AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN HISTQRY AND SCIENCE

Thesis Ice II“ Dogma OI M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Rolf A. George
1956

AH INVESTIGATION OF THE DISTIHUTIOH

BE JESH HISTORY AND SCIEHCE

A'EEBIS
Submitted to the College of Science and Arts of Michigan
State University of Agriculture and Applied Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

HAS”ER OF ARTS

Department of PhilOSOphy

1950

15-23515

 

 

 

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The author wisIes to express his grateful thanks
to Professors Henry 8. Leonard and Lewis K. Zerby for
their help and encouragement throughout the course of

this investigation.

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Introductory Jote
he Referential Ambiguity of "History”

Hominai'sm and Realism Concerning "Philo-
sophy of history”

Science and History
mhe Ontologies of Science and history
History and Epistemology: Preliminaries
History and Epistemology I

listory and epistemology II

Epistemology III

p;

History an

nd Value

9.)

History
History and Unified Science

An Attempt to Define ”Statement of History"
Iindelband's Theory

Concernine

0 Subjects and Predicates
Concluding hemarhs
Footnotes

Bibliography

#- I4

Ah II‘EDTIGATION OF THE DISTINCTION

BBTJEEN HISTORY AND SCIENCE

Introductory hote

The purpose of this paper is twofold: On the one hand,
it is to discuss some attempts that have been made to find
criteria for the discrimination of science from history. On
the other hand, it is to offer, tentatively, one such criter-
io..

The paper begins by discussing the ambiguity of
the word "history," and pointing out some difficulties that
have ensued from neglecting this ambiguity. The second
section deals with a seeming circularity, appearing in
enquiries of this type. These first two sections are mere-
ly to prepare the way for the investigation that is to
follow.

Section three gives a brief outline for the task
which is set for the critical part of this paper. It
states that a criterion for the discrimination of his-
tory from science can conceivably be found through an on-
tological, an epistemological, or a formal enquiry. The

ubsequent sections are to carry out the critical task

(,0

and attempt to establish that none of the ontological or

epistemological arguments yield the proposed criterion.
Section nine deals with a claim made by heinrich

Rickert that histories are ”value charged" while the

sciences are not. This assertion is discussed in detail,

Q.

an it is shown that does not hold.

Section ten has to do with the theory that science
and history are in fact one, a theory which has been put
forth by some logiCa 1 er piricists. This section attcwuts
to show that science and history eeual each other only as
far as the observations are concerned from which they both
must proceed, or, at least, that the evidence offered by
the philos0phers discussed there does not allow one to con-
clude that science and history equal each otner in any fur-
the respect. In this section, the point has been reached
where the formal differences between t1 e two branches of
knowledge are discussed.

In the following Section the same type of enguiry is
continued, and an attempt is made to demonstrate that a
difference between science and history cannot lie in the

nature and kind of the individual statements which are

9)

dnitted in one or tie other. This being achieved, it re-
mains to show that the difference between science and his-

ory lies in the way in which the statements are connected,
rather than in the statements themselves.

In a concluding remark, a brief reference is made to
the meta physical conse<uence s that would ensue from the
adOption of the tentative solution that is given in the
last part of the paper.

In the Opinion of the author, the theory of the log-
ical eo itivists concerning the unity of science and history

has never been criticised on formal grounds. This might be

attributed to the general unwillingness of philosophers of

history to engage in studies of a formal nature. But while
there has been no formal criticism, there has also been no
general agreement on the issue; and only too often the is-
sue was dismissed with a somewhat outdated mathematicus-
non-est-collega gesture. Perhaps it is needless to say

that I do not wish to pass any such value judgnent on either
science or history in maintaining that a difference exists
between the two. As this claim issues from a formal con-

sideration, no valuation can be eXpected to evolve from it.

The Referential Ambiguity of "History"

The word "history" possesses a referential ambiguity.
It refers, first, to a number of events, and secondly, to a
body of knowledge about these events. Thus we may say that
hommsen occupied a certain position in the history of mankind,
and, on the other hand, that he wrote a history of Rome. Cor-
responding to this ambiguity, two branches of philosOphical
enquiry have been develOped, one concerning the events that
are commonly called historical and the other related to the
writings that have been comgosed about these events. The
former is called the "material," the latter the "formal"
philosOphy of history. With reference to this let us, for
the time being, adept the convention of speaking about
"history in the formal sense" and "history in the material
sense."1

If the following is asserted: "Charlemagne's victory

' we have

at Tours is a part of the history of Charlemagne,’
an instance of "history" in its material sense. On the
other hand, "'Charlemagne won the battle of Tours' is a part
of a history of Charlemagne" represents an instance of "his-
tory" in the formal sense.

Thus if we employ the word in its formal sense and make
an assertion "a is a history," this assertion will be similar

in kind to "b is a sentence.’ In both cases we are dealing

with linguistic entities.

The problems that arise from investigations of
sentences and histories will show some similarity: there
will have to be considerations of structure, concern, veri-
fication procedures, and probable truth. In the case of his-
tories, moreover, the interconnection of sentences will have
to be considered, as a history will commonly consist of more
than one sentence.

Much of contemporary EurOpean philosophy is character-
ized through an over-reliance upon the structures and pecul-
iarities of natural languages. In some cases, this inclina-
tion has resulted in obviously erroneous and inconsistent
statements. Especially of Martin Heidegger it is true that
the natural language, in his case the German language, is
thought to have an unveiling, revealing character.
(Entbergungscharacter) Heidegger's Sein und Zeit2 is inter—
spersed with etymological analyses which are to show forth
the "actual" meaning of one word or another. Such an
approach does not permit the elimination of an ambiguity,
as an ambiguity is never thought to be accidental, and be-
cause a language is thought of as conferring some information
through any ambiguity. In the present context, the ambiguity
of the term "history" will be treated as logically accidental.
How it came to be ambiguous, i.e. the etymological problem
does not interest us here.

A brief analysis of Benedetto Croce's philOSOphy of
history will best serve to demonstrate the difficulties which
arise if the ambiguity in the term "history" is not elimin-

ated or if it is taken as intrinsically meaningful.

O\

Croce starts his book Geschichte ale Gedanke und Tat}
with an attempt to determine the essential characteristics of
a historical writing. What is it that makes a piece of liter-
ature a history? Croce contends that it is not the style
in which it is written,and he continues that not even the
greater or lesser abundance and preciseness of the individual
data can give a clue to the solution of the problem because:

Ausfuehrlichste und genaueste Sammlungen von

Einzelangaben (liegen vor), bei denen sofort zu spueren
ist, dass sie nicht Geschichte sind. Anderseits (kennen
wir) Werke... von leuchtender historischer Einsicht,
aber arm an Tatsachen und sogar von ungenauen, legendaeren
oder erdichteten Angaben durchsetzt ...Kompilationen von
Tatsachen nennt man Chroniken, Augzeichnungen, Kemoiren,
Annalen, aber nicht Geschichtswerke; und selbst wenn
sie kritisch gesichted warden, wenn von jeder einzelnen
Angabe die Quelle angefuehrt wird oder ein gruendlich
ueberprueftes Zeugnis, so koennen sie...nie auf ihrer
Egene die Aeusserlichkeit der Quelle und des Zeugnisses
ueberwinden...und koennen nie unsere Wahrheit werden,
waehrend die Geschichte eine von uns aus unserer innersten
Erfahrung geschoepfte Wahrheit erfordert."4

According to Croce, therefore, the correspondence to
facts or the arrangement of data do not in any way establish
a criterion as to whether a given piece of writing forms a
history. A writing, in order to become a history, has to
show forth a truth "that comes from our innermost self."

The meaningfulness of the passage quoted evidently depends
upon a precise account of this truth. Such an account is not
eXplicitly given. However, from the general context in which
the quoted passage occurs, it can be Judged that Croce meant
some such thing as "vital truth," or a "truth that has prac-
tical bearings upon our life."

At this point there arises a peculiar difficulty. A

truth, or true statement does not in itself contain a clue

which allows us to ascertain its practical importance. Thus
it may be of great importance to know a certain fact at a
given time, but the same knowledge may be quite inconsequen-
tial at another time. According to Croce, a true historical
writing would then be a piece of literature that conveys
truths which are of vital necessity for its time.

Croce holds that a judgement about a history should be
directed toward its historicity, and he defines historicity
as:

...ein Akt des Verstehens und der Einsicht..., den

ein praktisches Beduerfnis ausloest, welches nicht eher
innerlich geloest in die Tat einmuenden kann, bis die
Schatten, die Sweifel und die Unklarheiten, gegen die as
ankaempft, durch Stellun. und Loesung eines theoretischen
Problems beseitigt sind.

Constitutive for a history is therefore the fact that
in it be posed a resolved a theoretical problem the solution
of which is a practical necessity at the time when the history
is composed. Thus, a history acquires its peculiar status
through the fact that it is composed in history and has
practical bearings upon the latter.

From this it follows obviously that some writing may
be a history say, around 1880, but cease to be one in 1920,
when it no longer has any bearing upon some practical problem.

It seems that writings other than histories share the
characteristics here listed. They are all composed at a cer-
tain (historical) time, and it is true of many writings out-
side of histories that they have practical bearings of one

kind or another, and that a certain number of years later they

cease to have such practical consequences. Should then their

name be changed or should we resolve the apory by saying that
for the people around 1880 this was a history, but for us it
is a mere piece of literature?

So far there are three possible interpretations of
Croce's theory. One might think that Croce presupposes a
general knowledge of the term "history" on the part of his
readers. Then the passages quoted above are only to give a
criterion for the discrimination of "real" or consequential
historical writings from unimportant ones.

The second possible interpretation would put the em-
phasis on the fact that historical writings are composed in
history and that through this they acquire their peculiar
status. As this is true of all writings, here again a knowl-
edge of what histories are is already presupposed, if not a
discrimination between historical and other writings should
be doomed impossible.

The third possible interpretation would be like the
second with the exception that no knowledge of the meaning
of the term history is thought to be required. In this case
all writings would be historical writings. Surprisingly
enough, Croce eXplicitly confesses his adherence to the third
of the above listed vieWpoints. He holds that all Judgments
are in fact historical judgements. For this he gives two
different reasons. The first has to do with the subject
matter of all possible judgments. As the subject matter that
is contemplated in any judgment has its being in history, the

judgement itself is rendered a historical judgement. If he

were to make a judgment about a stone that is lying before

his feet, Croce holds, his judgment would in fact be a his-
torical judgment, for it would be about a certain period in
the stone's history.

Secondly, all judgments are historical, because they
take place in a certain place in the judge's history.

Denn tatsaechlich kann kein konkretes Erkennen -
ebensowenig wie ein geschicht ~ liches Urteil - davon
absehen, dass es an das Leben, also an das Tun gebunden
ist, als ein Moment der Unterbrechung oder Erweiterung
dieses Tuns.

This hookup with life makes for the historicity of

any judgment.

It is obvious that the two arguments listed above are
taken from two different areas. If we call a judgment "his-
torical" because its subject matter is in history, the term
"historical" is employed in its formal sense. If, on the
other hand, a judgment is said to be historical, because the
act of judging took place in history, the term "historical"
is employed in its material sense. Consequently, the above
assertions, if they are true, prove two entirely different
things, which are not to be confounded.

It cannot be denied that all acts of judgment do in
fact have a historical locus, but if we call a judgment his-
torical because it has been made in history, we are asserting
a mere pleonasm, and do not in any way contribute to a meth-
odology of history.

Moreover, it is not in the nature of a logical or

methodological investigation, to determine under which con-

dition an assertion was made — this enterprise is up to the

10

sciences of sociology and psychology. In addition, the
assertion that all judgments are historical is not even con-
tributory to these sciences.

An acceptance of Croce's theory would lead to the most

awkward consequences. Croce himself writes:

Die Theoretiker oder Wiesenschaftler selber, die
ueber die physikalisch - mathematischen und
Naturwissenschaften theoretisch denken, bestehen heute
darauf, dass auch der Laturwissenschaft der Character
einer Geschichte zuerkannt werde.7

The basis on which this assertion rests, namely the

contention that all judgements are historical, confers its
vagueness directly upon this statement about the sciences.
If the sciences are historical because they are in history,
they can be said to coincide,in this respect,with histories
'as well as with all other meaningful and meaningless sen-
tences. The author of this paper does not recognize this as
a sufficient criterion for the assumption that therefore
science and history coincide in all other respects also,
for this is what the above quotation amounhsto. Although
it may well turn out that no criterion can be found through
which to distinguish between writings of scientists and
historians, a criterion will be sought in the structure of
scientific treatises and histories, where the circumstances
of their reapective origin is left out of the question.

It appears that for the sake of clarity one must in-

sist that the ambiguity of the term "history" is to be elim-

inated. Croce is only one instance for the confusion that

may arise out of the neglect of this most reasonable demand.

11

In the present approach, the investigation will be
altogether divorced from considerations of "history" in the
material sense and the usage will be confined to the formal
sense of the term.

It will be assumed throughout this paper that events
forming a history are not bestowed with certain ontological
preperties which make them a history. We shall say rather
that events form a history if they are envisaged under a cer-
tain viewpoint. This amounts to saying that all events can
conceivably be part of one history or another (the term here
is taken in its material sense) just as any account of any
single event can conceivably form a part of a historical
writing. It may appear that this contention coincides with
the first of the reasons which Croce lists in order to prove
that all judgments are historical judgments. The difference
lies in that Croce holds that the stone has a history in and
by itself, whereas it is held here that the events of which
the stone is a part form a history only if they are envisaged
as such. It is the account that is given of them which makes
them into a history. Thus we can pose the main problem of
this paper as "Under what conditions do events permit that a
history be written about them?" The conditions will be
looked for not in the events but in the VieWpoint of the
observer. Thus the problem can be restated as: "Under what
methodological approach do events appear to form a history?"

We translate this sentence into "Under what methodoé

logical approach do accounts of events form a history?"

12

In the last sentence "history" is employed in the
formal sense; in the sentence before, it is used in the mater-
ial sense.

If we assume that these two sentences are equivalent
in meaning, then we can disregard the material sense of
"history" altogether, in that we can always substitute the

formal sense for it.

Ntominalism and Realism Concerning "PhilOSOphy of History"

In attempting to determine a criterion for the distinc-
tion of historical writings from all other writings, we are
compelled to deal briefly with the question of nominalism
versus realism. The problem puts itself in a rather uncommon
context. The question is, should we try to determine the
characteristics of histories by investigation of actual his-
torical writings, or should we try to determine the earmarks
of historical treatises a priori through the actual establish-
ment of an organon for history?

In his book, The Problem 3; Historical Knowledge,
Maurice Mandelbaum writes:

An examination of the subject matter of actual

histories (which is the sole basis on which we have
here a right to generalize) discloses that the his—
torian is always interested in human activities...“

It is plain that Mandelbaum, at least in this quotation,
adheres to a philos0phical position of extreme nominalism, in
his contention that actual histories are the only basis on
which a formal philosOphy of history may be based. The con-

sequences of this vieWpoint are highly interesting, for if

there is no criterion through which it can be established

13

a priori whether or not a given piece of writing forms a
history, this decision will be up to the author or to pub-
lic consent. However, for the public to be able to decide
upon this matter, an a priori criterion is again necessary.
If no such criterion is thought to exist, the burden of the
decision will be altogether up to the author. Then "history"
would have to be defined as anything that has ever been called
such by its author.

Speaking in the terms of Ogden and Richards:

This is reminiscent of Croce's dictum with

regard to the Sublime: 'the Sublime is everything
that is or will be so called by those who have
employed or shall employ the name.'"9

This consequence leads to the conclusion that with
histories as well as with other products of human craft the
problem of realism versus nominalism cannot from the begin-
ning be decided in favor of philos0phical nominalism.

The writing of a history as well as the manufactur-
ing of a technical product is a process which is governed by
rules. Both activities have their organon which precedes
them and according to which they proceed. One would be
involved in‘serious difficulties if one were to attempt to
abstract the organon of history from given historical writ-
ings, for it is plain that a given history does not have to
use all the rules, which the organon provides, nor can the
name of a history be denied to a writing which, upon certain
occasions, trangresses the boundaries which have been set

by the organon of this branch of knowledge.

14

It is true enough that a philosopher in attempting to
draw up the rules of the organon of history has to keep his
eye on public consent regarding this term, and he has to see
that his endevor does not fail to account for actual writings
which public consensus has termed histories. At the same
time, however, he has the right to include in his organon
rules which have never been used, because they follow from
assumptions which are agreed upon. On the other hand, the
rules of his organon may fail to refer to certain parts of
writings which his organon would otherwise identify as his—
tories. Thus it must be permitted that the extension of the
term history,as established through a nominalist position,will
have to be limited in some respects and eXpanded in others.
The only standard which can be given,and according to which
this limitation and eXQansion may take place,is that of the
consistency of the organon itself.

Thus we are led to something like a midway position
between nominalism and realism. On the one hand, there will
be no clearcut relation between the rules of historical writ-
ing and the historical writings themselves. This relation has
to be sacrificed for the sake of the consistency of the rules
with each other. From this it follows that the term "history"
may or may not precisely refer, depending on whether there is
a writing which does not transgress the organon. To state
the foregoing sentence at all, we must be able to define the
term "history" without making reference to any particular~

history. This definitibn has to read: A history is a

15

number of signs which satisfy the following rules (Follow the
rules). So far the realistic side of the matter. The nomin-
alist, on the other hand, may be satisfied with the notion

that the rules of the organon must not be drawn up in an alto-
gether arbflrary fashion, but that they have to be capable of
reference to at least some parts of any member of the species
history, where the extension of the term "history" (the species)
is at the beginning determined through public consent whereas
later the subsequently created organon redetermines the exten-

sion.

Sgience and History

I have spoken above about the ambiguity of the term
"history" which is prevalent in common talk. It appears that
a similar ambiguity exists with regard to the term "science."
If we speak of the science of chemistry, we may have in mind
a number of Operations or else a system or statements. Unless
we want to hold that the Operations and the statements are
really the same - which has sometimes been done - we have to
c0pe with this ambiguity somehow. Let us keet this distinc-
tion in mind, as it will have some bearing on the remainder
of this paper.

However, the body of knowledge called history and that
called science are akin to each other in many respects, and
the problem arises as to where to find a distinguishing mark
between history and science - if there should be any differ-
ence at all between the two. In the latter part of the last

'century and the first part of this one the attempt to find a

16

conclusive discrimination between history and the sciences
has been the major objective of the philosophers of history.

In appealing to common sense, we see at once that
there must be some sort of a difference between the two, as
hardly anybody will mistake a history for a scientific treat-
ise, but it can at the same time be seen that the question is
hardly ever put in this way. The question usually is "What
is the difference between science and history?" and the am-
biguities in the two remain unexplained. ‘

Traditionally, the arguments put forth in this matter
were of two kinds, one stating that the epistemological cate-
gories are different in science and history, the other assign-
ing different ontological realms to the two branches of knowl-
edge. I do not know of any attempt to solve this problem by
first eliminating the ambiguity in the term "history," and by
a subsequent analysis of the formal characteristics of writings
in the two fields that did or did not reveal structural dif-
ferences between histories and scientific writings.

It is perhaps the case that the last alternative
has never been pursued because of some unwarranted philosOph~
ical hesitation which I hepe to have proved pointless in the
section on nominalism and realism. For do we not have to
know, it may be argued, which writing is the history and which
is the scientific study before we can compare them and sub-
sequently describe their respective structures? One should
be aware of the fact, however, that this type of circularity
is quite frequently encountered, apparently without its lead-

ing to inconsistencies.

17

Thus it appears that a comparison between science and
history can conceivably follow three different lines: ontol-
ogical, epistemological and formal (on a linguistic level).

The arguments from ontology and those from epistemology
usually, though not always, occur Jointly, for it is argued
that different realms of being necessitate different cate-
gories of understanding, where the ontological argument
usually has the preponderance. Thus it seems only just that

we continue our discussion with the latter.

The Cntologies of Science and History

Collingwood, in his Th§_;g§a 9: History10 criticises
the philosOphers of history of the German nee-idealistic
school (Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, Dilthey) in the follow-
ing sentences:

The general problem bequeathed to posterity by
the writers I have analysed may be stated by saying
that it concerns the distinction between history and
natural science, or historical process and natural
process. It starts from the positivistic principle
that natural science is the only true form of knowl-
edge, which implies that all processes are natural
processes... The peculiarity of an historical or
spiritual process is that since the mind is that which
knows itself, the historical process which is the life
of the mind is a self-knowing process: a process which
understands itself, critizes itself, values itself,
and so forth...11

This passage presupposes a dichotomy of the universe, appar-
ently following the lines of Descartes' thought. The Cartesian
dualism serves as the basis for the methodological distinction
between science and history. It seems to me that this part

of Descartes' metaohysics has exercised great influence, even

in recent years, upon the attempts to characterize the features

18

of historical subject matter. Thus Simnel's account of the
object of historical study employs a verbiage which is al-
most reminiscent of Descartes'. Simmel writes:

haehrend die Erkenntniskritik im Allgemeinen von

der Tatsache ausgeht, dass das Erkennen eine
VorsteLlung und sein Subjekt eine Seele ist, had die
Kritik des historischen Erkennens die zusaetzliche
Eigenschaft, dass ihre Objekte gleichfalls aus
Vorstellungen, Wollungen und Gefuehlen von Personen
bestehen, dass ihre Objekte See an sind.

However, much resemblance to Descartes there may be,
the fact is that the definition of the subject matter of
history given above has been develOped by Vice in criticism
of Descartes' theory of knowledge. Vico criticised Descartes'
notion of the clear and distinct ideas on very much the same
grounds as later on David Hume: that belief is nothing but
the vivacity of our perceptions. According to Vico, an idea,
however false, may convince us on grounds of its seeming
self-evidence. Thus Vico proceeds to define the necessary
limits of human knowledge. The principle found by him is
that "verum and factum convertuntur." In order for an ob—
ject to be prOperly understood, it has to be man made, and
consequently, all of nature is intelligible only to God.

Thus man is confined to the study of human affairs, and the
postulate follows that the preper object of study for man
is man himself.

Vico's argument is, of course, of an epistemological
nature, but it can easily be shown that it proceeds along
the lines of Gartesian ontology. for nature is conceived as

consisting of purely extended mechanisms created by God,

while on the other hand, we have human intelligence, or

19

created spirits which Vico believes to constitute and create
the sjhere of history. Hence we have the Cartesian dualism
right in the core of Vico's philosophy of history, and it
turns out that his polemic asainst Descartes concerned matters
of epistemology only. The point of divergence between the two
thinkers was the problem of the degree to which the cosmolog-
ical spheres are accessible to human understanding.
Vico was the main channel through which the dualistic
ontology found ingress into the philosOphy of history. He
was held in high esteem by Croce, Collingwood, Troeltsch and
others, and it is after his fashion that we find history de-
fined in many a recent book on the subject. Thus Collingwook
writes:
There can be no history of nature... The only

condition on which there could be a history of

nature is that the events of nature are actions on

the part of some thinking being or beings, and that

by studying these actions we could discover what were

the thoughts which they exoressed and think these thought:

which they eXpressed and think these thoughts for our-

selves.13
The concept develOped above meets with a rather severe dif-
ficulty when the history of a society is to be discussed.
The Sophists already knew that so many individual sheep do
not make a flock, for with the merging of the sheep into a
flock a society of relations comes into existence which was
not realized as long as the sheep were by themselves. The
same holds true for any humaisociety. The problem is whether
such a society can be made the subject of a historical study;

for while the spiritual existence of the members is estab-

lished by postulate, the group as a whole does not have

2O

spiritual existence other than as exhibited by its mem-
bers.

Xost philosoChers did not conceive of the problem
that lies here. Simmel, however, does have an answer.
He writes:

Wie dem obigen gemaess die individuelle Seele,

so wird hier die - kurz gesagt - Sozialseele von
vornherein als eine derart einheitliche vorausgestzt.ll

It seems that Simmel's point of view is the only pos-
sible one which is consistent with the general theory exoli-
cated in this section. At the same time, however, it exhibits
quite clearly the weakness which lies in the system as a
whole; for doubtlessly, the group soul would have to fall
before Occam's razor.

Aside from the problem of the group soul, there are
a number of other points which can be offered in criticism
of the ontological approach.

1. The common consent concerning the extension of
the term "history" does not preclude the formulation of a
phrase like "history of the universe." On the other hand,
the right to redefine the term cannot be denied to the
philosOpher. The point in criticism is here that the re-
definition of the term "history” issues in a rather inconven-
ient convention. It should be made a rule that definitions
are not to be made in an altogether arbitrary fashion. In
defining the term history as denoting the body of knowledge
concerning human affairs, the term is made to refer to part
of what is commonly called history and to part of science;

for psychology, sociology and other sciences of human affairs

21

would belong to history, whereas the histories of non-human
things would be excluded. My criticism is directed against
the inexpediency of such a definition. This criticism is of
a pragmatic nature and constitutes the weakest argument
against the ontological approach.

2. The ontological argument is altogether too remote
from the precinct of fact finding and evaluating to consti-
tute a valid ground for the discrimination of science and
history. It can easily be shown that an additional assump-
tion is needed to make a dualistic ontology applicable for
the intended purpose. Let it be acknowledged that statements
of fact can be verified only if they are about physical hap-
penings. How are we then to discriminate between facts that
are manifestations of psychic processes and those that are
not? Even if a dualistic ontology is adooted, an additional
principle is needed through which members of the respective
classes or beings can be recognized and discriminated. It
could, for instance, be asserted that physical facts inas-
much as they are manifestations of psychic events, are to be
ordered teleologically, whereas all others are to be envis-
aged as though they were causally related. It is plain,
however, that if such a formal principle is introduced,
reasoning does not start with the ascertainment that such
and such a fact is of psychical nature and then eXplains
the fact in a teleological manner. The direction is the
Opposite. Because a number of facts can be ordered as though
they form a teleological chain, it may be asserted that they

are of psychical nature. Thus it turns out that a decision

22

whether a given fact belongs in the realm of mind or in that
of matter, can be made only after a certain method has been
develOped. It would, therefore, be more correct to assert
that all facts that can be treated after the method of his-
tory belong to the precinct of spirit, those that can be

treated scientifically belong to matter. In tating this,

(0

it becomes at once clear how inconsistent the results of the
ontological argument are with common usage. Furthermore, no
clue is given as to what the respective methods of science
and history actually are.

3. Apart from the question whether or not a dualistic
ontology can be applied to discriminate science from history,
we may now raise the question whether it is permissible to
classify the sciences with respect to the objects that they
investigate. It is quite evident that this cannot be done,
as one and the same object can be made subject of inquiry by
various branch 3 of science. Thus for instance a plant can
be made subject to a physical, chemical or biological in-
vestigation. The real grounflupon which these sciences can
be differentiated lies in the question which they ask and
not in the nature or character of their objects?

4. It can be shown that the dualistic ontology found
entrance into the theory of history through a fallacious
epistemological argument. Let us reconsider Collingwood's
statement that was quoted above. Collingwood said:

...It starts from the positivistic principle

that science is the only true form of knowledge,

which implies that all processes are natural
processes.1

23

It can be told from the remainder of Collingwood's work,
that the dependent clause contained in the above statement
is supoosed to be a valid conclusion from a fallacious
premise. Thus, "all processes are natural processes" is

not part of the positivistic principle, but does, according
to Collingwood, follow from it. This being granted, the
above statement turns out to be an enthymeme, where the main
premise has been omitted. This premise would have to read:
"To all forms of knowledge there corresponds a type of proc-
ess in reality."

As this premise is vague, there is a choice of sev-
eral interpretations of it. If "forms of knowledge" is
meant to refer to analytic and synthetic knowledge, the
premise is false; for no process at all corresponds to
analytic knowledge. Secondly, if "forms of knowledge" is
to refer to the branches of science, the argument is like-
wise false, for one and the same process can be investigated
by use of different methodologies, as I pointed out above.
Finally, if "forms of knowledge" is to mean "scientific
knowledge and historical knowledge," the premise is also
false. For both, scientific systems and histories do have
to proceed from statements of fact, and it is easily conceiv-
able that the same statement of fact that forms part of a
history can also appear in a scientific treatise on the same
linguistic level, i.e. as a statement of fact. This point
will be dealt with in greater detail later on. For now it

may suffice to remark that if the same statement can appear

24

in history and in science, then the fact to which it refers
cannot be,at the same time.a member of a natural and a his-
torical process. This amounts to saying that even though
history and science may be termed different forms of knowl-
edge, this does not furnish a sufficient reason for suppos-
ing that two different types of process have to correspond
to them in reality. Thus the mere existence of different
forms of knowledge does not warrant the assumption of a
dualistic universe.

5. As we have seen above, Collingwood's redefinition
of "history" is a rather far reaching distortion of common
usage. If we now, for the time being, adopt the dualistic
ontology and grant that to each of the "substances" corres-
ponds a form of knowledge, we are still confronted with the
problem as to where to classify psychology and related
sciences. As regards their method, those sciences are more
closely related to physics than to history. As regards
their subject matter they would, according to the vieWQoint
treated in this section, belong in the same category with
history, or form a part of it. It is precisely this point
that has been attacked by Wilhelm Hinddband in his famous
inaugural address at the University of Heidelberg in 1894.16
If all organized knowledge is to be divided into Naturwissen-
schaften and Geisteswissenschaften, he says then the position
of psychology is altoghether questionable. Windelband ques-

tioned this whole scheme of classification, but our point is

that even though we grant it, we still need an additional

25

principle to distinguish psychology from history, for other-
wise they fall into the same precinct.

6. Lastly, I wish to quote Heinrich Rickert as an
authority on the subject who has devoted much consideration
to the point here in question. He says:

Zwei Gruopen von ijecten, die sich mit

Ruecksicht auf die Art ihres Seine, d.h. in der
Weiss wie Hoerper und Seele von einander unter-
scheiden, sind fuer die Gliederuns der fiissen-
schaften gar nicht zu finden, weil es, wenigstens
in der unmittelbar zugaenglichen Welt, nichts
giebtl, das einer Untersuchung von der formalen
Eigenart wie die Naturwissenschaft s e fuehrt,
prinzipiell entzogen werden duerfte.
Rickert holds, that a formal distinction must be found
between science and history as the only feasible solution

of the problem of the classification of both.

History and Epistemology: Preliminaries

Not without hesitation did I include the following
section in this chapter on epistemology, it has to do with
the logic of explanation and should therefore appear within
a section on logic. PhilosOphers of history, however, have
unfortunately very seldom concerned themselves with the
universal logical features of scientific and historical
eXplanation. What has constantly escaped the attention of
those philOSOphers is the fact that for an eXplanation to be
valid it is not sufficient that certain fact finding pro-
gggugeg should be obeyed, but also that such an eXplanation
should have a certain logical form. The neglect of dis-

cussing these logical forms has resulted in much fruitless

26

speculation concerning the validation of historical eXplana-

tion, where

Carl

the term "explanation" remained unclear.

G. Hempel in his article The Functions 2f Gen-

eral Laws in History18 gives an adequate account of the point

here under consideration. He points out that in order to

give an eXplanation for the occurrence of the event E,the

following set of statements has to be compiled:

(l)

(2)
such

(a)

(b)

a set of statements asserting the occurrence
of certain events Cl'°’Cn at certain times
and places,

a set of universal hypotheses,
that

the statements of both groups are reason-
ably well confirmed by empirical evidence,

from the two groups of statements the
sentence asserting the occurrence of

‘1

event b can be logically deduced.19

An explanation of the event E would then consist in listing

theinitial conditions Cl...Cn for the occurrence of E and

also the law under which E would probably follow from these

conditions.

It is very telling to observe on which grounds this

schema of an explanation has been attacked by philosOphers

of history.

Most of their discomfort has issued from men-

tioning the term "general law" or "universal hypothesis."

Thus W. H. Walsh in his £2 introduction to Philosooh g:

History2anids these terms and replaces them by "general

knowledge" and similar eXpressions. Then he asks himself

What kind of general knowledge a historian should have and

27

comes forth with the answer that a historian should have
some general knowledge of "human nature." After he has done
this, he declares that the oositivists do not believe in such
general general knowledge, but that they are of the opinion
that a historian should have general knowledge appropriate
to the field which he investigates, thus if someone attempts
to write the history of an economic system, he must have
general knowledge of economics. According to Walsh, the
positivists hold that a historian must consult individual
scientists in order to gain the particular general knowledge
connected with his subject in order to be able to give his-
torical eXglanations. But, this View is evidently mistaken,
he says, for
...there are plenty of competent historians, -en
whose judggent of particular historical situations
can be trusted, who are largely ignorant of those
sciences, their methods and results.‘
According to Walsh, this is largely due to the fact that
these historians had sound knowledge of huwan nature. He
continues that it might be said that this knowledge is
acquired by common exgerience, but this clearly "falls
short of the truth: genius is wanted too."22
Though the average historian can fulfill his
function adequately enough with qualities amount-
ing to no more than those of common sense, it can
surely be argued that something like genius is required
for really telling work in this field too.43
It is as remarkable as it is discouraging to see how the
question of the logical structure of eXplanations has been

taken out of its natural context and has been connected with

epistemological problems which it was not meant to deal with.

28

Walsh's account is not only a misrepresentation of the posi-
tivist theory, but it also reflects a gross misunderstanding
of the nature of formal enquiry in general. Hempel in his
article leaves no doubt that valid explanations can be given 1
without the explainer being aware of the explanatory schema ‘
that he follows. As a matter of fact, this has been done by
many a scientist during the last several hundred years. L ke-
wise there can be no doubt that explanations with an invalid
generalization or with a suppressed part could still not be
denied this name, although they would have to be called false
or incomplete. It can also be the case that an explanation
is given without the historian being aware of the universal
hypothesis which he employs or even without the historian
knowing that he tacitly assumes such an universal hypothesis.
Such an explanation may still be considered a "good" one if
the reader makes the same assumptions concerning the univ-
ersal hypothesis. But while a good history may be produced,
even though the historian made tacit assumptions of this type
and even though he did not know that he made them, the philos-
Opher is not justified to believe certain epistemological
faculties at work which enable the historian to write a his-
tory in such a way. This, however, is exactly what Walsh did.
It is an obvious misunderstanding of the nature of logical
assertions to assume that a logical argument can be disproved
by making reference to historians who did not try to engage
in investigations to substantiate the generalizations which

they did not know they were employing.

29

It seemed advisable to engage in this consideration of
the logical form of eXplanations, as this preliminary dis-
cussion will enable us to understand the significance of the

various theories concerning historical understand.

History and Epistemology I.

Several different kinds of epistemological problems
have been conceived as being connected with history. The
variety of theories, however, which I prOpose to treat under
this heading, is partly due to the fact that I here treat the
term "epistemology" in a relatively unrestricted manner.
There will be no attempt to give a precise definition of the
term, as it suffices to state with clarity the problems here
accumulated under this heading.

The first problem with which I wish to dea, is commonly
known by the name "the problem of 'Verstehen' or 'emphathic-
understanding'." Since Vico, there have always been schools
of thought which regarded empathic understanding as the method
of fact finding specifically connected with history. His-
torically, this theory has its origin in Vico's dictum that
"ggggm g; factum convertuntur," i.e. in order to gain an
"insight" into a state of affairs, one has to be able to re-
construct the motives behind it, which, according to Vico,
is possible only if those motives can be associated to one's
own possible motivations. However, while Vico attempted to
limit the possible field of knowledge to human affairs, dis-
regarding the facts of nature as essentially unintelligible,

his followers did not associate themselves with so rigid a

30

claim and allowed for the possibility of valid scientific
knowledge.

As to the method of empathic understanding it must be
said that it is a specific way of conjecturing unknown
causes - or motives - from known results. It is to produce
an answer to a question of the form "Why did X occur?". If
this question is thought to be answerable through a state-
ment which refers to a testable fact, then the scheme of ex-
planation has to contain reference to a general law - as I
have pointed out above. It is at this point tlaat disagree-
ment arises between the adherents of the method of emphathic
understanding themselves. While some of them deny the exis-
tence of general laws in the field of historical enquiry,
others hold that there are such laws and that the method of
empathic understanding is used for the subsumption of a given
event under such a general law. In the following, I wish to
deal with each of these positions separately.

Let the first group be represented by Herder. He
writes in his "Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur
Eildung der Rbnschheit:

Ganze Natur der Seele...um diese mitzufuehlen,
antworte nicht aus dem Worte, sondern gehe in das
Zeitalter, in die Himmelsgegend, die ganze ’
Geschichte, fuehle dich in alles hinein - nin
allein bist du auf dem Wege das Wort zu verstehen.24

and

Wer bemerkt hat, was es fuer eine unaussprech-,
liche Sache mit der Eigenheit eines Kenschen sei.

These quotations are remarkable in two different respects.

They reflect Herder's attempt to conjecture from the outward

31

manifestations the state of mind that is behind them by "giv-
ing up" his contemporary frame of reference and "feeling him-
self into" the object under consideration. Such a process is,
in turn.characterized by the fact that its results are not
communicable. Therefore, he; urgasthat the reader should .
imitate his contemplation of those foreign places in order
to understand the "mere shadow of a word" which is the out-
come of his investigations. Herder, it seems, was perfectly
aware of the fact that,in employing his method of "empathic
understanding? he would at the same time violate the linguis-
tic universe which is the presupposition for all communication.
To assert that a past event is unique and different from all
others beyond comparison is to give up all hepe of ever
speaking about it significantly.

herder, of course, was largely unaware of the role of
language in history or science. To him,it was not a fallacy
that a history should be incommunicahle, but a fate that all
histories have to share.

It would be a gross mistake to think of Herder's posi-
tion as an isolated historical one. In this case it would
have been hardly worth my while to treat it here. Mr. Pitt
in his article on ggmological EKplanatioo i2 History26 quotes
P. Gardiner's Opinion on the subject. Gardiner writes:

Louis XIV died unpOpular...having caused France

to lose...the incomparable position s-e had gained
by the policy of the cardinals...
The positivist interpretationwould be that Louis

XIV represented a case of the law 'Rulers are unpOQu-
lar whenever their policies prove detrimental to the

32

fortunes of their countries,’ and that the explanation
in question was deduced from this law taken together
with the circumstances of the case.

But as an historian I would feel uneasy if it were
suggested to me that my statement 'Louis XIV was
unpOpular because his policy was detrimental to
France,’ represented a confirmatory instance of an
historical or sociological law... It is because
I do not regard Louis unpOpularity as being a
case of any general hypothesis at all. I regard
it as the outcome of a particular complex of fac-
tors, a complex which included Louis' expansionist
foreign policy, and his wars, his heavy taxation,
his court policy... What in fact is historically
important is to bring to light the nature of the
connection which existed between Louis' policy
and his unpopularity and this is principally a matter
of analyzing in detail the particular case before
me.

It seems to me that P. Gardiner is to be classed together
with Herder, although he does not explicitly adhere to a
theory of empathic understanding. The reason for this lies
in that Gardiner seems to rely for his historical explana-
tions upon a faculty of insight which he is not able to
characterize in any detail. He writes that it is historic-
ally important to bring to light the "nature 2: the connection
whigh existed between Louis' pplicy and his unpooularity."
Now, any eXplanation of this connection will have to make
reference to some general law or another, but, as M . Pitt
points out, this law does not have to have the form in which
it is cited by Gardiner.28 In this particular example, as
"unpOpularity" refers to a statistical event, a host of laws
would have to be employed to eXplain the fact. About these
laws we have to say only that they are not to be thought of

as being imposed upon the state of affairs in question, but

that an explanation is always plausible preportional to the

33

degree of belief that has been reached with regard to the
general law which is employed here.

As Gardiner explicitly rejects such a notion, he must
be regarded as believing in some other faculty of insight
which I shall, for lack of power to discriminate, classify
with Herder's empathic understanding. The charges which I
brought against Herder will consequently have to be repeated

with regard to Gardiner's theory.

fiistory apd Epistemology II.

In the previous section we discussed a theory which
meant to find the determining feature of historical investi-
gation in a historian's obligation to "feel himself into"
an event and in his capability of eXplaining such an event in
statements which are apprOpriate exclusively for the particu-
lar event in question. The point to be discussed now is
closely related to the one in the last section insofar as
here again a theory of empathic understanding will be inves-
tigated, one, however, which does not ask the historian to
abstract from his own experiences.

In this theory.it is acknowledged that historical ex-
planation has to take into account general laws or notions
of lawful connections, but on the other hand it is held here
that the lawful connections which are assumed by the histor-
ian evade systematization and proof to such an extent that
it may occur that two historians who are supplied with

identically the same information can Justifiably arrive at

34

entirely different explanations. From this,issues the claim
that every generation has to write its own history.

It cannot be denied that historians do,in fact,differ
from one another in such a way; but our task is not to sub-
stantiate or explain this fact; but rather to investigate
if,and to what extent,these disagreements are essential to
histories. Is it this fact which makes for the difference
between histories and science?

Before we enter into the discussion of this point it
remains to be mentioned that an inconsistency between two
different eXplanations of the same facts hardly ever remains
undisputed among historians. Thus, while historians attempt
to eliminate such inconsistencies through further and more
acute explanations, the phiIOSOphers,whom I have in mind,
here regard the same inconsistencies as uneliminable and even
regard their existence as a defining characteristic of his-
tories. The only requirement here made.is that an explana-
tion should be adequate, where the degree of adequacy is
dependent upon the degree of empathic understanding of which
the historian is capable. It can easily be understood that
such a weak criterion should be a matter of considerable
dispute, especially as it would deny to history the same
claim to truth that the sciences have so successfully estab-
lished for themselves.

Epistemologically, the theory here discussed is of
interest as it brings with it a new status of the g priori,
as we shall presently see. The best way to lead into this

discussion, it seems to me, is a brief consideration of the

Kantian doctrine of the deduction of the pure concepts of
understanding. Kant writes:

Indessen darf man von diesen Begriffen, wie von
allem Erkenntnis wo nicht das Erinzipium ihrer
Moeglichkeit doch die Gelegenheitsursachen ihrer
Erzeugung in der Erfahrung aufsuchen, wo alsdann
die Eindrucke der Sinne den ersten Anlass geben, die
ganze Erkenntniskraft in Ansehung ihrer zu eroeffnen
und Erfahrung zustande zu bringen...Ein solches
Nachspueren der ersten Bestrebungen unserer
Erkenntniskraft, um von einzelnen Wahrnehmungen
zu allgemeinen Begriffen aufzusteigen, hat ohne
Zweifel einen grossen Nutzen.2

Apparently, Kant contends that the concepts of space and
time as well as the categories are not innate such that
they are already existent at the first conscious contact

with reality. He rather holds that they originate upon

such occasions and that these contacts with reality are the

"Gelegenheitsursachen ihrer Erzeugung." An investigation

of these occasions, however, will not result in a demon-

35

stration of the universality and necessity of those concepts.

Their use can be Justified only through a transcendental
enquiry. Thus Kant continues

Allein eine Deduktion der reinen Begriffe a
priori kommt dadurch niemals zustande, denn sie
liegt ganz und gar nicht auf diesem wege, weil
in Anschauung ihres Kuenftigen Gebrauchs...sie
einen ganz anderen Geburtsbrief als den der
Abstammung von Erfahrungen muessen aufzuzeigen
Kaben.

Diese versuchte physiologische Ableitung,
die eigentlich gar nicht Deduktion heissen kann,
weil sie eine ouaestionem facti betrifft, will
ich daher die Erklaerung des Besitzes einer
reinen Erkenntnis nennen.

 

The use to which these concepts are to be put, and in view

of which they demand their Justification is the coordination

of the raw material of eXperience.

36

It has been claimed, every so often, that the cate-
gories listed by Kant, can only serve for the Justification
of scientific knowledge, but do not have any explanatory
force with regard to historical eXperience. Thus Dilthey,
Troeltsch and Simmel attempted to supplement the Kantian
critique of knowledge in such a way that it would cover also
historical knowledge. They strove for a "Critique of His-
torical Reason." It must be understood that they did not
consider the Kantian account incomplete or fallacious for
general epistemological reasons (as for instance Peirce did),
but they considered it unsatisfactory as an account of the
epistemological problems of history. What was their
reason for supposing this?

First of all, it must be noted that it was not the
number and kind of the categories that were questioned, but
it was the way in which they were deduced, and the fact that
they were thought to be unalterable. For if the categories
were unalterable and universally and necessarily valid,andg
if they were to rule over Ell experience, then one of two
contradicting histories would be false, and no one can
argue that each was true for its own time.

The problem which arises here cannot be solved
through a critical or transcendental investigation; for
those would, by virtue of their very nature, lead to cate-
gories independent of empirical change. Thus, in order to

Justify the doctrine of changing validity, one has to take

37

recourse to a generic or historical investigation. Thus
Troeltsch says:

So muss denn Jede historisch denkende Zeit von
ihrem Standort aus die Sinneinheit des Ganzen als
ihren eigenen Standort einschliessend oder auf
ihn abziehlend deuten.31

and

Das Verstaendnis der Gegenwart aus ihrem
Gewordensein, die Uebersicht ueber die noch
erreichbare und in ihrem Gesamtzusammenhang
verstandene Erfahrung der Gattung oder doch
wenigatens unseres Kulturkreises und Volkes,
die daraus erwachsende historische Erziehung
unseres Denkens und die durch sie zu gewin-
nenden Richtlinien fuer die Zukunft: das ist
der Sinn der Historie.32

In speaking here of the "historical education of our
thinking," Troeltsch takes an altogether different course
than Kant did, for it is now the "Gelegenheitsursachen,"
the occasions which plan a decisive role not only for the
realization,but also for the character of the categories of
understanding.

In order to understand more clearly the view that is
discussed here, it is perhaps helpful to consider for a
minute the use to which the term "g priori" is put by Simmel
and Rickert,in distinction from the manner in which Kant
employed it. For Kant.all prOpositions were g priori that
did not depend for their validity upon any experience of
whatever kind. Some of those g priori propositions are,
according to Kant, of especial importance for the fact that
they condition our eXperience. His reasoning was, that if

there is anything at all that is essential to all experience,

then it must also be logically prior to any experience. For

Simmel and Troeltsch, on the other hand, the meaning of "g
priori" has been narrowed down to "that which conditions our
experience." Hence Simmel and Rickert do not assert that the
conditions for all eXperience are g priori Judgments,but,
rather,that "g priori" refers to all conditions of any ex-
perience. Thus we find Simmel make the assertion that it
has become more and more obvious that many g prioris are
Open to empirical investigation, and very few are not. He
did not see, however, that this seeming advance in philoso-
phical insight was a mere redefinition of the term "a priori."33
Troeltsch frequently makesassertions of a similar sort,
but he raises the significance of his theory considerably in
his statement that:
In Jedem anerkannten Apriori bleibt ein Stueck
hagnis und Tat, ein Ergreifen des sich als
notwendige Vernunft darbietenden Gedankens durch
einen Willen, der es daraufhin wagt, die erfahrung
nach diesem Gedanken zu ordnen und zu beurteilen.
Sein endgueltiges Recht entscheidet erst die
Leistung, die so zustande kommt.3
In order to interpret this passage, we must first gain some
more clarity concerning the role of the g priori with Simmel
and Rickert,and its relation to historical eXplanation.
I mentioned above,that,for any historical or scientific
explanation.it is necessary that a general law be employed.
It is understood that in practical historical research.
these general laws are frequently present only as vague
notions, uncritically derived from previous eXperience.

There is a very definite sense in which it can be asserted

that these general laws, whether clearly perceived or only

39

unconsciously employed, are pgigg to the eXplanation in which
they serve - either Openly stated or tacitly assumed. Inas-
much as general laws are uncritically admitted into eXplana-
tory schemes, one can say that any generalization that a
person happens to entertain may form the g oriori for some
explanation that he gives. But even critically checked gen-
eralizations as used in explanations are only probably, and
thus the adaptation of any g priori involves a risk.
Troeltsch asserts that the g priori is Justified through "the
accomplishment which issues from it." Had he asserted that
the g priori is Justified to the extent to which it is sub-
mitted to test, he would have stayed within the boundaries

of an epistemological discussion. The reference to accom-
plishment, however, tries to make a question of validity

into a question Of usefulness.

As I have stated above, it was a prevailing conviction
of this German School that the problem Of scientific knowl-
edge was solved through Kant's Critique 2: Pure Reason,
while theirs was the task of considering the foundations of
historical research. If we now consider Troeltsch's last
statement as relating only to history and not to a prioris in
general, then it becomes at once evident how close his stand-
point is connected in some respects with that of Benedetto
Croce, for here again it is thought that a piece of writ-
ing should bear results for it to attain the character of a
history.

It is not difficult to understand that Simmel and

Troeltsch found the critical approach suitable for a theory

40

Of scientific understanding, while they attempted to solve
the problem Of historical knowledge through the generic
‘ficpprcach: the constancy of the standards of validity in the
sciences defies any attempt to make them subject to histor-
ical relativism in the same way in which this can be done
with histories. Therefore, Troeltsch contends, the criti-
cal enterprise is Justified with respect to scientific under-
standing, whereas the generic question retains its import—
ance as regards historical reasoning.

There are a number of points that can be offered in
criticism of this theory. For one thing, the task which was
set for this epistemological theory, namely the discrimina-
tion Of histories and pieces of science, was not and cannot
be achieved through an epistemological enquiry of the kind
outlined above. For it does not allow one to discriminate
between histories and scientific writings other than through
awaiting a possible change in the standards of validity
with respect to a writing under investigation. Any undis-
puted accumulation of cognitive sentences would have the
tentative status of a science. While on the other hand,

a branch of science in which occurs an inconsistency between
two different explanations would have the tentative status
of a history, for it is not clear at all, whether,or not,
one of the explanations is apprOpriate for one generation
and the other one for the next generation, or whether one,
or both.are simply false.

A reason for this awkward result seems to be that

Troeltsch and Simmel never arrimaiat an adeduate and clear

41

definition Of the term "g priori." From the context Of their
writings, it seems evident that something like a group of
universal hypotheses was intended whenever they used this
term in connection with historical understanding. Once one
of the two equations "g priori" - df "universal hypothesis"
or "g priori" 3 df "group of universal hypotheses" is granted
validity, the untenability of Simmel's and Troeltsch's posi-
tion becomes evident. For now the only epistemological dif-
ficulty with regard to histories would consist in ascertain-
ing the tacitly assumed universal hypotheses in actual his-
torical writings, while it can be demanded that for all future
histories such assumptions should be avoided. Or else, if
such a demand should be deemed undesirable, one should at
least abstain from posing unnecessary epistimological prob-
lems, or from bestowing the historian'with some mysterious
power Of insight. In other words, histories are usually
wanting in clarity of explanation; and this is the only \.
difference between history and science that an epistimolog-
ical enquiry like Simmel's or Troeltsch's can reveal. .
The second point of criticism can be stated only in
anticipation of a terminology to be introduced later. I
shall later state that both science and history proceed
from statements of fact, and that they have their reduction
basis in those statements. Furthermore, I shall assert that
one and the same statement may appear in both a history and
a scientific writing. This will be held true not only of
statehents Of fact, but also of generalizations and conse-

quently of explanations. Thus, a bifurcation of the

42

universe on general epistemological grounds will be held
unJustified. From this,it would follow that the case for
historical relativism cannot be established by proceeding
from the statements Of fact or their explanation, but per-
haps through the valuations which are connected with them.
Thirdly, as the g prioris which are present in any
historical explanation are thought to be dependent upon the
cultural environment Of the historian there will always be
facts that come to his knowledge for which his historical
categories are unsuitable. Thus, Troeltsch might argue that
a history Of Egypt cannot be written by a contemporary, be-
cause his cultural setting will not permit him to understand
the Egyptians. From this notion issues the general demand
that a historian should confine his research:: to his own
cultural circle, i.e. to peOple that he might be able to
understand. If the historian transcends the boundaries of
his culture, Troeltsch holds, he will not be able to unite
the scattered pieces of information which he might be able
to Obtain into a meaningful unity. He says:
Eine Sinneinheit koatinuierlicher Entwicklung

Kann nur vom Standort des Betrachters und das

heisst fuer den Umfang des ihn umschliessenden,

in tatsaechlicher Folge und Wirkung zusammen-

haengenden Kulturkreises konstruiert werden.35
There is no reason at all to believe that the difficulties
with which the historian is confronted when he contemplates
events outside of his own cultural setting are in any way
theoretically insurmountable. It seems more sensible to say

that these difficulties issue either from a lack of informa-
tion (and connected with it a difficulty in arriving at

43

generalizations and eXplanations).or else from a very low
degree of credibility,with regard to the available infor-
mation.

It must be mentioned in favor of Troeltsch that he
attempted to overcome the historical relativism outlined
above, and we find him also making statements like the fol-
lowing:

Der Ausgangspunkt fur die Logik der

Geschichte kann...nicht die Psychologie,
sondern nur das erkenntnistheoretische
SubJekt und das in ihm eingeschlossene log-
ische a priori sein.36

Perhaps it is needless to say that in Troeltsch we
find also the notion of the dualistic universe as outlined
in the chapter on ontology. However, the consequences that
Troeltsch draws are quite unlike those of Collingwood, which
may be due to the difference of origin that their respective
dualisms had. For Troeltsch, for instance, something like
the history of the universe is possible. He states his
Justification for this as follows:

Alle Erkenntnistheorie und mit ihr alle
philOSOphische Begriffsbildung geht nicht vom
erfahrbaren und der Erkenntniswelt angehoerigen
psychologischen, menschlichpersoenlichen SubJekt,
sondern von dem mit ihm verbundenen, aber begrif-
flich abtrennbaren unpersoenlichen Bewusstsein
ueberhaupt aus, fuer das die Welt war, und fuer
das sie sein wird, wenn es gestorben sein wird,
und das wir immer hinzudenken, wenn wir vcn
einer Geschichte der Erde oder des Sonnensystems
Sprechen, such in Zeiten wo kein menschliches
Wesen existiert hat.37

This quotation, Of course, contradicts the earlier one in

which the empirical subJect was said to be concerned with

44

the historical understanding. But aside from this,it is
interesting to note through what difficulties Troeltsch has
to go in order to make such a phrase as "history Of the
universe" consistent with his system. He has to postulate

a supreme consciousness - an almost Berkeleian thought.

History and Epistemology III

Cassirer, in his Egggy 2g Egg,writes that "ideal recon-
struction, not empirical Observation,is the first step in
historical knowledge."38

While the two former epistemological theories could be
discussed without making reference to the pastness of the
subJect matter, it is necessary now,to take this into con-
sideration. It is Cassirer's contention that history and
science are differentiated through the fact that science
rests on Observation.whereas history comes about through
the interpretation of symbols. Symbols are the sole source-
of historical knowledge, it is held, due to the fact that
the events which they denote cannot be re-enacted. It seems
to be a good representation Of Cassirer's vieWpoint to say
that there are other branches of enquiry which are concerned
with symbols and still others which are concerned with the
'past, but it is the distinguishing mark of histories that in
their case both these conditions must be fulfilled.

Cassirer's vieWpoint is of especial importance as he
explicitly states that only through this epistemological
approach can histories be distinguished from scientific

treatises. He writes:

45

Most writers looked for the difference between

history and science in the lggig, not in the object

of history. They took the greatest pains in con-

structing a new lOgic Of history. But all these

attempts were doomed to failure... Historical and

scientific thought are distinguishable not by

their logical form but by their ObJectives and

subJect matter.39
It is not too difficult, however, to show that the con-
ditions stated by Cassirer are not sufficient in order to
discriminate between science and history. It is not unusual
that the scientist,as well as the historian.has, upon occasions,
to interpret accounts of the facts that have come down to his
time - descriptions of the stellar constellations in Greek
poetry, accounts of vulcano eruptions, and so forth. Thus,
it is not necessarily the case that "He connects the present
with the past by following backward the chain of causes and
effects."40 It may be argued that a science becomes a history
to the extent that accounts Of facts,rather than facts,are
treated; but violence will be done to the common notion of
"science" as well as to the most restrictive definition of
this term if it is not permitted to include in the class of
Observation - statements, a statement concerning a past and
not reproducable event. This would certainly be true for
sociology, but also for astromony and geology. Incidentally,
Cassirer lists the latter as an example for a field of en-
quiry in which records Of events are supposedly not admitted
as establishing evidence.

On the other hand, I cannot see any reason for deny-

ing to a biography which is founded on direct Observation

and written in a day by day fashion the names of a history.

46

Equally, this name could not be denied to Thukydides'
"Peloponnesian War."

It must be noted that Cassirer's position, as far as
it is here described, does not allow a criticism on general
metaphysical or epistemological grounds. He cannot be
charged with having introduced a general dualism of the
ontological or epistemological kind, as the above mentioned
philos0phers did. It seems more apprOpriate that a criticism
should,in this case.proceed from pragmatic considerations.

One can say that in his essay, he has given a con-
textual definition Of the term "history." This definition,
however, does not allow for the term to be used in contexts
in which it commonly occurs, such as "history of the univ-
erse," "history of mankind" (if the latter is thought to
include also prehistoric times). On the other hand,
Cassirer's account makes the term rather well fit for a
description Of the activities that are commonly going on in
history departments. Now, it is everybody's right to define
as he pleases. If, however, a classification is to be as.
chieved through a definition, then it is well to consider
the advantages and disadvantages of such an Operation. I
shall later attempt to show that "history" can be defined in
a more useful manner. The description that I shall give
later purports to depict a more comprehensive but also more
rigidly bounded complex of knowledge which I shall term
"history." The definition to be given will also have the

advantage of greater conformity with common usage.

 

 

 

 

 

47

Thus the criticism of Cassirer's theory, aside from the
points that I made above, will be given through the con-
structive part of this paper.

For the argument's sake,I have,up to this point,
suppressed one part of Cassirer's theory, and have treated
only that part which fitted into the general course Of the
discussion. In addition, Cassirer entertained some notions
which move him in close neighborhood to the German school
and to Collingwood. Cassirer says, for instance, that the

historian

...infuses into his concepts and words his own
inner feelings and thus gives them a new sound 4
and a new color - the color of a personal life. 1

and

-.-history cin live and breathe only in the
human world. 2

Both of these quotations testify quite obviously to the fact
that Cassirer wished to limit the subJect matter of history
to human affairs, that is to say that the term "history" in
the last quotation is used in its material,rather than in

its formal,sense; for otherwise the dictum that history can
live only in a human world would amount to saying that history

is remarkable for the fact that it is not written by animals

or stones.

History and Value

Under this heading I prOpose to treat some attempts to
articulate the meaning of "history" through reference to
value Judgements which supposedly occur in the historical

enterprise. The approaches to the problems of history which

48

have been dealt with above are characterized through the
fact that they attempted to describe the process Of histori-
cal enquiry by limiting the range Of "history" to human
affairs where all epistemological elaborations appear to be
nothing but an ex post facto Justification of this limitation.
In Heinrich Rickert, we find this process reversed. Rickert
claims that histories deal with the world in an individual-
izing manner, 1. e. they describe facts, while the sciences
attempt to make generalizing statements about the world.
(We shall deal with this part of his theory at a later stage.)
From this position, he argues that a historian does not have
any inducement to deal with a part of the world historically,
unless the subjects treated, somehow express valuations which
are in some way or other related to his own valuations. This
limits, in Rickert's Opinion, the range Of historical en-
quiry to human affairs. He says:
dass...wir nur dann Veranlassung haben, eine

Wirklichkeit individualisierend oder historisch

darzustellen, wenn unter diesen seelischen Wesen

sich auch solche vorfinden, die selbst zu den die

Darstellung leitenden Werten Stellung nehmen, so

dass es also in der Tat keine historische

Darstellung ohne ein reales sselisches Zentrum

gibt.43

According to this quotation, all obJects of histor—

ical investigations must have "real psychical centers" (reale
seedische Zentren), since there is otherwise no reason to
deal.with them. In this respect, Rickert is reminiscent of
ELL the other philosOphers with whom I dealt in preceeding
paragraphs. He differs from them in that this conviction is

“flikl him derived from another notion: namely that all his-

tomies must, with necessity, be "value impregnated."

49

I do not wish to investigate why Rickert contends that
the belief that histories have to do with man alone must
follow from the notion that they are value impregnated. The
inference is not my concern here, only the premise. Rickert
holds that histories can be distinguished from scientific
enquiries by the fact that they have to do with values, while
the sciences do not. According to Rickert, histories have a
two-fold relation to values: the selection of subJects is
based on value Judgments; and, secondly, in the histories
themselves, value Judgments occur as an essential part. In
both these respects histories are said to differ from the
sciences.

Let us discuss the former point first. Rickert argues
as follows:

Allgmeine Bedeutung kann...ein individuelles

Ereignis nur dadurch erhalten, dass es in irgen-

deiner Weise mit einem allgemeinen Werte

verknuepft ist, und so werden es denn immer Werte

Siréfién‘t'iif:Einii’nliéité’;siléiititétl‘ifiefii‘i‘iia“ deg
The historian cannot describe all of history. He must make
selections, and these selections are made in accordance with
Value Judgments. This is supposed to distinguish the his-
torian from the scientist. There can be little doubt, how-
every that this assumption is false.

Let us consider the case Of mathematics. It can be
ShOVni that, in principle, a machine can be constructed, Whldl.
18«atfle to state in an infinite time, all the true propositions

0f arithmetic and geometry. Would such a machine, if actually

Inflth, make the profession of an arithmetician or geometrician

obsolete? It would not, for the machine does not have the
capacity of distinguishing "interesting" mathematical prOp—
ositions from uninteresting ones. The machine might, for
instance, put out for a very long time,statements like 10074101
and, lOl¢lO2, etc. The mathematician would not particularly
care for such a machine, because he wants to find statements
which are at the same time true and interesting.

Interestingness seems to be a value term, but perhaps
there is a concise definition for it in mathemetics. It
seems to be the case that mathematicians are primarily
interested in more general propositions and not so much in
the instances which follow from them. "Interestingness"

would then be perhaps coextensive with generality." But
this would not exglain the mathematician's preference for
these general prOpositions over the particular ones; it
would not account for the fact that the mathematician is
more interested in develOping mathematics as a deductive
system than in making chance discoveries of particular
mathematical truths. In other words, somewhere along the
line,we would find the mathematician making a value judg-
ment concerning the subject matter with which he wants to
concern himself. From this, it seems to follow that the
historian is in no way in an exceptional position as con-
cerns his choice of subject matter. Although, in a way,
he has to make such choices more often than someone who

pursues a more thoroughly deductive science, but he would

be in no different position than a classifying biologist.

51

It has been claimed that the historian will always
choose subject matters eXpressing values which are in some-
way related to his own. (See Rickenfs statement above).
From this, it supposedly follows that his account of the
subject, thus chosen, will be made in the light of these
values. This position contains two assertions, namely,
that the account will necessarily contain hidden or Open
value judgments, and that these judgments are identical with
or proceeding from, the value judgments which have been
guiding the selection of the material in the first place.

Above, I have shown that history does not occupy a
unique position as regards value judgments, relative to
the selection of materials to be investigated. The ques-
tion is now whether these motives of choice do permeate
through, and remain influential over, the total account.

The answer is clearly in a negative. A candidate for a
doctor's degree may pick, as a subject matter for his
thesis, something which has never been made subject to an
enquiry, merely in order to avoid competition. This fact
does not preclude objectivity or good quality of the prod-
uct. Nor can it be argued that he will necessarily find
avoidance of competition the main value expressed by the
characters with whom he deals. Of course, the reply will
always be that he did not produce a real history, but merely
an inconsequential piece of writing - and, with this, we are
back at Croce's position.

Nagel, in his paper on The Logic 9: Historical

Analysis45 contends that there may be value judgments

52

involved in the selection of one historical subject matter,
rather than another, but he also holds that this is true for
all other sciences. He also makes it quite clear that there
is no reason to believe that this selectivity has to termin-
ate in a suspension of the objectivity of the historian,
while it does not have the same effect in the case of the
scientist.

It seems to me that now we have established,beyond
reasonable doubt,that the value judgments which are causal
for the selection of materials do not have to continue to
exercise influence upon the enquiry which they help to
, initiate. But it remains to be decided whether value judg-
ments should be admitted at all in histories; and if they
are, whether they should not likewise hold a place in the
sciences, or whether the admission of value judgments into
histories and their exclusion from the sciences marks the
distinction between these two branches of knowledge.

It must be born in mind that there are two different
senses in which one can assert that value judgments occur
in science, depending on whether science is envisaged as a
system 93 statements or as a systematic activity. The same
holds true for history.

Let us first try to answer the question whether science
or history, as systems of statements, contain value judgments.
In answering this question, I do not attempt to decide
whether science and history do really contain judgments of
value; but rather, whether it is reasonable to hold that one

does contain them,while the other does not.

Let it be agreed first, that sciences, and possibly
histories, make use, at times, of analytically true state—
ments. These statements do not, by definition, have any
value content.

Secondly, sciences contain observation statements.
While I am willing to agree that the acceptance or rejec-
tion of an observation statement is a matter of valuation,

I think that the observation statements themselves do not
have any valuational content; for if they did, all synthetic
statements would be, at least as far as part of their con-
tents is concerned, value judgments; and a differentiation
between cognitive statements and judgments of value would be
impossible. If the above-stated point should be found ob-
jectionable, let us, at least for the present context, agree
on calling observation statements value free in the above
sense.

If the observation statements do not have valuational
contents, then none of the statements deducible from any
set of observation statements will have valuational contents.
This assertion is susceptible to proof.

Let A, B, C,...,N be particular atomic sentences.

Let 0 be a particular atomic sentence which follows from

A, B, C,...,N. It can be shown that 0 follows from this

set, if,an only if, A-O v B a 0 v C : O v...v N - 0. If 0
is not to be an atomic sentence, then it will still not con-
tain any statement other than those contained in the premise.

This result is interesting in many ways. In the present

54

context, it is of importance as it shows that from a set of
observation statements no sentence, atomic or molecular, can
be deduced, which has value contents, if the observation
statements do not have it themselves.

There are, however, the procedures of induction,
which are not dealt with in the above consideration. Those
procedures can be described as leading to prOportionately
and universally, or indeterminately quantified statements.
In other words, they do not result in the introduction of
value judgments either. If the above considerations hold,
then we have established that sciences do not contain rules
which allow one to derive value judgments from value free
statements.

It is my claim that histories have to proceed from
observation statements just as the sciences do. We have
seen above that the fact that the historian does not, in
most cases, make the observations himself; but that he re-
ceives the observation statements through a mediator, does
not amount to an essential difference between history and
the sciences.

From this it follows that the claim that histories
contain value judgments, while the sciences do not, amounts
to saying that there are rules of historiography which allow
for the derivation of value judgments from valueefiee state-
ments, for otherwise the introduction of any value judgment
in a history would amount to an act of caprice on the part of

the historian. I do not wish to deny that "acts of caprice"

55

of this type are upon occasions useful and even desirable,
but they are not exclusive with histories, nor can their
chance occurrence serve as a defining feature of them.

Let this be as it may: the question remains whether
there are rules of historiography which allow for the trans-
ition from observation statements to value judgments.
Rickert, whose theory is still under consideration, is un-
able to point out such rules; and we can safely assert that
if those rules exist, they are not known to date. We can,
however, not base our criterion of discrimination on the
highly doubtful assertion that there are rules of this type.
Rickert himself seems to have based his theory on the fact
that in history, as Opposed to the sciences, there are

relatively many chance occurrences of value judgments. How-

ever, the lack of demonstrable regularity and necessity defies

any attempt to find here a definitive characteristic of his-
tories.

Above, we have agreed upon the convention to call
observation statements value free. The above considerations
show, however, that if observation statements had value con-
tents, these contents would persist through any transforma-
tion that they might undergo. This would, of course, hold
true for history as well as for the sciences; and, therefore,
whether we think of observation statements as purely cog-
nitive,or as partly value judgments, in neither case do we
obtain a criterion which would allow us to discriminate his-

tory from the sciences.

.‘e-uen. *Ar‘rw -Ma-

It remains to be considered whether science and
history, as systematic activities, have any relation to value
judgments. I said above that the acceptance or rejection of
an observation statement can be called a matter of valuation.
Regardless whether one wants to agree with this convention
or not, I cannot see a difference between a historian's
acceptance or rejection of an observation statement and a
scientist's execution of the same act. A remarkable dif-
ference between the two, however, lies in the fact that a
scientist has to engage in some rather careful deliberation
as to whether a given accepted observation statement should
be deemed consequential in view of the system that he is
about to construct. Let me give an illustration of this
point.

When Galilei set out to measure the correlation be-
tween weight and acceleration of falling bodies, he decided
that, in all likelihood, the colors of the falling bodies
would not introduce a significant variation in the relation
between weight and acceleration. In other words, although
he probably accepted the observation statement "The object
is of such and such a color," he decided not to treat this
statement as consequential in view of the experiment that
he had set out to undertake.

From a modern point of view, one might argue that
Galilei would have had to take the colors of his objects
into account, had he not otherwise found a significantcor-

relation. This is very true. However, Galilei's advance

57

beyond his Scholastic predecessors lies exactly in the fact
that he found it feasible to disregard tentatively in the
course of a particular investigation some of the observation
statements that he might have utilized in the course of
another investigation.

It has been shown that part of the scientific inabil-
ity of the Middle Ages depended on the refusal, on the part
of the Schoolmen, to make value judgments in Galilei's fashion.

Thus Anneliese Eaier, in her book, Die Vorlaeufer Galileis lg

 

14. Jahrhundert, writes
...Die Neuzeit (betrachtet) die mechanischen

Kraefte ausschliesslich in methodischer Abstrac-
tion..., und (interessiert) sich nur fuer ihr Mass...,
waehrend die Scholastik das gegenstaendliche Moment
im allgemeinen in seiner ganzen Konkretheit in ihre
physikalischen Betrachtungen aufnimmt, also etwa mit
der Kraft rechnet, mit der Sokrates einen Stein
aufhebt oder bewegt, und dabei modifizierte Neben-
faktoren, die organisch oder willefigmaessig bedingt
sind, durchaus mitberuecksichtigt.

In other words: rather than develOping a ballistic curve,

they were too much concerned with getting Socrates' char-

acter into the equation, in order to account for the fact

that it was he who threw the stone.

This fact gains importance as soon as it is realized
that the Schoolmen's procedure is much more reminiscent of
historical than it is of scientific method. For the his-
torian, in describing Socrates' throwing a stone, will not
have to engage in careful deliberation as to which of the
true observation statements he should call consequential,
and which he should disregard. To Speak of Socrates' char-

acter when telling that Socrates threw a stone,will not

58

jeOpardize his efforts of giving a narrative of this event.
In the last part of this thesis more shall be said about this
point.

Professor Rudner, in his paper, The Scientist qua
Sgigntist Makes Value Judgments,47 has pointed out that the
scientist, in adopting a hypothesis, makes a value judgment.
In a way, Rudolf Carnap argues the same point when he says
that

The factual sciences establish synthetic state-

gzgéz£itéi&:48general statements which are...used
In other words, in accepting a hypothesis, the scientist
makes a value judgment; for, confronted with the inevit-
able risk of error, he decides that such and such an
hypothesis is best for his purpose.and best in view of the
consequences. He acknowledges the inevitableness of the
risk of error by saying that his hypothesis is only tenta-
tive.

The historian, on the other hand, when he utilizes
for an eXplanation,an hypothesis which has been established
beforehand by a scientist, does already have the example of
a man who has taken the risk of holding this hypothesis true,
such that his chances to fail are considerably diminished.

The foregoing analysis shows that if a decision is
to be made whether it is the scientist or the historian who
has to make more value judgments in the pursuit of his task,
the result is clearly in favor of the scientist. In making
this decision, however, we have considered the activities

of the scientists and historians only, and consequently have

59

not gained a formal criterion for the discrimination of his-
tories from scientific treatises.

I wish to conclude this chapter by attempting to
resolve why the conviction that the historian has to make
value judgments was rather prevalent in the German phil-
osophy of history of the late 19th and early 20th century.
It is a fact that,among all scholars,the historians par-
ticipated most intensely in the political movements in
Germany during the 19th century. Possibly due to this fact,
the nation found it reasonable to have their plans and
aspirations justified through historical considerations.

It is clear that a historical happening in itself is not

a justification for any action whatsoever. It must also

be decided that a historical happening was good, or worth-
while in order for it to serve as a precedent. The accepted
German historians of the 19th century have generally accepted
the responsibility for making decisions of this kind, and it
seems to me that this fact might have induced some philos-
ophers of history to describe the task of the historian

as essentially connected with making value judgments.

gistory,and Unified Science

While I attempted in the preceding chapters to
discuss various theories which had,as their objective,the
differentiation of science from history, I now wish to draw
attention to a school of thought which denies the existence
of any such fundamental differentiation. I mean, of course,

the logical positivists. They were not the first to deny

60

that such differences should exist; but to my knowledge,
they were the first to maintain such beliefs on tenable
grounds.

We saw above that Croce thought that all sciences were

' and he cannot have been the only one,

"really histories;'
for he claims that all thinkers who thought fundamentally
about science shared this belief. On the other hand, we.
find a man like Ottokar Lorentz, around the turn of the
century, voice the belief that history is "really" a science.49
He subsequently set out to treat world history "scientific-

ally, ie. he attempted to describe the natural laws which
govern world history. He claimed to be able to substan-
tiate the notion that in history minor changes occur every
thirtieth year, major changes every 300 years, and really
fundamental changes every 900 years. This system, he
claimed, was scientific since it allowed him to make his-
torical prodictions.

Lotentz' theory was not at all well accepted, as can
be imagined. It seems that his only follower was his son,
Alfred, who wrote a history of music on the basis of his
father's theory. He conveniently terminated this work
with the year 1910, about which time major changes in
musical style occurred which were not due before 2050. This
alone should relieve me of the obligation to state an ex-
plicit refutation of Lorentz' theory.

It should be born in mind that an attempt, such as

Lorentz', must not be confounded with some systems of what

61

one could call material philosophies of history,such as
Comte's. When Comte described the history of mankind as
having taken place in three stages, he was not issueing a
hypothesis in the sense in which this term should be used.
He gave, rather, a description, not an eXplanation, of a
process that had already taken place. Consequently, on
the basis of Comte's theory of history, no predictions
could be made. It did not, unlike Lorentz' statement,
assume the status of a universal hypothesis.
Let us now turn to the discussion of the theory
of the logical positivists. Their claim is that all of
science and history has to proceed from observation state-
ments or, as it is eXpressed sometimes, that all sciences and
history have their common reduction basis in observation
statements. This would then account for the fact that we
can call them parts of one universal science. Moreover,
it is argued, we should not think of the sciences as being
grouped into clear cut compartments: They overlap.
This leads us to the conclusion that we may look

at all sciences as dovetailed to such a degree that

we may regard them parts of one science, which deals

stars, Milky Ways, earth, plants, animals, human

beings, forests, natural regions, tribes and nations -

in short, a comprehensive cosmic history would be the

result of such an agglomeration.5O
At first sight, it might seem as if Neurath employed the
term "history" in the same way in which the ancients used
"historia," or in the way in which we find it in phrases

such as "natural history." In this sense, the term would

refer to a comprehensive description of some class of

62

objects. However, such is not Keuraths intention. He
continues:

Some peOple may not object to this attempt to
eXpand the sphere of history, but they may still
remain doubtful whether chemistry and mechanics
also fit into this same scheme. Yet surely they
do, because just as we may speak of the behavior
of plants and animals in a certain period at a
certain place,so we may also speak...of the
behavior of sodium and levers in a certain period
of the cosmic aggregation. This period may be long,
but why should we assign any kind of "universality
to chemical and mechanical statements instead of treat-
ing them as historical ones?51

To paraphrase Neurath freely: all statements about the
world are historical, because the world does in fact, or
may eventually, change. No part of synthetical knowledge
is about something that always is, but it is altogether
about that which sometime was, or that which just happens
to be.

It is not my purpose to demonstrate that Neurath's
argument is not scientific, but ontological. I rather
wish to draw attention to the fact that his argument does
not give a valid ground for assuming that there are no
basic differences between science and history. Neurath
would probably agree that the sentence "Charles V rode a
horse on such and such a date" has a number of denotata
which occupy certain temporal regions, and which have
about them the peculiarity that they can no longer be
actualized. This statement is, therefore, to be called a
historical statement.

On the other hand, it is known that the law of levers,

or golden rule of mechanics, has had denotata at least for

63

the last 1850 years, for Heron of Alexandria was already
aware of it. What does it mean to say that levers may change
their behavior? Apparently this: up to this time the series
of instances which established the probability of the law
has had a certain frequency of disconfirming instances (in
our case none), but as the series has not come to an end,
there is a possibility of this frequency changing. Thus,
instead of having a probability of l for the law of levers,
there may at one time be a probability of less than 1. How-
ever, as the series does not end as long as there are levers,
we can not be sure of the overall probability of this law.
In other words, we should have to wait until there are no
more levers until we could ultimately assess the probability
of f1/ f2 ; 82/ ex. In Neurath's sense, we should, there-
fore, with precaution, as it were, call this statement
historical.

In the second example, "historical" obviously has a
different meaning than it has in the first one, for the
first statement is only indirectly connected with questions
of probability. Our ground for believing that "Charles V
rode a horse etc. is true," may be shaky; but not necessar-
ily because of an ascertainable low probability of this
truth. It is therefore not because of its probably being
true that this statement is called historical. It is rather
called such, because the event which is its denotatum occurred

at a definite location.figtime. 0n the other hand, the law

64

of levers is called historical, exactly because it is prob-
able.

One might argue, that the law of the lever can be ren-
dered into a'historical statement by supplementing it with an
indication of the time during which it is used to hold. I
agree readily that in this case the law would becomé'a his-
torical statement in the sense in which the sentence about
Charles V is a historical statement. However, this is not
what the scientist does. Let us imagine a time in which
levers behave in a different manner. An historian might
describe the ensuing state of affairs in the following way:
"Levers usually behave according to formula A, but on such
and such a date a lever behaved according for formula B."
The scientist would account for the same state of affairs
by saying that the probability of formula A being true for
levers is slightly less than 1.

Later on, I shall attempt to show that a historian
does not attempt to arrange observation statements in the
same way as the scientist, i.e. he does not try to arrange
them into series which allow him to infer general hypotheses
through a certain frequency of occurrence of similar events.
With Neurath, this distinction is not made, apparently on
account of the fact that the term "historical" seems to lend
itself for a designation of events which would otherwise be
called "temporally determined" and "temporarily determined,"
respectively.

In the same paper, Neurath denounces what he calls

"scientific pyramidism".

65

Would it not be preferable to treat all statements
and all sciences as coordinated and to abandon for
good the traditional hierarchy: physical sciences,
biological sciences, social sciences, and similar
types of "scientific pyramidism?"52
This statement shows Neurath's encyclOpedic persuasion and
eXplains to some extent the stand which he took on the prob-
lem of history. At the same time,it puts him in opposition
to such trends of logical positivism as have been voiced
some years earlier by Rudolf Carnap. Carnap's view was
then very similar to that which is denounced here as
"Pyramidism." It is of interest for our problem, as Carnap
also puts forth a view according to which a thorough distinc-
tion between science and history cannot be maintained.
In his paper Die Physikalische Sprache als
Universalsprache der Wissenschaft Qggnap points out:
...alle Saetze der Psychologie (lessen) sich
in die physikalische Sprache uebersetzen, und
zwar sowohl die singulaeren als auch die
generallen ('psychologischen Gesetze') oder,
was dasselbe bedeutet, die Definition jeder
psychologischen Bestimmung (feuhrt) auf
physikalische Bestimmungen zurueck.53
According to Carnap, the same holds true for sociology
and history. History, it seems, is treated as an outgrowth
of sociology: and the latter as a dependent of psychology.
With this last assumption, I am not in agreement; for it
contains a determination of history via ts subject matter.
However, it may be occasionally necessary for the histor-
ian to employ a psychological law; and in this case, it
should be insisted that this law is derived from observation,

and can therefore be "physicalized." In other words, I think

that Carnap's thesis may be correct, inasmuch as it concerns

66

psychology; but it has only eventual bearings upon the pur-
suit Of historical study.

Carnap's "pyramidistic" view becomes even more evident
if we connect the above statement with two more quotations
from a later paper:

We can endeavour to develop science more and more in
the direction of a unified system Of laws onlySEecause
we have already at present a unified language.

and

The construction of one homogeneous system of laws
for the whole of science is an aim for the future dev-
elOpment of science.55

This view may or may not be sound; for the present context
the only point which should be noticed is that,here, history
is tacitly incorporated into the unified science.

I should be willing to agree that histories are part
of the unified science if,by this phrase,it was meant that
histories have to proceed from the same type of statements
as sciences do. However, if we take both Of Carnap's papers
together, it appears that he was of the Opinion that his-
tories would be incorporated into the future system Of laws
called unified science. With this I do not agree. My reasons
will become Obvious in the constructive part of this paper.
For now it may suffice that I refer back to my criticism of
Neurath's position, which should have made obvious that the

historian combines statements in a way which is entirely

different from that of the scientist.

in Attempt to Delinc ”Otitonont : History”
If we are to describe the iormal nature Oi histories, it is o r—
haps host to try finding a criterion WMlCfl would p~w1it idonti :10 ca-
'- fl ' ‘v "v ’ ' I F‘L‘ 1‘! r. “x vn .-.. - '7 he - -, -1." . . - fl «A
tion Oi any sentence of “law if as O lohging in LnlS field 01 knOIle go.
Let us, ior the moment, turn to a.tncuucics, and try to iinq out
-pw one can determine tnut a statement i is a mettcment of mathematics.
speciiiCations Oi vary 3: r1 or are gossigie.
1 r11 "1 " (" "u': -- --\ ‘ar‘ Ll‘ .4— t ._.— a l ‘
o 11;, .1001) 4. ..L‘ O... O'VLQ, Cs. 5.)le 011101.18 DOA-1L I'f , (18 VI. 1.“.va .IO 1 '..O'..l CL
consist in uefi ninit, as a statemsnt Oi mathematics, one that can be
‘,‘,], , ‘1 :‘HA Y n t Y r" _ J“ ‘ , .i-‘ A. .4- ' 1],. ...‘r1 ‘. ‘ . 3 '. 3 \ .C‘
ceuicoa lion s gi N’vo1 set Oi (nscnsmacicsl) uxi as oy the rules Oi
f rmal lo ic, as set iortn in BrinCipia hitgsmutica, or a Similar
-‘\ r114 ‘ -- ~.~ .4-':-$’\ . ”i 1-- efiJ‘Ifi'r-V "‘/ -.| ‘,' ' . q 1 "" —.‘ f:
CJnlCLIluso lills («Le—L inlL/J—Dll lb dial-C 5:) DU.i1's.‘-.er L'dCCx LIL; it ‘JOULQ 8.1—6.1. blue
a numoor Oi statements wnicn are co:-m1only "e .:'ardod as mathematical:

.1. .

it can he shows that not all true statements of second or higher type
.0 ll tr (1 ‘7‘ 5'1, -1, 1.: -.’ - . 2) first p a"? . T r~ ‘ 1-‘ . x :3 4-116;) “’3 C; t.. -- Wu ..J -.s .1-
'1' O 014 erL.L thlJ .L l.1ltv OK] OJ. Rel—5.10.110. in) 1.1le UA-Ak/l KI Lire S LALK.JL.1V.LLLJS
which :re usually culls tatSH Hits of mathematics and which cannot
e iornulsted as statements of lo .Jest tyie, the explication given to
the torn ”etc to ent of nut thenatics” does not coincide with the usggs
OI the term thus explmzotod. I shall not here deal with the question
way tfliS is tne case. All I wish to state is that, only in a limited
numocr of cases, statements can be identified as belonging to msthe-
RathS: because they follow from a limited set of axioms in a finite
number of Stejs

r) I '~ ,-‘ . n -— e: .31 ~ ~/. (w -.— «'7 l' 3“ -‘ ~.- 50' r el- N

s. inc second, 11.01 a customs}; y and moi e ins cticuOle es. lication
Of 1‘ Str—rtQT‘ v ‘- "c‘ v -‘~ 7r " ' '. W) ~‘- If - v - fl " ‘, ~V - - r~ w w - ‘ - '.

'm~wdpdu Oi mathematics would suosdne ll sonttai cos dMUdr unis
‘£“QLH31hii n are true, follow cert.: ir1 ioime‘ion iulss, and contain

only sorta in terms .

O\
03-"

3. There is, however, still another, more loose sense Of
the expression ”statement of mathematics”, which would coincide
with the one listed under (2), except that the sentence is not
required to be true.

Thus, Fermat's theorem that if x is identical with 22n + 1,
then x is a prime number, would be a statement Of mathematics, in

.1-

the sense given under (3); but it would not be such a statement

according to the second definition, for it is false if n 5. On
the other hand, Goldbach's theorem that every even number is the
sum of two prime numbers, would be a statement Of mathematics ac-
cording to (3); but it is not known whether it also fulfills the
condition demanded by (2). If, however, it is a statement of
mathematics according to (2), then this particular prOposition
also fulfills the condition demanded by (1).

Let us now consider whether any one Of the three suggested
(patterns of defining ”statement of mathematics” can be applied
for defining ”statement of science” and ”statement of history” in
such a way that a Iifference between the two fields becomes ap-
parent.

As to suggestion (3), the following is to be said: It
might perhaps be possible to identify an observation statement
through a compilation of thh primitive terms of human experience
and certain formation rules, and it might also be possible to
identify, somehow, the inductive consequences of this class of
Observation statements.

In accordance with suggestion (3), I do not wish to apply

a criterion of truth and falsity to the class of statenerts thus

n'ified. The question then is, whether the total class Of

0.

id

(D

Observation statements - possibiy containing both, true and false,

sentences, - belongs exclusiv wlr to science or to history. Clear—

0

ly, this is not the case. histories, as well as scientifi
treatises must be p- rmitte d to contain both, observation mt te-
mcnts and air inductive conse1uences. It must be noted that

such a weak criterion already suffices to discredit suggestion

(3) as a possible ground for discriminating science and 1i tory.
If a stronger denard con erning the en Halo e11t Of OOservation

‘1

F’
9.)

1d such as ”All sciences as wel --s histories
)

r‘ 4- ‘ 4 .
statements is issu.

K

should contain nothing but Observation statements and their in-

..nlm1

ductive consenuences", then t1e criterion is still farther from

I‘ ‘,\ . ,“I . y /fl LE“, 1 . ‘. ‘ f1
achisVinQ the deSired end.

1 0 {'11

O dispose Of. as state

d

Suggestion (2) is e

*1 n .~~
'1} reuflf
1

ua
ments identii MiedslfJ-‘1rou 1 (2) form the subclass Of all true state—

ments identified through . As it must be allowed that the

sciences as well as history c ntain true observation statements,
no discrimination of the two is pos siole through criterion (2).
Thus, suggestion (2) and (3) are not fit for establishing
a criterion for the disc: i‘z1inat ion of scie nce from history.
It remains to discuss (1). It seems clear that for an
hypothetico-deductive science §J one can give a very rigorous
definition for "g is a Statement of E": which will remind one of

he definition given under (1) above. As a mach of fact, it

is one of the claims of the r1ore radical logical positivists that
eventually all Observation wt t- a1ents can be demonstrated in just

131"

this fashion as being statements of physics. inis dez1onstration

r/O

will be possible as soon as it ca11 be shown that the unity of
science, which at the tine is a unity only by virtue of the com—
mon ”reduction basis”, is also a hyOothetic co- -deductive unity.

Let us, for the Ourpose of this enouir3, pretend such a
unity of science does, in fact,exist. In this unity, as des-
cribed by Carnap, all statements of sociology would be a sub-
class Of the sta'enents Of psychology; the latter would be a
subclass of the statenents of physiology, etc., and all of them
would be subclasses Of the statements of physics. As I have
pointed out, Carnap holds that the statements of history are to
be conceived as a Sinclass of the statenents of psychology in
this unified science. It seems that this is altogether'too re-
strictive. In order to comply more closely with the common usage
of the tern’historyf it seems advisable to admit that any Obser-
vation statement may occur in some history. Accordi13 to this
convention, a piece of discourse in which a staten1ent Of physics
occ11rs 1-Il1ich is not a state 1nent Of thSiOlO5 y would, for this
reason, not be excluded from the class of histories.

For reasons which are to be presently e: plained, it seems
advisable not only to admit all Observation statements into his-
tory, but also all true universal hypotheses. This being granted,
we are compelled to conclude that "st at enent of physics" must be
coextensive with "statelent of history", where "physi ' is used
to denote the totality of the hypothetico-deductive scientific
unity, and "history” the sum total Of all possible histories.

It would be a gross error to suppose that consequently

”phys ics" and "history” must have the sa1e me aning All that is

7l

asserted here is that any statement of physics (any statement of
the unified science) may occur in some history.

If the above consideration holds, then history and science
cannot be divided on the grounds that certain statements are ad-

r11

mitted in one, but are not admitted in the other. lliS would hold,
regardless which grounds we choose for the identification of
statements of science.

This being the case, if there is a distinction between
history and science, another fundamentum divisionis must be found.
If it is not the statements themselves, then it might be the con—
nection, or selection of them, which marks the difference between
science and history.
hindelband's Theory

At this point, I wish to discuss Windelband's theory, as
it seems to be of considerable importance for the problem indi-
cated at the end of the last section. He introduced the theory
of the nomothetic and idiographic. This theory evolved from a

discuss ion of the distinction betwee n,turvis enschaften and

Geisteswiss ens chaften.

 

It appears that the way in which these names were assi ned
to different branches of knowledge is due to the organization of
the German universities as it happened to exist at the time when
this assignment was made. At that time, for instance, the chairs
for psychology and philos0phy were usually held by the sazne per-
son, which resulted in grouping both these fields within the

,

Geisteswis enscnaften. So far the procedure se a1s reasonable, as

U

 

there is a sense in which one can hold the t they are both sciences

72

of the mind, and distinct from the sciences of nature. Diffi—

pma

culties arose, however, throu3h the fact ‘1at the major part of

Hll oriented

0

hi tor

H)
U)

1e Geisteswissenschaften consisted 0
fields of research. Lven philOSOphy itself, inasmuch as it was
conducted by professional philOSOphers, was largely considered

a ma ter of historical contemplation, in seneral, or an analysis

Q

r 9 .-‘. .l c‘ '7-‘17‘ .‘n - “wt. ‘11“.7‘
OJ. ‘9111. 0909-”, 111 Pun}. lCuLLLL.

O
*—
F
(D
iv;-
...J
H‘
U)
cf
0
*3
ka

V

ihis preoccupation with historical thou3ht in philOSOphy,
and the unfortunate association of psycholo3y and philos0phy, led

to attempts to set up a cozzlprehensive Igletl1odolO3ical fraz. ewor}:

J.
'1ich would comprise, at the saml time, history and psychology as
the t. .‘0 p1 ominent sciences of the mind. A methodolO3ical unity

was thou3ht to issue, somehow, from the common subject 12 Htt r of

these two seiences, which would, at the same time, allow distin-

natural sciences.

O

guisl‘ling the two from th
Dilthey, a philosopher of this school, is im. essive in his
attempt to reconcile the difficulties which arose, although his
enterprise was unsuccessful.
It was Jindelba nd's attempt to find an entirely difi erent

bas or a division of the sciences in their method, *ather than

Ho
Pb

’3‘
L.)

7'

i

:3

O
S.

(D

their subject matter. I sag
”Die Lr1.n1un*s*is ens chaften such an in der Erken-
ntnis des "irh ichen entrre dler dcs n113e11ein in der
Form des Yatur3e—setses, ode r das Linze -ne i11 der
3escnicntlich bas iz'iiten asstait sie be trachten zu
eineil 1‘eil Cme.:hm1er sich "leich bicioend Form,

Q—

zum :ndern ieil den einmalL 3en, in sich bestimmten
lnhalt des wirglic1~n Geschc hens. Die ei:en sind
Gesetzasxlsssnscnaitvn, die anderen Lre'3niswissen—
schaften, je,e lehren_was immer ist, diese was
einmal war.“9

Q:

C)
y

' 1. r1 v v . fi A V 1 "\ '(jJ‘ . 1 —- 'I H“ ’~ . fl" . " "\ ~ :“ ~.-
‘Jas u 3331scna1tlicn3 uehhen lSu - w31n man
.. i i ’ .1. . ,f .. _-, 1- ji."
neue LnnstauSaraecAe tild3n dar - in dem

. ‘3] . .7 .1 r 'W ’ 4'1 I) ‘ I ‘. r
0111311 1 1:11.11} 11 10 1,113 tisch 1i1 den anee1 1 an id—

_i 1 ~-
10 ““1p1 liSC11 "

.0. 'w c r\' I o” I s 0 To ‘0‘ I [’3 v\% o 1
Acco1d ing to ”inneleanc, 11 t- .‘1s distinction is applied,

psychol 3y fa lls clearly within the realm of the nomothetic sci—

 

“ ‘1 f I 1 - .’\ “\ J' '7. '1‘ T“ I“ "~ . J. v" 7 v .\1 '0 ,- ‘, r'\ 0 1 . 4— :1 '5‘ h.
'LICQS. 33 COnceab Oi bAC quSuchlSSD m1 Cudlt31 as irdlbldl lOf
+T ’ ° --.—4‘ . I." 4-“, ',1‘., .. , ,- r“. - .." .. ‘ ’ ,

the clas ific CiuiOfl 01 the selences is entirel; aoanioned, oe-

\‘ r" 4‘1"
(IL-41.11.13 U11

(3
O

4‘. r1 —: 1n . . ~ 4-- : -. -. q: ‘1 ,w I- -- -,-\ ‘ 4— . 1 ‘-
lassi1icat1cn no 1 n33r 31003333 p-10d 3h distin 3u.isl1-

. ‘ "'v ‘1‘ :- 1-"1-" " "' ',~‘) 1 1-~ ~ .1-3—‘2 ’ --) V‘- -.1 -« y~ (w . —,—.4-, -. ‘- ‘C' -“ .P
11, subject 11.31.1131 s, set 5131,1131 tn1 ou3h a co11side1—tio11 01 the

If I underst Ad'windelband's out ine correctly, he is o

F!)

1 .. ° .1‘: . 1. ,1 -_ .11 , 1, n.1,, ,1 °, ,1 ,. 1 1, i-” - '1.
tne opinion LAG one and the same subject matter can be made oo—

All as of an historical, investi3ation.

P.
(J
L
(‘1
I“!
*1
Po
(‘4
\D
9-,
0)
(l
k.
(J

ject of a so

H
ci‘
1-1.

or scier tific: lly. In a more cautious way, this theory would

" 11 - 1‘1 ‘7 '. v. 1‘. jfi‘v?‘ "‘1;-'-\-1.-r-‘ ‘ - ‘ . u-u ‘ , nmw 1 ‘- . .
p1ooauly, nowadays, e eAp 3ss31 as “One and t1 Servatioa

5
m
5::
6
o
o

(J)
1‘
£3
(1'
(a
:10
..5
d‘
O
L
:3
O
O
Q
.‘L
’3
H
D
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H.
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}.— —l
,
(b
3
C.)
0"

cience or a history”. If this
is the case, fiiadelband ar nos, tien theciiffe re11ce oe t'Ieen the
scie11ces and history must lie in the soecial way in which this

A

reality is env1sa*3 . A3ain I propose to reformulate this su
gestion in a som3what more cautious way. I should reformulate it
as ”hot the observation statements tncss lve s, but the way in
which they are selected and combined marl :6 the difie1ence be1t tween
science and history”.
The c esti on now arises: what are the diffem‘ nt ways in

1

which the ooservation statements are selected and combined?

.3 one and the same ”reality" that is invest act d historically,

inCelband In eet sthis particular problem in his own terms by
saying that the histories are concer1ed with the singular, non—

J.

. - , .x -.u'1 a, .7
recurrent, while the sc e1c

(D

s are concerned with the permanent
L.

£01m of all events. It is at this point, of course, that'flindel—

oand's theory displays considerable need of reformulation and

In order to achieve this, I now wish to turn to a consid-
eration oi a more formal hind “hich is to achieve this clarifica—
tion.

', A :1 -‘ ,
Concern n” subjects and 1redicates

 

tic,"

ortrand Russell and Alfred horth flhitehead, in their
59

Pnhuibia Lathm x1tica, speak eventually of "predicates them-

selves". Such a predicate would be, in the El“lish langua Oe,

' . i S -c,. (1‘ 811 9 11:1 .118“ l "

for in Lance, "beino re" d”, or “being lall r t’11" a11o
. ‘ _ - A 1 o 1 O

tate these predicates as x. Tne 3 serves merely as an indica-

tion that E is, in this case, a one place predicate. Predicates
interpreted in this way have consideeable importance for formal
logic, as a great number of expressions in the calculus of pre-
dicates can be expressed through exclusive usage of the ”predi-
cates themselves”. for example, "Px implies ex” is the same as
"(x):Px implies Qx”. To give an interpretation of this exam le:
”fieing green implies being colored" is the same as to say ”It is

rue for all.x that if x is green then x is colored”.

It must be noted that the Cir umflex over the subject var-

 

iable is to be interprete as an abstractive binder. Unfortun—

ately, the alnotation suggeS‘ed in the Principia does not exclude

 

certain amoi uities. Thus, for instance, from the expression:

\,

75

”(x): Px implies 92:”, an abstraction can be performed thich will

‘ .“A .‘ . . ' o . A ,‘. 1 _~ ,
Tlelai Jfix implies ix”. It is not clear, hOUchr, Whether a con—

cretion, to be performed on this last exDression, is to yield:

”(x):Px implies ngi', or "(::)(y): Px implies Say”.
This consideration Zled to the introduction of a differ-

ent annotation of the abstractive binders, in some ways similar

60

A
o '1 o y o A I
to that of the quantiiiers. For Px the annotation x Px is

A
used° g is called an ”abstractive binder”. as

, ach such abstrac-

(D

tive binder has a definite sc0pe, ambiguities as occur with the

Principia annotation are excluded.

 

Abstractively bound expressions form an alternate way.of
stating a great number of expressions of the calculus of predi-
cates, otherwise annotated with quantifiers. One example has been
given above. The use of the term ”implies" is not to suggest
that the same connective is supposed to be operative with ab-
stractively bound expressions as well as with quantified ones.
While in the former case ”implies” is to denote inclusion, in
the latter case it is to denote logical implication; the reason
being that 2; stands for a sentence, while 2% or % (2;) do not.

It is my contention that scientists, inasmuch as they are
engaged in establishing universal hypotheses, or hypotheses with
a certain degree of probability, do, in fact, attempt to relate
predicates to one another. That this is often done through the
mediation of established serial orders of measurement, does not
change the assumption.

In order to shed some more light upon this assertion, let

me draw attention to a semantic aspect of predicates. The expres-

>>

1

sion :(Px)

of‘y if it

76

can be used to denote part of the total intension

is true that P1. similarly, all the other predi-

cate which are true of y can be listed, such that a cluster

of pre edic ates is derived which jointly form the intension of

.y or part of it. It is not the task of science to list such

acc mulations of predica

the surfac

es. If, for instance, a Inea “e for

cf

e tension of water is sought, then it is probably

not necessary that it be known that water quenches thirst.

Jhat is wanted is a relation betmI en a number of prc' dieates,

which, for

the context of the measure of surface tensions, suf-

ficiently define water, and an e: {pression for the surf ace ten-

sion. The

(Y) r
L 4:. doxuo

expression which will be derived will have the form

...RxDTx, or, alternately,

/‘
A

A
81 x(Px.;x...Rx) C x(Tx)

It s eems to be the case that the scientist does not commonly in-

tend to in
relation b
wants to r
relation t
that corre

Let
Vided that
dent of 81

But

only Signi

crease the number of predicates involved in such a cor-
eyond necessity. His task is quite the opposite: he
estrict the number of predicates involved in some cor-
o the minimum which is consistent with the validity of
lation.
A

me give an example: Let x(Sx) be any predicate. Pro—
51 is true, we could then include §(5x) in the antece-
without chan ing the truth value of 81.

take the case that §(Sx) is true of water and that the

ficant correlation which is known to exist, and in whicli

A
A
.X(fxfl occurs is not 81, but

A n

S? x(Px.£x... IJm:.Sx) C x(Tx)

v

It is obvious that at such a

the

N»

that (dx) is not a critical

from a simple law of l03ic,
established.

It can safely be asse

from a statement

e 32 to a statement like 31 constitutes

77

state of scientific deveIOpment,

truth of Bl cannot be known, for it is not yet established

predicate. while 51382 follows

the converse must be experimentally

rted that the transition in science

gen-

uine progress. The reason for this does not lie in the truth

va ucs the respect1 e sentences, ior tley are the same, if

R c -

x(Sx), in accoida nce with our assumption, is not a critical pre-

dicate. Rather, such a step

.'
arr
.LL,‘

not derived from material im
inclusion employed

added factors does not hold.

”cons euence". If such a
‘would not imply 32, and the

of properties

there fore lo3iCal ly and expel imentally more eas

in 31 at l

responsible for

is progress, bec 351 is simpler

y to handle

that one mirht even re3ard the rela-
2
Tx)" in S] as

plication, and diffe~ent from the

)"30 O
V

VLAQ

t in such a way that th la'w' of

Such a elation could be terncc

relation was thought to hold, then Sl

derivation of the mos t limite set

the occuri ence of some other prop—

erty would be an absolute must for the scientist.
Let me give tw examples for the importance of the demand
1 o o 4‘ - o .. 3 n _ .L. _g 1
that the soientiSt should restrict, as mucn as conSistent with t
4‘ ‘I‘u L". j 7 4_, v p ., . - -. . .. '.. .- . - - -
viutn oi tne Statement as a whole, the numeer of predicates con—
tr~ ‘. 7 ° 1 - 4- 1 ‘ ~ 4— 9 .1. . . '1 L" - Ol
d'nGQ in the anUQC3‘Gflb oi a statement line 01, or 52.
It is commonly re3arded a major advance in scientific de—
Velocuent that Galileo succeeded in establishin” “net the fact1“

of weight was not crucial for the ace leiation of fallin
or, in other words, that the W“euicace denotin3 the weisht of a
fallin3 body was not a critical predicate in the above sense for
a: expression statinc the acceleration of such a body. If we
were to state Galileo's discovery by use of the relation of in-
clusion, an addition of a predicate ex3ressin J3 i 3ht in the ante-
cedent would not render the sta enent false; if, however, we wish
to express Galileo's findin3s by use of the relation of conse-

.C“

Quence, for which the lactor-added law does not hold, then the

‘

addition of an exorsssion for Jeight in the antecedent would

i
sult in a false statement.

The second example has to do with the natural philOSOphy
of the late Scholastic period. Je could represent the position
0i the Schoolmen in the following way: If we were to find an

xprcssion for the surface tension of water, we should not, ac-
cording to this view, rest with the list of predicates 3iven for
the antecedent in 31, Jhich we sup mo c‘d to be the minimum set, but
we should list all the predicates consistent with §(Px.£x....fix).
If we interpret the relation between antecedent and conseguent as
that of inclusion rather than conse::uence, an expression thus
3ained would still be true, but extremely difficult to handle. It
is easy to see that the fellows of herton Colle3e precluded throu3h
this theoretical dema nd the possiole divanceacnt of science on
their part.

a
4

To sum up, it seems to be the case Mlat part of the tee:

(N

of the scientist consists in selecting the smallest set of p

*3
*d

'3".
V. I“; -

ties which are jointly responsible for the occunemce or me 3nitude

of some other property.

79

Turning to history, it becomes at once evident that no
suce rule is operative here. It segms to 03 the task of the
historian to ccumulat ejust sucn clusters of predicates which

the scientist has to abstract from, if he wants to ari ivc at

'J

iflniiicait corre latiozs. A history is always a his r3 o~ s01e

./

~ . -» - r.-~ -‘ -‘—1 , -.1 ~ -: r‘ " 1.", w -.-§ ' Y" 'x'“. A -a . ~11 . D ‘1 ""1“ ’.~‘ 1' '.
subject, and thooioticallj the e is no under limit .LOl the null--

"- "x " D “AI-.1 .- ‘ "t f‘ 4- ‘ 1-‘ f ‘ \_ . 1,.1. 1-\ r 1 c -~ ~, -~ —‘ 34‘ a — ' ‘ ~ . 1 . ,- I‘-
ve" oi grecicates thzt hi nt o; «sse*teu asout Euls squeCc.

f)

- ., ° n ' ~ 4 , ~1.. r:- A -. m- ' -fi- .--1 h —.
«Lile QA incldsion line u dees not chan e its tidufl value or

j.‘ '5 3an . J‘- r‘ zfi-v' "-1 r"‘,-‘-",J' '1‘r '~. -.v \-4 ‘\~'1'- 1 >~11 t‘n ’5 #1: I. . - 'n v

4.110.}. \IC".Q\J lbo O¢M;/_L';(Al(.4 LJOJ. J *I’Ovl‘v tALL UI'LK_;'I“" A-'q CJ=\.L'\-th 101-1 OI- n01].-
criciCil nreu icatc s in the ant cecen , no matter how many there

::y es aided, a history becomes more and more comprehensive the

more predicates are added to it. One could even soeag of a com-

plet; history of a, i.e., a lwi tory that lists all the predicates
which :re true of Q. Such a comglete history, of course, would

be an impos si‘o Ml ty, as the number of are ~iich it would
have to celvr'sc, is infinite.

It seems to be tne case, however, that the subject mattgr
-... n1. . ,(‘J-' ..r - 1- a 1.. . ,C. -- u- an 1
union ...S .Lulfco l ated Of a his oOl ian, .L talc: deaf .111inch ‘13 ll].-
vestigates it, do not themselves dictate an upper limit for the

1

number oi predicates which should oe asserted, nor do they demand

-t

H.
(0

a certain minimum of predicates to be 1 d. Therefore, it must

(L

O
H
cf
f
L
O
(D
F”
,l,
,_J
cl‘
(L
}.__u
C:
O
H)

' -~-~m - - 1 ° ..1 — ° 1 ,. um

oe JGCtiC&i COHSldeiuLlOnS, sucn as 149
v‘ V“ .1. f 7" . 1 - (\I-rx .‘IA. 1 ..fl 5 A J—-‘ . -- W ‘ .3 ,- ~ g a . .- -—.

sons yULPOSB, unlCfl maLes the histo ian settle Mltn some numbei
" - a c“ "’ -'. fll‘ I -1 ‘- r_ {\1, 1" , ‘1.

01 predicates, iatne“ than anotne .

fl a L...“ ,- ~-- -. I . raw - »\ n< I 7" vx ‘ (“.1 ,5 ‘44- 3 r " r 2' O
BHfUHCl‘xJOJfQ, 1t LBJVCACd Ell 1L Vc‘iu'd J L1"; ’3 L148 1.713.; c1 (All-

-’ z (W w-v '0 *1 “fi'? h“ 1 ~11 7 . rfiv #1 "I‘ '1 ‘~"$
“nose asnects oi hlStOif and science are conce ed Jhich ale here

\JQ

. 1 .3 ~‘_ _ a 4 ~ p ,_ ~~1 _ _‘ -' .___I_ I C‘- ' .- ~ ~ (‘ __ W ' .u- . .. ‘1 ‘_
1.1113 .L1.L‘)O.Lfl'u_..i10(3 OJ. 9'. )1. J‘LLLCL-i \3 45(94:) f0? (.1 rJLQUlOl-l SLICIJ.

‘ -* P A x '»\ — r‘ v r -_ I) ‘ -
as bl is, at leest in p“inchl3, 3Leily assess3d. l tAc see-
I" A
' A ~ . ' ‘ n - .I.
stitution.of'zin'*:) for x\?gfl JJ ‘Xl enah33r tie trwuLL'VLlue of

‘L' . ‘ "- ‘ ‘ ~’ . r‘ . V - . --1 -' ~'\ \‘1’. '. ‘7‘ “/1-1 "~ ~ ‘h'I- --: N ’. -'-
than 3-:(rn) is LJPOLtJut - or cLLth l - LoL ul, OtnLLHLse i3

13 unriportght, or non—CL“ _c'cL._.

1 ‘ 4— ‘y' "A ' . fl . a" n". « 1 . '«\ G' ' -, '. 4" A ‘3 r1
...le ULl'Jl‘ in SL131]. :4 0:133 tLllS lJJ?JQ.LCCLUd .Lu

*(J
I l

f 1

V
rJ

(“L

(1‘
l. J

C

(J

0

of which x(

‘

important enough to he li 3a, may have to d with circumstance

(Q

J

ither dependent upon the subject of the enguiry, nor

H
D
(p

which are

upon the method OflplOTBd. gone kind of valuation must be Opel: —

tive, h 33v r, as the number of predicates, which can be liste‘,

is of necessity limited, anr as there is no intrinsic reason why

he preferred to others.

it does not seen promising to follow this line of investi—

aatior any further, as any definite assertion concerning the kind
v

tuous. The exam le of Richert d monstrates most cle mly the

futility of such an enterprise.

although the above considerations do already mark a dis-

tinction between science and history, it is desirable to list

aiven as—

O

S

9.;

some further characteristics of history,

dicates which are true

H)
(L)

sertion that histories are clusters 0 pr

n

o: a certain suoject holds not only 0

Fig

histories 0, but also of the

merely de scri tive sc'ences.

f.—

Additionally, one would have to re: uire of histories that
in the list of predicates reference is made to the temporal order

of the occurence of the properties to which these predicates refe

e in historical selection appears to be presump-

14
J.

81

Je thus have establish3d two ruLuirements which a writin*

must fulfill if it is to be called a history. But these two
charac 3ristics are only a minimum requirement, and histories

have, in the majority of cases, additional features, the most

1 a
\

important of which I shall suosequently discuss.
A historian commonly re'a-rds it as part of his tasl: not

only to list predicates, but also to explain them. Any such ex—

.L 62

planation requires for its validity a universal hypothesis.

(D

Such a universal hypoU es, however, can be interpreted as a re-
lation bet 3en predicates. I have shown above t1 at it is the

uch relations; therefore, when

:<
m'

ta-k of the cie 1tist to establish

C)
U)

the historian employs a universal hypothesis, he applies science;

r4

:hen he establishes it, he acts as a scientist.

l‘his consideration le Hazs to a ratlier conseLuential modifi-

C
O
«:1
t.)
d-
D.
9.)
C1.
D

cation of one of the above assertions. I have said a-
history of‘a is an accumulation of predicates which are true of

'a. If, however, the historian is to be allowed, as h3 should be,
to e:: ol ain events ratller than merely to list them, one must also
allow him to include in the history ofggsentences which are true
of a subject other than a. He must be permitted to do this inso-
far as this procedure is required for the explanation of some pre-
dicate of.a itself.

Vlve an

In very many cases in which a historian wishes to Q
explanation, he has only a very vague or even false notion of the
universal hypothesis which he employs. Thus he may, for instance,
employ a universal hypotheses which contains in its antecedent all

I“!

the critical and some non-‘ritical predicates. Lnis would be a

r‘ /)

UN

rather fortunate case, but it would force us to make a decision
in the following mat er: Lith- er the historian must be required

W ‘1

to articulate his universal hypothesis and e: :CLud all non-c1i-
J

tical p edicates, or in the case of histories one cannot replace
the relation of inclusion in universal hypotheses by the rela-
tion of cor Lse uence, as it could be done in science. with less
fortunate cas es, such as ULe omission of critical predicates in
the antecedents of universe hypotheses, I do not wish to concern
myself in this contex , as all such cases would result in invalid
explanations,r regardless which viewpoint mi3ht be taken.

It is important to note that the historian's attempt to
explain some event may have bearings upon the selection of the
predicates which are to constitute his history. If among the
total number of prediCa“ tes which constitute the complete history

A
’1 A 0 ~ I
01 , a istorian finds x(lx) most important, tnen he will,from

IE

-I a

the rest of the predicates which are true of g,select cniefly
those which are needed to explain the occurrence of 23. Such
selection, of course, presupposes a fairly accurate notion of
the universal hypothesis which is to be employed for the explan-
ation of Ba,

It might appear as if in the above flea %raphs we were con-

cerned only with the selection of statements of science and his-

 

tor . Those considerations however have some implications
’ 1 a.

concernin3 the connection of statements as well. Thus, if it was

 

asserted that a history ofig is a number of predicates which are
true of a, then any statement 2; may belong to this history merely
by virtue of the fact that it is about a. In other words, to be

about a connects Pa with the remainder of t1e history of.g strongly

a
1

\1)

enou3h to make it eli3ible as a part of the history of Q.

On the other hand, this weak criterion does not suffice
in the case of a universal hypothesis of science. In sudl a
universal hypothesis, every critical predicate is connected with
the remainder of the 'xgression throu3h logical connectives.
Moreover, if a science is strictly hypothetico-deductive, logi-
cal relations hold between all the universal hyiotheses of such
a science and all the observation statements which are eXplained
by the universal hypotheses.

Thus, in such a science, no statement is to occur in deduc-
tive isolation, while histories may contain sta ements which are
thus isolated.

Above, I have spoken of the establishment of an organon
for history. The term "organon" commonly refers to a set of
rules which, when followed, assure the origination of a good
or valid product. Such an organon, however, always contains
a minimum set of rules which assure that the product is at all
what it is supposed to be. Above, we have listed such a m'nimum
set of rules, which, when followed, issue in a history.

(T1

ihese rules are:

1

_a. A history of a may consist of

1. any number of predicates which are
true of a, and

N
0

any number of predicates which are
true of subjects other than a, if

such predicates are needed to ex-

plain predicates true of a.

b. In the list of predicates forming a history,
reference is made to the teMporal order of
the occurrence of the properties which these
predicates denote.

c. The subject of a history is of the histor-
ians own choosing. It is not required that
the subject should be of 103ical type 0.

While these rules allow that in a history a statement may, if it
fulfills certain other requirements, occur in deductive isolation,
no statement may occur thus isolated, if it is to belong to a
hypothetico-deductive science. moreover, while for histories
exists no upper limit for the number of predicates which they
should contain, any scientific universal hypothesis is not to
contain any predicate other than critical ones. This in turn
imposes a restriction upon the number of predicates which may
occur in the totality of hypothetical constructs contained in
any science.
Concludin3_hemarks

In the preceding chapter, the abstractive binder was in-
troduced with respect to subjects, such that we gained xores-
sions like §CP11 There is no reason why this binder should be
used with respect to subjects alone. If a predicate is bound
abstractively, an expression like $(Pa)w uld be gained. This
expression would denote the “subject as such". Ehile eXpression
with abstractively bound subjects lend themselves to alternate
form.7 ations of many expressions in the calculus of predicates,
no such use can be made of expressions with abstractively bound
predicates. They consequently seem to have very little use.
It seems to be the case, however, that, in saying that the his-
torian lists all the predicates which are true of some subject,
we employ exactly such an expression. we do, in fact, say that

A
. ... -. O ._
he lists all the predicates Which are true of some r(em.

A

This result is remarkable insofar as '3 (Pa)can be in-
terpreted as standing for the concept of a substance in the
Aristotelian sense. If this assumption holds, then it seems
to be the case that the concept of substance plays some role
in history, which it does not in science.

If we take this for granted, it turns out that the con—
cepts of substance and function are not actually ontological
concepts, but have to do with different ways of envisaging the
world: function is related to science, substance, to history.

This View, however, must be considesably restricted. In
a history, the concept of a substance can be operative only as
a principium selectionis. As soon as a definite assertion is
made about the substance under investigation, a predicate is em-
ployed which can gain its significance only throu3h its being
the member of some serial order. Thus, while the historian may
make his selection as if there were substances, the concept of
substance ceases to be operative as soon as he makes definite

assertions about the object under investi3ation.

FOOTNOTES

(The translations are my own,except for the case of
Kent's Critioue 2; Pure Reason, where Norman Kemp Smith's
translation has been used.)

1The distinction between formal and material philos-

Ophies of history has been made by several philosOphers. Cf.
Maurice Mandelbaum, Some Neglected Philosogbic Problems Re-
garding History, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLIX, No. 10,
May, 1952; pp. 317 ff. Also Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus
und seine Problems, Gesammelte Schriften, Ed. III, passim.
W. H. "alsh calls the two branches of enquiry "critical" and

"speculative" philOSOphy of history. W. H. \falsh, An Intro-
duction to PhiIOSOphy of Histor , London (HutchinsoETs Univ-
ersity Libraryy 1951, pp. 13 ff.

 

2Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tuebingen, 1953,
passim.

3Eenedetto Croce, Die Geschixrhte als Gedanke und als
at, Bern, 1944; translated from the Italian by Francois Bondy.

The discussion of Croce is based on this German translation.

49g. cit., p. 37. Translation: "(h {e have) most de-
tailed and most precise collections of individual data, where
it can be felt at once that they are not history; and ‘ '
we have on the other hand works of radiant historical insight,
but poor in facts and even interspersed with unprecise, legen—
dary or invented assertions... Compilations of facts are
called chronicals, accounts, memoirs, annals, but not histor-
ies; and even though they be critically sighted or though of
each individual datum the source be noted or a thoroughly
checked testimony (be given), they can nevertheless never...
overcome the superficiality of source and testimony... They
can never become our truth, whereas history requires a truth
that comes from our innermost self.

500. cit., p. 39. Translation: "An act of understand-
ing and insight, which is initiated by a practical necessity,
which cannot be fulfilled and issue in action until the shadows,
the doubts and unclearnesses, against which it struggles, are
eliminated through posing and resolving a theoretical prob-
lem.‘

692. gi£., p. 61. Translatio.: "There is no con-
crete understanding...which can abstract from the fact that
it is bound up with life and therefore with action, as a
moment of interruption or expansion of this action."

87

79p. g;;., p. 480. Translation: "The theoreticians
or the scientists themselves, inasmuch as they think theoret-
ically about the physioommathematical sciences, insist nowa-
days that it be acknowledged that the natural sciences have
the character of histories." (Literally: "of a history.“)

It is possible that Croce here thought of Neurath. Cf.
below pp. 60 ff.)

8Maurice Mandelbaum, The Problem 3: Historical Knowl-
edge, Ne": Yorltp 1938, p. 100

90. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning 9: Mean-
ing, 3rd ed. London, 1930, p. 135

10R. G. Collingwood, The Ide of History, ed. T. M.
Know, Oxford, 1946.

 

1193. cit., p. 175.

12George Simmel, Die Probleme der GeschichtSphilosOUhie,
Muenchen and Leipzig, 1922, p. 1. Translation: Jhile theory
of knowledge in general proceeds from the fact that understand-
ing is a representation and its subject is a soul, the theory
of historical understanding has the additional characteristic
that also its object consists of the representations, wills
and feelings of persons, that its objects are souls."

13Collingwood, _p. cit., p. 302.

14Simmel, pp. Lit., p. 32. Translation: "The group
soul is here presupposed as a uniform entity as above the
individual soul."

15Collingwood, 22. cit., p. 175.

16Printed in Wilhelm Windelband, Praeludien, Tuebingen,
1924, Vol. II, pp. 136 ff.

17Heinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissen-
schaft, Tuebingen, 1910, p. 14. Translation: "Two groups of
objects...which are differentiated from one another like body
and soul cannot be found with respect to the classification
of the sciences; for there is nothina, at least in the immed-
iately accessible world, that ought to be withdrawn from an
investigation -_ which has the characteristics of a scientific
one."

18Carl G. Hempel, The Functions of General Laws in His-
tory, in Readings in PhiIOSOphical Analysis, ed. Herbert Feigl
and Wilfrid Sellars, pp. E59- E71.

 

 

 

1992. cit., p. 460.

2Ow. H. Walsh, 92. Cl ., pp. 59 ff.

[0

1 -. cit. p. 66.

m

00
292. cit. , p. 67.

2393. _g_., p. 68.

24Johann Gottfried Herder, Auch eine Philos0phie der
Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit, reprinted in Herders
Saemmtliche Lerke, ed. Bernhard Suphan, Vol. V., Berlin,
1891, pp. 575 593,pp. 503. The first edition appeared in
1774. Translation: "Entire nature of the soul...to feel
it, do not answer in a word, but go into the age; the part of
the world, into all of history, feel yourself into everything

- only thus will you be on the way to understand the word."

 

259p. £13., p. 502. Translation: "He who has realized
how inexpressible a matter the uniqueness of a man is, ..."

26'27Jack Pitt, Nomological Explanation Ln Histor ,
Ideas, Vol. 5., No. 2, January, 1956, pp. 3-15, pp. 9710.
The quotation of Gardiner is said to be taken from: P.
Garginer, The Nature g; Historical Explanation, Oxford, 1952,
p. 75.

28The unintentional employment of universal hypotheses
is treated below p. 37.

291mmanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2nd ed.,

p. 119. Translation from Norman Kemp Smith, A Translation
9; Kent's Critioue p: Pure Reason, New York, 1950: “"Ne can,
however, with regard to these concepts, as with regard to all
knowledge, seek to discover in experience, if not the principle
of their possibility, at least the occasioning causes of their
production. The impressions of the senses supplying the first
stimulus, the whole faculty of knowledge opens out to them,
and experience is brought into existence... Such an in-

estigation of the first strivings of our faculty of knowl-
edge, whereby it advances from particular perceptions to
universal concepts, is undoubtedly of great service."

30Loo. cit., Smith's translation: "But a deduction of
the pure a _priori concepts can never be obtained in this man-
ner; it is not to be looked for in any such direction. For
in view of their subsequent employment...they must be in a
position to show a certificate of birth quite other than that
of descent from experiences. Since this attempted physiolog-
ical derivation concerns a guaestio facti, it cannot strictly
be called deduction; and I shall therefore entitle it the
explanation of the posession of pure knowledge."

.39

31? Ernst Troeltsch, Qp. cit., p. 180. Translation:
"Thus, every historically thinking age must interpret the
conceptual unity of the totality (of events) as including
itself or as directed toward itself."

32Ernst Troeltsch, Was heisst: Wesen des Christentums?
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II, p. 425. Translation: "It is
the purpose of history to understand the presence through
its origins, to give a survey over the attainable comprehen-
sive eXperience of the species or at least of the culture and
the nation, and to thus achieve a historical education of our
thinking, and arrive at measures for the future."

33cf. the beginning of Simmel's Die Problems der
Geschichtsphilosoohie.

34Ernst Troeltsch, Der Historismus, etc., p. 180.
Translation: "With every g priori is connected some risk
and decision, a grasping by a will of a thought which
represents itself as necessary reason. The will thereupon
takes the risk of ordering and Judging experience according
to this thought. It (the thought) receives its final just-
ification through the achievement which is thus born out."

3592. git., p. 75. Translation: "A conseptual unity
of continuous deve10pment can be constructed only from the
vieWpoint of the observer, and this means only for the ex-
tension of the cultural circle which surrounds him and which
forms a unity of actual consequences and results." (Meant
is probably a unity by virtue of common causes or origins.)

36Ernst Troeltsch, Moderne Geschichtsphilosophy,
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II, p. 687. Translation:
"Psychology cannot be the starting point for a logic of
history, but only the epistemological subject and the logi-
cal a priori that is involved in it."

3792..g;§., p. 684 f. Translation: "No part of the
critique of knowledge and consequently none of the philos0phi-
cal concept formation proceeds from the eXperiencable human
and personal subject. They rather proceed from unpersonal
consciousness which is connected with it, but can be con-
ceptually separated. For this consciousness the world once
existed, and will exist after it has died, and we always
assume it tacitly when we speak of the history of the earth
or of the solar system for times when no human being existed.

38Ernst Cassirer, fig Essay 23 Kan, New York (Doubleday)
1953' p0 2220

39Loc. cit.

409p. ci ., p. 224.

9O

4193. cit., p. 236.

42pp. cit., p. 241.

43Heinrich Rickert, Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen
Begriffsbildung, 5th edition, Tuebingen 1929, p. 507. Trans-
lation: that...we have reason to describe a reality indiv-
idualising or historical only if under these animated beings
some can be found who take a stand with regard to the values
that guide the description. Consequently, there are in fact
no historical writings without a real psychichal center."

4492. gi£., p. 744. Translation: "An individual event
can gain universal importance only through the fact that it
is in some way connected with a universal value; therefore,
it will always be values, which ultimately direct the selec-
tion of the essential in history."

45Ernest Nagel, The Logic 2; Historical Analysis, in
Readings in the Ehllaflflnhx Di finianne, ed. Herbert Feigl and
May Brodbeck, New York, 1953, pp. 688-700.

45Anneiiese Maier, Dig Vorlaeufer Galileis is l3.
Jahrhundert, Rome, 1949, p. 65. Translation: "In modern
times one views the mechanical forces exclusively in method-
ical abstraction and is interested only in their mesure...,
while the schoolmen generally included in their considera~
tions, the factual event in its full concreteness. They
considered, for instance, the force with which Socrates
lifts or moves a stone, and they did not disregard modified
minor factors, which are organically or volitionally deter-
mined.

47Richard Rudner, The Scientist gua Scientist Makes
Value Judgments. PhiIOSOphy of Science, Vol. 20, No. 1,
January, 1953, PP- l ff.

 

48Rudolf Carnap, Formal and Factual Science, Feigl and
Erodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of Science, pp. 125—128,
p. 127.

490ttokar Lorenz, Deutschlands Geschichtscuellen ip
Mittelalter, 2 Vols., Berlin, 1876,77.

500tto Neurath, Foundation 2; the Social Sciences,
International EncyclOpedia of Unified Science, Vol. II, No. 1,
p. 9.

51 c t

Loc. 1 .
5222, cit., p. 8.

53hudolf Carna p, Die phvsi Icalische Sprache als
gpiversa sorache der Jissenschait. LInenntnis Vol. II, 1931,
pp: ABE-n05, p. 443} 1rans1atiorz ”All statements of PS}-
chology can be translated into the physical lan Duare. This
includes the singular as well as the : eneral one srthe psy-
chological laws). This is the same as to say that the defin-
itions of all psychological determinations lead back to
physical determinations.

54hudolf Carnap, Lo; ical loundations of the U11ity,p_
dcie ence, leigla nd oella Rea din; s in rhiloSOphicaIM1a1y-

(\n

818, pp. h03“h23, p0 Lh4:b

\)‘1

5Loc. cit.

I

 

 

5% Cf. H. Hermes, latnenut1sC1c Lo ;ik, pt. II, Muenster
1954, p. 169, where 1e1 ere 1ce is made to 1. Goedel, Ueber for-
mal u1cntoc111doer1e-aot ' dor irinc1nia nathe11etica und

 

varwandter oyste1e; atsne fte fuer mathematik und Physik 38,
19,31,131). 1/3- 17K).

57Jilhelm Nindelband, Praeludien, Tuebingen, 1924, Vol.
II, p. 145. The sciences (of expe1ience) search in their in-
vestigation of reality either the general in the form of the
nat11ral law, or the individual in the 1istorica11y determined
"3estalt;” on the one hand they enquire the always permanent
form, on the other hand the unique, in itself determinate con—
tent of events. The former are law-sciences, the latter are
event-sciences,t those teach what always is, these what once

‘I-IIOKS.

 

..—\

SUCD. Cit., p. 149. Tra1s lation: Scientific thinking
is - if it be allo..ed to form neJ artificial exi>re ssions - in
the former case nomethetic c, in the latter idiographic.

9“, - w - \v 1 - -1 o 1 o
hertrand Hussel and Alfred north aniteheao, Prin-
cipia Iathematica, Vol. I., 2nd 3 ., Cambridge, 1925.

 

\n

C\
C)

fhe use ofa bstractive binders is taken frOIn lectures
by Professor Henry e. Leona1d, Lida gan btate University. For
this chapter of. Ernst Cassirer, Substance and Function, Chicago,
(Dover) 1953, esp. Chapter IV, Me tion 4. -

61This state of affairs could pc eihaps be expressed by
saying that the scientist does not only want to d-e scribe suf-
ficient conditions responsible for the occurrence of some
property, but chiefly the necessary conditions.

62.

0f. above, p. 25.

71") r1 7— ‘ *{1'I'
LIrJ. JJutfi-J- :JJiL Cid-J J

Carnap, Rudolf. Formal and Factual Science in Readings in
the Philosogihy oi scie1'1ce, ed. H. Feizl and11.
Brodbeck, new Iork1953, pp. 123 - 12e.

Carnap, Rudolf. Die 1hfs1gclische Sprache als Universalspr ache

der Hiss enschaIt, h1henntnis, Vol. II, 1931.

Carr ap, Rudolf. Lorie al Foundations of the Unityiof Science,
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Cassirer, Ernst. An Essay on Jan, New York, (Doubleday) 1953.

assirer, Ernst. Substance and Function, Chicago, (Dover) 1953.

Collingwood, R. G. r“he Idea of History, ed. T. M. Knox, Oxford

 

 

1946.
Croce, Benedetto. Die Geschichte als Gedanke und als Tat, Bern,
1941+-

He1oec*or, Martin. Sein und Zeit, Tuebingen, 1953.

Hempel, Carl C. The Function of General Laws in History, in
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Herder, Johann Gottfried. Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte
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saemntlicne uerhe, ed. buphan, Vol. V, Harlin 1591,

PP. 475 - 593.

Kant, Immanuel. K1itik der reinen Vernunft, ed. R. Schmidt,
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Liebrich, Hans. Die Historische Wahrheit bei Ernst Troeltsch,
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93

Handelbaum, Maurice. Some Neglected PhilOSOphic Problems
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Hegel, Erne st. The Logic of Historical Analysis in Readings
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Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. A. The Heaning Of Meaning, 3rd.

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Russel, Bertrand, and Hhitehead, Alfred North. Principia
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Rickert, Heinrich. Kulturxissenschaft und Haturwissenschaft,
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1

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am 535 0:, LY

Demco-293

 

 

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