McFubara/MAKING AFRICAN NGOS RESPONSIVE

Making African NGOS more responsive to
social needs
KALADA GODSON McFuBARA I

of advocacy,

obligation

and responsibility,

organizations

ABSTRACT
of institutionalized voluntary sector or the non-
The development
(NGGs) in Africa is a complementary
governmental
in public sector provision. But that develop-
response to the shortfall
ment was made possible because of the existence of communitarian
principles
already
practised in the extended family before the arrival of the European
Christian missions.
The success of foreign NGGs is due to the
management principles of openness, accountability and non-distribu-
tiveness demonstrated in their operations. It isproposed that African
NGGs
to these
management principles so as to become more responsive to the needs
of their people. In this way African NGGs will be able to tap into their
local resource base tofund more good causes as well as contributing
towards an inclusive and sustainable bottom-up democratic welfare
system.

their communitarian

principles

should

apply

Introduction
CONCERNING THE socioeconomic development of countries
DISCUSSIONS
often centre on two sectors-the
public sector and the private sector.
The public sector derives funds for its activities from taxation as well as
revenue from natural resources, while the private sector generates its
funds through profit-making businesses. In both sectors however, it is
the public who contribute to general taxation who also operate profit-

(HISPRO), Nigeria. I would like to
I Health in School Project
acknowledge the constructive comments in thefirst draft of this
paper by an anonymous referee

VOL 17 NO 1 JANUARY 2002 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

39

making businesses. The private sector is not obliged to serve the public
interest from its profits. The extent to which the public interest is really
served by the public sector is not clear, as the state is not only in the
business of protecting public interest but also in protecting the national
(state) interest.

For the purpose of this discussion I shall say that the public interest
is served when services that benefit the everyday life of members of the
public are provided and delivered. This includes educational, health-
care and financial services. Partly as a result ofthe dual role of the state,
there is a shortfall in the provision of public services. This shortfall
necessitates the development ofa third, or voluntary, sector. The volun-
tary sector generates its own funds through the voluntary donations of
individuals and group members of the public.
the
voluntary sector exists to complement the public sector.

In other words,

(NGOs), has been very successful

In developed countries with their efficient application of basic
management principles, the voluntary sector, represented by the non-
governmental organizations
in
meeting social needs. In fact, the role of the voluntary sector cannot be
dissociated from the development achievements of those countries.
This role includes providing care for the homeless as well as giving
funds for research into diseases like cancer. However, in developing
countries (and African countries in particular) the voluntary sector is
yet to make a recognizable impact. Where they do make a impact,
information about it is scanty. As a World Bank country study in 1993
puts it:

for
The state of knowledge about NGOs in Uganda is typical
developing countries: we do not know even how many develop-
ment NGOs exist, much less how many communities they serve,
what kinds of activities they engage in, how effective they are
and how much non-governmental funding they mobilize (World
Bank 1995 3: 22).

But if AfricanNGOs apply the communitarian principles of the extended
family system to the management principles that have made foreign
it is possible they would
non-governmental organizations successful,

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McFubara/MAKING AFRICAN NGOS RESPONSIVE

also make more impact. As Theodorakis (1998:57) suggests, it is only
by re-evaluating
experience and tradition that those who aspire to
progress can utilize forces that would enable them act effectively.

The development of the institutionalized voluntary sector in Africa
The development of the institutionalized voluntary sector in Africa is
the legacy of foreign organizations, especially the European Christian
missions (Schram 1971 and Wellard and Copestake 1993).For instance,
Ajayi (1965: 163) writes that during the colonial period"the most essential
feature of the Victorian society, the voluntary association, was also
encouraged". Examples ofthis can be found in the Mutual Aid Society
and the Ijaye Relief Committee formed to send aid to Christians and to
care for the children evacuated during the Ijaye Warbetween 1860 and
1864.

However, before the arrival of European missions inAfrica, voluntary
action rooted in the people's communitarian philosophy, fonned the
basis on which social services were provided. For instance, in the field
of traditional (pre-colonial) African education, Fafunwa(1982:15)writes,
"responsibility
for the upbringing of young Africans is traditionally
shared by the entire social group". And Nyerere (1982:236) believes
that this kind of education is more directly relevant to the society.Bratton
(1989:570) agrees, stating that Africa has a long history of collective
(voluntary) action. The communitarian African philosophy espouses
an inclusive principle of mutual responsibility whereby members of a
society pursue values they hold in common and mutually (Tam 1998:14).
The principle of mutual responsibility is demonstrated inthe extended
family system. For instance, Bindura-Mutangadura (2001) reports that
the main form of support
for households coping with incidents of
morbidity and mortality in Zimbabwe comes from the extended family.
And Chazan et al. (1999) indicate that the extended family, the lineage
and, in some cases, the more inclusive clan, define a person's immediate
social networks and obligations. According to the authors, "there is
rarely a bureaucrat, university lecturer or migrant worker who does not
feel the need to meet the expectations of his or her relatives" (ibid.:79-
80). It is the principle of advocacy within the extended family system

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41

that provides the key to a group member's recognition of the need to
meet another member's expectations.
In a given family this can be
observed as when, for instance, the mother advises her son to assist
his niece. Because such assistance is often socioeconomic in nature, to
reciprocate the niece assists her uncle with his domestic chores. The
mother feels obliged to do this because the niece is her granddaughter.
Thus, by her act of advocacy, a network of mutual
is
established within an extended family.

relationships

This is how the communitarian philosophy provides every member
of a network of families an opportunity to contribute what they can
towards the development of the extended family. Even at the larger
community level, the chiefs or a committee of the various family heads
that govern that community also performed the act of advocacy. For
example, when the people of Bonny, a municipal town in Nigeria, wanted
an entrepreneurial education rather than a religious one,
it was the
chiefs who spoke to the missionaries on behalf of their people to secure
what they wanted (Lewis 1965:32).

Moreover, the principle of mutual responsibility ensures that

the
is shared among the other
suffering or happiness of one member
members of the family. And because of the institutional nature of the
family within society, mutual responsibility can also be said to be institu-
tionalized. In such groups individuals receive welfare support
from
others, not as a favour, but as a right (Bratton 1989:570). But a claim to
such rights among members of a social group also imposes a burden of
obligation on the part of those to whom the claim is made. As a result
we can identify these communitarian principles of responsibility, advo-
cacy and obligation.

It is these principles that have sustained the extended family system
and have enabled the institutionalization
in
Africa. This is particularly so because, as Ajayi indicates, in the extended
family system where beneficiaries are members of the same family
networks, the immediate beneficiaries of the missions' philanthropy
were also those in close contact with the missions.

of the voluntary sector

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McFubara/MAKING AFRICAN NGOS RESPONSIVE

ofNGO activities in Africa
Independence

Proliferation
Since after
there has been an influx of foreign aid.
organizations as well as proliferation of local NGOs in Africa. Hiscock
(I995:30),
for instance, observes that in 1993 Ghana received financial
support from over 175 NGOs for its health activities alone. In Nigeria
during the 1998 World AIDS day there were more than ten indigenous
NGOs inthe field of AIDS advocacy.Giving areasonforthis development
Amanor et. al. (1993) describe how in post-colonial Ghana, "a vacuum
in welfare provision for the urban and rural poor ledto a growth inNGO
activity from the late 1960s" (ibid.: 183).

this.

Despite this rise in NGO activity the demand for welfare provision
still outstripped the supply. But that vacuum was due to the aloofuess
of the state during colonial times to public needs. For instance, during
the colonial period, health services were provided only to members of
the colonial service and their relatives, to the neglect of ordinarymembers
ofthe public. The Adeola scandal of 1888 in Nigeria (Adeloye, 1977:10)
demonstrates

Although in recent times the state has not been aloof to public needs,
the impact of the global economic downturn of the 1980s has found
developing countries turning to NGOs for assistance. Engberg-Pedersen
(I 996:23) describes how, during the crisis years which preceded adjust-
ment, African countries saw an extension of non-state actors as an
option in the provision of social services. This move does not seem to
have yielded results. In fact, it was the perennial socioeconomic prob-
lems affecting African countries that led to the establishment of the
Global Coalition for Africa in 1990 with the aim of developing a long-
to such problems. Despite the voluntary sector
term approach
involvement
in the development process, social problems still persist.
In 1995 during a conference organized by the Global Coalition for
Africa, Dr Kwesi Botchwey, a one-time Finance Minister in Ghana,
observed,

Experience in many places suggests that there are many who are
jumping on the NGO bandwagon for reasons that have nothing to

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43

do with development as such. Some promote narrow sectarian
interests even as they purport
to advance popular aspirations
(quoted in Davies1995).

This kind of experience prompted the World Bank to conduct a study
which reported that "in many countries public investment programmes
have become passive repositories of donor-driven projects whose
recurrent costs after completion continue to accumulate contributing
to an expansionary fiscal bias" (World Bank 1997:84). In this report the
World Bank indicates that, although turning to NGOs for aid may be
due to weak capacity on the part of local officials, the presence of too
many aid organizations has led to fragmentation of policy-making.

This fragmentation hampers the ability of the state and indigenous
NGOs to respond to social needs. Governments in developing countries
and their indigenous NGOs have had to fulfil conditions attached to
foreign,NGO-administeredaid. Because those conditions were externally
derived (in the spirit of "partnership") without reference to local needs,
they had little or no relevance to the country concerned and were bound
to distort the government's prioritizing of socioeconomic needs. Hence,
as Engberg-Pedersen et al. (1996:3)
there was an initial
reluctance by leaders of these countries in accepting foreign aid.

indicate,

A shift from public sector responsibility?
In search of solution and in an effort to deal with its socioeconomic
problems, the state in Africa shifted some of its responsibi Iity for publ ic
welfare to individuals. This can be seen in policies and programmes
where access to public services such as health-care is made to depend
on the ability of individuals to pay for those services. The Bamako
Initiative demonstrates this very clearly, according to Diskett and
Nickson (1991:44). The aim of this initiative was to pass recurrent
expenses such as drugs, health workers' salaries and fuel costs on to
individual patients. Although individual members of the public may be
willing to pay, in most cases they pay for services that are virtually non-
existent. Hence in Zimbabwe, according to Bassett et al. (1997: 1850),
rather than attending hospital consultations when there are no drugs

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McFubara/MAKING AFRICAN NGOS RESPONSIVE

available, members ot the public would prefer to have drugs available in
the hospitals and the costs included in their consultation fees. If, despite
the involvement of the voluntary sector, individuals are required to pay
even more for public services, is it not worth questioning what benefits
the proliferation of NGOs has brought to the African people? It would
appear that the increase in NGO activity in Africa has created a situation
in which the public sector has become less, rather than more, responsive
to social needs.

from reliance on foreign

of NGOs: a disadvantage

Proliferation
funding?
Michaud and Murray (1994) suggest that external assistance, which
forms only 2.8 per cent of total health expenditure in developing
countries, may be altering the policies and priorities of the governments
of these countries. Since government policies are expected to reflect
the needs of the people, any alteration of policies initially developed on
the basis of local needs would also mean that the people are excluded
from a process of collective action, including the collective derivation
of resources.

Similarly, when local NGOs (e.g. the Christian Relief Development
Association in Ethiopia and the Grassroots He!llth Organization of
Nigeria), depend on foreign NGOs to fund much of their activities, the
clients are excluded from participating in the development process. In a
case study of Sierra Leone and The Gambia, Hudock(1999:59) observes
that NGOs rely on external sources of funds to such a degree that their
activities are largely donor-driven and reflect outside interests rather
than those of grassroots. This dependence can prevent local NGOs
from maximizing resources from their public. This is what Fowler et al.
(1992: 10) mean when they indicate that African NGOs are "uncoupled
from their local resource base".

A major problem in the excessive reliance of local organizations on
foreign funds is that this limits the ability of the local public to seek
accountability.
If a whole community's individual NGOs are dependent
on external donors no one in the community has a right to request
accountability. But ~his weakness is because it is more likely for NGO

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45

exists,

relationship

operators to be accountable when there is a benefactor
relationship
with property in their trust, than a mere beneficiary relationship. In fact,
an indirect benefactor relationship can also exist when a close or distant
relative can be identified as a direct benefactor. Meanwhile, where a
benefactor
those who do or should demand
accountability can also influence the security of "their" (public) property
either by continued contribution, withdrawal of contribution and support
or withdrawal of support for the activities ofNGO operators. But where
no such relationship exists the community cannot influence the security
ofNGO property. If they try to do so success is unlikely. For instance,
Zaidi (1999:265) indicatesthat, ifNGOs fail, according to criteria adopted
by a donor, money can be delayed, reduced or completely halted. In
short, the right to accountability is usually held by the donors.

The other problem about dependence on foreign funds is that,
although they may be large, they are short-term and for specific projects
(Najam, 1996:342).Hence NGO operators spend most of their time in the
officeon administrativetasks required to maintain northern NGO support,
which leaves them little or no time to develop relationships with or
respond to the needs identified by the community they serve (Hudock,
1999:9).Njenga (1996) observesthat, in reality,the contribution offoreign
aid to national development is less satisfactory than anticipated, except
for disaster alleviation or relief. According to the author,"apart from a
few in the emergency and relief sector most NGOs are moving away
from pure service delivery to the area of capacity building and lobbying"
(Ngenga, 1996:27).

The proliferation ofNGOs: an unanticipated accident?
African countries have taken the route of capacity building, rather than
service delivery. "Capacity building" is a term that describes the various
that have the purpose of strengthening,
activities or processes
developing or creating social structures, organizations or institutions
that fulfil differing roles in the development sector (Thorn 1997). In
structure and culture African NGOs are a reflection of their northern
counterparts. Their common situations can best be illustrated
by
considering two cases of apparent NGO proliferation. One is in Britain

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where 70 per cent of the public think that there are too many charities
doing the same work; cancer charities being a good example (Benjamin
2000). The other is in Lagos (Nigeria) where during the 1998 World
AIDS day there were more than ten charities working in the field of
AIDS advocacy alone.

When foreign NGOs have been established inresponse to emergency
situations (e.g. Save the Children Fund and OXFAM, founded after the
First World War and during the Second World War respectively), they
continue to impact on lives of people around the world long after those
emergencies. The success of these organizations can be traced to their
methods of planning, where appropriate and adequate resources,
including information, are secured or have the potential to be secured,
before they embark on their missions. Hence, we can see that when
disaster strikes there is always a co-ordinated effort by the major or
relevant organizations
to generate a common reservoir of resources
from their home base, which enables them to respond effectively. The
flood that hit Mozambique in 2000 is an example.

However, when development, resources and information are lacking
or are not properly co-ordinated,
there is bound to be duplication of
roles by many organizations with similar objectives. And so, if African
NGOs continue to multiply in response to emergencies, when they have
little resources and limited access to information, their chances of
responding effectively to the daily social problems of their people are
slim. And if these NGOs continue to depend on foreign support, which
often is given in response to emergency situations, hopes for the benefits
of development will be dashed as soon as such support ceases to exist.

Competition and mergers
if the proliferation
of NGOs is a common f~atu~e of
Meanwhile
for both developed as well as developing countrIes, It can
development
only be a coincidence.
In developing countries with a small resource
base and in the face of limited access to relevant information, there will
always be competition
among NGOs and it is possible ~hat open
competition as, for instance, in the struggle to generate foreIgn fun~,
will pitch one NGO against another. Blind competition may also arIse

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47

rather
Ikelegbe (2001 8:22) indicates that

from lack of co-ordinated access of information within a country or
than
region. In either situation competition will undermine,
contribute to, development.
the
proliferation of civil society activities, intheir bid to project and protect
"substantive
are "undermining
democratic sustenance and stability". But in developed countries such
situations can be repaired because of successful mergers among their
NGOs, unlike among African NGOs.

goals",

interests"

and "parochial

Successful mergers in a developing country are unlikely because
NGOs are often built around individual personalities or the self-serving
interest of their operators. This personalization makes the proliferation
of NGOs unavoidable since individual operators seek to protect what
they see as "their own", serving their own purposes,
rather than the
public interest. For instance, when an operator of a local NGO in Nigeria
was asked why she was building new old people's home rather than
renovating existing ones, replied. "I cannot use my own money to develop
government old people's homes" (Tell magazine 2001 :38).

Proliferation ofNGOs: advantages for development
Even where local capacity development may constitute an advantage,
the core function of NGOs, recognized by the World Bank, is service
delivery(Munro et al. 1999:87). Service delivery can be carried out within
existing facilities or it can by establishing new facilities. Thus, the more
NGOs there are, the more public services should be delivered. But the
overriding principle of service delivery, as reflected in how much NGOs
perform, should be the serving the public interest. That is how foreign
NGOs make their reputations at home.

Despitetheir growingnumbers, foreign NGOs are still able to mobilize
additional resources from their public to complement or support
the
efforts of their governments. In specific cases their contributions even
outstrip those efforts of government. In 1999, for example, £10 million
worth of neonatal equipment was supplied to hospitals in the UK by
charitable organizations. In the same period the government supplied
only £2 million worth of neonatal equipment through the Nationa! Health

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Service (The Sun [SW] newspaper, 2000:4). In African countries such
figures would be considered extraordinary.

African NGOs depend largely on foreign organizationsfortheir funds.
In Ethiopia,
for instance, because of incessant drought and war, the
Christian Relief Development Association derives 98 per cent of its
funds from foreign organizations (Beurden, 1998:57).However,even in
Nigeria, with its huge natural and human resources, NGOs still depend
on foreign NGO funds for much of their activities. Yetthe proliferation
ofNGOs inAfrica should provide an additionalopportunitiesto mobilize
local resources, because the more NGOs there are, the more money they
could derive from their local public for particular good causes.

Management principles based on trust
The success of foreign NGOs in Africa can be attributed to the
management principles they use. First, being able to mobilize large
resources is an indication of the trust they receive from their public,
which suggests in turn their degree of accountableto that public. Second,
as they are able to provide services even in already-existing public
facilities, they are open to public scrutiny and not to their own members
alone. And third, public trust may depend on how non-distributive
their operators are with property entrusted to them.

All this can be summed up in the comment, "the charity sector only
functions because of trust" (Benjamin 2000). This shows that African
NGOs can and should also become more responsive to their people's
social needs. They can do it ifthey apply the communitarian principles
that have sustained the extended family system to these management
principles of accountability, openness and non-distributiveness, which
have made foreign NGOs successful. Such an application would enable
and strengthen the reconnection of African NGOs to its local resource
base.

A responsive strategy for African NGOs
In order to build on the principles of the extended family system in
Africa, we need to be clear about the value of the system. First, there is

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49

a cohesive advantage coming from mutual responsibility that unites
the parties involved in a relationship. Second, this union ensures that
the relationship is enduring. Bindura-Mutangadura
(2001: 18) reports
how households in Zimbabwe "have become increasingly dependent
on f~ily
support" in their times of need. Chazan et a!. (I999) also
indicate that:

Despite many changes during the colonial period and first
year of independence-including
a move towards a more nuclear
family in the urban areas and the development of inequalities
based on education and income within the extended families-kin
ties have rarely been consciously severed or kin obligations eas-
ily ignored (p. 80).

Although relational ties may not have severed by being uncoupled
from their local resource base, African NGOs have failed to provide a
connective avenue for the public to demand or be provided with
accountability. NGO operators need to involve their local public in a
benefactor relationship through which the members of the community
served can also claim a share in the ownership of the NGO,
thus
enhancing their power to demand or expect accountability from NGO
operators.

A failure to provide this avenue for accountability limits African
NGOs ability to respond proactively to social needs. This is because
NGOs are accountable to their external donors or patrons
(Najam
1996:351), whose interests they may be serving, rather than their clients.
The weakness of African NGOs in responding to social needs may be a
result of their failure to apply effective management principles in their
operations, as Botchwey suggested, pointing to the need for NGOs to
improve their governance (Davies 1995:1914). The folIowing strategy
would help to improve their responsiveness to social needs.

in advocacy

Openness
Voluntary action is usualIy taken in response to social needs. It takes
place either in family situations or in the larger community.
In each
setting voluntary action has often been initiated by individuals who

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McFubaralMAKING AFRICAN NGOS RESPONSIVE

believe in the principles of social justice. In England it took the resolve
of people like Lord Ashley, Richard Oastler and Michael Thomas Sadler
to sensitize the public to the need to free their people, especially children,
from hunger and disease. They did this by embarking on advocacy
such as writing articles for newspapers and giving talks and lectures in
public. According to Fraser (1984), these advocates were so moved by
their people's needs that they were not afraid to call on the slave masters
or the community as a whole to "sink your commerce and rise humanity,
benevolence and Christianity" (quoted in Fraser, 1984:18).Hudock (1999:
91) believes that southern (including African) NGOs have a comparative
advantage
this
advantage is not always used. Najam (1996:346) believes that what the
NGOs are doing is simply saying to the communities, "agree with what
we (i.e.,
the NGO) already intend to do". That approach to advocacy
can only serve the self-interest of NGO operators. In open advocacy,
access to mobilizing and utilizing public resources, including information
is enhanced by the elimination of self-serving purposes. As
channels,
a result
the social services delivered by the NGOs would match their
advocacy.

in advocacy over their northern counterparts. But

That

is what

communities

to participate

the Althorp's Bill, a precursor to the Factory Act of
1833, did for children in the nineteenth century England. The Factory
Act brought
the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the welfare of
children at work bore not just on parents or employers but on the
community at large. In more recent times the British Government has
encouraged
in voluntary action. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer announced inhis 1999budget Government's
pledge to give twenty-eight pounds to every hundred pounds a taxpayer
contributes
for good causes. Professor Tony Giddens, in his 1999 BBC
Reith lecture describes such open community participation as a way to
reconnect m;mbers of the extended family or the larger community to
each other in an active, democratic manner that reconstitutes the rights
and obligations of members of society.

therefore, means that NGO operators should ~e apolitical
but outspoken on issues that affect weak members of socIety so as to
for their cause. It also means that NGOs are
aUract public support

Openness,

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51

proactive in seeking and providing information so as to protect or
advance the public interest. More importantly, openness means NGOs
make themselves available to the public and not exclusively to their
members, as burial societies or church clubs do. In developed countries
an organization such as Christian Aid helps, not just Christians, but
also members of other religions in need. It is the~ind
of advocacy
~:hThe
Guardian, Nigeria (2000) editorial, which highlighted
the case of a blind five-month old child, observing that "many cases
deserving humanitarian love and sympathy are not attended to because
they are not brought to the attention of the public".

Accountability for responsibility
Those who take responsibility for others must be prepared to give and
be seen to be giving account of that responsibility. Where accountability
is lacking there is also bound to be mistrust. A lack of trust in those to
whom responsibility has been given would suggest an absence of the
recognition to advance the public interest. The examples proliferate. In
Nigeria for instance, Barrett (I985:94) describes public officers as
individuals who, "treat
their jobs as a sinecure granted them in
recognition of their status as indigenes of the state".

Olowu (1999: 13) observes that because of the breakdown in the
responsibility, reporting and reward system in the African civil service,
there is no system of accountability for performance. Zaidi (I 999) makes
the point that African NGOs have an "ambiguous" relationship with
the state and donor agencies that renders them unaccountable to their
local public. Edwards and Hulme (I995) believe, "there is a level at
which the absence of accountability begins to make the likelihood of
ineffectiveor illegitimateactions by an organization much more probable"
(ibid:9).

Meanwhile, in its WorldDevelopment Report, the World Bank (1997)
indicates, "although the State has a central role in ensuring the provision
of basic services-education,
is not obvious
that the State must be the only provider or a provider at all". (ibid.:27).
The World Bank even believes that the state's choices about provision,
financing and regulation of these services must build on the relative

health infrastructure-it

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strengths of markets, civil society and state agencies. These statements
should therefore provide a basis for African NOOs to mobilize more
local resources for their activities. But they can only do this if they are
willing to justifY their status concerning the public interest. One way
they can do so is to provide the public or the community they work with
(who may also constitute their benefactors), with regular records of
their [mancial activities. Najam (1996:345) describesthis as accountability
to clients.

that

In England charitable organizations with a certain level of income
that fail to make annual returns to the Charity Commission are struck off
the Charity Register. This is because the Charity Register is a public
document
is open to the general public for information and the
scrutiny of activities of charitable organizations. Similarly, inthe United
States,
in order to maintain registration with the government, private
voluntary organizations must submit a number of documents annually,
including audited budgets using USAID forms and Inland Revenue
Service reporting forms.

lack mechanisms

in developing countries, says Najam, "not only do
Meanwhile,
for holding NOOs
communities
impoverished
accountable,
the process of aspiration definition is also murky and
subjective". Even where there are avenues for public accountability
(Hiruy 1997: 129), there are no sanctions to enforcethem because,accord-
ing to Beurden (1998:50) NOO registration may be required for
administrative
purposes only, without being legally binding. For
instance, in South Africa, of about 54,000 NOOs only 6000 are registered
(Hiruy 1997:123).But ifAfrican NOOs tookthe initiativetomakeaccount-
ability a necessary aspect of their responsibility, they would also be
able to court public trust and tap more public resources for good causes.

of NGOs oot to make private use of their assets (noo-

Obligation
distributiveness)
Any justification for the NOO claim to advance the public interestshould
be demonstrated in their ability to provide relief and deliver services to
their beneficiaries. The extent to which this obligation is fulfilled can be
determined by how much of an NGO's money goes into good causes.

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53

Benjamin (2000) reports a study by Manchester Business School which
found that, in 1992, 80 per cent of charity (NGO) money was spent on
charitable causes. But by 1997 this had fallen to 67 per cent. Although
these statistics do not suggest that NGO operators are benefiting from
their organization's funds, they show the. extent to which NGOs are
fulfilling their obligations. Sometimes NGOs spend a large amount of
money to produce glossy publicity materials; whether to outshine others
in the field or to attract public approval, is not clear.

In the absence of statistics on NGO spending for developing
countries, a similar experience can be described for their public service
organizations. For instance, in 1995 at the first National Health Summit
in Nigeria, the Health Minister noted that 80 per cent of recurrent
subvention goes to personnel costs whereas less than 5 per cent was
spent on patient care (Federal Ministry of Health 1995). Also in a study
on community banks in Nigeria, Onugu (2000) found that only 23.3 per
cent of deposits in these banks were ploughed back into the economy.
This, according to the author, is because community banks were involved
in direct trading.

But non-distributiveness

means that NGO operators

are not
personally interested in their organization's property. When in 1991
community banks were established in Nigeria their chief purpose was
to finance non-banking (non-profit) activities such as training in trade
and vocational skilIs. Hudock (I 999:7-8) tells how men in Sierra Leone
hoped to use their womenfolk to secure foreign NGO funding for their
private palm-oil business. Bennett and Gibbs (I996:75)
record how
African women's groups obtained foreign funds for sewing machines.
At first these machines were used to sew uniforms for schoolchildren at
a minimum profit (which was shared among members). But when funds
ceased to arrive and the machines needed parts to be replaced, coupled
with strong competition from a local entrepreneur, the group could not
continue. The remaining machines that were still functional were
distributed among members. Many such anecdotes exist in the literature.
The above i1Iustrationsshow the wide variation between developed
In an

spending power for good causes.

and developing countries'

54

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McFubara/MAKING AFRICAN NGOS RESPONSIVE

African country where state provision for social services is often very
weak, the less an NGG's percentage allocation of funds for good causes
is, the less responsive to social needs the NGOs will be seen to be. To
change this will require a change of attitude on the part ofNGOs and all
public service workers. They would need to show willingness to advance
the public interest, not their own. In doing so they will reciprocate the
public trust reposed in them and a relationship of mutual responsibility
between NGG operators and members of the public will then develop.
In this way African NGGs would also ensure their own sustainability
overtime.

Conclusion
Ancient principles of African social life that are rooted in the extended
family system can still be exploited for community development.This is
mainly because of the principle of mutual responsibility present within
the system. In our modem setting when more voluntary organizations
are springing up, African NGGs could become moreresponsiveto social
needs if they can adapt the principles that have sustained the extended
family system to the management principles that have made foreign
NGGs successful.

Particularly in advocacy and their claim to responsibility for public
interest, the principles of openness and accountabilitywill enablegreater
public participation in NGG activities. And more importantly, because
of their obligation to provide and deliver service, African NGQs should
endeavour
to apply a greater share of their funds to the causes for
which they were established. In this way African NGOs can become
focus factors of development between the people and the state.

To the people they would prove to be a focus for effective social
advocacy and service delivery. And to the state they would constitute
a focus for effective policy implementation. In bothways AfricanNGOs
would be able to tap into their local resource base and respond more to
social needs as well as contribute towards an inclusive and sustainable
bottom-up democratic welfare system.

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55

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