Zambezia (1981), IX (i).THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLEIN COLONIAL ZIMBABWE*M. C. STEELEEdge Hill College of Higher EducationSEVERAL RECENTLY PUBLISHED studies1 have effectively challenged that mostresistant of European assumptions about African cattle-ownership, the so-called'Bantu cattle complex'.2 The approach usually adopted has been to demonstratethat Africans were perfectly willmg to sell their livestock to Europeans, both in pre-colonial and colonial times, provided that they judged the prices offered to beadequate. While this fundamental principle is not disputed here^and furtherevidence will be given to corroborate it for the period of the study (c. 1914-c. 1945)Šit will be argued that an analysis based primarily on the exchange function (and atthat, on only one type of exchange, between Black herdsmen and White traders)does not fully appreciate the multiform economic character of African cattle-ownership that developed at a very early stage in the history of colonial Zimbabwe.This emphasis, on the exchange function3 in studies of African cattle appears tohave two root causes. The first stems from an understandable urge to attack the'Bantu cattle complex' head-on by controverting its main assumption (that onreligio-social grounds Africans were reluctant to sell their cattle to Europeans)rather than examining the wider economic context of African cattle-ownership.Secondly, there has been the influence, conscious or unconscious, of the formalist* An earlier version of this article was presented at an African History Seminar at the Univ[ersity]of Manchester, 6 Dec. 1977. Comments and criticisms from participants at this Seminar, and from C.Keyter, V. Machingaidze and P. Reynolds, are gratefully acknowledged. One omission that must be"mentioned is that of R. M, G, Mtetwa, who lost his life in tragic circumstances before he could commenton the draft1 P. Stigger, 'Volunteers and the profit motive in the Anglo-Ndebele War, 1893*, RhodesianHistory (1971), II, 11-23; E. C. de Carvalho,' "Traditional" and"modem" patterns of cattle raising insouthwestern Angola: A critical evaluation of change from pastorallsm to ranching', Journal ofDeveloping Areas (1974), VIII, 199-226; R. J, Fielder, 'The role of cattle in the Ha economy', AfricanSocial Research (1973) [II], (xv), 327-61; R. M. G. Mtetwa, 'Myth or reality: The "cattle complex" inSouth East Africa, with special reference to Rhodesia*. Zambezia (1978), VI, 23Š35. R. S. Roberts,Cattle in Pre-Cotoiai Zimbabwe', NAD A (1980), XII, ii, 84-93, arrived while I was redrafting thisirticle.2 The classic statement is M. J. Herskovits, 'The cattle complex in East Africa', Americaninthropologist (1926), XXVIII, 230-72, 361-80,494-528,630-64. For a very recent restatement of'Ms view, see'Rhodesia is cattle country', Focus on Rhodesia (n.d. [1977]), II, ix, 9: 'One problem inpersuading Africans to take an active and profitable part in cattle farming is their traditional attitude to theanimals'. Ironically, the peoples whose attitudes may ha¥e involved something of a 'Bantu cattlecomplex' (the Masai, Dinka, Nuer, etc.) were not Bantu.Ł' This is particularly the case in Mtetwa, 'Myth or reality', 27, which dismisses the productivefunction in a single sentence.2930 THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLEschool of economic anthropology4 with its emphasis on the exchange function. But,as Meillassoux has pointed out production (and the associated phenomenon ofreproduction) is a much more central concern in societies of the type presentlyunder discussion.5This article seeks to establish one main thesis: that the sale of cattle toEuropeans constituted only one, and often the least attractive, of severaleconomic choices normally available to African owners. In the first place, therewere two other forms of exchange, lobola (bride-wealth) transactions, and salesbetween Africans themselves; secondly, there was the long-standing utilization ofcattle as a form of saving against future need; and thirdly, there was the productiveuse of cattle for ploughing and transport, and as suppliers of milk and manure.There is abundant evidence that what was so often considered to be irrationalbehaviour on the part of the African owner (i.e., a refusal to sell or an' exorbitant'price demand) represented on the contrary a careful weighing-up of the advantagesand disadvantages of disposal to the European market, with reference to hispersonal needs as defined above, leading to a final and quite rational decision not tosell.One significant socio-economic aspect of cattle-ownership, 'herding out',technically falls outside the scope of this discussion; it has been discussed in detailelsewhere with reference to Zimbabwe and its neighbours,6 but may be brieflymentioned here. Large stock-holders acquired prestige by leasing out cattle to lessfortunate men, making them into virtual clients. Cattle thus became an importantagency in social stratification, a trend established a long time before the Europeanintrusion and continuing well into the colonial period, especially in the Ndebeledistricts. The 'herding out' system was also a convenient way of securing adequategrazing for large herds and reducing the level of risk from localized natural disastersfacing the big owner.CATTLE IN THE AFRICAN ECONOMYOne reason often advanced to account for the reluctance of Africans to respond to4 i.e., S. Cook, R. Firth, E. E. LeClair, H. K. Schneider and others. The most extreme statementof this school is S. Cook's 'The obsolete "anti-market mentality": A critique of the substantive approachto economic anthropology', American A nthropologist{ 1966), LXIII, 323-45. Useful introductory textsare R. Firth(ed), Themes in Economic Anthropology (London, Tavistock Publications, 1967), andE.E. LeClair and H. K. Schneider (eds). Economic Anthropology (New York, Holt, Rinehart andWinston, 1968).5 C. Meillassoux, 'From reproduction to production: A Marxist approach to economicanthropology'. Economy and Society (1972), L 94, 98, 101.6e.g., A. J. B. Hughes and J. van Velsen, 'The Ndebele', in D. Forde (ed.), The Shona andNdebele of Southern Rhodesia (London, International African Institute, 1954), 90; Fielder, 'The role ofcattle', 339-41; Carvalho, '"Traditional" and "modem" patterns', 218; S. I. Mudenge, 'The role offoreign trade in the Rozvi empire: A reappraisal', The Journal of African History (1974), XV, 389; Q.N. Parsons, 'The economic history of Khama's country in Botswana, 1844-1930", in R. H. Palmer andQ. N. Parsons(eds), The Roots of'Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa (London, Heinemann,1977), 113-17.M. C. STEELE31market opportunities by the European commercial sector was the assertion thatthey regarded stock as a form of currency. Officials, and not a few Africans, likenedcattle to a banking system.7 Holleman has pointed out that the Shona term forlivestock (pfuma) shares a common root with the word for wealth (upfumi)} Butwhat type of wealth did cattle represent? Writing on the Tiv of Northern Nigeria,Bohannan has defined horned stock as 'special purpose money', serving a strictlylimited function (the payment of lo bo la) within a multi-centric exchange systememploying other forms of currency.9 Dalton has applied this classification to thecontinent as a whole with the implication that it was valid for the colonial, as well asthe pre-colonial period.10 In fact, in so far as the Shona and Ndebele wereconcerned, cattle fulfilled all the three criteria of'general purpose currency':" theywere stores of value, standards of value and media of exchange.The importance of cattle as stores of value has often been treated as antitheticalto other economic functions. Thus Barber asserts that Africans still 'in largemeasure regard cattle as stores of value, and not of income',12 While there is littleevidence that stock-owners went in purely for ranching, delaying sales until theprice was rightŠan oversimplification in the opposite directionŠBarber's con-ception of income is too circumscribed, ignoring the productive and reproductiveroles of cattle in creating potential new income. As stores of value, cattle had majoradvantages over other forms of investment Their reproductive capacity normallyguaranteed a higher rate of interest than Post Office savings accounts. " They werea relatively liquid asset which, subject of course to the vagaries of the market, couldfairly easily be converted into other assets; in contrast, cash withdrawals from asavings account often involved lengthy journeys to the Native Commissioner'soffice or nearest urban centre. Cattle lacked the perishability of grain and bank-notes and moreover were movable assets in the most literal sense. It is smallwonder that even educated and urbanized Africans regarded them as a highly7 See, for example, [National Archives, Zimbabwe, Salisbury; all references to archival sourcesare in this Archives], S607 (Native Affairs Dep(artmentj, N|ative| C[ommissioner], Bubi, Corres-pondence, General, 18 Feb. 1918-29 Nov. 1935), Chief Somvubu at Chiefs' and Headmen's meeting,Inyati, 22 June 1925.8 J, F. Holleman, Shona Customary Law (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1952), 318.9 P. Bohannan, 'The impact of money on a subsistence economy', in G. Dalton (ed.), Tribal andPeasant Economies (New York, Natural History Press, 1967), 122-35.10 G. Dalton, 'Economic theory and primitive society', American Anthropologist (1961). LXIII,1-25.11 cf. H. K. Schneider, 'Economics in East African aboriginal societies', in M. J, Herskovits andM. Harwitz (eds), Economic Transition in Africa (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), 62. AsLeClair and Schneider, Economic Anthropology, 468, pointout, thesubstantivists' dichotomy of specialand general purpose money is a false one, as in principle, cash cannot buy a wife in Western society,12 W. J. Barber, "Economic rationality and behaviour patterns in an underdeveloped area: A casestudy of African economic behaviour in the Rhodesias', Economic Development and Cultural Chanee(1960), VIII, 239.'Ł' The interest rate stood at 3.5 per cent in 1932. The average annual rate of net increase in theAfrican cattle population between 1923 and 1932 was 7.38 per cent32 THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLEsatisfactory type of investment;14 apart from financing lobola transactions, theyrepresented a form of social security for the unemployed and elderly at a time ofincreasing dislocation in the African rural sector. Nor is it surprising that cattle-owners generally interpreted the Government's wartime destocking measures as akind of capital levy.15The role of cattle in lobola payments, to be discussed in the next section, wassupplemented both prior to and during the period of this study by a wide range oftransactions which defy any attempt at a neat 'multi-centric' classification andshow that, on the contrary, cattle operated as a 'general purpose currency' withinthe African economy. Traditionally, restitution for torts and fines for offencescommitted against the common weal took the form of cattle, a practice whichcontinued clandestinely after the chiefs' judicial powers were stripped away by theGovernment16 Communities which lost crops because of inclement weathertraded meat for grain: Mtetwa and Roder have described one such system in thepre-colonial period, involving the Sabi Valley and adjacent plateau societies.17In the present century, the exchange function of cattle became more diversified AEuropean witness told the Morris Carter Land Commission that Black stock-owners were selling cattle in order to purchase carts, which they leased out for tenshillings a day.18 The launching of the African Purchase Area scheme in the early1930s provided an incentive for owners of large herds to convert some of their stockinto land. According to one district official, breeding-stock and animals intendedfor lobola purposes were freely exchanged for cash between Africans.19Unfortunately, Native Department records are virtually silent on suchimportant issues as the scope of inter-African transactions and operating prices: afactor which has undoubtedly resulted in the prominence given to the betterrecorded and quantifiable trade with Europeans. It is likely that for most of theperiod being discussed here, price levels were generally higher in the former. Thefrequency with which figures of £5 and £7 appear as the opening demand in pricenegotiations with cattle traders in the late 1920s and 1930s suggests that, taking14 See, for example, Z[Commissions and Committees of Enquiry], BJ/1 [Native Production andTrade Commission, 1944: Evidence], 1 [Oral], (2), 993, evidence of C. Mzingeli, W. and B. Ntuli, 4 July1944.15 Report on the Southern Rhodesia Labour Party African Branch Conference, 12-13 Feb. 1944,in The Rhodesia Herald, 18 Feb. 1944.16 In one important civil case, Mtandwa v. Shiota( 1929), the appellant alleged that Chief Chihota(the respondent) had imposed upon him a fine in cattle, for incest For further details, see Reports ofCases in the Native Appeal Court, Southern Rhodesia ([Salisbury, Govt Printer, ad.]), I, (i), 5-20.17 R. M. G. Mtetwa, 'The "Political" and Economic History of the Duma of South-EasternRhodesia from the Early Eighteenth Century to 1945'(Univ. of Rhodesia, unpubl. D.Phil, thesis, 1976);W. Roder, The Sabi Valley Irrigation Projects (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago, 1965), 69-71.18Z/AH/1/1 [Land Commission, 1925: Evidence: Oral], (2), para. 4817, evidence of L. G.Robinson, 1 Apr. 1925.19 S1563 [Native Affairs Dep., QhiefJ N. C, Reports, C. N. C. and N. C.s, 1934-48], N. C.Lomagundi, Annual Report for 1936.M. C. STEELE33into account the mechanics of bargaining,20 a sum slightly below this representedthe norm for internal trade, as well as the equivalent standard of value expressed inmonetary terms.21 In both instances, from about 1921 onwards the figure wasusually substantially higher than that offered by the European sector. JasperSavanhu drew the appropriate moral in his evidence to the Godlonton Commission:'If they [African stock-owners] do not want to sell to Europeans it is because theydo not realise prices that are as good as when they sell amongst themselves'.22There were several other factors which inhibited sales of cattle, or certain typesof cattle, to Europeans and serve to qualify the general assertion that Africanswould sell if the price was 'right'. First, to borrow Schneider's useful analogy, largestock were the 'big notes'23 of the exchange system. As with high-denominationcurrency bills, the owner would hesitate to'break' them down if other, intrinsicallyless valuable, forms of exchange (e.g. sales of grain or labour) were immediatelyavailable to meet financial obligations. Secondly, this hesitation would bereinforced by the innate caution of the peasant living close to the margin ofsubsistence: as Goodfellow has so rightly commented, where resources are scarce,it behoves the agriculturalist to dispose of them carefully and on economic lines.24Thirdly, most cattle offered to traders were elderly and had little further economicvalue. A Native Commissioner commented in 1918: 'Those who own big oxen areloath to part with them, while "weeds" do not command a ready sale. Breedingstock are very rarely sold,'25 In time, this practice provoked many official grumblesabout African ignorance of market forces, but in point of fact breeding and draughtanimals were too valuable to be sold to outsiders except in a very buoyant market orin cases of extreme adversity.The number of African-owned cattle increased rapidly over the thirty yearsfrom 1902, the year when Native Department statistics commence (see Table I).During this period owners were recovering from the main disasters of the 1890s:the seizure of cattle by the Chartered Company and settlers after the 1893 War,26and the rinderpest pandemic of 1896 which may have destroyed as much as20 A very useful account of bargaining between cattle-owners and European dealers at the turn ofthe nineteenth century is given in S. P. Hyatt, The Old Transport Road (London, Andrew Melrose,1914), 107-39, Hyatt stresses several points of procedure often ignored by later generations of Whitetraders: African cattle owners' dislike of being rushed, since cattle sales were important events in thecommunity; their readiness to sell to those whom they knew and trusted; their willingness to bargaindownwards from the usually high opening demand. I am grateful to Professor T. O. Ranger for thisreference.21 Schneider's study of Turn cattle ownership gives a similar valuation, 'Economics in EastAfrican aboriginal societies', 65."Z/BJ/1/1, (3), 1712, evidence of J. Savanhu, 4 Aug. 1944.23 Schneider, 'Economics in East African aboriginal societies', 54.24 D. M. Goodfellow, Principles of Economic Sociology (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,1939), 3-17. Goodfellow'shook reveals the sometimes overlooked fact that criticism of the' Bantu cattlecomplex' is no recent phenomenon."N/9/1 [Native Dep.: Reports: Annual], 21 [1918], N. C. Lomagundi, Annual Report26 See Stigger, 'Volunteers and the profit motive'.34 THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLETable IAFRICAN-OWNED CATTLE, 1902-1945Year1902191319151917191919211923192519271929No. of Cattle55 155377 090445 795551 632652 776854 498927 3431 095 8411 370 5671 495 803Year19311932*1933193519371939194119431944*1945No. of Cattle1 628 2991 755 6101 748 6211 653 4621 582 0621 570 3101 768 6901 824 5211 915 5341 911 644* = Peak years.Source: Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, Mashonaland. . . 1902and Report ofthe Chief Native Commissioner, Matabeleland. . . 1902 (Sessional] Papferjs, 1902;Report of the Chief Native Commissioner. . , 1913 (Sess. Paps, A. 8, 1914), and for the succeedingyears indicated (title varies).95 per cent of African-owned stock throughout the country. 21 Arguably this isanother factor which may have inhibited sales to Europeans. After 1932, a series ofdroughts caused a temporary reversal, but expansion of the cattle populationresumed at a more modest rate just before the outbreak of the Second World Warand continued until the start of statutory destocking in 1945,LOBOLAOne aspect of the exchange function, lobola, merits closer attention if only becausethe majority of Native Department officials regarded it as the principal obstacle tothe commercial exploitation of cattle,28 The growing impatience discernible in theDepartment's records was not expressed in terms of hostility to the institution perse. No official wanted to abolish lobola, as it created a bond between participatingkinship groups, helped to ensure the decent treatment of women by their affines,and fostered the security of the marriage arrangementŠall vital matters to the37 H. Weinmann, Agricultural Research and Development in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1923(Salisbury, Univ. College ofRhodesia, Dep, of Agriciculture Occasional Paper 4, 1972), 105. On therinderpest pandemic itself, see C, van Onselen, 'Reactions to rinderpest in Southern Africa, 1896-97*.The Journal of African History, XIII (1972), 473-88.28 See, for example, S 235 [Native Affairs Dep., C. N. C, Correspondence, Unnumbered Series,1909-49] 487 (Native Affairs Dep, Advisory Committee, 1931-3, Minutes of Conference), commentsof W. S. Bazelev.M. C. STEELE35Table IIAVERAGE LOBOLA CLAIMED AND ACTUALLY PAID,1910-1945 (CASH EQUIVALENT)ClaimedActually PaidClaimedActually paid1910-14£1111s001930-4£156s10101915£1181935£173-19s100-9s1001920-4£157s001940-5 (sic)£217s001925-9£177s00Source: Graph in H. Cripps, 'Should lobola be restricted by legislation?' NADA (1947), XXIV, 42.Native Commissioner in his role as civil justice.29 Concern was voiced rather at the'commercialization' of what was held to be an essentially non-mercenary, socialinstitution: a process attributed to Western materialist influences. One peri-urbanNative Commissioner instanced the acceptance of lobola cattle by fathers whoknew that their daughters had no intention of marrying the suitors.30 The steady risein the level of lobola demands (as shown in Table II) was cited as further evidenceof commercialization. Of course, the mounting discrepancy between claims andactual payments may signify nothing more than a reluctance to pay up in full at atime of growing marital instability. But it could also point to the progressiveimpoverishment of suitors and ultimately of their paternal kin, who weretraditionally responsible for finding lobola cattle for their sons. The sudden jump inthe average actually paid in the period 1940-5, a time of economic recovery, wouldtend to confirm this interpretation.In view of the inability of husbands to pay in full, why did the level of lobolademanded continue to rise? The most immediate reason seems to be parentalanxiety.31 Chief Nyakuna succinctly summarized this feeling at a meeting of theMtoko Native Board held in 1932:Pledging is prohibited and our daughters go about engaging themselvesto young men of their own choice, strangers they find at stores andother places. These men are not of our own choosing and some of them29 As defined in the Southern Rhodesia Regulations Proclamation, 1910 (High Commissioner'sProclamation No. 55 of 1910, Section 14 (a)). Note also the Native Commissioner's extensive powersas Registering Officer for 'native' marriages (Native Marriages Ordinance, No. 15 of 1917, Section 1).30 S 1563, N. C Salisbury, Annual Report for 1934.31 Other reasons suggested include the rise in population (cf. Schneider, 'Economics in EastAfricanaboriginal societies', 64) and the effect of the erosion of wealth in the African Reserve economy resultingfrom the demands of the European sector (C. Keyter, personal communication, 16 May 1978).36THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLEare bad characters and we naturally feel that we have the right todemand a comparatively large amount of lobola as a guarantee of theson-in-law's worthiness and good intentions.32The sense of socio-economic insecurity felt by the older generation wasreflected in the overt commercialization of the rutsambo element, paid by the suitor(not his father) and equivalent to a betrothal present. Rutsambo had been no morethan a token in pre-colonial times, but it was now paid in cash and amounted toseveral pounds." A further predisposing factor leading to inflation was the rippleeffect caused by one family (or group of families) electing to raise the level of lobolademanded; not wishing to give the impression that their daughters were of smaller'value', other families followed suit and eventually established a new norm for thecommunity as a whole.34An element of commercial calculation was thus apparent in lobola transactions.Was this a new feature, as the Native Department maintained? Certainly, with thegrowing diversification of economic life in the economy of the Reserves resultingfrom the impingement of European values, there was a trend towards 'com-mercialization': soon, girls with a modicum of Western education were able tocommand higher levels of lobola than their uneducated sisters. But a widerange of recent anthropological research conducted in Africa after about 1950 hascast considerable doubt on the rather idealized social interpretation of lobolawhich had held sway for so long. Lobola. now emerges as a basically economicmechanism with important social ramifications. First, it represented the mostpervasive form of exchange in pre-colonial society, and indeed some formalists likeGray have claimed lobola to be the fans et origo of the economic system,enabling it to rise above the purely subsistence level35 But secondly, and moresignificantly, women and cattle were' economic' in the sense that they were bothproductive units,36 and their value was enhanced further by their reproductivecapacity. Both of these concerns were essential for the community's futuresurvival, and their control was, as Meillassoux has stressed," a key concern. Onone level, this can be seen in terms of male dominance over women. But, as Terrayand Douglas have pointed out, from differing standpoints, there is a second strandof exploitation in lobolaŠthat of juniors by their seniors. The older generation32S1542 (Native Affairs Dep., C, N, C, Correspondence, General, 1914-43], N2 (NativeBoards, 1931-9], minutes of the meeting of the Mtoko Native Board, 10 Mar. 1932. On pledging, seebelow, fn. 40.33 Holleman, Shona Customary Law, 159, gives a range of£ 1 to £7 in Buhera for 1928. By 1946-8, the average rutsambo in Charter District as a whole was £10.34 Ibid., 164.35R. F. Gray. 'Sonjo bride price and the question of African "wife purchase"*, AmericanAnthropologist (1960), LXII, 3,4-47.36 It is only fair to point out here that Holleman, often dismissed by critics of the 'Bantu cattlecomplex', is fully aware of the economic nature of the lobola transaction: 'Cattle and females, and cattleand food, are in a sense interchangeable values in Shona life', Shona Customary Law, 116.37 Meillassoux, 'From reproduction to production', 101.M. C. STEELE37utilize lobola as a means of controlling the supply of women to check possibleattacks on their status by the young men: Douglas likens it to a rationing system inwhich the elders 'keep control of the issue desk'.38From about the end of the first decade the pre-colonial lobola mechanismbegan to show obvious signs of strain. The older generation was confronted with anew constellation offerees: a settler society which imposed numerous financialobligations; the entry of labour migrants who sometimes sought wives fromamongst local women, but who more often than not were content with formingirregular unions on a temporary basis; and an emerging younger generation whoclaimed higher status within their society on the strength of such non-traditionalcriteria as a period of service under Europeans, wealth in the form of cash or tradegoods, or education. The elders responded by raising the ruling level oflobola, anaction which had important social implications: fathers protected their status bykeeping their sons dependent on them for the supply of lobola cattle, while theirsons-in-law were imprisoned in what was in effect a client relationship for acorrespondingly longer period. At the same time, the older generation providedthemselves with a measure of immediate financial security by insisting upon thepayment of rutsam bo in cash. On the other hand, they were faced with the usualparental responsibility of finding suitable spouses for their daughters, if only toprevent them from absconding to the towns, forming irregular unions with aliensand thus becoming lost to the group as a whole.39 One possible recourse, thepledging of girls before puberty to elderly and wealthy men in exchange for somelobola cattle on account, was greatly hindered by Government legislation, whichalso required that the consent of the woman should be' freely and voluntarily' givento the marriage.40 It is thus likely that to an increasing extent, fathers werecompelled to face reality and to accept relatively poor suitors for their daughters:the growing disparity between lobola demands andpayments may be a reflection ofthis trend.Lobola clearly represents a factor of importance in an overall survey of theeconomic function of cattle, as, at any given time, a proportion of stock wasearmarked for lobola purposes and excluded from the pool of cattle available forexternal sale, although they were used in the interim period for other purposes suchas ploughing. The existence of statistics relating to the size of lobola demandswould appear to make the calculation of this proportion a simple task, but inpractice they offer little help. Lobola was essentially a circular transaction:daughters brought in cattle from other groups, and sons took them out againŠyet38 E. Terray, Marxism and 'Primitive' Societies (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1972), 165Š7; M. Douglas, 'Primitive rationing: A study in controlled exchange', in Firth(ed), Themes in EconomicAnthropology, 128-33, 138,39 A tabulation of Native Board minutes for the period 1931-3 shows that the problem ofabsconding women was brought up at 15 out of a grand total of 80 meetings; the grievance was mostdeeply felt in Reserves close to urban centres.40Native Marriages Ordinance (No. 15 of 1917), Sections 6, 11 (1), and 12.38 THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLEanother reason for marrying off daughters fairly promptly. With equal numbers ofsons and daughters, a father would in theory eventually break even; and in any casehe required a large number of cattle only on a few occasions in his lifetime. Stocktransferred to a father on the marriage of his daughter would be held 'in suspense'for an unmarried son, and under normal circumstances would not be sold. Thesystem of paying lobola in instalments, usually completed on the birth of one ormore children of the union, adds a further element of complexity to any quantitativeanalysis, especially as it is clear from Table II that lobola debtors were fallingfurther and further into arears. Finally, the calculation must attempt to establish theaverage number oflobola animals held by the stock-owner throughout his adult life,relative to the overall size of his herd, and take into account the variables mentionedabove. As a practical exercise, it is fraught with difficulties, especially as fewmarriage registers have survived and the information they provide is fragmentary.Neither do individual assessments by Africans themselves help greatly, as they areeither a desideratum, or simply reflect the ruling level of lobola.THE PRODUCTIVE USE OF CATTLEDuring the period of this study, the main productive use of cattle was forploughing, with the hauling of produce to market by means of sleighs, wagons andscotch-carts, and the supply of milk and manure making up various ancillary uses.Taken as a whole, the productive function of cattle assume'd greater importance astime passed, with the potential result of removing an increasing proportion of cattlefrom the external marketBetween 1913 and 1938, the number of ploughs owned by Africans in theReserves rose sharply from 4,280 to 93,938. Expansion was swiftest during therelatively prosperous years of the mid and later 1920s. The rapid change-over fromhoe to plough necessitated the supply of a large number of draught animals,especially as the type of yoke in use at the time required at least four oxen perplough.41 Although ploughs and ploughing oxen were hired out, and some Africansactually went into business as semi-professional ploughmen, it seems reasonable toassume that there may have been approximately 250,000 draught animals in theReserves by the outbreak of the Second World War. African peasants castratedtheir bulls wholesale to make them amenable to the plough, with the addedincentive that when they were no longer useful, they would fetch higher prices thanbulls.42 Their enthusiasm had unfortunate long-term consequences: since the largeranimals were emasculated, the quality of African stock degenerated and itssaleability diminished. Their determination to possess tools and other means ofproduction on an individual basis, typical of peasant proprietors in general, led to41 The figures are taken from the Annual Statistical Returns attached to Southern Rhodesia, Reportof the Chief Native Commissioner,.. 1913, and for succeeding years (title varies); Z/AZ/2/1 (NaturalResources Commission, 1938-9; Evidence: Oral), (2), 340, evidence of E, Alvord, 7 Nov. 1938.42N/9/l/22[1919j,N. C. Salisbury, Annual Report; S 235/508 [District Annual Reports, 1930],N. C, Bikita, Annual Report.M. C. STEELE39unmistakable signs of imbalance in herd composition: by 1948, working oxen werereported to have comprised 30 per cent of all cattle in some Reserves,43From a very early stage in the colonial period African cultivators used draughtanimals to move surplus grain to market The sleigh, a platform of branchesdragged behind the oxen and perforce of very limited capacity, was the simplest ofthe conveyances employed; despite official condemnation of its part in causingerosion,44 the sleigh persisted until quite recently. One reason for this was the highcost of wagons and scotch-carts, which put them beyond the reach of the averagecultivator. The price of a scotch-cart in 1937 is reported to have been £45,45 Anattempt at local manufacture was made during the Second World War, but theresulting product was considered to be of poor quality and unjustifiably expensive.Nevertheless, ownership of scotch-carts and wagons steadily increased from 1914onwards and facilitated the emergence by the outbreak of the Second World War ofa limited number of'middle' peasants in Reserves and Purchase Areas reasonablyclose to urban areas and railway lines. As was noted earlier, owners often hired outvehicles, but the very high charges made (another characteristic feature of peasantentrepreneurship46) must have deterred many would-be users.The utilization of cattle for dairying was more developed inNdebele areas; milkseems to have figured less in the diet of Mghveld Shona groups like the Zezura.47African dairymen around Plumtree and Shabani were supplying milk in com-mercial quantities to their respective urban centres by the 1920s, This soon led toprotests by European milk-producers and an expression of anxiety about hygienefrom the Government Health Department Legislation providing for the registrationof dairymen and conferring upon the Minister concerned extensive powers torefuse certificates was eventually introduced in 193?.48 Although it did notexplicitly discriminate against African milk-producers, the Dairy Act in practicevirtually extinguished their share of the commercial market outside the Reserves.With the implementation of the Alvord agricultural demonstration scheme andthe complementary system of arable land centralization from the late 1920sonwards, a new premium was placed on the use of manure to maintain soil fertility.Some initial resistance was shown by cultivators who complained that itaccelerated weed growth.49 A further delaying factor was the lack of labour and43 Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs^ Chief Native Commissioner, andDirector of Native Development for the Year 1948 (Sess. Paps, C. S. R. 27, 1949), 102.44 e.g.. Annual Report of the Natural Resources Board for the Year Ended 31st December 1946(Sess. Paps, C. S, R 36, 1947), 3.45Z/BJ/l/2 (Written], (1), C, D. Dryden, memorandum, 1944,46 See D, Warriner's similar comment about the pre-war Bulgarian peasantry in her Economics ofPeasant Farming (London, Cass [reprint of 1939 original], 1964), 122.47Z/BJ/l/2, (2), A. N. C. Bindura, memorandum, 1944.48 Dairy Act (No. 28 of 1937). For the effects of the Act on African dairyists, see S235/516(District Annual Reports, 1938], N. C. Belingwe, Annual Report49 On the question of cost benefit relationships in peasant agriculture, see E. Boserup, TheConditions of Agricultural Growth (London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1965), 66, and P. F. M. McLoughtin(ed), African Food Production Systems (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), esp. 3-39.40 THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLEtransport to collect and spread it out on arable land. Nevertheless, the employmentof kraal manure in agriculture had won a fair measure of support by the start of theSecond World War,50 especially among' advanced' farmers with relatively easyaccess to markets. Alvord's native agriculture section operated on the basicassumption that a mature ox produced sufficient manure to treat one arable acre ofland, an estimate that has been accepted by several recent agro-economists likeFloyd.51 However, Native Department statistics reveal that prior to 1927, andafter 1938, the ratio between total cattle and cultivated acreage was smaller thanthe Alvord formula, and that itdid notrise above 1.18 beasts per acre at any stage.52As calves and low-quality animals producing correspondingly less manurerepresented a sizeable fraction of the total, and as cattle were not evenly distributedbetween districts and owners, it is apparent that even had manuring become auniversal practice, there would not have been sufficient to go round.Another major impediment was the shortage of land for African use, both forcommercial ranching53 and for mixed-farming operations, in areas reasonably closeto towns and the line of rail. This topic has been covered in detail elsewhere,54 but inthe present context it is interesting to see how the Native Department turned theissue around by harping on the prevalence of 'overstocking', especially in thesmaller Reserves. On that basis, the Department engaged in a lengthy campaignto induce Africans to cull their herds. However, it is significant that of the 20Reserves estimated by Alvord in 1946 to be more than 50 per cent overstocked, 17were also more than 50 per cent over-populated.55 In other words, Africans incongested Reserves had too little land, rather than too many cattle.The principal impression conveyed by this data is that Africans had insufficientstock (as well as insufficient land in many areas) to realize the full potential of themixed-farming system envisaged by the Alvord agricultural scheme.56 A com-parison between what was deemed to meet economic requirements and actualholdings offers further quantitative evidence. Various official estimates of theformer are available, giving a generally low range of 6 to 12 cattle per family: lobola50 Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs and Chief Native Com-missioner, for the Year 1939 (Sess. Paps, C, S. R. 9, 1940), 24.5' B, N. Floyd, Changing Patterns of African Land Use in Southern Rhodesia (Lusaka, Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 3 vols, 1959), I, 127.52 This calculation is based on the figures given in the General Statistical Returns attached to theReport of the Chief Native Commissioner for the Year 1918 (Sess. Paps, A.4, 1919), and succeedingyears to 1945 (title varies),53 Purchase Area farms ranged in size from about 100 to 2,000 acres. The larger units were in veryarid areas where the carrying capacity of the land was low (15-20 acres per head); also, most of thesefarms were dry.54 Most notably in R. H. Palmer, Land and Racial Domination in Rhodesia (London, Heinemann,1977).55 'Annual Report of the Director of Native Agriculture for the Year 1946' in Southern Rhodesia,Report of the Chief Native Commissioner, Secretary for Native Affairs, and the Director of NativeDevelopment for the Year 1946 (Sess. Paps, C. S. R. 48, 1947), 49-52, Charts VIII and IX.56 For further details, see M. C. Steele, 'The Foundation of a "Native" Policy: SouthernRhodesia, 1923-1953'(Simon Fraser Univ., unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, 1972), 359-93.M. C. STEELE41cattle are customarily excluded on the grounds that they were not a fixed part of theherd.57 The national average per married tax-paying male increased from 6.6 headin 1920 to a peak of 11.9 in 1932, then fell steadily to 8.8 in 1938 as a result of thecontinuing rise in the human population set against stagnation in the number ofAfrican-owned cattle.At first blush, these ratios appear reasonable, except for the downard trend ofthe later 1930s, but the average is skewed by two factors in the distribution: first,the inclusion of predominantly pastoral districts like Matobo with correspondingratios of 23.9 (1920), 20.4 (1932) and 12.4 (1938), and, secondly, the wide rangein the size of herds.58 A Native Department cattle census conducted in ShanganiReserve during 1933 showed that although the average holding was about 40 head,175 owners had 14,569 cattle (a mean of 83 head) and the remaining 1,125 ownedin total only 28,431 head (a mean of 25).59 Some Africans, especially in the small,densely populated Reserves where grazing was severely limited, owned no cattle atall: the Native Agricultural Department in evidence to the Godlonton Commission(1944Š5) put their number as high as 35 per cent of the total.60 Although theabsence of comprehensive statistics for each Reserve does not permit a categoricalopinion, it seems likely that by the late 1930s, more than half of the African mixedfarmers did not possess economic herds.SALES OF CATTLE TO THE EUROPEAN SECTORStatistics covering the sale of cattle to Europeans were maintained systemat-cally only from 1926 onwards, although reference to Native Commissioners'Annual Reports enables one to derive a reasonably complete set of figures for a fewdistricts from the end of the First World War (See Table III). The War itself was adistinctly favourable period for African cattle sales, with the stimulation of demandresulting from the East African Campaign and the opening up of the Rand market to57 It is significant that the Native Department took a serious view of the matter only in the SecondWorld War. For estimates, see Z/BJ/1/1, (1), 1311, 1319, evidence of A. St J. Harvey and A. F.Durham, [July 1944], in which the witnesses gave a range of 8 to 12 per family, excluding lobola, andcommented that only 10 to 12 Africans in the Fort Victoria Reserves had herds of more than 25 cattle.Alvord's estimate of 6 per family (as against the actual average of 4.6 in 1944) appears in Report of theNative Production and Trade Commission, 1944 (Sess. Paps, C. S. R. 2, 1945), 31. Compare theseofficial estimates with that of an African teacher quoted by R. McGregor, "Native Segregation inSouthern Rhodesia: A Study of Social Policy" (Univ. of London, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, 1940), 164, viz,15-20 per family: 4Š6 ploughing, 3 milk, 11 lobola. Fielder gives a similarly high figure (20 householdneeds, and 10 herded out) for the Ila in Zambia, "The role of cattle in the Ha economy', 338.58 Based on the figures given in the General Statistical Returns attached to the Report of the ChiefNative Commissioner for the Year 1918, and succeeding years (title varies). A fairly large margin oferror is present in this calculation, as the ratio of married men varies substantially from district to district,and even in the same district at different times; also, elderly men were usually exempted from the paymentof tax and would not be included in the register. If single male taxpayers are counted in, the ratios becomesubstantially lower, but as boys over the apparent age of 14 (who would not normally own herds anyway)were liable to tax, it was decided to exclude them from the calculation.59 S1542/N2, 62, Assistant N.C. Shangani Reserve to N. C. Bubi, 16 May 1933; one herdsmandepastured nearly 2,000 head of cattle on the Shangani Reserve.60 Report of the Native Production and Trade Commission, 1944, 27.42 THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLETable IIISALES OF CATTLE TO EUROPEANS: NATIONAL AND SELECTEDDISTRICT ESTIMATES, 1918-1945Year1918191919201921192219231924192519261927192819291930193119321933193419351936193719381939194019411942194319441945National27 14422 36032 00059 21479 24841 15631 64281 08171 98562 60194 580105 357156 85187 51893 893 Ł92 939113 446106 25695 067141 445Mtoko1 5001 3197652175001061065376156207076757501 6752 4861 2298571 0001 4691 8543 6483 9551 018Selected DistrictsChibi2 6001 5001 600*1 4001 1232 3553 0005 000None t10 07410 9537 98812 0777 9068 1355 9929 6255 984 X8 109 X4 337 1Ndanga5 0003 5001600200200100506301 3003 9003 5122 9261 2262 8152 4644 3022 9973 0433 2823 4202 3232 3892 624* Includes unspecified number sold to other Africans,t Affected by foot-and-mouth outbreaks,t Includes figures for Nuanetsi (separated from Chibi District in 1943) to facilitate comparisonwith earlier figures.Note: Estimates of 'disposals' in Native Commissioners' Reports are excluded, as they includeslaughters for own use and deaths.Source; Statistical Returns in the Report of the Chief Native Commissioner . . . 1918, andsucceeding years (title varies); N/9/1/21-5 (1918-22); S235/5O1-11, 513 and 517 (District AnnualReports, 1923-33, 1935, .and 1939); S1563 for 1934, 1936-8, and 1940-5.M. C, STEELE43Rhodesian cattle in 1916. Demand continued to rise after the Armistice, reaching apeak in 1920, but in the following year the market collapsed in response to the post-war trade depression. The treed of cattle prices corresponded with the changinglevel of demand, as Table IV shows:Table IVAFRICAN CATTLE PRICES, NDANGA AND BULALIMA-MANGWE,1917-192361Price In ShillingsYear1917191819191920192119221923Source;Ndanga40-50 (good quality cows)80-100 (good quality cows)50 (good quality cows)N/9/1/20-5 (1917-22); and S235/501.Bulalima-Mangwe120-240 (all cattle)180 (oxen)60 (oxen)35 (all cattle)20 (all cattle)Unfortunately for African herdsmen, the trough of the depression (1922-3)coincided with the worst famine since the Occupation, following the virtual failureof the preceding rains. Cattle had become so unsaleable as a result of the marketcollapse that many district officials refused to accept them as payment for reliefgrain.62 In 1924, South Africa imposed a protective embargo on the importation ofRhodesian cattle weighing under 1,050 lb.-Ša measure that hit low-weight Africanproducers and curbed the price recovery. At no time in the later 1920s and 1930sdid prices regain their war-time peak. The most favourable year was 1929, whencattle in Bulalima-Mangwe District were changing hands for an average of £5 perhead63 Some degree of correlation between the upward price trend and the volumeof sales in the later 1920s may be discerned; on the other hand, a proportion of thedisposals were made reluctantly to meet tax demands and dip fees (regarded ascattle 'tax' throughout the period by most Africans), or to buy food in years of lowrainfall. That a war-time valuation continued to be placed on cattle is evident inthe various amounts, ranging from £5 upwards (depending on district) demandedfrom traders.64 Native Department officials usually countered what they considered61 Price statistics are extremely fragmentary; Ndanga and Bulalima-Mangwe have been selectedbecause their figures are the most complete of any district On the whole, cattle from the ' sweet veld'districts of Southern Matabeleiand and Mashonaland were of better than average quality, and thesefigures are somewhat higher than the national mean62 For the famine, see N/3/11/7-8 (Native Dep.: Correspondence: Food Supplies and FamineRelief: 11 Mar. 1922-4 May 1923)."S235/5O7 (District Annual Reports 1929), N. C. Bulalima-Mangwe, Annual Report64 See, forexample, S 1561/10(NativeDep., C. N. C. Correspondence, General, 1909-54: Chiefsand Headmen. 1915-34), VIII, N. C. Mzingwane to the Superintendent of Natives, Bulawayo, 6 Jan.1926.44THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLEto be an illogical attitude by drawing the attention of stock-owners to the existenceof'market forces'. Few stock-owners seem to have been convinced as there isevidence that even before the post-war depression they knew only too well thatEuropean cattle fetched higher prices in the towns.65The 1930s constituted a decade of almost continuous crisis for African cattle-owners. Prices collapsed in the wake of the inter-war trade depression, a sequenceof natural disasters beset African herdsmen and recovery was further hindered by anumber of statutory measures designed to assist European producers. Nevertheless,the volume of disposals maintained an upward trend over the decade as a whole.This may seem surprising, in view of the persistent price disincentive,66 but theoperation of the 'push factor' in inducing sales, disguised to some extent by thecomparative prosperity of the later 1920s, now becomes unmistakable.67 Thesubstantial figure of 81,081 cattle sold in 1933 is explicable in terms of the poor1932-3 growing season, which obliged cultivators to dispose of stock for food andtax money at a time when alternative sources of income such as employment hadbeen curtailed by the economic depression. At such times, the question of pricebecame subordinate to the stark necessity of survival,68 though this is not to say thatowners demanded any less when haggling with traders.The post-depression recovery of the African stock industry received a severesetback as a result of Government measures such as the Beef Bounty and CattleLevy Act (No. 28 of 1935), the purpose of which was to subsidize the export ofpredominantly European-produced high-quality chilled and frozen beef; the exportbounty was to be financed from a 10s. per head slaughter levy, payable by butcherswho slaughtered more than five cattle for local consumption.69 To forestall possiblecriticism, the Government publicly maintained that local consumers, not pro-ducers, would ultimately pay the slaughter levy, and added that the export of largenumbers of prime cattle could improve the local market for African stock.70 Inpractice, the levy was passed back to the African producer, depressing his level of65 N/9/1/23 (1920), N. C. Hartley, Annual Report for 1920. Also, Africans complained aboutthe size of local butchers' profit margins on their cattle; see S 1542/N2, minutes of the Shangani Boardmeeting held on 7 May 1932.66 See, for example, the prices (in shillings) for Ndanga District: 15-25 (all cattle) in 1932,S235/510(District Annual Reports, 1932); 20(allcattle) in 1933, S235/511 (District Annual Reports,1933); 40-55 (large oxen) in 1934, S 1563; 15-25 (cows) in 1935, S235/514 (District Annual Reports,1935): and 15-30 (cows) in 1936, S1563.67 Particularly the effect of 'Native Tax', which remained at the figure of £1 set in 1904throughout the period, despite the hardships of the depression years; and the imposition of dip fees(usually Is. to 2s, per head per year) from the First World War onwards. For evidence of the correlationbetween these obligations and cattle sales, see S 1542/N2, minutes of the Native Board meeting held atPlumtree, 21 Nov. 1933.68 In 1933-4, 13,000 head were sold in Chibi District for tax, dip levies and food, S1542/S9(Store Sites, 1933Š43), N. C. Chibi to Superintendent of Natives, Victoria, 14 May 1934. This evidencesubstantiates the rural impoverishment thesis ofG. Arrighi, The Political Economy ofRhodesia (TheHague, Mouton, 1967), 28-35.69 Section 4 of the Act70 See the Minister of Agriculture's statement in the Assembly, Debates 1936, XVI, 234,24 Mar.M. C. STEELE45return even further.71 The second argument was disingenuous, as the Minister forAgriculture had already admitted in private that the size of the planned levy would'prevent butchers from buying native cattle for slaughter and drive them into buyingthe better-class stock from European famers',72The 1935 Act thus played a material part in slowing down the recovery ofAfrican sales in the later 1930s, The benefits of a firmer local market seem to haveaccrued to the European, rather than the African, cattle-owner, and in any casethey do not seem to have offset the scaling down of prices offered by traders whichresulted from the slaughter levy," Another factor of importance at the time was thefoot-and-mouth epidemic in the south-eastern part of the Colony which started inApril 1931 and tied up large numbers of cattle intermittently for the next six years,leading to serious overstocking in the Reserves of Fort Victoria and Gutu Districts.The sharp increase in the volume of sales which took place in 1938 correspondswith the culling operations conducted in these and adjacent districts when anelement of official compulsion was brought to bear on herdsmen.74 From the endof the Second World War, sales to the European sector rose steadily in response tothe official de-stocking campaign introduced in 1945.THE PRICE INCENTIVEAt this point, the question arises as to whether Africans would have sold more,or fewer, cattle if prices had been higher in the later 1920s and 1930s. Thetraditional interpretation bears some resemblance to the 'target theory' of Africanlabour: stock-owners had a specific sum of money in mind, and sold only therequisite number of cattle. Higher prices would merely have resulted in fewerbeasts being offered for sale.75 Yet even during the 1930s, several NativeCommissioners dissented from the popular view. Thus the Native Commissionerfor Mrewa noted in Ms Annual Report for 1937 that local Africans were 'eager tosell' more animals than usual because of the improved prices offered.76A study of the rather sketchy statistics available reveals no consistent pattern:sometimes higher prices correspond with larger volumes of trade, sometimes not.'" It was reported that local traders in Mtoko had admitted this; S 1542/N2, N. C. Mtoko to C. N.C, 25 June 1935.72 Historical Manuscripts Collection, CR1/4/2 (Papers of Lionel Cripps: Diaries: 28 May1896-3 May 1937), entry for 15 Dec. 1934; cf. the statement of D. M. Somerville, a leading rancher, inthe Assembly earlier that year, Debates 1934, XIV, 1266, 8 May,73 The implications of the Act are discussed in detail in C. F. Keyter ' "Underdevelopment" inSouthern Rhodesia, 1923-1953' (Univ. ofYork, Centreof Southern African Studies, SeminarPaper, 28April 1977), 7-10.'74 This is the subject of my companion study, 'The Victoria and Gutu cattle-culling sales of 1938',in R. S. Roberts (ed), Cattle in Zimbabwe (Gwelo, Mambo, in press).73 S235/517, N, C, Chibi, Annual Report; for a recent re-statement of this view, see J. Swift,'Pastoral nomadism as a form of land-use: The Twareg of the Adrar n Ifora's*, in T. Monod (ed.),Pastoralism in Tropical Africa (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1975), 449-51. The counter view isexpressed succinctly in W. O. Jones's now classic article, 'Economic Man in Africa', Food ResearchInstitute Studies (1960), I, 107-34.76 S 1563.46 THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLEAdvocates and opponents of the 'target theory5 seemingly can prove theirrespective cases by selecting the most appropriate sets of figures. On the otherhand, as this article has already indicated, it would be surprising if a correlationcould be established between the two indices, given the various economic functionsof cattle in the African economy. Even if the situation is studied purely from thestandpoint of the exchange function, it can be seen that short-term commercialconsiderations often militated against immediate sales in a rising market Incontrast to Mrewa, Hartley experienced a fall-off in sales to Europeans in 1937,despite firmer ruling prices, because Africans, like stock-exchange speculators,wanted to see how far the market would go before they committed large amounts ofstock.77 That they were fully alive to market trends is further demonstrated by theirreluctance to sell in the early months of the Second World War because theyexpected livestock prices would regain their earlier war-time peak in the nearfuture.78In times when cattle prices rose, a further trade factor affected the volume ofsales: the relative cost of consumer goods. While the declining level of cattle salesbetween 1918 and 192079 might be taken asprima facie evidence of the 'targettheory' in the light of the fact that stock prices remained firm, the sharper rise in thecost of ploughs and consumer goods in Reserves stores discouraged stock-ownersfrom parting with their cattle. A similar reaction occurred during the Second WorldWar, when trade goods were scarce, expensive and often of poor quality.80 Oneofficially organized sale collapsed when an African advised the assembled ownersthat they should demand more for their cattle because storekeepers had raised theirown prices.81Three points arise from this discussion. First, a simple correlation of volumeand price will not provide an accurate picture of African response to marketincentives and disincentives. Secondly, despite beliefs to the contrary, Black stock-owners were quite capable of reaching rational economic decisions, taking intoaccount the various factors governing price trends. Thirdly, as was noted earlier,sale to Europeans was only one of several equally 'economic' choices which mightbe available to the cattle-owner, and unless he had a pressing need to obtain cash,he might prefer to use his cattle for ploughing, or for lobola, or as a form ofinvestment if the European market did not offer what he considered to be arepresentative price for his stock It is true that Africans often sold cattle to meetpressing financial obligations but this does not validate the 'target theory' in thesense in which it was understood by the administrators and anthropologists in this77 Ibid.78 S1542/F2 (Farms, 1933-9), A. N. C. Gwaai Reserve to Staff Officer (Intelligence), 27 July1940,79 See above, Table IV.80 Southern Rhodesia, Reports of the Secretary for Native Affairs and Chief Native Com-missioner for the Years 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945 (Sess. Paps, C. S. R. 10, 1947), 116.81Z/BJ/l/i, (1), 2-3, evidence of the C. N. C, H. H. D. Simmonds, 30 May 1944.M. C. STEELE47period. African cattle-ownership was not basically 'uneconomic', becoming'economic' only when stock was traded with Europeans, and nor were Africanrequirements as fixed as the term 'target5 implies. From an early stage, cattle werebeing sold to finance an increasing number of wants, as well as obligations,especially in years of prosperity, and this trend continued despite the economicdifficulties of the inter-war period Thus the' target theory' is valid only in the sensethat the 'target' was steadily increasing in size: wants were being progressivelystimulated by the impact of Western economic, technological and culturalinfluences, even though the capacity to satisfy these wants was progressivelyeroded over most of the period under discussion,CONCLUSIONThe range of evidence presented in this article suggests that neither the traditional'cattle complex' philosophy nor the more recent formalist interpretation suc-cessfully captures the intricate nature of African pastoralism. The first view, basedon the assumption that African society did not respond to economic incentives as itwas resistant to change unduly emphasizes the religious and social functions ofcattle, while the second concentrates on the exchange aspect to the detriment of theother, often more significant economic functions. A final analysis of the economicrole of cattle must therefore incorporate all the elements outlined above.To take the currency function of cattle first, it seems likely that in pre-colonialsociety horned stock were seen primarily as stores of value, conferring economicand social status on their owners. At this stage, their productive capacity was ofsmaller account than their reproductive utility. Despite the introduction of a moneyeconomy after the Occupation, the role of cattle as general purpose currencypersisted because of their clear superiority over paper money and Post Officesavings as a form of investment. However, problems arose once the ravages of therinderpest epidemic and European seizures of the 1890s had been repaired.Grazing areas were limited by the crowding of Africans into Reserves; thepopulation rapidly increased; and the environment was progressively threatened,although not to the extent claimed by conservation interests. These factors in timetended to make cattle (in their purely monetary role) a wasting asset, and incombination with other factors, induced their conversion into other assets, such asPurchase Area farms, consumer goods, and services such as education for theherdsman's children; or in a negative sense, into cash for the payment of tax andother obligations. On the other hand, this was a long-term development which stillhad an extensive course to ran at the outbreak of the Second World War.The productive utility of cattle gained steadily in importance, especially in the1920s, and from the later 1930s onwards, as a result of technological inputs such asploughs and the use of manure in farming operations. To an extent, the othereconomic functions of cattle came into conflict with this process. Some individualsaccumulated herds far in excess of their arable needs, either to gain prestige, or topay bridewealth for additional wives, or for social security, thereby reducing the48 THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF AFRICAN-OWNED CATTLEamount of grazing available for less fortunate herdsmen. The necessity to findmoney for tax or the purchase of grain in bad years often obliged owners withmarginal or sub-marginal herds to sell productive animals, creating a vicious circleof impoverishment. A further limitation on the development of a commercialmixed-farming system was imposed by the progressive curtailment up to 1924 ofthe areas allocated to Africans, which created the impression that many Reserveswere overstocked. In total, these factors prevented a substantial proportion offarmers in medium- and high-rainfall areas from achieving anything like thepotential of the mixed-farming economy outlined in the Alvord scheme, whileshortage of land inhibited the development of commercial ranching in the lowrainfall areas.The exchange function included sales to other Africans and lobola transactions,as well as disposals to Europeans. While quantification of all but the last is notfeasible in the present state of research, the first outlet was certainly, and thesecond, probably, numerically more significant than sales to Europeans. Thewillingness of Africans to sell stock to Europeans was undoubtedly influenced bythe existence of these alternative types of exchange, as well as by a comparativeestimation of the margin which could be obtained from investment and productiveutility. On the other hand, it is likely that as a result of mounting rural poverty in the1930s, inter-African trade declined, forcing more and more cattle onto theEuropean market The part played by lobola in decreasing the potential volume ofpurely commercial sales is difficult to judge in the absence of surveys even on alocal basis. If lobola is interpreted as a purely social institution, some attemptat quantification is essential so that the proportion of 'non-economic* to 'economic*livestock can be ascertained. If the view of this article that lobola was primarilyan economic institution with important social ramifications is adopted, the exercisebecomes less vital, as all cattle were in a sense 'economic'. While it is likely thatNative Department officials exaggerated the scope and intensity of the deterrenteffect of lobola on sales of cattle, the possibility that a substantial proportionof stock was reserved for this purpose cannot be entirely ruled outA common thread may be discerned in this concluding analysis: the dynamicresponse of African pastoralists to the incentives and disincentives of the neweconomic order, initiated before the start of the colonial era and gainingconsiderable momentum by the Second World War. This picture differs sub-stantially from the one presented by contemporary European observers, who alltoo readily fell back on the convenient rationalization of the 'Bantu cattle complex'because they believed that Reserve Africans as a whole were incapable of adjustingto European economic concepts of cattle management, as illustrated by theirreluctance to sell stock to outsiders. However, as this article has attempted to show,the slow pace of advance in the commercialization of cattle in the inter-war periodis attributable more to the unfavourable economic position of the African sectorthan to an inherent conservatism.