HOLLEMAN, J. F. 1969 Chief, Council and Commissioner: Some Problems of Government in Rhodesia. London,Oxford University Press for the Afrika-Studiecentrum, XIX, 391 pp. 46s.The academic world of Rhodesia has for manyyears been eagerly awaiting this work of ProfessorHolleman, which is based on his experience as amember of the Mangwende Reserve Commissionof Inquiry, and as draftsman of the MajorityReport published in 1961. This Majority Reporthas been out of print for several years, and onlythe Minority Report of one member of theCommission is still available through the Govern-ment Printer. Holleman's book, therefore, hasbecome a necessity for students of African poli-tical tribal life in Rhodesia, as little of academicvalue has so far been published on this topic,although some works are now in press or prepara-tion.As Holleman states in his Foreword, his origi-nal intention was to recast the Report in bookform at .the suggestion of Professor Mitchell, atthe University College of Rhodesia. Since thendelay in publication has had the advantagethat it enabled Holleman to bring his materialforward to a later date, though by now moreevents have occurred which again date thematerial presented.Chief, Council and Commissioner deals withthe deposition of a leading Rhodesian chief whichcaused much more publicity than that of anyother of the numerous African tribal leaderswho have been deposed by Rhodesian govern-ments since 1890.The work is divided into three parts. Thefirst part, which gives the background to thecase history, is not so much valuable for thesummary of early Rhodesian history, which hasappeared in many publications, but for its des-cription of the origin of the Native Affairs De-partment and the role of Native Commissionersin the lives of Rhodesian Africans.In these Introductory chapters Holleman laysthe foundation for the concluding chapters, 'TheRediscovery of the Chiefs', which shows how acomplete change of government policy towardsAfrican chiefs occurred in Rhodesia; during theearly years of the European administration ofSouthern Rhodesia chiefs were deliberately re-placed by Native Commissioners, whereas morerecently chiefs have been incorporated into thecivil service bureaucracy.Holleman quotes and writes about the earlyyears: 'The African "was accustomed to look toa chief" and he required a form of "personalgovernment". Therefore, Milner argued, the Afri-cans should be accustomed to look to the localNative Commissioner "as the supreme authorityin all matters in which they are concerned"'(p 16). These early Native Commissioners'powers were wide since they were the only civilservants responsible for the African population;and the African population, in the early years ofthis century, accounted for most of the residentsof this new country because very few settlershad by then arrived. Moreover, Native Commis-sioners were the only official channels of com-munication between the indigenous populationand the white settler community or, as Hollemanputs it later on in the book, 'the outside world',for the African areas have remained until today'to a large extent "closed" territory' (p. 169).As a consequence of this key position ofNative Commissioners, the Native Affairs Depart-ment soon became 'a government within a govern-ment' (p. 18). This is an important observationbecause ehe monolithic structure of this depart-ment, which later formed the backbone of theMinistry of Internal Affairs, provided the basis onwhich an eventual system of apartheid may bebuilt. By analogy to South Africa, this body ofcivil servants may be seen as the future 'Bantuadministrators' of Rhodesia; and the currentgovernment emphasis on covering all Africanareas with councilsŠ105 councils have beenestablished out of a potential of about 225 Šshows the form which the future administrationof Rhodesia may take.In the early days of European administration,just as today, Native Commissioners were pre-pared for their future work through an intensiveservice training, not through academic education(p. 26). Holleman's evaluation of the charactertype formed by this type of training is full ofinsight, and a recent study of District Commis-sioners shows that this early tradition has beenpreserved among these civil servants. Holleman'slater analysis of a particular Native Commis-sioner, involved in the deposition of chief Man-gwende, confirms the impression given in thisearlier account.The second chapter of the introductory partdeals with legislation deeply affecting Africanlife: the African Land Husbandry Act of 1951and the African Councils Act of 1957. TheseActs are seen against the development of Africanagriculture and local administration so that thechanges in government thinking are clearly re-vealed. Holleman's section on African agricultureis valuable for the data on income from agri-culture of progressive and tradition-orientatedpeasants in the tribal areas (pp. 58-60). The lowincomes indicate the extent to which Africansmay be able to finance local services. The dis-cussion of the Councils Act is directly related tothe later issue of community development andthe position of chiefs on local councils. Todaychiefs are ex officio presidents of all Africancouncils. This, hovvever, is a situation whichcame about by overcoming opposition not onlyfrom the African people but also from thosecivil servants most concerned in the issue. In1957, Holleman states, 33 per cent of all NativeCommissioners were against a fusion of thetraditional tribal authority with a modern formof democratic government and 24 per cent of allNative Commissioners outright objected tocouncils (p. 73). Holleman re-examines thisissue at the end of the book.In the second part of the book, Holleman goesinto very great detail to document every aspectof the drama which culminated in the depositionof chief Mangwende in 1959. Again, he startswith filling in the background, this time of thetribal traditional system. He also illustrates thecomplexity of modern tribal administrationthrough a variety of associations which partici-pate in the running of rural African communities;the Kraal-heads' Association (p. 110) is one ofthese new bodies.Holleman's description of the characters ofthe two antagonists, chief Mangwende and theNative Commissioner, and the evaluation of thesemen by the people and by each other, is of highquality. The author shows how their conflictwas bound to accelerate and finally to end inthe defeat of the tribal leader, in spite of theintegrity of both men, because of the differentframes of reference within which they operated.A patriarchal tribal ruler was bound by anethical code different from that of a modernbureaucrat.This second part, however, gives more thana historical account of a case history. Studentsof African nationalism will find factors explainedwhich incline or disincline African chiefs towardsa modern political movement. A careful readingof the Chief Native Commissioner's Reportsthroughout the 1950s and early 1960s shows howthe Native Affairs Department strove to win thesupport of the chiefs by increasing their powerswhenever African nationalism seemed to gaingreater influence among rural Africans. Graduallymany chiefs, who at first had supported the newmovement, firmly rallied behind the governmentbecause of the security and advantages derivedfrom such a position. By the 1960s it was takenfor granted that African chiefs sided with theEuropean administration. Holleman writes that'Rhodesia's self-declared independence (11.11.65)was brought about not least because of the loyalsupport of the tribal authorities' (p. 357).Holleman shows that chief Mangwende did notfollow this general trend of shifting attitudesamong Rhodesian chiefs. Mangwende startedoff as a firm supporter of government becausehe believed in the authority flowing from theCrown. This he showed by his enthusiastic par-ticipation in the war effort. He also co-operatedwhenever his assistance was asked for by civilservants, and any new government policy wasimplemented smoothly in his chiefdom. It wasonly when chief Mangwende saw that the NativeCommissioner effectively ¥/eakened his standingamong his own people that this attitude towardsEuropean authority changed. Holleman writes:'It is therefore not surprising that Mangwende,in the early fifties, strongly resisted the overturesof the African National Congress in his area. Noris it surprising that, in later years, when hispowers were increasingly being challenged by theAdministration and he saw the whole structureof his authority being jeopardized by his irre-conciiabie struggle with the local commissioner,his resistance to Congress weakened until hefound himself in alliance with it' (p. 163). Later,chief Mangwende was said to have become afirm nationalist and at the time of writing thisreview he is no longer allowed to live with hisown people in the tribal area but resides onmission land.Holleman analyses the chief's shift of alle-giance as follows: 'as the conflict evolved ittended to shift from a local to a nationalplane . . . He had chosen to oppose Governmentin order to assert his tribal leadership. As aresult he had lost his chieftainship and had beenremoved from his people and the local scene.Almost unavoidably he thereupon aligned him-self with militant African nationalism, a forceand leadership unlike his own, but likewiseopposed to white government. He thereby ex-changed, in a sense, his specific tribal identityfor a closer association with and loyalty to a87broader and supra-tribal front of black opposi-tion to white political supremacy, in contrast, hissuccessor , . . chose to align himself with thewhite authority upon which he so utterly depen-ded. But in so doing he, too, lost in a sense histribal identity' (p. 235).This analysis also points to the dilemma of everyAfrican chief; is he, as G. K. Garbett put it(Race, 1966-7, 8, 113) a "Government Officer orTribal Leader?' The removal of any chief,whether by death or deposition, calls for com-petition among candidates for office. When Man-gwende became chief in 1937 his greatest rivalhad been his half brother Enoch. Enoch frettedunder his failure to gain the chieftainship andis said to have attempted the chief's assassinationin 1940. When, therefore, government appointedEnoch as successor, this was, in Hoileman'swords, 'playing power-politics with a vengeance'(p. 224). Yet the new chief's earlier careerdeprived him of popular support and made himutterly dependent on the administration. Holle-man writes that whenever he asked him for anopinion, Enoch replied that he first wanted toconsult the District Commissioner, thus indica-ting his lack of self-confidence and authority.The new chief of Mangwende, therefore, drewhis support not from his people but from theadministration, and the administration supportedhim loyally. In 1962 he became a founder mem-ber of the Chiefs' Council, and when he died in1967 he received a great obituary in the Rho-desian press where he was referred to as 'oneof the most respected of African tribal leaders'(The Rhodesia Herald, 21. vii. 1967). The dif-ferent fate of his deposed predecessor showsthat the power basis of Rhodesian chiefs haschanged: chiefs no longer need the support oftheir people, they need government support.Chief, Council and Commissioner is, as itstitle indicates, not only a book about the rela-tionship between traditional and bureaucraticauthority, but it is also a book about a council;more important still, it is the story of a councilwhose investigation contributed towards the evo-lution of separate development in Rhodesia.Holleman writes in retrospect about the Man-gwende Reserve Commission of Inquiry: 'Thecommission could not foresee at the time that,with these remarks, it had provided the Adminis-tration with one of the most useful slogans withWhich, not long afterwards, the new approachto "community development" was launched' (pp.212-13).The third part of the book takes up thispolicy of community development. Hollemanre-examines the structure of the Native AffairsDepartment in the early 1960s, and shows howdeficiencies in the administration, caused by anover centralisation of functions in the hands ofNative Commissioners, led to apathy among theAfrican people and an unwillingness to contri-bute to the advancement of their tribal areas.At the same time that the Mangwende Commis-sion reported its findings to the LegislativeAssembly, the Robinson and Patterson Reportswere also tabled. These two Commissions madethe same recommendation as the MangwendeCommission, and at so unanimous a findinggovernment decided to decentralise the adminis-tration of African areas. The Native AffairsDepartment was submerged into the Ministry ofInternal Affairs and Native Commissioners be-came known as District Commissioners. Variousservices rendered to Africans, such as agricul-tural extension advice, came under their respec-tive ministries. But then an irony of fate occur-red: the new policy of community developmentrequired the coordination of all services, justdecentralised, so that within a few years all werereunited under the Ministry of Internal Affairsand centralisation once more characterised thetribal areas of Rhodesia.Not only the structure of the administration,but still more government policies, affected theexistence and vitality of African councils. Tounderstand these problems in their larger pers-pective it is necessary to go further back in thehistory of Rhodesia's councils than the time ofcommunity development. In 1937 African NativeBoards were replaced by councils; and in 1944these councils were given limited powers oftaxation and of passing by-laws. They were en-titled to supervise primary education; and todaythe provision of primary education is thoughtto be the chief concern of African councils. Thechanges can best be illustrated by analysing therole of councils in African education, especiallysince the school issue was the focal point whichgave rise to the conflict between chief andNative Commissioner and which led to the de-position of the chief and the dissolution of theMangwende council.In the 1950s and until 1962 the Rhodesiangovernment was concerned about high standardsin African education. During these years almostall rural schools were run by Christian mission-aries who charged low school fees for the upkeepŁ< Aand extension of these schools while the govern-ment paid the teachers' salaries. In urban areasgovernment controlled most schools, and at theseno school fees were charged. Many Africansdesired the abolition of school fees in rural dis-tricts; and in some areas which had a council,like the area of chief Mangvvende, people pressedfor permission to open their own schools. Suchpermission, however, was only reluctantly given;in most cases it was refused because both thegovernment and missionaries feared that in Afri-can controlled schools standards would fall. Thus,although councils were by law recognised aspublic bodies which could run schools, educa-tionalists tried to restrict this right.In 1962 the new government decided to makecommunity development the cornerstone of itsadministration, and so official policy towardsAfrican primary schools and councils changed.Fees were now charged in all schools. From 1962until the mid-1960s, government encouraged Afri-cans to form local councils and promised thatif they did so they could take over responsibilityfor local schools. The Mangwende case, whichhad flared up over the school issue, influencedgovernment officials in their belief that this offerwould lead to a rapid adoption of communitydevelopment. By this time, however, Africanswere no longer interested in running their ownschools. They knew that they would not onlyhave to pay school fees but that, if the mission-aries relinquished the schools, they would haveto raise more money than they had done in thepast. Moreover, they were highly critical of thenew policy of community development.In the late 1960s and in the early 1970s afurther development occurred, a developmentwhich took place after Holleman had publishedhis book. Missionaries were forbidden to makeany extension to their primary schools, and toopen any new schools. When this pressure didnot lead to a speedy adoption of communitydevelopment, government announced that fromthe end of 1970 onward it would only pay 95per cent of the teachers' salaries, and that thisgovernment contribution towards African primaryeducation would in stages be further reducedUniversity of Rhodesiafirst to 90 per cent. If the missions were unableto make up the deficit of the teachers' salaries,they had to hand over the schools. The majorityof missionaries declared that they were finan-cially unable to pay an increasing share of theirteachers' salaries, and prepared to hand overAfrican primary education to those ready to takeon responsibility for it. But few councils tookover any significant number of schools; theparents still objected to council schools and sogovernment declared itself ready to sponsorschools for a limited period until councils couldbe formed. In government sponsored schoolsparents have to collect money to pay the fiveper cent of the teachers* salaries and childrenwhose parents refuse, or are unable, to pay, maynot attend school except in cases of special con-cession. If no councils are formed within aperiod of five years, the schools will toe closed.(African Education Amendment Act, No. 38,1970). The fear expressed by missionaries andAfrican parents and teachers that educationalstandards in African schools will fall under thispolicy, was declared unfounded by governmentofficials.This brief survey of the Africans' attitude to-wards running their own schools shows a com-plete reversal from the one current in the Man-gwende chiefdom during the period studied byHolleman. This difference is entirely due tochanged government policies. It would be in-teresting to know whether, if the deposed chiefMangwende were still the head of his people, hewould now actively support community develop-ment. His people seem to do so for the Man-gwende council, which was closed after the clashbetween the chief and the commissioner, was re-established in 1970 (Rhodesia GovernmentNotice, No. 408 of 1970).Holleman's book Chief, Council and Commis-sioner is a lucid exposition of a most complex andcontroversial situation in Rhodesian rural life,tribal history, and internal political relations be-tween Europeans and Africans. It is writtenwith great objectivity and deserves the carefulstudy of every serious student of tribal politicsin Rhodesia.SISTER MARY AQUINA O.P.89