

There are differential rights, expectations, access to education, training and employment, status, independence and power, between men and women. This aspect, a focus of the book, is seen as constituting a central contradiction and difficulty in development. The authors illustrate that family decisions, and, crucially, women's roles in the family and in production, are of great relevance to the success or failure of development policies at a national, as well as at a local, level. Therefore it is vital for planners and others to understand the basis for individual decision making and day to day activities with the family, and the constraints and influences on them.

One paper (by Oppong) also examines men's importance in the family, as fathers and in relation to child spacing. These issues are as often neglected as are women's contributions to the economy through their family roles and informal production.

The book is aimed at a wide readership, including planners, politicians, social researchers, demographers, and practitioners in many aspects of development. Some of the studies are fairly technical, and between them include a substantial amount of hard data, as well as detailed discussion and analysis. The whole cannot be called an easy read, but it contains a wealth of well-researched material that rewards perseverance. It should prove a valuable resource book for development workers and planners in general.

Reviewed by Helen Jackson, lecturer, School of Social Work, Harare.

South Africa: A New US Policy for the 1990s, Kevin Danaher, Institute for Food and Development Policy, San Francisco, 1988 (69pp, US\$6.00).

Kevin Danaher's short book is a model of crisp policy writing. It should be prescribed reading for everyone studying Southern Africa, whether or not they agree with him. It begins by quoting Martin Luther King in 1965, "the shame of the United States is that it is objectively an ally of this monstrous [South African] government in its grim war with its own black people" (p1). Danaher surveys the twenty years subsequent to this statement and concludes that "the United States remains the single most important protector of South Africa's apartheid regime" (p1). He continues "US policymakers were forced into a 'straddle' regarding apartheid: denouncing white minority rule while doing little to interfere with the support given to apartheid by major US corporations and security agencies of the US government" (p2).

Danaher argues that US policy toward South Africa was "accumulationist: safeguarding US corporate access to South Africa's human and natural resources in order to accumulate capital" (p3). In due course, "while verbal criticism of Pretoria's violence was designed to placate critics of apartheid, continued ties to white minority interests were designed to please corporate and national security interests" (p2f). However, five years into the Reagan administration, "public pressure forced the White House to declare limited sanctions" (p7).

In Danaher's view, the central defect of the Reagan policy on South Africa was an obsession with East-West competition. In a secret memorandum Chester Crocker stressed that "the top US priority is to stop Soviet encroachment in Africa" (p8). Danaher believes the chief threat to stability in the region is South Africa, not Moscow. "The permissiveness of constructive engagement allowed Pretoria to create havoc throughout the region" (p9). Danaher quotes Robert Mugabe: "Those who judge Africa in terms of East and West do us a grave disservice and they display deep ignorance" (p11).

On taking office, Chester Crocker knew little of Africa except the 'white' minority, on which he had published. "Crocker and his Rhodesian wife also owned thousands of dollars of stock in South African gold mines" (p9). Crocker said to Danaher in 1980, "All Reagan knows about Southern Africa is that he's on the side of the whites" (p10). But Danaher asserts that "Pretoria was a liability, not an

asset, for US policy in the region...It was South Africa's role [in Angola] that united African governments in denouncing US intervention while supporting Cuban and Soviet intervention" (p12).

Danaher observes that "Pretoria's strength is negative. It has the power to destroy but it does not have the power to build" (p13). When South Africans erupted in protest in 1984-6, the US anti-apartheid movement won a victory by forcing the Comprehensive Anti Apartheid Act on Reagan in place of his executive order which was "designed to have as little impact as possible" (p19).

Danaher sees a contradiction: "most members of Congress seek a difficult goal: they would like to see apartheid eliminated without destroying capitalism. But...apartheid and capitalism developed together in organic unity. This is not to say that capitalism cannot survive in South Africa without apartheid" (p22). "There is a fundamental dispute over the definition of democracy" (p23). Most US policymakers would be satisfied by the vote for all in South Africa; "but millions of South Africans are demanding that the transition to democratic rule include a redistribution of control over property" (p23).

Danaher proceeds into theory, and stresses: "it is not the United States *as a nation* that owns property in South Africa" (p25). The ties between the two countries "are conducted by a relatively small group of mainly older, rich, white males, representing a tiny percentage of each national population" (p25). But "the elite alliances are not limited to the rich" (p26). Poor black vigilantes are part of the elite alliance, for example. In Danaher's analysis, sanctions and disinvestment are not interruptions in relations between countries but between the elites. They should be judged not by whether they create unemployment or hurt the South African economy, but "by the extent to which they drive a wedge between South Africa's rulers and their supporters in the outside world. A white minority of 15 per cent cannot rule for long without powerful external allies" (p27). Reagan did not want sanctions, but "escalating outrage against apartheid created popular pressure in the United States strong enough to force a reluctant President Reagan to impose punitive measures against Pretoria" (p32). The lesson is that "the people can change US policy even with an unsympathetic president in the White House" (p43).

Danaher's policy for the future is less convincing than his analysis of the past. He believes that "Washington policymakers retain the strategic objectives of keeping South Africa nonsocialist and within the Western sphere of influence, but they are gradually realising that the white minority regime is not the best partner for achieving these goals" (p35). Is the last part of this argument not wishful thinking?

A new US policy for South Africa, in Danaher's opinion, should (:36):

- (1) help strengthen links between workers and peasants in South Africa and their allies in the outside world; and
- (2) weaken the international alliance of proapartheid forces by breaking links between South African elites and their inter-national supporters".

Part two is plausible. The idea, in part one, that either President Bush, or Governor Dukakis if he had won the presidency, would be remotely likely to want to strengthen links between workers and peasants in South Africa and their allies, is fanciful.

Danaher wants the US to force Pretoria to end state violence; to feed the starving; to end aggression against neighbours; to repeal the state of emergency and establish equal justice for all; release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners; permit free political expression; set a timetable for elimination of apartheid laws; and negotiate with the opposition (p37). Danaher sees Washington achieving this by truly comprehensive economic sanctions; by support for mandatory UN sanctions; by weakening the South African military; and by planning for a naval blockade (p39). Quite simply, the United States is most unlikely to do these things in the next five years.

Danaher asserts that "repression can postpone but not prevent a transition to majority rule" (p39). He goes on to say "A relatively non-violent transition to democracy in South Africa will only be possible if the major powers exert pressure on Pretoria to compromise" (p40). Here he is on firmer ground: a large

war in Southern Africa would suit neither super-power, and for that reason an eventual negotiation is likely to be forced on Pretoria. Yet no one should underestimate the length of time for which Pretoria can delay transition, nor the ability of South Africa's elites to use the gold to buy allies abroad.

Consider Danaher's conclusion:

"A foreign policy for the future must seek to be a majority policy: strengthening US ties to workers and peasants, not the generals, politicians and big businessmen who are the main beneficiaries of US policy. Abandoning a foreign policy that hitches the US star to elite groups around the world will require a domestic restructuring of the Pentagon, the CIA, transnational corporations and the other powerful institutions that have locked us into a foreign policy that favours minority rule" (p49).

If Danaher knows how to restructure the Pentagon, the CIA and the largest business corporations in the world so that United States ties to South African workers and peasants are strengthened, he has not told us. Nevertheless, his hyperbole is not entirely intolerable, given the clarity of his earlier text, and given the strong likelihood that there will be some mechanism, orchestrated by both superpowers, whereby apartheid is eventually ended.

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Multinational Joint Ventures in Developing Countries, Paul W Beamish, Routledge, London, 1988 (145pp, £27.50 hbk).

Investment by multinational corporations (MNC) in 'less developed countries' has often been seen as a primary means of bringing capital, technology and technical skills into these countries. The effects of such investments, proponents argue, is to support government import substitution policies and to create employment (advantages for the host country) and as a means of obtaining access to foreign markets (advantage to MNC). Critics of multinational corporation investment show how their power (based on size, number of countries they operate in, and wealth - some MNCs have annual turnovers greater than national incomes of the developing countries they operate in) allows them to override the sovereignty of governments, and to distort their social and economic policies. In the end, of course, the aim of the MNC is to increase its profitability.

The questions of capital development, technological advance and industrialisation are of course fundamentally important. For economic and social development to occur - for people's incomes, living standards and social wellbeing to improve - national wealth must increase and national productive capacity must grow. But it must be seriously questioned whether the sacrifices in national sovereignty, in particular of economic policy-setting by true representatives of national interests, are worth making for the minor gains that accrue from multinationals. Surely more important are serious efforts to tap and direct national sources of capital and to mobilise and motivate national initiative and creativity.

This book by Paul Beamish does not, in fact, contribute much to a progressive discussion of strategies for economic development in the 'less developed countries'. Looking as it does, in a rather dry and academic, and occasionally turgid way, at equity joint ventures between American or European multinationals and private companies in LDCs, it is based on a presupposition that such joint ventures "speed up international development". Joint ventures involving direct participation of governments of LDCs are not considered, a fact which makes the book not very relevant in Africa. Though there is an interesting section on the experiences surrounding joint venture exploration with China between 1979 and 1986, it is certainly of more relevance to executives of MNCs thinking about setting up such structures and relationships, than for policy setters or analysts in the Third World.

Of course, if in Zimbabwe the trade liberalisation now underway, and the long awaited and still 'expected shortly' investment code, so direct, the book might become relevant here, but only in