Zambezia (1979), VII (ii).ESSAY REVIEWTIME SUSPENDED: THE QUENET REPORTAND WHITE RACIAL DOMINANCE IN RHODESIAIN FEBRUARY 1979 Rhodesia officially became a 'non-racial' society. Legisla-tion, enacted earlier by the Rhodesian Parliament, went into effect at thatdate which abolished the Land Tenure Act and prohibited segregation anddiscrimination in public schools, hospitals, housing and public places.Many of these changes were recommended earlier in June 1976 by the Com-mission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination, but others went beyond theCommission's proposals.1Although it might appear that the Commission's proposals provided theimpetus for these changes, such a conclusion is largely unwarranted. Initiallythe Commission's major recommendations were rejected by the Govern-ment; and the recent changes, along with the new Constitution that providesfor Black majority rule, are the consequence of three other factors: thechanging power relationship of Black and White groups within Rhodesia;the continued escalation of the civil war; and the 'internationalization' ofthe Rhodesian conflict.The Quenet Report, however, does have a historical significance in atleast two ways: firstly, it forced the Government and White population torecognize that racial discrimination was the basis for African opposition;and, secondly, as a document it vividly illustrates how White racial beliefs,reflected in the Commission members and their recommendations, preventedtheir recognition or acknowledgement of the necessity for abolishing Whiteprivilege and accepting a constitutional restructuring that would lead toBlack majority rule. Some of these changes have now occurred, but theyhave been precipitated by the factors noted above and not because of a changein White beliefs. Indeed, the tenacity of White racial beliefs, translated subtlyin terms of White power and privilege, persist even in the recent 'non-racial'legislation and new Constitution. It is for this reason that the Quenet Re-port Š and the responses to it Š merit closer scrutiny.Established in 1975 under the chairmanship of Sir Vincent Quenet,the Commission was instructed by Parliament to investigate racial practicesin Rhodesia and 'advise Government of those cases or aspects of discrimina-tion which are no longer considered desirable and necessary'. In its finalReport, the Commission proposed changes in land tenure and franchisepolicies and the abolition of several discriminatory practices, noting mostspecifically that the Land Tenure Act was 'the main cause of friction be-tween the races'.2' Rhodesia, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination(Sessional Papers, Cmd. R.R.6, 1976) [Chairman: Sir Vincent Quenet; hereafter citedas Quenet, Report!.= Ibid., 9.243244 ESSAY REVIEWOpposition to the Quenet Report surfaced immediately, and bothAfrican nationalists and right-wing Whites (including some members of theruling Rhodesian Front) opposed the Commission's recommendations. Thenationalists, who had earlier refused to give testimony before the Commission,rejected the proposals as irrelevant. The only significant issue, they claimed,was that of majority rule, and the Commission had ignored that. Whitecritics opposed the recommedations as a 'sell-out' to Black rule and as arepudiation of the Rhodesian Front's founding principle: namely, the pre-servation of White power.There was an irony Š as well as a historical truth Š to the criticismthat the R.F. would be discarding its basic principles if it accepted the re-commendations. For, in 1962.the Rhodesian Front won the election byadamantly opposing virtually identical proposals put forward by the rulingUnited Federal Party. In that election the U.F.P. proposed 'the repeal ofexisting racially discriminatory laws which are either unnecessary or areunfair' and called for the abolition of the Land Apportionment Act becauseof its discriminatory nature.3 The White electorate rejected the incumbentparty and supported (as they have done since) a party dedicated to theprinciple of continued White rule Š 'in perpetuity' as some Rhodesian Frontmembers later promised.Thus the White critics of the Quenet Report (including, among others,R.F. parliamentry backbenchers who subsequently split with the partyover proposed changes to the Land Tenure Act) were historically correct:acceptance of the Quenet recommendations by the R.F. placed it squarelyin line (though for different reasons) with U.F.P. policy in 1962. Thus,it could be argued that history was repeating itself or had gone full circle.What seems most evident, however, is that the Rhodesian Front (and theWhite electorate), opposed to Black majority rule, attempted from 1962onwards to arrest or suspend time and thereby preserve White supremacyand privilege. In this effort they were successful for a period of time. Blacknationalism was briefly contained, but events since 1974, commencingespecially with the Portuguese withdrawal from Mocambique and Angola,forced the Rhodesian Front to adopt new strategies in an effort to curtail thenationalist movement and preserve White rule.4 The establishment of theQuenet Commission was a part of that strategy. However, some of theproposals for change, minor as they were, threatened White power and were,as a consequence, initially rejected by the Government.8 More significantly,what is evident in the Quenet proposals is that they clearly reflected Whiteracial beliefs, and even if fully implemented would lead to continued Whitedominance and privilege.Rhodesian Front strategies since 1962, including its support for a fewof the Quenet recommendations, had as their intent the preservation ofWhite power and privilege. Even if credence were given to the Govern-ment's contention that preservation of 'civilized standards' and 'merit' were8 Quoted in L. Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press^ 1973), 34.* D. G. Baker, 'The impact of regional events on Whites in Rhodesia and SouthAfrica', Plural Societies (Spring 1979, in press), X; and R. W. Johnson, How LongWill South Africa Survive? (London, Macmillan, 1977), ch. 1, 5-8.»The proposals that the Rhodesian Front accepted and rejected are discussedlater in the essay.D. G. BAKER 245its primary objective, the cultural and racial values implicit in its policiesand the Quenet Report are those of the dominant White minority culture.The fundamental issue is and always has been that of power, of who shouldcontrol government and thereby determine the character of the society andthe allocation of power, resources and privilege. Power in Rhodesia has re-mained in the hands of Whites who, even though they constitute less thanfive per cent of the total population, have historically developed and con-trolled the political, economic and social structures as a means of pre-serving White rule.6Through their control of these structures Whites preserved their pre-eminent position of power and privilege, modifying and adapting structuresand policies at different periods whenever necessary to keep Africans power-less and dependent. At most, Whites occasionally made minor concessionsto Blacks as a way of muting discontent. But the concessions never en-dangered White power, and the result was a society based on Whitecultural (including racial) beliefs. Following the Second World War,the rise of African nationalism prompted Southern Rhodesia to embracethe Central African Federation as one device for preserving White powerboth there and in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. But when Africannationalist pressures intensified and the British Government acceeded toBlack majority rule in the two territories, Southern Rhodesian Whitesresponded by rejecting the U.F.P. 'middle-class strategy' for incorporating'civilized' Blacks (itself a tactic for thwarting Black majority rule) andembraced an R.F. party dedicated to preserving White rule.7Rhodesian Front policy, though termed non-racial, moved slowly to-ward the racially encapsulated society found in South Africa. To preventintervention by a British Government that supported Black rule, SouthernRhodesia opted for secession from the Commonwealth and U.D.I. to protectits system of racial dominance. The policies of the ruling party thereafterhad as their rationale the preservation of White power and privilege. Butpressures, both external and internal, later forced the Government to copewith rising nationalist opposition and a civil war. As one means of placatingracial discontent, the Prime Minister in 1975 appointed the Quenet Commis-sion to investigate and propose to the Government policies for the elimina-tion of 'unnecessary' racially-discriminatory measures.The rationale for the Quenet Commission appears evident. Establishedto make recommendations for the removal of discriminatory practices 'nolonger considered desirable and necessary', the appointment of the Commis-sion was the Government's technique for muting mounting criticism of racialpractices and for arresting the movement toward Black nationalist groups.Changes, it believed, might lessen both external and internal criticism ofR.F. policy; and Government spokesmen even suggested that these changesmight prompt the removal of international economic and political sanctionsagainst Rhodesia.e M. W. Murphree, 'Race and power in Rhodesia', in D. G. Baker (ed.), Politicsof Race: Comparative Studies (Westmead, D.G. Heath, 1975), 245-76; M. W. Murphreeand D. G. Baker, 'Racial Discrimination in Rhodesia', in W. Veenhoven (ed.), CaseStudies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Vol. 5. (The Hague, MartinusNijhoff, 197Q), 377-413; and D. G. Baker, 'Race and power: Comparative approachesto the analysis of race relations', Ethnic and Racial Studies (1978), I, 317-35.7 Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia, ch. 2-3.246 ESSAY REVIEWSJU3A3.T XIJPBSJ suopBpuaroraooai sjioissiuiurco sip jo uoi;imjeA3 uythe White cultural," racial and political biases of that group. The Commis-sion membership included Blacks and Whites, but its composition wasnot representative. Most of the Commission's Black members, especiallythe Senator Chiefs, were, if not supporters, at least not outspoken critics ofthe Government. Although the Government was attempting to resolve itsconstitutional problems through negotiations with various members of theAfrican nationalist groups, it named none of the nationalists to the Com-mission. This fact, along with the Government's stipulation that the Com-mission look only at areas where discriminatory measures were expendableand not at the more fundamental issue of majority rule, led nationalistgroups to boycott the Commission.The Commission's emphasis, i.e. on the removal of discriminatorymeasures no longer considered desirable or necessary, was itself an exampleof discrimination, for that notion contradicted the principle of 'merit' whichthe R.F. claimed as its guiding principle (along with 'civilized standards').'Merit' means achievement, and achievement is based on opportunity. Hencepractices or legislation that limits opportunity or an equal chance for anyindividual or group, Black or White, is a repudiation of the merit principle.Moreover, the fact that some forms of-discrimination were deemed 'neces-sary and desirable' in the past as a 'historical necessity' cannot be justifiedin the late twentieth century.In terms of its hearings and recommendations, the Commission focusedon some of the factors that contributed to White dominance: economic (land,labour, and education as its affected employment opportunities); political(franchise and the Declaration of Rights); and social (land and housingpolicies, and social arrangements). But it ignored the fundamental ways inwhich political, economic and social structures have been used to denyor deprive Africans of resources and mobilization capabilities, thereby leav-ing them powerless. Hence the Commission excluded from its purview thefundamental issue of dominance and discrimination.Rather than confront the above issues directly, the Commission per-sistently deferred to 'White opinion', rejecting the more basic (or structural)changes that it thought Whites would not accept. This is evident from evena cursory appraisal of the Report. For instance, the Commission opposedthe opening of European residential areas to Africans who could affordsuch purchases 'because we consider there are many Europeans who wouldnot accept a departure from the existing position'.8 It opposed the creationof Government multi-racial schools because 'we do not think it is [a proposal]which would be acceptable to the majority of either of the major races'.9Even though the Commission acknowledged that in educational opportunities'there is unequal treatment of European and African pupils', it did notthink that 'different treatment amounts to unfair dealing'.10 It also dis-missed the idea of re-allocating education funds from European to Africanschools, thereby providing a more equitable allocation. Rather, it thoughts Quenet, Report, 15.»Ibid., 19. But it did conclude that private schools should be able to take inmore than the limited number of non-Europeans allowed under existing regulations.D. G. BAKER 247that African education should be left alone because it was 'completely be-yond the country's [financial] resources at present' to do otherwise." Theresult was to leave in existence the nearly insurmountable disadvantagessuffered by Africans in getting an education.Acknowledging that there was discrimination against Africans in em-ployment, the Commission stated that 'there are some employers who openlydeclare a preference for European employees', but it concluded that 'thatis not an attitude which, in our view, should be controlled by legislation'.12The Commission thereby rejected legislation as a basis for removing dis-criminatory practices. It maintained that change should come through'example' and suggested that 'Government can itself project an image whichwill influence the public at large'.13 But this recommendation was incon-sistent with the Commission's own investigation which showed that theGovernment, as an employer, was more discriminatory than others. Re-cognizing the presence of discriminatory and hostile treatment towards Afri-cans, Coloureds and Asians in social amenities, the Commission neverthelessconcluded: 'One can only hope for greater understanding . . . .'"> Theabove examples are simply illustrative of the attitudes that permeate theReport, attitudes that a.re deferential toward Whites and paternalistic to-ward Blacks. It envisioned behavioural change as coming through 'greaterunderstanding' and a change in attitudes. The extent of the Commission'sconcern about discrimination was, thus, suspect because of its proposal thatthe Government set an example, even though, as the Commission recognized,it was the Government which over the years had set the tone and patternof racial discrimination.An assessment of the major recommendations of the Commission readilyreveals how, even were its proposals implemented, Whites would still re-tain power and privilege. The major recommendations within the economicsector fell under three categories: land, employment and education as itaffected employment. Concluding that the Land Tenure Act was the 'maincause of friction between the races' and had 'led to widespread discontent anddeep-seated resentment',15 the Commission proposed its replacement by newlegislation that established two categories of land, 'Private Land' and 'StateLand'. Private Lands would include the European residential, urban andagricultural lands, African Purchase Land, African townships and multi-racial areas. State Land would include the Tribal Trust Land, the nationalareas of parks, wild-life and forest land as well as existing unalienated orunreserved lands.The Commission proposed that no new lands be added to the T.TX.s,but it did recommend that the State 'in its capacity as trustee' assume res-ponsibility for directing development within the T.T.L.s. The Report alsoopposed the opening up of T.T.L.S to European business or land purchase.13The paternalistic character of these recommendations is reflected in theproposal that the State serve as 'trustee'."Ibid., 23.Ł*Ibid., 62.«s Ibid.«4 Ibid., 18.« Ibid., 9.to Ibid., 12.248 ESSAY REVIEWThe Commission did recommend that Africans be allowed to purchasewhat were European agricultural (but not residential) lands and, conversely,that African Purchase Land be opened to European purchase. But it alsorecommended that safeguards be established to assure that Africans purchas-ing such lands be sufficiently experienced or qualified for properly usingthe lands, that Africans pursue acceptable standards of husbandry, andthat the land not be subdivided or have excessive numbers of people livingon it.17 All of this again suggests a paternalistic attitude toward Africanseven though the Commission hastened to add that such safeguards shouldsimilarly apply to Europeans purchasing agricultural lands. Beyond this,the Commission recommended that Africans be allowed to own or leaseland in European commercial areas so that they could compete on an equaleconomic basis with Europeans.However, if groups are to compete on an equal footing with each otherit is obligatory that they have equal access to education and skill-obtainingopportunities. This aspect was ignored in the Report, and the Commission'snegative attitude towards providing Africans with equal educational oppor-tunities, as previously noted, meant that Whites would retain their privilegedposition. For, by dismissing equal educational opportunity as 'beyond thecountry's resources at present', the existing disparity would persist. As in-dicated above, the Commission did not see the incongruity between state-ments such as 'there is unequal treatment of European and African pupils'and 'different treatment amounts to unfair dealing'18 and its dismissal ofthese disparities with the statement: 'One hopes it will be possible in thefuture to provide additional finance to improve the present situation'.19Moreover, the Commission opposed the opening of Government Europeanschools to African entry, on the ground that multi-racial schools would notbe acceptable 'to the majority of either of the major races'.20 The con-sequences are obvious: existing constraints upon and impediments to Afri-can education would continue, and Africans would remain at a competitivedisadvantage in the economic sector. In cases, then, where disadvantagedAfricans did compete with Europeans and fail, the latter would dismiss itas simply another example of their own presumed superiority.21The competitive disadvantage of Africans was not resolved by theReport's appraisal of Africans' employment opportunities. Probing first thepublic sector (including Public Service, Ministries of Justice, Law and Order,Internal Affairs, Agriculture and others), the Commission acknowledgedthat, among other things, virtually no Africans held middle-level positionsiv Ibid., 16.<s Ibid., 25.!9 Ibid.20 Ibid., 19.2' This attitude carried over into the Commission's recommendations concerningteachers. Africans were paid less than Europeans, and the Commission noted the in-equality. But it again pleaded financial problems and claimed that it could not foreseeEuropean teachers giving up part of their salaries to 'put African teachers on an equalfooting'. Consequently, implied the Commission, the inequities must persist, notingthat 'we see the inequity of the present situation ... It is with great regret that Wecannot advance any suggestion' for solving the problem', ibid., 28. Again, then, theproposals lead to different standards for different racial groups.D. G. BAKER 2491 . and none could be found in upper-level positions. Moreover, African em-ployees were designated by titles different from those of Europeans in res-> pect of what were essentially identical jobs and were paid much lowersalaries. In response to these structural inequalities, the Commission coun-f selled: 'On this topic we simply express the hope that persons of promiseand ability will be given every chance for improving themselves'.22 This. same attitude prevailed in the Commission's assessment of the British SouthAfrica Police. Again their investigations disclosed that Africans were retainedat only the lowest ranks and that departmental attitudes, based on numerous1 rationalizations, were either indifferent to or openly hostile towards Africanadvancement.23 Despite the glaring inequities, the Commission surmised thatt 'although, ideally, all ranks should from the outset be open to Europeanand African alike', it thought that such a step 'would, at present, be toodrastic a change'.24, > Even though there existed considerable evidence indicating widespread' discriminatory treatment toward Africans employed in commerce and industry; (including apprenticeship training, employment and promotion), the Com-mission concluded that there was no outright 'evidence of racial discrimina-f tion'. But it did express its concern over the attitudes of White employerstowards hiring Blacks: 'We accept, however, there are some employers whoopenly declare a preference for European employees. That is not an attitudewhich, in our view, should be controlled by legislation.'28 The Commissionargued that 'legislation cannot adequately correct prejudiced attitudes',26but what it ignored was that employers' attitudes when translated into be-haviour result in discriminatory practices toward African labour. Withoutlegislation, these attitudes persist and racially discriminatory practices con-tinue. The result was that the Commission totally disregarded what wasf openly structural discrimination in employment.f Attributing the shortage of adequate job opportunities to the high; population growth rate among Africans, the Commission cajoled: 'It is,then, a case of supply exceeding the demand and, unpalatable though the> suggestion might be to some Africans the exercise of birth control is theonly way if a proper balance is to be achieved. Until that stage is reachedr there will be intense competition for available posts ... ,'27 But thefundamental problem was the present: no jobs or few jobs existed for" Africans in an economy that emphasized capital rather than labour-i intensive types of industry and commerce. And the jobs that were availablewere geared towards those with education and skills, meaning, in this in-stance, Europeans because of their greater educational opportunities. More-over, discrimination was occurring at that moment in time; it was not\ babies yet unborn who were competing for the prevailing scarce jobs andthereby creating the problem. The Commission's attitudes, as evident in itsi assessments and statements, reflects a cultural and callous myopia.l 22 Ibid., 50.[ 23 Ibid., 53./ z* Ibid., 56. They also investigated the Rhodesian Railways and found similari patterns of discrimination.' " « Ibid., 62.I as Ibid."Ibid., 61.I25O ESSAY REVIEWThe Commission recommended that European agricultural and com-mercial lands be opened for purchase by Africans, but there were fewAfricans who had the capital necessary for such purchases. In terms ofstructural disadvantages to Africans that give rise to racial friction (suchas the lack of educational opportunities, discrimination in employment, andWhite attitudes and discriminatory practices in general), the Quenet re-commendations would not solve these problems. What is obvious is thatthe Commission ignored the structural forms of discrimination: namely, thedenial to Africans of chances or opportunities to advance within economicsectors. There were a few exceptions, but the composite picture is evident.Denied the opportunity to develop economic resources the African waslocked into his subordinate position in Rhodesian society.The Commission's recommendations for removing sources of racialdiscrimination and discontent within political structures again illustratethe political near-sightedness of the group. Their two concerns were theelectoral law and the Declaration of Rights. As the Commission noted, theLegislative Assembly was drawn from three main sources: voters on theEuropean roll, the African roll, and Africans elected by Electoral Colleges.The Commission only briefly discussed the franchise issue, but it did con-clude that racial friction could be alleviated if there was- a return to the com-mon roll.28 But the return to a common roll would not in itself removeracial friction, for what is important is who determines the franchise re-quirements for the common roll. The qualifications, especially educationaland financial, were so structured that few Africans, given their limitedeconomic and educational opportunities, could meet the qualifications foracquiring the vote. This, then, was the fundamental issue, but it was ignoredby the Commission, because it did not wish to threaten the structural basesof White dominance. Even so, the Commission's proposal for a return tothe common roll was immediately rejected by the Prime Minister and theRhodesian Front. Their rejection is understandable. For, even though Parlia-ment could structure franchise requirements to curtail African participationin a common roll, future African pressure could possibly intensify andnecessitate a lowering of franchise requirements. And that would threatenWhite power.The other recommendation of the Commission concerning politicalstructures was its proposal to repeal section 84 of the Constitution.29 Thatsection stipulated that the Declaration of Rights, which included provisionsfor protection from discrimination, was not enforceable in the courts: 'Nocourt shall inquire into or pronounce upon the validity of any law on theground that it is inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights.5 Given thatsection, the Government if it wished, could enact racially discriminatorylegislation. Were section 84 repealed, however, Africans who believed thatthey had been discriminated against could resort in some instances to thecourts. There was, however, a limitation to that right, for the Declarationpermitted a type of discrimination: 'a law shall not be construed to discri-minate unjustly to the extent that it permits different treatment of personsas Ibid., 22.29 Ibid., 82.D. G. BAKER 251or communities if such treatment is fair and will promote harmonious rela-tions between such persons and communities . . .' Thus, even if the De-claration were made justiciable by repeal of section 84, the stipulation notedabove still allowed for the enactment of discriminatory legislation.30 Bothrecommendations (the return to a common roll and repeal of section 84)were rejected by the Rhodesian Front. Neither of the recommendations,if approved, would have fundamentally altered the power capabilities ©fWhite and Black groups; but the R.F., wary of even potential threats to itspower, ignored the Quenet proposals.The Quenet recommendations regarding social structures (and socialrelations) again reflect the White cultural values and the Commission'slimited awareness of the sources of racial discontent. For instance, in termsof the Land Tenure Act, the Commission rejected the opening of Europeanresidential areas to Africans. It based its decision on the principle that therewere 'many Europeans who would not accept a departure from the existingposition',31 i.e. of racially segregated areas. The Commission acknowledgedthat some people believed that Africans with necessary financial and educa-tional resources should be allowed to purchase homes in European areas,but the Commission rebuffed this notion: 'No doubt, that would be anideal situation but we think the movement should be gradual and un-hurried.'32 Given the fact that such a 'movement' could not be even 'gradual'because it was prohibited under existing legislation, both the Commission'sunderstanding of the racial issue and its own honesty are suspect. The Reportdid propose that additional residential lands for Africans be set aside, andit recommended that existing designated multi-racial areas (open only to'parties of a mixed union') be opened to anyone who desired to live there.But it put a racial curtain around European residential areas.33The Commission also recommended that Africans be given limited accessto public amenities (such as hotels and restaurants) but only within thoseurban areas zoned for commercial use and not 'within residential areas'that were European. All of this, however, would have little meaning unlesssupporting legislation was enacted to prohibit discriminatory treatmentagainst Africans and other non-White groups. Yet here, as with employment,the Commission offered little of substance. As previously noted, the Reportrecognized that some employers 'openly declared a preference for Europeanemployees', but the Commission's response was: 'That is not an attitudewhich, in our view, should be controlled by legislation'.34 That stanceclearly left an employer free to discriminate if he so wished. The Commis-sion held similar views concerning the social sector. Responding to com-plaints by Africans, Asians and Coloureds that they suffered discriminatorytreatment in public amenities, the Commission responded: 'One can onlyhope for greater understanding on the part of the owners of such establish-ments'35 Š an attitude that suffused the Commission's views. Appealingto people to change their attitudes does not end their discriminatory be-haviour.3° The Commission also recommended the establishment of a Race RelationsBoard that would be charged with hearing complaints concerning alleged discrimination,si Ibid., 15sa Ibid,as Ibid., 17.a* Ibid., 62.sslbid., 18.252 ESSAY REVIEWWhat is most significant is the Commission's ameliorative attitude orpious belief that people would open their hearts and embrace those againstwhom they persistently discriminated. Unless legislation was enacted thatspecifically prohibited discriminatory treatment or behaviour, existing Whiteracial attitudes, as reflected in their discriminatory behaviour, would simplypersist. The Commission also discussed other aspects of social relationships,but those cited above reflect its prevailing views.36 The Commission's pre-cept appeared to be: 'If we would only love one another, we could get alongbetter.' However, when groups contest for power and the benefits thatflow therefrom, such moral admonitions go unheeded. And where onegroup (in this instance Whites) held and enjoyed the fruits of power, therewas little willingness to give either of them up, as the history of Rhodesiareadily illustrates. The basic problem was that the Commission, given itsracial attitudes, was blind to the structural realities of dominance.The Quenet recommendations logically flow from the Commission'scultural and racial beliefs and (whether it recognized it or not) its desireto preserve White power and privilege. These White racial notions servenumerous functions. Most fundamentally these beliefs have served (forWhites) to justify racial stratification and discrimination; and Europeanpolicy has, historically, never deviated from its commitment to the preserva-tion of White culture, power and privilege. The Quenet Commission, thoughit conducted its investigation at a time of increasing racial confrontation,could not break through its racial biases and concentrate on the fundamentalstructural bases of White dominance and exploitation. Racial beliefs arenot simply a rationalization for exploitation, and both factors (racial beliefsand privilege) can be detected as bases for the Commission's analyses andrecommendations.From this perspective, the Quenet Report can be viewed as but anothereffort by the Rhodesian Front and White society to suspend time and therebypreserve White power and privilege by granting concessions to Blacks, con-cessions which, however, did not threaten White power. A number ofQuenet proposals were implemented between 1976 and 1978, includ-ing, among others: amendments to the Land Tenure Act; the gradual in-corporation of some Blacks into middle-echelon positions in public serviceareas, including the military and police; the incorporation of more Blacksat higher levels within commerce and industry (although this was alreadyoccurring because of the shortage of Whites who had been called up formilitary service); and the partial suspension of Parliament and establish-ment of a Government composed of Rhodesian Front and Black leadersparticipating in the 'internal settlement'. But the impetus for these con-cessions was not the Quenet report but the imperative need of the Govern-ment to gain Black support in the civil war against the Patriotic Front.Moreover, but again because of pressure from South Africa and theUnited States, the Government did accede to the principle of Black majorityrule in September 1976; and in January 1979 the White electorate, con-fronted by an escalating civil war and few other alternatives, did vote toas Among other topics taken up by the Commission were disabilities suffered byAfrican women as a consequence of the African social system, the Urban Areas Actand miscellaneous other areas of contact between European and African that led todiscriminatory practices.D. G. BAKER 253accept a new Constitution with Black rule. Almost simultaneously, legisla-tion was enacted that abolished the earlier Land Tenure Act and pro-hibited discrimination in education, housing, hospitals and public amenities.On the surface, this legislation goes much further than the Quenet proposals.However, given the structural forms of discrimination noted previously, thereality is that Whites still retain major positions of power and privilege.New legislation or loopholes in legislation still allow for discrimination.New and higher school fees, for instance, were introduced that make itdifficult for low-income Africans to attend previously all-White schools;Whites who discriminate against Blacks in public places are liable to civilaction, not criminal, and that entails prolonged and expensive litigationwhich few Blacks can afford; few Blacks, given their limited economic op-portunities, can afford what was previously White housing; and under thenew April 1979 Constitution 'entrenched clauses' to 'preserve standards'assure that Whites will preserve a considerable degree of power and pri-vilege. Indeed, even though the Rhodesian Front could not suspend timeforever, it shrewdly manipulated the new structures in such a way that,despite the appearance of Black majority rule, White power and privilegeis not significantly diminished. What this suggests is that the White racialattitudes which permeate the Quenet Report have not significantly changed;only the power relationships have.Long Island University D. G. BAKER