

South Africa and the Nation State

A. J. Christopher

Department of Geography, University of Port Elizabeth.

The political development of Africa in the 1960s has suggested that secession has not been particularly successful.¹ Some seven or more secession movements have attempted to establish separate states within the last twelve years; they have for various reasons been unsuccessful, but several movements are still extant and model insurgent states exist in several parts of Africa.² Generally, however, the state as inherited from the colonial powers has been recognised by most African leaders as being the unit of sovereignty in the new Africa and attempts to upset frontiers have received the almost universal disapproval of African leaders. The inherited state nevertheless is usually bound together by few ties of language, religion or nationhood, and often has little more than a common colonial experience to share. Consequently the state idea has had to be carefully fostered and a nation built.³

Amongst this background of the development of nation-state concepts of Africa, it is all the more remarkable that a major secession movement has received so little attention.⁴ For, the Republic of South Africa has found wanting the state-idea as applied to its diverse peoples, and so has sought a new concept. The present government has evolved the concept of 'multi-nationalism' whereby the various African tribes or nations within South Africa are being encouraged to develop their own national consciousness and their own state-idea.⁵ Such

nations are based largely on linguistic and at times on historic affinities. Consequently the political advance of the African nations within South Africa towards separate independence is a process which has reached the point of no return.⁶ All the states have the fact of statehood within clearly defined boundaries and a government, composed of executive and legislative, responsible for that territory. Even the external trappings of sovereignty in the form of flags and anthems have been achieved.⁷ However the creation of an identifiable nationhood may be more difficult.⁸

The creation of the new states poses a number of important questions in political geography.⁹ The state-idea may be fostered as it is elsewhere in Africa, but only half the Africans living within the borders of South Africa live within the areas demarcated as the new nation-states. The areas occupied by the nation and by the state are clearly not coincident and problems of identity and territorial claims are likely to be confused. In addition the national areas, as at present defined, are not integral units, as they have many exclaves separated from the main body of the nation either by other African states or by intervening land occupied by non-Africans.¹⁰ Consequently some rationalisation of national boundaries would be desirable, but the boundaries have been remarkably static compared with those in Rhodesia,¹¹ and resistance to the enlargement of the African

area is likely to be strong amongst the European population.

It is therefore desirable to examine the origins of these states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and trace the relationship between the national states being created and the nation they are intended to serve. The recent advance (1963-71) of all the states to internal self-government has highlighted their problems, while the 1970 census of South Africa has for the first time provided a detailed geographical analysis of the African population in its different national groups instead of national totals.¹² It is probable that in the formative years of the 1970s the census will be used in defining national areas and aspirations.¹³ As in the case of all ethnic statistics the census will probably be used cartographically to show different things.¹⁴ The maps presented in this paper have been produced by calculating the percentage of the *total* population belonging to each of the African nations. The European, Coloured and Asian peoples have been grouped together for the purpose as non-Africans. The present method was considered to be impartial with regard to the African national groups and no account is given of the non-Africans whose mutual problems are for the time-being outside the discussion of secession movements.

HISTORICAL SURVEY

Contact between the Europeans and Africans in South Africa began about the year 1736 along the line of the Fish River.¹⁵ The Europeans were cattle farmers, who in seeking new pasturage ventured further and further from Cape Town until they came into contact with the Xhosa. Contact, in the form of mutual border raids effectively halted further European and African expansion for over a hundred years. The Fish River became traditionally the boundary line between African and non-African peoples, although substantial numbers of Africans settled peacefully west of the river.

European expansion continued northwards but was spectacularly accelerated in the 1830s and 1840s in a major movement from the Cape (the Great Trek), which resulted in Europeans settling throughout most of the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal. The European colonists by treaty and conquest acquired vast tracts of land for settlement and effectively confined tribal Africans to restricted portions. In the eastern Cape Province the Xhosa through

a series of major wars were driven back to the Kei River in 1847 and a series of rural 'locations' were established for those who remained in the Ciskei. The remaining land was open for European colonisation. Finally in 1877 the Transkei was annexed to the Cape, but little of it was thrown open to European settlement and most of it became a virtual protectorate. Thus the Xhosa were left in two clearly defined areas.

The other African nations were not so fortunate. The Orange Free State, Transvaal and Natal had been dominated at some stage in the period 1815-40 either by the Zulu monarchy or by the Matabele or by both. In many places the pre-existing population had been systematically decimated. The defeat of both the Zulu and Matabele by the emigrant farmers from the Cape resulted in increased stability within these areas. It was therefore largely the remnants of the tribes which occupied the areas, who emerged from hiding when European control was imposed. There was therefore little resistance to this control, and few large blocks of land outside Zululand and Lesotho were set aside for African occupation.

All the South African states and colonies in the nineteenth century embarked upon a policy of territorial segregation between Africans and non-Africans. The Cape left the Transkei as a protectorate and the Ciskei with well defined African rural areas. The Orange Free State regarded Lesotho as the 'location' for its African population, although a couple of other small areas were set aside for groups who found favour with the Orange Free State government. Natal deliberately established a series of rural locations, where tribal society could survive, but spaced them so that anti-European federations would be difficult to form. In the Transvaal, small areas were set aside but formal rural locations were only established in 1907 at British insistence.

In 1913 the Native Land Act sought to stabilise the African area of the country by recognising the locations established prior to that date and preventing its extension. Furthermore Africans in Natal ceased to be able to purchase land outside the locations. Africans had never been able to purchase land on an individual basis in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Some 9 200 000 ha were scheduled as African. In 1936 this state of affairs was recognised as unsatisfactory, particularly in the Transvaal,

and the Native Trust and Land Act 1936 provided for an additional 6 200 000 ha of European land to be made available for African occupation. Africans in the Cape were further not allowed to buy land outside the African scheduled or released areas. Slight modifications have taken place since 1936, but as yet the total released area has not been transferred to African use.

In 1955 the Tomlinson Commission urged a concerted policy of economic development.¹⁶ This allied with the need to consider the political future of the African resulted in the Government embarking upon a policy of creating separate African states (Table I). Thus in 1963 the Transkei became internally self-governing, and in the following nine years all the remaining African national areas have followed suit and await the final step of independence. The economic problems of national development are great and have been examined elsewhere.¹⁷

Table I
EXTENT OF THE AFRICAN NATION —
STATES 1970

<i>State</i>	<i>Dominant National Group</i>	<i>Area (ha)</i>	<i>No. of parcels of land</i>
Basotho Ba Borwa*	South Sotho	42 827	1
Lebowa*	North Sotho	1 667 901	3
Matshangana*	Shangaan	762 925	4
Swazi	Swazi	444 588	3
Tswanaland*	Tswana	3 708 905	19
Vendaland	Venda	801 541	3
Ciskei	Xhosa	887 282	17
Transkei	Xhosa	3 409 544	2
Zululand*	Zulu	3 070 842	29
TOTAL		14 796 355	81

Source: HORRELL, M. 1970 and 1971 *A survey of Race Relations in South Africa*. Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, quoting official sources.

Allied to the creation of separate African states has been a policy of encouraging and often forcing Africans living in non-African areas to migrate to the African national areas. Thus most districts of the western Cape show considerable decreases in the number of Africans present between 1960 and 1970. In addition considerable shifts in population have occurred within the cities, all of which lie with-

*These names have recently been changed and are now (December 1972): Basuthuba, Quaqua, Leborwa, Mashangana, Boputhatswana, and Kwa-zulu, respectively.

in the non-African sector, and where possible satellite towns within the African national areas have been established.¹⁸ In rural areas the so-called 'black-spots'—African owned land in European areas—are being removed and their occupants are being transferred to land adjacent to the existing African area. Some 469 separate parcels of land covering 155 000 ha are involved. In this manner the government has sought to reduce the number of future exclaves of the African states, and consolidate the European character of the remainder of the country.

THE STATE AND THE NATION

In considering the concept of the African nation in South Africa certain broad divisions occur. Some nations have remained reasonably compact, particularly in the south and west, while others have been scattered as a result of wars in the period 1815-50. Most, however, possess a zone which may be regarded as a core region from which a national identity may be fostered, although in the case of the nations inhabiting the Transvaal this may be comparatively weak and unattractive.

In all cases a distinct state idea or *raison d'être* needs to be created similar to that existing in most other states.¹⁹ The reason for existence as a separate entity is something which must be considered. The South African government has encouraged the creation of separate identities for the various nations by instituting citizenship for all Africans in their own national areas.²⁰ In this manner the government hopes to link the urbanised African in the non-African areas with his own national state, thereby giving a substitute for political rights in the non-African area. Furthermore non-Africans are specifically excluded from the citizenship of the new national states.

The recognition of core areas is sometimes difficult, while some national groups have their core area outside South Africa. Thus the Swazis possess a Swazi national area in South Africa and an already independent Swazi national state ruled by the Swazi king. The South Sotho similarly rule independent Lesotho and the Tswana independent Botswana. In all three cases, however, more of the respective groups live in South Africa than in the existing independent states. Furthermore the maior part of the Shangaan inhabited area lies in Mozambique, although no national movement

has developed among the Shangaans of the Portuguese province.

Additionally some of the distinctions between the various national groups are slight. The Xhosa, Zulu and Swazi all speak closely related languages (Nguni), which are mutually intelligible. The Swazi learn Zulu at school so that linguistically there is little distinction between them and consequently some confusion may have arisen on the Census questions on language. It is in the realm of historical development that the three nations have established separate identities. Other linguistic groupings exist but as yet there is little evidence of interest in pan-Nguni, Sotho movements or other cultural or politico-cultural groupings. Similarly little interest has been shown by Africans within South Africa in those outside, while interest by those outside has mainly been aimed at a complete change in the South African political situation and therefore the abandonment of the fragmentation movement.

Table II

POPULATION OF THE AFRICAN NATION-STATES, 1960-1970

<i>State</i>	<i>Population 1970</i>	<i>Population 1960</i>	<i>Per- centage Increase</i>
Basotho Ba Borwa*	24 691	11 189	120,7
Lebowa*	1 084 277	490 217	121,2
Matshangana*	267 372	125 817	122,5
Swazi	117 845	52 260	125,5
Tswanaland*	884 146	386 264	128,9
Vendaland	264 465	171 421	54,3
Ciskei	523 564	330 534	58,4
Transkei	1 734 116	1 376 616	26,0
Zululand*	2 097 758	1 163 636	80,3
TOTAL	6 998 234	4 107 954	70,4

Source: SOUTH AFRICA 1971 Population Census 1970: Geographical Distribution of Population. Pretoria, Government Printer for Bureau of Statistics.

*These names have recently been changed and are now (December 1972): Basuthuba Quaqua, Leborwa, Mashangana, Boputhatswana, and Kwazulu, respectively.

The nine African national states cover only some thirteen per cent of the area of South Africa. (Fig. 1). They contain a considerable range of populations (Table II). In all cases South African government policy has led to a concentration of the national groups within their own states, and the rise in the population of these areas between 1960 and 1970 has been spectacular. The result has been some high population densities ranging from 24 per km² in Tswanaland* to 68 per km² in Zululand.* One of the most noticeable physical features of the states is their fragmentation with an average of nine parcels of land per state.

However, the nations lie only partly within their own states (Table III). The national homes are clearly least satisfactory for the South Sotho with only 1,6 per cent residing within their own national state and most satisfactory for the Venda who have 66,9 per cent within their own state. The dominant position of the Zulu and Xhosa is high-lighted by the fact that they are both twice as large as any other nation and also larger than the European population of South Africa. At the other end of the scale the North and South Ndebele are both so small in numbers and so scattered in distribution that they possess no national home and constitute minorities in other states. The Xhosa and Zulu nations may be regarded as purely South African, with core areas, national areas and nearly the entire nation within South Africa's borders. The two national states are therefore likely to present the clearest problems and solutions. A second group of nations in the Transvaal illustrates the problems of political fragmentation and dispersal, which are far more serious to the creation of a viable political entity. Finally the three nations whose core area lies outside South Africa, but who have a substantial part of the nation and a national state within South Africa: they present possibly the greatest political problems of relationship between people within and without the Republic's borders.

*Now Boputhatswana and Kwazulu.

Figure 1.




Table III

SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN NATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA IN 1970

<i>Nation</i>	<i>Total number</i>	<i>Percentage in own nation-state</i>	<i>Percentage in other African nation-states</i>	<i>Percentage in non-African Area</i>
Xhosa	3 929 922	55,0	1,1	43,9
Zulu	4 026 082	51,1	1,9	47,0
Swazi	498 704	16,4	6,1	77,5
North Sotho	1 603 530	56,0	6,4	31,6
Tswana	1 718 508	34,9	0,6	64,5
South Sotho	1 453 354	1,6	8,3	90,1
Shangaan	736 978	31,8	21,5	46,7
Venda	357 875	66,9	3,3	29,8
North Ndebele	181 719	—	38,5	61,5
South Ndebele	232 922	—	23,7	76,3
Others	317 965	—	6,0	94,0
TOTAL	15 057 559	41,8	4,7	53,5

Source: SOUTH AFRICA 1971 *Population Census 1970: Geographical Distribution of Population*. Pretoria, Government Printer for Bureau of Statistics.

THE XHOSA NATION

The Xhosa nation numbering some 3,9 million in 1970 is politically the most advanced of the African peoples of South Africa.²¹ The Transkei has a long history of separate local government since 1895 and the greatest degree of compactness of the larger national states.²² However, as a result of the peculiar history of the Xhosa nation it is divided into two sections, the Ciskei and the Transkei, which are taking separate courses to independence.

The historical accident of dividing the Xhosa nation into two states clearly does not conform to the South African Government's aim of creating national states. The split between the two has been criticised and in 1966 the Ciskei Government established a Commission to enquire into the question of union with the Transkei: but such a course was rejected in 1967 and the Ciskei decided to proceed as a separate state.²³ In 1968 the Transkei parliament requested the amalgamation of the Ciskei and the Transkei into one Xhosa state but no action was taken.²⁴ Relations between the two states were strained in 1971 when the chiefs in one district of the Ciskei (Glen Grey) demanded secession from the Ciskei in order to join the Transkei. The demand was not related to Xhosa nationalism and the creation of a greater Xhosa state but to regionalism. The Glen Grey district is inhabited by the Tembu tribe, most of whose members live in the Transkei. The secession movement amounted to no more than the demand that all Tembus should live in one

state. The plebiscite held in the district in October, 1971, showed an overwhelming majority in favour of remaining part of the Ciskei.²⁵ The Ciskeian state showed a remarkable ability to survive and the threat of an *Anschluss* has receded. Clearly the relationship between the two Xhosa states is worthy of geopolitical study, while the problems of regionalism are evidently present, within both states.

The two Xhosa states clearly do not coincide with the extent of the Xhosa nation (Fig. 2). The areas of the Ciskei and Transkei occupied by Europeans contain overwhelming Xhosa majorities. However, the Xhosa are present in considerable numbers throughout the eastern part of the Cape Province and indeed spread beyond their original extent into every province, suggesting that they have supplied a real need in the European sector of the country's economy. Some 370 000 Xhosa are living in the Transvaal. It is the Xhosa who have been most affected by the reduction of Africans in the Western Cape and the Xhosa areas have therefore had to deal with a resettlement problem. Such movements involving an expulsion of recent settlers is common in African states and it is noteworthy that the first such movements are already taking place in South Africa. The Transkei and the Ciskei have, as yet, not claimed the extensive tracts of land occupied by the Xhosa in the non-African sector of South Africa, but the Transkei has claimed the areas of the Transkei alienated to Europeans after

 TRANSKEI
 Ciskei

percentage Xhosa

 ≥ 90
 75 - 89
 60 - 74
 25 - 49
 5 - 24

+++++ Boundary claimed
 by Transkei




Figure 2.

1877.²⁴ Such claims have been raised on historical grounds largely because ethnic claims are still regarded as dangerous in their repercussions and might be uncontrollable.

Within the Xhosa states there is a high degree of homogeneity, although within the Transkei the South Sotho constitute a 3.7 per cent minority. The numbers of non-Africans within the Ciskei and Transkei have been substantially reduced between 1960 and 1970.

THE ZULU NATION

The Zulu national state shows the highest degree of fragmentation of any of the new national units. In part this reflects the deliberate policy of the initial European settlers in southern Natal in the 1840s, who deliberately demarcated small scattered reserves, while the division of northern Natal in 1905 left a greater degree of compaction.²⁵ As a result of political fragmentation the pattern of African settlement is greatly interrupted, although throughout the Province of Natal, the Zulu constitute a majority of the population, except where substantial European and Indian settlement has occurred (Fig. 3). The extreme fragmentation of the Zulu state will undoubtedly lead to a pressing of the demands for more rational boundaries and for a port on the northern Natal coast. The development of Richards Bay may provide such a solution, although land around the Bay is being transferred to the non-African area.

The core area of the Zulu nation as it existed before the Zulu War of 1879 has been fragmented, and unlike the Transkei there is no obvious capital within Zulu territory. Even the tombs of the Zulu kings fell into European hands in 1884 and have only recently been declared part of Zululand. The boundaries of 1879 presented a considerable contraction of the area dominated by the Zulu nation at the height of the Zulu monarchy in the 1820s and 1830s when Natal and parts of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal owed allegiance to its monarch and still regard themselves as Zulu.

The Zulu national state as it exists today provides a core area with 98.1 per cent of the inhabitants classed as Zulu. However, 49.0 per cent of the Zulu nation live outside the national state and severe problems of nation building may be expected. Furthermore nation building on the basis of ethnic and historical affinities is liable to bring the national leaders

into conflict with the non-African sector of the community to a greater extent than the Transkeian government. Zulu leaders opposed the creation of a separate Zulu state until the late 1960s and consequently political development lags behind that of the Transkei, and little has been done to solve the geopolitical problems faced by the Zulu state.²⁷

THE TRANSVAAL NATIONS

The various national groups within the Transvaal constitute a picture of the utmost complexity (Fig. 4). The dispersion of the various tribes of that Province in the period 1815-50 resulted in the scattered pockets of reserves and intermingling of the different nations. The nations represented by national states are small. The north Sotho number only 1.6 million, the Shangaan 0.74 million and the Venda 0.36 million. Their national homes contain 56.0, 31.8 and 66.9 per cent respectively of the national group. All the states contain minorities of varying dimensions but no minority constitutes more than ten per cent of the total. Two smaller groups, the North and South Ndebele, constitute minorities without national homes and some 61.5 and 76.3 per cent respectively live within the non-African part of the Province.

Clearly the emergence of strong national states under these circumstances may be difficult. The states generally constitute poor core areas, while the historical precedents in the Transvaal have been conducive to the creation of the state idea. The scattered nature of the national states, together with the limited economic developments, will present major problems to their governments. Possibly some exchange of minorities such as occurred in the Balkans at the end of Turkish rule may be the solution.²⁸ However, fragmentation is likely to be fossilised by the continuing existence of a rump non-African area. The Shangaan, in particular, present a number of geopolitical problems in their affinity to the Shangaan-speakers in Mozambique, from whom they are separated by the international boundary and the uninhabited area of the Kruger National Park. There is also the interesting contrast in administration in that the South African Shangaan are being encouraged to develop their own individuality, whereas those on Portuguese territory are being encouraged to integrate with the Portuguese nation.

Figure 3.




Figure 4.




Table IV
**COMPOSITION OF POPULATION
OF JOHANNESBURG, 1970.**

<i>Nation or Group</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
African		
Xhosa	81 511	5,8
Zulu	245 258	17,4
Swazi	29 872	2,1
North Sotho	77 604	5,5
North Ndebele	8 155	0,6
South Ndebele	5 438	0,4
Tswana	146 184	10,4
South Sotho	108 190	7,7
Shangaan	57 228	4,1
Venda	31 936	2,3
Others	12 135	0,9
Non-African		
European	482 589	34,3
Coloured	82 551	5,9
Asian	39 312	2,8
TOTAL	1 407 963	100,2

Source: SOUTH AFRICA 1971 Population Census 1970: Geographical Distribution of Population. Pretoria, Government Printer for Bureau of Statistics.

The Transvaal has attracted large numbers of immigrants to the major industrial areas in search of work. The migrants and recent settlers and their descendants constitute a major part of the African population. Johannesburg and the mining and manufacturing regions have attracted a cosmopolitan population whose links with the essentially rural national states is often tenuous (Table IV). The major mining and industrial areas are clearly planned to remain within the non-African area of South Africa. The temporary nature of African residence within these industrial areas is repeatedly asserted by the Government. It is significant that even within the new African towns built outside the main non-African centres, the various national groups are separately housed and national consciousness is encouraged.²⁹

THE TSWANA, SOUTH SOTHO AND SWAZI

Three nations, the Tswana, South Sotho and Swazi, overlap other independent states, where their own nationals live. Under the original scheme of South African political development, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland were envisaged as the core areas for these national groups.³⁰ However, the three states were not incorporated into South Africa and they achieved their independence in the period


1966-8 separate from their kinsmen in South Africa. The results of these actions have been considerable. There are substantial numbers of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland nationals included within the census returns of the three national groups. In all three cases labour is one of the major exports of the countries concerned.

If the figures for the South African national groups are considered, the provision of national homes for all three groups would appear to be inadequate, with only 1,6, 16,4 and 34,9 per cent of the South Sotho, Swazi and Tswana living within their own national states as provided by the South African Government. However, if account of the independent states is taken (and South African planning does appear to have considered them to be part of the general scheme of separate development) then the figures are increased to 39,53 and 54 per cent of the national groups respectively living within either their own independent states or South African national states.³¹ The percentages achieved then approximate more closely to those of the Xhosa, Zulu, North Sotho and Venda.

The introduction of the three already independent states into the political calculations of the new national states must inevitably complicate matters, and relations between the independent states and emerging nationalisms within South Africa need to be considered. Considerations as to whether separate political histories can lead to permanently separate state ideas and states need to be examined.

The South Sotho present the most curious case, as the provision of a national state (Basuthuba Quaqua) within South Africa has been within very confined limits—a mere 428 km² containing 1,6 per cent of the South Sotho in South Africa (Fig. 5). It seems highly doubtful whether Basuthuba Quaqua can claim permanently the allegiance of the South Sotho, with such a small territorial base. Inevitably if a national identity is to be found it will be Lesotho which must provide it. Much of the eastern Orange Free State adjacent to Lesotho is inhabited by South Sotho. Furthermore it was Mosheshoe I, ancestor of the present king of Lesotho, who founded the nation and for a while ruled Lesotho and the eastern Orange Free State. The areas conquered by the Orange Free State government in the 1860s were the best areas of Lesotho and territorial claims

Figure 5.






Figure 6.

would seem possible on both historical and ethnic grounds should be governments in Pretoria and Maseru not continue to co-operate closely.

The Swazi similarly have a poor territorial base in South Africa with only 16.4 per cent of the Swazi nation in South Africa within it (Fig 4d). It would again appear that the Swazi national state is too small to provide a satisfactory national core capable of resisting the prestige of Swaziland. As in the case of Lesotho, the Swazi kings in the last century controlled much of the area occupied by the Swazi nation in South Africa and consequently as Swaziland is still ruled by the Swazi king allegiance to him is likely to be too dominant.

The Tswana nation however provides a completely different picture (Fig. 6). The Republic of Botswana has a population of 648 000 which is smaller than Boputhatswana's 884 000. Clearly some rivalry for the allegiance of the Tswana people within non-African South Africa is likely, as well as more nearly equal contact between Botswana and Boputhatswana. The Tswana core area is fragmented, and largely because the Tswana nation is composed of several tribes it is impossible to state that either of the states has the advantage particularly as there are no striking historical precedents to rely upon. However Botswana has the prestige of prior independence and the likelihood of economic prosperity, which appears at present to be far off in the case of Boputhatswana.³²

These three South African nation states have other problems of a geopolitical nature to face. Boputhatswana in particular is highly fragmented, with parcels of land extending 675 km east-west and 550 km north-south. Such a high degree of fragmentation is likely to make administration difficult and some measure of consolidation must be urgently pressed. The Swazi state is similarly fragmented but owing to its small size this is not so disadvantageous. In the form of minorities both the Swazi state and Boputhatswana contain over thirty per cent of the population not belonging to the dominant nation. In Boputhatswana none of the minorities are particularly large (the North Sotho 7.4 per cent). However, in the Swazi national state the Zulu nation constitutes an 18.1 per cent minority. Neither the problem of frag-

mentation nor minorities affects Basuthuba Quaqua.

In all three nations the problems of relations with their already independent neighbours are likely to increase in importance, although the current co-operation between South Africa and the three independent states is likely to preclude territorial claims for the time being. However, the three national states will have the most difficult task of providing their own distinct *raison d'être*.

PARTITION

The partition of South Africa into a non-African and several African states has advanced to a stage where it would be difficult to reverse. The various national states emerging in South Africa are unlikely to become independent immediately but independence is a matter of time. The Chief Minister of the most advanced (the Transkei) stated in 1971 that he 'was not agitating for independence' but 'we see ourselves for some years to come as still being part and parcel of South Africa'.²⁴ However, the pace of political development has accelerated and lines are being drawn on maps indicating the extent of the various national states. National consciousness and pride amongst the Africans are being fostered. But are the states being created capable of attracting the loyalty of the majority of Africans living outside them? Indeed are the state boundaries acceptable or will more of their respective nations have to be included within them? Much depends upon the amount of additional land the South African government is willing to give the new nation-states to make them politically viable.

Inevitably greatest attention has been directed towards the Transkei as the most advanced and most compact of the states involved. As such it gives a pointer to the progress of the others. It is the Transkei which has also been the first to develop the idea of state objectives so far as territorial claims are pursued, and its success in its demands will in large measure be followed by the other states in formulating their own. It has been recognised that the states did not have to be economically viable or indeed consolidated before self-government, and it seems probable that the same view will be taken before independence.

CONCLUSION

The idea of the nation-state as propounded in Europe and extended to Africa in the last twenty years has had a significant influence on development in South Africa. The identity of nation and state, which the South African government is aiming to create, is to some extent negated by the large proportions of each national group living outside their own area. The realm of speculation and development in political geography is considerable, as rarely does a state voluntarily partition itself and even

then the problems remaining will engage political study for a long time as the relationships between the new states and their external subjects are sorted out and the relationship between the state and its minorities is adjusted. Once created it remains to be seen whether the new states of South Africa will cling to their territorial integrity as rigidly as the past colonial states of the rest of Africa have done, or whether balkanisation with all its connotations of dispute related to nineteenth century politics will bedevil southern Africa.³³

REFERENCES

1. PRESCOTT, J. R. V. 1970 Geography and Secessionist Movements. *Proceedings of the Geographical Association of Rhodesia*, 3, 50-6.
2. MCCOLL, R. W. 1969 The Insurgent State: Territorial Bases of Revolution. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 59, 613-31.
3. POUNDS, N. J. G. 1963 *Political Geography*. Chicago, McGraw Hill; EASTON, D. 1965 *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York, Wiley, pp. 171-89.
4. HILL, C. R. 1964 *Bantustans: the Fragmentation of South Africa*. London, O.U.P.
5. THOMPSON, L. M. 1966 *Politics: The Republic of South Africa*. Boston, Little Brown.
6. The Chief Minister of the Transkei stated that any attempt to prevent the Transkei gaining its independence when he saw fit would lead to his unilaterally declaring his independence, *Eastern Province Herald*, 13. viii.1971.
7. Under Transkei Flag Act of 1966 and Bantu Constitution Act of 1971.
8. FOLTZ, W. J. 1969 Building the Newest Nations. In: KAPERSON, R. E. and MINGHI, J. V. eds., *The Structure of Political Geography*. Chicago, Aldine, 231-5.
9. NIDDRIE, D. L. 1968 *South Africa: Nation or Nations?* Princeton, Van Nostrand.
10. ROBINSON, G. W. 1959 Exclaves. *Ann. Ass. Am. Geogr.*, 49, 283-95.
11. CHRISTOPHER, A. J. 1971 Land Tenure in Rhodesia. *South African Geographical Journal*, 53, 39-52.
12. SOUTH AFRICA 1971 *Population Census 1970: Geographical Distribution of Population*, Pretoria, Government Printer for Bureau of Statistics.
13. BOWMAN, I. 1928 *The New World: Problems in Political Geography*. Chicago, World Book.
14. WILKINSON, H. R. 1951 *Maps and Politics*. Liverpool, University of Liverpool Press.
15. WALKER, E. A. 1957 *A History of Southern Africa*. London, Longmans.
16. SOUTH AFRICA 1955 *Summary of the Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa*. Pretoria, Government Printer, U.C.61.
17. BROOKFIELD, H. C. 1957 Some Geographical Implications of the Apartheid and Partnership Policies in Southern Africa. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 23, 225-47. NEL, A. 1962 Geographical Aspects of Apartheid in South Africa. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 53, 197-209.
18. STACEY, R. D. 1966 Some Observations on the Economic Implications of Territorial Segregation in South Africa. *South African Journal of Economics*, 34, 56-67.
19. HARTSHORNE, R. 1950 The Functional Approach to Political Geography. *Ann. Ass. Am. Geogr.*, 40, 95-130.
20. Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970.
21. STONE, A. 1969 The Transkei: The World's First All-Black State. *The California Geographer*, 10.
22. CARTER, G. M. et al. 1967 *South Africa's Transkei*. London, Heinemann.
23. *Keesings Contemporary Archives*, 12-19, iv.1969, p.23298.
24. *IBID.*, 15-22, v.1971, p. 24601.
25. *Eastern Province Herald*, 22.x.1971.
26. BROOKES, E. H. and HURWITZ, N. 1957 *The Native Reserves of Natal*. Cape Town, O.U.P.
27. HORRELL, M. 1969 *The African Reserves of South Africa*. Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations.
28. PALLIS, A. A. 1925 Racial migrations in the Balkans during the Years 1912-24. *Geographical Journal*, 66, 315-31.
29. HOLTZNER, L. 1971 Soweto-Johannesburg, Beispiel einer Sudafrikanischen Bantustadt. *Geographische Rundschau*, 23, 209-22.
30. LORD HAILEY 1963 *The Republic of South Africa and the High Commission Territories*. London, O.U.P., pp. 94-5.
31. 1970 Populations: Botswana — 648 000; Lesotho — 904 000; Swaziland — 408 000.
32. BEST, A. C. G. 1971 South Africa's Border Industries: The Tswana Example. *Ann. Ass. Am. Geogr.*, 61, 329-43.
33. See ANDERSON, M. S. 1963 *The Eastern Question*. London, Macmillan.

