This article examines the concept tsika from two different points of view, the analytical and the empirical. I attempt, firstly, to elucidate the meaning of the term and its philosophical relationship to the concept hunhu, and, secondly, to explore its relevance to a Kantian understanding of morality. The point here is to show that tsika morality is different from Kantian morality, being tied, conceptually, to social beliefs and practices. I then describe ways in which tsika is conceptualized by teachers and parents and the importance attributed to the teaching of tsika. The case of the education of Tonga children is then outlined and this leads me to conclude that in many instances learning tsika may be an alienating experience for children. Finally, I suggest that the formal qualities of tsika, particularly the fact that the concept can be taught only through an application of itself, may, if over-zealously applied, run counter to the aim of fostering moral autonomy in children. I conclude by suggesting that the concept is best understood within the framework of a utilitarian moral system.
Read
