Aspects of Divorce in RhodesiaB. GoldinHigh Court of Rhodesia, Salisbury.INTRODUCTIONThe subject matter of this article is intendednot merely to furnish some factual information,but also to encourage and stimulate criticism,( further research and study which will result in theadoption of appropriate measures by which toreduce the rate of divorce in Rhodesia. A know-ledge, and understanding of the causes and* "'incidence of divorce is considered essential forthose who are concerned with the rate of divorceand the serious and undesirable economic and± x social consequences of divorce.The problem of divorce has been considered byA several bodies in England, notably the Groupappointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury inJanuary 19641, a Royal Commission on Marriagex and Divorce under the chairmanship of LordMorton,2 and the Law Commission under»> Mr. Justice Scarman.3 Some of their recommenda-tions have formed the subject of legislation.» Measures intended to reduce the rate of divorcehave also been introduced in other countries.vBoth in Australia (Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959,t section 14), and in New Zealand (MatrimonialProceedings Act, 1963, section 14), the Courts* have been given the power to adjourn divorceproceedings to enable the possibility of reconcilia-* tion to be explored and to refer the parties to aconciliator.' *(c) B. GoldinIn this article, however, attention is not focusedon the possible measures by which the rate ofdivorce can be reduced or on measures adoptedin other countries which are intended to avoidor to diminish the economic and social problemswhich result from divorce. For, it seems moreimportant, as a first step, to set out some of thefacts relating to the problem before methods andmeasures by which to solve it can be usefullydiscussed or understood.RHODESIAN LAW OF DIVORCEDivorceA decree of divorce can be granted by theGeneral Division of the High Court of Rhodesiaon the following grounds: adultery, maliciousdesertion, incurable insanity, imprisonment for acertain and defined period, and cruelty. The maingrounds upon which divorces have been grantedare adultery, desertion and cruelty.AdulteryAdultery by one spouse entitles the other toobtain a decree of divorce. The circumstancesunder which adultery is committed are irrelevantso that a single act of adultery, or adultery com-mitted while under the influence of alcohol orwhere a person has been induced to commitadultery under emotional stress, will give rise toan action for divorce. If one spouse deserts theother or refuses to cohabit with him, such con-23duct does not excuse adultery; in short, there canbe no excuse for adultery. If, however, the inno-cent party knows that the other party committedadultery and yet forgives the commission ofadultery, the right to daim divorce on the for-given acts of adultery is lost by that condonation.It is also not possible to sue for divorce on theground of adultery where there has been con-nivance at adultery, that is, one party is satisfiedand willing that the other spouse should commitadultery and assists or encourages the commissionof adultery.Malicious DesertionMalicious desertion is constituted by one ofthe spouses wrongfully or maliciously leaving thematrimonial home and staying away with theintention of not returning. If the party has justcause for leaving the other spouse, such as thecommission of adultery or acts of cruelty by theother spouse, then the desertion is not wrongfulor malicious (and will not give rise to a groundfor divorce). But even where one spouse does notleave the joint home, he can still be guilty ofmalicious desertion as, for example, where he orshe refuses without good reason to have sexualintercourse with the other spouse, or when he orshe is guilty of constructive desertion, namely,where by his conduct he reveals an intention ordecision to treat the marriage as at an end. Thiscan consist of a great many modes of behaviour,including ordering the other spouse to leave thehome, ceasing to support her or the children,treating her with contempt or showing no interest.Period of DesertionIn terms of the Matrimonial Causes Act (Chap-ter 179) no court is entitled to grant a final decreeof divorce on the grounds of malicious desertionunless at least three years have passed since thedate of marriage and the defendant has malicious-ly deserted the plaintiff for an uninterruptedperiod of at least six months immediately preced-ing the date upon which a final decree is granted.In all cases for divorce based on malicious deser-tion, the court, if satisfied that a prima facie caseagainst the defendant has been established, givesthe defendant an opportunity to change his or hermind and return to the plaintiff. Therefore, theorder made by the courts is to call upon thedefendant to restore conjugal rights to plaintiff bya fixed date and, failing this, to show cause on asubsequent date why a final decree of divorceshould not be granted. Therefore, while a finaldecree cannot be granted until at least three yearshave elapsed from the date of marriage or plaintiffhas been deserted for at least six continuousmonths, a plaintiff can commence an action forthe restitution of conjugal rights before theseperiods have expired.The court has a discretion to grant a final orderof divorce without making the preliminary orderfor the restitution of conjugal rights if it is provedthat defendant has already deserted the plaintifffor art uninterrupted period of at least three yearsimmediately preceding the commencement of theaction.It is obvious from what has been said that theprovisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act aredesigned to prevent divorces on grounds of deser-tion until certain periods elapse so as to give theparties an opportunity to become reconciled. Sucha 'cooling off' or 'thinking over' period is not pro-vided in actions of divorce based on adultery orcruelty.CrueltyA decree of divorce may be granted on theground that defendant has during the subsistenceof the marriage treated the plaintiff with suchcruelty as makes the continuance of married lifeinsupportable. A court may regard such habitualdrunkenness or such mental cruelty as makescontinuance of married life insupportable ascruelty (see sections 3(c) and 6(1) of the Act).The Act further provides in section 6(2) that acourt shall not grant a divorce on the grounds ofsuch cruelty unless it is satisfied that the plaintiff(that is, the person suing for divorce) is not toany appreciable extent to blame for the unlawfulconduct of the defendant.Upon careful reading of the legal requirementsto constitute cruelty, it will be seen that it cancover a variety and multiplicity of types of beha-viour and conduct. It is not any act which a spousefinds difficult to tolerate that will amount tocruelty. The test has to be whether such cruelty Łrenders the continuance of married life insupport-able. It is obvious that conduct which makes thecontinuance of married life insupportable for onespouse will not be considered in the same light byanother married person; abusive language, per-sonal habits, or even drink, will affect differentpersons in a different manner. An analysis of thenumber of cases based on cruelty and the natureof the allegations of cruelty will help to under-stand this ground of divorce.Ancillary MattersIn actions for divorce, particularly where thewife is the plaintiff, she often claims maintenancefor herself, custody (and at times also guardian- Ł24ship) of the minor children of the marriage andmaintenance for the children until they attain acertain age, usually eighteen, or become self-supporting. In contested divorce actions, the dis-pute often relates to custody and maintenance onlybecause both parties are agreed that the marriagemust be terminated. A defendant may counter-claim for a decree of divorce, but in such a case,where both parties seek a divorce, the only realquestion is usually who shall be granted the order.The husband may sue on grounds of cruelty andthe wife, as defendant, will deny that she is guiltyof cruelty and because she does not wish for adivorce, often for religious reasons, she willcounter-claim for a separation and claim custodyof the children and maintenance for herself andthe children.In practice, however, it can be safely estimatedthat three-quarters of contested divorce actionstake place because the parties are unable to agreeon who should have the custody of the children,or the amount of maintenance which should beawarded. In deciding who shou'ld have the custodyof the children, the paramount consideration isthe interests of the children, and the court has toconsider who is better suited and who can takethe better care of the children and provide themwith the best attention. In the case of very youngchildren, the court is most likely to award themto the mother where the circumstances justifysuch an order.Very few divorces are contested, and the parties' usually agree upon questions of custody and main-tenance and enter into 'consent papers' or writtenagreements which are subject to approval by thecourt. The court, as the upper guardian of allminors, will carefully scrutinize agreements relat-ing to the welfare of the children. The courtusually approves the arrangements made by theparties, but when it is considered desirable it willcall for further evidence and the views of prob-ation officers to determine whether the partieshave reached an agreement which is the best pos-sible for the care of the children. This, however,is not a frequent practice, and reliance is usuallyplaced on the agreement of the parties as repre-senting the best arrangement that it was possibleto make.As very few cases are contested Š approximate-ly one in every 150-200, the proportion varies alittle from year to year Š the study undertakenas to the incidence of divorce is not affected bythe fact that a few cases are contested.STATISTICS OF DIVORCE JN RHODESIA.in studying these figures, the reader must bearin mind that the population of Rhodesia increasedor altered through immigration and emigrationover the last ten years, as it did before that. Agreat number of those who are divorced in anyone year were married in other countries; andan analysis of divorces granted during the periodrevealed thai out of 600 divorces about 250couples were married outside Rhodesia. Accord-ingly, a great many of those who aredivorced were married outside Rhodesia and anunknown number of those married in Rhodesialeft the country. The statistics relating to divorcesand marriages must be read in the light of thepopulation changes, and are therefore not as truea reflection of the divorce rate when comparedwith countries whose population is composedTable IMARITAL STATUS BY SEX AND AGE GROUPSEuropean MalesAge Groupin YearsUnder 1515-1920-2425-2930-3435-394044454950-5455-5960-6465-6970 and OverNot StatedTOTALNeverMarried33 58110 5686 7192 27286162856345028327621710813018156 837Married402 1145 5075 9896 7127 1047 5566 0765 2643 7551 9841 8749454 069Widowed142121409610716120820962241 494Divorced32134138172227221203178124666671 568Separated297470828611289725840442758Total33 60610 6088 9027 9927 0797 6168 0218 4366 7595 9534 3652 4102 740304114 79125largely of persons born there; where compara-tively few leave and fewer settle from outside.Nevertheless, the available figures provide usefulinformation concerning this subject.European FemalesAge Groupin YearsUnder 15154920-2425-2930-3435-3940-44454950-5455-5960-6465-6970 and OverNot StatedTOTALNeverMarried32 1749 2793 4779574873933233403373393372142826949 008Married6324 9306 3866 1416 7716 9146 8715 2974 1512 7541 23896012453 169Widowed2133748801993666509081 2301 2243 302408 089Divorced411117919321827929725427419610710762 225Separated9601008687117147103917141462960Total32 1979 9298 5937 6516 9557 5507 8348 0216 6415 7654 5922 8244 702251113 505Source: RHODESIA 1971 1969 Population Census (Interim Report). Vol. 1, Salisbury. Central Statistical Office, Table 9;cases of unspecified marital status are included.Table 11DIVORCE IN RHODESIA19511952195419571958196119621963196419651966196719681969Total248264314328377422377430397401462487527538Adultery223130542726433654543938GroundsCruelty106105114181167177180170202238267267Desertion186190233187183227174194205195221232Miscellanea us21111PlaintiffWife171182188243230259239256303314337366Husband143146189179147171158145149173190172Table HI*RATE OF DIVORCE COMPARED WITH RATE OF MARRIAGE IN RHODESIATotal Number of MarriagesTotal Number of Divorces19642 04639719651 87640119662 13645219672 18348719682 20352719692 451538ŁAlthough, for reasons that are not relevant to this study, a few African divorces and marriages are included in the above »figures, they only constitute an insignificant number and can be disregarded. The vast majority of African marriages aregoverned by customary laws oi registered in terms of special regulations applicable only to Africans. A study of marriage ^and divorce among Africans would have to be a separate exercise. Marriage and divorces for Coloured and Asian couplesare included but also constitute a very small number. It can therefore be estimated that at least 98 per cent of all theabove figures relate to Europeans, with whom this investigation is concerned. Ł*26DURATION OF MARRIAGESThe duration of marriage, that is, the periodduring which a marriage subsisted before it wasdissolved, was analysed in order to determinewhether divorce results in the earlier period ofmarriage or with equal frequency throughout theduration of a marriage. The basis of what followsis an analysis of the 600 cases of divorce heardbetween January 1968 and April 1969. The resultswere tested by checking records of divorces duringthe period from 1960 to 1968, and it was foundthat no significant differences existed. The 600cases analysed were divorces granted mainly onthe grounds of cruelty, adultery and desertion.The approximate proportion of each was about300 cases of cruelty, 250 of desertion and 50 onthe grounds of adultery.The total number of 600 was analysed together,in the first place, to determine the period thatelapsed before the marriages were dissolved,irrespective of the grounds upon which divorcewas granted. The results are sot out by givingpercentages, which make it also easier to appreci-ate the comparisons which they reveal.Table WDURATION OF MARRIAGES ENDING IN DIVORCEPercentage of CumulativeDuration in Years1 or less234567891011-1516-2021-3031 and OverTotal2,88,49,010,05,65,65,04.63,25,617,211,010,61,6Percentage2,811,220,230,235,841,446,451,054,259,877,088,0Thus, a little over one-third (36 per cent) of allmarriages which ended in divorce subsisted forfive years or less. Within ten years of marriage60 per cent were divorced, and 77 per cent weredivorced within fifteen years. So that three-quarters of the marriages ending in divorce weredissolved within fifteen years.It is true, for what comfort it may bring, thatafter fifteen years of marriage the chances ofdivorce greatly diminish. The conclusion that canbe drawn, and which is perhaps not a surprisingone, is that the longer a marriage has lasted theless chance exists of it terminating in divorce.Nevertheless, proof of what some may considerto be a self-evident truth is a relevant fact tothe problem, ft will be observed that during thesecond year, third year and fourth year ofmarriage the rate of divorce is particularly high,as compared with that of the years immediatelyfoliowing: 27,4 per cent of all the marriages whichended in divorce only subsisted for two, three orfour years.CHOICE OF GROUND OF DIVORCEBefore dealing with the duration of marriagesdissolved on particular grounds it is necessary toconsider the 'choice' of a ground of divorce. Themain grounds of divorce are cruelty, desertionand adultery. Often plaintiffs decide to commencedivorce proceedings on more than one ground, inthe alternative, as for example, on the grounds ofŁ cruelty, but in the alternative they allege maliciousdesertion and seek an order calling upon a defend-ant to restore conjugal rights and failing compli-ance therewith, then a decree of divorce. In prac-tice it is rare Š about one case in every 2 000Š that a defendant offers to restore conjugalrights or, in other words, to return; and this isa significant fact when the prospects of reconcili-ation after the commencement of divorce proceed-ings are considered.Similarly, an action may be based on adulterybut with a claim in the alternative for restitutionof conjugal rights, that is to say, on the groundsof desertion. In order to avoid the stigma attachedto adultery, a defendant often agrees not to con-test the daim based on desertion and a divorce istherefore sought on the grounds of desertion. Thisalso often occurs where a divorce is claimed onthe grounds of cruelty. The defendant does notwant to admit allegations such as excessive sexualdemands, habitual consumption of excessivequantities of drink, or that he assaults his wifeor any other act of cruelty. In order to avoid acontested trial on the grounds of cruelty, he agreesnot to contest a claim based on desertion.There are also cases in which the partiesappreciate that one is guilty of conduct whichrenders the continuance of married life insupport-able, however unintentional; as for example, thehusband may not be able to abstain from heavydrinking or control his behaviour towards his wifewhile under the influence thereof; or the husbandmay consider that he is unable to resist thetemptation or opportunity of an affair withanother woman. He knows and regrets that hisconduct causes his wife unhappiness but is unable,27or considers himself unable, to abstain frombehaving in the manner that causes her distress.In such circumstances also the parties often agreeto terminate the marriage on the grounds ofdesertion in order to avoid 'washing dirty linenin public' generally, or for the sake of thechildren of the marriage, who are to be kept inignorance of the conduct of their father so as notto diminish their respect for him, or to beadversely influenced morally by such an example.The result is again an action based on desertionwhere grounds of cruelty exist and in some casesand for the same reason where evidence of adult-ery may also be available.Accordingly, in many actions for divorce basedon desertion the plaintiff could have obtained adivorce either on the grounds of cruelty or,adultery, or on both. This must be borne in mindin considering the incidence of cruelty, adultery ordesertion. But these considerations do not affectthe analysis of the nature of the cruelty allegedby parties; it only means that many more personscould claim a divorce on the grounds of crueltyor adultery than those who in fact do. Adulteryis often difficult to prove, and the wife may there-fore base her rilaim on cruelty or desertion. Itmust be emphasised that these claims are neithercollusive, fraudulent nor fictitious. For example,where a husband has been behaving in a mannerwhich amounts to cruelty, it will usually justifyhis wife leaving him, and his conduct amountsto constructive desertion. On occasions, suoh ahusband not only behaves in a manner justifyinga decree of divorce on the grounds of cruelty butin the course of his behaviour he actually leaveshis wife once or twice. In other words, a spousemay have two or three genuine, and lawfulgrounds upon which to seek a decree of divorce,but the selection of the ground upon which sheclaims divorce may be influenced by a desire notto face a contested trial, or by the effect of anyparticular ground upon the children, familyassociations, or the husband's employment.Dependence on Husband after DivorceIt is perhaps desirable to emphasise that a wifeoften appreciates that if she were to make knownher husband's drinking habits or moral turpitude,it could result in his loss of employment or in hisprospects of promotion being impeded. Shedoes not want to effect his employment either outof a sense of kindness but more often becauseeven after divorce she, and particularly thechildren, will continue to depend upon him formaintenance and support. These considerationsresult in actions based on desertion and not onexisting grounds of cruelty or adultery.A claim for divorce on the grounds of desertiongenerally requires proof of desertion only and notof the motives of conduct which caused desertion.The evidence usually consists of allegations thatthe parties were happy for a certain period, afterwhich the defendant lost affection for the plaintiffor became 'cool' towards her, and on a particulardate left the matrimonial home and has sincefailed, refused or neglected to return. Toemphasise the point, letters are at times pro-duced in which the defendant was called upon'to restore conjugal rights to his wife', and eitherevidence of a failure to reply or a written or evenverbal refusal to do so. Only on a few occasionsis there mention of drink or another woman or ofany other reflection on defendant's conduct froma moral or derogatory point of view. The evidenceof desertion by itself does not often reflect ad-versely on either party. It may give rise tospeculation but it does not provide the facts.The simple procedure followed in a case basedon desertion is in itself a reason why many aplaintiff chooses it as the ground upon which toterminate the marriage. The proceedings are alsoshorter because the 'story' is shorter than onebased on cruelty or even adultery. A plaintiff isspared the embarrassment of standing in courtand telling an audience of strangers, how herhusband treated her, and in the first instance shealso avoids having to tell her legal advisers mattersof an intimate nature. It is in the light of theseobservations concerning the choice of a groundupon which divorce is claimed, that the followingfacts and statistics have to be considered:Table VDURATION OF MARRIAGES DISSOLVED ONGROUNDS OF CRUELTYDuration in Years Percentage of Total1 or less234567891011-1516-2021-3031 and Over7,49,29,48,04.05,06,04.04,03,015,012.010,02,028In analysing the 600 cases in this connection,the results were again checked by random samplesof divorces granted on grounds of cruelty from1960 to 1968, and no significant differences werefound. From these figures it can be determinedthat of all marriages dissolved on grounds ofcruelty 39 per cent were dissolved within fiveyears of marriage, 61 per cent within ten years ofmarriage, 76 per cent within fifteen years ofmarriage and 87 per cent within twenty years ofmarriage.Table VIDURATION OF MARRIAGES DISSOLVED ONGROUNDS OF DESERTION*Duration in YearsPercentage of Total1 or less234567891011-1516-2021 and Over2,55,57,59,06,09,04,55,53,56,019.58,512.5The comparison of the duration of marriagesdissolved on different grounds will be consideredand analysed later, but again it may be useful tomention at this stage that of all the marriageswhich were dissolved on the grounds of desertion30 per cent of such marriages lasted up to fiveyears, 59 per cent lasted up to ten years, 78 percent lasted up to fifteen years and 89 per centwere dissolved within twenty years of marriage.*It has been pointed out that the Court is not entitled togrant a final decree of divorce on the grounds of desertion* until three years have elapsed from the date of marriage.For the purpose of analysis, however, the period of theŁ> duration of marriages which terminated on the groundsof desertion has been based on the date upon which anorder for restitution of conjugal rights was granted.Although at law such marriages terminate only upon the Jgranting of a final decree of divorce, it is considered morerealistic to treat the date upon which a restitution orderwas granted as more correctly indicating the factual* »Ł duration of marriage for the purpose of this study.Table VIIDURATION OF MARRIAGES DISSOLVED ONGROUNDS OF ADULTERYDuration in Years Percentage of Total1 or less3456789101112-1516-2021-306,06,018,02,06,02,04,08,02,06,08,012,014,04,0These figures show that 38 per cent of allmarriages dissolved on grounds of adultery lastedup to five years; 60 per cent up to ten years, 94per cent up to fifteen years and 98 per cent weredissolved within twenty years of marriage.COMPARISONSThe statistics of the duration of marriagesterminated on the three main grounds reveal dif-ferences in the duration of marriages dissolvedon grounds of cruelty or desertion when the fig-ures relating to the duration of marriages for anyparticular period and, in particular, up to tenyears, are compared.Of all the marriages dissolved on grounds ofcruelty after one, two and three years of marriage,the percentages are 7,4; 9,2; and 9,4 respectively,compared with 2,5; 5,5; and 7,5 of all marriagesdissolved on grounds of desertion after the first,second and third years of marriage.One of the main differences is capable ofexplanation by reference to the provisions of theMatrimonial Causes Act. As has been mentioned,it is not possible at law to grant a final decree ofdivorce on the grounds of desertion until andunless the marriage has subsisted for three years.Accordingly, if a spouse is deserted after sixmonths from the date of marriage, she will begranted a restitution order but no final orderuntil the expiration of three years from the dateof marriage. For obvious reasons a plaintiff isoften reluctant to wait that length of time beforeobtaining a decree of divorce. He or she maywish to remarry, or not retard the chances ofremarriage; or generally there is a wish to termin-ate legally a marriage which is considered to havebroken up and terminated as a matter of fact.Therefore, such spouses will rely on cruelty or29adultery if such grounds exist. They have not thesame opportunity or inducements of choosingbetween alternative grounds such as cruelty ordesertion, or adultery or desertion, which is avail-able to spouses who have been married for overthree years.Table VlllCOMPARISON OF DURATION OF MARRIAGHSENDING IN DIVORCECumulative percent agesDurationin Years Cruelty Desertion Adultery\ OF less23451015207,416,626,034.039,061,076,087,52.58,015,527,530.559,078.589,06,012,030.032,038,060,094,098,0It will be observed that a larger proportion ofmarriages are dissolved within the first five yearson grounds of cruelty than on the grounds ofdesertion. Until five years have elapsed from thedate of marriage the number of divorces grantedon the grounds of cruelty substantially exceeds theproportion of all divorces granted on the groundsof desertion. Parties who seek divorce after theexpiration of five years from the date of theirmarriage, as for example within ten or fifteenyears, rely more on the grounds of desertionthan on the grounds of cruelty.It has already been pointed out that because it isnot possible to obtain a final decree of divorce onthe ground of desertion until a marriage has sub-sisted for at least three years is probably the mainreason why more plaintiffs seek a divorce on thegrounds of cruelty in the earlier period ofmarriage. Another reason is that considerationswhich influence a woman not to seek divorce ongrounds of cruelty, such as her dependence onhim for maintenance after divorce, the influenceof the grounds of divorce on children are notpresent in the early years, and where they exist,the over-riding consideration is the reluctance towait for a final order and the desire for finality.CHILDREN OF DIVORCED COUPLESOf all the couples who were divorced, 85 percent had children. Of these. 40 per cent had onechild, 30 per cent two children and 30 per centthree children or more; three couples had anonly adopted child. In the 600 oases betweenJanuary 1968 and April 1969, there were 850minor children under the age of 21 of thosemarriages. A study of the position during the pre-ceding five years reveals that approximately 700minor children are born of marriages which aredissolved in any one year.MARRIED WOMEN IN EMPLOYMENTForty per cent of all women who get divorcedworked during the marriage and in particular theywere all employed at the time of the divorce pro-ceedings; and 68 per cent of them were mothersof minor children.Such figures may seem to confirm a commonsuspicion that a woman's employment is a factorwhich contributes to or causes the break up ofa marriage. As usual, however, it is not safe togeneralize. There are marriages whose success orsubsistence depends on the very fact that thewife does work. Her contribution to the familyincome enables the couple to live in reasonablecomfort so as to avoid stresses and strains causedby financial difficulties or the lack of essentialitems. In some families the wife's earnings areused to purchase a house, to save, to provide achild with a university education. Her employmentmay even have 'fringe benfits' in that the wifeacquires greater self confidence, appreciates herhusband's problems with sympathy and advice,and generally keeps her interested and interesting;and for these reasons she is a more balanced andbetter adjusted companion.There are of course examples of women who byhaving to work, or merely by being in employmentout of choice, adopt an attitude and act in a man-ner which contributes to marital unhappiness: shemay constantly remind her husband of theirdependence upon her earnings, or spend her ownincome or unnecessary luxuries when the moneyshould more beneficially be spent on essentialhousehold requirements; or she may neglect herusual domestic duties, her children and her hus-band. There are other obvious examples of thistype of woman whose employment is the cause Łof marital stress and strain.The point does emerge that a woman, particu-larly one who has the care of minor children, canby her attitude contribute to unhappiness whichcan result in divorce. It is therefore a subjectwhich has to be considered in deciding upon themeasures that can be taken to avoid divorce byeliminating the causes of friction in the home. Inmany cases Marriage Guidance Counsellors areable to assist such couples to see the problem inthe perspective and to remove the undesirableconsequences resulting from the wife being in30employment. This is relevant to the subjectwhether there should be compulsory efforts toeffect a reconciliation before matrimonial proceed-ings are commenced.According to statistical information revealed bythe 1969 census in Rhodesia, 36 per cent of allmarried women in Rhodesia are in employment.It is interesting to note that the number in part-time employment (by which is meant those whowork for less than 20 hours a week) is verysmall. Out of 34 206 European women in employ-ment, referred to in technical language, as'economically active females', only 2,1 per centwere in part-time employment in the sense inwhich it is defined above. Thus, while 36 per centof all married women are in employment, 40 percent of all women who get. divorced are in employ-ment; the fact that the wife works, therefore, isprobably a factor which contributes to divorcebut it does not appear to be very significant.It has not been possible to ascertain what pro-portion of the 36 per cent of the married womenwho are in employment are the mothers of minorchildren. It will have been observed that of the40 per cent of all these women who were divorcedwho were in employment, 68 per cent of them hadminor children. This is obviously a subject whichrequires further investigation to determine whetheror not employment in the case of a woman whohas no minor children is less often a contributoryfactor to divorce than in the case of women whoare in employment and also have the responsibilityfor young children.CONCLUSIONThis brief survey has dealt with some aspectsof the duration of marriage and grounds ofdivorce, but other important questions remainedunanswered:(a) What effect does the age at date ofmarriage have on the divorce rate? In otherwords are persons who marry at a youngage (and at what age is one too young?),more likely to find that their marriage willend in divorce?(b) Are divorced persons who remarry morelikely or less likely to divorce again com-pared with persons who marry for the firsttime? This is an important aspect becauseit appears that in nineteen per cent of alldivorces one or both parties have beendivorced before.(c) Does the fact that parties engaged in pre-marital sexual intercourse with each otherbefore marriage adversely affect the rate ofdivorce?(d) What is the nature and incidence of par-ticular allegations of cruelty such as drink,assaults, infidelity or money?(e) Is it 'too easy' to get a divorce so thatstricter divorce law may reduce the rate ofdivorce?These aspects are equally relevant to an under-standing of the causes of divorce which is essentialin order to determine what can be done to reducethe rate of divorce.Ac K N O W1EDG M E N TSI acknowledge with thanks the assistance of Mr. C. D. O'Callaghan and Mr. P. R. K. Edwards of theCentral Statistical Office of Rhodesia, for supplying statistics which are clearly identifiable, and Mr, E.Pope-Simmonds, Registrar of Marriages, for the relevant information supplied by him.REFERENCES1. ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY'S GROUP ON THE DIVORCE LAW 1966 Putting Asunder: A Divorce Lawfor Contemporary Society. London, S.P.C.K.2. GREAT BRITAIN 1956 Marriage and Divorce. London, H.M.S.O., Cmd. 9678.3. GREAT BRITAIN 1966 Reform of the Grounds of Divorce. London, H.M.S.O., Cmnd. 3123.31* *