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Title: The causes and consequences of partisan conflict in American politics
Creator: Rohde, David W.
Date: 2000-04-04
Collection: G. Robert Vincent Voice Library Collection
Description: Michigan State Universiy Professor of Political Science David Rohde delivers a talk entitled, "The Causes and Consequences of Partisan Conflict in American Politics" at the MSU Main Library. Rohde discusses the reality of power politics, candidates submitting to party leadership to secure support for re-election, and a shift in power in party politics from party leaders to committees. He also says that the growing trend of differing policy positions within parties may be attributed to the...
Show moreMichigan State Universiy Professor of Political Science David Rohde delivers a talk entitled, "The Causes and Consequences of Partisan Conflict in American Politics" at the MSU Main Library. Rohde discusses the reality of power politics, candidates submitting to party leadership to secure support for re-election, and a shift in power in party politics from party leaders to committees. He also says that the growing trend of differing policy positions within parties may be attributed to the advent of the primary system where voters have more influence on the candidate than party. Rohde answers questions from the audience. Rohde is introduced by MSU Librarian Ruth Ann Jones. Part of the Michigan State University Libraries' Colloquia series.
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Title: The Democratic Party and the conclusion of World War I
Creator: Palmer, A. Mitchell (Alexander Mitchell), 1872-1936
Date: 1920
Collection: G. Robert Vincent Voice Library Collection
Description: Attorney General of the United States Alexander Palmer speaking as a presidential candidate at the 1920 Democratic Convention. He speaks about Americans and their courageous action during World War I, and the importance of mixing party philosophies in time of war.

Title: Dr. Willis Dunbar discusses the evolution of political parties in early American politics
Creator: Dunbar, Willis Frederick, 1902-1970
Date: 1948-09-06
Collection: G. Robert Vincent Voice Library Collection
Description: Dr. Willis Dunbar discusses the evolution of political parties in early American politics. Dunbar explores the conflict between the Federalists and the anti-Federalists, the election of Thomas Jefferson, the elections of 1824 and 1828, and the roots of "Jacksonian democracy".

Title: The impacts of party cohesion on democratic accountability
Creator: Huang, Shih-hao
Date: 2014
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations
Description: This dissertation features party cohesion as a factor influencing how voters hold ruling elites accountable. It consists of three essays that dissect the impacts of party cohesion on democratic accountability in the United States. In a nutshell, this dissertation finds that when party cohesion increases, the focus of politics is shifted toward partisan rivalries, and hence the ruling elites may not be held accountable to the public as they pursue partisan goals. The first chapter is an essay...
Show moreThis dissertation features party cohesion as a factor influencing how voters hold ruling elites accountable. It consists of three essays that dissect the impacts of party cohesion on democratic accountability in the United States. In a nutshell, this dissertation finds that when party cohesion increases, the focus of politics is shifted toward partisan rivalries, and hence the ruling elites may not be held accountable to the public as they pursue partisan goals. The first chapter is an essay titled Income Inequality and Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in the United States, 1976-2008. The United States features a political system where party loyalty has been traditionally seen as electorally costly to individual legislators. However, if being loyal to the party is costly, why did legislators in the U.S. increase their party loyalty to a high level during the past decades? I argue that the electoral cost of party loyalty could be reduced, and I suggest that such a reduction of electoral cost was resulted from the increases in income inequality. The evidence from the U.S. House elections between 1976 and 2008 indicates that party loyalty becomes less costly when income inequality increases. This finding may not only complement the existing theories of party government, but also shatter the conventional wisdom on the role of the party in personal-vote systems. The second essay is titled Clarity of Responsibility and Clarity of Party Line: The Impacts of Party Cohesion on Economic Voting in the United States, 1980-2008. Powell and Whitten (1993) maintain that governing party cohesion is a stable feature of political systems that enhances clarity of responsibility and economic voting. However, party cohesion is not stable, and there are ebbs and flows in party cohesion. Further, research finds that at the micro level, voters respond to partisan cues and become more partisan when the elites from each party stand with their in-party members and that economic conditions matter less when there are more partisan voters. With data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) between 1980 and 2008, this essay demonstrates that party cohesion is a double-edged sword. As party cohesion increases from a low to mid level, it may strengthen economic voting by enhancing clarity of responsibility. When it is at a high level and party line becomes clear, it may hinder economic voting. Finally, the essay, Resisting Being Held Accountable: The Impact of Party Cohesion on Concentration of Votes in the United States, 1992-2012, is the third chapter. Party cohesion has been seen as a constraint on particularistic exchanges between politicians and voters. However, using the concentration of votes as an indicator of particularistic exchanges between parties and voters, I find that party cohesion has a positive impact on the concentration of votes in presidential elections between 1992 and 2012. This finding suggests that a smaller range of the electorate is served by the incumbent party when the party is more cohesive. Further, I demonstrate that the concentration of votes received by an incumbent party positively affects the vote share of the party. Hence, a higher level of party cohesion does not improve accountability. Instead, it contributes to the ability of a party to resist being held accountable to the interest of the public. The three essays show how accountability may vary with the changes in party cohesion. The evidence presented suggests that party cohesion may not improve accountability as what political scientists have wished for. Rather, high levels of party cohesion may hinder voters from holding ruling elites accountable for the public interest.
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Title: Political consequences of economic inequality
Creator: Park, Chunho
Date: 2017
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations
Description: This dissertation consists of three essays that investigate various political consequences of economic inequality in democracies. While focusing on the manners in which political actors, including political parties and voters, respond to rising economic inequality in electoral competition, each essay provides explanations of why voter-party linkages based on redistributive preferences weaken when economic inequality increases.The first essay investigates why, counterintuitively, the poor do...
Show moreThis dissertation consists of three essays that investigate various political consequences of economic inequality in democracies. While focusing on the manners in which political actors, including political parties and voters, respond to rising economic inequality in electoral competition, each essay provides explanations of why voter-party linkages based on redistributive preferences weaken when economic inequality increases.The first essay investigates why, counterintuitively, the poor do not vote for leftist parties at the ballot box. While previous studies answer this question by focusing on potential factors distracting the poor from their economic interests, they fail to account for the economic and institutional contexts that may affect the poor's voting calculus. In order to fill this gap, this chapter theorizes that poor voters rely on changes in economic inequality to evaluate the performance of leftist governments. Specifically, I demonstrate that the poor support leftist parties only if the leftist government successfully advances the economic well-being of the poor by reducing economic inequality. Employing a hierarchical regression analysis using survey data from 54 elections across 21 advanced democracies, I find that income-based voting decreases when the wealth gap widens under leftist governments.The second essay focuses on right-wing parties' responses to changes in economic inequality in electoral competition. This chapter argues that the varying degrees of political constraints in advanced and emerging democracies incentivize right-wing parties to respond in different manners to the various levels of economic inequality. Specifically, rightist parties in advanced democracies attempt to politicize social issues in the face of high inequality. The reason underlying this attempt is that in advanced democracies stronger political constraints imposed on the strategic choice of party leadership curb opportunistic policy moderation of the rightist parties. In nascent democracies, however, the right-wing parties opt for more leftist positions within the economic dimension. I find supporting evidence for the predictions using 1754 party platforms of 475 parties in 44 democracies.The last essay empirically examines factors that may affect the intensity of ethnic appeals of political parties in electoral competition. In order to investigate the determinants of ethnic appeals, I focus on political and economic conditions that shape the incentive of political parties to engage in ethnic appeals in their pursuit of electoral gain. Relying on previous research studying ethnic politics, I then identify political and economic factors that are argued to incentivize political entrepreneurs to mobilize voters around ethnic issues. I find consistent evidence that economic inequality between (or within) ethnic groups is positively (or negatively) correlated with the intensity of parties' ethnic appeals using the information on party platforms of 386 parties across 27 democracies, whereas I fail to find supporting evidence for the effects of the other factors on ethnic appeals. The results of empirical analysis provide important implications for policy makers to minimize the negative consequences of ethnic politics in ethnically divided societies.This dissertation contributes to the better understanding of the relationship between inequality and redistribution by offering alternative mechanisms of how greater economic disparity causes the breakdown of programmatic voter-party linkages based on economic preferences. Each chapter demonstrates how rising economic inequality may induce political agents - voters and parties – to respond it in a manner that de-emphasizes a redistribution issue in their pursuit of self-interest in elections. In doing so, this dissertation highlights the importance of dynamics between political actors in electoral politics in understanding the relationship between economic inequality and redistributive outcomes in democracies.
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Title: Formal institutions in informal politics : the effect of clientelist politics on party system institutionalization
Creator: Lee, Helen Hyun-Young
Date: 2014
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations
Description: This dissertation consists of three essays that seek to improve upon theoretical and empirical accounts of the three dimensions of party system institutionalization: (i) emergence of new parties; (ii) party nationalization; and (iii) ideological congruence between parties and voters. In explaining these aspects of the party system, my approach highlights the role of the informal mechanisms of clientelism. My dissertation argues that clientelism exerts centrifugal forces on the relationships...
Show moreThis dissertation consists of three essays that seek to improve upon theoretical and empirical accounts of the three dimensions of party system institutionalization: (i) emergence of new parties; (ii) party nationalization; and (iii) ideological congruence between parties and voters. In explaining these aspects of the party system, my approach highlights the role of the informal mechanisms of clientelism. My dissertation argues that clientelism exerts centrifugal forces on the relationships among key actors, which in turn has negative effects on institutionalization.The first essay investigates why new parties emerge in an environment where clientelism is widespread, if clientelist practice empowers the ruling parties as conventional wisdom suggests. To answer this question, I highlight the structural aspect of clientelism. Drawing upon bargaining theory, I contend that when extensive clientelist practice is coupled with a decentralized resource structure, abundant resources actually reduce political actors' incentives to pledge allegiance to the incumbent party, as in this situation their resource needs can be easily met by alternative resource channels. I demonstrate that the combination of clientelist resources and decentralized clientelist structure creates an incubator for the birth of new parties.In the second essay, I ask why some parties are competitive throughout the country, while others appeal to only a few specific regions. In this study, I examine if and how much informal mechanisms of clientelism mediate the impact of formal party structure on party nationalization, i.e. the patterns of territorial vote distribution of parties. To this end, I explore the relationship among three variables: party structure, effectiveness of clientelism, and party nationalization. I hypothesize that extensive party structure enhances the effectiveness of parties' clientelist efforts, which in turn decreases party nationalization. Where clientelist efforts are effectively translated into electoral gains, elites and voters are more likely to establish relationships beyond party organizations. Therefore, I argue that effective clientelism undermines a party's organization as a collective entity. As existing studies suggest, parties with extensive organization tend to have higher levels of party nationalization. However, I find that this positive impact is suppressed to the extent that these organizational attributes improve the effectiveness of clientelism.Finally, the third essay examines the impact of clientelism on the level of congruence. Conceptualizing clientelism as a tool of persuasion employed by political parties, I maintain that elites distribute clientelist rewards in order to alter the preferences and behaviors of voters who would otherwise hold different or no views about parties' policies. In response to the rewards, I argue, some voters will develop an affinity to a patron party, and subsequently vote for that party despite it being located further than other parties from their ideal points. Consequently, clientelism systematically widens the gap between voters' preferences and their vote choices, thereby undermining congruence. I suggest that voters' utility is a function of both issue position and material inducement. I find that clientelism serves as a crucial predictor of congruence.This dissertation contributes to the understanding of party system institutionalization by emphasizing the under-explored role of informal institutions. By demonstrating how informal rules constrain and modify the way formal institutions function, this dissertation also offers important insights into the literature on the relationship between formal and informal institutions. Thus, this dissertation provides an opportunity to advance our understanding of to what extent formal institutions explain or predict political outcomes.
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Title: An analysis of electoral partisan fragmentation in single-member simple plurailty [sic] parliamentary elections : a macro and micro analysis of Canada and Korea
Creator: Park, Myoung-Ho
Date: 2002
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations

Title: A study of a nonpartisan political organization : the Arlingtonians for a Better County (ABC)
Creator: Felt, Franklin Owen, 1926-
Date: 1961
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations

Title: African political party development and the limits of institutional engineering
Creator: Lavery, Gerard David
Date: 2014
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations
Description: Why do some African countries have nationally oriented political parties and stable party systems while ethnic parties and volatility plague others? I address this puzzle by systematically analyzing differences in levels of party nationalization and electoral volatility within and across sub-Saharan African countries since 1990. To identify the factors that shape national parties and the systems in which they operate, this dissertation investigates the following research questions: Can...
Show moreWhy do some African countries have nationally oriented political parties and stable party systems while ethnic parties and volatility plague others? I address this puzzle by systematically analyzing differences in levels of party nationalization and electoral volatility within and across sub-Saharan African countries since 1990. To identify the factors that shape national parties and the systems in which they operate, this dissertation investigates the following research questions: Can political party laws encourage the development of national parties and stable party systems in Africa? What motivates politicians to comply with (or not) party laws that seek to build nationally oriented political parties over ethnic parties? Why do reforms to party laws work in some countries (some of the time) and not in others? How can we improve international political party assistance? Despite their theoretical and practical significance, scholars have largely ignored these questions in Africa.To address these questions, I employ mixed methods research to test a novel theoretical framework that centers on the forces that influence party leaders' decision to prioritize ethnic balancing over ethnic polarization in building their parties. To systematically examine variation in party development, the large-n component of this project uses data from the African Party Law and Nationalization Database (APLND), an original database covering 78 elections from 27 countries from across the region since1990. Statistical analysis confirms that higher levels of party system nationalization are associated with lower levels of electoral volatility; the more national the party system the more likely it is to be stable and enduring. As expected, the analyses also confirm that ethnic fractionalization, leadership legacy, and economic conditions are powerful predictors of African political party development. The main finding of the statistical analyses is that centripetal party laws -- regulations that attempt to establish broad-based parties that transcend ethno-regional cleavages -- are associated with both higher levels of party system nationalization and lower levels of electoral volatility. This relationship remains significant even after controlling for alternative explanations, which is important because it suggests that formal institutions are gaining traction in some African countries.The quantitative findings are complemented by in-depth examination of Kenya's multiparty elections since 1992 and comparative case study analysis of Benin, Zambia, and Ghana. Historical analysis, focus group research, and key-informant interview data suggests national parties and stable party systems are possible only when the forces that encourage multiethnic cooperation (horizontal coordination pressure) are more powerful than the pressures that compel party leaders to cater to their ethnic constituencies. In order for party laws to achieve their intended results they must increase horizontal coordination pressure on politicians thereby compelling them to invest in more organizationally robust and enduring national parties. Based on the key findings of this study, I conclude the dissertation by providing actionable policy recommendations designed to increase the development impact of international political party assistance.
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Title: Political consequences of economic inequality
Creator: Han, Sung Min
Date: 2016
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations
Description: Economic inequality has emerged a persistent topic in the popular press, academic circles, and election cycles. Indeed, mounds of evidence suggest the gap between the rich and the poor is not only growing in the United States, but also around the globe. While much research exists on the economic fallout of inequality, we have less understanding of the political repercussions of this expanding wealth gap. My dissertation, comprised of three main chapters, aims to address this lacuna and revise...
Show moreEconomic inequality has emerged a persistent topic in the popular press, academic circles, and election cycles. Indeed, mounds of evidence suggest the gap between the rich and the poor is not only growing in the United States, but also around the globe. While much research exists on the economic fallout of inequality, we have less understanding of the political repercussions of this expanding wealth gap. My dissertation, comprised of three main chapters, aims to address this lacuna and revise conventional wisdom by highlighting the consequences of economic inequality on our political systems and politics. In particular, I examine how economic inequality yields more extreme policy positions by political parties, how it fosters public discontent with democracy, and how it moves voters to prioritize redistributive issues. Each chapter features a clear micro-level model of how the rising economic inequality affects electoral incentives and redistributive preferences among party elites and voters. Together, they contribute to our understanding of how changes in economic inequality affect party-voter’s distributional linkage, redistributive attitudes, democratic processes, and democratic accountability.
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Title: The relation of constituency and electoral competition to Congressional party voting in three midwestern states, 1957-1960
Creator: Murray, Suzanne
Date: 1961
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations

Title: An examination of intra-party competition : gubernatorial and senatorial nominations in the United States
Creator: McNitt, Andrew Douglas
Date: 1978
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations

Title: Pension politics : partisan influences on public sector pensions
Creator: Thom, Michael Dennis
Date: 2012
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations
Description: This dissertation seeks to answer three broad questions. First, what can be said about the relationship between states' political environments and public sector pension funding? Using panel data, I investigate the role of partisanship, ideology and other political and economic factors as determinants of the division of costs between public employees and state governments and the long-term funded status of pension plans. Empirical results suggest that cost sharing is not affected by state...
Show moreThis dissertation seeks to answer three broad questions. First, what can be said about the relationship between states' political environments and public sector pension funding? Using panel data, I investigate the role of partisanship, ideology and other political and economic factors as determinants of the division of costs between public employees and state governments and the long-term funded status of pension plans. Empirical results suggest that cost sharing is not affected by state politics, but that Democratic legislative partisanship and citizen liberalism depressed long-term public sector pension funding over the previous decade.Second, to what extent is the evolution from traditional pensions to defined contribution accounts in the public sector driven by partisanship? I find that Republican legislative partisanship and growth in state indebtedness are significant predictors of whether or not a state will implement such accounts. There is no evidence of pressure from the state governor, annual revenue changes or labor unions. These results clarify some of the factors which contribute to the complex public sector pension climate across the states.Third, what are the costs and implications of defined contribution accounts for public sector employers and employees? In 1997, Michigan began enrolling new state employees in a 401(k) plan but maintained an existing pension for previous hires, making the state an excellent case study for the comparative costs of each program. Results suggest Michigan's 401(k) plan presents lower, more stable annual costs relative to the pension plan, although this has not always been the case. Pension liability growth slowed following implementation of the 401(k) plan, but unfunded pension liabilities remain. Michigan's failure to remit full annual pension contributions and the state's use of pension funds for non-retirement purposes complicates cost determinations, and eventual benefit levels of the 401(k) plan are uncertain.
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Title: Incumbency and competition : an analysis of state party politics
Creator: Hyde, Mark Sage, 1944-
Date: 1972
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations

Title: Three topics on elections
Creator: Tanaka, Makoto
Date: 2008
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations

Title: How do electoral systems affect representation
Creator: Chen, Tse-hsin
Date: 2011
Collection: Electronic Theses & Dissertations
Description: The project is to discuss the micro-foundations of how electoral institutions impact political representation. The micro-foundations are built upon the citizens' decisions on how to express their policy preferences in elections. The beginning of political representation is political participation, the decision of voting or not. Moreover, since not all people decide to vote, the accuracy of the citizens' preferences expressed through voter turnout is essential in political representation....
Show moreThe project is to discuss the micro-foundations of how electoral institutions impact political representation. The micro-foundations are built upon the citizens' decisions on how to express their policy preferences in elections. The beginning of political representation is political participation, the decision of voting or not. Moreover, since not all people decide to vote, the accuracy of the citizens' preferences expressed through voter turnout is essential in political representation. Furthermore, the authorization of the citizens' preferences is related to the selection of political agents who have the power to speak for the people's will in the government. These three topics are the main themes of this project.The central finding of this project is that various types of electoral systems (i.e., proportional representation (PR henceforth) and single majoritarian (SMD henceforth) systems have their own advantages and disadvantages on three components of political representation. I first show that the micro-foundations of why PR systems are associated with higher turnout than SMD systems are built upon the calculus of voting and spatial theory. Individual evaluations of the B term in the calculus of voting are affected by spatial party competition framed by electoral institutions. Then I ask the question of how electoral institutions affect the degree of political representation through the perspective of comparing the distribution of voter preferences versus that of all electorate. Different types of electorate according to their relative locations in the distribution of voter preferences have various incentives to voting. Finally, I argue that electoral systems create the convergent and non-convergent electoral incentives with substantial impacts on the position-taking strategy of political parties through mechanisms of the electoral formula, and the district magnitude. The pattern of party positioning is also modified by the type of government (i.e., majority and coalition) and voter turnout rates depending on electoral systems. These two aspects cause lower policy dependence under SMD and higher policy dependence under PR.
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