The Changing Rhodesian Political Culture: 1969P. B. HarrisDepartment of Political Science, University College of Rhodesia,Salisbury.t *> *ŁThe year 1969 should be remembered as theyear in which a new White Rhodesian politicalculture finally emerged. Two reasons may be ad-duced for this contention; in the first place theconstitutional issue was clarified by the publica-tion of a new constitution approved by referen-dum on 20 June, and secondly there developed arealisation that a solution of the Anglo-Rhodesiandispute was extremely unlikely. In short, the pros-pect of majority African rule became more andmore remote.A political culture has been defined as "thesystem of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols,and values which defines the situation in whichpolitical action takes place [and which] providesthe subjective orientation to politics."1 Politicalcultures are not, however, entirely "natural"; theyare also "created". In 1969, the values and atti-tudes held by political actors, which are a com-ponent of political culture, underwent a decisiveclarification.A political culture is most probably formed atcertain significant moments in the course ofnational history. These key moments occur, mostparticularly, with ethnic inflow or immigrationfrom another culture, dominant or otherwise; atthe moment when representative institutions arebeing formed and finally, at the time when partyalliances come under discussion.2 In 1969, Rho-desian political institutions were settled with thegreatest degree of finality certain in that country'suncertain political climate. It was also the yearin which new party alliances were formed andnew and more positive positions were established.If we take the first point first, namely that ofconsidering Rhodesia's political institutions, weshould find that in 1969, the Rhodesian govern-ment, already pronounced a de jure governmentby the Rhodesian judiciary, determined on a finaltermination of negotiations with the British gov-ernment. During 1968, the second attempt at anAnglo-Rhodesian rapprochement had ended infailure on board H.M.S. Fearless. The Britishthen set out their position in two White Papers.3The Rhodesian government likewise set out itscase in a White Paper, and part of this is worthquoting at length as it offered an interpretation ofthe respective positions of the two sides in thedispute:"British position (as publicly stated by theBritish Government)(a) There were three basic issues which, asfar as the British were concerned, were non-negotiable, namely:(i) The provision of a blocking quarterof directly elected African members inthe Legislature;(ii) the incorporation of a further safe-guard for the specially entrenchedprovisions, e.g. a system of appeals tothe Privy Council as set out in theTiger proposals;(iii) the establishment of a broad-basedGovernment to serve until the newconstitution came into force;(b) Other points of difference would benegotiable.(c) The six British principles must be adheredto.Rhodesian position(a) Any blocking mechanism must provide forequal numbers of elected Africans andChiefs in the Senate.(b) Appeals to the Privy Council were entirelyunacceptable.(c) An interim broad-based Government couldbe countenanced if this were not to bepart of a so-called "return to legality" asenvisaged on H.M.S. Tiger.(d) Other points of difference would benegotiable.(e) The six British principles were of no con-cern to Rhodesia and were solely a Britishcommitment."4After this no further attempt was made tobridge the gulf between the two sides, and, inFebruary 1969, the Rhodesian Front produceda set of proposals for a new constitution. Therewas some confusion at first, because the docu-ment issued on 24 February 1969 from the head-quarters of the Rhodesian Front in Salisbury dif-fered from that issued shortly afterwards in SouthAfrica in respect of its proposed scheme for theamendment of the constitution. This point of dif-ference was taken up in an editorial in The Rho-desia Herald of 21 March, but Mr. Smith lenthis personal charisma to the constitution, describ-ing it as a "world-beater". The Government'sdefinitive proposal for the constitution appearedon 21 May 1969 accompanied by a speech fromMr. Smith.5 These proposals had effectively beenapproved by the Rhodesian Front in February;Mr. Smith had comfortably succeeded in 1969where he had only narrowly survived at theRhodesian Front Congress in 1968.The constitution permitted Africans to electeight members to the Parliament of 66 seats. Afurther eight would be elected by Chiefs andHeadmen. The present "A" and "B" rolls wouldbe eliminated as would cross-voting. Africanrepresentation would be determined by the pay-ment of income tax to the national exchequer. Itwas suggested that, in the far future, when Afri-cans paid an amount of income tax equivalent tothat paid by Europeans they would have a parityof representation; 50 seats in the national Parlia-ment of 100 members. The introduction of aSenate was envisaged with 23 members, ten Euro-peans and ten Africans who would all be chiefs.There would be a small but highly significantgroup of three persons to be appointed by thePresident without reference to race. This groupwould be crucial in the formation of the racialcomposition of the Senate, particularly whereamendments to the Constitution and to the en-trenched clauses of the constitution were con-cerned. Given the admittedly remote time whenAfricans might expect to receive a parity of repre-sentation in the Assembly, the franchise issue maybe said to have been settled in 1969. At presentthere are four and three quarter million Africansin Rhodesia (shown by the preliminary results ofthe 1969 Census), and they pay about %\% ofRhodesia's direct taxation; expressed in anotherway, for every S200 paid by the European atpresent, the African pays only about 11. Africanspay other taxes, of course, but the constitution isconcerned solely with income tax.One determinant of the Rhodesian politicalculture was settled by this new constitution. Thequestion of representative institutions had nowbeen "solved" with all the finality possible in thesituation. No more debate may be expected overquestions of voting rolls, parliamentary structureor ideal of any political institutions until such timethat the Rhodesian Front has been removed fromoffice. Before 1969 it was always possible tovisualise a rapprochement between Britain andRhodesia but this would presumably involve anacceptance of unimpeded progress to majorityrule, the first of Britain's Six Principles. By accept-ing the proposed constitution by referendum on20 June 1969. the Rhodesian electorate logicallyturned its back on such a rapprochement. What-ever else this means, it clearly implies a certaindegree of certainty if not finality.The question of party alignments may perhapsbe examined next. The Centre Party, largely white-sponsored party established in order to oppose theRhodesian Front, was formed in mid-1968 and itappeared, until June 1969, that the Centre Partymight constitute a substantial opposition to theRhodesian Front. The Centre Party took its standon a platform of settlement of the Anglo-Rhode-sian dispute and gradual acceptance within theterms of the Six Principles including unimpededprogress towards majority rule. The Centre Partyappeal could only attract the European elector-ate in so far as it was prepared to accept thecertainty of eventual African majority rule. Theeventuality of majority rule was the price in factto be paid for settlement with Great Britain. TheCentre Party could only appeal to the Africanpopulation in so far as it was able to persuadeAfricans that majority rule ought to be held backfor the rest of the century. This would prove anextremely difficult proposition to accept forI- Itsophisticated and politically conscious Africans.In this context ought to be remembered the wordsof de Tocqueville: "It is exetremely difficult toprevent an extension of the franchise; somethinglike trying to make water run uphill."The results of the referendum were somewhatblurred as the conservatives wished to accept therepublican proposals, but to reject what theyregarded as a "liberal" constitution, whilst theCentre Party rejected both the republic and theconstitution. Naturally Rhodesian Front suppor-ters welcomed the proposals, both republic andconstitution. Party alignments just before theJune referendum then were in a state of uncer-tainty which was not to be dispelled until after thereferendum.Of the many interesting observations made onthe fate of Rhodesia after 1969, perhaps the mostinteresting came from a journalist, DouglasBrown, writing to the Sunday Telegraph of 25May. He observed that a unique political formulahad been established in Rhodesia, arguing that"a kind of perverse honesty has broken through".He argued that "Mr. Smith's Government mustbe the first in modern history that actually pro-claims a police state as the norm ..." He con-trasted this with the South African situation wherethe "governing principles" of apartheid gave riseto a series of measures designed to give it logicaleffect. In a sense, the Rhodesian political culturespecified the measures which it proposed to takeagainst its enemies in some detail, without anya priori thinking involved. The South Africans, onthe other hand, refused to take any measureswithout an appeal to a principle, the principle ofrational or quasi-rational racial segregation.Given the hostile attitude of the outside world,it may be worthwhile asking a fundamental ques-tion. Is Rhodesia a democracy? Clearly it couldnot be described as a Madisonian-type democracy;for Dahl, speaking of the Madisonian concept ofmajority rule, argues that preoccupation with therights and wrongs of majority rule has "run likea red thread through American political thoughtsince 1789".6 As far as Rhodesia is concerned,majority rule is a red thread. Indeed the Rhode-sian political myth may be the assertion thatmajority rule is a myth itself. The essence of thecase of the Rhodesian government is the incompe-tence, supposedly self-evident, of African govern-ments. Dahl distinguishes further between govern-ment by a minority and government by minorities.In a sense Rhodesia does constitute the latterrather than the former case; for there may exista contrived but de facto "alliance" between thehegomonic Rhodesian Front and the minorityNdebele tribe together with duly appointed Afri-can chiefs. Rhodesia in fact may be described asneither a democracy nor yet as a fully fledgedtotalitarian monopoly. It has in fact, to use theterminology of Giovanni Sartori, a predominantparty system structure.7U.D.I, was, in a sense, a "democratic" move-ment, removing as it did the barriers to the emer-gence of a new white Rhodesian independence,and substituting a more specific set, of Rhodesianmores. Rhodesian society is consequently sociallyless pretentious than before 1965 Š "what hasbeen removed is the garden-party syndrome".Alternatively it might be said that the new Rhode-sian elite has captured the role of the old quasi-British aristocracy expatriate in Rhodesia.There exists in post-independence Rhodesia anon-competitive political system, closely approxi-mating to monopoly in economics. Competition inpolitics is however neither as common or rare asis competition in economics. There is a constanttendency for imperfect competition or even oligo-poly (corresponding to oligarchy) as in the factsof social and political organisation. One does nothave to be too cynical to remark that those whopreach competition frequently practise monopoly,but as eminent a commentator as Dahl has argued,'In a rough sense the essence of all competitivepolitics is bribery of the electorate by politicians'.8Such bribery may even be necessary in stateswhere such cajolements may be regarded as nomore than rhetorical. The political scientist whosemain field of interest lies in Africa or Asia faces atwo-fold analytical problem. He may see his sub-ject as a whole with African politics as a part ofthe whole. Should he make this axiomatic, hewill find it difficult to avoid seeing Africanpolitics as a mere derivative of Western Europeanpolitics. He may on the other hand see his speci-ality as sui generis. The concept of political cul-ture is an excellent example of this twin dilemma.When Almond and Coleman offered funotionalismas the answer to the dilemma, they really did littlemore than to argue that in every non-Europeanthere may be a European wanting to get out. Theydeclared that there must be a "political culture"lurking just beneath every political surface,slightly difficult to recognise until one was prac-tised in the techniques of the functionalists.9A political culture in Rhodesia may exist, butit is still largely an unquarried area. Should it befound, it might then be "organised", "socialised","mobilised" in order to attack the old, discreditedapparatus of legalism and the state. Unfortunately,it will never really be easily possible to persuadethe simple electors that a "state" which protectstheir interests is an enemy, that it does not exist,is not worth their homage, loyalty and respect,just as it is not easily possible to persuade thosewho curse a regime to assure them that their fearsare unfounded because the object of their hatredis no more than a process, or a bundle of func-tions.Nearly two decades have passed since the with-drawal of European colonial regimes from Africa.Considerable political experimentation has takenplace. Most states first attempted to adapt them-selves in accordance with the Westminster, or arelated, system, but in most cases for a very shortwhile only. Rhodesia, however, still operates aversion of the Westminster model and this wascommended and recommended in the abortiveWhaley Commission Report in April 1968.10 TheWestminster model has been a singularly impor-tant element in the Rhodesian political culture.The retention of parliamentary forms, even in atruncated fashion, is significant because institu-tions "embody power and not mere opinion". Yetthis situation is changing and with it Rhodesianpolitical culture; for nothing, not even a politicalculture, can remain static. Rhodesia is no longerwhat Popper would call "open society". This isnot to suggest that the new states of Africa havediscovered a more democratic political path tofollow. The lugubrious dialogue between corruptpolitician and austere soldier has increased andmultiplied, and indeed, between 1958 and 1969,fifteen African states were successfully taken overby the military, out of a total of thirty-five.11 Thepoint is simply made that Rhodesia is in Africa;its turmoils are Africa's turmoils. There is no lawwhich says that men north or south of the Zam-bezi are politically more gifted than others, thoughit is a part of conventional wisdom to accept thatthis is so. There is throughout all Africa a curiousparadox; there exists both a ferment and a fear ofideas. Sir Isaiah Berlin, speaking of nineteenthcentury Russia once said: "If a man was a profes-sor in late nineteenth century Russia, then themere fact of his involvement with ideas madehim an implacable opponent of the regime inwhich he lived; if it did not, he was, in the eyesof the militant, a traitor, a man who had sold out,a coward or a ninny." These words are unfortu-nately applicable in much of independent Africain 1969.REFERENCES1. PYE, L. and VERBA, S. 1965 Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton, Princeton University Press,p. 513.2. PULZER, P, 1969 The Legitimising Role of Political Parties: The Second Austrian Republic. Polit. Stud., 18(in press).3. GREAT BRITAIN 1968 Rhodesia: Report on the Discussions held on board HM.S. Fearless, October, 1968.London, H.M.S.O., Cmd. 3793.1969 Rhodesia: Report on Exchanges with the Regime since the Talks held in Salisbury inNovember, 1968. London, H.M.S.O., Cmnd. 4065.4. RHODESIA 1969 Statement on Anglo-Rhodesian Relations December, 1966 to May, 1969. Salisbury, GovernmentPrinter, C.S.R. 36, p. 2.5. RHODESIA 1969 Proposals for a New Constitution for Rhodesia. Salisbury, Government Printer, C.S.R. 32.6. DAHL, R. A. 1961 A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, p. 4.7. SARTORI, G. 1967 "Typologies of party systems Š a critique". Paper read at International Political Science Asso-ciation, Seventh World Congress on Recent Research on Typologies of Political Regimes and Political Development,Brussels.8. DAHL, p. 68.9. ALMOND, G. A. and COLEMAN, J. S. eds. 1960 The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton, PrincetonUniversity Press.10. RHODESIA 1968 Report of the Constitutional Commission 1968. Salisbury, Government Printer.11. LUTTWAK, E. 1968 Coup d'etat: a Practical Handbook. London, Allen Lane, Penguin Press, p. 182.