SHARED SPACE, VARIED LIVES: FINNISH-RUSSIAN INTERACTIONS IN DACHA COUNTRY, 1880s-1920s

By

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation examines the Russian summer house (dacha) communities in southeastern Finland as a site of diverse social interactions from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century. It covers the period from the 1880s to the mid-1920s because it seeks to address how Finnish-Russian social, economic and cultural contacts were significant in the political context of Finnish nationalists’ resistance to Russian authority and Finland’s transition to independent statehood after the Russian empire’s collapse. This project investigates why the dacha, entrenched in Russian thought as a symbol of Russian middle-class status, also became a physical and mental meeting place for Russians and Finns from various social backgrounds. Dacha communities in Finland were heavily concentrated in the Karelian Isthmus, a region within a few hours reach by train from St. Petersburg, Russia’s imperial capital. This meant that interaction between dacha-goers from Russia and Finnish-speaking inhabitants formed an integral part of the social landscape. These summer house settlements therefore offer a lens through which to examine how social boundaries were created, sustained, and destabilized. This case study is illuminating because Finns and Russians came into contact with each other in a space that was generally seen as part of the personal, private sphere; yet, these contacts also resonated in the public context of community. By examining intercultural exchanges in a specific spatial setting, and asking how imperial imaginings of particular places intersected with everyday social realities, this project prompts us to reconsider issues of nationality, identity, and state-building from an alternate perspective that than of Russian authorities’ efforts to control recalcitrant minorities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My most sincere gratitude goes to my advisory committee chair, Dr. Lewis Siegelbaum, for his guidance throughout my graduate studies at Michigan State University. I would also like to thank the other members of my committee, Dr. Keely Stauter-Halsted, Dr. Leslie Moch, Dr. Gordon Stewart and Dr. Charles Keith, for their continued support during the dissertation writing process. I am also grateful to Dr. Jason Merrill from the Department of Linguistics and Languages for serving as the Dean’s representative on my committee. I would like to give my thanks to Dr. Timo Vihavainen, Liisa Byckling and Natalia Baschmakoff for taking the time to discuss my project while I was conducting research in Helsinki.

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Finally, I would like to thank the Aleksanteri Institute in Helsinki for providing institutional support during my research trip to Helsinki from January to March 2010.
Parts of this dissertation appear in recently published peer-reviewed articles. Tables 1 and 2 and parts of Chapter Three are included in “For whose Common Good? The Russian Philanthropic Society in Finland and the Challenges of Russian Language Education in Late Imperial Russia,” *Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia*, vol. 1, no. 2 (2012), 255-283. A part of Chapter Six is published as “Homes across the Border: Russian Summer Houses in the Karelian Isthmus and the Finnish State, 1917-1927.” *Journal of Borderlands Studies*, vol. 27, no. 3 (2012), 331-343.

Transliteration of Russian names and words in this dissertation, with the exception of widely recognized names, follow the Library of Congress system if the original source is in Russian. Russian names appearing in Finnish language sources are transliterated according to the Finnish standard. Russian words written according to pre-1918 orthography are transliterated as if they follow post-1918 orthographic conventions.

Naming conventions for places in Finland follow the modern-day Finnish standard, with a few exceptions. Swedish names for the Finnish cities Viipuri, Turku and Tampere (Vyborg, Åbo, Tammerfors) are used for narrative that refers specifically to the pre-1917 period. Finnish names for these three cities are used for narrative referring to the post-1917 period. Helsinki will remain the name used for the Finnish capital city throughout this dissertation.
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Introduction

Antti Leskinen grew up in the 1890s in a Finnish-Russian border town that was a popular place for affluent St. Petersburghers to establish summer houses, known in Russian as the dacha. Fluent in Finnish and Russian, Antti was able to communicate with Russian-speaking guests who frequented his father’s variety store in the town. After the Bolshevik Revolution, he assisted Russian speakers seeking refuge in his village by serving as a translator. Finnish historiography informs us that when Finland was part of the Russian Empire, Finnish and Russian speakers rarely interacted with each other. Migrants from Russia clung to the Orthodox Church as their center of public life. Russian artists, musicians and writers contributed heavily to Finnish culture, but never felt they belonged in Finland. Imperial policies limiting Finnish autonomy in the early 1900s gave Finnish nationalists cause to label Russians as the enemy “other.” Antti Leskinen’s experiences demonstrated nonetheless that Finnish-Russian interaction persisted in spite of political and ethnic tensions.

1 Folklore Archives of the Finnish Literature Society (SKS KRA), Sirkka Karskela, KE 28: 5773-5985.
3 Temira Pachmuss, A River of Moving Tears: Russia’s Experience in Finland (New York: Peter Lang, 1992), 231.
The narrative of Finnish political history posits Finland’s incorporation into the Russian Empire in 1809 as a monumental step for Finnish national development, since the Finnish political, economic and cultural institutions developed rapidly under Russian rule. This situation took a negative turn towards the latter half of the nineteenth century, when Tsarist bureaucrats came to see Finnish nationalism as a threat to the Russian Empire’s internal security, and enacted centralizing measures in Finland that provoked Finnish nationalist resistance against the autocracy. The legacy of Russification has contributed to a narrative that treats conflict between Russian governing officials and Finnish political leaders as the central focus of the story on Finnish-Russian relations. In this historiography, Finnish-Russian social and cultural exchanges in everyday life remain peripheral to the larger story of Finland’s transition from an autonomous part of the Russian Empire to an independent state. Because Russian imperial subjects were a numerically small minority in Finland, and never attempted to formally colonize Finnish lands, much of the story on Finnish-Russian interactions is told from the point of view of high-level governance. Quotidian encounters between Finns and Russians figure into the larger political picture only when they support the Finnish nationalists’ accounts of Russia as a seemingly benevolent governing power that guaranteed the existence of the Finnish state only to renege on earlier promises.

This dissertation reconsiders this narrative by examining the Russian summer house (dacha) communities in the Karelian Isthmus as a space for diverse social interactions. The

5 A variety of terms denote places where dachas were popular. The dacha settlement (dachnyi poselok) refers to a place occupying a small swath of territory designated specifically for recreational summer homes. The dacha village (dachnaia derevnia) was essentially a peasant village where urbanites rented property from local inhabitants, and the dacha location (dachnaia mestnosit') was usually an estate or a village where the dacha was the main type of dwelling but
Karelian Isthmus is a region in southeastern Finland bordering Russia that alternated between Swedish, Russian and Finnish administration over several centuries. Its population included people from various ethnolinguistic, religious, and socio-economic backgrounds. This region’s proximity to St. Petersburg attracted migrants and visitors from Russia. Interaction between dacha-goers from Russia and local Swedish- and Finnish-speaking inhabitants formed an integral

was not originally intended for dacha use. See Stephen Lovell, *Summerfolk: A History of the Dacha 1700-2000* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 60. In this dissertation I use the terms dacha place or dacha community to encompass dacha locations and dacha settlements, since towns and villages in the Karelian Isthmus such as Terijoki and Kuokkala had characteristics of both forms land use. Figure 3 is a modern day map showing the locations of the most popular dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus. Both the pre-1948 Finnish place names and post-1948 Russian names are provided with this map.

The Karelian Isthmus is part of the historic Finnish province of Viipuri, which is located in southeastern Finland. Further distinctions in terminology referring to Karelia are as follows: Russian Karelia is a region in the northwestern reaches of the Russian Empire, between the northern shores of Lake Ladoga, Lake Onega and the White Sea. During the nineteenth century, it was administered by the Russian empire, and was not a part of the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland. Finnish Karelia, which Finns sometimes refer to as Northern and Southern Karelia, is located in eastern and southeastern Finland and includes the historic provinces of Kuopio, Mikkeli and Viipuri (until Viipuri Province was ceded to the Soviet Union in 1944). See the maps in Figures 1 and 2.

The territory of the Karelian Isthmus belonged to the Vyborg Province, an administrative region that had been passed between Swedish and Russian rulers several times from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. Historically, this area was a part of the Swedish kingdom from the fourteenth century, when the fortress at the city of Vyborg was first built, to the eighteenth century. In the seventeenth century, the Swedish King Gustav Vasa brought the region under the influence of the Lutheran Church, and the border between the Swedish kingdom and Russia became the boundary between the Lutheran and Orthodox worlds. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Russia’s defeat of Sweden in the Great Northern War resulted in the Treaty of Nystadt (1721), in which Sweden ceded the territories of Vyborg, Kexholm, and Ingermanland to Russia. Further administrative changes followed after Finland’s incorporation into the Russian Empire as an autonomous Grand Duchy. In 1811, reorganization of administrative structures led to the reincorporation of the Vyborg province into the Grand Duchy of Finland. See Kimmo Katajala, “Cross-border Trade in Karelia,” in *The Flexible Frontier: Change and Continuity in Finnish-Russian Relations*, ed. Maria Lähteenmäki (Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute, 2007), 75 and David Kirby, *A Concise History of Finland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 42-43. E.A. Balashov, *Karel’skii peresheek: zemliia neizvedannaia, kraevedcheskoe izdanie* (St. Petersburg: Geza Kom, 1996) chronicles the history of the Karelian Isthmus. See Map 2.
part of the social landscape.\(^8\) The dacha communities offer a lens through which to examine how social boundaries were created, sustained, and destabilized. They challenge the singularity of cultural entities such as Finns and Russians.

This project investigates why the dacha, entrenched in Russian thought as a symbol of Russian middle-class life, also became a physical and mental meeting place for Russians and Finns from various social backgrounds. These encounters occurred in a space that was often seen as part of a personal, private sphere yet they also resonated in the public context of community. By examining intercultural exchanges in a specific spatial setting, and asking how imperial imaginings of particular places intersected with everyday social realities, this project considers issues of nationality, identity, and state-building from a perspective other than that of Russification. It also revisits these issues from beyond the context of Finnish nationalists’ anti-Russian backlash after the empire’s collapse. This project therefore contributes to current research on cross-cultural interactions in empire- and nation-building processes by integrating the historiography on governance in multiethnic polities with insights on individuals’ everyday experiences. It argues that hostility and harmony coexisted in Finnish-Russian interactions because dacha life embodied complex ambiguities embedded in the wider context of ethnicity, class and other social and cultural identities.

The political context of this narrative is Finland’s regime change from an autonomous province within the Russian Empire to an independent state. I trace the extent to which these political changes and the nature of Finnish-Russian contacts affected each other. Since the

intense transformation of Karelian Isthmus villages into dacha places for Russian visitors began in earnest in the 1880s, it is illuminating to examine the significance of inter-group ties that developed from that time onwards. My narrative ends in the late 1920s because a series of legislations dramatically limited foreigners’ (especially Russians’) rights in Finland. Nativist groups with a specifically anti-Russian agenda gained widespread popularity towards the end of the decade and significantly changed the outlook of Finnish society and politics in the 1930s and 40s. Finnish-Russian contacts after the 1920s merit treatment in a separate study.

**Theoretical Framework**

Several sets of theoretical perspectives inform the analysis in this dissertation. This project uses concepts related to imperial formations and processes, and ideas on identity in nation- and state-building terms to comment on social and political contexts of Finnish nationalists’ struggle against Russian imperial authority. Finally, discussions on the significance of space and place serve as the overarching theoretical setting for probing the complexities of empire-, nation- and state-building processes.

**Imperial Processes, Imperial Situations**

This dissertation underscores the tensions in Russian administrators' attempts to reconcile the empire’s heterogeneous population across vast stretches of territory with their desire to systematize authority. Edward Thaden and Theodore Weeks have addressed this issue by examining imperial-local relationships in Finland, Poland and the Baltic Provinces. Thaden argues that the Tsarist government had no consistent policies for centralization. It relied on co-opted elites of a different ethnic background than the titular ethnic group to maintain social
These elites sought to cultivate their regions’ separate ethnic identity, and attempted to isolate local society from imperial influence. These efforts inadvertently led to the emergence of new titular elites, who came to play an important role in the local social, economic, and cultural life. Similarly, Weeks argues that the Tsarist bureaucracy, rather than pursuing a consistent Russian nationalist program, constructed policy in the Western borderlands in reaction to the tensions of the empire’s non-national nature. The Tsarist government carried out its centralization efforts, referred to as “Russification” by people who felt oppressed by the autocracy, in objectively different degrees in each territory. They were harsher in Poland, but much milder by comparison in Finland. However, in all areas, titular and foreign elites alike eventually condemned imperial policies as tyrannical.

Russia’s imperial relationship with subjects in the northwest differed from its relationship with peoples in Siberia and the Caucasus. Michael Khodarkovsky has commented on Russia’s colonization in the south and east as part of efforts to reorganize diverse peoples with different notions of governance into state forms more familiar to imperial authorities. Williard Sunderland has argued that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Russian imperial establishment saw the steppe as an alien, empty frontier zone that required colonization as a

9 In the Baltic Provinces, the German minority formed the social and economic elite in the Estonian and Latvian lands, while in Finland the Swedish minority served as the elite over Finnish tenant farmers and peasants.
matter of state security and effective governance. 13 Similar to the European overseas empires, Russian colonial expansion eastward was based on rulers’ belief that Russia had a right to the civilizing mission in the far flung regions. 14 This mission was also embedded in thoughts on economic advantages of trade and commerce for the Russian heartland; thus, imperial expansion and conquest also involved a program for coopting local elites and integrating native legal and economic procedures with Russian ones. 15

The contrast between methods and practices of imperial rule in different parts of the Russian Empire shows that perceptions of empire as a state form are rather complicated. 16 Recent emphasis on studies of imperialism and colonialism has shifted away from defining what empires are to what they do. Ann Stoler has argued that scholars should not treat empires as concrete things but as situations and formations resulting from processes that produced different degrees of sovereignty. 17 Imperial situations are “defined by the tensions, incongruity, and

16 Incongruence of practices in different parts of an empire is not limited to the Russian case. The place of Algeria in French imperial and colonial visions was quite different from that of other French overseas colonies. Algeria had a status that made it an integral part of France, but it was not automatically accepted as part of the metropole. As Gary Wilder has argued, France’s imperial situations meant that territories, peoples, and governments did not align seamlessly with each other. See *The French Imperial Nation State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 7.
incommensurability of the languages of self-description.”¹⁸ That is, what role did imperial visions of specific places play in everyday social realities? Although this dissertation is not intended as a comparative study, asking this question about the relationship between the Russian Empire and the dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus has potential significance for other studies that focus on empire as a process and as a situation.

**Nation, State and Identity**

Since Finnish historiography characterizes Finnish nationalism as a response to Russian imperial authority, I also draw from theories on the relationship between nationalism, state-building, and identity. John Breuilly defines nationalism as a form of politics that is primarily about power directly connected to control of the state. The nation exists with an explicit character, prioritizes its interests and values, and must exercise political sovereignty.¹⁹ Nationalist movements are therefore most successful when they are able to relate ideology to specific political objectives.²⁰ Leaders of nationalist movements often seek to appeal to their target audience in emotive ways to cement the bond between the nation and political objectives, especially where state apparatuses are not fully developed. Eric Hobsbawm’s insistence that nationalism derives from invented tradition – “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or

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¹⁸ Gerasimov et al., “New Imperial History and the Challenges of Empire,” in *Empire Speaks Out*, 23.
²⁰ Ibid., 17.
tacitly accepted rules...which automatically implies continuity with the past”\textsuperscript{21} – is important for understanding the intersection between politics and ideology.

Theories explaining how groups of people evoke cultural traditions to fuse the notion of the nation to specific political objectives are compelling, yet they do not sufficiently explain how different forms of identity, which are not exclusive to nationality, can at times overlap. Historical actors most invested in nation- and state-building have sought to enumerate and measure identity in a systematic fashion. Census categories such as native language and religion often stood for an entire nation. The authors of census questionnaires, intentionally or inadvertently, designed questions that allowed for individuals to identify with only one group. Gary Cohen and Pieter Judson have remarked that the census in the Habsburg Empire at the turn of the twentieth century only allowed for individuals and families to select one language as their mother tongue. Bureaucrats interpreting census results were inclined to label people in the culturally diverse Bohemian lands as either purely Czech or German, even though many respondents spoke both languages with ease and came from families of mixed heritage.\textsuperscript{22}

Official figures only tell part of the story on social interactions. Data from the Statistical Office of Finland’s general population census (Tables 1 and 2) indicated that there was a growth in the number of Russian speakers and in the number of Finnish residents born in Russia at the


end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. However, this information does not permit us to distinguish between ethnic Russians and non-Russian minorities who were subjects of the Russian Empire. These statistics do not indicate the length of time Russian-born individuals had lived in Finland. Figures on the number of people who spoke Russian as a mother tongue do not reveal how many of these Russian speakers were multilingual, nor do they indicate whether they were of mixed Finnish-Russian parentage. It is not possible to determine whether those who spoke Russian or were born in Russia were subjects of the empire or Finnish citizens, since citizenship did not exist as a census category. Russian-speaking migrants from the empire did not always become Finnish citizens once they moved to Finland. There were approximately 6,000 individuals born in the Russian Empire who had acquired Finnish citizenship by 1900. Many more Russian subjects lived temporarily or seasonally in Finland, but chose not to apply for Finnish citizenship. This did not necessarily mean that Finns were isolated from Russian influences or vice versa. These census figures can only provide a partial picture of the Russian presence in Finland at the end of the nineteenth century.

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23 The Statistical Office of Finland has been conducting a general population census in 10 year intervals since the first general census was introduced in 1870. See “History of Statistics in Finland,” Statistics Finland, accessed July 16, 2012, http://www.stat.fi/org/historia/index_en.html. The core of the Russian community in Finland consisted of military and government officials, Orthodox clergymen, merchants, factory workers, servants and members of the intelligentsia from Russia who moved to Finland throughout the nineteenth century, and this Russian community grew to several thousand people. See Baschmakoff and Leinonen, 22-23.

24 Baschmakoff and Leinonen, 23. See also Vihavainen, ed., Dva Lika Rossii, 19.
Table 1. Population of Finland according to mother tongue.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Region</th>
<th>1880</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uusimaa</td>
<td>202 806</td>
<td>1 606</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turku/Pori</td>
<td>344 649</td>
<td>117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Häme</td>
<td>221 360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viipuri</td>
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<td>2 219</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mikkeli</td>
<td>167 310</td>
<td>121</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuopio</td>
<td>256 420</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vaasa</td>
<td>358 480</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Uusimaa</td>
<td>239 456</td>
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<td>Turku/Pori</td>
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<td>Viipuri</td>
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<td>Vaasa</td>
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<td>Viipuri</td>
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<td>3 960</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mikkeli</td>
<td>189 460</td>
<td>187</td>
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<td>Kuopio</td>
<td>313 951</td>
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<td>460 460</td>
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<td>Turku/Pori</td>
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<td>Viipuri</td>
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Source: Suomen väkiluvuntilasto (Finnish Population Statistics) SVT VI 9 (1880), 12-13; SVT VI 22 (1890), 76-77; SVT VI 37 (1900), 78-79; SVT VI 45 (1910), 212-213.
Table 2. Population of Finland by number of individuals born in Russia.

<table>
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<th>1910 Present</th>
<th>1910 Absent</th>
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<td>6 148</td>
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<td>Häme</td>
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<td>253</td>
<td>307</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viipuri</td>
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<td>6 255</td>
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<td>Mikkeli</td>
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<td>953</td>
<td>222</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>7 947</td>
<td>8 725</td>
<td>13 536</td>
<td>9 064</td>
<td>10 036</td>
</tr>
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Source: Suomen väkiluvuntilasto SVT VI 9 (1880), 32-33; SVT VI 22 (1890), 78-79; SVT VI 37 (1900), 92-93; SVT VI 45 (1910), 232-243.

More importantly, population statistics are limiting for measuring the size of the Russian community in Finland because they do not reflect the emotive aspects of identity. Interethnic contacts in family, social and economic relationships may have affected the extent to which an individual thought of himself or herself as a Finn or as a Russian, and one may identify with different cultural communities throughout the course of a lifetime. Rogers Brubaker has suggested that scholars should separate thinking about identity as a category of practice – the ways in which “it is used by ‘lay’ actors in some everyday settings to make sense of themselves” – from identity as a category of analysis “used by political entrepreneurs … to persuade people that they are ‘identical’ to each other and at the same time different from others.”

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The 1910 census introduced two new categories of individuals. The “Present” category referred to individuals who were still living in the parish where they were registered at the time of the previous census. The “Absent” category referred to individuals who as of 1906 no longer lived in the parish towns where they were originally registered. See Suomen väkiluvuntilasto SVT VI 45 (1910).

Zelnik’s study on an industrial strike in the Baltic Provinces, which features the autobiography of Vasili Gerasimov, a worker with who had a Russian name but spoke Finnish as a native language, reveals the intricacy of identity as both a category of practice and a category of analysis. Gerasimov’s case points to the importance of examining how various meanings of identity affected individuals’ everyday life.

I use the terms Russians and Finns, not because I accept them as bounded groups, but because actors referred to themselves as such in memoir literature. Ethnicity is merely one among several salient categories whose significance is situational and can vary. I therefore ask how specific social, cultural and political settings invest categories with meaning in multiple group contexts. Tara Zahra contends that scholars risk following nationalists’ example “by idealizing borderlands as idyllic sites of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism or pathologizing them as settings for inevitable conflict and violence.” Scholarship requires a more rigorous articulation of how people operated beyond, under, or through difference in particular times and places. Focusing on state imperatives for distinguishing groups does not further comprehension of the social networks that connected people from varying backgrounds. The foremost challenge for scholars is to situate and interpret the multifaceted nature of inter-group dialogue. I seek to further this line of inquiry by concentrating on the significance of interdependent ties, both in times of peace and turmoil, and then contemplating the intersection of political contexts with these relationships.

27 Reginald E. Zelnik, Law and Order on the Narova River: The Kreenholm Strike of 1872 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 9. Gerasimov was a St. Petersburg orphan. The city’s foundling home sent him, as an infant, to Karelia where he was raised by Finnish peasants. At the age of 11, the Kreenholm textiles factory recruited him for work.

Dacha space in the Karelian Isthmus is an ideal case for examining how tensions and incongruities of imperial situations intersected with nationalist endeavors. Where did these dacha places in Finland fit in the Russian imperial imagination? How were they envisioned in locational and spatial terms? That is, what did it mean for dachas to be located in a place outside of the regular reach of imperial legislation, and how did this situation intersect with daily realities? The Karelian Isthmus was part of an autonomous Finland with limited direct political connections to the Russian imperial core, but at the same time, this region was very tightly connected to St. Petersburg through the thousands of St. Petersburg families that made their secondary homes there in the summer months. This dichotomy raises interesting questions about what St. Petersburgers envisioned as imperial space, and how the significance of the Karelian Isthmus dacha places changed after the collapse of the Russian Empire and Finland's subsequent establishment as an independent state. Discussions on the meaning of space and place shape the theoretical framework on the relationship between empire and nation.

Finland’s contiguity to Russia is a spatial issue that poses a significant conceptual challenge for comparative discussions on the meaning of empire, especially when juxtaposed with the relationship between European overseas empires and their colonies. Alexei Miller has commented that the competition between continental empires in Europe, which bordered each other, were distinct from the political rivalries between maritime empires that did not share contiguous space.\(^\text{29}\) Land-based empires had more permeable boundaries and more ambiguous

\(^{29}\) Alexei Miller proposes, for example, that British decisions to support Muslim peoples in the Caucasus against Russian rule would not have brought any significant consequences for British rule over Muslims in its own empire. However, Austrian support for Polish nationalist
distinctions between center and the periphery. However, the distinction between center and periphery in the maritime empires may not be as rigid as we assume. Julia Clancy-Smith's study of Tunis before and during French colonial rule characterizes the Mediterranean region as “layered zones of contact…characterized by fluctuating degrees of internal social coherence forged by high exchange densities, while remaining subject to ‘pushes and pulls’ from larger, external forces.” Thus, there were no fixed boundaries between European shores, the northern fringes of the Ottoman Empire, and European colonial holdings in North Africa. As Cooper has argued, both the maritime and continental empires coexisted in an increasingly interconnected world. Sharp distinctions between these types of empire might hinder us from asking important questions about the interrelated historical processes and contingencies.

The relationship between settlers and their spatial environment reveals much about imperial and colonial situations. David Prochaska contends in his study of French settlers in the Algerian port city of Bône that settler colonies were distinguished from other varieties of colonial situations. In addition to colonial administrators and local peoples, settlers represented a third significant social group. The implications and consequences of decisions made by settlers are significant for the colonial situation in a particular setting. It is therefore important to

\[ \text{30 Gerasimov et al., } Empire Speaks Out, 8. The authors have commented that the contiguous empires are often depicted as entities based on formal autocratic rule and direct territorial conquest. Maritime empires are seen as novel forms of territorial organization, where informal colonial control and dense communication networks ensured their function.} \]

\[ \text{31 Julia Clancy-Smith, } Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration c. 1800-1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 11.} \]

\[ \text{32 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 23.} \]
examine ways in which the formation of settler societies can be conceived of in the same way as
the formation of other social groups.\textsuperscript{33} Studies on how imperial processes functioned in a
particular place helps us think about how empires were imagined in relation to contiguous as
well as noncontiguous territory.\textsuperscript{34}

Scholars have at times used the term “borderland” to discuss region-specific dilemmas in
the Russian Empire, even though the concept itself lacks definitional coherence.\textsuperscript{35} Kate Brown,
by seriously contemplating the emotive, rather than political, meaning of place through the
“bottom up” social construction of cultures, illustrates how there can be multiple, overlapping

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\textsuperscript{33} David Prochaska, \textit{Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press1990), 9. The political context by which Russian dacha folk arrived in the Finnish countryside differed significantly from the political impetus by which French migrants settled in Algeria. In Prochaska’s study, the French and other European settlers in Bône were segregated by socio-economic status and race. In the Karelian Isthmus, the dacha folk embodied the idea of the middle class, but the boundaries of this group were rather ambiguous, and the people who aspired to be part of this strata varied widely in wealth and occupation. The racial element was not a factor in the Russian-Finnish relationship, since it involved Europeans moving to other European lands. This is not to suggest, though, that Russian and Finnish speakers saw each other as part of the same community. Colonial settlement in Finland was also never a stated objective of Russian officials, unlike French designs for Algeria. However, like the French in Bône, Russians also vastly outnumbered the locals in the Karelian Isthmus towns. They also had significant influence on shaping the local landscape as well as social and economic life. Using French settlement in Algeria as a reference point for examining Russian dacha communities in Finland raises general questions about the role of space in imperial/colonial processes.

\textsuperscript{34} Cooper and Stoler, \textit{Tensions of Empire}, 22.

\textsuperscript{35} In East European mental geography, as Lawrence Wolff and Maria Todorova have succinctly argued, border areas are characterized either as zones of cultural-linguistic transition, or as battlegrounds between apparently drastically different civilizations according to popular political imagination. See Lawrence Wolff, \textit{Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenmen} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994) and Maria Todorova, \textit{Imagining the Balkans} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). These works discuss how the notion of Eastern Europe came into existence as mental constructs, and how the mental mapping of these regions was imbued with Orientalist meanings.
imaginings of borderland as a space. In some cases, however, the term borderland is used synonymously with the term periphery. Tuomo Polvinen’s *Imperial Borderland* focuses on the animosity between some of Russia’s most conservative imperial bureaucrats and a growing nationalist movement in Finland. Polvinen uses borderland as a spatial analytical framework to emphasize the clash of cultures between Russians and non-Russian. The idea of Finland as a periphery, however, needs to be questioned since St. Petersburg was a mere 30 kilometers away from the Finnish-Russian border. Although there was an official customs boundary between the Grand Duchy of Finland and Russia, the Finnish mental map at times included some territories in Russia. Karelia, for example, was at the center of competing Russian and Finnish claims. Regional differences made it difficult to definitively determine where the heart of Finland was located. Borderland as an analytical concept is therefore limited in enhancing our comprehension of Finland’s place in the Russian Empire.

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38 As Marina Vitukhnovskaja notes, Karelia was not a problem area for the Russian Empire until the end of the nineteenth century, since its predominantly Orthodox population did not attract much negative attention. Tensions over this territory arose in the late nineteenth century when Finland began its economic and cultural expansion into the region. However, rather than siding with either Finnish or Russian national projects, Karelians became increasingly drawn to their own sense of regional identity. See “Karely na granitse konkuriruiushchikh natsional'nykh proektov: sotsio-ekonomicheskie razlichiiia rossiiskoi i finliandskoi Karelii kak faktor natsional'noi politiki,” *Ab Imperio*, no. 1 (2003), 114. Another relevant case of contested territory based on real or imagined stories about the indivisibility of a particular land to another polity is Kosovo’s place in Serbian nationalists’ imagination. The notion that Kosovo had always been an integral part of Serbia has fuelled territorial conflicts between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. See Julie Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
A spatial approach is more insightful for examining how abstract concepts such as empire and nation are translated into everyday experiences. In this project, I refer to place as a concrete location where spatial practices and representations can be observed. Spatial practice refers to the daily routines and networks that link people in particular locales. Spatial representation refers to the way individuals identify and organize places according to specific activities.\textsuperscript{39}

Contextualizing dacha places in the Karelian Isthmus in spatial terms makes this project more than just a regional study. This approach allows for the exploration of localized experiences and phenomena that are more cosmopolitan in nature.\textsuperscript{40}

Studying the Russian dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus through the prism of space permits the questioning of rigid analytical categories common in studies of historical change. For example, dacha life reveals the permeability of class boundaries. The dacha was indeed a phenomenon that stemmed from the growth of the Russian middle class; however, the variety of the individuals who sought a dacha lifestyle challenged the homogeneity of this so-called middle class. The dacha phenomenon also obliterates sharp distinctions between urban, suburban and rural life because the dacha folk were primarily city people who sought refuge in the countryside from the stresses of the urban environment. Finally, some Russian speakers who established summer residences in Finland spent half the year or more in their secondary countryside homes, and commuted to St. Petersburg for work. They thus blurred the distinction between temporary and permanent residents, locals and visitors, native dwellers and immigrants,

and insiders and outsiders. What role did these hazy distinctions play in people's everyday lives during times of relative tranquility and during times of political strife? Perceptions of these permeable social boundaries are important for addressing socio-cultural exchanges.

**Historiography on Russification and the Finnish-Russian Relationship**

Russification occupies a significant place in historiography on the Finnish-Russian relationship. Russification was a policy provoked by a reactionary mentality in Russian political life, especially after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. This campaign involved the curtailment of traditional rights, particularly with regards to self-government, in Russia’s western borderlands. Scholars have made comparisons between the situations in Polish, Baltic, and Finnish lands on the grounds that these territories had their own respective laws, customs, institutions, social organizations and religions. Finland, for example, was allowed to retain most of its political and legal institutions established by its former Swedish rulers. Because Peter the Great and his successors who incorporated these territories into the Russian empire had intended for the institutions in these lands to serve as models for the rest of the empire, imperial authorities needed strong justification for imposing Russian norms on these recently acquired territories. The ruling classes in these regions thus retained their special rights and privileges.

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well into the middle of the nineteenth century, when imperial governance took a more conservative turn.  

Edward C. Thaden’s edited volume, *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland*, offers a systematic analysis of similarities and differences in Russian policies in the western fringes of the Russian empire. Contributors to this volume provide a complex view of interactions between Russians and Germans, Estonians, Latvians, Finns, Swedes and other minority nationalities in the region. Rather than treating Russification simplistically as an ideologically driven campaign espoused by Great Russian chauvinists, Thaden and his colleagues consider three different aspects of Russification: the unintended structural integration of imperial center and periphery that resulted from changes made during the period of Great Reforms, administrative necessities, and cultural considerations. These interpretations allow us to consider Russification in the context of modernity and modern statecraft. 

42 Thaden, *Russia’s Western Borderlands*, 3 and 231. Janet Hartley has argued that Russian Tsars’ plans to use institutions and social organizations in Poland and Finland as models for the rest of the empire to imitate should not be taken too literally. She contends that Alexander I used expressions such as constitution, nation, rights of man, and liberty without deep awareness of their underlying meaning and significance. This meant that although Alexander acknowledged rights and privileges of subject peoples, he did so only insofar as these provisions agreed with the general imperial decrees and laws. See “The ‘Constitutions’ of Finland and Poland in the Reign of Alexander I: Blueprints for Reform in Russia?” in *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire: A Comparative Study*, ed. Michael Branch, Janet Hartley and Antoni Maczak (London: University of London School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1995), 41-43. There are also significant differences between these different parts of the western borderlands. Norman Davies cites the growing strength of Polish nationalism after the three partitions of Poland as one significant factor that made Polish nationalism more of a threat to imperial authorities than Finnish cultural nationalism. Poland, as well as the Baltic lands, was in a much more precarious strategic position for the defense of the Russian Empire. The ideology of pan-Slavism did not apply in Finland or the Baltic lands. The strength of the Catholic Church and its widespread reach in Europe was a concern that Russian authorities did not have about Lutheranism in Finland and the Baltic Provinces. See “Prologue,” in *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire*. 

C. Leonard Lundin's study of Russification in Finland reveals that a more complex factor than Russian nationalist ideology is required for explaining the course of Russification in Finland at the end of the nineteenth century. He argues that while Alexander III was implementing more centralizing policies in the Baltic provinces, he was initially inclined to accommodate Finnish privileges to a certain extent because he did not see the Russian-Finnish imperial relationship as one that needed serious reconsideration. However, when the Finnish Diet and Senate, the main legislative and administrative bodies in Finland, became more confrontational in their dealings with imperial authorities, the Tsar sided with his advisors. Russia’s precarious geopolitical position in Europe compounded the problem: in the decades following the Crimean War, supposedly neutral Sweden became increasingly drawn into British and German spheres of influence. Strategic factors, combined with Russian officials' insistence that previous Tsars never guaranteed Finnish autonomy, compelled Tsarist authorities to push forward with centralizing policies in Finland.44

Scholars of Finnish history maintain that while Russian authorities initially sought to garner support from the local ruling elites as a strategy for maintaining political stability in Finland, they came to see advantages in strengthening the role of Finnish speakers to mitigate Sweden’s influence over the Grand Duchy.45 Russian authorities encouraged the development of a distinctly Finnish national culture. The nineteenth century Fennoman movement, which derived its inspiration from Romantic nationalism via German lands and Scandinavia, promoted

44 Lundin, “Finland,” in Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 379.
the Finnish language and Finnish folklore. The paradox of Russification is that while the imperial authorities were weary of the negative effects of Finnish nationalism on the integrity of the empire, it was imperial authorities themselves who had cultivated Finnish cultural nationalism during the early years of the empire’s reign in Finland.

Lauri Puntila treats Russification as relative to Finnish nationalism in the nineteenth century. He traces the development of various nationalist parties in Finland, and focuses on their

46 Works of literary figures such as Elias Lönnrot, J.L. Runenberg and J.V. Snellman gained widespread popularity among the educated Finnish reading public. Lönnrot founded the Finnish Literature Society in 1831 as a vehicle to promote Finnish culture among the Swedish speaking elite in Finland. In 1835, Lönnrot published the Kalevala, a collection of folk poems based on oral traditions in eastern Karelia. Although the collection was initially poorly received, by the middle of the century it was hailed by scholars as the epic of the Finnish people. In the 1840s and 1850s, Runenberg penned the series of poems, Tales of Ensign Ståhl, which recounted the Russo-Swedish war of 1808-1809 and lauded Finnish heroism in contrast to Swedish incompetency. Snellman is considered to be the father of modern Finnish nationalism because he was active in galvanizing the educated classes to adopt and enhance the native language of the Finnish-speaking masses.

47 Miroslav Hroch accounts for this narrative in his three-phase model of national development. The first phase (middle of the eighteenth century to the 1820s) entailed a renewed concern by a group of intellectuals for studying the language, culture and history of the suppressed minority. During this period, intellectuals became increasingly interested in Finnish language and culture, and this spirit prevailed after Finland was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1809. Hroch marks J.V. Snellman’s patriotic program from the 1820s to the 1840s as a significant landmark for the beginning of the second phase, which involved galvanizing widespread public support for the national movement. In the Finnish case, favorable conditions created by Alexander II helped give the movement a mass character by the 1870s. Hroch considers the 1870s to 1880s as the final phase, where national consciousness has become the concern of a broader segment of the masses and the national movement began to have a firm organizational structure across the national territory. The Finnish national movement was able to resist Russification because of the political circumstances under which Finnish nationalism developed during the first two phases. The degree of autonomy granted to Finland facilitated mutual interdependence among the inhabitants of Finland, and this interdependence intensified when there was a need to defend this autonomy from Russificatory programs. Animosity towards the Russian regime during the most intense years of Russification helped bring Swedish and Finnish speakers together against a common Russian enemy. See Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 62-63 and 73-75.

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fluctuation between cooperation and competition with each other in dealing with perceived
Tsarist oppression. First, he sets up the rise of Finnish nationalism as an impetus for
Russification policies. He argues that Governor General N.I. Bobrikov’s zeal in eradicating all
traces of Finnish autonomy was influenced by separatist sentiments he observed among the
minority nationalities. Puntila then addresses the response of various nationalist groups to
Russification. He traces the competition between the ‘Old Finns,’ a nationalist group that held a
more conciliatory stance towards the autocracy, and the Young Finns, who were discontent with
the Old Finns’ seeming inability to preserve Finnish autonomy in the face of Russian power.48
This conflict brought to light the question of what it meant to be Finnish.

Lundin’s interpretation of Russification in Finland also includes internal political schisms
as part of the analysis. Lundin observes that in the latter half of the 19th century, Finland was
divided along three lines: one between rural landowners and landless peasants, one between
industrial workers and their bourgeois employers, and finally, the most important cleavage was
between the tradition political, economic and cultural elite consisting of a mostly Swedish
speaking aristocracy and a Finnish-speaking corps of bourgeoisie, intelligentsia and prosperous

48 L.A. Puntila, *The Political History of Finland 1809-1966*, trans. David Miller (Helsinki: Otava, 1974), 61 and 63. Osmo Jussila’s work also addresses Russification and the development of Finnish nationalism in the same plane of analysis. He provides a narrative of Russification as a restrained and pragmatic response to the dilemmas of integrating a vast empire. When the Finns actively protested against imperial decrees, Tsarist authorities relied on the collaboration of Finns whom Russian bureaucrats believed to be loyal to the empire. Within this narrative, Jussila reveals the intricate relationship between Finnish politicians and Tsarist authorities, and between the workers’ movement and the nationalist movement. When these intricacies are taken into consideration, the direct effects of and reactions against Russification on Finland’s immediate post-1917 development become more complicated. See *Nationalismi ja vallankumous venäläis-suomalaisissa suhteissa 1899-1914* (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1979).
peasants who were rising in political importance. By the last decade of the century, the mounting tension between the Swedish-speaking conservative aristocratic camps and the Finnish-speaking liberal camps kept Finland divided even as Russificatory policies became more pointed. Additionally, the landless peasants, a significant proportion of the disenfranchised and disgruntled people, were particularly susceptible to Russian officials’ propaganda efforts. These peasants bought into rumors, spread by soldiers in Finland and by itinerant peddlers from Russian Karelia, that Russian support for parceling out land to the landless was contingent upon the extension of Russian law into Finland.

Tuomo Polvinen further reveals the ideological conundrums that mired Russian officials' attempts to centralize administration of multiple nationalities in the periphery. He argues that Russia, as an aspiring imperialist power, sought a more unified internal policy in order to compete successfully with the other European powers. For the imperial authorities, “separatism in border territories could seriously jeopardize foreign policy, and therefore had to be

49 Lundin, “Finland,” in *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland*, 399. Risto Alapuro’s *State and Revolution in Finland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 19-21 makes similar assertions about these social cleavages in Finnish society. It is important to note that while the peasantry was made up of mostly Finnish speakers, not all Swedish speakers in Finland belonged to the land owning classes. At the end of the 18th century, most of the 15% of the Swedish-speaking population of Finland was engaged in farming and fishing in the coastal regions. Although land was an important indicator of wealth, because relations of production were never completely feudalized in the Swedish realm, peasants did hold some property. This meant that the nobility’s dominance was not as strongly based on landownership as in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead, the nobility’s central role in bureaucracy was a stronger contributing factor to their dominance.


51 Ibid., 416.
eliminated.” Governor General N.I. Bobrikov saw the Grand Duchy as some strange borderland where the local population actively sought to segregate the Russian population and render the latter second class citizens. Polvinen paints a picture of Bobrikov as a zealously chauvinist imperial administrator committed to the idea of a “Russia, One and Indivisible.”

The above works deal with Russification as a political issue that mattered to the population at large only when the elites were able to convince people that this imperial policy was a threat to their way of life. The extent to which the tense political atmosphere of the late nineteenth century actually intervened with everyday life in the Karelian Isthmus dacha places, and the degree to which people considered dacha life as a Russian imperialist incursion into Finnish territory remains to be explored. If Russification was seen by Finns as an oppressive, imperialist course of action, how locals interpreted the economic and cultural benefits that came with these dacha places, and the way they reacted to the mass displacement of Russians in Finland after 1917, should tell us something about the way people made sense of empire, identity and nation- and state-building.

Leisure and Culture in Finnish-Russian Contacts

Several seminal works on the dacha are relevant for this dissertation. Stephen Lovell’s *Summerfolk* skillfully illustrates the rich history of the dacha, the Russian summer home, as a social and cultural institution. Rather than accept the Russianness of the dacha as a given, Lovell interrogates the social, cultural, and political contexts that made the dacha a particularly Russian

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52 Polvinen, *Imperial Borderland*, 268.
53 Ibid., 74.
54 Ibid., 17.
phenomenon. He illuminates how the extraordinarily acute urban stresses in late imperial Russia and the impossibility of recreating suburban enclaves similar to the ones that existed in Western Europe contributed to the dacha’s popularity among Russian families of varying household income.\(^55\) He also emphasizes the lack of conditions necessary for the creation of a middle class in Russia as a compelling reason for examining why the middle class label was so often applied to the dacha dweller. In doing so, Lovell calls for a re-examination of political, economic, social and cultural boundaries that colored perceptions of Russian life.

Anthropologist Melissa Caldwell addresses related issues in *Dacha Idylls*, a more contemporary ethnographic study of Russian dacha life. Her work focuses on dacha life as a central ordinary part of everyday life in Russia at different levels of society.\(^56\) She uses literary references from the late imperial period, personal interviews and participant-observer methods to interrogate why Russians in the Soviet and post-Soviet era had such strong attachments to the dacha. She considers why Russians see activities common in other cultures, such as connecting with nature, cultivating hobbies and forming neighborhood networks, as unique to their own society. In doing so, she demonstrates the peculiarity of the dacha as a Russian phenomenon in a larger context of leisure and culture.

Studies on leisure in a Russian context are helpful for examining the significance of Finnish-Russian contacts because dacha life is one among several aspects of social-cultural exchanges in a recreational context. Louise McReynolds’ *Russia at Play* explores the growth of leisure activities among the Russian middle class in the late imperial period as a reflection of the

\(^{55}\) Lovell, 6 and 61-62.

evolution of Russians’ perceptions of themselves in society. Her examination of theater life, sporting activities and tourism reveals both cosmopolitan and national aspects embedded in Russian middle class attitudes. Anne Gorsuch’s work on post-Stalin era tourism, although focusing on a very different temporal and political context, is nonetheless insightful for examining how travelers related to physical space and notions of the domestic and the foreign, especially in a political entity that covered almost as much territory as the Russian Empire.

Neither of these works deals with the dacha in substantial detail, but they are influential because they question the treatment of leisure and travel as marginal aspects of social and cultural development.

Lovell and Caldwell raise interesting questions about the nature of dachas vis-à-vis other cultures. If the dacha is indeed such a particularly Russian social and cultural phenomenon, what did it mean for Russians to establish dachas in places where the local population did not share their social and cultural legacy? How did non-Russians respond to the incursion of a particularly Russian institution on their soil? These questions are important for examining the histories of Finland and the Baltic lands since the nineteenth century dacha boom encroached upon these territories. Scholars collaborating with researchers at the University of Helsinki have compiled an edited volume that addresses the manifestation of dacha life in the Baltic region.

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58 See Anne E. Gorsuch, *All This World is Yours: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after Stalin* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
Contributors to this volume also acknowledge the particularly Russian aspects of dacha life. They emphasize Russian artists’, musicians’ and writers’ contribution to local towns in Finland and the Baltic lands, and the inspiration that the seaside landscape offered these intellectuals.

These works examine the Russian dacha communities in the Baltic region as an accepted outcome of St. Petersburg’s expansion, and they acknowledge the entrenchment of the dacha in this region. However, they do not delve into the details of how these dacha communities intersected with everyday aspects of local life.

Vilho Hämäläinen’s overview of the dacha phenomenon deals with the political implications of Russian dacha life in Finland. His work underscores policies in the Grand Duchy of Finland in the latter half of the nineteenth century that opened up opportunities for Russians to acquire properties along the Gulf of Finland. Hämäläinen examines how the political and economic aspects of the dacha communities influenced political decisions in Finland. He contends that Finnish political authorities made decisions out of the perception that the dacha settlements in Finland were tied specifically to Russian imperial interests. The presence of these dacha communities and the question of whether Russian owners of Finnish property could

60 Nina Kauchtschishwili, “Dacha kak simvol russkoi zhizni” and Valentina Gavrishina, “Dachnaia zhizn’ kak sotsiokul’tornee iavlenie” in Dacha Kingdom. Kauchtschishwili examines depictions of dacha life in Turgenev’s work as well as demands for dacha space among Russians abroad. Gavrishina notes the way St. Petersburgers in the late nineteenth century increasingly came to equate dacha life as a sign of better living conditions and upward mobility.


retain their property rights became a dilemma for authorities in independent Finland, especially in their relationship with a post-imperial Russian state in flux. ⁶³ These political questions in Hämäläinen’s work do not address the everyday interactions in the dacha communities, but they form an important backdrop for investigating issues of interethnic contact.

This dissertation relates to more recent research outside the field of political history that deals more thoroughly with contacts between Finns and Russians. Ben Hellman has noted that in the realm of arts and literature there was no lack of cultural bridge builders among Finns and Russians. The achievements of Russian culture during the years 1809-1917 had richly rewarding consequences for the Finnish cultural elite. ⁶⁴ The benefits of Russian cultural life for Finland notwithstanding, scholars of literature have also portrayed Russians as living lives parallel to Finns in the Grand Duchy. Temira Pachmuss, for example, in emphasizing the rich legacy of Russian literary figures in Finland, has commented that Russians were never integrated with the native population. ⁶⁵ These views suggest that a closer examination of actual contact points and the nature of the Finnish-Russian cultural relationship is necessary for uncovering why, in spite of bridge building efforts, some Russians still felt alienated from Finnish life.

Svante Kuhlberg’s edited volume on Russian commercial life in Helsinki emphasizes the vibrancy of Russian merchant life in the Grand Duchy. Kuhlberg argues that the Russian merchant community had been well integrated into Helsinki society since the beginning of the

⁶⁴ Ben Hellman, “The Reception of Russian Culture in Finland,” in *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire*, 212.
⁶⁵ Temira Pachmuss, *A River of Moving Tears: Russia’s Experience in Finland* (New York: Peter Lang, 1992), 231.
nineteenth century. Russian merchants were often patrons of the arts, and made an important contribution to cultural life in the city. In this manner, Russian entrepreneurs added to Helsinki’s mosaic image. While articles in this volume note the presence of Russian business life in Finland, authors examine developments only within this community, treating it as apart from rather than a part of the overall economic scene in Finland. I extend this examination of Russian commercial life in Finland by illuminating ways in which the Russian summer house industry and the business enterprises associated with it became an integral part of the local economy in the Finnish countryside.

Recently, two volumes edited by Timo Vihavainen have also contributed to the growing body of literature that acknowledges the presence of Finnish-Russian contact. The twin publications, Venäjän kahdet kasvot (Russia’s Twin Faces) and Monikasvoinen Suomi (The Many Faces of Finland), explore Finnish perceptions of Russia and vice versa. These two books, the fruitful result of collaboration between Russian and Finnish researchers, underscore several significant areas for exploring Finnish-Russian dialogue at the end of the nineteenth century: high culture, military life, commerce, and linguistics are a few examples. Contributors to these two volumes argue that points of Finnish-Russian contact remained well into the 1920s and 1930s, and reinforced stereotypes that Finnish- and Russian speakers had of each other. Evidence of these links indicates that the common trope of Russification as the one imperial strategy that solidified antagonism between Finns and Russians is too simplistic to explain the trajectory of

Finnish-Russian relations from the end of the nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century.

My analysis builds on efforts in the above-mentioned works to confirm the existence of Finnish-Russian contact, and seeks to address the meaning of such interaction. I investigate how these points of contact prompted individuals to question what constituted the boundaries of belonging in a social and political community. My work contributes to the existing historiography by illuminating ways in which social, economic and cultural interaction between Finns and Russians complicated the notion of social boundaries at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. Although these interactions were somewhat limited, their persistence suggests that boundary crossing can take place against dominant political currents, and that attempts to limit these encounters have unintended consequences for both state actors and for individuals at the grassroots level who attempted to initiate or respond to these contacts.

Outline and Chapter Organization

The first chapter of my dissertation, “Dacha Settlements in Finland and Questions of Empire,” investigates the intersection of spatial and political aspects of the imperial situation in Finland. It considers the extent to which the growth of Russian dacha places in Finland was part of a larger imperial experience. It surveys nineteenth-century travel accounts to probe whether visitors to the Karelian Isthmus considered the villages in the region as suburban extensions of St. Petersburg. It employs documents from the Russian Council of Ministers to trace how the massive flow of Russian subjects to an autonomous province in the empire exposed contradictions and tensions in various aspects of imperial rule.
Chapter Two, “Everyday Encounters and Interdependence through Dacha Space,” examines interstitial spaces for social contact. It explores different kinds of economic relationships and their significance for interethnic exchanges. Memoirists recounted fights between Finnish and Russian pupils but also numerous instances where Finnish farmers sold produce to Russian visitors. Newspaper advertisements indicated that wealthy Russian families often sought Finns for hired help. Police reports suggested that Finns did not always side with their ethnic kin when squabbles with Russian neighbors arose. These sources substantiate ways in which interdependent relationships can be both sources of cooperation and tension between local Finnish villagers and summer visitors from Russia.

The third chapter, “Cultural Bridge Building through the Dacha,” is an examination of the dacha zone as a cultural space. It investigates how various social and cultural institutions such as religion, voluntary society, and the artistic milieu mediated interethnic ties. I examine church documents from Orthodox and Lutheran parishes in the Karelian Isthmus, literary anecdotes, and memoirs to address how ethnic stereotypes were reinforced or deconstructed through cultural institutions. I argue that cultural institutions and practices can strengthen ties between diverse groups of people, but they can also lead to a community’s isolation and reinforce inaccurate stereotypes of other groups of people.

The fourth chapter, “Crime and Terror in the Dacha Zone,” examines the dichotomy of banality and volatility in dacha space. It examines why the Karelian Isthmus dacha communities played dual roles as sites of leisure and respite and as preparation grounds for clandestine political activities. This chapter is set in the context of the rise of revolutionary terror and the political turmoil of the 1905 Revolution in Russia. It reveals how Finland’s legal position in the
Russian Empire, combined with the nature of social interactions associated with dacha life in Finland, contributed to the duality of the Karelian Isthmus dacha places.

I further explore the dichotomy between stability and uncertainty in the Karelian Isthmus dacha communities in the penultimate chapter, “Refuge in the Dacha Land: Ethnicity and Refugee Management.” This chapter examines the effects of the intersection between politics and personal relationships. From 1918 to 1922, war and revolution in both Finland and Russia produced scores of refugees fleeing from Russia to Finland and vice versa. The summer house settlements in the Karelian Isthmus became the center of activity for authorities attempting to manage the tide of refugees and displaced peoples. 68 I adopt Peter Gatrell’s consideration of refugees as a group whose predicament “was created not just by objective circumstance, but also by the gaze of politicians or professionals who sought in various ways to order refugee life.” 69 I analyze letters individuals sent to aid agencies to investigate the role of ethnicity and nationality in determining criteria for allotting refugee assistance. This chapter explores the importance of social networks for refugees’ survival in ways that government officials did not anticipate.

The concluding chapter, “The Afterlives of Abandoned Homes,” deals with the Karelian Isthmus dacha places as contested space. I use property claim appeals to illustrate a concrete case where previous ties between Finns and Russians complicated Finnish state governance in the 1920s. Interdependency between Russian subjects who owned property in the Karelian Isthmus and the local Finns they encountered made it at times difficult for the Finnish state to expropriate Russian-owned property without negative consequences for those Finnish citizens who had the

most regular contacts with Russian acquaintances. This chapter demonstrates that although by
the 1920s the number of Russians residing in Finland had declined dramatically, the effects of
their previous relationship with Finnish contacts continued to resonate.

Each of these chapters deal with some aspect of liminality associated with dacha life.
These ambiguities stem from broader uncertainties related to social mobility, national identity,
and empire- and state-building imperatives. Although dacha life was only one aspect of the
Russian existence in Finland, a closer examination of this life reveals that Finnish-Russian
interactions were far more central to Finnish nation- and state-building and the construction of
social identities than is accounted for in the historiography on the Finnish-Russian relationship.
Chapter 1 – Dacha Settlements in Finland and Questions of Empire

In Finland, the Karelian Isthmus became a prime location for the expansion of Russian summer house (dacha) settlements from St. Petersburg at the end of the nineteenth century. Since this region had been under both Swedish and Russian rule over several centuries, it offered a complex setting for interethnic contact long before Finland was incorporated into the Russian Empire as the Grand Duchy of Finland. This part of Finland was home to Finnish, Swedish and Russian speakers who adhered to both Orthodox and Lutheran faiths. A small minority of Karelian-speaking peasants also called this area home. Seasonal and permanent workers in both agriculture and industrial enterprises resided there. Noble landowners and peasant leaseholders lived in close proximity. The railway line between Helsinki and St. Petersburg ran through the Isthmus; thus, the area served as a geographical and metaphorical corridor between Finland and Russia.

1 When the growth of the dacha settlements reached its height at the end of the nineteenth century, their presence highlighted significant administrative dilemmas in the region.

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1 Karelians are Finno-Ugric peoples that have historically resided in areas around Lake Ladoga. They speak a language closely related to Finnish.

2 The railway line between Helsinki and St. Petersburg ran from Riihimaki, a station several kilometers north of Helsinki, and the Finland Station in St. Petersburg on the north bank of the Neva River. The line was constructed from 1868 to 1870 with funds from both the Russian imperial treasury and the Finnish Senate. Russian authorities were responsible for constructing the section of the railway line from St. Petersburg to Belooostrov, the last station on the Russian side of the Finnish-Russian customs boundary. The Finnish Senate funded construction of the remaining portions of the line. After its completion, Finnish transportation officials administered the entire railway line until 1917, when Finnish authorities turned over the Russian portion of the route to their Russian counterparts. Finnish rail traffic was properly connected to the railway system in the rest of the Russian Empire in 1913 when the construction of a railway bridge link in St. Petersburg over the Neva River was completed. Over 11,000 Finnish workers were employed for the construction of the St. Petersburg-Helsinki railway line. This project provided much needed economic relief for a population that was still recovering from crop failure and widespread famine between 1866 and 1868. See E. A. Balashov, Karel’skii peresheek: zemliia
Recent scholarship on empire has underscored the importance of examining situations where empire becomes visible, either because of its contradictory, uneven and unsystematic heterogeneity, or as a result of conscious attempts to make it more manageable and rational. This chapter explores how these dacha settlements exposed particular dilemmas of imperial governance in political, spatial and legal terms. The Russian Empire functioned through a complex system of differences based on territory, ethnicity and religion. Ann Stoler and Carole McGranahan have argued that while imperial formations may have presented themselves as fixed cartographies of rule, the workings of empire were in reality far more complex. Designated boundaries were not the sole factors in which empires operated, nor were they the absolute markers of governance and legitimacy. For example, the Grand Duchy of Finland had a separate citizenship regime, and subjects of the Russian Empire had to apply for citizenship in the Grand Duchy in order to access the same civil rights as their Finnish peers. Since territory constituted just one of several reference points in the ideology and practice of empire, regions should therefore be treated as historical categories that produced new narratives of self-description.

5 Prior to 1809, when Finland was a province in the Swedish realm, all Finns were considered Swedish subjects and citizens. After Sweden ceded Finland to the Russian Empire in 1809, a separate citizenship was established to distinguish Finns from Russian subjects. Subjects of the Russian Empire “could acquire Finnish citizenship only according to the Finnish law of naturalization. The law thus placed the Russians in the same category with other aliens.” See John H. Wuorinen, A History of Finland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 123.
rather than as products of present day geographical mental mapping that reproduce binaries of empire or nation-centric boundaries. ⁶

The newer historiographical impulses on the imperial experience can be applied to the Russian Empire’s relationship to the Grand Duchy of Finland. While an official customs boundary separated Finland from other parts of the empire, the geographic markers of this border were not the sole indicators of Finland’s unique status within the empire. ⁷ This customs boundary was given meaning when combined with other legal and political factors that guided imperial governance. This situation served as an example of how “gradations of sovereignty and sliding scales of differentiation” served as a hallmark feature of imperial formations. ⁸ The Grand Duchy of Finland and its inhabitants were rarely referred to as colonized or conquered peoples, but this did not mean that Finland’s autonomous status was fixed and taken for granted. When the intersection between the political, social and territorial aspects of empire is taken into consideration, a more complex picture of how subjects experienced empire emerges.

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⁷ The customs border between Russia and Finland was originally removed in 1808-1809, but was reinstated in 1811 to avoid having goods from the rest of Europe enter Russia via Finland duty-free. See Erkki Pihkala, “The Finnish Economy and Russia, 1809-1917,” in Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire: A Comparative Study, edited by Michael Branch, Janet Hartley and Antoni Maczak (London: University of London School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 1995), 155-156 for more specific detail on the Finnish-Russian customs regime. The Sestra/Rajajoki River served as the natural boundary in the Karelian Isthmus between Finland and Russia, and it also served as the geographical marker for the Finnish-Russian customs border. According to Kimmo Katajala, this border transformed into a modern customs system, with many inspection stations established to regulate the flow of people and goods between the Grand Duchy and the Russian Empire. See “Cross-Border Trade in Karelia from the Middle Ages to the October Revolution 1917,” in The Flexible Frontier: Change and Continuity in Finnish-Russia Relations, ed. Maria Lähteenmaki (Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute, 2007), 82.

The expansion of the dacha settlements into the Karelian Isthmus offers an interesting case for examining the spatial imagining of territory in an imperial context. Throughout the entire period of Russian rule, even during the height of administrative and cultural Russification at the beginning of the twentieth century, Russian colonization of Finland in the purest sense of the term – the establishment of settler colonies – was never an explicit goal of imperial authorities.  

At the same time, the transplant of a very distinctively Russian middle class social and cultural institution to Finnish soil easily lent itself to accusations of Russia’s imperialist and colonialist designs for Finland, especially by Finnish nationalist contemporaries who saw the presence of these dacha settlements as a threat to Finnish political autonomy. To what extent did these dacha settlements represent or advance Russian imperial interests? In what ways did they expose the problems and contradictions of imperial governance? How did these dilemmas translate into social reality?

Edward Said distinguishes imperialism, “the practice, the theory, the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory,” from colonialism, “the implanting of settlements on distant territory.” He argues that these two terms are closely related because colonialism often stems from imperialist impulses. See Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 9. Willard Sunderland has commented that the complexities in late imperial thought in Russia about the issue of colonization stemmed from the fact that the Russian lexicon had two words that described similar processes: colonization (kolonizatsiia) and resettlement (pereselenie). Kolonizatsiia referred “to the physical act of settling on ‘new’ land as well as to the more overarching process of incorporating this land into orbits of colonial or imperial rule.” The term colony (koloniiia) referred to European settlements in non-European territories. In the Russian case, this term referred to military and commercial establishments in borderland regions, or to entire borderland regions not meant to be fully integrated into the empire proper but were areas for potential economic exploitation. Pereselenie referred strictly to peasant resettlement from the interior to the borderland areas specifically for agricultural reasons. However, the distinction between these two terms became increasingly blurred in the latter decades of the twentieth century because many of the territories to which resettlement took place were also regions that imperial authorities saw as potential areas that the empire could exploit to further Russia’s economic growth. See “The ‘Colonization Question’: Visions of Colonization in Late Imperial Russia,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, vol. 48, no. 2 (2000), 212. 

Sunderland’s monograph, Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), analyzes the evolution of the concept and processes of colonization from the Muscovite era to the late imperial period.
According to Vilho Hämäläinen, the Russian dacha settlements spread spontaneously into Finland at a time when Finnish-Russian relations were relatively peaceful in the 1880s. Russian property ownership in the Karelian Isthmus had its roots in the 1870s, when the Finnish Senate sold land owned by the Finnish treasury to wealthy Russian nobles for private, individual ownership. Towards the beginning of the twentieth century, however, imperial military authorities increasingly feared that St. Petersburg was under threat from the expanding German military forces. They began to see the Karelian Isthmus shoreline as a vital strategic territory that needed to be taken under control. Authorities therefore used the protection of Russian summer residents in the Karelian Isthmus as a pretext for making territorial demands on the Grand Duchy of Finland and incorporating the three parish districts with the highest number of Russian-owned properties, Terijoki, Kivennapa and Uusikirkko, as part of the St. Petersburg Province for military reasons. In this sense, geopolitical perspectives on territory affected space because external exigencies linked dacha life in the Karelian Isthmus to imperial authorities’ strategic imagining of space. Jane Burbank and David Ransel have argued that not all people were concerned with empire at the same time. Imperial regulations did not govern every aspect of subjects’ lives, and a narrative of empire cannot be forced upon all constituent parts. I contend in this chapter that some aspects of empire were more relevant than others for the establishment and growth of the dacha settlements. In turn, the increasing popularity of these dacha settlements

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in the Karelian Isthmus gave empire meaning particularly when they exposed the tensions resulting from incongruence in imperial governance.

This chapter begins by examining the significance of Russian migration to, and settlement in, the Karelian Isthmus prior to the height of the dacha settlements’ expansion near the end of the nineteenth century. This section explores some of the administrative dilemmas that imperial authorities faced when managing the movement of people across territories with different sets of legal arrangements. Next, this chapter addresses the spatial dimension of empire by examining the extent to which late nineteenth century travel literature\textsuperscript{13} depicted the Karelian Isthmus dacha towns as suburban extensions of the imperial capital region, and how movement of people across the Finnish-Russian customs boundary may have complicated such views. By addressing descriptions of the Karelian Isthmus dacha zone in spatial terms, this chapter exposes the ambiguities in the way people thought about the geographical expanse of empire. It also reveals contradictory imperial assumptions bounded in specific experiences associated with particular places. Finally, this chapter will examine the significance of Russian subjects’ limited access to civil rights in Finland, focusing particularly on how this issue affected those who owned property in the Karelian Isthmus, but only resided there on a seasonal basis.

**Before the Dacha Boom**

To gain a full appreciation of the dilemmas of imperial governance that the dacha settlements in the Karelian Isthmus exposed, it is important to consider the social landscape in the region prior to the proliferation of these settlements at the end of the nineteenth century. The

\textsuperscript{13} I define travel literature as any kind of writing that deals with the multiple aspects of travel. This includes descriptions of journeys and destinations in travelogues, newspaper accounts of travelers’ experiences, guidebooks for tourists and other types of travelers, and print promotional materials for tourism.
Karelian Isthmus was never an empty space discovered by dacha people, collectively referred to in the Russian language as dachniki. In addition to the native Finnish- and Swedish-speaking peasants, different kinds of migrants from Russia have also lived there at various points over the course of several centuries. These migrants contributed to the variegated ethnic and social backdrop in the region through their activities and their engagement with locals. The way these groups of people complicated various aspects of imperial rule sets the scene for assessing the significance of these leisure settlements for empire.

One group of imperial subjects from Russia who settled in the Karelian Isthmus prior to the dacha boom at the end of the nineteenth century consisted of employees of factories owned by Russian noblemen. Sestroretsk, a parish town located near the customs boundary between the Grand Duchy of Finland and Russia, hosted a munitions factory that was established in 1718. Another such factory town was located in Raivola village, a settlement that hosted an iron works factory established by Count Saltykov from the Orlov region in 1802. These towns provide an intriguing perspective on the relationship between the Russian Empire, the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland, the imperial subjects who worked in these towns and their descendants who remained in these locales. These factory towns were established prior to the region’s

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14 For example, Kyyrölä (present day Krasnosel’skoe) was a village located in middle of the Karelian Isthmus, about 110 kilometers away from St. Petersburg, that became a Russian-speaking enclave. The village’s Russian population were serfs from Jaroslavl’ and Kostroma who were resettled there in the beginning of the eighteenth century, after Russia had acquired the Vyborg Province from the Swedish kingdom. The Kyyrölä Russians were granted Finnish citizenship after Finland was incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1809, and the Vyborg Province was handed over to the Finnish administration. However, they maintained their own language, religion and cultural customs. See S. Karelin, *Putevoditel’ po Finliandii* (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1913), 59-60.

administrative transfer to the Grand Duchy, thus the administrative changes affected the lives of these workers and their descendents. The legal quandaries that this group of migrants and their descendants faced remained unresolved when dacha dwellers began arriving en masse. The legal status of two different sets of Russian residents in this town therefore came into political question around the same time at the end of the nineteenth century.

In 1820, after Vyborg Province had been incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Finland, the Raivola ironworks factory ownership switched to the imperial military authorities, and the factory was connected to the same administration as that of the Sestroretsk munitions factory. An agreement between the Finnish Senate (the main governing body in the Grand Duchy of Finland) and Ministry of Internal Affairs stipulated that imperial subjects working in Russian-owned enterprises located in the territory of the Grand Duchy would be permitted to reside there permanently under the jurisdiction of Finnish laws. This arrangement was in place until February 1867, when the Senate and the Ministry of Internal Affairs finalized the agreement to transfer administration of the Sestroretsk village from Vyborg Province to St. Petersburg Province. This new administrative arrangement allowed workers who held jobs at either factory to live in Raivola under special administrative authority. Under these conditions, workers residing in Raivola lived on agricultural land provided by the factory administration.16

This modified arrangement was designed to ease administrative dilemmas related to industrial enterprises that were closely linked to Russian imperial economic and strategic interests. The decision reflected imperial authorities’ preoccupation with resolving specific problems that stemmed from territorial changes between the Grand Duchy of Finland and the

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16 RGIA, f.1361 op.1 d.43, ll.3-5. Statement from the Finnish Senate to Governor General N.I. Bobrikov, October 17, 1902 outlining the history of administrative arrangements for the Raivola village.
Russian empire in the past century. However, this situation posed a new dilemma for workers who moved between the Sestroretsk and Raivola factories. Both were under the same system of administration in terms of ownership, but one of them was now located in a village under the legal jurisdiction of a Russian province while the other was located in a village under Finnish authority. In 1889, the Finnish Senate and the Vyborg Province Governor tried to remedy this situation by giving permission to the Raivola factory workers to form their own autonomous village district. According to this agreement, the residents could devise their own arrangements for maintaining local order and safety, land and forestry management, sanitary measures and assignment of public resources. Members of the village district could elect their own community members to liaise with authorities from the Vyborg Province. The committee’s decisions were to be submitted to the local provincial governor for final approval. If the board members were dissatisfied with the governor’s decision, they could petition for an appeal within 30 days.\(^{17}\) This deal in theory offered a partial solution to the administrative difficulties.

In spite of this new arrangement, the Russian workers from the Raivola factory still did not find the solution satisfactory, since this village district was only a *de facto* form of self-governance and did not have much legal weight. Although this village district could make recommendations about certain aspects of public life, its residents were still bound by Finnish law and local police authority. In September 1901, a group of 123 workers and former workers from the Raivola ironworks factory sent a petition to Tsar Nicholas II, via the Ministry of Internal Affairs, requesting that the village administration be transferred from the Kivennapa parish district, in which it was then located, to the St. Petersburg Province. The petitioners

\(^{17}\) RGIA, f.1276, op.18, d.512, ll.102-103. Vyborg Province Governor administrative order, December 20, 1889.
argued that it would be more logical for both factories to be under the same territorial administration.  

The petition mentioned a list of various grievances affecting workers’ daily lives. Current and former workers at the Raivola ironworks factory argued that that living under Finnish administration caused them unnecessary duress. In spite of having settled in Raivola for several decades, this group of people was still not familiar with Finnish legislation. They were not exempt from paying the customs fees when traveling to and from St. Petersburg. The petitioners also argued that the local Finnish inhabitants were not entirely friendly towards the Russian workers, and local authorities were often unwilling to assist with their problems. Their biggest complaint was that local Finnish authorities levied what the former workers considered illegal taxes on the workers for use of local services such as hospitals and schools. The group argued that it was unfair for them to pay these taxes since they never used these services. In their request for the Raivola parish town to be transferred to St. Petersburg administration, the petitioners mentioned that it would be easier for them to deal with practical aspects of life such as visiting doctors, midwives, and medical clinics. 

Not surprisingly, the Finnish Senate’s reaction to this petition was not positive, given that political discussions in Finland at the time fixated on concerns about Russification and the erosion of Finland’s autonomous status. A statement from the Senate to the Governor General enumerated a host of reasons why Senate members were unwilling to accept such an administrative change. The Senate reasoned that since the Raivola village was located farther away from the Russian border than Sestroretsk, it would be logistically difficult to transfer its

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18 RGIA, f.1361, op.1 d.43, l.2.
19 RGIA, f.1361, op.1 d.43, ll.19-21. Petition from members of Raivola Agricultural Community to Emperor Nicholas II.
governance from its current Finnish parish district to the Russian province without significantly disrupting administrative tasks in that district. New changes to territorial administration would also complicate the situation for the Finnish residents of the village. While the Senate’s statement acknowledged that imperial subjects were the overwhelming majority of the 2000 residents in the village, senators did not believe this was sufficient reason to consider major administrative changes. The senators insisted that they could not ignore the situation of the 169 Finnish citizens who lived in Raivola. The report also pointed out that no fewer than 75 property holdings in the village were owned by Finnish citizens, some of whom were Russian workers who had taken Finnish citizenship. Some local Finnish farmers had also purchased part of the ironworks factory’s land. Since these land holdings had been established under Finnish property law, ceding village administrative authority to the Russian Empire might alter land holding agreements, and create further complications.20

Disagreement between the Finnish Senate and authorities in Russian imperial ministries on the precise details pertaining to daily local administrative tasks underscored the ambiguities in governance. Factories owned by imperial subjects, staffed by workers who came from Russia, made up the majority of the inhabitants of a village in Finnish territory. It was not easy for authorities to come to a conclusion on the political and economic rights of the village’s residents that would be fair for both the minority and majority residents. It was also a complicated issue because this discussion took place during a period when Russification was a volatile topic of political discussion. Proposals initiated by Russian subjects concerning administrative changes in Finnish territory likely evoked protectionist tendencies in the Senate’s reaction. Even though

20 RGIA, f.1361, op.1 d.43, ll.7-8. Statement from the Finnish Senate to Governor General N.I. Bobrikov, October 17, 1902 outlining the history of administrative arrangements for the Raivola village.
logistically it made sense for the Raivola villages’ majority Russian population to be able to live under Russian administration, it became difficult for the Senate to ignore the urge to accommodate the minority Finnish population in the village.

The village of Raivola is an interesting case because it was a community of Russian migrant workers long before the influx of Russian visitors led to the establishment of a dacha settlement in the same village. This was also a place where the Finnish-speaking population formed a minority. As a Russian enclave within a region heavily populated by Finnish farmers and peasants, it would be tempting to assume that the dacha dwellers who arrived at the end of the nineteenth century blended seamlessly with the Russian workers. Although some of the dacha people built their houses close to the Russian peasant workers’ homes, the petitioners did not include the dacha dwellers in their communication with imperial authorities. There is no other direct evidence to indicate that the dacha folk and the iron works factory workers shared similar concerns and supported each other in voicing their grievances to authorities. The number of landowners among the dacha dwellers from St. Petersburg continued to grow in the last decade of the nineteenth century, but at the same time, they did not necessarily share the same concerns as the peasant workers at the Raivola factory because the dacha dwellers were mostly seasonal residents. This case shows that the uniformity of Russian communities in the Karelian Isthmus towns should be questioned.

Another group of imperial subjects with a long standing presence in the Karelian Isthmus should also be considered when examining the significance of legal differentiation based

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21 The dacha settlement in Raivola was located four versts away from the railway platform, the town’s locus. See Karelian, *Putevoditel’ po Finliandii*, 52.

partially on territoriality. These were the Russian-speaking peasant traders from nearby provinces who engaged in small scale agricultural trade and peddling in the Vyborg Province. Although this group of people did not live permanently in Finnish territory, and affected the local economy only on a minute scale, their transience underscored the lack of boundaries separating subject people by ethnicity. The movement of these peasant traders and their contacts with Finnish villagers exposed further policy dilemmas for governing authorities in the region after the Vyborg Province’s reincorporation into the Grand Duchy of Finland.

For most of the nineteenth century, the legality of peasant trade across the Finnish-Russian customs boundary remained vaguely defined. This was due to the perceived insignificance of such activity. In March 1879, the Finnish Senate established a statute that clarified the Finnish position on this issue. The statute stated that all Russian subjects wishing to engage in small scale trade and peddling in Finland could be permitted to do so, providing that they could prove they were Russian subjects with good moral standing in their home provinces. At first glance this statute seemed to be favorable for the peasant traders since it designated their legal rights to conduct their economic activities in Finnish territory. In practice, however, this statute also raised several more practical problems.23

In the early 1900s, communications between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Minister State Secretary of the Grand Duchy of Finland (the Finnish official liaison between the Tsar, the Council of Ministers and the Finnish Senate) indicated that Russian authorities were skeptical as to whether this statute encouraged peasant traders to continue their activities. A Ministry of Internal Affairs memo to the Minister State Secretary in January 1901 explained that the statute actually placed certain restrictions on peasant trade by requiring that the peasants first

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23 RGIA, f.1291, op.45, d.2, l.1. Memo from the Minister State Secretary of the Grand Duchy of Finland to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, January 5, 1905.
obtain appropriate documentation to prove their identity and their good moral standing. This stipulation placed the responsibility of obtaining proper documentation on the peasants themselves. Those unable to provide Finnish police such documents were considered to be conducting illegal activity and were liable to arrest. Because these peasants were mostly transient people, and did not often reside in the same place where they were born, it was often difficult for these peasants to obtain the proper documentation required by Finnish authorities.  

Although this issue did not pertain specifically to the dacha settlements, it nuances our understanding of the Russian presence in Finland. Peasant peddling took place mostly in border areas, particularly in East Karelia and in the Karelian Isthmus, and mostly under very informal terms. This suggested that local people, whether Finnish- or Russian-speaking, engaged with each other, and saw these transactions as a regular part of daily life. Research by Nils Storå reveals these peddlers’ importance as cultural intermediaries in the border region. Another scholar has illustrated that in the first half of the nineteenth century, the peddler trade contributed to economic vitality at the frontier, in spite of authorities’ arrest of individuals for violating commercial law codes. Peddler exchange among Russian, Karelian and Finnish peasants in the Finnish-Karelian border region is an example of cultural exchange that took place outside the purview of state control.

The fact that the Senate at the end of the nineteenth century initiated specific legal terms under which this group of imperial subjects, who had a long history in the Vyborg region, could

24 RGIA, f.1291, op.45, d.2, l.2.
engage in economic activities becomes more resonant when considering that at the same time, more affluent Russian subjects were able to acquire immovable property in Finland. This brings up the question of the extent to which Finnish authorities saw Russian visitors and migrants through the prism of relative social position. Did Finns and Russians have different understandings of relative social standing? Was there special treatment for wealthier Russians, and did this special treatment translate into hostility among Finnish residents against the seemingly more economically influential Russian guests? To what extent did local Finnish villagers consciously distinguish between different socio-economic categories of Russian residents in their locales? These questions are significant because the dacha was not strictly an

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27 The notion of private property rights in the Russian Empire was relative new at the end of the nineteenth century. Ekaterina Pravilova has noted the Russian Civil Code, established in 1835 was what Mikhail Speranskii had envisioned in terms of the notion of private property. Similar to the French legal tradition, which was enshrined in Roman law, the Russian Civil Code in theory recognized the right to private property. However, only nobles, merchants and clergy were permitted absolute rights to private property. Use and disposal of land were the only kinds of proprietary relations permitted for people outside of these social categories. See “The Property of Empire: Islamic Law and Russian Agrarian Policy in Transcaucasia and Turkestan,” Kritika, vol. 12, no. 2 (2011), 356. While reforms made after the emancipation of serfs in 1861 technically permitted peasants to claim part of the land to which they were previously attached, peasants were not allowed to sell their land freely, and this situation led to a dependency of the peasantry on creditors to pay off their loans for redemption. This is a point Yanni Kotsonis makes in Making Peasants Backward: Agricultural Cooperatives and the Agrarian Question in Russia, 1861-1914 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999), 17.

28 The boundaries of different social categories of Russian imperial subjects were rather difficult to define because of changing social and political contexts. Elise Wirtschafter has commented that in Russia since the reign of Peter the Great, social status was formally prescribed by membership in a specific social estate, rank, and office legally prescribed in terms of tax and service obligations. However, informal elements of social status identification included occupational or educational differences within particular social categories. She has argued that lack of clarity in these social designations meant that social status in imperial Russia was actually quite indeterminate and flexible. The fluidity in social category definition also meant that status was not necessarily tied to one’s economic standing or wealth. The ambiguity of social status in Russia is best embodied in a group known as the raznochintsy, or people of various ranks. See Structures of Society: Imperial Russia’s People of Various Ranks (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), xii-xiii.
institute of the elite and the extremely privileged. Such questions prompt us to consider different ways in which social mobility affected the nature of Finnish-Russian interaction in the dacha communities. The issue of socio-economic status and interethnic contact will be taken up in next chapter’s discussion of economic interdependency in interaction between Finnish and Russian speakers in the Karelian Isthmus parish towns.

**Dacha Space: Suburban Escape or Foreign Tourist Paradise?**

Having examined the extent of Russian settlement in the Karelian Isthmus prior to the height of the dacha boom, it is necessary to turn to a detailed discussion of the dacha as social and cultural currency for Russian subjects. The political, social and economic profile of the Vyborg Province contextualizes one important factor that contributed to the expansion of social space for Finnish-Russian everyday interactions: the growth of Russian dacha communities that linked the Finnish countryside to Russia’s imperial capital in St. Petersburg. The dacha had been a socio-cultural institution among the Russian nobility since the seventeenth century, but by the nineteenth century this phenomenon came to include a wide range of people in imperial Russian urban society. Stephen Lovell has noted that by the last third of the nineteenth century most Russian urbanites from craftsmen to office proletarians to aristocrats sought dachas. With St. Petersburg’s rapid growth due to industrialization, many of the city’s residents sought leisure space outside the metropolis during the summer months to escape from the disorder of urban society. Dachas soon dotted the Gulf of Finland shoreline in the Karelian Isthmus despite the region’s location in the Grand Duchy of Finland, a part of the Russian empire that had a significant degree of autonomy. Several centuries of political and economic ties between the

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Vyborg Province and Russia paved the way for the development of dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus. By 1899, foreigners owned over 70,000 hectares of land in the Vyborg province.  

**Table 3. Vyborg Province Land Owned by Foreigners**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Land Owned by Foreigners (hectares)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>59,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>69,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>59,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>62,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>71,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>70,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>67,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>66,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>70,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>70,597</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Official census records do not distinguish between Russian subjects and other foreigners who owned property in Finland. In 1892, local parish district chiefs in Vyborg province began keeping records of Russian subjects who purchased or rented individual plots of land from larger estates specifically for the use as summer homes. Records collected by Vilho Hämäläinen show that 4,312 Russian subjects registered with local parish district chiefs in Terijoki, Raivola, Kukkala, Tyrisevä, and Vammelsuu. These figures, however, only represent individuals who had officially registered their properties with local authorities. Many more acquired property for dacha use through more informal channels, or simply did not state summer house use as their purpose for property purchase, and were thus not included in this set of data. See Tables 3 and 4.
### Table 4. Number of Russian Summer House Registered with Vyborg Province Local Parish District Chiefs, 1892.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Number of Registrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terijoki</td>
<td>2,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raivola</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuokkala</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyrisevää</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vammelsuu</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,312</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vilho Hämäläinen, *Karjalan kannaksen venäläinen kesäasutus ja sen vaikutus Suomen ja Venäjän suhdeiden kehitykseen autonomian ajan lopulla* (Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto, 1974), 103

In the 1870s, the completion of the Helsinki-St. Petersburg railway line drew the Grand Duchy of Finland closer to the Russian Empire in production and trade. It also directly contributed to the dacha boom in the Karelian Isthmus in subsequent decades, since these new transportation routes made this picturesque territory accessible to St. Petersburgers as well as to Russians who worked in various cities and towns in Finland and the Baltic region. During this period, the Senate of the Grand Duchy of Finland even actively encouraged the sale of this land to Russians. In 1891, the Finnish Senate passed a decree permitting Russian subjects from all social estates, with the exception of those adhering to the Jewish faith, the right to purchase property. The Karelian Isthmus attracted middle class Russian subjects because the sale of land in Finland was open not just to the aristocracy or nobility, but also to other social classes as well. By contrast, in the rest of the Russian Empire, the majority of land at the end of the nineteenth

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32 Finnish Acts and Decrees No.5, February 16, 1891.
century was still overwhelmingly held by the nobility, and it was more difficult for people of lower social standing to acquire property.  

Because the Karelian Isthmus was so attractive to prospective vacationers from Russia, some towns sprang up in the 1870s and 1880s in places that had been sparsely populated. Kellomäki, a tiny Finnish village located along the railway line between St. Petersburg and Vyborg, grew rapidly as the site of a dacha settlement in the last decade of the nineteenth century when St. Petersburgers began buying up land unsuitable for agriculture. Many buildings in this locale were designed by prominent architects from the capital. Schools, Orthodox churches and theaters flourished in these parish towns as predominantly Russian cultural spaces for social interaction. The Russian Philanthropic Society in Finland (Russkoe blagotvoritel’noe obshchestvo, hereafter RBO) opened a branch in the city of Vyborg within a few years of its establishment in 1872, and it oversaw efforts to establish Russian schools and kindergartens in smaller parish towns in the Karelian Isthmus. Prior to the dacha boom in the 1890s and early 1900s, the only major railway station and customs checkpoint on the Finnish side of the border was located at Terijoki. As rail traffic between St. Petersburg and these Karelian Isthmus towns increased, transport authorities built more train stations, platforms and customs checkpoints near these small villages on the Finnish side of the border. The town of Terijoki blossomed during the summer months. Kristina Rotkirch describes this town as “an area blessed with a mild

33 Lovell, 70.
34 E.A. Balashov, Karel’skii peresheek, 107.
35 While these cultural institutions were established by Russian speakers and had specifically Russian characteristics, they also formed part of the social space for diverse Finnish-Russian interactions. Chapter 3 will discuss the cultural aspects of dacha life in further detail.
37 Ester Kähönen, Entinen Terijoki (Kouvola: Teri-säätiö, 1982), 18.
climate and magnificent long sandy beaches which attracted people from all over Finland as well as international summer visitors, among them mostly Russians from nearby St. Petersburg.” This town was nicknamed the “Finnish Riviera,” and “was famous for its numerous spas, elaborately carved wooden dachas and easy-going social life off and on the beach.” 38 In a span of a few decades, the Russian summer vacationer had become part of the countryside landscape in the Karelian Isthmus.

Stephen Lovell has argued that as a social and cultural institution, the dacha’s development paralleled Russia’s urbanization and may be considered “a by-product of urbanization thus analogous to forms of settlement elsewhere in developed world: suburban zones colonized by the North American and European bourgeoisie, or indeed the country retreats of leisure class.” 39 Did St. Petersburgers who frequented their dachas in the Karelian Isthmus see this area as a foreign land, a borderland region, or simply as a suburban extension of St. Petersburg? Spatial references to empire contribute to puzzling conceptual challenges. When looking at the empire as a whole space, addressing constituent parts in terms of core and periphery becomes problematic. Leonid Gorizontov has argued that the status of St. Petersburg challenges these binary notions, since the position of St. Petersburg as an imperial center was not universally accepted. 40 Karelia, including the Karelian Isthmus, is often referred to as an outlying region (okraina), and the term is often associated with the idea of the imperial

40 For Gorizontov’s full argument, see “The ‘Great Circle’ of Interior Russia: Representations of the Imperial Center in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” in Russian Empire: Space, People, Power (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).
periphery. Yet the proximity of this region to the imperial capital is precisely what makes it
difficult to draw a concrete line between center and periphery. Julie Buckler has noted a similar
conceptual dilemma in discussing St. Petersburg’s relationship to its surroundings. She contends
that the use of terms such as environs (okrestnosti) and outskirts (okrainy) represent relationships
of inclusion and exclusion rather than concrete geographic locations. The frequency with
which the dacha dwellers went back and forth between the Isthmus and the capital illustrates this
conundrum. The extent to which summer visitors from St. Petersburg considered their dacha
settlements in the Karelian Isthmus as rural suburbs of the growing metropolis and as an
extension of Russian territory is an intriguing question to pursue. It illuminates conflicting ways
in which Russian subjects saw the contiguity of empire as well as notions of the familiar and the
foreign.

Travel guides for tourists and dacha goers are insightful sources for addressing how
middle class Russians related to the Karelian Isthmus in emotive spatial terms. On the one hand,
this type of literature targeted people who were not particularly knowledgeable about this part of
the empire. Travel guides are therefore limiting in what they can reveal about the people who
knew little about Finland. They also may not reflect the authors’ most sincere and astute thoughts
about Finnish life, since these guides were partially designed to promote travel to specific

University Press, 2005), 158.
42 A few examples of these travel guides include A.A. Annikov, *Putevoditel’ na Imatru* (St.
1914), K.B. Grenhagen, *Putevoditel’ po vodolechebnym, dachnym i zhivopisnym mestnostiam
Vostochnoi Finliandii* (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1898), P.V. Gusev, *Praktcheskii putevoditel’ po
gorodom, kurortam i zhivopisnym mestnostiam Finliandii* (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1908), S. Karelin,
*Putevoditel’ po Finlandii* (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1913), V. Mainov, *Putevoditel’ po Finlandii* (St.
destinations and therefore provided only basic information. On the other hand, these guides were read by people with an explicit interest in traveling to different parts of the empire, even if it was for recreational rather than educational purposes. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, tourism in Russia developed as a middle class phenomenon. The Crimea, home to many spas and health resorts, was the locus of late imperial Russia’s travel industry. The advent of tourism in the Baltic region was linked specifically to St. Petersburg’s growth. \(^43\) Finland was one among several attractive destinations for the typical bourgeois tourist, especially from St. Petersburg. Travel guides were often one of the first sources of information for visitors to Finland, which included both occasional tourists, people who regularly frequented the sanatoria and health resorts in the Karelian Isthmus, and dachniki.

The content of travel guides is therefore suggestive for examining what writers thought people should know about the Karelian Isthmus, as well as probing what preconceived notions Russian travelers had of the region. As Louise McReynolds has observed, travel literature and guidebooks were structured “in such a way that they prompted the reader to see him/herself fitting into unfamiliar surroundings.” \(^44\) In other words, they aimed to create the illusion of familiarity out of mysterious places and situations. These books and pamphlets were also compiled based on other travelers’ experiences, and they thus provide a clue to how people attempted to make sense of the spatial relationship between the dacha zones in the Karelian Isthmus and other parts of the Russian Empire.

A common theme across most travel guides on Finland is the emphasis on the different rules and customs in Finland, and the fact that Russians in Finland did not have the same set of

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\(^44\) Ibid., 182.
rights as Finns. One writer prefaced his travel guide with the remark that “the people, country, nature, language and customs are all distinguished from that which exists in Russia.” The guides all mentioned the presence of an internal customs boundary between Finland and the rest of the empire, and provided advice on how best to prepare for inspection at the customs checkpoints. Many of these guides cited Russians’ inability to understand the Finnish and Swedish languages as a reason for providing detailed information for prospective visitors to Finland. These books and pamphlets often urged Russian travelers, as visitors to the region, to respect these local rules. One travel guide, for example, made explicit reference to the notion that Russian travelers to Finland were guests there. In this guide, the author did not make the distinction between occasional tourists and dacha people who visited the Karelian Isthmus dacha settlements on a regular basis. The notion of these towns as second homes for St. Petersburgers was not always evident. Russian visitors were referenced as “travelers” (puteshchestvenniki), or as “tourists” (turisty). The author admonished travelers to behave with decorum, and to treat the local people with respect. He commented that Russian tourists in the Karelian Isthmus towns have tended to be too demanding of local people when visiting stores in the towns near the railway stations and have ended up offending the locals. He suggested that the local people’s attitudes towards the tourists and visitors depended on how the traveler behaved.

Although travel guides noted Finland’s special political status within the Russian empire, and the language quite often referred to Finland as a particular land (strana), the literature nonetheless emphasized Finland as a travel destination within the empire. Interestingly, some of

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47 Ibid., 5-6.
the travel guides promoted the cost-effective aspects of visiting Finland as opposed to other destinations in Russia. One of the guide books even made an explicit comparison between travel to Finland and to other popular tourist hotspots within the Russian empire: “One can travel to Finland for three to four days with insignificant expenditures, but when one makes an excursion to farther places, for example, to the Volga, to the Caucasus, and so on, tourists have to use up more time and money.” The author also noted that while it was not entirely possible to directly compare these vacation destinations, travelers’ impressions of Finland were just as nice as recollections of other places. The travel literature thus evoked a sense of imperial pride in Russia’s vast expanse as well as the empire’s contribution to economic development in non-Russian territories. One guide mentioned that Finland offered many of the same comforts that tourists would typically find in their journeys through foreign countries. This comment is intriguing because the author made a direct comparison to foreign lands while at the same time implying that Finland was a place within the borders of the empire that could meet Russians’ travel desires. A different guide that specifically promoted visits to the Imatra waterfalls in Finland explicitly referred to this landmark as “one of Russia’s finest picturesque attractions.” Another travel publication commented on the economic Russification of communities in eastern Finland that were the most popular with Russian tourists.

Much of the Russian economic influence on Finnish towns and villages stemmed from the presence of dacha goers, especially during the summer months. Some of the travel guides on

Finland, while generally recognizing Russian subjects as visitors, did indeed single out the dacha locations as places where many Russian families had second homes during the summer months. One guide, published in 1887, noted that in recent years the areas near the Terijoki and Kuokkala railway platforms had become popular as places of summer settlement for St. Petersburgers. The distinction between typical tourists and dacha folk was also evident in another travel guide. L.K. Timofeev’s publication frequently referred to the dacha people as residents (zhiteli) in several Karelian Isthmus towns.

In practical guide books published specifically for people wishing to find dachas in Finland, there was a stronger emphasis on the notion of the Karelian Isthmus towns as places of summer residence. Russian visitors were simply referred to as dacha folk (dachniki), rather than as tourists or visitors. This language implied a somewhat longer term presence of Russians, especially St. Petersburgers, in these towns. One such guide mentioned that in recent years, it has become increasingly difficult to find places to build or buy dachas in the towns near St. Petersburg with a Russian population. The next available option, therefore, was for people to find places in towns slightly further along the Finnish railway line where the Finnish-speaking population lived. According to this dacha guide, these towns were just as suitable for building summer homes. Some regular tourist publications also allude to the sprawl of dacha properties from St. Petersburg through Finnish territory. One such work, published in 1913, described the

53 Timofeev, 4.
54 Examples of these guides include N. Fedotov, *Illiustrirovannyi putevoditel’ po dachnym, vodolechebnym i zhivopisnym mestnostyam Finliandii* (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1899) and *Tainino: novaia dachnaia mestnost’* (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1911).
St. Petersburg-Vyborg railway line as a route where recently constructed dachas with great views of the seaside stretched “for many verst along the Gulf of Finland.” The writer referred to this span of territory as a dacha zone (dachnyi raion), commenting that “each settlement [was] practically indistinguishable from the previous.” He also noted that places in this region were so close to the capital that many of the dacha people also stayed there through the winter. These travel guides implied congruence between ethnicity and territory, and made reference to Finland as a different part of the Russian Empire, but did not necessarily describe the dacha zone as particularly foreign.

The blurring of the foreign and the familiar in travel literature indicated that travel guide writers saw dacha culture as a significant aspect of St. Petersburg urban life. One guide even referred to Terijoki, located 50 kilometers from St. Petersburg, as a “dacha city” (dachnyi gorod) that swelled to 40,000 Russian residents during the summers. Although the dacha can be seen as an alternative lifestyle to the stresses of the urban environment, a clear distinction between the urban, suburban and rural cannot be easily drawn. As Lovell has stressed, the dacha also had many vestiges of urban life and thus can also be viewed as an effort to “transplant urban civilization beyond the city.” These guides therefore implicitly acknowledged dacha culture as a noticeable aspect of urban experiences.

Travel guides, however, offer only a partial view on the significance of the Karelian Isthmus towns as summer settlements for the St Petersburg middle class. Given their objective to provide tourist information and attract visitors to the destinations, it is not surprising that these

narratives often romanticized the dacha zone as an idyllic place. These guides described the Karelian Isthmus towns as peaceful, attractive places with fresh air. They emphasized public safety, the rarity of public drunkenness and poverty, and the regular enforcement of law and order by the village police. They depict native residents as friendly, accommodating folk who welcomed the arrival of summer visitors.\textsuperscript{59} Such depictions could be interpreted through a framework of imperialist language. In characterizing this particular part of Finland as orderly and peaceful, writers were possibly informing travelers from St. Petersburg that the unadulterated natural playground was easily accessible to the metropolis’ residents without actually having to travel to some exotic, primitive hinterland. These guides evoked positive emotions about the Karelian Isthmus locales, but it was not always clear whether through the romanticized descriptions they encouraged readers to think about these places as alternative homes.

Travelers’ own reminiscences about the Karelian Isthmus also indicated lack of consensus among Russians on the extent to which the region was a foreign or familiar territory. One traveler who wrote about his visit to Finland described his journey by train as such: “After about an hour, one can admire the beautiful dacha architecture located among parks that are rich in luscious vegetation, not far from the vicinity of the railroad…Further, until Vyborg, on both sides of the railroad, coniferous forests stretch…In general, the route from St. Petersburg to Vyborg appears uniform and indistinguishable.”\textsuperscript{60} This traveler’s observation that Finns were an honest people who had different habits and spoke an unfamiliar language, and his comment that Finns loved their own land indicated he understood that Finland was not Russia. However, his description of the landscape and the fact that he did not mention the customs inspection process

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{59} Fedotov, \textit{Illiustrirovannyi putevoditel’ po dachnym, vodolechebnym i zhivopisnym mestnostyam Finliandii}, 4.
\textsuperscript{60} N.S. Illarionov, \textit{Putevye zametki o Finliandii} (Kharkov: n.p., 1886), 1-3.

61
required for all passengers on the St. Petersburg-Helsinki railway line suggested that he was not spatially aware of where Russia ended and where Finland began. One tourist, who submitted a travel description anonymously to the journal Novosti, hinted at the urban-suburban connection between St. Petersburg and the dacha zone in the Karelian Isthmus. He commented that with the approaching dacha season, all of St. Petersburg was preoccupied with the question of where in the St. Petersburg environs people could find the right conditions for maintaining the dacha lifestyle, given the city’s growing population. He remarked, “Such a corner exists. One could find it a few hours away from St. Petersburg, in Finland.”61 The writer expressed a sense that the Karelian Isthmus dacha zone was a familiar space, even though it was located in another land.62

Newspaper accounts offer similarly ambiguous views on the significance of dacha space in Finland. One newspaper that catered specifically to dacha goers often published editorials that referred to the Karelian Isthmus towns as a border zone. It emphasized the importance of these dacha towns as summer homes for many St. Petersburgers. In reference to the town of Terijoki, the newspaper mentioned that it was so close that it was practically a part of the St. Petersburg sphere, but at the same time it was separated by a different language, culture, and religion, in addition to customs controls. Although the dacha people’s primary interests lay at home in St. Petersburg, the fact that many traveled to Terijoki for several consecutive years made it

61 Excerpt from the journal Novosti, 1901, No. 139 and 145, reprinted in Finliandskie vpetchatlenii, zapiski turista (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1901), 1-3.

62 The mix of the familiar in the foreign is also prevalent in travel literature related to other imperial and colonial situations. Victoria Thompson has noted that French renovations in the Algiers port district can be seen as part of an attempt to visually impose a “natural” sense of French authority on a newly colonized territory while attracting French tourism to the colony. Many travelers were surprised by the familiarity of the landscape in the port city, even though they also found the exotic natural aspects of the sea and the sun quite attractive. See “’I Went Pale with Pleasure’: The Body, Sexuality and National Identity among French Travelers to Algiers in the Nineteenth Century,” in Algeria and France, 1800-2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia, ed. Patricia M. E. Lorcin (Syracuse: Syracuse University press, 2006), 22-23.
important for them to feel at home rather than as foreign guests. The editorial encouraged dacha
goers to form their own associations to discuss their needs with local authorities. It was also
common to find letters to the editor where dacha dwellers expressed familiarity with the Finnish
environment. One letter writer claimed that the dacha goers often knew the most picturesque
places better than the locals did. Dachnaia zhizn’, a popular magazine devoted to issues
concerning dacha life, reported that many local inhabitants in the dacha towns were actually ex-
Petersburgers who had relocated to Terijoki, and were starting to turn the place into a real
home.

The terminology that newspapers used in reference to people leads to a variety of
assumptions. Most newspaper accounts of daily occurrences also employed the term “locals”
(mestnye) to refer to the Finnish villagers who lived in the Karelian Isthmus dacha towns. Ethnic
references to “Finnish” or “Swedo-Finnish” peoples were made when discussing what authors
believed to be ethnic traits based on common stereotypes. Newspapers tailored for people who
visited the dacha zones often referred to Finnish peasants as honest, hardworking folk, simple
and peaceful, who can be trusted as neighbors. Russians were sometimes referred to as
travelers, but sometimes as visitors, or simply as dacha folk (dachniki), and rarely as settlers or
residents. They were identified as Russians when there was a need to emphasize the linguistic-
cultural differences between Finns and Russians. While the term “locals” did acknowledge the
permanence of the villagers who live there, it also left much to the imagination for who should
be considered a “local.” From these descriptions, it appeared that newspaper editors did not

63 Teriokskii dnevnik, June 9, 1913.
64 Teriokskii dnevnik, June 23, 1913
65 Dachnaia zhizn’, April 17, 1911.
66 Finliandskii vestnik, September 30, 1909.
identify the dacha towns strongly either as foreign tourist destinations or as places of secondary settlement.

This combination of terminology indicates ambiguous views about the way the presence of dacha settlements in Finnish territory was transmitted to the Russian reading public. The inconsistent usage of ethnic and national categories and the prominence of the term “locals” suggested that Russian observers writing about the Finnish dacha space envisioned Finland as a place that could be both foreign and familiar, depending on the situation. When protests in Finland arose over Russian schemes in the early 1900s to incorporate the dacha towns into the St. Petersburg Province, newspapers catering to the dacha community urged readers not to be caught up in the spirit of nationalist polemics that prevailed in the right-wing press. In contrast to more conservative newspapers such as Novoe Vremya, which often pointed to the alienation of Russians in Finland, these newspapers explained the administrative changes as necessary logistical measures to ensure orderly local governance in the dacha zones, and not as a slate for starting hostilities against Finnish neighbors. These comments acknowledged differences between local Finnish residents in the dacha towns the seasonal visitors from Russia, but did not portray the relationship between these people as one where one group dominated the other.

The mixed messages in popular descriptions of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus as both familiar and foreign is intriguing when juxtaposed with the official discourse on Finland’s political status within the Russian Empire. Since the 1880s, educated conservatives with close ties to government increasingly lamented the separateness of Finland from the Russian Empire and lack of uniformity in Russian and Finnish legal provisions for protecting imperial subjects in

67 Finliandskii vestnik, November 30, 1909.
the Russian Empire. Ministry of Finance publications referred to Finland as its own customs zone. Moreover, Finland was not even included in the first empire-wide population census in 1897. Ample sources available to the Russian reading public emphasized Finland as a distinct land; nonetheless, popular perceptions of Finland did not always correspond with the official political discourse.

If emotive references to the Karelian Isthmus dacha settlements as an extension of St. Petersburg suburbs remained vague, how did the practicalities of traveling between the metropolis and the dacha zone affect people’s experiences? The customs inspection process is one example where dacha goers seemed confused about the exact political-economic relationship between Finland and Russia. The Grand Duchy of Finland was a part of the Russian empire, but because of special arrangements with imperial authorities, it had a separate customs relationship with the empire. The annual routine of visiting the dacha was different for St. Petersburgers traveling to their vacation properties in Finland than for Moscow residents, who did not have to traverse a customs boundary to travel to the outskirts of that city. The customs inspection process for traveling from St. Petersburg to dacha settlements in Finland affected the summer visitors

68 Messarosh and Bobrikov have both written extensively about this topic. See P.I. Messarosh, Finliandiia: gosudarstvo ili russkaia okraina? Znachenie osobykh uchrezhdenny finliandskoj okrainy Rossiiskoi Imperii (St. Petersburg: V.V. Komarov, 1897) and Bobrikov, N.I. Vsepoddanneishaia zapiska Finliandskogo general-gubernatora, 1898-1902 (St. Petersburg: Gos. Tip., 1902).

69 See, for example, P. Morozov, Finliandiia v torgovo-promyshlennom otoshenii (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo finansov department torgovli i manufaktur, 1895), 61.

70 Pervaiia vseobshchaia perepis’ naseleniia Rossiiskoi Imperii 1897 g. (St. Petersburg: Izd. Tsentral’nogo statisticheskogo komiteta Ministerstva vnutrennykh del, 1899). This census included Poland and the Baltic lands, but excluded the Grand Duchy of Finland. In Finland, statisticians began keeping census records in the 1870s.
significantly. Issues relating to customs controls between Finland and the rest of the Russian Empire revealed how human mobility complicated territorial administration.

One travel guide mentioned that many of the dacha dwellers were not well informed about the customs procedures involved in traveling between Russia and Finland. The author noted that people were mostly unaware of information such as the kinds of goods they were permitted to transport across the border, the customs duties that they had to pay on certain items, and the overall inspection process. Some of these dacha goers saw the customs inspection as an absurdity, since they were traveling to places so close to home. A petition from a group of 129 dacha owners in the Terijoki parish district to the Minister of Finance in January 1881 stated that many dacha dwellers in Terijoki and Kivennapa parish districts lived permanently in St. Petersburg and traveled frequently to the Finnish towns for the summer. The petitioners argued that the double Finnish and Russian customs inspection process inconvenienced them greatly because of their frequent travels. They protested that the inspection procedures were unnecessarily intrusive, since officials sifted through all of their belongings, including their clothing and household items. They also complained that they could not take as much meat, sugar, fruits and vegetables, coffee and spirits as they wished to Finland. The petitioners suggested that a customs free zone should be extended all the way to Vyborg, since there were so many dacha settlements between St. Petersburg and Vyborg. They requested that if a

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71 N. Fedotov, Putevoditel’ po dachnym zavedeniiam v okrestnostiaakh S. Peterburga i po zheleznykh dorogam (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1889), 118. Other general tourist guides that included detailed information on the customs process include Geikel, Kak puteshstvovat’ po Finliandii, 5-6, and Karelin, Putevoditel’ po Finliandii, 14-15.
reorganization of the customs zone was not possible, the dacha dwellers should instead be exempted from customs controls.  

Correspondence between the Department of Customs Duties and the Minister of Finance revealed that government officials hesitated to treat this petition seriously. In a memo to the Department of Customs Duties, the Minister of Finance opined that the chief of the St. Petersburg Customs Office should not look further into the matter. His rationale was that although there were many names on the petition, the petition did not represent the entirety of the dacha dwellers. His comment reflected his belief that the petitioners were a numeric minority among dacha goers in Finland. The minister suggested in his letter that those who did find customs procedures so cumbersome should simply find dachas closer to St. Petersburg, so that they did not have to travel to Finland for their summer vacations. He argued that any major changes in customs procedures would have to be thoroughly investigated, since such changes would likely affect a large number of Finnish inhabitants in the Karelian Isthmus towns who traveled frequently to St. Petersburg. The issue would have to be put forth to the Finnish Senate for debate. Changing the internal borders between Russia and the Grand Duchy was no small matter, and it would require cooperation from Finnish authorities. The minister concluded that the concerns of a small group of dacha enthusiasts did not warrant such immediate action. The minister also determined that moving the customs border to Vyborg would not necessarily solve the problem, since there were other Russians living Finnish towns and cities much farther away from the customs border. Any changes to the customs border region now would have a much farther ranging implication for Finland, since imperial authorities would then have to

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72 RGIA, f.21, op.1 d.15, ll.1-2. Petition from dacha owners in Terijoki parish district to the Minister of Finance, January 1, 1881. One travel guide noted that some of the household goods that dacha folk brought with them to their dachas in Finland included bicycles and sewing machines. See Timofeev, *Putevoditel’ po Finliandii*, 2
contemplate the significance of Russians, however small their number, living in Finland beyond
the border region. ⁷³

Interestingly, the Minister of Finance also noted that there were Russian subjects living in
border areas near Austria, but in those regions, the residents did not complain about the
inconvenience of customs inspections as the Terijoki dacha people did. This case suggests that
the dacha dwellers who signed this petition thought of Finland’s autonomous status in abstract
terms. Some of them possibly considered Finland to be a mere provincial extension of the
Russian Empire where inhabitants happened to speak a different language. Others might have
accepted Finland’s special status within the empire, but were not cognizant of how this condition
functioned on a practical level. That the dacha owners assumed their petition could prompt
authorities to make significant changes to the customs zone suggested a superficial
understanding of the delicate relationship between Finland and the empire.

The descriptions of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus in travel guides and other types of
travel literature reveal several layers of ambiguity in the conceptualization of recreational space.
The dacha fit into a grey area between urban, suburban and rural life. References to the dacha
lifestyle in the travel guides indicate that definitions of dacha space in the late imperial Russian
context was rather fluid. The line between the foreign and familiar is also unclear. The dacha
dwellers were traveling to places that required them to pass through a customs boundary, and
they established their out-of-town residences in a region where locals did not speak their
language. At the same time, they created communities in Finland that were based on a
particularly Russian middle-class cultural institution. The extent to which they saw their dachas
in Finland as suburban extension of their urban experiences in St. Petersburg cannot be

⁷³ RGIA, f.21, op.1, d.15, ll.3-5. Letter from the Minister of Finance to the Department of
Customs Duties, January 29, 1881.
determined, yet references to the dacha communities in Finland as typical dacha locations indicated that the notion of Finland as a foreign land was not always the most influential reference point when discussing Finland. Travel descriptions reveal that the notion of empire, however vague among travel guide writers, colored their perceptions about Finland.

**Seasonal Visitors and Access to Local Rights**

As the practice of vacationing in Finnish towns became more established and the number of St. Petersburgers acquiring properties in the Karelian Isthmus increased in subsequent decades, the legislative differences between Russia and Finland began to affect the residents of the dacha settlements more directly. One of the dilemmas that came to the forefront of press and government attention from the beginning of the twentieth century to the eve of the February revolution was the differentiation of rights and obligations between Finnish citizens in the Grand Duchy and imperial subjects in Russia. It is premature to discuss the concept of state and national citizenship as we understand it in the modern day context, since scholars have already noted that the concept of Russian citizenship was based more on one’s rank in society, and that the emphasis of citizenship was much more about obligation to the state than individual civil rights, hence the differentiation in terminology between subjecthood (*poddanstvo*) and citizen (*grazhdanstvo*). However, contemporary officials were aware that access to civil rights was indeed different for those registered in the Grand Duchy as Finnish citizens and those who were considered subjects of the Russian Empire. It is instructive to investigate the extent to which the rights of dacha owners in the Karelian Isthmus towns were included in this discussion.

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Jane Burbank has argued that “an imperial dimension of Russian legal thinking was the assumption that all peoples possessed their own customs and laws. Incorporating these distinctive customs and laws into official governance was a means to enhance order and productivity in each region of the empire.”

There was no exception to this mentality when the Grand Duchy of Finland was incorporated into the Russian Empire. Imperial authorities understood that respecting Finnish-Swedish legal traditions established prior to Finland’s incorporation into the Russian Empire was a key component of eliciting cooperation from the local elite. How should this legal arrangement apply to subjects who moved frequently? This was a particularly vexing question for Russian subjects who lived in Finland.

Robert Schweitzer has noted that by the end of the nineteenth century, the terms of Finnish autonomy had developed such that Finnish citizenship had to be a pre-requisite for access to civil rights in the territory of the Grand Duchy. This meant that acquisition of civil rights was dependent upon an individual’s ability to adopt citizenship in the Grand Duchy. For many imperial subjects, this task was complicated by several factors. First, Finnish legislation required Russian subjects to be released from imperial subjecthood before they could be considered for citizenship. From both the Russian and Finnish perspectives, authorities wanted to ensure that acquisition of Finnish citizenship could not be used as a means to evade responsibilities to the Russian Empire.

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77 RGIA, f.1276 op.18, d.21, l.14. Finnish Senate report on citizenship, June 12, 1906. The report mentioned that only Russian males over the age of fifteen, who have either completed
amended in 1839 and 1859, one had to satisfy a minimum residency requirement of three years, and demonstrate intent to live in a parish in the Grand Duchy. Finally, those wishing to seek citizenship in Finland must demonstrate good moral standing, and the capacity to support themselves and family members without relying on public assistance funds in Finland.\footnote{RGIA, f.1276, op.18, d.21, l.11. Excerpts from Finnish Senate statement, 1858.}

The administrative Russification of Finland that began in earnest in the beginning of the twentieth century posed problems for imperial authorities. In a variety of reports on the Russian subjects’ rights in Finland, Russian officials investigating the citizenship question repeatedly pointed to the unequal differentiation in legal status between Russian subjects in Finland and Finnish citizens in the empire. These reports noted that Finns could easily migrate to the Empire and enjoy the same rights as Russians, not only in terms of property rights but also in rights to participate in public office and the right to vote in local elections. They did not have to forfeit their Finnish citizenship for these entitlements. Russian subjects, however were treated practically on the same basis as foreigners in Finland, with the slight exception that Russian subjects had a far greater range of rights with respect to property acquisition than other foreigners.\footnote{RGIA, f.1276, op. 18, d.21, l.74. Letter from the State Secretariat of the Grand Duchy of Finland to the Minister of Internal Affairs, February 21, 1907.}

I will deal specifically with the relationship between property ownership and access to local rights, since this aspect of the citizenship question related most directly to dacha people. In the context of European empires in the nineteenth century, this situation of Russian dacha owners in Finland had no direct parallel, since the autonomous status of Finland within an imperial polity was rather unique. Finland inherited a legal regime of property ownership from a
polity that had a much more developed constitutional structure. Whereas Europeans who sought private property in overseas colonies altered the local norms on property rights and economic practices, in the Russian-Finnish case, Russian possession of property in Finland prompted debates in Russian imperial political circles on the relationship between property, citizenship and subjection. Moreover, the expansion of Russian dacha property possession into Finland occurred because of economic exigencies rather than through direct encouragement and sponsorship from imperial officials in Russia. The specific nature of the legal relationship between the peasantry in Finland and the nobility is complex. The notion that the peasantry in Finland could have hereditary rights to land holdings on former Crown lands that had been converted to freehold farms had become regular practice under Swedish law by the early eighteenth century. On the eve of Finland’s incorporation into the Russian Empire, Finnish peasants enjoyed the right to purchase freehold land from the nobility. The peasant land situation differed in the Karelian Isthmus, which was the part of Finland that had already been ceded to Russia in the beginning of the eighteenth century. Peter the Great had granted a third of the land in this region to Russian nobles. When this region was reintegrated with the rest of Finland as part of the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland in 1809, Nicholas I had declared the endowed lands as nobility leaseholds in 1826, and Finnish peasants became leaseholders on these property. This situation changed in 1867 when the Finnish Senate began buying these estates from the Russian nobility and distributing them to peasants, though the Senate amended legislation in the 1870s to permit Russian nobles to buy whatever land that had not been leased to peasants. For a more detailed account of property law in Finland under Swedish and Russian administration, see Eino Jutikkala, “Tenancy, Freehold and Enclosure in Finland from the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century,” Scandinavian Journal of History vol. 7 (1982), 339-344, and “Origin and Rise of the Crofter Problem in Finland,” Scandinavian Economic History Review, vol. 10, no. 1 (1962), 78-83.

C.A. Bayly has noted the development and evolution of contract law in Britain at the end of the eighteenth century, when applied in British colonial possessions, led to dramatic changes in the conceptualization of property in southern Asia and southern Africa. See Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World: 1780-1830 (New York: Longman, 1989), 6. Similarly, Antony G. Hopkins has contended that the realignment of property rights in British overseas colonies was related to the desire to root British economic, political and cultural influence in the non-European world. This was particularly crucial in order to maintain imperial pressure over rivals in the industrial era. See “Property Rights and Empire Building: Britain’s Annexation of Lagos, 1861,” Journal of Economic History, vol. 40, no. 4 (1980), 778.

Balashov, Karelskii peresheek, 33. St. Petersburgers did not need persuasion from officials to seek dacha property farther away from the city. In other European contexts, European officials made concerted efforts to initiate an official colonization program to attract reluctant migrants.
between the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland and the Russian Empire made plausible solutions for resolving ambiguities in Russian property ownership in Finland even more difficult to find.

The relationship between property ownership and citizenship was a complicated one. Acquisition of citizenship in the Grand Duchy posed an interesting dilemma for imperial subjects who regularly resided in Finland during the summer months. According to the strict letter of the law, they did not meet the requirements for Finnish citizenship because they did not reside full time and permanently in Finland. At the same time, though, many of these dacha folk owned immovable property with significant value in the territory of the Grand Duchy, and local decisions in the parish towns had potential to affect the dacha dwellers’ lives. When officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs reviewed the Senate’s discussion on this issue, they noted that the Diet had originally suggested that Russian subjects who owned real estate in Finland for three years or more would satisfy citizenship application requirements, without having to be formally released from Imperial subjecthood. However, the Senate had rejected this condition on the grounds that it would make citizenship too much of a commodity to be purchased along with plots of land. If citizenship was tied to property ownership, it might discourage Russian property owners from selling their property if they believed their access to civil rights in Finland might be revoked. Senate members feared that such a provision would have a profound influence on the

from the core to the periphery. In French Algeria, for example, military land grants to ex-officers and civilian land provision schemes initially failed to persuade French citizens to settle and populate Algerian cities. See Julia Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 88.
Karelian Isthmus parish towns because it would make many of the seasonal visitors who owned property in the region eligible for citizenship, even if they did not reside there full time.\(^{83}\)

Although the decision to ease requirements that permitted property owners to acquire citizenship in the Grand Duchy was dropped, the issue of partial access to civil rights for property owners was revisited in July 1910. Correspondence between Finnish Governor General F.A. Zeyn and the Ministry of Internal Affairs discussed the prospects of registering imperial subjects who were not Finnish citizens but who owned property in the Grand Duchy in the local electoral district lists. This new proposal, if approved, would allow those who owned immovable property in the territory of the Grand Duchy for more than one year to be eligible to vote in elections to the Finnish Diet. This discussion involved weighing out the pros and cons of granting these rights to Russian subjects who were not Finnish citizens. The Governor General’s summary of Senate discussions noted confusion in distinguishing between local Finnish citizens and Russian subjects who had partial access to local rights, and other foreigners who did not have any form of civil rights in Finland. Senate members, however, also noted certain advantages to including these foreigners in the electoral district lists. Since these lists were used by tax collectors each year to ensure that people were making their payments, this would streamline the record keeping tasks for keeping track of the Russian dacha owners’ tax payments.\(^{84}\) This case demonstrated that some members of the Finnish Senate recognized the economic significance of Russian property owners in Finland.

\(^{83}\) RGIA, f.1276, op. 18, d.21, l.42. Report from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Council of Ministers, June 27, 1907.

\(^{84}\) RGIA, f.1276, op.18, d.312, l.9. Governor General F.A. Zeyn’s report on Senate discussions regarding the registration of Russian property owners in the local electoral district lists, October 11, 1910.
The new proposal represented a step forward in acknowledging the local rights of those from the Russian Empire who made significant economic contributions to the Grand Duchy. What remained ambiguous was the notion of a residency requirement in order to be eligible for citizenship. This issue most affected the Russian dacha visitors. Although they had a regular, yearly presence in the territory of the Grand Duchy, they straddled the boundary between permanent residents and local visitors. Access to basic civil rights such as being able to vote in local elections were important for them because they could participate in the decision making processes that could affect their stay in the Karelian Isthmus during the summer months. Those who owned immovable property had a slight advantage over those who did not, since their presence on tax collection records made it easier for Finnish authorities to quantify their presence in Finland. The notion of access to civil rights, therefore, also became a class issue. Russian dacha visitors of a lower social standing did not qualify for the same rights to engage in important questions on local governance.

The relationship between the political discussion on Russian dacha owners’ access to civil rights in Finland and dacha people’s every day existence is still difficult to gauge. On the one hand, access to civil rights may have given the seasonal visitors a greater sense of belonging and a closer political connection to Finland. According to Finnish legislation, Russian subjects in Finland could not work in the medical profession without special permission from the local governor. Since the process of obtaining this permission was often onerous, this generally meant that there were very few available doctors in the dacha communities who were able to serve the seasonal visitors. The lack of access to medical services was something that dacha visitors complained about when they wrote letters to the editors of popular newspapers. Additionally, property owners were required to pay local taxes even though they rarely used public resources
such as schools and hospitals. On the other hand, without significant sources to prove definitively that lack of access to local political rights posed significant obstacles for dacha owners’ daily lives when they visited the Karelian Isthmus, it is difficult to establish the significance of changes to Russian subjects’ access to civil rights in Finland for dacha folks.

Nick Baron has noted that the classical interpretation of the Russian Empire has always been linked to the notion of imperial space – Russia’s territorial expanse. The “new spatial history” that has recently emerged adds to this interpretation by addressing how geographical issues intersected with locales of everyday experiences. These intersections show that binary categories of description such as urban-rural and foreign-domestic do not always exist in opposition to each other. These categories overlap, and in some specific contexts, they can even coexist.

This chapter has explored the intersection of spatial interpretations of territory, political understandings of geography, and everyday experiences at the local level in order to illustrate different ways in which the constant movement of Russian subjects between Finnish and Russian territory underscored complex dilemmas in imperial administration. The presence of Russian migrants in Finland prior to the expansion of dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus meant that solutions to practical problems did not apply uniformly to Russian subjects as a whole. The ambiguity of the Karelian Isthmus dacha zones as extensions of imperial space made certain aspects of Finnish autonomy, such as the presence of a customs boundary between Finnish and

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85 See, for example, articles in Moskovskie vedomosti, October 13 and October 19, 1899.
Russian territory, more difficult for subjects to understand. Political discussions on whether access to civil rights should be extended to Russian property owners in Finland further complicated the notion of dacha people as part of the local social landscape in the Karelian Isthmus. These administrative ambiguities set the context for examining the extent of interdependent relationships between the dacha folk and local Finnish residents, a subject that will be explored in the next chapter.
Chapter 2 – Everyday Encounters and Interdependence through Dacha Space

Lempi Vanhanen grew up near Terijoki in the early 1900s and always welcomed the summer season because it meant the arrival of vacationers en masse from Russia to Terijoki, which hosted one of the most prominent dacha settlements in the Karelian Isthmus. She and her brother would visit the Russian speakers at their dachas to sell berries, crafts, and similar items. The families she visited often invited the siblings into their houses for snacks, and gave them a fair amount of money for the goods they hawked. She described them as friendly, civilized folk who saw Finland as their second home.¹ The Vanhanen siblings’ experience with Russian neighbors raises larger questions about the nature of social interaction in these summer house settlements. Why were some Finnish and Russian speakers more compelled than others to seek contacts across linguistic and cultural divides? How did these encounters contribute to the local social, economic and political environment, and how did they shape Russian-speakers’ sense of belonging in these towns?

This chapter explores a variety of everyday encounters between the thousands of Russian-speaking visitors that arrived in the Karelian Isthmus in the summer and the local Finnish-speaking villagers from the 1880s to the beginning of the First World War. It examines how these contacts contributed to instances of interdependency, cooperation and conflict. The first part of this chapter underlines initial reactions to this region’s growing popularity as a vacation destination and summer house settlement for subjects of the Russian Empire from different social strata. Next, it probes the relationship between the dachas and the tourism industry, and the extent to which dacha life straddled the boundaries between temporary, leisurely visits and long-term residence. Subsequent sections study various relationships of

¹ Finnish Literature Society Folklore Archives (SKS KRA), Lempi Vanhanen, ME S, 644.
economic interdependency between dacha people and Finnish- and Swedish-speaking residents in the Karelian Isthmus towns. It concludes with a brief examination of the extent to which crimes associated with the dacha industry contributed to interethnic hostilities. I contend that interethnic tension and cooperation coexisted because people crossed multiple social boundaries in their daily interactions. Rather than treating these interactions as signs of either harmony or hostility between singularly defined social groups, we should consider how individuals attached meaning to these encounters on a situational basis.

**Initial Response to the Dacha Settlements**

The initial Finnish reactions to the development of these Russian dacha settlements varied. Residents described the pace of life in the Karelian Isthmus towns as slow and quiet prior to the onset of the dacha boom. Agriculture, farming, fishing and forestry were the main industries dependent on local natural resources. In the winter, logging became the staple of the rural economy, along with transport of goods to Vyborg and St. Petersburg. In the countryside, commerce and trade in consumer goods only played a minor role, since most of the region’s business enterprises and services were located in Vyborg. The pace at which urban folk from the imperial center moved into this picturesque countryside irked some local residents who were protective of their environmental resources. Peasants at first reacted negatively to the summer residence settlements because it altered the local landscape and disrupted their source of livelihood in the lumber and fishing industries. Some residents complained that the dacha folk

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2 See, for example, written testimonies by Otto Havia about the Kanneljärvi district, SKS KRA, Otto Havia, KV2: 305, 1957, and Emil Nikkanen, who wrote about the town of Terijoki, SKS KRA, Emil Nikkanen, KE 57, 12140-12160.

were occupying the paths and roads in a manner that blocked their access to the shoreline.⁴

Many of these villagers were small farmers who had only managed to acquire their land in recent decades. These locals sometimes saw the incursion of foreigners who sought property in the Karelian Isthmus as a potential threat to their livelihoods because of the way the dacha people’s activities affected the region’s economy.

In these small rural villages, it is plausible that residents would bond over their suspicion and hostility toward newcomers. Nonetheless, it serves to bear in mind that the Finnish-speakers in the Isthmus also quarreled with each other, and that their mutual suspicion of outsiders did not necessarily negate fissures in their own communities. The interethnic dimension of hostility should therefore not be taken out of proportion. It is equally important to challenge the notion that these villagers were backward folk who rejected modern influences from the urban world. Many of the Karelian Isthmus villagers traveled frequently to the markets in St. Petersburg, and the experience opened them to a different world of knowledge. For decades, people from the region had been migrating to St. Petersburg seasonally for work in the imperial metropolis’ burgeoning industries. The movement of itinerant workers connected the population of eastern Finland with Russia and provided opportunities for interethnic contact.⁵ Farmers living close to the Finnish-Russian customs border often sold agricultural products in St. Petersburg and its surrounding areas.⁶ Men were frequently involved in the transport of goods, and women in the Karelian countryside often earned money as wet nurses for children sent from St. Petersburg’s

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⁵ Max Engman, “Migration from Finland to Russia during the Nineteenth Century,” *Scandinavian Journal of History*, vol.3 no.2 (1977), 161.
⁶ SKS KRA, Riita Ampuja, KE Miehet 26-40. Adolf Susi, born in 1895 in one of these border villages, came from a peasant family that made many such visits to St. Petersburg.
foundling hospital. According to Marjatta Rahikainen, the growing St. Petersburg industries sent representatives to recruit child workers from the rural regions in the Karelian Isthmus, and some children were also hired as apprentices by St. Petersburg craftsmen. The effects of these contacts filtered back to the migrants’ home parishes, especially since the migrants were highly transient and visited their places of origin at least occasionally. Moving to the city in search of work gave these villagers a sense of agency, but this dynamic also changed when it involved receiving foreigners. These circumstances complicated binary notions of conflict as an issue of in-group versus out-group grievances.

*Finliandskaia gazeta*, the Russian language newspaper in Finland, printed a review of a travelogue in 1900 that covered the writer’s reminiscences of his journeys through Finland in recent decades. The author marveled at the increasing exodus of Russian families to Finland during the summer. The travelogue described the relationship between local Finns and Russian visitors in the borderlands as a mixture of openness as well as muted hostilities. On the one hand, some Finns were thankful for the exposure to different cultural influences, but on the other hand, they also complained about Russians blocking the main roads during the summers. In general, though, the author remarked that Finns were getting better acquainted with the Russian visitors.

The observations in this travel account reflected wider questions about the general reception of Finnish-speaking villagers to the rapid growth of the dacha settlements in the Karelian Isthmus communities. To what extent did different social actors accept these changes, and how did their outlook evolve over time? What did these attitudes reveal about peoples’ reception to change and cultural diversity over the long term?

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8 *Finliandskaia gazeta*, May 25, 1900.
Tourism and the Dacha Phenomenon

After the construction of the Saimaa Canal connecting Lake Saimaa to the Gulf of Finland near Vyborg in the 1850s and the completion of the St. Petersburg-Helsinki railway line in 1871, tourism to the Karelian Isthmus thrived because such transport infrastructure made it easier for a wider selection of individuals to travel through the region. St. Petersburgers who found their dachas in the Karelian Isthmus lived in the area part-time, and their presence was more prolonged than that of tourists, but they could still be considered as part of the burgeoning tourism industry in Finland. Since this group of people traveled to Finland mostly for leisure rather than primarily for long-term settlement, it is insightful to use travel and tourism as a starting point for discussing the dacha communities’ effects on this border region.

An examination of contemporary travel literature on Finland and the Karelian Isthmus reveals that different aspects of the tourism industry can serve as a platform for Finnish-Russian cultural exchanges while posing as potential foci for tension. The journey between Russia and Finland was to be a springboard for discussing first impressions and stereotypes that travelers formed, especially if they did not have prior contact with Finnish speakers living in the Empire. One writer marveled at the efficiency of rail travel from Russia to Finland. He praised the Finnish-speaking staff on these trains for their politeness and professionalism, complimenting their ability to converse in basic Russian. He also lauded the Finnish-speaking passengers for their orderly behavior and cleanliness. He implied that it was often the Russian passengers that caused the most disturbances on these trains with their lewd manners, referencing newspapers that mentioned the “infamous behavior” of St. Petersburg passengers on the Finnish trains.9

Similar publications noted the propriety of Finnish staff on the trains from Russia to Finland, 

characterizing the Finnish-speaking workers as people of good morals. Such examples of travel literature offered a very positive description of travel through Finland. These reports, however, were not the definitive assertion of travelers’ attitudes towards Finland and its inhabitants. They should be seen as examples of one particular set of impressions that Russian visitors to Finland had of their encounters with the host society.

Other travel writers hinted at more serious instances of disagreement between Russian and Finnish speakers who encountered each other through the tourism industry. One writer observed that there were repeated reports of misunderstanding between passengers from Russia and the Finnish and Swedish speaking employees on the trains operating throughout Finland. He commented that some Russian passengers were rude to workers, even though the staff on the trains were generally polite towards the visitors. He noted that some passengers from a higher social standing expected to be treated deferentially by the staff, and did not seem willing to adhere to rules of conduct set for all passengers. As a result, the conductors often had to remove these uncooperative passengers from the train car. These observations offered insight into class based sources of miscommunication between the Russian-speaking visitors and the Finnish-speakers they encountered. Divergent views on social conventions for individual and group status affected Finnish-Russian interactions that cut across class lines.

The dacha places added a complicated dimension to the tourism industry because the nature of summer house life straddled multiple boundaries between permanent residency and temporary visits. The presence of sanatoria and convalescent homes in the Karelian Isthmus

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dacha towns was one such example of how the boundaries between permanence and temporariness as well as between necessity and leisure intersected. There were several of these establishments in the Karelian Isthmus dacha zone, the most well-known being the Hallila sanatorium, run by public authorities in St. Petersburg. Some of the visitors’ guides to Finland also included information about obtaining permission from authorities to use these health establishments. The details provided in some of the travel guides related to local businesses, churches, medical services, schools, and prices for dacha properties. One guide even offered a summary of Finnish legislation that might be important for longer term visitors, such as information about local norms for employing domestic servants.¹² These details gave visitors a more extensive look at life in Finland than was required for the average tourist.

The organization of associational life among Russian visitors to Finland further contextualizes the blurring of boundaries between visitors and residents. A voluntary association called the “Society for Tourists in Finland” was established in St. Petersburg in 1910 with the goal of familiarizing Russian visitors with the country. One of the society’s aims was to raise awareness in the Russian press about opportunities to travel to Finland, and provide practical information to tourists. This society consisted of members living in different cities in Finland who supplied the St. Petersburg bureau with information.¹³ This detail is significant because the society’s publications did not consist only of impressions from tourists, but also from permanent Russian residents in some of the larger cities, as well as dacha owners who frequented the

¹² See N. Fedotov, Putevoditel’ po dachnym zavedeniiam v okrestnostях St. Peterburga i po zheleznym dorogam (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1889) and Illiustrirovannyi putevoditel’ po dachnym, vodolechebnym i zhivopisnym mestnostiam Finliandii (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1899).
¹³ Finliandskii vestnik, April 3, 1910.
Finnish countryside on a yearly basis. These travel guides were important sources of information to help visitors from Russia navigate their interaction with local Finnish-speaking villagers.

Many dacha owners and other St. Petersburghers who rented properties in the Karelian Isthmus also formed local residents’ associations in their respective towns. One such organization, the Society for the Improvement of Kuokkala (Obshchestvo blagoustroistva Kuokkala) was formed in 1901. The association’s charter stated that the group’s aim was to improve the conditions of life in the town. Its activities included overseeing the cleaning of streets, maintenance of public parks and squares, supervision of fire prevention and raising funds for local schools and churches.  

Another such organization was established in Terijoki in 1913 to discuss funding for public works. This group included members from the Finnish- and Swedish-speaking business establishments, and thus indicated that Finnish and Russian residents sometimes cooperated in their dealings with local affairs. These associations were similar to ones established by proprietors in the St. Petersburg countryside, such as the Society of Dacha Settlements (Obshchestvo “dachnye poselki”), which aimed to facilitate property owners’ construction of summer houses as well as roads, bridges, bathhouses, gardens and other similar infrastructure and amenities.

The blurring of lines between temporary and semi-permanent residence for dacha dwellers was also evident in the kinds of complaints they made to local authorities about dilemmas that concerned dacha life. One newspaper report noted that in Terijoki, the largest of the summer house settlements, dacha dwellers were concerned about the amount of dirt and dust

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15 Teriokskii dnevnik, September 16, 1913.
16 Ustav obshchestva “Dachnye poselki” (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1903).
in the air cause by increased traffic on the main roads. Dacha owners as well as store keepers with property close to the main road complained to town officials that the problem prevented them from carrying on with their summer activities, claiming that some neighbors had already moved to other dacha settlements because they could not bear the situation. Local officials informed the complainants that they had been searching for suitable solutions to the problem, but did not have sufficient funds to clean the streets to their satisfaction. Several of the dacha owners then offered to contribute to city council funds so that officials could continue to keep the streets dust and dirt free for the duration of the summer. 17

This situation could be read as one where temporary visitors from Russia lodged petty grievances against local city officials to express their dismay at the lack of services that the town offered them. Some of the dacha owners felt neglected by Finnish officials in the dacha settlements, but this case also suggested a deeper sense of local responsibility. There were particular occasions where these temporary and seasonal visitors to the Karelian Isthmus towns cared about local issues. Being able to participate in local decision-making was important to them, and they had a stake in solving local problems, even if their presence in the towns was limited. In the decades since the St. Petersburgers began flocking to summer houses in the Karelian Isthmus, the dacha folk adopted a greater sense of belonging in the regions’ towns, and sought ways to assert their place in local society.

17 Teriokskii dnevnik, September 6, 1913.
Interdependent Neighbors

Within the context of the tourism and dacha industry, economic interdependency mediated different kinds of exchanges between Finnish and Russian speakers in the Karelian Isthmus. The macro aspect of the Grand Duchy’s commercial ties with the Russian Empire is well established in Finnish and Russian historiography. Russian writings on this subject tend to emphasize the benefits this relationship bore for Finland. The re-orientation of Finnish economic ties from Sweden to Russia allowed Finland to establish a competitive industry, which later received access to markets in Western Europe. These commercial relations helped spark a thriving Finnish economy and advanced Finnish business interests. Finnish views stress the more ambiguous financial outcome of Finland’s incorporation into the Russian Empire. This political union should have encouraged mutual trade, but it did not necessarily promote equal terms of trade. Although Russia allowed Finland to maintain the lower Swedish customs tariff for goods from other parts of Europe, the protectionist members of the Tsarist regime eventually demanded the imposition of a customs barrier against Finland for foreign goods entering Russia via Finland. Whether imperial economic relations were advantageous for the Finnish population depended on the scale of economic activity one engaged in, and the specific perspective from which one assessed the situation.

The micro effects of Finnish-Russian economic exchanges are worthwhile exploring because they were immediately visible to individuals on a daily basis. An editorial from one Russian newspaper commented that the local economy in the Karelian Isthmus was strongly

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dependent on different kinds of visitors from Russia. This editorial was published at a time when imperial authorities were discussing the possibility of joining the three most prominent parish districts for dacha settlements to the St. Petersburg Province under Russian jurisdiction. It acknowledged the dramatic effect this move might have on the Karelian Isthmus region, since the local economy was linked to the visitors from Russia.  

The commentary mentioned that when most St. Petersburgers wanted to take a short holiday without spending exorbitant amounts of money traveling to the Volga or the Caucasus, they rarely went anywhere else except to Finland. During the holiday seasons, trains were always packed with these travelers. Finnish-speaking residents in the Karelian Isthmus were keen to establish functioning relationships with Russian visitors because the dacha communities ultimately brought significant material benefits. Maria Lähteenmäki has observed that many Finns in Western Finland at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century migrated to North America in search of work, but in the Karelian Isthmus, locals recalled that jobs were so widely available that few felt compelled to venture to America.  

Karelian Isthmus Finns migrated to St. Petersburg for work, but some of this migration was seasonal and circular. Most of the residents did not stray far from their home parishes, and those who did travel to the Russian side of the border were still able to maintain regular contacts with friends and family in the Isthmus. One former Finnish-speaker who lived near these dacha settlements considered the arrival en masse of Russians as a boon to

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20 Rossiia, June 6, 1910.  
21 Maria Lähteenmäki, Maailmojen rajalla: Kannaksen rajamaa ja poliittiset murtumat 1911-1944 (Helsinki: SKS, 2009), 311.
the Finnish villages. These dacha people brought capital to the local economy and made life
livelier.  

Land and Property as Sites of Interethnic Exchange

Economic differentiation is often a source of interethnic hostility in societies where
ethnic and social cleavages mutually reinforce each other. To some extent, the perception that the
vast majority of the Russian visitors were extremely wealthy served as one source of tension
between Finns in the Karelian Isthmus and the Russian dacha dwellers. This perception was
partially a by-product of the Finnish Senate’s decision to sell land owned by the Finnish treasury
to wealthy Russian nobles in the 1870s. In that initial phase, a few of these nobles established
their lavish summer estates on this land.  

In subsequent decades, an increasing number of less
affluent St. Petersburg residents also began to build or rent dachas in the region. By the end of
the nineteenth century Russians were moving into Finnish territory in such large numbers and at
such a rapid pace that the Finnish population became a minority during the summer months.
Finnish inhabitants in the seaside towns were gradually pushed from the shoreline as more and
more St. Petersburgers began to arrive.

The number of dachas in Finland increased in the early 1900s, thanks to further changes
in property laws designed to attract more foreign landowners. In 1903, the Finnish Senate passed
legislation that allowed Russian subjects to acquire immovable property in Finland, and more
importantly, administer it according to the same regulations valid for Finnish citizens, thus

22 SKS KRA, Otto Havia KV2: 305, 1957.
23 Vilho Hämäläinen, Karjalan kannaksen venäläinen kesäasutus ja sen vaikutus Suomen ja
Venäjän suhteiden kehitykseen autonomian ajan lopulla (Tampere: Tampereen Yliopisto, 1974),
30-34.
removing the last of the restrictions that barred Russians from establishing secondary homes on the Finnish side of the customs border.\(^\text{24}\) Some Russians purchased properties from Finnish owners, while others rented summer dwellings from local Finns. For example, in 1903 a St. Petersburg merchant purchased a part parcel of land in the Kivennapa parish that was owned by a Finnish farming couple.\(^\text{25}\) It is difficult to track the actual number of rented versus purchased dacha properties because of inconsistencies in record keeping. When conducting their inventory of land ownership county clerks only noted properties that were completely owned by Russian subjects, and did not take into consideration Russian summer houses built on Finnish-owned lands or on plots divided between Finnish and Russian owners. By 1917, the number of dwellings used by Russian subjects as dachas in Vyborg province may have been as high as 12,000, with approximately 10 per cent of the actual land in Finnish ownership. It is worthwhile to note that this growth in dacha settlements did not happen because the Finnish Senate and officials from the Imperial ministries intentionally sought these developments. Rather, this spurt occurred more or less spontaneously because of the desire for Russians to acquire dachas as a status symbol.\(^\text{26}\)

Sometimes Finnish villagers resented the Russian visitors who purchased large properties for flaunting their wealth. Some of the Russian landlords had elaborately ornate homes built on their properties. A Russian proprietor whose son was a personal physician to the Imperial family owned a 40-room mansion near Uusikirkko.\(^\text{27}\) One memoirist described these homes as works of

\[^{24}\text{Kähönen, Entinen Terijoki, 21.}\]
\[^{25}\text{LOGAV, f. 63, op.1, d.262, l.29-44. Rental contract, signed June 29, 1903.}\]
\[^{26}\text{Hämälainen, “Vanhan Suomen venäläiset huvila-asukkaat,”120-122.}\]
\[^{27}\text{Temira Pachmuss, A River of Moving Tears: Russia’s Experience in Finland (New York: Peter Lang, 1992), 173.}\]
art, many having between four and ten sections, with all kinds of flowers and plants in bloom in the gardens. She recalled having feelings of awe whenever she saw these lavish homes. Another Karelian Isthmus resident recalled that a few of her family’s neighbors expressed misgivings about the presence of so many wealthy folks in their towns and villages boasting about their expensive homes.

The differences in financial position between the Finnish peasants and some of the wealthier Russian visitors only offer a partial explanation for tension between locals and foreigners. Socio-economic status and ethnicity did not neatly overlap in a mutually reinforcing way. The region had its own economic elite among Finnish and Swedish speakers, and the Russian-speaking seasonal residents were not the only group who owned trendy homes in the Karelian Isthmus. Several notable Finnish artists also purchased land and built grand summer villas in the region. Modernist writer Olavi Paavolainen had a two-story villa with elaborate gardens and ponds in Kivennapa. Finnish- and Swedish-speaking socialites from Helsinki also visited the Karelian Isthmus during the summers, and these Finnish members of urban high society were almost as foreign to the rustic countryside as the Russian-speaking guests.

Sociologists and anthropologists have long acknowledged that cross-cutting social cleavages have been a significant factor in maintaining social cohesion in many societies. Cross-cutting ties materialize when individuals within a given community are embedded in a variety of social networks. Since cross-cutting ties increase the potential for in-group division, they can serve to

28 SKS KRA, Lempi Vanhanen, ME. S. 644.
29 SKS KRA, Tilda Leskinen, Interview by Elsa Pukonen, series 1277, 1959.
reduce the number of participants in potential intergroup conflicts. Although this is a simplistic model for explaining the likelihood of interethnic tension, it indicates that economic differentiation among the Finnish and Russian speakers respectively should be taken into consideration when addressing sources of hostility and cooperation.

When there was interethnic strife over economic differentiation, this scorn was usually directed against Russians and other foreigners who were snapping up land in the Karelian Isthmus. It is worth considering that while the assumption that all of the dacha owners were wealthy Russians persisted, available sources do not corroborate this postulation. Some of these Russian dacha owners were actually foreigners who had become subjects of the Russian empire. An inventory by Finnish land settlement authorities handed over to the Council of Ministers in 1915 listed the names of over 100 foreigners who had recently acquired Russian subjecthood and who also owned property in the three parish districts of Kivennapa, Terijoki and Uusikirkko. Some of these foreign property owners were also Finnish-speaking people who had moved to St. Petersburg. This group of dacha owners consisted of retired military personnel and government officials and clerical staff. Like their middle class Russian peers, this group of Finnish-speaking migrants to St. Petersburg had also adopted the Russian dacha culture and found new ways of profiting from the property of family members and relatives. The ambiguous ethnic identity of

32 SKS KRA, Ulla Manonen, E138: 4431.  
33 LOGAV, f.290, op.1, d.46. This inventory included the names of the owners, the date that the owner had passed into Russian subjecthood, and the date the property was purchased, along with information about the land itself, including size and the buildings found on the property.
dacha dwellers, whether they were landlords or renters, made the interethnic dimension of daily interactions in the dacha towns much more complicated.

Russian-speaking property owners, or those with Russian-sounding names, were targeted because they were numerous and more visible. Nonetheless, some of the criticism was also directed at both the Finnish- and Swedish-speaking upper-class. Local peasants were exasperated by what they saw as lack of progress with agrarian reform. The overwhelmingly rural population of Finland was in the throes of a land crisis in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when a population surge led to an increase in the number of landless people. In comparison to Russian peasants the Finnish farmers were better off, since the latter had not experienced serfdom, but there was a perception among the poor farmers in Finland that the predominantly Swedish-speaking Finnish nobility wielded significant power over them and prevented their upward mobility. 34 Because the Finnish Senate encouraged the foreigners to purchase land in Finland, the peasantry interpreted government decisions as signs of the political upper class’s indifference to lower class issues. Social class dilemmas added another layer of complication to the nature of interactions between Finnish and Russian subjects.

Most Finnish farmers who were eager to sell or rent their property to foreigners saw their decision as a financial necessity rather than as a conscious effort to facilitate foreign takeover of the Karelian Isthmus. Villagers whose fields were too small to yield profitable crop found brighter days when the dacha communities grew, since these villagers could sell or rent out parts of their properties to St. Petersburgers vying for dacha space. Locals came to recognize that the Russian visitors actually sought to build summer houses on the sandy soil along the shoreline,

land that was completely unsuitable for cultivation. They quickly learned to take advantage of
this situation. Yrjö Seise came of age in the Karelian Isthmus towns in the 1880s, and as a
young adult, traveled frequently for various jobs to St. Petersburg, where he became acquainted
with middle class Russians who sought dacha properties. When Seise acquired his own property,
he traveled to St. Petersburg to arrange the sale of a parcel of his land to a Russian artist who
visited during the summer. In some towns, the method of parceling out land actually worked to
villagers’ advantage when dealing with Russians who sought seaside property. In Seivästö, for
example, land was arranged longitudinally to allow as many people as possible to have access to
the coast. This enabled villagers to further subdivide their land and sell or rent parcels closest to
the shore to Russian dacha people.

A larger number of St. Petersburgers who visited the Karelian Isthmus during the summer
seasons could not afford to purchase their own dacha properties, and renting dachas was a
sensible option for most of these people. St. Petersburg newspapers from the last decades of the
nineteenth century to the eve of the 1917 revolutions often ran advertisements for the rental of
dacha properties, especially during the summer months. These ads indicated that dacha houses
and land plots existed in a variety of sizes and costs, depending on location, materials used for
these houses, and the property’s original use. One of the dacha price guides also offered
important information on the different types of dachas sought by St. Petersburgers. Some of the
properties available for rental were merely single rooms with minimal furnishing in a large
farmhouse located far away from the picturesque places. Others were more elaborate but modest

35 Kähönen, Entinen Terijoki, 22.
36 SKS KRA, Alvi Seise, KE 84, 17618-17635.
37 Raili Taberman, Seivästö: meri, mäki, majakka (Pirkkala: Seivästö-säätiö, 1999), 50.
dachas that had been converted from former farm houses. A few were large, extravagant dachas with 10 to 12 rooms. In many of these ads, the identity of the person placing the ad was not revealed, but based on the details available, it appeared that some of the individuals renting out the property lived in Finland, and some lived in the St. Petersburg environs. Because of the popularity of dacha space in Finland, none of these ads ran in the St. Petersburg newspapers for more than a few weeks at a time.

Many of those who did not own property in the Karelian Isthmus rented buildings from local Finns that could pass as summer homes. Sometimes, this relationship led to misunderstandings because rental properties were in such high demand and there were so many Russians traveling between St. Petersburg and the Karelian Isthmus towns. One Russian speaker got into a scuffle with his Finnish-speaking landlord when the latter refused to allow the former to enter the house when there was one month remaining on the rental contract. In police reports, the landlord explained that he had not intended to evict his tenant prematurely. He claimed that he had planned to show the house to other potential tenants, and did not want the current tenant to be present when potential tenants were viewing the property. Such cross-class dimensions to Finnish-Russian interactions make it problematic to assume that the basis of social tensions in the Karelian Isthmus stemmed mainly from impoverished Finnish peasants’ resentment of wealthy foreigners.

38 Fedotov, Putevoditel’ po dachnym zavedeniiam v okrestnostiakh s. Peterburga.
39 MMA Terijoen nimismiespiirin Kuokkalan poliisiaseman arkisto (Terijoki Parish District Sheriff’s Office Police Archives for Kuokkala) IV Ab1, No. 37, March 29, 1908.
Service Industry

Many seasonal vacationers from St. Petersburg required local peoples’ services at their summer homes. Some foreign property owners employed Karelian Isthmus villagers for their construction projects. Ester Kähönen recalled that her father had a job building houses for some of the Russian families. As part of the yearly exodus of dacha folk from St. Petersburg to the region’s seaside towns in the spring, many people took most of their belongings with them. The railroad was the easiest way for these vacationers to travel, and local Finns anxiously awaited their arrival so they could vie for business driving the Russian-speaking dacha visitors and all their possessions to their summer homes. Licensed taxi drivers registered with local district authorities normally operated routes between the railway stations and the dacha houses for a fixed price. Finnish farmers who wished to earn extra money often worked informally as chauffeurs, and since these drivers usually charged lower fees, some of the less affluent dacha visitors preferred their services. Hermann Nylander remembered that during the summer seasons, many of his friends made several roundtrips from the train station to the clusters of dachas in one day.

Some of the wealthier of the Russian dacha folk employed a number of Finnish farmhands, housemaids, cooks and other hired help to maintain their households during the summer months. For many Finnish farming families living in the Karelian Isthmus, these odd

40 SKS KRA, Ester Kähönen, KE 39 8490-8496.
42 Fedotov, Illiustrirovannyi putevoditel’ po dachnym, vodolechebnym i zhivopisnym mestnostyam Finliandii, 8.
43 SKS KRA, Herman Nylander, interview with Elsa Pukonen (1984), 1270.
jobs in the service industry helped supplement the family income. One dacha guide summarized Finnish conventions for the hiring of domestic servants. The book informed readers of terms under which servants were normally employed and dismissed, appropriate salaries for services rendered, and other aspects of the employer-employee relationship. No evidence revealed whether dacha dwellers and their servants actually followed these guidelines, but the fact that a travel guide writer chose to include this information in his publication indicated that the service industry was a significant point of contact between the seasonal visitors from Russia and local Finnish villagers in the dacha settlements, and that some bosses and employees sought amicable relationships with each other.

The fact that Finnish residents in the dacha settlements derived income from the Russian visitors did not mean that they were always content to work for dacha folk. One particular incident registered in local police records in Kuokkala suggested that Finnish workers sometimes felt their Russian employers took advantage of their willingness to work. Seasonal visitors from Russia did not always comprehend what aspects of life were important in these small parish villages. The visitors at times went about their daily business oblivious to the way their activities affected local practices. As a result, locals sometimes interpreted the visitors’ attitude as a sign of their callous disregard for Finnish customs. These misunderstandings led to some disputes between the locals and foreigners. Some Finnish workers in Kuokkala once made an official complaint when a Russian developer insisted that the Finnish workers he hired continue construction work on his villa complex on a Lutheran holiday. When the police investigated the case, the Russian claimed that he was unaware that such a holiday existed, since he was not from

44 Fedotov, Putevoditel’ po dachnym zavedeniium v okrestnostяхikh S. Peterburga, 114-115.
Fortunately for all parties involved, this incident did not boil over into a major conflict, since the Russian employer agreed to compensate his Finnish employees for having worked on a religious holiday.

Robert Schweitzer has commented that it was “the petty grievances of Russians from St. Petersburg, who felt themselves treated as foreigners in their holiday homes on the Finnish side of the frontier, which set the public debate on Finnish statehood ablaze.” 46 Discontent with Finland’s status as a constituent part of the Russian Empire, especially after Imperial authorities revealed their plans to take over administration of several Karelian Isthmus districts, may have played a partial role in disputes between Finnish and Russian residents in these areas. Police reports indicated that a number of dacha goers lodged multiple complaints against local cab drivers. A Russian baron once claimed that at the Kuokkala train station, he was offered a ride by a Finnish taxi driver. Upon informing the driver of his destination, the driver spoke rudely to him, impolitely addressed him in the informal “you” form, and gruffly told him that he should walk instead. The local authorities responded by suspending the driver’s license for two weeks. 47 Similar incidents involved dacha visitors who claimed that taxi drivers refused to serve them or drive them all the way to their final destinations after they had already started the trip from the train station to the summer houses. 48 Whether these Finnish drivers’ treatment of Russian clients was politically motivated is impossible to detect through the police reports;

45 MMA Terijoen nimisimiespiirin Kuokkalan poliisiaseman arkisto IV Ab1, No. 36, August 16, 1908.
47 MMA Terijoen nimismiespiirin Kuokkalan poliisiaseman arkisto IV Ab2, March 29, 1911.
48 See also MMA Terijoen nimismiespiirin Kuokkalan poliisiaseman arkisto IV Ab2, logs from July 29, August 27, and August 27, 1911.
nonetheless, these cases alluded to the persistence of some resentment between Russian and Finnish speakers who interacted with each other through the service industry.

Lack of clarity on the terms of employment and the rights of service workers also contributed significantly to disputes between cab drivers and their passengers. One Russian newspaper article reported that many dacha dwellers complained about local taxi drivers’ laziness and their refusal to perform all tasks that passengers demanded. The author informed readers that certain sets of rules regulated the tasks that drivers were expected to perform, and much of what dacha visitors demanded was not included in these regulations. The writer argued that St. Petersburgers were prone to abusing the rights of Finnish cab drivers because they often did not respect the rights of drivers when at home in St. Petersburg. The author published a summary of these regulations, and implored readers to respect the rights of local workers.49 These kinds of disputes illustrate different ways in which misunderstanding of local customs can lead to interethnic hostility.

Finnish-Russian contacts in the health service sector related to some of the political tensions stemming from different rights for imperial subjects in Finland. One important piece of information that appeared in many of the travel guides on Finland was a listing of doctors serving different towns. One newspaper also published lists of Russian-speaking doctors, nurses and midwives serving the several dacha settlements in the vicinity of Terijoki.50 Because Russian subjects needed special permission to practice medicine in Finland, many of these Russian-speaking doctors were actually Finnish citizens who had learned to speak Russian. Visitors from Russia, especially those staying in the dacha towns for several months at a time,

49 *Teriokskii dnevnik*, July 20, 1913.
often sought out the services of these multilingual doctors, nurses and midwives. Little evidence exists to shed further light on the exact nature of the relationship between these Finnish medical professionals and their Russian clients, but Russian journalists often lamented that there were not enough Russian-speaking doctors to serve the dacha folk in these locales.\footnote{\textit{Moskovskie vedomosti}, April 26, 1890 and \textit{Novoe vremia}, October 13, 1899.} This exemplified how Finnish-Russian relationships that had proven to be neither particularly cordial nor confrontational could have been construed as a political problem.

Networking became an important aspect of employment in the service industry. The transience of both the Russian- and Finnish-speaking population in the Karelian Isthmus meant employer-employee pairings changed frequently. Finnish-speaking gardeners, nannies and maintenance workers often found jobs in several different Russian households. Because no established system of hiring existed for a very informal sector of the local economy, people relied on personal connections to put employers and employees in touch with each other. Dacha dwellers usually referred their staff to each other so that they could find hired help in a timely fashion.\footnote{SKS KRA, Lempi Vanhanen, ME. S. 644.} Elviira Haapalainen, a Finnish-speaking farmer’s daughter born in a small Karelian Isthmus village in 1889, worked as a maid in a Swedish-speaking household in Vyborg. Her employers were well acquainted with a St. Petersburg family who owned a dacha in Terijoki. When her Swedish-speaking employers no longer need her services, they referred her to their Russian-speaking friends. Elviira began working for that Russian family soon after, and developed a close bond with the members of the household, including the matron, from whom
she learned to converse in Russian. These social networks helped circulate jobs in the Karelian Isthmus towns, and facilitated people’s exchanges with each other.

Villagers in the Karelian Isthmus who were able to communicate in Russian in addition to their native language easily found jobs in the service sector. Some of the summer visitors placed help wanted ads in the local Finnish newspapers and Russian newspapers in St. Petersburg, and a number of these ads indicated a preference for multilingual (Finnish-Russian or Swedish-Russian) workers. People with the proper language skills were especially sought after in service jobs that involved speaking with different people on a regular basis. Restaurants and cafes in Terijoki and Vyborg often sought waitresses and waiters who could speak Finnish, Swedish as well as Russian. Russian-speaking families looking for nannies sought girls who spoke Finnish and Swedish, presumably so that the nannies could either teach their young charges a few words in the local language or so that they could complete household errands that required dealing with local non-Russian-speaking people. This practice indicated that visitors from Russia made a stronger effort to connect with the local inhabitants than stereotypes suggest. Although the Russian-speaking population in the Karelian Isthmus towns equaled or outnumbered Finnish speakers in the summer months, this alone did not guarantee that the townspeople isolated themselves from each other based on linguistic boundaries. The Russian visitors’ efforts to recruit multilingual workers indicated that having cultural brokers in their midst was an important consideration.

53 SKS KRA, Aune Maria Sopanen, KE Naiset 3409-3422, p. 3410-3412.
54 Common newspapers where these kinds of help wanted ads appeared included the Russian newspaper in Finland, Finländskaia gazeta, and regional Finnish newspapers Karjala and Viipurin sanomat.
55 See help wanted ads in Karjala, May 4 and May 31, 1911.
Local Commerce

The increasing number of dacha dwellers and tourists that visited the Karelian Isthmus each summer enhanced commercial opportunities in the hospitality sector. Several of the travel guides on Finland include numerous listings and advertisements of hotels in the region’s towns. One publication commented that in recent decades, thanks to the growth of the tourist industry, many hotels had sprung up in Vyborg. These hotels catered not only to visitors passing through the Karelian Isthmus on the way to other locations in Finland, but also to dacha dwellers in nearby villages who wished to spend a few days going to concerts and theaters in the larger towns. Some of these hotels were owned and operated by Russian-speaking entrepreneurs who had resettled in Finland; others by local Finnish- and Swedish-speaking businessmen looking to capitalize on expanded opportunities. These hotels in turn served as central points for other local residents to profit from the summer visitors. According to one travel description, young boys often loitered outside the hotels selling newspapers in various languages to the visitors. Nearby cafes popular with the visitors also served as places where local entertainers could earn money. Drivers and porters often gathered outside the hotels to solicit new clients. In Terijoki, a gambling house in the hotel district was a popular leisure place for dacha people. In addition to the taxes that the town received from the operation of this enterprise, the gambling house benefitted locals who operated nearby outdoor kiosks and cafes. Leisure establishments therefore served as prominent crossroads of contact between local residents and several different kinds of visitors to Finland.

56 Gusev, *Prakticheskii putevoditel’*, 23.
57 Ibid., 26-27.
The summer guests from the Russian Empire stimulated local commerce by opening shops and bringing the St. Petersburg trade closer to local Finns in the Karelian Isthmus villages and towns. Finnish businesses that existed prior to the growth of the dacha industry also profited from new clients. A number of establishments run by local Finnish residents placed advertisements in local newspapers in Vyborg and Terijoki. Some of these ads were printed in the Russian language, suggesting that these entrepreneurs actively sought Russian-speaking clients.\(^58\) The increased demands for general consumer goods also encouraged locals to operate their own stores. In 1897 there were 21 variety stores in Terijoki, of which nine were Finnish-owned and 12 were Russian-owned. By 1911, there were 16 Finnish stores and 20 Russian ones.\(^59\) As the significance of farming diminished, many more inhabitants of the Karelian Isthmus began to see trade in both agricultural and non-agricultural goods as a viable option for earning money.

One local recalled that when the dacha season started up, there was much more activity in the village markets, and one could find a much larger variety of goods in the shops.\(^60\) The rising demand for meat and dairy products in St. Petersburg proved profitable for the Finnish countryside and Finns in the Isthmus wasted no time in selling their food to Russian summer visitors. Juho Savolainen grew up in a farming family in Kivennapa. His family raised cows, and prior to the dacha boom in his village, the family sold the meat in Russian markets because customs officials did not collect duties on meat transported from Finland to Russia. By the time

\(^{58}\) For example, one sporting goods store ran ads regularly in \textit{Teriokskii dnevnik}. Other advertisements placed by Finnish businesses in that newspaper included a book store that sold stationery as well as travel guides, and some Finnish works in Russian translation.

\(^{59}\) Kähönen, \textit{Entinen Terijoki}, 34.

\(^{60}\) SKS KRA, Tilda Leskinen, interview with Elsa Pukonen, Series 1277, 1959.
Juho was old enough to take care of the family farm, dacha folk had started arriving *en masse* from Russia. He no longer saw a need to travel all the way to St. Petersburg to sell meat, and instead went to the nearby dacha hub in Terijoki, where there were plenty of customers. The expansion of the dacha industry shifted the site of business transactions in food and agriculture closer to home for many of these Finnish-speaking Karelian Isthmus villagers.

For some Karelian Isthmus residents, their variety stores turned into family enterprises in which every member of the household played an integral role. Lea Pyykkö’s family lived in Ollila, a town that received a great number of Russian-speaking visitors in the summer because of the sanatorium located there. The Russian summer visitors had brought so much revenue that by May 1918 Lea’s father owned three different shops in the town. Her mother worked as a cashier and bookkeeper for the family business, and the older children in the family helped out in cleaning and stocking the stores. Antti Leskinen’s family ran its own variety store in the early 1900s in a village near the border with Russia, and often catered to Russian clients. On visits to St. Petersburg the Leskinens bought back other consumer goods from the capital to sell at the family variety store. Maija Pihkanen, who grew up in the Uusikirkko parish district in the 1890s, recalled that her father and older brother frequently traveled to St. Petersburg to purchase clothing, foodstuffs and other goods to supply their family friend’s variety store. The presence of the dacha folk fostered a spirit of entrepreneurship among locals, both Finnish and Russian, and this environment encouraged locals to travel farther to acquire the goods that would transform their village stores into thriving businesses.

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61 SKS KRA, Bertta Lifländer, KE 44 9461-9473.
62 SKS KRA, Lea Pyykkö, KE 70, 14599-14617.
63 SKS KRA, Sirkka Karskela KE 28 5773-5985, interview with Antti Leskinen.
64 SKS KRA, Maija Pihkanen E234, interview with Elsa Pukonen.
What is remarkable about these intercultural exchanges is that they included cross cutting class and ethnic ties. Stephen Lovell has noted that dacha folk consisted of people from a range of economic and social statuses. In late nineteenth-century Russian society the growing urban population often viewed dacha-going as a symbol of middle class standing. The definition of this group, however, was fluid. The middle class included all those who “did not do physical labor or perform menial service yet were not grandees or landowning nobles,” and the income boundaries of this segment of society varied widely.65 Some Russian artists, writers, and musicians who did not receive regular wages considered themselves as part of the middle class, even though not all earned more money than the Finnish farmers and craftsmen who worked in the dacha industry. According to a study by Liisa Pyykönen, of the 1,683 Russian-owned properties in Terijoki in 1908, about 500 were owned by people of lower ranks. These people included government clerks in the imperial bureaucracy, professionals, and other office workers.66 The annual summer exodus from Russia brought different classes of people to the Karelian Isthmus.

The Russian-speaking visitors’ varied economic base meant that Finnish-Russian contacts were not limited to exchanges between people from a small economic niche. The dacha people who flocked to the Karelian Isthmus towns also brought with them Russian-speaking shopkeepers, gardeners, bakers, and other itinerant workers to fill all sorts of odd jobs. Some Finns saw these workers as competition in the service industry. Many Russian landlords preferred to employ Russians because they were willing to accept lower wages than Finnish workers. Others were not as conscious of this workplace dynamic. Herman Nylander recalled that many of the men from his village were working alongside Russians on construction projects

for wealthy land owners. Wages were decent, and workers usually got along. Gradually, though, the dacha folk came to hire more Finnish workers because the Finns had gained a reputation for producing better quality results. It was also likely that the Russian population swelled so much within such a short time that the local Finnish population simply could not supply the man power required to sustain the entire community of dacha visitors. This was especially so, given that many local Finns also sought work in the St. Petersburg industries. The arrival of Russian workers meant that there was a much wider range of cross-class interaction in Finnish-Russian economic relationships than implied in historiography.

Criminality and Social Interactions in the Dacha World

The growth of the dacha settlements in the Karelian Isthmus was accompanied by an increase in certain types of crime. Petty theft and robbery was a common occurrence in several dacha towns. One Terijoki newspaper commented on the significant presence of petty thieves in public places. The author noted that signs reading “Beware of Thieves!” used to be found only in centrally located areas and crowded places, such as at the train station and on the trams. In recent years, however, one could find these signs posted all over the town since theft and robberies were becoming more frequent. The author lamented that locals had become so accustomed to these thefts that they rarely thought anything of it, and often did not report the crimes. The writer argued that the local police should be more vigilant in their efforts to prevent robberies.

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67 SKS KRA, Herman Nylander 1270, interview with Elsa Pukonen.
68 Kähönen, Entinen Terijoki, 29.
69 Teriokskii dnevnik, September 6, 1913.
A subsequent editorial in the same newspaper also commented on the recent string of thefts in the dacha settlements. The author mentioned two incidents where thieves stole jewelry, silverware and dishware from dachas simply by climbing in through open windows at night. The commentator opined that dacha folks did not always take the necessary precautionary measures to thwart theft. He claimed that dacha folk neglected to watch out for their own safety as soon as they arrived in Finland. He attributed this factor to the reputation Finns had as honest, trustworthy people. He argued that this trait pertained only to the local Finns who had resided in the region for a long time, and not to some of the newer arrivals. It was important for dacha dwellers to keep up similar standards of precaution against theft because professional thieves also traveled throughout the dacha settlements. The writer further cautioned that robberies and other similar displays of immoral behavior could negatively affect the local people.70

These press commentaries offer significant insights on the nature of Finnish-Russian relationships from the micro to the meso level. The journalists writing about these crimes never revealed the ethnic identity or origins of the thieves, and it is not known why the writers did not make specific references to this particular detail. It is plausible that the general profile of the thieves was too varied to make any concrete statements about their identity. Nonetheless, it was implied through the articles that the thieves were not typical local residents, and it was quite possible that many of these fiends were criminals from St. Petersburg traveling through the dacha settlements along with the dacha people. In one case, a seventeen-year-old girl from Kostroma employed at a wealthy St. Petersburg couple’s dacha tried to steal valuable small items from the home, and fled after only three days of work. She was caught at the Terijoki train station and detained by local police to verify her identity before being expelled to her home.

70 Ibid., June 23, 1913.
province. Police crime registers from the Kuokkala parish town from 1908 to 1916 indicated nonetheless that there were no specific patterns to the ethnic origins of the thieves.

Vandalism of dacha property was a common petty crime where Finnish citizens tended to be the main perpetrators. One property owner from St. Petersburg notified police that when he first arrived at his dacha at the start of the summer season, he found that his garden had been trampled through, and that several of the new trees he had planted in the previous year had been uprooted. One farmer from the Kivennapa parish district was caught knocking down fences at the property of a St. Petersburg dacha owner. Local police were notified of the incident by neighboring dacha owners who apprehended the perpetrator. Since one of the witnesses was a Finnish resident, this particular case illustrated an instance where a Finnish-speaking local defended the interests of a fellow property owner from Russia. In a similar case, a Finnish worker was brought to the police for destroying the fences at the property of a Russian dacha owner. The report stated that the two men mutually agreed that the vandal would pay for the repairs. This incident is an example of Finnish and Russian neighbors resolving a conflict through mutual agreement rather than an externally imposed solution. These examples suggested that in some tense situations, neighbors were able to negotiate through their differences.

Some of the skirmishes and scuffles between Finnish- and Russian-speaking residents in the Karelian Isthmus related more to alcohol-induced revelry and petty personal rivalries than to interethnic hostility. Russian military servicemen from nearby bases often stayed in local villages

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71 Ibid., June 30, 1913.
72 See MMA Teri joen nimismiespiirin Kuokkalan poliisiaseman arkisto, IV Ab1 to IV Ab6.
73 Ibid., IV Ab2, April 26, 1911.
74 Ibid., IV Ab3, October 24, 1913.
75 Ibid., IV Ab2, March 17, 1911.
when they were on leave. They explored the Karelian countryside and consorted with local women. Young, prosperous Finnish men sometimes also sought the company of Russian women who came with their families to the Karelian Isthmus towns during the summer. For the most part, this brought Finnish and Russian families and friends together. Elena Dubrovskaya has commented that Finns and Russians participated in local celebrations together, and marriages between Russian military personnel and local Finnish women were not uncommon. \textsuperscript{76} Other times, this resulted in brawls between Russian and Finnish youths. In one case documented by the Kuokkala police, three Russian cadets from a military training facility got into a fight with a Finnish-speaking youth. The cadets were on their way to visit a local Finnish girl when they saw a young Finnish man with one of their Russian female acquaintances. Witnesses reported that the cadets were intoxicated, and provoked an attack on the young Finn. \textsuperscript{77} Although there appeared to be an ethnic element to this incident, it was likely equally provoked by the individuals’ alcohol consumption and temperament. Yet these were the very kinds of incidents that newspapers claimed as cases of interethnic tension. During the First World War, for example, the Finnish press claimed that Russian soldiers stationed in Finland behave crudely, and caused disturbances in the city streets with their public drunkenness. \textsuperscript{78} These sorts of press reports contributed to negative stereotyping of Russian men as alcoholic troublemakers.


\textsuperscript{77} MMA Terijoen nimismiespiirin Kellomäen poliisiaseman arkisto (Terijoki Parish District Sheriff’s Office Police Archives for Kellomäki) PAIII Aa3, May 16, 1913.

\textsuperscript{78} Dubrovskaya, “Rossiiskie voenoslushashchee i naselenie velikogo kniazhestva Finliandskogo,” 274-275.
One of the unintended consequences of the yearly dacha exodus was that the underground sales in alcohol flourished. Prohibition was a policy that the majority of Finnish political parties supported, and on several occasions between 1907 and 1914 the Finnish Senate had tried to pass legislation banning the import and sale of hard liquor in Finland. Each time, the bills failed to translate into law. 79 Nonetheless, police and inspectors in Finland attempted to regulate the sale of hard liquor. However, in spite of these attempts to curb alcoholism, one Russian newspaper noted that based on official sales records, alcohol consumption in Finland was still quite high. Beyond authorized alcohol sales, many Finns living in the countryside near the border purchased alcohol through the informal market. 80

Since visitors from Russia often brought liquor with them when they came to visit the Karelian Isthmus towns, some unscrupulous individuals soon discovered that they could make money in Finland by selling their extra bottles to the locals. Police records in the Isthmus towns were filled with reports of public drunkenness and alcohol trafficking. The range of alcohol smuggling related offences included transporting a few extra bottles of liquor that dacha people claimed as refreshments for holiday celebrations, to instances where a ring of people organized large scale illegal alcohol sales. 81 Some of these episodes were simply the result of overly rowdy celebrations on the part of the Russian-speaking residents, as was the case when a police constable in Kuokkala detained a Russian worker and his wife who were intoxicated in the

80 Rossiia, April 9, 1910.
81 MMA Terijoen Nimismiespiirin Kuokkalan poliisiaseman arkisto IV Ab1, No. 42, April 16, 1908, and No. 49, April 30, 1908.
streets in the early hours of the morning. Sometimes these cases escalated in public disorder when intoxicated workers got into scuffles with each other.

It is tempting to assume that the erosion of social mores that accompanied the hustle and bustle of the dacha season irked the Finnish population in these small towns and did much to turn the locals against the seasonal visitors. However, both Russians and Finns participated in illicit alcohol sales and smuggling of spirits from the Russian to the Finnish side of the border. Police records indicated that the same relative proportion of Finns and Russians, based on their percentage of the population, were fined for alcohol-related public disturbances. There was also an even balance of Russians and Finns as witnesses to these incidents. Although there were some instances of Finnish workers and peasants testifying against their employers or landlords for smuggling, there were no discernable patterns suggesting that Finns accused only Russians of being unruly and vice versa. Some individuals may have been compelled by their ethnically based prejudices to lodge complaints against neighbors who did not share a common language and culture. However, it is just as plausible that petty economic grievances and individual pride, rather than ethnic hatred, were the main catalysts for these complaints. Miscommunication leading to minor disputes occurred in a variety of settings, but when these altercations involved people of different cultural backgrounds, these incidents enticed the nationalist press to attribute these skirmishes to interethnic hostilities, even though individuals involved in the disputes were not particularly motivated by ethnic issues.

82 Ibid., IV Ab1, No. 32, August 22, 1908.
83 Ibid., IV Ab1, No. 33, August 30, 1908.
84 MMA Terijoen Nimismiespiirin Kuokkalan poliisiaseman arkisto IV Ab1, No. 53, May 10, 1908. In one police report, a worker claimed that his Russian employer sold four bottles of spirits to other workers.
The dacha settlements located in parish towns in the Karelian Isthmus at the end of the nineteenth century were neither idyllic sites of multicultural cooperation, nor were they battlefields for open conflict between people of different cultural backgrounds. Depending on the local context, the interactions varied. The rapid development of Russian dacha culture in these towns and the influx of seasonal visitors to the region disrupted the local social and environmental landscape, and were genuine sources of conflict and hostility between local Finnish-speaking inhabitants and visitors from Russia. However, the mixing of people and lifestyles also created ample economic and cultural opportunities for both Finnish and Russian speakers in the region. These points of contacts suggested that people in these diverse towns did not always see themselves as belonging to strictly defined social categories. They crossed social boundaries frequently, and in doing so, they challenge the notion of singular, fixed identities.
Chapter 3 – Cultural Bridge Building through the Dacha

The dacha is both a social and cultural phenomenon. In the dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus, various forms of culture played a significant part in turning these places into sites of complex social interaction. This notion carries diverse meanings in multiple contexts. In Finland, the cultural sphere facilitated bridge-building between Finnish and Russian speakers. However, it also fostered insularity, and was at times manipulated to create and reinforce negative stereotypes of the “other.”

Culture is important for the study of interethnic contact because it informs us of the way people see themselves in relation to others. The juxtaposition of the “self” and the “other” is manifested through cultural symbols, since “the ‘identity work’ of nationalism is produced in a social discourse and in symbolic interaction with different Others.”¹ This quest for Russian identity is further convoluted by the multinational nature of the Russian Empire, which had a profound effect on the way Russians conceptualized nation. They used the term rossisskii to denote an imperial identity, but associated the term russkii with an ethno-cultural sense of Russianness. These two concepts, however, were not mutually exclusive. Indeed, as Olga Maiorova argues, Russians often found it difficult to separate themselves from the language of empire: “Empire was a stage where the Russian people’s historical drama unfolded…It served to reinforce rather than to obliterate Russian national identity.”² Since Russians also defined themselves in relation to other Russians, cultural practices are important indicators of how

² Olga Maiorova, From the Shadow of Empire: Defining the Russian Nation through Cultural Mythology, 1855-1870 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), 5-6.
notions of groupness and belonging have been socially constructed in the broader search for ethno-national identity.³

The habit of defining the self against the other resonated not only in ethno-national terms, but also in social terms. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, changing social hierarchies also complicated the notion of Russian identity. The social and political reforms that began during the Petrine era and continued through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to the erosion of the nobility’s power, privilege and prestige, and the increasing presence of social groups that did not fit the estate system. The raznochintsy, or people of various rank, embodied the permeability of social categories in late imperial Russia. Social representations depicted this group in multiple ways: as ambiguously defined social elements among the lower urban classes, as folks that were neither peasant nor noble, and as non-noble but educated commoners.⁴ The fluidity of social identity contributed to anxieties in fin-de-siècle Russian society, necessitating the need to seek the roots of identity through the construction of otherness. In particular, the emergence of two ambiguously defined middle groups, the petty bourgeoisie (meshchanstvo) and the intelligentsia, was at the heart of social discord. The meshchanstvo emerged as an amorphous group encompassing the lower urban strata such as artisans, laborers in skilled trades, and later came to include professionals and merchants. The intelligentsia, a self-defined group of intellectuals that saw itself as a “spiritual heir to the aristocratic traditions…aristocratic in spirit and poor in means” came to see the meshchanstvo, who belonged neither to the aristocracy nor

⁴ Elise Wirtschafter, Structures of Society: Imperial Russia’s “People of Various Ranks” (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994), 93.

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the peasantry, as a group that undermined the romanticized common ideal. Commentary on the social “other” became a constant theme in the literary discourse in the late nineteenth century.

Examining the dacha zone through a cultural lens allows us to consider how Russians saw the dacha communities in Finland as specifically Russian spaces, and how these spaces embodied the ideals and aspirations of the middle class. Moreover, what did this envisioning of Russian middle class space mean when intellectuals constantly criticized middle class values associated with everyday life as being radically non-Russian? As Vera Tolz has argued, part of the confusion about Russian identity stems from the fact that “the limits of the Russian national community could not be defined with certainty due to the country’s vastness and its continuing expansion.” Since many educated Russians were well aware of Finland’s unique autonomous status and the circumstances behind which it was incorporated into the Russian Empire, it is difficult to claim that Russians generally saw Finland as an organic part of their national community. At the same time, as I have argued in the first chapter, the expansion of the dacha spaces into Finland and the common perception of the dacha area as a suburban outreach of

7 Finnish and Swedish speakers also have their own summertime cottage cultures, and they value the summer cottage as an important aspect of respite while appreciating the wonders of the northern natural environment. However, it is rather difficult to speak of such thing as a summer cottage community. Finnish and Scandinavian peoples tend to build their summertime cottages far away from urban civilization. They also prefer to retreat to remote areas where they are not likely to encounter many other people. The isolation of cottage living in Finland is well illustrated in Finnish novelist Tove Jansson’s 1972 work, The Summer Book, trans. Thomas Teal (New York: New York Review Books Classics, 2008).
8 Boym, 68.
9 Vera Tolz, Russia: Inventing the Nation (London: Arnold, 2001), 164.
Russian cities mean that it is not entirely preposterous to consider whether some Russians saw these towns and villages in Finland as part of Russian space. The notion of Russian space should thus be situated in several different contexts beyond geopolitical boundaries. National, imperial, and transcultural dimensions are important because addressing space in these contexts gives us multiple lenses through which to examine Russia’s interaction with other cultures. The dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus embodied all of these contexts. The dacha, as Steven Lovell argues, is a specifically Russian social and cultural symbol of the aspiring middle class. It can have an imperial dimension because of its incursion into territories of people who did not see themselves as truly belonging to the Russian polity. It is also transcultural because it brings people of different ethnonational, religious and class backgrounds into contact with each other.

This chapter treats culture and leisure in the same analytical plane because the two concepts combined reveal the interstices between the everyday and the extraordinary. It also prompts us to consider territorial space not just in terms of the national, but also in terms of social hierarchy. The idea of the everyday as a concept emerged from secularization in a modernizing context, and it is also connected to the emergence of the middle class. It is, as Svetlana Boym describes, “amorphous, unformed and informal, yet it is also the most conservative mode of preservation of forms and formalities.” Changing personal perceptions of middle class identities in fin-de-siècle Russian urban society went in tandem with changes in economic and political structures. Leisure – how people enjoyed themselves outside of the

context of work – offered people opportunities to imagine their roles in public and private life, thus shaping individuals’ relationship to society. In the nineteenth century, the concept of culture also changed from an aristocratic social convention to common entertainment for the masses. For example, the notion of the traveler as a nobleman journeying to far-away lands for intellectual pursuit transformed into an image of the commercial tourists whose experience of distant lands varied from that of their aristocratic predecessors. Leisure also broadened the cultural sphere to include a wide range of public spaces beyond the theater and the opera house. Theatrical journals proliferated because of increased mass interest in the theater. The blending of culture and leisure means that it important to address leisure as another aspect of everyday life alongside the concept of work.

The assumption that the dacha was primarily a Russian summertime leisure pursuit thus leads to the further question of whether the dacha should be accepted as a part of everyday living. Melissa Caldwell has argued that Anton Chekhov’s literary works at the end of the nineteenth century appealed to a broad spectrum of readers, among his contemporaries and among modern-day readers, because his work dealt with the social issues reflected in the everyday lives of ordinary folk with humor. He used dachas as a recurring setting in his work to

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14 Ibid., 9 and 26. The critique of leisure as a part of middle class culture has loose parallels in non-Russian cases. In Victorian Britain, leisure was part of a larger contested cultural space that revealed social and political rifts. According to Mike J. Huggins, the Victorian middle classes fostered the notion of respectability as a response to fears of the moral misuse of leisure. However, this fear was targeted more at the workforce as well as at middle class youths than at themselves. One of the main concerns in Victorian literature was the young unmarried male spending time away from home where there were allegedly more opportunities to engage in sinful behavior and hedonistic life. See Mike J. Huggins, “More Sinful Pleasures? Leisure, Respectability and the Male Middle Classes in Victorian England,” *Journal of Social History*, vol. 33, no.3 (Spring 2000), 586 and 590.
critique common social issues such as serf emancipation, industrialization and urbanization, and the class tensions that resulted from these socio-economic changes. Caldwell contends that both Chekhov and his contemporary, Maxim Gorky, displayed “shrewd awareness that dachas belong to the realm of ordinary life, and as such are not immune to trials and conflicts that crop up elsewhere in the course of everyday activities.”\textsuperscript{15} The dacha was a setting for summertime respite in fin-de-siècle Russia, but it was by no means an extraordinary retreat to isolationism from all vestiges of “normal” urban living. Chekhov’s 1885 short story “Dachniki” illustrates this aspect of dacha life. In this story, young newlyweds, Varia and Sasha, are taking a stroll near the railway platform of their dacha town. They are admiring the tranquility of summertime village life of the dacha to which they have escaped for the summer. A train approaches, carrying the couple’s entire extended family who had decided to make an unannounced visit to the newlyweds’ dacha. The two realize in horror that their idyllic summertime retreat to marital bliss would be completely disrupted.\textsuperscript{16} The dacha is thus a setting where those who engaged in activities associated with dacha life encountered the full spectrum of rural and urban everyday experiences.\textsuperscript{17}

Clifford Geertz defines culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward

\textsuperscript{15} Melissa Caldwell, \textit{Dacha Idylls: Living Organically in Russia’s Countryside} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 30 and 33.


\textsuperscript{17} Caldwell, \textit{Dacha Idylls}, 46.
life.” In this chapter, culture is broadly defined to reflect the multiple symbols and experiences that shaped community identities. It consists of theater, literature, music and art. It includes folk festivals and other forms of popular entertainment. It also refers to public institutions that inculcate a sense of shared identity and community, such as churches, schools, and voluntary associations. Together, these different forms of cultural expression serve as an arena where individuals turn the imagined components in Benedict Anderson’s definition of the national community into lived experiences and processes. The various ways in which people in the dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus experienced culture allow us to analyze how culture can serve as a bridge that linked diverse groups together and simultaneously functioned as a wall that further divided them.

Artistic Intelligentsia in Finland

The Russian artistic and literary elite had significant ties in Finland throughout the nineteenth century. Liisa Byckling has noted that in the major urban centers in Finland, Russian theater gained popularity among Finnish audiences with the establishment of the Alexander Theater in Helsinki in 1880 and the Finnish Regional Theater (Suomalainen maaseututeatteri). Finnish and Russian educated elites mixed in these settings, and enriched the cultural

19 Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (London: Verso, 1991), 6. Simon Franklin and Emma Widdis argue that while it is fair to characterize notions such as identity and culture as social constructs that are created through imagination, it is important not to dismiss these concepts as not real. The texts, images and sounds that lead to the imagined identities and cultures are nonetheless real, lived aspects of peoples’ lives, and thus they are real, cultural facts. See “All the Russias…?” in *National Identity in Russian Culture*, 2-3.
atmosphere. Ben Hellman has commented that the 1870s and 1880s was a fruitful time for the introduction of Russian literature to the Finnish readership, since Finns born in Russia began translating works by Pushkin and Gogol. Leo Tolstoi’s personal circle of friends included Finnish novelist Juhani Aho, artist Akseli Gallen-Kalella, and the Järnefelts, a family of prominent Finnish writers, artists and musicians. Finland’s most well-known composer, Jean Sibelius, grew up near a Russian military garrison in Tavasterhus (Finnish: Hämeenlinna), a city in central Finland, and professed that Russian influences were a significant part of his childhood. His first violin teacher, for example, was Mitrofan Wasilieff, a Russian musician from the Imperial String Quartet in St. Petersburg who came to teach at the Helsinki Music Institute. Although Finnish politics was mired by divisive debates about the extent to which imperial governance intruded upon Finnish national development, people in the cultural sphere were much more receptive to cosmopolitan influences. Russian ideas were among many different inspirations in Finnish cultural circles. The escalating tensions between Russia and Finland,

according to Philip Ross Bullock, “did not necessarily impede cultural contacts between the two countries. Indeed, such contacts were indicative of a shared disdain for Russian autocracy.”

With the growth of St. Petersburg, many inhabitants from the bustling imperial capital increasing looked westward towards Finland in search of their ideal summertime homes. A number of writers, artists and musicians purchased property in the Karelian Isthmus, and spent their summers and weekends there nurturing their creative work. The Karelian Isthmus towns were hugely popular among the St. Petersburg artistic and literary elite and served as a meeting place for Finnish and Russian artistic figures, since the beautiful scenery inspired the creative intelligentsia. Hannes Sihvo has remarked that even prior to the dacha boom in the last decade of the nineteenth century, the natural beauty of the region appealed to St. Petersburgers. He characterized the Karelian Isthmus as “a veritable paradise, close to the metropolis,” with “a lasting impression on the history of Russian art, especially modernism.” In this sense, it is appropriate to examine space as the objective reality of the physical environment. As Mark Bassin, Christopher Ely and Melissa Stockdale have argued, the real existing features of the physical environment were often loaded with strongly emotive significance, and they evoked attitudes that strongly affected one’s attitude and behavior. The growth of these seaside dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus thus contributed significantly to the dialogue between the Finnish and Russian artistic intelligentsia, which was already well established by the end of the nineteenth century. The Karelian Isthmus and its Finnish inhabitants were frequently referenced in Russian cultural works. The Imatra waterfalls was the subject of one of Ilya Repin’s paintings.

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One of the protagonists in Anton Chekhov’s 1897 play *Uncle Vanya*, Professor Serebriakov, mentions buying a small dacha in Finland with some of his remaining funds.\(^{27}\)

Playwright and novelist Leonid Andreev was among the group of prolific creative figures who owned property near these seaside dacha communities in Finland. In the summer of 1907, he purchased a small plot of land near Vammelsuu, a village located just outside the main dacha settlement at Terijoki. He also purchased a small field from a neighboring peasant as a vegetable garden. On his plot of land, he built a house with a stone foundation. He moved there in May 1908 with his son Vadim, even though the construction of the house was not yet fully completed.\(^{28}\) Unlike the dacha folk though, his stay at this property was more than just for summertime or weekend leisure. From 1908 on, Leonid Andreev stayed at his home in Vammelsuu semi-permanently. The environment at that location gave him great inspiration. Vadim recalled in his memoir that this home gave off an air of grandiosity. The home was an inspiring place to cultivate one’s artistic senses, and everyone who visited Andreev’s home in Vammelsuu was inspired to write or take on other creative endeavors. Vadim’s tutor, for example, was an aspiring writer who lived with the Andreevs in Vammelsuu for two years in order to nurture his creative talents.\(^{29}\)

The high number of established and aspiring writers, artists and musicians from Russia who visited their properties in Finland each summer made the Karelian Isthmus dacha communities an ideal location for informal gatherings among the artistic intelligentsia. Ilya


\(^{28}\) Vadim Andreev, *Detstvo: Povest’* (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1963), 33. In his Finnish property contract dated June 3/16, 1907, a larger plot of land in the area was divided among Andreev and three other Finnish landowners. RGALI, f.11, op.5, d.9, l.1.

\(^{29}\) Andreev, *Detstvo: Povest’*, 38-9.
Repin, who purchased a plot of land by the shores of the Gulf of Finland near the Kuokkala railway station, built a house that he named the Penates. During the span of his stay in Kuokkala, he hosted countless guests from the Russian artistic and intellectual community. His grandson jokingly remarked in his recollection about life at the Penates that “at the Kuokkala train station, there were not enough cab drivers: they were all snapped up by guests at the Penates. Rich and poor, near or far, they were taken in by the host of the house.”  

Until 1914, Repin hosted numerous artistic evenings for his circle of friends. These creative minds spent many hours sharing their opinions on recent theatrical productions and literary works. Vadim Andreev also recalled visiting Maxim Gorky at the latter’s family’s dacha in Neuvola, another nearby Finnish village where Russians built summer houses. The young Andreev had also met Kornei Chukovsky at one of Repin’s gatherings. In 1908, Chukovsky started renting a house near Repin’s villa, and Repin extended invitations for his intellectual gatherings to his new

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31 Ibid., 400.
33 Ibid., 116-117.
neighbor. Through these summer visits to Kuokkala, Repin and Chukovsky got acquainted with each other and with other artists and intellectuals that Repin often invited to his residence.

The remarkable artistic collective in the Karelian Isthmus dacha communities is well documented in Lydia Chukovskaia’s memoir about her childhood in Kuokkala. The Repin and Chukovsky families lived in the same area and had a very close connection with each other. She remembered that she and her brothers passed notes between her father and Ilya Repin almost every day. She wrote that her father “couldn’t spend a single day without literature, without the society of artistic and literary friends,” and his house at Kuokkala was the center of his artistic and literary universe, where he had gotten acquainted with prominent Russian artistic figures. According to Chukovskaia, her father was treated like a member of the Repin household at Penates. Guests at the Repin household often visited the Chukovsky family later the same day, and vice versa. These same guests often visited other artist and writers’ households, where they discussed the current political and social atmosphere for artistic expression. Chukovskaia’s memoir reflects a very nostalgic view of life in the Karelian Isthmus villages.

34 Repin also sought to have his group of artists and intellectuals meet in locations other than his dacha. He described his intentions for establishing a circle (kruzhok) of debaters among the dacha folk in Kuokkala. He planned for the group to meet once a month on the first Sunday at a local guest house. He did not require for participants to prepare essays or presentations, but he wished to discuss literature, art, philosophy and even politics during these meetings. See letter from Repin to Chukovskii, July 6, 1909, in Repin I.E., Chukovskii K.I. Perepiska, 1906-1929 (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006), 30.
37 Ibid., 59.
Temira Pachmuss has commented in her work on Russian writers in Finland that the 1840s was the high point of friendly cultural relations between Finns and Russians in the realm of high culture. Russian nobility often exchanged visits with prominent members of the Finnish-Swedish aristocracy, and high ranking Russian officers often attended Finnish balls.\textsuperscript{38} However, as the propaganda efforts in Finland for resisting Russian rule increased, negative attitudes of some Finns towards anything associated with Russia created insurmountable tensions between Finns and Russians. The more the Finns disparaged Russian life and culture, the more Russian speakers resented the Finns and saw them as a rebellious people who were ungrateful for the significant Russian contributions to the development of Finnish culture. Pachmuss writes, “The Finns, in turn, were offended by this behavior, which resulted in criticism by the Russians of them.”\textsuperscript{39} Pachmuss attributes this tension to some Russian elites’ sense of isolation in Finland, especially after 1917 when Finland seceded from the defunct Russian Empire, and local politics became increasingly hostile towards Russian emigrants.\textsuperscript{40}

Pachmuss’ observations only provide a partial view of Russian experiences in Finland. The vibrant dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus indicated that not all Russian artists and writers in Finland felt the same sense of isolation at all times. Many of the Russian artistic intelligentsia in Finland directly contributed to a lively theater and arts culture in Finland. This culture was accessible not only to the artistic elite, but to the wider public as well. The summer season in Terijoki and other Finnish towns that had a strong presence of dacha folk were packed with public performances such as plays, operas, and concerts. These events were advertised in

\textsuperscript{38} Temira Pachmuss, \textit{A River of Moving Tears: Russia’s Experience in Finland} (New York: Peter Lang, 1992), 5.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 13-14.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 172.
the Russian-language newspaper in Finland, *Finliandskaia gazeta*, St. Petersburg publications about the dacha zones in Finland such as *Teriokskii dnevnik*, local and regional Finnish newspapers such as *Karjala* and *Viipurin sanomat*, and major newspapers in the St. Petersburg region such as *Sankt Peterburgskie vedomosti* and *Novoe vremia*. There was no lack of cultural events for Russian speakers to attend, and Finnish speakers knew about opportunities to participate in Russian cultural developments.

Some Russian writers and observers were well aware of developments in Finnish cultural life, and wrote about them in Russian journals and newspapers. One newspaper article in a publication catering to the dacha communities commented on the significance of folk poetry in the development of Finnish culture. The columnist discussed the Kalevala, linguist Elias Lönnrot’s compilation and translation of a series of folk stories in the Karelian region that came to be known as Finland’s epic, as a significant part of the “Golden Age” of Finnish folk culture. He argued that the Finnish people’s love of music and folk poetry had not waned within recent years. He used the first song festival in Jyväskylä, an eastern Finnish town, in 1886 as an example of the recent proliferation of interest in the cultural life of peasant folk in Finland.41 In one Russian language journal devoted to Finnish studies, a reader’s letter to the editor of the journal called for more linguistic specialists to examine Finnish manuscripts so that scholars could investigate specific links between Finnish and Russian vocabulary.42 Some publications also reviewed Finnish literary works, and commented on the relationship between these works and Finnish life. One such review discussed fictional works by Finnish writers about the Finnish peasantry. The reviewer mentioned the pattern in Finnish literary works for discussing Finnish

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41 *Teriokski dnevnik*, “Finliandskie pevecheskie prazniki,” June 9, 1913.
peasants and their aspirations to own more land. He commented on the way some of these works depicted Finnish peasants as simple folk, while juxtaposing the peasantry with the cunning merchants. This review showed that some Russian observers were aware of the social cleavages in Finnish society and the stereotypes Finns perpetuated about each other. 43

Finns and Russians also made honest efforts to promote understanding of each other through cultural events. One such event was the Finnish song festival held in Terijoki in June 1913. According to one Russian newspaper, the song festival’s purpose was to promote peasant folk culture in Finland, and generate pride in the cultural life of peasants in Finland. Additionally, Karelian peasants were also scheduled to perform and showcase various aspects of their culture. To generate more interest in Finnish folk culture, festival organizers had arranged for Finnish musicians, singers and dancers who were renowned in Europe to perform. Although the festival was aimed at the local Finnish population and promised to celebrate their lives, the Russian author of this article about the folk festival commented that the event should catch the attention of the dacha folk. 44

44 Teriokskii dnevnik, “Finskie pevcheskie, muzykal’nye sportivnye prazdnestva,” June 9, 1913.

It is important to point out that the newspaper article describing this festival distinguished between Finnish and Karelian folk culture. The study of ethnography of the peoples in the Russian Empire proliferated in the latter half of the nineteenth century, thanks to the efforts of the Russian Geographical Society. Maria Leskinen has noted that Russian ethnographers who studied Karelians were careful to differentiate Karelian from Finnish peasant culture, and this distinction was noted in popular ethnographic publications. For examples, ethnographers often commented on some of the similarities between Karelian peasant culture and Russian peasant culture in the northwestern reaches of the Russian empire. They noted that many Karelian peasants, similar to Russians, followed the Orthodox faith, while Finnish peasants mostly followed the Lutheran faith. See “Suomalaisen kuva 1800-luvun lopun populaareissa etnografisissa esityksissä,” in Monikasvoinen Suomi: Venäläisten mielikuvia Suomesta ja suomalaisista, ed. Olga Iljuha, Aleksei Tsamutali and Timo Vihavainen (Helsinki: Edita, 2009), 60-61.
Russian elites also participated in their share of promoting Russian cultural events that bridged the gap between Russian and Finnish speakers. One group of Russian playwrights, artists and performers even organized their own Russian summer theater in Finland. In the spring of 1912, this group, which included symbolist artist Nikolai Sapunov, theater director Vsevolod Meyerhold, and writer Aleksandr Blok, wanted to honor Swedish playwright and novelist August Strindberg, who had recently died in May that year. The group chose Terijoki as the location for their independent theater because it was a place that was easy for many from among the Russian artistic elite to reach. Additionally, Finland had the added advantage of having a close relationship with Sweden. The members observed that a good number of improvisation theater troupes performed there.\(^{45}\) The group chose a casino as the site of their theater. A local Finnish-Swedish businessman, V.I. Jonker knew some members of this group, and leased out this property to the theater group for a portion of the profit from ticket sales. He did so even though the group had forewarned him that this theater was only meant as an experiment, and would not generate significant revenue from shows put on for the dacha public. The group nonetheless had a good impression of Jonker, and formed an amicable working relationship with him in their endeavors to establish their theater.\(^{46}\) This example of artistic endeavors demonstrates the significance of intercultural contacts.

For almost a month after initial plans were made for this summer theater, the members of the group planned and rehearsed performances in St. Petersburg, even though many of the directors and performers lived in the dachas in Finland. Almost all participants in the organizing

\(^{45}\) V.A. Piast, *Vstrechi* (Moscow: Izdatel’svo federatsiia, 1929), 235. Vladimir Alekseevich Piast was a poet and translator who was also one of the summer theater organizers.

\(^{46}\) V.P. Verigina, *Vospominaniiia* (Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo iskusstvo Leningradskoe otdelenie, 1974), 174. Valentina Petrovna Verigina was an actress who participated in the Terijoki summer theater.
group, however, agreed to move to Terijoki during the summer, and together they rented a dacha where they could all live together to discuss their craft. 47 Meyerhold, one of the key organizers of the group initially was reluctant to live with the rest of the summer theater collective in Terijoki. In the end, however, he agreed to make the move, as long as the rest of this group consented to his coming and going from the dacha as he pleased. 48 Living in the dacha for the entire summer, the novelists, playwrights and performers developed a sense of camaraderie and created a tight knit artistic and literary community in the dacha settlement. Even long after the production had finished, Sapunov remained in Terijoki. In this sense, these intellectuals participated in the construction of their own community.

The theater’s opening performance was scheduled for July 14, 1912. The event was well publicized in local newspapers as well as in newspapers and journals in St. Petersburg. As a result, many guests and members of the audience came from St. Petersburg to attend the opening performance, and the grand opening of the theater was celebrated among the Russian community in Finland, local Finnish residents in Terijoki, and Russians in St. Petersburg. 49 After the premier, many St. Petersburg publications reviewed the performance, and the feedback was mostly positive. One editorial even commented that the theater group had managed to generate enough interest to fill almost the entire concert hall! 50 Cultural performances like these were common in the Karelian Isthmus, especially during the summertime. These events added an element of elite culture to the simple pace of life in the dacha communities.

47 Piast, Vstrechi, 236.
48 Verigina, Vospominaniia, 178.
49 Piast, Vstrechi, 239.
50 Verigina, Vospominaniia, 179.
Interestingly, this artistic culture as a lived experience did not necessarily always draw Russian speakers closer together. The dacha is therefore an interesting setting for discussing social divisions among Russian-speakers in general. Some of these Russian artists and writers did not consider themselves to be dacha folk, even though they lived in communities that were heavily dominated by dacha people. Russians like Chukovsky and Repin, who had no ancestral ties to the region but nonetheless considered both their residences in the Karelian Isthmus and in Russia to be their homes, were reluctant to be considered dacha folk. The boundaries between the dacha people and Russian speakers who lived in Finland permanently were blurred precisely because of the fact that some dacha people came to be long term residents and established permanent households in Finland.

Some Russians like Chukovsky and Repin, who lived in Finland year-round, developed an animosity towards the seasonal visitors from Russia and preferred not to associate with them. According to Lydia Chukovskaia, the contrast between families like hers and the dacha-going families who lived in Kuokkala only during the summer was “the idleness of the dachniks and the intense busyness of Kornei Ivanovich, his friends and acquaintances.” She made a very sharp distinction between the leisure activities of the artistic intelligentsia and the common dacha folk. She commented that poetry recitations, seaside visits, and outdoor strolls were leisure activities that her father and his friends did in order to enrich the mind. These activities “in no way resembled the diversions of the dachniks, especially the ladies, who could spend whole days on the beach turning themselves from one side to the other with complete seriousness…then in the evenings parade back and forth on the station platform in expectation of unexpected
meetings.” This disdain for the dacha people reveals a noticeable divide between the artistic elite and the petty bourgeoisie (*meshchanstvo*).

The gulf between the petty bourgeoisie among the dacha folk and artistic people who sought inspiration from the dacha setting reflected the anxieties that the growth of mass consumer culture in the urban milieu provoked. The unsettling awareness that the old order of the estate system no longer matched the economic realities of nineteenth-century urban society also accompanied the proliferation of mass consumerism. By the end of the century, the merchant category had emerged as a potential harbinger of social change. Those who classified as merchants came from multiple old estates, including both peasants and the petty bourgeoisie. While social change was unfolding in Russia, there were still many obstacles to real social mobility, including the conservative outlook of the wealthier merchants and the former nobility who eschewed the changes that could erode their prestige in society. Intellectuals distrusted new cultural forms that emerged with these social changes in society, namely, mass consumerism and mass entertainment. They saw the emergence of these cultural forms as phenomena that eroded moral pursuits of elite culture and disrupted the stereotypical image of unadulterated folk (*narod*) culture.

The dacha, as a cultural institution that was heavily associated with the growing and variegated middle class, was heavily criticized by some members of the elite because the spread of dacha life dovetailed with wider social changes that made values of urban life much more

51 Chukovskaia, *To the Memory of Childhood*, 58.
ubiquitous. Steven Lovell has noted that the dacha both stood apart from and was a part of urban recreation. He has commented that popular dacha magazines often featured advice columns on home improvement and home décor, gossip reports, and boulevard press stories of sexual exploits with locals. In other words, the dacha “predisposed city folk to relaxation, diversion and domestic consumption.”54 Julie Buckler has noted that dacha life before the 1840s was mainly associated with the elite as part of this group’s creative leisure environment. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the dacha began to stand more sharply against the notion of the proper country estate. The dacha became associated in periodical literature with the urban, commercial contamination of rustic peasant life.55

The intelligentsia’s critique of the divide between the growing group of professional people who aspired to achieve the middle class dacha lifestyle and the working people of social orders is also evident in fin-de-siècle Russian literature. Maxim Gorky’s play Summerfolk (Dachniki) lampoons the stereotypical frivolous dacha folk who waste their summers away trying to keep up with the trivial conventions of middle-class living. Gorky commented on this social divide through the lens of the disdain that local townspeople of the working order held towards the dacha folk. In Act II of the play, the two watchmen, Pustobaika and Kropilkin, observe the new cohort of dacha folk who have arrived at the Bassoff family’s summer house. Pustobaika complains of the dull homogeneity of city folk who flock to the countryside estates in droves during the summer time: “Summerfolk are all alike. I have seen hosts of them, these five years. To me they are like bubbles in a puddle of water, they swell and burst.” Pustobaika and Kropilkin also mock the dacha-goers’ pathetic attempts at staging a performance:

54 Lovell, Summerfolk, 98.
55 Julie Buckler, Mapping St. Petersburg, 169 and 171.
Kropilkin: I never saw the gentry act. I suppose it’s funny? Have you seen them?
Pustobaika: Yes, many times. I have seen many sights.
Kropilkin: How do they do it?
Pustobaika: Very simply. They dress up in other men’s clothes and say – all sorts of things, – just what suits them best. – They shout and bustle about as though they were doing some work – they make believe they’re angry and deceive one another. One makes believe he’s honest, – another that he’s clever, or unhappy…Whatever suits ‘em, they act. 56

Later in Act IV, Pustobaika continues to chastise the dacha folk for their lack of civility and their utter disregard for maintaining a minimum standard of public behavior: “Look at this rubbish! Heathens! Just like drunks, these summerfolks! Wherever they go they clutter up; but it is for the likes of us to pick up after them.” 57 Gorky demonstrated through the literary medium how in the dacha places, people can share physical spaces yet live significantly varied lives.

The emergence of the distinction between dacha folk and other Russian-speakers in Finland indicates that experiences of social and cultural life in Finland were never static but always changing. This contrasting description of the artistic intelligentsia and the common dacha folk also reveals that the mental divide among Russians of different social backgrounds was further perpetuated by the dacha setting. This divide is related to the concept of byt and the intelligentsia’s interpretation of it as the equivalent of frivolous domesticity and a mark of the idle, private sphere lifestyle of the petty bourgeoisie. As Catriona Kelly has argued, “Russian intellectuals themselves understood their ascetic intolerance of byt as egalitarian, as a gesture of solidarity between the intelligentsia and the working class.” For writers of humble background like Chukovsky, the pettiness and frivolity of the bourgeois dacha folk was a contrast to constant

57  Ibid., 86.
intellectual productivity. Russians themselves were just as efficient as Finns at stereotyping the lives of the thousands of dacha people who visited the Karelian Isthmus each year. The dacha folk formed their own community in the Karelian Isthmus, but the Russian artistic intelligentsia also formed their enclave in that setting.

Institutions and Associations

As the dacha settlements in the Karelian Isthmus became more reputable as an ideal leisure home location, and as Russians began staying longer in the Finnish towns and villages, they began to make more concrete plants to establish their own cultural institutions. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Society for the Improvement of Kuokkala (Obshchestvo blagoustroistva Kuokkala) was a popular civic association among the dacha folk. Many members of the Russian artistic community belonged to this society, and used this society to develop social ties with the local Finnish- and Swedish-speaking population. Natalia Nordman-Severova, Repin’s companion, encouraged Chukovsky to join this association when the writer first thought of moving to Kuokkala in 1908. Dacha people established many other community institutions

58 Catriona Kelly, “Byt: Identity and Everyday Life,” 155-156. The term byt can include everyday life, material culture, private life, domestic life and other aspects of daily existence. See Svetlana Boym, Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) for a more detailed explanation of the term byt. In the context used by Chukovskii and other intellectuals, byt was interpreted as something related to consumerism and mundane quotidian problems associated with modern progress. Likewise, Lovell has also commented that the dachniki were often the subject of ridicule and were lampooned for their association with all sorts of vices. Criticism against this group was part of a widespread distaste among elite intellectuals “for ‘unproductive’ use of the land, for physical idleness, and for private property.” See Lovell, Summerfolk, 4-5.

such as schools, churches, theaters and sports clubs. These cultural establishments are important for understanding interethnic contacts because they give us a glimpse of how the small Russian community in Finland set the boundaries of belonging. In order to understand how the Russian residents in these seaside towns related to local Finnish villagers, it is crucial to reflect on the ways in which Russians defined themselves in relation to other Russians.

Sports clubs were common summertime leisure associations in these dacha communities. Dacha-goers from Russia formed their own associations to promote sport, not only in a competitive atmosphere, but also to encourage healthy living. The Terijoki Sports Club (Teriokskii sport-klub), for example, had a board that met regularly to deliberate on the club’s activities and functions. At one meeting, the board discussed initiatives specifically directed at younger people. Board members expressed interest in promoting sport, not only as leisure activities, but as part of the dacha people’s daily routine for maintaining one’s good health. The board also suggested organizing games and tournaments between sports clubs in Terijoki and surrounding towns to promote friendly relations between dacha dwellers in different locations between St. Petersburg and Vyborg. This club was not unlike other voluntary associations in late imperial Russia that encouraged active community involvement in its own activities, as well as generating community interests in others’ physical well-being. In Finland, Russian migrants established other kinds of voluntary associations such as reading circles, temperance societies, and various charities to foster a sense of community.

planned to discuss the question of establishing a kindergarten, “a question that could closely affect you.”

60 Gai Repin, “Penaty,” Mosty, no.10 (1963), 393.
Some of these voluntary society activities were not limited to Russian speakers. The local Finnish-language newspaper in Terijoki reported the establishment of a youth group in Kuokkala in 1909. The newspaper reported that the founders of this group were dacha goers from Russia who had based the activities of this organization on ones that already existed in Russia. This was a group for boys and girls from age seven to 14, and its aim was to promote physical culture and general well-being. Activities included outdoor exercises, backyard games, and short excursions so that youths could learn to appreciate their natural environment. The group also organized reading circles, sing-alongs and dances for young people. Most importantly, the group was open to children and youths of all nationalities. The paper reported that registration for this group for the upcoming summer was already starting in St. Petersburg, and urged local youths to sign up for this club as well.62

This type of club is intriguing because its openness to members from different cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds stood in sharp contrast to the polemicized debate in both the Russian and Finnish press about the need to isolate youths from the undesirable influences of outsider groups. For example, one contributor to Finliandskaia gazeta complained that children of Russian families in Finland were becoming too accustomed to the Swedish and Finnish languages through their contacts with local servants in their household. He was convinced that these youngsters lacked proper exposure to their mother tongue and would soon lose their connection to their mother country.63 One columnist in a local Finnish newspaper argued that children living in the border regions were at risk because of the spread of Russian schools.64

63 Finliandskaia gazeta, September 15, 1900.
64 Viipurin sanomat supistus, July 10, 1909.
presence of groups like the Kuokkala youth club indicates that interethnic cooperation was possible amidst the incredibly tense atmosphere of nationalist confrontation.

Russian social clubs and voluntary associations were not limited only to activities among the dacha folk who only stayed in Finland during the summer months. It is also important to recall, as mentioned in Chapter One, that the Karelian Isthmus had a high number of Russian-speaking residents even before the dacha boom in the 1880s and 1890s. Many of these Russian families had lived in the Karelian Isthmus for several generations. They, too, were interested in matters pertaining to Russian community and identity. However, since these families were permanent residents whose primary purpose for living in the Karelian Isthmus villages was not seasonal leisure and respite, their ideas of community were understandably different from that of the summer folks. Their social and cultural needs also differed. The stronger presence of Russian speakers in these villages during the summer time affected more than just their relationship with local Finnish villagers. It also impinged upon the structure and purpose of existing Russian cultural institutions.

One of the changes to Russian cultural establishments was the development of Russian language schools. Russian voluntary associations were heavily involved in establishing schools for Russian speaking children in Finland. The Russian Philanthropic Society in Finland (RBO) sought to provide funding for education in Russian-language primary and secondary schools to help foster a sense of solidarity among Russian migrants from the empire at the end of the nineteenth century. The RBO’s regional branch in Vyborg, established in 1872 when the organization was first founded, eventually dealt with issues related to the establishment and
maintenance of Russian schools in the whole Karelian Isthmus region, including the dacha districts.

The extent to which dacha goers saw this organization’s activities as relevant for their own lives is debatable, since many of them lived in Finland only in the summer months, and thus did not always see education as an urgent matter. Yet as more and more dacha folk began to stay in the Karelian Isthmus year round, there was more interest in establishing Russian language schools in these towns and villages as a cultural institution to instill a sense of Russian identity among youths who ended up living permanently at these locations. Some members of the artistic intelligentsia who lived in the dacha zone were supportive of attempts to establish Russian schools in the region. Repin and Chukovsky, for example, were heavily involved in the organization of a Russian folk school in Kuokkala. The school’s founder even asked Repin to take over the as the chairman of the Kuokkala folk school committee, a position he declined. However, he still sought to increase interest among the artistic folks in the school. Repin and Chukovsky’s attempts to generate interest in Russian education in the dacha zone therefore muddled the boundary between Russians in the Karelian Isthmus dacha zone as temporary, seasonal residents and as more permanent residents who began to see the significance of community action in their new environment.

These Russian language schools were not originally meant to foster intercultural communications, but in the Karelian Isthmus, where the Russian presence was so strong, some savvy Finnish-speaking villagers saw an advantage in having Russian language schools in their communities.

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66 Letter from Repin to Chukovskii, December 20, 1909, in Repin I.E., Chukovskii K.I. Perepiska, 34.
towns and villages. To a certain extent, these schools also helped facilitate interethnic contacts through the younger generations. Some Finns and Russians who intermarried chose to send their children to Finnish schools while others desired Russian-language education for their offspring. In the Finnish parish towns in the Vyborg province, where the intermingling of Russians and Finns had a longer history, some children with one or two Finnish speaking parents went to Russian schools. There were several Russian schools established in the 1880s that included both Finnish and Russian-speaking pupils. The Terijoki Russian School, established in 1885, accepted children baptized in both the Orthodox and Lutheran Churches. The teachers at this school usually came from the Orthodox seminaries, although some also graduated from the pedagogy schools in St. Petersburg.  

Although the Russian schools mostly catered to Russian speakers who did not intend to stay in Finland permanently, they actually helped some local Finnish villagers give their children a Russian language education. For some Finnish-speaking Karelian Isthmus villagers, their contact with people from Russia prompted them to get acquainted with Russian language and culture. For example, Solomon Muurinen, who grew up in a small village in the Uusikirkko parish district in the early 1900s, pursued schooling in St. Petersburg. There, young Solomon learned Russian quickly, and worked as a store clerk on Vasilievsky Island. When he returned to

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67 *Finliandskaia gazeta*, August 15, 1901.

68 For example, a summertime kindergarten that opened in Kuokkala in 1911 was established in part with funds from a Russian summer theater. During the first summer of its operation, the kindergarten accepted 40 children who were from the families of domestic servants and day laborers employed in the dacha industry as well as children of local Finnish- and Swedish-speaking residents. About half of the children enrolled in the kindergarten were Finnish and Swedish speakers. See Repin I.E., *Chukovskii K.I. Perepiska*, 24, n2.
Finland, he opened a general store in his village.\textsuperscript{69} Others even attempted to enroll their children in Russian schools in spite of the anti-Russian rhetoric that permeated different segments of Finnish society. Viljo Susi’s father lived in the Karelian Isthmus and worked on construction jobs for Russian employers. This experience fuelled his desire for Viljo and his sibling to have some Russian language education. The Susi children began going to a nearby school that offered some Russian language classes.\textsuperscript{70} Another Finnish-speaking couple from the Karelian Isthmus also thought it was important for their son to learn Russian, and managed to secure a spot for him in one of the two Russian language schools in the Kellomäki parish.\textsuperscript{71} That the RBO included these people in its allocation of funding indicated that this voluntary society did not necessarily adhere to a narrow definition of Russianness based exclusively on language, birthplace, nationality or formal citizenship. Personal acquaintances and networks was an important key to widening the RBO’s influence among the Finnish population.

Cultural development of Russian life in the Karelian Isthmus dacha communities was not simply limited to the realm of voluntary associations and public activism among the more socially aware members of dacha society. Imperial government officials also claimed a stake in Russian cultural life in Finland. Interestingly, one of the areas that the Council of Ministers in Russia took notice of was the establishment of sanatoria and workers’ social halls in Finland. One news editorial published in 1910 pointed out the recent interest among Ministers in enhancing these social spaces for Russians to gather in Finland. However, the editorial also lamented that the Council of Ministers was not making as great an effort in promoting Russian

\textsuperscript{69} Folklore Archives of the Finnish Literature Society (SKS KRA), Maire Pöyhönen KE 77 15958-15972.
\textsuperscript{70} SKS KRA, Viljo Susi, KE 86, 17935-17944.
\textsuperscript{71} SKS KRA, Emil Nikkanen KE 57, 12140-12160.
cultural life in Finland, especially in high culture. It emphasized the renewed need for Russian ministers to pay closer attention to helping develop Russian culture in the borderlands. This article illustrates a sense of detachment the Russian population in Finland felt from local Finnish cultural developments. It also underscores the enormous pressure that the Russians placed on their own government officials to support Russian cultural life in non-Russian parts of the empire. Thus, the issue of culture should not be seen as detached from the issue of political tension between the Russian imperial center and constituent parts.

Religion was another aspect of culture where institutional life intersected with the dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus. The Orthodox Church was an important cultural institution for Russian speakers, since Orthodoxy was such an entrenched aspect of Russian identity. As Sergii (Stragorodskii), the archbishop of the Orthodox Diocese in Finland from 1905 to 1917, remarked, “Faith has contributed so much to Russian nationality that if a Russian ceases to be Orthodox, then he loses so much of his inner content that he ceases to be Russian.” The presence of Orthodox churches in the dacha communities was important because it “supported the spiritual needs of Russian Orthodox people living among the mass of non-believers.” Similar to the establishment of Russian schools in Finland, the founding of Orthodox churches proliferated with the increased arrival of dacha folk from Russia. One dacha resident writing for the Orthodox Church journal *Tserkovnyi vestnik* remarked in 1894 that the Russian summer population in the Karelian Isthmus had grown so quickly in recent years that the nearby churches

74 *Tserkovnyi vestnik*, July 13, 1895, 893.
had long been overgrown. More than ever, expansion of churches was needed. Terijoki, the most prominent of the dacha communities in the region, quickly became the center of Russian church life among seasonal visitors, drawing in worshippers from near and far, including other dacha locations in the region. The writer expressed hope that in the near future the diocese of Finland would succeed in establishing more churches everywhere in the Finnish villages, and that they would become clearly visible symbols of Russian life. Indeed, the strong presence of dacha folks in the Karelian Isthmus led to the establishment of more churches. The Kellomäki Orthodox parish, for example, was established in 1906 from donors’ funds. It was located near the Kellomäki railway station, and was also affiliated with the local Orthodox parish school, which had educated a total of 95 students by 1915. The church was a cultural establishment that offered dacha folk a social and spiritual meeting ground.

The presence of institutions such as Orthodox schools and churches, however, did not mean that Russians had a unified platform for expressing pride in their own culture. On the contrary, these institutions often exposed the divisions within Russian society and underscored the gulf between Russians of different occupational or economic strata. The RBO, for example, did not serve Russians equally in its efforts to support Russian-speaking children’s education in their mother tongue. Although its official mandate was to provide financial assistance to Russian families lacking the means to send their children to Russian language schools, a closer examination of the kinds of people who received funds from the RBO reveals that the organization did not always include all disadvantaged Russians in its allocation of financial

75 Tserkovnyi vestnik, July 7, 1894, 424.
76 Tserkovnyi vestnik, July 13, 1895, 894.
77 Regional Archives of Mikkeli (MMA) Kellomäen ortodoksinen seurakunta (Kellomäki Orthodox Parish) Il BA 1, Vedomosti v tserkvi v Kellomiaki za 1915 godu.
assistance. It did not regularly serve the illiterate peasant population or small craftsmen and artisans, since the organization dealt mainly with written requests for financial assistance. Some Russian professionals were aware that efforts to expand Russian language education often neglected this group. One editorial about the state of Russian school affairs in Finland underscored that the Russian population in Finland was much more significant than officials had estimated. In addition to military personnel, merchants, and people of high society, the editorialist pointed out that numerous rural craftsmen and industrial workers were involved in local trade and industry, particularly in the Vyborg province. The writer called for the Imperial government to pay more attention to the needs of these Russian workers. 78

Likewise, the Orthodox parishes in Finland did not serve all Russian speakers equally. Part of the problem was that the Orthodox diocese in Finland was very small, and was administered by a small group of priests spread across a large swath of territory. In 1904, for example, Orthodox parishioners in Finland numbered only 53,589, excluding Russian troops. 79

In this case the distance between Russian-speaking Orthodox followers who lived permanently in the Karelian Isthmus villages and the summertime visitors was most evident in the structure, organization and activities of these parishes. At one church council meeting in the Kellomäki parish in 1908, council members discussed the requests of parishioners who stayed in the town during the winter months. These residents expressed the desire to have access to church services year round; however, the group wanted the funding for the extended services to come from the budget set aside for the summer months. One of the church council leaders commented that

78 Finliandskaia gazeta, March 7, 1912.
79 Dixon, “Sergii (Stragorodskii) in Finland,” 55. It is unclear whether this figure included the seasonal visitors from Russia who owned or stayed in dachas in the Karelian Isthmus during the summer months.
without the consent of residents who resided in the town only during the summer, it was difficult
to make decisions about keeping local churches opened year round. Other council members
opined that the absence of the dacha people during the winter months should not prevent the
remainder of the parishioners from making decisions about church services in the winter. At the
same time, they recognized that funding issues affected the summertime residents equally.  

Because interfaith marriages were common in Finland, especially in the Karelian Isthmus
where ethnic diversity was evident even before the arrival of the dacha folk, both the Lutheran
and Orthodox churches served as important interlocutors between Finnish and Russian speaking
peoples. The Orthodox parish in Kuokkala, for example, was active in promoting stronger ties
between Finnish- and Russian-speaking members. In addition to Russian language literature, the
parish also distributed church bulletins in Finnish. One of them advertised a Finnish-language
church news publication aimed at improving relations between believers who came from
different ethnolinguistic communities. The contents of this periodical included religious stories,
biblical texts, reports from church catechism teachers, and other stories on Orthodox life in
Russia, Finland and abroad. The editorial board of the publication included Finnish- and
Russian-speaking Orthodox parishioners, and it sought to establish branch offices in some of the
major cities in Finland where there was a strong concentration of Orthodox believers.  

Religious holidays and festivals were also important arenas in which Orthodox parishes
reached out to people of other faiths. In 1893, for example, the visit of the archbishop to Terijoki
was celebrated with much pomp and circumstance. Upon his arrival at the train station in
Terijoki, he was greeted by a delegation of permanent residents who were deeply familiar with

80 MMA Kellomäen ortodoksinen seurakunta II CA 1, Minutes from the meeting of the
Kellomäki Orthodox Church Council, August 27, 1908.
81 MMA Kellomäki ortodoksinen seurakunta II EC1, “Aamun Koitto” poster, 1917.
church affairs. Dacha folks also actively participated in welcoming the archbishop. He was invited to a parishioner’s dacha, where he dined with other summer visitors. More importantly, church services over which the archbishop presided drew other local people’s attention. These other locals included Finns of the Lutheran faith as well as other foreign visitors who were curious about Orthodox liturgy.  

One observer noted that at one church festival that took place in Terijoki, the performance of the church choir, made up of dacha folks and artists from the Imperial Opera in St. Petersburg, attracted Lutheran and Catholic audiences from neighboring villages.

Interrmarriage, however, was a controversial subject for ecclesiastical and political authorities to handle, and was itself a source of tension between parishioners and officials. Archbishop Sergii was convinced that Orthodoxy faced a serious struggle in the face of the Russian empire’s multiethnic and multiconfessional nature. Apostasy statistics both confirmed and disproved his theory: between 1905 and 1907, there were 1,493 cases of Orthodox to Lutheran conversions documented in the Finnish diocese, but these numbers declined after 1907. Mixed marriages, on the other hand, gave Orthodox officials much cause for concern because they had significant consequences for the way children with parents from both faiths could be baptized. For this reason, Sergii endorsed a strict stance on interfaith marriages, insisting that special permission be obtained. Yet daily activities of the Orthodox parishes in the Karelian Isthmus indicate that local parishioners and clergymen tended to view mixed marriages as a

82 Tserkovnyi vestnik, July 7, 1894, 423-424.
83 Tserkovnyi vestnik, July 13, 1895, 893.
84 Dixon, “Sergii (Stragorodskii) in Finland,” 59 and 66-69.
positive way to reach new people of different cultural backgrounds rather than as a threat to the sanctity of their faith.

**Culture, Stereotypes and Interethnic Hostilities**

Because the Karelian Isthmus was located on the physical and metaphorical border of two cultures, nationally-minded people came to view the area as a site for competing nationalisms. The sources of tension between the Finnish and Russian residents in the region also became a launch pad for nationalist ideologues to spread their agenda. Not only was there tension between the Finnish villagers and the dacha folk from Russia, but some among the Swedish intelligentsia in the Vyborg province also felt uneasy about the incursion of a Russian intelligentsia that might erode their influence in the region. Already by the end of the nineteenth century, the locals had become oriented towards St. Petersburg rather than western Finland. The local peasant culture, both socially and economically, derived from the St. Petersburg environs. Finnish nationalists sought to defend the territory from this Russian invasion. Advocates of further centralization and Russification saw Finnish nationalists' anti-Russian rhetoric as justification to call for further measure to protect the position of Russians in the Grand Duchy of Finland.

Some of the quarrels between the permanent residents of the Isthmus and the summer visitors from Russia can be attributed to cultural misunderstanding. The Isthmus was a mixture of Finnish and Russian, Lutheran and Orthodox influences, but individuals did not always understand or accommodate others whose social experiences were rooted in another set of daily

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routines and habits. As Hannes Sihvo notes, several novelists in the early twentieth century depicted linguistic and ethnic problems between the diverse permanent and seasonal inhabitants in the Isthmus. Arguments did sometimes surface between Lutheran and Orthodox villagers, but it is important to challenge the assumption that religious institutions served as incubators of national culture. As noted at the end of Chapter Two, the Karelian Isthmus, however diverse it was at the end of the nineteenth century, was not always a melting pot of cultural influences or a peaceful site of mutual support. Potential for conflict or cooperation depended on the context of specific situations. The case illustrated in Chapter Two of a group of Finnish workers in Kuokkala who complained about a Russian employer who forced them to work on a Lutheran holiday is a strong example of disputes that originated from a specific situation of cultural misunderstanding.

Since Russian influence on the Karelian Isthmus towns had grown stronger by the start of the twentieth century, Finnish elites worried about the effects of this Russian incursion on Finnish identity. According to Evgenii Balashov, the territory had been so thoroughly Russified that the cultural scene in the Karelian Isthmus was completely incomprehensible, especially to Finns from the central regions of Finland. The local language was peppered with Russian terms, and Orthodox churches came to outnumber Lutheran ones. One editorial in a regional newspaper discussed the economic and cultural Russification of Vyborg province. It referenced a recent article from the conservative Russian newspaper *Novoe vremia* boasting of widespread

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86 Ibid., 236.
87 MMA Terijoen nimismiespiirin Kuokkalan poliisiaseman arkisto IV Ab1, No. 36, August 16, 1908.
Russian influence on the region, such as the common usage of the Russian ruble (instead of the Finnish currency) and the alleged willingness of local farmers to communicate in Russian. The Finnish newspapers claimed that these changes amounted practically to a Russian takeover of property and economy in the region, and had significantly altered the local power dynamics.  

These concerns of Finnish observers on the negative influence of Russian dacha folk on the life of Finnish villagers in the Karelian Isthmus related to a broader context of tension between Finns and Russians at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. Observers in Russia were well aware of Finnish animosities towards Russian culture. One literary review published in a Russian newspaper discussed a novel by a Finnish writer named Ilmari Pitänen on the subject of students in Helsinki. The author of the review emphasized the students’ discontent with Russian influence in Finland; these youths didn’t have working knowledge of Russian, and considered national issues important. Some Russian observers also perpetuated negative stereotypes of Finns. In one editorial on Finnish people’s morals, the columnist condemned the common occurrence of prostitution, especially in the larger cities.  

The context of Russian incursion into Finnish life was quite different in other parts of Finland, for example, in Helsinki, where most of the city’s Russian-speaking residents lived there more permanently, and where the Russian elite tended to have more sway over public life even though they did not have the same legal rights as Finns until 1911. But the juxtaposition of Finnish-Russian animosity in the large Finnish cities and in the dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus villages is nonetheless important to note. At times, cultural issues were

89 Viipurin sanomat supistus, July 23, 1908.
90 “Finliandskie studenty,” Rossiia, June 8, 1910.
incorporated into the larger polemic about Finnish-Russian imperial relations, the perception of Russia as an oppressive imperial power, and Finns as recalcitrant nationalist agitators. *Novoe vremia*’s perspective on the Finnish song and culture festival, for example, addresses the festival as part of a larger ploy by Finnish nationalists to incite anti-Russian agitation. One commentary in the dacha newspaper *Teriokskii dnevnik*, however, refuted these claims by writers at *Novoe vremia*. The *Teriokskii dnevnik* writer claimed that this description of the folk festival as an anti-Russian demonstration was completely unfair. The writer argued that as soon as Finns had started to develop their own literary culture, new measures established by the recent Governors General seemed to have taken away these advances. He argued that under such circumstances, it was understandable for a people to want to take pride in their national culture. It was normal for each nation to celebrate its own language and customs. The author expressed hope that once political and economic tensions between Finland and Russia had dissipated, cultural bridges between Finnish and Russian peoples would soon be restored.  

Not all of the cultural stereotypes and nationalist rhetoric in the Finnish and Russian press, however, contributed to animosity between Finnish villagers and dacha folk from Russia. Maria Lähteenmäki has observed that some Finns in the Karelian Isthmus described the Russians in a positive light. The Russians’ generosity was one common theme. Primary accounts in Lähteenmäki’s work refer to the hearty wages Russian employers gave to Finnish workers.  

N. Fedotov’s guides on dacha zones in Finland also described Finns positively. Local Finns in the Karelian Isthmus villages were “honest, hardworking, strong, and obedient with good moral

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92 *Teriokskii dnevnik*, June 16, 1913.
character.” Fedotov also expressed admiration for the way Finns regarded each other as equals in social rank.94

Beyond these descriptions Finns and Russians had of each other, one can find many other more examples of friendly relations between Finns and Russians. As mentioned in Chapter Two Lempi Vanhanen and her brother often visited the dacha folk in the evenings, when most residents would be at home entertaining guests. She remembered that the families she visited were mostly friendly. Even after her family moved from the village to Vyborg, she continued to see her Russian-speaking neighbors in the city in a positive light. Her grandmother taught her some phrases in Russian and she often learned Russian songs from children in her neighborhood.95 Other Finnish speakers in the Karelian Isthmus recalled that they often played with Russian children who came to the towns each summer, and learned to communicate with each other in a mixture of Russian and Finnish.96 Some Russians even regularly invited Finnish friends and neighbors to their dachas as guests.97 An opera singer from St. Petersburg who lived in a large dacha near Solomon Muurinen’s family home invited Solomon’s sister to see her shows in St. Petersburg on several occasions.98 These experiences illustrate the myriad possibilities for interethnic contact through the cultural realm.

94 N. Fedotov, Illiustrirovannyi putevoditel’ po dachnym, vodolechbnym i zhivopisnym mestnostiam Finliandii (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1899), 5.
95 SKS KRA, Lempi Vanhanen, ME S. 644.
96 SKS KRA, Ulla Mannonen, E138: 4431, 1937.
97 SKS KRA, Ester Kähönen, KE 39, 8490-8496.
98 SKS KRA, Maire Pöyhönen, KE 77, 15958-15972.
This chapter has shown that culture is an important lens through which to examine the dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus as discursive spaces. These spaces offered rich potential for diverse social interactions between Russian-speaking dacha folk who visited during the summer, long-term Russian-speaking residents, and Finnish-speaking local villagers. A close reading of the role of the artistic intelligentsia in nurturing elite and popular culture in the dacha zone and the role of institutions and voluntary associations in helping dacha folk establish their cultural centers near their summer residences show that there were mixed messages in the relationship between culture and interethnic contacts. On the one hand, the cultural sphere provided ample opportunities for Finnish-Russian bridge-building, and allowed for people from diverse backgrounds to exchange ideas. On the other hand, culture can be politicized and polemicized as much as any other aspect of society. This process can serve to further isolate groups of people from one another and contribute to disparaging stereotypes about those who did not belong. More importantly, this examination of culture has shown just how permeable the boundaries between the in-groups and out-groups were.
On the evening of July 18, 1906, Mikhail Herzenstein, one of the founders of the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party and a prominent Duma representative, was walking through the woods near his dacha in Terijoki with his wife and daughter when an assailant shot and mortally wounded him. Eye witnesses could do little to identify the assailant, and immediate attempts to apprehend him were futile. The assailant and his accomplices, by taking their plans to the seemingly peaceful environment of the Finnish countryside, succeeded in catching their victim off guard.\(^1\) The right wing Union of the Russian People (Soiuz naroda, hereafter SRN), the group responsible for the assassination, was not the only one committing crimes of a political nature in Finland. One female operative in the Socialist Revolutionaries’ militant arm helped run an explosives laboratory in Terijoki by posing as a housemaid who worked at a Russian-speaking family’s dacha.\(^2\) St. Petersburgers in late imperial Russian society thought of the dacha places in Finland as idyllic spaces where they could forget the social and political tensions in the capital, but public acts of political violence such as Herzenstein’s assassination, along with the flurry of clandestine activities orchestrated by different political groups in the Karelian Isthmus prompt us to reconsider whether the dacha communities in Finland were so isolated from politics in Russia after all.

In Russian culture, dachas have been recognized as places of respite and leisure. Summertime activities such as trips to the beach, excursions to attractive natural landmarks, hikes in the forest and social hours with neighbors were characteristic of dachas and similar

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\(^2\) Valentina Popova, “Dinamitnye masterskie 1906-1907 g.g. i provokator Azef,” Katorga i ssylka, no. 33 (1927), 55.
recreational spaces. The dacha was also a quiet, peaceful place at which artists, writers and musicians could harness their creative talents. As seen in Chapter Three, a vibrant artistic atmosphere was typical in the dacha places in Finland. Peace and tranquility, however, was only one image that the Karelian Isthmus dacha places evoked. Beneath the veneer of mundane village life, dacha places provided amenable conditions for hatching political protests.

Each group that operated in the Karelian Isthmus dacha places had different ideological aims, and different attitudes towards the Russian autocracy, but saw similar advantages in orchestrating their activities in this particular setting. These places were attractive for two primary reasons. First, they were located in the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland, which meant that Tsarist authorities had limited power to prevent and disrupt illegal operations. Second, the nature of dacha life itself altered expectations of what constituted normal or abnormal activities and behavior. The liberal Kadets fled to the Finnish dacha locations after a major political protest failed because these places sheltered them from police scrutiny when they needed to devise a new plan of action. The Russocentric Union of the Russian People, which supported autocratic rule, did not need to flee to Finland to escape government oppression. Instead, these right-wing radicals saw the Karelian Isthmus dacha locations, which many liberal politicians frequented, as prime hunting grounds for eliminating their own political enemies. The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks used dachas in the Karelian Isthmus as remote hiding places while they plotted acts of terror against the regime. All of these groups, regardless of their views on the Tsarist regime and outlook on political violence, exploited legal ambiguities between the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Russian Empire, and benefited from less intense security presence in places known more for rest and relaxation than for high profile crimes.
These factors altered the picture of these Karelian Isthmus dacha places as carefree villages where symbiosis between local Finnish residents and seasonal guests from Russia flourished.

**The Karelian Isthmus: A Liberal Mecca**

St. Petersburg dacha goers and Finnish villagers did not usually associate the dacha places in Finland with any particular social or political movement. Liberally oriented Russians who vacationed in the Finnish dacha towns, however, attributed specific political and emotive meaning to these places partly because of Finland’s autonomous status within the empire and the legal-political traditions it inherited from the Swedish realm. When Russia annexed Finland, the Tsar’s first priority was to secure the loyalty of the existing nobility in Finland. Imperial authorities accepted a central administration that was run by a Senate composed of Finnish-born members. They also established a Diet as the main legislative body. This organ was modeled on the Swedish four-chamber Diet that included a Peasant Estate with its own voting powers. After the initial session to acknowledge Finland’s incorporation into the Russian empire, the Diet did not convene again until 1863. This form of self-rule was nonetheless unrivaled anywhere else in the empire, with the exception of the Kingdom of Poland before the 1830-31 uprising. When the late nineteenth century Tsars became increasingly hostile to the social and political reforms implemented by their predecessors, liberal intellectuals gradually came to see Finland as a democratic haven. Many educated Russians of liberal orientation saw dacha life in Finland as a welcome escape from the political realities in Russia. Maria Vitukhnovskaia-Kauppala refers to

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the dacha settlements in the Karelian Isthmus, and Terijoki in particular, as a “mecca for Russian intelligentsia.”

The Russian liberal intelligentsia had the added benefit of moderate support from several Finnish liberal public figures. Leo Mechelin, a Finnish law professor who served in the Senate from 1882 to 1890, had consistent ties with several prominent Russian liberal thinkers, including jurist B. N. Chicherin and D.D. Protopopov, a St. Petersburg publicist who lived in Terijoki during the 1890s. It was during his residency in Terijoki that Protopopov learned Swedish and discussed constitutional matters with some of the Finnish-Swedish liberal bourgeoisie who visited from nearby Vyborg. Mechelin had also been acquainted with I. V. Gessen, editor-in-chief of the liberal journal Pravo and newspaper Rech’, since 1898. These informal political connections between Russian and Finnish liberals turned into more concrete action in the early 1900s when Governor General N.I. Bobrikov began taking measures to restrict Finland’s autonomy. In 1903, Bobrikov exiled a number of Finnish political leaders known for their opposition to the autocracy. This coincided with attempts by more radically minded liberals in Russia to form the Union of Liberation, the predecessor to the Kadets. Members in the Union of Liberation began courting the Finnish liberal opposition in their endeavors to bring substantial constitutional changes to the Russian government. This alliance was tentative because some Finnish opposition members were not fully satisfied with the Russian liberals’ stance on Finland’s role in a future democratic Russia. However, from 1903 to 1904, Mechelin did draft a


proposal for a Russian constitution, which he allowed the Kadets to use as part of their political platform.  

Connections to Finland benefitted the Russian liberals when conservative imperial officials significantly inhibited their ability to bring about political change through legal channels. Some members of the liberal intelligentsia owned or rented dachas in the Karelian Isthmus towns. M.M. Vinaver, another influential Kadet leader, was one among several Russian liberal politicians who frequently traveled between St. Petersburg and his dacha in Finland. Several other Duma deputies were already living at their dachas in the Karelian Isthmus in the summer of 1906 when they learned of the Prime Minister’s impending decision to dissolve the Duma.  

T.V. Lokot, a representative from the first Duma, recalled that many of the deputies were preparing to leave their dachas in Finland and return to Russia for their legislative duties when news of the Duma’s imminent dissolution caught them by surprise. The dacha places where many deputies were already residing became more than just leisure territory and summertime vacation destinations. They suddenly held prime potential as gathering places close enough to the imperial capital for Duma deputies to reach yet outside of Russian security agents’ legal jurisdiction.  

When Prime Minister Petr Stolypin dissolved the Duma just prior to a session due to be held on July 10, 1906, a significant group of liberal deputies took action in Finland. One-third of the Duma deputies, many of whom were Kadets, traveled to Vyborg to convene their own session on the evening of July 9. At this meeting, the deputies published a general appeal to the

6 Ibid., 168-169.
population to engage in passive resistance, which came to be known as the Vyborg Manifesto.\textsuperscript{9}

Between July 7 and 9, numerous Kadets traveled from St. Petersburg to Terijoki, where they met up with colleagues already vacationing at their dachas to determine the manifesto’s parameters.\textsuperscript{10} From this location, these deputies continued to organize their plans for action after the manifesto failed to garner widespread support. A.I. Fenin, a civil engineer who unsuccessfully sought election to the Duma as a Kadet representative from the Iuzovka region in southern Russia, happened to be living in Vyborg with his family at the time of the manifesto. In his memoir, he expressed excitement about meeting with numerous acquaintances who were Kadet deputies in the Duma. His recollection of the events of July 1906 revealed an atmosphere of anxiety and anticipation in Vyborg and other surrounding Finnish towns.\textsuperscript{11} As the events of that summer unfolded, the Karelian Isthmus dacha places became visible hubs for political activity rather than areas where politically minded dacha goers had occasional conversations about the state of affairs in Russia.

The dacha places in the Karelian Isthmus served a second function as a sanctuary for the Duma deputies who signed the Vyborg Manifesto. Return to Russia was risky because Russian authorities could mete out harsh punishments on the participants. Pavel Miliukov, one of the principal organizers, recalled that Duma deputies believed rumors that those who had signed the manifesto would be arrested upon their arrival in St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{12} These deputies had reason to


\textsuperscript{10} Vinaver, \textit{Istoriia Vyborgskogo vozzvaniia}, 15.

\textsuperscript{11} A.I. Fenin, \textit{Vospominanitii inzhenera} (Prague: n.p., 1938), 173.

\textsuperscript{12} P.N. Miliukov, \textit{Vospominaniiia}, vol. 1, edited by Boris Elkin and Michael Karpovich (New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1955), 406. Donald C. Rawson also mentioned that Kadet Duma deputies had heard rumors in Vyborg that angry loyalists would attack them as soon as
be apprehensive: judicial authorities in St. Petersburg had initiated criminal proceedings against those who signed the manifesto right away on July 16, and even those who did not return to St. Petersburg were tried and given prison sentences in absentia. Staying in Finland to wait out the political storm remained one of the few viable options for Kadet deputies who wished to maintain their freedom and continue with their political activities. The conservative newspaper Novoe vremia reported that Duma deputies involved in drafting and signing the manifesto considered it imperative to establish themselves in Finland. Some deputies returned to their dachas in the Karelian Isthmus after the manifesto was issued, others stayed in hotels in Vyborg and surrounding towns, while a handful returned to St. Petersburg. Miliukov and his family stayed at his dacha near Terijoki in the months after the Vyborg Manifesto. He recalled that party members who remained in Finland organized secret meetings in Terijoki, and these meetings were always held at a colleague’s dacha. Party members who attended these meetings were cautioned to arrive separately, lest they be under surveillance of political police agents operating in Finland.

The Herzenstein Case and the Union of the Russian People

The Vyborg Manifesto and the Kadets’ attempts to continue their political campaigns from Finland contributed directly to one other significant incident that propelled the ostensibly quiet dacha places in Finland into headlines of Russian newspapers: the assassination of Kadet

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14 Novoe vremia, July 11, 1906.
15 Miliukov, Vospominaniia, 417.
Duma deputy Mikhail Herzenstein. The reading public first heard of Herzenstein’s assassination in the days after the incident. According to a report in Novoe vremia, news of the murder spread quickly in Terijoki, both among Finnish locals and Russians who were there for their annual visit to their dachas. This newspaper’s account of the murder mentioned that the police did not succeed right away in apprehending the shooter. Two bystanders who first heard the shots gave chase, but the assailant had already fled into the woods. The reporter commented that it was relatively easy for the culprit to hide in the forests. 16

Herzenstein’s assassination in Finland was significant because it was emblematic of the volatile political struggle between different groups vying for influence over Russia’s governance. The Union of the Russian People, a prominent right wing group that espoused anti-liberal rhetoric and aggressive action against the liberal opposition, orchestrated the assassination. Members of this group saw liberals and moderate socialists as a greater threat to the imperial order than even the revolutionaries, and the Vyborg Manifesto further antagonized them. The group decided to make an example of Herzenstein, one of the first deputies to sign the manifesto. 17 Interestingly, the assassination drew as much attention to the confusing gaps in the legal order between Russia and Finland as to the enmity between liberals and staunch conservatives and the questionable judicial standards for prosecuting crimes committed by supporters of the monarchy.

The investigation of the crime was painstakingly slow. Finland’s special status within the Russian empire complicated efforts to determine how Finnish and Russian authorities would proceed with investigation and prosecution. Authorities were slow to act, and many of those

17 Rawson, Russian Rightists, 132-133.
involved in planning the attack had a chance to flee or go into hiding. The Kadets immediately made accusations against the Black Hundreds, a loose umbrella movement of right wing extremists, which included the SRN. Pavel Miliukov, one of the Kadets’ leaders, discussed in his memoir the emergence of the Black Hundreds as a terrorist force to eliminate revolutionaries during Alexander III’s reign. He discussed the fear of reprisals by the Black Hundreds on himself and other prominent liberals including Vinaver and G.B. Iollos. The Black Hundred movement was quite active in the northwestern reaches of Russia in its efforts to suppress nationalist activism among Karelians in Russian Karelia. Since Finns considered Karelians to be their ethnic kin, and the Finnish Lutheran Church played an active role in claiming the Karelians’ loyalty, the Black Hundreds’ efforts to quash Karelian nationalism occasionally brought some of its members into Finland. The numerous extremist groups associated with the Black Hundreds had widely varying views on issues such as land reform and workers’ rights, but they were united in their hatred of the liberals as well as Jews. When Finnish police finally began investigating the crime, evidence incriminating the SRN indeed surfaced. Further inquiry by

18 Vitukhovskaja-Kauppala, “Kurort kak arena politicheskikh batalii,” 211-212.
19 Miliukov, Vospominaniiia, 413.
20 As mentioned in the introduction, Russian Karelia is a region in the northwestern reaches of the Russian Empire between the northern shores of Lake Ladoga, Lake Onega and the White Sea. During the nineteenth century, it was administered by the Russian empire, and was not a part of the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland.
22 Jacob Langer, “Corruption and the Counterrevolution: The Rise and Fall of the Black Hundred,” (Ph.D. Diss., Duke University, 2007), 2 and 68. See also S.A. Stepanov, Chernaia Sotnia v Rossii 1905-1914gg. (Moscow: Rosvuznauka, 1992) for further detail on the Black Hundred’s campaigns against the liberal bourgeoisie.
Finnish police finally led to charges against several members of the SRN. 23 The trial of the suspects, which included N.M. Iuskevich-Kraskovskii, the leader of the SRN’s paramilitary group (druzhina), began in January 1907 in a Finnish district court in Kivennapa, a village known more for the dacha lifestyle that St. Petersburgers brought than high profile criminal cases. 24

The murder trial was noteworthy not because of the victim’s renown or the perpetrators’ notoriety, but because it presented significant problems of jurisdictional authority in the Finnish-Russian relationship. Although the victim and perpetrators were imperial subjects, according to a provision added to the Criminal Code in 1826, Russian natives who committed crimes in Finland were to be tried in Finland. Finnish authorities had the right to request that suspects who had already returned to Russia be extradited to Finland for trial. 25 Jane Burbank has stated that “with legally defined exceptions, criminal actions arising in the Grand Duchy of Finland were exempted from the rules of the Criminal Code.” 26 Apparently, the murder of a prominent Russian political figure did not qualify as a legally defined exception, and the issue of extradition was left to negotiations between the Russian Minister of Justice and Finnish judicial authorities.

At first glance, Russian authorities appeared to cooperate with Finnish legal officials and

23 Rawson, Russian Rightists, 133.
24 The URP’s documents show that its founder and leader, A.I. Dubrovin endorsed the assassination. He put Iuskevich-Kraskovskii, in charge of planning the actual attack. The assassination itself was carried out by a group of four operatives. See A. Chernovskii and V. P. Viktorov, eds., Souiz Russkogo naroda: po materialam chrezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii vremennoogo pravitel’stv 1917 g (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1929), 44-45.
25 RGIA, f.1276, op.18, d.17, l.42. Bulletin on Criminal Code regarding crimes committed in Finland by Russian subjects, 1826. This bulletin was included in the Council of Ministers’ Committee on Finnish Affairs file on the investigation and trial proceedings of the Herzenstein murder.
complied with legislation regarding the prosecution of Russian subjects in Finnish courts. A letter from Minister of Justice I.G. Shcheglovitov to Minister of Internal Affairs Petr Stolypin indicated willingness to follow the proper protocol. Shcheglovitov offered his justification for turning over the accused to Finnish authorities: “Because the murder was committed in Terijoki, in the territory of the Grand Duchy, all affairs related to the assassination must be conducted by Finnish authorities according to Finnish law. Likewise, crimes committed in Russia by citizens of the Grand Duchy should be investigated by local officials where the crime was committed.”

Some extremists in support of the autocracy demanded that authorities change this judicial arrangement and bring the Herzenstein murder trial back to Russian courts. Several members of the Russian Assembly (Russkoe sobranie), a group of loyalists with similar aims to the SRN, sent a letter to the Minister of Justice expressing their objections to holding the trial of Herzenstein’s alleged assassins in Finland. The petitioners voiced concern that Russians tried under Finnish courts would lose their right to be judged according to the laws of the empire, laws with which Russian subjects were more familiar. They opined that Russian subjects would not receive a fair trial in Finland because the trial might be hampered by false witness testimony and by Finnish officials’ bias. They argued that this situation should not be tolerated because having imperial subjects prosecuted by the courts of a separate realm undermined the credibility of the Tsar’s power in Russia and further eroded subjects’ faith in Russian imperial authority.

In spite of these objections, Shcheglovitov did not initially comply with these demands to transfer the trial to Russian courts. This decision appeared to reflect the Minister of Justice’s

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27 RGIA, f.1276, op.18, d.17, l.9. Letter from the Minister of Justice I.G. Shcheglovitov to Minister of Internal Affairs Petr Stolypin, no date.
28 RGIA, f.1276, op.18, d.17, l.13. Letter from Kazan Department of the Russian Assembly to the Minister of Justice, August 25, 1906.
commitment to upholding the principle of Finland’s autonomous status in the empire, but it also revealed his awareness of logistical issues. When SRN representatives made similar requests to transfer the murder trial to St. Petersburg, he reiterated the provisions in the Criminal Code that allowed for Russians who had committed crimes in Finland to be prosecuted under Finnish laws.  

While acknowledging that there were imperfections in the Finnish courts, he also emphasized that “transferring all cases from Finnish to Russian courts would raise practical and unnecessary burdens.” This statement indicates that the decision not to transfer the trial to Russia had as much, if not more, to do with Russian officials’ reluctance to deal with the hassle of such a move as their sensitivity to Finnish autonomy.

Other aspects of the trial revealed gaping inconsistencies in Russian authorities’ respect for judicial procedures in Finland. The trial dragged on for over two years because the defendants’ attorneys kept stalling, using a variety of technical reasons related to the legal relationship between Finnish and Russian courts. One of the contentious legal issues plaguing this trial was the supply of witnesses. There were not many individuals in Finland who could positively identify the culprits and confirm their involvement in the crime. One key witness was a Russian Gendarme officer stationed at the Terijoki railway station who allowed several militant members of the SRN posing as Russian political police agents to stay at his home several days prior to the murder. Some other witnesses claimed that suspicious figures were following...
Herzenstein near his home in the days before the murder. Beyond these vague testimonies, Finnish prosecutors required corroboration from members of SRN to confirm the assassination plans. When Finnish officials subpoenaed key representatives from the group to testify in the trial, Russian officials refused to comply with the request.

Correspondence between the Governor General in Finland and the Minister State Secretary for Finland illustrates the complications on the issue of extraditing witnesses. A few of the individuals initially arrested in Finland in connection with the murder had informed police that other SRN members were aware of the assassination plot. Finnish prosecutors therefore sought those named in the statement as witnesses. The Governor General, the Tsar’s personal representative in Finland, questioned whether Finnish legal experts had mounted a sufficient case to keep the investigation in local courts while judicial authorities in St. Petersburg were debating the appropriateness of producing witnesses for trial in Finland. He argued that since this evidence was not presented in the presence of Russian authorities, and the signatures of the accused could not be certified, Russian officials had no reason or need to comply with Finnish requests that the persons named by the original defendants be detained for questioning. If, however, these witnesses could provide more details for the case, then such details should be presented to the Russian judicial authorities for further investigation. The Minister State Secretary, the highest ranking Finnish official responsible for liaising with the Tsar and Russian officials in St. Petersburg, informed the Minister of Justice that it was unreasonable and impractical for the accused to present their testimony once more in front of Russian authorities.

34 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.53, l.8. Letter from the Governor General to the Minister State Secretary for Finland, December 31, 1906.
simply for the sake of verification, and insisted that Russian authorities take immediate measures to detain these witnesses for testimony at trials in Finland.\footnote{RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.53, l.9. Letter from the Minister State Secretary for Finland to the Minister of Justice, January 2, 1907.}

Part of the rationale for Russian officials’ refusal of the request to send Russian witnesses to Finland for trial related to their concerns about the Finnish authorities’ true intentions for the witnesses named in the testimony of the accused. The Minister of Justice expressed his confusion over the grounds on which the witnesses were to be sent to Finland, and he demanded assurance from Finnish authorities that Russian witnesses would have their rights and interests protected if they were to testify in Finnish courts. He reiterated that he would not enter into discussions on this issue until Finnish authorities had clarified their objectives in summoning the witnesses.\footnote{RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.53, l.16. Letter from the Minister of Justice to the Minister State Secretary for Finland, January 10, 1907.} Russian officials never did comply with these demands to supply key witnesses, and subsequent attempts by Finnish authorities to summon the testimony of A.I. Dubrovin, founder of the Union of Russian People, also failed. The trial did eventually lead to conviction of some individuals involved, but upon an appeal by SRN members directly to Nicholas II, whom many considered sympathetic to the group’s cause, the Tsar quickly pardoned the convicted.\footnote{Rawson, \textit{Russian Rightists}, 133-134.} The Herzenstein murder trial and Tsarist officials’ inaction at ensuring that perpetrators would be punished for their crimes showed that the imperial security apparatus tolerated and even condoned the illegal political activities of the right. Ian Lauchlan has argued that throughout the Herzenstein affair, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police Department failed to completely divorce themselves from the extremism that right wing groups exhibited. He has even argued that some
members of the political police were directly involved in hindering Finnish judicial authorities’ efforts to prosecute the culprits by protecting those connected to the accused.  

The Herzenstein assassination had broader political significance that connected Finland to the rest of the empire. The Karelian Isthmus was not the exclusive territory of the liberal intelligentsia in late imperial Russia. Other political groups also operated in the Karelian Isthmus. By sending operatives to murder Herzenstein in Terijoki, the SRN played a role in tarnishing the peaceful reputation of the Karelian Isthmus dacha places. It is true that Finland was never a hub of the SRN’s activity, nor was it a particularly important target for the group’s violent acts. Don C. Rawson has noted that rightist groups were mostly concentrated in the central provinces, where these groups’ promises to restore law and order was attractive in places plagued by chronic agrarian crises. Rightists were also prominent in the western borderlands, where constant religious, linguistic and other cultural disputes between Russians and numerically significant national minorities such as the Poles and Jews provided a natural cause célèbre for the right’s nationalistic campaigns. However, Herzenstein’s murder demonstrates the importance of not assuming that the intense political rivalries simmering in Russia were contained within the Russian provinces.

Russian Security Police Response to Revolutionaries Activity in Finland

Russian officials at the beginning of the twentieth century increasingly came to see Finland as a dangerous hiding place and breeding ground for activities that could disturb the political order in Russia. These concerns were directed mostly at those aligned with socialists

38 Lauchlan, Russian Hide-and-Seek, 281-282.
39 Rawson, Russian Rightists, 75.
and other revolutionary groups. Files from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Police Department indicate Russian security officials’ alarm about dangers that Finland posed as a popular hiding place for revolutionaries, where they could plot to destroy the autocracy unimpeded. As Peter Waldron has argued, Stolypin’s plan to strengthen the imperial government’s authority in Finland was directly related to his alarm at revolutionaries’ use of Finland as a meeting place. Imperial officials had grave concerns about terrorists committing crimes in St. Petersburg and then escaping to nearby Finnish villages, where the imperial police’s authority was limited, to evade arrest and prosecution.  

These concerns were not merely the irrational fears of a group of paranoid security officials in Russia. In addition to the moderate liberal intelligentsia, radical revolutionary groups from Russia also used Finnish towns as their base of operation. Like their liberal rivals, socialist groups saw Finland’s status in the Russian empire and the fact that Russian security agents had limited authority in Finland as an advantage for staging subversive activities. Interestingly, the Russian Social Democrats and other socialist groups gained their strongest support in Finland not from the Finnish Social Democrats, but from the ranks of Finnish constitutionalists.  

Similar to their right wing adversaries in the SRN, radicals in the socialist camps endorsed the use of violence to achieve their goals. Yet the Russian political police’s activities targeted revolutionary movements much more so than the right wing groups.

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41 Steven Huxley, *Constitutionalist Insurgency in Finland: Finnish “Passive Resistance” against Russification as a Case of Nonmilitary Struggle in the European Resistance Tradition* (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1990), 210-211. In fact, prior to 1905, the Finnish Social Democrats kept a very isolationist stance in order to protect its own position as a legitimate political party, and it was only after the Revolution of 1905 that Finnish Social Democrats began actively seeking contacts with Russian socialists.
Revolutionaries’ use of Finland as a place for planning seditious activities spanned from the beginning of the 1900s through the February Revolution in 1917. David Kirby emphasizes Finland’s role as a hiding place and escape route for enemies of the autocracy. He comments: “A short train journey would take the wanted revolutionary into a part of the Empire where a different code of law prevailed, and where a strong tradition of constitutionalism flourished.” He also remarked that Finland “provided a convenient bolt-hole, but it was also a place for hatching plots and holding conferences.” 

Lenin, for example, visited Finland 26 times from 1901 to 1917, and often sought refuge in the Karelian Isthmus dacha places, where he had acquaintances and could follow up on developments in St. Petersburg. After the London International Conference of Social Democrats Lenin and his wife sought to evade the political police and stayed at the home of an acquaintance who lived in a small village in the Karelian Isthmus. 

Socialist groups also published and disseminated propaganda texts via Finland. The Social Democrats used Finland as a smuggling point for distributing revolutionary literature from Western Europe to Russia. Iskra, one of the party’s publications, was published in Finland at the end of 1901. The Bolshevik newspaper, Proletary, was published in Vyborg in 1906-1907 before it ceased its run.

More ominously for Russia’s security police, revolutionary organizations established militant wings that hatched many of their plots from the Karelian Isthmus dacha places near the

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44 Michael Futrell, Northern Underground: Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport through Scandinavia and Finland (London: Faber and Faber, 1963), 53-54.

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Russian border. The Bolsheviks’ technical combat group (*boevaia tekhnicaskaia gruppa*) was established in January 1905 to prepare for armed rebellion. The Bolsheviks’ technical combat group was established in January 1905 to prepare for armed rebellion. Its leaders frequently traveled between Finland and Russia to avoid detection. For example, N.I. Burenin preferred to travel by horseback between villages along the Finnish-Russian railroad, and once he reached a dacha place in the Karelian Isthmus with a smaller police presence, he traveled by train to Vyborg with other group leaders. Through his frequent travels, he became acquainted with Finnish railway staff member Otto Malm and took Finnish lessons from him. Malm also connected Burenin with other Finns who were able to help the organization with arms transport. As Anna Geifman has remarked, although the Finnish border areas were the least directly affected by revolutionary terror among Russia’s western territories, lax law enforcement and willingness of locals to assist made the revolutionaries feel like “fish in the water.”

The Socialist Revolutionaries’ combat group (*boevaia organizatsiia*) was also active in Finland. In 1905, the organization’s leaders decided to transfer two of its dynamite production workshops (*dinamitnye masterskie*) from France to Finland. Both were located in dachas near Terijoki. In 1906 the workshop organizers had its temporary headquarters at a hotel owned by a Finnish activist in the Finnish town of Imatra. One of the SR operatives, Valentina Popova, remarked that the location gave them the feeling of freedom and complete safety, at least for a short time. Popova credited Finnish limitations on Russian security police activities in Finland

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46 N. Burenin, “Organizatsiia ‘Boevoi tekhnicaskoi gruppy,’ 1901-1904 g.g.” in 1905: *Boevaia gruppa pri TsK RSDRP(b)*, 42 and 51.
for giving the workshop leaders an advantage in avoiding arrest. For example, when Russian security police came to Imatra to search the hotel where the dynamite workshop leaders and other operatives within the combat group stayed, they could not do so without the presence of Finnish policemen because the hotel was owned by a Finnish citizen. SR activists were confident that sympathizers among the Finnish government and local police would warn them of impending police raids and government decisions to extradite suspected radicals to Russia in time to plan a proper escape.

Writers for the conservative newspaper *Novoe vremia* lost no time in pointing out the proliferation of revolutionary activity in Finland. One editorialist commented that weapons and arms such as revolvers, pistols, bombs and other explosives were being confiscated on a daily basis. The writer wrote about police efforts to stop the clandestine storage of weapons with alacrity: “Reading the chronicles every day, the gullible might think that the revolutionary bandits would gradually and successfully be disarmed, and there will soon be a time when the revolutionaries will not have a single revolver left.” The writer warned that this line of thinking was erroneous and dangerous. “The destructive means of the revolutionaries has not and will not be exhausted since they have invented all kinds of cunning ways to hide and obtain arms.” He lamented that revolutionaries had been smuggling arms on seafaring vessels, and “neither at the shores of Finland or Lake Ladoga have we succeeded in detaining one arms transport.”

These comments reflected the attitude among Russian conservatives that Finland’s autonomous status posed a security risk for the empire.

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49 B.V. Savinkov, *Vospominaniia terrorista* (Kharkov: Proletarii, 1926), 165.
50 “Gde revoliutsionery khraniat oruzhie?” *Novoe vremia*, August 30, 1906.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs observed developments in Finland, particularly in Vyborg province where many of the dacha villages and settlements were located, with a critical eye. After 1901, the Ministry expanded its Security Section’s competencies in Finland. The headquarters of the Northern District Security Section, as part of the St. Petersburg Security Section, had influence over political investigations conducted by the Finnish Gendarme Directorate and the Finnish Railway Gendarme Directorate located at Finnish border points and surrounding areas. Gendarme officers supervised secret agents in surrounding areas and in military garrisons. These Directorates were very active in Finland, particularly in Vyborg province, well into the First World War. Russian officials regularly reviewed the number of security officers stationed in Finland. A recommendation in 1904 pointed to the necessity of replenishing the Gendarme staff at Finnish posts three to four times a year. It was also important for higher level officials to inspect customs stations that were operated by lower-ranking staff members several times a year to ensure that customs procedures and inspection of passengers and goods across the border were followed. Finland was a significant point of contact between the Russian empire and Western Europe, and Russian security officials directed much attention to ensuring that inspections along the Russian-Finnish border ran smoothly, and that individuals traveling to and from the empire via Finland were scrutinized.

Surveillance and heightened security controls at border crossing points between Finland and Russia were significant parts of the operational mandate for the Finnish Railway

51 Lauchlan briefly describes the role of the Finnish divisions of the political police within the larger structure of the Special Department, while John Daly, *The Watchful State: Security Police and Opposition in Russia 1906-1917* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004) makes several references to the Russian political police’s presence in Finland at the beginning of the twentieth century.

52 GARF, f.494, op.7, d.1, l. 594. Circular from the Finnish Gendarme Directorate, May 12, 1904.
Gendarme Directorate and the Finnish Gendarme Directorate, which were departments of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Police Department. Instructions issued to Gendarme staff on passport control at border crossing points stipulated that officials must scrupulously inspect people and goods moving in both directions. No passengers suspected of carrying dangerous materials should be allowed to traverse the border. Inspection of passengers’ literature was also an important prerogative for Gendarme officers. Staff members were instructed to confiscate books, pamphlets and other reading material inciting seditious action. The instructions also specified that Gendarme officials were responsible for deciding whether literature that did not appear to contain obvious political meaning should be returned to passengers without censorship. The instructions listed diaries, almanacs, calendars, dictionaries, scientific texts, travel guides and prayer books as texts that fell under this category. The minutia of the details listed in instructions for Gendarme officers indicated that security officials considered the smuggling of illicit reading material to be a significant threat to the political order in the empire, and that Finland was a particularly troublesome area for these kinds of transgressions.

In addition to border crossing inspections, Russian political police also prioritized surveillance of suspected revolutionaries during their sojourn in Finland. Russian revolutionary groups set up bases of operation in Finland, but for the most part Finnish revolutionary groups were not particularly active in providing direct assistance to Russian revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks had a brief alliance with Kagal, a group of Finnish radical constitutionalists that directed the underground passive resistance to Russian rule. Kagal, in spite of its roots in the

53 GARF, f.494, op.1, d.21, ll.20-22. Instructions to the staff of the Finnish Gendarme Directorate on passport control, May 1904.
54 GARF, f.494, op.1, d.21, l. 30. Ibid.
passive resistance movement, was involved in the Bolsheviks’ ill-fated attempt to smuggle arms to Finland and Russia on the SS John Grafton in the spring of 1905. The Finnish Active Resistance Party, led by journalist Konni Ziliacus, was the most active in aiding the Russian revolutionaries in armed struggle and orchestrating terrorist acts against Tsarist authorities after the 1905 Revolution. This group was particularly crucial in distributing contraband literature. The personal nature of these contacts between Russian revolutionaries and their Finnish supporters made it crucial for Russian security agents to scrutinize these individual relationships.

Ministry of Internal Affairs officials were convinced that Russian revolutionaries were rather successful in planning their operations in the Finnish countryside. One internal report listed a number of meetings that revolutionary parties held in Finnish territory, many of which took place in the Karelian Isthmus dacha places: the Socialist Revolutionaries’ combat group met in April 1907 in Kuokkala; in June the St. Petersburg section of the Social Democratic party held its meeting in Terijoki, and the general meeting of the party convened in the same place in July; the Socialist Revolutionaries also met in Terijoki in September. The report also alleged that several political crimes committed in Russia, including the December 1906 murder of St. Petersburg city governor von der Launitz (who was allegedly sympathetic to the SRN’s causes) 56

56 Copeland traces the attitude of the Finnish opposition movement towards Russia’s anti-government groups from 1899 to 1904. Copeland argues that the Finnish movement “underwent a distinct metamorphosis from firm suspicion to active sympathy within a time period of only five years.” He divides the transformation into two periods: 1899-1902 represented the formative phase, while 1903-1904 signaled official cooperation between the Finnish and Russian movements. See The Uneasy Alliance, 16. Antti Kujala describes Kagal’s role in the John Grafton affair as an alliance of convenience, and characterizes the cautious approach the Active Resistance Party took towards the Bolsheviks. See “The Russian Revolutionary Movement and the Finnish Opposition, 1905: The John Grafton Affair and the Plans for an Uprising in St. Petersburg,” Scandinavian Journal of History, vol.5 (1980), and “Finnish Radicals and the Russian Revolutionary Movement, 1899-1907,” Revolutionary Russia, vol.5, no.2 (1992). Steven Huxley contextualizes Kagal’s role, within a larger context of pacifist opposition against the autocracy. See Constitutionalist Insurgency in Finland, 148-152.
were “planned to the minutest detail” in Finland. The report also alleged that Russian
revolutionaries connected to the Bolshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party managed to set
up a laboratory to test explosives in a Karelian Isthmus village. It claimed that St. Petersburg
police had uncovered the existence of a terrorist cell in Kellomäki, a small parish town adjacent
to Terijoki, where members sought to murder political figures through use of explosives. Many
of these revolutionaries had taken up residence in various hotels and safe houses in Vyborg and
surrounding areas. The report concluded that dangerous revolutionaries were “engaged in
systematic propaganda among local forces,” and had formed organizations to plan agitation and
prepare terrorist acts in the empire in places beyond Finland.57

These reports were compiled from data supplied by spies working for the Finnish
Gendarme Directorate.58 Their accuracy must be taken with caution, since these reports were
meant to draw attention to the Russian security agents’ concerns about subversive activity in
Finland. As Antti Kujala has noted, while spies and informants were recruited from among the
local Finnish population, most locals eschewed any kind of association with the Russian police.
The Finnish Gendarme Directorate “was forced to recruit the majority of its agents from amongst

57 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.59, l.1. Report from the Minister of Internal Affairs to Minister State
Secretary for Finland, December 5, 1907.
58 The Police Department regularly used spies to penetrate revolutionary organizations in
Russia. Evno Azef , the head of the Socialist Revolutionary Combat Organization, was a
notorious double agent who had been working for the security police since 1893. While in
service to the police, he also allegedly played a leading role in orchestrating the assassinations of
Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve in July 1904 as well as several other prominent imperial
officials. See Abraham Ascher, P.A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 70-75, Anna Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill, 232-237,
and L.G. Praisman, Terroristy i revoliusionery, okhranniki i provokatory ( Moscow: Rosspen,
2001). As leader of the SR's combat organization, he oversaw some of the organization's work in
Terijoki, and met with operatives in the Karelian Isthmus on several occasions. The Finnish
Gendarme Directorate, however, was not quite so successful in recruiting such high profile
informers.
the drunks, petty criminals and mentally disturbed elements of Finnish society. Agents quickly discovered the kind of information their superiors wanted and set about providing it.”

Nonetheless, these reports illustrated the extent to which officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs associated Finland’s special status with specific threats to the empire.

**Camouflage in the Dacha Places**

When considering the uniqueness of dacha places as locations that offered cover for those plotting against the ruling regime, it is worthwhile to use political crime in urban spaces as a reference point. In order to get their message across to a large audience, terrorists needed to commit their acts in places where their actions would be memorable enough to affect a large number of people. The city, with its dense population, offered such an arena for activists to deliver their message. For terrorism to be effective, “it required both the densely populated urban spaces with a modern infrastructure and public and a tightly bonded community to sustain and be sustained by its memory.”

In addition to being a medium for broadcasting a political creed, the city also served as a tool for masking perpetrators’ identities. Claudia Verhoeven, through her analysis of Dmitry Karakozov’s assassination attempt on Alexander II in 1866, has argued that the urban environment in St. Petersburg offered a cloak of anonymity to aspiring terrorists. Karakozov took advantage of St. Petersburg commoners’ practice of gathering at the gates of the

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60 Lynn Ellen Patyk, “Remembering ‘The Terrorism’: Sergei Stepniak-Kravchinskii’s Underground Russia,” Slavic Review, vol.68, no.4 (2009), 761. For a more comprehensive definition of revolutionary terrorism in late imperial Russia, particularly on the distinction between the motivations and tactics of different revolutionary groups, see Anna Geifman’s Thou Shall Kill.
Summer Garden to catch a glimpse of the Tsar in order to execute his plan. He was not apprehended until after he had already fired his shot because he was able to blend in with fellow commoners in the city. Verhoeven credits Karakozov as the first of the nihilists to use the urban crowd as a cover, and subsequent generations of revolutionary activists had to acquire that skill to succeed in carrying out their plans.61

In some ways, the dacha place can serve as both a medium for communicating a message and as a device for concealing unlawful activity. Like the urban environment, the dacha offered both, but in very different manners. The dachas were located in a more rural setting, but the settlements that housed these secondary homes were not isolated villages “amid the monotony of the boundless steppes and the sea of peasants” that Vera Figner had described.62 The dacha places, which hosted a growing number of urbanites from bourgeois and merchant backgrounds, were not completely detached from the city. They were located within reasonable distance from the cities, usually no more than several hours away by train. As Stephen Lovell has remarked, the dacha was “an exposed and precarious outpost of urban civilization in an overwhelmingly rural and under civilized country.”63 The dachas were still very closely connected to the city, but the dacha goer usually decided how often and in what capacity he or she engaged with city affairs.

62 In her memoir, Figner points to the futility of committing terroristic acts in the rural village, since their isolation meant that there was no mass audience to observe the effects of these acts. See Vera Figner, *Zapechatlennyi trud: Vospominanitia v dvukh tomakh* (Moscow: Mysl’, 1964), quoted in Patyk, “Remembering ‘The Terrorism,’” 760-761.
If the effectiveness of terroristic acts depended on the ability of perpetrators to provoke a sense of fear in places with a particular symbolic meaning for a large number of people, the dacha place, in a sense, mimicked one of these locales. As a site of leisure, the dacha represented an area of peaceful respite for thousands of urbanites. Acts of political violence in places where city folk least expected them could deliver a powerful message. Herzenstein’s assassination near his dacha in Terijoki served as one such example of politically motivated violence that had a shocking public effect. The dacha places in the Karelian Isthmus were well reputed, since they “had none of the public disorder that characterized Russian locations.” Vandalism, petty theft, alcohol-induced fights and occasional robberies were the extent of felonies dacha folks experienced. Visitors from St. Petersburg had good impressions of the Karelian Isthmus towns as crime-free places. That such a heinous transgression as the murder of a high profile political figure could happen in such a peaceful town shocked both local Finnish residents and the liberal intelligentsia who sojourned there.

On a practical level, the dual nature of the dacha settlement as an outpost of urbanity and as a quiet retreat from the norms of urban life also played into revolutionary terrorists’ advantage. The very nature of dacha life, combined with Russian authorities’ limited reach in Finland, made the dacha settlements in the Karelian Isthmus ideal locations for coordinating underground activity. Bolshevik agent S.M. Pozner remarked that it was so common for Russians to purchase or rent dacha space in Finland that two Bolshevik operatives, using false

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64 Verhoeven has argued that as part of the spatial dimension of terrorism, “at any moment, otherwise familiar territory can be estranged when, suddenly, an undetected (disguised, camouflaged) enemy appears out of nowhere, acts and disappears again.” See The Odd Man Karakozov, 106.
65 Lovell, Summerfolk, 112.
66 Teriokskii dnevnik, September 6, 1913
passports, were able to pose as a married couple and purchase dacha property for use as an explosives laboratory. Valentina Popova remarked that the idyllic countryside surrounding the dachas frequented by Socialist Revolutionary activists provided a good front for operating their explosives production workshop. She commented that in the summer of 1905, more families than usual sought to visit dacha places in Finland to escape the political tensions brought on by revolutionary unrest that year. It was relatively easy for her contact in the organization, Sasha Sevast’ianova, to pose as a housemaid traveling to the dacha zone with a bourgeois St. Petersburg family. In fact, she even evaded arrest in St. Petersburg by posing as the maid at the house where her colleagues were apprehended by security police agents. Other Bolshevik agents once got through border inspections on the train journey between Finland and Russia by dressing in typical summer travel attire and posing as vacationers. One of the party organizers recalled that associates traveled from Western Europe to the dachas near Vyborg posing as tourists from Tyrol.

The remoteness of these Finnish villages also played to the revolutionaries’ advantage. A. Ignatiev, a member of the Bolshevik technical combat group, used a dacha in a small Karelian Isthmus village as a place to store the group’s cache of arms. He recommended the location since his family lived there and knew the area well. The village was located not far away from the Russian border, not directly on the railway, but just off the main road between St. Petersburg and Vyborg. It was well connected to all stations along the Finnish-Russia railway to Vyborg. This

67 S.M. Pozner, “Iz istorii boevoi tekhniki, shkola v Kuokkala,” in Pervaia boevaia organizatsiia Bol’shevikov 1905-1907 g.g., ed. S.M. Pozner (Moscow: Staryi Bol’shevik, 1934), 233.
68 Popova, “Dinamitnye masterskie 1906-1907 g.g. i provokator Azef,” Katorga i ssylka, no. 33 (1927), 55-56.
69 N.I. Burenin, “Organizatsiia ‘Boevoi tekhnicheskoi gruppy’ 1901-1904 g.g.,” in Pervaia boevaia organizatsiia Bol’shevikov, 42 and 55.
meant that the local conditions provided both the seclusion and convenience for arms transport. There was no shortage of dachas in remote forested areas for setting up clandestine operations. The original SRs explosive school in Kuokkala was moved to a nearby village when agents got a tip from Finnish acquaintances in the local police that Russian security agents were suspicious of the activities in the Kuokkala dacha.

The malleable social hierarchies in the dacha places in Finland also contributed to the ease that subversive activists felt in Finland. Unlike the cities, the dacha settlements were also places of informal sociability. These places accorded people more freedom to ignore or subvert formal social conventions, and there were more avenues for interaction between people from disparate backgrounds. Prosperous Finnish families often invited Russian acquaintances to stay at their homes when the latter were visiting multiple towns and villages in the Karelian Isthmus. The constant coming and going of people rarely raised alarm. When Popova and Sevast’anova were traveling through the Isthmus to reach the SRs explosives laboratory in a more remote location, they stayed with a Russian contact who rented a dacha from a Finnish landlord. The two women simply told the landlord that they were guests of the Russian baron who was a tenant in this home. These kinds of visits were considered the norm in dacha social circles, and few stopped to question these frequent visits.

70 A. Ignatiev, “Vospominaniia organizatora,” in Pervaia boevaia organizatsiia Bol’shevikov, 77 and 89.
71 Pozner, “Iz istorii boevoi tekhniki, shkola v Kuokkala,” in Pervaia boevaia organizatsiia Bol’shevikov, 238.
72 Lovell, Summerfolk, 101.
73 Popova, “Dinamitnye masterskie 1906-1907 g.g. i provokator Azef,” Katorga i ssylka, no. 33 (1927), 56.
Such informality allowed for a certain degree of anonymity, since it became more difficult to determine what was appropriate of interaction between people of different social standing. In Finland, in particular, different tiers of the social hierarchy were not as distinct as in Russia. Peasants were an important element of local life, and a few even amassed considerable wealth. It was not uncommon to see local peasants mingling with prominent businessmen. This was an important component of Finnish village life in the dacha locations, where locals in all sectors of the economy reaped in the financial benefits of hosting seasonal vacationers from Russia. Ignatiev, who knew some Finnish, relied on Finnish workers he knew at his dacha village to help him conceal weapons at a local farmhouse.  

Another Bolshevik operative once hid explosive materials at the home of a Finnish acquaintance who was a local furniture maker. He and his Finnish accomplice worked out elaborate plans for emergency transport of these explosives in case of detection by authorities. These kinds of contacts that reached across conventional social boundaries made it more difficult for authorities to anticipate and identify behavior that seemed out of place.

Surveillance of individuals was therefore important to Russian authorities because for the most part, Russian revolutionaries forged contacts with their Finnish counterparts on a personal level. It was the mundane, everyday nature of these personal connections between Finns and Russian revolutionary activists in the seemingly idyllic setting of the dacha town that made these contacts so potent. The quotidian aspects of personal exchanges in places of leisure lent a shroud of anonymity to the revolutionaries’ radical plans. Russian security agents concerned about the

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74 Ignatiev, “Vospominaniia organizatora,” in Pervaia boevaia organizatsiia Bol’shevikov, 78.
75 V. Smirnov, “Rabota v Finliandii,” in Pervaia boevaia organizatsiia Bol’shevikov, 85.
difficulty in deciphering the meaning behind these personal relationships saw an urgent need to scrutinize daily activity and individual contacts in the rural towns.

**Dilemmas of Imperial Governance: Cooperation with Finnish Authorities**

By the beginning of the twentieth century, multiple features of Finland’s position within the Russian empire contributed to the vagueness of imperial authority in Finland, a factor that made Finland an advantageous home base for groups wishing to operate outside the confines of imperial laws. The Finnish Senate acted as the central governing apparatus that oversaw judicial matters. Most branches of administration such as finance and education were not subject to Russian ministerial control. A special Minister State Secretary for Finland was in charge of liaisons between the Senate and the Tsar. Russian ministers were required to consult the Tsar if they devised policies that were likely to affect the Grand Duchy of Finland. A specific customs and currency boundary clearly separated Finnish territory from Russia. Most importantly, Swedish laws prevailed in Finland, and legislation could not be made or amended without consent of the Diet. The ambiguity of this relationship severely limited imperial authorities’ range of action in pursuing political criminals in Finland. Abraham Ascher asserts that the cordial nature of the relationship between Finnish and Russian authorities crumbled in the 1890s because Russian authorities increasingly came to see Finland as a security risk. He specifically named the inability of Finnish authorities to proscribe revolutionary activity as a catalyst for this deteriorating relationship. Even more troublesome for Russian authorities was the Finnish

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police’s sympathy for revolutionaries, and the ample support local activists gave to socialist operatives.  

Provisions for Finland’s autonomy changed when Governor General Bobrikov issued the so-called February Manifesto in 1899, which made references to initiating common legislation in areas concerning both Finland and the empire. The February Manifesto also laid the groundwork for reducing the power of the Senate and the Diet to consultative capacities. The Revolution of 1905 in Russia was a significant turning point in Finnish-Russian relations. The general strikes in Russia in October were slow to reach Finland despite the proximity of the Finnish border to St. Petersburg, the hub of the revolutionary unrest. Nonetheless, when Finnish workers finally began to strike 10 days later, Finnish towns and villages quickly mobilized in protest against imperial designs to further integrate Finland into the empire. Under enormous pressure, the Tsar issued an imperial decree that suspended Bobrikov era acts and returned the Finnish-Russian legal relationship back to the status-quo ante, meaning that the Russian gendarmerie no longer had a

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77 Ascher, P.A. Stolypin, 304.
79 Alapuro, State and Revolution in Finland, 114-115. It is important to note the Revolution of 1905 in Finland was also expressed in specifically anti-Russian terms. Working class activism was a significant component of the strikes in October-November 1905, but these strikes were also fused with a Finnish nationalist element. Also significant is the fact that for the most part, these strikes and demonstrations in the cities and the countryside were not violent; there were no expressions of desire to overthrow the Tsarist government. This was a factor contributing to Nicholas II’s decision to appease Finnish demands to repeal Bobrikov's policies. See Toivo U. Raun, “The Revolution of 1905 in the Baltic Provinces and Finland,” Slavic Review, vol. 43, no. 3 (1984), 464-465.
full range of powers in the Grand Duchy.\textsuperscript{80} This factor was significant in revolutionaries' decision to operate in Finland in the wake of the 1905 Revolution.

Clandestine political activity in Finland underscored legal conundrums for imperial officials, and throughout the last two decades of the Russian empire’s existence, devising better methods to keep track of and bring to justice political enemies in Finland remained an urgent policy matter for imperial authorities. As one possible solution to Russian officials’ inability to conduct proper investigations of revolutionary activity in Finland, the Council of Ministers’ Special Committee on Finnish Affairs (\textit{Osoboe soveshchanie po delam Velikogo kniazhestva Finliandskogo}) recommended introducing military authority in Vyborg province in 1907. Along with this proposal, the ministers also suggested establishing larger military units on the outskirts of the Vyborg province as a buffer that could protect St. Petersburg from any unrest that might unfold in Finland.\textsuperscript{81} Advocates of this measure argued that the implementation of military authority would ensure the smooth operation of railways for transport of goods, enable political police to monitor smuggling more closely, and allow Russian military tribunals to oversee legal proceedings for crimes against the state.\textsuperscript{82} These measures were part of the Council of Ministers’ proposed solution to the so-called “Finnish Question.”

Not surprisingly, the Finnish bourgeois public did not react well to conservative Russians’ discussions of Finnish autonomy at the end of that decade. Much of the criticism of the autocracy at the time stemmed from revelations that the Council of Ministers was considering the

\textsuperscript{80} See Document 72, “The November Manifesto Granted by the Tsar, 1905,” in \textit{Finland and Russia}, 115.

\textsuperscript{81} RGIA, f.1276, op.18, d.54, l.9. Report from the meeting of the Council of Ministers Special Committee on Finnish Affairs, October 18, 1907. The report was dated November 3, 1907.

\textsuperscript{82} RGIA, f.1276, op.18, d.254, l.8-9. Letter from the Finnish Governor General to the Minister of Military April 2, 1910.
incorporation of three Finnish parish districts where many Russians’ dachas were located into the St. Petersburg province.\textsuperscript{83} One anonymous Russian author of a political pamphlet expressed frustration at the Finnish public’s inability to understand that decisions to reorganize administrative jurisdiction in the Vyborg Province was a question of security for Russia. The author argued that the Tsarist regime’s measures in Finland were directed primarily against revolutionaries in Russia, and not against the Finnish population at large. Russian authorities advocated for the division of the Vyborg Province because they had to make Finns understand the proximity of the border to Finland meant that Russian revolutionaries could easily hide in Finland.\textsuperscript{84} The Finnish public, however, did not easily accept proposals to impose military authority in parts of Finland or rearrange administrative boundaries. Some Finnish villagers in the Karelian Isthmus even refused to do work that supported the Russian dacha industry as a method of protest.\textsuperscript{85}

In October 1907, the Council of Ministers convened the above-mentioned Special Committee on Finnish Affairs to debate questions specific to the Grand Duchy of Finland. The discussions at this meeting reflected the frustration of government ministers over Finland’s special status as an autonomous entity within the Russian empire. To many of the ministers, this arrangement was akin to the Grand Duchy being a separate state with no ties or obligations to the Russian empire. This special arrangement, the officials believed, was what made it so easy for

\textsuperscript{83} The Finnish newspaper \textit{Karjala} ran an article on August 31, 1907 about rumors surfacing in St. Petersburg that Russian ministers were preparing a committee to look into the amalgamation of Vyborg Province with Russia. Throughout the winter of 1907 and spring of 1908, Finnish newspapers commented regularly on Russian discussions of this issue. See Vilho Hämäläinen, \textit{Karjalan kannaksen venäjäinen kesäasutus ja sen vaikutus Suomen ja Venäjän suhteiden kehitykseen autonomian ajan lopulla} (Tampere: Tampereen Yliopisto, 1974), 173-174.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Okhrana russkikh interesov v Finliandii} (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1910), 7.

\textsuperscript{85} Some examples of these protests are illustrated in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
Finnish officials to dismiss Russian concerns over the proliferation of revolutionary activity in Finland. In fact, the ministers argued, other foreign states such as Germany and Sweden have been much more thorough in taking measures against revolutionaries, leaving the ministers no doubt that had Finland still been a Swedish province, the fight against the revolutionary terrorists would have been much more successful. To make matters worse, Stolypin did not trust Russia’s Governor General in Finland, N.N. Gerard, whom he thought was sympathetic to the Finnish separatist cause. Although the Governor General, appointed by the Tsar, was supposed to represent the autocracy’s interests in Finland, Stolypin did not believe Gerard was doing enough to ensure that Finnish officials were acting against Russian revolutionary terrorists. The issue of security in Finland brought to the forefront the dilemmas associated with Finland’s status within the Russian empire. The elusiveness of revolutionary groups operating in the dacha places near the Finnish-Russian border was at the heart of imperial officials’ anxieties. For these reasons, exchanges between Russian and Finnish officials over measures to apprehend suspected revolutionaries were most intense from 1906 to 1908.

In the wake of the 1905 Revolution, imperial officials’ insecurity was clearly expressed in the Council of Ministers’ assessment of the situation in Finland. The ministers were keenly aware of previous examples of Finnish animosity towards and resistance against Russian decrees, and this awareness colored their judgment on Finnish issues.

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86 RGIA, f.1276, op.18, d.57, l.5. Report from the meeting of the Special Committee on Finnish Affairs.
88 The more memorable instances of Finnish defiance of Russian decrees stemmed from the period of N.I. Bobrikov’s tenure as Governor General. When Bobrikov introduced several regulations for enacting imperial legislation in Finland in February 1899, which later became
discussions touched upon the support that Finnish organizations gave to the rebels of the 1905 revolution, which included the delivery of weapons in Finland to revolutionaries and the spread of anti-government propaganda among local Russian troops. The Council also pointed to the extradition agreement with the Finnish Senate as an issue that hampered the political police’s ability to pursue revolutionary fugitives in Finland. The Finnish request that Russian officials provided ample documentation before a Russian accused of crime in Finland could be transferred to Russia for trial was cited as a noteworthy area of disagreement between Finnish and Russian authorities. 89

The sharing of competencies between the Finnish Gendarme Directorate, which was a division in the Ministry of Internal Affairs Police Department, and local Finnish police was a significant bone of contention between Russian and Finnish officials. Within the backdrop of escalating political tension, there was little room for amelioration in the relationship between Finnish and Russian police. The Russian political police often pressured Finnish post offices to conduct mail perlustration, and Finnish police officials, accustomed to operating within the

known as the February Manifesto, many Finns saw these regulations as a direct infringement on Finnish autonomy. Historians of Finland have generally attributed the birth of widespread resistance to Russian rule to reactions against the February Manifesto and subsequent decrees. For example, the military service law of 1901, which introduced selective conscription of Finnish citizens for the military, resulted in prolonged passive resistance. See Kirby, ed., Finland and Russia, 69-70. In 1904, a disgruntled student, Eugen Schauman, assassinated Bobrikov. Although he acted alone, many within the passive resistance movement hailed the assassination “as the deed of a selfless patriot.” See Kirby, A Concise History of Finland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 141. In October-November 1905, a general strike in the name of Finnish nationalism spread across the country, affecting much of the country’s infrastructure. See C. Leonard Lundin, “The Storm Breaks and Rages,” in Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, ed. Edward C. Thaden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 444. 89

RGIA, f.1276, op.18, d.57, ll.5-8. Ibid.
confines of Finnish law, refused to accept directions from their Russian counterparts.\textsuperscript{90} Russian security officials were keenly aware of the gendarmerie staff’s difficulty in taking action to deter terrorist organizations in Finland due to legal constraints. They were concerned that Russian gendarmes might even be put in a position of harm in Finland because they were targets of anti-government activists’ scorn and because of the Finnish officials’ negative attitude towards any form of Russian authority.\textsuperscript{91} Officials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs became increasingly concerned about the rising animosity of the Finnish population towards imperial rule, and this sense of alarm contributed directly to the Gendarme Directorate’s desire to clarify grounds on which its officers were to cooperate with local Finnish authorities in the towns and cities where the subdivisions of the Finnish Gendarme Directorate were stationed.

Russian officials desired to hold Finnish authorities responsible for the proliferation of clandestine political activities in Finland, especially in the border zones. The Council of Ministers repeatedly voiced its security concerns to Finnish governing representatives. The ministers issued lengthy letters to the Minister State Secretary of the Grand Duchy of Finland detailing Russian officials’ opinion on the matter. In one such report, Russian authorities accused Finnish officials of foot dragging in assisting Russian political police with apprehending individuals and groups suspected of committing crimes against the Russian state. In spite of a ruling by the Finnish Senate in November 1906 to tighten performance requirements of Finnish police in investigating major cases involving political crimes, Russian representatives claimed that it took too long for Finnish police to transfer powers to imperial authorities in order to make

\textsuperscript{90} Futrell, {	extit{Northern Underground}}, 54-55.

\textsuperscript{91} RGIA, f.1276, op.18, d.57, l.22. Report from the meeting of the Special Committee on Finnish Affairs.
timely arrests of the revolutionaries in question. Russian officials’ frustration at their inability to break through the complex and organized web of revolutionaries’ organizations in the Finnish countryside translated into hostility towards Finnish authorities.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs proposed a number of measures to strengthen the competency of imperial police officials. These proposals included provisions that would require local Finnish police in different parish districts to report the addresses of suspicious individuals living in Finland to imperial police authorities. Finnish police were to routinely approve Russian political police officials’ efforts to conduct search and seizure at the homes of Russian subjects suspected of crimes against the state, and Russian police were to be given permission to detain the suspects without objection from Finnish police. Those arrested by Finnish police at the request of Imperial authorities were to be turned over right away to imperial police. Finally, if the investigation of a Russian subject suspected of crimes against the state implicated a Finnish citizen, then details of the case related to the Finnish native were to be transferred to imperial officials, with notification to local police. These measures may have reflected the typical relationship between local police in Russian provinces and the security police, but in Finland, these proposals threatened Finland’s autonomy.

In a response to the Ministry of Internal Affairs lengthy list of proposed measures to strengthen Russian police competencies in Finland, the Minister of State Secretary only agreed to some vaguely defined measures. These included the responsibility of Finnish authorities to take proper steps to remove from Finnish territory Russian subjects suspected by imperial authorities of participating in terrorist activities, promises to transform and reinforce Finnish police so that

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92 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.59, ll.2-3. Letter from the Council of Ministers to the Minister State Secretary for Finland, December 5, 1907.
93 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.59, ll.6-8. Ibid.
Finnish constables can be more efficient at conducting searches and arrests, and a pledge to encourage closer interaction between Finnish and Russian police on criminal investigations. Furthermore, the Minister State Secretary explained that since 1903, Finnish authorities had made every effort to strengthen police forces in Vyborg Province, where revolutionaries seemed to be most active. In the dacha settlements in Terijoki, Kuokkala, Kellomaki and Ollila, for example, the Finnish police bureau established two more police commissioners, two police chief constables, seven regular constables, seven supervisory constables, and authorized the activities of other detectives. Finnish authorities believed they were already doing everything possible to curb the activities of revolutionaries who allegedly carried out their plans unhindered in the remote rural areas in eastern Finland.

Russian authorities were reluctant to accept the Minister State Secretary’s claims that Finnish officials were doing their best to strengthen security in the border zones. The Governor General underscored several shortcomings that he felt Finnish authorities still needed to address. He noted that although a previous decree by the Finnish Senate in November 1906 gave provincial governors in Finland the power to arrest and expel individuals at the request of Imperial authorities in relation to crimes committed in Russia had been done little to deter the criminals. He pointed out that Finnish police was slow to adopt the necessary measures stipulated by the decree, which meant that political criminals were able to evade justice. According to one report from the Finnish Gendarme Directorate, when Russian gendarme

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94 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.59, l.21. Letter from Minister State Secretary to Minister of Internal Affairs, December 31, 1907.
95 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.59, l.23. Ibid.
96 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.59, l.29. Letter from the Governor General of Finland to the Minister State Secretary, January 18, 1908.
officials accompanied Finnish police to conduct a search of a suspect’s home, the local police did
not conduct a timely search of all the rooms in the suspect’s apartment while police officers were
interviewing his wife. During that time, the suspect was apparently able to destroy all
incriminating evidence that would have linked him to a crime against the state. The Ministry of
Internal Affairs report also cited another case where Finnish police failed to conduct a proper
search of a suspect’s home due to the landlord’s absence. The Minister of Internal Affairs
proposed that the Finnish police should be required to send regular reports to imperial officials
about the performance of Finnish police, and indicate whether local police followed proper
procedure for arrest of suspects accused of conducting revolutionary activity. He bluntly warned
that if the Finnish Senate still insisted on debating the issue of the rights of imperial police in
Finland, Russian authorities may need to take special action. Emergency measure might need to
be placed to limit the threat of revolutionaries “who remain unimpeded just a few hours away
from the residence of the monarchy.”97 Interestingly, these criticisms of the Finnish police's
incompetency made no reference to apprehending terrorists from the right. These discussions
about the inability of Finnish officials to mete out justice to revolutionary rebels occurred at the
same time as the trial of Herzenstein's assassins were going on. Yet there was no mention in
Russian documents about the great lengths Finnish officials went to prosecute the SRN members
responsible for the murder despite constant foot-dragging by SRN lawyers. The pressure that
Russian authorities put on their Finnish counterparts to tighten security indicate that Russian
security officials were concerned primarily with revolutionary activities, and were willing to
overlook transgressions by extremists from the right.

97 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.59, ll.45-46. Letter from Minister of Internal Affairs to the Minister
State Secretary, February 1, 1908.
The Finnish Senate rebutted the Russians' accusations in a report issued by a committee dealing with Russian affairs. The Senate committee claimed that police, at least in the Vyborg Province, had already complied with requests from imperial authorities to take stronger measures regarding Russians accused of crimes against the state. They gave the example of a case from the previous year where the police in the Vyborg Province carried out the search and arrest of four individuals in Terijoki, Kellomäki and Kuokkala as requested by Russian authorities, even though details and facts about their case were insufficient for police action. The Senate report noted a few other successes by Finnish police in uncovering revolutionary plots: eleven people were recently arrested in a dacha in Kivennapa, where material for manufacturing bombs was discovered; in July 1907, Vyborg city police raided a house where a Socialist Revolutionary cell was publishing incendiary literature. In December of the same year, police in Terijoki raided a Finnish watchmaker’s house which served as a warehouse for storing revolutionary publications; police in Kuokkala and Kellomäki also discovered explosive material hidden along the shoreline.

The Senators acknowledged that there had been several cases where efforts to detain suspected revolutionaries had been unsuccessful. They admitted that in one case, a Russian subject arrested for holding meetings to incite revolutionary activities managed to escape from a provincial jail where he was held. There were some individuals among local police squads in the dacha places who assisted revolutionaries. This did not mean, however, that the police force in Finland as a whole was complicit in abetting the outlaws’ activities or that the police were

98 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.59, l.72. Report from the Finnish Senate to the Finnish Governor General, March 21, 1908.
99 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.59, l.73. Ibid.
100 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.59, l.74-75. Ibid.
indifferent to the severity of the situation. Finnish authorities, both local and provincial, were aware of the disadvantages police faced in detecting and preventing these political crimes. The Senators’ report emphasized that Finnish authorities did not object in general to the Ministry of Internal Affairs proposal to enhance Russian security forces’ competencies in Finland. For example, the Senate agreed that Russian subjects held for crimes against the state specified in previous circulars should be extradited to Russia no later than the day after the request for extradition had been made as long as there were significant grounds for the arrest. In such cases, Finnish officials would not interfere with the procedure. Russians who had not acquired Finnish citizenship at the time of their arrest would lose their right of residence in Finland. However, the Senate insisted that Finnish police should have sole power to carry out all arrests, and investigation of Finnish citizens implicated in revolutionary plots should always remain in the hands of Finnish authorities. Other provisions in the Ministry of Internal Affairs proposal required further clarification before the Finnish Senate could discuss the issue. 101

Exasperated by Finnish legislators’ refusal to deal with revolutionary activism in a manner satisfactory to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Stolypin intensified efforts to curb Finnish autonomy between 1907 and 1909. The democratically elected Finnish Diet was dismissed repeatedly over its refusal to support Russian proposals. For example, Stolypin dissolved the Diet in March 1908 because its members had voted against the Finnish Senate’s decision to comply with the Russian government’s request to hand over Russians suspected of political crimes to Russian administrative courts. 102 Many members of the Finnish Senate eventually resigned over increasing pressure from the Council of Ministers to fund an expensive

101 RGIA, f.1361, op.1, d.59, l.76-77. Ibid.
102 Ascher, P.A. Stolypin, 309.
railway bridge over the Neva River in St. Petersburg that would connect the Finnish and Russian railway lines. Stolypin took the opportunity to appoint a new, reorganized Senate composed mainly of Russified Finns. Finally, on June 10, 1910, the Duma passed Stolypin’s bill stipulating that all questions affecting the interests of the Russian Empire were to be handled only in St. Petersburg. In essence, this law denied Finnish political organs the power to act on and initiate legislation that Russian officials deemed to be of empire-wide interest, including selected questions relating to judicial affairs.

In spite of the tightening of imperial legislative control over Finland, the Finnish threat to the empire was far from subdued. In the wake of Stolypin’s June 1910 law, Finns became more united than ever in their opposition to Tsarist measures. Revolutionaries continued to urge Finnish workers to side with them in the revolutionary struggle against Tsarist authority. The Police Department did not cease taking precautionary measures in Finland. The Finnish Gendarme Directorate continued to gather intelligence in Finland and supply information about alleged terrorist and revolutionary plots to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Although much of this information was exaggerated, and even fabricated, in order to attract the attention of Russian

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104 Kirby, ed., Finland and Russia, 123. The Kharitonov Commission was a 1909 Finnish-Russian committee charged with the task of resolving differences in the judicial-legal relationship between Finland and Russia. The Russian members of the committee espoused the following viewpoint: “The fundamental laws of the Empire have the same validity in Finland as in other parts of the Empire. Fundamental laws provided for Finland are valid only for its internal affairs.” The Stolypin law of June 1910 was based on the Russian reports from this committee. While the points on the legal affairs was broad enough to give Russian officials more leeway in determining which legal issues, such as extradition and prosecution of Russians who committed political crimes in Finland, were to be treated as affairs of interest to the Empire. See Document 79, “Résumé of the viewpoints of the Finnish and Russian Members of the Kharitonov Committee on Russo-Finnish relations,” in Finland and Russia, 129.
105 Kirby, ed., Russia and Finland, 124.
ministers who had begun to lose interest in Finnish affairs, this factor did not render the Police Department’s continued operations in Finland irrelevant. The fact that up to the eve of the First World War there were still security officials willing to believe that the Finnish countryside was a haven for Tsardom’s enemies underscored the effect that previous accounts of revolutionaries’ activities had on Russian security thinking.

Anxieties over security in Finland resurfaced during the First World War. Records of the Finnish Gendarme Directorate in 1916 showed that of the 188 Gendarme officers stationed in Finland, 29 were stationed permanently at the military garrison in Vyborg. Additionally, 101 permanent and temporary staff worked at the Terijoki department. Russian political police representatives in Finland made further attempts to augment their competencies in Finland. The chief of the Finnish Gendarme Directorate proposed in 1915 that questions of cooperation between members of the Russian security police and local authorities over border security should be revisited. He argued in favor of establishing an official agreement with local governors that would give security police from the empire sole jurisdiction over search and inspection of individuals suspected of espionage in border regions. He insisted that Russian officials and local government organs needed to limit the rights of foreigners in Finland. He also suggested widening local authorities’ obligations to Russian security officials to include providing information on people who crossed the border illegally into Finland or those who planned to flee

106 Kujala notes that an investigation of the Finnish Gendarme Directorate in 1912 revealed that a number of reports of rebellious plans by opposition groups were forged by opportunistic agents. See “The Policy of the Russian Government Toward Finland,” 161-162.

the territory of the empire via Finland. The Gendarme Directorate chief’s proposals indicated that Russian security officials increasingly doubted Finnish officials’ willingness to take necessary measures to detect elements in Finland that were harmful to the imperial regime.

This mood of anxiety was also evident in the Russian security police’s observations of the general disposition of the Finnish population and the situation of the Grand Duchy during the war. The Chief of the Finnish Gendarme Directorate’s observations of Finnish attitudes towards Russian officials presented a grim picture. He commented that Finland was an area of potential danger to the empire because revolutionary agitators traveled along the same railway networks as the ones that supplied Russian military garrisons in Finland. In addition to the threat from Russian revolutionary groups, imperial administrators in Finland also had to contend with Finnish youths who received military training in Germany and Sweden. The Gendarme chief opined that such developments were undoubtedly a part of the “traitorous” movement growing in Finland. He estimated that about 1500 to 2000 of these youths had already returned to settle in Finland, with approximately 200 to 300 of them living in the Vyborg Province. This situation posed a threat to the Russian capital, and it was therefore necessary to keep surveillance of the population to keep track of movements of seditious groups. Even though this small group of German-trained youths that supported the independence movement had very little else in common with the radical revolutionaries besides overthrowing the autocracy, the presence of both these groups in the same Finnish towns further aggravated Russian security agents’ frustration at their incapacity to make arrests in Finland.

109 GARF, f.494, op.1, d.5, ll.1-5. Observations of the Chief of the Finnish Gendarme Directorate on the local population in Finland, September 23, 1916.
Political Context in Late Imperial Russia

The flurry of clandestine political activities in the Karelian Isthmus dacha locations had its roots in the rising tide of violence and terror in nineteenth century Russia. This deluge began in the 1860s with the attempted assassination of Alexander II, and although the revolutionaries of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were very different from the assassins of the earlier days, terror became an entrenched part of late imperial Russian political life. Both radicals on the left and extremists on the right resorted to murder and other violent acts to eliminate their political opponents and send their public message. Some liberal supporters of constitutionalism abhorred these practices and insisted on making their political demands heard through peaceful means. This had been the intent behind the plans for the Vyborg Manifesto. Others from the liberal camp, however, tacitly condoned terroristic acts from left-wing agitators. Public displays of violence such as Herzenstein’s murder and the proliferation of subversive activities such as the organizing of socialist terrorist cells should be understood in the context of escalating social and political tensions in late imperial Russia.

The first decade of the twentieth century, the temporal focus of this chapter, was one in which news of revolutionary violence permeated the public sphere in Russia. Although the group responsible for Herzenstein’s assassination, the Union of the Russian People (Soiuz russkago naroda), claimed to mete out justice in defense of Tsardom rather than against it, this sensational incident should not be cast aside from the larger narrative of politically motivated violence that

110 The Kadets did not participate in or outwardly endorse terror as a political tactic, but also did not take an active stance in condemning the terror tactics of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks. According to Anna Geifman, Kadet rhetoric implicitly justified left-wing terror under the intolerable political conditions in Russia. Kadets tended to see terrorists as victims of an oppressive regime, and took an active stance in pursuing political amnesty. See Thou Shalt Kill, 216.
swept across Russia. In a decade when both extremist groups that supported and opposed Tsarist authority increasingly turned to assassination of prominent political figures to stake their claim over Russia’s governance, Herzenstein’s murder was significant for several reasons.  

First, the act was committed in a part of the Russian empire that was located very close to the center of political action, a mere 50 kilometers away from St. Petersburg. At the same time, Finland’s special status within the Russian empire made Finland administratively aloof from Russia. Finland’s criminal justice system differed from that in use in Russia, and this meant that efforts to pursue and prosecute the culprits depended on cooperation between Finnish and Russian police authorities. Second, this assassination was one of numerous incidents that contributed to the notion of the Russian dacha places in Finland as magnets for individuals and groups with seditious intentions. The drama of Herzenstein’s assassination unfolded while radical socialists were scheming to wreak havoc in St. Petersburg.

Finnish towns that were popular destinations for Russian dacha goers became a growing security threat to an imperial regime that was already battling widespread unrest in the heartland and elsewhere in its borderlands. Socialist groups were arguably even more active in Finland. The autocracy’s security apparatus thus saw Russian socialist organizations operating in the idyllic Finnish countryside as an ominous force that, combined with the growing Finnish opposition movement, could be deadly for the regime’s longevity. The Russian political police’s inability to properly quash this threat due to the legal obstacles that Finland’s autonomy posed  

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111 Rawson offers a systematic analysis of the most prominent right wing monarchist groups that emerged in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. He discusses both the assassinations planned by revolutionary groups and rightists groups. See Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905. John Daly details the intensification of terrorist activities throughout the early months of 1906. See The Watchful State, 24 and 37. Norman Naimark’s Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander III (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), details the influence of the Populists’ terrorist acts on the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries.
frustrated imperial officials. These factors gave Russian authorities a new sense of urgency in finding ways to further integrate Finland with the empire.

The continuing escalation of political unrest across Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century contributed to the chaos within the Russian political police system. Fredric S. Zuckerman’s work describes a highly centralized political police network plagued by a myriad of circulars and orders, leaving many provincial and local Gendarme Directorates aimless with lack of direction from the capital.112 Jonathan Daly attributes chaos in the Police Department to the fact that Russia was severely undergoverned, with incoherent lines of communication across a large swath of territory. He also notes that the empire’s western borderlands, including Finland, were the least controlled and most prone to harboring revolutionary sympathies.113 Tsarist ministries’ concerns with the spread of revolutionary terror in Finland should be viewed in the context of the chaotic organization of Russia’s political police ever since this organ began conducting surveillance in Finland. The Police Department’s mandate in Finland was not analogous to its activities in foreign departments in Western Europe because Finland was technically a part of the Russian empire. At the same time, the Police Department’s range of action in Finland was limited because of Finland’s legal status within the empire. Interestingly, few scholars have made a systematic study of the Russian security police’s operations in Finland and analyzed the significance of Finnish autonomy for these operations.114

113 Daly, The Watchful State, 5.
114 The Russian political police’s operations in Finland are not included in either Zuckerman’s study of the political police in Russia or his study of the Russian secret police in Western Europe, The Tsarist Secret Police: Policing Europe in a Modernizing World (London: Palgrave, 2003). Charles A. Ruud and Sergei A. Stepanov, Fontanka 16: The Tsar’s Secret Police
The attempted assassination of Stolypin on August 12, 1906 at the Prime Minister’s dacha on Apteka Island, located near St. Petersburg in the Neva River, did not help soften Russian security officials’ perception of Finnish dacha places as havens for terrorists. Although the bomb that exploded at Stolypin’s dacha failed to kill the Prime Minister, it killed his daughter and resulted in many casualties. The Russian press’ response to the attempt reflected a pervasive sense of crisis. One St. Petersburg newspaper commented: “The attempt left a large and heavy impression not just in Russia but also abroad. At its extreme, the estimates of the damage of this attempted attack have been passed on by word of mouth in St. Petersburg.” The writer set this assassination attempt in a larger context of Russians’ response to the recent rash of politically motivated murders of government officials: “Whether order is achieved through the state Duma or through reforms at the Duma’s calling, as long as the political killings do not stop, one cannot even dream of what creative work could be done.”

Commentary in Novoe vremia depicted a Russian political arena under siege: “Across the expanse of Russia every day we are besieged with death caused by revolutionary malice that is emboldened by the streams of blood.”

Another newspaper editorial condemned the political message of the perpetrators: “Russian society cannot relate to the recent terrorist acts committed in the name of liberating ideas without a feeling of horror. These kinds of bloody acts cannot be valued.”

Although Stolypin’s dacha was located on Russian soil, the idea that prominent government officials could be attacked at their secondary homes in places they perceived of as their refuge from the stress of imperial

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(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1999) traces the history of the political police (okhrana) as a special section within the Police Department, but does not make specific mention of political police operations in Finland.

115 Peterburgskii listok, August 13, 1906.
116 Novoe vremia, August 13, 1906.
117 Peterburgskaia gazeta, August 13, 1906.
politics was not lost on officials. Crimes against the state committed in places that were considered sites of leisure only served to heighten officials’ sense of alarm at the rising political turmoil that had potential to threaten the integrity of imperial authority. Up until 1908, imperial officials had reason to be concerned about the underground revolutionary operations in the Karelian Isthmus.

The wave of revolutionary violence subsided by 1909 thanks in part to Stolypin’s hardline approach to hunting and punishing the government’s adversaries and in part to oversights within the ranks of the revolutionaries. Combat groups associated with the SRs and Bolsheviks had already abandoned their stations in Finland by the end of 1908. Yet imperial officials’ preoccupation with Finland as a launching pad for subversive activities never quite faded away. In the twilight years of the Russian Empire’s existence, the legacy of political violence that accompanied the Revolution of 1905 still resonated for Russian security officials who kept a close eye on developments in the Karelian Isthmus towns and villages.

The picture of the Karelian Isthmus dacha zone in this chapter stands in stark contrast to the image of the idyllic, benign nature of daily social and cultural interactions in the dacha towns.

118 Stolypin himself alleged that the attempt on his life was planned in Finland. See Ascher, P.A. Stolypin, 310.
119 Beginning in 1905, the government began placing many regions across the empire under a state of martial law or extraordinary security, and military courts were given the authority to try political crimes. The revolutionaries themselves blamed Stolyin’s harsh measures for their failures. Furthermore, the revelation in 1909 that Evno Azef was a double agent significantly damaged the SRs morale. Other revolutionaries still pursued terrorism as a viable strategy, but these acts were much more infrequent after the so-called Azef affair. See Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill, 227, 231, and 236-237.
120 Kujala, “Policy of the Russian Government Toward Finland,” 160. Since the stringent measures against revolutionaries made it extremely difficult to carry out there acts of terror successfully in Russia, planning these acts in Finland became moot.
illustrated in Chapters Two and Three. The assassination of a prominent Russian political figure in Terijoki was a sobering reminder that violent crime did happen even in the most serene places. Disagreements between Finnish and Russian authorities over policing the dacha zone, as well as the increased surveillance of individuals in these towns cast a pall over these summer vacation destinations. Evidence of clandestine political activities in these localities eroded the image of the Karelian Isthmus as a rural utopia unspoiled by political unrest in St. Petersburg. Granted, personal testimonies by villagers in these towns indicated that people, for the most part, carried on with their daily lives relatively unhindered by police surveillance. Contacts between Russian revolutionary activists and Finnish citizens sympathetic to their cause were strong in this region, but because most of these relationships were kept secret, they did not appear to disrupt everyday life in these towns in obvious ways. Even in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution and the Kadets’ ill-fated attempt to incite popular civil disobedience through the Vyborg Manifesto in the summer of 1906, Russians continued to flock to the Karelian Isthmus for their annual vacations. Local Finnish villages continued to profit from daily economic exchanges with their Russian acquaintances. This did not mean, however, these interactions remained completely untouched by the tensions between Russian and Finnish authorities. Finnish residents in these towns responded negatively to Russian plans to incorporate their towns into Russian regional administration. The presence of radical revolutionaries in these Karelian Isthmus towns complicated the image of these places as mere vacation destinations. Many of the middle class St. Petersburgers may have found the towns in eastern Finland attractive because they saw the region as a nicer, more peaceful extension of imperial suburban space. Revolutionary activists, however, saw the Karelian Isthmus as an attractive location precisely because they saw it as a space apart from and outside of imperial authorities’ reach.
The chaotic situation after 1917 lent further fuel to the notion that the Karelian Isthmus dacha locations, which became a transit corridor for people fleeing from both Finland and Russia, were ripe grounds for breeding subversive elements. White émigrés and members of the defeated White armies settled temporarily in Finnish towns in the 1920s, thus posing a concern for Soviet security officials.¹²¹ The Finnish government, reeling from the effects of a bitterly divisive civil war, was particularly suspicious of the scores of people who flocked to Finland claiming to be fugitives from Bolshevik oppression. Finnish officials feared the prospect of Bolshevik operatives hiding amongst these refugees. As will be seen in Chapter Five, these fears significantly affected the way the post-independence Finnish government dealt with the refugee crisis from the beginning of the Bolshevik Revolution to the late 1920s.

¹²¹ The Russian General Military Union (Russkii Obshche-Voinskii Soiuz, or ROVS) was a large White émigré organization that was active during the interwar period. One of its branches was located in Finland. See Paul Robinson, The White Russian Army in Exile 1920-1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 100. Lazar Fleishman notes that the OGPU’s investigations revealed intent by members of ROVS to launch an intervention against the Soviet Union. See Vtiskakh provokatsii. Operatsiia 'Trest' i russkaia zarubezhnaia pechat' (Moscow: NLO, 2003), 178.
In the spring of 1923, Anna Karlson wrote a letter to Finnish authorities in charge of refugee aid through a Finnish-Russian translator. She disclosed that she was a Russian-speaking subject of the defunct Russian Empire who was born in the Grand Duchy of Finland. In her youth, she had moved to St. Petersburg, where she married a Finnish citizen. When civil war broke out in Russia she fled to Finland along with her husband, her mother, and her child. Soon after their arrival in Finland, her husband abandoned the family. She wrote, “I have a poor command of the Finnish language and have not succeeded in finding work, and because of that, I cannot support my child and my invalid mother in the country of my birth. I respectfully ask you for help to ease my family’s burdens.”

Although Karlson had very few personal ties to Finnish-speakers beyond her absent husband, she nonetheless appealed to Finnish authorities for assistance at a time when many within Finnish political circles regarded Russians with suspicion. Did her mention of Finland as her birth country and her marriage to a Finnish citizen indicate a conscious effort to garner sympathy from aid officials? What meaning did territorial space and geopolitical borders hold for individuals thrown into the crucible of war and revolution? What did this example reveal about the way political context affected individuals’ identification with a particular community?

This chapter investigates the ethnic dimension of refugee management in Finland from 1918 to the mid-1920s, when the number of people fleeing revolution and civil war in Russia climaxed. I examine the correspondence between refugees, displaced persons and aid agencies to probe how definitions of nationality or ethnicity affected the plight of those seeking refuge in

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1 National Archives of Finland (KA) Finnish Interim Economic Committee Archive (SVTK) Ea3 Folder 3. Letter from Anna Karlson to SVTK representatives in Helsinki, March 17, 1923.
Finland. Ethnicity and nationality were slippery categories for identifying refugees and displaced peoples because of the diversity among these groups. These people’s daily activities prior to the onset of political strife rarely required that they identify themselves by such categories. Examining the way refugees and displaced persons identified themselves in their communication with aid agencies allows us to see different ways in which individuals employed the language of ethnicity as a category of practice.

The analysis in this chapter offers some insight into the power dynamics that affected the lives of those displaced by political crises. Who had the power to decide how aid should be distributed, and how did individuals’ social, cultural and political identities factor into these power dynamics? Maria Lähteenmäki has remarked that strict surveillance of the Russian population in Finland began immediately after the Finnish Civil War in 1918, and contemporaries justified the scrutiny of Russians in eastern Finland as part of the ethnic battle between Finns and Russians for control over towns in the Karelian Isthmus. Max Engman has noted that after 1917, Russians who lived temporarily in Finland became foreigners without protection. Their security was further threatened in the spring of 1918, when Finnish authorities planned to remove the Russian population from eastern Finland to cleanse the border areas of Russian influence. By 1919, nearly 12 000 Russians had applied for permission to remain in the

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4 Engman, *Raja*, 67. In May 1918, the Finnish Senate issued an order to begin mass deportation of Russian subjects who had not acquired Finnish citizenship. The deportation orders were revoked shortly after because of widespread protest from the prominent members of the Russian business community in Finland.
Viipuri (Vyborg) Province, and their fate was in the hands of government officials reviewing these petitions.⁵

It is easy to surmise from the secondary literature that Finnish government agencies had the sole power to decide who could remain in Finland and who must leave, who should receive aid and who should not. It is equally tempting to assume that government decisions always disadvantaged people who identified as Russians. However, by adopting such myopic views one risks neglecting individuals’ capacity to recognize the fluidity of identity categories. Although Russian émigrés in Finland often lamented their social isolation in Finland, this sentiment did not apply to all Russian speakers in Finland. Some had established ties with Finnish speakers through years of social interaction, while others formed family connections with Finnish acquaintances through marriage. Like the nationally indifferent people in Tara Zahra’s study of Czech and German identities in Sudetenland, both Finnish and Russian speakers employed nationality as a category of practice to suit their daily realities.⁶ I argue that Finns’ and Russians’ intricate social networks complicated the use of nationality, ethnicity and citizenship as bureaucratically defined categories for allocating aid to those displaced by political instability.

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⁵ Ibid., 90.
⁶ Tara Zahra uses the term “national indifference” to describe several different kinds of behavior among Czech and German speakers in the Bohemian lands at the beginning of the twentieth century. She argues that for some individuals, this entailed complete absence of national loyalties. Some individuals also switched “sides” in nationalist politics depending on political and social circumstances. Others may have considered themselves Czechs or Germans in a nominal sense but rejected the broader demands of nationalist politics. See *Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 4-5. Pieter Judson has made similar arguments in his work on Austria’s linguistically mixed regions. For example, he has observed that some peasants who supported nationalist associations often did so for non-national purposes, such as gaining access to farming provisions. See *Guardians of the Nations: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).
The experience of refugeedom prompted some individuals to think of ethnicity and nationality in ways they had not previously envisioned.

Finland’s refugee crisis in the early 1920s was linked to a larger European-wide context of population displacement and statelessness resulting from the First World War. There were countless instances in the past when people fled their homelands due to warfare and political turmoil, but the post-First World War situation differed from previous refugee movements in several ways. Claudena M. Skran has argued that the interwar refugee waves dwarfed the others in both size and scope. The scale of revolutionary changes and political upheavals that stemmed from the end of the First World War and the collapse of Europe’s contiguous empires produced a mass exodus because a larger proportion of people were involved in effecting these social and political changes. Furthermore, the swift development of immigration controls after 1919 made it extremely difficult for refugees to settle indefinitely in a new country.7

The two political revolutions in Russia in February and October 1917 displaced people in unprecedented scales because the social, political and military conflicts that resulted from the twin revolutions affected a large segment of the population in the Russian Empire. In the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917, many subjects of the defunct Russian Empire fled their native country to escape persecution from the Bolshevik forces, or simply to seek refuge from the hardships and turmoil of living in a war-torn society. As a group, the refugees from the former Russian Empire did not necessarily form a unified whole. The majority of those who left, whether motivated by personal safety or political choice, objected to Bolshevik rule in Russia. They saw themselves as constituting a temporary “Russia Abroad” that could

pose as an alternative to the existing political regime in Russia until the Bolsheviks could be ousted from power. A small minority of the refugees came to regret their decision to leave Russia and later sought ways to return home. Some also remained in Europe while refusing to identify with the so-called “Russia Abroad.”

Many of these individuals were not accepted as citizens of either the new Soviet polity or the European states to which they fled. George Ginsburgs has noted that from 1917-1921, Russians in exile after the Bolshevik Revolution were de facto stateless people, since they “repudiated the new regime and were in fact repudiated by their country of origin, which turned its back on them and granted them neither admittance nor protection.” However, they were still de jure Russian citizens, since Bolshevik authorities considered documents issued by the Tsarist government and Provisional Government as valid evidence of Russian citizenship. Decrees of the Council of People’s Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. in 1921 and 1924 essentially amounted to the involuntary de-nationalization of former subjects of the Russian Empire living abroad who did not apply for Soviet citizenship.

The plight of Russian refugees in Finland resonates with a larger debate on boundaries, state sovereignty, and the politics of belonging in the era of the nation-state. The Russian exiles’ situation underscored the problems of statelessness at a specific historical moment when tensions between nation-state sovereignty and human rights concerns became manifest. Peter Gatrell has argued that unlike previous European wars, where people who fled fighting in central Europe sought the protection of an alternative authority neither lost nor acquired “rights” in the modern

10 Ibid., 329.
sense, many who fled their homelands during the First World War became homeless and stateless because of some modern states’ unwillingness to integrate minorities.\textsuperscript{11} The notion in international law that individuals had the unambiguous right of entry only to countries in which they were citizens further solidified the nation-state system. The passport as proof of citizenship was linked to individuals’ claims of belonging to a specific country.\textsuperscript{12} The making of the refugee as a legal-bureaucratic category thus “resulted from the consolidation of the nation-state and associated notions of membership and entitlement.”\textsuperscript{13} After the First World War, the creation of new nation-states out of the remnants of collapsed empires rendered hundreds of thousands of people without formal citizenship.

This chapter employs the term refugee loosely to refer to people displaced from their places of permanent residence due to war, revolution and other humanitarian crises, rather than the legal definitions of the United Nations’ 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees.\textsuperscript{14} This analysis thus includes subjects of the Russian Empire who had been residing in Finland either permanently or temporarily prior to 1917 but who had not acquired formal Finnish citizenship. It is important to note that people displaced from the former Russian Empire included the non-

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Peter Gatrell, \textit{A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 9-10.
\item Article 1A of the United Nations’ 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as anyone who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
\end{enumerate}
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Orthodox, non-Russian-speaking ethnic minorities. Although these individuals did not fit the standard definition of refugees as people who fled their country of origin, their lack of legal rights and freedom of mobility in Finland rendered them particularly vulnerable. The problems with defining the refugee are also compounded by the time these individuals spend outside of their homelands. Refugeedom implies an impermanent condition: once dangerous conditions were removed from their homelands, refugees could return home. For many people fleeing from the remnants of the Russian Empire, the favorable conditions that would allow for their return never materialized. More importantly, the choice not to return to their homeland was an explicit rejection of Bolshevik rule. As Nick Baron and Peter Gatrell have argued, the post-1918 reconfiguration of power and territory displaced those who migrated as well as those who were rooted in one particular locale that had undergone dramatic changes. Such circumstances therefore altered these people’s location in time and space. A modified definition of refugees allows for greater reflection on the emotive consequences of displacement and dislocation. I follow Gatrell’s consideration of refugees as “a group whose ‘condition’ was created not just by objective circumstance, but also by the gaze of politicians or professionals who sought in various ways to order refugee life.”

15 Administrators of the Nansen passport, instituted in 1922 to allow for refugees from Russian to travel across state boundaries in search of employment or friends and relatives, defined “Russian” as any subjects of the former Russian empire (including the non-Russian minorities) without diplomatic representation who had not acquired citizenship in another polity. See Skran, Refugees in Intervar Europe, 109.
18 Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 8.

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The Karelian Isthmus as a Refugee Zone

Malleable perceptions of the meaning of space and place are important factors in shaping different kinds of social interactions. They affect considerations of belonging. Chapters Two and Three have outlined how the Karelian Isthmus towns in the late nineteenth century became popular leisure space for scores of visitors from the St. Petersburg region because of their perceived tranquility. Chapters One and Four have illustrated how these dacha settlements were also sites of tension in the early 1900s when the Russian imperial officials considered changing the administration of some districts from Finnish to Russian authority. As seen in the preceding chapter, this region also became a hub of clandestine revolutionary activity because of its accessibility from the Russian capital. These perceptions of the Karelian Isthmus dacha places stand in sharp contrast to each other. These towns and villages had never been tranquil sites of cross-cultural exchange, and the effects of war and revolution further undermined the notion of these places as serene. This chapter continues the juxtaposition of stability and chaos in the Karelian Isthmus by exploring the liminal status of refugees whose flight brought them to the towns and villages of this picturesque region. The analysis in this chapter illustrates the difficulty in drawing the fine line between those who did and did not belong when individuals made decisions through the lens of space and territory.

The series of social and political crises that followed the collapse of the Russian empire and Finland’s secession from the imperial entity contributed to a massive flow of humanity across the Finnish-Russian border in both directions. Finns and Russians with Bolshevik affiliation who dreaded the victorious Whites’ retribution after the civil war in Finland fled to Russia. Many more individuals attempted to flee from Russia to Finland to escape the Bolshevik scourge. The Finnish-Russian border areas in the Karelian Isthmus became important centers of
refugee activity because they were routes between Soviet Russia and the West. St. Petersburg/Leningrad, a city that housed Russia’s largest foreign population prior to the First World War, was located only 30 kilometers away from the Finnish-Russian border. During the war, naval operations near the Baltic lands made it difficult to leave Russia through those territories, but relative calm in the Karelian Isthmus meant that it was still available as a possible escape route until the Finnish civil war broke out early in 1918. S.R. Mintslov, an officer who served in the Imperial Army in the Kiev garrison and in the Caucasus, lived near Vyborg in early 1918, and he described in his diary the chaos of civil war in Finland. He wrote in January 1918 that he could hear heavy fire from his house at night, but could not distinguish if the fire was coming from the Finnish Red or White forces. Several days later, his wife and daughter went to the stores by the nearest railway station to find supplies, but found nothing left in the local stores and the train station area under heavy armed guard of the Finnish Reds.

The refugee crisis in the Karelian Isthmus stemmed from problems during the First World War. Some Russian visitors had second thoughts about their annual trips to the Finnish coast. Anxious about these Gulf of Finland settlements’ vulnerability to German naval attack, many Russians stayed away from the Isthmus when the war broke out, and some Russian permanent residents in the Isthmus returned to Russia. However, due to food shortages in St.

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19 Engman, Raja, 36.
Petersburg, some of the visitors began staying at their dachas in the Isthmus for longer periods of time during the war years, turning their dachas into half year or even full year settlements.\(^{22}\)

After the onset of the war, the dacha as a place of respite took on a new meaning, since Russian authorities set up convalescent homes in the region for wounded soldiers. Dachas that stood empty during the winter months became sought after properties. As part of the war effort, several dacha owners offered their properties for use by the Finnish section of the Russian Red Cross as convalescent homes. As early as August 1914, two Russian women had offered their dacha in Kuokkala to the Russian Red Cross for use as a military hospital. In their letter to Red Cross officials they described their house as a large property, surrounded by scenic forests with access to good drinking water and the seaside.\(^{23}\) Finns who owned large properties in the region also offered their houses for military use. The Finnish-speaking wife of a financier from Russia informed the commander of the Vyborg military base that her dacha property near the Imatra train station was available for use as a hospital.\(^{24}\) At the end of the First World War, many of the soldiers who convalesced in the dacha towns were internally displaced in Finland.\(^{25}\)

A significant number of these seasonal residents opted to seek refuge in their Karelian Isthmus homes when revolution broke out in 1917.\(^{26}\) When Finland declared independence from Russia in December 1917, many of those who sought refuge in Finland suddenly found

\[^n\] Engman, *Raja*, 63
\[^n\] KA Finnish Red Cross Archives (SPR) Ub3570. Letter from Evgenii Konstantinovich and Nadezhda Nikolaevna Sergeeva to the Russian Red Cross Office in St. Petersburg, August 8, 1914.
\[^n\] KA SPR Ub4 571, undated letter.
\[^n\] Engman, *Raja*, 62. In 1917, approximately 125,000 Russia soldiers remained in Finland.
themselves in a foreign country without having relocated. Mintslov also recalled reading about Finland’s declaration of independence in Russian language newspapers and coming to the realization that he was now “living abroad, in the fullest sense of the term.”

By the end of 1918, the social and cultural landscape had changed dramatically in the Karelian Isthmus towns. In May that year, the Viipuri Province governor pointed out that the situation in his province was different from other Finnish regions because of the heavy Russian presence, which included the large number of landowners and merchants who had been living there for several decades, as well as those who had arrived recently seeking refuge. The Finnish state requisitioned many of the abandoned dachas formerly owned by St. Petersburgers for use as quarantine stations. Irina Elenevskaja, who fled with her family to Finland in 1920-1921, recalled in her memoirs that she stayed in one such dacha while quarantined in Terijoki. Her family shared the second floor of that house, normally closed in the winter, with several other families. G. A. Solodukhin, a rank-and-file soldier stationed at Kronstadt, had taken part in the Kronstadt rebellion against Bolshevik forces in March 1921, and fled to Finland in the aftermath of the failed uprising. When he and his comrades first arrived in Finland, they were taken to Terijoki, where his group of 80 people was housed in an abandoned dacha. For the two weeks while they were stationed at the dacha, Red Cross personnel provided them with food and

28 Ibid., 86.
29 Irina Elenevskaja, *Vospominanii* (Stockholm: n.p., 1968), 120. Elenevskaja was the daughter of a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official.
clothing. Soludokhin and other participants in the Kronstadt rebellion were eventually sent to a refugee camp at Turkensaari, an island not far from Vyborg.  

Towns that were popular destinations for the dacha folk also became temporary transit stations for Russian refugees who planned to move to other cities in Europe. I.V. Gessen fled with his family to Finland in 1918 out of fear of arrest by Bolshevik authorities. The family lived in Terijoki for a few months before moving to Berlin via Helsinki. A. A. Vyrubova, who served Empress Alexandra as a maid of honor and was close to the imperial family, fled to Finland in the winter of 1920. Her first stop was Terijoki, and when she arrived, she had no possessions or money. She received some assistance from local aid authorities, and was eventually relocated to Helsinki.

The ambiguous nature of Finnish-Russian border controls contributed to a paradoxical situation in the Karelian Isthmus. The old customs boundary between Finland and Russia was not well demarcated by any physical features in the countryside. Both Finnish and Russian authorities lacked the resources to guard the territory. It was especially easy to cross the border at night in the unpopulated areas. For example, John Reed traveled from the United States to Russia through the forests in eastern Finland, where Finnish Bolshevik sympathizers smuggled

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31 Vladimir Gessen, V bor’be za zhizn’: zapiski emigranta (New York: Rausen Publishers, 1974), 29. Vladimir, son of I.V. Gessen, recounts his experience growing up as the son of a political figure in St. Petersburg as well as his life in emigration in Europe.
32 A.A. Vyrubova, Stranitsy iz moei zhizni (Berlin: n.p., 1923), 128-129.
33 Johannes Virolainen, Karjalaiset Suomen kohtaloissa (Helsinki: Otava, 1988), 63.
him across the border. Princess Sofia Volkonskaia simply walked across a small bridge over a dirty stream into Finnish territory in May 1919. After the Red Army defeated General Yudenich’s forces in northern Russia in December 1919, civilians and soldiers continued to stream across the border to Finland. By 1922, there were approximately 20,000 refugees from Russia in Finland. Although the Finnish state attempted to control the number of Russians entering the country and expel a large group of Russians already residing in Finland, the lack of physical control over border areas made it essentially an open space for the flow of human traffic. It was specifically this unpatrolled, unregulated movement of people that alarmed the Finnish political leadership. The porousness of the Finnish-Russian boundary in the immediate months after the end of the civil war in Finland did not correspond with the Finnish government’s desire to keep Russian influence out of the country.

**The Strengths and Weaknesses of Family Ties**

Pekka Nevalainen’s work on the flight of people from Bolshevik-controlled Russia to Finland underscores the myriad of problems the Finnish government faced in managing the tide of people who sought shelter in the country. These complications stemmed from the diversity of people referred to as “refugees” in contemporary literature. In addition to the Russian subjects already living in Finland who became de facto stateless people, refugees included ethnic

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36 Skran, *Refugees in Inter-war Europe*, 34.

Russians as well as non-Russian subjects of the former empire such as Ukrainians, Belorussians and Germans. People fleeing from Russian included members of the aristocracy, bureaucrats in the former imperial government, merchants, artists, intellectuals, and lay workers. Many were former residents of the St. Petersburg environs, and had previous contacts with Finns through their travels to Finland. Refugees from Russia also included what Finnish historiography refers to as “kinsmen.” One of these groups was the Ingrian Finns, a predominantly Finnish-speaking group who had lived along the Gulf of Finland shoreline stretching from St. Petersburg to the eastern parts of Estonia. Another group of ethnic kin was the Karelians, a people that resided in regions adjacent to the Finnish-Russian border and spoke a language closely related to Finnish. These groups were usually farming people with limited education. Many of them fled to Finland to escape political persecution and famine, even though most had fleeting ties to Finnish territory. Some of these “kinsmen” retained their Lutheran faith and Finnish language, but others followed Orthodox rites and spoke Russian as their mother tongue.

The government of the nascent Finnish state made no prior plans for accommodating such as vast array of refugees, and the temporary and uncertain nature of the population displacement crisis made it difficult for officials to plan logically. The first government sponsored agency that dealt with the refugee crisis, the Finnish Interim Economic Committee (known hereafter by its Finnish acronym SVTK), was established with the original intent to safeguard Finnish financial and property interests in Russia. From 1919 to 1922, this committee

38 Nevalainen, Izgoi, 38-39.
39 Ibid., 29. By the spring of 1922, approximately 15,000 refugees who had fled to Finland were considered by the Finnish government as Finnish.
40 Ibid., 31.
41 Ibid., 8.
facilitated the repatriation of Finnish citizens living under duress in Russia. The committee received partial funds from the Danish and American Red Cross for distribution to the displaced and dispossessed. This fledgling agency thus took on the gargantuan task of classifying refugees.

The SVTK had a mandate to assist Finnish citizens, but its records show that doling out resources based on citizenship and nationality was a much more convoluted affair at a time when the concept of formal territorial citizenship was still novel. For example, distribution lists for material aid to individuals included people who did not have proper identity papers. This list consisted of people with Finnish surnames born in Russia as well as people with Russian surnames born in Finland. Decades of labor migration between Finland and Russia in both directions meant that ethnicity, nationality and territory did not correspond neatly. Names, place of birth and mother tongue were insufficient for determining citizenship, especially given that little else besides property titles and parish records established an individual’s ties to a particular polity. In one case, a man claiming to be a Finnish citizen sent a letter to the SVTK, penned in Russian, asking the committee to locate his sister, a Finnish-speaker who had moved to St. Petersburg and become a Russian subject through marriage. With so many people whose nationality could not be easily verified claiming to be Finns returning to Finland, it was no wonder that aid agencies soon became overwhelmed by requests for assistance.

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42 The Finnish Interim Economic Committee (Suomen valiaikisen taloudellisen komitea/SVTK) was established in October 1918 after the Finnish Passport Office in St. Petersburg/Petrograd ceased to operate in June. At first the SVTK’s task was to keep track of Finnish-owned property in Russia until official Finnish diplomatic representation could be established. The Finnish government soon gave it the task of facilitating repatriation and managing refugee aid. See the Finnish Interim Economic Committee Archive finding aid at the National Archives of Finland.

43 KA SVTK Bb1 Folder 1. List of refugees receiving material assistance, October 19, 1921.

44 KA SVTK Ea3 Folder 1. Letter from F. Ostening to the SVTK, December 21, 1921.
In the initial phases of the refugee crisis, Russian voluntary organizations were active in helping those who self-identified as Russian. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution these organizations dealt with a wide range of issues, such as education, temperance and poor relief, but many of them became impromptu refugee agencies in the aftermath of the Russian Empire’s collapse. One example of these organizations was the Russian Philanthropic Organization (Russkoe blagotvoritel’noe obshchestvo, RBO). This association was founded in 1871 with the aim of supporting Russian language educational establishments in Finland for the children of Russian-speaking families residing in Finland. The RBO had already established several Russian schools in Finland by the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution. The organization continued its work in Russian language education in Finland after 1917, but in the early years after Finland’s independence, this organization diverted much of its resources towards supporting refugees. For example, the RBO helped convert many of the schools it funded into temporary shelters for those fleeing from Russia.\(^{45}\)

In May 1918, a group of prominent Russian merchants and professionals living in Finland established the Russian Commission in Viipuri Province. This group sought to provide material assistance to all Russian families living in this part of Finland. Its other tasks included negotiating with Finnish authorities over proposed plans to expel subjects of the former Russian empire from Finland.\(^{46}\) Within the first week of this society’s establishment, it had already assembled lists of potential donors and designated representatives to speak with local Finnish authorities. In these early months, the Russian Commission sought to get official assurance from

\(^{45}\) Sto let Russkomu blagotvoritel’nomu obshchestvu, (Helsinki: VR Painatusjaosto, 1972), 40-46.

\(^{46}\) LOGAV, f.504, op.1, d.1, l.1. Minutes of the Russian Commission in Viipuri Province meeting, May 7, 1918.

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local Finnish authorities that the organization could carry on its activities without interference.\textsuperscript{47}

When rumors about impending expulsion of Russian refugees surfaced, refugees turned to the Russian Commission to verify the details.\textsuperscript{48} Most of the Russian refugees living in Vyborg and other towns and villages in the Karelian Isthmus only had rudimentary command of the Finnish language, and they often relied on Russian aid organizations as their primary source of information about their predicament.

The Russian Commission also dealt with administering Russian-run institutions in Finland. Prior to the revolutions of 1917, St. Petersburg regional authorities had established several sanatoria and convalescent homes in the Karelian Isthmus. With the Russian Empire’s disintegration, these health establishments’ future became uncertain. When the Finnish government notified the Hallila sanatorium of its intention to requisition the properties in the summer of 1918, physicians and staff at the sanatorium approached the Commission with concerns about the future of the patients at the establishment, since they had received no notice from administrators in Petrograd. Without formal instruction from the sanatorium’s administrators in Petrograd, the doctors were reluctant to comply with orders to turn over the property to the Finnish authorities. The Commission negotiated with Finnish officials over the terms of requisition and the liquidation of the establishment’s movable assets, and eventually set up a liquidation committee to facilitate this process.\textsuperscript{49} Without official Russian government representation, the Russian Commission took on significant diplomatic functions in Finland.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48} LOGAV, f.504, op.1, d.1, l.2. Protocol 3, minutes of the Russian Commission in Viipuri Province meeting, May 8, 1918.

\textsuperscript{49} LOGAV, f. 504, op.1, d.2, l. 89. Letter from Chief of Physicians at Hallila Sanatorium to the Russian Commission, August 14, 1918.
Refugees in Finland who were subjects of the defunct Russian Empire asked the Russian Commission to help them solve a variety of problems. One widow informed the committee that her identity papers were destroyed when she fled to Finland. She feared that without proper papers, Finnish authorities would send her back to Bolshevik-controlled Russia. She therefore asked the committee to issue her temporary papers. Another widow saw the Committee as an ad-hoc child services agency. This invalid woman found that being the sole caretaker of her young grandchildren was too onerous, and therefore requested that the Russian Commission care for these children. The members of the organization responded negatively to these requests, stating that these tasks were not under its field of competency.\textsuperscript{50} The Commission also received numerous demands from people to speed up the delivery of aid to refugees, a difficult challenge for the organization because its financial standing in Finland was unstable.\textsuperscript{51} These kinds of requests revealed the enormous expectations Russian refugees placed on the most prominent members of their community.

The Russian Commission thus served as a liaison between the Russian community in the Karelian Isthmus and regional Finnish authorities. The organization’s leadership soon discovered just how difficult it was to act in this capacity. The political, social and ethnic heterogeneity of people considered as Russians in Finland complicated this task. In the early 1900s, many Russians fleeing to Finland were fugitives of the Tsarist regime. They included the autocracy’s enemies of all political hues: anarchists, Bolsheviks, and other radicals. After 1917, many

\textsuperscript{50} LOGAV, f. 504, op.1, d.1, l. 13. Protocol 22, Minutes of the Russian Commission meeting, May 30, 1918.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
individuals connected to Tsarist government also fled to Finland. The Russian refugee community in Finland was therefore by no means unified in political ideals. The varied political allegiances contributed to an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust among refugees in Finland. Natalia Baschmakoff and Marja Leinonen have noted that although Russians in Finland formed numerous associations in the early 1920s, many of these groups were gripped by constant infighting. The incoherent order of hierarchy among Russians in Finland made it difficult for community leaders to solve problems affecting their groups.

Due to limited funding, the Russian Commission restricted access to material aid. Early on in the organization’s existence, its leadership decided that Finnish women married to Russian men were not eligible to receive financial assistance from the Russian Commission, nor were Russian women who married Finnish citizens. There was a gendered element to this decision since the restriction did not seem to apply to Russian men married to Finns. Such decisions were not entirely arbitrary, yet they did not correspond with the realities of people’s social bonds. Finnish widows of former Russian military personnel could not receive material aid from the organization even though some may have considered themselves a part of the Russian community.

Distributing aid by nationality proved difficult for officials because of the complex family relationships between Finnish- and Russian-speaking refugees. Some individuals from the mixed Finnish-Russian families who were unable to secure aid from Russian voluntary

52 Nevalainen, Izgoi , 16.
54 LOGAV, f.504, op.1, d.1, l.7. Minutes of the Russian Commission in Viipuri Province meeting, May 16, 1918.
associations turned to Finnish organizations for help. Elena Bogdanova wrote to SVTK officials and described her plight through the help of translators. She was born in Russia, but lived in both Finland and Russia, splitting her time between Vyborg and St. Petersburg. She married a Russian-speaker with Finnish citizenship who died shortly after the couple fled from Russia to Finland in 1919. Although Bogdanova had acquired Finnish citizenship through her husband, she was unable to find work and had no means to support her two children. She explained: “I have already requested assistance from the Russian Commission in Viipuri, but was denied help because I am now a Finn by marriage. I have not asked the Finns for help in the past because I lacked proper language skills, but now my situation is so extreme that I am left with little choice.”

The aid agency responded favorably to her request, and granted her a small sum of money to purchase food and clothing. Bogdanova’s specific reference to the Russian Commission denying her help indicated her awareness of the complex relationship between nationality and aid organizations’ rationale for distributing funds. Her letter revealed her isolation from the Finnish community, yet this seclusion did not prevent her from identifying herself as a Finnish citizen in her appeal to Finnish authorities for help.

Political turmoil in Finland and Russia separated some Finnish-Russian families. Finnish officials frequently received requests from citizens to locate and assist relatives who remained in Russia. Alfred Blomqvist, a Swedish-speaking Finnish citizen who had migrated to St. Petersburg some years ago for factory work, wrote to the SVTK in August 1922 pleading for the organization to evacuate his Russian wife and daughter from Russia. Although Blomqvist had been able to leave Russia a year ago, his wife and daughter had fallen ill and were forced to remain. By the time they had recovered, the most recent wave of Finnish evacuations had already

55 KA SVTK Ea3 Folder 2. Letter from Elena Bogdanova to SVTK, January 12, 1923.
terminated. At the time of writing, Blomqvist claimed that his wife and daughter were living in squalor with little access to food, clothing and shelter. He had read in the newspapers that the Finnish government was planning a new round of evacuations, and decided to ask the SVTK to ensure that his family was included.\(^5^6\) Pekka Pitkänen, a Finnish citizen who fled from Russia in 1922, wrote to the SVTK in 1923 informing the committee that he still had relatives in Petrograd whose whereabouts were still unknown. He requested that the committee help him find his relatives.\(^5^7\) Others treated the organization as a courier service for sending food and other supplies to friends and family in Russia. One refugee asked the committee to send a package of shoes and clothing to his son in Petrograd. The sender only provided the name of his son without a forwarding address, and expected the SVTK to deliver the materials promptly!\(^5^8\) Refugees looked upon the SVTK as an umbrella organization for all kinds of tasks related to their well-being. While the organization attempted to track Finnish citizens remaining in Russia or arbitrarily imprisoned in Soviet prisons, the enormity of this task overwhelmed officials because it involved dealing with an unstable government that was not on good terms with the Finnish political establishment.

Difficulties notwithstanding, the Finnish aid organizations displayed some willingness to help Finnish citizens with relatives stranded in Russia, even if the relatives were not Finns. Valdermar Lutinen, a teacher from a Karelian Isthmus village, wrote to the SVTK in 1922 asking that the organization send money to his daughter Anna, who had moved to Petrograd during the First World War to work as a housemaid. After having lost contact with her father for over four

\(^{56}\) KA SVTK Ea3 Folder 2. Letter from Alfred Blomqvist to SVTK. August 10, 1923.
\(^{57}\) KA SVTK Ea3 Folder 3. Letter from Pekka Pitkänen to SVTK representative Anni Arpiainen, April 11, 1923.
\(^{58}\) KA SVTK Ea3 Folder 3, Letter from J. Waljus to the SVTK, no date.
years, she now informed him in writing that she had married a Russian man and given birth to a child. She wrote that that her husband had recently fallen ill, leaving her as the primary wage earner in the family with no one to care for their son. The SVTK responded favorably to Lutinen’s appeal to assist his daughter and her family in Petrograd.\(^{59}\) Finnish citizens were sometimes successful in convincing their government officials to care about the plight of their non-Finnish relatives.

Finnish aid agencies occasionally worked with their Russian counterparts in solving complex problems that some interethnic families faced. Local representatives of the Finnish Refugee Aid Committee in Kellomäki investigated the situation of a young girl living in a refugee center at a former Russian gymnasium. The girl, born in Petrograd, had a Finnish-speaking father and Russian-speaking mother who were divorced. In 1921, her father and stepmother fled with her to Finland. Several months after their arrival in Finland, the girl’s father left her in the care of her great-aunt, who was now staying at a Russian refugee center in the Karelian Isthmus, while he and his wife moved temporarily to Berlin. The girl’s great-aunt expressed desire to send the girl to Petrograd, where her biological mother still lived. When the father heard of this plan, he asked the Finnish Refugee Aid Committee representatives to send the girl to Berlin. The committee’s officials, however, were reluctant to comply with the father’s demands. Aid workers found that that girl was well adjusted at the Russian refugee center, where she was enrolled in classes with other children of her age. According to the aid workers, the child was completely Russified, and the girl claimed she had no desire to move to Berlin with her father. Not knowing how to deal with this situation in the long term, the Finnish Refugee Aid Committee representatives decided to send money to the Russian refugee center in the girl’s

\(^{59}\) KA SVTK Ea3 Folder 2, letter from Valdemar Lutinen to SVTK, September 7, 1922.
name as compensation for her care until suitable guardianship arrangements could be made. In this particular scenario, the Finnish citizen who requested assistance from officials did not initially get desired results. Finnish aid authorities dealing with this case showed empathy for a child whose predicament as a refugee was further complicated by custody issues.

Russian refugees in Finland relied on their connections with Finnish acquaintances for survival in the tumultuous years of the 1920s. Individuals with family connections through marriage tended to fare better. Those without such connections had a much harder time with simple tasks such as finding housing, work, and food and clothing. With the large influx of refugees coming to Finland in 1921-1922, there were significant housing crises in Finland’s three largest cities: Helsinki, Viipuri, and Turku. Elenevskiia recalled that her family, after several months in quarantine centers in the Karelian Isthmus, were told that they were to leave and resettle elsewhere, since only those who had dachas or other immovable property in the Karelian Isthmus were allowed to stay. The family wanted to go to Vyborg, but was informed by authorities that they were not allowed to resettle there without special permission. They eventually got permission to move to Vyborg, but since they did not know any Finnish or Swedish, they relied on a Russian-speaking acquaintance who had lived in Finland for a long time and who was familiar with local government agencies. The Elenevskiia family’s acquaintance eventually found housing for them in the same quarters as two other Finnish-speaking families who had lived in St. Petersburg until the Bolshevik Revolution.

The hierarchy of power within the Russian community in Finland governed the lives of those who did not have personal connections in Finland. The Finnish section of the Russian Red

60 KA SVTK E1 Folder 4. Letter from Finnish Refugee Aid Committee in Kellomäki to the SVTK in Helsinki, February 15, 1923.
61 Elenevskiia, Vospominaniia, 122.
Cross, which continued to operate in Finland until the mid-1920s, prioritized material assistance to Russians who had been long term residents in Finland prior to independence. Many of these individuals were higher ranking military personnel, teachers, university professors and other professionals. Red Cross records from 1922-1923 provided details on the people receiving aid. Widows of military personnel were the most common aid recipients. One officer’s widow even received aid for herself, her adult son, three minor children, and the family’s nanny. The Red Cross also gave money to a disabled colonel whose wife was fatally ill and had two young daughters under his care. The colonel had sold his family’s belongings at an auction, and when his family had used up all the money from that sale, he turned to aid organizations for help. Several teachers from the Russian gymnasia in Finland also accepted aid given by the Finnish section of the Russian Red Cross. These teachers all had young children in their households and were unemployed because they lacked proper language skills to teach in Finnish schools after several of the Russian schools had been shut down.\(^\text{62}\) The pre-revolutionary hierarchy of power among Russians still regulated the lives of those who had minimal ties with people outside the community in the 1920s.

**No Haven for Bolsheviks**

In 1922 Russian writer Viktor Shklovsky attempted to flee from Soviet Russia to Finland under threat of execution in Petrograd.\(^\text{63}\) He had participated in anti-Bolshevik activities but later served in Red Army during the Civil War. Once he reached Finland, he required written

\(^{62}\) KA SPR Hpa2. List of people receiving Red Cross aid. Complied by the Committee of the Finnish Red Cross, 1922-1923.

\(^{63}\) Viktor Shklovsky wrote his memoirs in Raivola, one of the Karelian Isthmus villages with a strong Russian presence, in 1922. See *A Sentimental Journey: Memoirs, 1917-1922*, translated by Richard Sheldon (Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 2004), 133.
confirmation from a trusted person that he had no Bolshevik ties. He turned to artist Ilya Repin, who had by that time become a well-known resident in the Karelian Isthmus and was well respected by Finnish officials. Repin, who adhered strictly to the pre-revolutionary Russian cultural ideals, responded:

My dear Viktor Borisovich – of course I know you well and love you. But, why do you practice the ‘new’ illiterate orthography? Why are you afraid of your own authorities? How can I assure them that you are not a Bolshevik?  

Repin then wrote to his old friend Kornei Chukovsky, explaining his refusal to provide the written testimony on Shklovsky’s behalf. Repin claimed that since Shklovksii used the new orthography, he “considered it as a clear indication of slavery to Bolshevism.” Repin, as someone who identified as Russian, did not come to the assistance of a fellow Russian by providing a reference that would have helped his friend’s case with Finnish authorities’ investigation. The correspondence between Repin and Skhlovsky underscores the elusiveness of a unifying Russian identity. Political divisions among Russians living in Finland in the 1920s should not be underestimated. Finnish officials’ suspicion of Russians as potential Bolshevik enemies heightened these divisions. Repin’s response to Skhlovsky’s pleas reveals that some Russians who wished to remain in the good graces of Finnish authorities felt the necessity of distancing themselves from other Russians who had even the slightest connection to Bolshevism. This factor contributed to the sense of alienation among Russians in Finland.

There was a broader political dimension in the relationship between those fleeing from Russia and refugee management authorities in Finland. Concerns over the seeming porousness of

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64 Cited in Baschmakoff and Leinonen, *Russian Life in Finland*, 50.
Russia’s western borders related to broader European views on how best to deal with the two warring sides in the civil war in Russia. As John Thompson has noted, Western leaders contemplated a range of policy options in dealing with political turmoil in Russia. One of these options was “the isolation of Russia and the erection of a surrounding ring of buffer states to contain Bolshevism – a cordon sanitaire.” By the end of 1919 when Allied intervention in Russia had failed to produce desired results against Bolshevik forces, the Allied delegations at the Paris Peace Conference gave the idea of the cordon more serious consideration. Both David Lloyd George and George Clemenceau argued that the Allies should approve the encirclement of Russia with a small number of independent states to prevent the Bolsheviks from spreading their influence outside this zone, and to deter a much weakened Germany from entering into economic and political partnerships with Russia. As part of this strategy, the Allies proposed to give the new Russian border peoples as much assurance from Bolshevik attack as possible, along with economic assistance for the states in the cordon sanitaire.

There is no direct evidence linking the western Allies’ views regarding the cordon sanitaire to the Finnish government’s handling of Russian refugees in Finland, but Allied involvement in the civil war in Russia did affect Finland’s position vis-à-vis Russia from 1918 to 1920. Although Poland was at the center of the cordon idea, the Baltic area, including Finland, was not obsolete in Western diplomatic and military planning. The British were especially interested in the Baltic region not only as part of a cordon sanitaire against Soviet Bolshevism,

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67 Ibid., 368-369. R.A.C. Parker has commented that the French devoted their efforts in 1919 to strengthening Poland and Romania, rather than supporting anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia as part of their vision of the cordon. See Europe 1919-49 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 42-43.
but also as part of a region for facilitating trade with the Russian market. British-French military representatives and foreign policy makers relied on Finland’s assistance against Bolshevik forces in a planned attack on Petrograd. Finnish politicians had some reservations about participating in this campaign. Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, Finland’s first president, was particularly concerned that White Russian émigrés in Western Europe, who did not support Finnish aims, might influence Britain’s and the United States’ willingness to recognize Finnish independence. Finnish diplomats thus emphasized that any Finnish participation in an offensive against Petrograd would be conditional on the Whites’ recognition of their country’s independence. In the spring and summer of 1919, Admiral Alexander Kolchak’s government in Omsk refused to go beyond granting Finland autonomy until an all-Russian constituent assembly could be convened. This led to tensions within the Finnish government over the treatment of the Russian refugees: members of the Agrarian Party wanted


70 Thompson, *Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace*, 331-332.
the Russians to be driven out, while other parliament representatives felt they should address the humanitarian concerns regardless of political outcomes in Russia.  

The relationship between nationality and political affiliation was a troubling one for officials to consider when dealing with the masses of people entering Finland from Russia. The defeat of the Reds in Finland’s civil war colored Finnish attitudes towards the Russian population. Some officials deemed Russians to be a bad influence and sought to rid them from Finland even though many Russian refugees did not identify with the Bolshevik cause. Animosity toward Russians, however, was not reserved only for the Bolsheviks. Members of Finland’s political leadership worried that Russians who were part of the old Tsarist regime would oppose Finnish independence. While some leaders wished to show the Whites in Russia their goodwill by supporting Russian refugees, others worried about the effects of providing safe haven for Russians who did not support Finnish independence.

Political considerations affected refugees’ relationship with Finnish authorities. Alexander Hedberg, a Swedish-speaking Finn who grew up in Western Finland, moved to Russia as a young adult and married a Russian woman. He was politically active in his youth, and during the Civil War in Russia, he served in General Wrangel’s army. He fled to Finland after White armies’ defeat. His Russian wife, however, was captured and imprisoned by the Bolsheviks. Hedberg received news through an acquaintance that his wife had tried to flee clandestinely to Finland but was caught in the process. His acquaintance suspected that she had been beaten and tortured by her Bolshevik captors. Hedberg explained to SVTK officials, “I

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71 Engman, *Raja*, 118.
72 Ibid., 81.
73 Ibid., 125.
would travel myself to Russia to find my wife, but as someone who had served in the White armies, such a thing equals my death sentence. I urge you to do everything possible to bring her to Finland.” 74

Interestingly, Hedberg’s letter to the SVTK was written in Russian, indicating that he had been away from Finland for such a long time that he had lost his ability to communicate in Finnish or Swedish. He likely worried that this factor might cast doubt of his loyalty to the Finnish state. He explicitly stated that the SVTK could contact the gymnasium director at his old school, who had known him in his childhood, to verify his political reliability. This emphasis in his letter shows that he recognized the tense political environment in Finland, especially after the country had been bitterly divided by its own civil war. He may have sensed that the Finnish authorities viewed with suspicion anyone who had connections to Russian politics. He likely felt that as someone who had spent his adult life in Russia and participated in Russia’s civil war, his political reliability in Finland may not be taken for granted even though he was still a Finnish citizen. Hedberg’s communication with authorities demonstrates his understanding that acceptance into the new Finnish polity depended on more than just bloodline.

Finnish security and customs officials made strong efforts to monitor and control the movement of people into Finland, especially after the Whites’ final defeat in 1922. Memos circulated in the Finnish Investigative Police (VALPO) Terijoki regional center mentioned that Soviet authorities used data available from the Finnish Passport Office in St. Petersburg/Petrograd to determine the identity and citizenship of individuals who wished to leave

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74 KA SVTK Ea3 Folder 2. Letter from Alexander Hedberg to SVTK, April 30, 1922.
Some Finns returning from Russia in the early 1920s had official exit travel documents issued by the Soviet government verifying that they were Finnish citizens who had lived in Russia for work, and who were registered with the Grand Duchy of Finland’s Passport Office in the former imperial capital. Many of the refugees from Finland did not possess proper identification papers, and these individuals relied on witness testimonies to verify their identities. These refugees’ transience and their diversity in terms of occupation and familial connections made it difficult for Finnish authorities to confirm these testimonies. For example, Ludmilla Nordstrom, a housemaid, was born to a German-Russian family in Vyborg in Finland, and had worked informally for different Russian and Finnish families in Finland and in Russia. In 1919, she tried to enter Finland through Estonia but was unsuccessful. Because she was unable to provide written proof of her place of birth or citizenship status, she did not manage obtain permission to travel to Finland until 1923.76

Finnish state security organs set up an investigative police force in the Terijoki parish district to gather information on the political reliability of refugees, both Russian and Finnish, in quarantine centers in Terijoki and Kellomäki. Authorities interviewed refugees at the quarantine centers, and recorded information on individuals in detailed surveys. Besides basic demographic details on each individual such as place of birth, occupation, marital status and place of residences, authorities recorded information on the refugees’ intended destination in Finland. Officials were especially interested in individuals who responded that they were traveling to meet relatives or friends who were already residing in Finland. The questionnaires also contained

75 See memos from 1921-1922 in the Finnish Investigative Police (VALPO) Terijoki regional center archives, KA VALPO Terijoen osasto Box 71.
76 KA VALPO Terijoen osasto Box 71, Ludmilla Nordstrom, questionnaire, September 14, 1923.
information about the reasons for an individual’s decision to go to Russia if he or she was born in the Grand Duchy. Most importantly, the interviewers were interested in the refugees’ prior political activities: whether they had participated in any capacity in the Finnish civil war, whether they had been imprisoned for crimes of a political nature, whether they had any connection to the Bolshevik Party in Russia, and whether they had participated in the Russian civil war. Police and customs officials’ documents suggested that not all who claimed to be Finnish or claimed to have Finnish connections were welcomed into the country with open arms, and not all were treated equally once they entered the country.

Irina Elenevskaia recalled her family’s interrogation by customs officials in Terijoki. Communicating with the Russian family in German, the Finnish officials asked detailed questions about their lives. In addition to the family’s political affiliation in Russia and reasons for fleeing, authorities also asked about living conditions in Petrograd and the mood of the population, especially in the workers’ quarters. The border guards eventually determined that the family was in danger from persecution by the Bolsheviks in Russia, and granted the family the right to stay in Finland temporarily. Many more Russian families attempted to flee Russia via Finland in 1921 as the civil war in Russia intensified. The massive influx of Russian refugees prompted Finnish authorities to use extra scrutiny to determine whether the refugees would pose a threat to the Finnish state. It also appeared that they used information the refugees provided as a method for gauging the political environment in Russia.

Refugee aid authorities in Finland were interested in confirming individuals’ political reliability before distributing materials to those requesting assistance. The SVTK, which

77 See the investigative reports of the VALPO Terijoki department in the Finnish National Archives. KA VALPO Terijoen osasto Boxes 71-76.
78 Elenevskaia, Vospominaniia, 117.
received funds from the American Red Cross, relied on informants to provide information on
refugees. The organization employed Elisabeth Kaipainen, a Finnish woman from the Karelian
Isthmus who spent some time living in Russia. She was a refugee herself who got to know some
individuals held at the quarantine centers. She became the organization’s regional representative
responsible for relaying information about the plight of refugees in the quarantine centers to
SVTK headquarters in Helsinki. One of her jobs was to verify the political reliability of refugees
whom authorities considered moving out of the quarantine zone. In one report, Kaipainen
tested on behalf of a couple whose political allegiance was suspect because they were Finnish
citizens of Russian descent who lived in Russia prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. Confirming
that they had no Bolshevik ties, she recommended that this couple be moved out of the
quarantine zone and be allowed to resettle in nearby villages in the Karelian Isthmus. 79 In
another report, Kaipainen interceded on behalf of Sergei Lenskii, a Russian-speaker who was
born in Finland. She argued that since he served in the Imperial Navy with an impeccable record,
and had a Finnish-born wife, it was unlikely that he would harbor any Bolshevik views. She
recommended that he receive refugee aid from Finnish agencies. 80 Finnish authorities apparently
accepted her judgment: a letter from the SVTK to the American Red Cross stated that since
Kaipainen knew many of the refugees, “the certificates about the fugitives she thus issues are
thoroughly to be relied on.” 81

79 KA SVTK Ea3 Folder 1. Letter from Elisabeth Kaipainen to the SVTK representative in
Helsinki, Anni Arpainen, no date.
80 KA SVTK Ea3 Folder 1. Letter from Elisabeth Kaipainen to the SVTK representative in
Helsinki, Anni Arpainen, March 25, 1921.
81 KA SVTK Ea3 Folder 1. Letter from the SVTK headquarters in Helsinki to the American Red
Cross, no date.
People like Kaipainen served as agents of the state by providing information authorities required to determine the trustworthiness of those seeking refuge in Finland. At the same time, they also served as intermediaries between aid agencies and scores of refugees seeking material assistance. These dual roles empowered agents like Kaipainen, who could re-interpret rules on aid distribution and significantly influence other individuals’ well-being. These agents often interceded on behalf of those who did not have the resources to approach authorities and request for aid. Kaipainen often wrote to officials on behalf of those who were illiterate and could not send written requests for assistance, and she did so for individuals regardless of their nationality. For example, Kaipainen once informed Helsinki authorities about the plight of a Russian peasant and his wife who spent several years traversing the Finnish-Russian customs border as peddlers. In the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution this couple fled to Finland. Having subsisted by begging and scavenging for over a year, they were finally detained at the quarantine center in Terijoki. She told SVTK authorities in Helsinki that since this couple was making a concentrated effort to learn the Finnish language and had a strong desire to live among Finns, the SVTK should provide extra rations and funds to this couple as a show of good faith. Although in these cases Kaipainen made no mention of people’s political affiliations, her connection with them suggested that she trusted these individuals and was willing to intercede on their behalf. Her rapport with refugees suggests that she did not internally categorize individuals by language or nationality. Her reports about the individuals with whom she interacted indicated that the main lens through which she viewed these people was the experience of dislocation. In doing so, she challenged the markers of ethnicity and nationality that officials often used to determine which groups were to receive aid.

KA SVTK Ea3 Folder 1. Letter from Elisabeth Kaipainen to the SVTK representative in Helsinki, no date.
Peter Gatrell has argued that “individual states interpret their obligation toward refugees in different ways, and elaboration of a group designation rather than an individual condition has not prevented states from seeking to discriminate between different categories of forced migrants.”83 Efficient control over the movement of people into Finnish territory was a crucial part of state-building endeavors. Indeed, aid agencies in Finland initially attempted to sort refugees and displaced peoples according ethnicity and nationality so that they could prioritize assistance to Finnish citizens. However, complex social relations among those who sought refuge in Finland made it extremely difficult for authorities to draw a clear line between those who could have access to Finnish aid based on nationality and citizenship criteria and those whose welfare was not in Finnish jurisdiction. Refugees’ correspondences with aid officials suggested that the experience of dislocation prompted some people to employ ethnicity and nationality in ways they had not previously imagined. In doing so, these people engaged in conversation with officials on the boundaries that determined how different groups were to be treated. The plight of refugees in Finland revealed a feedback relationship between micro-level personal experiences and meso- to macro-level state building practices. People’s daily routines limited the range of state actors’ efforts to assert their authority. In turn, officials’ methods for dealing with these limits prompted some individuals to devise new strategies to cope with government responses to their circumstances.

83 Gatrell, A Whole Empire Walking, 10.
In the 1910s, Aino Väisänen’s family lived in a Finnish village near the Russian border, and regularly sold produce to visitors from Russia coming to stay in their summer homes. After the Bolshevik revolution, some of these visitors were trapped in Russia, some went into exile in Western Europe, and others remained in Finland as refugees. All had ambiguous legal standing in the newly independent Finland, and faced enormous hurdles in retaining their properties in the Finnish villages. Aino’s father arranged to pay property taxes on behalf of the Boronins, St. Petersburg visitors who regularly bought his vegetables. In exchange, the Väisänens could use the Boronins’ land however they wished. This allowed Aino’s large farming family to move to this spacious property. After losing all contact with the Boronins, the Väisänens sold the premises in 1926.¹

This chapter investigates how evidence of previously existing Finnish-Russian social ties affected the Finnish Republic’s management of real estate owned or used by subjects of the former Russian empire. It evaluates the consequences of government decisions on foreign-owned assets for both the Russian property owners and the Finns they encountered. It reveals how property settlement decisions led to unintended consequences when officials attempted to balance state and individual interests. This case study illuminates ways in which Finnish-Russian social and cultural contacts in the border regions impinged on nation-building, as well as the way state efforts to exert control over borderland areas affected daily social interactions at the micro level.

The majority of Russians who possessed immovable assets resided seasonally in the Karelian Isthmus. Yet government authorities’ attempt to transfer Russian-owned properties to the Finnish state unearthed the long-term effects that decades of social and economic transactions between Finns and Russians had on the region. Theorists on borders and borderlands have commented that the post-Westphalian nation-state often imposed political boundaries on the population with little regard to its social structure, with significant consequences on the social structure itself. The effects of the post-1917 border regime changes on dacha property management reflected how the imposition of borders in connection with nation- and state-building can have real life consequences for people whose activities traversed this boundary. This case study also reminds us that borders are not merely spatial distinctions but are also social sites that cut through lives, cultures, economies, and identities. It invites us to consider how social transactions at the micro level can have broader effects.

This chapter is based on archival research conducted at the Mikkeli Provincial Archives of Finland. Petitions to the Administrative Organ for Property of Foreign Owners in Viipuri Province (hereafter Administrative Organ) to claim the abandoned property included letters of attorney proving a Russian landowner had given permission to a Finnish citizen to manage his property. These documents do not describe the precise relationship between the Russian and Finnish citizens, but suggest that some contacts between them continued even if political changes between 1917 and 1922 prevented them from meeting physically. Reports stating the Administrative Organ’s decisions on these property claims, while not detailed in reasons,

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collectively illustrate this governing body’s decision-making patterns. Board meeting minutes
divulge more concretely the motives and rationale behind the Administrative Organ’s decisions.
The bulk of this material is from the years 1923 to 1927, the period of greatest flux in property
claim issues.

As the first chapter has emphasized, the Karelian Isthmus had been under both
Swedish/Finnish and Russian rule over several centuries, thus creating a complex setting for
Finnish-Russian contact. Trans-border contacts was a regular aspect of life in this region. After
Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire, the Finnish Customs
Department established checkpoints along the Finnish-Russian border in 1812 to monitor the
transfer of goods between Finland and Russia, but these were merely “local manifestations of the
increasing control over space rather than expressions of boundaries dividing the space.”

Precedents for Finnish-Russian economic and cultural contacts existed prior to the mass arrival
of Russian visitors to summer houses in the Karelian Isthmus at the end of the nineteenth
century. Daphne Berdahl has argued that border zones “are often fields of heightened
consciousness that demand articulation or identification.” They are also “intersecting,
overlapping, and often, mutually constitutive cultural fields” and as such they “may also have
real spatial dimensions and implications.” Although Finnish-Russian interaction in this region
was neither completely serene nor constantly wrought with tension, the imposition of a strict

4 Anssi Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the
5 Daphne Berdahl, Where the World Ended: Re-unification and Identity in the German
Borderland (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 7.
border regime after 1917 that cut through this territory had profound consequences for its inhabitants.

The networks that bound the Karelian Isthmus’ Finnish residents and Russian visitors functioned within a backdrop of rising political tension. Finnish nationalist activists became increasingly concerned with what they perceived to be Russian authorities’ fortified attempts to impose centralized forms of imperial rule on Finland. Officials in Russia worried that what they perceived to be the Finnish people’s strengthening aspiration for sovereignty would undermine the empire’s security. As mentioned in previous chapters, these tensions affected the nature of cross-cultural contacts in the Karelian Isthmus.

The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 facilitated Finland’s secession from the crumbling Russian Empire in subsequent years. It is possible to argue that the post-1917 border changes stranded people on the “wrong” side of the boundary, since they cut off many Finns living on the Russian side and left some Russians stranded in Finland. Anssi Paasi offers a more nuanced description of the new border situation. He posits that the boundary was functionally located in the “wrong place,” since it immobilized people whose social and economic activities spanned both sides of the new divide. The establishment of a new border regime disrupted social transactions between local Finnish villagers and seasonal visitors from Russia. Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel have argued that national borders are “imagined projections of territorial power.” In the years immediately after Finland’s declaration of independence, state authorities prioritized securing the border region for military reasons. Chapter Five has noted several examples of the Finnish government’s attempts to secure the border region. These attempts

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6 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness, 169.
included expelling Russian military personnel remaining in Finland and heavily restricting the number of people who could reach Finland from Russia. Finnish authorities also established a quarantine center in Terijoki to screen individuals attempting to enter Finland from Russia. These efforts can be seen as authorities’ attempts to turn the state’s imagined territorial power into reality.

The Finnish authorities’ attempts to secure the border zone were set in a wider political context of uncertainty over what regime change in Russia could mean for Finland’s sovereignty. These efforts were pertinent, given the territorial disputes between Finland and Bolshevik-controlled Russia from 1918 to 1921. The anti-Russian rhetoric espoused by Finnish nationalist groups within the elite in reaction to Russification at the end of the nineteenth century did not dissipate once the imperial system disintegrated. Instead, anti-Russian sentiments were fused with anti-Bolshevik expressions. Paasi has commented that although the Finnish population did not serve as a mouthpiece for extreme rightwing groups, ideas proposed by students and the academic intelligentsia became crucial for developing territorial ideologies based on anti-Russian patriotism. During the first decade of Finland’s independence these ideologies became the dominant view in Finnish public life. The populist association, the Academic Karelia Society, gained notoriety for its campaign to homogenize the border regions for ethnic Finns.

Paasi contends, “nationalism is a specific form of territoriality” that “looks inward in order to unify the nation and its constituent territory, and...looks outwards to divide one nation

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9 Paasi, Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness, 99.
and territory from another” and is “always concerned with a struggle over the control of land.”\textsuperscript{11} Subjects of the defunct Russian empire owning landed property in a Finnish region adjacent to the Russian border potentially threatened the new state’s territorial integrity. Eric Hobsbawm theorized that nationalism involved elites’ invention of traditions, rituals and symbols that imply continuity with the past to establish boundaries of social cohesion and membership.\textsuperscript{12} In this constructed national narrative, Finnish right wing groups imagined Russians as the hereditary enemy.\textsuperscript{13} This implied continuity, however, did not necessarily correspond with social reality. Evidence of Russian home ownership in the Karelian Isthmus brought into question the extent to which Finnish- and Russian-speakers regarded each other as enemies. It also challenged the idea that the region “naturally” belonged to the Finns. Issues of border and territorial control were thus fused with ideas about nationalism.

**Russians and their Dachas after Finnish Independence**

Changes to border control from 1917 to 1920, made it extremely difficult for many dacha owners to care for their properties. Those in Russia could not personally tend to their summer homes because they could not easily travel to Finland, while those in Finland could not mobilize resources to do so. Most owners were unable to pay taxes once political turmoil eased in the mid-1920s. The state simply annexed much of the abandoned properties once the Russians

\textsuperscript{11} Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness*, 51.
\textsuperscript{13} Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness*, 159.
disappeared en masse from the Karelian Isthmus. Kristina Rotkirch, whose maternal
grandparents had spent much time at the Karelian Isthmus dachas, recalled that when the Finnish parliament passed a law in 1920 enabling local Finns to purchase the deserted properties, her
great uncle bought several of these houses.

In some cases, the government even sequestered houses with living inhabitants. A memoirist recalled that in one Finnish village, a St. Petersburg hat maker bequeathed land from his large dacha territory to the Finnish Lutheran Church in St. Petersburg as a shelter for the poor widows among its members. Soon after, the home opened its doors to thirty women from the St. Petersburg Finnish Lutheran congregation. The council that ran the St. Petersburg Finnish Lutheran congregation also directed this shelter. When the border closed in May 1918, the shelter remained on the Finnish side of the border, and the administration was stranded on Russian side. Since no one could pay the property taxes, the Finnish state took custody of the dacha grounds and the buildings. Land settlement authorities displaced the women living in the home and leased the premises to other parties. The authorities’ actions severed the bonds between the donor and the destitute Finnish women he had intended to assist, and in doing so, deprived these Finns of their security.

Those Russians who remained in Finland after the country declared independence were in an equally difficult situation. Living in a state where they could not maintain their livelihood, Maria Lähteenmäki, *Maailmojen rajalla: Kannaksen rajamaa ja poliittiset murtumat 1911-1944* (Helsinki: SKS, 2009), 299.


I use the terms sequester and annex in a similar sense, to denote indefinite takeover of property, with the possibility that the owner may reclaim the property. I use the terms confiscate and expropriate to mean seizing of private property without a chance for the owner to redeem the property or receive any compensation for it.

they had limited means for paying their taxes. Some managed to retain their properties and subsisted by putting up boarders at their dachas and planting vegetables on their plots. Others attempted to sell their real estate as a last resort. Doing so, however, was difficult because government policies aimed to limit the influence of Russians in the Karelian Isthmus as much as possible. This involved denying citizenship applications to Russians and complicating their business activities. Russians’ landed property came under special scrutiny by state agents, and a series of statutes and laws were passed between 1918 and 1925 to restrict or even prevent Russians from owning land in Finland.

**Bargain or Burden?**

Before considering whether Finnish policies on foreign-owned land can be construed as part of a general nativist policy designed to diminish Russian influence in a region with a strong history of Finnish-Russian cultural interaction, it is vital to consider this issue from a pragmatic point of view. The Finnish state simply could not ignore the problem that hundreds of people had abandoned their properties and owed an enormous amount in property taxes. Since the state also struggled with land and housing shortages, annexing the real estate appeared to be the most direct solution. The Board of Settlement oversaw the populating and cultivating of estate lands to improve the position of the landless population. Sorting out the legal aspects of the large number of foreign-owned real estate required a much more concentrated effort. On October 20,

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18 Baschmakoff and Marja Leinonen, *Russian Life in Finland*, 53.
20 Finnish National Archives (KA), Board of Settlement Archive Finding Aid 523.
1922, the government created the Administrative Organ as a special section of the Board of Settlement to handle affairs related to foreign-owned properties.\(^{21}\)

In the early years of Finland’s independence, vaguely worded legislation regarding foreigners’ land ownership rights complicated the Administrative Organ’s tasks. A 1920 Finnish law stipulated that foreigners who did not reside in the province in which they held property titles did not have the right to control property in Finland without special permission. But as members of the Administrative Organ noted in a letter to a cabinet minister, “control of property” and “special permission” were not clearly defined in the legislation.\(^{22}\) Nonetheless, this issue appeared moot, since many Russian dacha owners had already fled the area, and the state simply seized their properties in accordance with the 1922 Law on Properties in Finland Abandoned by Foreign Owners that gave the Finnish state annexation rights. If no owner came forward to claim the property after five years had lapsed, the state would then be entitled to appropriate it. Since Article 7 of this law in theory permitted Russian owners to redeem their real estate from within five years of its seizure, the 1922 law inherently contradicted the 1920 legislation that prohibited foreigners from owning property in Finland without special authorization.\(^{23}\) This contradiction generated a situation where right to redemption was subject to authorities’ discretion based on criteria external to legal provisions.

\(^{21}\) Karlaja, November 2, 1922. The Council of State named bank manager I. Alopaeus as the chairman, Justice of the Court of Appeals A.H. Makkonen as secretary and architect O.I. Meurman as the member-at-large.

\(^{22}\) Mikkeli Provincial Archives of Finland (MMA), Administrative Organ Archive, Da4. Letter from the Administrative Organ for Property of Foreign Owners to Cabinet Minister Juho Niukkanen of the Board of Settlement, 24 October 1923.

\(^{23}\) Finnish Acts and Decrees Collection, 211/1922. Law on Property in Finland Abandoned by Foreign Owners. This law was amended in 1924. Memos from the Administrative Organ, which contained lists of properties owned by Russian subjects and the taxes still owing on these
The Administrative Organ’s interpretation of laws on property ownership and real estate sales indicated that its foremost priority was economic: ensuring that the Finnish State had the financial advantage. In the wider context of property rights, the state regulation of property ownership for monetary purposes is not a unique phenomenon. As Bruce Carruthers and Laura Ariovich have emphasized, scholars studying property rights have long recognized the relationship between government and property, and that the state generally specifies rules to serve its own fiscal interests in tax revenues. The numerous villas that wealthy Russian summer guests owned provided a source of income for the Finnish state. The government used some of the funds received from the seizure and rental of these properties to finance border patrols in the Karelian Isthmus.

The state’s need to confiscate neglected real estate also related indirectly to the 1922 Land Settlement Act, which “provided for acquisition of land, by the state or communal aid, for any Finnish citizen, who met certain conditions, and who otherwise could not become an owner of a farm or dwelling site.” Expropriation became one of the main means for the state to acquire additional territory. Those most liable to expropriation were owners of neglected farms, which in the Karelian Isthmus dacha settlements mainly meant Russian landowners. Real estate speculators and those whose activities did not exclusively pertain to agriculture were also liable properties, indicated that the Administrative Organ had turned over these properties to state custody. These memos can be found in MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Da4.

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25 Lähteenmäki, Maailmojen rajalla, 301.

to expropriation. “  

As a site of leisure, the Russian dacha became vulnerable to expropriation legislation.  

The worsening condition of abandoned dacha properties provoked a sense of urgency for authorities who prioritized state fiscal gains. At a board meeting in April 1923, representatives from parish districts with large numbers of abandoned properties discussed the financial consequences of deteriorating real estate. The chairman desired that the abandoned properties “be taken into the state’s care as soon as possible, since these properties have now been abandoned for about five years. They are now in such bad condition, that they need to be salvaged in the near future.” He also acknowledged that it could be less costly for the state to allow foreign owners to redeem these plots and sell them, because the government would not have to pay for the repair of damaged homes. The state could recoup some revenue lost through years of unpaid taxes by property redemption fees and shift the burden of restoration to the original owners.  

Subsequent rulings suggested that economic expediency gave state agents and judicial authorities incentive to permit some Russian and Soviet citizens to reclaim less valuable lands. For example, Ivan Ivanoff was able to reclaim his property after the Administrative Organ had turned it over to the state in April 1923. The Viipuri Provincial Governor approved the return of this property on condition that Ivanoff paid twenty-five Finnish marks per month to the state appointed caretaker who looked after the property when it had been in state custody.  

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27 Ibid.  
29 LOGAV, f.505, op. 1, d.3, l.1. Viipuri Province Governor’s office, memo N:o 36266, August 24, 1923.
These decisions acknowledged the Russian dacha folks’ economic significance to the Karelian Isthmus but did not necessarily reflect goodwill on behalf of the Administrative Organ officials toward Russian property owners. They did not represent Finnish authorities’ acceptance of a permanent Russian presence. Since strict border regulations still made it difficult for Russians to travel to Finland, this option was only open to those already residing in Finland, or to those in Russia able to communicate with a Finnish acquaintance to negotiate property claims on their behalf. The stipulations for redeeming expropriated property were financially burdensome. The applicant was required to pay outstanding property taxes and pay for the property’s maintenance while it was in state possession. The value of the applicant’s real estate was not high enough to compensate for the start-up costs associated with re-acquiring it. Raising such sums was mostly beyond the means of those without gainful employment in Finland and those who lacked the social networks to assist with this purpose.

Maintaining the state’s financial advantage remained the priority for the Administrative Organ. Russians’ material well-being and their general entitlement to property ownership were addressed only if they did not interfere with government priorities. That the debate on what should be done with real estate in good condition for which the ownership title remained unknown underscored this priority. The consensus was that the state should immediately expropriate and auction off these properties before another party had the chance to claim them. The chairman claimed this practice was prompted by the prevalence of cases where soon after the Administrative Organ had announced its intention to appropriate a more valuable property, “an agent who had bought the said real estate or had a letter of attorney permitting him to sell it always appeared.” The Administrative Organ would thus be required to postpone the seizure and
sale of this property until an investigation could determine whether the said agent’s claims were legitimate.  

The Administrative Organ’s preoccupation with maintaining the state’s financial advantage in dealing with property ownership in some instances even inadvertently penalized some Finnish citizens who purchased property from Russian owners, especially when the chain of ownership could not be clearly established. Kalle Kakko had purchased land from Russian merchant Feodor Ivanoff in October 1924, a small part of which had been parceled out and sold to another Russian, Ivan Kondratjeff, in 1917. Since only Kondratjeff’s part of the plot was neglected, the Finnish state should only have been entitled to expropriate that small section. Nonetheless, upon examining the original sale agreement between Ivanoff and Kondratjeff, the Administrative Organ turned the entire property over to state control on the grounds that the contract did not clearly delineate the part sold to Kondratjeff, and therefore the entire property could be considered abandoned.  

In another village, the Sirki family faced similar obstacles in their May 1924 purchase of dacha property from Russian engineer Dimitrij Vojeikoff and his brother Pavel. The Vojeikoff brothers had inherited this property from their father in 1916, but the Administrative Organ argued that because the brothers had not provided sufficient proof that they were the legal heirs, they had no right to ownership and therefore no right to sell this property. The Supreme Court of Finland voided the sale between the Voijeikoffs and the Sirkis, and allowed the state to sequester

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31 MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Ea2, 1926. Viipuri Province Court of Appeals decision, June 3, 1926. MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Ea2, 1926.
this real estate, thus depriving the Sirkis of valuable land.\textsuperscript{32} Josefiina Toivonen’s case paralleled the one mentioned above. She had purchased property from Leningrad acquaintances who inherited the real estate from their father in 1918. The Administrative Organ had deemed this sale illegal, claiming that since the landlord had died in Russia in 1918, his sons’ inheritance rights could not be verified. Toivonen thus appealed to a local judge to honor the sale. By preventing real estate transactions between a Finn and Russian, the Administrative Organ ended up sacrificing the Finnish citizen’s interest in favor of state financial gains.

Protecting state fiscal interests through repossession of abandoned properties was much more complicated than simply confiscating foreign-owned real estate. The complex task of transferring Russian-owned properties to Finnish hands raised several larger issues that legislators had not initially anticipated with regards to evaluating Russians’ place in Finland. By allowing subjects of the former Russian empire to repossess less valuable properties out of financial expedience, would Finnish officials subsequently be required to recognize Russian property owners’ legal rights in Finland? Would this solution lead to public recognition of these Russians’ previous connections and contributions to the Karelian Isthmus dacha towns, thereby legitimizing their right to permanent residence in Finland at a time when the Finnish government’s goal was to limit the number of Russian residents in Finland? In ensuring the Finnish state’s gain from transferring property out of Russian hands, the Administrative Organ also disadvantaged Finnish citizens who had direct contact with the Russian proprietors. What unforeseen implications would this have for future land settlement policies?

\textsuperscript{32} LOGAV, f.505, op.1, d.3, l.13. Supreme Court decision, March 13, 1925.
Trustworthy Trustees?

Some Russian landowners who were able to re-establish contacts with acquaintances in Finland opted to assign their Finnish associates as temporary caretakers as part of their efforts to keep their assets. Russian citizen Maria Schukovnova signed over her two dachas to a neighboring farmer for maintenance. 33 A Russian colonel’s wife turned over her property, which had been in her family’s possession since 1891, to a policeman for temporary care. 34 Finns who took over temporary care of land for the absentee owners dealt with rentals, maintained buildings on the property, and most importantly, paid property taxes. 35 Other Russians with no plans to return to Finland sought to entrust their properties to Finnish citizens for temporary care in hopes of recouping some sales revenue. A Russian couple drew up a letter of attorney that allowed a Finnish citizen to sell their property in the Terijoki village “in order to raise funds for themselves,” although this document did not specify how proceeds from the sale of this property was to be transferred. 36 Members of the Administrative Organ were well aware of this practice, and worried that this legal loophole meant that the absentee Russians essentially remained de facto owners of their property. The Administrative Organ’s letter to Minister Niukkanen stressed the fact that the 1920 law requiring foreigners to have special permission to own property in Finland did not prevent a foreign proprietor from appointing another person to manage his real estate in Finland. “When the foreign citizen issues a letter of attorney that gives the recipient

34 MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Ea2, 1925. Maria Golubzova Letter of Attorney, February 23, 1925.
35 MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Ea2, 1926. See, for example, the affidavit for the temporary transfer of property caretaker duties from Anna Mushketova to Bruno Briesmeister, March 17, 1925.
36 LOGAV, f.505, op.1, d.6, l.3. Letter of Attorney signed by Andrei Ausin and Alisa Lovisa Ausin, June 4, 1925.
rights of guardianship, this would in effect permit the foreigner to control his property in the Viipuri province, thus breaking the spirit of the 1920 law.”\(^{37}\) What these officials failed to realize was that even appointing a trustee to sell their properties did not necessarily mean a significant financial advantage for the Russian owner abroad. One person recalled how he had arranged the sale of an acquaintance’s dacha. The notary in charge of the property informed him that there was now very little interest in the area where the dacha was located, since many of the other properties in the area were abandoned, thus detracting from the value of properties in the area.\(^{38}\)

Judicial authorities nonetheless permitted these kinds of legal arrangements between Russian proprietors and their Finnish acquaintances, so long as the foreigner appointed a Finnish citizen as the legal trustee. For example, the Administrative Organ had turned over an apparently abandoned farm owned by a Russian subject to the Finnish state. When a Finnish citizen submitted a letter of attorney to the Administrative Organ demonstrating that the owner had given him legal rights to manage the farm, the highest court in the Viipuri Province approved the transfer of this real estate after having confirmed the deal’s legality.\(^{39}\) Article 10 of the 1924 amendments to the 1922 legislation eventually established a clear guideline on redemption of property by a legal trustee appointed by the original owner. It gave the trustee who had already obtained a letter of attorney from the owner certifying his legal right to govern property on the owner’s behalf five years time from the original date of the property’s seizure to redeem it. The


\(^{38}\) Baschmakoff and Leinonen, *Russian Life in Finland*, 54-55.

\(^{39}\) MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Eb3. Court decision on a petition submitted by Otto Ukkonen, October 27, 1924.
title was to be returned to the legal appointee on condition that he paid the relevant fees related to the upkeep of this property for the time it was in state possession.  

These arrangements prolonged the permanent property transfer to the Finnish state, diverted revenue from the sale of land to foreigners, and had few benefits for the Finnish trustees besides direct access to the buildings and soil on the property, but they solved some immediate practical problems. The Finnish trustees would be responsible for general maintenance of the property, thus preventing the real estate from further deterioration that would devalue it. The Finnish trustees would also be responsible for paying outstanding property taxes, thus ensuring that the state would still collect some revenue from these properties. In cases where the state had already seized a Russian-owned property, the Finnish citizen who possessed a letter of attorney permitting him to control the real estate was responsible for paying the state-appointed caretaker who had tended to the property. This provision therefore relieved the state’s obligation to pay individuals for the upkeep of unoccupied premises. One Finnish shopkeeper who petitioned the Viipuri Province Governor for control of a Russian nobleman’s estate was allowed to do so on the grounds that he paid a modest salary to the state-appointed caretaker who had been looking after the estate. That these types of transactions were permitted suggested that some officials were capable of balancing state priorities and individual entitlements.

From the available documents, it is difficult to discern the exact nature of the previously existing relationship between the Russian property owners and the Finnish citizens who acted as

40 Finnish Acts and Decrees, 224/1924. Law on Property in Finland Abandoned by Foreign Owners (amendment).
41 LOGAV, f.506, op.1, d.9, l.40. Letter from Administrative Organ representative Einar Stenius to the Viipuri Province Governor, October 16, 1924. The birth certificate that accompanied Schahoff’s petition indicated that Schahoff had a Finnish mother and a Russian father. He was born in the Terijoki parish and baptized in the Orthodox Church.
caretakers. But since these dacha communities were small, these people kept intermittent contacts with each other. Aino Väisänen’s testimony indicated that Russians sometimes entrusted those Finns who provided services for the dacha industry – farmers and shopkeepers, for example – with the care of their properties. Such contacts offer an interesting window to survey ways in which Finns and Russians crossed legal paths even years after the Russian empire’s collapse severed the imperial relationship between Finland and Russia. From one point of view, it could be argued that by asserting their legal right as trustees for Russians who owned properties, Finnish citizens were taking advantage of new opportunities to gain access to lands that for decades had been held by middle and upper class St. Petersburgers. On the other hand, these legal transactions also point to the importance of pre-existing cross-border contacts that made these operations possible in the first place. Moreover, these kinds of boundary-crossing relationships affected a larger segment of society in the Karelian Isthmus towns, because they connected people of different socio-economic and occupational backgrounds. Though the relationship between the dacha owners and property temporary property caretakers may not have been extraordinarily intimate, establishing this contractual relationship would not have been possible if the Russian dacha folk had not established prior social networks that included Finns.

These relationships and their associated legal transactions also raised the issue of trust and dependency between the Finns and Russians engaged in these contracts. A Russian who was appointed a Finnish citizen as his legal trustee required reasonable assurance that the Finnish citizen would fulfill the tasks required of him or her, and more importantly, ensure that the original Russian proprietor would receive the revenue generated by the property sale or rental. This accentuates a reversal of roles that took place when Finland became an independent state. A number of the Russian villa owners had previously been the wealthier members of their small
communities. Farmhands, nursemaids, and shopkeepers in these parish towns even depended on wealthier Russians for jobs. After the Finnish state limited the Russians’ ownership of land, former Russian landlords’ livelihoods now depended on the farmers and shopkeepers whom they had appointed as their legal trustees.

**Debtors and Creditors**

In 1911, Finnish citizen Gunilla Virki had rented out a section of her property to Russian subject Dmitri Laurentieff for use as a summer home. Virki claimed in a petition to the Administrative Organ that after some time, Laurentieff disappeared, owing her unpaid rent dating from June 1915 to June 1925. Her request for rent compensation from the Administrative Organ was denied on the grounds that it was unreasonable. Economic interdependency between local Finns and Russians that had proliferated with the rise of the dacha industry also affected daily life in Karelian Isthmus towns after Finland’s independence through the debtor-creditor relationship. That a significant number of Russians rented dacha property from local Finnish farmers proved ominous for some Finns when border regime changes displaced their Russian tenants. The Russians’ rental payments had been a steady source of the Finnish farmers’ contribution toward property taxes. When many of the tenants either disappeared or became refugees unable to pay rent, many of these Finnish farmers, who had rented parts of their farmsteads to Russian families, could not pay their taxes. Consequently, these Finns’ properties were also under threat of expropriation while the owners’ debts accrued.

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42 MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Cb1, 1926. Administrative Organ Executive Board meeting minutes, July 16, 1926 and August 9, 1926. The documents do not indicate what board members of the Administrative Organ deemed “unreasonable.”
The Administrative Organ faced the complex task of determining whether landowners were truly paralyzed by the inability of their Russian tenants to pay rent or if these landlords were simply using the absence of tenants’ rent payment as a pretext for evading taxes. This illuminated another situation where officials representing Finnish state interests confronted evidence of Finnish-Russian contacts in legal texts. In order to assess the Finnish landholders’ claims, government authorities inevitably investigated details of the relationship between the Finnish landlords and their absentee Russian tenants. Regardless of state representatives’ attitudes towards these relationships, agreeing to ease Finnish subjects’ tax burden due to Russian tenants’ debt could set off an unpleasant precedent whereby the Finnish state would then be taking on responsibility for these Russians’ inability to pay rent.

Other types of creditor-debtor relationships also affected the Administrative Organ’s activities. One particular case concerned Finnish attorney Herman Beyrath’s claim that Russian actress Anna Datschkova owed him a significant amount of money. Beyrath argued that he should receive the assets of Datschkova’s real estate as compensation, but property was already in state custody. Although local parish courts ruled in his favor, the Administrative Organ implored the Viipuri Province Court of Appeals to overturn this decision. The Administrative Organ then turned to the Supreme Court of Finland for a final ruling. The petition mentioned that if a property owner had borrowed from a creditor, the debtor had the right to mortgage the property to pay the debt. This situation became complicated when after a state had annexed the real estate, a creditor claimed the revenue the state received from the property due to the

43 MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Da4. Memo from the Administrative Organ to the Board of Settlement, January 30, 1926. MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Da4.
44 MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Da4. Administrative Organ petition to the Viipuri Supreme Court, April 15, 1924. MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Da4.
previous owner’s debt to him. The question became whether the state should be liable for paying the debts of an individual whose property the state had already taken into custody. The letter of appeal to the Finnish Supreme court outlined the urgency of clarifying this issue and stated that this decision had “very great significance to the operation of the Administrative Organ.”

Even in 1922 when the first laws were established regarding the state’s seizure of abandoned foreign properties in Finland, the Administrative Organ was already concerned about consequences for the state if a creditor was permitted to seize properties already in state possession as compensation for debts. The Administrative Organ worried that should this be the case, the state would not be able to recuperate expenses incurred for the maintenance of the properties, and thus the state would have the most to lose when annexing abandoned real estate. The Administrative Organ made a small compromise in its petition. While insisting that the state should continue to receive the revenue from properties seized, it also acknowledged that it was unfair for creditors to be denied compensation from debtors whose property the state had already confiscated. It suggested that the Supreme Court amend the Viipuri County Court of Appeal’s decision so that the right of redemption for that property should be transferred to the creditor. He may then dispense with the property as he wished, and the state would not be directly responsible for repaying this debt.

This case indicated that land authority representatives, legislators, and judicial authorities did not always agree on the interpretation of laws pertaining to foreign-owned property,

45 MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Da4. The Administrative Organ’s petitions to the Finnish Supreme court, November 24, 1924.
46 MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Da4. Letter from the Administrative Organ for Property of Foreign Owners to Cabinet Minister Juho Niukkanen, 24 October 1923.
47 MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Da4. Administrative Organ’s petition to Finnish Supreme court, November 24, 1924.
especially if they affected the balance of public versus private interests. On the one hand, compensating the Finnish creditor potentially implies acknowledging that whenever the state seized Russian-owned property, it may also be responsible for taking on the Russian’s financial burdens. On the other hand, the courts could rule in favor of the Finnish state, and reject the creditor’s claims for financial compensation, but this option would disadvantage the Finnish citizen. It would also proclaim that pre-1917 contacts between Finnish citizens and Russian subjects should be ignored and forgotten, even if it penalized Finnish citizens who engaged in these contacts. In the Beyrath case the courts and land settlement agents struggled to find common ground due to the wide range of implications the final decision on this case could have.

The debtor-creditor relationship between former Russian subjects and Finnish citizens revealed further layers of complexity in Finnish-Russian everyday contacts that may not have been initially obvious. In late nineteenth century Russian society the dacha was often associated with the urban middle class, but the income boundaries of this segment of society were therefore rather amorphous, such that by 1900 the dachniki included a diverse range of people “from mandarins all the way to shopkeepers.”48 For example, Russian artists, writers, and musicians thought of themselves as part of the middle class, even though they were not all necessarily better off than the Finnish farmers, craftsmen and civil servants with whom they interacted. By the early years of the twentieth century, Russians unable to afford the dacha lifestyle increasingly borrowed money from the growing Finnish middle class. The Finnish small farmers, too, profited from the Russians’ yearning for the exurban pleasures that the dacha offered. Renting out their farmhouses to the growing community of dacha folk enabled Finnish farmers to earn

48 Lovell, Summerfolk, 4.
supplementary income.49 These transactions brought Finns and Russians of different economic circumstances into dialogue with each other, and Finnish authorities confronted these interactions in the early 1920s when balancing state priorities with Finnish citizens’ financial well-being. The enduring effects of these Finnish-Russian contacts made it difficult to determine exactly what “Finnish” objectives were. Safeguarding Finnish interests was more complicated than imposing strict measures on Russians.

**Interpreting Soviet Interests**

Because settling Finland’s property ownership questions involved citizens of a neighboring state, it is also useful to consider the transnational context in evaluating the Finnish reaction to legal evidence of Finnish-Russian contact in dealing with landed property questions. Dealing with a foreign government complicated Finnish officials’ assessment of property claims because it prompted them to question whether individuals were acting in their own interest when submitting their petitions or whether they were acting in the interests of the Soviet state. Additionally, the transnational dimension further exposed the Finnish state’s tendency to weigh greater state priorities against that of the individual citizen. Given the overall hostility toward Bolshevism among the Finnish political leadership, dealing with the newly established Soviet state on property issues had significant consequences on the final decisions the Finnish authorities made on Russians’ right to property in Finland.

Sorting out Soviet citizens’ real estate ownership rights in Finland was not the first or sole instance in which the Finnish government had dealt with the defunct Russian empire’s successor states over property issues. Mikael Korhonen’s study of Finnish citizens’ restitution

49 Hämäläinen, “Vanhan suomen venäläiset huvila asukkaat,” 118.
demands for personal property damaged or lost to Soviet Russia illustrates that this issue was related to peace negotiations between Finland and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic that culminated in the Treaty of Dorpat in October 1920. His study analyzed private claims made by individual citizens, many of whom were Finnish citizens working and living in Russia before 1917. Groups or individuals originally made these claims through private initiative because the Finnish state could not, for political reasons, act openly on behalf of these claimants. Finnish diplomatic support was restricted to general support for civic and private associations organizing these claims for compensation. Korhonen argues that the Finnish government did not play a more active role in supporting these individuals’ claims for private property compensation because it did not want to jeopardize larger state property claims by interfering with the much smaller, and comparatively less valuable individual claims. As a result the private claimants lost out in this relationship. Korhonen’s study demonstrates that among Finnish government officials there was an established pattern of protecting larger state assets at the expense of individual citizens.

In March 1925, the establishment of the Soviet Citizens’ Society for the Protection of Russian Property Owners in Finland, based in Leningrad, further complicated the Administrative Organ’s efforts to assess varying property claims. Because the Soviet government appeared to have at the very least approved of this society’s activities, property ownership claims could no longer remain an issue of strictly domestic Finnish interest. The Soviet government’s


51 Lovell notes, for example, that Leningrad regional executive committee had originally refused to support any society to defend dacha owners’ interest in Finland on the grounds that this organization might interfere with the committee’s municipalizing of private houses in Leningrad.
endorsement of this society added a diplomatic dimension to the issue of property claims. Up to this point, Finnish authorities had at least been willing to examine petitions from individuals even if they were Russian or Soviet citizens. Finnish land settlement authorities, however, were extremely skeptical of real estate claims made through an organization with apparent ties to a foreign government. They suspected that the Soviet state was interested in supporting its citizens’ land ownership rights in Finland only to bolster Soviet state finances. A civil servant working for the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported from Leningrad that Soviet news reports on the Society for the Protection of Russian Property Owners in Finland contained “misleading information by the Party with the purpose to get claimants with property in Finland to leave this matter to the Soviet Union’s government.” He also noted, “Russians…have said that the Society asks for a fee in order to provide assistance, which amounts to around 60 to 250 marks, in addition to the relatively high payments for inquiries and other services for which the Society takes responsibility.”

As Stephen Lovell has remarked, although many Soviet government representatives in the early 1920s disapproved of summer houses as the least acceptable form of private property, policies preventing dacha ownership had dubious legal foundations, and exurban locations posed uncertainties in Soviet legal processes.

Intervention from Foreign Minister Boris Chicherin and head of state Mikhail Kalinin in 1924 changed the committee’s decision. See Summerfolk, 123.

MMA Administrative Organ Archive, Ea1. Memo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the Society for the Protection of Soviet Citizens’ Property Ownership in Finland. May 8, 1925. In this report, the civil servant also includes the Russian newspaper article to which he refers, the May 6, 1925 edition of Torgovo-promyshlennyi kurier. This article states, “The Society for the Protection of Soviet Citizen’s Property Rights in Finland has taken to canceling some of the auction of real estate that have been designated to be sold.” It also mentions that in the first month of the Society’s operation, 80 people have personally spoken to representatives of the society inquiring about their properties in Finland.

Lovell, 122-123.
servants unaware of the tensions Soviet legislators faced in interpreting the legal code feared that the Soviet government was attempting to undermine Finnish sovereignty.

Finnish government agencies’ refusal to deal with property claims presented through Society for the Protection of Russian Property Owners, on the grounds that it had no legal standing in Finland to represent Soviet citizens, elicited an unsympathetic response from the Soviet consul in Viipuri. The consul argued in turn that the Administrative Organ had no legitimate reason to refuse to review claims made through the society in cooperation with the Soviet Consul. Whereas the Administrative Organ claimed that the society could not be recognized as a legal representative of Soviet citizens in Finland, the consul argued that “in any case the Administrative Organ cannot say the same about the Consular Office, which is legally the administrative organ of the Soviet Union accepted by the authorities of Finland, and the tasks of which include controlling the interests of the citizens of Soviet Russia.” Unfortunately for the Russian dacha property owners seeking claims through this organization, the involvement of the Soviet state in this negotiation may well have done more to hinder than help their claims for expropriated real estate, even if they had their Finnish peers’ support.

This chapter has attempted to illustrate the relationship between territorial boundaries, state prerogative in managing resources, and everyday relationships at a local and regional level. In the twentieth century, especially within recent decades, lawmakers have justified tightening border controls by claiming the need to prevent outsiders from accessing state resources such as healthcare and education. Such controls, however, cannot be separated from practical concerns

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that might contradict the border's role as a gatekeeper. The examples in this study remind us that the connection between territorial boundaries and control of state resources can be an ambiguous one, especially when individuals' social interactions are taken into consideration.

Nationalism is intrinsically related to territory in the sense that nationalizing states often attempt to make territory congruent with nationality. Borders are an important aspect of this equation because they can be regarded as structures that denote the spatial extent of state sovereignty. Border scholars have addressed people’s attempts to traverse territorial boundaries in spite of government attempts to limit these movements. These limits do not just refer to mobility across guarded boundaries. Borderland peoples can complicate national interests without physically crossing a territorial border. They do so by evoking relationships where people’s daily activities might bring them into contact with those from the other side of the divide. State actors, however, are not always successful in untangling these cross-boundary connections without subordinating nation-building interests to state-building ones or vice versa. Authorities’ attempts to impose administrative order in border regions resonate with larger themes on relations between state actors and individual citizens.

The cases presented in this study indicate that protecting the Finnish state’s financial interest was the primary factor motivating officials’ handling of Russian-owned property in the first decade of the country’s independence. It is tempting to assume that officials explicitly sought to deprive Russians of their assets in Finland in pursuant of a nativist agenda because anti-Russian movements continued to gain momentum in the 1920s. Permitting Russians to own a vast amount of property in a region that Finnish nationalists considered a battle ground for competing influence with Russia seemed counter-productive to the state-building program. However, this view is misleading because it overshadows significant practical dilemmas that
complicated governance in a border region. Officials made decisions on property claims within a backdrop of uncertainty over whether Russian proprietors would be free to traverse the Finnish-Russian border as they had done for decades prior to Finland’s secession from Russia. The immediate fiscal imbalances resulting from mass abandonment of valuable property also affected authorities’ judgment.

Defending national interests by transferring Russian owned real estate to the Finnish state was in reality a much more convoluted affair. Finnish authorities’ concern with Russian owned property related to their efforts to assert control over border regions that were sites of Finnish-Russian interaction. In the process of managing territory and property, officials inadvertently marginalized borderland inhabitants. Although land settlement authorities had been charged with the task of resolving land and housing shortage problems by confiscating abandoned property, expropriation practices did not benefit Finnish citizens uniformly. Varying degrees of economic interdependency between the Russian summer inhabitants and the local Finns they encountered in the Karelian Isthmus made it at times difficult to expropriate Russian properties without negative consequences for certain Finnish citizens. When there were conflicts of interest between state revenue and individual gains, legal decisions sometimes privileged the state at the citizen’s expense. In many of these cases, Finns who actually had intimate and regular contacts with the Russian seasonal residents gained very little from the state’s efforts to transfer property from Russians to the Finnish state. Although the annual exodus of Russian summer visitors to the Karelian Isthmus was physically a part of the local landscape for a short time, the effects their contacts with local Finns who resided there permanently had a much longer afterlife.
Conclusion

The dacha, which has been a ubiquitous part of Russian bourgeois life since the middle of the nineteenth century, found its way into southeastern Finland through decades of urban expansion in St. Petersburg. The dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus did not develop unexpectedly: years of Finnish-Russian political, social and cultural exchange, coupled with the political legacy of Finland as a buffer between the Swedish kingdom and the Russian Empire, facilitated the growth of dacha life in southeastern Finland. Dacha culture was one particular aspect of Finnish-Russian encounters from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, but the effects of these exchanges resonated more broadly. This dissertation has made use of one micro-level topic to explore the wider consequences of social changes at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. The stories in this study reveal the malleability of ethno-national identities. They defy the notion that national and imperial perspectives existed as binary opposites. They indicate that class boundaries were anything but rigid. They challenge the distinction between residents and visitors, insiders and outsiders. Finally, the cases in this study expose overlapping rural and urban perceptions of space.

Ethnicity and Nationality

First and foremost, this dissertation has shown that lived experiences often left traces outside neatly bounded ethno-national categories of analysis set by ethnographers and nationalist politicians. Russian-speakers who flocked to the Karelian Isthmus in droves during the summers and Finnish-speaking villages who lived permanently in the region recognized the dacha as a particularly Russian social and cultural phenomenon. This acknowledgement, however, did not
stop either group from reaching beyond the ethnolinguistic divide. Chapter Two has illustrated how Russian and Finnish speakers engaged with each other through various facets of dacha life: land and property exchanges, the service industry, local commerce, and other micro aspects of economic interdependence. Finnish-speaking inhabitants in the Karelian Isthmus originally viewed this incursion of Russian life into their towns with suspicion, and this attitude certainly lingered throughout the years of the dacha boom in Finland. Nonetheless, many locals recognized the boon this development brought to their region, even if they did not always get along with their new Russian-speaking neighbors and summer visitors. The willingness of Finnish and Russian speakers to communicate with each other did not mean that they were void of any sense of belonging to a particular cultural community, nor did it mean that they were indifferent to significant cultural divides. It only meant that some individuals were capable of negotiating through these differences when the opportunity arose.

The experience of mediating cultural differences served further purposes in times of political uncertainty. Chapters Five has shown how some individuals manipulated nationality and ethnicity as categories of practice in order to improve their own personal circumstances. Russian-speaking refugees in Finland who had personal ties to Finnish speakers emphasized these relationships when claiming aid from Finnish agencies. Likewise, some Finnish speakers who had been long-term residents in St. Petersburg also made note of their family connections to subjects of the defunct Russian Empire when they fled to Finland. They appealed to these familial bonds when making their pleas for assistance from Russian community organizations that provided assistance to former Russian subjects living in Finland.

Chapter Six has shown how years of interethnic contact in the Karelian Isthmus posed significant administrative dilemmas for Finnish officials who sought practical solutions to the
question of abandoned dacha properties in Finland. These officials quickly realized that prioritizing the Finnish state’s fiscal priorities in property management also meant disadvantaging some Finnish citizens who had close ties with Russians who had owned or rented dachas in Finland prior to 1917. This case study has illustrated how people’s daily interactions brought them outside the confines of narrowly defined national communities, and how these interactions continued to affect state- and nation-building processes long after these bonds were severed.

Class Boundaries

Interethnic hostilities existed in the context of dacha life in the Karelian Isthmus, but these hostilities did not necessarily cement the bonds of ethnic cohesion. Chapter Three has shown that Russian speakers in the Karelian Isthmus dacha communities did not constitute a uniform group. The fissures and disagreements among Russians were as revealing as misunderstandings and conflicts between Russian and Finnish speakers. Chapter Three has shown that not all of those who lived in the dachas wished to be associated with the dacha lifestyle. Artists and writers like Ilya Repin and Kornei Chukovsky lived amongst the dacha folks, but did not interact much with them. Repin and Chukovsky preferred consorting with fellow creative individuals. These people included Russian and Finnish speakers. These artistic intellectuals’ disdain for the regular dacha dwellers exemplified the gulf between the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie. Both groups emerged from social changes that made the old estate system of social organization in Russia less relevant in an era of capital relations, but each saw their role in the modern world in different ways. The bourgeoisie associated the domesticity and leisurely atmosphere of dacha life – upgrading home décor, entertaining guests, group visits
to the beach and public bathhouses – with upward mobility, but the intelligentsia considered the bourgeoisie’s preoccupation with dacha life to be superficial social conventions that encouraged crass consumerism, pettiness and idleness.

The world of the dacha also reflected the amorphousness of class boundaries. These boundaries were not strictly defined by income and financial wealth. Occupation and lifestyle traits mattered just as much in people’s perception of social status. By the latter decades of the nineteenth century, Russians had come to view dacha life as a status symbol of belonging in the middle class. The dacha was no longer the luxury leisure form of an extremely privileged elite. People of widely varying incomes sought to own dachas. Those who could not afford to buy dacha properties rented them from local farmers and entrepreneurs ready to take advantage of these real-estate transactions. It was not uncommon for Finnish and Russian speakers of different occupation and income status to engage in interdependent economic relationships with each other.

Chapters Two has shown how these relationships, which blurred the divide between social classes, sustained the dacha world in the Karelian Isthmus. Farmers sold plots of land unsuitable for agriculture to office workers from St. Petersburg, or rented rooms in their farmhouses to financially struggling stage actors who also wanted to experience the dacha life. As Chapter Six has shown, the significance of these transactions between people of different social strata resonated deeply after Finland became an independent state. Local villagers who sold or rented out their properties to Russian dacha dwellers brought up these economic ties when negotiating property management with Finnish officials. In Chapter Four, the amorphousness and permeability of class boundaries had significant consequences for security. The regularity with which people from different walks of life engaged with each other
confounded Russian security police agents who were more accustomed to formal social conventions and strict social hierarchies.

**Local and Imperial Perspectives**

The encroachment of the dacha onto Finnish territory underscored the clash of local and national elements of everyday life with the imperial experience. From a spatial-territorial perspective, Chapter One has revealed how geopolitical boundaries can easily be relegated to the background in some daily situations. Dacha goers from St. Petersburg often complained about the tedious customs inspection process when crossing the Finnish-Russian customs boundary. However, in spite of this process, St. Petersburgers still traversed this boundary frequently and accepted customs inspections as a normal aspect of the annual exodus to the dacha. Travel literature indicated that many Russians did not have a particularly strong sense of where Russia ended and where Finland began. In fact, once the dacha goers arrived at the various dacha communities in Finland, they felt right at home since they had brought so many vestiges of Russian life with them.

From a legal-political perspective, dacha life in Finland underscored the dilemmas of governing a vast empire where constituent parts had differentiated sets of legal and political traditions. Chapter One has illustrated how differentiated notions of subjecthood and citizenship between the Russian Empire and the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland impinged upon daily life for dacha dwellers. Since Finnish citizenship was required to practice medicine in the Grand Duchy, dacha folks often complained about the lack of Russian-speaking physicians that could tend to their needs. Such practicalities were the basis of lengthy discussions between Finnish authorities and imperial officials over the dacha dwellers’ access to basic civil rights in Finland.
This inevitably led to further debate over the relationship between property ownership and rights of citizenship. Chapter Four has underscored how legal differences between Finland and Russia had more dramatic consequences related to the broader political atmosphere. Political organizations opposed to the Tsarist regime took advantage of the different legal procedures and the imperial police’s limited jurisdiction in Finland to plan anti-government activities, many of which took on a violent nature. The proliferation of these clandestine political activities in the Karelian Isthmus villages led to heated debate between Finnish and Russian officials over the nature of Finland’s autonomous status.

When Finland was incorporated into the Russian Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century, imperial officials never planned for the intentional colonization of Finland. The expansion of dacha life into Finland coincided with other measures by Russian authorities to curtail elements of political autonomy in Finland. The strong presence of Russian life in the eastern reaches of Finland gave Russian officials further grounds to scrutinize Finnish political autonomy. No wonder, then, that the proliferation of these dacha communities in the Karelian Isthmus provoked commentaries in the Finnish nationalist press about the threat of Russian colonization of Finnish territory.

**Residents and Visitors**

Dacha life blurred the distinctions between the definition of local residents and visitors. As urban space became increasingly crowded, many Russian urbanites came to see their dachas not just as a seasonal, summertime or weekend get-away, but also as a place of secondary residence. As seen in Chapter One, travel literature at times described the permanence of the dacha folks in the Karelian Isthmus in ambiguous ways. Travelogues and tourist guides
employed a variety of terms to stand in for the dacha dwellers. Some used the term *dachnik*, which evoked the image of the dacha goer as a special type of visitor to the Karelian Isthmus towns. Other publications used the term tourist, which lumped dacha folks into the same category as one-time visitors. The dacha was intricately linked with the tourism industry: dacha dwellers and regular tourists alike were drawn to the same natural attractions in Finland, and they occupied the same social spaces such as parks and beaches, pubs and restaurants, theaters and gambling houses. Some publications referred to the dacha dwellers as residents, which implied their long term presence. Indeed, some St. Petersburgers even began staying at their dachas in the Karelian Isthmus for the entire year, commuting to the city when their jobs made these journeys necessary. In the aftermath of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, some of the dacha people who remained in the Karelian Isthmus had no home other than their dachas in Finland.

The haziness of the distinction between resident and visitor is important because it also altered the perception of who was considered an insider and an outsider. These perceptions mattered in an age when the prevailing political atmosphere encouraged people to define in-groups and out-groups based on criteria that did not always match lived experiences. The dacha folks did much to shape the towns and villages in the Karelian Isthmus alongside Finnish-speaking residents whose families had lived there for generations. The dacha goer was not a permanent resident in the Karelian Isthmus in the same sense as locals who had long standing familial ties to the region; however, their influence on local life was far more significant than that of someone who only visited on a few occasions in a lifetime.
Urban and Rural Life

Finally, the dacha world distorted boundaries between the urban and the rural. Life in the Karelian Isthmus had been strongly connected to St. Petersburg ever since Peter the Great founded this city on Gulf of Finland, a mere 30 km away from the Finnish-Russian boundary. People living in the Finnish countryside near the border became increasingly drawn to the St. Petersburg sphere of influence, and their fortunes changed along with the booming metropolis. The dacha phenomenon was one among several of the urban influences from St. Petersburg that affected the towns and villages in the Finnish countryside.

The dachas were physically located in a rural setting, and it was the tranquility and idyllic nature of the countryside that city folks sought when establishing their secondary residences. Urbanites, stressed from the ills of city life, sought some form of return to nature. At the same time, the dacha dwellers were never quite content to abandon all the vestiges of urban life when they left for the dachas during the summers. Dacha living did not always entail disappearing into the wilderness to live the life of an ascetic. Many of the dacha folks were eager to establish theaters, gambling houses and other social-cultural institutions common in urban spaces. They brought with them the consumer culture of urban society. They also scurried back and forth between the dacha and the city as their jobs and social obligations necessitated. The rural towns and villages in the Karelian Isthmus offered St. Petersburgers an ideal middle ground between the stresses of urban life and the isolation of living deep in the backwoods.

Boundaries and political situations have changed, but presence of the dacha in Finland is still a part of the Finnish-Russian dialogue. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian citizens have once again turned to eastern Finland in search of dacha properties. Since 2003,
Russian citizens have made up 80 percent of foreigners who own property in Finland, mainly as secondary homes. Most of these Russian-owned secondary homes are located in eastern Finland. Local Finnish residents and the Russian property owners interact intermittently with each other, and attitudes that locals and foreigners have of each other are neither uniformly positive nor negative.\(^1\) The political circumstances behind this new wave of Russian dacha ownership in Finland has changed dramatically from the situation a century ago, but the economic, social and cultural implications of dacha life in Finland from the end of the nineteenth century should serve as a reminder of the complex nature of Finnish-Russian interactions.

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Appendix A

Figure 1: Map of Vyborg Province, 1897

Source: *Atlas öfver Finland* (Helsinki, 1899).
Appendix B

Figure 2: Map of the Frontiers of Finland, 1595-1812

Appendix C

Figure 3: Map of St. Petersburg and environs

Pre-1948 Finnish place names:
Metsäkylä (Molodezhnoe)
Tyrisevä (Ushkovo)
Terijoki (Zelenogorsk)
Kellomäki (Komarovo)
Kuokkala (Repino)
Ollila (Solnechnoe)
Siestarjoki (Sestroretsk)

Source: Sankt-Peterburg I Leningradskaia oblast’ atlas avtomobil’nykh dorog Rossii (St. Petersburg, 2009).
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