THE QUESTION OF RADICAL GENEROSITY: ETHICS AND POLITICS OF COSMOPOLITANISM

By

Ali Kashani

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This inquiry is about the following question: what conditions give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. This study examines ethical and political conditions concerning cosmopolitanism, and argues that radical generosity is a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Generosity involves benevolence that expects nothing in return. It does not depend on reciprocity, duty, calculation, or following a rule. It is an unconditional practice. Radical generosity differs from random acts of generosity that may happen from time to time, but do not have profound social and political impact. Radical generosity is a social practice, which has the potential to transform ethical and political practices. The practice of radical generosity has a transformative aspect, that is to say, it is a practice as a “way of life.” A “way of life” means practicing radical generosity as an everyday activity, which can become the ethos of society. In other words, radical generosity has the potential to challenge and transform existing values and norms.

This study examines three distinct philosophical approaches to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. It examines cosmopolitanism as a “way of life” developed by Stoics thinkers in diverse ways, but lacking a political or institutional conception of cosmopolitanism. Then, examines two other approaches to cosmopolitanism, the “juridical-political”(Kant and Habermas) in the framework of political institutions, and the “beyond-normative”(Derrida and Levinas) in the realm of unconditional ethical responsibility.
It acknowledges the importance and necessity of these approaches to cosmopolitanism and extracts certain ideas from these thinkers. It also problematizes and shows their limitations in certain respects in order to advance its argument. Finally, it attempts to develop a conception of radical generosity as a social practice in concrete terms, and underscore the idea of practice (praxis). The idea of practice (praxis) refers to human activities that transform material, social, and political conditions in historical terms. It attempts to show the relevance and importance of radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.
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INTRODUCTION

Thesis

My inquiry in this study begins with the following question: what conditions give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism? In order to answer this question, I will examine ethical and political conditions concerning cosmopolitanism and argue that radical generosity is a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Recent discussions of cosmopolitanism do not adequately acknowledge the importance of generosity as a practice for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. In fact, the idea of generosity as a practice (praxis), with respect to cosmopolitanism, has been overlooked. Here, I present a brief description of it, but I will further develop my idea of radical generosity in chapter four and explicate what practice (praxis) in the context of radical generosity means.

Generosity involves benevolence that expects nothing in return. It does not depend on reciprocity, duty, calculation, or following a rule. It is an unconditional practice. I make a distinction between random acts of generosity by individuals, generous singular acts which may happen from time to time but do not have profound social and political impact, and radical generosity as a social practice, which has the potential to transform ethical and political practices. I suggest that the practice of radical generosity has a transformative aspect; that is to say, I understand it as a “way of life.” A “way of life” means practicing radical generosity as an everyday activity, which can become the ethos of society in concrete terms. In other words, radical generosity has the potential to challenge and transform existing values and norms. It must be noted that, I am not proposing that radical generosity will address all the problems of the world. In other words, radical generosity is not a panacea, rather within the context of the possibility of cosmopolitanism, which involves the issues of immigration and refugee crisis,
radical generosity can be considered as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. I argue that the current immigration and refugee crisis indicate that the existing policies are not sufficient and failing, and xenophobia is on the rise in an alarming rate. Thus, there is a serious need for rethinking these policies and values and practices that inform and produce these self-interested and nationalistic policies. Thus, political institutions can consider adopting generous policies with regard to the immigration and refugee crisis. It must be noted that ethical issues have political implications, in particular, within the context cosmopolitanism, citizenship, immigration, and refugee crisis. Thus, in my view, politics without ethical consideration could be blind.

With the idea of radical generosity, we turn from individual acts of generosity within existing society to social acts that have transformative implications. Radical generosity is a social practice that transcends individual acts both by being the action of groups and by aspiring to create new ongoing social practices. Here generosity is not simply the application of existing rules but a challenge to existing practices. Thus, it breaks with existing paradigms but retains an ethical quality in part by pointing to new practices and norms. Furthermore, the potential for the practice of radical generosity is also a potential for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Therefore, radical generosity understood as a transformative praxis has concrete implications, such as, generous policies with regard to immigration and refugee crisis.

Now, I turn my attention to the idea of cosmopolitanism. It must be noted that cosmopolitanism is a challenging concept to define. It has many definitions and interpretations. In other words, it is not a given, rather a possibility, and, as such, raises difficult conceptual issues. In general, cosmopolitanism is defined in two distinct ways, ethical cosmopolitanism and political cosmopolitanism. Ethical cosmopolitanism is concerned with the extension of the scope
of ethical concern. This implies that every human being as a citizen of the world belongs to a
world community and has an equal ethical worth, and this creates the idea of caring and
responsibility for others, regardless of ethnicity, national, cultural, and political associations.
Political cosmopolitanism seeks to develop political institutions that can create a cosmopolitan
political order to both organize the world and address some political issues on global scale in a
democratic and legal framework. But these two distinct conceptions of cosmopolitanism cross
over strict ethical and political definitions and boundaries. It is difficult to conceive of a political
cosmopolitanism without reflecting on ethical implications of such a view, and vice versa.
In my view, cosmopolitanism is an ongoing project and a possibility. Conceiving it involves
social relations, a movement, a society, a worldview, and a way of life, by which we understand
the idea of citizen as “world citizen” that transcends both the nation-state idea of citizen and the
exclusions that this idea implies. What distinguishes this view is that it treats cosmopolitanism in
historical terms; it acknowledges the institutional requirements of cosmopolitanism, viewing it as
openness to others and a way of life, and, in doing so, involves social and political
transformation, which in turn involves the practice of radical generosity.

Before going any further with the idea of cosmopolitanism, we need to answer the
following question: why should cosmopolitanism be considered, and why now? The short and
simple answer is that the idea of “nation-state” and the notion of “national interest” have
produced so many devastating wars and the refugee crisis in recent history. To name a few,
World War-I, World War-II (the Holocaust and the use of atomic bomb), the Israeli-Palestinian
War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Iraq-Iran War, the Balkan War (ethnic cleansing),
and the most recent wars include the Afghan War, the Iraq War, the Ukraine War, the Yemen
war, the Libyan War, and the Syrian War, most of these wars have caused massive refugee crisis.
Furthermore, the influx of immigrants and refugees has caused a drastic rise in xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe and the US. It seems existing worldview, political order, and policies cannot adequately address these crises, simply because it is based on the idea of “nation-state” and “national interest.” In my view, it is time to think about the possibility of an alternative worldview, and think about potentials for a different future. How can we realize a different world and future, and create an alternative to the notions of “nation-state” and “national interest” and avoid the perpetual war and the refugee crisis? I suggest that a cosmopolitanism worldview can offer such an alternative and solution to the challenges of war and the refugee crisis that the world is experiencing now, which has given rise to xenophobia. Therefore, conditions that give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism can be examined and considered. There might be objection to my suggestion. Certainly, we can continue the same path that we began 367 years ago when the treaty of Westphalia was established, which paved the way for the modern conception of “nation-state.” But as I argued above it has been a devastating experience so far, and it seems it is not getting better any time soon with current conditions of war and the refugee crisis in the world. Why not try an alternative worldview? Isn’t it time to transcend the idea of “nation-state” and “national interest” in favor of something more inclusive, which promotes the idea of “world citizen,” solidarity, and treats everyone equally ethically and politically, regardless of their place of birth, ethnicity, race, and culture? It seems to me it is a desirable alternative to consider, and try to examine the possibility of such a world.
Method

A very brief remark about my method in this study: first, it must be noted that in this project I am engaged in a creative inquiry, which means my reading of the texts and appropriation of concepts at times are unorthodox. I must acknowledge that this approach may cause some difficulty. Nevertheless, this departure from the standard reading of the texts and occasional unconventional reading of the texts opens the possibility for a creative synthesis of ideas, and this innovative interpretation of the texts enables me to develop my concepts. I acknowledge that this is a novel approach but the compelling nature of this project to some extent requires such a novel approach. Therefore, innovative interpretations should be evaluated not from the position of their hermeneutic accuracy, rather from their ability to contribute to a creative project justified by the compelling nature of the crisis (e.g. the immigration and refugee crisis). However, in light of the difficulty that this approach may present, I attempt to provide the exposition of my positions in this project, and justify them in the best possible way. Second, it must be noted that we cannot be engaged in a philosophical discourse outside of the history of philosophy, and, moreover, nothing is outside of history. As such, I focus on the history of cosmopolitanism and the relation between the history of cosmopolitanism and the contemporary discourse of cosmopolitanism.

My method is historical in two senses: one regarding the history of concepts, the other regarding the historical context of present discussion. I explore key historical figures and concepts in my discussion of conditions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. I examine conditions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, from an ethical and political perspective, assessing the soundness of these ideas. The unfolding of chapters presents the movement of my argument by relying on historical concepts and thinkers in the context of conditions of
cosmopolitanism, with each chapter examining the thinkers who have contributed to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. By close reading of the texts I extract and appropriate certain concepts from these thinkers in order to develop and advance my argument.

**Overview of Chapters**

I will examine three distinct philosophical approaches to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. I begin my discussion by examining cosmopolitanism as a “way of life” developed by Stoics thinkers in diverse ways but lacking a political or institutional conception of cosmopolitanism. It must be noted that my interest in the Stoics pertains to their ideas on cosmopolitanism. Moreover, Stoicism is not a monolithic school of thought. It has diverse thinkers who belong to different historical periods and cultures. Then, I turn to two other approaches to cosmopolitanism: the “juridical-political” (Kant and Habermas) in the framework of political institutions and the “beyond-normative” (Derrida and Levinas) in the realm of unconditional ethical responsibility.

I acknowledge the importance and necessity of these approaches to cosmopolitanism and extract certain ideas from these thinkers. I also problematize and show their limitations in certain respects in order to advance my argument. Finally, I develop a conception of radical generosity as a social practice and underscore the idea of practice (*praxis*). The idea of practice (*praxis*) refers to human activities that transform material and social conditions in historical terms. The practice (*praxis*) in concrete terms means generous policies with regard to the immigration and refugee crisis. I attempt to show the relevance and importance of radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

My study consists of five chapters. Chapter one begins with a brief historical account of cosmopolitanism and its genealogy and its modern conception today. And then it moves on to a
historical examination, namely, the Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism. The Stoics offer a fruitful point of reference for contemporary discussions on cosmopolitanism. The focus here is on Stoic cosmopolitanism and the corresponding practice of ethics and politics as a “way of life.” For the Stoics, cosmopolitanism was a worldview, an ethical and political practice, which implied a “way of life.” My project seeks to rethink Stoic cosmopolitanism and extract from it ideas that have not been examined and considered.

According to the Stoics, cosmopolitanism refers to the idea that human beings belong to a global human community, regardless of their place of birth and country. And this idea of belonging to a global human community implies the concept of world citizen (kosmou politês). This Stoic understanding of the idea of citizenship in the context of the global human community transcends the limitation and exclusion presented by the idea of a city-state (polis) and in the modern sense the idea of nation-state. By close reading of Stoic texts, I examine key concepts in relation to the idea of world citizen (kosmou politês) and the practice of ethics and politics as a “way of life.”

Stoic philosophy involves practice of ethics and politics as a “way of life” in the ancient Greek tradition of the practice of philosophy as a “way of life.” This “way of life” implies not only the love of wisdom but also the practice of wisdom, where one’s life is transforming to cosmopolitan “way of life.” The other important concept is “affinity” (oikeiôsis) and the idea of care for the wellbeing of others. Central to Stoic ethics is the concept of “affinity” (oikeiôsis). For the Stoics, oikeiôsis is a technical concept, which implies one’s relationship to his or her environment and others, or self-awareness and being aware of others. The Stoic concept of oikeiôsis suggests that it is imperative to be generous, have affinity and solidarity with other fellow cosmopolitan citizens, and care for their wellbeing.
The Stoic tradition of practical philosophical reflection, which translates to philosophy as a “way of life,” suggests that living in the world means not only taking care of oneself and having one’s own wellbeing in mind but also taking care of others and having their wellbeing in mind. Drawing from the Stoics, I suggest that if we approach ethical and political practices as a “way of life,” that is to say, as everyday practices, then there is no need to be concerned about motivation for ethical conducts and practices, as this implies that we practice ethics not because we are obliged as a duty to be an ethical subject but rather that we practice ethics as a “way of life” because it is the ethos of society, which leads to having the well-being of others in mind. This in turn can give rise to a cosmopolitan “way of life,” which implies cosmopolitan awareness and intent through the everyday practice of ethics and politics. These Stoic concepts provide a framework to develop my general claim with regard to consider the practice of radical generosity as a “way of life” and as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

I conclude chapter one noting that the Stoics offer original ideas, and leave certain questions unanswered, with respect to cosmopolitanism. The Stoics, considering their historical situation, did not offer a conception of cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions, the way in which modern cosmopolitanism (e.g., Kant and Habermas) offers the possibility of cosmopolitanism in the realm of political institutions, which is the focus of my discussion in chapter two.

In chapter two, following my successive historical analysis, I turn my attention to two modern thinkers, Immanuel Kant and Jürgen Habermas, who have envisioned the possibility of cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions. My aim here is to examine the idea of political institutions as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Here, I examine to
what extent the “juridical-political” approach (Kant and Habermas) advances the Stoic cosmopolitanism and what might be missing in the “juridical-political” approach.

Kant’s cosmopolitanism is a legal and political order on the international scale. Kant proposes the idea of cosmopolitan right and the league of nation-states, which nation-states will join voluntarily based on self-interest to avoid war. Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism is situated within the framework of social contract theory and the idea of self-interest. Kant equates the situation of individuals in the state of nature with the nation-states. There is no explicit focus on ethics. Kant proposes a cosmopolitanism that does not require ethical commitment. Habermas seeks to overcome Kant’s conceptual difficulty, namely, the idea of self-interest based on social contract theory, and situates his vision of cosmopolitanism within the current political institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). Habermas proposes a world domestic politics without a world government (Weltinnenpolitik ohne Weltregierung) with democratic procedures and practices, with the idea of citizenship (constitutional patriotism) going beyond the ethnic and cultural realm.

In the second part of this chapter, I turn my attention to Habermas, who seeks to supersede and advance Kant’s idea of cosmopolitanism. In order to advance Kant’s cosmopolitan project, Habermas develops Kant’s idea of the constitutionalization of international law. Habermas suggests a procedural framework relying on democratic practices and rule of law, which implies transition from international law to the constitutionalization of international law, that is to say, legitimatization and institutionalization on the transnational and supranational levels. For Habermas, this is an ongoing project for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

In the third part of this chapter, I examine some difficulties with Habermas’s approach to cosmopolitanism and suggest that Habermas’s “juridical-political” approach to cosmopolitanism
is necessary but not sufficient. Habermas’s cosmopolitan political order lacks motivation and explicit ethical consideration. It does not adequately address what is required of an ethical consideration that would achieve a contemporary cosmopolitanism. For example, Habermas’s communicative ethics (discourse ethics) indicates that all those affected should participate in a dialogue. However, ethical discourses are highly improbable in everyday life, because the ideal expectations that they place on interlocutors are extremely demanding. There is no mechanism to check whether participants in discourse have equal chances to speak freely and to see how inclusive discourses are. For example, immigrants that are seeking membership do not have an equal position as the nation-states who are offering (or are not offering) membership. This is purely on an empirical level. In other words, discourse ethics is not adequate in terms of dealing with certain real life practical issues such as immigration. It must be noted that, I am not suggesting Habermas’s cosmopolitan theory is an application of his discourse ethics. Habermas’s conception of cosmopolitanism focuses on political institutions not ethics. I do acknowledge the necessity of political institutions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

Axel Honneth argues that Habermas’s discourse ethics lacks an adequate account of motivation to moral action, because there is a gap between a universal pragmatic and everyday experience. Honneth addresses the issue of motivation in The Struggle for Recognition (1995), relying on Hegel’s early Jena writings, with the notion of struggle for recognition (Anerkennung), and G.H. Mead’s social psychology. Honneth’s empirical notion of recognition has three crucial elements: love, rights, and esteem. Honneth notes that a theory of communicative action has to rely on a concept of morally motivated struggle. It must be noted that I am not rejecting Habermas’s cosmopolitan theory. Indeed, radical generosity is a complement to his conception of cosmopolitanism.
I conclude chapter two by suggesting that having an adequate ethical consideration involves the practice of radical generosity as a transformative practice that has the potential to challenge and change existing values and norms and point to new norms and practices. This implies that political institutions can exhibit radical generosity in their practices and policy making. Thus, in the following chapter I focus on an adequate conception of ethics as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism in order to advance my argument.

In chapter three, I examine Jacque Derrida’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s conception of unconditional ethics. From Derrida’s point of view, it would seem there might be a paradox here in the cosmopolitan discourse: on the one hand, it seems that cosmopolitanism calls for some kind of “juridical-political” institutions; on the other hand, it also requires unconditionally an ethic of welcome and hospitality beyond the “juridical-political” framework. It can be argued that the “juridical-political” approach to cosmopolitanism promoted by Kant and Habermas seems to overlook this unconditional ethical concern for others.

The aim of chapter three is to focus on an adequate conception of ethics as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Namely, Derrida’s and Levinas’s the “beyond normative” approach to ethics. For Derrida and Levinas, ethics is not about knowing this and that rule and making ethical decisions based on some abstract formal rules. They offer an understanding of ethics, which is about unconditional ethical concern for the other. Therefore, Derrida insists on the idea of infinite and unconditional ethical concern, which he calls the possibility of impossibility. Derrida’s ethical approach points both to a limitation of ethics and to a paradoxical ethical concern that he suggests is unavoidable for human beings. Here we have ideas how there can be the opening of an ethics even when political and institutional issues are unresolved.
Derrida and Levinas offer an understanding of ethics, which I take to involve an unconditional ethical concern for the other and ethics beyond following rules. I draw from their work on the ideas of unconditional ethical concern for the other and ethics beyond following rules to advance my argument regarding radical generosity. Radical generosity also involves unconditional openness to others and concern for the wellbeing of others without following rules; in particular, “welcome” as unconditional “hospitality” can be understood as radical generosity.

It must be noted that while Levinas locates politics outside of the ethical realm, Derrida’s insistence on ethics as the condition for politics, opens up the possibility for rethinking the relationship between ethics and politics. I suggest that the challenge is to have ethical consideration in politics and to politicize ethical issues toward an adequate ethical politics. By ethical politics, I mean politics with ethical concern that moves toward openness to others and considers the wellbeing of others. In concrete terms, means policies that consider ethical issues with regard to immigrants and refugees. It must be noted that, I am not suggesting ethics and politics are the same. Thus, I attempt to develop a conception of radical generosity as an unconditional ethical practice in the social realm that politicizes the ethical concern in the context of cosmopolitanism. This understanding of radical generosity implies that ethical politics exhibits radical generosity concerning immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers and in general all world citizens.

While Derrida’s and Levinas’s ethical response focuses on individual (ethical subjectivity), my focus is on the social aspect of ethical response rather than an individual dimension of it. These ideas about ethical response help to define what I mean by radical generosity. Radical generosity as a practice is a social disposition and the ethos of society. It
must be noted that societies are not naturally self-interested or generous, rather, societies have the potential to become self-interested or generous based on values that inform and produce social practices. Thus, through social practices historically social and political change occurs.

Derrida’s and Levinas’s ideas are fruitful, but they also have limitations as far as the focus of this study is concerned, because their arguments emphasize the individual’s responsibility for the other and do not address the relevant practical and social questions. The unconditional radical generosity is understood as a social and transformative practice. In chapter four, I elaborate and develop further what the practice of radical generosity implies beyond Derrida’s and Levinas’s approach to ethics, emphasizing and underscoring the social and transformative aspect of radical generosity.

More specifically, in chapter four, I examine the ideas of generosity and praxis in order to develop a conception of the practice of radical generosity. First, I present and examine Aristotle’s idea of generosity (eleutheriotês) as part of his virtue ethics. For Aristotle, generosity (eleutheriotês) is an important virtue, which needs to be in harmony with other virtues for developing an excellent character. Aristotle’s conception of generosity (eleutheriotês) is conservative and does not focus on the transformative aspect of generosity. Second, I focus on Nietzsche’s conception of generosity, because in contrast to Aristotle, Nietzsche emphasizes the transformative aspect of generosity by reevaluating existing ethical norms and challenging them. Third, I offer a brief overview of contemporary philosophical discussions about generosity in order to give a historical account of generosity and noting that only a few scholars have explored the concept of generosity but not in the context cosmopolitanism. Fourth, I turn to Marx, because radical generosity involves social and transformative practice.
Here I focus on Marx’s conception of praxis, in particular, because of Marx’s idea of praxis as a social and transformative activity that brings about social and political change in historical terms. For Marx, the interior and exterior modes of life are interconnected, which implies that the material conditions of life need to change to improve the interior mode of life; thus, praxis means revolutionary or radical practice that transforms the world. Praxis in the context of radical generosity refers to concrete practical-critical and transformative activities, and transformation implies social and historical change that takes place in society. I also emphasize that radical generosity as a social practice has political implications. In other words, radical generosity is not merely an ethical idea; it involves politics, which means politicizing ethical issues and suggesting politics with ethical concern. Radical generosity as praxis embodies a concrete concern for the wellbeing of others. This begins by transforming social relations toward openness and solidarity with others that can give rise to a cosmopolitan worldview and intent. The practice of radical generosity in concrete terms means generous immigration policies.

Furthermore, Marx relies on his insights about social practices to provide a historical analysis of how new historical possibilities arise through evolution of social processes. Drawing on Marx’s historicity, we must examine these practices within the context of historical and material conditions in order to understand present practices and the social and political relations, not necessarily in the “orthodox Marxism” sense of the “historical determinism” of “class conflict” but rather in the sense that we must consider the multiple historical and material conditions that give rise to the formation of social and political practices. Drawing from Marx’s conception of praxis, I suggest that radical generosity as a transformative practice challenges the existing social and political norms and has the potential to give rise to new ways of social and political practices. Finally, I present a discussion about the practical aspect of radical generosity
as ethical politics with respect to immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. This discussion shows the emergence of solidarity and openness toward immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers by various social and political movements in the world. I suggest that the emergence of these social and political movements indicates a gesture and potential for the practice of radical generosity. I conclude chapter four by suggesting that I have developed the necessary features of the practice of radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

In the final chapter, I note that my argument may not be a perfect argument but one that requires developing and evolving in an ongoing mode. Nevertheless, I must emphasize that my thesis has potential, and it is my contention that this mode of radical thinking is productive in its task of politicizing ethical issues and transforming social and political practices. Furthermore, we cannot reject a theory before considering and examining its potentials and putting it into practice, only the passage of time and historical processes will reveal whether a theory is sound or not. Moreover, my conception of radical generosity is not a panacea but rather a novel contribution in the heterogeneous mode to other approaches that I examine in this study with respect to the possibility of cosmopolitanism as an ongoing project.
Chapter 1: The Origins of Cosmopolitanism

In this chapter, I start with preliminary remarks on the idea of cosmopolitanism and its importance in recent times, and then I examine the origins of cosmopolitanism. In order to articulate my argument, I begin my discussion with a historical examination of cosmopolitanism going back to the Stoics. The Stoics offer a fruitful point of reference for contemporary discussions on cosmopolitanism. It must be noted that most scholars agree that the idea of cosmopolitanism originates from the Stoics. However, I am not suggesting it is the only idea in the Stoic thought. Stoicism is not a monolithic school of thought. Stoicism has diverse thinkers who belong to different historical periods and cultures. My interest in the Stoics pertains to their ideas on cosmopolitanism. Some of these thinkers focused on ideas on cosmopolitanism (e.g., Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Hierocles). I attempt to rethink Stoic cosmopolitanism and extract from it ideas that have not been examined and considered. Furthermore, my reading of the Stoics texts and appropriation of concepts may seem unconventional at times but this innovative interpretation of the texts enables me to develop my concepts and advance my argument in this project.

First, I present what the Stoics offer in terms of an idea of cosmopolitanism and corresponding practices of ethics and politics as a “way of life.” According to the Stoics, cosmopolitanism refers to the idea that all human beings belong to the human community, regardless of their place of birth and country. And this idea of belonging to a global human community implies the concept of world citizen (*kosmou politês*)¹. This Stoic understanding of the idea of citizenship in the context of the global human community transcends the limitation

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¹ Stoic thinkers like Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and Cicero discuss the idea of world citizen in their writings.
and exclusion presented by the idea of city-state (polis) and, in the modern sense, the idea of
nation-state.

Second, by close reading of Stoic texts, I seek to rethink Stoic cosmopolitanism and
extract from it ideas that have not been examined and considered. The key concept in relation to
the idea of world citizen (kosmou politês) is the idea of the practice of ethics and politics as a
“way of life.” Stoic philosophy requires the practice of ethics and politics as a “way of life” in
the Greek tradition of the practice of philosophy as a way of life. This way of life implies not
only love of wisdom but also the practice of wisdom, where one’s life is transforming to a
cosmopolitan way of life. The other important concept is oikeiôsis meaning “affinity” and the
idea of care for the wellbeing of others. Central to Stoic ethics is the concept of oikeiôsis. For the
Stoics, oikeiôsis is a technical concept, which implies one’s relationship to its environment and
others, or self-awareness and being aware of others. The Stoic concept of oikeiôsis suggests that
it is imperative to be generous, have affinity and solidarity with other fellow cosmopolitan
citizens, and care about their wellbeing.

Furthermore, I suggest that in order to grasp the cosmopolitan aspect of Stoic philosophy,
it is crucial to understand the importance of these key concepts, such as “philosophy as a way of
life.” For the Stoics, what may render cosmopolitanism possible is the practice of philosophy as
a “way of life,” which implies cultivation of the self as a means to transform one’s mode of life
and awareness and, in turn, to be engaged in ethical and political life to transform social, ethical,
and political practices. These transformative practices as a “way of life” are fundamental to my
conception of the practice of radical generosity as a potential for the possibility of
cosmopolitanism.
Finally, I conclude that to some extent the Stoics offer original ideas and leave certain questions unanswered with respect to cosmopolitanism. The Stoics, positioned as they were historically, did not offer a conception of cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions, the way in which modern cosmopolitanism (e.g., Kant and Habermas) offers the possibility of cosmopolitanism in the realm of political institutions, which is the focus of discussion in chapter two.

**Preliminary Remarks: The Question of Cosmopolitanism**

The idea of cosmopolitanism raises a series of fundamental issues, namely, birthplace, belonging to a place, and having particular interests in relation to others and one’s place in the world. A place of birth designates where one is born, but it does not necessarily imply belonging to a particular place. One’s birthplace is simply an accident, but the issue of belonging to a specific place with certain interests in relation to others is a more complex matter. It would seem that the concept of cosmopolitanism might address these very issues that it raises. That is to say, cosmopolitanism as a worldview (Weltanschauung) approach, and as a practice, may be able to provide an ethical and political framework for living with others in the world. The cosmopolitan worldview (Weltanschauung) implies having ethical and political consideration for others, that is to say, caring for the wellbeing of others in the world. The question is whether cosmopolitanism is a concrete social and political practice or a possibility. Perhaps, as Kant noted about enlightenment, at the present time we do not live in a cosmopolitan age, but we do live in an age of cosmopolitanism.²

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² Kant in *What is Enlightenment?* notes: ‘If it is now asked whether we at present live in an enlightenment age, the answer is: No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment.’ *Kant’s Political Writings*, Immanuel Kant, translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.58.
The idea of cosmopolitanism is an ancient concept going back to the Stoics in ancient Greece and later the Roman Empire, and in the 18th century it was revitalized by modern thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant. Whether it was actually practiced, there is, admittedly, not much concrete evidence. Furthermore, considering the historical facts and ethnic violence and wars throughout the history, there might be objections and even resistance to the idea of cosmopolitanism as a viable concept. However, precisely because of these conflicts and wars and, in particular, the rise of xenophobia in the world, cosmopolitanism becomes crucial. Although, the idea of cosmopolitanism may not be a concrete social or political practice, nevertheless, it is a possibility, and as such, it would seem reasonable to think that the idea of cosmopolitanism is a possibility as a concept for living with others in an inclusive world, in which we understand the concept of citizen within the framework of world citizen, and the implications of such a view requires caring for the wellbeing of others. Not only as an ethical stand, rather as a political stand as well. Therefore, conditions that give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism can be examined and considered.

**Cosmopolitanism Considered**

To situate and illustrate why cosmopolitanism should be considered as a vital idea and what conditions give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism, I begin with a brief history of discussions on cosmopolitanism and suggest that recent discussions of cosmopolitanism may address certain aspects of this Stoic idea. Nevertheless, these discussions do not address the issues that my project seeks to examine and consider.

Let us examine the word cosmopolitan, which derives from the Greek word *kosmou politês*, which means world citizen. It refers to the idea that all human beings belong to the human community, regardless of their place of birth and country, and this human community
must be promoted and cultivated. In the 18\textsuperscript{th} century Kant, influenced by the Stoics, revived the idea of cosmopolitanism.\footnote{See Pauline Kleingeld’s discussion of \textit{Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany} (Journal of the History of Ideas, 1999), pp. 505-524. Kleingeld writes that in late eighteenth-century Germany cosmopolitanism was not a single encompassing idea but rather came in at least six different varieties: moral cosmopolitanism; proposals for reform of the international political and legal order; cultural cosmopolitanism, which emphasizes the value of global cultural pluralism; economic cosmopolitanism, which aims at establishing a global free market where all humans are equal potential trading partners; and the romantic cosmopolitan ideal of humanity as united by faith and love. According to Kleingeld, these six kinds of cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive.} Cosmopolitanism can be viewed in the realm of an ethical community, which implies that every human being as a citizen of the world belongs to a human community, and has an equal ethical worth, and this creates the idea of caring and responsibility for others, regardless of ethnicity, national, cultural, and political association. Cosmopolitanism can be construed in terms of political institutions that can create a cosmopolitan political order to organize the world and address some political issues on global scale in a democratic and legal framework.

In my view, it is difficult to conceive of a political cosmopolitanism without reflecting on ethical implications of such a view, and vice versa. It must be noted that, I am not suggesting ethics and politics are the same. Cosmopolitanism is a possibility and an ongoing project. As such, conceiving it involves social relations, a movement, a society, a worldview, a way of life, by which we understand the idea of citizen in terms that transcend the nation-state idea of citizen and accept the exclusions that this idea implies. As such, I suggest, it requires a rethinking of ethical and political practices within the framework of cosmopolitan discourse.

Before going any further with the possibility of cosmopolitanism we need to answer the following question: why should cosmopolitanism be considered, and why now? The simple answer is that because of recent wars in the Middle East and recent wave of immigrants and
refugee crisis the idea of cosmopolitanism seems to be an alternative worldview to the notions of “nation-state” and “national interest” that cause war and refugee crisis.

Furthermore, we live in a world that is becoming increasingly interconnected in various respects: socio-economically, politically, and technologically. In recent times⁴, as an alternative or antidote to “neoliberal globalization” and to the false perception that somehow “neoliberal globalization” may lead to cosmopolitanism, some thinkers, such as the sociologist Ulrich Beck and philosopher Jürgen Habermas, have revitalized the idea of cosmopolitanism. For Beck⁵, cosmopolitanism offers an alternative to “capitalist globalization,” and Habermas, following and superseding Kant, situates cosmopolitanism in the realm of law and political institutions, which he refers to as “the constitutionalization of international law.” I will discuss Kant’s and Habermas’s conception of cosmopolitanism in detail in chapter two. Other thinkers, such as David Held, Thomas Pogge, James Bohman, Daniele Archibugi, Seyla Benhabib,⁶ and Martha

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⁴ Of course, we must note that as early as 1965 H.C. Baldry discussed the idea of cosmopolitanism in his book The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1965). Also, it is worth mentioning Benedict Anderson’s book Imagined Communities, in which he critiques the idea of the nation-state and nationalism. See Imagined Communities. (London & New York: Verso, 1991).

⁵ Beck’s contribution to cosmopolitan discourse is valuable and in certain respects his project is informed by Habermas’s idea of cosmopolitanism. However, Beck’s discussion of cosmopolitanism as an alternative to “capitalist globalization” remains a project in sociology; that is to say, Beck’s project does not examine and consider ethical practices that may have political implications with regard to cosmopolitanism. He argues that his project is a sociological one, not a philosophical discussion. Cosmopolitan Vision, by Ulrich Beck, (Polity Press, 2006), pp. 1-14.

⁶ David Held proposes the idea of the “Cosmopolitan Model of Democracy,” which requires the creation of regional parliaments. He gives examples, such as Latin America, Africa, Asia, and European Parliament. It would seem that to some extent Held’s proposal has some similarity to Habermas’s idea of cosmopolitan political order. Habermas envisions cosmopolitanism as a legitimation requirements of a democratically constituted world society without a world government-assuming that nation-states and their population undergo certain learning processes. ‘Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?’ (David Held, 2008), Cambridge: Polity.wwp.poli.co.uk/modelofdemocracy/docs/democracy-essay.pdf. (Essay PDF), pp.13-52.Thomas Pogge calls his project “Institutional Moral Cosmopolitanism,” which implies a human rights norm for global institutional order, and this norm will give rise to the global institutional reform toward a vertical dispersal of sovereignty. According to Pogge, this reform on the global level will reduce poverty, oppression, and inequality and give rise to the possibility of peace. ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.’ The University of Chicago Press. Ethics, Vol. 103, No. 1 (Oct., 1992), pp. 48-75. James Bohman argues that contrary to cosmopolitan and communitarian proposals, good democratic governance needs both bigger and smaller units. Most important in this regard is not mere size, but the ways in which politics and subunits are organized and interrelated. According to Bohman, the proper solutions to the problems of democracy are not to find some optimal size or ideal democratic procedure, but rather to establish a
Nussbaum, have theorized about cosmopolitanism as well. I briefly focus on Nussbaum’s discussion of cosmopolitanism, which is pertinent to my focus on Stoic cosmopolitanism in this chapter. Nussbaum by rediscovering cosmopolitanism has contributed greatly to the cosmopolitan discourse.

In 1994, Martha Nussbaum published a short essay titled ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ (1994). In this essay, Nussbaum evokes the idea of cosmopolitanism drawing from the Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism. However, Nussbaum’s focus is on critiquing the communitarian view of patriotism, and she offers the cosmopolitan worldview as an alternative. Nussbaum, in critiquing the communitarian view, writes the following passages in her essay:

[T]his emphasis on patriotic pride is both morally dangerous and, ultimately, subversive of some of the worthy goals patriotism sets out to serve—for example, the goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of justice and equality. These goals, I shall argue, would be better served by an ideal that is in any case more adequate to our situation in the contemporary world, namely the very old ideal of the cosmopolitan, the person whose primary allegiance is to the community of human beings in the entire world…Cosmopolitanism offers only reason and the love of humanity, which may seem at times less colorful than other sources of belonging…the life of the cosmopolitan, who puts right before country, and universal reason before the symbols of national belonging, need not be boring, flat, or lacking in love.7

more complex democratic ideal, and he calls this ideal ‘transnational democracy,’ because it lies between nation-states and international conceptions on the one hand and cosmopolitan democracy on the other. It is not nationalist or internationalist to the extent that argues for the feasibility of democracy outside states and the delegated authority of state; it is not cosmopolitan and does not require a form of political organization at the apex of a hierarchy. See Democracy across Borders: from démos to démoi (James Bohman, The MIT Press, 2007). Seyla Benhabib argues for the protection of weak social groups, such as, aliens, immigrants, and refugees, developing Hannah Arendt’s notion of the right to have rights, she argues that no human is illegal. The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Seyla Benhabib, Cambridge University Press, 2004), Another Cosmopolitanism (Seyla Benhabib, Oxford University Press, 2006). Daniele Archibugi argues for a major reform of the international system, his idea of institutional cosmopolitanism seeks to combine cosmopolitan obligation with the principles of democracy. This can be done by reinforcing the existing international institutions, starting from the UN, and also by creating new ones. According to Archibugi, the project of cosmopolitan democracy gives a central role to the idea of a world parliament. Even if with limited powers such a parliament could be the institution on which the peoples of the world deliberate and suggest some cosmopolitan norms. Benhabib ‘s and Archibugi ‘s conception of cosmopolitanism begins with Kant’s ideas and to some extent is influenced by Habermas. The Global Commonwealth of Citizens, Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy (Daniele Archibugi, Princeton University Press, 2008). Also, see Otfried Höffe’s Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Nussbaum’s work has established the consensus on the importance of Stoic cosmopolitanism, but she has concentrated more on developing current implications of a general cosmopolitan ideal, rather than examining precisely what the Stoics meant, and what conditions give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Nussbaum published two more essays on cosmopolitanism focusing on the Stoics and their influence in the current discourse of cosmopolitanism. In the first essay, ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’ (1997), Nussbaum argues that Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism was very much influenced by the Stoics and the idea of universal reason is central to the Stoic idea of world community, which Kant embraced in his conception of cosmopolitanism. In the second essay, “Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic Legacy” (2000), Nussbaum examines the Roman Stoics and Cicero’s legacy with respect to duties and justice. And, recently she has published texts focusing on human rights and global justice. Nussbaum’s contribution to cosmopolitan discourse is valuable and important, but her emphasis has been on virtue ethics and human rights, rather than on the conditions of the possibility of cosmopolitanism, or the practice of generosity.

Stoic Philosophy Considered

Stoic philosophy offers an excellent historical reference for how one might want to think and theorize about cosmopolitanism as a worldview (Weltanschauung) and a “way of life.” Stoic


8 Nussbaum critiques Rawls’s theory of justice, which is based on the social contract theory. She argues that in thinking about justice the contractarian theories have some structural defects that make them yield very imperfect results when we apply them on the global level. She argues for the “capabilities approach,” this approach suggests that a set of basic human entitlements, similar to human rights, as a minimum of what justice requires for all. But Nussbaum doesn’t elaborate on the notion of minimum requirement for justice. The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, edited by Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. ‘Beyond the social contract: capabilities and global justice’, Martha Nussbaum, (2005), pp.196-218.
philosophy is an alternative to Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, however to some extent Stoic ethics is similar to Aristotle’s ethics⁹. The distinction between Platonic and Stoic philosophy is twofold. First, the political aspect of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy is not cosmopolitan in nature. For Plato and Aristotle, a man is a citizen of the city-state (*polis*) with which he needs to identify and belong; he must be loyal to that city-state’s institutions, and he must ready to defend that city from foreign attacks. The Stoics by contrast claim that the world (*cosmos*) is the city-state (*polis*), because human beings are part of the world (*cosmos*), in other words, part of the whole. The Stoics claim that all human beings belong to the human community as a whole; therefore, one does not belong to a particular city but rather one is a citizen of the world. Second, what is intriguing about the Stoics, in contrast to Platonic philosophy, is their emphasis on materiality: namely, the idea that only physical bodies exist and things that do not have bodies do not exist. The Stoics did not seem to have any metaphysical principles in their ethics. Indeed, Stoic ethics is rooted in physics, the inquiry into the nature of sensible objects. The Stoics confined existence to bodies, meaning that only those things can be said to exist, which have threefold extension together with resistance (SVF II.381).ⁱ⁰ Almost all of Stoic philosophy can be categorized in logic (including epistemology and the study of method), ethics (including practical sciences and specially politics), and physics. The most general tendency in Stoic physics is materialism, the rejection of incorporeal entities. Ultimately, the focus of logic, physics, and ethics is one thing, the rational universe, considered from three

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⁹ It is worth noting that for Aristotle, ethics is based on virtue (*arête*), one must have right virtues in order to reach the final aim, and that is happiness (*eudaimonia*). For the Stoics, virtue is only one aspect of Stoic ethics and their conception of virtue is slightly different from Aristotle. For example, Aristotelian virtue may have some affective aspect as long as is moderate in balanced and harmonized condition by way of doctrine of mean. The Stoics, on the other hand, do not allow any emotion in their conception of virtue, since they view emotion as false belief, which must be overcome by reason. Also, Stoic ethics has a cosmopolitan aim.

different but mutually consistent points of view. The Stoic practical approach to the practice of philosophy is in direct contrast to the Platonic notion of forms, which places the practice of philosophy and understanding of ethics in the realm of metaphysics. The Stoics considered their philosophy to be coherent and rational. They thought that the world (cosmos) has a rational explanation and has a rationally organized structure. For the Stoics, reason (logos) is the faculty that enables man to think, speak, and be engaged in the activities of human life, which is embodied in the world (cosmos). According to this logic, human beings in their nature belong to a whole. Since human beings are rational and the universe is rational, they are interconnected. For the Stoics, this implies living according to nature, or in agreement with nature, which accords with human rationality. Ultimately, the aim of human life is complete harmony between a man’s actions and the course of events in the universe. Zeno says, “the real nature or physis of a man consists in his rationality” (SVF i 179, 202), and Diogenes says, “a man needs nothing but physical and mental self-discipline to fulfill him-self, to live according to nature” (D.L. vi 24-70).\(^{11}\) For the Stoics, reason (logos) in a broader sense seems to mean practical wisdom, a way of life in which a man acts in line with what is truly valuable to him, in terms of his inner well-being, not according to conventional social and moral judgments or changes of fortune; thus, real freedom is achieved, and such a life would be natural since it is according to reason (D.L. vii 71). For the Stoics, philosophy is “the practice of wisdom” or “the practice of appropriate science” (SVF ii 35,36).\(^{12}\) What is remarkable about this philosophy and logic in some sense is the practical approach to the practice of philosophy, and, at its core, ethics.

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\(^{12}\) Ibid., p.119.
Drawing from this Stoic approach to philosophy, and, especially, ethics, it would be reasonable to assume that ethical conduct more than anything must rely on conducts and practices, which relate to social and political relations and the formation of social relations. This aspect of Stoic philosophy relates and to some extent is a starting point for my argument with regard to ethical conduct as a practice and a “way of life” with respect to the practice of radical generosity as a social practice.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is not my aim to rely and focus on Stoic cosmology like some scholars, for example, A.A. Long, who suggests that there is an all permeating divine drive which unites human beings, or Martha Nussbaum’s Kantian reading of Stoics, which entails the idea of universal reason in human community, nor do I want to be engaged in a polemic. My aim is to be engaged in an inquiry, which is focused on certain aspects of Stoic philosophy, which has not been examined thoroughly and considered with respect to cosmopolitanism, namely, the Stoic practical approach to philosophy, as well as their focus on ethical practices as a “way of life.”

**Ethics in Stoicism**

As I noted earlier it seems Stoic ethics does not focus on metaphysical framework, rather it appeals to practical experience based on conducts and practices. Central to Stoic ethics is the concept of *oikeiôsis*. Scholars agree that this word is hard to translate because of the multiplicity of its meaning. It has been translated as well-disposed, related, akin, belonging, and having affinity with others. For the Stoics, *oikeiôsis* is a technical concept, which implies one’s

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relationship to its environment and others, or self-awareness and being aware of others. This concept of relating and belonging to oneself and to others seems to be natural according to Stoic philosophy, but it has an evolving process that begins with pure impulse in human beings to protect and preserve themselves and progresses to a rational mode of existence in a mature human being, which accords with reason and becoming aware of the fact that all beings belong to the human community. In the beginning, one is aware of its own existence and body, and the need to relate to one self and preserve itself. But then the awareness comes that one needs to relate to other beings as well. Diogenes Laertius, the third-century B.C. writer of the Lives of the Philosophers, reports Chrysippus saying: “the first thing appropriate to every animal, is its own constitution and the consciousness of this” (SVF 3.178). He also reports that Hierocles says: “we are an animal, but a gregarious one, which needs some one else as well. For this reason too we inhabit cities, for there is no human being who is not a part of a city. Secondly, we make friendships easily. By eating together or sitting together in the theatre.”

To articulate this Stoic concept with respect to cosmopolitanism, it is crucial to pay attention to other statements by the Stoics, which are more specific in terms of the formation of social relations and ethics. For example, John Stobaeus reports the following statement by the Stoics:

The Stoics say that all good things belong (in common) to the virtuous in that he who benefits one of his neighbors also benefits himself. That is why he who benefits someone else is also benefitted himself and he who harms someone also harms himself. All virtuous men benefit each other, even though they are not in all cases friends of each other or well disposed (to each other) or in good repute (with each other) or receptive (of each other), because they do not have a (cognitive) grasp of each other and do not live in the same place. They, however, are disposed to be well disposed and to be friendly to

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each other and to hold (each other) in good repute and receptive (to each other).  

Furthermore, Hierocles describes Stoic cosmopolitanism through the use of concentric circles combined with the idea of affinity (*oikeiôsis*). Hierocles describes individuals as consisting of a series of circles: The first circle is the individual. The next circle is the immediate family, followed by the extended family, and then the local community. Next are the community of neighboring towns, followed by fellow citizens, and finally the whole human community. The task, according to Hierocles, is to draw the circles in towards the center, transferring people to the inner circles, making all human beings part of our concern.  

This description captures the Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism with regard to sociality of human beings and having concern for the wellbeing of others. Cicero also states:

> It develops naturally that there is among men a common and natural congeniality of men with each other, with the result that it is right for them to feel that other men, just because they are men, are not alien to them… From which it naturally follows that we put the common advantage ahead of our own. For just as the law put the well-being of all ahead of the well-being of individuals, so too the good and wise man, who is obedient to the laws and not unaware of his civic duty, looks out for the advantage of all more than for that of any one person or his.  

These passages illustrate specifically what the concept of *oikeiôsis* means in the second phase of its evolution; the mature cosmopolitan citizen acts and conducts herself ethically toward other fellow cosmopolitan citizens who may or may not be a friend or family. Ultimately, for the Stoics, it is the community, which governs the formation of social relations and care for the wellbeing of others.


The Stoic concept of *oikeiôsis* suggests that it is imperative to be generous, have affinity and solidarity with other fellow cosmopolitan citizens, and care about their wellbeing. There is nothing altruistic about these practices; rather, according to the logic of *oikeiôsis* we all belong to the human community. In some sense, this concept is crucial to understand the idea of world citizen (*kosmou politês*). In order to be a citizen of the world, we must realize the concept of *oikeiôsis* and practice it every day as a “way of life,” recognizing that caring for the wellbeing of others means caring for the wellbeing of the human community as a “way of life.” Ethics and ethical practice for the Stoics, implies living a good life, and living a good life is an ethical life, which involves cultivation of the self (the care of the self) and being engaged with others and caring for others, and practicing and mastering the art of living. Having knowledge of ethics and rules of ethical conduct may be necessary to live a good life, which is an ethical life, but it is not sufficient to actually produce a good life and ethical life: what is needed is the practice of ethics as a “way of life,” as an ethical life in which the care of the self implies caring for others and being engaged with others; that is ethical conduct and practice with cosmopolitan aim. Stoic philosophy offers a framework with respect to ethical practices, for example, the practice of radical generosity, as an ethical and political practice, as a “way of life,” which can provide optimal conditions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

**Is Stoic Ethics Politics?**

Reading various Stoic texts one may think and perceive Stoic philosophy devoid of politics and perhaps even apolitical and mainly concerned with ethics. However, a close and careful reading and examination of the Stoic texts may suggest that indeed Stoic philosophy and ethics involves being engaged in politics, that is to say, politics is implied in Stoic philosophy and ethics. The Stoic concept of cosmopolitanism raises ethical and political questions at the same time. For
example, when Cynic Diogene\textsuperscript{19} declared that he is a citizen of the world \textit{(kosmou politēs)}, he raised ethical and political questions at the same time.

This is a crucial point in Stoic cosmopolitanism. To claim that one is a citizen of the world raises ethical and political questions. This claim has ethical elements, because it implies all the citizens of the world have equal ethical worth, and belong to the global human community without exclusion. It raises political question, since it may be perceived as ignoring one’s obligation to one’s city and state but the crucial point is that it indicates that all citizens of the world have equal rights.

According to the Stoics, one belongs to the local community as well as to the global community, and there should be no tension between the local and global community. Both of these views raise political and ethical questions. The question is: what is the nature of Stoic cosmopolitanism? Is it strictly political or ethical? My reading is that, for the Stoics, ethical issues within context of cosmopolitanism have political implications. To elucidate this point we need to refer to reports on Stoic philosophy in which the Stoics discuss the concept of cosmopolitanism with respect to ethics. There will be more detail discussion on the concept of cosmopolitanism with respect to practice of ethics later in this chapter. Briefly, the discussion will focus on the Stoic understanding of practice of ethics based on practical approach to ethics, which has political implications. For example, Seneca in his letters talks about the materiality of good. He says:

Our school holds that what is good is a body because what is good acts, and whatever acts is a body. What is good benefits; but in order to benefit, something must act; if it acts, it is a body. They say that wisdom is good. It follows that they must be speaking of

This passage confirms two crucial points that my inquiry and argument relies on, namely, the Stoic practical approach to ethics and the importance of understanding ethics in terms of practice. For the Stoics, ethics has meaning and value in the realm of practice. Stoicism views the idea of good and virtue in terms of practice. For instance, Sextus Empiricus says: “Good is benefit or not other than benefit, meaning by benefit virtue and virtuous action” (SVF 3.75, part). It would seem that for the Stoics, if a concept or rule is theoretically formulated, it might offer a less direct concrete prescription. Stoic ethics is based on experience of the world and gaining knowledge through experience and on what is good and beneficial to all cosmopolitan citizens in the world in terms of ethical practices and conducts as a “way of life.”

The Stoic and Cosmopolitan Vision

How do the Stoics conceive of the concept of cosmopolitanism? Moreover, what did the Stoics mean by cosmopolitanism? In a general sense, the Stoics consider all human beings part of the whole human community. This understanding has ethical and political implications. That is to say, the Stoics encourage and advocate discourses, contrary to convention and ethical and political practices of their time. Greek culture and philosophers and, in particular, Plato and Aristotle focused on the idea of the city-state (polis) and defined citizenship in the realm of the Greeks and barbarians. One was a Greek citizen or a barbarian, a non-citizen. The Stoic understanding of citizenship goes beyond a particular location and birthplace, which challenges the conventional discourse of Greek society and culture. To elaborate on this point, let us

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examine a few texts that report on Stoic philosophy, which refer to the theme of cosmopolitanism in Stoicism. Plutarch in his writing reports:

The much admired Republic of Zeno … is aimed at this one main point, that our household arrangement should not be based on cities or parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all men as our fellow-citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of herd grazing together and nurtured by a common law (SVF I.262, part).\(^\text{22}\)

This comment by Zeno sets the foundation for the concept of cosmopolitanism to come. Zeno’s statement offers a new idea and way of thinking in Greek culture and society, a way of life, which transforms the conventional norms and ethics, moving away from Greek elitism and paving the way for rethinking the concept of city and citizenship. For the Stoics, the idea of world citizen (*kosmou politês*) and its boundaries go beyond the scope of legal and conventional framework of the city-state (*polis*) and move into the realm of the global community. This Stoic idea of world citizen is a crucial idea, which has a significant influence in the current understanding of cosmopolitanism as a possibility and with regard to living with others in the world.

Ultimately, the claim of ancient Greek philosophy is to offer a framework for ethics and politics, which is a “way of life” through excellence and virtue that leads one to an ethical life, the good life, and happiness. What is unique about Stoic philosophy is the suggestion that not only the Greek citizens, the elite, can pursue the good life and happiness. Indeed, the pursuit of the good life and happiness might be a possibility for all people, by way of becoming citizens of the world and viewing the world from a cosmopolitan perspective. The Stoics open the possibility of a new way of thinking both about ethics and the politics of living together in the

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world and about the formation of social and political relations and institutions. In a sense, the Stoics reframe the old question of justice in a more concrete sense, situating it in everyday practices of ethics and politics as a “way of life” asserting that, indeed, a cosmopolitan way of thinking and practices may lead to ethical and political activities that might render justice possible.

Furthermore, Plutarch reports that “By nature, as Aristo said, there is no native land, just as there is no house or cultivated field, smithy or doctor’s surgery; each one of these comes to be so, or rather is so named and called, always in relation to the occupant and user” (SVF 1.317, part).\(^{23}\) According to this statement by the Stoics, the idea of native land as one’s country becomes a problematic notion, since they view the native land not as a fixed entity, rather as something that is in flux and relational. In other words, the Stoics question the nature of citizenship and what it means to be a citizen of a land that one might call one’s native land. In a sense, Stoicism questions the idea of citizenship, which is defined in relation to a particular location. This opens the possibility for the cosmopolitan view of the world. The cosmopolitan view of the world defines citizenship, ethics, and politics not in terms of location but rather in terms of social relations that are beyond the notion of native land. Let us examine the notion of native land further in terms of birthplace according to the Stoic concept of cosmopolitanism.

Seneca reports the following:

Let us take hold of the fact that there are two communities- the one, which great and truly common, embracing gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner nor that, but measure the boundaries of our state by the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigned by the accident of our birth.\(^{24}\)


This passage reinforces the idea that for the Stoics, place of birth is not the only determining factor in bonding the social relations and interests, rather, the true common interests are cosmopolitan, where the entire planet becomes one’s home and focus of interest, and one’s birthplace is only an accident and nothing more in terms of how one relates and conducts oneself ethically and politically in the world. Furthermore, Cicero defines the world (cosmos) as a city and republic:

And yet, since there are gods (if they really exist, as they certainly do) it is necessary that they be alive, and not only alive but also rational and bound to each other by a kind of political bond (i.e., congeniality) and society, governing this single cosmos like some shared republic or city. For the cosmos is like a common home for gods and men, or a city which both (gods and men) inhabit.25

The Stoics promote a unique understanding of community, politics, and ethics in which we can imagine the world as united in accepting difference, because the human community as a whole has different parts and all the parts belong to the whole. Although the Stoics did not provide a detailed framework for the actualization of cosmopolitanism, they do, nevertheless, set the stage for the possibility of such a world. Stoic philosophy requires the practice of ethics and politics as a “way of life” in the Greek tradition of practice of philosophy as a “way of life.” This “way of life” needs cultivation and everyday practice to become a commonplace in the world, where one’s life is becoming and transforming from one mode of life to a new mode of life and where one’s practices must have cosmopolitan awareness and intent. Next, I shall discuss what is meant by practice of ethics as a “way of life” and cosmopolitan awareness and intent. These concepts are crucial to my argument and to the articulation of the practice of radical generosity as a “way of life,” which must be considered as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

Practice of Ethics as a Way of Life: Cosmopolitan Awareness and Intent

For the ancient Greeks, philosophy and the practice of ethics begins with this question: “How should one live?” This question is broad in scope and depth, as it covers all aspects of human life including social, ethical, and political life.

To elaborate on this theme, I begin with Pierre Hadot’s idea of “philosophy as a way of life”\textsuperscript{26} as well as Michel Foucault’s discussion on the concept of “the care of the self”\textsuperscript{27} in Stoic philosophy. I suggest that in order to grasp the cosmopolitan aspect of Stoic philosophy, it is crucial to understand the importance of these key concepts with respect to what I call “cosmopolitan awareness” and “cosmopolitan intent.” In other words, for the Stoics, what may render cosmopolitanism possible is the practice of philosophy as a “way of life,” which implies cultivation of the self as a means to transform one’s mode of life and awareness to a “cosmopolitan awareness,” and in turn to be engaged in ethical and political life to transform social, ethical, and political practices to a “cosmopolitan intent.” These transformative practices as a “way of life” are fundamental to my conception of the practice of radical generosity as a potential for the possibility of “cosmopolitan awareness” and “cosmopolitan intent,” and, ultimately, a cosmopolitan way of life. By “cosmopolitan awareness,” I mean recognition of the formation of social, political, and ethical relations with respect to belonging to the human community. And by “cosmopolitan intent” I mean, social, ethical, and political practices that will lead to a cosmopolitan way of life. These concepts are rooted in the everyday practices as a “way of life,” which aims for the cosmopolitan way of thinking and life.

For the Stoics, the practice of philosophy means a “way of life,” which has spiritual and transformative dimensions; that is to say that to practice philosophy implies leading an ethical life in both the private and social spheres. And to practice ethics as a “way of life” requires exercises, which have spiritual and transformative dimensions. To qualify and explain what is intended by the practice of philosophy as a “way of life,” one has to consider what the practice of philosophy meant in ancient Greece. Philosophy (philosophia) “love of wisdom” implied a way of life that leads one to the practice of wisdom and that was achieved by certain exercises to transform oneself; for example, using reason and rationality in one’s life by being engaged in philosophical discourse. For the Stoics, however, philosophical discourse without concrete practices does not lead to a spiritual and transformative life. Stoic philosophy involves paying attention to one’s everyday conduct, which implies the exercise of self-mastery and self-awareness, as paying attention to oneself. For the Stoics, it means “cultivation of the self” or “care of the self” (epimeleia heautou), and this cultivation of the self has social and political aspects; that is to say, the practice of care of the self and transforming oneself implies caring for others and being engaged in social and political activities in the world. Ultimately, the overarching objective of Stoicism is to offer a “way of life” which is an ethical life with

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28 It should be noted that although spirituality in a narrow sense may be understood in the religious realm, spirituality in a broader sense has a place in the social and political realm. The idea of spiritual experience with transformative dimension is rooted in the ancient Greek philosophy, and especially the Stoics. For the Greeks, the spiritual experience with transformative dimension meant a necessary condition to access the truth. Foucault suggests that the western notion of spirituality implies that the truth is never given and the subject must undergo a conversion and transformation in order to access the truth. This conversion may happen in the shape of a movement, which will in the process transform the subject and the social and political conditions as well. *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, (Lectures at the College de France, 1981-1982, Michel Foucault, 2005), pp.1-19. Also, Hadot notes: “The philosophical way of life never entered into competition with religion in antiquity, because at the time religion was not a way of life, which included all of existence. And all of inner life, as it was in Christianity.” *What is Ancient Philosophy?* (Pierre Hadot, 2004), p.272.


30 I am not using this term “ethical life” in the Hegelian sense but rather within the context of the ancient Greek philosophy, in particular, Stoicism, which refers to taking care of oneself and others as an ethical practice. For Hegel, full human flourishing depends on the existence of well established, ethical relations in particular, such as
cosmopolitan intent. The question is: how does one cultivate oneself to lead to a transformation of the self from one mode of life to another mode, which is an ethical life with cosmopolitan intent?

For the ancient Greeks, practice of philosophy involved the cultivation of the self or the self-mastery, which begins with self-awareness, know yourself (gnothi seauton)\(^\text{31}\), for the Stoics, the cultivation of the self and idea of knowing oneself moves into the realm of self-awareness, which has transformative dimensions, that is to say, one becomes aware of oneself and the others by caring for oneself and fellow cosmopolitan citizens and by being engaged in ethics and politics that promotes cosmopolitan intent. Ultimately, for the Stoics, the cultivation of the self must transform one’s knowledge of oneself and the world to a cosmopolitan awareness that promotes ethics and politics with a cosmopolitan intent. The Stoic understanding of the practice of philosophy as a “way of life” opens the possibility for all cosmopolitan citizens to be engaged in exercises that transform not only the individual but rather transform society and social and political norms by transforming ethical and political practices in everyday life as a “way of life.” As Hadot suggests, “Ancient philosophy proposed to mankind an art of living.”\(^\text{32}\) In particular, for the Stoics, the practice of philosophy as a “way of life” is not merely about knowing this and that subject; rather, it is about living a certain way, which meant for them being engaged in ethics and politics not as a matter of duty or obligation but rather as a “way of life” in the world, which implies a “way of life” that has cosmopolitan awareness and intent. As Hadot notes, “the

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Stoic does not act in his own material and or even spiritual interest, but acts in a way which is always disinterested and in the service of the human community.”\textsuperscript{33}

Stoic philosophy as a “way of life” suggests that living in the world means not only taking care of oneself and having one’s own wellbeing in mind but also taking care of others and having their wellbeing in mind as well. I suggest that if we approach ethical and political practices as a “way of life,” that is to say, as everyday practices, there is no need to be concerned about motivation for ethical conducts and practices, this implies that we practice radical generosity not because we are obliged as a duty to be an ethical subject, rather, we practice ethics as a “way of life,” which leads to a life having the well-being of others in mind. This, in turn, implies cosmopolitan awareness, through everyday practice of ethics and politics, which transforms our way of life to a cosmopolitan “way of life,” specifically a “way of life” with cosmopolitan worldview and intent.

I conclude with the suggestion that if we remove cosmological and mythical aspects of Stoic philosophy with respect to the practice of ethics, the fundamental and essential element of Stoic philosophy will be illuminated, which can offer a valuable framework to formulate a novel way for the practice of ethics and politics, which can be situated in the context of the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Certainly, this novel approach to the practice of ethics and politics as a “way of life” rooted in Stoic philosophy can translate into the practice of radical generosity, which I suggest is implicitly implied in the Stoic understanding of philosophy as a “way of life,” and the idea of the care of the self, and caring for the wellbeing of others.

To conclude my discussion in this chapter, as I noted at the outset, the Stoics offer a fruitful point of reference for the contemporary discussions on cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless, it

must be noted that, the Stoics, within their historical context, did not offer a conception of cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions in the way in which modern cosmopolitanism (e.g., Kant and Habermas) offers the possibility of cosmopolitanism in the realm of political institutions. Thus, in the following chapter, I turn to Kant’s and Habermas’s conceptions of cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions.
Chapter 2: The Possibility of Cosmopolitanism in the Realm of Political Institutions

In chapter one, my discussion focused on how the Stoics conceived the idea of cosmopolitanism as a worldview (*Weltanschauung*), a way of thinking that included ethical and political practices as a “way of life” but the Stoics did not envision cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions. In this chapter, following my narrow successive historical analysis, I turn my attention to two modern thinkers, namely, Immanuel Kant and Jürgen Habermas, who have dealt with issues about cosmopolitanism, with special emphasis on political institutions. My aim here is to examine the idea of political institutions as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. First, I examine to what extent the “juridical-political” (Kant and Habermas) approach advances Stoic cosmopolitanism.

Kant’s cosmopolitanism is a legal and political order on the international scale. Kant proposes the idea of cosmopolitan right and the league of nation-states, which nation-states will join voluntary based on self-interest to avoid war. Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism is situated within the framework of social contract theory and the idea of self-interest. Kant equates the situation of individuals in the state of nature with the nation-states. There is no explicit focus on ethics. Kant proposes a cosmopolitanism that does not require ethical commitment.

Habermas seeks to overcome Kant’s conceptual difficulty, namely, the idea of self-interest based on social contract theory, and situates his vision of cosmopolitanism within the current political institutions, such as the United Nations and European Union. Habermas proposes a world domestic politics—without a world government with democratic procedures and practices—and the idea of citizenship (constitutional patriotism) beyond the ethnic and cultural realm.
In the second part of this chapter, I turn my attention to Jürgen Habermas, who seeks to supersede and advance Kant’s idea of cosmopolitanism. In order to advance Kant’s cosmopolitan project, Habermas develops Kant’s idea of the constitutionalization of international law. Habermas suggests a procedural framework relying on democratic practices and rule of law, which implies transition from international law to the constitutionalization of international law\(^{34}\), that is to say, legitimatization and institutionalization on transnational and supranational level. For Habermas, this is an ongoing project for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. In the third part of this chapter, I examine some difficulties with Habermas’s approach to cosmopolitanism and suggest that Habermas’s cosmopolitan vision in terms of law, procedure, and democracy, is necessary, but not sufficient. Habermas’s cosmopolitan political order lacks motivation and explicit ethical consideration. It does not adequately address what is required of an ethical response that would achieve a contemporary cosmopolitanism. For example, Habermas’s communicative ethics (discourse ethics) indicates that all those affected should participate in a dialogue. However, ethical discourses are highly improbable in everyday life, because the ideal expectations that they place on interlocutors are extremely demanding. There is no mechanism to check whether participants in discourse have equal chances to speak freely and/or to measure how inclusive discourses are. For example, immigrants who are seeking membership do not have an equal position as countries that are offering (or are not offering) membership. This is purely

on an empirical level. In other words, discourse ethics is not adequate in terms of dealing with certain real life practical issues such as immigration.

Habermas’s approach does not explicitly address the ethical practices concerning cosmopolitanism. The question that follows is: how do we become motivated to practice ethics with cosmopolitan awareness and intent? For instance, with wars and the increase of immigration and refugees in Europe, anti-immigrant sentiments are rising, despite the fact that there are international laws, which protect the rights of immigrants. These recent anti-immigrant sentiments indicate that there is no adequate established policy with respect to immigrants and refugees. A case in point is the deportation of the Roma people by the French government, and turning away refugees, a policy that ignores international and the European Union law. Another example, which shows a lack of ethical practices with respect to outsiders, is the rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe, as well as in the United States. While there are laws that protect freedom of religious practices, these laws in current form alone may not guaranty ethical conduct, the practice of hospitality, and/or the promotion of cosmopolitan awareness and intent. Therefore, I suggest that radical generosity as a transformative practice can challenge and change existing norms and point to new norms and practices. Thus, social and political institutions can exhibit ethical politics by implementing radical generosity in their practices and policy making with respect to immigrants and refugees. It must be noted that I am not suggesting that Habermas’s cosmopolitanism is an application of his discourse ethics. Moreover, I am not rejecting Habermas’s cosmopolitan theory indeed radical generosity is a complement to Habermas’s conception of cosmopolitanism.
Kant’s Conception of Cosmopolitanism: A Brief Historical Account

As it was presented in chapter one, the Stoics did not think of cosmopolitanism within the framework of law, procedure, or political institutions. For the Stoics, cosmopolitanism was a “way of life,” in terms of ethical and political practices and how one should live in the world with others. Kant, on the other hand, frames the question of cosmopolitanism in terms of peace, state, rights, and law and adds a new dimension to the cosmopolitan worldview (Weltanschauung), namely, a juridical and political approach.\(^{35}\) Kant belonged to the Enlightenment (the Age of Reason) thinkers who believed in the idea of rationality that there is intellectual progress, and cosmopolitanism was a part of the Enlightenment ideal. Kant, like many of the Enlightenment thinkers, believed that politics could be subjected to rational examination and political orders could be formally institutionalized according to rationality.\(^{36}\) Furthermore, Kant was inspired by the US declaration of independence and the French revolution, and, within this particular historical context, Kant developed his political theory about peace, rights, state, international law, and cosmopolitanism. It is also worth noting that

\(^{35}\) It is important to note that some Kant scholars focus on Kant’s moral aspect of cosmopolitanism, such as Pauline Kleingeld. She argues that Kant is clearly a moral cosmopolitan and Kant also defends a political version of cosmopolitanism. See Pauline Kleingeld’s *Kant’s Cosmopolitan Patriotism*, (Kant-Studien 94. Jahrg., S.(pp.) 299-316, 2003), as well as her discussion of *Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth-Century Germany*, (Journal of the History of Ideas, 1999). Habermas, as a postmetaphysical philosopher, focuses on Kant’s political theory with respect to cosmopolitanism, and Thomas McCarthy argues that Kant’s moral ideal of kingdom of ends, as the systematic union of rational beings under laws they give to themselves, seems to warrant that characterization, but Kant’s moral theory is not his political theory. A closer look at Kant’s specifically political writings, especially his essay on *Perpetual Peace*, the single most influential discussion of cosmopolitanism by a major philosopher, shows that this widespread impression is a mistake. See Thomas McCarthy’s *On Reconciling Cosmopolitan Unity and National Diversity*, (2001). McCarthy in his essay *Multicultural Cosmopolitanism Remarks on the Idea of Universal History* (2009) goes further and argues that the demands of theodicy that Kant placed on history play no role in postmetaphysical and postontological frames of interpretation. There is no *Endzweck* of history; it does not have to make moral-rational sense. Along with theodicy goes the teleology of nature embedded in it. According to McCarthy, there is no way to make sense of Kant’s claim that the full development of the natural capacities of the human species is *der letze Zweck der Natur*, the ultimate aim of nature.

Kant’s political theory is influenced and situated within the framework of the social contract theory.

Let us begin with Kant’s Ideas toward a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784). In this essay, Kant formulates his first normative ideal of peace and its necessary conditions. Kant articulates the ideal notion of a world federation of states, and it is during this period (1780s) that Kant argues for a formal institution of a robust federation of states with coercive powers at the federal level. However, this theme goes through revisions in Kant’s later political writings, notably in Perpetual Peace (1795). In Perpetual Peace (1795) Kant proposes a modified version which advocates the establishment of a league of nations based on the idea that states will join the league voluntarily without coercive powers, although, as some scholars, including Habermas, argue, Kant continued to believe in the stronger version of a federation of states as an ideal notion for the possibility of a perpetual peace. It would seem that for Kant this weaker version of a league of states was a first step and transition, which would eventually lead to a stronger ideal of a federation of states. It is worth noting that in Perpetual Peace (1795) as well as in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) Kant introduces the idea of cosmopolitan right, which has been a topic of debate among scholars. I discuss the idea of cosmopolitan right briefly in this chapter as well as in the next chapter focusing on Jacques Derrida’s critique of Kant’s notion of cosmopolitan right and hospitality.

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Kant in his early political writings discusses the idea of a federation of states, namely, in *Ideas toward a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* (1784). Kant in this essay in the seventh proposition writes the following:

The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved. What is the use of working for a law governed civil constitution among individual men, i.e. of planning a commonwealth? The same unsociability which forced men to do so gives rise in turn to a situation whereby each commonwealth, in its external relations (i.e. as a state in relation to other states), is in a position of unrestricted freedom. Each must accordingly expect from any other precisely the same evils which formerly oppressed individual men and forced them into a law-governed civil state….but finally, after many devastations, upheavals and even complete inner exhaustion of their powers, to take the step which reason could have suggested to them even without so many sad experiences—that of abandoning a lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own legal judgment, but solely from this great federation (*Foedus Amphictyonum*), from a united power and the law governed decisions of a united will. However wild and fanciful this idea may appear—and it has been ridiculed as such when put forward by the Abbé St. Pierre and Rousseau (perhaps because they thought that its realization was so imminent)—it is nonetheless the inevitable outcome of the distress in which men involve one another. For this distress must force the states to make exactly the same decision (how ever difficult it may be for them) as that which man was forced to make, equally unwillingly, in his savage state—the decision to renounce his brutish freedom and seek calm and security within a law-governed constitution.38

In this passage Kant links the analogy of the state of nature among individuals to the states, which although they have civil laws internally, are externally in the state of nature with each other, which is the state of constant war. Therefore, Kant following Abbé St. Pierre and Rousseau before him, proposes a federation of states, although Kant acknowledges that Abbé St. Pierre and Rousseau’s similar ideas were ridiculed and perceived as fanciful, nevertheless, Kant thinks it is a positive idea and he is hopeful that it may be realized. There are two main aspects of Kant’s proposal that I will discuss here. The first is that he adopts the framework of social

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contract theory drawing on the Hobbesian idea of “the state of nature” as holding among states. The second point is that Kant does not elaborate in detail how this federation of states will arise and be stable and peace will be perpetual. Kant seems to think that the states will be forced to join out of self-interest. It is later in Perpetual Peace (1795) that Kant modifies his proposal of a federation of states and proposes the idea of a league of nations that states will voluntarily join or leave. Nevertheless, as Habermas and other thinkers note, Kant until the end believed in the stronger version of federation as the ideal concept for a perpetual peace, and this modified version was a first step as a transition to a stronger federation as an ongoing project.

In Theory and Practice (1793) Kant, anticipating his more elaborate articulation of theory of state, constitution, international law, rights, and in particular cosmopolitan right, writes the following:

On the one hand, universal violence and the distress it produces must eventually make a people decide to submit to the coercion which reason itself prescribes (i.e. the coercion of public law), and to enter into a civil constitution. And on the other hand, the distress produced by the constant wars in which the states try to subjugate or engulf each other must finally lead them, even against their will, to enter into a cosmopolitan constitution. Or if such a state of universal peace is in turn even more dangerous to freedom, for it may lead to the most fearful despotism (as has indeed occurred more than once with states which have grown too large), distress must force men to form a state which is not a cosmopolitan common wealth under a single ruler, but a lawful federation under a commonly accepted international right… For my own part, I put my trust in the theory of what the relationships between men and the states ought to be according to the principle of right. It recommends to us earthly gods the maxim that we should proceed in our disputes in such a way that universal federal state may be inaugurated, so that we should therefore assume that it is possible (in praxi).  

Kant in this essay promotes his idea of a cosmopolitan political order in the framework of a federation of states and international law and rights. He also warns about despotism under a single ruler, by which that Kant means “universal-monarchy.” Later Kant elaborates on these

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ideas in detail. In *Perpetual Peace* (1795) Kant argues that republican states are less prone to war and are not despotic. Also, it is in *Perpetual Peace* (1795) that Kant recognizes the need to propose an intermediate form of a world organization, namely, a voluntary league of nations, because Kant doubted that states would give up their sovereignty and feared the concentration of power in the form of a “universal-monarchy.”

In *Perpetual Peace* (1795), Kant begins his discussion with the idea of promoting peace, which must be permanent and established formally in a legal framework. Thus, Kant moves in the concrete domain of state, law, and rights, to conceptualize his vision of world peace (cosmopolitanism). In this essay, Kant again refers to the state of nature analogy. In the second section of the essay Kant writes:

A state of peace among men living together is not the same as the state of nature, which is rather a state of war. For even if it does not involve active hostilities, it involves a constant threat of their breaking out. Thus the state of peace must be formally instituted, for a suspension of hostilities is not itself a guarantee of peace. And unless one neighbor gives a guarantee to the other at his request (which can happen only in a lawful state), the latter may treat him as enemy.\(^\text{40}\)

Furthermore, in the footnote of the same page with respect to a lawful state and legal constitution, Kant articulates the following:

But any legal constitution, as far as the persons who live under it are concerned, will conform to one of the three following types:

1. a constitution based on the civil right of individuals within a nation (*ius civitatis*).
2. a constitution based on the international right of states in their relationships with one another (*ius gentium*).
3. a constitution based on a cosmopolitan right, in so far as individuals and states, coexisting in an external relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind (*ius cosmopoliticum*). This classification, with respect to the idea of a perpetual peace, is not arbitrary, but necessary. For if even one of the parties were able to influence the others physically and yet itself remained in a state of nature, there would be a risk of war, which it is precisely the aim of the above articles to prevent.\(^\text{41}\)

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\(^{41}\) Ibid., pp. 98-99.
It is important to note that Kant here articulates three preliminary necessary conditions for the possibility of a perpetual peace and one of the important conditions is cosmopolitan right, which scholars interpret as a basic international law and human rights. In *Perpetual Peace* (1795) Kant introduces three definitive articles. In these, Kant proposes the following:

First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace: The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican. Second Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace: The Right of nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States. Third Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace: Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality.\(^{42}\)

In the first article, according to Kant, the republican system of government is more inclined to seek peace rather than monarchy, because monarchy is despotic, also, citizens in the republican system are free subjects and have rights and can decide whether to go to war or not. And, since war is costly and dangerous, the citizens will avoid war. In the second article, Kant advocates a federation of states without coercive powers, in other words, a league of states where states can join or leave voluntarily. Later in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) Kant articulates his position more clearly: “This association must not embody a sovereign power as in a civil constitution, but only a partnership or confederation. It must therefore be an alliance which can be terminated at any time, so that it has to be renewed periodically.”\(^{43}\) It would seem from this statement that Kant modifies his strong position of a federation of states to a voluntary league of states, because of the feasibility issue and fear of despotism, or perhaps, as Habermas notes, the league of states for Kant implied a gradual expansion and an ongoing project to an eventual transition to the ideal of a greater federation.


\(^{43}\) Ibid., p.165.
It should be mentioned, as I noted in the beginning of this chapter, that it would seem the main difficulty with Kant’s project is the fact that his conception of cosmopolitanism is situated within the framework of social contract theory, in particular with the notion of the state of nature and idea of self-interest, which Habermas and other scholars recognize and seek to reformulate. For example, in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), Kant writes:

> Since the state of nature among nations (as among individual human beings) is a state which one ought to abandon in order to enter a state governed by law, all international rights, as well as all the external property of states such as can be acquired or preserved by war, are purely provisional until the state of nature has been abandoned.\(^{44}\)

This passage indicates that Kant’s analogy of the state of nature is crucial to his theory of perpetual peace. As Habermas notes, the state of nature concept in the current global conditions is not a useful concept and it is misleading. This issue will be discussed in the second part of this chapter where I focus on Habermas’s conception of cosmopolitan political order.

Let us examine the third definitive article in perpetual peace, cosmopolitan right, which has been a topic of debate about basic human rights and international law. It is important to note that cosmopolitan right for Kant is a crucial condition for the possibility of perpetual peace. Kant writes:

> The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advancing towards a perpetual peace.\(^{45}\)

Furthermore, Kant argues that cosmopolitan right implies universal hospitality. In the third definitive article of a perpetual peace, Kant notes, “cosmopolitan right shall be limited to


\(^{45}\) Ibid., pp. 107-108.
conditions of universal hospitality.” Thus, Kant defines the conditions in the realm of international law and rights. In order to understand Kant’s argument with respect to cosmopolitan right, conditions, limitations, and possibilities, it is crucial to pay attention to the following passages in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) and *Perpetual Peace* (1795), in which he articulates his idea of cosmopolitan right in terms of international law. In *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), Kant writes:

> The rational idea, as discussed above, of a peaceful (if not exactly amicable) international community of all those of the earth’s peoples who can enter into active relations with one another, is not a philanthropic principle of ethics, but a principle of right...This right, in so far as it affords the prospect that all nations may unite for the purpose of creating certain universal laws to regulate the intercourse they may have with one another, may be termed *cosmopolitan* (*ius cosmopoliticum*).

In this passage Kant articulates the idea of cosmopolitan right in terms of international law among nations (states), which can in turn regulate interaction among states as well as the citizens of the world with states. Furthermore, in *Perpetual Peace* (1795) in the third definitive article of a perpetual peace, Kant writes the following:

> We are here concerned not with philanthropy, but with right. In this context, *hospitality* means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory. He can indeed be turned away, if this can be done without causing his death, but he must not be treated with hostility, so long as he behaves in a peaceable manner in the place he happens to be in. The stranger cannot claim the right of a guest to be entertained, for this would require a special friendly agreement whereby he might become a member of native for a certain time. He may only claim a right of resort, for all men are entitled to present themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth’s surface. Since the earth is a globe, they cannot disperse over an infinite area, but must necessarily tolerate one another’s company. And no-one originally has any greater right than anyone else to occupy any particular portion of the earth... But this natural right of hospitality, i.e. the right of strangers, does not extend beyond those conditions which make it possible for them to attempt to enter into relations with the native inhabitants. In this way, continents distant from each other can enter into peaceful mutual relations, which may eventually be regulated by public laws,

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thus bringing the human race nearer to a cosmopolitan constitution.\footnote{48}

It would seem that to a certain extent cosmopolitan right might be limited. The main point of cosmopolitan right is the right to hospitality, as Kant states, “cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.” Kant limits and defines cosmopolitan right as a negative right, in other words this right is not a right to visit, rather, it should be understood as the right of stranger not to be treated with hostility. According to Kant, this is only the right to present oneself and try to interact with other people and states around the world. Thus, this is a right to approach, not to entry (\textit{Zugang} not \textit{Eingang}), the stranger does not have a right to be a guest and supported, taken in, and even tolerated by the state. Therefore, the concept of right to hospitality, despite its positive connotation on the surface, it is not a right to be received as a guest. In fact, as Kant notes, the state can deny entry as long as it does not cause any harm to the stranger.

Ultimately, the stranger only has the right to present herself not the right to visit. This raises the question whether cosmopolitan right and right to hospitality might be too limited. Some scholars argue that Kant was aware of colonial practices by the Europeans and therefore wanted to limit and prevent such practices. However noble Kant’s intentions in terms of cosmopolitan right, some thinkers criticize Kant’s views on race and other cultures and find his views problematic, notably those expressed by Kant in his \textit{Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View} (1798).\footnote{49}


Let us examine Kant’s argument for peace, in his conclusion in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), with respect to the possibility of a perpetual peace Kant writes:

There shall be no war, either between individual human beings in the state of nature, or between separate states, which, although internally law governed, still live in a lawless condition in their external relationships with one another. For war is not the way in which anyone should pursue his rights. Thus it is no longer a question of whether perpetual peace is really possible or not, or whether we are not perhaps mistaken in our theoretical judgment if we assume that it is. On the contrary, we must simply act as if it could really come about (which is perhaps impossible), and turn our efforts towards realizing it and towards establishing that constitution which seems most suitable for this purpose (perhaps that of republicanism in all states, individually and collectively).  

Kant sought to promote peace around the world. It would seem that what is most important for Kant is the idea of the possibility of perpetual peace and cosmopolitan right as a necessary condition for peace within the framework of international law that all rational subjects who belong to the world community of reason as citizens of the world (*Weltbürger*) can recognize and accept. Kant’s vision of cosmopolitanism is placed within a juridical and political framework. Considering the historical context of the 18th century, ultimately, Kant proposes the conditions of the possibility of peace and cosmopolitanism in the framework of rights and international law. As Habermas suggests, Kant’s conception of cosmopolitan political order is that of a legal framework influenced by social contract theory. For Kant, cosmopolitan order is possible only by legally binding contracts between states and through international law and rights. Thus, Kant’s juridical and political conception of cosmopolitanism provides an institutional framework for the Stoic vision of cosmopolitanism as a way of thinking and a “way of life,” and this is a progress by Kant beyond Stoic cosmopolitanism, which did not have a political institutional framework. Ultimately, Kant suggests a weaker form of international legal order than his original idea of a “world republic”: a “league of nations.” To sum up, in *Perpetual* 

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Peace (1795), Kant argues that cosmopolitan political order is possible only when states are structured internally according to republican principles, when the states are organized externally in a voluntary league for the purpose of keeping peace, and when they respect human rights not only of their citizens but also of other states. Kant suggests that the league of nation states shall not have coercive military powers, because that will violate the internal sovereignty of states, constitute a potential danger to individual freedoms already established within those states, and, if the federal authority were less respectful of human rights than some of the member states, reduce the chances that states would actually join.

Though the Stoics influenced Kant, his approach to cosmopolitanism differs from that of the Stoics. Kant’s approach to the idea of cosmopolitanism is juridical and political. Kant’s cosmopolitanism, unlike the Stoics, does not promote a “way of life” that encompasses ethical and political practices. For the Stoics, as I noted in chapter one, the question is: “How should one live?” For them, cosmopolitanism is a way of life, which is transformational in the sense of living an ethical life with a cosmopolitan awareness and intent that manifests on the individual and social level. Kant situates cosmopolitanism within the framework of state, law, and rights. Kant seeks to institutionalize cosmopolitanism in a formal juridical and political structure with a perpetual peace (legal peace) in mind.

Despite the fact that Kant’s vision of cosmopolitanism has some weaknesses and inconsistencies, nevertheless, we must acknowledge Kant’s contribution to the cosmopolitan discourse from the philosophical and, in particular, historical perspective. Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism as a political institution and the formation of a cosmopolitan political order within the framework of the constitutionalization of international law are the starting points for the current discourse of cosmopolitanism.
Habermas’s Conception of Cosmopolitanism in the Realm of the Constitutionalization of International Law

Habermas seeks to supersede and advance Kant’s idea of cosmopolitanism. In order to advance Kant’s cosmopolitan project, he expands on Kant’s idea of the constitutionalization of international law. He suggests a procedural framework within the realm of law and democracy, which implies transition from international law to the constitutionalization of international law, that is to say, legitimatization and institutionalization on the transnational and supranational levels. Habermas argues for the legitimation requirement of a democratically constituted world society without a world government—assuming nation-states and their populations undergo certain learning processes. This implies the promotion of a “world domestic policy without a world government” (Weltinnenpolitik ohne Weltregierung). For Habermas, this is an ongoing project for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

Habermas is a philosopher who has been deeply influenced by Kant’s philosophy. Habermas’s post-metaphysical philosophy, developed within the framework of critical social theory, defends what he calls the unfinished project of enlightenment and modernity. His conception of cosmopolitanism draws on Kant’s cosmopolitan program, recast in a procedural approach to the institutionalization of a cosmopolitan political order. Habermas seeks to supersede Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism by avoiding the weaknesses and inconsistencies in Kant’s project.

Habermas argues that a difficulty with Kant’s cosmopolitan project is that it is developed within the framework of social contract theory. Thus, Kant applies social contract theory to

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relations between states within a state of nature. Habermas argues that the state of nature model in social contract theory with respect to states is misleading. He points out that Kant’s project was situated in the specific historical experiences of his time. Therefore, Kant’s cosmopolitan condition seems to have conceptual difficulty, because our historical conditions and experiences are different from Kant’s time. It would seem that, according to Habermas, had Kant conceptualized the idea of a cosmopolitan condition in abstract terms he would have avoided some of the conceptual difficulties it is facing now.

In order to overcome Kant’s conceptual difficulties, Habermas seeks to reformulate and situate the idea of a cosmopolitan condition within current global conditions. Habermas proposes a procedural method of constitutional democracy and rule of law in which the constitutionalization of international law can be realized to bring about the transition from an international to a cosmopolitan political order. It is important to note that Habermas, by the constitutionalization of international law, does not mean a “world republic;” rather, for Habermas, this is an ongoing project based on discursive examination and deliberative politics, which is a procedural model of democracy framed in the rule of law. Habermas notes that the Kantian project only found its way onto the political agenda with the League of Nations after two centuries, and the idea of a cosmopolitan order only became institutionalized with the foundation of the United Nations. Thus, Habermas is hopeful that the proposed reforms in the UN will be a learning process for the direct political will toward a continuation of the Kantian project.

Habermas indicates that Kant’s vision of a cosmopolitan condition, provided that we construe it

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in sufficiently abstract terms, still is a viable option to begin to formulate a cosmopolitan order with the world’s current conditions.\textsuperscript{54} Habermas remarks:

Kant recognizes that the democratic will has its roots in the ethos of people. But that does not necessarily imply that the capacity of a democratic constitution to bind and rationalize political power must be restricted to a specific nation-state. For the universalistic thrust of the constitutional principles of a nation-state points beyond the limits of national traditions which are no doubt also reflected in the local features of a particular constitutional order.\textsuperscript{55}

According to Habermas, this recognition by Kant that the universalistic features of the constitutional principles of a nation-state, such as democracy and rule of law, lead Kant to propose the “\emph{bürgerliche Verfassung}” a constitution that moves from the national onto the global level, which was inspired by the American and French revolutions, which signifies the birth of the idea of a constitutionalization of international law for Kant. Habermas remarks that this shows Kant’s extraordinary farsighted conceptual innovation, which implies that international law as a law of states would be transformed into cosmopolitan law as a law of individuals. That is to say, individuals are not merely citizens of a nation-state and enjoying the legal status of a nation-state, they also become members of a politically constituted world society as individual world citizens.\textsuperscript{56}

Habermas suggests that Kant, to the very end, promoted the idea of a stronger cosmopolitan political order, even though he proposed a weaker version of a “league of nations” (\textit{Völkerbund} ) as a first step toward a commonwealth of nations (\textit{Völkerstaat}). Habermas seems to think that Kant’s weaker version of a voluntary association of states that are willing to coexist peacefully while keeping their sovereignty seems to suggest a transitional step to a stronger

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., p. 314.
cosmopolitan order.”\textsuperscript{57} Habermas’s understanding of the Kantian cosmopolitan project with respect to a “league of nations” as a transition to a legal and political cosmopolitan order reflects on Habermas’s own cosmopolitan vision.

Habermas questions and analyzes what prevented Kant from conceptualizing a “cosmopolitan condition” in abstract terms rather than a “world republic” and then later why Kant considered a weaker version of a “league of nations.” Habermas notes that what prevented Kant’s conceiving of the cosmopolitan condition in sufficiently abstract terms was the fear for loss of cultural specificity, identity, and, possibly, both independence and sovereignty of nation-states. Habermas argues:

Had Kant read this conception of divided sovereignty from the US model, he would have realized that peoples of independent states who restrict their sovereignty for the sake of a federal government need not sacrifice their distinct cultural identities.\textsuperscript{58}

Furthermore, Habermas notes, “This fear may explain his [Kant’s] search for a ‘surrogate,’ though not yet why he felt compelled to conceptualize a cosmopolitan condition in the shape of an all-encompassing state in the first place.”\textsuperscript{59}

Critiquing Kant’s misconception of a cosmopolitan condition by noting Kant’s reliance on social contract theory, Habermas alludes to Rousseau’s idea of social contract theory, which implies that the state and the constitution are one, because both arise from the will of the people. Habermas argues that in relying on this idea, Kant neglected a different, competing constitutional tradition that rejects any such conceptual linkage of state and constitution.

\textsuperscript{58} Jürgen Habermas, \textit{The Divided West}, edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p.128.
According to Habermas, in the liberal tradition the constitution does not have the function of constituting authority but only that of constraining power. Pointing out the current world conditions, Habermas extols the cooperation between different nations in multilateral networks or in transnational negotiation systems, which has in many cases produced the legal forms of a constitution of international organizations without state characteristics which dispense with familiar forms of legitimation through the will of an organized citizenry. Relying on the liberal type of constitution that limits the power of the state without constituting it provides a conceptual model for a constitutionalization of international law in the form of a politically constituted world society without a world government.\(^6^0\) It would seem that to solve Kant’s problematic conception of a “world republic” and cosmopolitan condition Habermas is proposing deliberation and negotiation in the framework of a “rule of law” among nation-states rather than the model of a world government and direct democracy through the citizens of the world. To illustrate his cosmopolitan legal order further, Habermas states:

With the transition from state-centered international law to a cosmopolitan legal order, nation-states will be restricted in their scope of action without being robbed of their status as subjects of a global legal order by the individual world citizens, who now acquire the additional status of subjects of cosmopolitan law. Rather, republican states can remain subjects of a world constitution without a world government alongside the individual world citizen.\(^6^1\)

In other words, the constitutionalization of international law may not require a world government. Furthermore, Habermas contends that the institutionalization of international law as a long-term process is driven not by revolutionary masses but rather by nation-states and regional alliances of states. Ultimately, Habermas suggests that the gradual progress in the constitutionalization of international law began with support of governments rather than by

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\(^6^1\) Ibid., p.317.
citizens by the gradual internalization of anticipatory legal construction. To further his argument and provide an alternative to the idea of a “world republic,” Habermas proposes the following steps, which must be taken:

a) the concept of national sovereignty must be adapted to the new forms of governance beyond the nation-state; b) we must revise the conceptual linkage between the state’s monopoly on force and compulsory law in favor of the idea that supranational law is backed up by the sanctioning powers that remain the preserve of nation-states; c) we must identify the mechanism that explains how nations can change their self-understanding.62

These steps are only possible within the framework of the constitutionalization of international law. Habermas’s cosmopolitan project is committed to the rule of law as a condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. For Habermas, it would seem the legal norms are the only viable medium for integrating modern complex societies. He argues that the laws must be the result of public deliberation, which means deliberative democracy, and the legitimacy of laws is determined in public deliberations where all those possibly affected by the laws have an equal say. This deliberative method, accordingly, will be implemented in the cosmopolitan order in the form of global institutions at all levels (UN, WTO, IMF, World Bank, Municipal, National, and Supranational) through these discursive procedures with legal norms legitimated legally and institutionalized.63 Habermas suggests, the idea of a cosmopolitan constitution, the distinction between the supranational and the transitional level points to the reform of the United Nations, and to the dynamics triggered by an awareness of the lack of legitimacy of current forms of global governance.64 It would seem that the road to the constitutionalization of international law

for Habermas, leads to a major reform in the structure of the United Nations, which will empower it to secure the world peace. He argues:

[I]nternational relations as we know them would continue to exist in the transnational arena in a modified form—modified for the simple reason that under an effective UN security regime even the most powerful global player would be denied recourse to war as a legitimate means of resolving conflicts.\textsuperscript{65}

Furthermore, Habermas notes:

Thus reformed, the world organization could count on a worldwide background consensus in a threefold sense. The agreement would be geared, first, to the political goal of a substantively expanded conception of security, second, to the legal basis of the human rights pacts and conventions of international law passed by the General Assembly and already ratified by many states, and, third, to the procedural principles in terms of which a reformed world organization would tackle its problems.\textsuperscript{66}

According to this vision, cosmopolitan order will be an ongoing project, which relies on principles, procedures, long-term democratic learning process, and constitutional laws on the global scale. This seems to be a formidable task for Habermas’s cosmopolitan project. Habermas is optimistic that his procedural method based on his theories of communicative action, discourse ethics, deliberative democracy, and the rule of law can provide a viable framework for cosmopolitan order. To safeguard cosmopolitanism within the framework of the constitutionalization of international law, Habermas suggests the use of the public sphere on the national as well as on supranational levels. The idea of the public sphere plays a crucial role in Habermas’s project, which will provide a framework for the democratic legitimation of the transnational and supranational institutions. In the public sphere citizens of the world will discuss the issues at hand democratically through different media and have a critical voice in the political discourse.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 325.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 343.
In order to comprehend Habermas’s cosmopolitan project within the framework of the constitutionalization of international law, we have to pay attention to the backdrop in which he is theorizing and conceptualizing, namely, the European Union. It would seem that for Habermas, the European Union as a political and economic institution provides an empirical and practical model for his cosmopolitan vision. Through democratic practices the European Union can be a successful model for a cosmopolitan order. He notes:

The European Union could provide a model for other regions because it harmonizes the interests of formally independent nation-states at a higher level of integration, thereby creating a collective actor on a new scale. However, European unification can serve as a model for constructing regional political alliances only if it achieves a level of political integration that enables the EU to pursue democratically legitimized common policies both at home and abroad.68

Furthermore, Habermas argues that the European Union experience suggests that nationality and citizenship can be understood beyond the framework of the nation-state.

Therefore, he defines citizenship within the framework of constitutional law, which he calls “constitutional patriotism.” He contends that:

Nationalism provided the basis for what is by any standard a highly abstract form of civic solidarity. This national consciousness must now be raised to an even higher level of abstraction in the process of integrating nation-states into continental regimes. A mobilization of the masses through religious, ethnic, or nationalist agitation will

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67 It should be noted that although the European Union may offer an empirical and practical model, it is not perfect by any means. For example, Turkey, a long time member of NATO and relatively in good economic standing, has been waiting to become a member of the EU for many years, and its membership has been opposed strongly by France and Germany. On the other hand, some eastern European countries have become members or are being considered as potential members without any difficulty, although these countries have not been a part of NATO nor have they a strong economy. Critics accuse the EU of practicing a double standard, because Turkey is a Muslim country and its population is not considered white European. If the European Union is being considered as an empirical and practical model for a cosmopolitan order, then perhaps the issue of race, ethnicity, and religion needs to be addressed more seriously by the European Union. Furthermore, as Will Kymlicka argues, European citizenship still remains derivative of national citizenship and the directly elected European parliament remains subservient to the nationally delegated European Commission. According to this view, the EU so far has failed to transcend national citizenship, national legislatures, and national identities as the main locus of political practices. Therefore, politics in Europe remains too nation centric and the moral value of the EU depends on changing this. See Will Kymlicka’s essay ‘Liberal Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice,’ in Seyla Benhabib’s Another Cosmopolitanism, edited by Robert Post, (Oxford Press University, 2006), pp. 128-144.

gradually become less likely the more the expectations of tolerance inherent in a liberal civic ethos permeate political culture also at the national level.\footnote{Ibid., p.327.}

Habermas is aware that such understanding of nationality and citizenship depends on the institutionalization of international law and on creating regional alliances. Therefore, he is proposing the constitutionalization of international law. Habermas is hopeful that the European Union model and experience can be a good example for his project of the constitutionalization of international law, which will provide a framework for the slow historical process of working toward a project of cosmopolitan vision. Habermas notes:

> Philosophy can try to clarify certain basic conceptual features of the development of law in the light of both existing constellations and valid norms. Only at this level can it contribute to the discussion of whether the Kantian project still has a future.\footnote{Jürgen Habermas, \textit{The Divided West}, edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p.117.}

It would seem, ultimately, for Habermas, that the future of a cosmopolitan project is rooted in the procedural and legal order on the global level. The question is whether Habermas’s constitutionalization of international law can address the complex ethical issues that emerge with globalization. Habermas addresses these concerns in the following statement:

> We do need to concern ourselves with the purportedly “realistic” premise defended by Hobbesians both of the left and the right, namely, that law, even in the modern guise of constitutional democracy, is merely a reflex and mask for economic or political power. On this assumption, legal pacifism, which seeks to extend law to the international state of nature, is a sheer illusion. In fact, the Kantian project of constitutionalizing international law is nourished by an idealism free from illusions. The form of modern law as such has an unambiguous moral core that proves itself in the long run as a “gentle civilize” (Koskenniemi) whenever law is employed as the medium in which a constitution is formed.\footnote{Jürgen Habermas, \textit{The Divided West}, edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p.106.}

Habermas thinks that democratically implemented constitutional law can provide the necessary framework addressing the various issues that may arise in a cosmopolitan condition, including
ethical issues related to immigration. For Habermas, the possibility of cosmopolitanism calls for the rule of law, of course, within the realm of democracy.

Habermas’s contribution to the cosmopolitan project is valuable in advancing Kant’s vision and commitment to an institutional project within the realm of law and democracy. He moves away from Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism framed in the social contract model based on self-interest of nation-states. According to Habermas, the cosmopolitan project is ongoing based on change and progress. Despite its certain limitations, it would seem that Habermas’s conception of the constitutionalization of international law is the most comprehensive proposal for the possibility of cosmopolitanism as a political institution.

The Difficulties with the Juridical-Political Approach to Cosmopolitanism

Let us examine some of the issues that Habermas’s cosmopolitan political order is not sufficiently addressing, according to some of his critics. These criticisms raise doubts about Habermas’s cosmopolitan project on the grounds that cosmopolitan political order fails to address cultural and national identity issues. These critics are known as multiculturalists, such as Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka, as well as communitarians, like Michael Walzer. Multiculturalists promote “national-cultural” identity and favor “group rights” over a strong notion of “individual rights.” These groups, according to multiculturalists, can be distinguished as those of “national minority,” such as a people involuntarily incorporated into a larger state as a result of colonization, conquest, or the ceding of territory from one imperial power to another, like, for example, the Kurdish people. Other examples within the western democracies include the Quebecois and Native American people in Canada, as well as the Catalans and Basques in Spain, and the Scots, and the Welsh in the United Kingdom. Communitarians argue that democracy needs to be anchored in the political culture of a country. In particular, Walzer argues
that if the decision on membership were no longer the sovereign right of communities, but that of
dividuals with their basic right to migrate, then such a right would destroy the specific
character of political communities.\textsuperscript{72} Habermas acknowledges the issues that these thinkers raise
but argues that “the decisive alternatives lie not at the cultural but at socioeconomic level…the
question is not whether human rights, as part of an individualistic legal order, are compatible
with transmission of one’s own culture. Rather, the question is whether traditional forms of
political and societal integration can be reasserted against, or must instead be adapted to, the hard
to resist imperatives of economic modernization.”\textsuperscript{73}

Habermas argues that because of modernization in the form of globalized market
economy and loss of cultural identities, the traditional social and political order, such as nation-
state based on culture and ethnicity, is no longer viable. The alternative is a cosmopolitan
political order beyond the nation-state. It seems that, given the recent political uprisings in North
Africa as well as in the Middle East where people demand social and political freedom, universal
human rights, and the practice of democracy, to some extent Habermas’s hypotheses might be
correct: that aspiration for social and political freedom, universal human rights, and democracy
transcends cultural differences, and, ultimately, the root cause of these uprisings is
socioeconomic conditions on the global scale.

\textbf{Proceduralist Paradigm}

\textsuperscript{72} For a detail discussion of multiculturalism see Will Kymlicka’s, \textit{Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of
Minority Rights}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) as well as Charles Taylor’s article ‘The Politics of
Recognition’ in \textit{Multiculturalism}, edited by Amy Gutmann, Princeton Press University, 1994), pp. 25-73. Also, see
172-196. For an excellent discussion on multicultural cosmopolitanism see Thomas McCarthy’s essay \textit{Multicultural
Cosmopolitanism: Remarks on the Idea of Universal History}, (Publisher of Stephen Schneck, ed., Modest
Harmonies, 2009), pp. 1-29. For discussion on communitarian view see Michael Walzer’s \textit{The Moral Standing of
States}, in (Philosophy and Public Affairs 9, pp. 209-229, 1980) and \textit{Spheres of Justice}, (Oxford and Cambridge:
Blackwell, 1983).

\textsuperscript{73} Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights, in \textit{The Postnational Constellation}, trans. and ed., Max Pensky,
At this point I must make a brief remark on the proceduralist paradigm, as David Ingram terms it in *Habermas: Introduction and Analysis* (2010). Ingram writes:

Habermas’s theory links legitimacy to the discursive formation of a rational will. Deliberation, not decision, is its preferred method for legitimation. Confronting problems of collective choice head on, it explains how conflicting preferences can be transformed and harmonized into laws that all can freely accept. Doubts, however, remain regarding the autonomy of the public sphere… Aside from these empirical challenges, there are four philosophical concerns that merit special attention. First, one might object that Habermas’s proceduralist paradigm is paradoxical: either discursive procedures possess sufficient normative substance to constrain the outcome of democratic deliberation, in which case they violate autonomy of deliberasors by imposing a philosophically predetermined result; or they do not, in which case they permit them to make irrational and discriminatory decisions. A related concern is that procedures only provide a subset of conditions that are necessary for deliberation to be just and rational. Other conditions—above all, a more equitable distribution of economic and cultural assets—seem necessary as well… The theory’s narrow focus on law and politics—to the exclusion of the workplace—as the focal point of democracy. Of related interest is the mundane struggle against technical elites and technological hierarchy in pursuit of more democratic technical organizations. Finally, the theory’s presumption of democracy as an institutionalized revolution provokes the further objection that it cannot justify revolutionary actions that aim to overthrow the political forces that prevent democracy from being institutionalized in the first place.74

Ingram questions the sufficiency of Habermas’s procedural method in terms of empirical and practical possibility, as well as its philosophical assumption with respect to discursive deliberation and democratic practices, in particular, especially the idea of democracy as an institutionalized revolution, which seems to prevent the revolutionary practices that might be required to institutionalize democracy in the first place. For example, the recent social movements around the globe against undemocratic economic practices by globalized neoliberal market forces is a good evidence that revolutionary practices are necessary for establishing democratic practices, like those that Habermas advocates.

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On the issue of immigration and group rights with respect to procedural paradigm Ingram writes the following:

[When the proceduralist paradigm is applied to multiculturalism or immigration; in neither of these instances does the paradigm obviously favor the solutions that Habermas tries to draw from it. Group rights that are intended to provide equal protection for discrete classes of persons appear to constrain identities in ways that seemingly violate the inherent openness, fluidity, and hybrid nature of identities set in motion by discursive procedures. The paradigm provides no definitive guidance in specifying what constitutes a legitimate group that is worthy of equal protection. Yet Habermas’s somewhat tortured effort at distinguishing between legitimate “enabling” rights and illegitimate “protective” rights—classifying this or that group as falling into either one of these categories—presumes that it does. The same applies to immigration. When it comes to deciding membership, the paradigm at once supports and undermines territorially bounded national self-determination, so that the answer to the question about what distinguishes ascriptive from nonascriptive qualifications for membership—and what decides the legitimacy of appealing only to the latter—depends on what perspective one adopts.]

Ingram’s argument shows shortcomings of procedural method in the sense that in it Habermas fails to adequately address the issue of multiculturalism or immigration. In particular, because of the lack of clear guidance in terms of determining what is a legitimate group right that needs equal protection. Furthermore, when it comes to discursive deliberation, immigrants who are seeking membership do not have an equal position as the nation-states who are offering membership, on purely the empirical and practical level. In other words, procedural method is necessary, but it is not sufficient in terms of dealing with certain real life practical matters, such as immigration.

The other difficulty with the juridical and political approach to cosmopolitanism seems to be the lack of motivation with regard to ethical practices. For example, Axel Honneth argues that Habermas’s discourse ethics lacks an adequate account of motivation to moral action, because there is a gap between universal pragmatic and everyday experience. Honneth addresses the issue

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of motivation in *The Struggle for Recognition* (1995), by relying on Hegel’s early Jena writings, with the notion of struggle for recognition (*Anerkennung*), and G.H. Mead’s social psychology. Honneth’s empirical notion of recognition has three crucial elements: love, rights, and esteem. Honneth notes that a theory of communicative action has to rely on a concept of morally motivated struggle.\(^76\) Also, Daniel Munro argues that:

> It is not clear that Habermas’s solution to the problem of motivation navigates the tension between norms and motives in either normatively or practically compelling ways. Given that political discourse in existing capitalist societies is characterized by power inequalities and the existence of unattractive preferences, expectations and motives, it is hard to see how norms that are the outcome of a real deliberative procedure could be protected from objectionable features of the social and political status quo.\(^77\)

According to this argument, it would seem ideal norms that are meant to be the outcome of a deliberative procedural discourse, may not be protected by political institutions, because of the lack of motivation or objectionable motivation. We can conclude that political institutions may be necessary for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, but they may not be sufficient. Therefore, there seems to be a lack ethical response and consideration with regard to the juridical and political conception of cosmopolitanism.

Ultimately, the juridical and political approach to cosmopolitanism addresses the issue of international law, considering the rights of citizens within the framework of cosmopolitan political order, which is an important part of cosmopolitan condition. Thus, Habermas’s

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\(^{76}\) Habermas’s discourse ethics has been criticized by many philosophers. See *The Struggle for Recognition*, Axel Honneth, (The MIT Press, 1995), pp.1-6. And, *The Fragmented World of the Social*, Axel Honneth, (SUNY Press, 1995), Introduction. Habermas tries to solve the problem of motivation by arguing that “only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.” Habermas is hopeful that participatory-deliberative discourse combined with institutional organizations may make possible the ideal moral awareness, which will develop motives that could stabilize the normative ideal of radical democracy and simultaneously maintain the normative integrity of the ideal. However, critics find it doubtful that without a moral motivation Habermas’s discourse ethics will be effective, for example, with immigration issues in particular in the EU.

proposed legal and political institutional framework for the possibility of cosmopolitanism is necessary, but it is not sufficient. What is problematic with the juridical-political approach to cosmopolitanism hinges upon the answer to the following question: what will motivate people to practice cosmopolitanism and acknowledge and accept cosmopolitan laws and rights? What is missing from “juridical-political” approach is an adequate ethical response that would achieve the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Habermas’s cosmopolitan political order lacks motivation and explicit ethical consideration. What is needed is an adequate ethical response by politicizing ethical issues, which will lead to ethical politics. I suggest that political institutions can exhibit radical generosity in their practices and policy making with regard to immigrants and refugees.

In the next chapter, I will focus on an appropriate conception of ethics as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. The emphasis will be on Jacques Derrida’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s the “beyond normative” approach to ethics.
Chapter 3: The Possibility of Cosmopolitanism in the Realm of Unconditional Ethics

In the preceding chapter the focus of discussion was on political institutions as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, namely, the “juridical-political” approach (Kant and Habermas) to cosmopolitanism. In chapter two, I argued that Kant and Habermas propose political institutions as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism; however, what is missing in this approach is an adequate ethical response that would achieve the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Habermas’s cosmopolitan political order lacks motivation and explicit ethical response, such as radical generosity as a transformative practice by social and political institutions.

From Derrida’s point of view, it would seem there might be a paradox here in the cosmopolitan discourse. On the one hand, it seems that cosmopolitanism calls for some kind of “juridical-political” institutions; on the other hand, it also requires an ethic of welcome and hospitality unconditionally beyond the “juridical-political” framework. The “juridical-political” approach to cosmopolitanism, as promoted by Kant and Habermas, seems to overlook this unconditional ethical concern for others.

Thus, the aim of this chapter is to focus on an adequate conception of ethical consideration as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Namely, Jacques Derrida’s and Emmanuel Levinas’s the “beyond normative” approach to ethics. For Derrida and Levinas, ethics is not about knowing this and that rule and making ethical decisions based on abstract formal rules. They offer an understanding of ethics, which is about an unconditional ethical concern for the other. Therefore, Derrida insists upon the idea of infinite and unconditional responsibility in ethics, which he calls the possibility of impossibility. Derrida’s ethical approach points both to a limitation of ethics and to a paradoxical ethical concern that he
suggests is unavoidable for human beings. Here we have ideas about how there can be the opening of an ethics even when political and institutional issues are unresolved.

For Derrida, ethics is the condition for politics and for Levinas ethical concern is not in the realm of politics. Derrida and Levinas offer an understanding of ethics, which I will take to involve an unconditional ethical concern for the other and ethics beyond following rules. From their work I draw upon the ideas of unconditional ethical concern for the other and ethics beyond following rules in order to advance my argument regarding radical generosity. Radical generosity also involves unconditional openness to others and concern for the wellbeing of others without following rules; in particular, “welcome” as unconditional “hospitality” can be understood as radical generosity.

However, Derrida’s and Levinas’s ethical response focuses on individual responsibility, while my focus is on the social aspect of ethical response rather than the individual dimension of it. These ideas of Derrida and Levinas about ethical response will help to define what I mean by radical generosity. Radical generosity as a practice is a social disposition and the ethos of a society. It must be noted that communities are not naturally self-interested or generous, rather, societies have the potential to become self-interested or generous based on social practices. Thus, through social practices historically social change occurs. In chapter four, I elaborate upon and develop further what the practice of radical generosity implies beyond Derrida’s and Levinas’s approach to ethics.

Moreover, drawing from Derrida and Levinas, here, I give an account of an ethical response that is not a matter of following rules and present the idea of an ethic that is unconditional. Thus, we have here a sense of ethical concern for the wellbeing of others that involves radical generosity. Furthermore, radical generosity involves transformational ethics,
which implies challenging social norms and producing new ways of thinking and ethical practices.

While I draw on Derrida’s and Levinas’s ideas of ethics to develop my conception of radical generosity, I, nevertheless, move beyond their ethical concern for the other and introduce the idea of the practice of ethics based on historical and social practices of ethics as a “way of life,” which involves the practice of radical generosity on both the individual and social level to transform social and ethical relations.

In this attempt to articulate and develop these ethical aspects for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, this chapter will proceed as follows: first, I present and examine Derrida’s idea of ethics and politics in terms of the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Here I focus on Derrida’s later work, including his critique of Kant’s political writings, with an emphasis on the ideas of cosmopolitan right and hospitality, as well as Derrida’s appropriation of Levinas’s infinite responsibility and “welcome” as unconditional “hospitality.” I will also refer to his criticism of Habermas’s work. Derrida and Habermas came to some agreement on practical political issues, such as European foreign policy on the eve of the Iraq war. In fact, on February 15, 2003, Habermas published an article on this issue and Derrida was a co-signatory. Second, I read Levinas through Derrida with respect to ethical concern, infinite responsibility for the other, and welcoming the other as hospitality. Third, I examine the limits of Derrida’s and Levinas’s ethical concern and argue that Levinas’s ethical concern does not move from an individual (ethical subjectivity) realm to a social domain, and, thus, remains marked by significant lacunae. Thus, I move beyond their ethical concern for the other and introduce the idea of the practice of ethics

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based on concrete everyday life practices as a “way of life,” which must include the practice of radical generosity on the singular and social level to transform social and ethical relations.

As I mentioned at the outset, Derrida and Levinas present a different ethical and political approach with respect to the possibility of cosmopolitanism, which is beyond the framework of norms, procedure, and political institutions. According to Derrida, ethics and politics are marked by un-decidability\(^{79}\), and ethical-political decisions, therefore, cannot follow a norm or procedure, rather ethical concern involves infinite responsibility. Derrida says:

> I believe that we cannot give up on the concept of infinite responsibility… I would say, for Levinas and for myself, that if you give up the infinitude of responsibility, there is no responsibility. It is because we act and we live in infinitude that the responsibility with regard to the other is irreducible. If responsibility were not infinite, if every time that I have to take an ethical and political decision with regard to the other this was not infinite, then I would not be able to engage myself in an infinite debt with regard to each singularity.\(^{80}\)

Furthermore, Derrida argues:

> Habermas thinks that in the idea of infinite responsibility there is an ethical overload (surcharge), but the ethical overload has to be overwhelming (surcharge), it overwhelms (surcharge), and the arrival of the other is the overload. One cannot eliminate the overload and control things by norms within discourse. When there are norms, it is finished, everything is done, everything follows from the norms. There is no

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\(^{79}\) Derrida, invoking Kierkegaard, says “a decision requires a ‘leap of faith’ beyond the sum total of facts.” Likewise, Derrida writes: “The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two decisions. Undecidable—this is the experience of that which, though foreign and heterogeneous to the order of calculable and the rule, must (\textit{doit}) nonetheless—it is of duty (\textit{devoir}) that one must speak-deliver itself over to the impossible decision while taking account of law and rules. A decision that would not go through the test and ordeal of undecidable would not be a free decision; it would only be the programmable application or the continuous unfolding of a calculable process. See ‘Force of Law’ in Jacques Derrida’s \textit{Acts of Religion} (New York: Routledge, 2002), p.252. Furthermore, Derrida says: “the responsibility of what remains to be decided or done (in actuality) cannot consist in following, applying, or carrying out a norm or rule. Wherever I have at my disposal a determinable rule, I know what must be done, and as soon as such knowledge dictates the law, action follows knowledge as a calculable consequence: one knows what path to take, one no longer hesitates. The decision then no longer decides anything but is made in advance annulled. It is simply deployed, without delay, presently, with the automatism attributed to machines. There is no longer any place for justice or responsibility (whether juridical, political, or ethical).” See Derrida’s \textit{Rogues: Two Essays on Reason} (Stanford University Press, 2005) in ‘The Last of the Rogue States: The “Democracy to Come,”’ Opening in Two Turns’, pp. 84-85.

more responsibility when there are norms. Thus, if one wants to normalize, to norm the ethical overload, it is finished, there is no more ethics.81

For Derrida, the idea of infinite responsibility is always marked with an ethical overload.82 Derrida’s deconstruction has an “ethical-political” theme. Derrida says that deconstruction is “an openness towards the other.”83 However, this statement does not imply that Derrida has a normative ethical or political theory. Rather, he is concerned with ethical and political questions, with respect to difference, the singularity of the other, and the relation to the other, which according to Derrida, is marked by asymmetry. To a certain extent, Derrida’s ethical concern is informed and influenced by Levinas’s ethics as “first philosophy,”84 particularly Derrida’s later work,85 which is focused on justice, law, and cosmopolitanism. However, it is important to note that unlike Habermas, who is a post-metaphysical philosopher and is concerned with formal social and political institutions in the tradition of social theory, Derrida’s deconstruction functions within the framework of metaphysics and traditional

82 By “overload” Derrida refers to the notion of more than one can handle, beyond one’s capacity, and the idea of “infinite,” which means beyond what one can think of.
84 Levinas says:” it must be understood that morality comes not as a secondary layer, above an abstract reflection on the totality and its dangers; morality has an independent and preliminary range. First philosophy is an ethics.” See in Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 1985), translation by Richard A. Cohen, p.77.
philosophical discourse, nevertheless always deconstructing the metaphysical framework in the paradox of “inside-outside.”

Contrary to Habermas, Derrida does not provide a systematic conception of procedural rationality that is developed in terms of norms in ethics, politics, and law. Rather, he intervenes in the discourse of cosmopolitanism in the tradition of deconstruction and, in doing so, shows the limits and possibilities of cosmopolitanism. Derrida calls for examining norms, laws, politics, and ethics; for going beyond norms and rules; and for seeking new openings. He calls for a new ethical-political order and democracy, which he refers to as “democracy to come.”

**Derrida’s Critique of Kant’s Cosmopolitan Right and Hospitality**

In this section, I focus on Derrida’s examination of Kant’s ideas of cosmopolitan right and hospitality, where Derrida points to their contradictions and limitations. Derrida situates Kant’s idea of cosmopolitan right and hospitality in the paradox of possibility and impossibility. He argues that the very conditions that Kant proposes for the possibility of hospitality limits hospitality. For Derrida, hospitality must be unconditional which means pure and absolute hospitality. Derrida says that Kant’s cosmopolitan right indicates that we are in the domain of right, not of morality, and this right is related to citizenship, the state, and the subject of the state, even if it is a world state; therefore, it is an issue of an international right. According to Derrida, Kant’s idea of universal hospitality is not motivated by “the love of man as a sentimental motive.” Derrida argues for unconditional hospitality as an ethical response.

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86 Derrida says: “We cannot really say that we are ‘locked into’ or ‘condemned to’ metaphysics, for we are, strictly speaking, neither inside nor outside.” See ‘Dialogue with Jacques Derrida,’ in *Dialogue with Contemporary Continental Thinkers* (Manchester University Press, 1984), ed., Richard Kearney, pp. 112-13, in p. 111. This quotation is also in Richard J. Bernstein’s ‘An Allegory of Modernity/Postmodernity: Habermas and Derrida’ in *The Derrida-Habermas Reader* (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen. p.81.
Derrida’s approach to cosmopolitanism differs from Habermas’s in that Derrida’s deconstructive approach to Kant’s argument in Perpetual Peace (1795) focuses on its contradictions and limitations. He situates Kant’s idea of cosmopolitan right and hospitality in the paradox of possibility and impossibility. He argues that the very conditions that Kant proposes for the possibility of hospitality limit hospitality. For Derrida, hospitality must be unconditional, which means a pure and absolute hospitality, which, ultimately, renders Kant’s idea of hospitality impossible. The possibility of hospitality is, in effect, a paradox of the possibility of impossibility. Derrida begins his discussion on hospitality with Kant’s third definitive article of perpetual peace, which Derrida quotes: “Cosmopolitan Right shall be limited to conditions of Universal Hospitality.” Derrida asserts, “Already the question of conditionality, of conditional or unconditional hospitality, presents itself.” Furthermore, Derrida notes that two words are underlined by Kant in this title, “cosmopolitan right” (Weltbürgerecht: the right of world citizens), which indicates that we are in the domain of right, not of morality, and this right is related to citizenship, the state, the subject of the state, even if it is a world state; therefore, it is an issue of an international right. The other word is “hospitality” (der Allgemeinen Hospitalität, 87

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87 Derrida says: “And this impossible that there is remains ineffaceable. It is as irreducible as our exposure to what comes or happens. It is the exposure (the desire, the openness, but also the fear) that opens, that opens itself, that opens us to time, to what comes upon us, to what arrives or happens, to the event. To history, if you will, a history to be thought completely otherwise than from a teleological horizon, indeed from any horizon at all. When I say “the impossible that there is” I am pointing to this regime of the “possible-impossible” that I try to think by questioning in all sorts of ways (for example, around questions of gift, forgiveness, hospitality, and so on), by trying to “deconstruct,” if you will, the heritage of such concepts as “possibility,” “power,” “impossibility,” and so on.” See ‘A Dialogue with Derrida’ in Giovanna Borradori’s Philosophy in a Time of Terror (The University of Chicago Press, 2003), p.120. It is noteworthy that Derrida’s notion of the “possibility of impossible” does not have a negative connotation, because, as he puts it, “I place under the title of the im-possible, of what must remain (in a nonnegative fashion)”. See Derrida’s Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford University Press, 2005) in ‘The Last of the Rogue States: The “Democracy to Come,” Opening in Two Turns,’ p.84. Also, see Derrida’s discussion on the notion of “possible-impossible” in ‘ On the Gift’: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion moderated by Richard Kearney in God, the Gift, and Postmodernism (Indiana University Press, 1999), ed., John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, p. 38. 88 Jacques Derrida, ‘Hostipitality’ in The Derrida-Habermas Reader(The University of Chicago Press, 2006), ed., Lasse Thomassen. p.209.
universal hospitality), which, according to Derrida, defines the conditions of a cosmopolitan right, a right that its terms would be defined by a treaty between states, by a kind of a UN charter.\(^9\) Derrida alludes to Kant’s assertion that universal hospitality is not concerned with philanthropy, but rather with right, and in this context “hospitality means right of stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory. He can indeed be turned away, if this is done without causing his death.”\(^9\) Derrida remarks on Kant’s statement in a long footnote:

The stranger can pass through but cannot stay. He is not given the rights of a resident. In order for there to be a right of residence, there must be an agreement between states. Everything—and this is what cosmopolitanism means—is subject to an inter-state conditionality. Hence, there is no hospitality for people who are not citizens…This is the challenge today, too: a hospitality which would be more than cosmopolitical, which would go beyond strictly cosmopolitical conditions, those which imply state authority and state legislation. The foreigner cannot claim a right to residence (that would require a special friendly agreement which would make him the member of a native household for a certain period of time), but can claim a right to visit, a right of resort.\(^9\)

According to Derrida, Kant’s idea of universal hospitality is not motivated by “the love of man as a sentimental motive.”\(^9\) Thus, according to Kant’s conception, universal hospitality arises from an obligation, a right, and a duty all regulated by law. Derrida suggests that hospitality understood in the Kantian sense is formalized as a law of hospitality that violently imposes a contradiction on the very concept of hospitality by limiting it. Derrida says:

Hospitality is a self-contradictory concept and experience which can only self-destruct (put otherwise, produce itself as impossible, only be possible on the condition of its impossibility) or protect itself from itself, auto-immunize itself in some way, which is to say, deconstruct it precisely—in being put into practice.\(^9\)

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\(^89\) Ibid., p.209.
\(^90\) Ibid., p.211.
\(^93\) Ibid., p.211.
It would seem that Derrida questions Kant’s formal institutional conception of cosmopolitan right and universal hospitality, thus, situates it in the paradox of impossibility as soon as it is formalized, known, experienced, and put to practice in a conditional Kantian sense.

Derrida suggests that, “we do not know what hospitality is. This not knowing is not necessarily a deficiency, an infirmity, a lack,” which might ordinarily be a negative statement, but, for Derrida, hospitality is not in the domain of being or an object of knowledge. Derrida explains his own conception of hospitality this way:

Hospitality, if there is such a thing, is not only an experience in the most enigmatic sense of the word, which appeals to an act and intention beyond the thing object, or present being, but is also an intentional experience which proceeds beyond knowledge toward other as absolute stranger, as unknown, where I know that I know nothing of him.

Furthermore, Derrida says:
I am not claiming that hospitality is this double bind or this aporetic contradiction and therefore wherever hospitality is, there is no hospitality…what must be overcome (it is the impossibility which must be overcome where it is possible to become impossible. It is necessary to do the impossible. If there is hospitality, the impossible must be done). Hospitality can only take place beyond hospitality, in deciding to let it come, overcoming the hospitality that paralyzes itself on the threshold which it is. It is perhaps in this sense that ‘we do not know (not yet, but always not yet) what hospitality is’…in this sense hospitality is always to come (l’à venir), but a ‘to come’ that does not and will never present itself as such.

In Derrida’s view, justice, democracy, forgiveness, and hospitality are never present as “there is” (es gibt), rather one awaits their coming, as he puts it “to come” in a non-religious messianic sense (messianicity without messianism), and I will elaborate on Derrida’s notion of “to come” and “messianism” in the next section where the focus of discussion is on democracy to come.

Nevertheless, this idea of “to come” does not imply that hospitality is deferred to some future time, according to Derrida. Rather, it points to the notion that “hospitality” as such, does not

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95 Ibid., p.216.

96 Ibid., pp.225-226.
exist and cannot be present, and therefore pure and unconditional hospitality must remain open as “to come” not in a pragmatic, practical, and formalized institutional sense but beyond the norms and rules and law, which becomes infinite ethical responsibility for the other, which is always infinite and more than one can think of.

Furthermore, on the theme of pure and unconditional hospitality, Derrida says the following:

Pure and unconditional hospitality, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance open to someone who is neither expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, non-identifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly other. I would call this a hospitality of visitation rather than invitation…this concept of pure hospitality can have no legal or political status. No state can write it into its laws…Unconditional hospitality, which is neither juridical nor political, is nonetheless the condition of the political and the juridical.

Derrida recognizes that perhaps pure and unconditional hospitality may be practically impossible and moves beyond the juridical-political realm and is situated in the domain of ethical responsibility for the unknown other. Nevertheless, Derrida suggests that without the thought of unconditional hospitality we would not have the idea of hospitality itself; therefore, the unconditional hospitality, which is not in the realm of politics and law, is the very condition for the political and the juridical. Derrida’s assertion suggests cosmopolitan ethics must move

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98 Derrida invoking Levinas writes: “I am the hostage of the other insofar as I welcome the face of the other, insofar as I welcome infinity. For Levinas, the welcoming of the other is the welcoming of the other who is infinitely other and who consequently extends beyond me infinitely, when I consequently welcome beyond my capacity to welcome. In hospitality I welcome an other greater than myself who can consequently overwhelm the space of my house.” See Jacques Derrida, ‘Hostipitality’ in The Derrida-Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen. p. 229, note 20.


beyond politics and law, and indeed it is the condition for politics and law with respect to relation to the other in the cosmopolitan discourse. Derrida’s critique of Kant’s Juridical-political approach to cosmopolitan right and cosmopolitanism is compelling. Ultimately, Derrida is skeptical about the Kantian idea of hospitality and cosmopolitan right in terms of political institutions, which limits the unconditional notion of hospitality and cosmopolitanism. Derrida introduces an ethical move beyond the Kantian Juridical-political approach to cosmopolitanism.

**Derrida’s Cosmopolitics and Democracy to Come**

Here the discussion is about Derrida’s critique of political institutions. Derrida argues that ethics is the condition for politics, and political institutions such as cosmopolitanism and democracy are a promise “to come”\(^{101}\) not present. Nevertheless, Derrida acknowledges that cosmopolitanism and democracy are needed in the face of tyranny, and political civilization remains better than barbarism. In contrast to Habermas, Derrida does not provide a systematic conception of procedural rationality that is developed in terms of norms in ethics, politics, and law. Rather, he shows the limits and possibilities of cosmopolitanism. Derrida calls for examining norms, laws, politics, and ethics; going beyond norms and rules; and seeking new openings, a new International Law, and a new ethical-political order and democracy, which he refers to as “democracy to come.” Drawing from this discussion, I argue that we should begin with ethics, and, indeed, ethics should not be separated from politics, and the idea of ethical politics can be achieved through the practice of radical generosity in politics.

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\(^{101}\) Derrida says: “In general, I try to distinguish between what one calls the future and “to come.” The future is that which tomorrow, later, next century will be. There is a future, which is predictable and foreseeable. But there is a future *l’avenir* (to come), which refers to someone who comes, whose arrival is totally unexpected. For me, that is the real future, that which is unpredictable. The Other who comes without my being able to anticipate their arrival. So if there is a real future beyond this other known future, it is *l’avenir* in that it is the coming of the Other when I am completely unable to foresee their arrival.”

Like Habermas, Derrida argues that cosmopolitanism calls for moving beyond the nation-states, because nation-states function within the framework of nationalism. Derrida like Habermas supports international cooperation and reform and transformation in the UN.\textsuperscript{102} However, where Habermas is hopeful that through reform in both the UN and other democratic formal institutions cosmopolitan political order may be a possibility, Derrida is skeptical about the prospect of cosmopolitan political order, not just for practical difficulties but also because, for Derrida, concepts such as cosmopolitanism and democracy remain a promise “to come,” therefore, he refers to cosmopolitanism as “cosmopolitics.” According to Derrida, his interest in international cooperation and cosmopolitanism is to some extent in the spirit of Kant, but he has some questions (reservations) with respect to Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism.\textsuperscript{103}

Let us examine Derrida’s ideas of “to come” and “democracy to come.” I begin with a lengthy quote from Derrida’s preface to \textit{Rogues} (2005), where Derrida, invoking Plato, Benjamin, and Levinas, writes:

\begin{quote}
We think at once the unforeseeability of an event that is necessarily without horizon, the singular coming of the other, and, as a result, a weak force. This vulnerable force, this force without power, opens up unconditionally to what or who comes and comes to affect it...A certain reinterpretation of Plato’s \textit{Timaeus} had named Khôra (which means \textit{locality} in general, spacing, interval) another place without age, another “taking-place,” the irreplaceable or placement of “desert in the desert,” a spacing from “before” the world, the cosmos, or the globe, from “before” any chronophenomenology, any revelation, any “as such” and any “as if,” any anthropotheological dogmatism or historicity... But what would allow these to take place, without, however, providing any ground or foundation, would be precisely Khôra. Khôra would make or give \textit{place}; it would give rise—without ever \textit{giving} anything—what is called coming of the event. Khôra receives rather than gives. Plato in fact presents it as a “receptacle.” Even if it comes “before everything,” it does not exist for itself. Khôra: before the “world,” before creation, before the gift and being—Khôra that \textit{there is} perhaps “before” any “there is” as \textit{es gibt}...what here receives
\end{quote}


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the name Khôra, a call might thus be taken up and take hold: the call for a thinking of the event *to come*, of the democracy *to come*, of the reason *to come*. This call bears every hope, to be sure, although it remains, in itself, without hope. Not hopeless, in despair, but foreign to the teleology, the hopefulness, and the *salut* of salvation. Not foreign to the *adieu* (“come” or “go” in peace), not foreign to justice, but nonetheless heterogeneous and rebellious, irreducible, to law, to power, and to the economy of redemption.104

This passage can be read in terms of what Derrida refers to as “to come,” which in a certain sense relates to the coming of the event (the other, democracy, justice, and cosmopolitanism).

When Derrida refers to coming of the other as a “weak force” he is invoking Benjamin105 and interprets it as “messianicity without messianism,” and for Derrida, this “messianicity without messianism” refers to a call and a promise of an independent future for what is to come, in the shape of peace and justice, a promise and hopefulness, independent of religion, a promise beyond three Abrahamic religions and without relation to revelations or to the history of religions, in a sense a faith without a religion. In other words, it is a secular call with no universal *telos*. However, it is important to note that, according to Derrida, that “to come” is not something that is certain to happen tomorrow or in the future in concrete formal terms, rather it remains a promise to come.106 Nevertheless, Derrida gives a surprisingly concrete example of this messianism without religion by referring to Benjamin’s notion of a “weak force” and uses it to describe the alter-globalization movements that are heterogeneous, unformed, and full of contradictions. According to Derrida, these weak forces will prove to be strong in the end and represent the future. Furthermore, he asserts that we must very cautiously, give force and form to this “messianicity without messianism” and not give in to the old politics of sovereignism and

105 “Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim.” Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ in *Illuminations: Walter Benjamin Essays and Reflections* (New York: Schocken Books, 1985), ed., Hannah Arendt, p.254.
territorialized nation-state. This is Derrida’s most concrete gesture toward the possibility of cosmopolitanism, democracy, and justice, despite the fact that for him these concepts remain as a promise to come.

Let us examine Derrida’s notion of democracy to come with respect to international law and his critique of the current understanding of international law and democracy, or, at least, perhaps, his ideal notion of it. The following passage will illuminate Derrida’s thought on this issue:

As at the end of the social contract, questions of foreign policy, of war and peace, were still excluded, marginalized or deferred in the treatment of the concept and stakes of democracy. This democracy remained and still remains a model of international and intrastate political organization within the city. Despite some appearances, it is not certain that things have changed. Whether we follow the guiding thread of a post-Kantian political thought of cosmopolitanism or that of the international law that governed throughout the twentieth century such institutions as the League of Nations, the United Nations, the international Criminal Court, and so on, the democratic model (equality and freedom of sovereign state subjects, majority rule, and so on) or tends to become “in spirit” the norm of this politics of international law. But this appearance is deceptive, and the question of universal, international, interstate, and especially trans-state democratization remains an utterly obscure question of the future. It is one of the horizons of the expression “democracy to come.”

Derrida’s assertion here is a critique of the Habermasian conception of democracy and cosmopolitanism that assumes that democracy is being practiced today and has been practiced before, however imperfect, and it is the only hope for peace and the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Derrida questions this assertion and insists that this is only an appearance and it is misleading. Derrida says that “to come” points to the promise and suggests that democracy will never exist, in the sense of present existence, and not because it will be deferred but because

it will always remain aporetic\textsuperscript{109} in its structure.\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, in *The Politics of Friendship* (1994), Derrida writes the following about his idea of “democracy to come”:

For democracy remains to come; this is its essence in so far as it remains: not only will it remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but, belonging to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its future times, to come: even when there is democracy, it never exists, it is never present, it remains the theme of a non-presentable concept.\textsuperscript{111}

Furthermore, Derrida writes:

This expression “democracy to come” does indeed translate or call for a militant and interminable political critique. A weapon aimed at the enemies of democracy, it protests against all naïveté and everyday political abuse, every rhetoric that would present as a present or existing democracy, as a de facto democracy, what remains inadequate to the democratic demand, whether nearby or far away, at home or somewhere else in the world, anywhere that a discourse on human rights and on democracy remains little more than an obscene alibi so long as it tolerates the terrible plight of so many millions of human beings suffering from malnutrition, disease, and humiliation, grossly deprived not only from bread and water but of equality or freedom, disposed of the rights of all, of everyone, of anyone. (This “anyone” comes before any other metaphysical determination as subject, human person, or consciousness, before any juridical determination as comppeer, compatriot, kin, brother, neighbor, fellow religious follower, or fellow citizen).\textsuperscript{112}

Despite his critique and skepticism regarding democracy and cosmopolitan political order in the Habermasian sense, Derrida offers a certain gesture and suggestion toward Habermas’s conception of democracy and cosmopolitanism, however, not in terms of norms, rules, law,
procedure, and formal institutions. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Derrida does not reject democracy and cosmopolitanism in principle neither does he reject formal democratic institutions. Derrida writes the following in support of democratic institutions and cosmopolitan political order, quoted here in length:

But, beyond this active and interminable critique, the expression “democracy to come” takes into account that absolute and intrinsic historicity of the only system that welcomes in itself, in its very concept, that expression of autoimmunity called the right of self-critique and perfectibility. Democracy is the only system, the only constitutional paradigm, in which, in principle, one has or assumes the right to criticize everything publicly, including the idea of democracy, its concept, its history, and its name. Including the idea of the constitutional paradigm and the absolute authority of law. It is thus the only paradigm that is universalizable, whence its chance and its fragility. But in order for this historicity – unique among all political systems – to be complete, it must be freed not only from the Idea in the Kantian sense but from all teleology, all onto-theo-teleology… the democratic beyond nation-state sovereignty. beyond citizenship. This would come about through the creation of an international juridico-political space that, without doing away with every reference to sovereignty, never stops innovating and inventing new distributions and forms of sharing, new divisions of sovereignty. (I refer to inventing here because the to-come gestures not only toward the coming of other but toward invention— invention not of the event but through the event.)…the renewed declaration of human rights (and not the “right of man and the citizens”) at the end of World war II remains an essential democratic reference for the institutions of international law, especially the United Nations…It is by democratic reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that one tries, most often to no avail, to impose limits on the sovereignty of nation-states. One example of this, among so many others, would be the laborious creation of an International Criminal Court. 113

Derrida in his double114 gesture of deconstruction, on the one hand, critiques and insists on ongoing critique of democratic paradigm, and on the other hand, supports the very idea of formal democratic institutions in principal. It seems Derrida recognizes that the only recourse to democratic and cosmopolitan practices is through democratic means and institutions. In some

114 See Vincent Descombes’s Modern French Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1980), Descombes claims that “Derrida opts to play a double game (in the sense that a double agent serves two sides), feigning obedience to the tyrannical system of rules while simultaneously laying traps for it in the form of problems which it is at a loss to settle.” pp. 138-139.
sense, Derrida’s double gesture echoes Habermas’s post-metaphysical discourse in terms of democratic institutions, international law, and cosmopolitan political order, which goes beyond the nation-states paradigm. Derrida insists on the ongoing renewal (the New International and the New Declaration of Human Rights) and invention of democratic practices and institutions, because according to Derrida, formal democratic institutions are always insufficient and remain a promise to come. To some extent, Habermas agrees with Derrida’s ongoing process of renewing and inventing, however, Habermas’s approach is normative, systematic, and has a procedural framework with discursive and democratic deliberation which is ongoing and subject to critique and improvement.

Let us examine Derrida’s critique and support of international law and, in particular, his call for the “New International” by taking a certain position 115 in Specters of Marx (1993). Here again Derrida makes a remarkable double gesture toward Marx, by critiquing certain aspects of Marx and a certain Marxism 116, on the one hand, and by acknowledging the importance of renewing the Marxian critique and analysis, on the other hand, in calling for a reform and transformation of international law and, more importantly, the new international. Derrida writes:

Just as the concept of human rights has slowly been determined over the course of centuries through many socio-political upheavals (whether it be a matter of right to work or economic rights, of the rights of women and children, and so forth), likewise international law should extend and diversify its field to include, if at least it is to be consistent with the idea of democracy and of human rights it proclaims, the worldwide economic and social field, beyond the sovereignty of States…Despite appearances, what we are saying here is not simply anti-statist: in given and limited conditions, the super-State, which might be an international institution, may always be able to limit the appropriations and violence of certain private socio-economic forces. But without

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115 Derrida says: “what I am putting forward here…corresponds more to a position-taking than to the work such a position calls for, presupposes, or prefigures.” See Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 53. Also, see Simon Choat’s Marx Through Post-Structuralism (London: Continuum, 2010) Ch. 3 pp. 66-93, Choat has a good discussion on Derrida’s engagement with Marx.

necessarily subscribing to the whole Marxist discourse (which, moreover, is complex, evolving, heterogeneous) on the State and its appropriation by a dominant class, on the distinction between state power and State apparatus, on the end of the political, on “the end of politics,” or on the withering away of the State, and, on the other hand, without suspecting the juridical idea in itself, one may still find inspiration in the Marxist “spirit” to criticize the presumed autonomy of juridical and denounce endlessly the de facto takeover of international authorities by powerful Nation-States, by concentration of techno-scientific capital, symbolic capital, and financial capital, of State capital and private capital. A “new international” is being sought through these crises of international law; it already denounces the limits of a discourse on human rights that will remain inadequate, sometimes hypocritical, and in any case formalistic and inconsistent with itself as long as the law of the market, the “foreign debt,” the inequality of techno-scientific, military, and economic development maintain an effective inequality as monstrous as that which prevails today, to a greater extent than ever in the history of humanity.\(^{117}\)

In this passage, Derrida argues for the extension of international law and its reform, to the extent that it limits the power of nation-states and private economic forces in the world, as well as calling for cosmopolitan political order when he mentions the super-state or an international institution as a kind of a world governing body that functions within the framework of international law. At the same time, though, Derrida suggests that we must critique the juridical-political autonomy of powerful nation-states as well as the forces of the free market economy that undermine international law. Derrida is skeptical about law\(^{118}\) especially in the framework of international law and the powerful nation-states that abuse international law and use it to their advantage. This comment by Derrida suggests that Derrida finds Marx’s critique of political economy useful, and he seems to agree with it to a certain extent.

Moreover, Derrida writes:

The “New International” is not only that which is seeking a new international law… it is a link of affinity, suffering, and hope, a still discreet, almost secret link, as it was around 1848, but more and more visible, we have more than one sign of it. It is an untimely link, without status, without title, and without name, barely public even if it is not clandestine,


\(^{118}\) See ‘Force of Law’ in *Acts of Religion* (New York: Routledge, 2002), ed., Gil Anidjar, Derrida writes: “law is always an authorized force, a force that justifies itself or is justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be judged from else where to be unjust or unjustifiable… Law is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it demands that one calculates with the incalculable” pp. 233-244.
without contract, without national community (International before, across, and beyond any national determination), without co-citizenship, without common belonging to a class. The name of new international is given here to what calls for the friendship of an alliance without institution among those, who even if they no longer believe or never believed in the Socialist-Marxist International, in the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the messiano-eschatological role of the universal union of the proletarians of all lands, continue to be inspired by at least one of the spirits of Marx or of Marxism (they now know that there is more than one) and in order to ally themselves, in a new, concrete, and real way, even if this alliance no longer takes the form of party or of a workers’ international, but rather of a kind of counter-conjuration, in the (theoretical and practical) critique of the state of international law, the concepts of state and nation, and so forth: in order to renew this critique, and especially to radicalize it…This Marxist critique can still be fruitful if one knows how to adapt it to new conditions, whether it is a matter of new modes of production, of the appropriation of economic and techno-scientific powers and knowledge, of juridical formality in the discourse and the practice of national or international law, of new problems of citizenship and nationality.119

Derrida suggests the new international, a new alliance and friendship, which invokes Marx and cosmopolitanism and moves beyond the formal and institutional idea of these concepts and beyond international law and the nation-states. Derrida insists that the Marxian critique can still be useful in terms of providing a framework for analysis of international law and issues of citizenship, if this Marxist critique is adjusted to the new socio-economic and political conditions of today. Ultimately, Derrida remains skeptical about the prospect of formal institutions, such as international law and cosmopolitanism, despite the fact that in principle he believes in them.

**Levinas’s Ethical Concern Beyond Norms**

In this section, the focus of my discussion is on Derrida’s engagement with Levinas’s notion of ethical responsibility. Here, I explicate Levinas’s ideas with respect to the conception of ethics beyond norms, which begins with the idea of infinite responsibility for the other. For Levinas, ethics begins with one’s relation to the other and the realization that one’s subjectivity and freedom is called into question and is hostage to the other prior (primordial) to cognition and

knowing the other; therefore, one is responsible for the other infinitely in an asymmetrical relation. Levinas’s ethics begins with relation to the other, the-one-for-the-other, ethics of infinite responsibility, and for Levinas, this infinite responsibility and ethical concern is primordial.

Derrida accepts Levinas’s idea of infinite responsibility for the other and indicates that infinite responsibility is the beginning of ethical response, which is more than one can think of and a responsibility which cannot be met. Therefore, this ethical responsibility is infinite. My interest here is not in Levinas’s “ethical subjectivity;” rather, my focus is on the idea of unconditional welcome and hospitality as radical generosity. Levinas does not offer a historical and social conception of ethics and does not provide an account of how the problem of responsibility for others can be addressed under practical conditions. Levinas’s main concern is ethics of infinite responsibility for the other, locating politics outside of the ethical realm, while, for Derrida, ethics is the condition for politics. Nevertheless, drawing from the idea of unconditional ethics of infinite responsibility and the idea of unconditional welcome as hospitality, I translate these ideas of concern for the other into the language of radical generosity. I develop a conception of ethics that involves radical generosity as a social practice, transcending Levinas’s ethical subjectivity, and moving it into the realm of social and historical transformation. The focus must be on the social and collective aspect of ethics.

As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Derrida’s ethical concern is, to some extent, influenced by his engagement with Levinas’s writings, in particular, Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than Being (1974)\textsuperscript{120}. Derrida’s direct engagement with Levinas’s work

\textsuperscript{120} Levinas in Otherwise than Being (1974) responds to Derrida’s critique with respect to the role of language in Levinas’s ethics, as well as not being able to overcome Hegelian dialectic, Husserlian phenomenology, and the Heideggerean philosophy of Being (ontology), despite the fact that Levinas tries to distance himself and critique all three in Totality and Infinity (1961).
begins with two important essays ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ (1964) and ‘At This Very Moment in This Work Here I am’ (1980), critiquing and praising Levinas’s work. Derrida’s final writing on Levinas is after Levinas’s death, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1997), in which Derrida appropriates Levinas’s “welcome” as “hospitality.” It is noteworthy that Derrida’s later work with explicit ethical concern regarding cosmopolitanism and hospitality seems to have a Levinasian undertone that moves through Derrida’s later writings.¹²¹

Let us examine Levinas’s ethics as “first philosophy.” Levinas says: “My task does not consist in constructing ethics; I only try to find its meaning. In fact I do not believe that all philosophy should be programmatic.”¹²² To elaborate on Levinas’s statement, it would be best to read Derrida’s remarks on Levinas in ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ (1964), in which Derrida writes the following about what ethics means in the Levinasian sense:

[L]et us not forget that Levinas does not seek to propose laws or moral rules, does not seek to determine a morality, but rather the essence of the ethical relation in general. But as this determination does not offer itself as a theory of Ethics.¹²³

In ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ (1964) Derrida critiques Levinas’s work and introduces Levinas’s ethics with a great insight. It is clear that Levinas’s ethics is not a normative ethics based on prescribed rules and norms, like the Kantian deontology and categorical imperative and utilitarian ethics. Rather, Levinas’s ethics begins with relation to the other, the-one-for-the-other,

¹²¹ Derrida, in a conversation with André Jacob concerning Derrida’s philosophical and intellectual distance with regard to Levinas’s work, makes the following remarks: “Faced with thinking like that of Levinas, I never have an objection. I am ready to subscribe to everything that he says. That does not mean that I think in the same way, but in this respect the differences are very difficult to determine; in this case, what do differences of idiom, language or writing mean? I tried to pose a certain number of questions to Levinas whilst reading him, where it may have been a question of his relation to the Greek logos, of his strategy, or of his thinking with respect to femininity for example, but what happens there is not of the order of disagreement or distance.” See The Ethics of Deconstruction (Purdue University Press, 1992), Simon Critchley, pp.9-10. Here Derrida suggests that for the most part in principle he is in agreement with Levinas’s thought and he only poses questions to Levinas.


ethics of infinite responsibility, infinite responsibility for the other, and, for Levinas, this infinite responsibility and ethical concern is primordial and beyond self-consciousness, master-slave dialectic, negation, recognition of the other, consciousness (cognition), essence, and Being, contra Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger. In other words, Levinas’s ethics as first philosophy critiques the totalizing philosophy of Hegel and Heidegger, and, to some extent, Husserl’s phenomenology.

To understand Levinas’s ethics let us begin with Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas writes:

This book will present subjectivity as welcoming the other, as hospitality; in it the idea of infinity is consummated…The welcoming of the face and the work of justice…We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question my spontaneity, as ethics.

For Levinas, subjectivity and ethics begin with relation to the other and the realization that one’s subjectivity is called into question and is hostage to the other prior (primordial) to cognition and knowing the other; therefore, one is responsible for the other infinitely in an asymmetrical relation. The other in the face to face relation, cannot be reduced to an alter ego or another self, or, as Levinas calls it, the “Same” (self, I, the knowing subject, self-consciousness); the other

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124 Levinas writes: “We have thus the conviction of having broken with the philosophy of the Neuter: with the Heideggerean Being of the existent …with Hegel’s impersonal reason, which shows to the personal consciousness only its ruses.” See Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 2004), trans. Alphonso Lingis, p.298.

125 It is important to note that Levinas critiques Husserl’s idea of intentionality; however, his method is phenomenological. Levinas writes: The relation between the same and the other is not always reducible to knowledge of the other by the same.” See Totality and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 2004), Emmanuel Levinas, trans. Alphonso Lingis, p. 28. According to Richard Cohan, “Levinas’s work both continues and breaks with phenomenology…he discovers the limitations of phenomenology, the point where moral encounter precedes and under girds intentionality itself, that he breaks with phenomenology in a way that establishes the decisive priority of ethics over phenomenology.” See Levinasian Meditations: Ethics, Philosophy, and Religion (Duquesne University Press, 2010), Richard A. Cohen, p.175. For a good discussion on Levinas’s thought see the following: The Cambridge Companion to Levinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), eds. S. Critchley and R. Bernasconi, God as Otherwise Than Being (Northwestern University Press, 2002), Calvin O. Schrag, Ethics and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 1985), Emmanuel Levinas, translation by Richard A. Cohen, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (Purdue University Press, 1993), Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, and The Ethics of Deconstruction (Purdue University Press, 1992), Simon Critchley.

remains the stranger in its alterity and singularity. Levinas refuses to reduce the other to universalize and totalize mode of the “Same.” Levinas insists on the singularity of the other that resists totalizing and remains infinitely transcendent and foreign, and for Levinas that defines the ethical relation to the other in the mode of exteriority, as the other remains different in her alterity, rather than seeking to overcome difference. Levinas insists on difference, and this exteriority manifests itself in the Levinasian sense in the face to face relationship, but the face cannot be thematized, known, and reduced to some specific physical appearance, such as color of the eye and so on; rather, for Levinas the face is tied to discourse and language in terms of speaking and saying “here I am” and “thou shalt not kill.” Levinas says the following with respect to the face:

I do not know if one can speak of a “phenomenology” of the face, since phenomenology describes what appears. So, too, I wonder if one can speak of a look turned toward the face, for the look is knowledge, perception. I think rather that access to the face is straightaway ethical…The best of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! When one observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other. The relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to that…I mean that the Other, in the rectitude of his face, is not a character within a context…the meaning of something is in its relation to another thing. Here, to the contrary, the face is meaning all by itself. You are you. In this sense one can say that the face is not “seen.” It is what cannot become a content, which your thought would embrace; it is uncontainable. The face is what one cannot kill, or at least it is that whose meaning consist of in saying: “thou shalt not kill”…Face and discourse are tied. The face speaks. It speaks, it is in this that renders possible and begins discourse. I have just refused the notion of vision to describe the authentic relationship with the Other; it is discourse and, more exactly, response or responsibility which is this authentic relationship.¹²⁷

For Levinas, the face opens the relationship with the other and in turn establishes ethical relations in terms of responsibility for the other in the context of language and discourse by the simple saying of “here I am,” by presenting oneself through language and discourse, and this

presentation is only possible in relation to the other in terms of infinite responsibility for the 
other in an asymmetrical mode. It is a radical ethical position that puts one’s subjectivity in 
question and defines it as a hostage to the other, in which the only recourse seems to be receiving 
this infinite ethical responsibility for the other prior to knowing (cognition) or any rules or 
calculation.

Furthermore, in *Otherwise than Being* (1974), Levinas writes:

> The recurrence of the self in responsibility for others could never mean altruistic will, 
> instinct of “natural benevolence,” or love…For under accusation by everyone, the 
> responsibility for everyone goes to the point of substitution. A subject is a 
> hostage…Responsibility for another is not an accident that happens to a subject, but 
> precedes essence in it, has not awaited freedom, in which a commitment to another would 
> have been made. I have not done anything and I have always been under accusation— 
> persecuted…The word I means *here I am*, answering for everything and for 
> everyone…Responsibility for the other, this way of answering without a prior 
> commitment, is human fraternity itself, and it is prior to freedom. The face of the other in 
> proximity, which is more than representation, is an unrepresentable trace, the way of 
> infinite…To be oneself, the state of being a hostage, is always to have one degree of 
> responsibility more, the responsibility for the responsibility of the other…But in the 
> “prehistory” of the ego posited for itself speaks a responsibility. The self is through and 
> through a hostage, older than the ego, prior to principles…It is through the condition of 
> being hostage that there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon and proximity—
> even the little there is, even the simple “After you, sir.” The unconditionality of being 
> hostage is not the limit case of solidarity, but the condition for all solidarity.¹²⁸

Here again Levinas articulates his understanding of subjectivity in terms of this infinite 
responsibility for the other primordially. For Levinas, this responsibility is an unconditional and 
fundamental structure of subjectivity, because he defines subjectivity in terms of the relation to 
the other as ethics, which, in turn, implies responsibility. And, this responsibility is for the other, 
although the subject never asks for this responsibility, nevertheless, the subject is responsible. 
Levinas refers to this situation as “election,” which is not the subject’s own choice. Rather, the 
subject is chosen and the subject cannot refuse this responsibility once he encounters the face of 

the other. According to this Levinasian understanding of the subjectivity, the subject is hostage in an asymmetrical relation to the other in terms of his responsibility for the other, whether he is able or not able to do something. For Levinas, this un-conditionality and infinity renders his ethical concern possible, and, according to this Levinasian logic, this hostage situation is not a limit; rather, responsibility for the other is the condition for the possibility of compassion and solidarity in this world, and, ultimately, the condition for the possibility of ethics.

Moreover, Levinas says:

I am responsible for him, without even having taken on responsibilities in his regard; his responsibility is incumbent on me. It is responsibility that goes beyond what I do…the intersubjective relation is a non-symmetrical relation. In this sense, I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair. It is precisely insofar as the relationship between the other and me is not reciprocal that I am subjection to the Other; and I am “subject” essentially in this sense…my responsibility is untransferable, no one could replace me…Responsibility is what is incumbent on me exclusively, and what, humanly, I cannot refuse. This charge is a supreme dignity of the unique. I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible, a non-interchangeable I. I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me. Such is my inalienable identity of subject.129

Levinas insists on a singularity of ethical responsibility refusing any totalizing reduction of difference in terms of relation to the other and responsibility for the other. This idea of the one-for-the-other cannot be reduced and defined in reciprocity or universal terms. No one can replace this singularity of responsibility for the other. I am the only one who is responsible, and no one else can replace me. This also implies that the other must remain in her alterity; therefore, the asymmetrical relation remains in place, as not overcoming difference but rather maintaining difference is the aim of Levinasian ethics, which renders his approach to ethics unique and remarkable; it is Levinas’s ethics as “first philosophy.” As I argued at the beginning of this section, while Levinas’s approach to ethics offers a new opening beyond ethical rules and rule

following; nevertheless, there is a need to move this ethical responsibility toward a social and historical transformation. The emphasis must be on a collective aspect of ethics in concrete terms beyond “ethical subjectivity.”

**Derrida Reading Levinas: Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas**

In this section the focus of my discussion is on Derrida’s reading of Levinas, appropriating Levinas’s idea of “welcome” as “hospitality” and elaborating on the idea of infinite responsibility for the other as an unavoidable ethical response, which involves “welcome” and “hospitality.” For Derrida, this ethical responsibility and response must be immediate, without getting caught up in calculation and evaluation of interests, whereas political responsibility is about actual laws, which require a time for analysis and calculation. Here Derrida reads Levinas’s ethics against Kant’s “juridical-political” cosmopolitanism. This is a crucial point that Derrida makes: ethics must be the condition for the politics, not the other way around. Therefore, I argue that political practices inevitably have ethical implications. Drawing from this discussion, I read unconditional “welcome” as “hospitality” and suggest that radical generosity constitutes both unconditional “welcome” and “hospitality” as ethical politics. The challenge is not to separate ethics from politics. Rather, ethics must be politicized to open to the possibility for a deeper understanding of ethical politics. Such an understanding implies that politics must exhibit radical generosity concerning immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and, in general, all citizens of the world. I suggest that the practice of radical generosity has the potential for a paradigm shift and social and historical transformation, which can render cosmopolitanism a possibility.

Let us examine Derrida’s reading of Levinas in *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas* (1997), with respect to “welcoming” the other as “hospitality” and discuss Derrida’s own ethical concern with respect to cosmopolitanism. Before we proceed, it is important to understand what Levinas
implies by infinite responsibility for the other, and, by extension, Derrida’s idea of it, because the concept of infinite is crucial in Levinas’s work. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter Derrida says that for him and Levinas, without infinite responsibility there is no responsibility and this infinite responsibility is an ethical overload, and it is precisely because of this infinite responsibility as an overload that overwhelms that there can be ethical concern for the other; therefore, in order to have ethics there must be infinite responsibility beyond one’s capacity, which is an asymmetrical relation with the other beyond norms and rules. Levinas says:

The idea of the infinite implies a thought of the Unequal. I start from the Cartesian idea of the Infinite, where the ideatum of this idea, that is, what this idea aims at, is infinitely greater than the very act through which one thinks it. For Descartes, this is one of the proofs of God’s existence: thought cannot produce something which exceeds thought; this something had to be put into us. But it is not the proof Descartes sought that interests me here.¹³⁰

Levinas refers to Descartes’s proofs of God’s existence in the third Meditation, but it seems he is less interested in the proof itself than in the formal structure of Descartes’s argument. Here he focuses on the idea that the infinite is more than can be thought of.¹³¹ Levinas develops this idea of infinite in his ethical thought and his conception of the relation to the other as an infinite responsibility. According to Levinas, this idea of the infinite is more than one can think of and so is the responsibility for the other, that is to say that this ethical relationship with the other is an “ethical overload,” because it goes beyond one’s capacity to think of or even fulfill this responsibility. Therefore, this responsibility is infinite. Following Levinas, Derrida insists on this

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idea of infinite responsibility, which is the starting point for Derrida’s ethical concern beyond norms and rules.

Let us read Levinas through Derrida in order to understand how “welcome” can be read as “hospitality.” Derrida reads Levinas against Kant with respect to cosmopolitan right, hospitality, and peace. He begins his discussion with a quotation from Totality and Infinity (1961), which I cite here to articulate the idea of welcome and hospitality in Levinas’s ethical discourse, again through Derrida’s reading:

[Is] to welcome (I take the liberty of emphasizing this word) his expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to receive (Levinas’s emphasis) from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Discourse, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed (my emphasis again) this discourse is a teaching. But teaching does not come down to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain.132

Derrida emphasizes the word “welcome,” which implies for him a particular interpretation of “welcome” that renders “welcome” into “hospitality.” Derrida admits that Levinas does not explicitly refer to “welcome” as “hospitality,” but he notes that Levinas does mention welcome and hospitality in his ethical discourse, though not with respect to Kant’s cosmopolitan right and hospitality. Nevertheless, Derrida reads Levinas’s welcome and hospitality as an ethical concern that is beyond politics and law. In this respect it contrasts with Kant’s juridical-political approach to cosmopolitan right and hospitality, which Derrida describes as “cosmopolitical.” Derrida writes:

On the horizon of these preliminary reflections, I will be guided by a question that I will in the end leave in suspense, being content simply to situate some of its premises and points of reference. It would concern, on first view, the relationship between an ethics of hospitality (an ethics as hospitality) and a law or a politics of hospitality, for example, in the tradition of what Kant calls the conditions of universal hospitality in cosmopolitical law: “with a view to perpetual peace…” Let us assume, concessio non dato, that there is

no assured passage, following the order of a foundation, according to hierarchy of founding and founded, of principal originality and derivation, between an ethics or a first philosophy of hospitality, on the one hand, and a law or politics of hospitality, on the other. Let us assume that one cannot deduce from Levinas’s ethical discourse on hospitality a law and a politics, some particular law or politics in some determined situation today… How, then are we to interpret this impossibility of founding, of deducing or deriving? Does this impossibility signal failing? Perhaps we should say the contrary.\(^{133}\)

Derrida suggests that Levinas’s ethical discourse does not provide a foundation nor does it provide a political or legal framework with respect to cosmopolitan right and hospitality.

Nevertheless, Derrida does not think that failing to derive political and legal conclusion from Levinas’s ethical discourse is a failure. Instead it may indicate that Levinas’s ethical concern exceeds politics and law, though it has political implications nonetheless.

Derrida’s reading of Levinas against Kant poses a series of questions about hospitality and peace. He writes:

Now, how can this infinite and thus unconditional hospitality, this hospitality at the opening of ethics, be regulated in a particular political or juridical practice? How might it, in turn, regulate a particular politics and law?...from “perpetual peace” and from a universal, cosmo-political, and thus political and juridical hospitality, the hospitality that Kant reminds us must be instituted in order to interrupt a bellicose state of nature, to break with a nature that knows only actual or virtual war. Instituted as peace, universal hospitality must, according to Kant, put an end to natural hostility. For Levinas, on the contrary, allergy, the refusal or forgetting of the face, comes to inscribe its secondary negativity against a backdrop of peace, against the backdrop of a hospitality that does not belong to the order of the political, or at least not simply to a political space…Whereas the Kantian concept of peace is apparently juridical and political, the correlate of an interstate and republican institution, Levinas, at the end of “Politics After!,” puts forward the suggestion ( and “suggestion” is his word, just about the last one of “Politics After!”) that “peace is a concept that goes beyond purely political thought.” A distant but faithful echo of the declaration of peace that opens the Preface of Totality and Infinity: “Of peace there can be only an eschatology.”\(^{134}\)


\(^{134}\) Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford University Press, 1999), trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, pp.48-49.
Derrida critiques Kant’s reliance on the idea of a state of nature in *Perpetual Peace* (1795), in which the possibility of peace depends on political and juridical measures to surmount a warlike state of nature. Derrida argues that unconditional hospitality and unconditional peace may only be possible beyond the framework of juridical and political discourse. Derrida notes that Levinas’s ethics of welcoming the other and not forgetting the face is hospitality and peace at the same time, going beyond the Kantian conception of peace in terms of juridical and political discourse.

Furthermore, Derrida writes:

The Kantian argument is well known: if I make peace with the thought in the back of my mind of reopening hostilities, of returning to war, or of agreeing only to an armistice, if I even think that one day, more or less in spite of myself, I should let myself be won over by the hypothesis of another war, this would not be peace. There may then, never be any peace, one might say, but if there were, it would have to be eternal and, as an instituted, juridico-political peace, not natural…Levinas always prefers, and I would want to say this without any play on words, *peace now*, and he prefers universality to cosmo/politanism. To my knowledge, Levinas never uses the word “cosmo/politanism” or adopts it as his own…because this sort of political thought refers pure hospitality, and thus peace, to an indefinite progress…Whereas for Kant the institution of peace could not but retain the trace of a warlike state of nature, in Levinas the inverse is the case, since allergy, the rejection of the other even war, appear in a space marked by the epiphany of the face, where “the subject is a host” and a “hostage,” where consciousness of…or intentional subjectivity, as responsible, traumatized, obsessed, and persecuted, first offers the hospitality that it is. When Levinas affirms that the essence of language is goodness, or that “the essence of language is friendship and hospitality,” he clearly intends to mark an interruption: an interruption of both symmetry and dialectic. He breaks with both Kant and Hegel, with both a juridico-cosmo/politanism that, in spite of its claims to contrary, could never succeed in interrupting an armed peace…For Levinas, peace is not a process of the negative, the result of a dialectical treaty between the same and the other…These are the final pages of *Totality and Infinity*. They declare peace, *peace now*, before and beyond any peace process, even before any “peace now movement.”

Derrida’s reading of Levinas against the Kantian cosmo/politanism suggests that the Levinasian ethical discourse rejects the concept of state of nature, because the Levinasian ethics is against

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violence and war, symmetry, dialectic, or formal institutions in the juridical-political framework. Derrida insists that the Levinasian ethics offers welcoming, hospitality, and peace, because the subject is the host and hostage at the same time and responsible for hospitality and peace. This hospitality and peace in the Levinasian sense, according to Derrida, cannot be reduced to a dialectical process aiming at an indefinite progress in history. Rather, Levinas’s ethics interrupts this logic and demands peace now through language, offering welcome, hospitality, friendship, and peace.

Concluding his discussion on Kant and Levinas, Derrida’s reading of Levinas against Kant critiques the Kantian notion of peace and justice in the domain of the state. Derrida invokes Levinas’s critique of the state in *Totality and Infinity* (1961) and refers to “the tyranny of the State” as well as the “anonymous universality of the State.”136 This is what Levinas writes, according to Derrida:

> Metaphysics, or the relation to the other, is accomplished as service and as *hospitality*. Insofar as the face of the Other relates us to the *third*, the metaphysical relation of the I to the Other moves into the form of the We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality. But *politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself*; it *deforms* the I and the other who have given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, and thus as *in absentia* (par contumace).137

Furthermore, Derrida asserts that the political dissimulates because it brings light, making the face visible and seen in the public, but at the same time it makes the face invisible. According to Derrida, the violence of the political mistreats the face to the point of destroying its uniqueness rendering it to generality.138 This is a radical assertion by Derrida that echoes Levinas’s

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137 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
138 Ibid., p.98.
insistence on the singularity of the other, with respect to having ethical responsibility for the other, which implies that the state may not be able to replace this infinite responsibility, because the state is prone to tyranny and violence. Derrida asserts:

> It is necessary to deduce a politics and a law from ethics. This deduction is necessary in order to determine the “better” or “less bad,” with all the requisite quotation marks: democracy is “better” than tyranny. Even in its “hypocritical” nature, “political civilization” remains “better” than barbarism.\(^{139}\)

Derrida echoes his own commentary on politics in *Specters of Marx* (1993) and acknowledges the relation between ethics, law, and politics and the fact that politics is necessary. However, Derrida in his tradition of double gesture is quick to note that politics and law are necessary, but they are not sufficient with respect to ethical concern. Derrida writes:

> Ethics enjoins a politics and a law: this dependence and the direction of this conditional derivation are as irreversible as they are unconditional. But the political or juridical content that is thus assigned remains undetermined, still to be determined beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation, all concepts, all possible intuition, in a singular way, in the speech and the responsibility taken by each person, in each situation, and on the basis of an analysis that is each time unique-unique and infinite.\(^{140}\)

Derrida, on the one hand, recognizes that ethical concerns have political implications and so, therefore, ethical concerns are conditions for the political and juridical discourse. On the other hand, Derrida is not willing to accept the role of politics completely, because according to him, juridical-political content remains undetermined. Ultimately, Derrida remains skeptical about the juridical-political institutions, contra Kant and Habermas.

To conclude Derrida’s reading of Levinas in *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas* (1997), with respect to ethical concern, politics, and cosmopolitanism let us read Derrida’s final words on


\(^{140}\) Ibid., p.115.
Kant and Levinas, which will illuminate Derrida’s ethical concern beyond the juridical-political institutions. Derrida writes:

Our task here is simply—between Kant and Levinas—to sharpen a difference that matters today more than ever with regard to this right of refuge and all the most urgent matters of our time, everywhere that—in Israel, in Rwanda, in Europe, in America, in Asia, and...in the world—millions of “undocumented immigrants” (sans papiers), of “homeless” (sans domicile fixe), call out for another international law, another border politics, another humanitarian politics, indeed a humanitarian commitment that effectively operates beyond the interests of Nation-States.\(^\text{141}\)

Derrida makes a sharp distinction between the Kantian juridical-political approach to cosmopolitanism and his own approach. He reads Levinas’s ethics as an ethic of welcoming the other as hospitality and accepts the Levinasian idea of infinite responsibility. This offers a notion of ethical subjectivity that calls into question the idea of subjectivity, by referring to the subject as a host and hostage, which insists on difference and singularity and resists universality and totality. This Levinasian ethical concern moves beyond state, international law, and politics. From Derrida’s point of view, it would seem there might be a paradox here in cosmopolitan discourse: on the one hand, it seems that cosmopolitanism calls for some kind of formal juridical-political institutions; on the other hand, it also necessitates welcoming the other unconditionally as singular in her alterity beyond juridical-political practices. The Kantian approach to cosmopolitanism seems to overlook this radical ethical concern for the other beyond politics, law, duty, recognition, cognition, Being and totality, which Derrida calls for through his reading of Levinas.

\textbf{The Limits of Derrida’s and Levinas’s Ethical Concern}

In this section, I criticize certain aspect of Derrida’s and Levinas’s approach to ethics, such as lack of practical and social perspective in their conception of ethics. Nevertheless, I acknowledge

and draw on their ideas to develop my conception of radical generosity. I acknowledge this radical move by Derrida and Levinas in terms of unconditional ethical concern for the other in cosmopolitan discourse. But for the Levinasian ethical concern to maintain its radical position (unconditional ethical concern for the other) it must move beyond the individual, with respect to ethical concern, and address ethical concern in the realm of everyday life practices in the historical context of social relations. Ethical concerns arise in historical and social contexts in everyday life practices of ethics, and while to some extent ethical relations maybe an individual matter, they are not a private matter. It is important for every individual to have ethical concern for the other; however, at some point this ethical concern must move into the everyday life practices in concrete historical and social terms. Ethical concern in the context of radical generosity and cosmopolitanism involves our relation to others who we do not know but nevertheless we have concerns about their wellbeing. In other words, ethical concern must be a social concern and an everyday life practice that transforms social relations and becomes “Transformational Ethics,” which move beyond the individual.

Derrida’s and Levinas’s ethical concern is distinct and radical in its demand for unconditional responsibility, which is infinite and cannot be met. This distinction is marked by emphasis on the difference and alterity that must remain in place, which defines this ethical subjectivity. Levinas’s subject is a host, a hostage, and prepared to substitute for any distress, and suffering; in other words, the subject is marked by disruption that demands infinite ethical responsibility that the subject cannot escape. As Simon Critchley puts it, “Levinas’s work is ethical subjectivity.”142 This comment implies that to some extent Levinas’s ethics remain in the framework of subjectivity. This Levinasian ethical concern moves beyond norms, procedure, and

calculation. I acknowledge this radical move by Derrida and Levinas in terms of ethical concern for the other; however, the Levinasian ethical concern, in order to maintain its radical position, must move beyond the ethical subjectivity, with respect to ethical concern, and address ethical concern in the realm of everyday life practices in the historical context of social relations and social. Ethical concerns arise in historical and social contexts in the everyday life practices of ethics.

In order to articulate my point better, it is crucial to pay attention to Critchley’s critique of Derrida’s and Levinas’s ethics. Critchley points to a deficiency in Derrida’s and Levinas’s ethical concern:

[W]hat is lacking in Derrida’s and Levinas’s work and more widely in ‘postmodern’ thinking is a full theorization of the passage from care to justice. That is to say, an account is needed of the passage from the quasi-phenomenology of ethical asymmetry to a full-blown theory of justice…Although Levinas’s insistence on the passage from the other to the third (le tiers), or from ethics to justice, leaves open the place for such a moral legal and social theory, and although such a place is open in Derrida’s work as can be seen from his recent arguments for the necessity of international law, this place is, in my view, fatally underdetermined in their work.143

Levinas attempts to address this issue by the idea of the third party144 that can bring justice in the form of formal institutions; however, he does not fully develop this idea of the third party and

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143 See in ‘Appendix 2: Habermas and Derrida Get Married’ in The Ethics of Deconstruction (Purdue University Press, 1992), Simon Critchley, p.269.
It is also worth mentioning briefly that Alain Badiou has offered a critique of Levinas. Badiou says, “In Levinas’s enterprise, the ethical dominance of the Other over the theoretical ontology of the same is entirely bound up with a religious axiom…To put it crudely: Levinas’s enterprise serves to remind us, with extraordinary insistence, that every effort to turn ethics into the principle of thought and action is essentially religious…and taken in general, ethics is a category of pious discourse.” See Alain Badiou’s Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, (Verso, 2002), pp. 22-23.

144 Levinas writes: “The third party looks at me in the eyes of the other.” “In the measure that the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the metaphysical relation of the I with the Other moves into the form of We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality. But politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself.” See Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 2004), trans. Alphonso Lingis, pp. 213 and 300, respectively. Furthermore, Levinas writes: “Justice is this very presence of the third party.” “The third party is other than the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other, and not simply his fellow.” See Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being (Duquesne University Press, 2006), trans. Alphonso Lingis, p. 191, note 2 and p. 157. Finally, Levinas says: “The interpersonal relation I establish with the Other, I must also establish with other men; there is thus a necessity to moderate this privilege of the Other; from whence comes
justice, and sometimes he refers to the third party as “my neighbor” and “neighbor of my neighbor,” so perhaps this idea of the third party and justice could be put under the rubric of what Derrida describes as fraternity, humanity, and hospitality, which are central to Levinas’s heteronomous ethics. Nevertheless, the question remains whether the Levinasian ethics has anything to say about the formation of ethical practices beyond the framework of “ethical subjectivity.” It would seem that the Levinasian ethics remains in the realm of “ethical subjectivity,” despite the fact that Levinas seeks to first, present the subject outside the realm of autonomy and consciousness, contra Kant, Hegel, and Husserl, and second, give substance to the subject as an empirical and ethical subject in relation to the other, a living breathing individual, not just an ideal notion. It would seem that Levinas’s ethical concern does not move from an individual realm to a social domain, and thus, it remains marked by significant lacunae. It is important for every individual to have ethical concern for the other; however, at some point, this ethical concern must move into the everyday life practices in concrete historical and social terms. In other words, ethical concern must be a social concern and an everyday life practice that transforms and becomes “Transformational Ethics,” or, to put it vigorously, “Revolutionary Ethics” or “Radical Ethics,” which moves beyond “ethical subjectivity.” The idea of “Transformational Ethics,” “Revolutionary Ethics,” or “Radical Ethics” focuses on what people practice in social and historical context as everyday life practices that form social relations and inform and produce ethical practices. The practice of radical generosity as a “way of life” and

justice. Justice, exercised through institutions, which are inevitable, must always be held in check by the initial interpersonal relation.” See Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 1985), translation by Richard A. Cohen, p. 90. Sometimes Levinas mentions justice in terms of formal institutions, but it is not quite clear how one should understand the idea of the third party and justice together. It seems the third party suggests a move from the ethical to the political realm. However, Levinas is always skeptical about politics, as is clear in quotation above.
ethical practice offers such an opportune transformational and revolutionary opening into the formation of a social and political discourse with regard to the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

To sum up my discussion here, drawing from Derrida’s and Levinas’s conception of ethics, despite the certain limitations that presents, I develop a conception of ethical politics that involves radical generosity as a social (collective) practice transcending Levinas’s “ethical subjectivity” that moves into the realm of social and historical transformation. If Derrida’s and Levinas’s welcome and hospitality implies one’s openness to the other unconditionally, radical generosity calls for social and collective openness to others; that is to say, moving beyond “ethical subjectivity” and situating radical generosity in the realm of sociality and collectiveness. This social and collective reading of unconditional welcome and hospitality as radical generosity implies openness to others in concrete ethical and political terms by implementing politics and policies that are generous toward immigrants. Thus, my reading of Derrida’s and Levinas’s unconditional welcome and hospitality as radical generosity attempts to formulate a conception of ethical politics that can deal with the complexity these concepts present and include radical generosity in the political life. In my view, ethics plays a significant role in politics. Derrida’s insistence on ethics as the condition for politics emphasizes the importance of unconditional ethics, which opens the possibility for rethinking the relation between ethics and politics concerning radical generosity. Drawing from this idea, the challenge is to understand the relation between ethics and politics and politicize ethical issues in concrete terms and to open the discourse to the possibility for ethical politics. Ethical politics implies ethical consideration in politics and policy making, which includes exhibiting radical generous policies concerning immigrants, and refugees, in general, all citizens of the world. Furthermore, radical generosity has the potential for both a paradigm shift and social and historical transformation. Radical
generosity can be fruitful in its political task of transforming both the individuals and the social world. Thus, political institutions can consider adopting radical generous ethical politics and implement policies that are based on cosmopolitan awareness and intent.

In the following chapter, I will discuss the idea of practice (praxis) reading Marx to articulate the idea of the practice of radical generosity as a “way of life” and everyday life practice, which focuses on the historical and social dimension of ethical practices. Therefore, as I have argued throughout my dissertation my attempt here is to develop a concept of ethical politics based on practical philosophical reflection, which focuses on the idea of practice (praxis). In the next chapter, drawing from Marx, I develop my concept of practice (praxis) with respect to radical generosity. I also define what is involved in the concept of generosity by examining, Aristotle’s and Nietzsche’s ideas of generosity, and, drawing from their ideas, develop the concept of radical generosity. The practice of radical generosity involves social transformation and ethical politics in concrete terms with respect to the issues of immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and, in general, all citizens of the world facing war, refugee crisis, and neoliberal globalization to which cosmopolitanism is an alternative worldview and practice.
Chapter 4: The Practice of Radical Generosity as a Condition for the Possibility of Cosmopolitanism

In chapter three, I focused on a conception of ethics as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, that is, Derrida’s and Levinas’s the “beyond normative” approach to ethics. The useful ideas in Derrida’s and Levinas’s conceptions of ethics with respect to radical generosity are the following: infinite responsibility as unconditional ethics, ethics beyond following rules, and welcome as hospitality. I suggested that welcome as unconditional hospitality is constitutive of radical generosity, and I also acknowledged that radical generosity is situated in the idea of unconditional ethics. As I argued in the previous chapter, while Derrida’s and Levinas’s ideas are fruitful, they also have limitations as far as the aim of this dissertation is concerned. Their arguments focus on the individual’s ethical concern and responsibility for the other but do not address the relevant practical and social questions. Here I want to emphasize and underscore the social and transformative aspect of radical generosity. The practice of radical generosity in concrete terms manifests itself in politics with ethical concern, which means implementing generous immigration policies with respect to immigrants and refugees.

In this chapter, I outline a conception of radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism implies including and having concern for the wellbeing of others, especially those we do not know, and includes the idea of social bonds, citizenship, and ethical and political concern that transcends the ideas of “nation-state” and “national-interest”. As I argued at the outset of this study my focus is on ethical politics as a social practice, which implies that radical generosity is not a random individual act but rather a social practice. Thus, the possibility of cosmopolitanism implies that the world community and its social and political institutions consider ethical concern for the wellbeing of the citizens of the
world. And, this begins with the practice of radical generosity, which has the potential to challenge and transform existing norms. This implies that norms and policies based on “national-interest” can be challenged by the practice of radical generosity, which will open the possibility for a paradigm shift. Of course, we must recognize that social change does not happen overnight, rather, it accrues historically by new ways of thinking and social practices. Therefore, the concept of practice (praxis) becomes crucial for radical generosity as a mode of transformation and a way of life. Radical generosity combined with the concept of praxis can develop as a transformative activity to challenge existing social norms with respect to the possibility of a cosmopolitan world.

In this chapter, the ideas of generosity and praxis will be examined in order to develop a conception of the practice of radical generosity. This chapter will proceed as follows: first, I present and examine Aristotle’s idea of generosity (eleutheriotês) as part of his virtue ethics. For Aristotle, generosity (eleutheriotês) is an important virtue for building an excellent character. Aristotle’s conception of generosity (eleutheriotês) is conservative and does not focus on the transformative aspect of generosity. Second, I focus on Nietzsche’s conception of generosity, because in contrast to Aristotle, Nietzsche emphasizes the transformative aspect of generosity by reevaluating existing ethical norms and challenging them. My conception of radical generosity includes this particular aspect of Nietzsche’s conception of generosity. Third, I have a brief overview of contemporary philosophical discussions about generosity in order to give a historical account of generosity, noting that only a few scholars have explored the concept of generosity, but my approach differs, because my discussion of generosity situates it as a radical social practice and a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Fourth, I turn to Marx because I attempt to develop my conception of radical generosity as a social and transformative
practice. Here I focus on Marx’s conception of *praxis*, in particular Marx’s idea of *praxis* as a social and transformative activity that brings about social and political change. Finally, I discuss the practical aspect of radical generosity as ethical politics with respect to immigrants and refugees. This discussion and its subsequent examples will show that I have developed the necessary features of the practice of radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

**Generosity: Aristotle and Nietzsche**

I want to clarify my aim here. I am interested in developing a conception of radical generosity as an ethical political practice that can transform social relations with respect to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Thus, since my method is historical in a narrow and limited way, it is appropriate to examine the genealogy of the concept of generosity. It must be noted that my examination is not exhaustive but, rather, is limited in scope to a few important concepts and philosophers such as Aristotle, Nietzsche, and a few other contemporary thinkers. Aristotle offers a conception of generosity (*eleutheriotês*) as a virtue among other important virtues that are required for developing a virtuous character in his virtue ethics. Nietzsche’s conception of generosity, on the other hand, focuses on the transformative aspect of generosity and calls both for a reevaluation of values and for a creation of new values that challenge the existing norms. I am particularly interested in Nietzsche’s transformative aspect of generosity. Nietzsche presents a conception of generosity with a transformative perspective that is compatible with my understanding of generosity as a transformative practice.

**Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and Generosity**

It must be noted that my reading of Aristotle is limited and brief with a narrow focus on Aristotle’s idea of generosity. I begin with an exposition of Aristotle’s position on ethics and
generosity (*eleutheriotês*) in order to understand the basic definition of generosity (*eleutheriotês*). Let us consider Aristotle’s conception of virtue ethics which includes generosity (*eleutheriotês*) as an element of virtue ethics in his ethical writings, namely, his *Nicomachean Ethics*, which is considered an important text with respect to ethics, especially as in recent times philosophers have examined and appealed to Aristotelian virtue ethics to develop new approaches to ethical questions.

Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* argues that, every activity, every enquiry, every practice and decision aims at some good, and by “the good” we mean that at which human beings characteristically aim. Thus, the highest human good is happiness, or, to be exact, human flourishing (*eudaimonia*) and living well and doing well. Furthermore, Aristotle argues that *eudaimonia* is an activity according to virtue (*aretê*), and, in turn, virtue is the state of one’s character, which, according to Aristotelian ethics, implies excellence; in other words, virtuous character means excellence. The question is how does one acquire a virtuous character? Aristotle’s answer to this question begins by dividing virtues into two kinds: namely, intellectual virtues and virtues of character (moral virtues). Intellectual virtue arises mostly from teaching, and needs experience and time, whereas virtue of character (*êthos*) comes from habit (*ethos*), hence its name “ethical”, slightly varied from “*ethos*”.

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145 According to Alasdair MacIntyre, some scholars argue that Aristotle’s more mature positions on ethics are in *Eudemian Ethics* rather than *Nicomachean Ethics*, but MacIntyre thinks that *Nicomachean Ethics* is the canonical text for Aristotle’s account of virtue. For further discussion on this issue see Anthony Kenny’s *The Aristotelian Ethics*, (Oxford University Press, 1978) and a review of Anthony Kenny’s *The Aristotelian Ethics and Aristotle’s Theory of the Will*, by T. Irwin in *Journal of Philosophy*, 77, 1980, pp. 338-354.

146 For example, Alasdair MacIntyre in his book *After Virtue*, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 2nd edition, 1984), argues that because of the failure of the Enlightenment project with respect to morality, Aristotelian virtue ethics must be reconsidered as a viable answer to the Nietzschean critique of the Enlightenment project with respect to morality. See chapter 5, 6, 9, and 18.

147 See Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by Terence Irwin, (Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), (1094a1, 1095a, 1139b3, 1140a28, 1140b7).

148 Ibid., (1103a20).
virtue does not come to us by nature; rather, it is a matter of habituation or practice. In other words, the aim of Aristotelian ethical theory is practical. Aristotle says that, “the purpose of our examination is not to know what virtue is, but to become good.” Furthermore, Aristotle states, “virtue requires habituation, and therefore requires practice, not just theory.”\footnote{Aristotle’s \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, translated by Terence Irwin, (Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), 1104a, 1105b15. Aristotle, says: “The many, however, do not do these actions but take refuge in arguments, thinking that they are doing philosophy, and that this is the way to become excellent people.” See (1105b15).} This shows that Aristotle’s virtue ethics considers practice more important than knowing the ethical norms, since knowing the norms and rules alone will not guarantee ethical activity. Furthermore, Aristotle defines virtue as a mean,\footnote{Doctrine of “mean” (\textit{mesotês}) has been criticized by many philosophers, because it seems vague and confusing and it is relative to every individual; the question is, how does one know what is the right “mean” for every virtuous action in general, if it depends on every individual’s capability and reason?} which aims at what is intermediate. For Aristotle, ultimately, virtue is a state that has element of mean, which implies finding a balance between two vices, namely, excess and deficiency, according to every individual’s reason and capability.\footnote{Ibid., (1107a).} For Aristotle, the virtues are those qualities in character that will enable an individual to achieve \textit{eudaimonia}. In his definition of the virtues Aristotle lists some important virtues and gives a description about their scope. He names justice, intelligence, wisdom, temperance, friendship, magnanimity, and generosity, which is the focus of my examination in this section, as important virtues.

In describing the scope of generosity (\textit{eleutheriotês}) Aristotle says that generosity (\textit{eleutheriotês}) is a mean about wealth, because generosity (\textit{eleutheriotês}) is about excess and deficiency involving wealth. And un-generosity is about taking wealth more seriously than is right. Accordingly, generosity (\textit{eleutheriotês}) is about giving rather than taking. For it is more proper for a virtuous person to do good than receive good. Thus, giving implies doing good. People are called generous who give rightly and are praised for justice. Generous people are
loved for their virtue of giving, giving to the right people, in the right amounts, at the right time, and for the right reason. Moreover, they take pleasure in giving and do not ask for favors, and give without stint and are not concerned with wealth, because it is not easy for generous people to become rich. However, the generous person does not give indiscriminately.\footnote{Aristotle’s \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, translated by Terence Irwin, (Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), (1119b15-1122a25).}

Ultimately for Aristotle, the practice of generosity (\textit{eleutheriotês}) is to be based on deliberate choice, according to the right reason, and appropriate to one’s means and circumstance without self-serving motives, just for the pleasure that the act of generosity brings to the giver and receiver. According to Aristotle, the act of generosity (\textit{eleutheriotês}) must be a noble act in itself, rather than a means to some other end. He also mentions that it is not the value of the gift that matters but rather the desire for the noble act itself is what is valuable.

Aristotle provides a basic definition of generosity (\textit{eleutheriotês}) as a good virtue and practice, which needs to be in harmony with other virtues to build a virtuous character. However, Aristotle’s conception of generosity (\textit{eleutheriotês}) seems to be conservative and situated in the realm of individual excellence and character\footnote{MacIntyre argues that Aristotle believes in the unity of virtues without elaborating on detailed interrelationships between different virtues in the character of the individual the good man, because the virtues are all in harmony with each other and the harmony of individual character is reproduced in the harmony of the state. See Alasdair MacIntyre’s \textit{After Virtue}, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 157. Also, it must be noted that, for Aristotle, only free men could acquire virtues; women, non-Greeks (barbarians), slaves, craftsmen, and tradesmen were of an inferior class and, therefore, incapable of becoming virtuous, as only affluent and people with high status can achieve virtues and participate in ethics and politics in the city-state (\textit{polis}), since virtuous man must be a good citizen of the \textit{polis}.} and does not address the social and political implications of a generous act in historical and material terms. As MacIntyre argues, there is a tension between Aristotle’s view of man as a political being and man as an essentially metaphysical being, and, furthermore, MacIntyre notes, Aristotle did not understand the transient nature of the \textit{polis}, because Aristotle had no understanding of historicity in general.\footnote{See Alasdair MacIntyre’s \textit{After Virtue}, (University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 158-159.} Generosity as a practice
must be situated in historical and material context as a radical social and political practice, not merely as an ahistorical individual act, in order to be valuable as a condition and transformative process to render cosmopolitanism a possibility. My understanding of radical generosity moves beyond existing practices and institutions and calls for the transformation of values that existing institutions cannot provide. Thus, it is crucial to turn to Nietzsche’s conception of the transformative ethic of generosity that challenges existing norms.

**Nietzsche’s Ethic of Generosity**

I must note that my reading and interpretation of Nietzsche is brief and limited to Nietzsche’s idea of generosity in contrast to Aristotle’s conservative view of generosity. I extract and appropriate certain elements of Nietzsche’s ideas (e.g., reevaluation of values and transformation) with regard to generosity in order to develop my concept of radical generosity.

Let us consider Nietzsche’s ethics and his conception of generosity. Nietzsche presents a conception of generosity with a transformative perspective that is attuned with my understanding of generosity as a transformative practice. Nietzsche’s style of critique and philosophizing with a hammer suggests a radical shift in understanding ethics and calls for the “transvaluation” (*Umwertung*) of what it means to practice ethics and becoming ethical. Nietzsche does not provide a normative ethical theory. In a certain sense, Nietzsche’s ethical critique, or his overcoming of the normative ethics, is a radical departure from the normative conception of ethics. He calls for a historical examination of values, arguing for a reevaluation of ethical values.

Nietzsche’s critique opens the possibility for rethinking ethical practices and what it means to practice ethics. My interest here is in Nietzsche’s transformative approach to ethics, which interrupts the norms and social order and creates ruptures in ethical practices. It is this idea of transformation that opens the possibility for the practice of ethics from a different perspective,
which does not operate on utility, self-interest, duty, or responsibility but rather shifts the focus to an everyday life practice of radical ethics as a way of life as an interruption of social order. This Nietzschean ethic of “transvaluation” (*Umwertung*), to some extent invokes an anarchist approach to ethics by interrupting the social order, norms, and rules of traditional conception of ethics.

I suggest that Nietzsche’s understanding of ethics and generosity, in particular, as a radical practice, refers to a process of transformation, which is life affirming, providing an active force of life against resentment, guilt, duty, and self-interest. This implies an everyday life practice of the ethics of radical generosity and magnanimity\(^{155}\), to put it more boldly in the Nietzschean language. Furthermore, the practice of radical generosity can be placed in Nietzsche’s ethics that he develops as transformative ethics.

Nietzsche is interested in generosity as a way of life that challenges a self-interested and utilitarian mode of existence. For Nietzsche, the ethic of generosity presents a new mode of

\(^{155}\) It is also worth noting Aristotle’s conception of magnanimity (*magnanimitas*). Aristotle says the following: ‘Well, a person is considered to be magnanimous if he thinks that he is worthy of great things, provided that he is worthy of them…magnanimous people are concerned with honour, because it is honour above all that they claim as their due, and deservedly…It would seem that the magnanimous man is characterized by greatness in every virtue… magnanimity seems to be a sort of crown the virtues, because it enhances them and is never found apart from them. This makes it hard to be truly magnanimous, because it is impossible without all-around excellence …At great honours bestowed by responsible persons he will feel pleasure, but only a moderate one, because he will feel that he is getting no more than his due, or rather less, since no honours can be enough for perfect excellence. Nevertheless he will accept such honours, on the ground that there is nothing greater they can give him. But honour conferred by ordinary people for trivial reasons he will utterly despise, because that sort of thing is beneath his dignity. And similarly with dishonour, because it cannot rightfully attach him… but he will also be moderately disposed to wealth, power, and every kind of good and bad fortune, however it befalls him…He is disposed to confer benefits, but is ashamed to accept them, because the one is the act of a superior and the other that of an inferior. When he repays a service he does so with interest, because in this way the original benefactor will become his debtor and beneficiary…Another mark of the magnanimous man is that he never, or only reluctantly, makes a request, whereas he is eager to help others. He is haughty towards those who are influential and successful, but moderate towards those who have an intermediate position in society, because in the former case to be superior is difficult and impressive, but in the latter it is easy; and to create an impression at the expense of the former is not ill-bred, but to do so among the humble is vulgar-like using one’s strength against the weak…He does not nurse resentment, because it is beneath magnanimous man to remember things against people, especially wrong; it is more like him to overlook them’ (IV, iii, 1123b-1125a). See Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by Terence Irwin, (Hackett Publishing Company, 1985).
thinking and being. What does Nietzsche mean by generosity (*magnanimity*)? Nietzsche tells us that magnanimity involves the inexpedient and that it is incredible. Therefore, it raises the question why magnanimity is being practiced, that there must be some advantage in this act. However, according to Nietzsche, magnanimous practice requires no reason for being unreasonable, and it is an act of unreason: idiosyncratic, incomprehensible, and impractical. Nietzsche says that when people engage in exceptional practices they do not see themselves as an exception; therefore they cannot arrive at a fair evaluation of the rules and follow the norms. Rather, they interrupt the norms.156 This Nietzschean understanding of magnanimity as generosity is crucial to my claim that the practice of radical generosity should not be understood as an exception but rather as an everyday practice, which breaks the rules and transforms the social norms. Furthermore, Nietzsche describes magnanimity as rising above oneself and overcoming egoism. He says that a “magnanimous person even forgives his enemy, and even blesses and honors him.”157 This Nietzschean conception of magnanimity to some extent relates to his notion of nobility and creating values beyond the normative values of a social order of conformity, which regulates, manages, disciplines, and governs our everyday life to the extent that we do not question the validity of the norms that we are practicing. For Nietzsche, nobility implies creating and practicing new values. He says:

> [V]alues for which no scales have been invented yet; offering sacrifices on altars that are dedicated to an unknown god, a courage without any desire for honors… it was this rarity and a lack of awareness of this rarity that made a person noble.158

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This Nietzschean ethics calls for “transvaluation” (Umwertung), interrupts and transforms social norms, and creates new values and practices that place the practice of radical generosity at its core. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883-1885), Nietzsche talks about generosity in the context of the gift-giving virtue as the highest virtue; he says:

> Uncommon is the highest virtue and useless; it is gleaming and gentle in its splendor: a gift-giving virtue is the highest virtue...become sacrifice and gift yourselves...Remain faithful to the earth, my brothers, with the power of your virtue. Let your gift-giving love and your knowledge serve the meaning of the earth.\(^{159}\)

Furthermore, Nietzsche in a poetic style declares what he considers to be the highest virtue: “That the mountain should descend to the valley and the winds of the height to the low plains—oh, who were to find the right name for such longing? ‘Gift-giving virtue’—thus Zarathustra once named the unnamable.”\(^{160}\) I read this idea of “gift-giving” as unnamable in the context of Derrida’s suggestion that, “we do not know what hospitality is.” And this not knowing is not a deficiency, rather, indicates that it is a practice beyond knowledge toward others that we do not know. It would seem, this might be an impossible act but according to Derrida, we attempt to overcome this impossibility and do the impossible. Nietzsche also says that to practice magnanimity (generosity) involves overcoming egoism and rising above one-self, which suggests overcoming the impossible.

Furthermore, Nietzsche, through Zarathustra, the ultimate gift-giver, names the unnamable by pronouncing the value and importance of the gift-giving virtue as the highest virtue and a gesture to practice generosity. It must be noted that Nietzsche’s ethics always moves beyond self-interest, obligation, duty, and sacrifice. It opens up the possibility for ethical practices that are

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considered impossible and unpractical. For Nietzsche, ethics is not about a rational exchange of duty, obligation, and conformity to the social order. Nietzsche says: “Why sacrifice? I squander what is given to me, I a squanderer with a thousand hands; how could I call that sacrificing?” Here, again, Nietzsche emphasizes that generosity is not about sacrificing but rather about the gift-giving virtue as the highest virtue, I read this idea of “gift-giving” as radical generosity.

To conclude this brief reading of Nietzsche’s understanding of generosity, it is important to note the relation between generosity and the concepts of welcoming and hospitality, which is pertinent to cosmopolitanism and was examined in previous chapters on (Kant, Derrida, and Levinas), where the idea of “hospitality” and “welcoming” were conflated. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883-1885) Nietzsche has Zarathustra speak about welcoming and hospitality:

To encourage one who despairs—for that everyone feels strong enough. Even to me you gave this strength: a good gift, my honored guests! A proper present to ensure hospitality! Well then, do not be angry if I offer you something of what is mine. This is my realm and dominion; but whatever is mine shall be yours for this evening and this night. My animals shall serve you, my cave shall be your place of rest. In my home and house nobody shall despair; in my region I protect everybody from his wild animals. And this is the first thing I offer you: security. The second thing, however, is my little finger. And once you have that, by all means take the whole hand; well, and my heart too! Be welcome, my guests!...From the manner, O Zarathustra, in which you offered us hand and welcome, we recognize you Zarathustra. You humbled yourself before us; you almost wounded our reverence. But who would know as you do, how to humble himself with such pride? That in itself uplifts us; it is refreshing for our eyes and hearts. Merely to see this one thing…

The Nietzschean ethics offers generosity in its broadest sense, which moves beyond the gift economy of give and take and reciprocity, which may create obligation, anger, and even hostility in the guests. This was Derrida’s concern with respect to hospitality where he critiques the Kantian conditional notion of hospitality, which limits the possibility of hospitality and, in effect, renders

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it impossible. The Nietzschean ethics welcomes and offers hospitality not out of duty but out of
generosity, and it is a humbling act not wanting to offend and anger the guests. It gives not mere
gifts; rather, it offers sanctuary, strength, courage, honor, and heart and uplifts the guests.
Nietzsche’s ethics promotes social relations based on generosity, where “will to power” (self-
overcoming) involves immediacy within the social world. This self-overcoming seems to be an
individual practice based on generosity, however, another reading of Nietzsche suggests that “will
to power” (Selbstüberwindung) meaning self-overcoming has the potential to become a social
practice of “transvaluation” (Umwertung) and transformation. Later in this chapter, I turn to Marx
to further develop the idea of radical generosity as a social and transformative practice (praxis),
because Nietzsche’s ideas of transformation and generosity are not explicitly within the context of
praxis and social transformation.

In my view, to practice radical generosity is to interrupt and transform social relations, which
implies radical transformation in rethinking what it means to practice radical generosity from a
social perspective and to embrace the sociality of this practice.

**Contemporary Views of Generosity**

Following the historical movement of my argument regarding the history of concepts, it is crucial
to examine the contemporary philosophical discussions on generosity. My aim here is to show that
the contemporary discussions about generosity are important but that they are limited in the sense
that the transformative aspect of generosity is not discussed, nor is the idea of generosity as a social
praxis and a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism advanced.

Let us consider very briefly some recent philosophical discussions on the concept of
generosity, which to some extent will illuminate my argument with respect to generosity. With the
exception of a few scholars who have paid attention to the concept of generosity, generosity has
not been extensively discussed among scholars in recent times. Lester Hunt in his 1975 essay “Generosity,” examining Aristotle’s and Nietzsche’s conception of generosity, argues that generosity is not altruism, sacrifice, or justice. He suggests that generosity is very different from altruism, because the generous act does not involve subordination of interest and, as such, is not sacrifice. Furthermore, Hunt notes that there is a radical difference between generosity and justice. Justice involves bringing about a state of affairs, which is fair. In other words, justice is about a fair outcome, calculation, and exchange. However, this is not the main element in generosity as a virtue.\textsuperscript{163} I think Hunt makes a crucial point that generosity differs from altruism, the subordination of interest, sacrifice, and justice. Hunt’s understanding of generosity seems to be close to Nietzsche’s conception of generosity. James Wallace in \textit{Virtues and Vices} (1978), following the Aristotelian conception of generosity suggests that generosity is a kind of benevolence, and a direct concern for others, which is primary.\textsuperscript{164} Certainly, the idea of benevolence and having a concern for the wellbeing of others is an important aspect of the ethic of generosity, which I have suggested throughout my discussion in this study. In more recent years, Tibor Machan in his essay ‘Politics and Generosity’ (1990), in line with Aristotle’s virtue ethics from a conservative point of view, argues that generosity is possible only within a libertarian political system rather than a welfare state. Machan supports the idea of generosity as an individual virtue, which defines the individual independent of social processes.\textsuperscript{165} Effectively, his approach to generosity is an individualistic counter to the sociality of generosity as an ethical practice. Refuting Machan, Rosalyn Diprose in \textit{Corporal Generosity} (2002) argues that “generosity is not only an individual virtue that contributes to human well-being, but that it is an openness to others that is fundamental to human existence,

\textsuperscript{163} See Lester Hunt’s essay ‘Generosity’ in \textit{American Philosophical Quarterly} Vol.12, No. 3, (July, 1975), pp. 235-244.

\textsuperscript{164} See James Wallace’s \textit{Virtues and Vices}, (Cornell University Press, 1978), chapter V, Benevolence, pp. 128-158.

sociality, and social formation.”  

Furthermore, from a feminist perspective she notes that, “And while understanding generosity as a pre-reflective corporeal openness to otherness may not guarantee social justice, it is a necessary move in that direction.” Diprose’s understanding of generosity in social terms to some extent is similar to my claim that as a potential for the possibility of cosmopolitanism radical generosity implies a social practice.

It is crucial to point out that one of the main elements of radical generosity, as a social practice is the idea of transformation. As I mentioned above, the contemporary philosophical discussions on generosity do not focus on the transformative aspect of generosity nor do they discuss the idea of praxis. Examining Nietzsche’s transformational ethics and conception of generosity, I have suggested that radical generosity interrupts the contracts established by social and political order. In other words, radical generosity does not fit existing categories or social understandings. Thus, radical generosity has the potential to transform existing social norms. To some extent, there are some similarities between radical generosity and Nietzsche’s approach to ethics in general, namely, the idea of transformation and the necessity of interrupting existing social and political norms. Therefore, the concept of praxis is crucial for radical generosity to become a concrete action as a social practice in order to transform social norms.

**Praxis: According to Marx**

It must be noted that my reading of Marx is not exhaustive and limited to the idea of praxis. It is also crucial to note that, I am not reading Marx in the tradition of “orthodox Marxism” of “historical determinism” and “class conflict.” Rather, I read the idea of praxis in a broad sense of

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167 Ibid., p.5.
social activity with transformative and critical elements, which challenges existing norms and brings about social and political change in concrete terms.

Marx’s conception of *praxis* is crucial to my idea of radical generosity as a social and transformative practice. As I argued at the outset, radical generosity is not an individual act, rather, a social practice and has transformative potential in concrete terms, such as, generous policies with respect to immigrants and refugees. My aim here is to situate radical generosity in the realm of social practice by synthesizing my idea of radical generosity with Marx’s idea of *praxis*, which gives concreteness to the idea of radical generosity.

Before I begin my discussion here it is important to note that, in the preceding chapter Derrida emphasized that, for him, ethics is the condition for politics. This remark opens the possibility to rethink the relation between ethics and politics. In my view, political positions have ethical implications. In other words, politics without ethical consideration could be blind. It must be noted that, I am not suggesting that ethics and politics are the same. What I am suggesting is that if ethics is about values that inform and shape our practices in life. Then, these values determine and produce policies. Consider the following examples; if laws are passed to prevent women to have reproductive rights, these laws are expression of certain values. If laws are passed to prevent gay and lesbian people having equal rights, again these laws are the indication of certain values. If laws are passed to cut social services and benefits, it raises questions with regard to justice and fairness. If policies are such that, women and children are deported and families are broken, immigrants and refugees excluded, criminalized, and treated as “illegal people” and “noncitizen.” These policies reflect certain values, such as “national interest” and the notion that immigrants and refugees do not have equal ethical worth and equal rights.
The practice of radical generosity in concrete terms is a move toward ethical politics that challenges these exclusionary policies by transforming them to generous policies of openness and welcoming with regard to immigrants and refugees. Indeed, generous policies open the possibility to rethink the current political order with respect to citizenship, immigration, and refugees.

Let us briefly discuss Aristotle’s conception of *praxis* and then move on to Marx’s conception of *praxis*. In Aristotle’s practical philosophy, there are two concepts that refer to two kinds of human activity: namely, *praxis* and *poiēsis*. *Praxis* is an activity that is good for its own sake and an end in itself, and *poiēsis* is an activity that is good as a means to an end, not for its own sake. For Aristotle, *praxis* has more value than *poiēsis*, because ethical and political activities are considered as *praxis* that are good for their own sake, while activities performed as a means to end are less valuable.

Central to Aristotle’s practical philosophy are ethics and politics seeking to answer the question: “what is the good life?” According to Aristotle, humans as political animals (*zoon politikón*) and social animals must seek the good life in *praxis* of ethics and politics in the city-state (*polis*) and be good citizens attending to civic duties, and *praxis* cultivates the virtues that are vital for good citizenship, such as justice, friendship, courage, temperance, and wisdom. Thus, a good citizenship facilitates a good city-state (*polis*), which exists not merely for the sake of life but rather for the sake of the good life. It must be noted that Aristotle’s conception of a good citizen excludes women and slaves, because they do not have the leisure time to develop vital virtues needed for a good citizenship; only free males can be good citizens.\footnote{See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Book I, 1094a- 1103a) and Politics (Book I,1252a-1253b, Book III, 1280a-1280b,VII, 1328a-1329a) in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. II, edited by Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton University Press, 1995).}
Let us consider Marx’s understanding of *praxis*. As Etienne Balibar puts it, “Marx removed one of philosophy’s most ancient taboos: the radical distinction between *praxis* and *poiēsis*.” For Aristotle and the Greeks in general, *praxis* meant a free activity that one is engaged in to transform the interior mode of existence and not necessarily the exterior mode of existence, because *poiēsis* means making and production (means to an end) that takes care of material mode of existence, which is distinct from *praxis* (end in itself). For Marx, the interior and exterior modes of life are interconnected, which implies that material conditions of life need to change to improve the interior mode of life; thus, *praxis* means revolutionary or radical practice that transforms the world. Marx articulates his conception of *praxis* in *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845) and *The German Ideology* (1845). Next we will turn our attention to these texts to understand what Marx means by *praxis*. In these texts Marx is attacking idealism, which shows his great insight into the material facts and activities that define human life. Let us consider these eight, where Marx states the following: “All social life is essential practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.”

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170 These eleven theses were jotted down in Marx’s notebook approximately around April 1845 right after *The Holy Family* (1845) was completed. In this short text, Marx wants to distance himself from Feuerbach by summarizing his disagreements with Feuerbach. Here Marx critiques Feuerbach’s conception of materialism.
171 Marx and Engels could not find a publisher to publish this manuscript. It was first published in 1932. This text is partly a critique of Stirner’s (anarchist) *The Ego and its Own* (1844) and Feuerbach’s *The Essence of Christianity* (1841), as well as a critique of the Hegelians such as Bruno Bauer and Young Hegelians. This text represents for the first time explicitly Marx’s materialist conception of history, which differs from Feuerbach.
Marx emphasizes the significance of *praxis* as a defining concept to understand the world and social relations in material terms and to recognize that revolutionary and critical activity must transform both the world and the material conditions of human life. The concept of *praxis* is further developed within the context of materialism and the materialist conception of history in *The German Ideology* (1845) and Marx’s later works. As Richard J. Bernstein puts it:

> Praxis is the central concept in Marx’s outlook…It provides the perspective for grasping Marx’s conception of man as “the ensemble of social relationships” and his emphasis on production; it is the basis for comprehending what Marx meant by “revolutionary practice.”

“The ensemble of social relationships” is a phrase quoted from the fourth thesis on Feuerbach and “revolutionary practice” refers to the third thesis. Marx’s conception of *praxis* is fruitful to formulate a conception of the practice of radical generosity in everyday life as a way of life, as well as a revolutionary (radical) practice, which has the potential to transform social relations and, consequently, the social and political life and render cosmopolitanism a possibility. Of course, it must be noted that the concept of practice must be understood in concrete terms in

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173 It must be noted that there is a controversy between Marxist-Humanism and Anti-Humanism with respect to Marx’s early and later writings. It began in the 1930s with the publication of *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844), translated by Raya Dunayevskaya in the Soviet Union, in which Marx, influenced by Hegel, discusses his theory of alienation, arguing that the conditions of capitalist production alienate the worker from his essence, and so, thus, he is not a free human being and not able to live up to his potentials. The other texts that influence Marxist-Humanism’s discourse are Georg Lukács’s *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) and Karl Korsch’s *Marxism and Philosophy* (1923), in which both present a Hegelian-Marxism view. Marxist-humanists in general emphasize the idea of human essence and subjectivity. Louis Althusser coined the term ‘Anti-Humanism’ in his 1964 essay in Cahiers de L’I.S.E.A, where he argues that ‘In 1845, Marx broke radically with every theory that based history and politics on an essence of man. This unique rupture contained three indissociable elements. (1) The formation of a theory of history and politics based on radically new concepts: the concepts of social formation, productive forces, relations of production, superstructure, ideologies, determination in the last instance by the economy, specific determination of the other levels, etc. (2) A radical critique of the theoretical pretensions of every philosophical humanism. (3) The definition of humanism as an ideology…This rupture with every philosophical anthropology or humanism is no secondary detail; it is Marx’s scientific discovery.’ Althusser opposed the philosophy of the subject and argued that social relations have primacy over the subject-consciousness; for him, the subjects are the product of social practices. For further discussion on ‘Anti-Humanism’ see *The Humanist Controversy and Other Texts*, Louis Althusser, edited by Francois Matheron, translated by G.M. Goshgarian, (Verso: New York, 2003).

order to be radical and revolutionary. Marx’s conception of *praxis* as a key concept in the analysis of human life presents the social character of human life, which produces social relations in accordance with practices and material productivity.

As Balibar puts it, in the *Thesis on Feuerbach* (1845) Marx attempts to dismantle philosophy by rejecting the idea of theory (*theòria*), which is understood as contemplation, and by identifying the criterion of truth with *praxis*. And in *The German Ideology* (1845), Marx equates *theòria* (production of consciousness) with ideology. Marx argues that the production of ideas and consciousness is indeed interconnected with material activity of men and that is the language of real life. And men are producers and product of their ideas as much as actual life-process itself. Marx famously states: “Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.” As stated in the first thesis on Feuerbach, Marx’s interpretation of consciousness is “sensuous human activity” or *praxis*, which should be understood as an aspect of *praxis* itself. As Marx notes, “a man is what he does.” He argues that philosophy must be a practice of ideas rather than contemplation of ideas and empty talk about consciousness. Here it is crucial to remember this famous passage by Marx in *The German Ideology* (1845), which is a direct critique of Hegel’s idealism:

> Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on retina does from their physical life-process.

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175 This point is indicated on the second thesis on Feuerbach.
This passage has been quoted many times, because it captures the importance of Marx’s emphasis on material activity of real life as well as the historical aspect of real life practices that determine social and political relations. Moreover, Marx emphasizes the social aspect of consciousness, he states that, “Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all.”

Furthermore, in order to connect the concept of praxis with history and radical historicity, Marx states that to make history requires the first historical act of production of material life itself. Part of the focus in The German Ideology (1845) is on the production of real-life and history, which involves praxis, of course. But more importantly, it must be noted that for Marx, praxis is understood in the context of social relations. To illuminate this point, it is best to quote Marx directly from his later text, namely, Wage-labor and Capital (1849), in which he states:

[T]he social relations within which individuals produce, the social relations of production, and change, are transformed, with the change and development of the material means of production, the productive forces. The relations of production in their totality constitute what are called the social relations, society…

For Marx, social relations are a process and an activity in the material sense, which can be understood in terms of work (labor) and other activities that define human life. It is important to note that though economic categories play a central role in Marx’s thought, his main aim is to reveal that “political economy” is not a reified abstraction rather it is a concrete form of human activity and social relations and praxis, thus, the focus must be on practices that define social relations. As Nicholas Lobkowicz notes about Marx’s conception of praxis: “All the seemingly

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180 See ‘Wage-Labor and Capital’ in Karl Marx Selected Writings, edited by David McLellan, (Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 256. This text was first published in the German newspaper called Neue Rheinische Zeitung in April 1849.
definite sociopolitical relationships, even the economic relationships which underlie them, are a result of human practice.”

Furthermore, as Lobkowicz puts it, by “material practice” Marx means more than only labor or even production in the broad sense of the term. He adds that it seems that there is no exact definition of the term praxis in Marx’s writings. And it seems Marx uses this term relatively seldom. However, Lobkowicz argues that it is not too difficult from reading The German Ideology (1845) to understand what Marx means by using the word praxis. It could be described as a human activity, which can have many different modes. It can be a physical activity and political, critical, revolutionary activity, and many other human activities. However, Lobkowicz notes that there is a certain ambiguity as to how Marx uses the expression praxis simply in the sense of “what man does” as opposed to “what man thinks.” I suggest, we can read the term praxis in a technical (specific practices, such as revolutionary and critical practices) or in a broad sense, which refers to activities that have everyday materiality beyond the ideal notion of contemplation. Therefore, one can argue that, for Marx, in concrete terms praxis is indeed a practical and matter not merely a theory, since Marx claims that all economic, legal, political, and social structures are results of human practices.

Let us consider the famous eleventh and the last of the Theses on Feuerbach (1845) with respect to praxis: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways: the point is to change it.” This statement by Marx implies that rather than changing one’s mind about the world, which does not affect the world nor change it, one needs to change the world. Thus, critical and revolutionary praxis is required to change the world and transform social order and relations.

Marx’s conception of *praxis* is one of the most important concepts of our times, which can provide a fruitful framework to understand and critique present reality and practices that are unjust and unethical. Thus, it is a reminder that human life is defined in concrete terms of practice and that is what it means to be an active social and historical citizen of the world with transformational power. For Marx, practice and social relations define human life, and, thus, radical generosity in concrete terms can be understood as a social practice. Therefore, the practice of radical generosity can be understood as a social practice with transformational potential that can change social relations from non-cosmopolitan practices to cosmopolitan practices. I must note that my understanding of *praxis* stresses the idea of social practice in general and in particular the idea of transformative practice. For Marx, this implies individual and social change, which leads to changing the social conditions in the world, which includes political institutions.

The concept of *praxis* is crucial to understand radical generosity as a transformative practice and a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Thus, we can rely on Marx’s emphasis on *praxis* in concrete terms, and situating *praxis* in the social and political realm to argue that the practice of radical generosity can be understood as a social practice in order to transform social and political norms and implement generous policies with respect to immigrants and refugees.

For Marx, what defines human life is practice. Perhaps it could be argued that Marx starts with the premise that his materialist and historical analyses begin with human beings that produce themselves in material, historical, and social processes. Marx emphasizes the importance of *praxis*, which produces the possibility of conditions for the concrete socio-political concepts and practices. Thus, it is logical to draw on Marx’s conception of *praxis*,
which provides a framework for practical reflection and action in the world to criticize and challenge the existing norms and institutions, in order to transform and change current social and political conditions.

I argue that by appropriating Marx’s conception of *praxis*, we could indeed understand radical generosity as a social and political activity that challenges norms and institutions which function to promote a self-interested way of life. In a sense, the idea of “radical” is embedded in the Marxian idea of *praxis* as a practical-critical and revolutionary activity and refers to the social and transformative aspect of generosity, which offers historical transformation and solidarity in social relations that, in turn, translates to transformation in material conditions and gives rise to a new way of life.

Moreover, while the economy is the base structure of society, it does not mean that everything in history is determined by the economy. In other words, the social and political activity of people plays a central role in the formation of discourses in society. For instance, the dominant political theory in the world is neoliberal globalization, which promotes the idea of “self-interest,” which indicates that most societies act based on “national interest.” However, recent events in the world, such as solidarity with the refugees from Africa and the Middle East, migrant workers in the US and elsewhere in the world, and stateless people (e.g., Palestinian), show the emergence of social and political practices that are generous in nature, which is in direct conflict with the perception of “self-interest” and “national interest.” These kind of social movements point to the move toward a new historical development and possibility that gives rise to the emergence of radical generosity. These acts of solidarity and the practice of radical generosity by the citizens of the world tells us that the citizens of the world are transcending the ideas of “nation-state,” “national interest,” and borders, in general, by caring about the wellbeing
of others in the world who are suffering and are in need of help. These social movements have the potential to influence political institutions in the world to pursue and adopt new policies that are radically generous toward the immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless people. This gives rise to the conception of cosmopolitanism as a viable option to reorganize the world and social relations in new terms, which is inclusive and open to the idea of citizenship beyond the national borders.

Finally, it must be noted that Marx’s philosophy is about emancipation, equality, and solidarity. Thus, it is reasonable to claim that the practice of radical generosity at its core is ethical politics. In the next section, I discuss why consider radical generosity and practical implications of radical generosity as ethical politics.

To conclude my discussion on Marx, I draw attention to the relevant aspects of radical generosity explicitly in relation to Marx’s idea of praxis. In my discussion on the idea of radical generosity, I have argued that radical generosity can be understood as a social practice rather than a random individual act. I have also emphasized two concepts, namely, practice (praxis) and transformation. Praxis refers to concrete practical-critical activity, and transformation implies social and historical change that take place in society through the practice of radical generosity. I have also stressed that radical generosity as a social practice has political implications. In other words, radical generosity is not merely an ethical idea; rather, it involves politics within the context of cosmopolitanism, which means politicizing ethical issues, and moving toward politics with ethical consideration. Radical generosity as praxis embodies a concrete concern for the wellbeing of others. This begins by transforming social relations toward openness and solidarity with others that will give rise to a cosmopolitan worldview and intent. Radical generosity as a
social *praxis* in concrete terms means, implementing generous policies with respect to immigrants and refugees.

Furthermore, Marx relies on his insights about social practices to provide a historical analysis of how new historical possibilities arise through evolution of social processes. Drawing on Marx’s historicity, we must examine these practices within the context of historical and material conditions in order to understand present practices and social and political relations, not necessarily in the orthodox Marxism sense of the “historical determinism” of “class conflict.” Rather, we must consider multiple historical and material conditions that give rise to the formation of new social and political practices.

**The Practice of Radical Generosity as Ethical Politics**

I must acknowledge that my argument with regard to considering radical generosity as a condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism raises many questions, such as; why consider generosity and cosmopolitanism? Are we generous or not? Why and why not? What would have to change? How can we promote and implement generous policies? What is involved in this process? I must admit that my argument may not provide all the answers to these questions. Nevertheless, the fact is the current world conditions such as, economic crisis, climate change, wars, refugee crisis, and the rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia compels us to rethink our worldview and values that inform and produce the social and political discourse in the world. And, that begins with imagining that another world is possible, which calls for alternative ideas and values, that could open the possibility to form social and political movements based on these alternative values and worldviews. The reason to consider this alternative vision is the fact that existing values and policies are not able to deal with the crisis (e.g., the immigrants and refugee crisis) that the global community is grappling with.
Here I attempt to address why consider the practice of radical generosity with respect to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. And, what is the scope of radical generosity within the context of my project. I begin by asserting that, my understanding of radical generosity as far as this project is concerned is within the context of cosmopolitanism. In other words, radical generosity is not a panacea for all the problems in the world. As I stated above this project may not be able to address all the aspects of generosity (e.g., giving money, goods, and food), and I do not claim addressing those issues in this project. Within the context of cosmopolitanism, the practice of radical generosity involves, openness, solidarity with others, and welcome and hospitality, which means implementing ethical politics by exhibiting generous policies (e.g., welcoming immigrants, refugees, and stopping deportation) with respect to immigrants and refugees. In concrete terms, it implies changing the “national interest” policies to generous policies toward a cosmopolitan worldview. With the transformation of values and formation of social and political movements change is possible. That does not mean transformation will happen overnight but it is in the realm of possibilities, because human existence is about possibilities.

Let us briefly examine the logic of my argument with respect to radical generosity. It must be noted that radical generosity is not “deontological” (duty) nor “categorical imperatives” (ought). An imperative is a command to do something; it is categorical when is applied without exception. It says: “You must do this without exception.” Radical generosity is a consideration and condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. In order to clarify this further, I put my argument in a formal logic structure:

1. If radical generosity is practiced, then cosmopolitanism is possible.
2. Radical generosity is practiced.
3. Therefore, cosmopolitanism is possible.
The symbolic logic form:

\[ p \text{ (radical generosity practiced), } q \text{ (cosmopolitanism possible)} \]

1. If \( p \), then \( q \).
2. \( p \).
3. Therefore, \( q \).

It follows, that the logic of my argument for radical generosity is a conditional argument not in the form of “categorical imperatives” (ought). Thus, I am not suggesting we “ought” to be generous. We can certainly not be generous and continue the path of “self-interest” and “national interest,” which have caused so many economic crisis, wars, and refugee crisis, and have given rise to xenophobia and Islamophobia. We may ask ourselves: didn’t we learn from the experience of World War II. Scientific reasoning asserts that, if we experiment based on some theories and assumptions, and keep getting the same negative results. Then, we need to consider alternative theories and set of assumptions and put them to test. The point is that, it would be absurd to repeat the same experiment with same theories and assumptions and expect different results. I am not suggesting that that my conception of radical generosity is scientific. I merely suggest that, it is worth considering and trying. If existing theories and assumptions are problematic and failing, and if we want to avoid war and the refugee crisis and live in a better and just world, then why not consider radical generosity and cosmopolitanism, and put it through the test of time and history. It must be noted that ethical, social, political, and economic theories are based on certain assumptions. These assumptions are not scientifically justifiable, nevertheless, based on these assumptions theories are conceptualized and practiced. Consider the ideas of “human nature” and self-interest.” The question is whether human beings are always “self-interested.” There is no empirical evidence to suggest that, we always act based on our
“self-interest.” Why we do things that are not to our best interest (e.g., eating too much food, drinking, and smoking, etc.)? Why are we destroying the environment that we live in? Why people risk their lives to save another life without even knowing the person? Why people sacrifice their lives for values and ideals that they believe in? Why should we accept these assumptions about “human nature?” Why should we assume that there is such a thing as “human nature?” The point I am trying to make is that why not assume that we can become “self-interested” or “generous,” no one is born “self-interested” or “generous.” We become “self-interested” or “generous” by accepting or rejecting certain assumptions, values, practices, and organizing society and political order based on those assumptions and values. Thus, I suggest, it is not outside of the realm of possibility to consider radical generosity and cosmopolitan worldview. In my view, societies can become generous and accept cosmopolitan way of life through social and historical processes. For example, when some European citizens welcomed refugees (refugees welcome), it indicates that social movements have the potential to transform values based on “self-interest” and “national interest,” and societies can become generous and cosmopolitan. Of course, one can object to my assertion, and demand proof and justification. As I argued, there is no scientific proof for ethical, social, political, and economic theories. Conversely, I can argue that we have tried the other assumptions and they are failing us, why not consider and try alternative assumptions. Furthermore, one can certainly argue that the ideas of “self-interest” and “national interest” are problematic assumptions and not good for humanity, because these ideas produce wars and the refugee crisis, why should we accept them.

Therefore, I contend, we tried these ideas and assumptions for a long time, and they are failing humanity miserably and producing devastation and crisis in the world. Consider, the recent refugee crisis, the EU is failing to deal with the crisis, instead of finding a proper solution
the EU is closing its borders, while refugees are stranded and dying on the sea. The question is why the EU closing its borders, because of the “national interest” of different member states in the EU. In the meantime the war in Syria intensifying, the US, French, and German weapons are used in the Syrian war, and the Russians recently sent weapons and troops too. It seems there is no comprehensive EU immigration policy and different member states pursue their own policies driven by the notion of “national interest” by closing their borders to the immigrants and refugees. In fact, the EU has agreed to improve border control and Hungary closed its borders to Croatia and putting razor-wire fence along the border. If refugees try to cross the borders they would be arrested and sent to prison. This will lead to encampments of stranded refugees behind closed borders, which will produce a humanitarian crisis in massive scale since World War II. There is also a discussion of setting up refugee centers (internment camps) outside of the EU to keep the refugees out and deter them from coming to Europe. This closing of the borders is a clear violation of human rights, because most of these refugees fleeing war zones in their countries. It is worth mentioning that the EU has a policy of visa requirement for countries that are prone to produce refugees and enforces it through so called carrier sanction, which means imposing fines on airlines that carry passengers not having the required visa. This particular policy forces the refugees to take dangerous voyage by the sea, which has caused many deaths. In addition the EU has a policy called third country rule, which means not accepting refugees who had entered from countries considered safe, which includes all the neighboring countries.

Furthermore, new figures show that the number of refugees is at its highest level since World War II. The United Nations says more than 51 million people are displaced worldwide, half of them children. António Guterres, the U.N. high commissioner for refugees says, “If we have for the first time since the Second World War more than 50 million people displaced by
war or persecution, it is because we are witnessing a multiplication of new conflicts in the world. And the global conflict generates global displacement. And at the same time, old conflicts seem never to die.” At the same time, there has been a rise in the deportation of “undocumented immigrants,” around the world, and, in particular, in the U.S. in recent times.

The Obama administration responded to the surge in child migrants with increased detention and speedier deportations. Thousands of children were held in U.S. detention centers after fleeing violence and poverty in Central America. More than 47,000 unaccompanied children have been caught at the U.S. border since October 2013. The U.S. government plans to open additional detention facilities and fast-track immigration trails to allow for quicker deportation. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement deported more than 72,000 parents of the U.S. born children in 2013. The plight of parents with American children has been a key issue in the immigration reform debate.

Many immigrants come to the U.S. fleeing violence and poverty to find a better life and to work and send money to their families in their home countries. There are 11 million “undocumented immigrants” in the U.S., in spite of the fact that the U.S. has deported 2 million people as of April 2014. The US Congress has not passed a comprehensive immigration reform bill for two reasons; the first reason is economic interest, which implies cheap labor helping profits to grow, and the second reason is self-interested reelection politics by politicians who are seeking reelection. Therefore, some politicians take a tough stance on the issue of immigration to be reelected.

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182 The data in this section were collected from the following sources:
http://www.unhcr.org (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees),
http://www-democracynow.org/2014/4/10/as_deportations_top_2_million_should.
In terms of refugees, countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Syria, have the largest numbers of refugees in the world. According to the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants’ Affairs (BAFIA), as of October 2011 the number of refugees registered with the authorities stood at over 882,000 (over 840,000 Afghans and some 42,000 Iraqis). And the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports, overall, that Afghanistan remains the biggest producer of refugees (2.7 million), followed by Iraq (1.4 million), Somalia (1.1 million), Sudan (500,000) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (491,000). Syria's refugee crisis is being described as the most catastrophic humanitarian disaster since the Rwandan genocide. The UN estimates (UNHCR) that there are now 2.7 million Syrian people registered as refugees in Syria’s neighboring countries. For many Syrian families, leaving their home is the only option to stay safe. As millions of refugees make the long, treacherous journey across the border, neighboring countries are struggling to cope with the arrivals. The UN and Syria's neighbors are appealing to the international community for more help in housing the millions of people who have fled the fighting. While the EU is a leading contributor of humanitarian aid to the region, the amount donated by each of its member states has varied greatly. The estimated Syrian refugees is about 4 million the EU accepted only 10% of the refugees and the rest are in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon.

Moreover, xenophobia and Islamophobia are on the rise. For example, the prime minister of Hungary said; Syrian refugees are Muslim therefore his country will not accept them. Slovakian government announced; they will only take Christian refugees. Ben Carson the republican presidential candidate said; a Muslim cannot be a president of the US. Donald Trump the republican candidate proposing to deport all the undocumented immigrants (11 million) in the US, and build a wall along the US-Mexican border. These xenophobic and Islamophobic
sentiments show a dangerous trend on the rise in terms of extreme politics of nationalism and exclusionary policies, which represents certain values based on “self-interest” and “national interest.” In my view, we can object to them and consider alternative values and politics that counter these extreme xenophobic and nationalistic values and politics.

Thus, the question is: can we with a good conscience argue that the current ethical and political practices are sufficient and there is no need to consider alternative ideas and values. It seems to me the answer cannot be affirmative, at best it would be maybe. The fact is, we are experiencing a humanitarian crisis on a massive scale since World War II, which cannot be ignored. The calamity of the refugee crisis in the world compels us to rethink the notions of “self-interest” and “national interest.” We can certainly consider alternative concepts and open the possibility for the transformation of values that inform and produce policies.

Furthermore, in my view, the transformation of values begins with imagining that another world is possible, if we think about alternative ideas and values, then social and political movements can be realized in concrete terms. For instance, if slaves in the US did not imagine that they could be free someday, then slavery would not be abolished. If women in the US did not think about having equal rights, then they would not be able to vote today. They struggled for 100 years and in 1920 they achieved the right to vote. If civil rights leaders did not imagine another world is possible, then there would not be a civil rights movement. If gay and lesbian people did not think alternative values and politics are possible, then they would not attain their civil rights today. In my view, history does not move in a linear way and the transformation of values and policies does not happen overnight but we certainly can think about alternative ideas and practices that could put the idea of another world in the realm of possibility.
As I argued above, the challenge here is that nation-states govern and implement policies based on the values promoted by “national interest.” These policies give rise to nationalism, exclusion, extremism, and xenophobia. The important issue with the idea of world citizen, immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers is the complex relation between ethics and politics. If we accept the claim that cosmopolitanism and the ideas of “world citizen” and inclusion can be an alternative to the notions of “nation-state” and “national interest,” then we can indeed consider politicizing ethical issues and respond with an adequate ethical politics that considers the practice of radical generosity. I suggest the practice radical generosity has the potential to challenge these policies and give rise to a different mode of thinking and norms, which promotes a cosmopolitan worldview and intent.
Chapter 5: Final Remarks and Conclusion

The Main Argument

My aim in this project was to make a contribution to the philosophical discourse on cosmopolitanism. Thus, I set out to examine the conditions that give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. In order to achieve my goal, I proposed a novel idea of radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

This final chapter will proceed in the following way: first, I restate my argument and give an account as to why the theme of this study is important. Here, I review how my conception of radical generosity was developed and present its relation to cosmopolitanism. Second, I explicate the logic and movement of my argument by showing the links between key ideas in the earlier chapters. Third, I summarize the key concepts in each chapter, detailing how each chapter advanced my argument. Fourth, I show both how radical generosity was developed in the context of praxis as a social and transformative practice and how the emergence of radical social and political movements in recent times points to the direction of transformation and radical generosity. Finally, I acknowledge that my concept and argument present a novel approach, but they do not provide the final word; rather, my hope is to make a modest contribution to the ongoing cosmopolitan project.

I began my discussion in this study with the question “What conditions give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism?” In order to answer this question, I examined ethical and political conditions and argued that radical generosity is a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

I noted that recent discussions of cosmopolitanism do not adequately acknowledge the
importance of generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, and that, in fact, the idea of generosity as a practice with respect to cosmopolitanism has been overlooked.

Furthermore, I defined what radical generosity means—namely that it differs from random acts of generosity that may happen from time to time. Radical generosity is a social practice with a transformative aspect, which involves a paradigm shift and social and political transformation. Moreover, the practice of radical generosity challenges existing social and political norms and is not an application of rules but a projection of a new way to act in the world and transform a non-cosmopolitan way of thinking and life into a cosmopolitan way of life. In addition, I suggested that ethical practices have political implications. It can be argued that if we accept the premise that all human beings have equal ethical worth, we also must acknowledge that all human beings have equal rights. This is the spirit of the cosmopolitan way of thinking and life.

Moreover, in my view, cosmopolitanism is an ongoing project, a possibility, a social relation, a movement, a society, and a worldview, by which we understand the idea of citizen as “world citizen” that transcends both the nation-state idea of a citizen and the exclusions that this idea implies. What distinguishes this view is that it treats cosmopolitanism in historical terms; it acknowledges the institutional requirements of cosmopolitanism, views it as openness to others and a way of life, and, in doing so it involves social and political transformation, which in turn implements the practice of radical generosity.

To justify the importance of cosmopolitanism, I contended that we live in a world torn by wars that is producing refugee crisis in massive scale since World War II, and two factors have caused these wars and refugee crisis, the notions of “self-interest” and “national interest,” and in addition by the processes of neoliberal-globalization the world is becoming increasingly interconnected in various respects: ecology, socio-economic, finance, and technology. The
processes of neoliberalization (e.g., austerity measures) and globalization (which involves the
displacement of workers) have created conditions under which a great number of people have been
moving around the globe as immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Further, it has contributed
to a rise in xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe and the US. I have argued that
cosmopolitanism can offer a solution to the challenges of wars, the refugee crisis, and neoliberal-
globalization that the world is experiencing.

The Logic of Positions and the Movement of Argument

Having stated in the introduction a key condition, namely, radical generosity for the possibility of
cosmopolitanism, and presented my preliminary understanding of cosmopolitanism, I then, in
order to articulate and develop my argument further, examined three distinct philosophical
approaches to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. First, I examined cosmopolitanism as a “way of
life” as developed by Stoic thinkers in diverse ways but lacking a political or institutional
conception of cosmopolitanism. For this, I turned to two other approaches to cosmopolitanism,
namely, the “juridical-political” (Kant and Habermas) in the framework of political institutions
and the “beyond-normative” (Derrida and Levinas) in the realm of unconditional ethical
responsibility and ethics as a condition for politics. While I acknowledged the importance and
necessity of these approaches to cosmopolitanism and extracted certain ideas from these thinkers,
I also problematized and showed their limitations in certain respects in order to advance my
argument. Finally, I developed a conception of radical generosity that views it as a social practice
and underscores the idea of praxis. The idea of praxis refers to human activities that transform
material, social, and political conditions in historical terms.

The formulation and movement of my argument relied on a historical method in this study.
I have noted that we cannot be engaged in a philosophical discourse outside of the history of
philosophy, and that, moreover, nothing is outside of history. As such, I have emphasized the history of cosmopolitanism and the relation between the history of cosmopolitanism and the contemporary discourse of cosmopolitanism.

My method was historical in two senses: one regarding the history of concepts and the other regarding the historical context of present discussion. I have explored key historical figures and concepts in my discussion of conditions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. I examined conditions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism from a political and ethical perspective, assessing the soundness of these ideas. The unfolding of chapters presented the movement of my argument by relying on historical concepts and thinkers in the context of conditions of cosmopolitanism. Each chapter examined the thinkers who have contributed to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. My argument articulated these conditions and examined the adequacy of each approach for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

**First Approach**

By close reading of Stoic texts and thinking through them to formulate my argument, I extracted certain ideas from the Stoics to develop my argument with regard to my understanding of cosmopolitanism and my conception of radical generosity. I acknowledged that the Stoics, because of their historical situation, did not offer a conception of cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions. Part of my argument relies on a basic Stoic principle, namely, the practice of ethics and politics as a “way of life” and the Stoic idea of affinity (*oikeiosis*) with others and the idea of care for others.

These concepts suggest that, within the context of cosmopolitanism, it is the world community, which governs the formation of social relations, and the idea of caring for the wellbeing of others is crucial for the conception of this world community. These Stoic concepts
have provided a framework to develop my general claim with regard to the practice of radical
generosity as a “way of life” and as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

Furthermore, in order to emphasize the idea of practice, drawing from the Stoics, I
showed that ethical life is not some metaphysical notion of knowing this and that rule but, rather,
about practicing ethics, such as care of the self and caring for the wellbeing of others as a “way
of life” and as such can be considered as part of the ethos of a cosmopolitan citizen and society
as a whole. I focused on the concept of practice, because of its concreteness. Later in chapter
four, I elaborated on the idea of practice, specifically in relation to generosity. Moreover,
practice defines human life in concrete terms. I emphasized that the term practice does not
preclude present and future activities. As such, these everyday practices of ethics as a “way of
life” within the context of cosmopolitanism imply that the practice of ethics is not based on some
self-interested motivation, calculation, or rule-following; rather, the practice of ethics must be
based on historical and practical reflections on openness and social relations.

With regard to my discussion on the Stoics, it must be noted that by calling attention to
the Stoics and ancient Greek thinkers, I did not intend to suggest that ancient Greek society was
exactly like modern society of today. There are obviously many differences between ancient
Greek society and the complex modern society of today, the global social and political issues of
today being far more complex than those of ancient Greek society. Nevertheless, certain aspects
of the concepts and approaches that were developed by the Stoics and ancient Greek thinkers can
be useful in terms of the ethical issues of today, such as the practice of ethics and politics as a
way of life, which includes the social understanding of those practices. I suggested that this
approach to ethics and politics rests on a tacit assumption that humans are social beings and their
sociality manifests itself in ethical and political practices in terms of living with others.
To underscore the importance of practical philosophical reflections, I emphasized that the practice of radical generosity challenges the familiar conventional precepts of ethical practices and interrupts norms, rules, and calculations, and offers ethical practice beyond self-interest. As such, the appropriate treatment of others must be addressed by practical philosophical reflections. Radical generosity understood as a social and transformative practice diverges from some accepted values and practices. The practice of radical generosity has the potential to transform social and political conditions. I suggested that it is this potential for transformation that provides the potential for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, to be a cosmopolitan citizen involves a practice of ethical politics, which is beyond self-interest and in the context of a more inclusive society.

**Second Approach**

I have noted that the Stoics did not envision cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions. Thus, to advance my argument, I turned my attention to the “juridical-political” approach (Kant and Habermas), which deals with cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions. While I acknowledged the necessity of political institutions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, I also raised some concerns, such as what might be missing from the “juridical-political” approach to cosmopolitanism. In order to address this, I noted that Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism, situated in the framework of social contract theory and the idea of self-interest, is problematic. Kant equates the situation of individuals in the state of nature to the nation-states. According to this assumption, it follows that the nation-states out of self-interest wanting peace will join a world federation. Furthermore, I have contended that there is no explicit focus on ethics, as Kant proposes a cosmopolitanism that does not require ethical consideration.
I have suggested that Habermas, on the other hand, seeks to overcome Kant’s conceptual difficulty, namely, the idea of self-interest based on social contract theory. Habermas situates his vision of cosmopolitanism within current political institutions, such as the UN and the EU. He proposes a world domestic politics without a world government with democratic procedures. I have insisted that while Habermas’s cosmopolitan political order is necessary, it is not sufficient, because it lacks motivation and explicit ethical consideration. It does not adequately consider what is required of an ethical response that would achieve a contemporary cosmopolitanism.

I argued that Habermas’s discourse ethics indicates that all those affected should participate in the discourse. Nevertheless, ethical discourses are highly implausible in everyday life, because the ideal expectations that they place on participants are enormously difficult. There is no mechanism to inspect whether participants in discourse have equal opportunities to speak freely and/or to measure how inclusive discourses are. For example, immigrants and refugees who are seeking citizenship do not have an equal position relative to the countries that are offering citizenship. This is purely on the empirical and practical level. In other words, discourse ethics is not adequate in terms of dealing with certain real life practical issues such as immigration and asylum seekers. While I have acknowledged Habermas’s contribution to the discourse of cosmopolitanism, specifically the importance of political institutions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, I have suggested that to have an adequate ethical response involves the practice of radical generosity as a transformative practice that has the potential to challenge and change existing values and norms and point to new norms and ways of life. This implies that political institutions consider exhibiting radical generosity in their practices and policy making with respect to immigrants and refugees.
Third Approach

Having argued that the “juridical-political” approach does not address the importance of an adequate ethical response concerning cosmopolitanism, I then focused on an appropriate conception of ethics as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Thus, I turned my attention to the idea of unconditional ethical response, which is the integral part of my conception of radical generosity.

I suggested that in Derrida’s view, there might be a paradox in the cosmopolitan discourse; on the one hand, it seems that cosmopolitanism calls for some kind of “juridical-political” institutions, while, on the other hand, it also necessitates an ethic of welcome and hospitality unconditionally beyond the “juridical-political” framework.

I noted that Derrida’s ethical approach points both to limitations of ethics and to a paradoxical ethical concern that is unavoidable for human beings. I suggested that this could be the opening of an ethics even when institutional (juridical-political) issues are unresolved. In addition, I argued that Derrida’s view of unconditional ethics and welcome as hospitality is constituted in radical generosity.

Drawing from Derrida and, to some extent, Levinas, I developed a conception of radical generosity both as unconditional welcome and hospitality and as a social practice, transcending Levinas’s “ethical subjectivity” and moving into the realm of social transformation. I contended that if for Derrida and Levinas unconditional ethics implies one’s openness to the other, then radical generosity calls for social and collective openness, moving beyond “ethical subjectivity” in concrete historical terms.
Furthermore, I noted that while Levinas locates politics outside of the ethical realm, Derrida insists on ethics as the condition for politics, which opens the possibility for rethinking the relation between ethics and politics. I argued that ethical issues have political implications and politics without ethical consideration could be blind. The challenge is to politicize ethical issues toward an adequate ethical politics. I suggested that a cosmopolitan society implies an open and generous society that values the social capacity of radical generosity. Thus, I attempted to develop a conception of radical generosity as an unconditional ethical practice in the social realm that politicizes ethical concerns in the context of cosmopolitanism. This understanding of radical generosity implies that ethical politics implies exhibiting radical generosity concerning immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers and, in general, all world citizens.

**Radical Generosity as a Transformative Praxis**

In my conception of radical generosity, I tried to show that contrary to Aristotle’s conservative understanding of generosity as a good virtue, which needs to be in harmony with other virtues for cultivating an excellent character, we must focus on the transformative potential of generosity as a social practice. Nietzsche’s conception of generosity, in contrast to Aristotle’s, emphasizes the transformative aspect of generosity by reevaluating existing ethical norms, challenging them, and creating new values.

Throughout my discussion in this study, I emphasized that radical generosity is a social practice, which implies that the social life is essentially practical activities in historical processes that define the ethical and political life. Therefore, the concept of *praxis* is crucial in order for radical generosity to become a concrete action as a social practice in order to transform social and political norms.
Thus, I attempted to develop a conception of radical generosity in the context of *praxis*. I focused on Marx’s conception of *praxis*, in particular Marx’s idea of *praxis* as a social and transformative activity that brings about social and political change. I suggested that the idea of “radical” is embedded in Marx’s idea of *praxis* as a practical-critical and revolutionary activity and that radical generosity is in line with the transformative aspects of *praxis*, which provides historical transformation and solidarity in social relations that in turn translates to transformation in material conditions and gives rise to new ways of life.

Furthermore, I noted that Marx relies on his insights about social practices to provide a historical analysis of how new historical possibilities arise through the evolution of social and political processes. Drawing from Marx’s historicity, we can see that the recent political events in the EU suggest that new social and political movements are developing by the radical left, such as Syriza (a coalition of the radical left) in Greece, Podemos (we can) in Spain, and Die Linke (the left) in Germany. What these radical political movements have in common is solidarity and cooperation in opposition to the neoliberal austerity programs based on “self-interest” and “national interest,” as well as acting to stop the xenophobic sentiments and the rise of the extreme right, such as PEDGIDA (the patriotic Europe and against the Islamization of the West) in Germany and Golden Dawn in Greece.

The emergence of these radical left movements indicates that there is a reevaluation of values taking place, which is politicizing ethical issues and moving toward an ethical politics of openness to others, in particular, with respect to immigrants and refugees. Thus, opposing “national interest” and neoliberal austerity programs by embracing solidarity demonstrates a transformation in social and political norms and implies a move toward the practice of radical generosity. If the EU is a model for the cosmopolitan project, then it would seem that anti-
immigrant sentiments and policies combined with the neoliberal austerity program is giving rise to the extreme right politics of “national interest” and diminishing the possibility of cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, the emergence of these radical movements suggest, that the potential for the practice of radical generosity is the potential for the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

The Final Remark

Finally, my position in this study has been a radical position with regard to radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. My argument may not be a perfect one and is certainly one that must be developing and evolving in an ongoing mode. Nevertheless, I must emphasize that my thesis has potential, and it is my contention that this mode of radical thinking is productive in its task of politicizing ethical issues and transforming social and political practices. Such a radical idea does not fit in the liberal mode of thinking. Furthermore, we cannot reject a theory before considering and examining its potentials and putting it into practice; only the passage of time and historical processes will reveal whether a theory is sound or not. Moreover, my conception of radical generosity is not a panacea, but rather a novel contribution in the heterogeneous mode to other approaches that I examined in this study, with respect to the possibility of cosmopolitanism, and as such it is one part of an ongoing project.
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