PERFORMANCE CONTROL: A STUDY OF THE CONTROL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

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PERFORMANCE CONTROL: A STUDY OF THE CONTROL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

By

Jackie Lee Gregory

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ABSTRACT

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Purpose

This study is concerned with the control over police officers' performance. The purpose of the study was to identify the component factors that comprised the control process and utilize the component parts to construct a model of the control process itself. To date, no control theory has been formalized; but this study has taken a step in that direction by examining some of the basic factors.

The problem of control over performance is of critical importance to police administrators. During the last ten years, several police agencies have been embarrassed by graft and corruption scandals. The President's Crime Commission and several educators have questioned police methods and practices, all of which points to the issue of police discretion and the control over that discretion.

Methodology

The study was built around an exploratory, descriptive design. The method of data collection was basically a participant-observation technique, which permitted maximum involvement within the one police organization studied. Data

were gathered from the macro level to the micro level. The study started with an examination of the total community and police organization in general and slowly narrowed to focus upon the behavior of the police officer and the detective. All data were gathered and processed into two major and nine minor categories.

The data collection, processing, and analysis were patterned after the sociological method of functional analysis. The guide for the use of functional analysis was Robert K. Merton's paradigm for functional analysis.

Results

Results of the study produced a model of the control process, which contains six component parts: (1) Standards, (2) Constraints, (3) The Communication Process, (4) The Selection Process, (5) The Decision Process, and (6) Performance.

Standards of behavior are created by the formal organization, the informal organizational groups, and the individual. The standards may be consonant or in competition with each other as they are communicated to the individual. If dissonant, the individual selects one of these standards and performs according to that standard. As the individual performs, the decision process begins to operate by monitoring behavior and correcting deviance. Prior to, during, and after performance, the powers of constraints are exerting force

upon all parts of the process. All components can be functional or dysfunctional to the work process, all of which depends upon the standard and perspective used to evaluate performance.

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Presented to

The Faculty of the School

of Criminal Justice

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DEDICATION

To my son, Allen and my daughter, Jacqueline, whose generation will reap the benefits and suffer the failures of this generation; for we are responsible for the future of our criminal justice system.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful for the guidance, insight, and support furnished by the members of my committee. Without their help, some important aspects of this study might have been lost. Further, I am appreciative of the special assistance of my wife, Patricia, whose skills in typing and grammar have enhanced the appearance of tnis thesis.

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CHAPTER I

SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE STUDY

This chapter is concerned basically with a brief introduction to the problem and its relative importance to the police field. The groundwork is laid for understanding the terminology used in the body of the thesis, along with an introduction to the extent and milieu of this study. Finally, the statement of the original hypothesis is made to indicate the assumptions held when the study was initiated.

I. INTRODUCTION

Within the last ten years, several city, county, and state law enforcement agencies have been rocked by graft and corruption scandals. Some agencies have been startled to discover an inability to cope with everyday police problems. During this time, we have seen law enforcement reach such a critical state that the President of the United States saw fit to establish a commission to study the whole criminal justice system.

One of the major problems that keeps coming to the surface is personnel performance control. It appears to be a factor of critical importance, for it has a direct bearing upon efficiency.

The President's Crime Commission touched very lightly

upon performance control. Most texts on management do not explain control, and only one or two authors on police theory have studied control with any depth. Consequently, the idea of a control theory is essentially unexplored.

Several authors have written about control processes in organizations. They have pointed out certain techniques used by management to persuade and/or force employees to perform in an acceptable manner, as defined by organizational standards. Some researchers have studied the police working environment to determine what factors influence behavior. To date, however, there has been no attempt to fit these results together in order to formulate a control theory, to identify the control process, or to identify the component parts of control itself. Control has not been organized into an understandable whole.

The problem in this particular study is to identify the factors that comprise the structure of performance control in order to determine the control process and to develop hypotheses to be tested in later studies.

II. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

The first step toward formulating a control theory is to identify the component parts of personnel performance control. The next step is to construct a model of the control process, using the component parts. If these two steps can be completed, important hypotheses could be made toward a control theory.

If the control process could be identified, it would not only fill a research gap, but it would have practical benefits as well. For the first time, administrators would be able to examine the whole control process as a system. They would be able to see where organizational methods fall short or fulfill control requirements. As it stands now, no one is certain what factors are present when performance is controlled or what factors are lacking when performance is not controlled.

Managerial theory had a similar problem with the communication process before research developed a model similar to the one Davis uses:[1]



(The Communication Process)

If a similar model could be built for performance control, a research gap would be filled.

Discretion in police work is very broad, allowing the police officer considerable leeway. Behavior can range from doing nothing in a particular instance to overacting. With our social system presently in such a state of turmoil, the

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[1]Keith Davis, Human Relations at Work (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967) p. 324.

control of police officers' performance becomes extremely important. The better a police administrator can control performance or understand it, the better decisions can be made toward organizational efficiency. In addition, if the component parts of control can be identified, the definition of control itself and the whole control concept will be sharpened.

III. EXTENT AND MILIEU OF THE STUDY

This study has been conducted within one police agency without the assistance of other researchers. Data in this study has been the result of empirical research conducted in an exploratory-descriptive manner, which is explained fully in Chapter III.

This study was completed during the calendar years, 1969, 1970, and 1971, and is the result of approximately sixteen months of endeavor. The extent of the study has been to examine police personnel performance and the factors causing that performance. No attempt has been made to judge performance standards as to their rightness or wrongness, nor has any attempt been made to analyze methods or techniques of supervision as to their desirability or undesirability. Supervision has been considered only with regard to its effect upon conformance to standards by personnel. The author has been concerned solely with the spectrum of influence over performance.

IV. DEFINITION OF TERMS

Control: Control is a result or consequence, which is measurable, indicating that it has a structure. The measurement appears related to some norm, standard, or generally accepted or desired end. The relationship of activity to that norm or standard is the measurement of control.

The literature appeared to indicate a generally proposed definition of control: THE ACCEPTANCE OF AND CONFORMITY TO A NORM OR STANDARD.

That definition implies that control is a behavioral decision which occurs after the norm or standard is introduced or communicated to a performer; control being measured by the activity of the performer. Control, therefore, takes place after some activity or force (constraint) is effected and before performance. This proposition is logical if control is measured by a degree of conformity to a standard. A zero degree or lack of conformity would indicate that control did not exist; control is only a positive factor represented by conformity.

Standard: A standard is merely a reference point which describes a level of performance behavior. A standard may be a rule established by the formal organization, which defines the quality of performance. A standard might also be a level or quality of performance established by the informal group. A third type of standard is one established by a particular individual, which is exclusive of the standards

of the formal organization and the informal organizational group.

Essentially, a standard is an expected pattern or quality of performance that an officer, the formal organization, or the informal organizational groups have established as a guideline for individual performance. The standards may all be in agreement with each other or they may be dissonant.

Constraint: Constraint will be used to identify any force that acts upon an individual to influence his performance. The constraint may be inherent, natural, or devised by the formal organization, the informal organizational groups, the individual, or the situation. The term, "constraint," may at times be used interchangeably with the word, "influence." Both may be used or expressed as the "force of constraints," or "force of influence."

Constraints include such things as training, direct supervision, group mores, individual physical and mental limitations, threat of punishment, needs, rewards, socialization, internalization, role structure, and role expectations. Constraints may influence both positive as well as negative behavior.

V. HYPOTHESIS

When this study was initiated, it was hypothesized that the function of personnel performance control did exist in police organizations. Consequently, it was assumed that control had a structure consisting of component factors.

It was further assumed that these factors could be observed and identified. If certain significant factors comprising control could be identified, realistic and comprehensive hypotheses could be derived regarding control. In addition, the component factors could be fitted together in order to form a complete control process.

The component factors of control should be the same in all instances. In each situation where performance is controlled, there should be certain factors present which are also present in other controlled situations. On the other hand, in situations where performance is not controlled, one or more of these factors should be absent.

This study was pursued with the hypothesis that standards were an integral and component part of the control process; that the standards were formulated by the formal organization, the informal organizational groups, and the individual; that the standards were communicated to the individual performer; and that the standards were constantly competing with each other. Consequently, the communication process becomes a component part of the control process also.

Both the selection of the standard and the performance are determined by the power of constraints. Therefore, standards, communication, selection, and constraints are all hypothesized to be components of the control process.

The term, "selection," is used in the same context as that used by Simon.

> The term, selection, is used...without any implication of a conscious or deliberate process. It refers simply to the fact that, if the individual follows one particular course of action, there are other courses of action that he thereby foregoes. In many cases, the selection process consists simply of an established reflex action...[2]

Kassoff comes closest to the hypothesis in this study in his assertion that the effective control process has three things:[3]

1. Establishment of standards.
2. A measurement of performance against standards.
3. Correction of deviations from the standard plan, if needed.

In support of the idea that a control process does in fact exist, we find that Voich speaks of the control process as consisting of three broad steps:[4]

1. The development of standards of performance, such as plans and objectives.
2. The measurement and appraisal of performance or feedback.
3. Taking corrective action.

Voich went on to qualify these three steps by saying that the control system must consider the factor of motivation of individuals and groups within the organization.

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[2]Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1965) p. 3.

[3]Norman C. Kassoff, The Police Management System (Washington: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1967) p. 34.

[4]Dan Voich, Jr. and Daniel A. Wren, Principles of Management (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1968) pp. 228-229.

The hypothesis in this study goes beyond Voich's model in order to establish a more viable model.

VI. SUMMARY

This is not a study based upon rigorous statistical analysis of numerical data. Instead, it is an exploratory study of human behavior, designed to discover ideas and insights. This does not make it any less important, however, for human behavior is at the very base of performance control. This study is important because it explores the area of performance in order to discover and define a process yet to be constructed. Although the study is concentrated within one police department, the application of its findings may be pertinent to other police personnel in similar environments. The hypothesis has been formulated from information contained in other studies, which reflected the direction to be pursued. The hypothesis, then, evolved from this information and this researcher's own insight.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Scandals in the past few years, particularly the one in Denver, have prompted research to determine the "why" of graft and corruption. The results have revealed a clearer picture of the kinds of policemen who get into trouble, why, and at what stage of their careers. One survey showed that 23% of all men hired in a seven-year period got into trouble, but some departments were as high as 54%.[5] The Chicago scandal prompted a similar survey in 1963 of that city's graft problem. The records for that year show that out of 309 complaints of bribery, traffic cases were the highest. The survey also revealed that men involved in graft and corruption could be placed into distinct categories. However, the most significant finding was that one group consisted of young men with five to ten years service and previously good records.[6] Still another survey suggested that the men in some departments could be generally classified into three groups, with about 15% of the men beyond corruption regardless

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[5]Richard H. Blum, Police Selection (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1964) p. 111.

[6]Ralph Lee Smith, The Tarnished Badge (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965) p. 211.

of the moral tone of the force and the community. At the other extreme, because of low recruiting standards, about 15% of the men were either corrupt or easily corruptible. The remaining 70% of the men were inclined to adjust to the prevailing attitude of that particular time and place. This seems to indicate that the men in the middle of the spectrum will adjust to the moral tone around them, whether it is one of honesty or dishonesty. These studies and conclusions may or may not be valid but do indicate that behavior patterns change in response to stimuli created by the environment.

Graft and corruption make up only one area of performance control; but from the preceding paragraph, one can see that the need to effectively control the performance of that 70% in the middle is highly important. To date, very little has been learned from these experiences, as illustrated by the recent scandal in the metropolitan police department of Seattle, Washington. These scandals are only examples of overt nonconformance. One has to use little imagination to see what types of other aberrant behavior must go on in police work.

The problem of nonconformance is always present in an organization. However, practical and effective control procedures by an administrator will help eliminate circumstances which breed deviance.

A police administrator may obviously want to assure that his personnel perform in a manner that is acceptable to his expectations. However, he may not know which is the

best way to assure this performance. Research in the past has not identified the control process, nor has it been able to determine the structure of control. Consequently, the administrator places his standards of expected behavior in departmental regulations and makes the regulations available to the men, expecting compliance.

The administrator knows that communication of these standards to the men is important, but he does not know how important, nor how often the communication must be done to become effective. He also knows that inspection is important to see that the work is being done properly. As a result, he sets up devices to examine the reports, records, and activity sheets submitted by the officers. He may also devise a few methods for monitoring behavior. The administrator knows that morale is important, along with salary, working environment, informal organizational groups, management supportive roles, security, and a multitude of other things. However, he is lost in a maze of concepts, words, guidelines and cures. He does not know how many methods may get the correct results, so he tries them all, or some, or none. There is no model, process, or theory available to show the administrator how the control process operates or is structured. If such a model did exist, the administrator would be able to examine his organization to determine the strong and weak points in his method of performance control.

Theoretical Bases of Control

Research, to date, has shed little light upon a control model. The study of control within organizations has been difficult and confusing, because there are various meanings attributed to the word, "control," and various approaches taken to view control activity. As W. E. Alberts, Vice President of United Air Lines stated, "The term 'control' in management control systems is easy to use but hard to define."[7] Simons reinforced Alberts' statement when he wrote, "To name a phenomenon is not to explain it."[8]

There is some variance in the theories on performance control. The basic variance appears to evolve from the application of means to assure that behavior conforms to some pattern. The theories could be viewed as a continuum of thought, with a completely self-controlled activity on the one end, and a completely externally controlled activity on the other end. Some say that control must be contained within structured parameters, such as control devices, while others state that control will evolve naturally from the mere activity of the organization's members as they strive for goal attainment.

Mary Parker Follett believed that the control of behavior was inherently affected by the type of interacting

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[7]D. G. Malcolm and A. J. Rowe (eds.), Management Control Systems (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1960) p. 13.

[8]Herbert A. Simon, The Shape of Automation (New York: Harper & Row, 1965) p. 65.

activity in which members of organizations participated. She used unity or conformity as a measure of control; she implied that the unity of an organization results from the interaction of its members, and is not the sum of its parts: "We never put parts together...we watch parts behaving together, and the way they behave is the whole."[9]

Follett believed that the functional elements within an organization should be structured to attain control, rather than structuring control devices to attain functional integration. She warned managers to prevent the effects of control devices which would create additional and unintended behavior patterns. She contended that the addition of devices that affect the behavior of the parts would also affect the behavior of the whole organization:

> ...the reciprocal activity of the parts changes the parts while it is creating the unity...In every situation, our own activity is part of the cause of activity. We respond to stimuli which we have helped to make.[10]

The internal activity that results in the inherent processes described by Follett was identified by Homans in his microanalysis of social control. Homans concerned himself with the effects of interactions, sentiments, activities, and norms within groups. He believed that the natural reactions of groups to each other and to the environment would be manifested by an integrated pattern he

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[9]H. C. Metcalf (ed.), Dynamic Administration (New York: Harper & Bros., 1940) p. 196.

[10]Ibid., p. 194.

called a "moving equilibrium."[11] According to Homans, the equilibrium results from the control processes that are inherent in groups. He described the problem in group processes as one of integrating interrelationships rather than one of controlling each group:

> The real problem is not how to keep social groups wholly independent and autonomous but how to organize their relations to central control in such a way that they can maintain their own life while contributing to the life of organized society.[12]

The Follett and Homans approaches can be summarized as an inherent system of self-controls; an inherent process of forces working to establish a unity of organization in a state of equilibrium that is dynamic and self-changing. Not all theorists agree with this.

Vroom, for example, believed that the function of control must be directed in order to establish conformity with a rational plan. He explains the need and purpose of control:

> The ability to control the behavior of its members is a prerequisite of a viable organization. To attain its objectives, each organization must determine the functions that have to be performed, allocate these functions to organization members, and establish behavior patterns on the part of its members which lead to the performance of those functions.[13]

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[11] G. C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950) p. 42.

[12] Ibid., p. 467.

[13] W. W. Cooper (ed.), New Perspectives in Organizational Research (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1964) p. 72.

According to Vroom, not only must the structure be functionally organized, but also the behavior patterns must be established. This implies a systematic pattern of checks to assure that the established behavior patterns conform to the desired rational plan of behavior patterns.

Blau's thoughts appeared to combine Homans' and Vroom's:

> Organization involves the coordination of collective effort. Some form of social organization emerges implicitly in collectives as the result of the processes of exchange and competition, in which the patterns of conduct of individuals and groups and the relations between them become adjusted... But other organizations are explicitly established for the purpose of achieving specified objectives... In these formal organizations, special mechanisms exist to effect the coordination of tasks of various members in the pursuit of given objectives. Such coordination of efforts, particularly on a large scale, requires some centralized direction. Power is the resource that makes it possible to direct and coordinate the activities of men.[14]

Albert K. Cohen presupposes deviance from the existing group norm:

> Finally, since responses to deviance are themselves subject to normative regulation, and since normative regulation implies the possibility and indeed the likelihood of deviance, the manifest structure of control itself becomes a major locus of deviance...thus we have travelled full circle and are confronted with the problem of the social control of the agencies of control...who will guard the guardians?[15]

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[14]P. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1964) p. 199.

[15]Albert K. Cohen, Deviance and Control (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1966) p. 40.

II. PRECEPTS FOR MANAGERIAL CONTROL

The traditional managerial concept was that controls must be directed and built into the organization. This is supported by the traditional managerial theorists, as illustrated by the following Koontz and O'Donnell statement:

> The managerial function of control is the measurement and correction of the performance of subordinates in order to make sure that enterprise objectives and the plans devised to attain them are accomplished. It is thus the function whereby every manager, from the president to the foreman, makes sure that what is done will be that which is intended...Or as Goetz puts it, "Managerial planning seeks consistent, integrated and articulate programs," while "management control seeks to compel events to conform to plans."[16]

For the measurement of control, Koontz and O'Donnell supply their traditional precept:

> It can be readily seen that the key to effective control is the establishment of standards, since they furnish the basis against which actual or expected performance is measured...[17]

The Koontz and O'Donnell specific and traditional approach was somewhat modified by Sayles. He emphasized the behavioral aspects in control which limit the applicability of traditional principles of control in organizations. Sayles contends that it is a myth to believe that managers are successful in communicating to subordinates what is expected of them:

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[16] H. Koontz and C. O'Donnell, Principles of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960) p. 545.

[17] Ibid., p. 552.

> In the real world of organization, the subordinate is barraged by stimuli, both positive and negative, and is left with the problem of interpreting their possible meaning.[18]

Sayles further contends that most existing monitoring techniques are merely the products of impulse and expediency, and almost no effort is made to relate the information sought to the organization as an integrated system. According to Sayles, most managers attempt to determine what is going on from the "strange assortment of unrelatable data" they receive. The function of controls, he believes, is to assess the degree to which the organization operates as an organized, reciprocating process. Sayles apparently holds some agreement with the Follett and Homans approach to control:

> ...Controls can be made consistent with the nature of the work and other systems concepts, rather than being something "tacked on" as are most traditional managerial controls.[19]

Sayles prescribed that control should be a system of interrelated activities that operate as self-adjustments, whereby the entire organization is relatively self-controlled. The Koontz and O'Donnell approach prescribed the control of individual parts as the means of obtaining an integrated organization. As in the theoretical description in the previous section, the Sayles and Koontz and O'Donnell statements

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[18] L. Sayles, Managerial Behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) p. 158.

[19] Ibid., p. 166.

each lean toward opposite ends of a conceptual continuum. Some of the other managerial theorists prescribed approaches to the subject that fell somewhere between the ends of the continuum. For example, Blau and Scott write that the central function of management is to design, "in collaboration with a staff of experts," appropriate impersonal controls such as rules, regulations, advance planning, performance, records, recruiting and training, and promotion policies.[20]

Blau and Scott stated that proper selection of personnel, combined with an adequate system of feedback will result in a satisfactory control system; that is, as long as the working parameters are well stated in advance planning (expected behavior) and checked in accordance with prescribed behavior (rules and regulations). This statement tends to emphasize the feedback or results portion of the system; a comparison between behavior and explicitly stated standards, such as rules and regulations.

There is, in the Blau and Scott prescription, an emphasis on rules and regulations. Caplow made some statements about the consequences of emphasizing the use of rules within an organization that is similar to the Cohen statement included in the previous section. Caplow formulated a series of propositions, some of which are pertinent here:

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[20]P. Blau and W. R. Scott, Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962) p. 185.

The following propositions appear to be fairly well established:

1. Rules are ordinarily promulgated by one group to control the behavior of another group in the presence of a conflict of interests.

2. Rules cannot be enforced unless they have been accepted by the subjects.

3. Any set of rules that requires enforcement by outsiders provokes systematic evasion.

4. When rule evasion has been systematized, there will ordinarily be collaborations between those charged with enforcement of the rule and those responsible for its evasion, in an attempt to maintain the status quo.[21]

According to Caplow, the use of rules requires that a corresponding increase in rule enforcement be attained. Those persons or devices concerned with rule enforcement, themselves, become the object of control and thereby increase the need for additional control and rule enforcement. This phenomenon creates a dilemma for management. Management must choose from the various control precepts described in the literature which may best serve their purposes. This decision is not one that can be easily reached on some empirical basis; the variety of precepts available to managers leads to confusion and ambiguity.

The International City Managers' Association seemed to side with Caplow, maintaining that rules which are unreasonable will not be obeyed by subordinates nor enforced by

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[21]T. Caplow, Principles of Organization (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1964) p. 279.

supervisors.[22]

Kassoff agreed with the theory of unreasonable rules, but went on to explain that at the other end of the spectrum was voluntary compliance. Voluntary compliance is usually associated with three factors: Insight, approval, and confidence.[23]

Argyris, on the other hand, was concerned not with voluntary compliance, but with the ill effects of formal measures to control performance. He felt that some organizational control methods were so strict as to cause frustration within the employee. Consequently, the frustration led to increased aggression and a decrease in individual efficiency.[24] This frustration suggests that conflict plays an important part in rule enforcement.

In fact, Leavitt feels that much of supervision is control through conflict:

> ...The threat of discipline to prevent some unwanted behavior is an attempt to introduce conflict into another person's perceptual world...Such control, through conflict, cannot be classed glibly either as good or as bad...Basically then, most subordinates probably see authority in the same way superiors do, as a tool for restricting and controlling their activities. But though they may see the

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[22]International City Managers' Association, Municipal Police Administration, 5th ed. (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1961) p. 191.

[23]Kassoff, op. cit., p. 32.

[24]Chris Argyris, "Organization & Administrative Control," Human Elements of Administration, ed. Harry R. Knudson, Jr. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1963) pp. 268-271.

same thing, they attach different meanings to it.[25]

If control can be viewed as causing conflict, we might expect that the subordinate will establish defenses and evasive mechanisms. Bredemeier and Stephenson indicate that there are five different kinds of social control mechanisms which might be regarded as five different "lines of defense" against deviance:

> The first line of defense is to forestall the strain itself by means of certain mechanisms that prevent potential strain from becoming actual. If this is not done successfully and strain is actually experienced by members of the system, a second line of defense is to drain off or canalize responses to the strain into socially sanctioned patterns of behavior. A third line of defense is a necessary adjunct to the second. It consists of arrangements that make socially disapproved responses either very difficult to express or very costly. In other words, not all strain is avoidable in any social system, but there may still be ways of deterring people from expressing their tensions in deviance and encouraging them to "manage" the tensions in accordance with certain "safety-valve" mechanisms. However, also these do not always work. Hence a fourth line of defense is to remove the deviant from the social system through imprisonment, banishment, "excommunication," or execution. A fifth line of defense sometimes coupled with removal is to resocialize the deviant, for example through psychotherapy. [In the police instance, to retrain][26]

As might be expected, the conflict situation produces informal group bonds. This is why Clinard indicated that for control mechanisms to be effective, they must be

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[25]Harold J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychology, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964) pp. 59-171.

[26]Harry C. Bredemeier and Richard M. Stephenson, The Analysis of Social Systems (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1965) pp. 146-147.

supported by customs, beliefs, ideals, opinions, and attitudes.[27]

Stern, in his study of the Denver Police Department, emphasized the importance of the informal group in police organizations. In fact, the police occupation has an inherent ability to pull its members together into a tight subculture. Members of the subculture are characteristically suspicious of outsiders and strive to gain each other's trust and respect. The informal group is so strong and important as to make "informal controls" significantly stronger than some formal controls.[28]

Johnson identified some of the problems inherent in the police subculture that Stern talked about, and some of the problems in combating it:

> In the police forces where scandals occur, the novice policeman finds himself exposed to an occupational subculture which presses him toward moral corruption. The low salaries paid make it more difficult for police departments to attract enough applicants with moral strength to withstand these temptations. These low salaries also increase the temptation to accept or seek illegitimate outside income...The shortage of competent supervisory personnel handicapped the police agencies involved... The sergeants lacked the time and equipment needed to do a good job and had too many patrolmen to supervise...Top administrative control was lost through outmoded and unreliable record keeping,

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[27]Marshall B. Clinard, Sociology of Deviant Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1966) pp. 148-150.

[28]Mort Stern, "Ex-Policeman Tells What Makes a 'Bad Cop'," Human Elements of Administration, ed. Harry R. Knudson, Jr., (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1963) pp. 96-100.

> deplorable report writing, inadequate communications equipment, and uncoordinated criminal investigation by several subunits of the organization.[29]

Some studies have been made to test and examine various systems of control and control devices. Some of those studies are reviewed in the following section. The studies reviewed were chosen to further demonstrate the ambiguity and dilemma of managers in deciding on how to organize and control their organizational processes.

III. RELATED STUDIES

There have been many studies made of managerial controls. Some were laboratory experiments; others were performed in organizations. Some studied the structure of control; others studied the effects of control devices; some compared informal controls to formal controls; others studied the effects of changes in control systems.

The Churchill, Cooper, and Sainsbury Study

Churchill, Cooper, and Sainsbury performed a laboratory experiment designed to test the effects of audits on the behavior of persons audited. They tested groups of people in business, as well as students. The testing device was a mechanical board designed to record solutions to problems presented to the people tested. Records were kept by the

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[29]Elmer Hubert Johnson, Crime, Correction, and Society (Homeward: The Dorsey Press, 1964) pp. 443-448.

persons tested to indicate the accuracy and quantity of solutions. The variables injected into the testing device were the presence or non-presence of auditors and auditors' comments. Some of their findings were interesting, but inconclusive. For example:

> In general, the experiment indicated that the actual occurrence of an audit per se exerts an effect on the behavior of those audited, even where there is no direct connection between the auditor's findings and the penalty-reward structure. The main direction of this effect appeared to be toward conformance patterns in which the behavior of those who were audited tended to move toward the auditor's criteria.[30]

Their study indicated that behavior patterns tended to change in the direction perceived to be intended by the external control device - the auditors. The implication is that external controls themselves cause behavior patterns and, consequently, have to be controlled to insure that they cause the "proper behavior." The tests also indicated that the combination of audit anticipation, supervisory check, and audit occurrence significantly decreased the number of problems solved correctly. They concluded:

> These results suggest that various kinds of audit mixes may have countervailing tendencies so that nothing is really added and, furthermore, that an "excessive" amount (or combination) of examinations may even be detrimental. Of course, the results of this experiment are only indicative...The possibility must be at least entertained that an injudicious use of control devices may, of itself, give rise to a need for further controls, and so on.[31]

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[30] C. P. Bonini, R. K. Jaedicke, and H. M. Wagner (eds.), Management Controls (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) p. 257.

[31] Ibid.

The Ridgway Study

Ridgway performed a detailed review of reported studies pertaining to the uses of single, multiple, and composite measurements used by managers as control devices. The Ridgway study was primarily a literary review of studies made by other researchers; Ridgway compared the results of other studies by examining the reported consequences of various control or performance measurements. He concluded that, "Quantitative performance measurements - whether single, multiple, or composite - are seen to have undesirable consequences for overall organizational performance."[32] Ridgway also felt that, in large organizations, there is a particular need for further research in this area:

> The complexity of large organizations requires better knowledge of organizational behavior for managers to make best use of the personnel available to them. Even where performance measures are instituted purely for purposes of information, they are probably interpreted as definitions of the important aspects of that job or activity and hence have important implications for the motivation of behavior The motivational and behavioral consequences of performance measurements are inadequately understood. Further research in this ares is necessary for a better understanding of how behavior may be oriented toward optimum accomplishment of the organization's goals.[33]

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[32]V. F. Ridgway, "Dysfunctional Consequences of Performance Measurements," Administrative Science Quarterly 1:2, September, 1956, p. 247.

[33]Ibid.

The Tannenbaum Study

Arnold S. Tannenbaum studied control structures within three organizations. His primary purpose was to determine, "How can we best describe and conceptualize the structure of control in organizations?"[34] Tannenbaum's studies were analyzed in terms of data he obtained through questionnaires and interviews with personnel in various levels of the organization. His study was limited to supervisory practices, which "...did not attempt initially to define the control process in organizational terms nor to integrate this process with the larger pattern of events within the organization."[35]

Tannenbaum's study technique was a graphic presentation of amounts of control perceived by supervisors and subordinates at various hierarchical levels. On a single graph, he presented two structures, "Actual Control," and "Desired Control," (as judged by the rank and file employees). His conclusions were based on the data he received and the "picture" they formed on his graph. The shape of his control curve was intended to illustrate the "distribution of control," "total amount of control," "discrepancies between the 'active' and 'passive' control," "orientation span of control," and "sources span of control."

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[34]A. S. Tannenbaum, "The Concept of Organizational Control," Journal of Social Issues 12:2, 1956, p. 51.

[35]Ibid., p. 52.

The Tannenbaum study is of interest in identifying the structural concepts of control; however, it has not indicated the control structures, but rather the perceived control structures. Further studies will be needed to determine whether there is a difference between actual and perceived control structures.

The Bensman-Gerver Study

The Bensman-Gerver study was a participant observation study of an airplane factory. The purpose of the study was to evaluate the effects of rules and "the social function of crime, particularly violations of private organization law."[36] Their study revolved around the use of a tool that was designed to put holes in parts which had been constructed with the original holes in the wrong place. The use of this tool was against the rules and policies of the organization. The tool was only "needed" when company quality control procedures failed to catch parts that were substandard in production.

Bensman and Gerver found that the use of the tool was condoned in an informal manner (rule enforcement was withheld) for a variety of reasons. When the rules were enforced, the organizational work process was disorganized;

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[36] J. Bensman and I. Gerver, "Crime and Punishment in the Factory: The Function of Deviancy in Maintaining the Social System," American Sociological Review, 28:4 August, 1963, p. 590.

informal work controls tended to organize the process, while formalization of the work controls tended to disorganize the process.

The Dalton Study

Dalton also performed a participant observation study of a factory and observed the effects of external controls on the work process. His study included a review of a special work team that was added to the work process to control the coordination between maintenance and operational work groups. The consequence of this external control device was "the rise and action of new informal groupings that brought new spearheads of departure for the parent organization to deal with."[37] Dalton's conclusion is interesting and pertinent to this study:

> Functional and prestige factors are intertwined in managerial situations. Attempts to separate them by logical schemes developed apart from intimacy with the situations are dangerously analogous to the solution sought by biologists decades ago in trying to check the threat of the fer-de-lance to human life in the Antilles. Without thoroughly studying the Antillean "web of nature," this group of scientists introduced the mongoose, enemy of the cobra in India, to destroy a different snake in a new environment. Unexpectedly, the mongoose found much easier game in the Antillean balance of life and altered the existing web by becoming itself a pest.[38]

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[37] M. Dalton, "Industrial Controls and Personal Relations," Social Forces, XXXIII (March, 1955) p. 248.

[38] Ibid., p. 249.

The Skolnick Study

In Skolnick's study of Westville policemen, he obtained information which indicated that the police occupation has an extremely high form of group solidarity. This solidarity often results in extremely strong group norms and strong informal controls. He discovered that the policeman's attitude itself was often an important constraint upon behavior, particularly when he was called upon to enforce laws that he had ambigious feelings about enforcing. For instance, laws regulating public morality were often inconsistent with the policeman's own beliefs and those of society in general.

Skolnick discovered that it was the policeman's use of authority and his discretion in the use of that authority that made control so important. In the use of discretion by the policeman, it becomes extremely hard to define standards of performance. Since standards are essential to the structure of control, control becomes more nebulous as the standards become harder to define. It was this confusion about standards that bothered the policeman, and Skolnick illustrated the attitude toward these formal controls:

> Indeed, the policeman is directly antagonistic toward euphemisms...he is irritated by most manifestations of what he terms "chicken shit" - an inclusive abstraction encompassing minor organizational rules, legal technicalities, and embellished descriptions.[39]

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[39]Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966) p. 82.

Task Force Report: The Police

The Task Force discovered that administrative policy did not have a very significant influence over the performance of individual officers. The problem could be attributed to two factors:

1. The ambivalent attitude which often accompanies the pronouncement of a policy implementing a decision like Miranda.

2. Competing influences brought to bear by subordinate command staff who are subject to more immediate pressures from the community they serve.[40]

However, the report went further to explain that the success of internal controls over such matters as dress, sleeping on duty, leaving post, etc., depends upon two major factors:

1. The attitude and commitment of the head of the agency to the policies being enforced.

2. The degree to which individual officers and especially supervisory officers have a desire to conform.[41]

The Task Force agreed that the mere formulation of policies will not secure control; but instead, a whole array of systems are needed to enhance control. The systems would set responsibility, design procedures for checking and reporting on performance and establish methods for taking corrective action.

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[40]The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967) p. 28.

[41]Ibid., p. 29.

I. A. C. P. Study

The Professional Standards Division of the I. A. C. P. conducted a study of one department and concluded:

> Our report pointed out that basic responsibility for supervision, inspection, and control lies with the line supervisor and his commander. To minimize this responsibility or to allow it to be ignored is to weaken the very fiber which holds the organization together. Without strong supervision and control, the organization disintegrates into a collection of independent individuals who all happen to be on the same payroll.[42]

The Wilson Study

James Q. Wilson, in his study of several city police departments within New York State, discovered many important factors relating to police performance control. Wilson concluded that there was a propensity for policemen to follow some particular rules:

> The young patrolman is taught "not to stick his neck out" and to "keep his nose clean." Penalties fall on the man who violates departmental procedures or who rushes into difficult situations; survival and security await the man who on procedural matters is "clean" and who on substantive issues "plays it cool."[43]

In fact, Wilson went on to say, rate-busters are frowned upon just as much in police work as in factories. As Wilson put it, "Few men, especially few poorly paid men, want to work harder than they have to."[44]

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[42]Professional Standards Division of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Organizations and Management, Case No. 2 (Washington: I.A.C.P., 1966) pp. 8-9.

[43]James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969) p. 49.

[44]Ibid.

Wilson seems to narrow this point and focus on what seems to be the basis for such a conclusion about rate-busters. He said the police administrator "must deal with the problem of wide discretion being exercised by sub-professionals who work alone (and thus cannot be constrained by profesiional norms) and in situations where, both because the stakes are high and the environment apprehensive or hostile, the potential for conflict and violence is great."[45]

Wilson concluded that the control systems within police organizations are not designed around performance control to solve problems; but are designed to protect the police department against charges that they did nothing.

IV. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature reviewed in this chapter included representative samples of underlying theoretical bases of control, precepts for managerial control, and studies of control. The purpose of the review was to find a general definition of control and to identify some of the components of control as expressed by the authors.

Throughout the literature, the concept of control was presented as the result of some activity or forces that ended in "conformity or unity" or "moving equilibrium" or "rational plan" or "coordination." The managerial precepts were concerned with the "measurement of performance" against

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[45]Ibid., p. 67.

standards, against the self-generated reciprocal work process, or against the explicit prescriptions of rules and regulations.

The studies reviewed indicated the possible effects of self-control as compared to directed control; the possible effects of external controls, or applied measurements.

The literature furnished the definition of terms stated in Chapter I and indicated the direction empirical research should take. From the literature, parameters were developed and insights were gained which made data gathering, processing, and analysis more relative to the hypothesis. In short, the literature reflected what the researcher should look for and what form relative factors would take.

The forces creating control are constraints to behavior; the acceptance of a standard may be temporary, but if a performer conforms to the message conveying the standard, acceptance and control are assumed and performance is thereby controlled. Attempts to create control may fail because of the devices, the message conveying the standard or norm, or the lack of receiving ability or understanding of the performer; it may also fail because of the viewpoint of the measurer of control by the interpretation or acceptance of a particular standard that may be different from that intended by the purported controller. For example, conformance to "group norms" as opposed to "formal standards" indicates that control exists; but that indication is based upon the viewpoint of the measurer. For the measurer of conformity to

"formal standards" there may be no control observed.

Having been defined in the literature as the acceptance of and conformity to a norm or standard, control can further be examined by the structure or form it takes. In order to be measured, it must be observed; in order to be observed, some specific factors must be identified to assure the observer that it is control, in fact, that is being observed and not the constraints to behavior. The literature did not identify those factors clearly, and many questions appeared to be unanswered.

Consequently, the purpose of this study was the search for those factors that would enhance the observability and understanding of control in police organizations. Some questions pertaining to that and other relevant points were left unanswered by the literature:

1. What are some of the component factors that comprise the structure of the managerial control process?
2. How does the observability and viewpoint of the observer affect the existence of control in organizations?
3. What are some of the relationships between inherent social controls and the controls directed by management?
4. What do managerial controls control, and what are their effects?

5. What expectations of subordinates' behavior should management hold?
6. What are the relationships between organizational objectives and organizational control processes?
7. What are some of the material and nonmaterial costs of controls?

CHAPTER III

METHOD OF STUDY

The purpose of this study, to identify factors that comprised the structure of control within the police department studied, was fulfilled by collecting data through participant observation and analyzing the data by the functional analysis method. Because the factors comprising control structures within the organization were unknown at the start of this study, it was necessary that data collection and data processing take place simultaneously. This meant that as data were collected, they were evaluated for pertinence and processed into one of the predetermined categories from which the control factors eventually evolved. After all data were collected, final processing and analysis were accomplished.

I. METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The method of collecting data was basically a participant observation technique. Since the specific data sought in the study could not have been identified prior to actual interaction between the researcher and the situation to be studied, a technique that permitted maximum involvement within the situation was necessary. Participant observation, supplemented by semi-directive interviews and

analysis of records was believed to be the method that would permit maximum involvement by the researcher.

Data were accumulated by observing available documents, activities, and the type of functions. From these observations, systems of constraints were traced and outlined, and patterns of interacting systems were drawn.

Data were originally identified from interviews of the semi-directive type, in which an outline of specific questions (Appendix A) was used as an initial approach; and other questions were asked as new leads developed from the interviews.

Prior to each interview, notes were made of the person's name, job description, number of years with the department, and background. During the interview, notes were not taken in order to avoid formality and to develop a conversational type of discussion. A summary of each interview was written in private as soon after the interview as was practicable.

The data collected from the interviews were recorded in notes and informal drawings of the organizational structure, functional relationships, and work-flow patterns. These data were used to determine what performance activities to observe. Performance activities were then observed and notes were recorded on the Incident Recording Sheet (Appendix B).

Notes of observations and results of interviews were recorded and filed by subject, name, and date. These notes

and reports were not included in this thesis; only the pertinent information contained therein was used. The results reported in the following chapters were derived from those notes and charts.

Functional relationships and work-flow patterns were identified from interviews, observations, and the tracing of documents and report flows within the department. These were drawn in informal notes and were used to support the results and analyses recorded in the following chapters.

The point of reference for the collection of data was the desire to obtain data pertaining to control in the organization. The interview schedule, the incident recording sheet, and other observations were used to collect the data. The only specific guideline used was the pertinence of available data or observable events to control. Therefore, as data were collected, they were evaluated; if it appeared that they would have some bearing on a description of activity that pertained to the relationship between behavior and standards, they were recorded. Consequently, the data collected resulted in a relatively detailed description of the departmental activity and internal behavior.

II. METHOD OF DATA PROCESSING

The data collected, consisting of observations, notes made of interviews, and informal charts of work relationships and work patterns, were processed into two general categories:

The Organization and Community, and Performance. The first category was further broken down into three sub-categories: Major Objectives and Plans, Internal Design, and Allocation of Work. The reason for the use of those categories in this study was to enable the researcher to observe and identify activity and behavior within various classifications of organizational operations.

The performance category proved to be the most difficult. From the literature reviewed in Chapter II, it was apparent that control could be observed by identifying the forces that constrained behavior (formal devices, informal pressures, etc.). If control is defined as the acceptance of and conformity to a standard, then the first step in observing control would be the identification of a standard and the forces or constraints that attempt to direct behavior toward that standard. The second step would be, then, to observe and classify behavior in relation to the particular standard. That method, however, would result in an evaluation of the degree of control (behavior v. standards).

This study was not designed to evaluate the degree of control in the organization; it was designed to identify the factors that comprised the structure of control. Consequently, the order of approach was reversed. The first step taken was the observation of behavior and collection of data; secondly, the data were processed into six sub-categories and analyzed as described in the next section. The six sub-categories were selected to permit the use of a

simultaneous collection and processing technique that enabled the researcher to limit the amount and kind of data needed. The total activity of personnel performance was included in six sub-categories:

Input: The situation, incident, or task presented to the personnel for solving or for completion; the kind of personnel recruited, the economic resources available, and the physical facilities.

Output: The effects upon citizens, the production of the organization in the form of arrests and community relations, the performer, other personnel, the organization, other services, and the community. This also includes any pertinent consequences of an activity.

Structure: The formal authority, power, communication, job contact, and informal social relationships of the work setting.

Attitudes: The values, norms, and perceptions of the personnel and the propensity of the organization.

Activities: Formal role expectations, collective activities, and administrative devices.

Behavior: The pattern of performance and the reasons for the pattern.

The method of processing performance data, therefore, was by recording information from the Incident Recording Sheet (Appendix B) and pertinent data from category I (The Organization and the Community) into a detailed description

of personnel performance behavior. By classifying all observed behavior and activity into the six sub-categories, the identification of the forces or constraints upon behavior was made easier. The two general categories and their sub-categories moved from the general to the specific and channeled the data into workable forms; from the total community to the organization, its objectives, plans, formal structure (design), to the allocation of work, to performance. Thus, activity was observed and classified from a macro level (the total organization) to the micro level (the work tasks).

Since the ultimate step in performing the research for this study would be observation and classification of behavior, it was first necessary to identify the types of behavior that would be observed.

At the onset of this study, the specific data to be obtained were unknown. What was known was the fact that behavior and activity did exist in the organization. By observing as much behavior as possible, and by using the categories described above, the data collected were classified into meaningful categories. As a result of the observations and the replies to interviews, the data collected were classified into the different categories. At the same time, whenever possible, notes were made as to why the observed behavior conformed to the pattern it did, e.g., by asking interviewees why they performed in a particular

manner. The total organizational and informal group behavior, therefore, was developed into usable categories.

III. METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

The data for this study were collected to enable the researcher to review patterns of behavior and activity. The purpose of gathering and classifying data was to facilitate an analysis that would result in a description of the factors that comprised the structure of control within this department, and in turn, interpretation of the results for a wider application to include police personnel in all police departments. As stated in Chapter I, the component factors of control should be the same in all instances.

The objective of this study was to identify some factors that comprised a managerial control structure. The working means for attaining that objective were the observations of the patterns of behavior that existed in the department. Since the relative importance of any one pattern could not be predetermined, the data collected had to be broad. It followed, that since the data collected covered a broad area of organizational activity, it had to be classified into certain workable categories. Once the data were collected and categorized, a relatively detailed description of the department's activity was ready for analysis.

What remained to be answered was the type and purpose of the analysis. The purpose was to identify the constraints that forced behavior to appear as it did and to identify the

processes that worked in conjunction with the constraints that would comprise the structure of control.

Having decided upon the purpose of the analysis, the type of analysis was determined. Functional analysis, as used in sociological technique, was determined to be a satisfactory technique for attaining the purpose of the study. The guide for the use of functional analysis was Merton's paradigm for functional analysis.[46] The reason for selecting and using functional analysis was the consideration that this study was a search for control factors and not a definitive study of predetermined factors. The data collected and processed were obtained in whatever manner or form practicable during the study. The data were voluminous, as expected, and the classification into categories described above served the purpose of organization, not analysis. A clue to the type of data needed came from the literature review.

The results of the literature review indicated that the structural factors of control were not clearly stated. What appeared to be most readily observable was the existence of constraints upon behavior. The use of functional analysis was determined to be the best method of understanding the function of constraints and their relationship to the structural factors of control.

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[46]Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Chicago: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1949) pp. 50-68.

In sociology, functional analysis is an examination of the consequences of certain actions. In Merton's terms, his paradigm "presents the hard core of concept, procedure and inference in functional analysis."[47] The paradigm suggests certain techniques and guides to the analysis of patterns of behavior. An analysis of this type "calls for a concrete and detailed account of the mechanisms which operate to perform a designated function..."[48] By analyzing existing behavior and activity patterns through a review of consequences, the "concepts of functional alternatives" and a "range of possible variation" may be determined. "It unfreezes the identity of the existent and the inevitable."[49]

Merton's paradigm suggested five considerations that were used in analyzing the data collected and processed. First, it suggested the location of participants in the structure, including the location of the structure in its environment. This was used to gather data pertaining to the community and department.

Secondly, it suggested the type of data to be analyzed. From the literature review, the type of data deemed necessary for analysis in this study pertained to the constraints upon behavior, since these appeared to be the most observable

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[47] Ibid., p. 50.

[48] Ibid., p. 52.

[49] Ibid.

mechanisms in managerial control. These were derived from data pertaining to plans, allocation of work, standards and measurements, and human behavior.

Third, having accumulated and processed all of the data, the meanings (cognitive elements) of the data were determined. Since the prime focus of the study was the identification of constraints from the observation of behavior and activity, the meaning of each constraint was determined from an analysis of existing behavior patterns.

The existing behavior patterns represented the effects of constraints that previously had influenced that behavior to conform to the existing pattern. The cognitive elements contained in the existing behavior patterns were not only clues to the constraints, but were also clues to other control factors; those cognitive elements had to be clarified. To clarify the cognitive elements required not only a detailed description of the behavior patterns and an understanding of the constraints therein, but it also required an understanding of the relationship between constraints and behavior.

To accomplish a detailed analysis under the technique of functional analysis, therefore, required a detailed analysis of behavior patterns and the constraints therein. To understand the cognitive elements of the constraints, Merton's fourth consideration was used.

The fourth consideration suggested by the paradigm was the function, or part, being played by each constraint and

inherent factors associated with constraints. From the detailed description of constraints, each constraint identified was analyzed to determine its function in the behavior pattern that resulted. Such questions as, "what forced behavior to act as it did?" and "toward which standard was the constraint forcing behavior?" helped the researcher identify the function of the constraints identified.

The answers to those questions also helped the researcher identify factors or cognitive elements that appeared to be consistent in the answers. It was the consistently appearing factors in conjunction with constraints that were sought as the factors that composed the structure of control. The constraint was the key to the structure of control; the constraint was a device to force behavior toward a standard; therefore, the way the constraint operated, the factors or variables that appeared previously and from the time the constraint started to influence a performer until the performer acted, would be the factors of control. The analysis, up to this point, went from observed behavior, to the constraint that caused behavior, to the function of that constraint, and finally, to the variables between the constraint and the start of the performance. The analysis was completed when the fifth consideration was applied.

Merton's fifth suggestion was of paramount importance to the analysis. The paradigm suggested that once the participants are located in the pertinent environment, the type of data required is known, the description of the data

recorded and detailed, and the function of the pertinent data understood, then data must be reexamined. That re-examination is made to identify the regularity of behavior or behavioral factors that are not explicitly recognized by participants but which are associated with central patterns of behavior and reasons for behavioral regularity.

For example, participants may be aware that their behavior conforms to a certain pattern or some explicit standard. They may not, however, be aware that behavior conforms to a pattern because of pressures and standards not recognized. Performance may conform to an explicit rule based upon a specific standard. Performance may have conformed to that explicit rule and standard because of pressure from the work group in order to keep the number of discrepancies in their work from the eyes of inspectors examining compliance with rules. Performance would be controlled not by the standard (explicit rule) but by a behavioral factor (group pressure).

The factors that really act to influence the decision of a performer may not be the explicit constraints; the factors may be implied and not necessarily explicitly recognized. Through the reexamination of those data collected and processed, the factors closest to the performer's decisions to act were identified. The last consideration especially points out the possibility of unintended consequences of behavior or actions.

These five considerations in analyzing the data collected and processed formed the basis of the analysis.

The first step was to gather data; this was a description of all activity observed. Secondly, the data were classified into the different categories which comprised the description in Chapter IV. Those data which appeared to indicate constraints to behavior were specifically identified. They were compared to the behavior of personnel in the organization, using the five considerations of functional analysis above, to determine the existence of consistent factors that affected all behavior. Any factors which influenced behavior by forcing or preventing activity were considered constraints. These were identified during the collection and processing procedures of this study and represent the results of this study.

Those constraints were likewise analyzed for consistent sub-factors and for the specific functions of the constraints. The results of this analysis form the bases for the conclusions in Chapter V.

IV. SUMMARY

A study performed in this manner is significantly dependent upon the personal ability of the researcher. The results presented in the next chapter are those perceived by the researcher to have existed. The conclusions drawn from those results are limited by the researcher's ability to identify significant factors contained in the mass of perceptions and observations.

Although the previous statement indicates some of the limitations to this type of study, the analysis was enhanced by the personal involvement of the researcher. Such conditions and events as facial expressions, informal remarks, observations of personal interactions, dress, and other inflections helped the researcher in placing replies and observations in a broader and perhaps more realistic perspective.

By becoming part of the working milieu, it was possible to discover and interpret facts in ways not possible by an outsider. By becoming acquainted with the situation in this way, it was easier to judge the situations and the actors in a more true and natural light. This had its disadvantages, however, for it was possible for the researcher to interpret actions with a bias. Therefore, extra precautions were taken to avoid this. It is sufficient to emphasize that no conscious effort was made to misrepresent the facts, and any error was due to unintentional mistake.

This study was not based upon precise, numerical data of sufficient nature to permit rigorous analysis. Instead, it was a study conducted in an exploratory nature, whereby judgement of values had to be made.

In order to avoid any undue criticism directed toward the department studied, a ficticious name is used to identify the jurisdiction of the police department: Zanja County. The facts derived from this study are far more important than the identity of the department studied; and

to identify the particular department would serve no scientific end - only curiosity.

CHAPTER IV

OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSES

The results of this study, derived from the use of the methods described previously, are included in this chapter. They describe the organizational behavior and activity observed. The information contained herein is the result of an in-depth examination of the whole police organization. All command and staff personnel were interviewed. A complete survey was conducted of the department's records system and reporting procedure. The complete history of the organization was examined. Fifty line personnel were interviewed informally and their work observed and analyzed. All detective personnel in one district were observed. Five walking beats and three radio car beats were studied. The work habits and techniques of twelve, first-line patrol supervisors were studied. In addition to these specific inquiries, the relationships and interactions of all positions and personnel were examined, in the formal as well as the informal organization. The observations in this chapter are divided into two parts: The Organization and Community, and Performance.

I. THE ORGANIZATION AND COMMUNITY

The community is industrial, with most of its income derived from shipping. It has the normal amount of shops,

stores, gas stations, taxis, busses, theaters, and other commercial establishments that one would expect to find. There are eight military reservations in the county, fourteen towns, two hospitals, one mental health hospital, twenty-five schools, two colleges (one university and one community college), two seaports, and two airports. The total population is presently about 50,000 for the entire county, including military reservations; the population is strewn throughout a rectangular-shaped area covering about 600 square miles. Almost all employable people in the county are employed, so there are no slums.

The community population consists of three major categories:*

1.	Typical white citizens with mixed European backgrounds.	50%
2.	Black citizens.	35%
3.	Spanish-speaking citizens of Latin ancestry.	15%

While a small percentage of the Blacks have been assimilated into the white community, the majority still remain concentrated in four towns; whereas, the Spanish-speaking citizens have been fully assimilated into the white community.

There is evidence of disparity in wages and jobs in Zanja County. In 1965, white citizens made up about 36%

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*No figures were available for these percentages; those given here are only a careful estimate by the researcher.

of the work force and took home 57% of the wages; while minority groups made up 64% of the work force and earned only 43% of the wages. However, in the last five years, government leaders have made genuine progress toward correcting this deficit. Training programs have been established for minority groups; and more jobs have opened up in the trade and craft unions, as well as jobs in other blue and white collar positions.

Racial and community conflict are almost non-existent in Zanja County. Unlike some parts of the United States, there have been no race riots within the county during the past ten years. There have been a few isolated incidents of racial conflict, but they have never reached a participation number exceeding thirty individuals. The Black Panther Party does exist in the county, but very few members of the community participate.

The lack of community conflict could be attributed to the high standard of living and the lack of slums. This is further pointed out by crime statistics. Roughly 96% of all persons serving sentences for serious crimes committed in the county are not residents of Zanja County. However, the juvenile crime problem is another story altogether: 60% of all juveniles handled by the police in 1970 were residents of the county.

There are two cities located just outside Zanja County right next to the county boundary. These two cities bear all

the trademarks of a large city, such as slums, crime, riots, congestion, and unemployment; and the majority of suspects in the crimes committed in the county are residents of these two cities. The largest of the two has a population of about 435,000 and is located near the southern part of Zanja County. It will be referred to throughout this study as La Ciudad. There are two languages spoken throughout La Ciudad and Zanja County; Spanish and English.

This study concentrated on the southern part of the county where the majority of police activity occurred (consistently 75% of the crime). Located in the southern district are both colleges, most of the schools, one seaport, the largest hospital, most of the military reservations, most of the population, and the largest town; and on the border, La Ciudad.

The Zanja County Police Department is the only police organization within the county. There are no individual town departments or town marshals. There are, however, armed forces police operating on military reservations and private security guards within the county.

The county government was not formed until 1904. However, police activity can be traced as far back as 1855, when an ex-Texas Ranger and forty armed guards were hired by the railroad for protection against bandits. This type of private law enforcement continued in conjunction with Federal troops until a local police organization was formed in 1905.

At that time, the department consisted of one lieutenant, two sergeants, and 72 policemen. A career military man was appointed as the first chief, and this practice continued until 1917.

In 1908, personnel served in police stations in 25 different towns and labor camps. In 1910, a reorganization of the department provided for four police districts containing nineteen police stations. In 1914, the department merged with the fire department to make one public safety organization. At the same time, the districts were reduced from four to two; the southern district, consisting of a central station and six substations, and the northern district with a central station and six substations.

In 1917, the first person without a military background and to come from the ranks was appointed as chief of police. In 1950, the police and fire departments were separated, and the police department remained divided into two districts. The next twenty years brought few significant changes; the department grew, changed, and expanded, adding new sections to handle special problems, such as detectives, identification, narcotics, and juvenile.

Zanja County was shaped and moulded by twelve different chiefs over a period of 68 years. Table 1 shows the length of tenure for the different chief administrators.

Table 1

Tenure of Chief Administrators

Date Appointed	Tenure as Chief
May 1904	5 years
May 1909	1 year
Feb. 1910	2 years
July 1912	3 years
Feb. 1915	2 years
July 1917	26 years*
July 1943	7 years*
July 1950	5 years*
Aug. 1955	2 years*
Oct. 1957	4 years*
May 1961	7 years*
Aug. 1968	Incumbent*

*Appointed from the ranks

Information taken from the police deparment's annual reports, covering a ten-year period from 1961 through 1970, revealed some interesting characteristics. The total complement of personnel had been fluctuating around 200-250 men between 1961 and 1963. Then in 1964, a major riot erupted in La Ciudad on the county boundary line, and some activity spread into the county. The riot started in a slum section of La Ciudad as a result of a precipitating event, originating in Zanja County. Following the riot,

the department began to rapidly recruit more personnel, until their strength reached nearly 350 men, (Table 2). Most of the new police recruits came from minority groups, which gave the department a composite more in agreement with the surrounding community. Eventually, minority group members made up about 20% of all sworn officers. All of the jail guards were minority group members.

Hiring and termination trends during the period from 1961 to 1963 seemed to balance out, making personnel strength relatively stable. However, with the rush to increase departmental strength came terminations; as the hiring rate increased, so did the resignation rate.

The data contained in Table 2 and Table 3 are in the same form as they were recorded in the annual reports, including the identical categories used by the department. There was no data breakdown for police officers only. In spite of this, some assumptions can be made for the ten-year period studied.

From 1961 to 1970, 268 new police recruits were hired; only three failed to qualify during probation. During the same period, 33 personnel either resigned while under investigation or were removed for cause. Police officers are the only personnel that fall into the category, "probation," so it is safe to assume that police officers made up most of those classified as "removed for cause," or "resigned while under investigation." Of all police department personnel,

Table 2

Hiring and Termination Trends

Personnel	Year									
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Total Complement.....	216	223	220	342	341	333	318	308	301	323
Policemen Hired.....	11	15	15	32	96	23	17	28	9	22
Terminations.....										
Police Officers.....	13	15	14	26	31	22	20	28	16	26
Clerks.....	1	1	2	2	6	5	6	2	3	6
Jail Guards.....	0	4	2	3	5	15	2	1	0	0
Crosswalk Guards....	0	0	2	6	9	9	7	5	7	5
Detectives.....	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
Matrons.....	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Dispatchers.....	0	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	0	0
Total Terminations....	14	21	20	37	53	53	38	38	27	38

Table 3

Reasons For Termination

Reasons	Year									
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Failed to qualify during probation.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
Removal for cause.....	0	3	1	4	0	0	0	0	2	4
Resigned under investigation.....	2	0	0	0	7	1	3	3	3	0
Voluntary retirement....	5	6	5	8	7	9	5	8	4	8
Disability retirement...	0	0	3	4	1	0	1	1	2	2
Resignation.....	5	8	4	14	17	17	23	16	13	16
Transferred.....	1	3	6	7	20	25	5	10	0	6
Death.....	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
Drafted.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Total.....	14	21	20	37	53	53	38	38	27	38

including officers and civilians, 339 persons left the organization during a ten-year period; and only 79 of these qualified for retirement. Most of those leaving fell into two categories; resigned or transferred (transferred meaning to take a job in another branch of the county government).

The annual reports provided still more revealing information about the police department (Table 4). The budget over the past ten years had increased 2.8 million dollars, mainly in the form of salary increases. In contrast, better salaries and more men had little effect upon crime. Stolen property was 200% higher in 1970 than it had been in 1961, with the greatest increases after 1964. The property recovered by police reached a ten-year high in 1966 (54%), but from there decreased steadily to a ten-year low in 1970 (28.4%).

Police investigations increased to a ten-year high in 1967 (10,145), but steadily declined until in 1970, they were almost as low as they had been in 1961. As indicated above, however, property recovered was at its lowest and property stolen was at its highest during this period. Arrests in 1961 were 1,276; during the next nine years they fluctuated, increasing as much as 17% and decreasing as low as 11%.

The police issued only 18% more traffic citations in 1970 than they did in 1961, while traffic accidents increased 91%, and vehicle registrations increased 70% during the same period. The seriousness of those accidents increased also, with injuries increasing 62% and resulting deaths tripled.

Table 4

Departmental Activities

Item	Year									
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Budget (Mil.)	$ 1.9	2.0	2.2	2.5	3.0	3.3	3.7	4.0	4.2	4.7
Property: stolen	$111,202	108,104	128,168	151,064	169,154	203,153	227,500	191,754	335,388	340,983
recovered	% 39	41	31	46.4	33.6	54.9	40.4	37.5	31	28.4
Investigations	7,531	7,483	7,645	*	*	4,489	10,145	8,553	9,843	7,637
Arrests	1,276	1,443	1,133	1,304	1,407	1,215	1,423	1,471	1,492	1,431
Traffic: violations	4,024	3,455	3,829	3,800	4,862	4,911	5,318	4,905	4,249	4,752
non-moving	*	*	*	*	*	1,523	1,775	1,926	1,789	*
warnings	5,947	5,736	4,801	6,100	9,376	9,354	10,552	10,678	10,420	8,690
accidents	751	851	828	981	1,086	986	1,057	1,260	1,270	1,442
injured	180	196	210	235	236	264	292	262	307	299
killed	6	9	10	13	7	12	10	9	16	17
Juvenile: arrests	522	446	409	409	408	425	455	446	418	434
court	40	32	43	25	32	35	45	58	61	71
no court	482	414	366	383	376	391	411	388	357	363
Commendations: by department	61	24	57	24	49	107	80	93	100	178
from citizens	64	31	43	36	31	28	59	54	53	148
Complaints from citizens	3	4	5	6	10	20	*	15	12	31

* Not reported

However, it appears that the police personnel have an increasing tendency to issue warning tickets rather than citations:

	1961	1969
Citations	4,024	4,249
Warnings	5,947	10,420

Juvenile arrests decreased in 1962, and then stabilized around 400-450 per year. The police continued to deal with juvenile problems on an informal basis, sending very few to court. However, during the last three years, more and more juvenile arrests have been disposed of in court.

The police themselves, at least as reflected by the annual reports, seemed to get along fairly well with the public. Several commendations were received from citizens each year, and many personnel were commended each year by the department itself.

At the other end of the spectrum, complaints against policemen from citizens increased steadily during the ten-year period. In fact, during 1961 through 1964, complaints stayed between three and six, but with the increase in personnel as a result of the 1964 manpower buildup, complaints increased 600% during a six-year period.

Table 5 shows the success rate experienced by the department in clearing Part I offenses. The department was able to solve nearly all its murder and manslaughter cases,

Table 5

Percent of Part I Offenses Cleared by Arrest

Crimes	Year									
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Murder.....	+	100	+	100	50	100	100	100	100	100
Manslaughter.....	100	100	100	100	100	100	+	100	+	100
Rape.....	100	100	100	66	100	33	100	+	100	66
Robbery.....	40	25	17	11	15	11	28	11	0	8
Aggravated Assault..	100	87	100	58	100	80	100	100	77	83
Burglary.....	23	34	54	19	19	30	21	30	15	20
Grand Larceny.....	20	20	15	3	14	13	9	12	6	11
Petit Larceny.....	23	31	21	28	26	20	23	21	30	16
Auto Theft.....	60	13	48	51	38	32	23	12	10	25

+ No offenses occurred in this category.

and rapes were solved with almost the same amount of success. However, the success rate for robbery reached a ten-year low in 1969 (0%) and in 1970 (8%). Most aggravated assault cases were solved, most of the time.

In 1963, the department reached a spectacular success rate by solving 54% of its burglaries by arrests, but the remainder of the years hovered around 15% to 20%. Grand larceny cases seemed to be solved more by accident than by design, with lows of 3% for 1964 and 6% for 1969. For the last five years, however, success was not as good as it had been. Consistently, petit larcenies were solved at the rate of about 20% each year. Overall, auto theft arrests appeared to decline during the last three years.

During this same ten-year period, several Part I crimes increased; but a few remained stable, as shown in Table 6. Murder remained about the same, fluctuating between zero and four; manslaughter stayed between zero and three. About ten rapes occurred each year, except for 1963, which had two; 1967, which had four; and 1968, which had one. Robberies occurred at the rate of about twenty each year, with the exception of three high years; 1966 had 31, 1967 had 39, and 1968 had 30. Aggravated assaults occurred at the rate of about ten each year, until 1965, when they began to decline. In 1969, they were back up to a ten-year high.

Burglaries stayed consistently around 400 each year, but auto thefts have been increasing steadily since 1964 and have almost doubled since the earlier years.

Table 6

Part I Offenses 1961-1970

Crimes	Year									
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Murder.....	0	1	0	3	2	1	4	2	1	2
Manslaughter.....	2	2	1	3	1	1	0	1	0	2
Rape.....	8	7	2	8	8	10	4	1	12	6
Robbery.....	14	28	27	19	20	31	39	30	19	23
Aggravated Assault.....	10	8	10	12	7	6	4	3	15	12
Burglary.....	406	436	436	438	376	442	386	367	426	423
Grand Larceny.....	180	154	169	144	212	308	290	325	330	201
Petit Larceny.....	914	898	837	884	977	951	1024	1016	1046	996
Auto Theft.....	32	18	24	36	35	58	67	55	64	60
Total.....	1566	1552	1506	1547	1638	1808	1818	1800	1913	1725*

* The department personnel were observed in the process of compiling data for these categories for the annual report. Due to the many changes in personnel, the persons compiling the data were inexperienced and unsure as to how to do the report. There is serious doubt that these figures are correct.

Grand larcenies were occurring at about 150 per year from 1961 to 1964, but in 1965 they jumped to over 200 and eventually climbed and remained stable at about 300 over the next four years. In 1970, however, they were knocked back down to 200. Petit larcenies did not change a great deal, with about 900 to 1,000 occurring each year.

Major Objective and Plans

As any police organization might be expected to have a generally defined goal, so did this one. The objective did not differ any great deal from that of any other police organization. As outlined in the departmental rules and regulations, the goal of the organization was stated as such:

> The primary purpose of the police is to preserve public peace and order, to protect life and property, and to prevent crime. More specifically, it is the duty of the police to:
>
> a. Promote the observance of all laws having effect in Zanja County.
>
> b. Prevent crime, pursue and apprehend offenders, and obtain legal evidence necessary to the prosecution in the courts.
>
> c. Escort prisoners awaiting trial to places of trial and convicted persons to places of their adjudged imprisonment.
>
> d. Hold in custody defendants awaiting trial who are not lawfully released prior to trial, and all convicted persons undergoing sentences imposed by the courts (where applicable).
>
> e. Execute lawful orders of courts, judges, and magistrates of Zanja County.
>
> f. Perform such other lawful duties as may be assigned by the Zanja County Government.

It must be clarified that the above statement indicates only the formal objectives of the organization. In reviewing the history of the organization, it was determined that the above stated objectives were established several years before the present chief of police was appointed. However, over the years, the organization was observed to pursue several different short-term or sub-objectives. Emphasis was placed upon various objectives by different district commanders and chiefs of police. Each chief of police interpreted these objectives differently and placed emphasis upon different aspects.

There are certain restraints upon the chief's discretion, so he may only decide objectives and goals within a prescribed framework. If one were to question each administrator when he was chief of police as to what his objectives were, he would most likely state the formal goals of the organization as outlined in the rules and regulations. The objectives of the organization would then have to be stated in terms of the above formal statement.

Having an objective, nebulous though it may be, the department sought to pursue that objective, or <u>those</u> objectives, in different ways. The objectives were pursued by several methods, such as allocation of work, specialization, and planning. Major plans initiated by the department influenced to a great degree the type of activity created by the department and the penumbras that emanated from that

activity. Some of the more important plans discussed in the following paragraphs are personnel entrance and promotional plans, salary and retirement plans, and training plans.

Entrance requirements for police applicants were not too difficult. The requirements consisted of a written examination, a medical examination, and a background investigation. The written exam was fairly easy, and few persons failed to pass it. Having passed, applicants were placed on a civil service register.

The medical examination probably eliminated more persons than did the written examination. Medical standards were extremely rigid to protect against work loss due to illness and other physical problems. Height and weight standards were very strict; the minimum height was 5' 9" and the maximum height was 6' 4". Minimum weight was 150 pounds, with a physique to conform proportionately to predetermined standards. Applicants who were overweight were never hired. Sight requirements were 20/20 uncorrected. No one who wore glasses was admitted as a recruit.

Applicants reaching the third phase with a relatively high written score were almost assured a job. The background check was cursory, and included an FBI check and a few written inquiries. Persons with minor juvenile records were hired occasionally; but generally, if a criminal record was discovered, the applicant was rejected. Hiring was controlled to a great extent by a central personnel agency.

The department had very little to say about the testing or the ultimate list of eligibles. It could, however, reject an applicant on the list of eligibles for just cause. The same personnel agency controlled all firing of department personnel, and the department's role was only to recommend and present the facts.

Once hired, personnel received medical and life insurance benefits and came under a retirement plan which provided retirement at age 50, with at least 20 years service. Personnel also earned vacation time at the rate of 12.5 hours every two weeks, or 320 hours each year.

Before going on the street to work, the recruit goes through a six-week training period, which is discussed in this section.

Personnel become eligible for appointment to detective or police technician after only one year of service. After three years service, personnel become eligible to compete for sergeant in a competitive examination.

A written examination is given to the aspirants to sergeant. If an officer passes the written examination with a grade of 70% or better, he enters a second phase. In the second phase, all personnel who passed the written examination are rated on their performance by their superiors and placed in ranking order. The combination of these two techniques produces a sergeant's list.

After being promoted to sergeant, the individual must

wait two more years before competing for lieutenant, at which time he goes through the same procedure as he did for sergeant. In the meantime, he may be appointed to detective sergeant or to a staff position.

Having attained the rank of lieutenant, the individual may be appointed to any staff or detective position, but he must wait one year before becoming eligible for appointment to captain. All other positions are by appointment, including chief of police.

The recruit has a bright future, even if he never gets promoted, because the liberal salary scale is extremely rewarding. In fact, all ranks enjoyed high salaries, as shown in Table 7.

Table 7

Pay Schedule

Position	Salary
Chief	$26,000 - $32,200
Captain	$18,200 - $25,000
Lieutenant (Detective & Staff)	$16,000 - $19,900
Lieutenant	$15,300 - $19,100
Sergeant (Detective & Staff)	$13,700 - $17,800
Sergeant	$13,200 - $17,200
Detective	$12,200 - $15,900
Police Technician	$10,500 - $15,100
Policeman	$ 9,800 - $14,100

The position of Assistant Chief was created in 1970, and the pay schedule had not been published at the time of this study. Theoretically, top pay was reached at or near retirement. However, some personnel retire before reaching top pay, with the result that they continue to get pay raises throughout their careers.

In-service training and the training of recruits was done in each district. In the southern district, where this study was concentrated, training was directed by a sergeant. He was directly responsible to the district police commander, but he had a staff responsibility to the training lieutenant at police headquarters. The lieutenant was the coordinator of all training. The training sergeant taught many of the classes, but a great many instructors came from the patrol, detective, traffic units, and command and staff positions.

Training for new policemen consisted of a six-week instruction period and a six-month testing period, all of which was included in a one-year probationary period. The first six weeks were spent in classroom instruction and on-the-job field training. The recruits spent six hours each day in class learning about the department, rules, regulations, procedures, laws of arrest, patrol, and investigative procedures. The remaining two hours each day were spent in the field, riding in a patrol or traffic car with an experienced officer. An outline of the subject concentration is shown in Table 8.

Table 8

Six-Week Training Schedule Content

Subject	Hours	Minutes
On-the-job field training	35	45
Law: Statutes, arrest, search and seizure, individual rights, civil liability, Bill of Rights	32	-
Firearms	21	-
Rules, regulations, policy and procedure	19	30
Traffic	12	30
Patrol techniques, procedures, preliminary investigations	12	30
Riot control	12	-
Examinations	10	-
Administrative matters	10	-
Assignment and review of homework	9	30
Familiarization of district and county boundary	8	-
Report writing	7	-
Mechanics of arrest, search and seizure, and preservation of evidence	7	-
Court procedure	6	30
Criminal investigation	4	-
Community relations	4	-
Proper use of police vehicle	3	-

Table 8 (cont'd.)

Subject	Hours	Minutes
First aid	3	-
Tour of jail	3	-
Handling juveniles	2	-
Miscellaneous	2	-
Unarmed defense	2	-
Narcotics	2	-
Interrogation	2	-
Inspection of notebooks	2	-
Handling of mentally ill	1	45
Domestic complaints	1	-
Use of force	1	-
Impounding animals	1	-
Counterfeit money	1	-
Handling petty complaints	1	-
Graduation	1	-
Total	240*	

*Six weeks = 30 work days = 240 hours

The data contained in Table 8 had to be compiled by the researcher after a study of the training program. It is believed that the department training personnel did not know how much time was being devoted to each category. Of course, there was some idea of relative time expenditure, but not to the degree illustrated in Table 8. The training program was alloted six weeks, and that time was "filled in" with relative material. The schedule was printed on a twelve-page program, outlining the six-weeks training on an hourly basis. It was an analysis of this program that produced the data contained in Table 8.

The training schedule was originally only three weeks, but it was extended to six weeks during this study. The relative concentration of course material remained about the same in both courses, however.

Upon completion of the classroom training, the recruit was assigned to one of the districts. He was given a list of books and material to study during the next six months. At the beginning of each month, for the first six months of the one-year probationary period, the recruit was given written examinations on this assigned reading.

A sporadic, in-service training program supplemented the recruit training. There was no set schedule for classes to be given at predetermined intervals. For instance, one year, no more than five different classes were given; another year, as many as twenty classes were taught. One of the

more active years for the in-service training program was fiscal year 1969. The following is an excerpt from the annual report for that year:

> Our new training concept, instituted in September, 1968, involves training coordinators in both districts, under staff supervision of the Inspector in charge of training. The assignments for writing lesson plans are given to various qualified members of the department and are screened by the Inspector for content and coordination of work of the two districts. Lesson plans are then referred to the District Police Commanders for final review, following which they are approved by the Chief. Subjects covered thus far are as follows: Field Interrogation; Search and Seizure; Basic Criminal Investigation, Parts 1, 2, and 3; Preservation of Evidence; Arrest; Report Writing; Police Traffic Enforcement; Traffic Accidents; Drunk Drivers; Radio Communications; Teletypes; Proper Preparation of Routine Police Reports and Forms.

In addition to the above training, the following additional classes were given during the same period:

1. Report Writing
2. Riot Control Training
3. Arson Investigation
4. Police Procedures
5. Public Relations
6. Annual Firearms Training
7. First Aid
8. Marihuana Identification
9. The county government sponsored a civil service training program. Officers attended courses in Reading Efficiency, Defensive Driving, Introduction to Supervision, The Supervisor and Human Behavior, Theory and Practice of Management and

Organization, and Writing.

10. A tuition refund program sponsored the following:
    a. Thirty-three officers completed 90 courses offered by the local university.
    b. Five completed the correspondence course, Criminal Identification and Investigation from the Institute of Applied Science.
    c. One completed the Davis Correspondence School course on Police Investigation.
    d. Five completed the Dale Carnegie course and are part of the police speaking team.
11. One lieutenant was sent to the National FBI Academy.
12. One lieutenant was sent to the Southern Police Institute at Louisville, Kentucky.
13. Two officers were sent to Washington, D. C. for a short course at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
14. One sergeant was sent to the Northwestern Traffic Institute for a course in Accident Investigation.
15. One detective sergeant was sent to the Florida State University Delinquency Control Institute.

The following year, 1970, another lieutenant was sent to the Southern Police Institute; a sergeant attended the Traffic Law Enforcement Course at Northwestern University; a detective was sent to the Keeler Polygraph Institute; a

detective sergeant was sent to Phase III of Delinquency Control Institute at Florida State University; and two lieutenants were sent to the FBI Academy.

Internal Design

At the time of this study, the county was divided into two police districts: North and South, each commanded by a captain. Personnel assigned to these districts worked out of a central station in each district. One small sub-station was located in the southern district. Police headquarters was located in the southern district about a mile away from the district station.

The county jail was also located in the southern district and commanded by a captain. The jail was situated in a rural area, about ten miles from police headquarters and the district station. The northern district station was located about 40 miles from police headquarters. All stations were connected by telephone lines, roads, and a railroad. Police headquarters and the southern and northern districts were further connected by a teletype system.

The department's 323 personnel were allocated to each division; headquarters, jail, northern and southern districts, generally depending upon the amount of work and responsibility. As shown in Table 9, most of the personnel were assigned to the southern district, where this study concentrated.

Table 9

Allocation of Manpower

Position	Headquarters	Northern District	Southern District	Jail	Total
Chief	1				1
Asst. Chief	1				1
Captain		1	1	1	3
Detective Lt.		1	1		2
Staff Lt.	2	2	1	1	6
Lieutenant		4	4		8
Det. Sgt.		1	2		3
Staff Sgt.		1	4	1	6
Sergeant		5	8		13
Detective		5	8		13
Police Tech.				5	5
Policeman		56	122	12	190
Admin. Asst. (civilian)	1				1
Youth Counselor, female			1		1
Clerical	4	2	5	2	13
Dispatcher		1	4		5
Crosswalk Gd.		2	8		10
Jail Guard		7	12	17	36
Matron		6			6
TOTAL	9	94	181	39	323

Since most of the material in this study was to be obtained from an analysis of the southern district and police headquarters, the examination of designs and interrelationships was narrowed to those two parts of the department.

The chief of police had gathered around him, in his headquarters, a completely new staff; far different from the situation he had inherited in 1968. Since his appointment in 1968, all top positions in the department, from lieutenant to chief, have changed either in job description or by the replacement of the person who had filled that position. In fact, there were 23 major administrative and personnel changes in the department in a short, two-and-one-half-year period.

So, it was a department characterized by many new faces in the command ranks, new ideas, new positions, and new relationships; but still with some of the old traditional practices, personnel, and methods hanging like a millstone around the neck of the department.

At police headquarters, the chief of police was assisted by an assistant chief, who held the rank of major. Also on the headquarters team were two staff lieutenants. One was responsible for the coordination of department training programs, and the other lieutenant was responsible for public relations and served as the chief's aid, more or less. The fourth person on the headquarters team was a civilian administrative assistant, upon whom the chief depended a great deal.

The administrative assistant handled all budgeting for the entire department. He kept the chief up to date on expenditures, manpower problems, civil service and government requirements, and a multitude of other related problems. He also kept track of all major expenditures in the department. According to his analysis, expenditures were either made or restricted, hiring was either increased or decreased, and certain plans were either maintained or discarded.

The rest of the headquarters staff consisted of clerical personnel, who maintained the files and accomplished all the paper work.

There was no central records complex in use by the department. Files were kept in all of the different units for their own use. Headquarters maintained numerous sets of files, many of which were duplicated in the districts. At the same time, many of the files maintained at headquarters were utilized by the districts in their work.

In the districts, the records system was still more diffused. Each of the individual units maintained one or more sets of files, many of which were duplicates; but some contained exclusive information. In the southern district police station alone, there were 13 indexes and 23 sets of files.

The commander of the southern district and his personnel handled all police duties in the southern part of the county. The captain's personnel were divided into two major work

units: A field operations section and a detective section, each commanded by a leiutenant.

The field operations section was designed to handle all initial contacts with crime and the public. It was divided into five basic units: Patrol, traffic, jail, clerical staff, and substation. The units were not distinctly separate, but were intertwined in a network of staff relationships which will be explained in the section on allocation of work.

In the detective section, there were four basic units: General investigation, identification, juvenile, and narcotics. The design of the detective section was more distinct than field operations and made specific responsibilities more discernible.

In addition to the detective section and the field operations section, the district commander had the assistance of two staff personnel, administrative assistant and training coordinator, both of whom were sergeants.

All work encountered in the southern part of the county was divided among these units; and obviously, some relationships presented working problems.

The chief of police had an assistant underneath him and a headquarters staff to support his operations; but his span of control was basically limited to three persons outside of headquarters: 1. Southern District Captain. 2. County Jail Captain. 3. Northern District Captain. (Figure 1).

The Southern District Commander was one of three captains reporting to the chief of police, as shown in Figure 1. The



Organizational Chart of Department

Figure 1

study began to narrow in scope and to commence focusing upon a particular part of the organization. Since the study would finally culminate in the southern district, the structure of that whole district was studied (Figure 2). This procedure continually moved the study from general toward specific, where it would end with the man on the street.

Allocation of Work: Southern District

The description of work division within the field operations section will be undertaken first, followed by a description of the detective section.

Field Operations. In order to better understand the allocation of work, the interrelationships of the individual units must be explained first.

The patrol section performed basically the same tasks that any other uniformed force would on most police departments. The personnel engaged in deterrant-type patrol, responded to minor complaints, were responsible for primary investigations of crimes, responded to emergency situations, made arrests, and did a lot of other things.

The traffic unit was harder to define, in that it was part of the patrol unit; but then again it was not. The primary mission of the traffic personnel was to issue traffic citations and investigate vehicle accidents. As a secondary mission, the traffic personnel lent support to the patrol unit. In explanation, during the daytime (8 am to 4 pm) the



Organizational Chart of Southern District

Figure 2

traffic sergeant worked in the central police station in his own office. During this time, he also assigned duties to the traffic patrols, such as traffic control and escorts. If a vehicle accident occurred which resulted in serious injury or death, the sergeant went into the field and took over the investigation. If he happened to be off duty, he was called in on overtime. Most of his time was spent compiling traffic statistics into report form and reviewing all traffic accident reports, citations, and traffic court cases. The sergeant was assisted in these duties by a traffic officer who worked in the same office (this position was rotated every three or four months among all the traffic officers).

When traffic policemen were not performing tasks specifically assigned to them by the traffic sergeant, they were in the field issuing citations and investigating traffic accidents; and all the while they were under the direct supervision of the patrol supervisors. The traffic officers had two masters to serve, which often made for strained relationships.

In fact, the twenty traffic policemen worked the same shifts with patrol officers, stood the same roll call, were responsible to the same supervisor, and shared in the same patrol tasks.

The district was covered by the following working units: Ten walking beats, five patrol car beats, and four traffic car beats. All of the walking beats were one-man beats, and all but one of the cars were one-man cars. Each officer had

communication with other officers and the station either through the car radio or the Motorola Handitalki.

All of the nineteen different beats were covered 24 hours a day, manpower permitting. After vacations, illnesses and the like, shifts usually carried about twenty on-duty personnel. The shapes of the beats never varied, nor was any consideration given to work load or demand based upon crime statistics. Manpower concentration was the same at 9 am Sunday as it was at 10 pm Friday.

The patrol and traffic officers were assigned to one of four platoons, with each platoon taking its turn on each of the shifts. Table 10 reflects the rotation pattern for these platoons.

Table 10

Uniform Personnel Shift-Rotation Schedule

Order of Rotation	Shift	Days	
		Work	Off
1	8 a.m. - 4 p.m.	6	2
2	4 p.m. - 12 midnight	7	2
3	12 midnight - 8 a.m.	7	4

A typical cycle would start with a platoon working the day shift for six days, followed by two off days. It would then come back to work for seven days on the afternoon shift and then have two days off. The platoon would come back to work on the midnight shift and work for seven days, followed by four days off. The other three platoons would fall in

behind and take their turns, resulting in three platoons always working each day and one platoon on pass, as illustrated in Figure 3.

Each platoon was commanded by a lieutenant and two sergeants. The lieutenant received most of his instructions from his immediate supervisor, the field operations lieutenant. Occasionally, he coordinated with the district commander, thereby bypassing his immediate supervisor. Instructions and inputs for the platoons, which originated from within the department itself, as opposed to street incidents, came to the shift lieutenant in one of several ways:

1. Verbally, from the field operations lieutenant or the district commander.
2. Verbally, from the detective section (all personnel).
3. Verbally, from the traffic sergeant.
4. Verbally, from the chief, assistant chief, and two staff lieutenants.
5. Verbally, from the training sergeant and the administrative assistant to the captain.
6. Verbally, from any of the clerical staff.
7. Written, from any of the above.

Some of these relationships amounted to staff or informal working agreements, but some held the power of departmental authority. It is too simple to say that the shift commander was responsible to the field operations lieutenant,



Daily Platoon Allocation

Figure 3

as shown in Figure 2, because other relationships entered into the shift lieutenant's milieu. Actually, the lieutenant's situation looked more like that in Figure 4, one of organized confusion which he was left to interpret. If he questioned some information, request, or relationship which was inappropriate to his self-conceived role, or that threatened his position, his alternative was to fall back on those formal relationships for security. By falling back upon the formal relationships, the decision for action was taken out of his hands and placed in those of his immediate superiors, the field operations lieutenant and the district captain.

For example, the traffic sergeant might inform the shift lieutenant that a traffic control point should be established at a certain location during a certain time; or the detective lieutenant might request two officers for a stake-out. The shift lieutenant would either comply with the request or take the problem to his superiors.

Actually, the shift lieutenants were not the only ones saddled with these relationships. All personnel had relationships of this type. The lieutenant's situation was just easier to illustrate; and more importantly, falls in line with this study's progression toward the individual officer at work on the street.

The two sergeants working under the shift lieutenant divided the work between them. One sergeant worked the station desk and the other sergeant worked the street (Figure 4).



Organizational Inputs to Shift Lieutenant's Work

Figure 4

They often rotated these jobs, taking turns on the desk, which was the most undesirable of the two.

The patrol sergeant was responsible for roll call, posting the new relief, and checking the platoon going off duty. Once the shift had been changed and his men had settled into their routine for the next eight hours, the patrol sergeant left the station and went into the field to supervise nineteen beats.

The patrol sergeants' techniques varied slightly, but most of their time was spent complying with certain procedures. All patrol sergeants were required to check each man on the platoon twice during each eight-hour shift. However, over the years this practice had narrowed to include the walking beats only. At the completion of each shift, the patrol sergeant submitted a report showing the times he had checked each beat man. If he had failed to make two checks on each man, he was required to enter an explanation on the report. The report eventually went to the field operations lieutenant and then on to the district captain.

The district captain was adamant in his demands that these checks be made, and sergeants were cautious to comply with this procedure. The district captain, when asked about the procedure, explained that it had two basic purposes: To assure that the patrol sergeant was doing his job and in turn keeping the beat man alert; and to act as a safety valve, in case anyone lodged a complaint against an officer. The department could at least pinpoint the officer's location

for a certain time during his tour of duty.

In addition to checking his personnel, the patrol sergeant was required to go to the scene of felonies and other serious incidents and upon arrival, supervise the preliminary investigation. From experience, this requirement was interpreted by the sergeants to include family disturbances, assaults, all juvenile crimes, burglaries, racial incidents, and selected grand and petit larcenies, depending upon the circumstances.

Regulations required that the patrol sergeant perform all physical agility tests on drunk driving arrests made by his personnel. If one of his men happened to make a felony arrest, the sergeant completed the investigation, took statements, compiled facts, and wrote the report that was ultimately sent to the prosecuting attorney.

During the daytime, Monday through Friday, the patrol sergeant was required to be in the morning and afternoon sessions of magistrate's court. His duty was to see that officers appearing in court presented their cases properly, to assure that witnesses and complainants were present, and often to organize and present cases before the judge, himself. The county prosecuting attorney only appeared in court on felony cases and extremely important misdemeanors. As a rule, the police did not have the assistance of a prosecuting attorney for misdemeanor cases.

In supervising his men, the patrol sergeant used several different techniques to obtain his interpretation of "good

work" from his men. The techniques selected by each supervisor depended upon many interlocking variables, such as personality, ability, formal and informal pressure, time, situation, and so forth. The informal technique obviously varied, depending upon each sergeant's ability as a leader. These individual differences being understood, the next important aspect was the formal means available to the sergeant to obtain compliance. Some of these formal tools are listed below:

1. Oral admonishment.
2. Written reprimand.
3. Individual training, in the form of roll-call training and field instruction.
4. Change of beat assignment (the sergeant usually could only recommend, because duty rosters and beat assignments were made by the field operations lieutenant and the district captain).
5. Direct supervision.

Of all the formal methods available, the three most frequently used by the sergeants were oral admonishment, written reprimands, and direct supervision. The most general patterns were oral admonishments for failure to perform duties in certain ways, minor rule infractions, and inabilities; written reprimands for being late for work, minor and major rule infractions, and poor judgement; direct supervision was used as a preventive measure for personnel who had

exhibited inabilities and poor judgement in the past. Only the chief could suspend personnel from duty, and his authority only included suspensions of up to thirty days. For suspensions exceeding thirty days and terminations, the central personnel agency decided all cases. Therefore, the sergeant's role was reduced to simply making his superiors aware of incidents. This in itself was considerable power; the decision to reveal or conceal.

Before explaining the work of the desk sergeant, the position and role of the radio dispatchers and jail personnel must be explained in order to place everyone in their proper perspective.

All the radio dispatchers were females, and they worked two basic shifts: 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. and 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. There were no radio dispatchers working between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., during which time the desk sergeant inherited their duties. During working hours, however, the radio dispatcher worked for the desk sergeant. The physical arrangement placed the dispatcher in a room directly behind the desk sergeant. Both the desk sergeant and the dispatcher had the same radio and telephone equipment. Both could answer incoming radio and telephone calls, and both could dispatch cars and walking beat men. This duplication of effort often created confusion among street personnel and made it almost impossible to keep track of personnel and calls.

The jail personnel were all civilian guards of equal rank, and were responsible to the desk sergeant. In the

daytime, there were usually two guards working the district station jail; but during the night, only one guard was on duty. The guards helped the desk sergeant keep track of the prisoner count, keep the jail clean, maintain order in the jail, brought meals from a local restaurant, regulated visitors, and performed many other tasks.

The desk sergeant sat at one of the busiest and most critical locations in the whole district. All persons coming into the police station saw the desk sergeant first. All incoming requests for police service came through the sergeant's telephone switchboard or that of the dispatcher, who was supervised by the sergeant. The sergeant and his dispatchers handled all radio traffic. The sergeant supervised the jail. He screened and booked all arrests. He read and approved all reports submitted by field personnel. He prepared and typed all court affidavits on police arrests. He made certain that defendants who were in jail were in court for their cases to be heard. He sent teletypes, maintained files, and performed a multitude of other tasks. The duties of the desk sergeant were explicitly outlined in several pages of instruction. Each report submitted by him had to be prepared in a certain way. In fact, there were about thirty pages of instruction on how to fill out the blotter when booking an arrest. The instructions listed phrases and abbreviations to be used on the blotter, and no others were acceptable. If a sergeant happened to make a mistake on the blotter, it would be sent back to him the next day for correction. If a sergeant made

too many mistakes, he was orally admonished by the lieutenant or captain.

The most active time at the desk was during the day shift, when all important command officers were in their offices, there were court sessions, there were detectives wanting to interrogate prisoners, and hundreds of other things to do. All sergeants interviewed hated to work the desk on the day shift and all dreaded to see their time come around.

All of the eight sergeants were observed during their turn to work the desk. Some tried to start the day with a bright outlook; others, who were otherwise congenial persons, came to work on edge. By the end of the day, all had gone through several changes in mood, ranging from contentment to anger, disgust, hopelessness, despair, and confusion. Some even spoke harshly to friends who had simply spoken or joked in a mild manner.

Detective Section. The detective section was divided into four basic units, general investigation, juvenile, narcotics, and identification (Figure 2). All investigative work was divided among these four units. A brief description of their activities is outlined below.

The identification unit was responsible for fingerprinting and photographing all persons who had been arrested by the police. This unit maintained fingerprint files, mug shot files, and a latent fingerprint file. The detective who worked in this unit spent all of his time in the office. Since most detectives did not like this job, it had to be

rotated among other detectives for short periods.

The narcotics unit consisted of two detectives and usually two policemen who were borrowed from the patrol force. Their work forced them to keep irregular hours, and they were hardly ever in the station. This unit was created recently in order to combat the rising drug problem. Both detectives assigned to this unit were volunteers and enjoyed the work very much. All detectives in the whole section had wanted to work in the unit when it was formed, because that was "where the action was."

The juvenile unit consisted of one sergeant, one detective, one female youth counselor and a secretary. This unit was less than two years old at the time of this study, and had been formed to fulfill a long-standing need to combat juvenile crime. Personnel in this unit performed primarily follow-up investigations, and did police/school liaison and community relations work. In fiscal year 1970, this unit informed over 12,000 citizens of the rising drug abuse problem, through 87 different public appearances. Most detectives did not like to work in this unit because they thought the work was more social work than "crook catching." The work had evolved, however, to the point that there was more activity in the area of public information and police/school liaison than there was in field work.

The general investigations unit handled all other crimes. All detectives in this unit possessed skills in fingerprinting and photography, because they were required to process

all of their own crime scenes, without the help of specialists. Several of the detectives in this section were court-qualified experts in fingerprints, photography and marihuana identification. Detectives in this unit worked shifts, which provided service from 8 a.m. to midnight each and every day. If a detective service was required between midnight and 8 a.m., a detective was called out on an overtime basis. Detectives in this unit seemed to like the work when they were engaged in a big case, but there were some aspects of their work which they did not like. They did not like organized shift work, but had no qualms whatever about working extra hours on a "good case." They disliked processing their own crime scenes, because they viewed their role as an investigative one rather than a routinized technical one. In addition, they felt that their unit had been neglected. As a result of the excitement and activity over the creation of the narcotics and juvenile units, the detectives in the general investigations unit became just a bit envious of the attention paid to the work of these new units by the top administrators.

All of the detective units were commanded by two people, the detective lieutenant and his assistant, the senior detective sergeant. They usually treated and supervised the individual units as separate entities. However, there was some overlapping of activity at times, and personnel were shifted around occasionally from one unit to another. In fact, in cases of extreme importance, such as a homicide,

all units were drawn together into one large unit and worked together until the case was disposed of.

II. ANALYSIS

The entire community appears to be an exceptional one, free from many of today's social ills, such as unemployment, racial conflict, and slums. The fact that most of the criminals are not residents of the county serves to enhance the cohesiveness of the entire community. In this respect, Simmel's conflict theory would maintain that a threat from outside the group would naturally draw members of the group together in mutually supportive roles.[50] However, there is another type of community conflict brewing over the rising drug problem, which accounts for a large percentage of the juvenile arrests (remember that 60% of all juveniles arrested are residents of the county).

The police department, like many others, was moulded in the early years by leaders with military backgrounds. These leaders have naturally left their impressions upon the organization, as evidenced by the quasi-military atmosphere of the whole department. Other indicators are official words, like "commander," "platoon," "pass," "leave," "police private," and the strict rules on saluting superior officers.

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[50] George Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations, (New York: The Free Press, 1968) pp. 48-50.

At the time of the study, the design of the department was not conducive to efficiency or to the control of personnel performance. Control was lessened by the fact that the chief and his staff were cut off from the rest of the department. Headquarters was extremely handicapped by its location in a separate building several blocks away from the district station. This very fact increased problems in communication and transportation, and had an unintended effect upon patrol personnel, which is discussed in the next section. To compound this decentralization problem, the department had no centralized records complex. Centralized records and an accurate reporting and communications network are necessary elements of organized managerial control.

Hiring standards seemed to be incongruous with the overall manpower problems. It appeared that in order to be a police officer, it was more important to be at least 5' 9" tall, with a proportionate build and not wear glasses than it was to be a high school graduate, able to cope with a fairly difficult examination which tested for relevant skills, or to be emotionally stable.

Department officials explained that the central personnel agency set hiring standards and controlled hiring to a great extent. However, no attempt was made by the department to influence the agency to bring hiring standards in line with police duties. In fact, two incidents disclosed to this researcher seemed to set the scene for hiring trends. One

involved a young man with a clean background, a master's degree in Police Administration from Michigan State University, who was a commissioned officer in the U. S. Army. He applied for a job as a policeman, but was rejected because he wore glasses. Another young man, with a high school education, a clean and honest background, who was otherwise acceptable, was rejected because he had acne. "He wouldn't look good in uniform," was the excuse. It would be wrong to make only negative conclusions about the department's hiring practices, because some good men were hired and some undesirable men were rejected.

These individual encounters with police applicants were inconsistant with what the department was trying to do. It was trying to keep all manpower slots filled for fear of losing them. The central personnel agency had in the past taken manpower slots away from the department if they were vacant for any length of time. Consequently, the department tried to keep as many slots filled as they possibly could. The result was indiscriminate hiring, based on the wrong qualifications.

The personnel agency also looked at the work load of the department and got the impression that there were too many policemen. Many officers worked days and months without ever having to make an arrest or perform any police duty. In fact, their work required that they just walk or stand in certain locations where crimes were almost non-existent.

On the other hand, many jobs were extremely overloaded. As a conclusion based upon departmental manpower and crime rates, the department was far over strength. It did not need nearly the manpower it had to do the job it had to do. Had manpower been logically assigned upon analysis of statistics, crime would have decreased significantly. Instead, an equal amount of men were assigned to each platoon, and they worked the same beats every day, in the same mundane manner. As a result, the personnel agency seemed to get the impression that many of these policemen were not needed, which created the push and pull relationship that existed between the personnel agency and the department.

Recruit training significantly contributed to the problem created by sub-standard hiring practices. It is difficult to be certain that recruits selected by these standards have learned anything in training, when only three recruits out of 268 failed to qualify during their probation. When one looks further and discovers that during the same period, 33 individuals were "removed for cause" or resigned under investigation, it is indicative that recruit screening, training, and the probationary period were not effective in eliminating poor performers.

The department realized something was wrong with the recruit training and increased the length of the academy from three to six weeks (the content of the training is analyzed below). The department seemed to encourage officers to attend college, and supported the program by a tuition refund

plan. By 1970, nine police officers had bachelor's degrees in various areas, and several more were working toward that goal. In addition, the new chief intensified the in-service training program and sent more personnel away to formal specialized schools in 1969 and 1970 than were sent in the whole history of the department.

The recruit training program revealed some interesting aspects considering the kind of impact it must have had upon the recruit. There have been several studies in the past showing the irrelevancy of course content as compared to police duties. However, the point made here is not so much what the recruit learned in the academy, but the innuendos, the perceptions, and the unconscious realizations that he absorbed as a result of being exposed to the training. The analysis of the course corresponded significantly with performance patterns in the field (performance is discussed in the next section). The four areas of instruction given the most emphasis were field training, law, firearms, and rules. Areas of least emphasis were use of force, domestic complaints, and juveniles (Table 8).

The emphasis upon law and firearms would seem to leave the recruit with a feeling for the importance of "crook catching." To support this conclusion, the recruit spent most of his training time in the field, learning how it's "really done." But to balance this out was a heavy emphasis on rules. In fact, he not only learned about following rules, but following rules and routinized procedures were practiced

during his training. The recruit notices that during training, emphasis is being placed upon the administrative matters of calling roll, assigning homework, preparing for the day's work, and reviewing homework. The major impact is rounded out to look like this: Police work is "doing," carrying and using a gun, and learning the law, but following departmental rules is just as important.

Conversely, the officer must place little importance upon working with people, especially the youth and the disturbed. In fact, one must conclude that it is just as important to impound an animal correctly as it is to use the right amount of force. The in-service training classes also supported this "crook catching" attitude.

The two most significant aspects derived from the training curriculum were field training and the importance of rules. Each area is discussed below.

Field training (O.J.T.) was viewed in its relationship to work patterns and the ultimate effect upon role socialization, or what is collectively called the police subculture. The field training is sufficient to give the recruit the idea that "doing" is important and to influence him toward "crook catching." However, his exposure to the veteran officer is not sufficient to completely socialize the rookie. In other related studies, socialization of police recruits was shown to take place over a longer period of time. Here, however, the socialization process is stopped short. Upon graduation from the academy, the officer is sent out on the street,

to work alone! All but one patrol assignment in the whole department were one-man beats. The rookie had very little chance to fraternize with other officers. He was exposed to other officers briefly before roll call and occasionally on the beat. In fact, patrol supervisors vigorously enforced rules prohibiting officers from congregating on their beats. In the field, the officer's most frequent contacts were with his supervisor, remembering that the patrol sergeant checked him twice each shift. In addition, the patrol sergeant's style, derived from rule interpretation, served to practice very close supervision. In fact, the sergeant was on the scene each and every time the officer had the opportunity to practice his trade, by handling an important incident or case.

Consequently, the rookie was never exposed to the full impact of his fellow officer's beliefs, experiences, prejudices, and the like. In the study of performance, which is described in the next section, the socialization process seemed to almost never take place. The police subculture is normally described as consisting of a very tightly knit group, playing mutually supportive roles, protecting each other, etc. Quite the contrary here. Officers criticized each other openly, protected each other very little, did not agree on techniques, and occasionally even arrested and "told on" each other. More significantly, many officers socialized with civilians outside the police milieu. There was some group solidarity and socialization present, but far

less than one would expect to find. In order to put the degree of socialization in its proper perspective, an example might be useful. In a large city department, where the rookie is quickly socialized, he would not normally even speak to a veteran unless spoken to; he almost always takes the veteran's opinion as gospel. In contrast, in Zanja County, rookies spoke freely, often rebuffing veterans' opinions, and formed their own opinions.

There were some unusual consequences formed out of this pattern. The rookie was denied the socialization process; he was "trained" as a crook catcher but never got the chance to exercise his discretion. The supervisor was always there to take over. The rookie didn't get the chance to learn rapidly from experience. At the same time, his experience was showing him the importance of rules; "don't be late for work, you'll get a letter on your file," "stand straight, don't get caught sitting down," "salute," "follow rules." Already exposed to the importance of rules during his training period, he falls back upon these rules as guides to do his job and "get by in the bureaucracy."

The supervisory styles used by the sergeants served to enhance the rookie's self-conceived role. The sergeants were pressured to get things done correctly without any problems. Since the training had not prepared recruits to do the job themselves, and the socialization process had not done its job, the sergeant often found it easier to do the job himself. Some officers did learn to do certain tasks

relatively well over the years, but many simply could not cope with difficult duties. Sergeants often re-wrote officers' reports, relieved veterans who could not direct traffic, and helped officers do their jobs. The sergeant was caught up in following rules, too. For instance, all sergeants resented the checks they had to make of street personnel, and they disliked many of their other duties, as well. Nevertheless, they followed the rules which upper management said were important.

The sergeants interviewed felt that each of their men had different qualities and therefore required different amounts and types of supervision. They said the practice of checking each man twice and submitting a report indicated a distrust. The sergeants were caught in the middle and did not really feel a part of the management team; management was pushing them. Consequently, the sergeants did not have the time to spend with men who needed extra help and more supervision.

One aspect of the department had an odd effect upon performance, and that was the relatively high salary. All personnel seemed to be preoccupied with money, and often justified their work on the basis of their good salary. Officers were often overheard making remarks like, "what the hell, for the money they're paying me, I'll do what they say," or "look, I don't make waves; this is the most money I've ever made and I guess they have a right to make certain demands."

When officers were required to perform what they termed, "Mickey Mouse" duties, they often made such statements. On the other hand, such duties frequently produced traumas resulting from what Dr. Victor G. Strecher calls, "cognitive disonnance," the frustration experienced when realizing the gap between role perception and performance.

The next section contains a detailed description of the individual police officers' performance on the street. The descriptions up to this point have gone from general to specific. They started with a description of the community and the organization itself, followed by a description of the design of the department and the allocation of work. Finally, the working atmosphere within which the officer works has been described. In the next section, his behavior is examined and his responses to the various stimuli are described.

III. PERFORMANCE

The description presented in this section is based upon data collected from observation of work behavior. Performance was studied in the patrol and detective sections only. The activities of the uniformed personnel were observed first and the detectives later, because most inputs from crime situations are initially handled by the patrol units and subsequently passed on the the detectives.

Patrol and Traffic Personnel

The police officers usually started coming into the station about 45 minutes before their shift began. The

early arrivals read complaints that had been submitted over the past few days. Others checked the duty roster to see if their beat assignments had been changed. Some of the newer policemen would review the beat instructions for their assignments. A few officers asked supervisors questions about work problems and performance. They talked fishing, sports, and arrests; and most of them joked and teased each other.

Most of the officers arrived fifteen or twenty minutes before the hour, but some didn't arrive until the hour exactly (roll call was usually held five or ten minutes before the hour). The department had a strict rule about being on time, and anyone who came to work after the hour received a written reprimand, which was placed in his personnel file.

Sometimes an officer would oversleep, have car trouble, or just not be punctual. However, officers did strive to be on time because they did not like to be reprimanded in this manner. The department's enforcement policy on this rule produced some significant behavior patterns.

Prior to roll call, if some of the officers noticed that another officer had not shown up for work, someone would call his home to see if he had overslept. However, this mutually protective practice was not engaged in by the whole group. If an officer was liked, someone might call his home. On the other hand, if an officer was disliked, his being late was of no concern. The protection occasionally extended to roll call itself when officers would "partially" vouch for the presence of another officer; "I thought I saw him in the

head," or "I think he's out front." Both statements could easily be attributed to an honest mistake, thereby not really committing the vouching officer to the defense of another officer.

This behavior is an indication that the informal group had joined together to systematically avoid punishment by the formal organization. But, there is one important qualification; the protection was done selectively, which indicates evidence in congruence with a conclusion stated in the previous section: Lack of complete socialization. After interviewing certain officers, overhearing remarks, and watching behavior, it was decided that the criteria used by the group in deciding whether or not to help another officer avoid punishment was based upon personal traits, not upon the simple fact that he was a brother officer. To be protected, it was not enough to be a police officer. Other personal relationships were taken into consideration. Incidentally, during the entire study, not one incident could be discovered where an officer was protected completely in a critical situation by his friends or the informal group. In most instances, when it came down to the wire, most officers came through with the truth.

Roll call was usually completed between five minutes before and five minutes after the hour, but occasionally extended fifteen or twenty minutes after the hour. This does not seem too significant until the pattern is studied further.

Once roll call was over, the new shift went to work. Patrol cars transported walking beat men to their beats, picked up the relieved beat men, and returned them to the station. The officers who worked patrol and traffic cars were relieved immediately after roll call, but the beat men were not so lucky. This meant that beat men coming off duty might not get back to the station house until fifteen minutes or half an hour after the shift had changed. Occasionally, a beat man would be forgotten and would get relieved as late as 45 minutes or an hour after his quitting time. All personnel going off duty had to report to the desk sergeant, and this is where the problem began to blossom.

Ususally, some officers would just make a comment about the relieving time; others griped, and some demanded overtime pay. The sergeant had made a mistake and now he had to deal with it. Usually, he tried to talk the officer out of the overtime. Most of the time, officers just griped or passed it off as an honest mistake. Some officers would go to the captain's office and complain, which put the sergeant on the spot.

This roll call practice served to antagonize the policemen because they felt it should have been a two-way street. If management were going to demand promptness and punish for violations, then they should come across with the overtime. On the other hand, if management wanted to overlook the relieving times, then they should overlook an occasional tardiness. About three officers of the one hundred studied had

refused to stand roll call. They came to the station just before, or on the hour, and were extremely careful to announce their presence to the sergeant on the hour.

After roll call, the patrol and traffic officers took to the streets and began their eight-hour tour. Some distinct patterns of behavior were discovered, and they are discussed separately in the succeeding paragraphs.

Of major concern to patrol car operators was getting their buildings checked and meeting their trains. Departmental regulations demanded that officers check certain buildings. A list of the buildings in each beat area was published in the beat instructions. Officers were required to check the buildings once on the afternoon shift and twice on the midnight shift. Officers were required to make entries in their car logs of the times they had checked each building.

Officers were questioned about their concern for building checks, when in contrast almost all of them despised the procedure and questioned its productivity. Most of their explanations seemed to agree; that management would discover if a building had not been checked and would punish them for failing to do so. Officers explained, "If I don't check these buildings and one happens to be open, my relief will find it and report it. Then it gets back to me. Or maybe there's a burglary there tonight. Well, tomorrow the detectives investigate and try to pinpoint the time. They use my building check sheet, and when they catch the guy...the times don't match. I would have a hard time explaining."

Officers agreed, however, there were times when they were not able to check their buildings because of other assignments, but when this happened, they all noted this excuse on their car logs. However, dispatched calls and arrests were the only activities that would break the officers' routine. Officers almost never missed a building check for any other types of patrol. Some officers avoided all use of discretion, sticking to the building checks and dispatched calls. After all, these were two areas where management could hold the individual officer accountable. Some of the officers' feelings were revealed in their comments, "Look, these building checks are a waste of time. I could do a lot more good if I had that time free. But, that's what the department wants, so that's what I'll give them."

Patrol car operators approached this task differently. Some hurriedly began their check immediately while others paced themselves. Each building took an average of five minutes to check, with about two minutes driving time between buildings. Some officers could make their first check in one and a half or two hours, but others took longer.

In addition to the building checks, two of the cars had to meet trains. The officers explained that occasionally someone would jump off the train while it was still moving and get hurt. There were reports of other crimes occurring at the depots, but not at any significant rate. In fact, crimes occurred at depots far less often than in other areas in the district. Officers explained that supervisors would

occasionally check to see if they had met the trains. One officer reflected, "Besides, if someone gets hurt down there, and I'm not there on the spot, I'm in trouble." Here again, officers did not like this duty and did not see any benefit from it.

Considering the building checks and depot checks, some officers already had their days work planned for them (Table 11).

Table 11

Patrol Car Work Schedule

Car	Buildings*			Trains		
	Shift 8 - 4	4 - 12	12 - 8	8 - 4	4 - 12	12 - 8
A	0	11	22	6	5	3
B	0	14	28	0	0	0
C	0	16	32	0	0	0
D	0	10	20	6	5	3

*Figures represent number of checks and not number of buildings.

Officers in two of the cars could make their building checks, meet their trains, and eat in four hours, if they hurried. This meant they could devote four hours to deterrant patrol in a manner of their own discretion; that is, if there were no calls dispatched to them.

On the day shift, the car operators did not have buildings to check, but did have another duty which produced

different behavior patterns. Officers were required to check the houses of people who were away on vacation. The work load for each beat could not be determined because of inadequate records kept by the department. The annual report for 1969 indicated that the whole police department checked 1,463 vacation quarters. The work load was much greater than the figures indicate, because vacations were taken mostly in the summer and the houses were checked by daytime cars only. The 1,463 is not a true work figure in itself; because vacation times overlapped, which would make the figure much higher. Taking all this into account, it could mean that five patrol cars could be responsible for checking between 100 and 300 houses each week.

Not all officers were diligent in checking vacation houses on their beats and there were usually three prevailing reasons. First, the number of houses to be checked became so large at times as to be unreal. Second, officers did not always record this information on their log, and almost no supervisory insistence was made for completion of this task. Finally, officers were usually too busy with other assigned tasks to check vacation houses.

The only valid records available to indicate the number of houses checked was kept by the dispatchers. Citizens routinely called the dispatcher to have their houses placed on the vacation list. The dispatchers recorded the information in a log book, and figures for the annual report came from this book. The annual report figures were not taken

from radio car logs, and consequently, only represented the number of people who had called the police station; not how many houses were actually checked.

The next area studied presented some difficulties, because of the department's inadequate record keeping. An effort was made, through records, to determine the activity of a radio car operator in two areas: 1. Use of discretion. How does he spend his unscheduled and unassigned time? 2. How many and what type of dispatched calls does he receive?

The radio car logs usually contained only information on building checks, complaint reports, traffic citations, and special assignments. These reports were not reviewed very closely by supervisory personnel; and if they had been, there was no way to check their accuracy, because there was no co-ordination between the dispatcher and the records system. Furthermore, the dispatcher did not keep a record of dispatched calls. The radio car log went from the officer to the desk sergeant, who simply recorded the total number of activities on another log for the annual report. The desk sergeant passed the form on to the traffic sergeant, who recorded traffic activity and the mileage travelled by each vehicle. After this was done, the forms were piled up chronologically and set aside.

In order to obtain data in this area, the researcher had to depend upon observations and interviews.

The activities of two cars were studied extensively. These are the same two cars identified as A and B in Table 11. Officers who worked these two cars had an aversion to working the day shift, and there were two basic reasons for this dislike. First, they disliked being around the management personnel. Second, they disliked what they described as non-police duties.

This aversion to management was explained by one officer. "I don't like days, because the brass is always around breathing down your neck. They want you to salute and they don't like the way you wear your uniform, and a whole lot of other things. It's all a big bunch of bull. I like it when they all go home, then we can get some work done."

The second reason related to an earlier observation about the structure of the department. These two cars, A and B, were called upon to shuttle letters, messages, objects, prisoners, and people to and from the district station, police headquarters, the court, the prosecutor's office, other government offices, individual houses, the hospital, and other places. This was done even though a formal messenger service existed for the entire county government. The messenger service was used for much of the official correspondence, but the atmosphere of the department was one of urgency. Many times personnel could not wait for a messenger, because they had to have something done "right now," even though the substance of the message might not have been

urgent. These errands were often so numerous that officers working cars A and B spent the whole shift running back and forth. One officer attempted to record these errands one day and his log reflected 21 separate trips. He admitted that this was an extra busy day, but that the norm was between ten and fifteen trips a day during week days. This activity was observed on five different occasions, and the trips always exceeded ten.

Officers hardly ever recorded this activity on their car logs, and explained, "What's the use?" Several different orders had been issued in the past instructing personnel that patrol cars would not be utilized for these errands. However, as the officers pointed out, "Look who violates the orders most...the ones who issue them." The officers didn't like it but pragmatically accepted it; "If that's what they want, who gives a shit, I'm the best paid errand boy and chauffeur in the whole county."

When officers did have free time, their behavior varied somewhat. Patrol car operators and walking beat men wrote almost no traffic citations. However, the walking beat men wrote almost all of the warning tickets, which they issued to illegally parked cars. Patrol car operators usually issued warning tickets rather than citations when they did initiate action. Traffic cars wrote almost all of the citations, and averaged 16.5 citations per day, 5.5 per shift, and 1.1 per car.

Traffic men wrote tickets because that was their basic responsibility. Pressure from the traffic supervisor kept output at about one citation for each traffic man for each day worked. Performance rarely exceeded this norm. Men falling below this norm too frequently were transferred back to patrol duty. Those exceeding this norm too frequently received informal group ridicule, and praise from the traffic supervisor. There was no formal pressure for patrol policemen to write citations or warnings. Informal group pressure, in the form of ridicule, was conducted, which encouraged regular patrol officers not to write citations. The remarks usually sounded like this, "Hey, fellas, Clark's trying to make a name for himself. What are you trying to do, get in traffic?"

One would suspect that patrol officers would try to avoid a confrontation which called for a citation and in turn a stress interview. Since they were not required to produce citations, avoidance came easier. Even most of the traffic control duties were assigned to traffic cars and walking beat men; and all of the accident investigations were assigned to the traffic men. One can see how the patrol cars were gradually squeezed out of the traffic scene. Even the traffic cars only wrote just enough citations to keep the supervisor happy. Records show that the number of citations has remained about the same during a ten-year period, while accidents, deaths, and vehicle registrations have

all increased considerably. There certainly seems to have been an increase in opportunity to write more tickets.

The recipient of a traffic citation was required to pay a fine or appear in court, depending upon the violation or the driver's record. However, warnings were different. A violator would have to receive three warning tickets of similar violation before having to appear in court on the third warning ticket. It was a lot less stressful to issue a warning ticket. A policeman could actually take sanctioned action and still play the role of a good guy. If the violator became antagonistic or beligerent, what better reason could exist for issuing a citation instead of a warning. On the other hand, if the warning happened to be the third one for the violator, the policeman would still come out on top. He might justify the court appearance in terms of "serving the violator right." After all, the third violation for the motorist isn't like the first one. The policeman might feel just a little bit self-righteous and taken advantage of because of his leniency.

Some officers felt that efforts expended on traffic citations were a waste of time, because some of the citations were cancelled. The same officers maintained that citations were cancelled for important people in the community. Usually, the officers brought into this discussion two department regulations:

1. Traffic citations shall not be cancelled by anyone except the district commander.

2. Policemen will not stop on the highway certain dignitaries for ordinary traffic violations unless stopping is necessary to prevent an accident. The dignitaries include the governor, county commissioners, mayors, high officials of the county government, general and flag officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and members of the families of these officials.

The reasoning used by policemen to analyze these two regulations is interesting. Officers felt that supervisors had in the past cancelled citations for "friends." Investigation revealed that citations had in fact been cancelled for certain persons, based simply on who they were. This procedure was not frequent, but it was frequent enough for the rumor to be spread and had more impact than it deserved. In fact, most of the citations did go through normal channels. Many policemen felt that only the court should decide whether a citation should be cancelled. The policemen were unaware of the criteria used by the department for cancelling citations. Not knowing the truth, therefore, and having some facts and some rumor, some officers did not write traffic citations.

In addition to this frame of mind, regulation 2 served to confirm for some that the traffic enforcement policy was unfair. Officers realized that some preference should be given the governor, county commissioners, and mayors, but most did not like the idea of extending the treatment to other members of the government, the armed forces, and

especially to members of their families. Officers reasoned that no one should be held above the law, and this practice amounted to exactly that.

This study began to probe deeper into the area of discretion and discovered some areas of significance related to arrests. Several studies in the past have indicated that law and Supreme Court decisions have no direct impact upon the individual officer, but only reach him through an implementation of the principles by departments themselves in the form of training and effective supervision. This is further illustrated in the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. CT. 1868, (1968), where the court realized that the exclusionary rule is not effective in controlling police conduct.

With this in mind, police were observed in the field, making arrests. Not always did a police officer consider probable cause, elements of a crime, nor many of the other legal aspects when making an arrest. Sometimes he did, especially when there were no exigent circumstances. Usually, there were more immediate factors used for reference. Danger was a prime consideration, followed closely by the degree of emergency, time, situation, peer-group pressure, supervisory pressure, and a multitude of other factors.

When making felony arrests, officers almost always gave the suspect the Miranda warnings. At times, however, the officer had to be reminded by the sergeant. Officers frequently failed to notice pertinent witnesses, handle evidence

properly, or obtain critical evidence. Much of this was due to lack of training and poor supervision, which is distinctly different from close supervision. The general trend or common thread that ran through this behavior seemed to indicate certain propensities. Officers appeared to be primarily concerned with making the arrest, recovering property, and generally holding the scene and all players static, pending the arrival of the supervisor who would iron out the details.

Once the emergency was over, there was a great concern for "doing it right" for court. The prosecuting attorney was advised of all facts in all felony arrests, and it was he who decided whether to release or prosecute. There were three prosecutors who worked with the police, and each demanded a different degree of facts before going ahead with a case. Usually, the patrol personnel were not exposed to the prosecutors sufficiently to react to this distinction. However, to jump ahead slightly, the detectives often capitalized on these differences. Detectives often would try to work with the prosecutor who was less of a task master.

When it came to misdemeanor arrests, the behavior changed slightly, because now that a misdemeanor arrest had been made, it became the patrol sergeant's or lieutenant's responsibility to make the decision whether to go to court or not. Officers still made good arrests and bad arrests, but the contact with the legal system was more frequent here and allowed the officer a closer look. The officer confronted the

legal system alone. It was not like the felony case where the sergeant, the detectives, and the prosecutors acted as buffers. Most officers never made it to the higher courts, and most of their contacts were with the lower magistrate's court.

In felony cases, the officer relied upon his training and supervision to guide him in making a good arrest. After all, these two sources were the most impressive ones. Misdemeanor cases were different, however. The officer did not rely so much on his training or what instructions, or books had told him was a good arrest. In the misdemeanor case, he used as reference, his personal experience with the particular judge, his informal group, and his supervisors.

Officers knew either from experience or from the experience of others what things the judge felt were important in certain kinds of cases. Officers would generally go about making their arrests and testifying in a manner that would give the judge what he wanted. During this study, there were three different judges sitting on the magistrate's bench at different times. One of the judges was thought by most officers to be too easy on criminals and anti-police. The officers were very careful with the cases they brought before this judge. Another judge was termed a "real judge," because he was easier on evidence, tried to get to the truth, and he was fair. More important, he never attacked the police in court like the other judge did. These two judges

took turns presiding over the court. Often, patrol, traffic and detective personnel would arrange certain cases to go before a particular judge. An arrest might even be delayed a day or two in order to have the suspect brought before a particular judge.

During the latter part of this study, the two temporary judges were replaced by a third, permanent judge. Here again, the officers were not as concerned with what the law said was a good case as they were with what this judge was willing to accept. At the conclusion of this study, the police were still testing and trying to define this particular judge's parameters. Remarks were overheard like, "I don't know...Judge Smith would never convict on this evidence. Well, hell, let's give it a try and see what happens with the new judge."

Another factor, and probably one of the more significant influences over the officer's decision to arrest, was the supervisor. The officer responded to the supervisor in much the same way that the supervisor and the detective responded to the judge. Assuming that an officer was inclined to make arrests, he took into consideration the behavior of his particular supervisor. If a supervisor encouraged good arrests and played a supportive role toward his subordinates, then officers usually tried to make arrests. If a supervisor was not inclined to be supportive and caused stress situations for his men, they tended not to make arrests. Many officers indicated that some arrests came their way

and having no choice in the matter, just had to take the individual into the station. On other occasions when officers had the opportunity to exercise discretion, they often declined to make an arrest; because as they put it, "It's easier this way. Sergeant Jones is working the desk and he always gives you a ration of shit."

One particular sergeant had the reputation of not wanting to work, period! An arrest required a lot of work by the desk sergeant; typing out the blotter and the affidavit, journal entry, teletype, etc. This particular sergeant turned many arrests away, after of course, he had "convinced" the officer that it was a bad arrest. This sergeant went so far as to make the statement at roll call, "Okay men, I'm working the desk tonight. I don't want any arrests." He made the statement jokingly, yet with serious overtones. It didn't take the officers who worked for this sergeant long to get the message.

Many other factors influence or constrain police behavior in the field, but this study was mainly concerned with those influences and constraints either created by or contained within the organization itself. The following incident will help to illustrate.

During the latter part of this study, an incident occurred involving white citizens and minority group members. As a result, there were some injuries, a couple of arrests, and a serious incident was averted. The next day, the administrators reviewed the facts of the incident. An

individual officer had moved into a hostile crowd and attempted to make a misdemeanor arrest. A fight ensued. The administrators decided that the officer had not acted wisely and had been overly zealous. They orally admonished the officer for his poor judgement. Of course, the grapevine did its job and rumors spread, with a lot of inconsistencies in the story. One of the officers had gotten hurt, which intensified the feelings. The next day, management came out with a policy change and began sending all personnel to a three-hour class to make sure the incident was not repeated. The instruction centered around conflict management, but one paragraph in the policy change created some misunderstanding:

> Before taking any action, call for backup assistance and notify your shift commander. Do not initiate any action until his arrival, unless of course, someone's life is in danger or the situation deteriorates and your prompt action is clearly defined...Arrests, if indicated, must not be made until the most advantageous opportunity presents itself and then by the shift commander's direction... How will the facts look to an unemotional judge the next day?

Many officers felt this was a threat to their authority and rejected this outlook. However, the longer the discussion continued, the more some officers began to realize the validity of such a perspective. Many officers interpreted this situation to mean that the police were "getting soft," and felt that minority groups would not respect the police. Many officers went back onto the street determined not to make an arrest, not to interfere, and to call the lieutenant on each occasion. They were already rule oriented, so it

was easy for most to hide behind this rule to avoid discretion. After the officers were back on the street a while, some returned to their previous good work patterns, obeying the new rule, of course. However, this study terminated before the full effects of the incident and the rule could be determined.

Many of the officers were receptive to such instruction, and as a result, altered their behavior in the field. It appeared that the most influencing factor was the very weak role played by group socialization. Many officers were not ready to accept the word of others as gospel, especially on how to deal with minority groups.

There were certain factors present that caused the officer to behave the way he did at the scene of this incident. These factors are realized and are important. However, this study was interested in the factors created by the department after the incident and their subsequent effect upon behavior.

This study also attempted to discover whether graft and corruption were present among the personnel. Before the findings are discussed, it should be pointed out that the majority of the police officers were honest. Interviews with twenty-one policemen revealed four attempts by the public to influence the decisions of the policemen with bribes while they were enforcing traffic laws. However, there was no evidence that any officer accepted a bribe. In all cases, the citizen attempting to bribe the officer was either a

new resident or did not live in the county. Interviews with fifty policemen revealed only five incidents in which policemen received free coffee, food, or other commodity. Over a six-year period, between 1964 and 1969, two officers were fired for stealing. These were the only cases revealed by this study in which any semblance of graft existed. In the two cases where the officers were fired, all police officers interviewed condemned their actions as wrong; they were "thieves."

There were other forms of deviancy present among the personnel, but this type of data was hard to obtain, especially in this kind of study, and statistics were not available. However, there were some general trends and categories discovered. Several officers had drinking problems, and during this study, five officers were discovered who could be described as functional alcoholics (people who were alcoholics but could still hold a job). There were instances of adultery, illigitimate children and venereal disease. There were some indications of undetected minor misappropriation of county government property. There were several cases of promiscuous sexual activity by personnel while on duty. There were two instances of emotional disturbance. There were several instances of financial difficulties, but not many, because most police officers were in excellent financial positions. Those who did have money problems were the type who simply could not manage their

personal affairs, and would have had problems had they been earning $30,000 a year.

This type of behavior would most likely be discovered in any police department using hiring practices similar to the department in this study. In spite of low recruiting standards, graft and corruption did not grow and take root for several reasons.

Even though the department may have been hiring marginal people and not giving them the right kind of training, there were other factors to offset this and keep the department relatively free of graft and corruption.

The first factor was the high salary, which placed most officers in such a position that the "need" to take graft or steal was nonexistent. The second factor was the environment. The community was very closely knit, free of disorganized life styles and slums. Consequently, police personnel did not have their values and morals tested day in and day out by an adverse environment. In addition, officers knew that citizens would be quick to complain and the department quick to respond to cries about overt behavior. The third factor is actually a combination of two: Socialization and supervision. In this department, officers were not subjected to the heavy bombardment of the police subculture and its values. Police officers worked alone and had very little opportunity to acquire each others' values. Some socialization did take place, of course, but not nearly to the degree found in a large city department. In addition

to all of the above factors, the department was heavily oriented toward rules and close supervision. In this atmosphere, the officer found it easy to avoid discretion situations. Since his socialization process stopped short, his response to supervision was more pronounced; because his contacts with his supervisor were as frequent or more so than with his fellow officers. There is more to be said about this third factor and some of the adverse ramifications it produced. This will be discussed at the end of this chapter. The important aspect of graft and corruption in the department studied is that deviant behavior was not fostered or learned in the police milieu, but was the result of individual character defects which were present at the time the officer was hired.

The aspects discussed in this section will be analyzed at the end of the chapter, but at this point, it is important to place detective personnel in their proper perspective.

Detective Personnel

Not all of the detectives' behavior is important to this study. Consequently, only those areas will be discussed which aid in analyzing, comparing, or clarifying factors discussed in the previous section.

Personnel who were lucky enough to get promoted to detective often had a change in outlook. They had taken the first step up the ladder of success. They were more visible to management and, consequently, had changed teams. Their

actions and beliefs became important. Their role had changed, so they could no longer express the same thoughts and opinions as they had as police officers. This change in outlook became difficult, especially when the detective found some of the same constraints in the detective section that he had experienced in the patrol section. The new detective did acquire more prestige and respect from management; but what he gained here, he most often lost in another area. His former friends in the patrol section now perceived him as "one of them" instead of "one of us." The newly appointed detective had not expected this, but it is a mystery why he thought he was any different from the detectives he himself had criticized.

The detective did not find the degree of freedom he had anticipated, either. His responsibility was greater, and his discretion base was widened; but the constraints were greater than he had expected. He had hoped to escape the rule-oriented atmosphere, but he had not done so.

Detectives also received written reprimands for being late and using poor judgement. Supervisors frequently controlled the decision to arrest and how to investigate a case. As a general rule, detectives never made arrests without consulting first with the detective sergeant or lieutenant, unless, of course, it was an on-view arrest or an emergency situation.

The different supervisors used different techniques; and as a result, some feelings of animosity among the detectives were noticed during this study. Toward the end of the

study, the personnel structure changed considerably, but the study terminated before the effects could be observed. The informal group structure caused considerable conflict among personnel. After interviewing the detectives, some of their feelings and thoughts seemed to place the blame in certain categories. Some felt that supervisors practiced unfair disciplinary techniques. The supervisors had their favorites, who received all the good cases. The same supervisors fraternized privately with their favorites and obviously rebuffed the friendship of others. One supervisor was accused of always stealing the scene by working all the big cases until the action was over, then turning the case over to a detective to do all the report writing and otherwise unpleasant tasks. When some detectives were late for work, it was overlooked, but the supervisor seemed to make a point of catching others.

Another practice that adversely affected morale was the method of assigning cases. Each morning, there were usually a number of new cases waiting to be picked up. Detectives disliked working minor crime scenes for photographs and fingerprints. There was no systematic method for rotating this duty, so some caught it more than others. Supervisors had overlooked this important factor.

Further related to case assignment was the supervisor's dislike for authorizing overtime. Consequently, when a detective got a lead that might carry his work into overtime, the supervisors often took his case away and turned it over to

another detective working the next shift. This particular practice had extremely bad consequences. Detectives often became enthusiastic over a case. Their personal intrinsic satisfaction derived from their work was to solve a case, to make an arrest, or to recover property. They would get their hopes up about a case, only to have the supervisor take it away or make them wait until the next day to follow up. The detectives who experienced this reacted in a most dejected manner.

Detectives would often reach a point where solving a case was more important, and they would agree to continue working without charging overtime. The supervisor would almost always make certain, emphatically, that the detective would not claim overtime.

One practice that seems to reflect the working environment was related by one of the detectives. The lieutenant was very strict about having all detectives read and initial all complaint reports submitted by the patrol section. Periodically, the lieutenant would take the reports for a one or two-month period and count the number of reports each detective had not initialed. Once he had compiled the data, the lieutenant decided upon a cutoff point, and all those below the mark received letters of reprimand. Since these reports amounted to 100 or 200 monthly, and since there was only one copy of each report for all detectives to read, this represented a difficult and unpleasant task. Many disliked it very much and suggested easier, more efficient methods;

but to no avail. One member of the section would come by the files from time to time and quickly place his initials on the corners of the reports; he rarely read all the reports. Another member read each report dutifully because he was interested, but occasionally he forgot to initial the reports. Consequently, he would receive a letter of reprimand. When this detective tried to explain the difference between reading and initialling, the lieutenant would not hear of it. The detective went on to explain that no one could remember the substance of all those reports anyway. However, the lieutenant stuck to his orders and issued the reprimand. After all, the presence or absence of an initial is factual and easy to judge and other things are not.

The supervisors wanted all crime scenes photographed and processed for fingerprints, regardless of the seriousness of the crime. This practice boiled down to include all felonies and most misdemeanors, where fingerprints could be obtained. Detectives didn't really mind working the scene of a homicide, robbery, or serious burglary, but they seemed to lose interest as the crime got less serious. Detectives usually performed well at serious crime scenes. There was no need for close supervision, because the detective had an interest; he wanted to get fingerprints and possibly make an identification. If he did, it brought informal group admiration, approval by the supervisor, and intrinsic job satisfaction. However, when performing the same duties at the scene of a lesser crime, such as a larceny of property from

a motor vehicle, their outlook changed. In the lesser crime, some detectives were just as diligent, but most didn't try as hard. They all went through the mystic motions of looking for fingerprints and scientific evidence in order to keep the citizen and the supervisor happy. Some even went so far as to destroy a few latent fingerprints. One explained, "Look, I'm busy, and a citizen comes in here with a dip shit complaint like that. If I lift a print, that means eliminating prints of all persons who ride in the car and a lot of extra work. Chances are, we'll never catch the guy anyhow. The victim doesn't care about that; he just wants his property back. Other than that, he couldn't care less. Yes, maybe he would like to punch the thief in the nose, but it's not worth it for an insignificant crime like this. The brass know that, but don't have the guts to stand up and tell the public. So, I go through the motions and keep everybody happy. I can't admit it to the public or to my sergeant because both would hang me for sure."

IV. ANALYSIS

This was a department which relied mostly upon three means to control performance and achieve compliance: Rules, rule enforcement, and close supervision. Each one is discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

The department promulgated hundreds of rules in over 500 pages of regulations. The recruit could not possibly remember all of the rules and decide on his own which ones

were more important. The department could not keep all the rules up to date and currently applicable, so the officer had difficulty relying upon the rule book itself. The officer looked around in his environment for answers to his questions; and as he began to obtain the answers, he began compiling a list of standards. Through his own interpretation and perception of the world around him, he "found out" which standards were more important.

The officer found that rule enforcement identified for him the important rules and the standards of acceptable behavior. If a supervisor enforced a particular rule, then it was an important one. On the other hand, if a supervisor failed to enforce a particular rule, then it was not important. Many incidents supported this assumption, but two particular rules best reflected the reasoning behind the assumption. The two rules required that officers salute superior officers and wear safety belts in police cars. Most of the time, officers complied with these rules when confronted with a supervisor who enforced them. Conversely, the same officers flagrantly disobeyed these rules in the presence of supervisors who did not enforce them. This same pattern of behavior was also observed with other rules. However, the assumption cannot be made that rule enforcement was the only factor that identified standards. On the contrary, officers obeyed rules out of habit, because of perceptions, desires, expectations, morals, and for hundreds of other reasons. The reason for describing rule enforcement

was to indicate that officers occasionally avoided obeying rules they disliked. It was hardly in the officer's best interest individually to obey some rules, especially when he did not benefit from obedience and the chance of discovery was almost nil.

The third factor, close supervision, created some unexpected and unintended results. Personnel found that the exercise of discretion often resulted in criticism by the supervisor. The supervisor, for many reasons, was usually at the scene of many situations, telling the subordinate what to do and often taking the decision out of his hands completely. The subordinate was always being told how to do some things and not to do other things. Eventually, he found himself with no ideas or initiative of his own. In addition, the officer found that he could by his actions shift the whole burden of decision to the supervisor. In giving up this freedom, he could enjoy the pleasures and irresponsibilities of a child.

Many supervisors did not realize this reciprocating phenomenon. One supervisor griped and wondered why officers could never write reports correctly. But, each time a poor report was submitted to the supervisor, he gave a disgusted sigh, dismissed the officer, and re-wrote the report himself. The superiors wondered why officers didn't use good judgement when confronted with minor, as well as major crisis situations. But, at the same time, the department took great pains to take the discretion away from the officer and place

it in the hands of the supervisors. This was supposed to improve the officer's decision making? What a dichotomy! They could not realize that one practice fostered the other, and it in turn reinforced the former.

The whole supervisory structure tended to significantly restrict the discretion base of the individual and simultaneously push him toward a "rule-compliance" orientation. This brought about some extensive costs to efficiency and effectiveness. Officers often declined to make decisions, reporting everything to their superiors and letting them make the decisions. This was significantly reflected in one of the desk sergeant's duties. He was required to send a teletype to police headquarters, explaining the pertinent facts whenever the police became involved in certain kinds of incidents. This list changed frequently, so the sergeant was often unsure as to which incidents should be reported. In addition, he was often criticized for not reporting some incidents; so he responded by reporting almost everything, thereby avoiding making a decision himself. The desk sergeant also received criticism for not reporting other incidents on the logs and reports, so many sergeants responded by reporting all activity.

It would have been impossible to report all activity observed during this study. As a result, only certain aspects have been discussed and analyzed. However, in the next chapter, the total implications of the study are examined to identify the component parts of control and the control process.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions derived from this study are included in this chapter. The results of this study were described in the previous chapter in the form of observations and analyses of activity within the department. The conclusions were drawn with the idea in mind that they would be applicable to a much wider frame of reference than the organization from which the data came.

The results of the study indicated that the communication process was part of the control structure in that it informed the performer of a particular standard; and that the power process (that which emanates from constraints) was also a part in that it attempted to force a performer to decide to act in relation to a particular standard.

Every event is a controlled activity; the intent or results of the activity may or may not be functional for the organization. What is functional for the organization, or the performer, or other persons depends upon the perspective and standard used to evaluate results.

Control can be observed by tracing behavior to the reason why behavior took place. This would indicate the type of power processes acting in the particular instance. The power process can be traced to a constraint or series of constraints

that caused the power process to operate. The value of the resulting action depends upon the relationship of the action to a specified standard. The standard used may be that which was expressed or that which was perceived (if there is a difference). If the relationship of activity to a standard is close, then the action could be considered in conformity and thereby, controlled. If the obverse is true, then there would be nonconformity and no control. The particular standard and degree of conformity would depend upon the perspective of the observer, the controller, or the performer.

Additionally, the means used to evaluate control has a direct relationship to the constraints in that they may be interpreted themselves as representing standards. Any constraint which causes a power process to operate also has some reference to a particular standard. Both of these considerations point out that standards are often created by other entities besides the formal organization. It would appear, then, that two factors of control are the processes that communicate standards and the processes which have power over performance. The relationship of those two processes could create the structure of control.

I. CONSTRAINTS, COMMUNICATION, AND STANDARDS

As a result of the literature review in Chapter II, control was defined as the acceptance of and conformity to a standard. This method of study was designed to permit maximum observation and identification of standards and

behavior in relation to those standards.

The results of the research performed within the organization tended to emphasize the various constraints upon behavior. This was also the emphasis of the literature reviewed on social and managerial control. The literature described the forces or devices that constrained behavior in a particular manner. Follett and Homans each discussed the interacting functions of groups that inherently caused behavior to conform to a pattern. Vroom and Blau described devices (explicit constraints) which assured the conformance of behavior to specified patterns. The managerial writers prescribed the use of devices (Koontz and O'Donnell), work patterning (Sayles), or rules and regulations (Blau and Scott), to assure that behavior conformed to specific standards. All described the activity of constraints. However, the function of constraints was never completely clarified.

Constraints upon behavior appeared to serve three functions: They identified standards, channeled behavior, and made control observable (behavior in relation to standards). Those functions were implied in the studies reviewed in Chapter II.

The identification of standards as a function of constraints was implied in the Cooper et al., Ridgway, and Bensman-Gerver studies. Each described the standard of performance in the form of constraints (the auditors, explicit measurements, and formalized work patterns). In those studies, the constraints upon behavior "communicated" the

expected behavior pattern to the performers.

Constraints were also shown to serve the function of making control observable. Since control is the relationship between behavior and standards, certain physical factors have to exist in order to observe control. Those physical factors are the constraints or forces upon behavior that channel or direct behavior toward some standard.

The Tannenbaum study emphasized that particular point by distinguishing between actual and perceived control. The observability of control is significant to the study of control structures. If control is perceived in one manner, and exists in another, then it is possible that the concept of control depends upon the perspective of the "controller," the "performer," and the "observer." The controller is the person(s) attempting to assure conformity; the performer is the person(s) behaving under the influence of constraints; and the observer is the person(s) studying or observing the relationship between performance and standards. As Tannenbaum emphasized, a person acts in accordance with his perceptions of what controls him; that may be different from what the controller intended. Nevertheless, control over the performer could exist; it may be observable by the constraints upon him which are created by his work group as opposed to the formal rules being "enforced" by his superiors.

The significant factor is the perspective from which control is observed. By tracing behavior to the constraints, the particular standard can be found. By indicating the

standard and the appropriateness of the behavior in relation to that standard, constraints serve the function of identifying the perspective. Constraints permit an objective observer to identify the existence of a control structure regardless of its functional or dysfunctional value to the organization.

In this study, the researcher was the observer. The method of study was designed to trace the path from behavior to constraints upon behavior and to the standard upon which the constraints were based. The results in Chapter IV described the behavior, constraints, and standards observed in the organization.

II. GENERAL CONTROL STRUCTURES

If control is composed of a communicated standard and an exerted power force, then it could be shown in the form of a control matrix as four basic structures.

Power of Constraints	Communication of Standards	
	Expressed	Perceived
Formal	I	II
Implied	III	IV

Control Matrix

Figure 5

Within the matrix, the structure of control in the formal organization could be identified for any given situation (other components are discussed in the next section). Standards could be identified either as expressed standards or perceived standards. Those categorized as expressed standards are found in rules and regulations, specific job descriptions, specific operating procedures, etc. Those categorized as perceived are the standards which are understood by the performer to exist. Consequently, it would be possible for the expressed and perceived standards to be the same in some instances and different in other instances.

Before the performer acts in relation to a standard, he decides to act. His decision is affected by the power exerted over him. This power may be formal power or implied power. Formal power can be comprised of direct supervision, physical force, or any formal constraint expressed as a constraint by the organization. Implied power is that power which the performer infers from a situation and may be the same as the formal power; implied power may also be the influence exerted over performers by conditions in their working environment, as well as those outside the organization.

As a consequence of the relationship between communicated standards and the power exerted over the performer, control could be structured in four patterns.

Control Structure I

This structure is the result of expressed standards and formal power. This also represents the formal and traditional

control structure which the traditional managerial writers called managerial control. This structure presumes that standards of performance are clearly expressed; and because of the existence of formal organizational hierarchical processes, that behavior will be formally directed toward that standard.

This type of control was described by Vroom and Blau as a directed or forced coordinated type. It is the type of structure that Koontz and O'Donnell would describe as the formal system of control, whereby the leaders of the organization not only express all the standards of behavior, but also have formal systems established for the sole purpose of influencing and checking upon that behavior.

In this study, the structure was found to exist in behavior conforming to the standard of promptness. The organization expressed the standard that all personnel would arrive at work on time. Behavior was influenced by the use of formal power in the form of a written reprimand. This structure was also found in other similar situations.

Control Structure II

This structure is the result of the relationship between perceived standards and formal power over behavior. This structure could result from several relationships. For instance, the formal organizational design might organize work relationships but not express standards. Consequently, the standards would be perceived by the performers and cause them to react to formal power differently than the leaders

of the organization had intended. This structure may also grow out of a misunderstanding of standards and formal power.

Tannenbaum's study indicated that there was a difference between standards of performance intended by the organizational leaders and those perveived by subordinates. Blau prescribed the use of formal power to force behavior to comply with a formal pattern. It must be presumed that this need arises because of the possibility of misperceived standards (from those intended by management). The regulation of behavior naturally implies the possibility and the likelihood of deviance. Blau and Scott indicated the existence of this type of control structure when they suggested the use of formalized rules, personnel selection, adequate feedback system, performance records, and training. All of these devices indicate a difference between expressed and perceived standards. It is not difficult to imagine that standards perceived by the performers may not necessarily be the same as those intended by the rule enforcer.

This type of control structure could lead to serious conflict because the formal power being exerted by supervisors may be based upon different standards than those used by the police officer. This is brought about frequently by a defect in the communication process.

This type of control structure was found, in this study, to exist in the relationship between the officer and his sergeant. The sergeant exerted close supervision over the

officer to assure that performance conformed to standards. However, the officer, in responding to the formal power, interpreted the standard to mean that he was to restrict his discretion base and not to make decisions. The misunderstanding here came from the methods used by the supervisory personnel and the lack of expressed standards.

This type was also found in the behavior of traffic personnel. No standard existed which stated the number of traffic citations officers were supposed to issue. The sergeant never stated that personnel were supposed to issue one traffic citation for each day worked. However, the formal power exerted by the traffic sergeant (transfer of officers back to the patrol section) indicated to the officers what the standard was.

Control Structure III

In this type of control, the standards are expressly stated, but power over behavior is implied rather than formalized. If the expressed standards are ever challenged, the work process may become disorganized. Conformity within this structure is obtained mostly from voluntary compliance.

This structure was discovered in this study in various forms, especially in standards which were expressed but which the department would have serious difficulty in enforcing or correcting deviance. In fact, conformity was encouraged, but no attempt was made to impose formal sanctions for deviance. For instance, the military atmosphere produced standards whereby personnel were supposed to salute

superior officers and address them either as "sir" or by their rank. If personnel refused to comply, it is very doubtful that formal power would or could have been exercised to obtain compliance. The Civil Service System and the civil courts would most likely not support any punishment based upon that standard. Such non-compliance would most assuredly disorganize the work process by upsetting those superiors who obtained moral support from such obsequious behavior.

Control Structure IV

In this type of control structure, the standards of performance are perceived by the performer and the power over their performance is implied. The Ridgway study indicated that standards may be perceived from the type of measurements applied against performance. This structure was also indicated in the Churchill et al., study where the standards of behavior were perceived to be those that the auditors were checking. Performance was effected by the implied power that the auditors had and was indicated by the conformity to the auditors' suggestions.

This type of structure was found in the patrol section, where most officers perceived the standard that roll call was to be held at ten minutes before the hour. Work patterns were arranged so that the officer perceived this standard. The officer also perceived implied power in the form of sanctions which were withheld. The standard and implied power

were reinforced in the officer's mind when he witnessed reprimands for being late for work. The actual standard which existed maintained that officers should not arrive after the hour; and those who did were punished. From the actual formal standard and formal power, the officer perceived other standards and power to exist, when in fact they did not. Remember, a few officers refused to stand roll call and were not formally punished; but this still did not offset the implications perceived by the other officers. Many officers expressed belief that the formal power would eventually come crashing down about the heads of those who refused to stand roll call. However, many supervisors confessed in private that they did not possess the explicit power to force the officers to stand roll call before the hour.

There is a possibility that all situations could be categorized into one of the above control structures. However, these four structures only take into consideration the control created by the formal organization. When the informal organization and other more complex factors are taken into consideration, the control process takes on other characteristics. Some of these additional factors are discussed in the next section.

III. ADDITIONAL FACTORS

A bureaucracy is an organization composed of roles, and there are specific expectations attached to those roles. Often overlooked, however, is the fact that the people who

fill the roles are also "persons" in other instances, which makes the situations more complex. George H. Mead pointed out long ago that the individual is complex, and influencing behavior is not a simple process:

> ...The organism does not simply react to any and all stimuli in its vicinity - rather, it selects stimuli in terms of its ongoing activity.[51]

Mead emphasized that in order to sift through this barrage of stimuli, the individual creates a generalized other, which gives the individual a sort of reference point:

> ...This generalized other represents, then, the set of standpoints which are common to the group... the individual...can act with a certain amount of consistency in a variety of situations because he acts in accordance with a generalized set of expectations and definitions that he has internalized.[52]

As a result, the individual can react to his environment much like a pilot reacts to natural forces by adjusting his airplane; or as Meltzer said in explaining Mead:

> ...Instead of being subject to all impulses and stimuli directly playing upon him, the individual can check, guide, and organize his behavior. He is then not a mere passive agent.[53]

However, as the individual begins to respond to selected stimuli, certain patterns of behavior may take shape. Chester I. Barnard recognized this pattern:

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[51]Bernard N. Meltzer, The Social Psychology of George Herbert Mead (Kalamazoo: Center for Sociological Research, Western Michigan University, 1964) p. 8.

[52]Ibid., p. 17.

[53]Ibid., p. 18.

> ...The interactions (of the informal organization) are apparently characterized by choice, and furnish the opportunities often for reinforcement of personal attitudes.[54]

These patterns of behavior, then, are the result of a psychological factor, which Barnard defines as:

> ...The combinations, resultants, or residues of the physical, biological, and social factors which have determined the history and the present state of the individual in relation to his present environment.[55]

These patterns of behavior indicate that the individual chooses whether or not to enter into a cooperative system like the informal group. The choice will be made, Barnard says, upon the basis of (1) purposes, desires, impulses of the moment, and (2) the alternatives external to the individual recognized by him as available. However, Simon was more careful to describe choice when it came to behavior:

> All behavior involves conscious or unconscious selection of particular actions out of all those which are physically possible to the actor and those persons over whom he exercises influence and authority. The term, "selection" is used...without any implication of a conscious or deliberate process. It refers simply to the fact that, if the individual follows one particular course of action, there are other courses of action he thereby foregoes.[56]

Whether one uses Barnard's concept of "choice," or Simon's definition of "selection," the fact cannot be denied that informal groups are formed and certain patterns of

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[54]Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956) p. 122.

[55]Ibid., p. 13.

[56]Simon, op.cit., p. 3.

behavior develop. Barnard made an acute observation of informal groups, "...comradeship is much more powerful than patriotism..."[57]

When an individual enters the informal group, he is subjected to the socialization process, whereby he goes through all the previously described stages and eventually becomes part of the group. Howard S. Becker explored the socialization process among medical students, and much of what he discovered is relevant to this study and the police subculture in general.

Becker discovered that medical students looked to the doctor for "pearls of wisdom," because it was the doctor who had experienced the things not attainable from a textbook. To see something was to be "lucky" because this meant valuable experience. Consequently, seniority reflected experience, and experience reflected knowledge.[58]

This condition exists to a great degree in the police subculture, where seniority reflects valuable experience. Rookies envy the older officer for having experienced certain conditions. The officer who can relate an impressive experience is held in high esteem among the other officers. As the medical student obtained knowledge from the doctor, the rookie learns his job from the older officer.

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[57]Barnard, op. cit., p. 119.

[58]Howard S. Becker, Boys in White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961) pp. 235-273.

Medical students looked forward to experiencing the situations described to them by the doctors. The police officer was no different. He was often overheard to say, "Boy, I would like to see a burglar coming out of that window right now," or "I'm not saying that I wish a stick-up, but if one is going to happen, I would like it to happen right here." Rookies often went about their duties conjuring up hypothetical situations and imagining how they would react. This mental exercise prepared the rookie for the situation he hoped to confront, but of course on his own terms and when he was prepared for it. This rarely happens, however.

The doctor had something the medical student wanted; responsibility. The medical student looked forward to the exercise of responsibility and often judged the value of a service by the amount of responsibility. On the other hand, the rookie looked forward to the experience, for the inherent feelings of the experience itself, and judged its importance by the amount of danger present.

During Becker's study, he also discovered that the socialization process produced a sharing of common values. By association with doctors, the medical students learned that some cases are better than others because some patients can be helped; that the concept of medical responsibility is saving lives; that people who do not take their advice are to be disliked; and that doctors form a very closely knit, mutually protective minority group.

One important aspect of the police subculture was discovered in this study. As can be concluded, the medical subculture is created out of the close relationship between the medical student and the doctor. The same subculture is also created out of the relationship between the rookie and the police officer. However, neither subculture would have progressed to the degree it did had not the student and the rookie been exposed to the doctor and the officer with such intensity. The close relationship was the catalyst which caused the subculture. The obverse to the subculture was found in this study; the close relationship between the rookie and the officer was stopped short before it could create a highly cohesive subculture.

In consideration of all the above concepts, the term constraints must then take on a broader meaning. Constraints were observed to come in many different forms; supervision, actions, events, beliefs, perceptions, wants, needs, socialization, etc. Generally, any force that channeled behavior and activity emanated from a constraint. The sources of constraints were found to be social, psychological, and technological in nature. However, it is too simple to say that constraints controlled behavior whenever they were activated and converted into power. On the contrary, there were other factors that interfered with constraints. Constraints competed with each other; there were barriers and conflicts; there were also value differences, goal variations, and power differences. In fact, the powers of constraints create a

complex network of processes. Figure 6 shows those processes in such a way that they can best be understood.

To support this view of constraints, Pfiffner indicated that power does not only come from supervisors, but is often created out of a situation or state of mind:

> Power is: visible, related to social goals and values, and derived from a number of sources... There are aspects of power which do not necessarily relate to leadership. There are forces in organizations which operate regardless of the individual actors and their leadership qualities, creating certain predispositions toward dominance within the system...Many times...power is not visible. This of course complicates any attempt to ascertain the manner in which patterns of influence operate to control behavior within an organization. Yet it is quite apparent we are dealing here with a phenomenon which sometimes operates consciously and sometimes unconsciously, which sometimes occurs directly and sometimes indirectly.[59]

In realizing the complexity of influence over behavior, one cannot help questioning the value of formal constraints. The literature reflected that formal controls may be dysfunctional. This was also found to be true in some instances during this study. For example, the formal controls exerted over personnel to assure that they arrive at work on time were certainly dysfunctional to some degree.

Another instance discovered in this study involved the enforcement of a departmental regulation which forbade personnel to publicly criticize their superiors. Over a seven-year period, three officers were suspended from their jobs

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[59] John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative Organization (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960) pp. 328-331.



Power of Constraints Upon Behavior

Figure 6

for criticizing supervisors. One officer made a public statement in a local newspaper about the whole department and the county government. Most officers agreed that his actions were unwise and reflected poor judgement. However, the other two officers were punished for off-hand, critical remarks made to other officers about a supervisor. The second two incidents gravely affected morale. Officers and supervisors both continued to make critical remarks after these incidents; they were just more careful when, where, and in whose presence the remarks were made. The punishment of these officers created a broad gap between the officers and the administrators, and caused mutual distrust.

Rensis Likert discovered in analyzing several studies, that unreasonable pressure (as interpreted by the worker) in the form of constraints by management, often decreased rather than increased the amount of influence exerted by supervisors.[60] Likert went on to explain that "managers...who are achieving the highest productivity, lowest costs, least turnovers and absence, and the highest levels of employee motivation and satisfaction display, on the average, a different pattern of leadership from those managers who are achieving less impressive results."[61]

The most significant aspect pointed out by Likert was that these successful managers were deviating from the more

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[60]Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961) p. 56.

[61]Ibid., p. 60

traditional techniques of managing. These patterns described by Likert were also found to exist in the department studied. Supervisors' techniques seemed to fall somewhere on a continuum between two extremes. On one end, a technique which most officers despised, and at the other end, a technique which most officers liked. During this study, different supervisors were discussed with the police officers. Many of the officers could not agree on the worth of some supervisors; "Oh, he's alright, I guess." Regarding other supervisors, however, almost to a man, officers would agree either that he was a good or a bad supervisor. In each instance, certain characteristics of the supervisor placed him in a distinct category.

The "bad" supervisor was almost always authoritative and militaristic in his approach to obtain compliance, and relied upon rule enforcement, followed by the prescribed punishment. He most often used criticism in evaluating work, but often was not competent in the job himself. He also had favorites.

At the other extreme, the "good" supervisor used rule enforcement far less frequently. He instilled confidence in his men; he created an informal work atmosphere that was mutually supportive. He used constructive criticism and always set the example for behavior. The most important aspect was that these supervisors created a one-to-one relationship with each individual, and that relationship was

supportive to the group as a whole. It was the opposite of "playing favorite" observed in the bad supervisor. There were other differences, but these were the most obvious characteristics discovered in this study.

IV. THE CONTROL PROCESS AND ITS COMPONENTS

Taking into consideration all of the conclusions discussed thus far, the study did support the original hypothesis by identifying the components of control and reflecting a viable model for the control process.

Control involves performance behavior which occurs as a result of the powers of constraints imposed upon the individual. However, the whole control process contains six basic components: (1) Standards. (2) Constraints. (3) The Communication Process. (4) The Selection Process. (5) The Decision Process. (6) Performance. This enumeration of components does not mean that there are six and only six basic components of control. There may be more or fewer. Some of the six could probably be broken down into more parts. This enumeration does mean, however, that in this study, control appeared to consist of six interlocking components. Enumeration appears to be, to a large degree, based upon preference and perspective. The properties of control are categorized into these six parts in order to make control easier to discuss. These components are not completely separate and distinct, but are often intertwined. However, this categorization and labeling is necessary in order to examine the whole

control process.

Standards: Standards are merely reference points which describe a level of performance or behavior. They are created by the formal organization, informal organizational groups, and the individual. They may take the form of rules and regulations, laws, beliefs, mores, etc. Standards may be in congruence with each other or in opposition to each other.

Constraints: This term is defined in the same manner that it has been used throughout the study, particularly as it was shown in Figure 6. Constraints are the bases of the power imposed upon the performer. They may originate from the formal organization, informal organizational groups, the individual himself, or the environment.

The Communication Process: This process relays to the performer the many different standards of performance in the complex world about him. This process is often aided or inhibited by the interplay of constraints, as are all the other components of the control process.

The Selection Process: This term is used in the same way Simon used it, without indicating a conscious or deliberate process, but meaning simply that in following one course of action, the performer foregoes other courses of action. This "selection" may be a conscious or unconscious effort. The selection process is affected by constraints and the communication process.

The Decision Process: This term is best described by Meltzer (as he explained Mead). It refers to the process

whereby, once the selection process is activated, there are efforts to monitor performance to determine whether it coincides with the selected standard. This process is used to guide, check, and organize behavior. It is used by the formal organization to determine whether performance conforms to standards; it is used by the informal group for the same thing. More significantly, it is used by the individual to stabilize his ongoing activity. This process involves the inspection of performance, the feedback of information, and the correction of deviant behavior. This process may be either conscious or unconscious, and it is affected by constraints.

Performance: This involves the activity of work and the performer himself. This aspect involves the physical and mental capabilities of the individual. It also includes the presence of activity or the lack of it; and the work activity itself. This component is affected by the power of constraints, also. Some of the more frequent constraints found here are the limitations of the mind and body, such as fatigue, energy, frustration level, etc.

Combined, these six component parts create a whole control process. The process can be explained in a rather broad manner, if one acknowledges all the other minute concepts discussed earlier. Standards of behavior are created by the formal organization, informal organizational groups, and the individual. The standards all compete with each other as they are communicated to the individual. The individual

selects one of these standards and performs relative to the chosen standard. As he performs, the decision processes of the formal organization, informal organizational groups, and the individual begin to operate. Due to the nature of the work itself, the decision process may not be successful in monitoring all instances of performance. In other words, performance may be complete before the decision process can act. Prior to, during, and after performance, the powers of constraints are playing upon all of the other component parts of the control process. The constraints may be designed by or inherent to the formal organization, informal organizational groups, the individual, or the environment. The control process is shown in Figure 7.

The original hypothesis was much narrower in scope than the ultimate findings produced by this study. At the beginning of the study, only five of the components were assumed to be part of the control process. The decision process was, at that time, not considered a separate and distinct factor. Also, constraints were conceived as only exerting power over the act of performance rather than the whole control process. In addition, the idea was overlooked in the hypothesis that a situation present in the environment would create constraints. However, the study did prove fruitful in that it produced a control process. Part of the purpose of the study was to produce hypotheses about the control process which could be tested in later research. These implications for future research are contained in the next section.



The Control Process

Figure 7

V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As a result of the study, certain significant areas were discovered which indicated a need for future study. Also, hypotheses were developed which need to be tested in other studies. Listed below are some suggestions for future research.

1. In the absence of expressly communicated standards and formalized power by the formal organization, performers will perceive their own standards and enforce their own behavior.

2. Since this study discovered that the socialization process of the rookie can be disrupted, another study should explore, in depth, the close relationship between the rookie and the officer. Since the close relationship is the catalyst causing the socialization, it would seem that if dysfunctional behavior patterns are to be broken, it is critical to understand this relationship.

3. What are the relationships between police organizational objectives and organizational control processes?

4. What are the relative powers of organizational constraints as compared to those of the informal group?

5. How effective are organizational constraints?

6. At what point in the police officer's career is the socialization process complete; and once the police subculture has been formed, how can it be changed?

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Position _____

1. What is your job?
2. How were you informed of your job duties?
   FORM BY WHOM
3. Type of job instructions.
   FROM FORM SUBJECT QUANTITY DATES
4. What are your job standards?
   HOW DETERMINED BY WHOM FORM
5. What reports do you prepare?
   FOR WHOM QUANTITY FREQUENCY SUBJECT
6. Who measures your performance?
   FREQUENCY BASIS-SUBJECT FORM OF
7. What is your supervisor's prime means of evaluating you?
8. What do you believe it should be?
9. As you perceive it, what percentage of your total job is under your own discretion?
10. What do you believe it should be?
11. From whom do you receive inputs for your job?
    HOW OFTEN WHAT TYPE BASIS OF ACTIVATION
12. To whom do you supply your outputs?
    HOW OFTEN WHAT TYPE BASIS OF ACTIVATION
13. From whom do you receive support services?
    HOW OFTEN WHAT TYPE BASIS OF ACTIVATION

14. Do you prepare a budget?

TYPE	FREQUENCY	SUBMITTED TO	APPROVED BY

15. Do you receive funds?

FROM WHOM	WHY	HOW DISPOSED	RECORDS OF

16. Do you disburse funds?

TO WHOM	WHY	HOW DISPOSED	RECORDS OF

17. How much of the organization do you supervise, and what activities does this include?

18. Who schedules your work?

TYPE	METHOD OF CHECKING ON YOU

19. What is your goal for your function?

20. How did you decide on this?

21. What do you expect of your subordinates?

22. How do you communicate your expectations?

23. How do you check or monitor their behavior?

WHEN	WHY

24. What is your prime control method(s)?

25. What is your opinion or policy on controls?

26. What are your supervisory functions?

27. Who hires your employees?

28. Who discharges your employees?

29. Who sets their job standards?

30. Who sets their pay schedule?

31. What reports do you receive from them?

SUBJECT	FREQUENCY	FORM

APPENDIX B

INCIDENT RECORDING SHEET

Standard _____

_____

Time _____ Date _____ Location _____

Shift (Check one) 8 - 4 4 - 12 12 - 8

Incident (Describe) _____

_____

_____

Variables Present:

Check if applicable	Describe
_____ Communication of standard	
_____ Inspection of performance	
_____ Feedback	
_____ Correction	
_____ Power (constraints)	
_____ Point of view	
_____ Qualities of performer	
_____ Degree of conformance	
_____	
_____	
_____	

Comments entered on reverse side