Zambczia (19/8), VI (ii).SMALL-SCALE FREEHOLD AS A MODEL FOR COMMERCIALAGRICULTURE IN RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE*ANGELA P. CHEATERDepartment of Sociology, University of RhodesiaIN FIRST DECIDING on the title of this paper, I had in mind a straight-forward cost-benefit analysis of the African Purchase Lands, setting thecosts of their establishment against their productivity, from their inceptionto the present, in an attempt to quantify impressions of their success. As soonas I started collecting data for this purpose, however, insuperable difficultiespresented themselves. National production figures were available only from1969. Costing direct Government financing of the physical infrastructure(roads, bridges, water supplies, fencing, diptanks, afforestation, soil conserva-tion measures) proved impossible beyond 1950 (see Table I). Estimating thecosts of extension work was likewise impossible. Although accurate figuresfor loans to A.P.L. farmers from the African Loan and Development Trustwere obtained from 1969 (sec Table II), the existence of other financingagencies (including the earlier African Loan and Development Company, theAfrican Development Fund and its precursor the Native Development Fund,the Land and Agricultural Bank, the Agricultural Finance Corporation, andcommercial banks and hire purchase companies) precluded the estimation oftotal loan-finance inputs. The attempt to weigh the costs of establishingmarketing institutions against the use made of these by A.P.L. farmers, finallyconvinced me that the proposed exercise was simply not feasible.At this point of maximum frustration, I was involved in a workshoporganized by the Rhodcsian Institute of Agricultural Extension to considerthe greater effectiveness of extension work among peasant farmers in theTribal Trust Lands. In the course of these discussions, it struck me that therewas an urgent need to examine, on a national level, the inter-relationshipsamong control over land, security of landholders, and productivity. I there-fore abandoned my previous efforts to investigate the A.P.L. sectorintensively, and switched my attention to a general but hopefully systematicexamination of possible forms and variations of landholding in this countryin the future.* This is an edited version of a paper delivered to the Fourth Rhodesian ScienceCongress in September, 1977. I am grateful to R. Clark and R. S. Roberts for providingme with statistical information and advice on where to find it, respectively, as well asto C. Brand, G. Chavunduka, G. Cheater, P. Gradvvcll and G. Kahari for their com-ments and criticisms on the paper as a whole. Final responsibility for opinions anderrors is, of course, mine.117118SMALL-SCALE FREEHOLD AS A MODELTable IDIRECT GOVERNMENT FINANCING OF PURCHASE LANDINFRASTRUCTURE*Year19311932193319341935193619371938193919401941194219431944194519461947194819491950TOTALGRANDWaterSupplies1 2993 2919 58610 30511 94413 94615 45617 13119 53322 67823 82033 23733 97358 49869 43880 80678 180120 0007 ###?623 121TOTAL : £796SoilConservationŠŠŠŠ_ŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠŠ19411 21314 670?26 077679 = Rh$lFencing64407423423560_6068609295075995965966386491 1498832 3402 33114 560593 358Dip tanks Affor-estation247 Š357 Š756 Š97?77?77Ł)7777##Š 30Š 261 360+ 56Roads andBridgesŠ1052002783956459201 227139218222 4993 5144 7086 56412 64014 86717 48022 97539 274131 505* Source: Southern Rhodesia, The annual estimates of revenue and of expenditurepublished as parliamentary papers (C.S.R. series); for a listing see, under year,F. M. G. Willson and G. C. Passmore, Catalogue of Parliamentary Papers of SouthernRhodesia, 1899-1953 (Salisbury, Univ. Coll. of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1965).** 83 diptanks transferred to Trust Administration.*** No longer separate votes, became part of consolidated revenue vote.One may argue, of course, that such an examination of landholdingpossibilities is irrelevant and time-wasting, because tenure patterns are quitelikely to be defined as a political issue and determined from an ideologicalperspective rather than with productivity prominently in mind. This possi-bility certainly exists: one would be foolish to ignore it. But other factorsalso require consideration. From the perspective of peasant motivation andreaction, historical precedent and possible profit are, if anything, moreimportant than ideology. Both D. Feldman (1969) and R. Feldman (1974)*- >ANGELA P. CHEATERTable II.119TOTAL SHORT-TERM LOANS EXTENDED TO A.P.L. FARMERS BYTHE AFRICAN LOAN AND DEVELOPMENT TRUST, 1969-77 (Rh$)SeasonTotal Amount1969-701970-11971-21972-31973-41974-51975-61976-71977-8197 000214 000254 000273 000300 000507 000432 000725 000900 000*TOTAL3 802 000* Anticipated.have shown that, in Tanzania, ideologies imposed from above may be sub-verted by peasants with an individualized concern for their own well-being.Such a concern arises at least partly from past experience in the colonialsystem. It is therefore legitimate and indeed necessary to examine possibilitiesthat have their main roots in the experience of the past eighty years in thiscountry.I therefore begin from the premise that individualized landholding forthe purposes of conrniercial agriculture has long been accepted in this country;and that if it is So fulfil its agricultural potential within the region of south-central Africa, as a major exporter of both food and cash crops,Rhodesia-Zimbabwe should consider as a matter of urgency land reformbased on individual tenure.Land reform may be considered from at least two angles. Firstly, indeveloping agricultural economies, there is the concern to ensure that allwho need it have access to land for subsistence without incurring rentcharges: this 1 shall refer to as the redistribution perspective. Secondly, withexplicit emphasis on productivity, there is the concern to prevent a decline,if not actually stimulate an increase, in the production of both food staplesand export crops. In practice it appears difficult, if not impossible, toreconcile these differing objectives, particularly when land reform is under-taken in densely-populated territories, where ensuring survival for themajority of the (voting) population is a prime political consideration. OneAfrican exception to this general rule is, of course, Kenya; and given thehistorical similarities between Kenya and this country, the Kenyan model oflandholding merits attention.Divided during the colonial period into the 'scheduled' (European-owned) and African areas, independent Kenya has opted for the individualiza-tion of holdings throughout the country, thus extending the model of the120SMALL-SCALE FREEHOLD AS A MODEL'scheduled' area into previously tribal, land. Many of the previouslyEuropean-owned farms in the highlands have been retained intact as large-scale farms under individual or sometimes collective ownership, to retainthe advantages of economies of scale in production. Others have beensub-divided into smaller units based on varying population densities: thethree smaller types average approximately 100-250 acres, 30 acres, and 5-10acres respectively. This last figure is similar to the majority of holdings inthe previously 'tribal' areas, in which the Swynncrton Plan, initiated in the1950s, is still being implemented. Irrespective of their varying sizes, allland parcels in Kenya are registered as individual, freehold farms once theirboundaries have finally been determined by survey.In Rhodesia at present, landholdings of the approximate sizes of theKenyan model already exist, complicated by racial distribution notwith-standing the Land Tenure Amendment Act No. 22 of 1977. Plots of 5-10acres are characteristic of the Tribal Trust Lands and are held generally ona communal basis, except for those individualized holdings allocated between1951 and 1962 in terms of the Land Husbandry Act of 1951. European-ownedsmallholdings averaging roughly 30 acres exist in the near vicinity of largetowns and cities, in relatively small numbers. Medium-sized farms of 100-250acres in the A.P.L.s are owned by Blacks, while large-scale farms of over 750acres are currently the preserve, almost exclusively, of Whites. With theexception of communally-held land in the tribal areas and irrigation plotsheld on short-term lease only, all other landholdings may be held in freeholddeed (of grant or transfer) Š which, of course, implies the possibility oflease as well.Indeed, one of the main problems associated with freehold, namelyabsentee landlordism, already exists as a result of the leasehold possibility,and affects particularly the large-scale, White-owned farms. By 1974, thisproblem had become so acute that the Rhodesian Front Government obtainedparliamentary approval, in the Agricultural Land Settlement Amendment Act(No. 29 of 1974) for the right of the State to appropriate and re-leastunworked farmland that had already passed into individual ownership. Oneprecedent thus already exists for re-allocation of land which, in the future,will be necessary on a much larger scale. The question thus arises: how maysuch rc-allocation, involving sub-division, be achieved without causingecological degradation and in the interests of increased productivity?My own opinion is that it would be a grave error for this country toadopt what I have called the redistribution perspective on land reform, andto sub-divide existing large-scale farms into high-density plots in a partialattempt to relieve existing pressure on certain land areas. Such a solution,because it docs not take into account the development process, is at besttemporary and palliative, and may be expected to extend existing problemsinto the future. Instead, I would suggest that some large holdings be brokendown into medium-sized farms and smallholdings, initially converting onequarter of all large farms into these intermediate categories in the ratio of< -4.ANGELA P. CHEATER.121sixteen smallholdings for every medium-sized farm created, to produce apattern of land distribution over the various types of holding similar to thatTable IIIDISTRIBUTION OF LANDHOLDINGS OF VARIOUS SIZES*Existing6 0008 500( 14 000 potential)?660 000(estimated)674 500Categorylarge-scale farmsabove 750 acresmedium-sized farms100-350 acressmallholdings25-30 acreshigh-density plotsup to 10 acresTOTALProposed4 50028 000230 000450 000712 500* Figures arc the nation:il average and include regional and ecological variations.Each high-density plot is assumed to support a household averaging at least six persons.reflected in Table III. I must emphasize that this suggestion is merely a firststep, an immediate re-allocation. Over time, it will be necessary to convertadditional large-scale farms into smallholdings in order to meet demandsfrom that part of the population now under age, since my initial estimatesconcerning re-allocation are based on existing households and take no accountof future projections.It goes almost without saying, of course, that re-allocation of land anda switch to nation-wide freehold cannot, of themselves, be expected toproduce miracles in the way of increased productivity. Indeed, before ruralland is touched, residential urban land must be converted to freehold; if theurban end of the development continuum is not given this precedence,agricultural land reform may be expected to encounter precisely the samedifficulties of implementation as did the Land Husbandry Act, whenthousands of urban workers who perceived themselves to be insecure intown sireamed back to the country to ensure that they retained what ruralsecurity they had for their old age. Furthermore, inl'vastructural improvementsin transport and communications, marketing and pricing policies, literacyprogrammes, increases in the quantity and quality of extension advice, andmore credit for small producers, must all be undertaken concurrently withland reform, if development is to occur.Given the costs, direct and indirect, of my suggestion for immediatere-nibeaLon of some ten million acres of farmland and the conversion of allholdings IO freehold, my justification for these suggestions revolves arounda 'peopled viewpoint*. The remainder of this paper will be concerned withvarious aspects of this view: farm size in relation to development andproduciiviiy; producer motivation; cultural values.122SMALL-SCALE FREEHOLD AS A MODELMy major reason for recommending against re-allocation to high-densityplots of up to ten acres, is that such holdings, cannot guarantee more than asubsistence living to those working them. Subsistence cultivation, in turn,tends to reinforce existing sources of social and economic security, particu-larly large families, which are problematic in the development process. Suchholdings should, therefore, be seen as a 'residual employer' in the nationaleconomy, rather than as the normal way of life for a majority of thepopulation. If we assume for the moment that development will permit risingstandards of living for the majority, such high-density plots may, eventually,be amalgamated into larger, more productive units through the operation ofa land market. At our present level of development, therefore, policy shouldbe oriented towards providing greater security for and increased produc-tivity among a substantial proportion of current subsistence producers, inorder to stimulate the process of development itself.For this reason, the importance of indivisible smallholdings, orientedeither to intensive crop or to intensive (small) livestock production andworkable by family labour, cannot be over-emphasized. Lipton (1977) holdsthat such units constitute a preferred size for ensuring equity and produc-tivity in primarily agricultural countries the world over. Clough (1968) andSteele (1972) note that the smallholdings in Kenya produce the greatestreturn per acre and are, therefore, the size of holding most likely toyield productivity increases in the short term. Indirect evidence from small-holdings half the proposed size (some 10-15 acres) in some of the A.P.L.s inthis country confirm impressionistically that such holdings are both produc-tive and easily manageable for the person with subsistence experience only.Smallholdings promise visible improvement in living standards, whileremaining within peasant management experience: an appealing motivationto greater productivity in the transition to a commercial farming orientation.However, by virtue of their restricted size, smallholdings can neverbecome purely commercial farms oriented entirely to production for thenational market, nor can they support cattle without special arrangements(save, perhaps, one cow for household milk requirements). If such small-holdings are to become the focus for rural development effort in the mediumterm, then, it is important to consider what arrangements could be made toaccommodate livestock, given that cattle are so important to peasants in thiscountry, for social and ritual as well as economic purposes. One possibilitylies in grazing commonages similar to those in high-density farming areasat present. The alternative of co-operative feedlots, presupposing as it doesa primarily commercial orientation to cattle, might initially be less popular,despite its advantages of economies of scale for the market production ofbeef, because it overlooks the banking function that cattle currently perform.Hence some combination of commonage and feedlot is probably the mostfeasible solution in the short term. Some workable solution must be devised,however, preferably in consultation with peasant farmers, in advance of anyland reform exercise.JANGELA P. CHEATER.123Given the disadvantages of size of both high-density plots and small-holdings for commercial production, it is essential for the national economy,particularly in the short term, that export-oriented production continues onmedium and large-scale farms. However, large farms currently tend to beunder-used and the available data suggest that medium-sized farms produce,in value terms per unit area, a comparable output to large-scale farms(Cheater, 1974, pp.15, 8S-9). Clark (1976) records that production perhectare among these A.P.L. farmers, to whom the African Loan and Develop-ment Trust has extended short-term credit, is valued at RhS 14,30 on acredit base of Rh$5,60. These figures compare with RhS21,60 on a creditbase of RhS7,10 per hectare on large-scale, European-owned farms. Hence itseems both sensible and efficient to invest resources for commercial produc-tion in medium-sized holdings, since they are almost as efficient, at leastamong the better farmers, as large farms, while not incurring the sameabsolute costs in achieving similar economies of scale. The productivity ofmedium-sized farms, as well as their current scarcity, is reflected in freemarket prices of between Rh$20 and Rh$25 per acre for these farming units.An immediate doubling of the (potential) number of these farms can thereforebe expected to have a positive effect on national agricultural output, althoughone would be foolhardy to attempt, an estimate of the quantitative increasewithout considerably more data on current production than are readilyavailable.Perhaps more important than immediate production increases, however,would be the longer-term effects on producer motivation that these suggestionsmight have, by lifting (though not removing entirely) existing constraints onproduction that arise from pressure on the land in the peasant sector. Oncethe existing pressure is relieved, not only does an improved standard of livingappear feasible to the peasant producer, but development within the high-density, subsistence base, starting with assured security of tenure throughfreehold, becomes a more realistic objective than it is under present circum-stances.In seeking to relieve this population pressure on the land, however, thecreation of nearly a quarter of a million smallholdings and doubling thenumber of medium-sized farms may not in itself be sufficient. In particular,in re-allocating large farms, we must consider the position of those peoplecurrently living and working on such units. At present, approximately one-fifth of the total Black population of this country resides on European-ownedfarms. In addition, an unknown but significant number of families (somecalculations put this figure as high as 20 per cent of all potentially independenthouseholds) in the Tribal Trust Lands de jure are landless, although de factothey may be working portions of kinsmen's fragmented land. Together, theselandless categories may comprise 100 000 household units, possibly evenmore. Therefore, unless we are to re-allocate additional large farms to high-density plots to accommodate these people, we must assume that they will124SMALL-SCALE FREEHOLD AS A MODELneed employment. Some may indeed find v/ork on new medium-sized hold-ings, and some may drift to town. But I would suggest that the majority,having experience in agricultural production, might best be employed onState farming corporations. While not in favour of sub-dividing more largefarms than is absolutely necessary, I see no reason why some agri-businessesshould not be owned and managed by the State, perhaps initially on anexperimental basis. Here I am emphatically not suggesting State co-operativefarming, which failed in Zambia (Lombard, 1971), but a system of Statemanagement, with a statutory minimum wage for workers and conditionswhich would include satisfactory welfare benefits and provision for retire-ment, as well as profit-sharing incentives to increase productivity.In the suggestions made so far, there has been a fundamental assumptionthat increased production, in the early days of development, is best promotedby encouraging production differentials through the land tenure system itself.This premise stands in direct contradiction to the view that land allocationshould be strictly controlled by the State, in a rationing system that willprevent the emergence of gross inequalities in the society as a whole. My ownview is governed, not by political ideals, but by the recognition that, ulti-mately, it is the producers who are responsible for, who cause, development.In turn, this premise can be broken down, to include:(1) the recognition that people should be given the freedom to choose whatrole they wish to play in national production: indeed, if this basicfreedom is not recognized, peasant producers will assume it anyway,thereby sabotaging planned production targets;(2) the importance of secure tenure to the small-scale producer, in someform of individual control over land and other instruments of produc-tion;(3) the necessity to provide positive incentives, in the form of increasedeconomic rewards, to the more capable producers in order to stimulatefurther productivity increments.However, in incorporating the producer's viewpoint into my assumptions,I have not accepted that inequalities should be allowed to develop unchecked.Explicitly in the case of the suggestions 1 have outlined in this paper, Ibelieve that a graduated land tax is essential, both to stimulate production(in order to pay the tax) and to remove enormous disparities in productivewealth. Such a land tax is more likely to achieve a measure of egalitariangrowth than is, for example, a levy system on production, partly because itdoes not penalize the successful producers and partly because it can beabsorbed, as a status indicator, into indigenous social organization. It is, ofcourse, well beyond the scope of this exercise to consider the mechanics ofimplementing such taxation proposals, or even the refinement of the taxationsystem itself: all I am concerned with here is basic policy.The importance of the views and wishes of producers in the develop-ment process cannot, I believe, be overstressed. If the producers are ignoredand their views deemed irrelevant, no amount of ideological commitment atANGELA P. CHEATER.125the top will be sufficient to ensure reasonably equitable modernization ofthe economy. One must allow the people, especially the peasants who con-stitute the majority of our population, latitude to make decisions based ontheir personal interests and related to their adaptation to specific localenvironments, both ecological and social. They will make such decisionsanyway, irrespective of policies and ideologies formulated at the centre; ifone is genuinely concerned to prevent the growth of glaring inequalities, onemust recognize this fundamental fact and, if necessary, abandon ideology infavour of pragmatic response to expressed opinions among the people. Iemphasize this point because, as a research anthropologist among farmers, Iwas struck by the gap between what Government believes (or purports tobelieve) about A.P.L. farmers and what the farmers themselves say.Among farmers in Msengezi A.P.L., for example, the single mostimportant reason given for buying a freehold farm was a desire for security:a secure home for retirement; a secure home for children; security of free-hold; security against resettlement; security for ageing parents. Theimportance of this security factor in its various forms reflects, firstly, thefundamental insecurity of work and residence in colonial towns; secondly, arejection of tribal systems, with their own particular modes of ensuringsecurity which are enshrined in social relationships; and, thirdly, theproblems which have arisen over the last forty years from the nationaldistribution of land, especially under the Land Apportionment and LandTenure Acts. This desire for freehold security is reflected in the escalatingfree-market prices paid for A.P.L. farms to which title has already beengranted, now more than ten times the original alienation price paid to thestate. The attraction of these farms is also confirmed by other researchers(Hughes, 1974; Kay, 1971; Weinrich, 1975).Nor is the concept of individualized freehold, found in the A.P.L.s, asremote from customary land tenure as is generally believed. Particularly inareas of high population density, in which agriculture had become effectivelysedentary rather than shifting, Shona-speaking people recognized the right ofthe eldest son de jacio to inherit his father's land (although land did notfigure in the inheritance ceremony), which represents a departure from themore usual practice of allowing a deceased 'estate of usufruct' to revert tothe common village pool for re-allocation by the headman. The inheritance ofland in this manner, which is fairly common in Africa, represents the firststep in the individualization process. Perhaps this incipient individualizationof tenure in the customary system goes some way towards explaining whythe majority of Africans, including chiefs, who presented verbal evidence tothe Land Commission in 1924-25, were in favour of the freehold systemembodied in the proposed Native Purchase Areas. Some, indeed, were quiteprepared to buy their own tribal land! Certainly such attitudes must be themain explanation for the indemnity payments made by new holders to thoserelinquishing tribal plots, recorded in the Buhera district in the laic 1940s byHolieman U968). The sale of individualized arable and grazing ri^his126SMALL-SCALE FREEHOLD AS A MODELacquired under the Land Husbandry Act (Holleman, 1968), also suggests aready acceptance of freehold and its implication of market transactions inland.Nor, indeed, is this acceptance of individualized tenure surprising, forit was precisely the individual control over land which underlay the ethic of'primitive capitalism' in precolonial society. Wealth was accumulated, inmany African societies, by investing production surpluses in labour units inthe form of additional wives, who then generated increased surpluses. Thisstrategy explicitly associates control over increasingly large landholdingswith increasing capital (in the form of wives and children). The importanceof land as the basic means of production and of generating capital, is alsoreflected in traditional Shona songs and proverbs. Thus in the precolonialeconomy, production differentials were accepted and reflected in the specialterm, hurudza, for the outstandingly successful farmer. Only when productiondifferentials grew to unacceptable proportions did certain levelling mechan-isms come into play to distribute wealth more evenly. One reason for thisacceptance of differentials was the Shona emphasis, in folklore, proverbsand stories, on hard work as the route to success, coupled with the recognitionthat not everyone worked equally hard.VŁiCONCLUSIONThe suggestions in this paper are made with a view to provoking thought onthe very important issue of land allocation and use in the short term in thiscountry. The assumptions underlying these suggestions are broadly compatibleboth with precolonial practice and with the contemporary views of Blackagriculturalists themselves, while taking into account the historical back-ground to existing tenure patterns and the precedents that this history hasestablished. It is vital to the country's future economic stability that it realizesits potential productive role as major food supplier in the regional economy ofsouth-central Africa. In this respect, the Kenyan example is instructive, forKenya has become one of the most successful agricultural producers on theAfrican continent since attaining its independence (Sinclair, 1968), usingsimilar landholding patterns on a similar historical base to the suggestionsmade here.Obviously, if landholding is defined as a political issue of fundamentalimportance to the creation of a socialist Zimbabwe, at one level these sug-gestions become redundant. Nevertheless, the underlying assumptions Šindigenous values and historical precedent Š will exist irrespective ofcentral ideologies and policies and, as a pragmatist concerned with develop-ment, I would recommend that peasant perspectives be incorporated intoplanning, whoever does it. Otherwise plans will fail.ANGELA P. CHEATERReferences,127BROKENSHA, D. 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