Zambezia (1983),.*.- Ł ...Ł<ŁESSAY REVIEW l "RECENT WORKS ON THE ZIMBABWE LIBERATIONMOVEMENTIN 1978 THERE was published African Nationalism in Zimbahweby WellingtonNyangoni, a Zimbabwean scholar then in exile atBrandeis University.1 In thiswork Nyangoni presents a descriptive analysis of the rise and development of
the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe from colonial occupation in the latenineteenth century through to the armed struggle in the late 1960s and 1970s.He divides the liberation movement into three phases according to theapproaches or methods employed to achieve majority rule.The first phase Nyangoni calls "micro and cultural nationalism' and coversthe period from 1890 to 1961. He argues that during this period, 'Africanassociations and political parties . .. invoked the historical traditions of theMashona and Matabele glories in their attempts to mobilize the Africans tofight for majority rule'.2 The second phase he terms 'Pan-Africanism' andcovers the period from 1961 to 1971. During this period, 'Africans adoptedPan-Africanism as a means for national liberation'. This took the form of'requesting financial support', as well as soliciting 'moral support' fromindependent African countries.3 And finally, the third phase covering theperiod since 1971, falls under the rubric 'scientific socialism',4 a conceptwhich Nyangoni, together with many who have used and abused it, does notattempt to define.Nyangoni should be commended for attempting to classify Africannationalism in Zimbabwe into various specific periods, and, as he does, forsuggesting a developmental process in the radicalization of the movement froma 'micro' parochial outlook to a 'scientific' secular ideological perspective. Butthis notwithstanding, such a neat categorization simplified the real andcomplex reality of the Zimbabwe nationalist movement. From the revolts ofthe late 1890s to the last bullet that presumably concluded the Chimurengawar in 1980, the invocation of cultural nationalism to 'mobilize the masses'never diminished. The recently published Songs That Won the War, by Alec
Pongwerii clearly speaks to this point.5 The songs in vogue during Nyangoni'sthird phase of 'scientific socialism' do not, however, include a Shona
translation of the Internationale nor did the comrades sing it in the original.6Similarly, the phase of'Pan-Africanism' is rather arbitrary. Why from 1961 to1971, when we know all too well that the Pan-Africanist dimension of theZimbabwe struggle was even stronger as Zimbabwe drew closer to majorityrule in the mid and late 1970s? Yet, one of the major causes of the ZAPU-'W.W. Nyangoni, African Nationalism in Zimbabwe (Washington, D.C., Univ. Press ofAmerica, 1978), H5 pp., £4.30.zIbid., 33Ibid.,4.4Ibid.5A.C. Pongweni, Songs That Won the War (Harare, College Press, 1982), 167 pp.,^4.95.'It is not likely that the author would omit the Internationale from a collection oflutionary songs.149ZANU split of 1963 hinged on the choice of external help and self-reliance asa rundamental approach to liberation.7The third phase, 'scientific socialism' is, in fact a period in the history pfthe Zimbabwe liberation struggle that is muddled and mingled with parochial,'micro', tendencies (tribalism) that appeared to overwhelm the 'scientific' andand 'socialist' outlook of the movement8 And, interestingly, Nyangoniprojects the formation of Frolizi at the beginning of his 'scientific socialism'
phase as a forward movement He suggests that the formation of Frolizi in1971, if not a clear manifestation of, certainly gave impetus to, ideologicaladvance in the liberation movement9 Yet, far from being a grouping of'scientific socialists', Frolizi was diagnosed by some to be a 'nepotisticgrouping of cousins and relatives . . . determined to sabotage the liberationstruggle'-10 The general thrust of the liberation struggle combined (among otherfactors), cultural nationalism, Pan-Africansim and a dosage of what Nyangoniterms 'scientific socialism'. The armed struggle was born of a search for a viablesolution to the problem of decolonization and not out of an ideological mentaltransformation involving the embracing of scientific socialism by thenationalist movement One could support, or even lead, the armed strugglefrom a purely nationalist instinct, yet oppose or pay lip-service to socialism,'scientific' or otherwise. This was more often the case during the liberationstruggle. And post-colonial property 'accumulation' by most former leaders ofthe movement would suggest evidence in support of this observation.Another book on the Zimbabwe Nationalist Movement published in 1978was Bishop Abel Muzorewa's Rise up and Walk.11 This is an historicalpolitical autobiography; it is a tale of the man's quasi-humble beginnings
typical of Zimbabwe's first-generation nationalists, but more importantly it isabout Muzorewa's rise to political eminence. Those who have wondered how
and why Muzorewa entered nationalist politics and remained in it for as long ashe has done while also keeping his position of leadership in his church should
read this book. More importantly, it should be read by those searching forinsights into how Muzorewa perceived the issues of the day such as unity, thefrontiine-statism, armed struggle, and, among other things, the more elusivebusiness of negotiating with Ian Smith. Also, the book is quite revealing into
the self-perception of leaders, a critically important factor in politics.Muzorewa portrays himself in this book as someone whose decision-making style is inordinately influenced by religion. Before he could accept theleadership of the A.N.C. in 1971, he had 'three weeks of prayer andmeditation'.12 This theme of prayer recurs many times in Muzorewa's book.When thoughts of possible arrest visited him (as they have many other leaders)Muzorewa always found appropriate passages from the Bible.13 And when'Nyangoni, African Nationalism in Zimbabwe, 57. Ndabaningi Sithole, who led the 1963split, gained fame for having coined the slogan, 'We are our own liberators' Š a reaction toreliance on the external (Pan-Africanist) approach.*E. Dumbutshena's Zimbabwe Tragedy (Nairobi, East Africa Publishing House, 1975)laments the rise of tribalism in Zimbabwe nationalist politics in the 1970s. See also M. SitholeZimbabwe: Struggles-Within-the-Struggle (Salisbury, Rujeko Publishers, 1979).'Nyangoni, African Nationalism in Zimbabwe, 4.10ZANU, Press Release (Lusaka, 10 Oct 1971). The statement was signed by RichardHove, ZANU Publicity Secretary."A.T. Muzorewa, Rise up and Walk (London, Evans Brothers, 1978), 289 pp., £9.95.12Ibid., 95."He quotes from Matthew 20:18-19; "The Son of man will be delivered to the chief priests, *to be mocked and scourged and crucified", ibid., 127.150confronted with pressures to quit politics (pp. 126-7), he encounters aconvenient passage in a poem and says, 'I went home and prayed about if, and,'clearly I heard God saying, "Abel, do not quit".'14 Obviously the questionthat arises from this style of leadership and decision-making is: Whom thendoes Muzorewa want us to give ultimate responsibility, God or himself?Another feature of Muzorewa5 s autobiography is his apparent captivity bythe crowd. This leads him to making the crowd his trump card and onlybargaining point in Ms bid for leadership. Referring to a crowd that welcomedhim on Ms return from exile on 3 October 1976, he says: 'Never before had Iseen a crowd estimated at 500,000 ,.. Later in Geneva I would be free to say Ifelt that day..»that it is the masses of Zimbabwe aod no-one else who are theprimary factors in the so-called RJiodesian situation.'15'Crowd polities' were prominent in Zimbabwe during the A.N.C.Muzorewa era from 1972 to Ms electoral defeat in 1980, This was theinstrament with which political barometricians measured the likely politicalfortunes of political gladiators as eich returned home from the LancasterHouse Constitutional Conference for the final countdown.16 Yet 'crowdpolitics5 has its own limitations. After the A.N.C.'s 'No' to the PearceCommission in 1972, Ian Smith was confident the A.N.C. would rusticate.Similarly, Muzorewa's 1979 electoral victory, opposed by ZANLA andZIPRA, did not gain international support. This suggests that Muzorewa'shypothesis that the masses are a decisive factor in politics needs revision ormodification. The masses are decisive only to the extent that elites, or thevanguard, both at the national and international level, want and allow them tobe decisive.Besides the fact that Muzorewa's autobiography is full of factuallyaccurate information, and notwithstanding the emotive interpretation of theevents, the book unintentionally reveals political naivety at its worstMoreoever, it unsuspectingly reveals political vanity inherent in manypoliticians. For instance, close to the height of Ms political career, Muzorewa,who had earlier surfaced as the unambitious champion of unity, did notparticularly cherish the thought of working with Sithole and Chirau in the so-called 'internal settlement' talks. He writes: 'Another horrid thought kept onnagging me. It was this mention of Rev. Sithole and Chief Chirau inconjunction with the A.N.C. The very idea was repugnant. Masses of theU.A.N.C. could not and would not stomach any collusion with those twoleaders.*17 At this time he also begins to separate or distance himself from hisorganization, the U.A.N.C, and starts to talk of"The U.A.N. C. and I were theodd man out' 'The U.A.N.C, and I decided to express our reservations'(my emphasis).18 Yet students of mass political movements must yet explainwhy it is that Muzorewa was once a force in Zimbabwe nationalist politics. Heis one man who was adored by the masses. But Machiavelli once said:- 'Inpolitics it is better to be feared than loved.'Maurice Nyagumbo's With the People19 is in many ways a differentpolitical autobiography from Muzorewa's. While Muzorewa is divinelyinspired, Nyagumbo finds inspiration in things worldly. The first half of the"Ibid., 128."Ibid., 212Š13. There are many similar references throughout the book.l6As it happened, Mugabe received the largest welcoming crowd, Nkomo the second largest,and Muzorewa the third largest, and they polled in that order in the April elections that followed.7Ibid., 226. l8Ibict 236, 239."M. Nyagumbo, With the People (Salisbury, Graham Publishing, 1980), 248 pp., Z$2,90.151book depicts a rather easy-going man not much concerned with educationaland religious pursuits. His dream was to go to Johannesburg where he 'believedworkers were better paid than in Rhodesia'.20 He ran away to South Africawhere he became a 'butler', a waiter or such-like in such diverse South Africancities as Kimberley, Port Elizabeth, East London and Cape Town,disappointing Lucys, Constances, Elizabeths and Jeans as he went from onecity to the other in pursuit of the good life. In Cape Town he joined theCommunist Party not for political reasons, but for 'social entertainment' sincehe had become friends with Jean.21 And, when an official of the CommunistParty approached him with a scholarship to study in the Soviet Union, heprevaricated, because sl just wanted to live an easy life and enjoy myself. ..And at that time Cape Town was the only city where life was full,'22He wasdeported from South Africa in 1955 after fifteen years as an activist in theAfrican National Congress and the Communist Party there.The latter half of With the People depicts a rather intransigent Nyagumbo.He emerges an uncompromising nationalist militant to the end. For that reasonhe paid a high price: between 1959 and 1979, Nyagumbo was a free man foronly two and a half years. But With the People is not a book about the reasonsor rationale for the nationalist straggle; it is not about the beliefs which theauthor held to rationalize Ms suffering. It is a straightforward account of aman's involvement in nationalist politics. It is an account of what he and otherswith whom he worked did; what happened to them; which prisons, detentions,,and restriction camps they were kept in; the conditions under which they lived,the treatment they receiYed; the 'actions' they took periodically to 'induce'insensitive officials to respond to their plight in detention; their political workfrom prison, and many such things. Yet one detects in Nyagumbo's account aperceptive mind: he observes a distinction in the behaviour of a Whitebusinessman and a White employee: 'One talked decently' while the other'appeared arrogant and very aggressive'.23 He observes that Whites with'liberal views towards Africans [became] unpopular and suspect in the eyes ofthe settlers'.24 Nyagumbo makes- unflattering observations about Zimbabwe'intellectuals' during the formative stages of the nationalist movement.Referring to some of his countrymen whom he met during Ms sojourn in CapeTown he says: 'It was a group of semi-intellectuals which elevated our status inthe social structure of our time.'25Back home, he is even less flattering. Commenting on African reaction tothe 1956 shooting of Wankie strikers. Nyagumbo says: 'The educatedAfricans were most disappointing to me. The few I had spoken to wereunconcerned . , . [They] feared the white man and did not want to lead theirsuffering people,'26 He resented their criticism of the Youth League's actionsand suggested that intellectuals did not support this organization because itwas led by non-intellectuals, and, 4If an African graduate were to lead ... allthe African intellectuals would join and there would be no criticism fromthem.'27Nyagumbo's book is an invaluable primary source on a number of otherissues in the Zimbabwe nationalist movement, not least of which are: the 1961constitutional talks debacle; the ZAPU-ZANU split and faction fights of1963-4; Ndabaningi Sithole's alleged plot to assassinate Ian Smith, in whichNyagumbo himself says he was involved; Special Branch intrigues; contacts20Ibid., 30:24 Ibid, 105.21 Ibid.-Ł'Ibid.:Ibid, 73.'ibid., 103.-ŁIbid, 87."Ibid, 106.with presidents of frontline states and the ZANU leadership crisis of late1974. With the People is simply written and is foil of dramatic action and coldlogic. It Is written with very little passion. Suffering is depicted as a matter ofcourse. There Is plenty of information in this book. Similar work fromNyagumbo's colleagues In prison and detention would be most welcome. Theonly aspect I find irritating is the editorial comments by T.O. Ranger whichare scattered all O¥er the book. Most of these comments do not explain muchthat is not coYered somewhere in Nyagumbo's book. Moreover, thesecomments could have been included in a more comprehensive introductorychapter by the same editor,A major work, Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Select Documents,29appeared in 1979. It Is a collection of'select' documents co-edited by twoyoung Zimbabweans, Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro. Thedocuments in this book are policy statements, programmes, memoranda,speeches, resolutions, proposals and submissions made over the years bymany Zimbabwe nationalists, and political parties. Included also in thecollection are materials from International organizations, speeches andwritings of some leaders of frontline states concerned with politicaldevelopments In Rhodesia. The book CGYered documents produced during theperiod 1957-1976, and so ZAPU(PF) and ZANU(PF) as well as joint PFdocuments are not Included in the collection. Thus a more comprehensiveselection of documente on Zimbabwe.independence movements could CG?erthe period 1957-1979, and among the additional documents one wouldinclude are N. Sithole?s The Reason for Our Action (1963) where reasons forthe original ZAPU-ZANU split are outlined; the Mugagawa document(1976) which marked the turning point in the straggle among nationalistpoliticians to gain favour and control of ZANLA ŁŠ a struggle which Mugabewon; and the 1976 document announcing the formation of the Patriotic Front.To be Included also should be the actual Tiger (1966), Fearless (1968),Smith-Home (1971) settlement proposals and the Pearce CommissionReport, not just nationalist reactions to these. Further, the so-called KissingerPlan (1976), and the Anglo-American proposals (1977) form importantdocuments In the Rhodesiaii saga. Finally, the Internal Settlement Agreement(1978), the Lancaster House Constitution. (1979), as well as various positionpapers tabled by various parties at the GeneYa Conference (1976) and at theLancaster House Conference (1979) should be part of this documentation.Nyangoni and Nyandoro's book is ne¥ertheless invaluable and scholarsInterested In 'what people actually said rather than what they themselves saythat they said5 will delight In .this book. It should also be of greatvalue to thoseinterested in comparative and deYelopmental analysis of liberation incre-ments. And Indeed, the gladiators tfaeinselYes should find occasion with shameor satisfaction, to ask themselves: 'Was that really me?' One failing of the co-editors, however, must be noted Š their neglect to supply editorial commenton each major document to provide appropriate, and more apt backgroundinformation or settings for the document; as It Is, each document is expected toexplain itself, and most of them do notAnother Invaluable source of Information is Diana Mitchell's AfricanNationalist Leaders in Zimbabwe: Who's Who 1980,29 The book gives a2*C. Nyangoni and G. Myandoro (eds), Zimbabwe Independence Movements: SelectedDocuments (London, Rex Collings, 1979), 456 pp., £15.00.MD. Mitchell, African Nationalist Leaders In Zimbabwe: Who's Who 1980 (Salisbury,privately, Independence Souvenir Edition, 1980), 106 pp., ZS3.9G,153brief biographical sketch of leading personalities in the Zimbabwe nationalistmovement; useful background Information Is provided, though morecomprehensi¥e In some cases than others; for example, names of the three topcommanders of the ZANLA and ZIPRA forces are given without any furtherinformation on the grounds that 'their stories,.. will be told many times as thenew Zimbabwe remembers Its heroes'.30 Also, the book tends to emphasizenationalists and politicians who succeeded in the 1980 elections, and many ofthose who appear in the earlier Yersion of the book31 are excluded in the 1980edition. Who's Who 1930 is poorly organized, and cheaply produced,obYiously done in a hurry, a point its author acknowledges in the preface. The1977 edition is by far a better work. Because of the importance of Who's Whoin Zimbabwe politics, a third edition must be attempted more soberly and withinterest more in posterity than in. the here and now.The inception of the Zimbabwe armed straggle was not easy and it did nothappen overnight. The initial stages (1966-1972) were disastrous. The cadreswere new in the conduct of guerrilla warfare. They had varied orientation anddiverse experiences because many had trained in different countries. Theleaders, too, were new to the whole exercise. They were all bound to makemistakes. Until recently not much had been written analysing the early stagesof the guerrilla war. Michael Raebum's Black Firen is essentially a critique ofthe initial stages of the guerrilla war in Zimbabwe, beginning from the 1964Crocodile Gang to the opening of the north-east guerrilla front in 1972.Raebum analyses the initial problems in the Chimurenga War with penetratinginsight. He conducts separate conversations with guerrilla critics from themajor liberation organizations, ZANU and ZAPU, who had lost favour witjithe party leadership Š a source both of the strength and weakness of the book.A ZANLA deserter who had trained in China, but now in London tells thisto Raebum at 'The Marlborough Arms* in London:The main thing that worried us about all this was the terrible wasteof men. It was quite dear that not enough groundwork had beendone inside the country. The places in which the guerrillasoperated hadn't been sufficiently reconnoitred. There hadn't beenenough support among the people ... to make a sort of wide safetynet giving a guerrilla unit scope to move about in when retreatingfrom the enemy. There were many other things lacking Š mostimportant, a solid objective towards which the various guerrillacells could work , . . The methods and objectives of the leadersthemselves were questionable, And that was exactly what weintended to do Š to question them. We wanted a lot of thingscleared up before we risked out necks in Rhodesia. We wantedsome fundamental changes and a lot of assurance,33Similar incipient tension and mistrust between cadres and leaders occurs inZAPU. Raeburn reports a long conversation with a Joseph Mpofa34 where heis told of ZAPU guerrillas trained in 'different countries' returning to Zambiaand waiting to be sent to fight in Rhodesia, Some of them had come back with' a"Ibid., 91.31R. Gary and D. Mitchell, African Nationalist Leaders in Zimbabwe: Who's Who 1977(Bulawayo, Books of Rhodesia, 1977),"M, Raebum, Black Fire: Accounts of the Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe (Gwelo, MamboPress, 1981), 182 pp., Z$2.90 [originally published: London, J. Friedman, 1978, 243 pp., withlatroduction and Conclusion by A.R. Wilkinson],"Ibid., 49.34Joseph Mpofu is a fictitious name: see ibid., 87,154powerful vision of how the -struggle should be waged*, and in the eyes of theleaders they were 'troublemakers'. And, 'as the leaders were themselvessearching for the right way to carry on the war, they were particularlyvulnerable',35Revolutionaries learn from their own mistakes. Having learnt from pastmistakes ZANU launched 'a new and well-prepared campaign' in the north-east in December 1972, Raetoum quotes Chitepo as having stated that ZANUhad abandoned the policy of military confrontation which he described as a'tragic error*, ZANU developed new tactics which concentrated on'politicizing and mobilizing the people before mounting any attacks against theenemy'. Now, 'it became easier for them [the people] to co-operate with ES andto Identify with our programme and objectives'.36 This was the beginning of theend of settler rale. In the last chapter, Raebiim ably describes how the heartsand minds of the peasants in the north-east were WOE.Black Fire is a rather rare book, Rare in that it discusses Issues in ZANUand ZAPU without fear or favour, and its style is refreshingly different It islike fiction, yet its facts are precise and accurate. Those who were intimatewith the liberation movement will not find it difficult to put real faces tofictitious names. And, patriots, will be annoyed by how much was said by somany for so long to 'strangers' at 'The Marlborough Arms', This willembarrass as well as amuse those who were there.This theme of internal contradictions and self-criticism in the liberationmovement is dealt with very specifically and pointedly in Owen Tshabangu'smimeograph-style book, The March 11 Movement in ZAPU,11 Tshabangu'sbook is about in-fighting in ZAPU, and he calls for ideological transformationin that party in particular, and in the whole liberation movement in general.The thesis in The March 11 Movement in ZAPU is that while the ZAPUleadership in exile was busy jockeying for positions a *re¥olution within ZAPU*was in the making, ZAPU was undergoing ideological transformation fromwithin. This internal revolution was being brought about by cadres who hadbeen schooled in both guerrilla warfare and Marxist-Leninist analysis ofsociety and revolution movements,38 These cadres sought the 'politicization*and 'democratization' of the ZAPU military establishment which, hithertohad been conventional and "militaristic*, or as Maoists would say,*commandist*,39Tshabangu makes a definite and clear preference for a Yanguard party andcalls for the structural and ideological transformation of present 'bourgeoisnationalist mass parties5, He declares; 'The parties have to transform andequip themseiYes to play a truly vanguard role, guiding ail the exploitedmasses*,40 Although Tshabangu observes strong manifestations of'tribalism*in the upheavals in ZAPU, he suggests that this was only the 'veil'. 'The realroot-cause of the impasse , , . was a naked unprincipled power straggle . , .between the petty-bourgeoises* who composed the leadership,41 While headvocates unity, Tshabangu welcomes it on a class basis."Ibid, 99. "Ibid., 130,"O.M. Tshabangu, The March 11 Movement in ZAPU; Re¥olutlon within theResolution for Zimbabwe (York, Tiger Paper Publications, 1979), 82 pp., £1.00."Tshabangu himself was a trained ZAPU militant. He went to train after graduating fromthe University of Par es Salaam, He fell out of favour with the ZAPU leadership in exile upon Msreturn In 1970,3STshabangu, The March 11 Movement, 6-15.*°Ibid., 5. 41Ibid., 26.155Tsfaabangu's March 11 Movement Is, as far as I am aware, the first work toattempt a Marxist or neo-Marxist interpretation of the Zimbabwe nationalistmovement by a Zimbabwean.42 This is a refreshing departure from the usualreliance on 'tribalism' and 'imperialism' as explanations, although theargument is not entirely convincing. As a matter of fact, the 'tribe' will hauntthe reader throughout Tshabangu's booklet Unfortunately, Tshabangu, as domany neo-Marxists on this particular subject, refers to Zimbabwe nationalistleaders simply as 'petty-bourgeoises*. In other words, there are no criteria usedto classify them as such. As it is, we are left with the impression that the leadersin question are petty-bourgeois because they engage in power straggles andfactionalism. This is unsatisfactory.Apart from its ideological content, Tshabangu's booklet is valuable in thatit proYides a lot of rare information on the goings-on within liberationmovements. Certainly the dangers facing the guerrilla were many and varied,not the least of which were fellow comrades in arms and with arms. The March11 Movement in ZAPU is an eye-opener to those who either romanticized thestraggle or were not in it, It is a worthwhile book that should be published in abetter format and not in its present mimeograph form.The only work approximating to a comprehensive post mortem of theZimbabwe straggle for liberation so far is The Struggle for Zimbabwe, co-authored by two journalists, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson,43 Althoughthe authors concentrate mainly on the straggle from December 1972, when thenorth-east guerrilla front was opened, to April 1980, when ZANU (PF)established the first internationally recognized Black government inZimbabwe, the book in fact covers ninety years of the straggle for Zimbabwe,"from the inception of colonialism in 1890 to independence in 1980.The authors suggest that ZANU's rise to pre-eminence over ZAPU in the1970s was the result of sheer luck: Frelimo had a long-standing alliance withZAPU as part of the Soviet-backed groups of liberation movements known bythe euphemism 'the authentics' and ZANU belonged to the 'non-authentics*.44ZANU approached Frelimo with a view to starting guerrilla operations in thenorth-east Frelimo refused; instead Frelimo leaders approached ZAPUleaders to persuade them to start operations in that area. ZAPU could not meetthe challenge because of the intra-party feuds of 1969-71, which Tshabaegu42My own Zimbabwe; Struggles-within-the-Struggle is in the mould of Tshabangu'sconcerns in the general sense of self-criticism' In the liberation struggle. It does not, however,prescribe and advocate a specific ideology. If anything, it suggests (p. vii) that, given the pluralisticnature of contemporary Zimbabwe society, a monolithic attitude in politics would be ill-advised,and that a' winner-takes-alF approach in power struggles militates against the idea of unity in thenationalist movement and nation-building in the future. Concerning ideological matters, I warned(p. 156) against the importation of ideologies: 'The struggles-within-the-straggle are worsenedand become even more irreconcilable when Zimbabwe liberation organizations pursue, religiously,the ideologies of the Americans, the Chinese, the Russians, or anybody else. An ideologicalconsensus will have to emerge from among Zimbabweans as a result of their aggregate experiencein socio-psychological terms. Anything else will be alien and false, and if that happens,indigestions of all sorts develop,' For this reason, Zimbabwe: Struggles-within-the-Strugglelacks clear ideological content and analysis. But I do not believe that, at the moment and for thepurpose of understanding why, for instance, Chikerema would quarrel with J.Z. Moyo, can beadequately explained by their membership in the 'petty-bourgeois' class as if members of theworking class do not engage in power struggles. Assume it can be established that both Chikeremaand Moyo, though leaders, had a working-class background, what next?45D. Martin and P. Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War(Salisbury, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1981), 378pp.,Z$5.25 [originally published: London,Faber, 19811.44Ibid., 14-15.156described. T.G. Sllundlka of ZAPU admits that'paralysis was starting withinZAPU at the time when our friends were making these proposals and thereforethe question of our responding to them immediately was just not practical',45Thus, Martin and Johnson conclude that had ZAPU positively responded tothe opportunity that Frelimo not only offered but implored them to take, thenZIPRA and not ZANLA would have had Mozambique as its initial base andthe nature and outcome of the straggle for Zimbabwe 'might have been verydifferent'.46 They are correct; but only in the context of ZAPU before theformation of Frolizi in 1971, The split in ZAPU in 1970-1 e¥entually reducedthat party to the regional organization that it has now become, temporarily orpermanently. This has to do with the politicization of ethnicity in thenationalist movement Š a factor which the authors of The Struggle forZimbabwe seem keen to underplay: 'While the supporters of these two men[CMkerema and J.Z.Moyo] tended to line up oe tribal lines the root cause ofthe ZAPU crisis was not tribal or regional'.47With compelling style, the authors describe the politicization,mobilization and recruitment activities of ZANLA guerrillas at the start of thedecisive phase of the war (1972). White farmers in the north-east were put inthe invidious position of having domestic workers and farm labourerssympathetic to the vakomana (toys) Š a euphemism for guerrillas, The authorsreport a Centenary farmer with experience of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenyaas saying, with rather deliberate humour: 'The atmosphere is very similar,except that we know these chaps are using highly sophisticated modernweapons. I would call it Mao Mao rather than Mau Man.*48 The two authorsalso provide useful family background and political history of most leadingguerrilla commanders and politicians as they appear on the scene throughoutthe book. The following is typical:Nhongo was bom Solomon Tapfumaneyi Mutoswa in May 1943in the Charter Tribal Trust Land,., He was the last often childrenby his father's two wives. Nhongo had Ms primary education atmission schools before going to Zimuto Secondary School wherehe became involved in ZAPU youth politics. A clandestine ZAPUbranch was formed .. , and Nhongo became organizing secretary.After he was expelled in 1962 he went to Zambia... He got a job asa secretary to the District Commissioner at Murabwa but returnedto Rhodesia in 1963 after hearing of the illness of Ms father, whodied three days after his arrival. Later... got a job in Bulawayo as asalesman for Dunlop . . , He helped organize demonstrations . . .and was arrested several times. On 25th December, 1967 he wasforced to flee to Botswana , . . Nhongo had decided to join theguerrillas ... he flew to Zambia, in March 1968. In August thatyear, with nine others, he went to Moscow for an eighteen-monthcourse .., They retume-d to Dar es Salaam in May 1970 and foundthat all was not well in ZAPU. Tribalism had become apparent.,.In March Nhongo crossed to ZANLA and was sent to Itumbicamp, where he adopted Ms chimurunga name meaning 'malegoaf . . . NhoEgo joined the group of sixty guerrillas who enteredRhodesia in the last months of 1972 to begin the decisive phase ofthe war.49"Ibid., 18.41Ibid., 29.46Ibid, 20,48IbkL 90,"Ibid., 86-8..57The Struggle for Zimbabwe discusses many contentious issues that developedin the course of the liberation struggle, particularly in ZANU: ZANU-Frolizisplit (1971), Nhare rebellion (1974), the Sithole-Mugabe leadership crisis(1974), the assassination of Chitepo (1975), ZIP A (1976) and the plot toseize power and join ZAPU (1977). One will differ from the authors'interpretation of some eYents, and perhaps for over-emphasizing the heroismor villainy of this or that gladiator, but they must be commended for the courageto state the unpalatable. They tell of intimate goings-on between this and thatoutside actor's activities, quite hidden from many Zimbabwe actors actuallywaging the armed straggle. For instance, Zambia's Mark Chona is quoted astelling South Africa's Vorster: 'President Kaunda said that "a white victory inRhodesia was impossible. A black {military] victory was not only possible buthe thought undesirable" '50 This attitude resulted in the detente exercise.There are a number of other 'secret diplomacy' incidents which, had theysucceeded, would have affected the outcome in Zimbabwe in quite aninteresting way. Take, for instance, the 'Vivo Affair'.Raul Valdy Vivo was one of the top men in the Cuban Communist Party incharge of foreign affairs. In May 1979, Vivo flew to see Machel in Maputo. Heargued that once the newly elected Muzorewa government was sworn in therewas real danger that a number of Western powers would recognize it, and itwas, therefore, necessary to pre-empt this. Thus, Vivo proposed the followingplan: Nkomo and Mugabe would be taken into one of the guerrilla-controlledareas of Zimbabwe from Mozambique and before Muzorewa was sworn inthey would pronounce the formation of a government of independentZimbabwe headed by Nkomo with Mugabe as the number-two man in chargeof defence. Journalists would be taken into the country to record the ceremonyand a substantial number of socialist bloc, African and Caribbean countrieswould recognize the Patriotic Front Government within days, therebyconfronting Western countries with the dilemma that if they recognizedMuzorewa they would be declaring their opposition to the Patriotic Front andits supporters. The plan misfired and Vivo lost Ms post in the Cuban CommunistParty, perhaps a scapegoat.51The authors of The Struggle for Zimbabwe are biased; they have takensides with the party and with heroes in that party whose story they want to telland they do not hide the fact. The preface to the book states clearly that 'Thebook is mainly about ZANU, who won a clear-cut victory in the 1980independence elections, and ZANLA, who did over 80 per cent of the fightingduring the final decisive years.'52 The book is dedicated specifically to the nowlegendary Josiah Tongogara, the late ZANLA commander. Having definedtheir subject matter so clearly and in this manner the question of bias,therefore, becomes redundant. It is like discovering that the CommunistManifesto has a bias towards the proletariat and does not glorify other classes.But, if we understood the very idea of the Manifesto from the outset, that it is acall to celebrate the era of the proletariat as a class, it would be redundant toexpress the opinion that Marx and Engels were partial to the proletariat.With this caveat, therefore, those who are neither ZANU or ZANLA northeir sympathizers should equally find this book extremely useful. It is full ofinformation, some of which only journalists could have access to (sincepolitical gladiators and journalists have affinity for one another). The bookdeserves the serious attention of all those who will want to know about the50Ibid., 129. "Ibid, 305-6, 308. 52Ibid., xvii.158straggle for Zimbabwe, its ups and downs, where things went right and wherethey went wrong. There is much in this book about ZAPU, and other parties,so much so thjat it is inappropriate to denigrate it, as some do, as being/TheZANU (PF) Straggle fo Zimbabwe'. Finally, Zimbabwe's Prime Minister,RG.Mugabe's words on this book are instructive. His foreword to the bookconcludes:Obviously the story being told is that by an onlooker and onlookershave the limitation that they are not the actors themselves. Whenthe actors themselves finally publish the drama of their struggle, asthey planned and presented it, they will no doubt find this work amost useful supplement.53.The hope is that the day is not too far away when the actors themselves tell thestory of straggle for Zimbabwe and onlookers can remain looking on.Un iversity of Zim babweM. SlTHOLE3Ibi<L159