South Africa and the Nation StateA. J. ChristopherDepartment of Geography, University of Port Elizabeth.*Ł *The political development of Africa in the1960s has suggested that secession has not beenparticularly successful.1 Some seven or moresecession movements have attempted to es-tablish separate states within the last twelveyears; they have for various reasons been un-successful, but several movements are stillextant and model insurgent states exist inseveral parts of Africa,2 Generally, however,the state as inherited from the colonial powershas been recognised by most African leaders asbeing the unit of sovereignty in the new Africaand attempts to upset frontiers have receivedthe almost universal disapproval of Africanleaders. The inherited state nevertheless isusually bound together by few ties of language,religion or nationhood, and often has littlemore than a common colonial experience toshare. Consequently the state idea has had tobe carefully fostered and a nation built.3Amongst this background of the developmentof nation-state concepts of Africa, it is all themore remarkable that a major secession move-ment has received so little attention.4 For, theRepublic of South Africa has found wantingthe state-idea as applied to its diverse peoples,and so has sought a new concept. The presentgovernment has evolved the concept of 'multi-nationalism' whereby the various African tribesor nations within South Africa are being en-couraged to develop their own national con-sciousness and their own state-idea.5 Suchnations are based largely on linguistic and attimes on historic affinities. Consequently thepolitical advance of the African nations withinSouth Africa towards separate independence isa process which has reached the point of noreturn.6 All the states have the fact of statehoodwithin clearly defined boundaries and a govern-ment, composed of executive and legislative,responsible for that territory. Even the externaltrappings of sovereignty in the form of flagsand anthems have been achieved.7 Howeverthe creation of an identifiable nationhood maybe more difficult.8The creation of the new states poses a num-ber of important questions in political geog-raphy.9 The state-idea may be fostered as itis elsewhere in Africa, but only half the Africansliving within the borders of South Africa livewithin the areas demarcated as the new nation-states. The areas occupied by the nation andby the state are clearly not coincident and prob-lems of identity and territorial claims are likelyto be confused. In addition the national areas.as at present defined, are not integral units, asthey have many exclaves separated from themain body of the nation either by other Afri-can states or by intervening land occupied bynon-Africans.10 Consequently some rationali-sation of national boundaries would be desir-able, but the boundaries have been remarkablystatic compared with those in Rhodesia,11 andresistance to the enlargement of the African23area is likely to be strong amongst the Europeanpopulation.It is therefore desirable to examine the originsof these states in the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies and trace the relationship between thenational states being created and the nation theyare intended to serve. The recent advance(1963-71) of all the states to internal self-government has highlighted their problems,while the 1970 census of South Africa has forthe first time provided a detailed geographicalanalysis of the African population in its differentnational groups instead of national totals.12 Itis probable that in the formative years of the1970s the census will be used in definingnational areas and aspirations.13 As in the caseof all ethnic statistics the census will probablybe used cartographically to show differentthings.14 The maps presented in this paper havebeen produced by calculating the percentage ofthe total population belonging to each of theAfrican nations. The European, Coloured andAsian peoples have been grouped together forthe purpose as non-Africans. The presentmethod was considered to be impartial withregard to the African national groups and noaccount is given of the non-Africans whosemutual problems are for the time-being outsidethe discussion of secession movements.HISTORICAL SURVEYContact between the Europeans and Africansin South Africa began about the year 1736along the line of the Fish River.15 The Euro-peans were cattle farmers, who in seeking newpasturage ventured further and further fromCape Town until they came into contact withthe Xhosa. Contact, in the form of mutualborder raids effectively halted further Europeanand African expansion for over a hundredyears. The Fish River became traditionally theboundary line between African and non-Africanpeoples, although substantial numbers of Afri-cans settled peacefully west of the river.European expansion continued northwardsbut was spectacularly accelerated in the 1830sand 1840s in a major movement from the Cape(the Great Trek), which resulted in Europeanssettling throughout most of the Transvaal,Orange Free State and Natal. The Europeancolonists by treaty and conquest acquired vasttracts of land for settlement and effectivelyconfined tribal Africans to restricted portions.In the eastern Cape Province the Xhosa througha series of major wars were driven back to theKei River in 1847 and a series of rural 'loca-tions' were established for those who remainedin the Ciskei. The remaining land was openfor European colonisation. Finally in 1877 theTranskei was annexed to the Cape, but littleof it was thrown open to European settlementand most of it became a virtual protectorate.Thus the Xhosa were left in two clearly definedareas.The other African nations were not so for-tunate. The Orange Free State, Transvaal andNatal had been dominated at some stage in theperiod 1815-40 either by the Zulu monarchy orby the Matabele or by both. In many places thepre-existing population had been systematicallydecimated. The defeat of both the Zulu andMatabele by the emigrant farmers from theCape resulted in increased stability within theseareas. It was therefore largely the remnants ofthe tribes which occupied the areas, whoemerged from hiding when European controlwas imposed. There was therefore little resis-tance to this control, and few large blocks ofland outside Zululand and Lesotho were setaside for African occupation.All the South African states and coloniesin the nineteenth century embarked upon apolicy of territorial segregation between Africansand non-Africans. The Cape left the Transkeias a protectorate and the Ciskei with well de-fined African rural areas. The Orange FreeState regarded Lesotho as the 'location' for itsAfrican population, although a couple of othersmall areas were set aside for groups who foundfavour with the Orange Free State government.Natal deliberately established a series of rurallocations, where tribal society could survive,but spaced them so that anti-Europeanfederations would be difficult to form. In theTransvaal, small areas were set aside but formalrural locations were only established in 1907 atBritish insistence.In 1913 the Native Land Act sought to stabil-ise the African area of the country by recog-nising the locations established prior to that dateand preventing its extension. FurthermoreAfricans in Natal ceased to be able to purchaseland outside the locations. Africans had neverbeen able to purchase land on an individualbasis in the Transvaal and Orange Free State.Some 9 200 000 ha were scheduled as African.In 1936 this state of affairs was recognised asunsatisfactory, particularly in the Transvaal,# *-»ŁŁ»24and the Native Trust and Land Act 1936provided for an additional 6 200 000 ha ofEuropean land to be made available for Africanoccupation, Africans in the Cape were furthernot allowed to buy land outside the Africanscheduled or released areas. Slight modificationshave taken place since 1936, but as yet the totalreleased area has not been transferred to Africanuse.In 1955 the Tomlinson Commission urged aconcerted policy of economic development,16This allied with the need to consider the politi-cal future of the African resulted in the Govern-ment embarking upon a policy of creatingseparate African states (Table I). Thus in1963 the Transkei became internally self-govern-ing, and in the following nine years all the re-maining African national areas have followedsuit and await the final step of independence.The economic problems of national developmentare great and have been examined elsewhere,17Table IEXTENT OF THE AFRICAN NATION ŠSTATES 1970StateBasotho Ba Borwa*Lebowa*Matshangana*SwaziTswanaland*VendalandCiskeiTranskeiZululand*TOTALDominantNationalGroupSouth SothoNorth SothoShangaanSwaziTswanaVendaXhosaXhosaZuluArea (ha)42 8271 667 901762 925444 5883 708 905801 541887 2823 409 5443 070 84214 796 355No. ofparcelsof land13431931722981Source: HORRELL, M. 1970 and 1971 A survey ofRace Relations in South Africa. Johannesburg,South African Institute of Race Relations, quotingofficial sources.Allied to the creation of separate Africanstates has been a policy of encouraging andoften forcing Africans living in non-Africanareas to migrate to the African national areas.Thus most districts of the western Cape showconsiderable decreases in the number of Afri-cans present between 1960 and 1970. Inaddition considerable shifts in population haveoccurred within the cities, all of which lie with-*These names have recently been changed and arenow (December 1972) : Basuthuba Quaqua,Leborwa, Mashangana, Boputhatswana, and Kwa-zulu, respectively.in the non-African sector, and where possiblesatellite towns within the African national areashave been established.18 In rural areas the so-called 'black-spots' Š African owned land inEuropean areas Š are being removed and theiroccupants are being transferred to land adja-cent to the existing African area. Some 469separate parcels of land covering 155 000 haare involved. In this manner the governmenthas sought to reduce the number of futureexclaves of the African states, and consolidatethe European character of the remainder of thecountry.THE STATE AND THE NATIONIn considering the concept of the Africannation in South Africa certain broad divisionsoccur. Some nations have remained reasonablycompact, particulary in the south and west,while others have been scattered as a result ofwars in the period 1815-50, Most, however,possess a zone which mav be regarded as a coreregion from which a national identity may befostered, although in the case of the nationsinhabiting the Transvaal this may be compara-tively weak and unattractive.In all cases a distinct state idea or raisond'etre nseds to be created similar to that exist-ing in most other states.19 The reason forexistence as a separate entity is something whichmust be considered. The South African govern-ment has encouraged the creation of separateidentities for the various nations by institutingcitizenship for all Africans in their own nationalareas.20 In this manner the government hopesto link the urbanised African in the non-Africanareas with his own notional state, thereby givinga substitute for political rights in the non-African area. Furthermore non-Africans arespecifically excluded from the citizenship of thenew national states.The recognition of core areas is sometimesdifficult, while some national croups ha\re theircore area, outside South Africa. Thus theSwazis possess a Swazi national area in SouthAfrica and an already independent Swazinational state ruled by the Swazi king. TheSouth Sotho similarly rule independent Lesothoand the Tswana independent Botswana. In allthree cases, however, more of the respectivegroups live in South Africa than in the existingindependent states. Furthermore the maior partof the Shangaan inhabited area lies inMozambique, although no national movement25has developed among the Shangaans of thePortuguese province.Additionally some of the distinctions betweenthe various national groups are slight. TheXhosa, Zulu and Swazi all speak closely relatedlanguages (Nguni), which are mutually intellig-ible. The Swazi learn Zulu at school so thatlinguistically there is little distinction betweenthem and consequently some confusion mayhave arisen on the Census questions onlanguage. It is in the realm of historical de-velopment that the three nations have estab-lished separate identities. Other linguisticgroupings exist but as yet there is little evidenceof interest in pan-Nguni, Sotho movements orother cultural or politico-cultural groupings.Similarly little interest has been shown by Afri-cans within South Africa in those outside, whileinterest by those outside has mainly been aimedat a complete change in the South Africanpolitical situation and therefore the abandon-ment of the fragmentation movement.Table IIPOPULATION OF THE AFRICAN NATION-STATES, 1960-1970StateBasotho Ba BorwaLebowa*Matshangana*SwaziTswanaland*VendalandCiskeiTranskeiZululand*TOTALPopulation1970* 24 6911 084 277267 372117 845884 146264 465523 5641 734 1162 097 7586 998 234Population196011 189490 217125 81752 260386 264171 421330 5341 376 6161 163 6364 107 954: Per-centageIncrease120,7121,2122,5125,5128,954,358,426,080,370,4Source: SOUTH AFRICA 1971 Population Census1970: Geographical Distribution of Population.Pretoria, Government Printer for Bureau of Sta-tistics.*These names have recently been changed and arenow (December 1972): Basuthuba Quaqua,Leborwa, Mashangana, Boputhatswana, and Kwa-zulu, respectively.The nine African national states cover onlysome thirteen per cent of the area of SouthAfrica. (Fig. 1). They contain a considerablerange of populations (Table II). In all casesSouth African government policy has led to aconcentration of the national groups withintheir own states, and the rise in the populationof these areas between 1960 and 1970 has beenspectacular. The result has been some highpopulation densities ranging from 24 per knr2 inTswanaland* to 68 per km"2 in Zululand.* Oneof the most noticeable physical features of thestates is their fragmentation with an average ofnine parcels of land per state.However, the nations lie only partly withintheir own states (Table III). The nationalhomes are clearly least satisfactory for theSouth Sotho with only 1,6 per cent residingwithin their own national state and most satis-factory for the Venda who have 66,9 per centwithin their own state. The dominant positionof the Zulu and Xhosa is high-lighted by thefact that they are both twice as large as anyother nation and also larger than the Europeanpopulation of South Africa. At the other endof the scale the North and South Ndebele areboth so small in numbers and so scattered indistribution that they possess no national homeand constitute minorities in other states. TheXhosa and Zulu nations may be regarded aspurely South African, with core areas, nationalareas and nearly the entire nation withinSouth Africa's borders. The two national statesare therefore likely to present the clearest prob-lems and solutions. A second group of nationsin the Transvaal illustrates the problems ofpolitical fragmentation and dispersal, which arefar more serious to the creation of a viablepolitical entity. Finally the three nations whosecore area lies outside South Africa, but whohave a substantial part of the nation and anational state within South Africa: they pre-sent possibly the greatest political problems ofrelationship between people within and withoutthe Republic's borders.ŁNow Boputhatswana and Kwazulu.26Figure 1.27Table IIISIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN NATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA IN 1970NationXhosaZuluSwaziNorth SothoTswanaSouth SothoShangaanVendaNorth NdebeleSouth NdebeleOthersTOTALTotal number3 929 9224 026 082498 7041 603 5301 718 5081 453 354736 978357 875181 719232 922317 96515 057 559Percentage in ownnation-state55,051,116,456,034,91,631,866,9ŠŁ41,8Percentage in otherAfrican nation-states1,11,96,16,40,68,321,53.338,523,76,04,7Percentage innon-African Area43.947,077,531,664,590,146,729,861,576,394,053,5Source: SOUTH AFRICA 1971 Population Census 1970: Geographical Distribution of Population. Pretoria,Government Printer for Bureau of Statistics.THE XHOSA NATIONThe Xhosa nation numbering some 3,9 mil-lion in 1970 is politically the most advancedof the African peoples of South Africa.21 TheTranskei has a long history of separate localgovernment since 1895 and the greatest degreeof compactness of the larger national states.22However, as a result of the peculiar history ofthe Xhosa nation it is divided into two sections,the Ciskei and the Transkei, which are takingseparate courses to independence.The historical accident of dividing the Xhosanation into two states clearly does not conformto the South African Government's aim ofcreating national states. The split between thetwo has been criticised and in 1966 the CiskeiGovernment established a Commission to en-quire into the question of union with the Trans-kei: but such a course was rejected in 1967and the Ciskei decided to proceed as a separatestate.23 In 1968 the Transkei parliament re-quested the amalgamation of the Ciskei and theTranskei into one Xhosa state but no actionwas taken,24 Relations between the two stateswere strained in 1971 when the chiefs in onedistrict of the Ciskei (Glen Grey) demandedsecession from the Ciskei in order to join theTranskei. The demand was not related toXhosa nationalism and the creation of a greaterXhosa state but to regionalism. The Glen Greydistrict is inhabited by the Tembu tribe, mostof whose members live in the Transkei. Thesecession movement amounted to no more thanthe demand that all Tembus should live in onestate. The plebiscite held in the district inOctober, 1971, showed an overwhelming ma-jority in favour of remaining part of theCiskei.25 The Ciskeian state showed a remark-able ability to survive and the threat of anAnschluss has receded. Clearly the relationshipbetween the two Xhosa states is worthy ofgeopolitical study, while the problems of re-gionalism are evidently present, within bothstates.The two Xhosa states clearly do not coincidewith the extent of the Xhosa nation (Fig. 2).The areas of the Ciskei and Transkei occupiedby Europeans contain overwhelming Xhosamajorities. However, the Xhosa are presentin considerable numbers throughout the easternpart of the Cape Province and indeed spreadbeyond their original extent into every province,suggesting that they have supplied a real needin the European sector of the country's econo-my. Some 370 000 Xhosa are living in theTransvaal. It is the Xhosa who have been mostaffected by the reduction of Africans in theWestern Cape and the Xhosa areas have there-fore had to deal with a resettlement problem.Such movements involving an expulsion of re-cent settlers is common in African states and itis noteworthy that the first such movementsare already taking place in South Africa. TheTranskei and the Ciskei have, as yet, notclaimed the extensive tracts of land occupiedby the Xhosa in the non-African sector of SouthAfrica, but the Transkei has claimed the areasof the Transkei alienated to Europeans after28pto1877.24 Such claims have been raised on his-torical grounds largely because ethnic claims arestill regarded as dangerous in their repercussionsand might be uncontrollable.Within the Xhosa states there is a high de-gree of homogeneity, although within the Tran-skei the South Sotho constitute a 3,7 per centminority. The numbers of non-Africans withinthe Ciskei and Transkei have been substantiallyreduced between 1960 and 1970.THE ZULU NATIONThe Zulu national state shows the highestdegree of fragmentation of any of the newnational units. In part this reflects the deliber-ate policy of the initial European settlers insouthern Natal in the 1840s, who deliberatelydemarcated small scattered reserves, while thedivision of northern Natal in 1905 left a greaterdegree of compaction.26 As a result of politicalfragmentation the pattern of African settlementis greatly interrupted, although throughout theProvince of Natal, the Zulu constitute a majorityof the population, except where substantialEuropean and Indian settlement has occurred(Fig. 3). The extreme fragmentation of theZulu state will undoubtedly lead to a pressingof the demands for more rational boundariesand for a port on the northern Natal coast. Thedevelopment of Richards Bay may provide sucha solution, although land around the Bay is be-ing transferred to the non-African area.The core area of the Zulu nation as it existedbefore the Zulu War of 1879 has been frag-mented, and unlike the Transkei there is noobvious capital within Zulu territory. Even thetombs of the Zulu kings fell into Europeanhands in 1884 and have only recently been de-clared part of Zululand. The boundaries of1879 presented a considerable contraction of thearea dominated by the Zulu nation at the heightof the Zulu monarchy in the 1820s and 1830swhen Natal and parts of the Orange FreeState and the Transvaal owed allegiance to itsmonarch and still regard themselves as Zulu.The Zulu national state as it exists todayprovides a core area with 98,1 per cent of theinhabitants classed as Zulu. However, 49,0per cent of the Zulu nation live outside thenational state and severe problems of nationbuilding may be expected. Furthermore nationbuilding on the basis of ethnic, and historicalaffinities is liable to bring the national leadersinto conflict with the non-African sector of thecommunity to a greater extent than the Tran-skeian government. Zulu leaders opposed thecreation of a separate Zulu state until the late1960s and consequently political developmentlags behind that of the Transkei, and little hasbeen done to solve the geopolitical problemsfaced by the Zulu state.27THE TRANSVAAL NATIONSThe various national groups within theTransvaal constitute a picture of the utmostcomplexity (Fig. 4). The dispersion of thevarious tribes of that Province in the period1815-50 resulted in the scattered pockets ofreserves and intermingling of the different na-tions. The nations represented by nationalstates are small. The north Sotho number only1,6 million, the Shangaan 0,74 million and theVenda 0,36 million. Their national homescontain 56,0, 31,8 and 66,9 per cent respectivelyof the national group. All the states containminorities of varying dimensions but no minorityconstitutes more than ten per cent of the total.Two smaller groups, the North and SouthNdebele, constitute minorities without nationalhomes and some 61,5 and 76,3 per cent re-spectively live within the non-African part ofthe Province.Clearly the emergence of strong nationalstates under these circumstances may be difficult.The states generally constitute poor core areas,while the historical precedents in the Transvaalhave been conducive to the creation of the stateidea. The scattered nature of the nationalstates, together with the limited economic de-velopments, will present major problems to theirgovernments. Possibly some exchange of minori-ties such as occurred in the Balkans at the endof Turkish rule may be the solution.28 However,fragmentation is likely to be fossilised by thecontinuing existence of a. rump non-Africanarea. The Shangaan, in particular, present anumber of geopolitical problems in their affinityto the Shangaan-speakers in Mozambique, fromwhom they are separated by the internationalboundary and the uninhabited area of theKruger National Park. There is also the in-teresting contrast in administration in that theSouth African Shangaan are being encouragedto develop their own individuality, -whereasthose on Portuguese territory are being en-couraged to integrate with the Portuguesenation.30Figure 3,31Figure 4.32Table IVCOMPOSITION OF POPULATIONOF JOHANNESBURG, 1970.Nation or GroupAfricanXhosaZuluSwaziNorth SothoNorth NdebeleSouth NdebeleTswanaSouth SothoShangaanVendaOthersNon-AfricanEuropeanColouredAsianNumber PercentageTOTAL81 511245 25829 87277 6048 1555 438146 184108 19057 22831 93612 135482 58982 551T407~963~5,817,42,15,50,60,410,47,74,12,30,934,35',9ŠM100,2Source: SOUTH AFRICA 1971 Population Census1970: Geographical Distribution of Population.Pretoria, Government Printer for Bureau ofStatistics.The Transvaal has attracted large numbersof immigrants to the major industrial areas insearch of work. The migrants and recent settlersand their descendants constitute a major partof the African population. Johannesburg andthe mining and manufacturing regions haveattracted a cosmopolitan population whose linkswith the essentially rural national states is oftentenuous (Table IV). The major mining andindustrial areas are clearly planned to remainwithin the non-African area of South Africa.The temporary nature of African residencewithin these industrial areas is repeatedly as-serted by the Government. It is significant thateven within the new African towns built out-side the main non-African centres, the variousnational groups are separately housed andnational consciousness is encouraged.29THE TSWANA, SOUTH SOTHO AND SWAZIThree nations, the Tswana, South Sothoand Swazi, overlap other independent states,where their own nationals live. Under the origi-nal scheme of South African political develop-ment, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland wereenvisaged as the core areas for these nationalgroups.30 However, the three states were notincorporated into South Africa and theyachieved their independence in the period1966-8 separate from their kinsmen in SouthAfrica. The results of these actions have beenconsiderable. There are substantial numbersof Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland nationalsincluded within the census returns of the threenational groups. In all three cases labour is oneof the major exports of the countries con-cerned.If the figures for the South African nationalgroups are considered, the provision of nationalhomes for all three groups would appear to beinadequate, with only 1,6, 16,4 and 34,9 percent of the South Sotho, Swazi and Tswanaliving within their own national states as pro-vided by the South African Government. How-ever, if account of the independent states istaken (and South African planning does appearto have considered them to be part of thegeneral scheme of separate development) thenthe figures are increased to 39,53 and 54 percent of the national groups respectively livingwithin either their own independent states orSouth African national states.31 The percentagesachieved then approximate more closely tothose of the Xhosa, Zulu, North Sotho andVenda.The introduction of the three already inde-pendent states into the political calculations ofthe new national states must inevitably compli-cate matters, and relations between the inde-pendent states and emerging nationalisms with-in South Africa need to be considered. Con-siderations as to whether separate politicalhistories can lead to permanently separate stateideas and states need to be examined.The South Sotho present the most curiouscase, as the provision of a national state (Ba-suthuba Quaqua) within South Africa has beenwithin very confined limits Š a mere 428 km2containing 1,6 per cent of the South Sotho inSouth Africa (Fig. 5). It seems highly doubt-ful whether Basuthuba Quaqua can claimpermanently the allegiance of the South Sotho,with such a small territorial base. Inevitably ifa national identity is to be found it will beLesotho which must provide it. Much of theeastern Orange Free State adjacent to Lesothois inhabited by South Sotho. Furthermore itwas Mosheshoe I, ancestor of the present kingof Lesotho, who founded the nation and fora while ruled Lesotho and the eastern OrangeFree State. The areas conquered by the OrangeFree State government in the 1860s were thebest areas of Lesotho and territorial claims33Figure 5.34» »OJjyV^'j TSWANALANDpercentage TswaixiMi 75-19illi 50-74[[fjfjjj 25-49p=^ s_2i\^" Y f\\\Iii!iiiiiiijV\\\\i/j _ fg].^ * "TjirfIlilJs11</Vy/ŁA/i" Š-j»Ł.Ł.ŁŁ».ŁŁŁ.ŁŁŁ;Ł.ŁŁ:.ŁŁ.ŁŁ??WSBS&L. ŁŁŁ;'-';i(ff^STt;MI!wIl1m\\Mil}*-iILta.ŠJtit=±iJPiIllllil^^L /ŁŁŁ-'Ł 'V0i0/100150//Li//200i1100"\1\tV.ijiii! /Ł*>ŁŠi /J1J//300 KmsŠi150 Milesenwould seem possible on both historical and eth-nic grounds should be governments in Pretoriaand Maseru not continue to co-operate closely.The Swazi similarly have a poor territorialbase in South Africa with only 16,4 per centof the Swazi nation in South Africa within it(Fig 4d). It would again appear that theSwazi national state is too small to provide asatisfactory national core capable of resistingthe prestige of Swaziland. As in the case ofLesotho, the Swazi kings in the last centurycontrolled much of the area occupied by theSwazi nation in South Africa and consequentlyas Swaziland is still ruled by the Swazi kingallegiance to him is likely to be too dominant.The Tswana nation however provides a com-pletely different picture (Fig. 6), The Republicof Botswana has a population of 648 000 whichis smaller than Boputhatswana's 884 000.Clearly some rivalry for the allegiance of theTswana people within non-African South Africais likely, as well as more nearly equal contactbetween Botswana and Boputhatswana. TheTswana core area is fragmented, and largelybecause the Tswana nation is composed ofseveral tribes it is impossible to state thateither of the states has the advantage particu-larly as there are no striking historical prece-dents to rely upon. However Botswana hasthe prestige of prior independence and thelikelihood of economic, prosperity, which ap-pears at present to be far off in the case ofBoputhatswana.32These three South African nation states haveother problems of a geopolitical nature to face.Boputhatswana in particular is highly frag-mented, with parcels of land extending 675 kmeast-west and 550 km north-south. Such ahigh degree of fragmentation is likely to makeadministration difficult and some measure ofconsolidation must be urgently pressed. TheSwazi state is similarly fragmented but owing toits small size this is not so disadvantageous. Inthe form of minorities both the Swazi state andBoputhatswana contain over thirty per centof the population not belonging to the dominantnation. In Boputhatswana none of the minori-ties are particularly large (the North Sotho7,4 per cent). However, in the Swazi nationalstate the Zulu nation constitutes an 18,1 percent minority. Neither the problem of frag-mentation nor minorities affects BasuthubaQuaqua.In all three nations the problems of relationswith their already independent neighbours arelikely to increase in importance, although thecurrent co-operation between South Africa andthe three independent states is likely to precludeterritorial claims for the time being. However,the three national states will have the mostdifficult task of providing their own distinctraison d'etre.PARTITIONThe partition of South Africa into a non-African and several African states has advancedto a stage where it would be difficult to reverse.The various national states emerging in SouthAfrica are unlikely to become independent im-mediately but independence is a matter of time.The Chief Minister of the most advanced (theTranskei) stated in 1971 that he 'was notagitating for independence' but 'we see our-selves for some years to come as still being partand parcel of South Africa'.24 However, thepace of political development has acceleratedand lines are being drawn on maps indicatingthe extent of the various national states.National consciousness and pride amongst theAfricans are being fostered. But are the statesbeing created capable of attracting the loyaltyof the majority of Africans living outside them?Indeed are the state boundaries acceptable orwill more of their respective nations have tobe included within them? Much depends uponthe amount of additional land the South Africangovernment is willing to give the new nation-states to make them politically viable.Inevitably greatest attention has been directedtowards the Transkei as the most advancedand most compact of the states involved. Assuch it gives a pointer to the progress of theothers. It is the Transkei which has also beenthe first to develop the idea of state objectivesso far as territorial claims are pursued, and itssuccess in its demands will in large measure befollowed by the other states in formulating theirown. It has been recognised that the states didnot have to be economically viable or indeedconsolidated before self-government, and itseems probable that the same view will be takenbefore independence.36CONCLUSIONThe idea of the nation-state as propoundedin Europe and extended to Africa in the lasttwenty years has had a significant influence ondevelopment in South Africa, The identity ofnation and state, which the South Africangovernment is aiming to create, is to some extentnegated by the large proportions of eachnational group living outside their own area.The realm of speculation and development inpolitical geography is considerable, as rarelydoes a state voluntarily partition itself and eventhen the problems remaining will engage politi-cal study for a long time as the relationships be-tween the new states and their external subjectsare sorted out and the relationship between thestate and its minorities is adjusted. Once createdit remains to be seen whether the new statesof South Africa will cling to their territorialintegrity as rigidly as the past colonial states ofthe rest of Africa have done, or whether balk-anisation with all its connotations of disputerelated to nineteenth century politics will be-devil southern Africa.33REFERENCES1. PRESCOTT, J. R. V. 1970 Geography and Secessionist Movements. Proceedings of the GeographicalAssociation of Rhodesia, 3, 50-6.2. MCCOLL, R. W. 1969 The Insurgent State: Territorial Bases of Revolution. Annals of the Associationof American Geographers, 59, 613-3!.3. POUNDS, N. J. G. 1963 Political Geography. Chicago. McGraw Hill: EASTON, D. 1965 A SystemsAnalysis of Political Life, New York, Wiley, pp. 171-89.4. HILL, G, R. 1964 Bantustans: the Fragmentation of South Africa, London, O.U.P.5. THOMPSON, L. M. 1966 Politics: The Republic of South Africa. Boston, Little Brown.6. 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S. 1963 The Eastern Question. London, Macmillan.37