

Afrikaner and Shona Settlement in the Enkeldoorn Area, 1890-1900

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On 31 October 1896, the Enkeldoorn laager contained the fifth largest European community in Mashonaland, 194 persons, of whom 118 were women and children. There had already been a shift of some local families to Salisbury, because of the Shona rising, but the figures given above indicate that a considerable European settlement of the southern part of Charter District had already taken place. The absence of a mine in the vicinity or of a township before the rebellion means that nearly all of the inhabitants of the laager had been engaged in farming.¹ In fact this was then the northernmost outpost of Afrikanerdom in Africa east of the Kalahari, unless one counts the by then moribund Laurencedale settlement of Van der Byl in Makoni's district.² Yet the Charter District, as defined by the district maps of 1894-1895, already supported a large indigenous population. In 1895 the chiefdoms of Gambiza, Mutekedza, Maromo and Maburutsi alone were estimated to hold 17,072 people, and these polities covered only the central portion of the district.³ Thus Charter at the turn of the century, contained a settlement of European agriculturists in large numbers, by Rhodesian standards, superimposed upon a considerable African farming population. An interesting feature of the European community was the fact that most of them were Afrikaners.

The African people were divided into several chiefdoms. In the mountains to the west were chiefs Nyika and Mushava, but although their territorial claims probably ran east to the Umni-

ati River, the land between the mountains and the river seems to have been relatively sparsely populated. Hardly any land in Rhodesia was unclaimed by African rulers, but since they had far fewer followers than they rule today, they were like the colonial powers in that they could not effectively occupy all the land that they claimed. Thus Maromo's Dzete claimed a *nyika* that stretched as far as Umvuma, but their effective occupation was limited to the land of Zihota, between Enkeldoorn and the Range. Between Zihota, the Umniati and the sources of the Sabi lay the chiefdom of Mutekedza's Hera, which represented an outlying point of Ndebele influence, as Mutekedza Mutiti Chigonero and his predecessors apparently relied upon Lobengula's support, and paid tribute through two tax-collectors from Bulawayo, Ruzane and Munondo.⁴ Between Mutekedza and Chirumanzu (Chilimanzi), fifty miles to the south, no other chief regarded the Ndebele as anything but an intermittent nuisance against which the Shona had evolved a fairly effective defence system of alarm signals, and underground refuges protected by guns. North-east of the Range were Maburutsi's Nobvu, and south of them lived Musarurwa's Rozvi, who had been local administrators of the area in the days of the Rozvi Empire, and who still retained vestiges of their former influence. Musarurwa's "cousins", Sango's Rozvi, held Chigarra Hill south of Enkeldoorn, but were independent of Musarurwa. Around these three small polities in a great arc from the Sabi almost to the Sebakwe were the Njanja, a

large group formerly under one chief named Gambiza, but latterly the heads of Houses of the Njanja had become chiefs (*Ishe*) as well, and even some of the heads of sub-Houses within these Houses had attained this rank by 1892. The tendency of the Njanja paramountcy towards fragmentation was then well advanced, a tendency which culminated in the abandonment of the use of the Gambiza title after the death of Gambiza Ngweni in 1908. Long before then, however, the real power lay with the various chiefs of the Njanja. Beyond the Njanja to the south-east lay Rozvi and Hera groups which were virtually untouched by European penetration until 1897.⁵

Thus Charter District contained many chieftaincies occupying the land, but some land still remained almost unused, such as that between the Mwanesi Range and the Umniati, and that south-west of Enkeldoorn and Chigarra Hill, towards Umvuma and the Mteo Forest. In this area were isolated families such as that of Huchu, a brother of Chirumanzu Chinyama, but there were no chieftaincies to provide the leadership or negotiate with European penetration. In these zones lay possible sites for an harmonious European settlement, but the European tendency to occupy land regardless of previous ownership and to peg neat blocks of farms side by side to facilitate surveying meant that this opportunity was missed.

The Pioneer Road ran through Charter on the watershed in order to avoid the danger of floods in the rainy season. This road, planned by Selous, cut through the lands of Gunguwo, Maromo and Mutekedza and at the same time dictated the position of the earliest European settlements. The old Hunters' Road from Bulawayo to the Hartley Goldfields entered the district, but stayed west of the Mwanesi Range. The first settlement was Fort Charter between the sources of the Sabi and Ngezi, and it was occupied as a police post throughout the period. Later it became a minor trading centre. Company post stations were maintained for a while at the "Umniati Ruins" and on the Inyatsitsi river, and they came under private ownership when the Company abandoned them. In the first two years of the occupation the Company did not attempt to make diplomatic contact with the local chiefs and until the first police patrols into the Njanja and Dzete areas were made in 1892, and the first Field-Cornetries were authorised in the same year, the only contact between Africans and Europeans was unofficial. This meant that the first land grants did not consider African interests.

Under the Company's rule, the process of ac-

quiring land was simple. Either the ground was pegged first and then an application was made to the Surveyor-General for approval, or he issued a grant and the farm was then pegged in the grantee's chosen place. The standard size of farm was 1500 morgen (about 3,000 acres), but farms twice or four times as large were not uncommon. The generous grant of 1,500 morgen was intended to attract farmers from the south. Members of the Pioneer Column got free farms, but others had to pay a quitrent of only £3 a year until a Final Title was granted. The main requirement of the Company was that the farm should be in "beneficial occupation", which meant in practice that the farmer should be on the farm frequently, and do a certain amount of work on it. In theory there should have been one responsible European on each farm, but in practice one owner could "oversee" several farms if they were relatively close together.⁶ In the case of the great land companies, one 'ranger' sufficed to "occupy" an area of up to 170,000 morgen, when such a large area had been alienated in a single grant.⁷ The Administration had two contradictory attitudes to land alienation: on the one hand it feared to let the land go in large blocks to land speculators or to farmers who would not develop it, but on the other hand it wanted an influx of European farmers and feared that a too rigorous enforcement of occupation clauses would drive settlers away. The result was that although a grant of 1,500 morgen was easy to get — many grants in the Grant Book have the note "verbal" — it was usually necessary to apply twice or more to get further land. Of course, a friend of some of the senior officials of the British South Africa Company suffered from no such restriction, as can be seen in the case of Dr. Jameson's friend Sir John Willoughby. Even after the foundation of the Native Department in 1894 there seems to have been no general policy as to whether farms should be granted near to African lands. Sometimes, indeed, a trader or a missionary would ask for a plot at a chief's village, for obvious reasons,⁸ and it will be seen that many farms in Charter coincided with African farmlands. By 1896, however, European settlement had gone so far that W. Landman was promised a farm provided that he got a letter from the Native Commissioner "stating that your farm does not interfere with any lands".⁹ This was a formality, because he had already been there for at least six months, but it shows a beginning of the awareness that African needs had to be considered.

Only a few grants were made in the area in

1891, and it is not certain whether they were taken up. One was to E. E. Dunne, trader and future Field-Cornet at Charter. Government employees were excused from occupying their farms. Chief Native Commissioner Brabant had a farm near Enkeldoorn, but was rarely there. In 1892 more farms were granted, nearly all close to the main road, for the benefit of traders in the area who received their goods from Salisbury or Victoria and needed a permanent base for their work. Alanberry, Altona and the Range were farms of this type; the Range farm was later purchased by the Company for the Native Department, whose successors still use it. In 1892 one of the many families named Maritz settled on the Washbank River, and Colenbrander's friend, Vavasseur, started farming near the Mwanesi Range. Part of a trek led by John Moodie settled around Fort Charter. In 1893 the Ferreira family settled between the Umniati and the Sebakwe, and the Potgieters moved west of the Umniati. In 1894 a trek arrived from Charlestown, near Volksrust, in the South African Republic, and a Van der Merwe settled next to the Mwanesi Range. However, in 1895 a far greater number of farmers arrived, most of them Transvaalers apparently, and by June 1896 a large part of the country was pegged for farms. These farms fell into several obvious groups. In the north there was a cluster around Fort Charter. In the west some farms faced the Umniati and some lay in the mountains. In the centre the land between the Washbank, the Sebakwe and the Umniati was nearly all pegged, and in the south a belt of farms ran from the Gwelo road past the Mteo Forest towards the Victoria road. There was no township and the Government contacted the farmers by mail from Salisbury at first through the local post contractor, P. H. Bezuidenhout of the farm "Rietbokspruit" near Fort Charter, and then through the Enkeldoorn Field-Cornet, Ferreira, who was at a point called "Vaal-kop" on his farm "Enkel Doorn". The only other officials in the district were the Native Commissioner at the Range, the Police at Fort Charter and the Fort Charter Field-Cornet.

The Charter Afrikaners varied widely in type. At one end of the cultural range were the Bezuidenhout brothers of "Alanberry". Lord Milner described one of them in the following words: "a very fine-looking Dutchman, who spoke English so well that I at first mistook his nationality. He keeps the store, but has also a farm of 6,000 morgen . . . He was a vigorous, broadminded man . . ."¹⁰ At the other end was the illiterate Petrus Lezare, who never acquired even one farm

in the 1890s. There were the Ferréiras, who between them owned seven farms, planned stores and a sawmill and played a leading part in the district. They were probably the nearest local approach to the Moodies of Melssetter, for in 1895-6 the Field Cornet was always a Ferreira. Thus it was around "Vaal-kop" on "Enkel Doorn" that the nucleus of the future town began, as a postal station. The Ferréiras of Enkeldoorn do not appear to have been very closely connected with Colonel Ignatius Philip Ferreira of the Adendorff Trek, and in so far as the origins of the Charter Afrikaners can be traced from correspondence, none of them seems to have come from the Zoutspansberg and the Adendorff Trek but rather from the Southern Transvaal and to a lesser extent the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony. Between the "aristocracy" of Bezuidenhouts and Ferréiras, and the lower class of landless Lezars and others was a larger middle class of rather simple people. They usually had one or two farms each, and many children for whom, if possible, farms would be obtained, often on alleged "verbal" grants by Rhodes or Jameson. At times the Land Settlement Department suspected the Enkeldoorn Afrikaners of "manufacturing" relatives in order to obtain farms.¹¹ They had simple beliefs, sometimes preferring wagon grease to any other treatment for wounds, and in 1896 Dr. Darling recorded the presence of a flat-earth enthusiast!¹²

There are many ways in which the interests of this community of European farmers could have clashed with those of the resident Africans. First, the territorial question must be examined. An African village of shifting cultivators who used the hoe, had relatively primitive ideas of land usage and depended upon grain crops rather than livestock for their basic diet needed more land than they ever had planted at any given time. Land used continuously became worked out, and new lands were needed, but unfortunately few if any Europeans seem to have realised this at the time. In addition, grazing lands were needed, for as the early history of hut tax in Mashonaland soon showed, the Ndebele state had not eliminated cattle and other livestock from Shona society. Also wooded land was required for fuel, and hunting still played a part in African life. Thus it was misleading to judge the territorial extent of African villages by the extent of their croplands, and even when an occupied European farm was not on African village lands it could still disturb nearby kraals. Much depends on whether a farm was occupied by its owner. If it was not, then the Africans within its boundaries might never realise

that their ancestral land had been granted to a stranger, until finally he came to start work there. The beacons of such farms were often posts, ant-hills or rocks, and gave no indication to the Africans of what had happened.

This situation existed on a large scale in the estates of the land companies, which had been granted title to large areas as 'development estates', which were estates that did not have to be developed until a Rand-type boom or a steady increase in land values should make it worth the owners' while to sell them.¹³ With effect from at least October 1894, the Mashonaland Development Company, the Exploring Land and Minerals Company and Willoughby's Consolidated Ltd., all controlled by Sir John Willoughby, claimed the Central, Eastdale, Lancashire, Wiltshire and other estates. These almost equalled the area of all the other European properties in the district put together, for the other land companies operating nearby, The Goldfields of Matabeleland Ltd. and Colenbrander's Matabeleland Development Corporation, were small by comparison.¹⁴ These great unoccupied estates had a considerable effect upon the allocation of land to Africans after the rebellion, but because they were unoccupied by Europeans they had no effect upon the resident Africans before 1896.

As far as the largely Afrikaner farming community of Charter District was concerned, part of the land the farmers occupied did impinge upon African land. Grant, Vavasour and Bester in the middle of the Mwanesi Range were in the middle of Mushava's territory, almost all of Maromo's land of Zihota between Enkeldoorn and the Range was pegged and so was Sango's land south of the Sebakwe. All of these chiefs rose in 1896, but other chiefs with Afrikaner farmers on their land, such as Chirumanzu who lived south of the Mteo Forest, did not rise. Mutekedza, the only other important local rebel of 1896, had virtually no Europeans on his land because most of it 'belonged' to Sir John Willoughby. It is significant that the Africans of the Charter and Chilimanzi districts today date the establishment of the farms that eventually confined them to the Tribal Trust Lands from the time when "Griffin" (C. E. Giffillan) surveyed the land in 1899.¹⁵ This suggests that the occupation of farms by Afrikaners was not a cause of the rebellion of 1896. Probably this was because the farmers, lacking a mining boom that would create a demand for foodstuffs or a railway for the export of crops, had done very little farming by 1896. Some of the Charter farmers had some lands planted before the rising,

but many other were content to grow just enough to keep themselves for the near future, and some, such as Bernadus Bester, left their farms and took up transport-riding.

Our knowledge of the relations between Africans and Afrikaners is limited by the paucity of documents dealing specifically with the area before the risings. Charter lay within the Salisbury Magisterial District, but it is not always clear whether references to this district are intended to include the Enkeldoorn area. A common accusation levelled at European employers of the time was that they cheated their servants of their wages, lashed them unjustly and illegally, or tried to avoid having to pay them their wages by whipping them into desertion just before pay-day.¹⁶ Evidence for this behaviour in Charter is scanty, and complicated by the destruction of many court records in 1943. The Salisbury Criminal Court Register for 1892-6 shows several surnames often found in Charter records, but the size of Salisbury Magisterial District and the fact that many unrelated Afrikaners bear the same name make it dangerous to draw positive conclusions. As for other causes of brutality, a contemporary opinion of an official blamed the language barrier as well as an unwillingness on the part of Europeans to allow for it: "the Mashonas are in their infancy as working natives, so that they are stupid at work and don't like rising early. [and] these points often aggravate employers who, being unable to explain to the natives or too hot tempered to do so, resort to the sjambok."¹⁷

Other official comment was equally vague and generalised at the time. Perhaps the official commenting on crime in the Salisbury Magisterial District was thinking of Charter as well as the rest of the district when he wrote: "the public will take the law entirely into their own hands [unless laws punishing African desertion from work are enforced] and brutal assaults on natives at the hands of ignorant and violent persons may take the place of a duly controlled system of lashing, administered under the sentence of a court of law."¹⁸ After four months in Charter Native Commissioner Meredith wrote: "I have often heard men speak of having flogged their boys as if they had accomplished a wonderful feat. This must be stopped."¹⁹ A later comment throws more light on the matter: "I think that in time labour from that quarter [Mozambique] will be plentiful when they find that they are not subjected to the same tyrannies and oppression of the Transvaal and Portuguese governments especially the former, as for example, it is difficult to get natives to work

for the Dutch farmers in the district owing to their having been accustomed to beating their natives under the Transvaal Government where no justice is accorded a native."²⁰ Very many Enkeldoorn farmers were from the Transvaal, and if Transvaal custom was still strong in 1899, how much stronger it must have been in 1895.

On the other hand there is a natural limit to the extent to which brutality can go undetected. The tendency of Shona labourers to flee from the scene of brutality or such disasters as mine accidents was well known at the time, and indeed was, as has been seen, the alleged *cause* of some acts of violence.²¹ If brutality in Charter had been so vigorous or so widespread as to cause mass desertions from work, the employers would have made fresh demands upon the Native Commissioners for fresh labour on a considerable scale; yet there is no like demand recorded in the Native Commissioners' reports of the time before the rebellion. The causes of the rebellion in the Charter District have still to be examined in close detail, but it seems that no over-riding importance can be attached to the Afrikaner settlement, which only partly impinged on African land and was only partly effective in the sense that few farmers had done enough work to disturb the African inhabitants. Indeed the work of the Native Department seems to have been an equally important cause. This article, however, is more concerned with the effect of the rebellion upon the Afrikaners than with the rebellion itself.

Already, in July 1895, a farmer named Maritz had been murdered near his farm in Sango's country. His murderer escaped from custody, and the motive remains obscure.²² This murder aroused comment but no-one took fright. In March 1896 news came that the Ndebele and some of the Shona of Matabeleland had risen. The burghers of the district were called into laager at Enkeldoorn under Commandant Lamprecht on 30 March and lived in considerable squalor until the middle of May. The burghers had been sending patrols towards Nhemas and Banka's chiefdoms in Matabeleland, and when these scouts reported that the country seemed peaceful in that direction, the laager was broken up and the people were allowed to leave.²³ The Afrikaners however did not go back to their farms, but gathered in groups on farms nearer to Enkeldoorn, such as "Doorn Kasteel" and "Alanberry."²⁴ All seemed well, but in June the full force of the Shona rising fell upon them. In the confused flight towards the Enkeldoorn and Charter laagers, thirteen European men were murdered, as well as many Africans who

were in their employ.²⁵ Indeed, one of the factors that comes out of the trials of the murderers is that men were killed not for direct personal reasons but because they were Europeans or worked for Europeans. Thus a Xhosa man trading for a European near Charter "had been warned he was going to be killed and was going to give me [his wife] his money when he was shot. he knew he could not get away as there were Mashonas living all around . . . I know them [the prisoners] both well. they are neighbours, they had no quarrel with Billy [the victim]."²⁶

The nightmarish quality of sudden attack by men who seemed friendly right up to the last moment may have been a military asset, but the killing of women and children proved to be a blunder on the part of the rebels, because it so infuriated Europeans that they were little inclined to show mercy when positions were reversed. The principal operations against the rebels were undertaken by forces from outside the district: Beal's column which when returning from Matabeleland attacked several villages, Brabant's force from Belingwe and other forces from Salisbury, and the final campaign in the central part of the district was that of the British army against Mutekedza in September 1896. However, the people of Enkeldoorn also mounted attacks on local rebel chieftaincies and inflicted heavy casualties, as in the attack on the village on the Sebakwe on 1 September.²⁷ On the other hand, although the burghers were capable of giving aid to the main Company and Imperial forces who defeated most of the rebels in the district, their experiences in June seemed to have induced a state of semi-permanent nervousness. For example, in August one of three Shona girls, captured near the Sebakwe River and put to work as servants around the laager some time before, was executed for attempting to leave the area with her African lover who was thought to be a spy. The military reason for the execution was that she might inform some Ndebele supposed to be in the area that the laager was in a weak state, but in view of the way she came to the laager it seems incredible that anybody could have thought that she was a spy.²⁸ This illustrates the state of nervousness that was prevalent among the Enkeldoorners after the June killings. The Enkeldoorn laager remained in being through 1897, but its garrison did not fire a shot in anger.²⁹ The Company finally persuaded the last burghers to leave the laager in January 1898, but then only on condition that they were given assurances that the Africans to the south and north-west would be put in locations, that cheap

ammunition, seed and tools would be available, and that more police patrols would be made.³⁰

In view of the fact that the last serious fighting within 30 miles of Enkeldoorn was on 30 October 1896 at Sango's, this reluctance of the burghers to leave the laager is difficult to explain. Even in October the rebellion in the area was virtually over, so that individuals could travel about the district alone, and the Native Commissioner at the Range nearby recorded only two minor actions between friendly and rebel Africans in the six months after the British Army defeated Mutekedza in September. The answer would seem to be that the burghers had in June 1896 received a shock that affected them for some years afterwards. For example, in January 1899 the farmers were in laager again, and in July a "scare" came up the telegraph line from Orton's Drift that Chirumanzu's people had risen. Once more the burghers moved into laager, only to find that the rumour was baseless. In December 1899 similar rumours put the district in a state of tension.³¹ A local resident even recalls a "scare" in 1904 that put Enkeldoorn into laager, and another as late as about 1911.³²

This sort of fear seems to have exceeded that in any other part of the country, where business returned to normal shortly after the fighting ceased. This is perhaps the first step towards the traditional view of Enkeldoorn as a particularly backward, rustic, half-comic place, although the diversion of the Gwelo-Salisbury railway through the Que Que and Gatooma mining areas was probably more decisive in this respect. One might ask whether relations between the employer and his servant had improved. Labour in Charter was relatively plentiful after the rebellion was over, but Taylor wrote in 1899: "I have great difficulty to get natives to work for Dutch farmers owing to ill-treatment by some and withholding of their wages."³³ Earlier, in April 1898, just after the Afrikaner farmers had returned to their lands, he had noted that "the supply of labour is certainly much greater than the local demand, but though this is so the demand from Enkeldoorn cannot be supplied on account of the bad name the Boers there have . . . I even have difficulty in getting boys for the English in Enkeldoorn, as everybody living there is looked upon as a Boer, and it is difficult to convince them to the contrary."³⁴

The people of Enkeldoorn showed little sign of political consciousness as Afrikaners in this period. Most of them entered Rhodesia before the Jameson Raid, when Rhodes was still Prime Minister

of the Cape with the support of the Afrikaner Bond, and in any case to enter Rhodesia at all meant submission to the British flag and the Company's rule. The idea of an Afrikaner political dominion in the north had ended with the Adendorff Trek as far as Rhodesia was concerned. Again, the Charter Afrikaners had not settled in quite so many formally organised treks as their Melsetter counterparts, and unlike them they had no-one with them of political importance in the republics such as M. J. Martin in Melsetter, who gained guarantees from Rhodes regarding the language rights of the Melsetter Afrikaners.³⁵ After the Raid ruined Rhodes' relations with the Afrikaners in the south, the rebellions followed so closely that there was no time for any anti-British feeling around Enkeldoorn to attract official comment. During the risings and in the years afterwards the Afrikaner community relied so heavily upon Rhodes and the Company for military and economic support that an anti-British attitude was out of the question. A few men from Enkeldoorn fought in the Boer War on the republican side, but in spite of the fears of officials the burghers showed no signs of giving trouble in any way.³⁶ Even when a depression led some families to emigrate to Tanganyika, a resident wrote to warn readers of *De Transvaaler* against such a move, as "the German Government is not nearly like the English Government . . . the laws of the German Government are unbearable to anyone who has been under English rule."³⁷ A fair comment on Afrikaner political feelings in Enkeldoorn up to 1905 would be that they reflected the varying shades of Afrikaner opinion in the South African colonies and republics and not a single stereotype, and that the Afrikaners' remoteness from other such communities, and the terms under which they entered the country tended to reduce these feelings to virtual insignificance.

In any case the history of the Afrikaner population of Enkeldoorn and the farms nearby was only a part of the history of Charter District after the rebellions. The problems of resettling the African polities of Maromo, Sango and Mutekedza which had been defeated in battle, the future relations with the chiefdoms that had stayed neutral or collaborated with the Europeans, and the extent to which the great land grants made to Sir John Willoughby's concerns and other land companies by the Jameson administration were to be recognised, occupied the Government to a much greater extent. The local official who had to deal with all these questions was Native Commis-

sioner Taylor, whose service at the Range until 1901 laid the foundations of the present division of African and European land in Charter District today. Taylor had an enormous task when he resumed his administration, and it was necessary for him to be allocated an assistant from 1897 to 1898. His first task was to supervise the surrenders and to check on rumours of more risings. Thus he interviewed chiefs anxious to profess their loyalty, including some whom he subsequently arrested and held or punished.³⁸ Every effort was made to collect guns from those involved in the rebellion, and efforts were made to arrest the killers of the initial period of fighting until a circular was issued in December 1898 which ordered the Native Commissioners not to continue.³⁹ The Native Commissioner was also expected to supervise the collection of grain by Company traders who bought large quantities for the troops engaged in the fighting in Hartley, Mazoe and Salisbury Districts.⁴⁰ Charter also supplied the rebels with food, Mashayamombe sending convoys to collect grain as late as July 1897.⁴¹

Taylor's principal problem was that of settling the refugees from the dispersed clans of Mutekedza, Maromo and the mountains to the west of the district. Daily, families came to the Range to hand in their guns and surrender, and it was Taylor's responsibility to locate them on a suitable piece of ground. It was Company policy to put such surrendered people on land away from their traditional hilltop strongholds, because another rising was feared. As early as 4 October 1896 Taylor was demanding to be told "what definite plans the Company have made regarding Native Reserves, so that I can act on them, and now is the time this should be carried out."⁴² Taylor was worried that it might be too late to sow crops on the 'locations' if he did not act at once. In the end he seems to have acted on his own initiative and forwarded an account of what he had done for subsequent approval. Some ex-rebel villages were left where they were because there was no time to move them. Even such places as Sango's where resistance had been strong were left alone until 1898.⁴³ The most urgent cases were those groups that had lost their chiefs, Mutekedza and Maromo. On 4 October 1896 Taylor began to choose sites for locations and by 19 October he had chosen a location for half of Mutekedza's Hera, a spot just north of Gabajena's, west of the Victoria road.⁴⁴ By March 1897 he had two locations, 'Masugandoro' and 'Matshimbudzana', which became the nuclei of the present-day Manyeni and Narira Trust Lands respectively.⁴⁵ When

the 7th Hussars and the British South Africa Police attacked the rebels in the Mwanesi Range in November 1896 and January 1897 many refugees came to surrender at the Range and were located in the two main "Reserves" as the locations came to be called. They had to stay there until the end of the fighting, and many remained in Manyeni and Narira permanently. The result was that when the Ngezi Reserve was surveyed in 1903 it covered 37,500 acres but held only 396 people.⁴⁶ Meanwhile the central reserves were becoming seriously overcrowded. Gabajena's old lands and the 'Masugandoro' location covered about the area of the present Manyeni Trust Land. East of the main road Taylor allocated all land between the Nyazwidzi and Sabi rivers up to a line from the Range to Mount Wedza for African occupation, but although this left most of the Hera country to European ownership the African land was to be reduced even further in later years.⁴⁷

The question of land occupation became vital from the moment that the farmers returned to the land, and by a tragic irony those Shona most affected were those who had been loyal or neutral during the rebellion, for the ex-rebels had been moved to the reserves. For example on Lategan's "Hugosfontein" and "Veeplaats" farms were the five kraals of Huchu, the brother of the important loyal chief Chirumanzu. In December 1899 Huchu told Taylor that "he was very short of food . . . as the demand and supply of labour to the farms left a lot of his ground unsown and the consequence was that he was short of grain every year." Taylor's detective confirmed that there was real hunger in Huchu's village.⁴⁸ Although it can be proved that more farms were occupied in 1898 than in 1896, this increase does not seem to have affected the resident Africans at once. Some preferred to stay where they were for the time being, but the demand for rent or labour by the farmers gradually produced a reaction like that of the chief who, on being told "that he and some of his people were living on private farms and that the owners desired the payment of rent, he replied that he and his people knew and recognised the Government only, and if the farmer desired revenue no doubt the trees and stones on the farm would provide that. [for] he and his people would move to a Reserve."⁴⁹ The prospect of such a move was not such an absolute hardship to a Shona clan at that time, because although 'ancestral lands' were mentioned earlier it should not be forgotten that migrations to new land were not uncommon in the past. Maromo's Dzete people came originally from the Mangwendi-Mrewa

area. The question was whether the Reserves were big enough. Nobody had then foreseen the 'population explosion' but even at the turn of the century available land was limited. That is to say, it was limited if one accepted the full claims of the Company's most favoured "farmer", Sir John Willoughby. Unfortunately, that is exactly what the Company did.

In 1899 the agent of Willoughby's Mashonaland Central African Estates started to collect a rent from the villages on that vast tract of land,⁵⁰ but the real trouble lay in the Wiltshire and Lancashire Estates to the east. Taylor's eastern "location" of 1896 had been expanded into the proposed Narira and Sabi Reserves, bounded by a line from the Range to Mount Wedza. This included some of the high country pegged by Willoughby's company. Taylor wanted some of this for the Africans because the lower angle between the Sabi and the Nyazwidzi was badly watered and some better planting land nearer to the watershed was needed.⁵¹ However, when Taylor requested permission to take the area he wanted for a Reserve he was told that he could only take the land not pegged by Willoughby's Exploring Lands and Minerals Company.⁵² By 1902 this company had begun to demand rent from villages still on their main estates, and to enforce its payment. Native Commissioner Posselt realised that the Manyeni Reserve could not easily take people from the Wiltshire Estate, because it already held 3,600 people although it had only been intended for 3,000. He therefore tried to get a strip of land on the Wiltshire Estate as an additional reserve for those who could not or would not pay rent. The Chief Native Commissioner Taberer recommended this grant but Milton, the Administrator, felt differently: "I am not prepared to purchase land for these people, nor, generally, to increase the area of existing reserves. There are vast areas reserved in the Victoria District and the Reserves in Hartley alone are sufficient for the whole native population."⁵³ The Exploring Lands and Minerals Company then threatened to sue the Africans on the land if they did not pay rent, and so Posselt tried to promote the offer of some Headmen to buy land from Willoughby.⁵⁴ To this the

Government replied that this was not the concern of the Native Department. In 1900 the Sabi, Narira and Manyeni Reserves covered an estimated 454,000 acres, of which some were of poor quality as noted above, and had a population of 32,823.⁵⁵ By 1963 when the Wiltshire and Lancashire Estates (formerly Willoughby's) were bought for the African people, they covered 346,200 acres, but their African population had shrunk to 2,610.⁵⁶ If it had not been for the huge grants of land made to men such as Willoughby, overcrowding would not have become such a problem in the Reserves.

Some conclusions can be drawn from the facts given above in this article, although there remains much work to be done on the area. First, Charter District is one of the few areas involved in the rising in 1896 that possessed a large European farming community. Yet there is no definite connection between the occupation of farms and the rising, for some occupied areas were neutral or loyalist, and the biggest rebel polity, Mutekedza's, was not really touched by European farmers' claims. Moreover, there is little indication that the Afrikaner farmers of the area had done enough work to disturb the people on whose lands they had settled. This suggests that the occupation of farms and the presence of European farmers were not a major cause of rebellion. On the other hand a second conclusion can be drawn, that although the boundaries claimed by the farmers or land companies were ephemeral in 1896, the fact that they existed on paper and that the first African reserves were only hasty creations intended to deal with the refugee problem caused by the fighting of 1896-7, meant that today's division of land in Charter between Africans and Europeans is based upon such factors as Selous' choice of a road, the Company's generous allowances of land to settlers and speculators, and the chances of war. Finally one can see that although the early Afrikaner farmers of Enkeldoorn were neither homogenous nor politically conscious their experiences of 1896 gave them a common heritage that may perhaps be found among their descendants in the area today.

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Abbreviations are used as follows:

A.	Assistant
Ag.	Acting
Admin.	Administrator
BAR.	British Army in Rhodesia

BSA Co.	British South Africa Company
BSAP.	British South Africa Police
C.	Chief
Comm.	Commandant

F.C.	Field-Cornet	R.M.	Resident Magistrate
GOC.	General Officer Commanding	Sec.	Secretary
Gov Rep.	Government Representative	Sec. NA.	Secretary for Native Affairs
NC.	Native Commissioner	Surv-Gen	Surveyor-General
OC.	Officer Commanding	UCR.	University College of Rhodesia
PP.	Public Prosecutor		

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