born equal. David Riesman concludes that "The bullet that killed McKinley marked the end of the days of explicit class leadership."[6] A good middle-of-the-road summation is supplied by Macarow, "A few men may be naturally gifted as leaders, but for most of us leadership consists of skills that can be acquired ... ."[7] Despite some dissent, the consensus of social scientists, and business and military writers, favors the idea that at least some of the qualities of leadership are transferable, presupposing the existence of health and intelligence.

Professor Newman says:

> "It pays to distinguish between those qualities that an executive must bring with him to the job and those he gets on the job. For our purposes the former may be called 'innate' and the latter 'acquired.' It does not matter here whether the innate qualities are inborn or developed during childhood. As long as they are characteristics that cannot be developed by an individual after he has been selected, they belong in the no-compromise category."[8]

Newman quotes Macy's executive appraisal chart which lists three values in the "realm of no compromise," as character, intelligence, and intuition, and in the "proper realm of compromise," experience, adaptability, and special skills.

TYPES OF LEADERS AND KINDS OF LEADERSHIP

If there is no confirmed idea of what leadership is, and if the idea

of leadership as some inborn quality has been discarded, it might be profitable to try and find out something about the other two elements in any condition of leadership. The other two elements, as stated earlier, are: "those to be led," and "the situation." Psychologists have spent considerable time, thought, and money in research to determine the effects of different kinds of leadership on the members of the groups which are led, and on the achievement of goals. One of the best known experiments is the work of Kurt Lewin and his colleagues in analysing "authoritarian," "democratic," and "laissez-faire" leadership.[9] This research started with situational studies of children, and has been accepted not only in the field of education, but by industrial psychologists and business theorists as well. The researchers concluded that the groups led, and the goals achieved, both fared better under "democratic" leadership. Despite its wide acclaim, and its contribution to theory, this writer chooses to be a member of what may well be a minority of one in swallowing this fare with a liberal sprinkling of salt.

Whyte implies an admiration for the old-fashioned "hard-driving leaders" in a chapter he calls "Togetherness." With tongue in cheek he writes:

> "As group dynamics studies have proved, high group morale is the heart of production. This means that the ideal leader should not lead in the old sense--that is, focus his attention and that of the group on goals. He should instead concentrate almost wholly on the personality relationships within the group. If he attends to these and sees to it that the members get along, the goals will take care of themselves."[10]

It is surprising to realize how many sane people have distorted the findings of researchers to the point where a statement like the one quoted can be accepted with perfect equanimity. The key word, of course, is "goal." A

vital part of the leader's function must be the setting of a meaningful goal. It must be meaningful to the worker, and at the same time economically desirable to management. Gardner and Moore say:

> "... management which is not able to translate the problems of doing business into broad, organizational goals which employees can understand, will find employees resistant and obstructive, for they will see the actions of management as threats against their own personal well-being."[11]

One writer classifies the kinds of leaders as the "hunter-warrior type," "the priest-leader type," "the politician-leader type," and "the business-leader type."[12] Of greater signification is the classification put together by the Brookings Institution's A. Mason Harlow, who declares, "The number-one man in any group imaginable has gained his position in one of three ways: he has been elected, self-chosen, or appointed."[13] Harlow categorizes methods of leadership as the method of persuasion, the dominant method, and the institutional method. The elected and the self-chosen use the methods of persuasion or dominance; the appointed leader uses the institutional method.[14] It is the appointed leader and the institutional method which are of greatest concern to industry, and to the army, and it is here that the "journeyman leader" finds two fruitful fields of employment. It is not the journeyman, however, who becomes a captain of industry, nor does he make the great decisions of life and war. It is on these levels that the "indeterminate force of personality," and the "spark of inspiration" have their effects, working within the framework of institutional leadership.

LEADERSHIP IN INDUSTRY

As the country grows, the need for leaders grows. More and bigger business structures require more men who possess the ability to inspire morale

and success, more men capable of guiding a group toward a mutually desirable goal. In the last 30 years, this need has resulted in continuing efforts on the part of industry to discover, to develop, or to train men in leadership. In order to do this readily, a system for recognizing leadership characteristics would be most helpful. One approach is to list characteristics like ingredients in a pizza recipe, and follow with instructions explaining how to mix. This approach is certainly the most popular. The characteristics are developed by some process of induction, no doubt, after observation of successful leaders in the field.

As far as this writer knows, the first to try the inductive method was Confucius, who said about 2400 years ago: "For everyone called to the government of nations and empires there are nine cardinal directions to be attended to."[15] Confucius' list of nine is really not too antiquated today. Sixteen characteristics are listed by Professors Craig and Charters, who explain, "In order to make possible a specific analysis, the sixteen abilities and traits which were found indispensable to successful personal leadership have been arranged ... in the form of a rating scale."[16] Chester I. Barnard undertakes to list "five fundamental qualities."[17] Macarow lists "eight basic qualifications," and so on.[18] Confucius' list is better than any of them. The striking thing about all of the inductionists is that no two of their lists of characteristics agree. It might be worth while to take, say, ten lists of characteristics, and select from the ten those characteristics that have been mentioned by four or five, or some other number of authors. Having done this, however, and having the list in hand, how does a man recognize a possessor of the characteristics when he sees him? This is where the psychologist comes in.

Vance Packard's provocative book has this to say:

> "Early in the fifties Fortune noted that 'nothing more important has happened to management since the war than the fact that many companies have begun to experiment psychologically on their supervisors and top executives.' ... The psychological services provided by management-consulting firms grew apace."[19]

Everyone is familiar with the usual sorts of tests administered to applicants for employment, the simple work tests ("how fast can she type"), the tests which measure ability in terms of reaction time and reflex, and even aptitude tests. But the psychological tests are something else again. These gems, including the Thematic Apperception Test, the Rorschach, the Szondi, variations and combinations of them, and even hypnosis, all have been used to probe into adjustment and leadership potential in executive personnel, and in applicants for executive jobs.

It may well be that psychological testing is wholly sound in a clinical environment, but in the hands of charlatans, witch-doctors, and even well-intentioned laymen who learned their psychiatry in high school, this instrument is grotesque.[20] The basic fallacies in using such do-it-yourself tests to identify leaders, or to select potential leaders, number at least four. They are: (1) there is no list of leadership characteristics which is commonly accepted as valid, (2) there are no tests which will measure value judgments, (3) a test which might work for a company in a given situation would not work for another company, or a different situation, and (4) regardless of what a test purports to reveal, ultimately the hiring, firing, or promoting must be on someone's subjective decision. Mr. Whyte expresses his feeling in the matter by including an appendix in his book, titled, "How to Cheat on Personality Tests."[21]

Most of the larger businesses today look to the college campuses for their potential leaders. Once recruited, a young man usually embarks on one

of several types of executive training programs. These will range from programs which are not training at all, but outright exploitation, to soundly constructed internships which develop whatever potential exists. During the course of training, the subject's promotability probably will be determined through ratings prepared by his superiors, and, in some cases by psychological testing. If the training program is sound, if the man does have potential, and if his raters are not too seriously influenced by hunch, guess, prejudice, psychological tests, and the man's wife, the trainee probably will move up to become a leader and a rater himself. The rating is of much greater consequence than the testing, because the very essence of leadership is not what a man is, but what he does.

LEADERSHIP IN THE ARMY

Earlier in this chapter, Dr. Harlow's discussion of an "institutional leader" was noted. Twelve years earlier, an army officer wrote:

> "Institutional leadership is a system of leadership. It substitutes prestige of position for prestige of personality. It permits frequent change of leaders without injury. There are no means in a peacetime army of selecting mass leaders, so a system of leadership must be depended upon."[22]

These words, in the context of Harlow's statements concerning the appointed institutional leader, describe the basis for the professional officer's leadership. Some officers, of course, are much more. Much more is necessary in time of war, and in many of the crises of the years of non-war. The army demands leadership of its officers, recognizing its essentiality in the management of our most important resource. Furthermore, the army provides the authority requisite to command. A military psychologist writes:

> "The leader starts out with authority. The military and

> naval forces give it to him. His uniform gives it to him. Authority is essential to discipline, It forms the background of all leadership. Yet most of the power that the leader needs in order to lead is not given him."[23]

It is in the attempt to prove his fitness for leadership that the officer finds his greatest challenge, and his most crucial area of adjustment.

It is likely that failure to adjust, failure to meet the challenge, accounts for a critical proportion of the attrition which plagues the peacetime officer corps. Graduates of the military academy leave their duties in alarming numbers; most of the men commissioned from Reserve Officer Training Corps programs in the colleges and universities count the days of their required service until they can be released. No doubt much of this may be attributed to "job-connected dissatisfactions," including difficulty in finding decent places to live, the necessity for frequent moving from place to place, the prolonged absences from family, and the continuing requirement for assuming new tasks and new routines. But failure to measure up to the challenge of leadership must not be overlooked. One writer may have fixed on an underlying cause of the frustration which leads to rejection in his statement, "The military leader, when he loses his influence on his command, loses all power to achieve results."[24] To this might be added, "failure to <u>gain</u> influence produces the same frustration." One is obliged, also, to question the effects of some of the leadership the young officer is compelled to accept.

Not all fail to escape the constriction of institutional leadership, as history will attest. General Patton once wrote:

> "The history of war is the history of warriors; few in number, mighty in influence. Alexander, not Macedonia, conquered the world. Scipio, not Rome, destroyed Carthage. Marlborough, not the Allies, defeated France., Cromwell, not the Roundheads, dethroned Charles."[25]

To the roll might well be added the name of Patton himself. Somehow, persons of his unusual capabilities always have been ready when the flag came under fire. There are those who claim that society in 1958 is geared to produce "organization men," "organization scholars," and, who knows, perhaps "organization soldiers." God grant that some flaw in the gearing will permit a few more Pattons to come off the assembly line.

This is not to say that there is any magic system that will apply across the board. On the contrary, each man who is gifted with the inspirational spark will find his own way to true leadership. General Gause, Erwin Rommel's chief of staff in Africa, wrote of our respected World War II enemy, a truly inspired leader:

> "In Africa Rommel developed his methods of command unrestrictedly in consonance with his nature. These methods would be difficult to teach and can hardly be applied under general circumstances. In spite of uniform training every military commander develops his own particular methods consonant with his mentality."[26]

Of course, Rommel survived the long years of institutional leadership in the bureaucracy of the Wehrmacht, before the force of his nature placed his name in the notebooks of historians--and so did Patton, and Eisenhower, and Robert E. Lee.

Of all the armies of the world, the army of the United States requires the highest order of leadership, for the American is the hardest individual to lead. The chief of staff of the army, speaking of recruits drawn from civil life into service, has this to say:

> "Almost to a man, they will bring the national characteristic of resentment to discipline and authority which, in my opinion, presents the greatest obstacle we have to face in the creation of good troops. ... Americans as a nation are innately critical of constituted authority. ... It is

> a phenomenon which we cannot and probably should not want to change because ... it is a necessary concomitant of the vigorous martial virtues which are also inherent in most of our citizens."[27]

A British sociologist, an observer of American society, seconds General Taylor's comments. He says:

> "... two major themes appear as characteristic of Americans: the emotional egalitarianism which maintains that all (white American) men are equal to the extent that the subordination of one man to another is repugnant ... and the belief that authority over people is morally detestable and should be resisted."[28]

He also declares that Americans do not hate violence and fighting, but are "antimilitaristic because they detest authority."[29] Army officers and business leaders will concur in substance with what the two have to say.

DISCOVERING POTENTIAL LEADERS IN THE ARMY

The problem of discovering potential leaders in the army is, primarily, the problem of selecting potential officers. The selected group, during its pre-commissioning education, experiences the first program of leadership training, a program which is supplemented throughout the officer's career at post-graduate service schools, and of course, by experience. In the selection of leaders, the army has managed to survive the appointments based on wealth, social position, and political influence which continued throughout the nineteenth century. It has tried selection based on psychological evaluations, and it continues to experiment with psychological techniques.[30] Today, however, the selection of potential leaders is based almost solely on intelligence, aptitude, and physical fitness.

The army's insistence that leadership can be taught inspires the question, "To whom?" As far as the officer leader is concerned, the answer

is, "To a very select group indeed." The professional officer, the peacetime subject of leadership training, is the survivor of a rigorous system of selection. The three most important sources of career commissioned personnel are the ROTC programs in colleges and universities, the United States Military Academy at West Point, and the Officer Candidate Schools. Admission to any of these sources is difficult.

A candidate for admission to an ROTC program leading to a commission must be a college student with junior standing, must pass a physical examination, must possess a good, and preferably an excellent academic record, must pass an aptitude examination, and must demonstrate to a board of active army officers "positive potential of becoming an effective officer." The aptitude examination, called an "RQ-3 test," is a combination vocabulary test and test of mathematical reasoning. The vocabulary test includes items similar to those in the American Council on Education Psychological Examination (ACE), and the Atwell-Wells Wide Range Vocabulary Test. Scores on tests of this kind are known to be a good indication of general intelligence, and this writer has obtained evidence of a high degree of correlation between RQ-3 test scores, and grades in military science subjects. The evidence was obtained from a comparison of RQ-3 scores with grades in military subjects of 271 ROTC graduates of Michigan State University in 1957 and 1958. RQ-3 test scores ranged from 115, the minimum acceptable, to 153; average military subject grades ranged from 2.0 (C) to 4.0 (A). Choosing a point about midway in the RQ-3 range, it was found that of all persons who scored less than 130 on the RQ-3 test, 19.7 percent received average grades of 3.5 or better; of all persons who scored 130 or more on the RQ-3 test, 44.3 percent received grades of 3.5 or better.

Entrance to West Point is even more difficult than entrance into ROTC.

Eighty-five percent of the nominations are "non-competitive," and are made by congressmen; 15 percent are "competitive" from other sources. Both actually are highly competitive. In addition to preliminary screening examinations, candidates must pass College Entrance Examination Board tests in English composition, intermediate mathematics, and scholastic aptitude; a medical examination; and a physical aptitude examination which measures "strength, coordination, muscular power, endurance, speed, and agility." Officer candidate schools are operated for the training of enlisted men and warrant officers who have proved themselves to have outstanding qualifications for commissioned service. In order to be appointed, candidates must survive a formidable testing and screening process, similar in many respects to the qualification requirements for ROTC or the Military Academy. The fact that the teaching of leadership techniques and traits is directed to an exceptionally well-qualified and receptive group, unquestionably strengthens the belief that leadership <u>can</u> be taught. There is no evidence to show that it can be taught to "anybody," however. On the contrary, even the three highly selective sources--ROTC, West Point, and OCS--have considerable numbers of persons eliminated for "failure to demonstrate leadership potential."

In the approach to teaching leadership to the selected groups, the army has had no fewer inductionists than industry. One psychologist separates the requirements of military leadership into four categories: (1) the soldierly qualities expected in all military effectives, (2) additional capacities, experience and traits, (3) the requirements for higher command, and (4) generalized aspects of leadership. He lists no less than <u>35</u> required characteristics.[31] Another discusses battle, and "whether an officer has developed to a sufficient degree the qualities of leadership;" he lists 19.[32]

The army publishes two manuals on leadership. One, Leadership, lists 19 traits "of paramount importance to the leader."[33] The other, Command and Leadership for the Small Unit Leader, lists 12 "essential traits."[34] Taken all together, the multiplicity of lists of characteristics is bewildering, to say the least. How many characteristics really are needed, the 35, or the 12? If a man has eight of the 12 characteristics, will he be eight-twelfths of a leader? How about seven, or six? This line of thinking is facetious, of course, and requires a restatement of an essential premise: leadership requires the existence of three elements, the leader, those to be led, and a specific or continuing situation. A characteristic of great importance in one situation, or with one group, would be of little moment in differing circumstances.

All of the inductionists maintain that leadership characteristics may be taught, but this is true only to a degree. For example, most of the lists of characteristics include such items as "intelligence," and "humor." It would be nice to know how to teach a man to be intelligent, or how to teach him to have a sense of humor. The Armed Forces Officer contrasts the personalities of a number of outstanding military leaders, and declares:

> "All in all it is a multifarious gallery. If we were to pass it in review, and then inspect it carefully, it would still be impossible to say: 'This is the composite of character. This is the prototype of military success.'"[35]

It must be concluded that no list of characteristics is a correct list, and at the same time, no list is entirely incorrect. Some traits can be learned, some characteristics can be taught, and some men will profit by the exercise. In this way, the journeyman leader is developed; he may become a great leader to the extent that he possesses the spark of inspiration.

The process employed in the development of leadership in ROTC courses,

in the Military Academy, and to some extent in the Officer Candidate Schools, centers around the case method, role playing, and situational studies, as far as formal academic teaching is concerned. The emphasis is on principles and techniques, rather than on attempts to inculcate traits and characteristics, despite all the work of the inductionists.[36] In addition, the three officer sources conduct continuing programs of observation, rating, counselling, and guidance, planned to bring out the qualities of leadership which their trainees may possess. Far from attempting to inventory a man's virtues, these programs are designed to assess his performance--in effect a Gestalt approach. The nature of the environment at West Point encourages such a program, and an effective one has been developed. The philosophy of its rating system is summarized in the statement: "Research has shown that the 'whole man' approach, an over-all evaluation of the effectiveness with which an individual accomplishes an assigned mission, is superior to quantifying specific traits or attributes."[37]

The procedures used in selecting and training temporary officer leaders in times of emergency follow closely those described above. Unfortunately, they must be drastically abbreviated in the urgencies of war and preparations for war. Despite abbreviation, history records the success of the method. Winston Churchill, one of the truly great leaders of the century, said in 1946:

> "To create great armies is one thing; to lead them and to handle them is another. It remains to me a mystery as yet unexplained how the very small staffs which the United States kept during the years of peace were able ... to find the leaders and vast staffs capable of handling enormous masses and of moving them faster and farther than masses have ever been moved in war before."[38]

THE OFFICER LOOKS AT LEADERSHIP

One of the propositions stated in the second chapter was: "In spite of the trend toward push-button warfare, the professional officer perceives his basic role to be one of providing leadership, and he does not believe that leadership can be taught." Responses to the twenty-first statement in the questionnaire testify to the accuracy of the first part of the proposition. Three-fourths of the professional officers agree with the idea that, "An officer's most important duty is to lead and direct men." Seventy percent of the younger officers reflect the same conviction.

TABLE 26

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST STATEMENT

"An officer's most important duty is to lead and direct men."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	76	15	9
Reserve Lieutenants	70	15	15

Three-fourths of all respondents agree that it is important to explain to subordinates the "reason why" whenever possible (Table 27). This is not a surprising response, nor are the differences in opinion of any significance.

Responses to statement 23 (Table 28) are revealing and quite significant. About one-third of the careerists disagree with the statement, "With proper indoctrination and training, any intelligent man can become a leader." Twenty-three percent have mixed feelings. The fact of <u>minority</u> agreement, despite the "party line" concerning the transferability of leadership tends to substantiate the second part of our proposition, "... he does not believe

that leadership can be taught." Only 26 percent of the second lieutenants agree with the statement, a significantly lower percentage.*

TABLE 27

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWENTY-SECOND STATEMENT

"An officer should be careful to explain to his subordinates the 'reason why' whenever possible."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	76	18	6
Reserve Lieutenants	77	13	10

TABLE 28

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWENTY-THIRD STATEMENT

"With proper indoctrination and training, any intelligent man can become a leader."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	35	23	35
Reserve Lieutenants	26	30	44

Seventy percent of the career officers agree that the military career is one of managerial skill, 22 percent have mixed feelings, and only eight percent disagree (Table 29). Forty-three percent, 27 percent fewer, reserve

* It is possible that the difference reflects an impression not yet affected by indoctrination.

officers agree, a marked difference of opinion.*

TABLE 29

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH STATEMENT

"The military career is a career of managerial skill."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	70	22	8
Reserve Lieutenants	43	38	19

In Table 30, we find refutation of one of the statements of Michigan's Morris Janowitz, recorded in the paper mentioned in the previous chapter.[39] Only 35 percent of the professionals, and 27 percent of the young officers agree that the quality of initiative has become the most praised of the military virtues. The rest of the responses, about two-thirds of the sample, are fairly evenly divided between mixed feelings and disagreement. The significantly lesser percentage of agreement on the part of the reserve lieutenants is explained to some extent in Appendix B. "The complete reverse is true in the army!" "You don't get a chance to think on your own." "I know cases where a man isn't given a chance." These are some of the comments which bring to mind any number of clichés about the impetuosity

* Here the limitations of the questionnaire raise other questions, among them: "Does the response of the reservists mean that they do not believe the career is one of managerial skill, or do they believe that it is, plus something else?" If the reserve officers who disagree or have mixed feelings, 57 percent of them, think the military career is not one of managerial skill (and this is likely), then we have evidence that a new look at the army's leadership training program content is necessary. As we discovered in Chapter I, management is an important part of military leadership; professional officers seem to agree.

of youth.*

TABLE 30

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH STATEMENT

"The quality of initiative in the individual has become the most praised of the military virtues."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	35	30	35
Reserve Lieutenants	27	37	36

Table 31 exhibits such unanimity in the choice of "influencing" as the word most descriptive of leadership, that one must suspect the reasonableness of the other five choices.

TABLE 31

WORDS SELECTED AS BEST DESCRIBING LEADERSHIP

FACTORS	% PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS	% RESERVE LIEUTENANTS
Influencing	76	77
Technique	15	12
Power	3	-
Intelligence	3	2
Inherent	3	1
Manipulation	-	8

*Since this chapter is about leadership, we might question the place of initiative in the personality of a leader. Table 26 revealed that a substantial majority of army officers believe leadership to be their most important responsibility. If it is permissible to ignore certain obvious semantic difficulties, we might suspect from the evidence of Table 30 that initiative is not considered to be particularly important among all of the attributes of leadership.

Professionals and reserves, 76 percent and 77 percent respectively, chose "influencing," while the other possibilities, except for "technique," were not named by any significant number of respondents. "Manipulation," another of Professor Janowitz' words, was ignored by the professionals, and selected by only eight percent of the reserve lieutenants.*

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* One should not assume that officers believe that an army leader is some sort of wizard, expert in the black art of behavior influencing. The probability is that they conceive of influencing in the sense of guiding and directing.

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CHAPTER VII

THE PLACE OF AUTHORITY

In the last chapter it was stated that leadership in the army starts with the authority given an officer by the military system. Two observers were quoted who agreed that Americans were inherently opposed to authority, and in fact, found it morally detestable. Criminologists claim that much of the juvenile delinquency in the United States arises out of a resentment and rejection of authority, both parental and community. For well over a century, the southern states have fought on the battlefield and in the Congress in defense of their rights as opposed to the authority of the Federal Government. Without attempting to explore the why of these phenomena, it will be useful to try and develop an idea of what this authority is.

First of all, it will be well to dispose of some of the meanings of the word authority, to find out what we are not talking about. Technical authority is vested in the person whose specialized knowledge gives him a unique position in the community. For example, most household mechanics boggle at re-plumbing the bathroom drain, and call a plumber, an authority on pipes, instead. Legal authority is established by law, and restricted by law. Certain government officials may write checks in the disbursement of public funds, but only under certain controlled circumstances; in private business, corporations collect income tax, but they are restricted in how they dispose of the money. Personal authority may be vested in an individual by reason of his popularity, or because of his ability to dominate his group

physically, psychologically, or financially. Inherent authority is that vested in a king by reason of his birth, or in a national state by reason of its existence.

The "authority" with which the next few paragraphs will be concerned is none of the four types just described, although it may be said to derive directly from both legal and inherent authority. It is, very simply, the right to act or command. In developing "an idea of what authority is," it should be possible to synthesize a workable concept which will apply in civil institutions by examining some of the concepts of business men, sociologists, psychologists, economists, anthropologists, and physiologists. This done, we can compare the synthesized concept with the army's official definition of authority, and then see what officers think about the subject.

AUTHORITY AND THE CIVILIAN

The man of business until recently has been little concerned with "authority" in the abstract. For several hundreds of years he had accepted as normal the fact that his employees would obey his commands simply because he was the boss, they were the workers, and that was an end of it. He might, if pressed, state that if the worker wanted to become a boss (and so exercise authority), the way was open to him. "This is a free country, and with hard work, thrift, and a little git-up-and-go, anybody can be a boss." The business man was aware, of course, that sometimes his commands were not exactly accepted with eagerness, but he always knew that "if they don't like it they can quit."

This is not to suggest that all business men were totally lacking in sympathetic understanding. On the contrary, most of them conducted their affairs with a considerable degree of enlightenment and good will, as long

as their authority to hire and fire, establish reasonable working conditions, manage the enterprise, and profitably dispose of the product was not challenged. But at an accelerating rate during this century, the business man has found his authority being challenged not only by his workers through labor unions, but by his government as well through direct legislative action, and indirectly, through taxation. O'Donnell says:

> "In the last two decades so much propaganda has poured forth from the trade unions and non-business enterprises that the business manager may be forgiven if he has begun to think that for him there may be, indeed, no rights. ... he is told in a convincing manner that <u>really</u> he has no authority except that which his subordinates give to him."[1]

The modern business man finds himself in a squeeze between traditional ideas of the boss-and-worker relationship, and a new dogma of "private socialism."

Before 1930, most of the work of sociologists in developing theories of authority was directed toward examining its manifestations in the political state, in the religious hierarchy, in educational institutions, and in the social group. The tendency was not in the direction of establishing just what authority <u>was</u>, but instead, of stating what it <u>should be</u>. There seemed to be a general agreement that authority was an intangible that existed because it always had existed. Authority was considered to be "good" when it was established on an ethical foundation, "bad" when it was not. It was widely considered to be an aspect of "power," and of course it still is.

One writer says: "Power is the ability to get obedience from others, and authority is formally delegated power."[2] This is an approach which apparently does not consider that authority may exist without any delegation at all, either formal or informal. Another contemporary concept considers "power structures" to be in the nature of informal arrangements, which may be unauthorized or illegitimate, existing side by side with "authority" in

rationally organized groups.[3] Max Weber, in his treatment of charismatic authority, introduced the factor of leadership into a consideration of authority, in distinguishing the quality of charisma from what he called "traditional authority" and "rational-legal" authority.[4] A charismatic leader, he said, possesses a gift of grace (either self-claimed or bestowed by his followers) which blesses him with the kind of authority intrinsic in absolute divinity. It may be said, then, that power, authority, and leadership are related. Give a man power, or authority, or leadership, or all three, however, and his influence on a group will extend only as far as his voice will carry. Another factor must be considered--that of organization.

The sociological concept begins to take shape as we consider the factors of power, leadership, and organization as they affect authority. A group must be organized before it can begin to be effective. The fact of organization postulates the establishment of positions which can be occupied by persons who will discharge responsibilities assigned the positions. In order that the responsibilities be discharged effectively, the positions are endowed with authority. For example, we may say that Mrs. Brown, the president of the Ladies' Society, has the authority to appoint a refreshment committee. Actually, Mrs. Brown does not have this authority at all. The authority is vested in the president of the society, and when Mrs. Brown's term of office is completed, she can no longer appoint the committee. On the other hand, Mrs. Brown, by reason of her interest, and her talent with bud and vase, has <u>always</u> arranged the flowers on the tea tables. Mrs. B. probably will not be disturbed when her term as president expires, but do not monkey with the flower arranging--evidence of authority in the <u>informal</u> organization.

Barnard advances the interesting theory that authority is vested not

in the person who issues an order, but instead in the person who receives it.[5] He maintains that an order issued by a person in a position of authority will be accepted only when the recipient (1) understands it, (2) considers it consistent with the purposes of the enterprise, (3) admits its consistency with his personal interests, and (4) is mentally and physically capable of coping with it. This thinking demands that we inquire if it is possible for authority to exist in a situation of non-compliance. Will a tired soldier decline to accept the authority of a sergeant who orders him to crawl into the face of machine gun fire, on the perfectly sound idea that it is opposed to his personal interests? In the unlikely event that he does decline, he will be punished, perhaps with death for "cowardice in the face of the enemy." On the other hand, a cable splicer may decline to accept an order to cut the main telephone line between Lansing and East Lansing because he knows that such an order is not consistent with the purposes of the enterprise. He stands in no danger of being shot, and, in fact, may get a bonus when the case is reviewed. Malinowski takes issue with Barnard's acceptance theory, writing: "Submission to laws as well as the power to enforce laws and rules are indispensable in human behavior."[6]

The examples of the soldier and the cable splicer were presented to introduce the thought that there are several different kinds of organizations in two main groupings--compulsive and non-compulsive. Youman's statement that authority is formally delegated power is reasonable in connection with a <u>compulsive</u> organization like an army. In an <u>non-compulsive</u> organization, Barnard's theory appears to be somewhat more admissable. Both theories, of course, accept the premise that a factor to be considered is that of organization. Power, leadership, and organization may be said to be components of the sociological concept of authority.

Psychologists tend to visualize authority in the light of men's attitudes toward its application to themselves. Against a school of thought which sees man as a compulsive rebel, there exists another school which perceives in him a fundamental need for submission to some sort of authority. The nature of any individual is dynamic, and it is possible to concede that the same person could have anarchistic and submissive tendencies at the same time, or at different times under different stimuli. A man's attitude toward authority, the psychologists say, may be rational, or it may be instinctive, depending upon the individual's psychological make-up, and upon the form taken by the authority being exercised. And, of course, whether his attitude is rational or whether it is instinctive, a man may react in a positive manner, or he may react negatively, or not at all. The component "organization" in the sociologists' concept of authority implies the existence of "position" or "status." A new perspective on this concept comes as the psychologist considers the methods of reward and punishment applied to statuses. Indeed, the whole psychology of motivation bears upon the concept of authority as the psychologist views it.

The rationalized development of industrial society might be thought of, in the psychological sense, as standing between the seeker after authority and the object of his seeking. This repressive influence is based in motivation. Despite emphasis on pay-check security as the principal motivating force, there seems to be a growing feeling that psychological motivations in industry should be re-examined in the light of some of the generalizations made by Elton Mayo 25 years ago. There is a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that a far stronger force which moves man as a social being is his desire for a secure place in the respect and affections of his associates. Respect for authority in the masses of men is strengthened if men believe that real importance is attached to their work.

Behavior is an integral part of the psychological significance of authority. In an earlier chapter it was pointed out that it is characteristic behavior for the members of a group to identify themselves with the group. The group loyalty which is a consequence of this behavior permits decision making on a plane where the welfare of individuals is not a matter of concern. Authority may be administered for the impersonal purposes of the enterprise. Individuals may be conditioned, by reason of this characteristic behavior pattern, to accept without disturbance the authority existent in the organizational structure, or they may condition themselves through acceptance of their own status. Simon maintains that "A subordinate is said to accept authority whenever he permits his behavior to be guided by the decisions of a superior, without independently examining the merits of that decision."[7] Carrying this thought even a step further, it has been said that life in a modern industrial culture probably predisposes workers to obsessive response.[8]

For a considerable period of time great stress has been placed on the psychological aspects of personality reacting to environment in the acceptance or rejection of authority. This school of thought places significance on the idea that the average person has some natural predilection for a particular occupation, which if thwarted will cause frustrations which may affect the person's ability to perform, or may result in rejection of authority and control. The implication is that if all men are just rightly placed in the industrial society, Utopia will be achieved. This theory discounts the highly adaptable nature of man and his marked ability to adjust. Within the limitations of his own physical and mental equipment, what a man may become is mainly of his own making. Bendix believes that "The celebration of individual character and effort has been superseded by a belief in individual adaptability ... ."[9]

To sum up: the psychologist's view of authority includes consideration of motivation, behavior, and personality in individuals as constituent parts of substantial importance.

By and large, the economist's view of authority takes somewhat the same direction as does the sociologist's. It is hardly necessary to say that the economist's concept has changed since Adam Smith stated in 1776 that authority must be confined to the owner of an enterprise, because the worker's nature did not permit his being trusted with authority. A more modern observation is made by Dutton:

> "The trend of management thinking is to restore initiative to the worker, from whom standardization and the machine, and machine concepts, had taken it away. While the manager continues to be finally responsible for results, and to exercise final authority, his role is that of coordinator rather than supplier of intelligence and initiative."[10]

The effect of the capitalistic system is not overlooked in the economic concept. It has been stated that the interests of capitalism require the establishment of a strong central government.[11] The strong government, in turn, develops an extensive administrative machinery which affects the free-enterprise system, and ultimately the authority of business enterprises.[12]

Profit and loss, supply and demand, the influence of the market place, and the operation of the business cycle all have a place in the economist's view of economic forces acting upon the exercise of authority. For example, it is doubtful that the authority of the president of a firm on the verge of bankruptcy is as effective as that of the head of a profitable corporation. Obviously, his authority in the market place is less, and it is likely that his authority, and that of the members of his hierarchy, is shaky in its own organization by reason of economic pressures. The reader may construct his own example of the effect of the business cycle on managerial authority by considering the changes which have taken place in industry as a result of

the depression of the 1930's.

The work of anthropologists establishes beyond the necessity of discussion the existence of human societies before the beginnings of recorded history. Humans are by nature beings who live together in communities by choice, and who derive their rights and their responsibilities as a result of their participation in the group order, in accordance with standards acceptable to its membership. Thus, in a family, a father has the responsibility to support his wife and children, and the right to exercise authority over them; in the state he has certain rights of person and property, and a responsibility to obey the laws, pay taxes and defend the state in time of war. These are over-simplifications, but are intended to point up the anthropologist's view that authority is a natural right, derived from the natural impulse of mankind to form itself into organized units.

Depending on the nature of the unit, and the needs of the environment, the forms taken by the processes of authority will vary. For example, the people of China have permitted the growth of a monolithic authoritarian state in the hope of improving their economic situation. In so doing, they have sacrificed most of the liberties enjoyed by persons living in "democratic" countries like those of Western Europe and the United States. In China, as in the Soviet Union and certain other countries, both Communist and non-Communist, there is a withdrawal from the ideal of personal property and individual authority, toward a condition of state ownership and state authority. The basis of individual authority, the natural right, is restricted. The state, according to the anthropologist, is the proximate source of authority.

A consideration of authority has never occasioned any interest in the field of physiology. A few random comments are found from time to time in

other writings, however, starting with Taylor's announcement of the dubious "... law governing the tiring effect of heavy labor on a first class man: For each given pull or push on a man's arms it is possible for the workman to be under load for only a definite percentage of the day."[13] Presumably this "law" would have some relationship to the authority exercised over the first class man by his supervisor. Mayo and others have reported a series of physiological experiments in the field of fatigue, monotony, and boredom, but any relation to the aspects of authority is not established.[14] One may say, however, that cases of industrial disease might have had a considerable effect on the exercise of authority in certain situations.[15] The incidence of silicosis in mine laborers, of lead poisoning in paint-spray operators in automobile factories, of radium poisoning in watch factory workers, definitely affected working conditions and may have had repercussions on patterns of authority. At any rate, it is possible to conclude that the physiological structure of the human body is a limiting factor in the exercise of authority.

In the beginning there was Aristotle and ethics; politics split off from ethics, and then there were two; economics split off from politics, and then there were three; sociology (a "science of left-overs") split off from economics, and there were four.[16] This possibility, suggested 50 years ago, might have a bearing on an appreciation of the contributions of the several disciplines discussed, toward an understanding of just what authority is. Are the varying ideas considered so very esoteric and unique after all? Probably not. Most people know more about authority than they know they know. Presumably, a "unitary concept" existed before the diverse fields of study tore it apart. Let us try to put Humpty together again: Authority, a manifestation of power, exists in associational organisms and is derived from the

natural law of man; it operates within, and is restricted by economic law and man's physical limitations; the acceptance of authority may be rational or instinctive, but it may not be repudiated without penalty, because it is based in group consent.

AUTHORITY AND THE SOLDIER

One need not search far to find a doctrinal definition of authority in official army publications. Most of those quoted in Chapter VI define authority. For example:

> "Every military unit is organized to perform a mission. The commander of each unit is given sufficient authority to insure accomplishment of that mission. This authority is simply the right, given to the commander by virtue of his rank or assignment, to issue orders, and take all action necessary to accomplish his mission."[17]

A definition, however, is usually barren of many of the things an inquisitive mind would like to know. A better approach might be to find out what is <u>taught</u>, rather than what is <u>written</u>.

In 1948, a "Character Guidance Council" was established in the army, consisting of the assistant chief of staff for personnel, the chief of chaplains, and the inspector general. The council, among other duties, has the purpose of conducting a character guidance program, "... devised to assist the commander in promoting a healthy moral and mental attitude on the part of the personnel ... to insure, so far as is possible ... the continuance of the wholesome influence of the home, the family, and the community. ... It is designed to encourage the individual to develop moral responsibility and self-discipline."[18] A part of this program is embodied in a series of discussions, intended to be led by army chaplains, and built around the ideas of "duty, honor, country." A manuscript for one of the discussions is

entitled "Authority and the Soldier," and it is the basis for a one-hour presentation to basic trainees. While the presentation is simple, it so well recapitulates the army concept that it is condensed here, after the fashion of an abridged Readers Digest:[19]

> Authority means the right to command, order or direct others, and to obtain obedience. It is natural for man to live with others; where men live together there must be authority; authority is of God by the mere fact that God made man as he did. You may ask, 'What can I as an individual soldier do about authority?' The answer is a simple one: 'Obey it.' Our founding fathers realized that freedom without authority would destroy itself. At the same time they were determined to limit the national authority to keep it from becoming a monster. This they accomplished by spelling out in the Bill of Rights certain basic freedoms, but enough authority to keep one person's freedom from interfering with the same rights of other citizens. The United States was founded and planned to protect the citizens; and the founders saw to it that there would be an established authority to guarantee freedom. Your army helps fulfill that guaranty. Authority is not force, on the contrary it is the responsible use of power for the good of all. Authority is not privilege, rather than giving privileges, it adds responsibilities. Authority is not a weapon of fear, instead men of authority must be leaders of men, not Frankensteins. Military authority is spelled out in regulations, directives, and orders. When these are put to work they establish military discipline. This military discipline is absolutely essential if we are to fulfill the high purpose for which the army is established--the security of the United States.

It is significant that the manuscript condensed above is intended for the use of a chaplain; it is significant that authority is presented as existing Dei gratia. There are scholars and observers outside the military who agree that authority derives from the grace of God, but this is not usual. It has gone out of fashion to ascribe much of anything to supernatural authority, but the military generally have never been reluctant in this way. It may be that the professional soldier, having acquiesced in the possibility of his death as a condition of employment, feels closer to the source of life.

If this is true, it explains much about the army concept of authority, among other things.

If we compare the civilian concept of authority with the army concept, we find no striking differences unless we wish to enter a philosophical contemplation of the differences between "natural law" and "grace of God."

THE OFFICER'S VIEW

Table 32 shows an overriding majority of professional officers, 73 percent, in favor of "control" as the word best describing authority. Their opinion is in marked contrast to that of the reserve lieutenants, only 47 percent of whom agree with their elders. The fact that there are 35 percent of the lieutenants who believe "power" best describes authority (in contrast to 16 percent of the professionals) also is significant. It has an unhappy connotation if we permit ourselves to conjecture on the sort of officer-enlisted man relationship that will develop if one-third of our second lieutenants, "first line supervisors," confuse their authority with power. On the other hand, it is credible to guess that they think of "power" in relation to the authority exercised over <u>themselves</u>. If this is so, it is understandable. Our second lieutenants in their basic school are getting a first dose of the army, and are subject to authority and discipline greater than any they have experienced in their lives, greater than that they will find in most assignments after they graduate. In his study of officer-enlisted man relationships, Stouffer made a statement which applies here also: "A considerable difference in perspective between officers who exercise authority and men over whom the authority is exercised is probably inevitable, at least in an organization operated on an authoritarian basis."[20]

In consideration of the statement that a superior officer should be an

"older brother" rather than a "father" (Table 33), only 28 percent of the professionals accept the fraternal idea, while 36 percent of the young reservists agree. There is hardly any significance here, nor is there any in the numbers who disagree, 32 percent and 36 percent respectively. It is quite possible that the four lieutenants who commented "neither" (Appendix B), are entirely correct.

TABLE 32

WORDS SELECTED AS BEST DESCRIBING AUTHORITY

FACTORS	% PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS	% RESERVE LIEUTENANTS
Control	73	47
Power	16	35
Legal	7	6
Superior	4	8
Personal	-	3
Inherent	-	1

TABLE 33

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH STATEMENT

"The relationship of a superior officer to his subordinates should be that of an 'older brother' rather than that of a 'father.'"

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	28	40	32
Reserve Lieutenants	36	28	36

Statement 27, "Responsibility without commensurate authority leads to chaos," is a statement hard to disagree with; 93 percent of the careerists and 85 percent of the reservists found it so (Table 34). Perhaps those who failed to agree stalled at the word "chaos." Koontz writes:

> "Since authority is the power of a manager to undertake assigned duties, and responsibility his obligation to use authority to accomplish these tasks, it logically follows that the authority and responsibility of a certain manager should correspond."[21]

He maintains that parity between authority and responsibility is not "equal," but "coextensive." Urwick points out that a delegation of authority for which the delegatee is not held accountable will lead to decreasing effectiveness in the exercise of authority. He says, "... at all levels authority and responsibility should be coterminous and coequal."[22] We may say that Table 34 adds more evidence in support of a principle already well accepted.

TABLE 34

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH STATEMENT

"Responsibility without commensurate authority leads to chaos."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	93	1	6
Reserve Lieutenants	85	12	3

There is a small but significant difference between professional officer opinions and reserve officer opinions in Table 35 which points to a more mature outlook on the part of the older officers. Only seven percent and 13 percent, respectively, agree that an army officer's authority extends to "complete legal

control over the lives and careers of his subordinates." In fact, the seven percent figure just barely can be credited at all in the light of the criterion established in Chapter II. Some of the comments made in connection with Table 32 apply equally here.

TABLE 35

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH STATEMENT

"An army officer has complete legal control over the lives and careers of his subordinates."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	7	15	78
Reserve Lieutenants	13	26	61

With statement 29, concerning a shift from control by domination to control by manipulation in the army, only a very few disagree (Table 36). While less than half agree, 43 percent of the professionals and 48 percent of the reserve lieutenants, there is a large number unwilling to make up their minds, 50 percent and 39 percent. It is suggested that evidence points to a conditional acceptance of the idea. The choice of the word "manipulation" is unfortunate. A clearer response probably would have been obtained if the word "management" had been used. "Manipulation" carries the implication of deception, a poor basis for any permanent relationship. Blau comments:

> "... sooner or later, some member is apt to see through them, and he is not likely to keep this a secret. Once they are discovered, manipulative techniques have a boomerang effect. Employees who realize that their superior tries to manipulate them are prone to suspect all of his statements

and generally to resist his efforts to influence their performance."[23]

TABLE 36

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE TWENTY-NINTH STATEMENT

"There is a shift in the army from control by domination to control by manipulation."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	43	50	7
Reserve Lieutenants	48	39	13

Only 25 percent of the professional officer respondents think an officer must obey his superiors' instructions regardless of circumstances (Table 37). Significantly, but not surprisingly, 45 percent of the lieutenants think so.

TABLE 37

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTIETH STATEMENT

"An officer must obey the instructions of his superiors, regardless of circumstances."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	25	35	40
Reserve Lieutenants	45	25	30

The comments under statement 30 in Appendix B are revealing, indicating that at least some of the professionals would decline to obey instructions that were illegal or immoral. There is little doubt that these comments would be seconded by most of the respondents, supporting the idea that officers

do not consider military authority to be absolute.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE PROFESSIONAL OFFICER IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

In the years immediately following the close of World War II, an epidemic of novels, short stories, and motion pictures afflicted the American public, all of them predisposed to expose, to glorify, to vilify, to be contemptuous of, or to laugh at the American army. Scholarly attempts to examine social phenomena in the service were no less numerous. This writer has read some three dozen articles on the subject in the journals of the social sciences published in 1946, 1947, and 1948. Some were mediocre, most were bad, only a few were good. Good or bad, fiction or learned observation, these efforts all had one property in common--they concerned an army that no longer exists. They concerned that transitory fact, the army of 1940-1946. The American Journal of Sociology devoted its entire issue of March 1946 to "an attempt to describe and interpret a central phenomenon of wartime: the transformation of the civilian into the fighting man."[1] Among all the papers published, this theme predominated, particularly in relation to the enlisted man. A few of the articles purported to treat of "social structure," "class," "status," "prestige," and the other determinants with which we are here concerned. This latter group, written by "observer-participants" trained in the techniques of the social sciences, constitutes a bitter indictment of the social orientation of the officer corps of the years of the second World War.

Granted, the army of the 40's exists now only in history. Granted

the truth of the premise stated in Chapter I: "The professional officer differs from the temporary officer in motivation, orientation, and competence." Granted the indicted ones led eight million men to victory. Nevertheless, if the comments of the "observer-participants" are true, and certainly they are at least partially reliable, then the corps of professionals which existed before 1940 failed greviously to transfer its values, its ideals, its simple standards, to the corps of amateurs which augmented its numbers in the extremity of total war. The consensus of the social-scientist observers pointed to an exaggerated sense of position and privilege, leading to lack of responsibility as characteristic of the war-time officer group.[2] A solution to the problem of seeking ways to avoid such a failure in the future is beyond the scope of this paper. An inquiry into the social placement of the present-day officer, however, might provide a starting point for further investigation.

In Britain, the problem of determining the social class of an officer would be easy. It would be necessary only to turn to the British Census of 1951 to discover that "Officers (Armed Forces)", are among the 567,800 in the country grouped in "Class I," along with certain other "professionals," "directors and managers," and "high civil servants."[3] Perhaps an officer of our air force will glance at a British Census someday, and be shocked to discover that in Britain he would be "Class II," along with "veterinary surgeons" and "midwives." There are other features of the British idiosyncrasy in respect to social class which are amusing to Americans, but they are based in the British tradition, and are natural and reasonable to most of the British people. Tracing the development of the professions in relation to social structure, Professor Marshall of Cambridge says, "The professions were, in English parlance, the occupations suitable for a

gentleman."[4] Among them, of course, was the profession of arms. In America, we have never had such a concept, nor have we ever attempted an arbitrary class designation for army officers, nor for any other fraction of the population.

Despite this lack, the existence of class in America is a fact. Kurt Mayer writes:

> "Social differentiation is a universal characteristic of human societies because it is essential for their maintenance and survival. Some division of functions, some mode of specializing and dividing labor, is necessary in all societies, human or animal."[5]

In discussing social stratification in modern society, Mayer says, "Even in America, with its pronounced equalitarian ideology, social classes are a reality which divide the society and influence the ways of life of its members."[6] Writing of a 1941 nationwide survey made by Professor Cantril, Sherif and Cantril conclude, "It is clear ... that nearly every adult American easily thinks of himself as a member of a class."[7] Mayer follows a Weberian concept in considering different <u>dimensions</u> in systems of stratification, calling them the <u>economic</u> dimension, the dimension of <u>prestige and deference</u>, and the dimension of the <u>power structure</u>.[8] While acknowledging "social mobility," Mayer uses the 1950 U.S. Census of Population, and various research based on the census, to demonstrate that social class in the economic dimension directly affects an individual's chances for longevity, for good mental and physical health, for an education, for justice and legal protection, and for food, shelter, clothing, and general comfort.[9]

If we accept the fact that there are classes in our society, then what are these classes, and who are the persons in each? In 1940, a poll conducted

by Fortune provided respondents with an opportunity to assign themselves to a social class, and 79 percent chose middle-class; a Gallup poll in 1939 revealed that 88 percent considered themselves to be middle-class.[10] Other similar tests, however, tend to demonstrate a lack of class orientation among Americans.[11] Asking people what class they are in is only one way of making a determination. A more scientific grouping has been developed by Professor W. Lloyd Warner and his associates, who propose a class structure based on studies made in various communities in the country. Warner's structure disposes the classes as upper-upper, lower-upper, upper-middle, lower-middle, upper-lower, and lower-lower. Combining these as simply upper, middle, and lower, there appear to be approximately three percent, 40 percent and 57 percent of the population respectively, in each of the classes.[12]

Where in this distribution is the professional officer? Lacking a hereditary officer class like the Prussian Junkers, the United States draws its officers from a cross-section of the people, providing the officer corps with no common economic or social background. For example, a study made at Michigan State University by the Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc. in 1958 showed that four percent of 178 ROTC cadets (future officers) considered themselves to be upper-class, 90 percent middle-class, and six percent working-class or lower-class (Table 38).[13]

A comparison of the classes selected by the cadets, with the income groups of their families (reported in the same study) is quite interesting (Table 39). It would appear that almost one-third of the potential officers are from families whose income is in excess of $10,000 annually. Since we have no way of checking the accuracy of the figures, nor any idea of the amount of the family incomes of other Michigan State students, no conclusions

are justified.

TABLE 38

CLASS GROUPS SELECTED BY ROTC CADETS

CLASS	CHOICES (PERCENT)
Upper Class	4.0
Upper Middle Class	35.0
Middle Class	47.5
Lower Middle Class	7.5
Working Class	5.5
Lower Class	.5

TABLE 39

INCOME GROUPS, FAMILIES OF ROTC CADETS

INCOMES	CHOICES (PERCENT)
Over $30,000	8.0
$20,000-$30,000	2.0
$10,000-$20,000	20.5
$7,500-$10,000	24.0
$5,000-$7,500	23.5
$3,000-$5,000	19.0
Less than $3,000	3.0

The income figures shown in Table 39 are in no way correlated with family income distribution reported in the 1952 United States census, which indicates that there are only 3.4 percent of the nation's families with

annual incomes in excess of $10,000.[14] If any comments are in order, they would be to the effect that Mayer's observations concerning the "economic dimension" and chances for education appear to be correct.

Turning to our questionnaire, how do our professional officers and reserve lieutenants see themselves in relation to society? No less than 14 percent of the professionals consider themselves to be upper-class (Table 40).

TABLE 40

WORDS SELECTED TO DESCRIBE OFFICERS' PLACE IN SOCIETY

FACTORS	% PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS	% RESERVE LIEUTENANTS
Upper-class	14	3
Leader	28	25
Middle-class	44	55
Citizen	11	13
Mercenary	3	-
Outcast	-	4

This is in marked contrast to the results of national surveys, and significantly greater than the reservists, only three percent of whom selected upper-class. If we consider "leader," along with "upper-class," although "leader" admittedly is not a class word, then the results are even more striking.

From a conceptual standpoint, it is necessary to differentiate among the terms class, status, and prestige. In the first place, class is not readily definable because of shifting values in place and time. It is different from "caste," and from legally established "estate," as these terms

are used outside the United States. A very broad notion may be grasped by considering classes to be congeries of persons whose values, incomes, occupations, recreations, educations, and patterns of behavior are similar. Prestige connotes a system of attitudes whose opposite poles are superiority and inferiority, while status implies the existence of ranked groups whose members consider the prestige of the other members to be like their own.

Statement 31 in the questionnaire is a "prestige" question, the results of which appear to indicate that both professionals and reserve lieutenants consider themselves to be toward the inferior pole when compared with other professions (Table 41). There is no significant difference between the two groups, and the results of the table confirm the civilian consensus noted in Chapter I.

TABLE 41

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTY-FIRST STATEMENT

"To the general public, army officers rank high among all other professions."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	28	22	50
Reserve Lieutenants	23	22	55

"The effect of becoming a part of the military during our time is to separate the individual from his former society both physically and psychically. The military is self-contained and vicinally isolated."[15] This statement, published in 1948, reflects an attitude which is still held by many ten years later. There seems to be considerable doubt that the statement is true; certainly a majority of officers, professional and potential,

fail to concur (Table 42).

TABLE 42

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTY-SECOND STATEMENT

"The army is a society within a society and is socially self-sufficient."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	38	32	30
Reserve Lieutenants	47	25	28

Statement 33 is another one pertaining to prestige. The statement was fashioned deliberately with a "dangling" closing, with the idea that responses to it would furnish additional light on what officers believe about the prestige they have now. Table 43 demonstrates strong confirmation of the results shown in Table 41. A political scientist says that "The traditional civilian attitude toward a professional military class, and the ideas such a class was traditionally assumed to represent, is one of avowed distrust." He notes a decided trend toward a reversal of this attitude, maintaining that during World War II, "Members of the armed services enjoyed prestige and privileges in civilian society without precedent in American experience."[16] No doubt the post-war years have seen a subsidence in these areas--at least the officers themselves think so.

The matter of status within the military structure is explored in statement 34: "Among all officers of the army, officers of the combat arms are better thought of than other officers." Chapter I noted an inquiry along similar lines made in 1957 which provided evidence of considerable agreement with the idea. It is probable that most civilians would agree,

in response to the body of folklore concerning rear-area soldiers and the services of supply. The results of Table 44 are not conclusive, although it is possible to say that only one-third of the careerists disagree. There is a marked difference in the young lieutenants' responses, demonstrating a majority agreement.

TABLE 43

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTY-THIRD STATEMENT

"An army officer does not have the prestige he used to have."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	74	14	12
Reserve Lieutenants	65	14	21

TABLE 44

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH STATEMENT

"Among all officers of the army, officers of the combat arms are better thought of than other officers."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	40	27	33
Reserve Lieutenants	60	20	20

The results of another status probe are shown in Table 45, results which seem to demonstrate that there is no particular status differential between career regulars and career reservists, as far as the professionals are concerned. The reserve lieutenants, however, are not so sure; 23 percent

of them agree that regulars are better officers than career reservists.

TABLE 45

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH STATEMENT

"Regulars are better officers than career reservists."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	10	23	67
Reserve Lieutenants	23	36	40

The last six tables to be considered concern the professional in his relationships with civilians and the civilian community. Before starting, it will be worthwhile to try to establish just what a community is. It is hardly necessary to stipulate that a civilian in this context is anyone who is not a part of the military. A sociologist, John Kinneman, distinguishes among sections, regions, subregions, districts, neighborhoods, and communities, writing, "... the community is an area of common culture in which the prevailing consciousness of the population is centered on institutions which reflect certain diversity."[17] Baker Brownell, a philosopher, says the community has five essential characteristics:

> "(1) A community is a group of neighbors who know one another face to face. (2) It is a diversified group ... . (3) It is a cooperative group ... . (4) It is a group having a sense of 'belonging,' or group identity and solidarity. (5) It is a rather small group, such as the family, village, or small town, in which each person can know a number of others as whole persons ... ."[18]

It is suggested that respondents to number 48 in the questionnaire had at least some of these ideas in mind in selecting a word to describe their roles

in a civilian community. One writer during the immediate post-war years published a severely critical essay concerning "the navy as an insulated occupation," observing that naval officers lived in near total isolation.[19] This situation probably was true of the army as well, 18 years ago, but it is not so today. Table 46 indicates that 66 percent of the professionals consider an officer to be either "liked" or a "leader" when living in a civilian community. This result may point to a rapport not usually credited in the military-civilian relationship.

TABLE 46

WORDS SELECTED TO DESCRIBE OFFICERS IN A CIVILIAN COMMUNITY

FACTORS	% PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS	% RESERVE LIEUTENANTS
Liked	42	31
Leader	24	27
Tolerated	20	19
Non-participator	13	20
Follower	1	2
Hated	-	1

Table 47 displays a modest want of agreement with the statement that weapons of mass destruction equalize the risks of warfare for soldiers and civilians. Army officers are aware of an existing "atomic stalemate" which makes the employment of weapons of mass destruction unlikely, except in a condition of extremity. Even in extremity, the soldier would continue to resist while the civilian, presumably, would be encouraged to seek protection. In addition, the world-wide deployment of the army adds to the soldier's risk,

and minimizes the civilian's, particularly in a situation of stalemate and "brush-fire war."

TABLE 47

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH STATEMENT

"Weapons of mass destruction equalize the risks of warfare for soldiers and civilians."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	35	23	42
Reserve Lieutenants	42	21	37

Although 78 percent of the careerists and 75 percent of the reserve lieutenants agree that American civilians are not interested in the army in peacetime, there is some doubt that the statement is correct.*

TABLE 48

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH STATEMENT

"American civilians as a whole are not interested in the army in peacetime."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	78	14	8
Reserve Lieutenants	75	16	9

* Somebody is buying the books, motion pictures, short stories, comic strips, and children's toys all related to the army. Somebody is paying the taxes to support a 41.5 billion dollar defense establishment. Somebody's son is being drafted. Somebody should ask civilians what they think. The result tabulated in Table 48 might be a conditioned response.

In recent years, scholars and statesmen alike have detected an increasing involvement of the military in matters of political, social, and economic policy.[20] High-level military schools, such as the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, include in their curriculums instruction in broad concepts of national defense, including the shaping of national policy, and the relationships of economic forces and politics.[21] Many other army educational and research activities maintain close ties with their civilian counterparts in the national economy; an example is the liaison existing between the Quartermaster Food and Container Institute for the Armed Forces and its "industry advisory committees."[22] Officers, both professional and reserve, obviously recognize this trend (Table 49).

TABLE 49

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH STATEMENT

"In 1958, the military must concern themselves with broad ranges of political, social, and economic policies."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	79	5	16
Reserve Lieutenants	80	11	9

Responses to statement 39 seem to convey a certain distrust of "civilian ways" in relation to traditionally military functions. (Table 50).

A significant difference in opinion between professional officers and young reservists may be discerned in the "agree" column of Table 51, in consideration of the statement, "Army officers have a conservative ideological

and political orientation." The difference is nullified to some extent in the "disagree" column, and in the presence of 42 percent of the younger men who report "mixed feelings." There are, in any event, a majority of the career men who agree, a majority which would seem to confirm the findings of Huntington and others.[23]

TABLE 50

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE THIRTY-NINTH STATEMENT

"Automated weapons systems require greater reliance on soldier technicians who are more adjusted to civilian ways than military ways."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	30	25	45
Reserve Lieutenants	37	31	32

TABLE 51

OPINIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF THE FORTIETH STATEMENT

"Army officers have a conservative ideological and political orientation."

	PERCENT AGREE	PERCENT MIXED FEELINGS	PERCENT DISAGREE
Professionals	58	21	21
Reserve Lieutenants	34	42	23

CONCLUSION

The professional army officer traditionally has not been well regarded

in American society. For long years, his education, experience, conditioned patterns of behavior, and his near isolation from his countrymen, developed in him a strong sense of identification with his service, and through his service, a sense of dedication to the state. The officer, almost unwittingly, has created a pervasive bureaucracy comparable to the bureaucracies in industry, and to the bureaucracies in the other great complexes of modern organization. He is sharply aware of his dependence on morale, discipline, and authority, and is convinced of the fundamental requirement for leadership in the military art. In 1958, there is a trend toward a coming-together of soldier and civilian, a trend which affirms the need for greater mutual understanding.

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED TO ARMY OFFICERS

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC SERVICE

THIS IS NOT A TEST

IT ASKS ONLY FOR YOUR OWN OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES

THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS

PLEASE DO NOT SIGN YOUR NAME

INSTRUCTIONS

The purpose of this questionnaire is to discover the opinions of Army officers in general on a wide range of subjects. After the responses have been tabulated and evaluated, it is hoped that the information will suggest methods of improving the morale and productivity of newly commissioned officers.

On the following pages you will find a number of statements which have been made by Army officers, civilian Government officials, writers, and others. You are asked to express an opinion on each statement. Some of the statements have three possible responses — "Agree," "Mixed Feelings," and "Disagree;" others ask that you check certain words. Please choose the response closest to your own opinion, and be sure to check every statement. Some of the statements may not be worded exactly as you would wish them; please answer them anyway, and make any comments you care to in the space provided at the end of each section.

PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS YOUR RESPONSES WITH ANYONE!

ONLY INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS ARE IMPORTANT!

In order to assist in making an orderly tabulation of responses, please check the boxes which apply to you. Thank you for your cooperation!

RANK

( ) General Officer

( ) Colonel

( ) Lt. Colonel or Major

( ) Company Grade Officer

BRANCH OF SERVICE

( ) Combat Arms

( ) Technical Services

( ) Administrative Services

COMPONENT

( ) Regular Army

( ) USAR

( ) National Guard

CAREER

( ) I am a career officer

( ) I am not a career officer

( ) Undecided

	AGREE	MIXED FEELINGS	DISAGREE
1. Peace can be maintained only so long as the military is prepared to fight effectively and immediately.	( )	( )	( )
2. An Army officer is on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week.	( )	( )	( )
3. An officer is obligated by the code of his profession to keep himself and his troops in constant readiness.	( )	( )	( )
4. An officer who continually gets bad assignments should get out of the Army.	( )	( )	( )
5. The Army is more than a career, it is a way of life.	( )	( )	( )

COMMENTS:

6. The organization of the Army is based on specialization.	( )	( )	( )
7. An officer or non-com cannot be expected to supervise directly more than 11 men.	( )	( )	( )
8. Standing operating procedures in the Army are necessary and important.	( )	( )	( )
9. An officer has security, if not of his life, then certainly of his livelihood.	( )	( )	( )
10. There is a gap between formal procedure and the informal realities of command.	( )	( )	( )

COMMENTS:

	AGREE	MIXED FEELINGS	DISAGREE
11. Parades contribute to organizational pride and efficiency.	( )	( )	( )
12. You <u>can't</u> have high morale and efficiency at the same time.	( )	( )	( )
13. There is too much time wasted in the Army on non-essentials.	( )	( )	( )
14. It is an officer's moral responsibility to go all the way in observing supply economy.	( )	( )	( )
15. A clean desk ("the Pentagon desk") is in fact evidence of an officer's efficiency.	( )	( )	( )

<u>COMMENTS</u>:

16. Discipline is good for people.	( )	( )	( )
17. The uniform code of military justice is adequate under present-day conditions.	( )	( )	( )
18. The Army has modified its system from rigid discipline to more indirect forms of obtaining cooperation.	( )	( )	( )
19. Officers of the combat arms must pay more attention to discipline than technical service officers.	( )	( )	( )
20. Military discipline is a state of order and obedience existing within a command.	( )	( )	( )

<u>COMMENTS</u>:

	AGREE	MIXED FEELINGS	DISAGREE
21. An officer's most important duty is to lead and direct men.	( )	( )	( )
22. An officer should be careful to explain to his subordinates the "reason why" whenever possible.	( )	( )	( )
23. With proper indoctrination and training, any intelligent man can become a leader.	( )	( )	( )
24. The military career is a career of managerial skill.	( )	( )	( )
25. The quality of initiative in the individual has become the most praised of the military virtues.	( )	( )	( )

COMMENTS:

26. The relationship of a superior officer to his subordinates should be that of an "older brother" rather than that of a "father."	( )	( )	( )
27. Responsibility without commensurate authority leads to chaos.	( )	( )	( )
28. An Army officer has complete legal control over the lives and careers of his subordinates.	( )	( )	( )
29. There is a shift in the Army from control by domination to control by manipulation.	( )	( )	( )
30. An officer must obey the instructions of his superiors, regardless of circumstances.	( )	( )	( )

COMMENTS:

	AGREE	MIXED FEELINGS	DISAGREE
31. To the general public, Army officers rank high among all other professions.	( )	( )	( )
32. The Army is a society within a society, and is socially self-sufficient.	( )	( )	( )
33. An Army officer does not have the prestige he used to have.	( )	( )	( )
34. Among all officers of the Army, officers of the combat arms are better thought of than other officers.	( )	( )	( )
35. Regulars are better officers than career reservists.	( )	( )	( )

COMMENTS:

36. Weapons of mass destruction equalize the risks of warfare for soldiers and civilians.	( )	( )	( )
37. American civilians as a whole are not interested in the Army in peacetime.	( )	( )	( )
38. In 1958, the military must concern themselves with broad ranges of political, social, and economic policies.	( )	( )	( )
39. Automated weapons systems require greater reliance on soldier-technicians who are more adjusted to civilian ways than military ways.	( )	( )	( )
40. Army officers have a conservative ideological and political orientation.	( )	( )	( )

COMMENTS:

41. Please check the one word you believe to be the most important factor in a military career.

Money	Security	Adventure
Recognition	Dignity	Patriotism

42. Please check the one word you believe best describes the Army's organization.

Specialization	SOP	Hierarchy
Pyramid	Bureaucracy	Traditional

43. Please check the one word you believe best describes efficiency.

Speed	Productivity	Ability
Training	Skill	Competence

44. Please check the one word you believe best describes discipline.

Punishment	Response	Obedience
Self-control	Cooperation	Subordination

45. Please check the one word you believe best describes leadership.

Technique	Power	Intelligence
Manipulation	Inherent	Influencing

46. Please check the one word you believe best describes authority.

Legal	Inherent	Control
Personal	Superior	Power

47. Please check the one word you believe best describes the position of Army officers in American society.

Upper-class	Leader	Mercenary
Middle-class	Citizen	Outcast

48. Please check the one word you believe best describes the role of an officer living in a civilian community.

Leader	Non-participator	Liked
Follower	Hated	Tolerated

APPENDIX B

RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS ON STATEMENTS IN QUESTIONNAIRE

RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS ON STATEMENTS IN QUESTIONNAIRE

STATEMENT NUMBER 1: Peace can be maintained only so long as the military is prepared to fight effectively and immediately.

Comments of Professional Officers:

None

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Is only true to a certain extent. A small effective force is better than an extremely large force during peacetime. (Mixed Feelings)

Harmony between nations may be accomplished without the scare between military forces. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 2: An Army officer is on duty 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Not in the strict sense as worded, but may be called to general duty at any time. (Mixed Feelings)

Many senior commanders take this to mean an officer should spend most of his "leisure" time on the job, even whenit is not necessary; and consider putting in a great number of hours the equivalent, or evidence, of devotion to duty. (Mixed Feelings)

Being a career man I feel that the family should be considered in the living-working time of the individual. Most duties should be performed in a normal length working day. (Mixed Feelings)

"On duty"--in the sense that he must uphold his position at all times, has authority without express announcement, but not in the context used in a court martial for drinking "on duty." (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Would say "on call," not "on duty." (Disagree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 3: An officer is obligated by the code of his profession to keep himself and his troops in constant readiness.

Comments of Professional Officers:

None

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

What is the code of the profession? (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 4: An officer who continually gets bad assignments should get out of the army.

Comments of Professional Officers:

The term "bad assignment" is vague. If an officer always thinks he has a "bad assignment" while others think the same assignment is good, he should get out because he is not the type the army needs. (Mixed Feelings)

If the officer concerned feels that his assignments are bad, he should attempt to do something about them--failing this it may be well for him to get out. (Mixed Feelings)

It could be an indication of his performance, or his attitude. He might make a good assignment a bad one. (Mixed Feelings)

A bad assignment is normally a matter of opinion or taste. If an officer continually gets assignments not to his liking, then he is unsuited for the profession and should get out. (Mixed Feelings)

"Bad assignments" are a matter of personal opinion. (Mixed Feelings)

What constitutes a bad assignment? (Disagree)

Should visit his branch career management office. (Disagree)

I'm assuming that assignments were made with no choice on the part of the officer concerned. (Disagree)

It depends on the interpretation of "bad assignment." If it means detrimental to career development and nothing can be done about it, I agree. (Mixed Feelings)

"Bad assignments" to one individual may be "desirable assignments" to another. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

This could be due to any number of things, thus it is difficult to answer. (Mixed Feelings)

My answer to question four is based on the belief that assignments are thought bad only if the individual dislikes his work. (Agree)

The bad assignments are a matter of bad luck. However, the individual's vocation is in the army or he would not have chosen it in the first place. Hence, if the vocation is still his, he should not sacrifice it for past bad luck. (Mixed Feelings)

I think he might try to do something about it, but he shouldn't get out of the army. (Disagree)

The officer should consult the career management branch if he continues to receive bad assignments. (Disagree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 5: The army is more than a career, it is a way of life.

Comments of Professional Officers:

None

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

The last statement is so so true. (Agree)

The army is a way of life, but not necessarily a good way of life. I mean to stay in the army your life would certainly be different from civilian life. (Agree)

Strongly disagree with statement five! (Disagree)

It is a way of life, but not one that I care for particularly. (Agree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 6: The organization of the army is based on specialization.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Agree, assuming that even a rifleman is today a specialist. (Agree)

Specialization in certain areas only. (Mixed Feelings)

To a higher degree recently due to advanced technology in many fields. (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

The organization is based on specialization, but personnel assignments are certainly not. (Agree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 7: An officer or non-com cannot be expected to supervise directly more than 11 men.

Comments of Professional Officers:

I think that it depends on the type unit, i.e., gun section of 240mm howitzer battalion. (Mixed Feelings)

The limit is probably five or six for most officers and non-commissioned officers. (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Even 11 men are too many for direct supervision by one man. (Agree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 8: Standing operating procedures in the army are necessary and important.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Agree, as long as they emphasize those procedures which are peculiar to a command and not just a rehash of material available through published sources. (Agree)

Procedure, both written and non-written should be practical. Each solution to a problem should be the easiest workable solution, not one which serves eye appeal. (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

None

STATEMENT NUMBER 9: An officer has security, if not of his life, then certainly of his livelihood.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Not true of reserve officers. (Disagree)

Answer applies only to regular army officer. (Agree)

For a regular yes, for a reservist no. (Disagree)

These are subject to change, and could conceivably be reduced or lost. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

At the price of stagnation of creative ability one obtains security in the army. (Mixed Feelings)

I feel this very strongly--to me his job, rank, position is in danger at his every move--because of some mistake of his own or dislike by a superior officer. (Disagree)

What security has an officer of his life? (Mixed Feelings)

What if the man is not regular army--he may be put out of the army, when the army wishes. (Disagree)

The policy of "rifing" officers with many years of service does not boost morale. (Disagree)

The United States Army Reserve officer does not have security because of the continuing cut-backs in the army. (Disagree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 10: There is a gap between formal procedure and the informal realities of command.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Leadership (or the ability to command) cannot be taught in school. The ability to command stems from DESIRE and EXPERIENCE. (Agree)

Number 10 is a poor question. What is the question asking? I don't know. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

I have not had enough experience to fully understand and answer this question. (Mixed Feelings)

I didn't feel number 10 was a clear question, therefor answer not really valid. (Mixed Feelings)

Uncertain of the meaning of number 10. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 11: Parades contribute to organizational pride and efficiency.

Comments of Professional Officers:

There are too many! (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Parades can be an unwelcome task. (Mixed Feelings)

Not if held on weekends. (Agree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 12: You can't have high morale and efficiency at the same time.

No comments

STATEMENT NUMBER 13: There is too much time wasted in the army on non-essentials.

Comments of Professional Officers:

If you mean eye-wash which detracts from the primary mission--training for combat. (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Non-essentials such as hurry up and wait. (Agree)

About 90 percent. (Agree)

I couldn't agree with number 13 more! (Agree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 14: It is an officer's moral responsibility to go all the way in observing supply economy.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Shut off the faucet and waste reams of paper. (Agree)

This is a loaded question! "All the way" might mean don't take items out for fear they will be broken. Also, an army destroys things and that job calls for too many risks--supply economy doesn't follow this. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

What is meant by all the way? (Mixed Feelings)

His first responsibility is the mission. If he can observe supply economy and still accomplish his mission he should. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 15: A clean desk ("the Pentagon desk") is in fact evidence of an officer's efficiency.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Check the desk drawers. (Disagree)

A clean desk may mean he does nothing--or passes it all on for someone else to do. (Mixed Feelings)

The top of the desk might be clean, but too often I think officers might rush their work in order to meet the requirement. If an officer is guided by his own integrity there will be no question of his efficiency. (Disagree)

This is never so. Work always goes to the "can do boys." (Disagree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

I have never had a desk in the army, but still I would not think a clean desk is a measure of efficiency. (Mixed Feelings)

I do not understand what is meant by a "clean desk" ("the Pentagon desk"). (Mixed Feelings)

A clean desk may just mean that the officer is passing the buck. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 16: Discipline is good for people.

Comments of Professional Officers:

It depends on how you define discipline. I would say that "people without discipline are no good." My view of discipline is that it is an attitude of the individual which initiates, directs, and sustains his energies toward a goal when such action reflects the welfare of others and not the satisfaction of his own selfish impulses. Developing this requires more than "doing tasks to train the will." If this latter is the concept intended here, I disagree. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

I cannot give an unqualified answer to this question. I believe that discipline can stamp out imagination and initiative in an individual. (Mixed Feelings)

Not if it interferes with original thought and ideas. (Mixed Feelings)

Discipline (the army way) is good for some but certainly not for others. (Mixed Feelings)

Self-imposed discipline is good for a person to have. It builds temperance, modification, and tolerance in important areas. But this does not mean that all people in general should lead the "disciplined" life of a soldier. (Mixed Feelings)

What degree of discipline? There is such a thing as excessive discipline. (Mixed Feelings)

This is too categorical a statement for me. I think in limited doses discipline is good, but it can be overdone. (Mixed Feelings)

A certain amount of discipline is good, but regimentation is not and that is the essential of military discipline. (Agree)

Either imposed or self. (Agree)

Discipline without efficiency and combat readiness as a goal is harmful. Discipline is good as long as nonconformity in thinking is permitted. (Agree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 17: The uniform code of military justice is adequate under present-day conditions.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Company commander needs more authority under Article 15. (Disagree)

Recent rulings of courts have made some articles inadequate; i.e., Fifth Amendment and corresponding military article. (Disagree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

My limited experience invalidates my opinion. (Agree)

Don't know. (Mixed Feelings)

I have had no reason to really find out. (Mixed Feelings)

The code, plus the qualities of the leader, are adequate. (Mixed Feelings)

The maximum punishments are a little too severe in cases. (Agree)

Always room for improvement. (Mixed Feelings)

Definitely not! (Disagree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 18: The army has modified its system from rigid discipline to more indirect forms of obtaining cooperation.

Comments of Professional Officers:

The army has not but individuals have. (Mixed Feelings)

Speak softly but carry a big stick. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

My limited experience invalidates my opinion. (Agree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 19: Officers of the combat arms must pay more attention to discipline than technical service officers.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Their lives and the lives of their men depend on it. (Agree)

Violently disagree. Discipline among the combat arms is a little easier to come by when the motivation is teamwork for survival on the battlefield. A man in the tech services must be well-disciplined to work long arduous hours on the necessary but unglamorous and unexciting job of logistical support. Add to this a factor of less supervision, and the need for discipline becomes even more acute. (Disagree)

Technical services need more discipline than they have. (Disagree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

This is evidently the feeling that many have around Fort Lee. (Disagree)

Discipline is more important to an officer of a combat arm, but they probably have to spend less time and attention on it. (Disagree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 20: Military discipline is a state of order and obedience existing within a command.

Comments of Professional Officers:

It encompasses more than stated in Question 20. (Agree)

Must start here and extend through self-discipline to loyal cooperation in the absence of orders. (Agree)

"Wilful order and obedience." (Mixed Feelings)

It's more than this. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Military discipline is more than just a state of order and obedience, it is loyalty and willful cooperation instilled into the men within a command. (Mixed Feelings)

Agree in part, i.e., that is a part of discipline. (Agree)

Discipline is initiated strict compliance with orders. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 21: An officer's most important duty is to lead and direct men.

Comments of Professional Officers:

None

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Not always, i.e., administration. (Disagree)

Mission comes first. (Disagree)

This depends on officer's job. (Mixed Feelings)

I feel this is important but the army doctrine specifies that it is the accomplishment of his mission. (Mixed Feelings)

Incomplete statement. I would add "... in accomplishing their mission," and then agree. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 22: An officer should be careful to explain the "reason why" to his subordinates whenever possible.

Comments of Professional Officers:

None

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Depends on definition of "whenever possible." (Agree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 23: With proper indoctrination and training, any intelligent man can become a leader.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Character and physical condition are as important as intelligence in becoming a leader. (Disagree)

Up to a certain point--leadership both an art and a science. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

This is too broad. I don't think it is always true. (Mixed Feelings)

To some degree, varying with individuals. (Agree)

Not unless he himself desires to become a leader rather than satisfy an unpleasant obligation. (Disagree)

Leadership depends upon the situation. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 24: The military career is a career of managerial skill.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Plus many others too numerous to mention. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

It is more than this for these skills are practiced under rather unique conditions. (Mixed Feelings)

A man is often pecuniarily liable, but can't manage as he sees fit. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 25: The quality of initiative in the individual has become the most praised of the military virtues.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Agree, but the thought is not altogether correct. (Agree)

Ability to organize and delegate is the rarest commodity in the army today. (Disagree)

The modern army has become one of conformity--initiative receives lip praise, but is frowned on in reality. (Disagree)

It should be but isn't. (Disagree)

Not by design, but this is an ever increasing problem. (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Ha! The complete reverse is true in the army! (Disagree)

You don't get a chance to think on your own. (Disagree)

I know cases where a man isn't given a chance. (Disagree)

I don't believe this has arrived yet, but the trend is leaning in this direction, which is a good sign, in my opinion. (Mixed Feelings)

It strikes me that this is one of the most praiseworthy, yet the least praised, of qualities in the army. By stressing conformity, the army loses the distinct advantage of individual personality and initiative. (Disagree)

I am not sure that I understand this question, but I don't think all army people have initiative and I am not sure it is the most important thing to have. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 26: The relationship of a superior officer to his subordinates should be that of an "older brother" rather than that of a "father."

Comments of Professional Officers:

Superior officers should pay more attention to subordinate officers and realize that they must teach them and show them the "tricks of the trade." (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Neither. (Disagree)

In my opinion, the relationships stated in question 26 are both incorrect. (Disagree)

Neither, should be more formal. (Disagree)

I don't think it necessarily has to be either. Any relationship that gets the job done efficiently is best. (Disagree)

The meaning of this question is a little hard to understand. (Agree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 27: Responsibility without commensurate authority leads to chaos.

No comments.

STATEMENT NUMBER 28: An army officer has complete legal control over the lives and careers of his subordinates.

Comments of Professional Officers:

He should have, but doesn't. (Disagree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

None

STATEMENT NUMBER 29: There is a shift in the army from control by domination to control by manipulation.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Control by certification is more appropriate. (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

I don't know. (Mixed Feelings)

In answering question number 29 and other questions dealing with a change in the army, it is necessary for me to say that I haven't had practical experience but have based my opinions on what I have heard from my instructors. (Agree)

My period of service is too short to express a valid opinion. (Mixed Feelings)

Problems are generated by laxity. People take advantage of "soft" situations. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 30: An officer must obey the instructions of his superiors, regardless of circumstances.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Not when moral turpitude is involved. (Disagree)

It is his duty to argue if he disagrees up to the moment the decision is made final. He should then comply. (Agree)

A man entrusted with the authority and responsibility of an officer should be allowed to adjust instructions from his superiors, without departing from the basic mission. In other words, mission type orders will preclude the necessity for blind obedience to rigid orders. (Disagree)

Viz: Nuremburg trials. (Disagree)

There are many incompetents in the army today. (Mixed Feelings)

Moral authority may be exercised by an officer, with prudence and good judgment, of course. (Disagree)

Agree, as long as the superior is competent and the instructions are lawful. (Agree)

Agree, except in obviously unlawful circumstances. (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

If disagreement exists, report to proper higher officer after doing job. (Agree)

Usually, not always. (Disagree)

In wartime it may be more so, yet I can see the point meant to be brought out. (Mixed Feelings)

Unless insanity. (Agree)

This is not exactly true at least in theory, but as things are set up, it is dangerous to beat the theory. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 31: To the general public, army officers rank high among all other professions.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Many people do not appreciate the devotion of most officers. (Mixed Feelings)

In my part of the country, New Jersey, they do. I know this is not universally true. (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

They rank very low. (Disagree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 32: The army is a society within a society, and is socially self-sufficient.

Comments of Professional Officers:

No society is self-sufficient. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

The first part of the statement is correct, but not the second. (Mixed Feelings)

Religious life is excluded. (Disagree)

True, but not the most desirable atmosphere. (Agree)

Yes, providing the army officer does not seek recognition outside of the military services. Generally speaking, I would think that a higher ranking officer would find it necessary to mix in outside circles. (Mixed Feelings)

To me no, to others perhaps so! (Disagree)

STATEMENT NUMBER 33: An army officer does not have the prestige he used to have.

Comments of Professional Officers:

If we have lost prestige, we are to blame. Financial instability, immorality should never be tolerated regardless of military worth of man. (Mixed Feelings)

Especially within the army. (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

I do not know. (Mixed Feelings)

Too many officers are not the "gentlemen" there once were in the army (in history). (Agree)

Agree, compared to wartime. (Agree)

I'm not old enough to be aware of the prestige, or lack of same, officers formerly had. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 34: Among all officers of the army, officers of the combat arms are better thought of than other officers.

Comments of Professional Officers:

This has undergone a change during the past decade. (Disagree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Maybe they are better trained officers. (Agree)

In the army this is true I think, but civilians have different values. I don't think it is necessarily true there. (Mixed Feelings)

Better thought of by whom, civilians or fellow officers? (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 35: Regulars are better officers than career reservists.

Comments of Professional Officers:

I would say this is "generally" true. (Agree)

Depends entirely on the individual, however, considering the entire group, I agree. (Mixed Feelings)

Each should be judged on own merit. (Mixed Feelings)

Many fine officers are reservists who have a sincere devotion to duty. (Disagree)

This is too great a generalization to be answered. (Disagree)

As a flat statement--no! Many regulars are, but the reverse is also true when the facts are examined in the light of performance and even dedication to career. (Disagree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

Not entirely true. Many career reservists are quite as good or better than many of the regulars. (Mixed Feelings)

Depends purely on individual. (Mixed Feelings)

STATEMENT NUMBER 36: Weapons of mass destruction equalize the risks of warfare for soldiers and civilians.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Only localized. (Disagree)

A soldier's actions cannot be passive, therefor more risk. (Disagree)

This remains to be seen. With the introduction of each new weapon, the same things have been expressed throughout history. The gases would destroy life, gunpowder, etc. I believe balance of power will control atomic weapons. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

None

STATEMENT NUMBER 37: American civilians as a whole are not interested in the army in peacetime.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Certainly many seem interested only in the price tag of defense. (Mixed Feelings)

Not interested in service, but interested in the more spectacular aspects of military life, service and happenings. This includes, of course, the aspect of money as it relates to the Federal taxes. (Mixed Feelings)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

None

STATEMENT NUMBER 38: In 1958, the military must concern themselves with broad ranges of political, social, and economic policies.

No comments

STATEMENT NUMBER 39: Automated weapons systems require greater reliance on soldier-technicians who are more adjusted to civilian ways than military ways.

Comments of Professional Officers:

Alas, too true! (Agree)

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

None

STATEMENT NUMBER 40: Army officers have a conservative ideological and political orientation.

Comments of Professional Officers:

None

Comments of Reserve Lieutenants:

I feel this may be true of the majority, but not all. (Mixed Feelings)

Perhaps they do, I don't know. It might be good though. (Mixed Feelings)

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